

**The Shifting Status of the Russian Language in Ukraine: A Comparison of Ukraine's and
Latvia's Post-USSR Language Policies**

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

How does a state build a national identity? What are the factors that create a unifying theme for a state that all of its citizens can cling to? It would seem that adopting the cultural practices of the state's local population would be the most appropriate. Symbolism, traditions, and language have all been cited as useful cultural markers a state can adopt when building a national identity. Many scholars of nationalism, such as Anderson (1983), Greenfeld (1992), and Hobsbawm (1992), have agreed that a common unifying language is one of the most important building blocks for a national identity. It almost feels blindingly obvious, a common language facilitates better economic, bureaucratic, and social coordination in a country. A government will often designate a language as its *official language*, and will conduct most governmental affairs and bureaucracy in this language. Thus a country's population will learn this language for economic and social integration, and helps foster a common national identity.

However, it is also common that a state will have one (or many) sizable portions of their population speaking different languages. States almost never agree with ethnic or linguistic borders, and immigrants bring further complications. This can introduce difficulties in essentially all aspects of public life. There is no one solution to this problem, and countries faced with it have enacted different solutions. Often a country will simply have two or more official languages. This is the case with many formally colonized countries, such as India, who has the two official languages of Hindi (one of the most widely-spoken indigenous languages of India) and English (the language of their former colonizers). Some will adopt a *lingua franca*, such as

Algeria and Tunisia, who use French as their official language, although French is not the native language of the majority of the population. Finally, a country may choose to simply make their indigenous language the sole official language, with little regard to the minority languages in their borders, no matter how many speakers they may have. Usually a state will give minority languages some amount of official status, (especially in the regions where the minority language is most commonly spoken) although this is not always the case.

This is what happened with many newly sovereign states that gained independence in the 1991 collapse of the USSR. Most of these states were (or had parts of their territory) part of the Russian Empire, and under the Russian Empire's rule they were subject to heavy *Russification*, a cultural assimilation process where locals adopted the Russian language and customs, and the Russian Empire put Russians in places of power. Contemporary of the Russification policies of the Russian Empire in the mid 19th century was the bolstering of the Ukrainian and Belarusian national movements. These russification policies persisted in the Soviet era, and while loosened in the 1980s during Perestroika, Russian was still the official language of the USSR, so the SSRs took it upon themselves to make their indigenous language their official language. Much of the russification policies were only truly overturned when the various constituent republics of the Soviet Union gained independence in 1991. Still, large numbers of Russian speakers continue to exist in the former constituent republics, including people who are not ethnically Russian, but have Russian as their native language. This is especially the case in Ukraine, where a sizable amount of the Russian speaking population in Ukraine are ethnically Ukrainian.

It is commonly accepted that a singular national language complements national identity and pride, something that has been exhibited in eastern Europe since the fall of the USSR

(Dubinsky and Davies 2018). Both Ukraine and Latvia developed their own language policies throughout the 1990s, which were closely connected to the processes of derussification and tried to find a solution to the question on how to treat their respective large populations of Russian speakers. In censuses taken in the early 2000s, Ukraine reported 29.6% of its population as being native Russian speakers (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2001), and Latvia reported 37.5% of their population having Russian as their native language (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2017). These Russophones are both groups composed of both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians/Latvians, many of whose ancestors learned Russian as a result of industrialization in the USSR, where knowledge of Russian was required (Yekelchik 2007). Such large proportions of each state's population presents challenges in instituting a singular common language throughout the government, education, and the private sector. As such, Ukraine and Latvia have developed their own approaches to language policy throughout the late 20th and early 21st century, which are still being developed to this day. However, these policies took vastly different forms when enacted in the 1990s, and both have developed differently as each country went into the 21st century. These differences are due to each country's unique nationalist history (especially in relation with Russia) and Ukraine's more mixed population (where many ethnic Ukrainians are native Russophones) compared to Latvia's, which has stark divides on ethnic lines.

Language Policies of the Russian Empire and Brief Independence

The Russian Empire's Russification policies treated the Ukrainian and Latvian languages in similar ways when both territories were under its rule. These policies had a large effect on

both countries's nationalist movements, and continued to inform language policies later in the Soviet era. As the language policies of today for both states are in some ways, a reaction to the Soviet Union's language policies, it is important to go back to the beginning and understand how this all started.

