Religiosity and its Impact on Individual Support for Welfare Spending Over Time

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One of the major traits consistently seen throughout the modern post-industrialized world is the existence of government funded social support and welfare programs. These programs are designed to benefit the poor and less fortunate, typically while taxing the wealthiest portions of the population at higher rates. Among the nations that fit the description of a post-industrialized democracy, there exists a great deal of variation in the degree to which these nations choose to fund these programs. This disparity is in addition to the fact that there are also major differences in the individual level of support for welfare programs seen throughout all of these countries. What this variance represents is one of the more interesting questions concerning political economy at the cross-national level. Understanding this variance in individual level support for welfare spending is extremely relevant for modern society.

With Portugal spending $4,380 per inhabitant while Germany and Luxembourg spending $9,363 and $17,870 respectively, the potential for social and economic impacts as a result of these programs becomes clear (Eurostat, Data Explorer). This disparity is further exemplified by the welfare spending patterns seen in the United States and France. The U.S. spends 16.3 percent of its annual GDP on these programs while France spends 29.7 percent. This disparity is further highlighted by the significant difference at the individual level of support seen in public opinion polls throughout each of these nations. Countries like Japan, Norway and Greece see over 25 percent of the population showing high levels of support for these programs while nations like Sweden and France are below 10 percent (Eurostat, Data Explorer). Ultimately, a great deal of debate exists concerning why
some individuals choose to support welfare programs, while others do not. This research seeks to enhance our understanding of the roots of support for welfare programs. I investigate this phenomenon at the individual level focusing on developed democracies. To develop hypotheses, I draw on several bodies of literature. This includes national factors such as diversity and a nation’s current economic status as well as individual level factors such as political partisanship, education and religiosity.

**Literature Review**

**Political Economy and Welfare Support**

There is the school of thought addressed in the literature that attributes the divergence in welfare spending to learned political ideology and social expectation mechanisms. Concepts such as social mobility, belief in a “just” world, and wealth disparity are considered. For example, Moene and Wallerstein argue that, “…the wider the gap between the income of the decisive voter and the income of the average voter, the greater the incentive for redistribution” (Moene Wallerstein, 32). Meaning that the less likely the average citizen is to be politically decisive the more likely they are to support welfare. They also go on to say that as income inequality increases over time, it results in increased support for redistributive policies. These results come from the logical argument that the public, specifically the median voter, will support policies that they believe will rationally provide them with the greatest overall utility.
Social and Institutional Factors and Welfare Spending

Scholars have analyzed the impact of national or aggregate level variables in order to find what factors tend to have the greatest impact on support for welfare spending. This includes political structure, electoral systems, and demographics. This is exemplified by David Goodhart’s 2004 article, *Too Diverse?*. In this article he argues that increased immigration within the United Kingdom, and the associated increase in diversity, results in a reduction in what he describes as “the national sense of solidarity” (Goodhart, 2004). This specifically refers to the concepts of being traditionally British and appearing as such, a concept that is clearly impacted by ongoing immigration. Furthermore, this alleged loss in solidarity further leads to a significant reduction in the national support for welfare spending. He explains that this relationship is a result of the fact that there is an eroded sense of “mutual obligation” among citizens as diversity increases. Furthermore, Hero and Tolbert (1996) analyze the impact of racial diversity among U.S. states, this research supports Goodhart’s assertion. They find further support through their research, which focuses on racial animosity within the United States. They focused on the impact that diversity has in creating animosity and found that this leads to a reduction in support of welfare spending (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2001, 28-32).

Another aspect of the literature on support for welfare spending focuses on national level factors, which addresses the structure of a nation’s electoral system. Alesina and Glaeser, in 2004, argue that proportional representation systems are more likely to result in a greater degree of wealth redistribution. The obvious
examples to support this argument are seen in the United States’ strict first past the post system versus the highly proportional electoral system seen in Norway and Sweden. Clearly there are a number of national level factors that arguably contribute to the amount a nation spends on welfare.

Some researchers make the argument that it is a wide variety of individual level factors that most directly contribute to whether or not an individual supports welfare spending and social insurance programs. Virtually every factor that informs an individual’s political ideology will also contribute to their opinion concerning welfare spending.

**Public Perception of Wealth, Mobility and Welfare Support**

Thomas Piketty (1995) argues that electorates that have strongly contrasting views concerning welfare spending can attribute this disparity in opinions to the public’s inability to effectively conduct cost benefit analysis of welfare programs accurately. This argument is based on the concept of “dynastic income mobility”. This separates the electorate along traditional left right ideology and uses current income, political ideology, and past experiences to indicate what an individual’s perception is concerning how easy or difficult it is to accumulate wealth. Piketty finds that those who believe that income mobility is possible are less likely to support welfare programs. Lastly, there is the research conducted by Benabou and Tirole (2006). They address the different perceived reasons why an individual has accumulated wealth or is in poverty on a cross-national basis. They propose explanations concerning why most individuals believe in a “just world” and why there is a distinct international variance in this perception. They conclude that the
“American Dream” is “more subtle than a simple yes or no” which is the common public perception (Benabou and Tirole, 2006, 734). Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) also focus on support for welfare spending as it relates to perceived mobility and individual expected gains and losses within a welfare state. This set of researchers focus on how the public perceives welfare spending, economic mobility and opportunity. They are concerned with a number of aspects of public perception concerning welfare spending and social insurance.

**Partisan Affiliation**

One of the more notable individual level factors that has played a role in this area of research is partisan affiliation. This impact was addressed by the 2004 study conducted by James Allan and Lyle Scruggs (2004). One of their primary conclusions is that partisan affiliations still have a significant impact upon welfare spending. They state that, “government by parties of the neo-liberal right since the 1980s (or even since the mid-1970s) has tended to result in greater retrenchment” (Allan and Scruggs, 509). While this study deals with welfare spending, it does so at the national level and does not directly deal with individual opinion. This means that this study has a different dependent variable and deals directly with the national level expenditures on welfare not with individual level of support. However, it does still have individual level implications, primarily due to the fact that national level policies are in theory created as a result of high levels of individual support.

Contrary to Allan and Scruggs, Kittel and Obinger found in 2003 that most political variables do very little to explain any changes in the welfare state of the twenty-one OECD countries. They claim that any significant impacts that would have resulted
from partisan affiliation have no impact beginning in the 1990s. This pattern is further exemplified by the research of Schneider and Jacoby (2005). They focused on a number of individual level factors including partisanship and political alignment. The results were, “The fact that partisanship and ideology continue to have a sharp impact even after prior attitudes are taken into account suggests that political orientations were a major source of observed temporal change in citizens’ preferences about welfare spending” (Schneider and Jacoby, 2005, 375). This illustrates that at the individual level partisanship has a significant impact upon personal preferences toward welfare spending. Ultimately debate still exists when addressing the impact of partisan affiliation and welfare spending.

