External Influences on Stability in Post-Civil War Democratization

Lebanon and Iraq

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Abstract

Democratization theory and policy has been at the forefront of international political discussion since the end of the Cold War. Different Western nations have participated in “exporting democracy” or interventions and occupations to facilitate the proliferation of democracies around the world. Alternatively, democratizations have also occurred while under the influence of other international actors, such as neighboring authoritarian regimes. Comparing post-civil war democratization in Iraq with intervention by the democratic United States to another case of transition in Lebanon with occupying authoritarian Syria, this paper will expose which regime performed best at facilitating stability and ultimately democratization. While not attempting to make formal policy proposals, the goal of this paper is to challenge pre-existing ideas on what is the most realistic and effective way to spread democracy around the world.

“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” – Albert Einstein
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I. Introduction

Starting with the end of the Cold War, democracy has been dubbed by political scientists as the ultimate regime to strive for and implement worldwide. Looking at Western examples of the United States and many European nations, a convincing argument can be formed in favor of this regarding the civil liberties and freedoms present in those societies. Because of this, much research has been devoted to democratization and the implementation of democracy. Scholars, such as Samuel Huntington and his three waves\(^1\) and Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson with their analysis of inequality,\(^2\) have attempted to explain how and why democratization rises and falls throughout history. Multiple indices have been created in an attempt to quantify democracy on a scale\(^3\) and also the presence of it in individual nations throughout time.\(^4\) Both of these types of scales have a threshold for democracy that must be met through different criteria before a nation can be considered a “true” democratic regime: different institutions and liberal aspects of society and government.

Throughout democratization literature there is a basic assumption that democracy is always the regime type to strive for in comparison to others. Policy throughout the Western world strives for the proliferation of democratic states worldwide. Yet some scholars, such as Loren J. Samons II of Boston University, criticize the public as having a

fundamentally different conception of democracy from its Athenian origins. In line with this questioning of common perceptions, the assumption that democracy is always applicable and best needs to be questioned, not in its entirety, but rather in implementation and timing. Specifically, whether democracy is the correct regime type for a nation immediately after civil strife, and whether the forced implementation of democracy by an external force makes sense if it does not stand the chance of consolidating and sustaining through time. This is not to say that democracy and democratization shouldn’t be the goal, but to allow for the discussion of the most realistic and sustainable form of democratization for each theater, country, and region.

The goal of this paper is to question whether or not the stability provided by an authoritarian regime is necessary for democratic institutions to develop and enable sustainable democracy. Specifically, whether the presence of a dictator is a necessary precursor for sustainable democracy and all of its benefits. Out of this question many more are produced: Is a dictator a natural precursor to democracy? How does one measure stability in a country? In a post-civil war arena, is the stability of concentrated, authoritarian power necessary? Are the institutions created, cultivated, and allowed by a dictator necessary for sustainable development?

Albert Einstein has been quoted with saying that the definition of insanity is “doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.” This can be applied to previous international interventions in the name of democracy. Even though these missions and initiatives have the noblest of causes regarding increasing human rights and

rule of law for the benefit of the people, repeating the same mistakes of those before will not increase the number of democracies around the world, but rather it will increase conflict as the fledging states fail and splinter.

**MENA Case Studies for Foreign Intervention into Democratization**

Democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been a controversial topic of recent that has sparked debate over the compatibility of Islam and democracy.\(^7\) The general consensus amongst scholars is that the religion and the regime type are not mutually exclusive, but rather that a new form of democracy and implementation needs to be created for its survival in the region. Two nations of the region, Lebanon and Iraq, are some of the few who have experienced democratization and have been deemed bulwarks against authoritarianism in recent years. Towards the end of its civil war and following the conflict, Lebanon was heavily influenced by the neighboring Assad regime in Syria. Assad’s connections to Hezbollah in particular are a window into the magnitude of his power and sway over the politics, culture, and institutions of Lebanon. In regards to Iraq, the United States’ intervention and involvement in Iraq’s civil war is well known, as well as praised and critiqued by many. Both nations entered into a period of post-civil war democratization with driving forces internally acting as a catalyst for the movements. These two countries differ not only in the success of the movements, Lebanon remains a fledgling democracy while Iraq’s institutions are deteriorating, but also in the type of international actors involved in their

democratizations. By understanding the affect of an international power on a country’s democratization, we can begin to formulate the best practices to implement sustainable and fair democracies around the world.

**Research and Methodology Summary**

This paper evaluates the influence of different regime types on the process of democratization in post-civil war arenas. The independent variable for this paper is the presence of an international power intervening in each case study’s democratization. The variance of this variable is whether or not the international power is democratic or authoritarian. The dependent variable is whether or not the external power facilitated stabilization in the post-war arena and subsequently whether democratization occurred. It is not intended to be a critique of humanitarian and diplomatic efforts to increase the number of democracies in the world. It is, however, intended to be the beginning of a discussion of what truly is the best course of action to create transparent governments working for their people.

The two cases of Lebanon and Iraq were selected because they are both Middle Eastern countries with relatively recent civil wars that had heavy external influence during and after war. They differ in the regime type of their external actors and therefore allow for the analysis of the different affect these external actors have on the dependent variable of democratization. This comparative study will rely on secondary analysis of statistical reports as well as content analysis of historical records. The literature and reports will focus on democratization, specifically post-civil war, and the histories of Lebanon and Iraq throughout their respective conflicts. It will include scholarly literature, reports done by international organizations, and ethnographies of the respective societies.
Within the stability chapter, different criteria for stability and democracy will be discussed in depth and then used in later chapters to analyze both countries. The criteria were selected from different methodology discussions from think tanks and research organizations around the world, Freedom House for example.

It is important to discuss the limits of this research in a full analysis of the puzzle of post-civil war democratization and international influences. While actively trying to include authors from both Lebanon and Iraq, Western authors will have written the majority of the data and literature used in this study. This paper will contribute to the academic discussion but the limits on research capability are important to mention for an undergraduate thesis relying primarily on other qualitative studies. The merit of this paper lies in the discussion it facilitates about international best practices for aiding democratization around the world. This study could be continued and elaborated upon with more in country studies and the inclusion of different cases from around the world.

**Summary**

At first, this research will cover the field of democratization and its many prerequisites and institutions, as well as how to define security and measure it. Then there will be in-depth discussions of the respective histories of the case studies, their civil wars, the internal and external actors present, and the results of both conflicts. Following this, analysis of the different foreign policies and intervention strategies of Syria in Lebanon and the United States in Iraq will be discussed with the intention of comparing and contrasting the policies of an authoritarian and democratic external influence. The goal of this research will be either to support or deny the hypothesis that the external influence of a foreign authoritarian regime on a country’s post-civil war democratization facilitates
more stability than a democratic counterpart. This paper seeks to argue that in establishing stability for its own goals, Syria indirectly enabled democratization in Lebanon by aiding the establishment of a stable political environment under which certain democratic elements were able to form and consolidate.

The democratization of a country relies on the coalescence of internal and external factors driving towards similar ends. A post-civil war arena provides multiple opportunities for powerful groups to capitalize on division and for international actors to become involved for a multitude of reasons. With both case studies it is important to understand how and why these external factors became involved in their respective conflicts and the impact that they had on the outcomes of both. Did the presence of one create more stability for democratization to occur under? And if so, what does that say for the future of spreading democratic values around the world and the policy of Western nations?
II. Democratization: A Process and a Theory

Defining Democracy

Throughout literature, the definition of a democracy is widely accredited to Joseph Schumpeter in his 1947 study *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. His theory of democracy details that the regime works via institutions that allow individuals to participate in competition for the people’s vote. Working off of his definition and specifically for the sake of this paper, democracy will be defined as a type of government that allows the people to choose rulers through free, fair, open, and competitive elections with more than one legitimate party.

Democratization Discourses

Democratization theories have developed significantly since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. The world watched with a multitude of anticipation and chagrin as many countries around the world transitioned into democracies: a period of time that Samuel Huntington, one of the most well known theorists and political scientists, has notoriously coined the “third wave” of democratization. Huntington’s work swept through the world and has been deemed one of the biggest contributions to the scholarly discussion of democratization. He determines three distinct waves of democratization throughout the world, meaning multiple democratizations in a short period of time, with the most recent occurring in the late 1970s and 1980s following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Huntington’s work is important to all literature on democratization because it attempts to summarize global factors that lead to

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9 Huntington, *The Third Wave*.
democratization, as well as shifts within and immediately around states that lead to democratization.

An interest in how democracies are created and consolidated has led key theorists to take different approaches in analysis. Political scientists tend to think about democratization in broad categories of discussions on economic, political or social causes. One assumption that most political scientists have accepted as truth is that there is a correlation between development and democracy. The variance in such research lies in the measurements of development. Political scientists James A. Robinson and Daron Acemoğlu measured development by looking at economic inequality as a catalyst of democratization.\(^\text{10}\) Adam Przeworski and collaborators also discuss development and democracy but through measures of wealth instead of economic inequality.\(^\text{11}\) Poor democracies have a higher occurrence of democratic breakdown so Przeworski argues that there is political stability in wealthy democracies, which creates a false correlation between wealth and democracy that should rather be attributed to political stability. Neither of these studies thoroughly addresses societal makeup and social factors of democratization.

One of the earliest works analyzing democratization is Barrington Moore’s work on the social origins of democracy.\(^\text{12}\) Acemoğlu and Robinson credit Moore’s work as the precursor to their own argument. He planned out different trajectories for societal makeups and ideologies in relation to development and ideology, but his argument is

\(^{10}\) Acemoğlu and Robinson, *Economic Origins*.


dated and simplifies all democratization into three trajectories with two resulting in dictatorship.

These grander themes of democratization are important to have a basic understanding of for anyone interested in conducting research on the topic. However, these broader theories fall short in applicability because they attempt to answer the huge question of “what causes democratization?” with broad answers that may or may not fit different countries in different situations. Due to the popularity of democratization and the study of it, there have been multiple splinters of the topic focusing on the transition in different contexts. Attempting to contribute to one of these smaller literature sets is more realistic and doable for research on such a vast and complex topic.

**Post-civil War Democratization**

Sonja Grimm provides a definition of what a post-conflict society is: “…societies affected by armed conflicts, where parts of the conflict are dealt with when the warring parties agree upon a ceasefire or a peace-treaty.”


factions and the power balance amongst them that lead towards democratization\textsuperscript{15} and Leonard Wantchekon and Zvika Neeman also look at the warring factions and the citizenry as engaging in a game model with democracy as one of many outcomes.\textsuperscript{16}

Roland Paris focuses on peacebuilding in post-civil conflict countries but forms a similar argument to the one being made in this paper. He argues that previous attempts at peacebuilding have largely failed because it is “an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict.”\textsuperscript{17} The main failure that he points out in peacebuilding practices is the immediate implementation of democracy without acknowledging the “inherently destabilizing side effects.”\textsuperscript{18} Very similar to the argument being made in this paper, Paris’ argument is to rethink the best practices for peacebuilding and to avoid making the same mistakes that were made in the past when liberalization efforts were forced by external powers. Although Paris focuses on peacebuilding, his theory is relevant to this research because it focuses on the “inherent” instability of democracy and peacekeeping efforts and how they can be detrimental if implemented too soon after conflict.

There is a lack of research on external factors of democratization and the impact that they can have on the transition and stability of a post-conflict country. How does an external force influence democratization in a post-civil war theater? More specifically,


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 57.
what impact do these forces have on the establishment of stability? Do these external forces contribute to the establishment of democratic institutions by providing a stable, non-competitive political culture for growth?

**Conditions for Democracy and Factors of Democratization**

Democratization scholars concur that there are prerequisites for a country to successfully and legitimately transition; however, debate is rampant over which factors are vital and necessary for transition to occur. These conditions may be separated into factors that must be present internally within the country undergoing democratization and externally via foreign intervention and influence.

**Internal Institutions**

Seymour Lipset wrote an iconic work in the field of democratization essential for understanding societal aspects of government and regime transitions that allow for consolidation and sustainability. He writes in his introduction:

> Surprising as it may sound, a stable democracy requires the manifestation of conflict or cleavage so that there will be struggle over ruling positions, challenges to parties in power, and shifts of parties in office; but without consensus—a political system allowing the peaceful ‘play’ of power, the adherence by the ‘outs’ to the decisions made by the ‘ins,’ and the recognition by the ‘ins’ of the rights of the ‘outs’—there can be no democracy.\(^{19}\)

Post-conflict countries have the opportunity to enact change and successfully implement different internal institutions that foster democratic ideals and practices. Amongst these institutions are rule of law; civil society and participation; pluralistic, competitive, free, and fair elections; and transparent and public media.

Rule of law creates equality before the law for all citizens with legislation that is clear and well known. Guillermo O’Donnell says that rule of law is democratic when it

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defends the rights of the people, upholds democratic procedures, and reinforces accountability throughout government.\textsuperscript{20} Rule of law contributes to the legitimacy of a regime in the eyes of its people and encourages participation when the population feels more secure in entering into civil society. Lipset says that, “the stability of any given democracy depends not only on economic development but also upon the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its political system.”\textsuperscript{21} Via rule of law and enforcement, individuals feel secure enough to defend their interests and push for more democratic practices. Only with the presence of rule of law can transition gain traction and legitimacy in the eyes of the state as much as those of the people.

The mechanism in which individuals may actively participate in democratization and consolidation is civil society. Graeme Gill defines civil society as “a society in which there are autonomous groups which aggregate the views and activities of individuals and which act to promote and defend the interests of those people.”\textsuperscript{22} Civil society acts as a legitimate middleman between the government and the people. It forms through the collaboration of individuals and civilian participation in organizations that act as a “pressure from ‘below’” on authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{23} The importance of civil society cannot be understated in relation to democratization because it is the driving internal force that instigates transition.

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\textsuperscript{21} Lipset, \textit{Political Man}, 65.
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Participation, not only in civil society, but also in elections is essential for the success of democratization and consolidation. As Samuel Huntington calls them, elections are the “vehicle of democratization as well as the goal of democratization.”

Free and open elections allow the populace to participate in politics and governance, which is the basis of democracy. A key element of the elections must be that they are competitive between multiple parties vying for the same position of power. Independent political parties act as a check on the aspirations of individuals for power and are “much more likely to help sustain democracy and to promote effective governance than the alternative.”

Only once free, fair, open, and competitive elections are in place can a country be considered a full democracy; if one of the qualities listed is not met, then the country may still be considered an illiberal democracy.

