

Sallust's *Bellum Jugurthinum* and the
Experience of the Roman Soldier

Lucas Andrew Monson
Dept. of Classics
University of Colorado at Boulder



Advisor

Noel Lenski: Dept. of Classics

Committee Members

Noel Lenski: Dept. of Classics

Peter Hunt: Dept. of Classics

Steven Dike: Dept. of History

November 2013

The pursuit of knowledge in the realm of military history was for a long time limited to the tactical and strategic breakdown of war. Many historical sources describe war in terms of large-scale campaigns and battles, and thus, this was the subject of study. Surprisingly recent, though, has come the quest to better understand these matters on a more intimate level, that is, on the level of the individual combatant. The idea is that further study into the experiences of the combatants themselves may allow us to expand greatly our understanding of martial conflict. Books like John Keegan's *The Face of Battle*, Richard Holmes' *Acts of War*, and S.L.A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire*¹ have made tremendous strides in opening up academic circles to the values of their study. As a result, our perception of war and the ability to study it has benefited greatly. Therefore, it is a laudable mission to seek clarification of the question of 'the face of battle' in order to rectify any uncertainties about the nature of war.

This pursuit becomes noticeably more difficult in the case of the ancient world. We are faced with the troublesome task of piecing together the experience of war in this era due to many limiting factors. In the field of modern history, one may go straight to multiple authors and investigate inconsistencies by comparison with an abundance of other sources. Often, accounts from both the opposing sides are available to hone our understanding of a specific war and its combatants. These luxuries are not afforded in ancient contexts. Writings from antiquity are subject to many constraints and bring to bear many questions, the solutions to which are largely conjectural due to sources' old age and small quantity. In ancient Rome, writing history was a pastime for the aristocratic elite. Authors' writings are often filled with the bias of their social class, and more importantly, the writers were commanders and did not have the frontline

¹ Holmes *Acts of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), Keegan *The Face of Battle* (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), Marshall *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1978).

experience of the infantry. These men could also use their writings as a medium to demonstrate their own mastery of literary prose. Their works are potentially unreliable in discerning the actuality of events because of this. No known first hand accounts from frontline soldiers exist, and we get limited insight into their lives from our sources.

The writings of Gaius Sallustius Crispus, or Sallust, are, unfortunately, no exception. Of his two fully extant works, the *Bellum Jugurthinum* is of greatest interest for the ‘face of battle’ question. Its subject, the Jugurthine War, pitted the imperialist state of Rome against the Kingdom of Numidia in North Africa in the years from 112 to 105 BCE. The conflict began when the prince Jugurtha made a grab for power by slaughtering his brothers, snubbing Roman wishes, and killing quite a few Italians on the way. Though some minor logistical and chronological inconsistencies exist,² Sallust’s insight into the actual war is, in some ways, quite informative. Nevertheless, he still raises many questions. He did serve as a commander and governor under Julius Caesar, yet his military endeavors were limited and he was never a well-accomplished soldier. As a result, his writings give plentiful coverage of the decisive and wide-ranging decisions made by leading characters, their outcome, and their effect on the story. This means many descriptions of macro-politics, invasions, large troop movements, large battles, sieges, victories, and catastrophes. These are of vital importance to the whole of the story, yet we get no in-depth look into the smaller events of the war, nor the individual’s experience of them. In order to understand the war truly, this gap must be filled. Only after that can one claim to comprehend the nature of the Jugurthine War, and of war in the late Roman Republic.

Thankfully, we are not limited to pure supposition. In the process of telling his account, Sallust inadvertently sheds some light onto this unknown subject through his general descriptions

² Syme, *Sallust* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), 142-150

of the war and combat. These various hints can be pieced together with knowledge from other martial sources to help paint a more complete picture. Caesar's writings are exceptionally useful in this pursuit, as they share a similar chronology and are written by one of the greatest military minds of the late Roman Republic. Caesar's experience of war was extensive, and he built his career upon martial achievements and his own soldierly toil. Though not of the same time period, other ancient sources like Livy, Plutarch, and Ammianus also give us constructive comparisons. Modern cases also present valuable, and better-attested, cross-cultural insights into combat despite the social transformations that have occurred between antiquity and the present. In the scope of modern human development, two thousand years is not a long enough time to change such basic responses like 'fight or flight', thus making select modern examples applicable to the ancient Roman context. By combining pieces of Sallust's account with other ancient sources and modern examples, we may more fully understand and appreciate the Roman infantrymen's motivations and experience of war in the late Republic, and by extension, war itself.

To do this we must explore four major categories of life on campaign: the men involved, discipline and army life, battle, and siege. I start with an in-depth look into the sort of men we may expect to have fought in the Jugurthine War. Next, their life in the martial setting will be analyzed by examining daily routine and discipline. The study then turns to the face of combat and the experience of Roman soldiers in it, including a look into physical burdens, battle atmosphere, morale, and panic. Finally, I will end on the problem of siege and the additional struggles it caused for the individual, and what that looked like.

Demographics of the Roman Fighting Man

The first aspect of the war that must be explored in order to understand its combatants is demographics. This is the most basic, but still drastically important, feature to know about the Roman soldier's experience in the *Jugurthine War*. No matter what happens in a conflict, the events are all viewed and interpreted by the different perspectives of each soldier. Understanding whom the average individual was is key to knowing his experience of a martial life and his willingness to endure harsh discipline.³ Age, background, and motivations should all be considered. Sallust and Plutarch wrote about the nature of the soldiers who signed on with Marius, yet sadly have little to say concerning other demographic details about volunteers or levied troops. In addition, they both fail to address the complexities of Marius' reforms. Marius was the first Roman commander to accept large numbers of volunteers from the lowest census class – the *capite censi*, or those “counted by head” instead of wealth – into the infantry. His actions greatly complicated the army's characteristics, as it became a mixed force in respect to the types of soldiers in it. Luckily, many ancient authors offer some mention on the demographics of the soldiery. It is still possible to piece together a respectable amount of information about the average Roman soldier by drawing off of Vegetius, Plutarch, Livy, and the laws of Gaius Grachus in addition to Sallust. All emphasize the dichotomy between the levied troops and the volunteers. Because of this, we can easily separate the two groups and consider their characteristics separately. So by exploring and extrapolating from the information left to us in the original sources, we may still gain an educated picture of the characters fighting, even if we must address two ‘types’ of soldiers.

The army of the Republic prior to Marius was more mixed than after his reforms. Because of the levee system, which chose the male citizens that would go to war in times of

³ Motivations on the field of battle should be treated separately and will be discussed at a later point in this paper.

need, the ages of the soldiers were fairly diverse. Logically, the draft would have been aimed at men in their prime, but older or younger men were selected in times of extreme need. Sallust mentions nothing concerning the age of the draftees under Metellus or Marius. Vegetius, writing of ‘ancient custom’, by which he means Republican times, gives us much insight. He claims that soldiers were levied at the beginning of puberty, and Sallust writes much the same in his account of the Catiline Conspiracy.⁴ This seems much too young for this period, as Gaius Grachus’ *Lex Militaris* (military law) raised the minimum age for draftees to seventeen years, although some boys likely lied about their age in order to share in the glories of war. In the modern era we have seen how a large number of infantrymen were well under the age limit of the time, like the boy soldiers of the Civil War or of the American-Vietnamese War. Nevertheless, I do not think it likely that these numbers were large enough to affect the data. Therefore, the lower limit for age was likely around seventeen. As for the upper age limits, it would be right to consider fifty a rough cut-off point, as stated in Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita*. However, soldiers of this age were very unlikely to have been in the Roman armies of the Jugurthine War since their allowance into the military was a rare circumstance.⁵ So given this wide range of data, I believe it would be safe to say the average age in a levied army would be around the late twenties.⁶ This would fit with Vegetius’ requirement for physical ability, match descriptions in Livy, and would allow for a good amount of experience within the legion of draftees.

Once members of the *capite censi* were allowed to volunteer *en masse*, this age figure had the potential to change. We cannot accurately account for their impact on the data because of limited knowledge, as Sallust gives us no indication as to the age or specific numbers of the

⁴ Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science* 1.4. Sallust, *Cataline Conspiracy* 7.4

⁵ Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* 40.26, 42.31

⁶ Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War* (Boston: Brill, 1999), 9-14.

capite censi who joined Marius' army. Neither do his writings, unfortunately, give us an idea of the size of the Roman army in Numidia. We do know a large portion of the army Marius took to Numidia was made of volunteers, so we can assume that their presence would have affected the data measurably.⁷ Their stated motivations, money and sustenance, and the fervor with which they enlisted also give us a slight hint as to their age. We get the strong sense that they were adventurous fortune seekers wishing to create better lives for themselves. This indicates a younger age group. It is impossible to surmise their ages with any more accuracy than by this supposition. Based on the information at hand, the lower twenties age range seems most likely. Older volunteers were certainly present, but not to the same extent as the young. Despite the large numbers that volunteered for Marius' army, the force that he received from Rutilius in Africa, as well as the troops he was allowed to levee in Italy, were both armies of draftees.⁸ With this in mind, it would be reasonable to put the average age of the whole army under the control of Marius as around twenty-five to twenty-seven.

In the modern world, many might see younger soldiers as vulnerable and especially susceptible to the harshness of war. Let us keep in mind that the ancients, even the younger ones, were much closer to death than the modern, and more used to it. Psychological casualties were certainly a concern, just as in a modern army, but the Romans were more likely to resist them. It could be arguable that the chaos that resulted in Albinus' army was due to psychological distress, but Sallust much more portrays their failure as a result of the general's wrongdoing than the squeamishness of the soldiers. For the most part, these were not boys, but hard, young men who went on and served Rome well.

⁷ Sallust, *Jug.* 84-86.

⁸ Sallust, *Jug.* 84, 86.

The backgrounds of the Roman men are much easier to see and more clearly explained in Sallust. The force Marius set sail with from Italy was made up of a large amount of poor volunteers who were allowed to join the army at Marius' allowance. Much of the urban mob was made up of families, who, within the last century, had migrated to the cities after the failure to sustain themselves in the country. That was too long ago for the young men of the *capite censi* to remember or experience. Therefore, many of the men who signed on with Marius were poor and made their living by any means possible. The aristocratic authors saw this as a terrible thing.

Vegetius emphasizes the supposed superiority of a rural stock of soldiers:

On this subject I think it could never have been doubted that the rural populace is better suited for arms. They are nurtured under the open sky in a life of work, enduring the sun, careless of shade, unacquainted with bathhouses, ignorant of luxury, simple-souled, content with a little, with limbs toughened to endure every kind of toil, and for whom wielding iron, digging a fosse and carrying a burden is what they are used to from the country.⁹

By this same logic, the soldiers from the city were plagued with vice, and made terrible soldiers because of their comparatively soft lifestyle. This was the typical bias of the Roman aristocracy. Urban mobs were always looked down upon as the desperate poor, while many writers saw Rome's agricultural origins as the source of its greatness. Marius' new enlistment style ran directly contrary to these opinions. In the end, these poor men were just as able of military service as any other, and proved good soldiers who were more than willing to endure hardship.¹⁰ Also, given that the *capite censi* was only a portion of the army, the majority would still have been close to meeting Vegetius' ideal.

Some draftees would also have been relatively poor because of Grachus' drastic lowering of the property qualification to bolster army numbers. Even this large drop was only the

⁹ Vegetius I.III

¹⁰ Plutarch, *Life of Gaius Marius* 13.1

next step in a trend of falling qualifications, as during the Hannibalic War the requirement fell from a worth of eleven thousand *asses* (bronze coins) to four thousand.¹¹ Despite this there was still a property qualification, and for the most part it seems that these members of the army sent to Africa would have been acceptable to traditional eyes. That is, the citizens were landholding members of the tribes who were drafted into the heavy infantry and fought until the threat was extinguished, after which they would return to their land.