**Religiosity**

Another aspect addressed by the existing literature is the relationship between religiosity and welfare spending. This more recently addressed issue has generated debate concerning the relationship between these two concepts. What is interesting about this area of study is the distinctly divergent viewpoints. Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004) argue that due to the historically charitable work of churches, religiosity has seen a gradual decline as governments adopt broader welfare programs. Essentially they make the case that increased welfare spending leads to individual secularization. They illustrate that over long periods of time welfare spending has functionally replaced religion and has subsequently caused individuals to leave the church or become secular.

A second study conducted by Scheve and Stasavage (2006) present the counter argument. They hold the viewpoint that “individuals who are religious are
predicted to prefer lower levels of social insurance” (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006, 255). Like Gill and Lundsgaarde, they argue the welfare and social insurance programs are social alternatives to one another, ultimately serving the same purpose. With this purpose being one of social support and safety for individuals when they are in times of hardship. However, they illustrate the point that religion and welfare can be seen as psychological equivalents to one another. What this relationship functionally results in is religious individuals seeking support from the church versus government social insurance programs in times of hardship. Others address the concept of religion as a form of social insurance as well (Dehejia, et al. in 2005). These studies serve as interesting parallels to one another, with Gill and Lundsgaarde claiming welfare has replaced religion as part of the process of industrialization and democratization and Scheve and Stasavage arguing that religious individuals seek to replace welfare spending with a religious practice. Lastly, the Gill and Lundsgaarde stance is somewhat supported by a study conducted by Daniel Hungerman (2005). He looks at whether or not churches are able to serve as an effective alternative to welfare. He does this by looking at the impact of the 1996 welfare reform legislation in the U.S., finding that churches can serve as an effective alternative.

This relatively new field of study, focused on the relationship between religiosity and welfare support relies heavily upon psychological research to support this proposed relationship. Specifically Sheve and Stasavage make the case that religion functions as a social buffer against “uncontrollable external forces”, such as job loss or health issues (2006, 257). They argue that members of a religious
community will view adverse life events differently, due to the fact that they are going to be insulated to a greater degree by religion (Pargament, 1997, 303 and 307). This relationship between these two concepts has been supported by a number of psychologically focused studies (Smith, McCullough and Poll, 2003, 626).

Scheve and Stasavage along with Gill and Lundsgaarde rely on this relationship that has been proposed by the psychological community. However, where their research must be expanded upon is in the presumed relationship between these two concepts.

**Gaps in the Religiosity and Welfare Support Literature**

As noted above, Scheve and Stasavage (2006) argue that “religion and welfare state spending are substitute mechanisms the insure individuals against adverse life events” (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006, 255). Effectively this means that individuals have a derived benefit from being religious that in times of hardship is equated to their derived benefit from social insurance programs. Sheve and Stasavage demonstrate that this relationship exists and is present at an individual level cross-nationally. Yet, what their research does not address is the potential for a temporal relationship between religiosity and support for welfare. This paper is going forward from their research, which addressed the question; does a high level of religiosity at an individual level result in lower levels of support for welfare spending? In this paper I hypothesize that these two will be highly correlated and will show a similar pattern over time at a cross-national level illustrating a temporal relationship between individual levels of religiosity and support for welfare spending. I expect to see that higher levels of religion will result in lower levels of
support for welfare spending. I further predict that over time religiosity will be associated with lower levels of support for welfare and subsequently lower levels of spending.

Ultimately, there are a number of very clear competing schools of thought that need to be addressed. The research conducted concerning religiosity supports the need for further investigation, especially due to the fact that no study had addressed the possibility of a temporal component in this story. Sheve and Stasavage 2006 clearly illustrate that these concepts are highly correlated, providing a strong basis from which to begin research, but again they did not address time as a component. By addressing this gap in the research, I expect to find higher individual levels of religiosity are highly correlated with lower levels of welfare spending and slower rates of growth in welfare spending over time. The possibility of lower levels of support for welfare spending and growth in social programs clearly should have significant impact on any given society.

Analysis and Discussion

Argument's Basis and Hypotheses

While this study will seek to expand upon the existing literature, there are a number of concepts that have been established by prior work that provide a framework for this research. Scheve and Stasavage (2006) established the concept that religion and welfare support provide a similar psychological good that is rooted in an individual's desire for stability. This is due to the fact that religion can be used as a type of psychological coping mechanism for hardships that can be financially addressed by welfare programs (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006, 263 and Pargament,
1997, 307). These studies reference and illustrate an individual’s inability to make the distinction between whether or not something is relevant to their life allowing these two very different resources to function as substitutes.

This relationship between these two concepts illustrates how religious individuals typically use religion to replace the need for welfare programs. What this leads to is individuals lacking the ability to psychologically separate “psychic benefits” from monetary ones (Schève and Stasavage, 2006, 264). The concept that individuals’ view monetary and psychic benefits as separate is further support by existing research. Typically what is seen is that even in countries with highly religious populations, individuals on average give no more than two percent of their income to the church (Hungerman, 2005, Chen and Lind 2005, and Dehjia et al. 2005). This illustrates a clear psychological disconnect between the individuals perceived financial contribution and their actual contribution. Highly religious citizens live with the perception that their donations constitute monetary amounts sufficient to be considered a “direct substitution”, eliminating the need for welfare spending (Schève and Stasavage, 2001, 262). However, as was illustrated when comparing the per capita welfare spending rates of Portugal, Luxembourg, France and the United States as a percent of GDP, the private contributions of individual citizens to religious institutions cannot possibly overcome the disparity in welfare spending as a percent of GDP or per capita. This is due in large part to the sheer volume of investment that goes into welfare spending programs annually in most of these nations. The two percent of an individual’s income that is donated annually
cannot possibly overcome this disparity in the many different levels of federal spending on welfare.

Therefore, what these arguments do is establish a clear basis for considering religion as the primary individual level factor for whether or not an individual supports welfare spending. Bearing these facts and arguments in mind, what individual level factors account for the variance in cross-national level support for welfare spending? The hypotheses and the variables that will be tested are as follows.

**Aggregate Hypotheses and Variables**

The hypotheses used in the research will parallel some of the existing research outlined in the literature review. They address the aggregate level factors such as political alignment or partisanship and education. The aggregate level hypotheses not pertaining to religion will serve as guidelines for control variables at the individual level and in regression models. Lastly, hypotheses one and two below (Figures 1.5 and 1.6) address the primary focus of this research, which is religiosity and will serve as the primary individual level hypotheses for this research.

