Embodiment

Peter G. Ossorio

University of Colorado

Running Head: Embodiment

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EMBODIMENT

Although the Person Concept has been elaborated to a fairly substantial degree I have not, up to the present time, made systematic reference to bodies.

One reason for this is that our primary interest has been in behavior, behavioral patterns, and behavioral episodes, and facts concerning bodies can be dealt with in that context as facts involved in the Performance aspects of behavior. For example, if I drink from a cup of coffee, my performance has to do with the movements of my body. It has to do not merely with the movements of my hand and arm, but also with my entire body posture and internal happenings at the time, for these are not merely what is happening at the time but are also part of how I drink the coffee. In this way, those body facts which are relevant to behavior can be incorporated systematically into our accounts of behavior via contingency statements in process descriptions (recall the Basic Process Unit in "What Actually Happens").

However, dealing systematically with body facts is not something we would want to put off indefinitely. We do, after all, speak of Wil's being six feet tall, weighing 200 pounds, having red hair, being left-handed, having an ulcer, being ugly, and so on. And we would want to say that the personal characteristics which

we attribute to Wil in this way are themselves, in some important sense, identical to or indistinguishable from the characteristics we attribute to some material objects (e.g., weighs 200 pounds), or, as in the case of "left-handed," that they imply other characteristics which are.

On the other hand, there are decisive reasons for not including such characteristics directly as person characteristics. To do so would, in effect, define Persons as specimens of Homo sapiens. That is, it would define Persons as being embodied in the structures and ingredients of Homo sapiens physiology.

But to do that would be a simple-minded sort of mistake. It is one that we would never be inclined to make if discussions of persons, minds, and bodies were not so overwhelmingly dominated by passion and ideology, especially among our disinterested and dispassionate scientists.

It is a mistake that we have no tendency to make in other contexts. For example, my meat grinder has a cast-iron body, a wooden handle, and a vertical funnel. Yet neither I nor our most dogmatically mystical materialists would consider defining a meat grinder as something with a cast-iron body, a wooden handle, and a vertical funnel. Similarly, thirty-three years ago all of the computers with which most of us

were familiar consisted of relays and vacuum tubes and lots of air conditioning. We did not at that time define a computer as something made of relays and vacuum tubes with air conditioning. Had we done so, we probably would have computers today consisting of very sophisticated arrangements of relays and vacuum tubes and air conditioning.

In general, we define things of these sorts not in terms of what they are made of, but in terms of how they function, for example, in terms of operating principles or input-output relations. Aristotle accomplished such a distinction by distinguishing both formal and material "causes."

Similarly, what makes a person a person is not what that person has by way of body characteristics. More specifically, if we take a given person to be "composed of" flesh, blood, nerves, bones, and so forth, in the way that these occur in a specimen of Homo sapiens, we are not thereby committed to the nonsensical conclusion that this is what makes him a Person. This will also be the case, though it is less commonly remarked on, if what we take the person to be composed of is his experience. And if we replace various of these protoplasmic structures with ingeniously constructed pieces of plastic, metal, wire, etc., we

do not say that the person is no longer a person or that he has become someone else.

It is for such reasons as these, then, that the formulation of the Person Concept has made no reference to the kinds of bodies which are familiar to us from observing the persons we know. Just as being a meat grinder in no way depends on having a given shape, articulation, or set of material constituents, neither does being a computer nor an airplane, nor a person. Therefore, if the task is to formulate what is essential to Persons, it is not to be done in terms of what a person is "made of."

Thus there is an apparent dilemma, for while we cannot define persons in terms of what they are made of, yet we do straightforwardly refer to "body" facts in giving some person descriptions. This presents a technical problem, and one of the major tasks of this paper is to present a technical solution.

First, we shall need to distinguish three things. The first is "person," as given by the Person Concept formulation. The second is "homo sapiens," which is a biological concept embedded in a biological taxonomy. The third is "human being." A person is an individual whose functioning exemplifies the formulations of Deliberate Action and the associated formulations (Ossorio, 1969/1978, pp. 71, 79). A

specimen of the biological species Homo sapiens is an organism which exemplifies the biological criteria for Homo sapiens. And a human being is an individual who is both a person and a specimen of Homo sapiens. Currently, all the individuals who are generally recognized by us as being persons are human beings, just as in 1947 all the artefacts commonly recognized by us as being computers were made of relays and vacuum tubes.

To point out these distinctions is not just an exercise in idle imagination. At present, members of other species (dolphins and great apes) are somewhere close to being recognized as persons. Primarily this is because they are close to being recognized as straightforwardly talking, as contrasted with merely signaling or communicating. And there are more exotic possibilities, as any reader of science fiction knows. For example, there are the eight-foot amoeboid creatures which the astronauts might have encountered on the moon, or the robots or sapient computer systems protrayed in recent cinematic adventures.