Many of the internal factors are linked together and with elections there must also be “fairness in access to the mass media and pluralism in media ownership.”

Public media’s role in democratization creates an informed population that can make a better decision during elections for their own benefit instead of perpetuating preexisting regimes due to misinformation. Patrick J. McConnell and Lee B. Becker say “media tend to be most supportive of democracy in the early, often euphoric, period after the previous regime has fallen, when journalists as well as other citizens are enjoying new-found

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freedoms.”27 The media play a vital role in processes of democratization in spreading information to the masses, inciting action from all, and providing rhetorical support for the existing democratic institutions. The use of social media cannot be understated, particularly in the Middle East. In more recent uprisings and revolutions like those of the Arab Spring, social media has been deemed the catalyst for revolution, coordination, and dissemination of news.28 Internally, rule of law creates a safe space within a country where civil society can flourish and collaborate for democratization. Media acts as a medium for civil society institutions to spread democratic ideas and initiatives amongst the people, and in more recent years social media has become an apparatus for a reciprocal relationship between the people and civil society. Elections and democracy are indistinguishable and the level of participation in and the transparency and fairness of elections speaks to the viability and strength of a democracy.

External Factors

As there are internal institutions that once in place facilitate democratization, there are external counterparts that may act as catalysts for democracy, in that they provoke democratization in another country, as well as driving forces, in that they actively promote democratization in another country. Debate is still rampant amongst scholars as to whether the internal makeup of a nation or the external support or presence is more important for democratization to occur. No single factor alone can be accredited

with being indispensable for democratization; instead they must all be evaluated together to construct an accurate depiction of the transition of a state and how it came about. Some scholars believe that external factors do not fundamentally affect or instigate democratization, but the importance of external factors lies in their facilitation of democratization and support of consolidation.

Laurence Whitehead discusses three ways in which external and international presences may have an influence on democratization in his work *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas: contagion, control, and consent.* Contagion involves the spread of democratic ideals from neighboring regimes, control is the forced imposition of democratization on a nation, and consent is the internal acceptance of the process and willingness of the people and institutions to democratize. His holistic view of internal and external working together is essential for an accurate explanation of democratization. The importance of internal acceptance of democratic values and processes cannot be understated; however, it is clear that international influences and support allow for the strengthening of democratic institutions and sustainable regime change.

An alternative way of regarding international influences is the distinction between “background factors” and “external pressures to democratize.” Background factors are the preconditions of the international environment that either enable or discourage democratization. These can include elements such as timing, for example the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following wave of democratization. External pressures are the

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policies enacted and actions taken by international powers that are focused on shaping the politics of another country. Background factors set the stage for support of democratization and external pressures are the actual acts of international powers to intervene in the transitions of other states.

Sonja Grimm accredits the collapse of the Soviet Union as the spark that caused a shift in international initiatives towards democratization efforts. In her paper “External Democratization after War: Success and Failure” she addresses why more recent attempts at rapid democratization have been less successful than others throughout history. In her discussion she lays out four structural conditions that the external power must address in democratization efforts: the level of socio-economic development, the level of stateness, the existence of a nation, and potential minority conflicts. External actors must engage the post-conflict country undergoing the democratization through “humanitarian aid and welfare, stateness, the rule of law, the political regime and the political community.” These can be achieved through control of armed groups, interim legislature, protection of civilians, building of courts, etc. Her main argument is to caution looking to past democratization efforts as “blueprints” for current plans:

These operations indeed led to successful long-term democratization, but only under the special post-World War II structural conditions, which turned out to be surprisingly favorable for re-democratization. Nevertheless, these structural conditions are not generalizable to all post-conflict situations, and therefore, taking these cases as a blueprint for future democratization efforts is not to be recommended.

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33 Ibid., 535.
34 Ibid., 539.
35 Ibid., 545.
It is a false dichotomy to look at democratization as a process that purely occurs domestically or through international influence. As Whitehead says, “Although there will always be some purely domestic and some exclusively international factors involved, most of the analysis will contain a tangle of both elements.”

Throughout democratization research and the preexisting literature, much emphasis has been placed on the importance of domestic factors. Civil society has gained a lot of recognition, particularly following the recent uprisings of the Arab Spring. The globalized world of today calls for a focus on international influences and the role that they play in domestic politics and transitions. With the end of the Cold War, the majority of Western nations are democratic and their influence and efforts to democratize the world have reached around the globe. For this reason, this paper will focus on international influences on democratization and the effect that they have on stability in country, which as a result affects the viability of institutions to democratize. While external factors have been critiqued as unable to “fundamentally influence democratization,” more research needs to be conducted on them and their actual impact on internal factors of democratization so that going forward nations may implement the best practices to ensure and support efforts to transition in other countries.

**Democracy in the Middle East**

As mentioned before, democratization in the MENA region has been a popular modern topic. Facing unique challenges after the “steady erosion of both the British and French empires in the face of powerful nationalist movements,” democratization in this

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region typically follows revolt against authoritarian leaders or civil conflict. As Francesco Cavatorta writes, “there is very little doubt that in world politics the region is considered to be uniquely authoritarian,” and because of this many scholars focus their attention on the region to understand the anomaly that has stood against the waves of democratization that have swept through the rest of the world. Freedom House’s most recent report *Freedom in the World 2016* ranks only 15% of the MENA region as being “Free” or “Partly Free.” Through their ranking system, Freedom House analyzes “a country or territory’s political rights and civil liberties ratings then determine[s] whether it has an overall status of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free.” The Center for Systemic Peace produces a Polity Scale IV report that graphs the authority trends of countries around the world and most nations in the MENA region fall far below the score of six required to be classified a democracy. As a result the region has no “background factors” as Haynes calls neighboring democratic influences, and instead the cases of democratization in the region are cases of external powers intervening.

This is not to say that there is no hope for the region in terms of increases in civil and human rights and democratization. Many scholars, such as Augustus Norton, see a future for civil society throughout the Middle East, “there has long been little doubt that the regimes in the region are under increasing pressure from their citizens.” It is crucial

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41 Ibid., 2.
42 Center for Systemic Peace, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions*.
to find the most realistic and best way to aid and foster these attempts at democratization so that interventions in the future are successful at developing and sustaining democracy.

**Cases within the MENA region**

Two “potential exceptions” to the authoritarian tone of the region are Lebanon and Iraq.\(^{45}\) They are both cases where international powers intervened in their civil conflicts, as well as their democratizations, and both can be considered democracies albeit fledgling and arguably illiberal.

*Lebanon*

During and after the Lebanese civil war, the neighboring Syrian regime had a large impact on the country through financial and military support for specific factions of the warring parties.\(^{46}\) Lebanon serves as a case study for a post-civil war democratization that was influenced by a neighboring authoritarian regime. Most research focuses on external factors in terms of a democratic environment or a democratic power intervening, but with the persistence of authoritarianism throughout the MENA region it is important to analyze how it is that Lebanon’s democracy consolidated under occupation by the Syrian regime.

*Iraq*

Iraq’s case is slightly more complex because its conflict is more recent in history and less research has been conducted as a result. However, the United States acted as an external force in the country and is the democratic equivalent of the authoritarian Syrian

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\(^{45}\) Cavatorta, “The Middle East,” 81.

regime in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{47} Through methods of comparative politics, the two nations and their respective intervening powers will be juxtaposed in order to uncover how their policies differed and the impact it had on the success of the separate democratizations.

**Summary**

Through a thorough analysis of the political and societal makeup of both Lebanon and Iraq throughout history, this paper will contribute to an ongoing scholarly discussion of what causes democratization at large and what enables democratization in unstable post-civil war settings. Acting as a critique to the commonly held post-Cold War notion that democracy is always the best regime type around the world, it opens up a dialogue for best practices and policies for nations around the world seeking to proliferate democracy. Even though the two countries’ civil wars occurred roughly twenty years apart, they still are similar in violence, foreign involvement, and short-term outcome. What distinguishes them from each other are their long-term outcomes and why one remains a democracy while the other is on the brink of state failure.

Analysis of external factors has largely been lacking in research on post-civil war democratization, compared to internal counterparts, and this paper seeks to rectify this imbalance. While not negating the fundamental importance of internal actors and institutions for democracy, the role of external influences cannot be understated in the global world of today. Civil conflicts of modern times rarely remain a war between countrymen, instead they typically gain international attention at the least and military involvement at the most. An example of this can be seen in the recent Syrian civil war

that, some argue, is more of a proxy war between global powers than a national conflict. So while democratization cannot be imposed on a society that does not have key internal institutions like rule of law and elections, it also cannot occur without international attention and conflicting agendas of regional and global powers. This being so, it is crucial for the leaders of the world to understand how to interact with a state in the throes of post-civil war democratization and exactly what actions to take to facilitate the transition and the consolidation.

The MENA region remains an area of the world far more authoritarian than others, as seen in the Freedom House and Polity Scale data above. As a result, it is important to look at the democratizations that actually have occurred in order to increase the number of them in the future and do so in an efficient and sustainable way. While this region draws a considerable amount of attention from Western scholars, they still do not scratch the surface of the history and complexity of a region that has roots as ancient as human history. The secular nature of Lebanese and Iraqi politics also distinguishes them from their neighbors and will be discussed in this paper. Having a deep understanding of the region and the characteristics of each country will help to extrapolate their conditions and experiences onto other developing nations and help develop theories of development and democratization. What makes these two countries different from their Middle Eastern neighbors does not lessen their validity as case studies, but rather it facilitates a larger discussion in which these two cases may be used in analysis of post-civil war democratization around the world.

Scholars need to know whether an authoritarian international influence or a democratic one has a greater impact on stability because it will enable better policy
decisions in the future; whether that be a decision to intervene or not, or whether to seek assistance from an authoritarian ally in establishing stability. Instead of potentially incorrectly assuming that democracies are the best at installing democracy in other nations, this study will allow for a realistic analysis of how external influences truly help to create stability and ultimately democratization.
II. Defining Stability

Revisiting the hypothesis, that an external influence of a foreign authoritarian regime on a country’s post-civil war democratization facilitates more stability than a democratic counterpart, requires a definition of stability in the context of democratization. Democracy and stability have a relationship that many scholars attempt to cover and due to the breadth of cases and the magnitude of both variables many fall short in contribution. It is important though to address the features of democracy that make it a regime type inherently unstable and competitive; so while democracy is the ultimate goal as mentioned before, it may be more difficult to achieve and implement due to the initial instability it creates. Many questions are formed out of this paradox: What purpose and significance does the presence of stability in a regime have? What role does it play in democratization and consolidation? How can an external influence establish and create stability in another state? This chapter will define stability as it will be used within this paper, outline different theories of stability and democratization, and finally outline the indicators of stability that will be used later in the paper for analysis of the case studies.

Definition

The Oxford dictionary defines stability vaguely as “the state of being stable”\textsuperscript{48} and stable as “not likely to give way or overturn; firmly fixed.”\textsuperscript{49} These only begin to define stability and as it is a term vague in nature, it requires specification as to what type of stability is in discussion. For the sake of this study, stability will be discussed in terms of

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political stability that encompasses legitimacy in the eyes of the people and security capabilities of the state. An argument could be made that economic stability is crucial to include for true stability; however, in a post-civil war arena it is not as important as the ability of the state to protect its people and the resulting legitimacy that it earns from the perspective of its citizens. For the comparison of the two different states in their post-civil war arenas, the focus will be on aspects of their political stability that are profoundly impacted by their respective international influences.

Some scholars focus on individual’s behaviors and the impact that they have on political stability, one of these being Claude Ake from NYU. In his article “A Definition of Political Stability,” Ake claims that all behavior is implicitly political in nature and therefore “political stability is the regularity of the flow of political exchanges. The more regular the flow of political exchanges, the more stability.”

Like many other political scientists that study stability, he focuses on the individual level and the impact of the individual on a nation’s stability. In opposition to this, this study will focus less on the impacts of the individual and more so on the policy decisions of the government and other non-state actors involved in both conflicts. The analysis of this paper will focus on the decisions of governments and the missions that they undertake in the name of democracy.

**Stability and Democratization**

Most scholars make the link of stability and democratization through economic stability. Sirowy and Inkeles’ paper reviews other scholars previous attempts at

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51 See Robert J. Barro. "Democracy and Growth." *Journal of Economic Growth* 1, no. 1
correlating democracy and economic growth. In their analysis they break down the literature connecting the two variables into three categories: conflict perspective, compatibility perspective, and skeptical perspective. These categories are significant for this paper because they can apply to theories of democratization as well. As Sirowy and Inkeles describe, conflict perspective is the idea that an authoritarian regime is necessary for economic growth in terms of the policies such a regime implements. Compatibility perspective holds the opposite: that democracies are just as capable of stimulating and supporting economic growth. Skeptical perspective doubts that there is any correlation between the two at all. Taking these perspectives and extrapolating them out from economic stability to political stability in its entirety, conflict perspective is what this paper is attempting to argue. That the stability of an authoritarian regime is required for policies that stimulate the economy, encourage participation, and enable future growth.

Yi Feng discusses the connections between democracy and political stability. He argued that economic growth and democracy could only be linked because of indirect positive effects of political stability on the longevity of both variables. Feng looks at the interplay of stability and democracy in the case of consolidated and liberal democracies,


53 Ibid., 129-132.
54 Ibid., 132-134.
not those in the post-civil war period or those in conflict zones faced with instability. Instead of looking at consolidated democracies and extrapolating information to different cases and circumstances, this paper will seek to evaluate how external forces influence stability in another country when it is going through an unstable time and transitioning to democracy. In an attempt to answer the question of how a state experiences political stability when it does not have the capacity to establish it itself, this study will look at Lebanon and Iraq and how their respective external influences aided or hindered stability during their transitions.

Many scholars associate stability as an essential prerequisite for democratization and vital for consolidation. One of these scholars being Samuel Huntington who addresses the role of stability in democratization:

One could incorporate into a definition of democracy the concept of stability or institutionalization. This typically refers to the degree to which the political system may be expected to remain in existence. Stability is a central dimension in the analysis of a political system.56

The peoples’ expectations and perception of the regime can help to explain the support a regime receives or the legitimacy it has within the nation and worldwide. The positive relationship between stability and democracy is largely accepted among scholarship on the topic and as a result it is important to include in a discussion of democratization and transition. Through the two case studies used in this paper, the legitimacy of the occupying forces in the eyes of the occupied will be assessed through the opinions of individuals who lived through the wars in both countries through the mediums of memoirs, personal histories and ethnographies. Legitimacy and government

effectiveness, alongside other indicators like rule of law, will act as a measure of stability within both regimes that allow for an analysis of the influence of international actors.

