Type of Thesis
Dr. Adrian Shin
Dr. Jennifer Fitzgerald
Dr. Levente Szentkirályi
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This thesis seeks to understand why some policymakers sign international agreements governing the rights of investors by looking at the effects of winning coalitions on state leaders. The two empirical sections of this thesis examine the mechanisms through which political institutions, and the policymakers within them, shape executive level policy toward bilateral investment treaties in autocratic states. I find that signing agreements with highly developed OECD states contributes to the credibility of policymakers within the regime, which ultimately incentivizes the signing of international agreements.
Hannigan, Frank, "External Negotiations, Internal Credibility: Investment Treaties and Autocratic Decision Making" (2018). Undergraduate Honors Theses. 1665.