The culmination of all that has been discussed so far lies in exploring the motivations that drove these soldiers to go to war and submit to military discipline. It is clearly enough stated with the volunteers. Sallust claims that, for the poor, “whatever will put something into their pockets is right and proper in their eyes.”¹² For Sallust, the main motivation for volunteering was monetary. Though his bias is obvious here, there is no reason to doubt him. Throughout the early part of his account, there are many statements about the seemingly endless wealth with which Jugurtha bribes Roman senators.¹³ Sallust’s comments here could reflect the typical notions of the aristocratic writers: that Rome was in a state of moral decay after the absence of *metus hostilis* (fear of an enemy). This manifested itself in an overstatement of Jugurtha’s bribes in order to emphasize Sallust’s own notions of *virtus* (virtue) and its yield to *libido* (desire).¹⁴ Despite this, it seems logical that tales of Numidia’s wealth would have attracted many Romans, and allowance into the army became an opportunity to thicken their pockets with that wealth. They were not disappointed, as Plutarch recorded the winnings after the war as nearly nine thousand pounds of gold and silver with two hundred and eighty thousand drachmas.¹⁵ Whether

¹¹ Smith, *Service in the Post-Marian Army* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), 4

¹² Sallust, *Jug.* 86.

¹³ Sallust, *Jug.* 13, 29.

¹⁴ Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961)

¹⁵ Plutarch, *Life of Gaius Marius* 12.4.

these winnings were *manubiae*, public money intended for games, triumphs, and public enrichment under control of the commander, or loot intended for the soldiers is not clearly explained in Plutarch. We can assume that some of the above stated amount was *manubiae* and not distributed to the army, but the goods that were personally looted by the soldiers were pooled and distributed amongst themselves as *praeda*.¹⁶ The total amount given to us represented nearly two million days wages for a soldier. Surely the men could expect to see a large amount of this, even if a quantity of it were appropriated for public use. Sallust looks down upon this impulse for money, and it certainly got the Republic into trouble later as men became utterly dependent upon their commander, but at this early time it was a perfectly legitimate motivation for most people. It did not hamper the soldiers' effectiveness in the war, nor did it lessen their ability to withstand life on campaign. In fact they excelled in combat and under Marius' discipline, which was a continuation of Metellus' practices with his 'traditional' army.¹⁷ Men from the *capite censi* volunteered and accepted army life so that they could acquire enough money, through pay and loot, to earn a living and better their lives.

It is difficult to discuss motivations when looking at the levied soldiers, as they had no choice but to go to war. Service was very unpopular at this time, most likely due to the conflicts in Spain. The hostile senate was counting on this fact when they allowed Marius to build his army, yet they misjudged, and Romans were still enthusiastic to go to war in Numidia.¹⁸ So why were these men willing and eager to withstand military life in a time when it was said to be unpopular? If we believe the ancient historians, men fought for idealistic reasons. Patriotism and

¹⁶ Churchill, "Ex Quo Quod Vellent Facerent: Roman Magistrates' Authority Over *Praeda* and *Manubiae*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 129 (1999): 85-116

¹⁷ Sallust, *Jug.* 87, 88. Plutarch, *Life of Gaius Marius* 13.1, 15.2-3.

¹⁸ Sallust, *Jug.* 84, note that this is in reference to Marius' soldiers, yet ones that he was legally drafting.

necessity were certainly possible motivations, A great deal of the men under Metellus must have heard of the disaster in Numidia, and likely considered Jugurtha a real threat to Rome. The men who fought under Albinus knew this first hand, as they had suffered defeat from Jugurtha's army. Sallust also states that all of the citizenry were engaged in helping Metellus prepare for campaign, likely because of their fear of Jugurtha.¹⁹ The war was in Africa, but many soldiers might have believed that they were protecting their homeland.²⁰ Another possibility that Sallust indicated was a strong tendency for Romans to emulate the great deeds of ancestors.

I have heard that Quintus Maximus, Publius Scipio, and other illustrious citizens of our state, used to say that the sight of their ancestor's portrait masks fired their hearts with an ardent desire to merit honor.²¹

Honor can be a great motivation to withstand punishment. Though these soldiers had to go to war, the social pressure to assume the burden honorably must have been immense. Lendon gives great importance to the role this played for soldiers. Members of the army created their own community, in which the judgment of their peers was of great influence. "Honor and shame among soldiers were grounded in success in war..."²² This was applicable in both military life and also in combat. Sallust spoke despicably of soldiers and generals who failed to act honorably on behalf of Rome. On a more positive note, the cordial relationships among soldiers in their community could have also given them motivation to endure hardship. The organization of men into *contubernia*, or squads, is argued to have nurtured an intimate bond between its members. These bonds would have made the men feel more at comfortable in their martial lives.²³ In

¹⁹ Sallust, *Jug.* 43

²⁰ Sallust, *Jug.* 87: *armis libertatem patriam parentisque et alia omnia tegi*

²¹ Sallust, *Jug.* 4.

²² Lendon, *Empire of Honor* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997), 243

²³ Goldsworthy, *Roman Army at War: 100 BC-AD 200* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 257

addition, many were willing to serve because of utter confidence in Marius' boasting, and were confident in Marius' ability to earn them glory and wealth:

...most of the men were eager to go overseas with Marius, imagining that they would make a fortune out of the spoils, return home victorious, and so forth.²⁴

This brings us to the largest motivator. Though there are many mentions stating the greed of the *capite censi*, and it does not seem that drafted soldiers' motivations were drastically different. In his speech after the Battle at the River Muthul, before Marius enacted his reforms, Metellus reassured his troops that from that point on, they would "be working to obtain booty."²⁵ This could have been meant to be a relief to the soldiers, that Rome was no longer at risk. Still, the motivational factor based on greed is evident. After Jugurtha laid an ambush upon the Roman scouts and foragers, Metellus put an end to marauding by isolated bands.²⁶ This indicates both that soldiers were allowed a fair amount of freedom in pillaging before this, and also that they still did afterwards but only in better-protected groups and on a smaller scale. Upon landing in Africa, Marius' first act was to plunder the countryside and let his soldiers have the spoils, contrary to practice, in order to gain the favor of both draftees and volunteers in his army. It makes perfect sense that soldiers were concerned with money. They were paid for their service, and after the *lex Militaris*, soldiers were no longer docked for their equipment. Nevertheless, this was not meant to be used as a bonus or to reward a soldier for service, only to cover expenses while on campaign until the man could return to his occupation at home.²⁷ Surely it is not unrealistic that most men were interested in bettering their financial standing. They were not as influenced by a desire for wealth as the *capite censi* volunteers who needed it, and surely factors

²⁴ Sallust, *Jug*, 84

²⁵ Sallust, *Jug*. 54.

²⁶ Sallust *Jug*. 55.

²⁷ Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army* (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 2003), 94.

like honor, patriotism, comradeship, and necessity played a part. But it would seem that for the majority of the army, money and personal advancement was the primary incentive to endure the harsh military life.

Life on Campaign

The soldier spent an overwhelming majority of his life not in combat, but rather, in a multitude of other day-to-day activities that were necessary for an army on campaign to perform. Because of this, it is essential to understand a Roman soldier's daily life if one hopes to form a solid perception of Roman martial life in the Late Republic. Many historians choose to focus on combat and its effects on the combatant when studying war on the individual's level, as battle is the most intense and characteristic part of war. To truly understand the subject of war, though, we must determine the whole of a soldier's life, not just the most intense bits.

The intricacies of the soldiers' existence are details rarely explained in historical accounts. This is true in Sallust's case. He himself was a member of the Senatorial Class and his writing reflects what he thought was most important: the commanders' decisions and the main events that happen because of them. It makes sense, as these events are the most important to the outcome of the war. Sadly, though, the typical soldier's daily routine did not fit into this practice, as it often did not seem important to the scope of the account. As a Roman senator, Sallust would most likely have found such things trivial, and therefore not worthy of mention. Nor would ancient readers have found this significant, as that sort of thing belongs in a military treatise, not a history. It is also very likely that he took for granted the army's daily practice as common knowledge. Those who might have read his work were most likely patricians (nobles) and aristocrats, either completely uninterested or generals themselves familiar with the subject.

In the end, we do not get any firm explanation of the daily routine of a soldier. Yet it is possible to glean some useful knowledge from Sallust's account by detailed examination of passages involving the soldiers and comparison with known practices. We get glimpses of daily life only when their routine was broken, such as when Metellus takes command of Albinus' army, or when extreme conditions occurred like a march across the desert. We can extrapolate on these passages by adding useful knowledge from known contemporary exercises. Thus, despite a shortage of source material in this area, we may still learn more of the military life while on campaign.

The dominant factor in a Roman soldier's life was control and discipline. In order for an army to function, the soldiers needed to be accountable for the orders given to them. He marched daily under the hot Mediterranean sun, lugged his own gear, built and took down fortifications daily, was subject to all sorts of duties and training exercises in camp, and for the most part, was willing to endure this life. What practices enabled this? The first step would have been a military oath called the *sacramentum*. In it, soldiers swore to obey their commander until released from duty.²⁸ Such an act seems trivial to many, for what would stop a man from lying or going back on his word? In modern times, soldiers still take an oath like the *sacramentum*, and it holds a surprising amount of sway over their actions. US Army deserters in the mid 20th century claimed that they signed their oaths in pencil in order to ease their conscience, and the oath acted as a massive deterrent for dissidence among the Nazi officer corps.²⁹ In addition to this, as the name

²⁸ Roth, *Roman Warfare* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 66

²⁹ Holmes, *Acts of War* 33

implies, the *sacramentum* had religious power as well.³⁰ This oath should not be taken as a minor burden on the conscience of a man.

Training also helped to create obedience. In modern armies, this is represented by close order drill and parade maneuvers. The idea is that constant and unrelenting drill of a skill will inculcate that skill into the soldiers mind so he may perform it without thinking. This works with obedience as well.³¹ However, this practice had the possibility of eliminating the individual's incentive and drive, which is precisely why the Romans did not employ such a method. Instead, they created soldiers by immersing the men in a constant and demanding regimen of labor.

One of the most notable passages in *The Jugurthine War* is when Spurius Albinus hands over control of his army to Metellus. This army was in a shambles. The men plundered the surrounding territory freely, whether it was friendly or not, they neglected to maintain castrametation practices or even attend any of their duties, wandered about as they wished and fraternized with the camp followers, procured many extra servants to do their work, and didn't move their camps until forced to by the stench of their own refuse. Sallust states that Albinus could not even use his troops after their defeat under his brother Aulus because of "relaxation of discipline." This did not mean solely a cessation of punishments for lapses of obedience, but mainly that the soldiers were allowed to neglect their standard labors. To the Roman mind, a large workload kept soldiers acting correctly. The building of camps and other laborious practices functioned as close-order drill for the Romans.³² When soldiers became rambunctious, it was because they were idle and had gotten used to vice. Tacitus wrote that the Pannonian

³⁰ Lee, "Morale and the Roman Experience of Battle," *Battle in Antiquity*, ed. Alan Lloyd (London: Duckworth, 1996), 207.

³¹ Idem, 39

³² Phang, *Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early Principate* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 67.

legions were more subject to their revolt because of the slackening of labor, and by resting in the city of Capua, Hannibal's army was rendered ineffective as well.³³

The Roman commanders always kept their soldiers busy in order to maintain control, so that is exactly what Metellus did to shape up Albinus' old army: "he (Metellus) decided not to take the field until he had inured the men to hard labor by putting them through a course of old-fashioned training."³⁴ He eliminated all excess servants from the camp and baggage trains, moved camp continually and fortified it with a wall and trenches, marched the men daily, and ensured each man carried his own gear and food. This whipped his soldiers back into Roman standards by forcing them to do the great amount of work expected from them. Marius did much the same, and to the extent that his soldiers were called Marian Mules. Later, when his army had nothing else to do in the Cimbrian/Teutonic War, he set them to clearing mud and obstructions from the mouth of the Rhone River so that they remained active.³⁵ This was a grueling process for an individual, as we shall see in a bit, but it seemed to have effectively gotten him used to military life and instilled purpose and pride in him. After a time one's body would have adapted to these struggles. The Roman men grew used to the strict schedule, and acquired a positive attitude that gave them drive and confidence in their identities as soldiers.³⁶ These practices started by Metellus continued throughout the war. Even so, this system was not perfect, and there was still a sizable amount of deserters.³⁷

Many people assume brutal punishments were used to ensure the obedience of the Roman soldier. They would not be completely wrong, but everyday discipline was rarely an act in

³³ Tacitus, *Ann.* 1.16, Phang 223.

³⁴ Sallust, *Jug.* 44

³⁵ Plutarch, *Life of Gaius Marius* 13.1, 15.2-.3

³⁶ Holmes, *Acts of War* 43 paired with Phang's comments about labor functioning as a Roman soldier's equivalent of close order drill on pages 67 and 221-223.