Thus distinguishing between person, Homo sapiens, and human being opens the way formally for designating as persons individuals who are not specimens of Homo sapiens. At present, as with the computers of 1947, all the persons we know of are of one kind. It doesn't

have to be that way. And it is because it doesn't have to be that way that such characteristics as having red hair, etc., are not straightforwardly personal characteristics. It would be nonsense, for example to say that our amoeboid person was six feet tall or any other height, or that he wasn't. Nor would it make sense to ask what color hair he had or whether he was left-handed or club-footed, and perhaps not even whether it was a he or a she.

The ground for a system of personal characteristics in Descriptive Psychology lies in two formulas and a definition.

(1) <B> = <I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S>

where B = Behavior = Intentional Action
I = Identity
W = Want
K = Know
KH = Know How
P = Performance
A = Achievement
PC = Personal Characteristic
S = Significance

Formula (1) represents a parametric analysis of behavior. A parametric analysis is a specification of the ways

in which a particular of a given general kind (in the present case, a behavior) can be the same as, or different from, another particular of the same general kind, as such.

(2) <B> = <I, <B>, <B>, KH P, A PC S>

where B = Deliberate Action, a special case of Intentional Action, in which the behavior engaged in is discriminated and motivationally selected from a set of options, or alternatives.

(3) Person = An individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of deliberate action.

Given the definition (3), we may proceed to construct a parametric analysis of Persons. The parameters given by this analysis will be Person parameters, and each parameter will correspond to a class of personal characteristics. At present, the person parameters which have been distinguished are (a) Traits, (b) Attitudes, (c) Interests, (d) Styles, (e) Knowledge, (f) Values, (g) Abilities, (h) Capacities, (i) States.

Note that "Personal Characteristics" is one of the parameters of behavior. The values of this

parameter for a given behavior are the set of particular personal characteristics of which the behavior in question is an expression. Also, to summarize briefly a set of considerations presented elsewhere (Ossorio, 1969/1978): A person is defined essentially as a life history. The number of ways that one life history as such can be the same as another or different from it is astronomically large and therefore not directly manageable. The parameters noted above represent relatively crude ways of grouping life histories. However, they are not merely arbitrary. They are systematically derivable from the more rigorous notion that life histories can differ in respect to constituent behaviors and the patterns of occurrence of those behaviors in the life history. They are also eminently usable, since all of the traditional "personality variables" of psychology and "personality features" of ordinary discourse can be classified meaningfully under these concepts. However, it should be noted that other classifications are possible, and therefore the list of parameters or classes of personal characteristic can never be completely definitive, and additions are possible in principle and might sometime actually be indicated.

Our familiar bodily characteristics are not straightforwardly ways in which one person as such

can be the same as another person or different from another. Thus, we cannot simply introduce these as the formal values of a new person parameter which would be called Embodiment. However, there is a solution of this general kind:

(4) <P> = <T, At, In, St, Kn, Va, Ab, Ca, St, E, θ>

Formula (4) represents a parametric analysis of persons. The first nine parameters are the general classes of personal characteristics noted above, i.e., Traits, Attitudes, et cetera. E is the Embodiment parameter. θ is a holistic "place holder" category which represents the possibility of additional types of personal characteristics.

The value of the Embodiment parameter is given by specifying the paradigmatic body type of the person in question rather than specific bodily characteristics. (Recall the discussion of the Paradigm Case Formulation in "Conceptual-Notational Devices," Ossorio, 1981.) In a PCF we cover a range of cases by introducing a paradigm case specification which covers some cases and then introduce some number of transformations of the paradigm case, each of which identifies a set of cases.) In describing a particular human being bodily we would specify (or presuppose) a normative

(paradigmatic) Homo sapiens embodiment and then introduce whatever transformations were necessary (e.g., six feet tall, red-haired) to achieve the desired individual characterization. Alternatively, since parametric analyses and paradigm case formulations are formally convertible into each other, we would introduce the parametric analysis of the normative Homo sapiens embodiment (e.g., height, hair color, weight, genetic structure, brain structure, etc.), and then specify parametric values for the individual or group in question.

Thus, it is paradigmatic body type, or Embodiment, which qualifies as one of the parameters of persons. It is this which is straightforwardly one of the ways in which one person as such can be the same as another person or different from another person. In contrast, ordinary individual characterizations of embodiment will be contingent personal characteristics. That is, they will presuppose, and be contingent on, a particular paradigmatic body type. For example, having red hair, a brain tumor, or an XY chromosome will be contingent on having a paradigmatic Homo sapiens embodiment. In contrast, having a viscosity anomaly or adhesion difficulties would be contingent upon having a paradigmatic amoeboid embodiment.

Systematic technical resources for giving the required descriptions are found in the descriptive formats associated with the State of Affairs System (Sections II, III in "What Actually Happens," Ossorio, 1971/1978). In particular, the Basic Object Unit (BOU) provides resources for giving Object Descriptions and part-whole descriptions and, in conjunction with the Basic Process Unit, it provides for Configuration (structure-function) Descriptions. Since these units are recursive, they may be used to give representations at any level from ultimate particles to the entire universe, and they may be used to give representations which extend from any level to any level, or which connect facts at one level with facts at any other level.