1. Extensive social welfare programs and high taxes are less likely to be supported by nations that attend religious services with greater frequency (WVS #F028).
2. Extensive social welfare programs and high taxes are less likely to be supported by nations who self identify as highly religious (WVS #V187).
3. Extensive social welfare programs and high taxes will be highest among individuals who are more liberal in political alignment (WVS #E33)

Each of the preceding hypotheses addresses one of the major areas of research concerning individual level support for welfare spending. As an initial look at some
of these relationships, I consider factors that influence national level spending on these programs based off of the existing literature. At the aggregate level I would suspect that country level patterns would mirror that of the individual level. This means that nations with higher rates of welfare spending would be highly liberal on average, creating a positive correlation between the two variables. Concerning education, I would hypothesize that nations with higher levels of education will experience higher levels of welfare spending. Lastly, nations with higher levels of racial diversity will see a negative correlation with welfare spending. Furthermore, when addressing hypotheses that this research focuses on I would suspect the same patterns to emerge at the aggregate level that are present at the individual level.

With that in mind my aggregate hypotheses are.

4. Support for extensive social welfare programs and high taxes will be highest in countries where more individuals have at least an undergraduate level of education or their national equivalent.
5. Support for extensive social welfare programs and high taxes will be lower in nations that have more racially heterogeneous populations.

These hypotheses will be addressed in figures four and five and will continue to be the focus of this research at the individual level.

**Aggregate Level Analysis**

The starting point for this research and data collection was the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development website and their database. From the OECD the national level welfare spending data was collected. For more effective cross-national comparison, multiple forms of data were collected. First was the information concerning welfare spending as a percent of GDP, then welfare
spending per capita. While both measures are effective, the welfare spending as a percent of GDP is the measurement most commonly seen throughout the literature.

![Welfare Expenditure as a% of GDP 2007](image)

**Figure 1.1**

For information concerning national demographics information at the aggregate level, the World Values Survey was used. Specifically this was used to establish the hypotheses concerning the racial heterogeneity of a country. While at the same time being used for what percentage of a country identifies as Catholic at the national aggregate level.

The primary source of data for this research is the World Values Survey, specifically the 1981-2004 waves and the more recent 2005-2009 waves. Multiple waves were used throughout this research in order to address the potential for temporal change. For the first hypothesis the World Values Survey question v114 was used. This question reads, “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the
right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking (World Values Survey, 2005-2008, v114)? For this individuals who self identified as a one or a two on a scale of one through ten were selected, with one being the most liberal. The prediction is that countries where more people self-identified as highly liberal should support welfare spending. This is due to the fact that welfare spending has traditionally been a part of the liberal or socialist political platform.

For the second hypothesis, the percentage of the country’s population that has received at least a bachelor’s degree or higher a higher level of education, was selected for this data, from the WVS. This question addressed the potential impact that education may have on an individuals support for welfare spending and the impact education has on welfare spending as a percentage of GDP. Hypothesis three uses the data from the World Values Survey. This information looks at the percent of the population that is not a part of the racial majority.

Hypotheses four and five both focus on religion. Four addresses the concept of attending religious services while five is concerned with whether or not an individual describes himself or herself as religious. While this may seem redundant, based on the idea that people who attend religious services would logically describe themselves as religious. However, the WVS question used in hypothesis five reads “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are religious?” (World Values Survey, v187). The deliberate exclusion of church attendance in the structuring of this question causes it to more directly address the concept of a religious identity versus religious participation. These two WVS
questions are the focus of the individual level research going forward. They will
serve as the primary independent variables at the individual level.

Aggregate Level Data and Discussion

Going forward with these sources and information sets, an initial round of
simple graphs have been created to test whether or not any immediate patterns
emerge concerning each of the hypotheses. While some of these graphs do have the
same patterns as what was expected, more complex individual level analysis will
need to be used to more effectively answer the hypotheses and address the
individual level focus of this research. All of the graphs and analyses are taking place
at a broad aggregate level and illustrate the patterns that exist in the literature. This
national level analysis is necessary due to the fact that will help effectively frame the
necessary control variables for the individual level. Bearing these concepts and
objectives in mind, what can be learned from the initial scatter plots of these
hypotheses?

The first hypothesis concerns those nations whose populations are highly
liberal has been tested in past research and has shown a consistent positive
correlation with support for welfare spending (Kittel and Obinger, 2003). Using the
OECD measures of welfare and the WVS data for political alignment, I found that
once again this was true (See Figure 1.2). A clear pattern emerges supporting the
idea that liberal political ideology and welfare spending are positively correlated.
Additionally, this shows that people's political preferences at the aggregate level are
clearly associated with policy outcomes related to welfare spending. While this is
not my main hypothesis, it may ultimately prove to be a factor that must be
controlled for. With such a clear positive correlation at the aggregate level, it is possible political ideology could represent a confounding variable during individual level analysis. From here I am able to see that the data being used is in support of the research trends previously outlined in the literature. The subsequent research concerning religiosity and the impact it has at the individual level should follow a similar trend.

While some would make the argument that political alignment or partisan affiliation are in actuality the decisive factor in determining an individual’s level of support for welfare spending, as was discussed in the literature review, this is not the case. Welfare spending is one of many different aspects that are a part of a political parties platform. An individual’s decision to be a part of a particular party may be caused by a number of different issues. This means that just because an individual is liberal or conservative does not guarantee that they will approach welfare the same as the party. Ultimately, partisan affiliation or political alignment do not single handedly decide what an individual's preference is toward welfare, creating a basis for further individual level analysis.

The second hypothesis concerning education shows less of a pattern. It lacks any sort of trend that would illustrate a correlation in either direction (See Figure 1.3). Subsequently, this graph and data set may need to have controls implemented to get at the actual direct impact of education upon welfare spending. Though, as stated above this is simple aggregate level data and does not necessarily mean that no relationship exists at the individual level. However, going forward focusing on the individual level data, I would suspect a significantly different trend to emerge.
Furthermore, the third hypothesis encounters many of the same problems as the second; no clear trend is present when looking at the graph (See Figure 1.4). This may be due to the use of a potentially less effective or less accurate measure of diversity. For this initial test all minorities were lumped together and considered as a single group, that were not a part of a nation's racial majority. Going for the use of more accurate data that takes into account the presence of multiple racial minorities may yield results that are in line with prior works from Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote in 2001 and the article by Goodhart. Going forward from the aggregate level data hypotheses number two and three will have to be adjusted in an attempt to create more accurate measures coming from data that more directly measures diversity and education.