³⁷ Sallust, *Jug.* 56, 76

suppressive violence as assumed. Minor acts of violence, for example, forceful discipline by a centurion's *vitis*, or vine, was almost certain to have occurred. But we also hear of much more severe punishments. Though the soldiers were Roman citizens, while under service of arms they were indeed subject to brutal and fatal penalty from a commander with *imperium*. A soldier caught sleeping on watch could be beaten to death by his comrades, and commanders could decimate (to kill one out of every ten) a group of soldiers who ran in battle. However, the extent to which this actually happened in our time frame was small. Sallust did not mention these penalties at all. In fact he applauded Metellus and Marius for disciplining their men without inflicting punishment.³⁸ Their practices included keeping the men busy, rewarding them for positive behavior, and calling on their honor. Other generals of the Late Republic used shaming punishments like feeding soldiers barley instead of wheat and forcing them to stand at attention without their clothes. These punishments, 'appeals to their honor' as stated by Sallust, show that soldiers of this time were very eager to maintain honor, and that such appeals were the mark of a good general.³⁹

Now let us turn to the actual doings of the Roman soldier on campaign. Marching was a huge part of life for the men fighting in Africa, and it always has been the defining action of infantry on campaign. I need not say how important the need to move was, and the Roman army excelled in traveling quickly, especially after the changes enacted by Metellus and more decisively by Marius. The Roman soldier was expected to march twenty Roman miles in five hours, and twenty-four when in a hurry, or about eighteen and twenty-two English miles respectively. This makes for a pace of roughly three to five miles every fifty minutes, as they

³⁸ Sallust, *Jug.* 45 and 100 respectively.

³⁹ Phang, *Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early Principate*, 111-151.

likely took about a ten-minute break every hour. This is in no way unrealistic, and soldiers in WWII sometimes marched up to thirty miles in a day.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, this was still with a large burden, and we must determine the weight that they carried on those distances to fully understand that burden. When Metellus took control of the forces in Africa, he eliminated excess slaves, servants, and beasts of burden attached to the army – as opposed to Albinus, whose men had purchased slaves and other porter animals to do their soldierly duty for them. But how could the army have gotten along without these things? Surely, a Roman army used slaves, most of whom were used in the baggage train driving beasts of burden and supplying the soldiers with some of their gear, as the men could not have realistically carried it all as we will discuss shortly. Sallust meant that Metellus did not dismiss all slaves and servants, just the ones who the lazy soldiers exploited.⁴¹ He must have allowed the use of slaves and porter animals in the baggage train, and only abolished them from the army in camp and on the march.⁴² Also, Sallust clearly states that beasts of burden were still with the army on their march to Thala:

Accordingly he issued orders that every pack animal should be relieved of all luggage, and nothing carried but 10 days rations of grain, together with skins and other containers for water.⁴³

So, while the army still used a sufficient number of slaves and animals, let us not think that the Roman soldier's burden was still not great.

A *contubernium* would have had to carry many things: armor, clothes, weapons, cooking equipment, tools, food, a tent, a stone mill for grinding grain, personal equipment, and *pila muralis*, or large fence posts for building a fort. The tent and its accessories, the stone mill, and

⁴⁰ Holmes, *Acts of War* 116. The exact rate is not given, but presumably, they would march for seven to eight hours, making their rate comparable to that of the Roman legionaries.

⁴¹ Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War* 93-104

⁴² Sallust, *Jug.* 45

⁴³ Sallust, *Jug.* 75

the sixteen *pila muralis* would have weighed around one hundred and six Kg. or two hundred and thirty-three pounds.⁴⁴ A mule or ox, which would have been in the armies train, must have carried these things. That still left somewhere between eighty-eight and one hundred pounds, without food, for the individual to carry, but with some estimates reaching as low as fifty-four pounds.⁴⁵ The true point of contest here is the amount of food that soldiers carried. Livy describes soldiers carrying as much as thirty days worth of rations with them, with each daily need measured at about one and eight-tenths pounds for a total of fifty six pounds; Caesar notes that Pompey's soldiers were carrying twenty-two days or forty-one pounds with them.⁴⁶ A soldier carrying that much would have been very prepared, but also been placed under too much of a burden. I believe it is possible that the soldier would have carried a part of this burden, while the rest was with the baggage train. Thus a soldier could have had plenty of food on him for emergencies, maybe ten days or a little over eighteen pounds worth. A surplus was carried with the rest of the gear in the train that the men in the *contubernia* could not carry themselves. That would make the total burden the soldier was carrying to be between seventy-two and one hundred and five pounds.

Even assuming the larger figure, this is not an unrealistic load to bear. Junkleman lead a group of German civilians across the Alps carrying around ninety-five and one hundred and one pounds averaging fifteen and a half miles a day.⁴⁷ Also, infantry of the modern era are known to have endured the same burden and even carried more. The Chindits in Burma during the Second World War carried between seventy and ninety pounds, Americans in Operation Torch carried as

⁴⁴ Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 77-78*

⁴⁵ Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 73-77*

⁴⁶ Both passages noted in Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 70*

⁴⁷ Mentioned in Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 73-77*. The citizens in the experiment were not selected for their physical endurance, but were allowed to train for a time prior to the event.

much as one hundred and thirty two pounds per man, and British marines and airborne infantry carried around one hundred and twenty pounds.⁴⁸ In addition, Marius is credited with inventing a new way for the soldiers to carry their weight. They arranged their load on the end a long stick with a crossbar at the top. With this stick carried over the shoulder or balanced atop the shield, the weight was carried quite effectively.⁴⁹ Though the burden is not unthinkable, it should not be taken lightly. Carrying this much weight for eighteen miles a day, after which a camp was built, would have been exhausting. No wonder Albinus' shattered army shirked its duties by buying personal slaves.

When discussing the burden of marching, the climate in Numidia must also be addressed. This territory stretched along the coast of North Africa in modern Algeria and part of Western Tunisia. Though this region has fairly mild winters, the summers are hot and dry. This is especially true in the desert and plateau that take up most of the country. During the summer it can become especially dusty there as well, as it was in ancient times as well.⁵⁰ Along the coast the summer temperatures are fairly mild - around seventy-five to eighty degrees Fahrenheit - but further inland they can vary from eighty-two all the way to one hundred and twenty degrees Fahrenheit. Sallust also mentioned the desolation of the interior when discussing the march to Capsa:

For, except the immediate neighborhood of the town, the whole district is desolate, uncultivated, waterless, and infested by deadly serpents, which like all wild animals are made fiercer by scarcity of food, and especially by thirst, which exasperates their natural malignity.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Holmes, *Acts of War* 120-121

⁴⁹ Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War* 77

⁵⁰ Sallust, *Jug.* 53

⁵¹ Sallust, *Jug.* 89

The winter months are much cooler, and can even see snow. But during winter in ancient times, the Roman army would be in their own territory, still performing duties, but not marching long distances. During the campaigning season, the burden surely must have been great. Marching nearly twenty miles a day for weeks with temperatures nearing one hundred degrees, all while carrying around one hundred pounds of gear is a hell of a feat. The Roman soldiers in this war had to perform more difficult marches on a few occasions. Certainly the marches that Metellus led the army on when he assumed control would have been long and hard because he was trying to reinstall discipline in his army. On the march to retake Vaga, the troops were very tired and only able to go on because of their vengeful spirits.⁵² Because of the urgency of this matter, one can assume they made this march at double time or faster. To get to Thala, the Romans had to march through fifty miles of desert, carrying their burdens plus extra water.⁵³ They had to travel one hundred and thirty miles through such terrain to reach Capsa. Sallust does not mention any deaths caused by exposure, heat stroke, or any other labor induced casualties, but it is safe to assume that some men died because of these marches. Caputo narrates a grizzly scene in which a man suffers permanent brain damage as a result of heat stroke during the American-Vietnamese War: the man dropped to the ground unconscious, only to awaken and viciously attack the truck driver before passing out again. This leads Caputo to comment sardonically on how the American men were fighting the sun more than the VC.⁵⁴ Similar events likely happened in the Jugurthine War as well. Not only could the weather be physically harmful, but also psychologically damaging. Hot temperatures can completely sap the will to fight from a man, especially long exposure to it. This is again exemplified in Caputo's recollections of the Vietnam

⁵² Sallust, *Jug.* 68

⁵³ Sallust, *Jug.* 75

⁵⁴ Caputo *A Rumor of War with a Twentieth-Anniversary Postscript by the Author* (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), 105-106

War. He describes a condition that developed due to the heat and boredom called *la cafard* that was characterized by attacks of depression coupled with “inconquerable fatigue” and loss of motivation.⁵⁵ Surely the Roman men fighting in this war were put under tremendous strain by these demands placed upon them, and the climate in Numidia certainly added to that strain.

At the end of the marching day, it was regular practice to build a camp within which the army could rest, eat, and sleep. The camp was built with an earthen wall topped by buried *pila muralis*, and trenches were dug in front of the wall. Vegetius tells us that the size of this ditch varied on how close the enemy was: if they were near, as Sallust tells us Jugurtha often was, the trenches would be dug twelve feet wide and nine feet deep. Its physical benefits are obvious. The camp protected the men from wild animals as well as the enemy. Castrametation discouraged the enemy from attacking at night when the invading Roman army was vulnerable. This also represents a large amount of work to be done by the men after their march was completed. Nevertheless it was rarely too large a burden amongst well-disciplined troops working together. Just look at the construction feats completed by Caesar's soldiers outside of Alesia, which encircled the city and again encircled the besieging army in order to protect them from Gallic reinforcements.⁵⁶

Castrametation provided many positive benefits for the Roman soldier. Most noticeably, camps provided physical protection for the soldiers, and their absence exposed the men to great danger. Jugurtha had some success attacking stragglers who were not encamped with the rest of the army, yet he was forced to change strategies when Metellus started making sure that all men were in camp or out in force when not marching.⁵⁷ Jugurtha and Bochas later routed the Romans

⁵⁵ Caputo *A Rumor of War* 68

⁵⁶ Caesar, *BG* 7.72-.75

⁵⁷ Sallust, *Jug* 55

just before sunset, seemingly because the Romans were out of their camp.⁵⁸ Building camp also reinforced the army's discipline due to the labor involved, as seen earlier. In addition, subdivisions were charged with a task at which they worked together and helped create a communal attitude.⁵⁹ The soldier would also feel safer while camped in the walls, and this again added to morale. The simple presence of the fortifications made the individual feel separate and safe from the dangers outside, thus encouraging better sleep. The cessation of castrametation, or allowing soldiers to wander from the camp, could lead to a drop in spirits. Albinus' army exemplified this after its defeat⁶⁰.

Another important part of life on campaign was pillaging and foraging. Commonly this was used to augment the army's resources, but the army could not have supplied itself entirely off of plunder and scavenged food. The local land could not have come close to being able to support thousands of men in one place, and the majority of the army would have been occupied with other duties. Metellus seems to have let his soldiers plunder in part to terrorize the population, crush the fighting spirit of the Numidians, and to force Jugurtha to face him in the field. Yet this could be dangerous because the relatively small groups were vulnerable to Jugurtha and his cavalry. They were cut down in great numbers. After this happened, Metellus changed tactics and only allowed pillaging or scavenging under the supervision of a few cohorts and the whole of the cavalry. It is quite possible that pillaging was not only done to hurt the enemy but also because it would bolster soldier's confidence and morale. Marius seems to have

⁵⁸ Sallust, *Jug.* 97

⁵⁹ Goldsworthy, "Community Under Pressure: The Roman Army at the Siege of Jerusalem" *The Roman Army as a Community*. Ed. A. Goldsworthy and I. Haynes. (Portsmouth: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1999), 202

⁶⁰ Sallust, *Jug.* 44

introduced his new recruits into the war by allowing them more freedom in their pillaging and by attacking and devastating weak targets:

He (Marius) then attacked some fortresses and settlements that were badly situated for defense and ill-manned, and fought a number of small engagements in various places. In course of time the new recruits learnt to go fearlessly into action...⁶¹

Thus, new recruits became accustomed to killing, death, and the dirty business of war. Pillaging also increased the soldiers' morale by helping them collect more plunder. Metellus allowed his men to ravage the country after their pyrrhic victory at the River Muthul in order to regain some of their lost confidence.⁶² In addition, it let the soldiers take out their aggression after weeks of dullness. A plunge in morale became a problem for the Romans due to Jugurtha's harassing techniques, so Metellus responded by leading the men into action.⁶³ However, when left unchecked, plundering could lead to a complete breakdown in discipline. Excessive pillaging was a large factor in ruining Albinus' army. If too much were allowed, the men would adopt the mindset of bandits and would not be accountable to their duties.⁶⁴ So it seems that terrorizing and plundering was an effective way to break up the potentially harmful monotony of the soldier's day. However, it had to be done with strict limitations. These practices supplied the men with extra goods, easy experience, confidence, a break from routine, and extra incentives via plunder.