To review briefly, the Basic Object Unit provides a representation of an object as a whole, which is the same thing as a set of objects (parts) which are related in just those ways in which they constitute the whole. Because it has a recursive structure, each part (object) can be represented as a whole which is the same thing as a set of parts (objects), which are related in just those ways which constitute that whole. And so on.

One of the important concepts associated with object descriptions is the notion of an object paradigm

(O-Paradigm in the BOU). The object paradigm, with respect to a given object representation, corresponds to which division of the object into immediate constituents is made. For in general, there is no limit to the number of different ways in which an object can be divided into immediate constituents, and those constituents into their immediate constituents, and so on. In general, if we take the objects of ordinary discourse, e.g., trees, tables, persons, different subject matters (and often, different theories or conceptual systems within the same subject matter) will correspond to and be defined by reference to different object paradigms or different state of affairs descriptions.

For example, one way of dividing a human body into immediate constituents is the familiar one which gives us head, arms, legs, hands, etc., as immediate constituents. Another is the also familiar and more recently fashionable division into liver, heart, brain, blood vessels, and so forth. Still another is one which divides us into atoms, molecules, ions, etc., and still another divides us into mesons, pions, and so forth. Moreover, either the head, hands, etc., or the heart, liver, etc., division may be used as the starting point for the further division into atoms, molecules, etc., and those objects may be regarded

as the starting point for the division into pions, mesons, etc.

Of course, the objects referred to in the various "natural" sciences have no presumptive priority over the objects of ordinary discourse, nor are they "what there really is" in the world. The actual advantages and disadvantages of using such O-paradigms are whatever we find them in fact to be. The presumptive advantages and disadvantages are whatever we may expect from the systematic observation, manipulative conventions, and bureaucratic management characteristic of science in its present institutional form.

One of the features of Object Description, Process Description, and Configuration (object-process) Description is a structure of possible contingencies. For example, in a Configuration Description of a human being, we may state contingencies which relate "body" facts to facts about that person's behavior or personal characteristics (e.g., traits, attitudes, abilities, and capacities). For example, the classic case of a person who is unable to read because she has a tumor in her left temporal lobe is directly handled by a contingency statement which connects one contingent personal characteristic (the tumor) with a fact about possible behavior (unable to read) and with another personal characteristic (the reading disability).

More generally, the object-process format provides the vehicle for taking any fact that we can uncover anywhere under any description and connect it to persons in terms of what it implies about behavior.

It is worth noting that a different technical solution to the problem of representing embodiment is possible, and it is essentially the one I referred to initially; i.e., to anchor it in the Performance parameter of behavior and to formulate the facts of embodiment as matters of style. Style is one of the already-distinguished person parameters; it is defined as one in which the type of behavior which qualifies as its expression is specified by specifying something concerning the Performance parameter of behavior. In this vein, we would specify the individual's structure-function characteristics as aspects of performance, derive "vegetative" functions as deficit cases via paradigm case formulations, and generate global style characterizations such as "human style" or "amoeboid style" in place of explicit reference to paradigmatic body type. However, the apparent parsimony of such a solution is more illusion than reality, at least given our current habits of thought, for it would complicate our descriptions in return for the saving of one person parameter. The gain in perspicuity provided by the Embodiment solution has

been a decisive consideration, but part of understanding it is to understand the alternative possibilities. It is because the Person Concept has the structure it has that the alternative solutions are alternatives.

In sum, our way of dealing with the facts of embodiment is a way which makes available to a science of behavior all of the "body" facts that anyone is ever going to discover about persons, whether the discoverer is a physiologist, physicist, guru, artist, Rolfer, chemist, acupuncturist, parapsychologist, or a practitioner whose discipline has not yet been invented. It is a way which makes those facts available systematically, nonreductively, nonmystically, and nonparadoxically. Further, the nature of the solution is quite general. It has already been applied to computers, meat grinders, and airplanes and can be applied to mountains, trees, and organisms as well as atoms, molecules, and ions.

There is a historical loose end that is relevant here. In Meaning and Symbolism, (Ossorio, 1969/1978), I presented an earlier version of the State of Affairs System, which systematizes the reality concepts of object, process, event, state of affairs, and relationship. The systematization is accomplished by means of a calculational system (a system of transition rules). In order to highlight the

connectedness of the concepts of Person, Behavior, and Reality, I said there that persons are objects and human behaviors are processes. This is likely to be misleading in some fundamental ways, and so I would like to say now that persons are also not material objects and that behaviors are also not processes.

The force of saying that persons are objects is that persons have object characteristics. Conversely, the force of saying that persons are not material objects is that persons are not a species of material object and, as we saw above, "person" does not designate a type of material object.

A chalkboard is green, but "chalkboard" does not designate a type of green or a species of green. This window is glass, but "window" does not designate a type of glass or a species of glass. The chalkboard has certain kinds of characteristics, e.g., size, weight, shape, and function. These are not characteristics which green could have. This incompatibility of characteristics of chalkboards and colors is one of the facts sufficient to imply that a chalkboard is not a species of green, or of color. Similarly, persons have characteristics, e.g., thoughts, feelings, experiences, which material objects as such cannot have. So, although persons have object characteristics, they are not material objects.