The final two hypotheses focus on different measures of religiosity. Number four, again, focuses on an individual’s rate of attendance of religious services (See Figure 1.5 and 1.6). The percentages used in this measurement was the percentage of a nation’s population who stated in the WVS that they attend church or religious services one or more times per week. The reason that this rate of frequency was selected is due to the fact that these nations and their participation in religious services would broadly qualify as highly religious by most people’s standards. While these measurements are simple assessment against the aggregate level of spending, the presumed negative correlation stated in the hypothesis is clearly upheld by the linear regression in Figure 1.5. There is a slightly positive trend in Figure 1.6, however, this may be due in large part to a number of outliers appearing to skew the trend in that direction. Specifically, Italy, Poland and South Korea can be seen as
outliers. Ultimately, these initial aggregate level models help to frame the individual level analysis and provide a basis for the controls that will be implemented going forward.

**Individual Level Data**

While the national level aggregate analysis is useful in order to frame the discussion of this topic and illustrate that this is a non-spurious relationship, the primary focus of this paper is on the relationship between individual’s level of religiosity and support for welfare spending. As previously shown in figure four concerning religious attendance, there is a strong basis for this hypothesis.

In this section I present the individual level data and analysis. The evidence collected and presented is consistent with my argument and the previously mentioned hypotheses concerning religiosity. Restated they are as follows. Individuals who express higher individual levels of religiosity will be significantly less likely to support welfare spending. Secondly, individuals who express higher individual levels of attendance at religious services will be significantly less likely to support welfare spending. This section will examine these hypotheses and the associated correlations in greater detail. This will be accomplished by showing that these correlations not only exist but also hold consistent when controls for other determinants are applied. The resulting regression models, with and without the control variables, I predict will illustrate a robust relationship between individual levels of religiosity, religious attendance and support for welfare spending. This evidence will be based off of the World Values Survey data collected from 21 OECD post-industrialized democracies. These nations are Australia, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States.

The primary dependent variable addresses the concept of welfare spending as a means of wealth redistribution. The World Values Survey question reads, “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy...Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor” (WVS, V152 in Wave 5). Respondents answered this question on a scale of one to ten with one being not an essential characteristic of democracy and ten being an essential characteristic of democracy. This question serves as the fundamental measure of support for welfare spending in this research. It addresses the structure of welfare programs and the fact that they commonly serve as a means to redistribute wealth and care for the poor in most western democracies. Furthermore, the fact that the question addresses whether or not welfare is an essential characteristic of democracy further serves to facilitate analysis of the nations included in this research.

The second dependent variable focuses on the concept of support for improper or wasteful welfare spending and is based off of WVS responses. This is from WVS question V198 which reads, “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in between. Justifiable: claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled” (WVS, V198 in Wave 5). Respondents were to answer this question on
a scale of one to ten with ten being always justifiable. This question serves as the accurate measure of how an individual’s level of religiosity affects their support for claiming improper government benefits. I would suspect that individuals who have higher individual levels of religiosity will be less likely to support the claiming improper government benefits. This is due to two primary factors the previously outlined in the literature. First is the psychological equivalence between religion and welfare established by Scheve and Stasavage (2006). The second is the morality doctrines espoused by most religious denominations. This ideology is centered on high levels of morality, which results in the perception that those who claim benefits from the government do so in a fraudulent manner. What this second dependent variable does is illustrate another perspective on what I would suspect is ultimately the same pattern, that as individual religiosity increases support for welfare spending decreases.

The independent variables used in this analysis are taken from the WVS and are the primary measurements of religiosity. The first focuses on the importance of religion to the individual, it reads, “For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: religion” (WVS, V9 in Wave 5). Respondents were given choices on a scale of one to four with one being very important and four being not at all important. This variable was labeled religiosity in the regression tables. The second variable focusing on the rate at which an individual attends religious services reads, “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” (WVS, V186 in Wave 5). Respondents were given choices on a scale of one to seven, with
one being more than once a week and seven being never to practically never. This variable was labeled religious attendance. The reason for the use of both of these variables is the fact that they both can serve as effective, yet different, measurements of religiosity.

**Controls**

Based off of the concepts outlined in the literature concerning support for welfare spending and discussed in the aggregate level analysis, a number of control variables were utilized. These variables helped strengthen what was already a strong negative correlation between the different measures of religiosity and support for welfare spending. The controls that are included below are taken from the existing literature and the aggregate level factors addressed earlier. The controls being utilized in this research are:

- **Political Alignment** is a control variable that ranges between 1 and 10 with 1 indicating those who are highly liberal and 10 being highly conservative. This is a highly effective control due to the fact that those left leaning parties and right leaning parties have extensively established their typical attitudes toward welfare spending. Furthermore, since individuals tend to vote along party lines on both economic and social issues, if an individual supports conservative social policies in accordance with their religion then economic ideology should logically follow. It is because of this pattern that I have included this variable in my regressions.

- **Interest In Politics** had respondents assess their interest level on a scale of 1 to 4 with 1 being very interested and 4 being not at all interested. The question read, “How interested would you say you are in politics?” (WVS V95 in Wave 5). The objective of this question and the reason for including it as a control in this study is that it can serve as a measurement for an individual’s knowledge of a subject. For this study the scale was inverted causing 4 to be those who responded as very interested.

- **Size of Town** categories WVS survey respondents based off of the population of the town or city in which they live. This is a control that has not been addressed by the existing literature (Scheve and Stasavage 2006, 281). Previous researchers have suggested that it be addressed as a dichotomous variable however the WVS provides the opportunity for a more accurate assessment. While this variable was not a part of the original literature it is
very useful in the fact that population density may affect how an individual views welfare spending. Respondents were grouped on a scale of 1 to 8 with 1 being those living in towns of less than 2,000 and 8 being cities larger than 500,000.

- Social Class is addressed in the WVS as a subjective measure on a scale of 1 to 5 in which one is high and 5 is lower. This variable is an effective gauge of not only where individuals believe that they fall economically but could by itself be a very predictive variable for support of welfare spending. Therefore, in order to isolate that religiosity is a relevant variable social class must be addressed as a control. This control was not inverted.

- Education is addressed in the question, “What is the highest educational level that you have attained?” and is measured on a scale of 1 through 8, with 8 being University with a degree or higher. Education serves two functions as a control variable. First it is an effective measure of an individual’s long-term earning potential and is a further indicator of social class. Secondly, those who receive higher levels of education are typically assumed to have a deeper understanding of social and welfare spending that may impact their opinion on this subject.