A soldier had lots of down time in the winter months when the troops were not on active campaign. During winter, the army would retire to the Roman Province in the neighborhood where Carthage once stood, near the capital Utica. They would remain here until the summer campaign.⁶⁵ The men would still have had soldierly tasks such as guard duty, latrines, occasional

⁶¹ Sallust, *Jug.* 87

⁶² Sallust, *Jug.* 54

⁶³ Sallust, *Jug.* 56

⁶⁴ Roth, *Logistics of the Roman Army at War* 148-154

⁶⁵ Sallust, *Jug.* 61

camp changes, et cetera. They were still not on campaign, though, and thus not marching or building camp every day. This downtime allowed for training. In the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, we get very little mention of the soldiers training, even the totally inexperienced *capite censi*. Sallust describes the arrangements made by each commander, but does not mention any martial preparation for the soldiers. Surely there had to have been some regimen to introduce soldiers to their responsibilities. While on campaign they were expected to build camps, form up for battle, obey commands, set night watches, assault cities, march in an orderly fashion, bear a load, and overcome their enemy in combat. Undoubtedly, some of these soldiers were veterans, and many others would have learned the basics of war through family teachings.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, these tasks would have required some amount of preparation, especially for the inexperienced soldiers. We get one large mention about training when Metellus took control of the army in the Roman province. He put them through “a course of old-fashioned training.”⁶⁷ As discussed earlier, he made sure to keep the soldiers busy with lots of chores like marching with loads, making camps, and keeping good watches. The fact that Sallust says “old-fashioned” indicates that these practices became regular at some earlier point in the Republic, and that only Albinus’ negligence allowed them to lapse. This training did more than just keep the soldiers busy, but it also instructed them in their duties. It seems very likely that new recruits would have gone through the same routines Metellus forced upon his men before his campaign in order to introduce them to Roman martial expectations, despite the lack of mention in Sallust’s writings. These exercises would also increase their fitness to acceptable levels.

⁶⁶ Roth, *Roman Warfare* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 66. Roth writes that the Roman soldier of the Republic had no “basic training”.

⁶⁷ Sallust, *Jug.* 44

Training would also have nurtured an aggressive spirit, which was very important in war. Iron discipline in the rank and file is often the aspect that many readers associate with Roman drill. In reality, it was aimed more at encouraging a bellicose attitude. Vegetius' treatise abounds in emphasis on practice with swords, javelins, arrows, in general athleticism, and swimming.⁶⁸ Whether or not soldiers were actually trained in any of these, Vegetius' remarks show the Roman desire to create aggressive soldiers. A man who was confident in his abilities in combat or the martial life was going to feel much more comfortable on the battlefield, thus boosting his ferociousness and morale.⁶⁹ Behind this Vegetius stressed fitness and the ability to work hard, and lastly the need for order on the march and in the *agmen*. In drills like the *armatura*, soldiers participated in field maneuvers, but these still focused on personal combat. Phang best states the idea.

...contrary to the modern popular stereotype, and despite stylized rhetorical descriptions in Greek authors, Roman infantry training was not dominated by drill and by coordinated close-order-formation. Combat effectiveness in sword fighting required a looser order, sufficient space surrounding individual soldiers so that they could use their weapons freely. They had to engage individual enemies with initiative and aggression. In battle and on the march, they were still constrained by formation, but such formations would have seemed loose and straggling to an eighteenth-century onlooker.⁷⁰

As far as combat training for personal skill, we again get little information. It was not included in the training that Metellus put the soldiers through. Gladiatorial training is an assumed part of the Marian Reforms, but did not start until the war with the Cimbri and Teutones.⁷¹ How did soldiers learn to fight? As mentioned above, many young men learned from relatives. Due to Rome's imperialistic expansion, most males of the *dilectus* (draft) likely had relatives with combat

⁶⁸ Vegetius 1.18-.28

⁶⁹ Vegetius 3.26: "Few men are born naturally brave; hard work and training makes many so."

⁷⁰ Phang *Roman Military Science* 50

⁷¹ Watson, *The Roman Soldier* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), 56

experience to share with them.⁷² Marius' inexperienced soldiers would have learned other associated skills first hand, due to the easy missions Marius sent them on. The more seasoned fighters in the army also taught them. Sallust states that after a while in Africa, the raw soldiers soon became effective fighters through easy battles and exposure to the veterans.⁷³

The multitude of duties that the Roman soldier was expected to perform was great. The little down time they received was spent eating, sleeping, or, if one were lucky, off duty. One large question remains concerning life on campaign. How did it affect the soldiers? If the men were expected to do this work daily for too long without achieving their purpose, to meet and defeat the enemy, then morale could plummet. This was because of monotonous and difficult work that the men were always engaged in, although these were not the only factors the soldier was concerned with. There are many unmentioned hardships involved in army life. Living every day with these hardships was described in Holmes' *Acts of War* as "living rough."⁷⁴ Pests like bugs and vermin could be a constant annoyance. They may seem trivial, but constant exposure to insects is a monumental displeasure. Rats provided a more direct danger in that they could eat grain stores, as well as nurture an atmosphere of uncleanness. Feeling dirty for such long periods of time can also take a toll on morale. A pilot named Charles McDonald exclaimed how astonished he was over the morale boost he received after a shower and a clean change of clothes.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the most direct psychological strain put upon the soldiers, outside of battle, was Jugurtha's harassing guerilla tactics. He would pick off a few men, but then refuse an engagement. Roman soldiers of this period were enthusiastic to come into close contact with the enemy, and if they could not, it greatly discouraged them. Metellus was forced to change tactics

⁷² Roth, *Roman Warfare* 66

⁷³ Sallust, *Jug.* 87

⁷⁴ Holmes, *Acts of War* 108-115

⁷⁵ idem

not only to counter the Numidian's pestering, but also to save the morale of his men.⁷⁶ Marius had trouble controlling the soldiery during the conflict with the Gauls, because they were so eager to come to blows with the enemy.⁷⁷

Battle

Now we will move on to the climax of the soldier's experience. Battle is the most intensive and widely studied aspect of war, and often the most profound experience for those involved. In fact, battle was the peak of the soldier's purpose; all their previous hard work was in order to facilitate it and give them the upper hand in that ultimate task. Despite the accomplishments that the men made in training, marching, and construction, and everything else in their daily lives, their worth as soldiers and as Roman men came down to their performance on the battlefield. Sadly, we do not get much insight into the experience of combat. Sallust was not a front line soldier, and his writings shed little light onto the subject. As in our earlier discussion, we can fill gaps in Sallust with other knowledge and contemporary writings.

First we must know the overall face of battle. An understanding of how it was waged and of tactics is important to the individual's experience of it. Certainly, a Spartan hoplite viewed battle differently than a Sassanid cataphract not only because of cultural differences, but also because of tactical dissimilarities. Thus a Roman legionary's perspective was dependent on Roman strategies/tactics in battle and how he fought in it. This is difficult for us to establish because of the transitions that were coming to fruition after years of gradual change, known as the Marian Reforms. This has the potential both to greatly complicate our task and to cast serious doubt on Sallust as an accurate source.

⁷⁶ Sallust, *Jug.* 55-56

⁷⁷ Plutarch, *Life of Gaius Marius* 16.1

It is very problematic to determine the type of force that the Roman generals led in Africa. Prior to this period, the infantry had been organized in the manipular fashion. In this organization, a legion was split into thirty maniples of about one hundred and twenty men each. These were then ordered into three types of infantry based upon the men's wealth and afforded equipment: *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*. The *hastatii* were typically armed with chain mail or a pectoral plate, a shield, sword, and several *pila*. The *principes'* equipment was very similar save for better quality, and the *triarii* carried even better armor and a spear versus a sword. The poorest class consisted of the *velites*, a skirmishing force armed with several javelins and a sword, who would precede the rest of the army. Livy described this force's use in the Second Punic War, and this was the organization many assume was used in Numidia by the Romans during the Jugurthine War. In describing Metellus' formation at the River Muthul, Sallust says that archers and slingers were placed among the maniples, indicating the manipular formation.⁷⁸ However, in most circumstances when Sallust depicts any type of formation or group of soldiers, he uses the term *cohors*, or cohort, not maniple. In the cohortal organization, the distinctions between the infantry classes were eliminated and three maniples were joined to create one cohort of roughly four hundred and eighty men. This formation proved to be more flexible in accommodating various circumstances. It had the ability to fight jointly with the other nine cohorts of the legion, but was large enough to be effective independently. The standardization of equipment also made cohorts a more homogenous and organized force. Most scholars seem to think that the transformation was slow, but that the cohort had replaced the maniple during

⁷⁸ Sallust, *Jug.* 49

Marius' conflict with the Cimbri and Teutones or Caesar's wars with the Gauls.⁷⁹ Sallust could have been confused about these logistics for many reasons. By the time Sallust was writing, the transition to the cohort was complete, and it is quite possible that he was projecting practices familiar from his own day into the past. In addition, previous generals like Scipio Africanus had organized their men into cohorts for a limited time and a specific purpose.⁸⁰ The use of cohorts in this war could have been the generals adapting to a specific situation, like when Metellus needed to make an assault on the Numidian infantry's position.

Gradually, therefore, he got his men together, re-formed the ranks, and opposed four legionary cohorts to the enemy's infantry...⁸¹

Nevertheless, the possibility that cohorts were in standard use is quite plausible. In that same battle, Metellus' legate Rutilius was instructed to secure the riverbank with some cohorts; later, Marius was sent to Sicca with a few cohorts. In both of these instances, the word *cohors* was used to indicate a number of men, not just a specific formation, thus indicating that this was not simply a temporary and opportunistic change. Another signal for the cessation of the manipular system was the increase of poorer soldiers and the *capite censi* in the army due to Grachus' *Lex Militaris* and Marius' reforms. It is likely that the equipment would have been standardized for the soldiers who were now supplied by the state and not out of their own pockets. This is indicated by the decrease in armor quality in this time period due to the increased need of supply.⁸² Implied is the abandonment of the three infantry classes associated with the manipular organization. Marius' volunteers had no land with which to designate

⁷⁹ Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 228. Luttwak, *Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 40.

⁸⁰ Polybius, *Hist.* 11.23

⁸¹ Sallust, *Jug.* 51

⁸² Bishop and Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment*. 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2006),

themselves a certain class, and they in addition to the poorer men of the draft were being armed by the state. The only indication we get of differences in armament within the Roman/Italian infantry is the ‘unencumbered cohorts’ mentioned under the command of Rutilius. This could be a reference to the *velites* of the manipular organization, but seems highly unlikely because the *velites* were likely never grouped in an organized way.⁸³ Instead, these men were probably stripped of all non-essential equipment in order to make their hurried march easier and to make them more ready for combat. Despite these facts, the answer is still quite unclear. Sallust’s vocabulary includes words describing both systems, often very close in location to each other. Contradictory words like *cohors*, *velites*, and *manipulus* (maniple) are used intermittently. This is quite indicative of Sallust’s ignorance in the specifics of this subject. Nevertheless, given the available information, I believe that there is little reason to doubt that the Romans had adopted the cohortal system during this war. We can translate words like *velites* and *manipulus* with their most literal definitions, ‘light armed/swift ones’ and ‘company’ respectively, as *velites* was used in contexts that do not fit with our strict understanding of this manipular class of infantry, and *manipulus* is even supplied when describing the Numidian army.

Outside of unit organization, the standard battle formation of the army was the *triplex acies*, or triple battle-lines. Here, the infantry arranged themselves in three lines so as to facilitate the replacement of tired troops and to supply the front-line fighters with plenty of reinforcements. In the Battle of River Muthul, Sallust tells us that Metellus formed his men in this fashion.⁸⁴ However, when Metellus led his four cohorts against the Numidian infantry in that

⁸³ Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army* 27

⁸⁴ Sallust *Jug.* 49. However, the description is quite unclear. It seems that Metellus lines his men up in *triplex acies*, then had each man turn left ninety degrees in order to resume their march to the river. Upon being attacked, it seems likely that the men simply turned right again to face the enemy.

same battle, he reformed their ranks, but the formation is not told to us. Presumably, he led them in one line due to the hurried nature of the situation. The organization of Rutilius' men in this same battle is unmentioned. Here, there is no reason to believe that these soldiers were not in the *triplex acies*. Sallust says that they were warned by the enemies approach by the dust cloud, and thus had time to prepare for battle. Nevertheless, other formations were also possible and commonly used as well. The clearest explanation of this is given to us in the very last battle of the war, when Jugurtha and Bochas attacked the Romans marching to Utica in the Roman province. Here, the army is clearly stated to be marching in a square formation. This was used when the army was expecting an attack from any side, or all sides. It proved quite effective in this circumstance.