Similarly, although behaviors are processes in that they have process aspects, given by the Performance parameter, they are also not processes, in that behavior is not a type or species of process, and specifically, not a species of movement (see Ossorio, 1973).

Some further elucidation may be desirable. Consider again the general formula for behavior:

(1) <B> = <I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S>

One way to read this formula discursively is to say that a state of affairs of the kind represented as B is one which at a minimum involves as immediate constituents states of affairs of each of the eight designated kinds. (Another way is to say that the class of B's is the class of octuples . . .).

In this regard I have sometimes used as heuristic examples the case of a jet aircraft taking off or of an automobile driving slowly down the street. Each of these phenomena, or states of affairs, can be referred to in a simple sentence as a single state of affairs, e.g., "the jet aircraft is taking off." That state of affairs is not a simple one. On the contrary, it is fairly complicated, and the fact that it is complicated is shown by the fact that it has numerous constituent states of affairs. For it to be the case that the jet aircraft is taking off many things have

to be the case. For example, there are states of affairs concerning the sequence of positions of the aircraft relative to the runway and relative to the ground. There are other states of affairs involving air intake and exhaust gases. And there are other states of affairs involving the rotation of the wheels and their relation to the fuselage, and still others involving the storage of fuel and the flow of fuel to the engines. And so on and on. In such example the simple description ("The jet aircraft is taking off") corresponds to the "B" in formula (1) and the set of implied states of affairs corresponds to the right side of formula (1). Clearly, a state of affairs of that sort (the jet aircraft taking off) requires states of affairs of those other sorts.

Similarly, then, for it to be the case that a behavior takes place (is engaged in), many other states of affairs classifiable under the eight parameters of formula (1) must obtain. The states of affairs classified under the Performance parameter mostly involve both objects and processes. Some of the states of affairs which would be classified under the Personal Characteristic (PC) parameter have to do with bodies. Most of these states of affairs do not involve bodies, but rather involve abilities, traits, values, states, and other such states of affairs involving persons.

When we include Embodiment among the set of person parameters we can say that these Personal Characteristic states of affairs do involve objects. Likewise, some of the states of affairs classifiable under the Achievement parameter involve objects or processes as immediate constituents, but most will not. The states of affairs classified under the remaining five parameters will not as such involve objects. Thus, the occurrence of a behavior will involve many states of affairs, and of these, some will involve objects as immediate constituents but most will not, and certain classes of them necessarily will not.

In the less contaminated language of the State of Affairs System: The occurrence of this behavior is [an event which is the same thing as] a state of affairs which is [the same thing as] a totality of related states of affairs, including SA_1, there being this object here, and SA_2, there being this process here having that object as a constituent, and SA_i, the many states of affairs corresponding to the values of the other (than Performance) parameters of behavior and the other (than Embodiment) parameters of persons.

The parametric analyses of person and behavior provide a perspicuous representation of the fact that the essential characteristics of persons include, but extend far beyond, the essential characteristics of

objects (a parametric analysis of material objects would give us size, shape, mass, and perhaps material), just as the essential characteristics of behavior include, but extend far beyond, the essential characteristics of movements or processes. These conceptual-notational devices, therefore, help to clarify what is involved in saying that persons are not material objects and behaviors are not processes.

These considerations have some relevance to the traditional mind-body problem.

Reports to the contrary notwithstanding, the mind-body problem is alive and well in academia. The fashionable answer today, if you ask a psychologist about the mind-body problem, is, "Oh, that's an old-fashioned problem. Really, it's a non-problem. I don't divide people artificially into a mind and a body or into a mental substance and a material substance." But it isn't that easy. One can't get out of the problem by pounding one's chest and saying "I don't have that problem." To do that is merely to impersonate someone who doesn't have that problem, but the substance of a solution evades us.

Let me review very briefly the nature of that problem. The mind-body problem, as we know it, stems from Descartes, at least in its present form. According to Descartes, there are two ultimate substances, one

mental and one material. Bodies are material objects, and by virtue of that have certain well-known characteristics such as having spatial extension, being located in space relative to other objects, having a geometrical shape, possibly undergoing displacements in space relative to other objects, having a temporal duration and location, and so on. Minds are a very different sort of thing. They are mental substances which take on all kinds of well-known characteristics such as experiences, emotions, thoughts, sights, sounds, smells, pains, pleasures, and so on. If we go down the specifications systematically, mind is a substance that has a set of possible characteristics or determinations, and body is a substance that has a set of possible characteristics or determinations, and there is no overlap between the two except perhaps that both undergo changes over time (but it is a truism that psychological duration is not the same as physical duration). Further, both mind and body are ultimate categories. There is nothing more fundamental than either, nothing beyond either one that could hold them together or relate them to one another.