The Ukrainian nationalist movements in the 18th and 19th century were the first of their kind, primarily headed by intelligentsia who called themselves "Ukrainophiles", who were being exposed to European romanticism as students in university (Lihus 2021), which influenced other nationalist and revolutionary movements occurring contemporarily with their academic life, such as those in France and Greece. These Ukrainophiles, such as Taras Shevchenko and Mykola Kostmarov, began to write and publish books in the Ukrainian language, both scientific and literary in nature, and organize clandestine societies to develop the Ukrainian national movement. At the time, Ukrainian was seen as a low status peasant language, and people like Shevchenko were among the first to stimulate the modern Ukrainian literary movement, one that did not exist previously in Ukraine under the Russian Empire. The most famous of these literary societies is perhaps The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, a secret organization devoted to a Ukrainian national revival and dreams of a democratic pan-Slavic federation. The Russian Empire's secret police prosecuted and exiled many of its members, including Shevchenko, who continued to write poetry in Ukrainian until his death. Clearly many were devoted to the Ukrainian national movement, and this is recognized still, with Shevchenko today being known as "Ukraine's National Poet".

Latvia also experienced a national resurgence under the Russian Empire in the middle of the 19th century, and it had many similar aspects to early Ukrainian nationalism. Both had

romantic influences and a strong focus on the rural peasant language, along with the accompanying rural folklore and traditions. However, while early Ukrainian nationalists were mainly from an intelligentsia or other well-off backgrounds¹, the first Latvian nationalists were from a growing peasant middle class who became first-generation university students (Druviete 2025). Latvia experienced large rural social change in the early 19th century, with the abolishment of serfdom in 1819 granting personal liberty and freedom of movement, albeit without large-scale land redistribution (Ijabs 2014). These social reforms were relatively early in the Russian Empire, with serfdom being abolished in the rest of the empire in 1861, and allowed a large amount of the peasant population to move up in social status. Many young men from rural areas enrolled in universities around 1850, and quickly grouped with one another, seeing themselves as separate but equal to the majority Baltic German (and to a lesser extent, Russian) student and faculty populations. These Latvian students saw the restrictions their native people and culture were placed under in not being allowed to use their own language in higher society, and that participation in academia meant Germanization. This group of Latvian students came to be known as the “Young Latvians” (*jaunlatvieši*), who, while being influenced by German Romanticism and its relationship to nationalist thought, denied the universalist German nationalism espoused by their Baltic-German peers, and refused to be acknowledged as an inferior people to be assimilated into either Germans or Russians (Plakans 2011). The Young Latvians would create Latvian newspapers and publish songs and folklore. Following the Young Latvians was the “New Current”, a movement in the 1890s that came out of the Latvian literary journals the Young Latvians helped spur, and several famous Latvian intellectuals, such as the

¹ Shevchenko being the notable exception as he came from a peasant background, who worked his way up the social ladder first as a servant and then as an artist after he was liberated from serfdom.

writer Rainis, would get their start participating in this movement. Many members of the New Current movement began to mingle with socialist ideology in the 1890s and early 1900s, and this allowed them to gain massive support from the growing working class in Latvia, exposing many to Latvian nationalism and intellectualism, something the Young Latvians failed to do with their more Romantic nationalism approach. The New Current would continue into the first decade of 1900, albeit struggling from government suppression, and while dying out due to key figures being exiled and papers subject to government censorship in the 1905 Russian Revolution, many Latvians yearned for independence, like others throughout the Russian Empire at this time.

After the Russian revolution in 1917, Latvia proclaimed independence in late 1918 and formed a provisional government, through the declaration of the People's Council of Latvia. This was common for many of the Russian Empire's former holdings; Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and several states in the Caucasus all declared independence as Russian imperial authority collapsed (Plakans 2011). Latvia would fight a two year long war with the Soviet Union to keep independence after the 1917 Russian Revolution. The Latvian Provisional government was supported by Poland, Estonia, and to a smaller extent western allies such as France and the United Kingdom. The Baltic German nobility initially supported the Latvian Provisional government, but attempted a coup d'état against the Provisional government, and failed after their puppet government could not gain support. Joint forces of Latvian and Polish troops made great progress in 1919 and early 1920, with peace negotiations beginning in April of 1920 (Plakans 2011). Latvia was now recognized internationally as the Republic of Latvia, and at first, Latvian was given an explicit special status in law. In fact, before Latvia's own constitution was ratified, Latvia adopted a law giving autonomy for ethnic minority schools to