Typically, Roman tactics were very aggressive. This allowed the infantry to close with the enemy and fight it out as quickly as possible. The individual's fighting techniques are still obscure. One hint lies in the space soldiers took in their formation. Vegetius gives us spacing of a three-foot frontage and seven feet between ranks, while Polybius gives each soldier a three foot frontage and three feet between ranks.⁸⁵ Whichever is correct, the emphasis on enough room to wield a sword and throw the *pilum* is emphasized. Combat for the Roman infantryman relied upon each soldier engaging the enemy with sword and shield. This was the primary purpose and preference of the soldier, and being unable to come to close grips with the enemy was greatly discouraging.⁸⁶ At this time, there was no standard training in which a soldier was instructed to use their sword, but the distinct shape and size of the *gladius hispaniensis* seems to have been made for a specific technique. Vegetius strongly recommends using the sword for stabbing versus cutting, as "A stroke with the edges, though made with ever so much force, seldom kills,

⁸⁵ Vegetius 3.14-.15, Polybius *Hist* 18.30

⁸⁶ Sallust, *Jug.* 50

as the vital parts of the body are defended both by the bones and armor. On the contrary, a stab, though it penetrates but two inches, is generally fatal.”⁸⁷ The *gladius* was very well made for this style of fighting, since it had such a long and sharp point. This technique seems more indicative of standard training in swordsmanship, which the soldiers of the Jugurthine War did not have. The evidence also suggests that the *gladius* could be used effectively for slashing as well. A lot of weight in a short blade would have made it much like a machete. We are told that the dead Macedonians left behind by Roman soldiers horrified the seasoned phalangites. They had experienced stab wounds from spears and arrows, but never such bodily mutilation, like limb removal and decapitation, as caused by the roman *gladius*.⁸⁸ Sallust uses the word *caedere* (to cut/hew) to describe the legionaries’ action towards any unfortunate Numidian who came too close.⁸⁹ The shield, or *scutum*, could also be used as an offensive weapon. A hit from the boss of the shield could do considerable damage to unarmored enemies, and would knock them off balance. This technique is shown in a scene from the *Tropaeum Traiani*, in which a legionary uses the boss of his shield to punch a man in the face while stabbing him in the gut.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Vegetius 1.12

⁸⁸ Livy. *Ad Urbe Condita*, 31.34

⁸⁹ Sallust, *Jug.* 58

⁹⁰ Pictured in Goldsworthy’s *The Complete Roman Army* 131



Before they engaged with their melee weapons, Roman soldiers were equipped with two *pila* to throw as well.⁹¹ These small javelins gave the legionary some amount of missile capability. Sallust tells us that at the siege of Zama, the Romans were being pelted by Numidian javelins and were throwing them back. In this circumstance, the Romans spent a considerable time in missile combat, though with limited range. Marius' slightly altered the *pilum* so that it would be unsuitable for reuse by the enemy by replacing the metal dowel attaching the shaft to the long point with one of wood⁹². This ensured that it would break upon impact so the enemy could not throw it back, thus indicating that Roman infantry sometimes spent a fair amount of time exchanging missiles with the enemy. Typically though, the *pila* were thrown before the charge. This would deal both a psychological and physical shock to the enemy. Sallust does not mention this happening in his account, but there is no reason to believe that it did not. In general,

⁹¹ Campbell, "Arming Romans for Battle" *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World*, ed. Brian Campbell and Lawrence Tritle (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 419-237

⁹² Sallust, *Jug.* 58. Plutarch *The Life of Gaius Marius* 25. Sabin, "The Face of Roman Battle," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 90, (2000): 1-17

we can assume that the Roman soldiers would use their *pila* as the situation demanded, not just for a pre-charge shock. Nevertheless, the Roman soldiers' true preference was to engage in hand-to-hand combat. In this, they would have been more likely to cut or hack with their weapon while using their shield as a bashing instrument, though they likely used the point of their weapons quite often as well. Still, there certainly was no standard to which they were obligated. Thus, their style could have varied greatly, but the preference put with close-quarters combat is clear.

Still, this is not a sufficient understanding of combat. To arrive at this, we need to examine what the experience of battle was like. The first subject to discuss here is the physical burden put on the Roman soldier. We have already discussed how the weight that soldiers carried was great, but what proportion of this would they have carried into battle? It seems most logical that in order to fight most effectively, one must be as unencumbered as possible, meaning that they only carried their arms and armor. Their armor, clothing, and weapons probably weighed between forty-eight and sixty-five pounds.⁹³ In this period, the armor would include a montefortino style helmet, possibly a shin griever (which would have added weight to the figure above), a shield, and a *lorica hamata* which was a long shirt of chain mail with added shoulder reinforcements. A pectoral, a simple disk or square of metal strapped to the chest, would also have been a possible feature instead of the *lorica hamata*. The shield itself weighted close to twenty-two pounds. This is a considerable weight to be carrying into battle, especially during the summer season in Numidia. All the same, the men were in tremendous shape, and Rutilius' men at the battle at the River Muthul spent their day marching, building camp, fighting and defeating the Numidian elephants and part of their infantry. They then marched to re-unite with Metellus'

⁹³ Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 73-77*

force.⁹⁴ Surely this greatly taxed the men, but they did it quite successfully. However, we must remember that these men were unencumbered by all of their marching gear as is ideal. It seems that the rest of the army was still carrying their full packs in this battle, as they had no time to build camp or gather their baggage. These men received the worst of the fighting. They were attacked while marching, so they were greatly hampered by their packs. They could have dropped their burdens to fight, but they were still responsible for them and had to carry their packs when not in direct combat. So it was ideal to relieve the soldiers from all unnecessary gear before battle, and this seems to have been the practice, but there were some circumstances in which they could not be totally unburdened.

The length of battle is important when discussing the physical burden on the men. Romans fighting in these conditions could not have grappled directly with the enemy for an extended amount of time, yet we get many indications that these battles lasted quite a while. First, we can tell this because of what Sabin calls the “internal clock.” It is based upon the understanding that, though the writer may recount a battle in only a small amount of text, the happenings mentioned would almost certainly take a sizable length of time.⁹⁵

...Metellus observed that the Numidian attack was weakening. Gradually, therefore, he got his men together re-formed the ranks, and oppose four legionary cohorts to the enemy’s infantry... So, as evening was no coming on, they stormed the hill facing them (these were the orders they had been given) and forced their way up it. The Numidians were dislodged from their position and routed.⁹⁶

This action surely took a long time, and the whole battle lasted most of the daylight hours. We know this because Metellus feared lest his troops “succumb to thirst” in the midday heat when

⁹⁴ Sallust, *Jug.* 50-53

⁹⁵ Sabin, “The Face of Roman Battle,” 4

⁹⁶ Sallust, *Jug.* 51-52

planning his approach to the battle, and the fighting lasted until evening⁹⁷. By reading the internal clock, we can also claim that the unnamed battle that took place while Marius was marching back to Utica lasted from just an hour short of sunset well into the night.⁹⁸ The men could not have been directly engaged this whole time. Throwing, running, cutting, thrusting, bashing, blocking, jumping, and other intense actions involved in combat, while carrying armor, shield, and sword was unquestionably an exhausting exercise. Even for men as fit as the Roman soldiers, these actions cannot be sustained for long. In modern times, contact sports are often very short affairs, but require much training: boxing has twelve rounds of only three minutes, mixed martial arts has between three to five rounds of five minutes, and judo matches only last five minutes total.

Therefore the battle must have involved alternating periods of combat and rest.⁹⁹ This would have allowed for the removal of wounded men and a short rest for the combatants. Here we see another reason the Romans extensively used support troops - so that they could be filtered in as fresh replacements in addition to preventing a breakthrough or rout. Metellus likely put extra reserves on his right flank at the River Muthul not only for physical support, but also for the ability to replace wearied troops during ‘breaks’. Sometimes one side could give way shortly after first contact, and Jugurtha’s men turned and ran before the physical engagement in a battle shortly before the siege of Thala. Yet the majority of battles in this war were long, protracted struggles.

A soldier’s mind must have been full of sensations when entering battle. The sound, taste, sight, and smell of it must have been terrifying for recruits and veterans alike. Sallust says little

⁹⁷ Sallust, *Jug.* 50

⁹⁸ Sallust, *Jug.* 97-98

⁹⁹ Sabin, “The Face of Roman Battle” 14

about these details but some of them we can be certain of. The noise would have been great: swords clashing upon shields and armor, sometimes bringing screams when they bit flesh, and men straining and yelling in the heat of struggle. The Numidians used missiles to a much greater extent than the Romans, so we can imagine the sight and sound of arrows streaming into the ranks, black streaks singing through the air before they thudded against shield, armor, ground, and men.

Shouts of encouragement, joyful cries, and groans, rose mingled with the clash of arms to heaven, while missiles flew from side to side.¹⁰⁰

The heat would have caused the men to sweat profusely, stinging as it ran into eyes and filling their mouths with its bitter taste. Perspiration also has a distinctive smell, and mixed with the sickly sweet smell of blood would have been very pungent. As mentioned earlier, the *gladius hispaniensis* dealt horrific wounds, and beholding these would have been quite a shock. The sight of blood and mangled limbs was common, unavoidable, and vividly gruesome. This tidal wave of senses was of course always combined with the known possibility of death that was always present on the field. No wonder Marius thought it necessary to get his men used to killing before putting them into combat. How the soldier reacted to these sensations is the ultimate question concerning the experience of battle.

In summation, battle was a very physically taxing thing, and the men would also have been bombarded with all sorts of terrifying sensations. It puts great pressure on men not only physically, but also mentally. Understanding the physical aspect of combat is greatly significant in helping us know how the individual felt, but discussing only this would be to foster a grave ignorance. Their physical action was a direct factor of their mental state, morale, and motivations.

¹⁰⁰ Sallust, *Jug.* 60

A large aspect of conflict in the Jugurthine War that must be examined is Roman morale in combat and what dictated it. In the stressful situation of battle, the direct involvement of a commander can mean everything. When his soldiers were barely withstanding the Numidian onslaught, Marius was able to save the situation by getting involved himself. Sallust says that this was due to the impossibility of giving commands in the melee. Nonetheless, his active involvement surely influenced the morale of his struggling soldiers positively, and though the troops were under great pressure, there was never a rout. Soldiers look up to their commander as an authority and inspirational figure. Their direct involvement can inspire one to sustain their struggle.¹⁰¹ Even the participation of lesser officers had an effect, and at the siege of Zama, the soldiers who were closest to their commanders were inspired to fight the hardest.¹⁰² But just as a leader's involvement could bolster the morale of his troops, it also increased the risk he would be wounded or killed. This could be catastrophic and so demoralizing as to cause the troops to panic.¹⁰³ Jugurtha was certainly aware of this when he shouted to the Romans that he had killed Marius. This action put them close to flight.¹⁰⁴ The individual soldier greatly looked up to his commander, especially the volunteers who were in debt to Marius, to such an extent that his fate in the battle could directly affect that of the soldier.

Morale was a greatly influential factor on the battlefield. The Romans troops seemed to have a hard time maintaining it in the Jugurthine War because of Numidian fighting styles. Jugurtha did a good job of exploiting this as much as he could by engaging the Romans from afar, and keeping the Romans uncomfortable by denying them sustained hand-to-hand combat, the sort they excelled at. When the Romans were able to come to close grips, they rarely had

¹⁰¹ Goldsworthy, *Roman Army at War* 257

¹⁰² Sallust, *Jug.* 60

¹⁰³ Lee, "Morale and the Roman Experience of Battle" 211

¹⁰⁴ Sallust, *Jug.* 101

much trouble defeating the Numidians, as shown by Rutilius' cohorts at the River Muthul.¹⁰⁵ However, the fighting described by Sallust was decidedly more chaotic and indecisive than the typically preferred set-piece battle, and would have been very discouraging for the Roman combatant. Romans soldiers were typically very aggressive and were even prone to disobey orders so that they could come to grips with their enemy¹⁰⁶. So if they could not slug it out with their foe, a drop in morale usually occurred. This is first exposed to us at the River Muthul, where the Numidians frustrated the Romans from afar with arrows and denied them close-quarters combat.