It is because the two categories are both ultimate and non-overlapping in their characteristics or determinations that the problem of relationship arises, for under these conditions no relationship

of any interesting kind is possible. Heuristically: The number 17 and the number 15 belong to the same domain, and there are straightforward relations between them, e.g., 15 is two less than 17. Likewise a banana and a grape belong to the same domain, and there are straightforward relations between them, e.g., the banana is on the same table as the grape, or it has a less edible skin, et cetera. But what is the relation between the banana and the number 17? We may offer the holistic "placer-holder" description, "the relation between the banana and the number 17," on the model of "The relation between Wil and Jil." But whereas in the latter case we can "fill" the place by giving a variety of specifiable relations, e.g., "Wil is Jil's brother," "Wil and Jil admire each other," and so forth, there is no specification we can give for "the relation between the banana and the number 17." There is no relation which we could understand as being that relation.

Thus, one horn of the mind-body dilemma is that there cannot be a relation between mind and body.

The other horn of the dilemma is that there obviously is. If we stick a pin in Wil, he says, "Ouch! Stop it!" And we are not at all surprised. We do a prefrontal lobotomy on Wil and find that thereafter he is much more complaisant and noncontentious. We break his leg, and then he cannot walk. Conversely,

Wil sees the lion walk into the room and he trembles and breaks out in a cold sweat. We give him hypnotic suggestions and stigmata appear on his palms. We tell him his tax return will be audited and his blood pressure rises.

The history of psychological theorizing is the history of trying to weasel out of that dilemma.

One of the most obvious moves is to say that one or another of mind and body is real and the other isn't. For all our chest-thumping, psychological theorizing has been essentially an exercise in metaphysics with a few technical details thrown in. Since bodies are considerably easier to predict and control than minds, the common fashion in psychology has been to say that what there really is, is bodies, and minds are something superfluous, unreal, and unscientific. Many of our body mystics have parlayed such metaphysics into the reputation for being "rigorous, hard-headed scientists."

There are drawbacks, considering that psychology is the study of mind: Without mind, we have only bodies and perhaps organisms, and psychology reduces to biology. It is difficult to make any headway on a science if at the outset you deny the reality of its subject matter. So we will not be surprised if psychology has contributed little to our understanding of persons and their behavior.

Probably the next most popular move, other than saying that bodies are what there really is, is not, as one might expect, the simple, symmetric move of saying that what there really is, is minds. Psychology has been too parasitical on nineteenth-century physics for that. Rather, it is what sounds like a very liberal position. It goes more or less like this. "I don't see any problems with saying that people are organisms or bodies. They just happen to be organisms that think and have feelings and experiences and do all of the things that people do, that's all."

But in this case, the dilemma remains, since it was from the beginning a dilemma of concepts, not of words, and changing the words may disguise the facts but it will not change them. The fact is that if our liberal thinker really means "organism," which means a body of a certain sort, then it is nonsense to say that <u>it</u> has experiences, etc. Or else he is using "organism" to refer to a hybrid which is composed of both mind and body, and saying of that hybrid that it thinks, feels, etc. But there can't be any such hybrid because there can't be any connection between the two, and lumping them together like that is like lumping together the banana and the number 17 and talking about a "17 banana." Now you might try saying of a 17 banana that it had a thicker skin than a grape or

that it was larger than the number 15. In every case the result is nonsense because the characteristics required by the banana are nonsensical for the 17 and vice versa. (Recall that it is not that the 17 aspect of the 17 banana is greater than 15, but the 17 banana itself, otherwise the original mind-body separation and problem remains unchanged.) The same nonsense is involved with our hybrid organism--anything we say about it will be nonsensical: "I can't see why organisms can't think, feel, etc." "I can't see why a 17 banana can't weigh four ounces and be two greater than 15." Nor will it help to create a fictitious entity which is "The thing which is the 17 banana and has both sorts of characteristics," for our next question will be, "And what thing is that?" and the answer, "the organism" or "the person," will only lead to a repetition of the question and to the original dilemma.

Another move is to introduce machinery into the picture, but mental machinery rather than body machinery. Earlier versions included cognitive "schemas"; more recent versions include "cognitive processes" and "information processing." But machinery is machinery for all that, and machinery is just as antithetical to mind as body is because it is essentially an object-process concept, and if we take it literally rather than merely metaphorically, all of the original problems

remain. One way to appreciate this better is to see how easy it is, once you formulate mind in terms of (hypothetical) mental machinery, to reduce it to (real) body machinery. "Thoughts and feelings are really brain processes" is the current version. Once you have mind and body set up in parallel form, it's very easy to say that one is really the other, and you're back to "All there really is is bodies." (See, for example, Fodor (1981) on the "functionalist" position.) If you don't do that, you have the original mind-body problem. How can something that has these body characteristics also have these mind characteristics? Impossible. So that is not a way out, either. (In Fodor's (1981) discussion of "functionalism" he initially comments that "Most philosophers now agree that no argument has successfully demonstrated why mind-body causation should not be regarded as a species of physical causation." He neglects to point out that it is also the case that no argument has successfully demonstrated why mind-body causation <u>should</u> be regarded as a species of physical causation. Obviously the burden of proof rests on the latter unless we wish to beg the question. Fodor does in fact conclude that "As matters stand, the problem of qualitative content poses a serious threat to the assertion that functionalism can provide a general theory of the mental.")