**Internal Stability versus External Stability**

The distinction between these two terms lies in what source is establishing or creating stability. Internal stability is the nation’s government or regime capability of establishing stability on its own and being seen as legitimate by its people. External stability, for the sake of this paper, will be defined as stability that is established by an occupying force or international power. In other words, stability that is created through the presence of a government other than the states’ own. Detailing the difference between the two of these terms is important because the basis of this research is whether or not a foreign power can productively occupy another nation and aid them in democratization. This paper seeks to analyze not only the case studies’ own governments’ capacities to create stability for democratization to occur, but also to analyze how large and crucial of a role their respective occupying forces played.

**Databases on Stability**

In an attempt to quantify stability, many different databases exist to measure attributes of a state that are associated with weakness or with capability. Most of these, like the Center for Global Development’s Commission on Weak States\(^{57}\) and the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index,\(^ {58}\) analyze what makes a state weak and hinders their ability to govern. These are two examples of many different collaborations between the United

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\(^{57}\) Commission on Weak States Working Group, accessed at: https://www.cgdev.org/working-group/commission-weak-states-and-us-national-security

States’ government research programs as well as think tanks in Washington D.C. that are devoted to global development, and this paper by no means seeks to undermine the vast scholarly contributions that they have made to global discussions on development and security strategies. However, while it is necessary to have an understanding of different indices and previous attempts to quantify stability and its many facets, these previous works and others similar to them are limited in their analysis because they fail to include information regarding external impacts by neighboring and international powers. The basis of this paper is to understand what impact foreign regimes have on others going through a democratic transition. Unfortunately, most previous attempts to quantify stability through indices have ignored external influences. In an attempt to measure the impact of the respective external influences on both Lebanon and Iraq, the stability factors chosen to incorporate into this analysis will specifically include elements that can be influenced outside of the transition regime or country.

**Indicators of Stability**

The majority of previous research throughout political science looks at instability and its causes, instead of stability and how it can spread and be sustainably consolidated. As a result, this study will take indicators of instability and look at them inversely. For example, the indices mentioned above look at freedom or the lack thereof as a measurement of instability. Within this paper a factor like freedom will be seen as a tenet of stability and different ways in which a neighboring regime can affect another country’s freedoms will be discussed. One of the previous works that discussed these factors the most in depth is the *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* published by the
Brookings Institution. Their compilation of indicators of instability is categorized into political, security, economic, and social welfare. From the political and security indicators, which are the most important for a post-civil war arena, some listed are: government effectiveness, rule of law, and freedom. As mentioned before, these indicators will be viewed as necessary precursors for stability, and ultimately democratization, and the level of foreign intervention and influence will be analyzed later in discussion of the case studies.

**Government Effectiveness**

The World Bank Group defines government effectiveness in their *Worldwide Governance Indicators* report as:

> perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.

Different variables that they look at when measuring governance are quality of bureaucracy or institutional effectiveness and infrastructure disruption, among others. These variables will be discussed for both case studies when analyzing stability before, during, and after their civil conflicts. Specifically, these variables can be affected by external powers occupying a local government’s territory and exercising different wartime powers. The extent to which external intervention helped cultivate stability through increased government effectiveness will be discussed.

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60 Ibid, 30-32.

Rule of law

In the same World Bank report mentioned previously rule of law is discussed and included in their measurements of governance worldwide. Rule of law is crucial for stability because it is the follow through and enforcement of the policies put in place.

According to the report, rule of law:

… captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.\(^{62}\)

Again similarly to government effectiveness, the World Bank lists out different variables involved in the measurement of rule of law: degree of security of persons and goods by criminal organizations, judicial independence and timeliness of judicial decisions, and trust in police and soldiers. The extent of the relationship of non-state actors or criminal organizations and external occupying forces, whether the judicial process remained independent of other political pressures, and the level of trust the people had in their own police and the occupying forces soldiers will all detail the degree of stability that the external power influenced through occupation and post-war policy.

Freedom

Freedom House creates one of the most widely accepted and accredited databases throughout political science and international affairs in regards to freedom in a country in their *Freedom of the World* reports.\(^ {63}\) For the sake of this paper, it is important to dissect their methodology and look at different aspects of freedom that have a positive or negative affect on stability. In their analysis of political and civil rights, amongst many

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\(^{63}\) Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2016.*
other factors, they research whether there have been free and fair elections with multiple opposition parties and the extent to which the government or non-state actors infringe on personal autonomy. This paper will ask the question of whether or not there is a trade-off between stability and freedom and to what extent a foreign power impacts this.

**Summary**

Stability most often falls along a continuum and is not a concrete concept. When discussing the two case study states post-civil war, the goal of this research is to explain who is on the right path towards stability and ultimately democratization. Defining the “right path” embodies sustainable methods of development for a country and its peoples, and this means policies and actions taken by the government or the occupying power that aid in democratization. Stability for a country is a necessary precursor for democracy; that being said, the goal is not stabilizing political relations but rather creating a climate where democratization may occur and eventually lead to consolidation.

As seen through the different databases discussed, and specifically the World Bank Group’s, there are many different indicators of stability and no set few that are vital in order to quantify stability. In fact, many of them are not mutually exclusive and overlap. Due to this, it is illogical to attempt to appoint a few indicators and use them to quantify stability. Instead, as a better use of discussion and what this paper will do, a few indicators will be used to provoke a conversation on the topic of stability and its effect on democratization. The key factors will be discussed instead of an exact percentage point.

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Different indicators of stability were discussed in this chapter because they will be included in the analysis of both case studies. For the analysis of government effectiveness:

1. the quality of bureaucracy or institutional effectiveness,
2. infrastructure disruption,

Similarly for rule of law:

1. degree of security of persons and goods by criminal organizations,
2. judicial independence and timeliness of judicial decisions,
3. and trust in police and soldiers will be discussed.

Finally, the indicators of freedom:

1. free and fair elections with multiple opposition parties,
2. and the extent to which the government or non-state actors infringe on personal autonomy.

These indicators were chosen because they are the most likely impacted by a foreign or occupying force. They are factors that are the most susceptible to policy changes and to policy that may be enforced externally. Both Syria and the United States’ policies towards Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, will be analyzed to see how they impacted stability through their policies’ effects on these different indicators. Not only the intention behind the policies will be included, but also the actual impact they had on the ground in terms of government effectiveness, rule of law, and freedom.
III. Iraqi Background

Similar to Lebanon, Iraq shares an ancient history of being a part of the Ottoman Empire and then falling under control of a colonial power after the end of WWI. This chapter will cover the relevant modern history of Iraq and subsequent invasion by the U.S. Briefly there will be a discussion of demographics and how the Kurdish people of the north fit into the country’s dynamics and international affairs. Briefly the Sunni insurgency and counterinsurgency operations of the U.S. will be mentioned but then discussed in more detail later in the paper. This chapter serves the purpose of providing a context and historical background to the actors and events that provoked U.S. intervention.

Modern History

A majority Muslim country, Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites showed “a rare sense of solidarity” against the British in the 1920s as rebellions for independence swept across the country. Divisions throughout Iraqi society mainly fell along rural versus urban populations and religious sects: a majority Shiite Arab, an elite minority Sunni Arab, and the Kurdish people of the north. Iraq gained its independence from Britain in 1930 with a representative parliament and admission into the League of Nations. Moving through periods of monarchy and dictatorship, the Ba’athist Sunni elites consolidated their power over the government. By 1958 the Ba’ath Party was in control of the government under Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husain and was moving closer to totalitarian rule.

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67 Ibid, 33.
68 Ibid, 137.
Husain assumed the role of president by 1979 and maintained this position until the U.S. invasion of 2003.

Map 1. Demographic layout of Iraq as of 2011

Husain’s presidency marked a beginning of the erosion of the Iraqi state. While he himself often stoked sectarian rivalries, he also engaged in wars that led to the decimation of the country’s economy and infrastructure. His military undertakings in the region marked him as a threat to U.S. interests; most notably, the Persian Gulf War of 1991. After accusing Kuwait, a neighboring nation, of economic mishandlings with oil and Iraq’s war debts, Saddam invaded and occupied the country before being forcefully

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removed by an international coalition led by U.S. and British troops.\textsuperscript{70} The sanctions imposed on Iraq were held after the war on the basis of “containing the Husain regime” impacted the Iraqi population more than it did the government and resulted in “over sixteen million Iraqis [becoming] directly dependent on some form of assistance.”\textsuperscript{71} Bombings and air raids performed by the international forces led to destruction of infrastructure throughout Iraq which severely impacted their ability to reconstruct after the war.\textsuperscript{72} An economically weakened yet vocally Western-opposed Iraq, and a shift to neoconservative thinking within the new American administration, poised the country for military occupation following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

**Kurdish Nationalism**

Some of the beginnings of U.S. intervention in Iraqi politics have their roots in the northern Kurdistan region where part of the ethno-linguistic group lives. The Kurds are divided across Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, with 3.7 million of them living in the northern region of Iraq and another roughly two million in other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{73} After chemical weapons assaults on the Kurdish population by their own government, the Husain regime, the United Nations Security Council conducted Operation Provide Comfort with American and Turkish troops to “give security and humanitarian assistance” to the Kurds as well as establish a “Kurdish safe haven and no-fly zone” in the northern region of Iraq.\textsuperscript{74} Throughout modern history narratives on Iraq, this is one of

\textsuperscript{70} Abdullah, *A Short History of Iraq*, 145-6.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, 149.
\textsuperscript{72} Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 227.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 19.
the only interventions that is spoken of positively and seen as beneficial for the people and their relations with the West.

**U.S. Invasion and their role in Occupation**

U.S. interest in Iraq has its origins in the Cold War and containment strategy of communism in the Middle East. U.S. backing of the Baghdad Pact, another Cold War coalition with the purpose of containing Soviet and communist influence in the region, led to a shaky coalition between Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Britain, which was short-lived due to the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and the breaking of diplomatic relations between Iraq and the U.S. In support of the new regime that came into power, the U.S. threw aside notions of democracy in Iraq in favor of stability for the next twenty years. With the beginning of the Husain regime in 1979, the U.S. gradually became more and more interested in Iraqi oil and stability and reestablished relations in 1984. Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. intervened more aggressively with the Gulf Wars and eventually with full-scale military occupation in 2003.

On the basis of the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as support for the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, the Bush administration invaded Iraq in 2003. Beginning on March 2003 and lasting for a little more than three weeks their unilateral approach accomplished the mission of ousting Husain and capturing Baghdad. Immediately following the takeover the Iraqi people took to the streets and were welcoming the invading forces and looting the businesses. As Thabit A.J. Abdullah says in his works on the history of the invasion:

76 Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 263.
Given the low numbers of the occupying forces and their obvious lack of interest in policing the country, law and order in the streets quickly unraveled. For the past decade, mounting scarcity due to international sanctions coupled with a callous regime had combined to create a highly unstable situation in the main urban centres. [sic]\(^{77}\)

Immediately after the Husain regime and its security forces were removed from power, Baghdad fell into anarchy with no police force.

By May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the civilian authority of Lieutenant Paul Bremer III was in control of Iraq and the only functioning governing body in the country.\(^ {78}\) They would remain in power until transition to an interim government in 2004 and would enact many controversial policies that will be discussed in detail in this paper in later chapters. The occupation met resistance within the Sunni community due to allegiances with the fallen regime and fear of losing elite status. A Sunni insurgency began in what is called the Anbar Triangle northwest of Baghdad. In 2005, free and fair elections were held in Iraq for the first time and instead of helping to consolidate the interim government’s authority they solidified “fragmentation of the state along ethnic and sectarian lines.”\(^ {79}\) Following the 2006 Askari Mosque bombing in Samarra’ by Sunni militants, a two year long civil war broke out between the two sects of Islam.\(^ {80}\) The fighting escalated and started to morph into an urban insurgency in the streets of Baghdad. As Abdullah words it, “The sectarian strife penetrated state institutions as the embryonic Iraqi security forces came to be divided into

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\(^{77}\) Abdullah, *A Short History of Iraq*, 160.

\(^{78}\) Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 266.

\(^{79}\) Ibid., 287.

\(^{80}\) Ibid., 299.
Sunni and Shi’i sections,” [sic].\textsuperscript{81} By 2007 the fighting had turned entire neighborhoods into battlefields and there were mass outflows of refugees from the city.

**Outcome of Occupation and post-war Iraq**

A counterinsurgency campaign in 2007 that sent a “surge” of troops into Iraq has been credited as a stabilizing move within the country. President George W. Bush sent in an additional 50,000 troops under the new command of General David Petraeus with a completely different counterinsurgency plan.\textsuperscript{82} Along with what has been termed the Anbar Awakening, where many Sunni leaders in the Anbar Triangle agreed to work with U.S. forces towards a cease-fire, 2007 was a pivotal year for stability in Iraq. Different policies of the U.S. government during occupation will be discussed later in this paper but it is important to note that research in Iraq today still remains dangerous and, for most, unattainable.

**Summary**

After independence from the British mandate Iraq was under authoritarian control for decades. The majority of this time was spent under control of the Sunni elite out of which the Ba’ath Party gained power in the 1950s. One of the notorious figures associated with the Middle East in the Western psyche is Saddam Husain who belonged to the Ba’ath Party and consolidated his control of Iraq in 1973. Under Husain, Iraq experienced war and detrimental destruction to infrastructure and their economy, which made it appear weak to foreign powers around the world. Following the events of 9/11 the U.S. occupied Iraq and instituted a foreign government before allowing transition to an Iraqi interim. Following years of instability and another civil war between Muslim

\textsuperscript{81} Abdullah, A Short History of Iraq, 172.
\textsuperscript{82} Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 307.
sects in the country, finally some order was restored to Iraq with a change in U.S. policy and compliance amongst the Sunni elite. This democratization and occupation will be compared to the similar case in Lebanon under authoritarian Syria, serving to answer the question of whether or not a democratic occupational force had the best policies and practices for sustainable democratization.
IV. Iraqi Case Study: ‘Coercive Democratization’ with a Democratic External Actor

Iraq was selected as a case study in order to include an instance of post-conflict democratization that was heavily influenced by a foreign occupying force. The main difference between Lebanon and Iraq lies in the regime type of the occupying forces. While Lebanon’s external actor, Syria, is authoritarian, Iraq’s external influence is democratic, the United States. There has been a plethora of scholarly research done on the Iraq War: its causes, its consequences, its policy, etc. The literature focusing on the specific external aspect of their democratization is much smaller and falls mainly under the work of Laurence Whitehead and David Beetham with few other contributors.  