For even the men who resisted with the most dogged courage were disconcerted by this irregular manner of fighting, in which they were wounded at long range without being able to strike back or come to grips with their foe¹⁰⁷.

It is unlikely that missile injuries were very often fatal, but they were surely dangerous and painful, as was medically treating them. A slit would have to be made in order to extract the arrow, or it would have to be pushed through. If embedded in the bone, the arrow would have to be drilled out. This was done without any sort of anesthetic.¹⁰⁸

We also hear of the Romans suffering from these tactics later in the campaign. Metellus decided to attack Zama because the Numidian's harassing tactics were tiring out his troops. In modern wars, the same thing can happen to men under barrage who are unable to respond with force. Heavy shelling is understood to be so damaging to morale not only because of the threat of death, but also because the soldier has no way to strike back at his aggressors¹⁰⁹. The Roman

¹⁰⁵ Sallust, *Jug.* 53

¹⁰⁶ Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts* 172-260. Plutarch, *Life of Gaius Marius* 16.1.

¹⁰⁷ Sallust, *Jug.* 50

¹⁰⁸ Salazar, "Treating the Sick and Wounded" *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World*, ed. Brian Campbell and Lawrence Tritle (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 294-311

¹⁰⁹ Holmes, *Acts of War* 29

soldier in this war was under a great deal of strain due to their inability to come to grips with the enemy, more so than in a great amount of other conflicts.

Nevertheless, battle was not entirely dependent on the morale of the two forces, yet it influenced other important topics that require discussing when examining hand-to-hand combat. These topics are the effects of panic and how it directly influenced Roman victory or defeat. The contest was decided when the majority of the combatants on the losing side turned and fled. Casualty figures give us a hint as to what this looked like. Many battles in the ancient world are heavily one-sided in terms of losses. This indicates one of two things: that one side received tremendous casualties and ran as a result, or that the one side was provoked to flee and was then cut down *en masse* by the victors.¹¹⁰ It seems overwhelmingly likely that the second option was more common. Sallust tells us that after Marius' recruits had been introduced to battle, they realized "that runaways were captured or killed, while the bravest stood the best chance of coming through unscathed..."¹¹¹ This denotes that those who ran were susceptible to the greatest danger, thus most casualties were suffered in a rout. We also get instances of the victors actually acquiring equal or more casualties than the vanquished. The Romans were victorious at the River Muthul, despite Sallust declaring that their losses were much greater than those of the Numidians.¹¹² These circumstances would be highly improbable if the first option were true, that is, if victory depended entirely on casualties sustained in combat. In fact, Sallust said that the only reason the Numidians did not suffer worse losses was because they were quicker and able to

¹¹⁰ Sabin, "The Face of Roman Battle" 6

¹¹¹ Sallust *Jug.* 87

¹¹² Sallust, *Jug.* 54

escape the Roman swords after they were routed, which of course supports the second option as well.¹¹³

Thus we see that battle was largely not decided by attrition, but by the men of one side losing heart and being cut down as they ran. This could have happened because of losses taken during combat, but it seems that for the most part a rout occurred because of the appearance of defeat more than death rates in the midst of battle. Morale could be a large factor in this appearance of defeat, as we discussed above, but was only one of the contributors to battlefield behavior. Panic was the other large one. They would fight until they viewed their situation as hopeless, whereupon panic took hold. While attacking the unnamed fort near the River Muluccha, the defenders abandoned their defenses simply because they heard Roman horns at their rear.

...trumpets suddenly rang out from behind the fort. The women and children who had come out as spectators were the first to flee; they were followed by those nearest to the wall, and then by the whole of the occupants, armed and unarmed alike.¹¹⁴

The way this is told, it seems that the Numidians panicked not because of any immediately tangible Roman victory, but because it appeared that they would be successful. At Metellus' siege of Zama, a great number of Romans in the camp were put to flight due to the sudden alarm of Jugurtha's attack. Some fought, but many were killed in their panic before Jugurtha had accomplished any significant damage other than penetrating into the camp.¹¹⁵ Other battles did not even require physical contact before they were decided. In one unnamed battle, the majority of Jugurtha's army fled immediately after the Roman charge, and this happened again later

¹¹³ Sallust, *Jug.* 52

¹¹⁴ Sallust, *Jug.* 94

¹¹⁵ Sallust, *Jug.* 58

because of a surprise charge under the order of Marius.¹¹⁶ In his first hand account of the Battle of Guadalcanal, John Hersey describes the panic there almost like a contagion, in which one by one, men grew doubtful of their position and once it had affected enough men in the platoon, it became a rout. Men were willing to deal with their own fear, but once they saw others showing fear as well, a rout was inevitable.¹¹⁷ Sometimes defeat could be caused by seemingly miniscule happenings. In one battle in WWII, a man removed himself from the fight after receiving a minor wound, only to find the rest of the men following him because they thought that he was running.¹¹⁸ There is little reason to believe that such a visceral reaction would have changed much in the course of two thousand years. So we can imagine what it was like on the ancient field of battle. The experience was much more jumbled than commonly thought. The soldier would have been susceptible to a flood of emotions and impulses that were largely beyond his control. They ran not because they were tangibly being beaten, but because panic arising from the appearance of defeat overwhelmed them and their comrades. Defeat could be directly related to the number of casualties taken, but this seems to have happened less than the spread of panic among the ranks.

We may ask how an army could sow panic among their enemies, and more specifically, by whom. One of the most prevalent misconceptions about massed hand-to-hand battle stems from what I like to call the ‘automaton combatant’. This viewpoint is nurtured by the style in which historians tend to narrate battles. In order to cover the whole scale of the event, the author must tell the battle as a tale of army against army, in which bravery and other characteristics are uniform to the group. This necessity fuels a misconstruction of combat as a massive struggle

¹¹⁶ Sallust, *Jug.* 74, 99

¹¹⁷ Hersey, *Into the Valley: Marines at Guadalcanal* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 56-57

¹¹⁸ Marshal, *Men Against Fire* 146

between two blocks of automatons, or a battle between the sum of the formation's parts and not between the parts themselves. In that battle, each soldier engages the enemy in a uniform fashion based upon their training and fighting style. There were many more complexities involved, as an army is a mass of individuals working together, yet each acting separately. One man would have fought and acted differently from another, and could single handedly play a large role in victory or defeat. Though the Romans used regimented formations and units, the battle was still a fight between the soldiers in those formations.

...all infantry actions, even those fought in the closest of close order, are not, in the last resort, combats of mass against mass, but the sum of many combats of individuals- one against one, one against two, three against five.¹¹⁹

We have already seen that fighting technique varied. The way in which a soldier acted in battle would also have been unique, as bravery and action in the face of death is not constant a group but dependent on the individual's characteristics. What this looked like on the field was a minority of soldiers striving to defeat the enemy, while the majority fought to stay alive. As stated before, in order to get the enemy to run, they had to be convinced they could not win which would cause panic to take hold. In the picture of sustained, close quarters combat, this would have been done by cutting ones way into the enemy formation. In other situations, standing firm while those around you fled, or simply doing what others were too timid to do could also serve the same purpose. This clearly took a lot of bravery, as the soldier had to step away from the comfort of his own comrades and into the grips of the enemy. The majority of soldiers would not have been up for this task, and would have been fighting for survival rather than actively to defeat the foe¹²⁰.

¹¹⁹ From John Keegan's *Face of Battle*. Quoted in Goldsworthy, *Roman Army at War* 266.

¹²⁰ Goldsworthy, *Roman Army at War* 222

In his studies of combatants in WWII, SLA Marshall noticed this very phenomenon. He noted that during combat experiences, only about a quarter of the combatants fired their weapons or tried to hurt the enemy in any way. The rest stayed in the battle, yet were likely seeking survival versus victory. He also observed that this same minority was the group that continually acted in an aggressive manner.¹²¹ Some veterans and military scholars have criticized his figures, but regardless of the specifics of the ‘ratio of fire’ question, Marshall reflects a trend that can be attested in ancient times as well. In our context, if we look at the casualty figures given to us by Caesar, it seems that this aggressive minority was usually the centurionate. Casualties among centurions were much higher than among regular legionaries, and it seems likely that this was due to their aggressive fighting.¹²² They were usually the ones who continually sought to spread panic amongst their enemies by attacking their opponents assertively, setting the example for the more timid men, and leading them in the dangerous tasks that ensured victory.

We see this in Sallust’s account as well. During the siege of Jugurtha’s unnamed treasury fort, one single Ligurian was responsible for climbing the cliff to the enemy’s walls and discovering a way in. It took much bravery and assertiveness for a lone man to climb up to Numidian battlements in order to find a way into the city. Of the small unit of men Marius chose to follow the Ligurian into the fort, four of them were centurions. The fort, which had held firm against the army for some time, was taken due to the bravery of this small group. Earlier in the war, under the command of Metellus, the tide of another battle was entirely turned by a small minority. Sallust tells us that when Jugurtha was causing havoc in the Roman’s siege camp around Zama:

¹²¹ Marshal, *Men Against Fire* 50-58

¹²² Caesar, *BC*. 3.99, *BG*. 7.51, Goldsworthy, *Roman Army at War* 257.

Out of the whole army not more than forty men, mindful of the honor of Rome, banded themselves together and took their stand on a slight rise, from which the enemy's utmost efforts failed to dislodge them. As long as the Numidians continued to pelt them with javelins from a distance, they kept on hurling them back – and a handful of men surrounded by so many could naturally score a higher proportion of hits. If their attackers came closer, that was their opportunity to display all their valor: they hewed at them like mad until they sent them flying in disorder.¹²³

We have no evidence as to the rank of these soldiers, but the point remains valid. A comparatively tiny group was not only able to turn the tide, but also to send the hitherto victorious Numidians running.

Just as the involvement of a leader can set an example, so can that of brave soldiers. After they turned the tide, the rest of the army was able to drive the remaining Numidians out of the camp. At the siege of Jugurtha's treasury fort, Sallust says that in the heat of the fighting, the best men were being killed, which was terrifying to the others.¹²⁴ This again hints that a minority was willing to face the worst danger, while the rest watched from relative safety. Though these are the only explicitly stated accounts of this phenomenon in the Jugurthine War, there is no reason not to believe that a minority strongly influenced the tide of other battles as well.

Therefore we can see how great an influence a small minority, or even one man, could have on the outcome of a conflict. The tide of battle was turned based on the actions of a small few who were brave enough to expose themselves to great danger that was necessary to attain victory. The rest would have fought more conservatively, hoping to ensure their own survival.

This brings to question the motivation required that influenced soldiers to submit to this mortal danger. What drove those individuals to surpass the standard of their peers? We have already discussed the factors that drove men to volunteer and submit to military discipline, yet these motivations would hardly be tangible while staring death in the face. One would not think

¹²³ Sallust, *Jug.* 58

¹²⁴ Sallust, *Jug.* 92

about gold or a plot of land when that critical moment was upon him, or while his comrades were dying and fleeing around him.¹²⁵ There are many possibilities to consider: patriotism and ideals, a sense of camaraderie and community with one's fellow soldiers, or a sense of personal honor and pride.

Sallust says little pertaining to battlefield motivations of the soldiers but tends to focus on hypothetical or idealistic factors. In the speech attributed to Metellus before the four cohorts lined up for the final push against the Numidian infantry, he is portrayed as entreating them to fight bravely by simple necessity. Metellus emphasized to them that they had no place to which they may retreat, and that their lives depended solely upon their victory there.¹²⁶ Vengeance is also mentioned as a motivator. Before the attack on Vaga, Metellus exhorted his men to work through their exhaustion and kill the enemy in order to avenge their fallen comrades. The Numidians there had massacred the garrison in an act of treachery, and it is quite possible that rage could have motivated the men to face their fear. The strongest mention of motivation we get from Sallust is in his description the brave soldiers who turned the tide of battle in the struggle for the siege camp around Zama. Here, he says that this small group of soldiers stood firm because they were mindful of their state's honor. This is possible, yet Sallust had no experience from which to back up his claims. Indeed, he served as a commander under Caesar, but was still lacking in front line combat experience.¹²⁷ An individual's honor was certainly a large factor in this topic, as discussed shortly, but the state's honor was much more unrealistic. Such motivations seem a little too hypothetical for practical purposes, and aristocratic assumptions

¹²⁵ Marshal, *Men Against Fire* 161

¹²⁶ Sallust, *Jug.* 51

¹²⁷ Ramsey, introduction to *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007)

about soldiers' are often plagued with personal ignorance or bias.¹²⁸ Also, as we saw before, it seems highly unlikely that such abstractions would have been present in the soldier's mind at such dangerous moments.

