The 16 essays in this collection1 are clustered around issues that arise when we engage with the following two questions: (i) Under which conditions are perceptual experiences a source of epistemic justification? (ii) Are perceptual experiences a sound basis for rejecting sceptical hypotheses? Crispin Wright has championed an important way of answering them: welfare epistemology. In ‘On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology’,2 Wright offers refinements of an earlier statement of his view3 and responds to criticisms and objections Aidan McGlynn and Duncan Pritchard advance in their respective contributions. In this review, I will focus on these three papers as well as on Jonathan Vogel’s essay on the problem of misleading evidence.
Steup, Matthias, "Scepticism and Perceptual Justification" (2017). Philosophy Faculty Contributions. 4.