Whitehead speaks of the democratization project that came about in Iraq after the initial military invasion as a “radical experiment in constitution writing and introduction of multi-party electoral competition.” Both authors write in critique of tactics used by the United States during their occupation and policy recommendations to the fledgling IGC. Coined for the first time in Whitehead’s work and used throughout literature that follows, he dubs the U.S.’s tactics as “coercive democratization” as undermining all previous multilateral and international efforts and promotion of democratization around the world.

Building off of Whitehead’s work, Beetham discusses the inherent issue of forced democratization as counter to the logic of self-determination and therefore doomed from

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85 Ibid., 220.
the beginning. Detailing some of the costs of the occupation and “coercive democratization”, Beetham explains why in his opinion Iraq acts as a warning to the international community of how not to support democratization instead of being the model that the U.S. had hoped for.

This chapter will detail different policies and tactics undertaken by the U.S. forces in Iraq post-2007. By this point in time, the original American claims for weapons of mass destruction had been proven false and the justification for the invasion became one of creating a stable and democratic Iraq. The following democratization policies will be analyzed in this chapter to determine whether or not they helped establish stability in the country and subsequently facilitated democratization to occur. The specific elements of stability that were discussed in the previous chapter will be the basis of analysis. In summary: (1) the quality of bureaucracy and institutional effectiveness, (2) infrastructure disruption, (3) degree of security by criminal organizations, (4) judicial independence and timeliness, (5) trust in police or soldiers, (6) free and fair elections with multiple opposition parties, and (7) the extent to which non-state actors infringe on personal autonomy. All of these indicators of stability have been chosen because an external occupier and their policies can directly impact them. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and display how a democratic external influence may not have the best policies in a post-civil war theater: is a focus on immediate democratization counterproductive because it invites too much competition? Does a democratic actor leading an external intervention create instability instead of stability?

87 Ibid., 445.
88 Ibid., 444.
Government Effectiveness

Stability can be discussed through analyzing the effectiveness of the interim government and governing council, IGC, instituted by the CPA. After 2011 with the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, there was extensive American influence in Iraqi politics and policy decision-making.

Quality of Bureaucracy and Institutional Effectiveness

The framework of the current Iraqi government has its roots in the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) appointed by the CPA in 2004 as an interim government before elections. The IGC was based on sectarian and ethnic identities that were allocated different positions within the council and a certain number of seats each from the total 24. Instead of creating a governing council representative of the people and the societal mosaic of Iraq, the oversimplified sectarian allocations for the seats on the council resulted in deeper divisions between the different communities in Iraq; specifically the dynamics between the Sunni Muslim and the Shiite Muslim communities. With the process of de-Ba’athification under the CPA, which removed the remaining members of Husain’s Ba’ath Party from power, the country’s leadership and bureaucracy was dismantled. In the place of the Ba’athist bureaucracy, the IGC was constructed and appointed to the positions were Iraqis largely from the exile community. The CPA’s choices for these positions essentially created Iraq’s new elite class that would lead to many of its members filling higher positions in government later in their careers, like former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

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89 Abdullah, *A Short History of Iraq*, 164.
90 Ibid., 163.
Al-Maliki’s, and some other members of the IGC’s, preoccupation with maintaining their own positions of authority and power often took precedence over matters of welfare for the state and the Iraqi people. In the case of al-Maliki when he was appointed prime minister of Iraq, he took advantage of the wording of the constitution to seize control of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In the constitution it says that, “the military should not play a political role” yet it also states the prime minister as the “commander in chief of the armed forces.”91 Instead of considering allowing for oversight and an experienced military leader, al-Maliki assumed control of the forces and turned the ISF into a Shiite secret police force.

Another instance of al-Maliki’s grab for power was his focus on keeping power centralized under him instead of dispersed throughout the different provinces. In Section 5 of the Iraqi constitution titled “Powers of the Regions”, only Kurdistan is officially recognized as a region. All other regions are ambiguously left to be “established in accordance with [the constitution’s] provisions.”92 Throughout his tenure there was no attempt to disburse power to the provincial level which would have empowered local leaders and allowed for more of a representative voice for the people of the country. The United States also failed to incorporate this concept of federalism into its planning for Iraq. By embracing the powerful local leaders, whether they be established religious leaders or militia leaders, it could have been a way to encourage elections at a provincial level before at a national level: a way of embracing democratic practices without potentially upsetting the balance at a national level.

92 Iraqi Constitution. Section Five, Chapter One, Article 117.
U.S. intervention in Iraqi politics did not stop with the official transfer of powers to the IGC in 2004. Whether in the form of an increase in military presence, like the “surge” of 2007, or with further diplomatic relations, the United States was forced to intervene in Iraqi affairs because of an obligation that the government felt to the people in the wake of the war that was essentially the U.S.’s fault. As an example the U.S. Ambassador was called to mediate Iraqi politics with the Erbil Agreement following the 2010 elections that halted the government while the new coalition’s (Iraqiya headed by former prime minister Ayad Allawi) legitimacy was called into question. Iraqiya won the majority of seats in the 2010 election and were set to enter into a national unity government with the al-Maliki government.\(^93\)

The formation of the government entered a stalemate in discussions for nearly nine months while the different parties fought over who would fill certain roles and share power with al-Maliki. Only with the intervention and mediation of the U.S. Ambassador James E. Jeffrey was an agreement reached. This agreement still only discussed who would fill what roles and who would be granted amnesty from the de-Ba’athification process,\(^94\) further evidence that the focus was on the power invested in each individual instead of the current state of the country. Mediation between the U.S. supported, Shiite al-Maliki government and other parties, such as the Iraqiya coalition, still required U.S. intervention in 2010: an example of how the government was not set up for sustainability from its inception and still requires international assistance when it comes to sectarian disputes. Instead of establishing an efficient and transparent bureaucracy, the U.S., in its

nation-building experiment, created an government run by ill-fitted, ill-equipped, and hand selected elites, which has not been able to sever ties with its occupier and has ultimately furthered sectarian conflict.

*Infrastructure Disruption*

The CPA had a bureaucratic structure with multiple offices focused on the reconstruction of Iraq after the war; some include the Office of Economic Development, Office of Operations and Infrastructure, and the Project Management Office which led most of the reconstruction initiatives following the transfer of power. The U.S. had an opportunity to devote its resources towards fixing some of the infrastructure directly impacted by U.S. operations during the war, and also improving Iraqi quality of life to higher than pre-war levels. Unfortunately, this opportunity was not seized and the reconstruction efforts did not result in dramatic improvements for the citizens of the country. More often than not the spending was directed towards military capabilities while large swaths of the country went without electricity.

Iraq’s legitimacy as a fledgling new republic “depended on its delivering services to the people; so the less electricity people received, the less legitimate was the state” in the opinions of the Iraqi people. A report done by the United State’s Government Accountability Offices in 2009 on the status of Iraqi reconstruction stated that not only had U.S. reconstruction budgets been drained but also the Iraqi government had only

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spent 24% of their own budget on reconstruction efforts. The lack of spending was accredited to the violence and sectarian strife that was still an obstacle to reconstruction and a shortage of skilled labors. The report goes on to talk of U.S. State Department attempts at cooperation with the Iraqi government to enhance their budget capabilities in face of the security threats, but these still resulted in electricity generation falling short of the demand in the country. In 2008, the daily supply still only met 52% of the country’s demand and this equates to roughly 10 hours of electricity daily. By 2011 this figure had only risen to 56%, much lower than the government’s goal of 10% above demand. Joint U.S.-Iraqi development and reconstruction efforts were not effective and were not valued above defense spending. Within the 2012 Iraqi budget, $14.7 billion was allocated to defense while only $5.6 billion was allocated to electricity. An argument can be made that the deteriorating security situation in Iraq calls for a higher percentage of funding allocations, but in a country that deals with temperature extremes and a citizenship that equates electricity with legitimacy, the funding for infrastructure development should be higher and should be highlighted by U.S. authorities.

**Rule of Law**

Stability can also be analyzed through the interim judicial powers, the Higher Judicial Court and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. The heavy reliance of these new and young Iraqi institutions on U.S. counterparts in the CPA was cut short with the swift removal of forces in 2011.

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98 Ibid., 52.
100 Zaid, *The Struggle*, 179.
Tribalism has a long history in Iraqi societal organization and has seen shifts in the late twentieth and twenty-first century with many people relocating to urban centers and metropolises. As a response the violence and instability of the country during the 2003 war and the outbursts of sectarian violence since, Iraqi society has once again focused around tribal identities and strong local leaders who provide protection from rogue militias and non-state actors such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The anthropologist Hayder al-Mohammad spent time in Basra, most recently in 2009, and wrote that he was struck by “how many Iraqis have become reliant on their tribes due to the lack of any state apparatus to protect them and their families, homes and lands.”

The importance of the tribes is that they were a secondary group of elites that replaced the federal powers as a figure of authority at the local level. Instead of empowering these leaders, often times the government would undermine their authority in order to keep the power centralized in Baghdad.

The tribes most often aligned along sectarian divisions and were rooted in religious traditions. The most significant support given to the tribes in Iraq during U.S. occupation was the Anbar Awakening of the 2007 “surge” tactics. An event that happened more as a coincidence in timing with a change in U.S. tactics than actually being orchestrated by the U.S. military officials, the Sahwa al-Anbar (Anbar Awakening)

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102 Ibid., 29.
103 Ibid., 31.
took place under the leadership of Sheik Abdul Sattar Abu Risha al-Rishawi. Revival of the sheik’s leadership council due to increasing tyranny by AQI in the region allowed for U.S. leaders to have a counterpart to communicate and negotiate with. Aligning and cooperating with the Sunni tribal leaders of the Anbar province, the U.S. was able to remove al-Qaeda as a heavy military presence in the region.

The impact of this strategic alliance goes far beyond the removal of a terrorizing non-state actor and has been criticized as empowering the Sunni leaders above other sects throughout the country, particularly the Shiite regions in the south. Creating a majority Sunni police force in Anbar after the U.S. withdrawal, the area was further alienated from other security groups around the country. Many of the Anbar tribesmen who stepped into formal security positions under the “surge” refused to enter into the ISF because they viewed it as “agents of the Sadr militia” (Shiite). Instead of alleviating sectarian tensions, the U.S. supported Awakening cannot be blamed for an increase in sectarian tensions, but did result in separate security forces throughout the country and harboring resentment in future government coalitions that would often stagnate the countries political entities. Foreign affairs analyst Steven Simon discusses the failures of the “surge” strategies aimed at empowering Sunni officials:

The United States’ bottom-up strategy is also worsening sectarianism. For many Sunnis, reconciliation means restoration -- not inclusion in power-sharing arrangements but regaining control of the state. Instead of discouraging this mindset, the evolution of the surge into a bottom-up operation has validated it, fostering the impression that Washington has at last recognized that its strategic

105 Ibid., 131.
interests lie with the Sunnis. As the Sunnis see it, the current U.S. strategy is a policy of organizing, arming, and training them to challenge Shiite supremacy.\footnote{Steven Simon, "The Price of the Surge—How US Strategy is Hastening Iraq’s Demise," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 87 (2008): 57.}

Any attempt to incorporate tribes or militias into security operations needed to be a more comprehensive program for all sects. Instead of staunching sectarian conflicts the U.S. tactic and military alliance with the Sunni sheiks of Anbar resulted in further Sunni-Shiite tensions.

\textit{Judicial Independence and Timeliness of Decision-making}

Judicial independence from other government branches is essential for democratization in order for the government to be ruled by law and for enforcement to occur. Out of CPA policy the Higher Judicial Council and Central Criminal Court of Iraq were established and staffed by local Iraqi judges and lawyers. Immediately following the 2003 war, the fledgling institutions were backlogged and overburdened by the amount of detainee cases.\footnote{Stuart W. Bowen Jr., \textit{SIGIR Quarterly Report}, 2010, 80.} Many of the country’s experienced lawyers and judges were removed under the de-Ba’athification order, leaving the judicial branch in U.S. control to be transfer prematurely to less experienced Iraqis in 2004. Medhat al-Mahmoud was a prominent judge in Iraq and was selected to be chief justice on the Supreme Court under the CPA. He was originally praised for his independence from the IGC but quickly developed a relationship with al-Maliki that questioned his role as an impartial judiciary. One example of this questionable relationship occurred in 2011 when a court ruling was overturned after a high-profile meeting between al-Mahmoud and al-Maliki.\footnote{Zaid, \textit{The Struggle}, 133.} The decision had been to ban a number of electoral candidates due to de-Ba’athification laws.
and association with the Sunni party but that they were still allowed to contest the outcome of the election. Not wanting any hitches on his maintenance of power, al-Maliki pressured al-Mahmoud to reverse the allowance of contestation of election results in order to silence any potential Sunni opposition.

The vast majority of the criminal cases that the Iraqi judicial institutions oversee are on detainees from sectarian militias and terrorist non-state actors convicted during outbreaks of fighting. Due to the alliances of these detainees with some of the more anarchist and terrorist organizations, many of the judges and lawyers associated with their trials became victims of violent acts. Between 2003 and 2008, 39 judges were killed who were serving on detainee cases. In the SIGIR report on Iraqi reconstruction of 2011, al-Mahmoud claimed that the security of judicial officials was becoming one of the biggest obstacles to justice in Iraq.

While the HJC has been reasonably successful in hardening facilities such as courthouses and housing complexes against terrorist assaults, judges and their families remain vulnerable to attacks when they travel to and from work. He also cites multiple instances of gunmen opening fire on judges and lawyers in and around Baghdad. Due more to corruption and misjudgment by Iraqi officials than U.S. policy, the problems within the judicial branch of Iraq stem more from coercive interactions with the U.S. backed elites, like al-Maliki, and the increasing security threats to judicial officials.

