Date of Award

Spring 1-1-2011

Document Type


Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)



First Advisor

Bradley Monton

Second Advisor

David Barnett

Third Advisor

Kathrin Koslicki


It is commonly thought that libertarian free will is incompatible with an eternalist theory of time. One promising response to this alleged incompatibility is offered by Nathan Oaklander and Michael Tooley; this response rests upon a distinction between truths and truth conditions. I argue that though their response offers a general solution, it is susceptible given certain popular views on causation. Furthermore, abandoning causation altogether is not a viable option in the context of the discussion since free will requires a type of agent causation. I offer a new solution to the problem that relies upon simultaneous causation of the will and claim that under my proposed model, there can be libertarian free will in an eternalist theory of time.

Included in

Philosophy Commons