Date of Award

Spring 1-1-2013

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Michael Tooley

Second Advisor

Robert Rupert

Third Advisor

David B. Barnett

Abstract

A view of persistence known as endurantism says an object persists through changes in its parts and properties in virtue of that object at one time being ‘strictly’ identical to itself at another time, and is to be distinguished from a view of persistence known as perdurantism, which says an object persists through changes in its parts and properties in virtue of one or more distinct (non-identical) temporal phases or temporal parts of an object being causally or mereologically related to one another across times. A view of time known as eternalism says all times are equally real, and is to be contrasted with the view of time known as presentism which says only the present time is real. Trenton Merricks argues that a contradiction arises between the conjunction of endurantism and eternalism, and that endurantism entails presentism. I will argue both claims are false, and false for the same reason: Merricks introduces a notion of ‘whole presence’ in his formulation of the concept of endurance, illicitly using the notion of parthood simpliciter when parthood relations for enduring objects are supposed to be irreducibly temporally relative.

Included in

Metaphysics Commons

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