Results and Analysis

With the necessary variables and controls established, the results begin to take shape. The first dependent variable focused on the relationship between individual levels of religiosity and welfare as a redistributive policy. This measurement does present a significant problem due to the fact that there is a very low response rate when compared with the other variables and most other World Values Survey questions. When looking at the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients the correlation is negative when paired with the independent variable of religious attendance. However, this is a fairly weak negative relationship in one and slightly positive in the other with a high probability of error in table 2.1, while table 2.2 represents a much stronger negative relationship (See tables 2.1 and 2.2). When the dependent variable of supporting welfare at the cost of taxing the rich is paired with either independent variable, education appears to be a more significant factor than religiosity or religious attendance. This is arguably due to an
extremely low response rate among respondents to the WVS on this specific question prior to wave five. Among the nations include for this research only 3560 individuals responded to this question and only 930 individuals among the people surveyed responded to both of the primary questions necessary for this regression analysis. Furthermore, all of those respondents were from Japan meaning this information is only applicable to that one nation.

However, these issues concerning Japan and its lack of support for hypothesis one do not in any way discredit the rest of the research. This is due to the fact that Japan has a number of notable differences from the other post-industrialized nations being considered in this research. Most notably, Christianity accounts for only two percent of Japan’s religious population (CIA World Factbook, Japan). Conversely, Shintoism and Buddhism account for 83.9 and 71.4 percent of the nations population (CIA World Factbook, Japan). Note that these two religious groups account for well over one hundred percent, this is because a large portion of the Japanese population identifies as both and actively participates in both of these religions (CIA World Factbook, Japan). So when looking at Japan there style of religious participation is unique both in the religions that are commonly found but also in the number of religions Japanese citizens associate with. This difference clearly illustrate that Japan is an interesting case that should be viewed as separate from the rest of this analysis.

Therefore, the first regression model lends little support to my hypothesis and does not have any broader implications to the other nations included in this research. Conversely, the second model lends some minor support to my hypothesis
and would arguably be strengthened by more a higher rate of response among the surveyed. This assertion is based off of the findings seen when analyzing the second dependent variable, concerning claiming improper welfare benefits.

The results for the controls in both cases are largely consistent with what was expected for the second dependent variable. Those individuals who are more educated or of a higher social class were less supportive of welfare spending regardless of religiosity. The same can be said of those individuals who self-identified as being more conservative. This analysis across my individual level analysis largely mirrors the initial aggregate information outlined previously. All individual level regression models include all of the previously established controls. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 (Original Regression Doc) again report the OLS coefficients for both of the independent variables on the dependent variable of claiming improper government benefits being justifiable. Both of these models illustrate very strong negative correlations with confidence intervals well above 95 percent. While both of these are done without the aforementioned control variables, very little changes when these controls are introduced in tables 2.5 and 2.6. Even with the inclusion of the controls, the findings are still highly significant negative correlations with high levels of confidence. Due to the fact that social class and education were highly correlated in a positive direction (table 2.8), separate tests were run with both of these controls. Therefore, tables 2.5 and 2.6 were done with education, while 2.6 and 2.7 were done with social class. In the first set of tables with the controls including education, none of the control variables have coefficient above 0.001. In table 2.5 none of the controls showed any statistical significance and religious
importance showed a strong negative correlation among the twenty thousand plus observations. Table 2.6 registered education with a P value of 0.001 when compared with the independent variable of religious attendance. What is interesting about tables 2.6 and 2.7 is the fact that social class seems to represent another variable that may have somewhat of an impact on an individual’s support for claiming government benefits that one is not entitled to.

Ultimately, what the second set of models show strong negative relationship between an individual’s level of religiosity and their support for claiming improper government benefits among those living in developed democracies. Meaning that individuals who are strongly religious are particularly unlikely to support welfare spending and even more unlikely to support individuals claiming benefits that they are not entitled to. This shows that among religious individuals the lack of support for welfare may be in part due to the perception that corruption exists in the welfare system and that a few, if not many of the people claiming government benefits, are doing so illegally. This information lends a great deal of support toward my hypothesis.

What is interesting when comparing these two variables is that despite the fact that they are different approaches to conceptually the same issue one has very strong results while the other lacks any strong conclusive evidence. The first dependent variable presents somewhat of an issue due to the fact that the results are inconclusive. The ambiguity and lack of support from this regression is almost definitely a result of an extremely low response rate by comparison to the second dependent variable. With only 3560 respondents across all waves, only 930 of
whom answered all the necessary questions for this study, it is quite possible that high probability rate for education is a result of a smaller sample size. However, these hypotheses are still supported by the second hypothesis to such a degree as to overcome the ambiguity of the first hypothesis. Having shown that religiosity and support for welfare abuse have a strong negative correlation, the temporal component of this research must be addressed.

**Temporal Analysis**

Having just established that there is a strong negative correlation between an individual's level of religiosity and their support for welfare abuse, which was in line with the existing literature (Scheve and Stasavage 2006) the focus of my research now shifts toward the potential for the existence of a temporal pattern. What I would suspect is that in nations where secularization is occurring, meaning that individual levels of religiosity are decreasing, the percentage of individuals that support welfare spending will be increasing. A pattern of secularization should then either be accompanied by or followed by an increase in the support for welfare spending at the individual level. If supported this portion of my hypothesis has clear implications on welfare spending rates within any given nation.

In order to address this potential pattern I will be using the same World Values Survey questions and responses from the individual level analysis. Since countries are surveyed during different years, responses will be grouped by wave. For this the three most recent waves were used. These waves included wave 3, which was from 1994-98, wave 4, which took place from '99-03, and wave 5, which was collected from '04 through 08. The first wave was excluded from this temporal analysis due to
the fact that the WVS did not ask the question concerning religiosity. In order to address the potential for a temporal change four different types of analysis were done with the WVS survey responses.

The first dependent variable addresses the concept of welfare spending as a means of wealth redistribution and is the same as the regression analysis in the previous section. The WVS question again reads, “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy...Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor” (WVS, V152 in Wave 5). Respondents answered this question on a scale of one to ten with one being, not an essential characteristic of democracy and ten being an essential characteristic of democracy. However, problems arise with this variable again due to very limited response rate. Prior to the fifth wave of analysis this question was only asked in Japan during the year 2000. This means that because it was only asked the one time a temporal pattern does not exist. However, there is a related question, which focuses on what a country should do. “which type of society this country you think this country SHOULD aim to be in the future... First statement: A society with extensive social welfare, but high taxes or Second statement: A society where taxes are low and individuals take responsibility for themselves.” (WVS, E067 in Wave 4). Respondents were given a five point scale with one being the first statement in favor of welfare spending as a social goal, while five was related to strong support for statement number two. While this question was only asked in Japan the majority of individuals voiced some degree of support for statement one. 11.3 percent of
respondents answer with a one compared to 7.0 percent for statement two. At the same time 37.7 percent of people gave a two which corresponded with, somewhat closer to the first, this means that 49 percent of those surveyed in Japan felt that their country should strive toward the ideal of more extensive social welfare even at the expense of high taxes.