Another classic way out is just to say, "Well, these things do interact." For example, in psychoanalytic theory you have a body locus energized, and lo! a psychic representation comes into existence, and then behold! the psychic representation causes my arm to move toward the apple. Sometimes the theory reads like interactionism, sometimes like epiphenomenalism, and sometimes like psychophysical parallism, all of which have never been more than default positions along with the classic double language and double aspect "theories." What is wrong with saying that they do interact is that there is no way that they could. (Interaction would imply a logical domain of phenomena within which the lawful interactions of mind and body occur. Such a domain would be more fundamental than mind or body, since it would include both. By Descartes' original definition of mind and body as ultimate categories, no such domain is possible. Nor have his philosophical or scientific successors identified such a domain.) Such explanations are therefore magical or supernatural explanations, not scientific ones.

Note that there is no implication here that scientific explanations have to be absolutely complete or that there shouldn't be any gaps in scientific accounts. Rather, it is one thing to recognize gaps in our accounts; it is quite another to call them

explanatory. And it is one thing to issue I O Us based on our incomplete knowledge or understanding; it is quite another to issue I O Us which, in terms of the understanding we do have, cannot be paid off. From an esthetic-intellectual point of view, magical solutions are decisively deficient; they are not possible intellectual positions, and at most can be legitimately valued for their historical interest and their salvage value--which may be high.

Once we get beyond these major genres, there is little more than swindles, confidence games, and nonsense. For example, "What you have is a continuum, and any given thing may be more physical and less mental or more mental and less physical. For example, having a headache is more mental and less physical, and being stuck with a pin is more physical and less mental." Trying to comment critically on this is like trying to comment critically on the view that things are just more or less seventeen-ish or more or less banana-ish. What is called for is education, not argument. If one had to say something, one could say that this kind of "explanation" is merely verbal play and doesn't have enough conceptual substance to give it any explanatory value.

In short, the history of psychological theorizing in light of the mind-body problem resembles nothing

so much as an old-time detective farce in which half the time the characters are scurrying around trying to hide the body, and the other half they're standing around looking innocent and pretending it never happened. Or the joke about the Irishman who was accused of stealing a kettle and said, "I didn't do it. Besides, it had a hole in it. And anyhow, I gave it back."

The kinds of theory noted above are generally believed to be literally or approximately True by their proponents and are generally so presented. Taking a phrase from the linguists, these are "God's Truth" theories. When you believe that what the theory says is how things really are, you have a God's Truth theory. The contrast is a "Hocus-pocus" theory. When you claim only that the theory is just a convenient way of talking but disclaim truth, you have a Hocus-pocus theory. Where there's room for God's Truth, there is also room for hocus-pocus, and, not surprisingly, in psychology there is a good deal of that.

Characteristically, it takes a very liberal-sounding form such as the following, "Well, I know those theories are no good. I know they don't deal with the problem. But after all, it would be presumptuous to pretend to have anything fundamental to say about these things. After all, nobody has a pipeline to the Truth. What I do is I just use the things that

seem to make sense and that have a practical value in helping me organize my observations." That does sound pretty liberal.

The defect here is that this approach is essentially a variation on what I called the Con Man, which is one of the six paradigm cases of how not to negotiate (Ossorio, 1976, pp. 154, 165). In the social practice of Negotiation, which represents the effort to find a good answer, or a true answer, a correct answer, etc., the Con Man is one who says "I'm very open-minded." You could convince me of anything. All you have to do is prove it to me." Since there is no such thing as proof in matters of most sorts, to take that stance is implicitly to assert license to think and say anything you damned well please because the facts will never prove anything to you. Similarly, our intellectual liberal above is someone for whom neither fact nor argument carry any intrinsic weight, since they are disqualified in advance. So someone who takes such a position is someone who has disqualified himself from entering into any serious discussion of the matter at hand. It is appropriate to let that disqualification stand.

Finally, we may note what is perhaps the only respectable attempt to deal with the mind-body issue in recent decades. This is P. F. Strawson's work

Individuals (1959). His thesis there was that the concept of a person corresponds to a fundamental logical or ontological category, one as fundamental as mind or body or even more so. Accordingly, a person is an individual of a special logical type, having both psychological characteristics and material object characteristics. In logical terminology, a person is an individual of a type for which both M-predicates (material object predicates) and P-predicates (psychological predicates) are applicable. Further, according to Strawson, there is a logical, or ontological, connection between the two, namely that such individuals are necessarily identified and re-identified by reference to their material object characteristics, and it is this necessity which provides the connection in principle between mind and body. (Recall that a common framework was identified above as a condition for making intelligible any interaction between mind and body.)