**Trust in Police or Soldiers**

the war, due to the complete deconstruction of the existing police force under Husain, the
new recruits made many mistakes that led to a lack of legitimacy later on. Following the
2005 constitution, al-Maliki as prime minister took advantage of the wording that made
him “commander in chief” of the armed forces, essentially making the ISF his own Shiite
fighting force.\footnote{Zaid, \textit{The Struggle}, 10.} In 2008, the Iraqi government and the U.S. government signed two
military agreements: the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and the U.S.-
Iraq Security Agreement (SA).\footnote{Trevor A. Rush, "Don’t Call It a SOFA-An Overview of the US-Iraq Security
Agreement," \textit{Army Law.} (2009): 34.} The SFA focuses on a long-term relationship between
the two countries and the SA laid out a timetable for full U.S. withdrawal from Iraq,
which occurred in 2011. The GAO report done by Gene L. Dodaro mentioned above also
covers improvements, or lack thereof, in the ISF and the U.S.’s role in them. He details
some of the largest obstacles to improvements in the forces and what the two security
agreements between the two countries are working towards: the lack of a single unified
force, sectarian and militia influences, continued dependency on U.S. and coalition
forces, and leadership shortages.\footnote{Dodaro, \textit{Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq}, 29.} Under control of al-Maliki, the ISF has largely lost
legitimacy in Iraq. Through human rights atrocities, like armed suppression of protests
and detainee abuse, the security forces in Iraq rule by fear, not by law enforcement.

Following provincial elections held in 2013 and while the votes were being
counted, multiple different Sunni protests broke out throughout Iraq, most notably in the
Hawija and Kirkuk areas.\footnote{"Iraqi Sunni protest clashes in Hawija leave many dead," \textit{BBC News}, (2013),
available at: \url{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22261422}} These protests are controversial because they were violently
attacked and resulted in hundreds of deaths. The Sunni communities throughout the

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Zaid, \textit{The Struggle}, 10.
\item Trevor A. Rush, "Don’t Call It a SOFA-An Overview of the US-Iraq Security
\item Dodaro, \textit{Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq}, 29.
\item "Iraqi Sunni protest clashes in Hawija leave many dead," \textit{BBC News}, (2013),
\end{enumerate}
country supported the protests against the al-Maliki government as they claimed discrimination on the basis of their religion. What makes this conflict important is that this was the first time since the 2007-8 sectarian fighting that the ISF used force against civilian protests.\textsuperscript{115} Through these protests it is clear to see that by 2013 the al-Maliki government and the ISF were largely associated with Shiite sects and the Sunni opposition was beginning to form and organize protests. Instead of helping to restore the peace within Iraq, the ISF under al-Maliki’s control stoked sectarian divisions in the country.

**Freedom**

One of the most basic tenets of democracy is freedom and how it dictates individuals’ rights. Looking at how the U.S. supported or undermined political and social freedoms in occupied Iraq will aid in the discussion of security and democratization. Within a post-civil war theater, freedom can be one of the most controversial topics because it raises the argument of stability versus competition. In a post-war setting, stability is needed for the consolidation of democratic institutions, yet the basis of democracy is competition amongst different parties representative of the mosaic of ideologies within a nation. The friction between these two ideas makes imposed democratization difficult and likely to fail.

**Free and Fair Elections with Multiple Opposition Parties**

Free and fair elections act as the vehicle for democratization as well as the defining feature of a democracy: because of this the timing of elections and the competition among parties can negatively impact genuine attempts at democratization. If

\textsuperscript{115} Zaid, *The Struggle*, 141.
an election is held too soon after conflict then the divisions that drove the conflict can carry over onto the ballot and fuel a divided government instead of an inclusive one. Iraq under U.S. occupation is an example of how ethno-sectarian rifts from a civil war can carry through to elections and impact the governmental and societal cohesion for years afterward.


The fundamental flaw in the approach adopted by the CPA was that instead of having wide consultations with and reaching out to, most sections of Iraqi society, it limited its engagement to a narrow group of pro-U.S. political leaders, which resulted in the CPA’s failure in ushering in an inclusive political process.

By focusing on leaders who supported U.S. interests in the country and were not anti-Western leaning, the CPA neglected many different groups throughout Iraqi society; most notably at the time of the 2005 elections were the Sunnis. Representation in the appointed Iraqi leadership who took over power after the transition from the CPA was almost wholly pro-American exile leaders. Through de-Ba’athification and a Sunni protest of elections in 2005, the religious sect and its corresponding political parties were largely left out of politics and continued to feel disenfranchised. For the first time the Sunni minority was out of control of politics and the Shiite and Kurdish communities were

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116 Mumtaz, Strategic Studies XXX, no. 1 (Jun 30, 2010).
117 Ibid.
more involved than ever before. Instead of 2005 elections leading to inclusive
democracy, they aided in the continuation of deep sectarian political rivalries and
detrimental competition.

Another mistake made under the CPA was the halting of local elections and the
appointments of hand-selected mayors and administrators.\textsuperscript{118} Larry Diamond, a leading
scholar of democratization, was consulted by the CPA for reconstruction in Iraq and the
drafting of their constitution in 2005. Since then, he has come out with multiple works on
the policy mistakes made by the U.S. government during reconstruction.\textsuperscript{119} One of his
critiques on the tactics of the CPA is that they did not focus on local elections and may
have rushed into national elections before the country was ready for them. The merits of
postponing national elections, and focusing on smaller regional or provincial ones, are
that it allows time for militias to be demobilized, new moderate parties to form, and
electoral infrastructure to be created.\textsuperscript{120} He critiques Bremer’s tactics in postponing all
elections in Iraq:

more so out of fear that holding early local elections would undermine the CPA’s
insistence that national elections were impossible to organize any time soon,
Bremer vetoed or reversed plans by many local CPA officials to hold direct
elections (using such rough-and-ready means as the food ration-card system) for
municipal and town councils.\textsuperscript{121}

This resulted in a lack of consultation with the majority of the political spectrum and
ruined the opportunity for local leaders to gain experience and potentially develop more
moderate parties.

\textsuperscript{118} Mumtaz, Strategic Studies.
\textsuperscript{119} Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 19.
In a turn around from 2005 electoral lack of participation, Sunni participation in the 2010 elections was much higher and resulted in an Iraqiya (Iraqi National Movement) majority win of seats in parliament. Voter turnout overall was up to 62.4% by 2014.\textsuperscript{122} Another example of al-Maliki’s close ties with the judicial branch of the government is seen in the 2010 Supreme Court ruling that allowed for a post-election coalition between his party and the INA so that he had the right to form the government.\textsuperscript{123} While the country remains very divided between its major political parties: al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, the Shiite Sadrist party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), etc.; the State of Law coalition remains in hold of a majority of seats in parliament (92) and therefore in charge of forming the government. Even though his grabs for power with the Supreme Court ruling of 2010 demonstrate his unwillingness to allow other parties into the upper echelons of the Iraqi government, al-Maliki did step down in 2014 to allow a fellow member of his party, Haider al-Abadi, to assume the role of prime minister.\textsuperscript{124} So while there are still loopholes in the Iraqi government that allow the consolidation of power under one party, it is promising to see a call for his removal and al-Maliki actually stepping down as prime minister. This however does not alleviate the sectarian divisions that the state of Iraq faces.

\textit{Extent to which Non-state Actors or Government Infringe on Personal Autonomy}

One of the largest obstacles to freedom, stability, and ultimately liberal democracy in Iraq is the presence of terrorist non-state actors such as ISIS. The birth of such organizations have been blamed on U.S. policy miscalculations, such as de-

\textsuperscript{122} Mumtaz, \textit{Strategic Studies}.
\textsuperscript{124} “Maliki gives up Iraq PM job to rival,” \textit{Aljazeera}, 14 Aug. 2014.
Ba’athification and the disbanding of the army in 2004,\textsuperscript{125} and more often than not grow out of other militant organizations with a longer history in the region, such as AQI. Benjamin Isakhan describes in detail the correlation between CPA orders and the growth of Islamic extremist organizations:

The CPA’s de-Ba’athification programme therefore failed to heal old wounds, marginalized well-trained Sunni Arab security personnel and drove an ever widening political wedge between Sunni Arab interests and the Shia Arab-dominated government in Baghdad. In 2014, the consequences of this could not be clearer: ISIS—who are the direct descendants of AQI—were able to capitalize on popular Sunni Arab dissatisfaction with the al-Maliki government to take over large swaths of the country and threaten to destabilize the region. \textsuperscript{[sic]}\textsuperscript{126}

Capitalizing on the sectarian conflicts that took over Iraq in 2007-2008 and led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ISIS grew exponentially in numbers and increasingly directed their efforts towards destabilizing the new Iraqi state.\textsuperscript{127} With the spillover from the Syrian crisis, ISIS has created a stronghold in the northern provinces of Iraq and continues to terrorize the Iraqi population living there, regardless of what religious sect they may belong to. From the period of May to October of 2015, the UN reports an estimated 10,911 civilian casualties from the ongoing violence.\textsuperscript{128} The report goes on to talk about the impact that the terrorist organization has not only in their violent killings and abductions, but also about the indirect ways in which they interrupt Iraqi life such as displacement of families and inadequate access to resources.


\textsuperscript{126} Benjamin Isakhan, \textit{The Legacy of Iraq}, 226.

\textsuperscript{127} Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.”

While U.S. hesitancy to intervene in the fight against ISIS within Syria and Iraq is understandable given the intense criticism that the government received for the 2003 invasion, ISIS is a completely new enemy that threatens not only Iraqi stability but also the stability of the entire region. The U.S.’s misguided policy may have led to the disenfranchisement of Sunni Muslims in Iraq, but the continued support of the al-Maliki government perpetuated the problem instead of helped to alleviate it. With a new era in Iraq politics under the al-Abadi government, it is an opportunity for the U.S. to more effectively assist in the fight against terrorism and Iraqi democratic development.

**Summary**

The purpose of this chapter was to discuss and display how a democratic external influence may not have the best policies in a post-civil war theater, especially in comparison to an authoritarian peer. Most of the work done by the CPA and the interim government under American tutelage did much more harm than it did good for the sake of Iraqi democratic development. The de-Ba’athification process completed destabilized the existing Iraqi bureaucracy down to the lowest entry levels of civil servants. The replacement of these skilled officials with sect-based appointments to the IGC did not help to create a national identity but furthered divisions. Power remained centralized under al-Maliki’s government and no attempts were made to empower officials and politicians at the provincial and local levels. The U.S. in its nation-building attempt created a weak state that still requires international intervention today into its elections and government building.

Joint U.S.-Iraqi development and reconstruction efforts were not effective and were not valued above defense spending. An argument can be made that the deteriorating
security situation in Iraq calls for a higher percentage of funding allocations, but in a
country that deals with temperature extremes and a citizenship that equates electricity
with legitimacy, the funding for infrastructure development should have been higher and
should have been highlighted by U.S. authorities. Instead of helping to alleviate sectarian
tensions in Iraq in 2007, the American “surge” was viewed as empowering Sunnis over
Shiites and furthered religious and tribal divisions throughout the country. The judicial
councils put in place by the CPA are overburdened and backlogged by detainee cases and
their officials are lacking independence from the executive branch of the government.

Speaking of trust in police in Iraq is a difficult topic because very little faith has
ever been placed in the security forces. Especially following al-Maliki’s seizure of the
forces and their subsequent abuses of power and rule by fear, the Iraqi police are not
trusted by the people and not seen as a legitimate, benevolent force. The elections
following the war were heavily influenced by U.S. intervention because many of the
candidates were selected based on their pro-Western leanings. The CPA also failed to
encourage local elections over national and preferred to keep power central over a
government that they could control through their candidates. While not alleviating any of
the sectarian divisions in politics, it is promising to see al-Maliki step down after a public
demand for him to do so. One of the largest obstacles to freedom is the continued
presence of ISIS as a non-state, terrorist actor in Iraq. With arguments linking the birth of
the organization from previous terrorist organizations such as AQI and de-Ba’athification
policies, the U.S. must admit some level of responsibility for the establishment and
continued terror campaign of the group. Ultimately, the U.S. failed to facilitate
stabilization in post-civil war Iraq. In a mishandled attempt at nation-building, the U.S.’s
attempt at “coercive democratization” failed and led to the current failing state of Iraq that is succumbing to regional terror campaigns and splintering along sectarian divisions. While the intentions of the U.S. campaign in Iraq post-2004 may be called honorable in that they attempted to establish democracy and facilitate stabilization, they ultimately failed because their policies were not the best practices for establishing stability and allowing for democratization.
V. Lebanese background

Similar to its neighbors, Lebanon has a rich history branching from Ottoman rule to French colonial mandate to twentieth century independence. This chapter will begin with Lebanese independence from the French in 1943 and provide a background of the political environment leading up to civil war. The basis of this paper is an analysis of Lebanese-Syrian relations and the beginnings of this discussion will fall within this chapter but will be covered much more extensively in future chapters. Lebanon was chosen as a case study because it is an example of post-civil war democratization with a foreign authoritarian intervener (Syria). The outbreak of fighting and the multiple different groups involved in the conflict will be explained in an approachable and understandable way because grasping the multiple actors at play is vital for understanding the conflict. Syria’s role and its objective with entering Lebanon will be discussed in depth and how it affected the outcome of the conflict. Finally, post-war Lebanon will be discussed briefly in comparison to the demographics and political environment before the beginning of the conflict. This chapter, and the previous covering Iraq, serves the purpose of providing enough background to understand how international intervention affects stability within the country at war.

Modern History

Lebanon gained independence from France in 1943 with “two founding texts:” the written constitution and the verbal and informal National Pact.\textsuperscript{129} The constitution acted to lie out the powers invested in each official government position, such as the president and prime minister, and how they would act as a check on one another. The

National Pact was more of an agreement on the country’s identity and how to correctly and fairly divide up the political roles between the different religious sects.

Part of the problem with understanding Lebanese demographics is that the most recent census data was collected in 1932. Based off of this data Lebanese society looked like this: 227,800 Maronites, 178,100 Sunni, 155,035 Shiite, 53,332 Druze, and other minority groups.\(^{130}\) It was from this data that the National Pact delegated top national positions. This can be problematic though, in many majority or plurality Muslim countries, because of differences in birth rates and how significantly these demographics can change from generation to generation. For this reason, there have been many calls for another census in more recent times, but Lebanese officials who do not wish to disturb the current governmental organization stand in strong opposition.

The top roles were assigned as follows: “a Maronite [Christian] president, a Shi’i speaker, and a Sunni prime minister,” [sic].\(^{131}\) Also, as a way to appease the different calls from Muslims for union with Syria, a neighbor with similar colonial legacies, and from Christians for closer ties to the Western world, the National Pact defines Lebanon as a “country with an Arab profile that assimilates all that is beneficial and useful in Western civilisation,” [sic].\(^{132}\) Out of these two founding texts the roots for future sectarian violence were planted and clear divisions within the new Lebanese society were sown.