When the above-mentioned original dependent variable was asked again during the fifth wave in Japan in 2005, strong support for the welfare state persists. During this year 36.5 percent of all individuals gave an eight or higher on a ten-point scale, stating that welfare subsidizes and high taxation were an essential characteristic of democracy. Furthermore, during this time frame 75.6 percent of respondents voiced some degree of support. Lastly, those who expressed that religion was either rather or very important to them decline from 22.3 percent to 19.5. While this piece of temporal analysis lacks a common variable and a large number of respondents from different nations, what exists does lend support. In 2000 the majority of Japanese citizens who were surveyed stated this was an ideal that they support then in 2005 even more people said that they support welfare spending. During this same time frame religiosity decreased in Japan lending some degree of support to my original hypothesis. While these measurements may not be ideal the support is still there and relevant. Going forward with the other variable focused on religious morality, I would suspect to see a similar pattern.

The types of analysis included were based off of the question used for the second dependent variable, “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:
claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled" (WVS V198 in Wave 5). Respondents rate their support for claiming improper government benefits on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being never justifiable and 10 being always justifiable. This version of the dependent variable again should see significantly lower rates of support from religious individuals. Again, this assertion is based off of the morality teachings of most religious doctrines. For this research respondents were group in the following ways.

- Percent of Support, which was those respondent that answered the previous question with a 6 or higher on the scale of 1-10. This assessment measures those individuals who collectively show at least some signs of support for welfare spending.
- Percent Opposed measures the individuals who oppose the idea of welfare spending, leading these individuals providing a response of a 4 or lower to the previous question. Grouping these respondents provides a clear measure of the population that is against welfare spending. I would expect to see nations with an increasing rate of response in this category to those with higher rates of religiosity and lower rates of welfare spending.
- Top Support is the percentage of the individuals who were surveyed and responded with a 10 out of 10, in favor of supporting welfare spending. While this group would admittedly be a small portion of any given society, nations with high rates of response in this category are logically more likely to see growth in welfare spending and I would suspect higher rates of secularization associated with it.
- High Levels of Support addresses the survey respondents who answered with an 8 or higher on the provided scale. While some of these individuals are not the strongest supporters they still are very clearly in favor of welfare spending. This may ultimately represent the most effective measure of the individual level of support for welfare spending versus changing levels of individual religiosity in a temporal comparison. This is logically due in large part to the fact that the percentage of the population providing this range of response is going to be more significant that those in the Top Support category.

With these temporal assessments established, the subsequent results provide an interesting range of results. When analyzing the developed democracies in this study as a collective group each of the assessments seems to support the hypothesis
for temporal change. Again this second dependent variable serves as a measure of how an individual’s level of religiosity affects their likelihood of approving of claiming improper government benefits and ultimately the system as a whole. Between waves 3 and 4 very little changed in the way of religiosity. Those who individually expressed that they were religious dropped by only 0.5 percent from 21.8 to 21.3 resulting in very little change in support for welfare spending and in the case of the percent support measure no change at all (See Figure 3.1). However, the following time from between waves 4 and 5 sees a 1.6 percent drop among respondents in religious importance and subsequently more significant transitions in support for welfare spending. Most notably individuals expressing higher levels of support, an 8 or higher, jumps from 3.3 to 6.7 percent support for claiming improper benefits (See Figure 3.3). Across all three waves there is a 2.1 percent decrease in religiosity and in this measure a 3.4 percent increase in support for welfare. This temporal pattern is further supported by the collective multinational responses when looking at the top support, which increases from 1.4 to 3.5 percent, more than doubling as a result of the 1.6 percent decrease in religious importance (See Figure 3.4). The same pattern exists in this measure when looking at the changes across all 3 waves. The percentage of top supporters jumps from 1.5 in wave 3 to 3.5 in wave 5. This trend is further supported by a gradual decrease in opposition across all three waves (See Figure 3.2). However, this trend is not as strong or seemingly as contingent on the drop in religiosity, but it is still present.

Ultimately, when looking at the nations on a collective basis there is a clear temporal pattern, as individual religiosity decreases support for claiming improper
welfare benefits increases. This illustrates that among religious communities there is strong opposition to claiming improper benefits from the government.

Additionally, this dependent variable suggests that as individuals become increasingly secularized, they become more supportive of the welfare state possibly due to a decreased perception of fraud within the system as previously mentioned.

A number of individual nations lend similarly strong support to the expected temporal pattern. Specifically, Norway and the United States exemplify the expected pattern. In 1990, 15.2 percent of Norwegian survey respondents stated they were religious. This number drops to 10.5 by 2008 and as a result the percentage of individuals expressing support for welfare abuse increases from 1.5 to 5.4 percent (See Figure 3.5). At the same time individuals opposing welfare drops from 96 to 89.2 percent, a decrease of 6.8 percent (See Figure 3.6). All of the other assessments used also lend their support to the temporal aspect of my hypothesis (See Figure 3.7 and 3.8). Similarly, the United States sees a 5.5 percent decrease in religiosity from 1990 to 2006, going from 52.9 to 47.4 percent (See Figure 3.9). During this time the percent of individuals that support claiming improper welfare benefits increases from 6.3 to 10.5 percent (See Figure 3.9). This pattern is mirrored by all other assessments, especially those who responded to the survey with a 10. The top supporters tripled from 0.9 to 2.7 percent of those surveyed (See Figure 3.10). This further supports the pattern that religious individuals are more likely to oppose welfare on not only psychological ground but also moral ground due to presumed fraud.
While this pattern is consistent across all four assessments on a collective basis the same cannot be said when each nation is separated out and assessed on an individual basis. Nations like Great Britain and Japan exhibit the opposite pattern as the collective. In Great Britain there is a 4.8 percent increase in religiosity between 1990 and 2006 but a 3.1 percent increase in high-level support for claiming improper government benefits (See Figure 3.12). Japan’s pattern is subtler with only a 0.7 percent increase in religiosity but a 1 percent increase in support (See Figure 3.12). These countries represent a clear exception of the collective pattern and my temporal expectations.