However, Strawson's argument concerning the necessity of appealing to material object characteristics has not been sustained. As a result, his formulation is left without an in-principle connection between the mental and material aspects of persons. But then we are left with the original problem which I formulated as the problem of the 17 banana: We are left with the statement that the mental and material do go

together, but there is no way to show how that could be.

Still, one could say that the effort was well conceived and well directed. The move from mind and body to P-predicates and M-predicates and persons represents a recognition that one needs something else in the picture besides mind and body in order to bring them together. For, in the original formulation, these are ultimate ontological categories: There is nothing beyond them and nothing more fundamental, and so there is nothing that could bring them together or relate them. Presumably that was not a problem for Descartes, because for him God was the ultimate answer to the unity of the two. However, it is generally the case for us that that solution is not available, though it may be that we are the worse off for that. Neither does it appear, following Strawson's effort, that theories of logic will provide a solution for us.

Of course, there is no reason why they should. In "What Actually Happens" (1971/1978), I commented on the poverty of philosophical argument relative to the Degragation-Ceremony analysis of "determinism," and on the insufficiency of Davidson's (1967) "quantification over events" relative to the part-whole representation provided by the State of Affairs System. The dilemmas in regard to the Self, and difficulties

in historical explanation, as well as the pre-empirical basis of empiricism, provide other examples. Given a genuine behavioral science, there is no particular impetus to look to philosophers to solve psychological problems.

The importance of resolving the problem of the general relation of mind to body is that an adequate formulation is needed in order to provide formal access to the empirical possibilities. So long as we do not we shall continue to be fundamentally lacking in our understanding of persons and their behavior. Correspondingly, we shall continue to have mistaken and distorted notions of what it is we can claim to have discovered when we collect and analyze empirical data involving particular mind-body relations.

If there is no way out of the mind-body problem, the thing to do is not to get in. The Person Concept formulation shows how we can do this straightforwardly:

(1) <B> = <I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S>

(2) <B> = <I, <B>, <B>, KH, P, A, PC, S>

(3) Person = An individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of deliberate action

(4) <P> = <T, At, In, St, Kn, Va, Ab, Ca, St, E, θ>

A knowledge of the State of Affairs System presented in "What Actually Happens" (1971/1978) is relevant here. To review briefly, the State of Affairs System (SAS) is a calculational system involving the concepts of objects, process, events, state of affairs, and relationship. In particular, descriptions referring to any of the first four of these concepts may be converted via identity coordination to descriptions referring to any of the other three. What is fundamental is the system which defines them as concepts. It should be noted also that the values of each of the parameters of formulas (1), (2), and (4) are states of affairs, but in the case of P (Performance) in (1) and (2), the state of affairs is the same thing as a process, and in the case of E in (4), the state of affairs is the same thing as an object. The values of B and P are also states of affairs.

Thus, as above: There being this behavior (b) is a state of affairs which is the same thing as a totality of related states of affairs, including there being this object here (SA_1) and there being this process here having that object as a constitutent (SA_2) and many other states of affairs (SA_i) corresponding to the values of the other (than Performance) parameters of behavior and the other (than Embodiment) parameters

of persons. (Note that person parameters correspond to the PC parameter of behavior.)

There is a formal aspect and a substantive aspect here. The formal aspect is provided by the State of Affairs System. In that system, objects, processes, and events are ultimate in that there is nothing beyond them, ontologically speaking (though there is something beyond ontology, i.e., reality and reality constraints as discussed in "What Actually Happens" (Ossorio, 1971/1978)). However, not only are they not independent of one another, but they are instead defined by their relationships to one another and to states of affairs. In the concept of state of affairs there is the potential, via Rule 1 (A state of affairs is a totality of related objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs), of not being converted into objects, processes, or events. This possibility is realized in the K, W, KH, PC, and S parameters of behavior.

Substantively, there is a multitude of conceptual connections among the values of the various parameters in formula (1) and in formula (4), as well as between the parametric values and the behavior of which they are aspects. For example, in regard to the latter, for the behavior B to be the behavior it is (e.g., my drinking a cup of coffee) there are strong constraints on the possible values of each of the parameters.

Thus, nothing could be farther from an arbitrary juxtaposition of elements than the coherent factual structure of an ordinary human behavior.

That structure has a place for states of affairs involving seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling, thinking, wanting, knowing, valuing, and other "mental" phenomena as well as for states of affairs involving arms, hands, eyes, livers, and sodium pumps, synaptic junctions, and other "bodily" phenomena. In that structure we have a resolution that is formally similar to Strawson's but has essentially nothing else in common, i.e., a way of bringing together both kinds of fact within some framework which makes the relationship between them not just arbitrary and not just a matter of fiat --and, incidentally, not just empirical, either. Q.E.D.