We should look elsewhere in order to ascertain Roman motivational factors. Another commonly accepted motivator could be camaraderie. On campaign, Roman soldiers were grouped into eight-man groups, called *contubernia*. These men marched, ate, slept and fought together. It is assumed that this proximity would have nurtured friendships between the men, which in turn would have motivated them to fight well in the presence of cared-for comrades. This would have influenced a soldier to fight harder either because he felt a duty to his unit or friends, or to maintain a collective pride. It would also have forged trust amongst the soldiers, so that they received not only physical support, but also mental support. This can be observed in modern accounts as well, and SLA Marshal noted that:

I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade...it is far more than a question of the soldier's need of physical support from other men. He must have at least some feeling of spiritual unity with them if he is to do an efficient job of moving and fighting... He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapons secondarily.¹²⁹

This is why the nature of a unit's formation could often be an indicator of the troops bravery. If the presence of a soldier benefited his comrades, the whole group would profit from a more dense formation. The hallmark of a truly confident and brave unit was a looser formation.¹³⁰

Thus Bomilcar formed his men into a tighter and deeper formation when facing Rutilius because he doubted their courage.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Lendon, *Empire of Honor* 238

¹²⁹ Marshal, *Men Against Fire* 42-43

¹³⁰ Goldsworthy, *Roman Army at War* 178

¹³¹ Sallust, *Jug.* 52

The amicable relationship between soldiers certainly mattered, but its effects do not adequately cover the subject. A close bond between soldiers was important in creating the army's community and instilling pride in the soldier, but does not create an adequate explanation of battlefield behavior. If we look at the above considerations in a different light, I believe we can get a more accurate view on what drove the individual to face the dangers of battle. The affiliation between soldiers likely played a more 'negative' role than previously stated. A greater factor was the influence of a system of reward, competition, and honor that Lendon refers to as 'outward solidarity'. This motivated soldiers to fight in order to surpass each other in feats of valor and to earn personal recognition for their deeds.¹³² The rewards that men received for their bravery supports this idea: the *corona aurea* was given for non-specific acts of valor, as were the *torques*, *armillae*, and *phalerae*.¹³³ All of these were prestige-based rewards given for an individual's dangerous actions in a battle. Sallust tells us that after the Battle at the River Muthul, Metellus spent a few days in camp while he treated his wounded and "awarded the customary distinctions to those who had done specially good service in the battles..."¹³⁴ Marius also later boasts to the Roman citizenry about his receiving of such awards.¹³⁵ Men were also greatly influenced by the presence and recognition of a commander, likely because it was they who would recognize and reward valorous behavior, and thus increase their honor. Before the Battle of the River Muthul, Jugurtha:

...also addressed individually every man whom he had rewarded with a gratuity of honor for distinguished service, reminding him of the fact and pointing him out as an example to others...¹³⁶

¹³² Lendon *Soldiers and Ghosts*, 255-256

¹³³ Maxfield, *The Military Decorations of the Roman Army* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 67-97.

¹³⁴ Sallust, *Jug.* 54

¹³⁵ Sallust, *Jug.* 85

¹³⁶ Sallust, *Jug.* 49

It is extremely unlikely that Sallust actually knew what Jugurtha said to exhort his men before this battle, and he likely invented the dialogue based upon what he thought Jugurtha would have said. Thus, we can be fairly certain that Jugurtha's words here resemble Roman practice, as known by Sallust. In Josephus' account of the siege of Jerusalem and in Caesar's commentaries, both authors acknowledge how the soldiers fought better when under the observation of their commander.¹³⁷ This was likely because of their desire to earn honor for themselves from their leader. This phenomenon has survived into the modern age. Caputo remarked how he was instilled with a "lasting fear of criticism and, conversely, a hunger for praise" to the extent that he would die for a good report.¹³⁸

If one was greatly concerned about showing bravery, then certainly they were equally if not more concerned with not appearing to be cowards. Shame played a very important role in the motivations of combatants. Caesar wrote how "nothing done well or shamefully could be concealed, and lust for praise and fear of disgrace drove both sides on to bravery."¹³⁹ Thus we also read of shame-based punishments that had great effect on mutinous or cowardly soldiers. Caesar referred to his men as citizens rather than soldiers in order to shame them into proper behavior.¹⁴⁰ Other soldiers who ran from battle were required exit the camp through a back door, to sleep outside the camp, and to eat barley instead of grain.¹⁴¹ Sallust himself shows great contempt for the men who ran in his account of the war, as exemplified by his snide comments

¹³⁷ Caesar, *BG* 3.14, 6.8, 7.62 and Josephus *BJ* 6.132-.135. Both sources pointed out in Goldsworthy "Community Under Pressure" 205.

¹³⁸ Caputo, *A Rumor of War* 35

¹³⁹ Caesar, *BG* 7.80. Quoted in Lendon's *Empire of Honour*, 239.

¹⁴⁰ Seutonius, *Jul.* 70

¹⁴¹ Phang, *Roman Military Service*, 143. Lendon, *Empire of Honour*, 239. Vegetius 1.23.

towards men who “find that their legs protect them better than their arms.”¹⁴² Lack of shame was another insult that Romans would accuse cowards of as well, as Sallust did in his treatment of Numidian deserters:

.... no Numidian, after a rout, returns to his post in the kings army; every man goes off where he pleases, and this is not regarded as a shameful thing for a soldier to do, because it is the custom of the country.¹⁴³

Many people in Rome showed disgust towards the men under Albinus’ command who ran while they still had the weapons with which to fight and die.¹⁴⁴ This likely reflects typical Roman sentiment at the time. Running was shameful, and thus one would only bear that shame if others were doing the same, or when they were hidden from the judgment of their peers.¹⁴⁵ In modern studies of soldiers’ fears before combat, it was found that the primary fear was of showing cowardice, followed by fear of death, mutilation, and torture after capture.¹⁴⁶

So we see that the main factor influencing Roman soldiers in battle was honor. Fear of being a coward kept them from fleeing while rivalry and appeals to reputation influenced them to seek victory. Other considerations like camaraderie and the necessity of victory for survival factored in as well, but these would likely have been overshadowed by honor-based motivations for the majority of combatants. Sallust unfortunately gives us little valuable insight into this question, but there is no reason to believe that modern examples did not pertain to Roman men as well; societies may change, but such fundamental reactions to danger are unlikely to change much in such a relatively small time in the length of human history. By appealing to their honor,

¹⁴² Sallust, *Jug.* 74

¹⁴³ Sallust, *Jug.* 54

¹⁴⁴ Sallust, *Jug.* 39

¹⁴⁵ Lendon, *Empire of Honour* 239

¹⁴⁶ Holmes, *Acts of War* 141-142

Roman commanders were able to influence enough soldiers to the astonishing acts of bravery it took to overcome their enemies.

Siege

The personal experience of siege for the attackers would have been strikingly similar to that of field combat, making it repetitious to treat every aspect in the experience of siege within this study. However, there are a few important distinctions that require separate discussion. The strain put on the Roman soldiers, both physical and mental, was more emphasized than in the open field. Furthermore, just as the action was more pronounced, the everyday grind would have been more strenuous on morale as well. Siege could double the workload of a soldier, a situation that, if extended over a long length of time lacking results, would greatly frustrate the men. It could also leave them inactive, which as we saw before would be disastrous to morale. Longer sieges could last years, and that long spent on a fruitless endeavor would demoralize the men and thus doom a campaign. Sieges were tough, not only for the defenders but also for the attackers, due to the difficulties in keeping the troops invigorated.

First we must examine what ancient siege warfare encompassed. By this time the Romans had a capability equal to or greater than that of the Hellenistic East.¹⁴⁷ Sallust includes mantlets, siege towers, ladders, sapping, and siege mounds in his narratives. Torsion artillery (*tormenta*), or ballistae powered by twisted rope, is only once directly mentioned, but their use is implied elsewhere by both the attackers and defenders. It is likely that the towers used to cover the men building the siege mound at Thala had torsion machines on them. Rocks, thrown from machines and hand, destroyed the Roman mantlets at Jugurtha's treasury fort. Missiles were the main weapons used during these engagements, and the advantage was strongly in the defenders' favor.

¹⁴⁷ Roth, *Siege Narrative in Livy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 51

Missiles discharged from the height of walls had gravity on their side, and the men under the walls were much more exposed to them. These factors are what made the action of siege warfare decidedly more terrifying for the Romans in the Numidian war as described by Sallust.

Siege warfare would have been much more detrimental to the Roman army than conflict in the field. In an assault, the Romans were constantly subject to Numidian arrows, rocks, and burning oil. Arrows and javelins would have presented a constant threat of maiming or death, while the burning oil thrown from the walls would have instilled much terror in the attackers. At the siege of Zama, the defenders rolled massive rocks off the walls, which could cause horrific damage to those beneath. All of this would have been dreadful, yet the most terrifying aspect would seem to have been the *tormenta*. These could easily crush a man with their projectiles or destroy siege works. Many brave Romans were killed this way, which instilled terror in the rest.¹⁴⁸ Even for the less aggressive soldiers, there was no respite from the hail of missiles. At Zama, the Roman soldiers were accosted by arrows, javelins, sharpened stakes, burning oil, and even large rolled rocks to the extent that Sallust claimed: “the danger, though not the glory, was shared alike by the cowardly and the brave.”¹⁴⁹

The rewards and motivations for brave action in siege were much the same; they were honor based, but also of higher prestige due to the higher amount of danger. The *corona muralis* and the *corona vallaris* were both given to the man who was first to climb over the enemy’s wall, and both carried more honor than the awards given in the field.¹⁵⁰ Officers gave these rewards, thus we see men striving harder to overcome the defenders in an attempt to be noticed:

¹⁴⁸ Sallust, *Jug.* 92

¹⁴⁹ Sallust, *Jug.* 57

¹⁵⁰ Maxfield, *The Military Decorations of the Roman Army* 67-97

At the points where lieutenants or tribunes were in charge, the men exerted all their strength, every man working as if success depended entirely on his own efforts.¹⁵¹

The men strove to earn merit in their commander's eyes, and thus win glory and its associated trophies. Yet other motivations that were dismissed as applicable in battle must be reconsidered here. Due to the fact that siege was a drawn out process, the soldiers motivations would not have been as 'knee-jerk' as they were in battle. Thus, again, monetary reward would have been an important factor. Much of the loot earned was taken from captured cities, and this allowed Metellus and Marius to cultivate their men's favor.¹⁵² After appealing to the men's sense of revenge, Metellus blatantly tries to encourage them with promises of plunder.¹⁵³ While an assault was taking place, the men would have been subject to strains similar to those of field combat, and thus would not be thinking about gold. Yet during the majority of the siege, while they were not actively engaged with the enemy, the riches inside the city must have been on their minds.

The process of taking a city could also prove strenuous on the soldiers because of the added workload as well as the dangers of assault. Siege warfare would have demanded the troops to build siege works, enclosing defenses, and a siege fort. At Alesia, Caesar's troops built inner walls to trap the citizens of the city, and outer walls to protect them from Gallic reinforcements. This represents an extreme, but does show the amount of work soldiers could be expected to do during a siege. At Zama, the Romans had to build walls all the way around the city, presumably with towers and forts/command centers throughout, as was the practice.¹⁵⁴ This work would have not necessarily been detrimental to the Roman soldier's mindset, and most likely was

¹⁵¹ Sallust, *Jug.* 60

¹⁵² Sallust, *Jug.* 54, 87

¹⁵³ Sallust, *Jug.* 68

¹⁵⁴ Sallust, *Jug.* 57

beneficial¹⁵⁵, but if the city was not taken easily by their efforts, they might think all their work to be in vain. Beyond this initial effort, the siege could last many monotonous days. Some cities were captured by surprise and without a siege, but the longest duration given by Sallust for sieges in the war was six weeks, and many others seem to have been similar in length. Surely there could not have been an assault every day and this left the men a lot of downtime. We have seen how this can be very detrimental to discipline and morale, as it is likely that after a while the men would start to consider their efforts pointless. Not all experience of siege could have been bad, as many ‘easy’ sieges are mentioned, and were a way to introduce men into combat and improve morale by letting them fight the enemy. Yet the longer sieges were certainly exhausting for the men. They would have been largely inactive day after day, watching the walls in the hot Numidian summer whilst occasionally being subjected to the helpless terror of assaulting the walls.