Another nation that appears to be problematic when it comes to supporting a temporal relationship is Spain. In Spain there is an 8.2 percent decrease in individual religiosity between 1990 and 2007, but this drop is associated with a 3.8 percent decrease in support for welfare (See Figure 3.14). At the same time something interesting occurs in Spain. The percentage of WVS respondents who oppose welfare spending drops from 81.6 percent to 78.8, but during this time there is seemingly constant fluctuations in the opinions of respondents concerning welfare spending (See Figure 3.15). Additionally, the level of religiosity undergoes major fluctuations during this same time period. This means that Spain does not serve to support or undermine my temporal expectations. Similar issues exist concerning France, Germany and Italy (See Figures 3.16 through 3.18). Italy specifically sees little to no change between the wave 3 responses of 1990 and the wave 5 responses of 2005. Religious importance increases by only 0.1 percent, which is effectively no change at all. However support for claiming improper welfare
spending drops from 7.8 to 2.1 percent (See Figure 3.16). At least in the case of Italy the argument could be made that religiosity is not the primary causal factor driving changes in support for welfare spending.

Ultimately, the inconsistency that occurs during this temporal analysis of these nations and their individual respondents raises a number of questions. This is especially true when considering the robust individual level support that has been previously discussed and the fact that collectively there is a notable temporal pattern. In order to address this inconsistency I will engage in a case study using Sweden and Norway. Sweden lacks any temporal pattern concerning a relationship between individual religiosity and support for claiming improper welfare benefits. This may be due in part to an almost constant level of religiosity and religious attendance. While at the same time their close neighbor, Norway, illustrates the strongest temporal pattern between these two variables. The objective of this type of case study analysis is to find a clear distinguishing factor that is the logical source of the variation concerning public opinion on welfare spending, despite the similarities of these two countries.

**Case Study**

The starting point for this case study will be to establish that there are extensive similarities between Sweden and Norway. The commonly held attributes of these countries will enable me to separate certain characteristics from the ones that may be causally related to welfare spending. This will ultimately make it easier to uncover the variable or variables that drive the variation in support for welfare spending.
When comparing Norway and Sweden there are a number of very clear similarities that emerge. Both of these nations are relatively small both in land area and in population. While Norway has a population of just over 5.1 million and Sweden’s is 9.7 million, or about 190 percent of Norway’s, their GDPs are very similarly proportioned (See table 4.1). Norway had a GDP of 282.2 billion in 2013, while Sweden’s was 522 billion, or about 185 percent of the latter’s. Sweden and Norway both have extremely high rates of urbanization with 85 and 79 percent respectively. Lastly, another similarity arises in the fact that both of these nations are largely similar on religious grounds.

Sweden and Norway both have their own national branch of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Furthermore, in each of these countries the Church of Norway and the Church of Sweden are by far the most common religious denomination. In Norway, the Church of Norway accounts for 82.1 percent of the nations religious denomination. While in Sweden, the Church of Sweden makes up 87 percent of the religious population. Both of these churches were also established in the early sixteenth century following the Protestant Reformation. However, one clear distinction exists between these two churches. An amendment to the Norwegian constitution in 2012 effectively severed all ties between their federal government and the previously affiliated Church of Norway or State Church, as it was commonly called (Library of Congress, 2012). While Sweden’s federal government is no longer affiliated with the Church of Sweden, following a similar political move to that of Norway, the fact that Norway made this political and institutional change so recently may reflect a more recent shift in their views on religion. Norway may be
undergoing a more radical cliff shift in their views toward religion, a trend than is
reflect in the temporal analysis.

This factor of state affiliation may lead religious individuals to be more
steadfast in their beliefs, religiously, socially and politically. Subsequently, This
contributes to reduced support for welfare spending. These facts and statistics
illustrate the clear similarities and differences that exist between these two nations
beyond their regional proximity and shared border. However, the time frame for
this shift does not fully explain what may drive the differences in individual support
for welfare spending and the subsequent temporal pattern that exists.

Another noteworthy difference between these two nations exists in their
relationship to immigration and ethnic diversity. In 2012 Sweden saw an estimated
increase of 74672 refugees versus less than half of that for Norway (CIA, World
Factbook, Norway and Sweden). This may contribute to around a five percent
greater degree of diversity. In Norway, those who identify as ethnically Norwegian
make up over 94 percent of the total population, which is over 5 percent higher than
ethnic Swedes in Sweden (CIA, World Factbook, Sweden). These factors play directly
into the research carried out by Goodhart (2004) as well as Hero and Tolbert
(1996).

However, there are a number of very clear differences between the two that
may further explain their disparity in support for welfare spending. First off, despite
their proportional similarity in population and GDP, Norway’s GDP is almost fifteen
thousand dollars higher than that of Sweden. This leads to a surplus of 13.1 percent
in Norway versus a deficit of 2 percent versus GDP in Sweden (CIA World Factbook,
Norway). Furthermore, Norway is able to spend 20.5 percent of its total GDP on welfare versus almost 7 percent more in Sweden. However, what is surprising is that despite that 7 percent difference, Norway spends almost a thousand dollars more per capita on welfare than Sweden (CIA World Factbook, Norway and Sweden). This may be due in part to a remarkably low unemployment rate of 3.6 percent (CIA World Factbook, Norway). This is exceptionally low and may allow them to maintain economic growth to a greater degree than their neighbors. These factors illustrate that even minor economic differences can have a significant impact at the federal level, which can lead to notable temporal changes in growth and support.

Additional religious distinction between these two countries that may explain their variation in support for welfare spending emerges when looking at some of the other patterns of religiosity. Between 1990 and 2006 Norway saw an almost 8 percent decrease in their self-assessment of the religiosity measure previously used in this research. This period was also associated with a 0.6 percent decrease in religious attendance. During this same time period Sweden experienced a 2 percent increase in their religiosity, while simultaneously undergoing a 1 percent decrease in religious attendance (CIA World Factbook, Sweden). Ultimately, what this shows is a lack of a consistent religious trend in Sweden that makes it difficult to assess any temporal relationship between individual religiosity and support for welfare spending.

When these limited differences in religious institutions and behaviors are paired with the clear variation in economic factors, specifically welfare spending per
capita and GDP per capita, it becomes clear why Sweden lacks any distinct trends. Sweden has a larger population that consistently experiences greater fluctuation in its composition. At the same time it appears as though its predominant religion is institutionalized to a greater degree than what is seen in Norway. Furthermore, this illustrates the potential impact that the individual nation’s starting GDP, population, welfare spending and other economic factors can have on the influence of religiosity on welfare spending. This fact would be especially true when considering potential temporal patterns.

**Conclusion**

In this research I have argued that the existing literature, despite its recent shift in focus toward addressing religiosity, fails to engage with the variables of religiosity and religious attendance to the extent that it should. Specifically, the prior literature fails to acknowledge the potential for a temporal pattern. My research addresses this concept. Arguing, if an individual has a high level of religiosity or engages in a higher rate of religious attendance, then one can expect that this individual would be less supportive of welfare spending. This assertion is increasingly accurate when considering the claiming of improper welfare benefits. Furthermore, nations with higher rates of highly religious individuals will see slower rates of growth for their federal welfare programs due to a lack of support.