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\(^{132}\) Ibid., 110.
Following independence there were separate periods of Christian and Muslim superiority in government and civil society. One that is pertinent to this paper and specifically the beginning of a deeper relationship between Lebanese Muslims and the Syrian government is Shihabism in the 1960s. Fu’ad Shihab was the Maronite president of Lebanon whose policies of moderation and religious harmony in the country successfully survived a political coup led by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in support of a Muslim government in Lebanon. Unfortunately, both Maronites and Muslims alike

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found Shihab’s policies to be too tolerant and they did not last beyond his presidency. The Muslims who viewed Shihabism as “Maronite autonomism” rejected the strong executive power that he had constructed during his time in office. The Christians reacted by claiming that the state had a “bias toward Muslims and [had] increased state intervention in society.” Unfortunately the failure of Shihabism in the 1960s set the stage for even further sectarian divisions within Lebanon and, in hindsight, was a catalyst for Syrian intervention in the coming years.

**Entry of the PLO**

The Palestinian population in Lebanon had been growing steadily from the 1950s on. It was mainly with the entry of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) into Lebanon that the dynamics between the groups became politicized and sectarian.

At some point between January 1965, when the first Palestinian commando crossed from Lebanon into Israel, and 'Black September' 1970, when tens of thousands of Palestinian guerrillas fled from King Hussein's army into Lebanon, the political balance between Palestinians and Lebanon changed profoundly.

The arrival of the Palestinians has been argued, and blamed by many Lebanese themselves, to be one of the main causes of the collapse of Lebanese sectarianism and the beginning of civil violence. The vast majority of Palestinians are Sunni Muslims, roughly eighty percent, and they tipped the demographic balance in the country enough to agitate already disenfranchised Maronite groups, such as the Phalangist militias. The PLO largely occupied southern Lebanon where the majority was Muslim and created the

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137 Ibid., 243.
region into “a battlefront for years to come.”\textsuperscript{138} Previous Christian presidents, such as Camille Chamoun, were sympathizers of the Palestinian cause until they began to see them as “part and parcel of a Soviet-sponsored Arab nationalist threat to Lebanon’s very existence.”\textsuperscript{139} This Arab nationalist threat was associated with Syrian ambitions in the region and contributed to even further separation between Christians in support of an independent, Western-leaning Lebanon and Muslims in support of Syrian unity.

**Militias and Outbreak of Fighting**

The Christians in Lebanon had formed a coalition by the 1970s called the Lebanese Front or the Lebanese forces, its military arm being the Phalangist militias under the name of Katā’ib Social Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{140} In opposition to this party, and mainly made up of Lebanese Muslims, was the Lebanese Nationalist Movement (LNM), which had better relations with Syria.\textsuperscript{141} While it is easy to make the assumption that the PLO and the LNM were both supporting the Arab cause and Syrian unity, the LNM was working in support of its own camp and the advancements of its own people in Lebanese government. They were considered allies of the PLO but in multiple instances ended up in conflict. The civil war erupted out of tensions between the two populist fronts, the Lebanese Front and the LNM, and as mentioned before was catalyzed by the arrival of the PLO.

13 April 1975, a car fired shots at a congregation of Phalange partisans in front of a church in ‘Ayn al-Rummaneh, wounding a number of people, to which Phalangist militiamen reacted a few hours later by machine-gunning a bus heading for the Tall al-Za’tar refugee camps, killing 21 Palestinians. Fighting

\textsuperscript{138} Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 152.

\textsuperscript{139} Hudson, “Palestinians and Lebanon,” 245.


\textsuperscript{141} Traboulsi, *A Modern History of Lebanon*, 191.
broke out throughout the southeastern suburb of Beirut between the Phalange and the Palestinian resistance and their Lebanese allies. A war that was to last for fifteen years had just begun.\textsuperscript{142}

These political parties lost the trust of the people during the conflict because they transformed into militias.\textsuperscript{143} Loosing all connections with political ideology, they fully embraced the sectarian divisions and were prepared to take up arms to defend those who fell in line with their own beliefs.

**Shared History with Syria and Syrian Role in Occupation**

Syria and Lebanon shared a colonial past under the French mandate until separate independence. Lebanon was literally “carved out” of Greater Syria in 1943, which still leads many Syrian nationalists to consider it a province of Syria.\textsuperscript{144} With regional ambitions and a sense of rightful ownership of Lebanese territory, Syrian officials integrated themselves into Lebanese affairs and government, so much so that they assumed a position of “Syrian tutelage.”\textsuperscript{145}

Syria played different roles throughout the Lebanese conflict that escalated in their involvement and commitment to resolution. Seen as one of the largest proponents of Pan Arabism, Syria pushed for an Arab coalition to help stabilize Lebanon after the outbreak of fighting. Under an Arab League decision the Arab Dissuasion Force (ADF) was sent into Lebanon in 1978; but for all intents and purposes it was a Syrian intervention because the vast majority of the troops were from Syria.\textsuperscript{146} Later on in the conflict, Syria arranged meetings with different leaders of the militias in an attempt at diplomacy. Calling it the Tripartite Agreement of 1983, Syria was able to make a shaky

\textsuperscript{142} Traboulsi, *A Modern History of Lebanon*, 183.
\textsuperscript{143} el-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 85.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 217.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 16.
alliance among Maronites, Shiites, and the Druze. Although nothing came about from this particular instance of diplomacy, it can be seen as an example of Syrian legitimacy in Lebanon and the willingness of Lebanese leaders to work with their neighbor. Most significantly, Syria helped broker the Ta’if Agreement that formally ended the civil war and declared a ceasefire amongst all militia in Lebanon. As Syria became fully committed to Lebanese stability their presence in Lebanese affairs shifted from implicit to explicit.

Naomi Weinberger divides Syrian intervention into three time periods marked by the extent of Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs. Prior to the outbreak of fighting and in the initial year of civil war, Syrian involvement was mainly mediation and attempts at peace talks between the many factions. Then it moved into a more “indirect intervention” in the state’s affairs and policies. Following this, Syria’s policy on Lebanon moved into full military intervention and occupation of Lebanon. She states that, “Syria’s key objective was not to advance the cause of any particular party in Lebanon’s civil strife.” They were more concerned with establishing stability so that they could pursue their regional hegemony. This paper seeks to argue that in establishing stability for its own goals, Syria actually enabled democratization in Lebanon by curating a stable political environment under which certain democratic elements were able to form and consolidate.

147 el-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 16.
148 Ibid., 13.
149 Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon*.
150 Ibid., 10.
Outcome of the conflict and post-war Lebanon

As mentioned above, the Ta’if Agreement in 1989 formally ended nearly 15 years of fighting and called for a ceasefire amongst all militias (except Hezbollah). An agreement brokered by the Syrians, it led to the “emergence of a new political elite composed of Syrian-supported politicians.”\textsuperscript{151} Through the Ta’if Agreement, Syria was given the right to send its troops to Lebanon for periods of time that could only be determined by Lebanon and Syria and the right to react to any threats to Syrian security within Lebanese territory.\textsuperscript{152} The final point in the Agreement discusses Lebanese-Syrian relations and explains the basis of their cooperation on future treaties:

> Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries’ coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries’ interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them.\textsuperscript{153}

While a ceasefire was established under Syrian diplomacy, Lebanon’s neighbor did not stop with that agreement in securing stability within the country. With a continued military presence and a more implicit governmental influence, Syria remained a key player within Lebanon’s political environment.

Summary

Already a divided society by the 1970s, Lebanon was posed for civil conflict when the PLO was relocated to the south of the country. With the transition of political parties to militias, it was merely a question of “when” the fighting would break out, not “if.” Lebanon’s close ties with Syria throughout history were used as justification for

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\item \textsuperscript{151} el-Husseini, \textit{Pax Syriana}, 23.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 17.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Arab League, “Ta’if Agreement.”
\end{itemize}
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intervention during their civil war. Their security threats were seen as inseparable and were the basis for Syrian military occupation during and following the civil war. As Weinberger states, their involvement increased throughout the war from mediator to full-scale military intervention. Under the Arab League, and led by Syria, the Ta’if Agreement formally ended the civil war and laid the basis of future Syrian involvement in Lebanese political affairs. This paper will seek to answer the question of how successful Lebanon’s democratization was under authoritarian Syria’s occupation and influence in comparison to Iraq’s democratization under democratic U.S. occupation and intervention.
VI. Lebanese Case Study: Post-Civil War

Democratization with an Authoritarian External Actor

Lebanon was selected as a case study because it is an example of a post-civil war democratization that was heavily influenced by its authoritarian neighbor Syria. While there have been other occupying forces in Lebanon, most notably Israel in the early 1980s, this paper will focus on the Syrian occupation immediately following the end of the Lebanese civil war. In contrast to the United States’ intervention and democratic project in Iraq, Syria’s mission and policy towards Lebanon was invited, at least at first, and coordinated with the Lebanese interim government. They centered on ensuring their interests with no façade to democratic development or promotion. What makes Syrian intervention in Lebanon relevant to this study is that even though it was an authoritarian intervening power, it still resulted in democracy in Lebanon.

*Pax Syriana* is a term that is used in reference to the time of Syrian occupation in Lebanon following the end of their civil conflict. Two of the most prominent and most often cited scholars on this time period are Naomi Weinberger and Rola el-Husseini. Weinberger details Syria’s creeping involvement into Lebanon in distinct phases starting with mediation and arriving finally at full-scale military intervention.\(^{154}\) She makes the argument that Syria intervened in Lebanon in an effort to advance their viability as a regional leader and to model Lebanese politics and policy after their own and in compliance with their interests.

Certainly Syria’s key objective was not to advance the cause of any particular party in Lebanon’s civil strife, but rather to assure that Lebanon’s authority structures were compatible with its own preferences.\textsuperscript{155}

El-Husseini makes a similar case to Weinberger’s about the progression of Syrian influence into Lebanese politics but her thesis focuses on the inability of the Syrian presence to provide “an actual reconciliation of the political tensions that led to civil war.”\textsuperscript{156} In contrast to Weinberger though, el-Husseini focuses on Syrian interaction with and encouragement of the elite class in Lebanon; an elite class that she says Syrian tutelage shaped and fostered growth for in pursuit of their own interests.

This chapter will look at the different criteria for stability, the same that were analyzed for Iraq in the preceding chapter, in order to determine whether or not Syrian intervention was more fruitful than these two scholars believe, in terms of democratization. Once again, these indicators and factors of stability were chosen because they are the most likely to be impacted by external actors and occupying forces. Focusing on specific Syrian policies and agreements between the two states, this chapter will seek to analyze whether, in pursuit of their own interests, Syrian intervention created a stabilizing force in Lebanon that allowed for key tenets of democracy to develop, such as political competition and judicial independence. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and display how an authoritarian external influence may have better policies and practices in a post-civil war theater for democratization to occur. Instead of overt democratization efforts, are the stabilizing policies of an authoritarian intervener more beneficial for democratization in the long run? Is an authoritarian occupying force better

\textsuperscript{155} Weinberger, \textit{Syrian Intervention}, 10.
\textsuperscript{156} el-Husseini, \textit{Pax Syriana}. 
at establishing a stable political environment in order for competition to develop? Can an authoritarian occupier be benevolent?

**Government Effectiveness**

Stability can be discussed through analyzing the effectiveness of the Lebanese government immediately post-war and the new roles and powers that were appointed to the different religious sects. Following through 2005 with the final withdrawal of Syrian troops in Lebanon, there was extensive Syrian influence in Lebanese politics and policy decision-making.

**Quality of Bureaucracy and Institutional Effectiveness**

The Ta’if Agreement of 1989 was the document that formerly ended the Lebanese Civil War and was brokered by the Arab League, specifically by Saudi Arabia and Syria. Its significance lies in how it legally connects the Syrian government to the new Lebanese Republic.

Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests.\(^{157}\)

Some of the most significant clauses within the document call for the disarmament and disbanding of militias involved in the civil war and taking power away from the president to make their role in the government more equal to other leaders such as the prime minister and the speaker. Declaring Lebanon as a democratic parliamentary government, the Ta’if Agreement was a springboard for further Lebanese-Syrian agreements and intervention.

\(^{157}\) Ta’if Accords, accessed at: [http://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-taifaccords89](http://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-taifaccords89)
Another significant agreement between the two neighbors was the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination of 1991. Focused specifically on the relations between the two nations and their “fullest cooperation,” the Treaty discusses security arrangements. In Article 3 the Treaty states that neither state shall harbor threats to the other or provide any assistance to an attack on the sovereignty or security of the other.\textsuperscript{158} Article 4 states that only the “Syrian and Lebanese Governments shall decide on the redeployment of Syrian forces…and determination of the size of the Syrian forces.”

The Treaty goes on to establish different joint committees between the two governments, to be led by their presidents and ministers throughout both governments, aimed at collaboration on joint interests. The significance of these two treaties is that they legally establish a basis for Syrian intervention into Lebanese politics and security following their civil war. Furthermore, the terms of these agreements are left to the interpretation of the two governments and not external or international bodies.

The Ta’if Agreement’s reallocations of powers within the government are significant for the post-war balance. Most significantly, by shifting the executive power to the Council of Ministers, the Agreement ended the “Maronite political dominance.”\textsuperscript{159} It also created a balance within parliament with equal distribution of seats between Christians and Muslims. The reallocation of power sharing allowed for the Syrian government to align itself with new parties and firmly implant itself into the new Lebanese Republic. In many ways, this reallocation opened up the Lebanese Republic to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[158] Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, accessed at http://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-taifaccords89
\end{footnotes}
foreign intervention and Syria capitalized on the new formations of parties to become “the ultimate arbiter of Lebanese politics”\(^{160}\) in the post-war era.

The main Lebanese political group that Syria decided to align itself with was the Shiite Amal Party. Amal’s positions were in line with Syria’s, specifically on the end of Maronite political dominance and reconstruction under Syrian terms.\(^{161}\) Links between Assad’s Alawite regime and the Shiites in Lebanon led to them often being on the same side in previous conflicts within Lebanese history. The Shiite population in Lebanon was mainly divided between the Amal Party and, the more militant at the time, Hezbollah.\(^{162}\) In 1989 at the end of the civil war, the two Lebanese Shiite groups were brought together in Damascus to sign a truce and agree to collaboration under Syrian support for the foreseeable future.\(^{163}\) Following this agreement disarmament of Hezbollah was halted and its relationship with Syria solidified. It even more so supported the Pax Syriana when it entered into the legitimate political process in the post-war setting: “Hizballah’s growing stake in the Lebanese political system after it won several seats in parliament, started to attach it to the Syrian-backed status quo,”*[sic]*.\(^{164}\) With support from the Shiite community, Syria had entered into the Lebanese political arena under the official names of the Shiite parties. Even though in pursuit of their own interests in maintaining influence in Lebanon, the Syrian government helped to integrate Shiites into the

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\(^{162}\) Ibid., 146-147.