teach in their own language, such as Russian schools teaching in Russian or Estonian schools teaching in Estonian (Smith 2002). Mirroring many of their newly independent neighbors at the time, the government automatically made anyone who resided in Latvia at the time of independence a Latvian citizen, regardless of ethnicity, and initially, there was no requirement for Latvian citizens to be able to speak the Latvian language (Plakans 2011). In the drafts for the 1922 Constitution, numerous articles protecting minorities were proposed but not adopted. Included in this was an article making Latvian the official state language, while ensuring protections for minorities to be able to use their native languages in speech and writing, and for minority language use in government contexts to be regulated by later law (Zile 1980).

In 1934, the Prime Minister of Latvia, Kārlis Ulmanis, initiated a coup d'état, dissolving parliament, and leading Latvia as an authoritarian prime minister for the next six years (Rogainis 1971). During his rule, the Ulmanis government discriminated against minorities heavily, dismissing them from government positions and requiring compulsory Latvian education in most minority schools. He also elevated the status of the Latvian language, requiring it to be used in all state offices and requiring both personal and geographic names to be Latvianized. A 1935 language law went even further, requiring Latvian to be used in basically every private business such as department stores or industrial offices, and every written agreement had to be drafted in Latvian or they would be considered invalid. Ulmanis's policies would last up until Latvia's annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940 (Topij 2017).

Language Policies of the Soviet Union

Even before the Russian Revolution of 1917, Vladimir Lenin was opposed to forced universal Russian education and supported schools taught in each republic's local language in an attempt to combat what he saw as centuries of "Great Russian Chauvinism". Lenin was very careful to please the non-Russian territories incorporated into the Russian Empire, and saw the compulsory Russian language education as an attempt to place Russian as superior to the other local languages in the Empire. In "Is a Compulsory Official Language Needed?" (1914), Lenin denounced the idea of a compulsory single language as he saw it as an element of coercion. While he still calls the Russian language a "great and mighty language", he thinks that "the closest possible intercourse and fraternal unity should be established between the oppressed classes of all the nations that inhabit Russia, without any discrimination", and In "Liberals and Democrats on the Language Question" (1913), Lenin explicitly calls Russia a "terribly backward country" and points to Switzerland as a place where a compulsory single language is not needed. He recognizes that while Switzerland has three official languages, French, German, and Italian; the Italians (and presumably the Germans) spoke French in parliament simply because they would like to be understood by the majority, and that the Italians did not detest this because it was not forced upon them by the state. Lenin believed that the same could become of the Russian language – a language that was not forced upon the people, but nonetheless encouraged and one that would probably be economically beneficial for the people who knew it. If a common language was to exist, that language must be agreed upon by the people, and that no aspects of any culture should be privileged or enforced over another. Still, Lenin goes on to say in "Liberals and Democrats on the Language Question" that one day it may be possible for the Slavic people

to do away with the “horrible thought” of people giving speeches in multiple languages during parliament. He saw the nationalism that pervaded the civil war as a powerful force, and that it was better for the USSR to accommodate, even support it to achieve “national unity”, rather than alienate them and spur discontent (Surman 2026). These early Soviet policies promoting each constituent nation and their minorities was known as *korenizatsiia*, literally “nativization”, a strategy to fight Great Russian Chauvinism. *Korenizatsiia* supported the titular language of the constituent nations by teaching them in schools and allowing their use in government. The *korenizatsiia* policy had mixed results around the Soviet Union, with success in ethnically homogenous republics like Georgia, but difficulty in more mixed nations like Ukraine, where a large amount of the industrial proletariat class spoke Russian. Still many nations under *korenizatsiia* saw success, with members of their indigenous populations gaining dominant positions in the all-union party government (Martin 2001).