My empirical evidence clearly establishes this relationship between high levels of individual religiosity and welfare spending, especially when viewing this concept from the perspective of religious morality. This is based off of the regression models previously discussed that lend robust support for this aspect of
the hypothesis. Furthermore, analysis addressing the temporal component of this research illustrates that as a collective these nations exhibit a decrease in religiosity and an associated increase in support for welfare spending over time. However, when viewed as individual nations this relationship does not appear as strong. This may be due to the potential role initial economic conditions play in this system. Meaning that the impact that religiosity has on this temporal relationship in any given individual country may be framed by the existing economic patterns. Another factor that may have played a role in these temporal patterns is the fact that some these nations did not undergo a change in their measure of religiosity.

However, this research is somewhat limited by the existing large N data on the subjects of religiosity and support for welfare spending collected by the WVS. Future analysis of this relationship would benefit significantly from the use of a long-term panel survey. This would serve to eliminate the issues I encountered with dependent variable, which only had valid responses in Japan. Additionally, questions focused on an individual’s perception of welfare would significantly enhance the understanding of religiosity’s impact on support for welfare spending. A panel survey would provide clear continuity and would allow one to see clear transition in an individual’s opinions. This survey would need to assess multiple measures of religiosity in addition to multiple measures of welfare spending. This type of long-term study, paired with the existing information on welfare spending per capita and as a percent of GDP, would be the most effective measures of the influence of individual levels of religiosity on support for welfare spending and its potential temporal impacts.
Furthermore, the concept of religiosity and what effectively causes individuals to be more religious and attend services varies. Future surveys and research should consider the many factors that lead to religious participation. This addition along with question concerning an individual’s perception of welfare would improve upon my research and the existing literature. These concepts for potential future research would overcome many of the barriers that I encountered during my research while increasing the accuracy with which researchers can address the relationship between these two concepts.

Ultimately, this research illustrates that there is a strong relationship between individual levels of religiosity and support for welfare, especially on the basis of a moral argument. My research goes on to support the potential for a temporal relationship between these two concepts and federal levels of welfare spending. Meaning that there are long-term implications that can come out of this research. Specifically, it can serve to inform the leadership of post-industrialized western democracies on how easy or difficult it may or may not be for them to pass different types of welfare policies.
Welfare Expenditure as a % of GDP 2007
Figure 1.2

Highly Liberal v. Welfare Expenditure as a % of GDP
Figure 1.3

Education v. Welfare Expenditure as a % of GDP

% Higher Education vs. Welfare as a % of GDP for various countries.
Figure 1.4

Diversity v. Welfare Expenditure as a % of GDP

Minority % of Total Population vs. Welfare as a % of GDP

Countries plotted include: NOR, POL, LXM, UK, NE, JPN, SWZ, SLV, AUS, IRL, ICL, USA, CAN, CZR, NZ, EST, AST, BEL, FIN, GER.
Figure 1.5

Religious Attendance v. Welfare Expenditure as a % of GDP

% Attend Church at Least Weekly

Welfare as a % of GDP
Figure 1.6

Religious Individuals v. Welfare Expenditure as a % of GDP

% of Individuals who are Highly Religious

Welfare as a % of GDP

SWE  FRC
GER  FIN
SPN  ITL
JPN  NOR
UK  NE
AUS  NZ
SWZ  SLV
POL  USA
KOR

45
Table 2.1: Both IVs with Support for Welfare Spending with Taxing the Rich (Low Response Rate)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>P&gt;</td>
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<tr>
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Table 2.2: Both IVs with Claiming Government Benefits Justifiable

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46
Table 2.3: Both DVs with Religiosity

<table>
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<th>Welfare over Low Taxes</th>
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<th>Government Benefits Justifiable</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>P&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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Table 2.4: Both DVs with Religious Attendance

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<td>Coefficient</td>
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<td>P&gt;</td>
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Table 2.5: Both DVs and Both IVs

|                     | Religiosity | | | | | Religious Attendance | | | | |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
|                     | Coefficient | Standard Error | P>|t| | Coefficient | Standard Error | P>|t| |
| Welfare over Low Taxes | 0.02357 | 0.0439 | 0.592 | -0.0044 | 0.0176 | 0.802 |
| Government Benefits Justifiable | -0.0932 | 0.0122 | 0.0 | -0.0287 | 0.0051 | 0.0 |
Figure 3.1: Combine International Temporal Support for DV#2
Figure 3.2: Combine International Temporal Opposition for DV#2
Figure 3.3: Combine International Temporal High Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.4: Combine International Temporal Top Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.5: Norway Temporal Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.6: Norway Temporal Levels of Opposition for DV#2
Figure 3.7: Norway Temporal High Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.8: Norway Temporal Top Support Levels for DV#2
Figure 3.9: United States Temporal Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.10: United States Temporal Top Support Levels for DV#2
Figure 3.11 Great Britain Temporal Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.12: Great Britain Temporal High Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.13: Japan Temporal Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.14: Spain Temporal Levels of Support for DV#2

![Bar chart showing support levels over years for Religiosity and %Support in Spain.](chart.png)
Figure 3.15: Spain Temporal Levels of Opposition for DV#2
Figure 3.16: Italy Temporal Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.17: France Temporal Levels of Support for DV#2
Figure 3.18: Germany Temporal Levels of Support for DV#2
Table 4.1: Case Study Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>5,147,792</td>
<td>9,723,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>323,802 sq. km</td>
<td>450,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity 1990</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity 2006</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance 1990</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance 2006-08</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denomination</td>
<td>82.1% Lutheran</td>
<td>87% Lutheran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total GDP</td>
<td>282.2 billion</td>
<td>522 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>55,400</td>
<td>40,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes and Revenue</td>
<td>56.8% of GDP</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Surplus/ Deficit</td>
<td>13.1% of GDP</td>
<td>-2% of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Spending as % GDP</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Spending Per Capita</td>
<td>11,435.2</td>
<td>10,517.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>79% of population at 1.2% growth</td>
<td>85% of population at 0.6% growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>94.4% Norwegian</td>
<td>89.3% Swedish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and Internally Displaced</td>
<td>30023</td>
<td>74672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Religiosity measured with WVS respondents who answered that religion was: Rather Important or Very Important.

Religious Attendance measured WVS respondents who said they attend church at least once a week.
Work Cited


<http://esp.sagepub.com/content/16/1/23.full.pdf+html>.