\(^{164}\) Ibid., 148.
Lebanese political system and create a more equal share of power between the major sects of the country.

**Infrastructure Disruption**

It is undeniable that Lebanon became a window into the free-market world for Syria; by 2003 Lebanon’s GDP was three times the size of Syria’s. The beginning of this economic opening and increase in neoliberal economic policies began with the new government in 1992 under prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri who focused on “the principle that infrastructure spending and budget austerity will stimulate private-sector growth.” Lebanon’s first loan from the World Bank was issued in 1993.

There was an influx of Syrian workers following the war supported by a Bilateral Labor Agreement in 1994 that virtually allowed Syrian workers a work permit at any border crossing. As a result, a national debate broke out about whether these workers were a hindrance on the economy and promoted Lebanese unemployment or whether they filled important jobs within the construction industry that was needed for Lebanese reconstruction. The debate became politically charged throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s before Syrian withdrawal, aligning the side that saw the Syrian workers as a hindrance on society as “pro-Lebanese” and the other as “pro-Syrian.” For the sake of post-war reconstruction, these construction roles needed to be filled and estimates place...

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167 Ibid.
the value of Syrian labor to Lebanese businesses at more than $1 billion per year. It did get to a point that the amount of unskilled Syrian workers in Lebanon and the black markets for Syrian goods were worsening the Lebanese economy instead of improving by 2005. This is often cited as one of the main economic reasons behind Lebanese dissatisfaction with Syrian occupation. However, the market that Syria created in Lebanon for its exports and the unskilled workers jumpstarted the economy immediately post-war and allowed for Lebanon to reenter the global economy. While Syria’s intentions with this may have been selfish and an attempt to use the Lebanese economy as a gateway to the global markets, it had positive unintended effects on Lebanon immediately following Ta’if in the early 1990s. The long-term effects turned into a problem for the Lebanese economy, but Syrian interference in reconstruction efforts through cheap labor agreements aided the rehabilitation of the Lebanese economy.

**Rule of Law**

With its roots as a terrorist organization in the 1980s, Hezbollah and their turn to legitimacy under Syrian tutelage is an important player in a discussion of rule of law in post-war Lebanon. Syrian intervention negatively impacted judicial independence by supporting a pro-Syrian status quo in judicial leadership. Syrian tutelage and training of its Lebanese counterparts in the security apparatus enabled the growth of the Lebanese forces into a functioning force that was able to manage itself by 2005.

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Degree of Security Provided by Criminal Organizations / Extent to which Non-state Actors Infringe on Personal Autonomy

A discussion of security in post-war Lebanon and the Shiite Hezbollah party are indistinguishable. For this reason, the section on the “extent to which non-state actors infringe on personal autonomy” will be dealt with in this section simultaneously. While still a controversial group in current Lebanese politics, the role that the organization has played in the country since its founding in 1982 has been pivotal in the empowerment of Shiite Muslims in the Lebanese political process. Due to a higher birthrate than Sunnis and Christians,171 Shiite demographics in Lebanon led to a greater presence in Lebanese politics post-war. Such as in the redistribution of parliamentary seats from a Christian majority to an even split, many reconstruction efforts incorporated redistributing the share of powers and the emergence of a Shiite coalition under Amal and Hezbollah further allowed for equal representation of the sects. Scholar Augustus Richard Norton claims that by the 1990s, “Hezbollah was certainly the best-organized political phenomenon and enjoyed the largest base of popular support.”172 Much of this development of a legitimate Shiite political presence is due to Syrian support of Hezbollah and Amal in the Lebanese political environment.

In its beginnings, Hezbollah had organized in opposition to Amal because of Amal’s lack of clerical leadership and its willingness to incorporate itself into the preexisting Lebanese patronism.173 However, entering into the post-war period and reconstruction of the Lebanese clientelism, Hezbollah capitalized on the openings in

172 Ibid., 16.
173 Ibid., 45.
politics and reasserted itself. They were able to “circumvent the traditional” and “build their own clientelistic networks enabling them to provide welfare services to followers and adherents.”

Acting as a stabilizing force in the south of Lebanon, Hezbollah not only provided security to its Shiite followers but also restructured itself from its terrorist and militant origins into a legitimate political party with a militant arm that it flexed periodically in the post-war era.

The Syrian government curated the security provided by Hezbollah. Syrian support for the Shiite community in Lebanon has its origins in the 1980s with Amal leadership travelling to Syria for training. Norton claims the alliance between Syria, Hezbollah, and Amal to be an “alliance of convenience” based on Syrian interests in stopping Israeli influence creeping into Lebanon through its southern border. Nevertheless, the support provided by the Syrian government allowed for the legitimization of Hezbollah and its entry into politics. By 1992, the willingness and support for the Shiite community to enter Lebanese politics was strong enough to encourage Hezbollah’s leaders to run for parliament, resulting in the party capturing twelve seats. With a voice in parliament, Hezbollah was able to allocate funding for different welfare projects for the Shiite communities living in the south. Ranging from hospitals and other charitable organizations to construction companies, Hezbollah

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174 Knudsen, Precarious Peacebuilding, 4.
176 Norton, Hezbollah, 32.
177 Ibid., 35.
178 Ibid.,101.
established a welfare system that created a “safety net” for the people of the Shiite community of Lebanon that it had never seen before.\textsuperscript{179}

In more recent years, Hezbollah’s presence in politics has been legitimized and remains a major political coalition with the Maronites that stands in opposition to Sunnis, Druze, and other Christians.\textsuperscript{180} One difference between these two groups is their different opinions on Syrian interference in Lebanese policy and decision-making. Following controversial events in Lebanese history, such as the Cedar Revolution and the assassination of al-Hariri, the divide along Syrian influence has deepened and continues to be a significant source of tension in Lebanese politics. In light of the spillover of violence from the current Syrian conflict, Hezbollah’s ties to the Damascus government have led to international criticisms and further ostracism within the Lebanese environment. Even in face of these recent challenges, it is too soon to make claims the Hezbollah has returned to its militant tactics and terrorist agenda. It stands to be an example of what could happen if militant organizations are given a legitimate political voice in a post-civil war setting. It is important to note that Syrian backing and Shiite cooperation across organizations and party lines in Lebanon allowed for the development of a legitimate party and coalition to represent the Shiite populations in the south.

\textit{Judicial Independence and Timeliness of Decisions}

The Lebanese judicial system was initially created in the constitution of 1943 and was founded on the principles of judicial independence from other branches of the government. Unfortunately, this was not the case in actuality because the executive

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 107-110.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 152.
branch held power to appoint, promote, and reassign judges.\footnote{Issam Saliba, “Lebanon: Constitutional Law and the Political Rights of Religious Communities,” \textit{Library of Congress}, (2010), available at: \url{http://www.loc.gov/law/help/lebanon-constitutional-law.php}} Modeled after the French system, the Lebanese courts are split between civil, commercial, criminal, administrative and personal status. Due to the diverse societal makeup of Lebanon, the personal status courts are further divided into shari’a courts, for the different Muslim sects, and ecclesiastical courts, for Christians and Jews. The Ta’if agreement reaffirmed the judicial powers and boundaries of the constitution but made an important amendment:

A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.\footnote{Ta’if Accords, accessed at: \url{http://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-taifaccords89}}

This constitutional council would play an important role in the first elections of the new Lebanese Republic. The president, the speaker, and the prime minister could only review this council; restricting review limited the petitions to rulings on the constitutionality of laws.\footnote{Ibid.}

Syrian intervention into the Lebanese judicial branch in the post-war period was focused on protecting pro-Syrian politicians and other supporters within the country. Ultimately, Syrian intervention was focused on executive power and security concerns, however, this carried over into the judicial branch due to the lack of independence. Wadji Mallat was the first president of the Constitutional Council from 1994 to 1997 and in
April of his last year he resigned due to claims of “political pressure”\textsuperscript{184} and “excessive interference by the Syrian-controlled authorities.”\textsuperscript{185}

The Syrian intelligence has strongly influenced post-war elections by manipulating the electoral law, dictating the political agenda and when necessary forced the Lebanese parliament to amend the constitution in order to secure a pro-Syrian leadership (the three year extension of president Emile Lahoud’s term in office is the latest example).\textsuperscript{186}

In more recent years, the Council has failed to appoint new members once the terms of the previous have expired, leading to “de facto paralysis of the institution”\textsuperscript{187} and a loss of executive oversight.

Syrian actions towards Lebanon’s judiciary can only be claimed as stabilizing in that they supported a pro-Syrian status quo in the wake of the civil war and allowed for other institutions to flourish and leading members of the judicial community such as Mallat to protest. However, the blocked access to judicial independence and timely decision-making does not allow for a positive argument around Syrian intervention into Lebanese affairs. Similar to U.S. intervention in Iraq and support of pro-Western political candidates, Syria negatively impacted judicial independence and interfered in fair, timely decision-making.

**Trust in Police and Soldiers**

Syria’s modern military presence in Lebanon has its roots in the 1978 Arab League decision to send in Arab Dissuasion Forces (ADF), which was composed of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Mordechai Nisan. "The Syrian Occupation of Lebanon." *Coalition for Responsible Peace in the Middle East* (2000), 60.
  \item \textsuperscript{186} Knudsen, *Precarious Peacebuilding*, 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{187} Mansour, “The Independence,” 31.
\end{itemize}
nearly 80% Syrian troops.\textsuperscript{188} This legitimized a Syrian presence in Lebanon; a presence that they consistently maintained over the course of the next thirty years. The number of Syrian troops in Lebanon had reached 40,000 by the time of the signing of the Ta’if Agreement.\textsuperscript{189} One of the conditions of the agreement was that the Syrian military would redeploy to secure only the Bekaa Valley and then slowly decrease the number of troops until completely gone. The Syrian government found ways to circumvent the wording of the agreement and continued to maintain their security presence.

This was done with the Defense and Security Agreement between the two countries that followed Ta’if and the Treaty of Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{190} This agreement established a bureaucratic joint committee for the security affairs of the two countries composed of different officials from both. The tasks assigned to each government included the prevention of any act of violence or threat conducted against the neighboring state, intelligence sharing, and joint training operations. Similar to the Treaty of Brotherhood, this agreement legitimized the Syrian presence in Lebanon and created lasting bonds between top officials in the upper echelons of both governments.

One of the biggest tasks that the Syrian presence is accredited with is the disarmament of the militias in Lebanon. By April of 1991, twenty-four militias disbanded following a general amnesty.\textsuperscript{191} Syria is generally credited with being the stable force that filled the power vacuum following disarmament and the reason that the country did not

\textsuperscript{188} El-Husseini, \textit{Pax Syriana}, 16.
\textsuperscript{189} Knudsen, \textit{Precarious Peacebuilding}, 11.
\textsuperscript{190} Defense and Security Agreement, accessed at: \url{http://www.syrleb.org/docs/agreements/02DEFENSE_SECURITYeng.pdf}
\textsuperscript{191} Knudsen, \textit{Precarious Peacebuilding}, 17.
fall apart afterwards.\textsuperscript{192} It is important to note that the only exceptions to the disarmament were Hezbollah and the Palestinian organizations. Following disarmament and the success of the Defense Treaty, Syria solidified its hold on Lebanon through the establishment of a joint security apparatus controlling the country.

By 1995, the Syrian order in Lebanon was in place, glued together by what opposition Lebanese politicians later labeled *al-nizam al-amni almushtarak*, or the mutual Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus controlling the country. The Bekaa Valley town of ‘Anjar, home to the headquarters of the Syrian intelligence apparatus, became the locus of decision-making in Lebanon and symbolic of Syrian control.\textsuperscript{193}

From disarmament to cracking down on local drug cultivation,\textsuperscript{194} Syrian forces became synonymous with a police force in the immediate post-war period.

The time period from 1990 to 2005 saw the creation of an effective joint military organization between Lebanon and Syria that was encouraged by both parties. Syrian tutelage led to the training of many Lebanese officials by their Syrian counterparts and mutual assurance of the end of a threat to either government. However, by 2005 the Lebanese popular opinion of Syrian occupation had changed. Pressure from international organizations and leading world powers led to the United Nations Security Council resolution 1559 calling for the removal of all remaining foreign troops to leave Lebanon.\textsuperscript{195} This led to a full withdrawal of Syrian forces and the Hariri government dismantling the joint apparatus that had secured the country for the past fifteen years. All of this happened after the extensive training of Lebanese security personnel through

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.


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direct interaction with their Syrian counterparts. Similar to how a Syrian military presence enabled disarmament of militias and acted as filler for the power vacuum created afterwards, it also allowed for extensive growth of a Lebanese military that became strong enough to direct itself by 2005.

**Freedom**

The same as in Iraq, Lebanon’s post-civil war theater provokes an argument on stability versus competition. In a post-war setting, stability is needed for the consolidation of democratic institutions, yet the basis of democracy is competition amongst different parties representative of the mosaic of ideologies within a nation. Having an authoritarian neighboring government as an occupying force may bridge this tension by establishing the necessary stability, yet indirectly enabling competition.

**Free and Fair Elections with Multiple Opposition Parties**

The confessional system that was reaffirmed and redistributed under the Ta’if Agreement, which allocated certain roles to the different sects of Lebanese society, was controlled by Syrian intervention and manipulation of post-war elections. While these elections cannot be called “fair” due to significant Syrian intervention, nonetheless they allowed for the electoral system to consolidate. Following 2005 Syrian withdrawal, the Lebanese political environment has been able to transform away from two polar camps of pro- and anti-Syrian.

Syrian influence in Lebanese politics is clear through their manipulation of electoral “lists” or in other words electoral multi-confessional unions or alliances, which are compiled for each district and typically after “Syrian consultation.”

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the composition of these lists is another example of their pitting different Lebanese sects against one another in order to maintain their dominance. Lebanese political scientist Bassel Salloukh states that, “Inter- and intra-confessional electoral alliances were imposed on unlikely confessional and ideological allies to ensure the election of pro-Syrian candidates and the defeat of opposition members.” Instead of this tearing apart the Lebanese parliament, it allowed for the consolidation of Syrian opposition and the fostering of political competition through elections. While these elections were not necessarily fair due to the Syrian intervention mentioned above, they still functioned to democratically elect legislators to office. They also functioned to indirectly foster political competition. While Syria was acting in its own interest to pit the different sects and political parties against one another, they were also indirectly fostering a competitive political environment that is a necessary component of democracy.