The Person Concept formulation is not a solution to the mind-body problem, nor was it devised with that problem in mind. It does show why the impossible problem is not inherent in the phenomena, and the Person Concept formulation does not generate the problem. Both the formal aspect (the State of Affairs System) and the substantive aspect (formulas (1), (2), and (4), together with definition (3)) of the viable alternative, are distinctive to Descriptive Psychology, and in one sense, this explains why an earlier resolution was not forthcoming. However, in working with object-process

descriptions at a technical level, we have encountered a problem which I believe will throw a good deal of light on why the mind-body problem remained unsolved for hundreds of years.

If we formualte the general problem as "What is the in-principle relation between mind and body (or between mind and body as such)?" then the general difficulty can be stated: There is a relation and we have no name for it.

This is not an exotic sort of difficulty. It arises in all sorts of commonplace contexts, as we have discovered. Here are two examples:

1. Think of an automobile. What is the relationship between the steering wheel and the carburetor of an automobile? Perhaps the temptation arises to say, "They are both parts of the same automobile." But this is like Davidson's quantifying over events; it will not distinguish the carburetor-steering wheel relationship from the battery-muffler relationship, etc., nor will it tell us what the relationship in question is, nor much of anything else either. The fact is that we have no name for the relationship in question. One reason why we do not is that we have no use for that relationship. We are never in a position where we have to refer to it, discriminate it, elaborate

it, or anything else about it, nor do we do anything that depends on it. Yet it's there. In an automobile the steering wheel does have a relationship to the carburetor. The fact is that our primary interest is in the whole (automobile) of which these two objects are parts, and our secondary interest is in each of these being the part that it is. And if somebody asks, "What's the relationship of this to this?", our primary resource for answering is to talk about parts and wholes. We describe the whole automobile in detail, including the details of the motor, and in the end we point to each and say, "The carburetor is this part and the steering wheel is that part," and that tells about the relation between them. And, indeed, if we are familiar with automobiles, we are not at all bothered by the question of what is the relation between the steering wheel and the carburetor. We know as much about what that relation is as we need to know, and the fact that we don't have a name for it doesn't bother us in the least. Note that nothing is importantly different in the example if, instead of talking about the carburetor and the steering wheel, we designate as the "kesh" all of the automobile other than the carburetor and then ask, "What is the relationship between the carburetor and the kesh?"

2. Think of an organization, e.g., a commercial organization, or, in the specific case in point, a police department. What is the relationship between the dispatcher (as such) and the patrol officer in the patrol car? Here we encounter the same problem, and we handle it in the same way. What we do is to describe the organization and how it works in detail, including a description of the statuses of "dispatcher" and "patrol officer," and in the end, we say, "This is the dispatcher, and this is a patrol officer." That tells as much as anyone needs to know about that relationship beteeen the dispatcher and the patrol officer.

3. In general, any complex structure will have this feature, that we have no names for most of the relationships among its parts as such and no interest in these relationships as such, but rather, our interest is in each one as the part it is in the whole. To call this thing a carburetor rather than, say, a curious collection of metal pieces, is already to refer to it as, actually or paradigmatically, a known particular part of a known sort of whole. Calling it a carburetor identifies what part it is and therefore implicitly already constitutes the kind of part-whole explanation referred to above. No wonder there is no more to be said.

Calling this thing a carburetor is a case of making a status assignment, and it exemplifies the holistic description presented in the last section of "What Actually Happens." The technical resource for giving such a description is Contingency 2(C) in the Basic Object Unit presented in Section III of "What Actually Happens" (Ossorio, 1978, pp. 52-53).

Think of formulas (1) and (4) as representing part-whole cases. Once the formula is given, we can point to the various parameters and say, "'Mind' is a collective term for this part or this part or . . . , and 'Body' refers to that part or that part." As to the relationship between them, we don't have a name for it and we don't need one, because we are very familiar with this whole thing and these known parts. This is very different from having to say, lamely, "Well, they do so go together, somehow."

An epistemological connection such as the one suggested by Strawson might have established a formal connection between mind and body, but even if the effort had been successful, it could not have provided the substantive understanding given by a genuine part-whole explication.

When we do apprehend the whole of which "mind" and "body" are elements, it isn't that we have now answered the question of what is the relation between

them. Rather, we have gotten out from under the burden of the question. To be sure, we could invent a name for the relation, but that would still sound as question-begging as saying, "Well, it's the carburetor-steering wheel relation": "Well, it's the mind-body relation." If the situation is as I have described, no better description is available, and so it will not be surprising that hundreds of years of scholarly effort have not resulted in producing one.

In retrospect, we can say that the mind-body problem is a classic example of tying ourselves up in knots by doing something that makes sense. For of course, distinguishing mind and body does make sense. It is simple, obvious, and sensible. It is not a fiction, and it is not an arbitrary division. We have not been able to get along without making the distinction. Yet the distinction is of such a kind that operating with it in any of the ways that most obviously make sense leaves us in an untenable position. The systematic formulation of the concepts of Person and Behavior makes it possible to do justice to the facts of mind and body without being victimized by the classical intellectual idiom which generated the problem, and which still informs current scientific and academic thought.

Thus, although there is a mind-body problem, there is also <u>not</u> a mind-body problem.

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