For the men besieging a city, we can be assured that the experience was horrific. Nerves would be frayed, and sometimes flesh torn, under the constant rain of missiles during an assault, which in extreme cases could have hindered visibility.¹⁵⁶ Lack of sleep due to the constant demand put on the men by the laborious businesses of siege in addition to the terror of assault would put the soldiers further on edge. As in field battle, the din had profound effects on the individual’s experience of assault: the sound of *tomenta* flinging death, missiles clattering onto shields and siege works, cracking stone, cries of the wounded and the silence of the dead. Casualties inflicted upon the besiegers in these conditions could be atrocious, as seen in the death

¹⁵⁵ Goldsworthy, “Community Under Pressure” 202

¹⁵⁶ Ammianus, XIX 2.8

of thirty thousand Persian men assaulting Amida in 359 C.E.¹⁵⁷ Beyond the combat aspect of siege, the experience between assaults was even more damaging for morale due to the tedium that prevailed between moments of terror. The heat of the Numidian sun would have exacerbated the misery, and the conditions were ripe for *la cafard* to infect the besieging army. Such factors made the life of the Roman soldiers an enormous struggle, and the effects would have been equally enormous. Some men would have lost friends or been wounded themselves, and become even more distressed by this. The frustration suffered by these men in their efforts to take the city had to eventually come boiling up, once given the opportunity.

When discussing the capture of cities by force, the question of morality and killing becomes quite clear. It seems that the brutalization of the citizen population was common and accepted. After the Battle at the River Muthul, Metellus took many cities by assault, plundering them and killing all the men of military age. His reason for doing this was to bully the population and to frighten Jugurtha.¹⁵⁸ This was unadulterated terrorism. Yet we sense no distain from our author, and he only notes of this technique's effectiveness. In fact, Sallust hardly uses a negative word for these terrible acts, for example the devastation of the land by fire and the massacre and complete destruction of Vaga.¹⁵⁹ Sallust only comments on the exceptionally bad treatment of the people of Capsa, where the citizenry, despite having surrendered, were massacred or sold into slavery, and the town was destroyed. Even then his objection was minor and he justified the deed.

¹⁵⁷ Lenski, "Two Sieges of Amida (AD 359 and 502-503) and the Experience of Combat in the Late Roman Near East" *The Late Roman Army in the Near East from Diocletian to the Arab Conquest: Proceedings of a colloquium held at Potenza, Acerenza and Matera, Italy (May 2005)*, ed. Ariel S. Lewin and Pietrina Pellegrini (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2007), 219-234

¹⁵⁸ Sallust, *Jug.* 54

¹⁵⁹ Sallust, *Jug.* 55, 91

This violation of the usages of war was not inspired by avarice or brutality on the consul's part: the fact was that the place was important to Jugurtha and difficult for the Romans to reach, and the inhabitants were a fickle and untrustworthy lot, whom neither kindness nor fear had ever been able to control.¹⁶⁰

This sort of thing was very common for soldiers of all types to do in those times. Scipio Africanus's men slaughtered the population of Carhago Nova until the Carthaginian commander was compelled to surrender¹⁶¹, and Jugurtha had his army killed all the male inhabitants of Cirta who had fought for his brother. We get no inclination that the soldiers regretted doing such things. In fact Sallust does not say that the slaughter at Capsa was ordered, and could have been done by the license of the soldiers. Vengeance and anger could have allowed them to do this: Metellus once appeals to the soldiers' desire for vengeance outside the walls of Vaga, and we have seen that the men were likely resentful after a siege. The soldiers would likely have been exceptionally bitter after their negative experiences, and took out their frustration on the local population. The pent up aggressions and rage would also have been intensified when joined with the relief of victory to produce grizzly results.¹⁶² Nor did soldiers have the pressure of self-restraint that was expected of their generals, and thus were not honor bound to limit themselves in their anger.¹⁶³

Another likely reason for this behavior was again greed. After these massacres, the soldiers were enriched by the city's wealth. The citizen population got in the way of what the soldiers wanted, and thus were dealt with harshly. Controlling the soldiers inside the walls was a difficult task once a city was taken.¹⁶⁴ When the Romans breached the gates at Capsa, Marius had to hurry into the town himself in order to ensure his soldiers fought the enemy instead of

¹⁶⁰ Sallust, *Jug.* 91

¹⁶¹ Livy, 26.46

¹⁶² Lenski, "Two Sieges of Amida (AD 359 and 502-503)" 232

¹⁶³ Lendon, *Empire of Honour* 247

¹⁶⁴ Gilliver "The Roman Army and Morality in War," *Battle in Antiquity*, (1995) 219-238

immediately going after plunder.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the effects of frustration and bitterness on the soldiers after a siege must not be underestimated. Monetary motivations surely had their place, but history has shown that collective resentment can inspire terrible deeds, for example the Rape of Nanking or the massacre at My Lai.¹⁶⁶ In some cases, the general himself ordered the slaughter of the people, as Metellus did. A sense of duty is not very likely to have motivated the soldiers to enact such policies; instead it gave them extra license to pursue their desire for spoils or vengeance.

It is unfortunate to be so limited in our exploration for knowledge of ancient warfare and the soldiers involved in it. Armed conflict was arguably the most influential episode in shaping the course of history, and soldiers were the tools of war and instruments of this change. Nevertheless, ancient Roman authors wrote so little about these obscure but important figures, and no extant writings from the soldiers exist for study. However, even recent work in this subject has mainly focused on battle, as the ancient writers were even quieter about the general lives of the combatants. As well as battle, it is highly important to examine the daily routines of the soldiers in order to better know the events of the war. The pursuit of seeking understanding in this field is therefore a significant task, but also an exciting one. It forces us to explore old sources in new ways and with a keen eye for previously unnoted detail.

Thus, by scrutinizing Sallust's writings in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, I hope to have made the soldier's experience in this conflict more clear. Sallust was not interested in documenting the lives of the soldiery, but we have succeeded by comparing scavenged details in his account with

¹⁶⁵ Sallust, *Jug.* 91

¹⁶⁶ See Iris Chang's *The Rape of Nanking* and PBS' *American Experience: My Lai* documentary respectively.

other better-known examples. The majority of the soldiers were young men, out seeking glory and gold across the Mediterranean landscape in a fight against a foreign despot. The life they were drafted into, or volunteered for, and swore to endure was a difficult one, though. The campaign's routine dominated their experience: marching, foraging, building camp, training, instilling discipline, and most noticeably a large amount of labor. Nevertheless, their purpose was to engage the enemy and to defeat them on the field of battle. The Romans in Numidia saw their fair share of action, yet combat was not well suited to their strengths. Though they won the major battles and the war, the combat was a grueling experience due to Numidian tactics and guile. The sieges would have proven exceptionally difficult, and the frustration often drove men to horrendous acts of slaughter. Nevertheless, they persisted, pushed on to victory with a desire to earn merit and glory, and to prove themselves up to the task.

I believe that all the important factors have been covered in as much detail as a study of this length will allow. I also consider that this is an exciting realm of research, and that this example will influence further study not just into the 'experience of battle' question, but also the 'experience of war' in the ancient world.

Bibliography

- Ammianus. *Rerum Gestarum*. Trans. J.C. Rolfe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940.
- Bishop, M.C., and J.C.N. Coulston. *Roman Military Equipment*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2006.
- Caesar. *De Bello Civili*. Trans. William Duncan. St. Louis: Edwards and Bushnell, 1856.
- Caesar. *De Bello Gallico*. Trans. H.J. Howards. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917.
- Cagniard, Pierre. "The Late Republican Army (146-30 BC)." *A Companion to the Roman Army*. Ed. Paul Erdkamp. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 80-95.
- Campbell, Duncan. "Part II Arming Romans for Battle." *The Oxford handbook of Warfare in the Classical World*. Ed. Brain Campbell and Lawrence Tritle, 419-437. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Caputo, Phillip. *A Rumor of War, with a Twentieth-Anniversary Postscript by the Author*. New York: Henry Holt, 1996.
- Churchill J.B. "Ex Quo Quod Vellent Facerent: Roman Magistrates' Authority Over *Praeda* and *Manubiae*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 129 (1999): 85-116.
- Crawford, Michael. *Roman Republic*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Earl, D.C. *The Political Thought of Sallust*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961.
- Gilliver, Catherine. "The Roman Army and Morality in War." *Battle in Antiquity*. Ed. Alan Lloyd. London: Duckworth, 1996. 219-238.
- Goldsworthy, Adrian, "Community Under Pressure: The Roman Army at the Siege of Jerusalem" *The Roman Army as a Community*. Ed. A. Goldsworthy and I. Haynes. Portsmouth: Journal of Roman Archaeology (1999): 197-210.
- Goldsworthy, Adrian. *The Complete Roman Army*. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 2003.
- Goldsworthy, Adrian. *The Roman Army at War 100BC-200AD*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Hersey, John. *Into the Valley: Marines at Guadalcanal*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.
- Holmes, Richard, *Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle*. New York: The Free Press, 1985.

- Josephus. *The Wars of the Jews*. Trans. William Whiston. Buffalo: John E. Beardsley, 1895.
- Lee, A.D. "Morale and the Roman Experience of Battle." *Battle in Antiquity*. Ed. Alan Lloyd. London: Duckworth, 1996. 199-217.
- Lendon, J.E. *Empire of Honour*. New York: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- Lendon, J.E. *Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
- Lenski, Noel. "Two Sieges of Amida (AD 359 and 502-503) and the Experience of Combat in the Late Roman Near East" *The Late Roman Army in the Near East from Diocletian to the Arab Conquest: Proceedings of a colloquium held at Potenza, Acerenza and Matera, Italy (May 2005)*. Ed. Ariel S. Lewin and Pietrina Pellegrini. Oxford: Archaeopress, (2007): 219-236.
- de Ligt, Luuk. "Roman Manpower and Recruitment During the Middle Republic." *A Companion to the Roman Army*. Ed. Paul Erdkamp. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, (2007). 132-147.
- Livy. *Ad Urbe Condita*. Trans. William Heinemann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938.
- Luttwak, Edward. *Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
- Marshal, S.L.A. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*. Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1978.
- Maxfield, Valerie. *The Military Decorations of the Roman Army*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981.
- Phang, Sara. *Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early Principate*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Plutarch, *Lives*. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin. London: William Heinemann, 1928.
- Polybius. *Histories*. Trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. New York: Bloomington, 1962.
- Ramsey, J.T. Introduction to *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Roth, Johnathan. *Roman Warfare*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Roth, Jonathan. *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B.C. – A.D. 235)*. Boston: Brill, 1999.

- Roth, Jonathan. "Siege Narrative in Livy: Representation and Reality." *Representations of War in Ancient Rome*. Ed. Shiela Dillon and Katherine Welch. New York: Cambridge University Press, (2006): 49-67.
- Sabin, Philip. "The Face of Roman Battle." *The Journal of Roman Studies* 90 (2000): 1-17.
- Salazar, Christine. "Treating the Sick and Wounded" *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World*. Ed. Brian Campbell and Lawrence Tritle. New York: Oxford University Press, (2013): 294-311.
- Sallust. *Bellum Jugurthinum*. Trans. S.A. Handford. New York: Penguin Classics, 1963.
- Sallust. *Bellum Jugurthinum*. Trans. J.C. Rolfe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921.
- Seutonius. *The Lives of the Caesars*. Trans. J.C. Rolfe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913.
- Smith, R.E. *Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958.
- Syme, Ronald, *Sallust*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964.
- Tacitus. *Annales*. Trans. Alfred Church. New York: Random House, 1942.
- Vegetius. *De Re Militari*. Trans. N.P. Milner. Liverpool: Liverpool Universtiy Press, 1993.
- Ward, Allen, Fritz Heichelheim, and Cedric Yeo. *A History of the Roman People*. 5th ed. Boston: Prentice Hall, 2010.
- Watson, George. *The Roman Soldier*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1969.