The parliamentary elections from 1991 to 2000 are representative of the waning Syrian presence in Lebanon. The 1991 elections saw the introduction of Syrian-backed elites into parliament because of the 40 vacant seats due to deaths during the civil war. All of those chosen in 1991 had ties to Syria. Twenty-nine of these appointed parliamentarians were elected to the legislature of 1992, twenty-five to the legislature of 1996, and twenty-one reelected for the third time in 2000…However, by 2005 this hand had all but disappeared.

Lebanese-American journalist Michael Young wrote that these Syrian-backed officials were never able to consolidate a Lebanese backing and therefore were virtually gone from parliament by 2005. The progression of the removal of Syrian-backed officials

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197 Bassel Salloukh, "Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed."
198 El-Husseini, Pax Syriana, 18.
199 Ibid., 18.
from parliament shows the consolidation and growth of a Lebanese political environment that stabilized after the war and fostered anti-Syrian candidates that eventually led to the waning of Syrian influence.

The competitive political environment encouraged in Lebanon under Syrian tutelage led to the creation of coalitions divided on whether or not the interference and intervention should continue. The 2009 parliamentary elections were the first to be held that were not directly affected by Syrian lists or electoral law and they were the battleground of the new political coalitions: the March 8th and the March 14th. The March 8th coalition is named after a pro-Syrian demonstration in Beirut led by Hezbollah and Amal. The March 14th coalition is named after the Cedar Revolution, the popular demonstration that led to Syrian withdrawal, and pro-Western parties under Saad Hariri, the son of the assassinated Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The non-violent, political competition between these two coalitions allowed for the growth of Lebanon’s civil society into an entity strong enough to resist and oust Syria after nearly thirty years of indirect control.

Summary

Through the Ta’if Agreement and the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, Syria established a legal basis for continued Syrian occupation in Lebanon. Most significantly, these two documents connected the two governments and invited Syrian tutelage and a period of Pax Syriana. Even though acting in their own interests to lessen Maronite control of the government, reallocating power from the executive to other heads of government and state allowed for more equal power sharing and checks

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and balances within the government. Aligning itself with the Shiite parties of Lebanon, Amal and Hezbollah, Syria established a legitimate presence in Lebanese politics through their influence over these two parties. Even though in pursuit of their own interests in maintaining influence in Lebanon, the Syrian government helped to integrate Shiites into the Lebanese political system and create a more equal share of power between the major sects of the country.

Lebanon became a window to the West for Syria that they exploited for their own interests. However, this indirectly aided the economic development of Lebanon with cheap labor from Syria under the Bilateral Labor Agreement. Acting as a jumpstart for the economy, the cheap labor and imports from Syria allowed for quick growth in the Lebanese economy. It is important to note that these agreements ultimately stalled out and by 2005 had become more of a hindrance on Lebanese development than an aid. While the long-term turned into a problem for the Lebanese economy, Syrian interference in infrastructure rebuilding through cheap labor agreements aided reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Lebanese economy.

Hezbollah, under Syrian tutelage, not only provided security to its Shiite followers but also restructured itself from its terrorist and militant origins into a legitimate political party with a militant arm that it flexed periodically post-war. Unfortunately, Syrian intervention into the judicial process had just as much of a negative impact on rule of law as the U.S. interference in Iraq. Their meddling in Lebanese judiciary business only facilitated the blockage of fair and timely decision-making and does not support the argument that an authoritarian external actor facilitates stability because negatively impacting the rule of law leads to a state of fear, not governance.
Syrian troops numbered at 40,000 by the signing of Ta’if, and through the Defense and Security Agreement the Syrian military presence in Lebanon was welcomed and legitimized. Syrian military presence is accredited with filling the power vacuum left by the disarmed militias and aiding in the stable transition following disarmament and the disbanding of established militias. Even though not sustainable because of heavy reliance on Syrian intervention, through a joint Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus the Syrian military forces became synonymous with a police force in Lebanon post-civil war. Syrian training and cooperation led to a Lebanese security apparatus that was able to manage itself by 2005 when international calls for the removal of Syria from Lebanon were strong enough to come to fruition.

Through the manipulation of “electoral lists” and the support of pro-Syrian candidates, the elections immediately following the war cannot be deemed free and fair. However, they functioned to indirectly foster political competition because Syria was acting in its own interest to pit the different sects and political parties against one another. They were also indirectly fostering a competitive political environment that is a necessary component of democracy. The slow removal of Syrian-backed officials from Lebanese politics is demonstrative of the consolidation and growth of a competitive environment that facilitated coalitions of parties and more participation.

While Syrian meddling with judicial independence stands in the way of a coherent argument for the indirect merits of an authoritarian external power on stability in a post-civil war country, it is clear that some of their efforts in Lebanon in pursuit of Syrian interests actually facilitated stability and ultimately competitive and sustainable democratization. The Syrian case in Lebanon is important for this paper because some of
the tactics that were employed to further Syrian influence actually resulted in the
development of a competitive and strong political environment that ousted its occupiers
in 2005.
VI. Conclusion

The hypothesis tested in this paper was that the influence of an external, foreign authoritarian regime on a country’s post-civil war democratization facilitates more stability and consolidation than a democratic counterpart. Ultimately, the U.S. failed to facilitate stabilization in post-civil war Iraq. The U.S.’s attempt at “coercive democratization” led to the current failing state of Iraq that is succumbing to regional terror campaigns and splintering along sectarian divisions. While the intentions of the U.S. campaign in Iraq post-2004 may have attempted to establish democracy and facilitate stabilization, they ultimately failed because their policies were not the best practices for establishing stability and allowing for democratization. In the case of Lebanon, Syrian meddling with judicial independence stands in the way of a coherent argument for the indirect merits of an authoritarian external power on stability in a post-civil war country. However, some of their efforts in Lebanon in pursuit of Syrian interests actually facilitated stability and ultimately competitive and sustainable democratization. The Syrian case in Lebanon is important because some of the tactics that were employed to further Syrian influence actually resulted in the development of a competitive and strong political environment that ousted its occupiers in 2005.

The argument for Syrian authoritarian intervention facilitating more stability than the American democratic counterpart provides conditional support for the hypothesis proposed. This paper discussed many aspects of the Syrian intervention that indirectly provided more stability than the American, but overall the case is not strong enough to say without a doubt that the authoritarian intervention contained the best practices. This being said, there are many aspects of the authoritarian intervention that could be taken
into consideration for future “democracy projects” or external attempts at
democratization. Taking practices and policies of an authoritarian power to promote
democratization may seem counterintuitive for most scholars of democracy, but it is the
kind of innovative thinking and policy-making that will be needed for the promotion of
open and transparent governments around the world going forward.

One of the important characteristics of the authoritarian intervention into Lebanon
was the reception that the Syrian forces received, in comparison to the invasion by
American forces. In large part due to the fraternal relationship between Lebanon and
Syria, their reception was well received by the population of Lebanon in trade of Israeli
occupation. While the attitudes towards Syrian occupation later became a point of
contention along party lines it is important to note that there was little to no resistance
upon first entry. In comparison, the American invasion into Iraq in 2003 was completely
forced, and while not entirely unwelcome by different parts of the population, still
required considerable military force and counterinsurgency tactic. For future
democratization promotion and projects around the world, it will be crucial to have a
local populace that is accepting and willing to admit the occupying force into their
country, otherwise it could lead to the continuation of conflict and failed attempts at
progress due to a lack of legitimacy.

Another important difference is the effective implementation of power sharing
under the Ta’if Agreement by the Syrian led Arab League. Removing the extensive and
overreaching powers of the executive branch and redistributing some of them to the
judicial and legislative helped to share the power more fairly amongst the different sects.
Even though it ultimately acted as a means for the Syrian government to solidify its
connections within the Lebanese government, it was a change that helped with long-term
democratization in Lebanon and equal shares of power for the different religious sects. In
comparison in Iraq, the focus was on the establishment of the IGC and the appropriate
candidates for the different seats. An approach that focuses on strengthening leadership
and infrastructure in all three branches of government, with an emphasis on checks and
balances among them, helps to consolidate democracy and produce a sustainable
government.

Syria’s economic incentives in Lebanon may have been self-rewarding but their
effects carried over to jumpstart the Lebanese economy. Through a bilateral economic
treaty, Syria secured placement for their overflow of unskilled workers within
reconstruction efforts in Lebanon. While these efforts eventually became a detriment to
the Lebanese society in more recent years before reversal of the agreement and Syrian
withdrawal, they provided much needed reconstruction for infrastructure and stimulated
the post-war economy through cheap imports as well. Often stability and government
effectiveness are judged, in the eyes of the people, through a government’s ability to
deliver services. In the case of Iraq, too few resources were devoted to infrastructure
development such as electricity demands. Even though security risks were arguably
higher in Iraq, some of the efforts focused on defense and military budgeting could have
been better spent on infrastructure reconstruction and possibly the reintegration of
combatants into construction roles. For future democratization efforts, it will be
necessary to establish a willing workforce for reconstruction efforts. It could potentially
become a part of disarmament, disbanding, and reintegration efforts for previous
combatants or, as in the case of Syria, it could come from an invested external power.
The question of how to reintegrate former combatants into daily life is one that is paramount for civil conflicts when atrocities on both sides need to be pardoned in order for society as a whole to move forward. Within Lebanon, Hezbollah was allowed to form into a legitimate political party and actively participate in the reformation of the Lebanese government. Because of this, they transformed from their terrorist origins under Israeli occupation into one of the key parties in Lebanese politics. While the support from Syria was once again in their own interests of being able to have control over decision-making in their sister-state, it nevertheless integrated a powerful combatant group of the civil war into politics to direct their actions into legal pathways instead of maintaining a militia identity and continuing violent campaigns. Post-civil war political environments should strive to be inclusive so that political participation may take the place of violent uprising. In Iraq, even after the error of their ways was acknowledged, nothing was done to counteract the CPA’s order of de-Ba’athification, which took some of the most qualified political actors out of office. This is not to say that all extremist parties should be granted access into legal and political practice, but the focus for future projects should be on political participation not barring access to such processes.

In terms of security, a joint military apparatus was created in Lebanon that allowed for training and joint operations by the Lebanese and Syrian forces. Again, Syrian incentives were for control and influence in the country but their presence in the post-war years, especially while they effectively disbanded and disarmed the militias, filled a power vacuum. The joint apparatus acted as police and Syrians trained the Lebanese throughout their ranks on efficient and effective tactics. In comparison, the U.S. troops in Iraq were not prepared to be a police force which is clearly seen through the
looting that tore through the country immediately after cease fire. For future projects, any kind of military intervention would need to be prepared to assume the role of police or at least assist in training the country’s forces.

The points mentioned above on best practices in external democratization efforts raise the question of what this would actually look like in reality going forward. It would be a much longer and financially draining occupation and commitment. For example, the U.S. entered into Iraq in 2003 and left eight years later in 2011, while Syria first entered into Lebanon during the civil war in 1976 and was forced to leave 29 years later in 2005. The time it would take to effectively implement different initiatives around governmental restructuring, economic revival, infrastructure reconstruction, militia reintegration, and security requires decades of commitment. Specifically, the military commitment is demanding and requires a long presence in country and many resources for the successful training of local officials. In the globalized politics of today, where all actions fall under international law, it would also need to be a multilateral commitment or at least an occupation that had popular support. This popular support no longer needs to be just from the one nation that would be intervening, but rather from the world at large. For example, the U.S. intervention into Iraq was only overtly supported by the United Kingdom and was openly condemned by other Western countries. For future democratization efforts, it will require support from allies and multilateral initiatives to provide the appropriate support.

This undergraduate thesis is limited in the amount of time allocated for research and the secondary research that it requires from the United States. That being said, it starts a relevant and interesting conversation on the best practices for democratization in
the future. This project could be improved if there were more case studies included from each region around the world, for example: Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, etc. This paper attempted to challenge preexisting notions of spreading democracy around the world and therefore it would be more applicable if it included case studies outside of the Middle East. The research conducted for this paper was mainly secondary analysis of statistical reports as well as content analysis of historical records. The literature and reports focused on democratization, specifically post-civil war, and the histories of Lebanon and Iraq throughout their respective conflicts. It included scholarly literature, reports done by international organizations, and ethnographies of the respective societies. It would have been a stronger interdisciplinary paper if it would have been possible to travel in country and talk to citizens about their civil and human rights. Field studies would have allowed for a more comprehensive sociological and anthropological study of the two cases, their histories, and their citizens’ attitudes towards their respective occupying powers.

Beyond the limits of the funding and the capabilities of the researcher to conduct anthropological field studies and public opinion surveys of these two cases, the two countries are not secure enough for researchers to safely conduct research there today. Both are feeling the weight of the spillover from the Syrian civil war. Iraqi Kurds in the north of Iraq are closer to succession than ever before with the Kurdish fighters gaining grounds against ISIS. Hezbollah fighters are filing into Syria to help defend their “fraternal” government under attack. The spillover of fighting into both countries and the threat of ISIS terrorism makes research in both daunting yet necessary for the continuation of democratic regimes in both.
Another limit of this research is that it looks at democracy from a strictly Western notion of democracy. For the scope of this paper, it was too large of a task to take on challenging Western democratic structure as well as the external interventions on democratization. Similar to challenging what are the best practices for promoting and facilitating democracy, it is necessary to challenge what democracy would look like in different countries around the world. There are entire sets of literature on democracy in the Middle East and Asia and its compatibility with Islam, as mentioned before, but including this concept of a democracy that looks vastly different from modern, Western democracy would enhance research on democratization efforts in the Middle East.

As stated before, the argument for Syrian authoritarian intervention facilitating more stability than the American democratic counterpart provides only conditional support for the hypothesis proposed. Overall the case is not strong enough to say without a doubt that the authoritarian intervention used the best practices. As listed directly above, there are many aspects of the authoritarian intervention that could be taken into consideration for future “democracy projects” or external attempts at democratization. Taking reconstruction practices and policies of an external authoritarian power to promote democratization may seem counterintuitive for most scholars of democracy; however, it is the kind of creative policy-making that will be needed for the promotion of fair and transparent governments going forward.
Bibliography