At first, Stalin actually spearheaded *korenizatsiia* alongside Lenin, delivering a speech in front of the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in 1923 declaring that a proper communist working in non-Russian environments must adapt to the local culture. He said that this is the only way for workers across the Soviet Union to be quickly integrated into the administrative and industrial workforce, and that local nationalism would be eradicated in the process (Grenoble 2003). However, even earlier, before the revolution, Stalin wrote an essay in 1913 entitled *Marxism and the National Question*, where he proclaims that a common language is essential for a nation, and that what makes a nation unique are various commonalities, such as common language, common territory and community of character, and that only these commonalities taken as a sum constitutes a nation. It is important to clarify

Stalin's definition of *nation* here, which is different from ours today, where the word *nation* is usually synonymous with the word *state* or *nation state*. To Stalin, this is not the case, and in *Marxism and the National Question* he explicitly states that no one calls Russia a "nation" but rather a "stable community" due to it possessing many nations inside of it, such as the Russians, Jews, Georgians, etc.² (Stalin 1935). Stalin expands on this in the similarly titled essay *The National Question and Leninism*, where he lays out the three stages a nation-state must undergo to achieve worldwide Communism. With regards to language, the first step sees the use of national languages growing now that their oppression under the bourgeois system has been abolished, the second sees the proletariat of each nation-state forming a common language for economic and political cooperation, while individual languages will still exist, and the third sees the a worldwide socialist system with the disappearance of national differences and national languages as a worldwide common language is formed. Stalin ends the essay by sternly stating that not only should education be in each respective native language, but that the cultural institutions surrounding that language, such as the press, the theatre, and the cinema, must be developed to ensure that the people will be successful in their "cultural, political and economic development" (Stalin 1954).

Now we have a clearer view on Stalin's own interpretations and intentions on the *korenizatsiia* policy: a stepping stone in the larger goal of an eventual common language, one that would in the future supplant all other languages. Stalin is only interested in the education and equality of languages only as a means to an end, and equality of the peoples is all people under a common socialist culture and language, not universal equality of different distinct

² Also relevant that Stalin says that a "stable community" is a prerequisite for a nation, meaning that the Russians, Jews, Georgians, etc. all are their own "stable communities".

peoples. Stalin still saw small-scale nationalism as a threat to the Communist movement, and in his 1934 address to the XVII Party Congress, declared nationalism a greater danger than Great Russian Chauvinism, signalling a change in how the Communist Party should treat national minorities and essentially ending Lenin's *korenizatsiia* policy (Grenoble 2003). A 1938 Central Communist Party decree made the Russian language compulsory in all schools across the Union starting in the first grade, and an effort to make all languages in the USSR's scripts Cyrillic (Chevalier 2006). These efforts would only intensify in the postwar period under Khrushchev, where he said that Russian has become the "second national language" (Khrushchev Lit & Prog) and the Education Reforms of 1958-59 made it so education in one's mother tongue was not compulsory anymore, only Russian was. Russification increased in the 1970s under Brezhnev, where party rhetoric heavily promoted a singular Soviet people with a common culture and language. The 1977 Soviet Constitution changed the status of language in education from the 1936 one too, while when the 1936 Soviet Constitution guaranteed the *right* of an education instructed in their mother tongue (implying one could demand it), the 1977 constitution changed this to just be the *opportunity* to be instructed in their mother tongue, and in 1978, new laws were adopted that ordered the creation of new pedagogical materials for learning the Russian language in schools (Grenoble 2003).

Even as Gorbachev came into power in 1985 and promised reform, the government largely ignored language policy. Compulsory Russian education had been in place for almost 50 years, and large language shifts in some areas had already taken place (Grenoble 2003). It was only in 1989, just before the Soviet Union collapsed, that the constituent republics would start to

adopt their own languages as their official “state” languages, increasing government support for them in education, the media, and public service (Grenoble 2003).

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Methodology

Literature Review

It’s important to first clarify the terms “nationality” and “ethnicity”. “Ethnicity” can broadly be said to be a social category based upon shared ancestry, cultural history, and cultural traditions (Isajiw 1993). For example, a U.S. citizen would never describe their ethnicity as “American”, but might say “European” or “Chinese”. Defining the term “nationality” is difficult. It is clear that states can be composed of many nations (ie Spain), or a state can be composed of just one nation (usually a small country like Bhutan). In a state like Spain, an ethnicity can advocate for their own ethnicity’s nationality (such as the Basque people), or, as is the case with most people, adopt the general Spanish nationality, which is composed of many different ethnicities.

Research has been done analyzing language’s relation to nationalism. This is most often evident by a period of *language shift*, which is defined by the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Linguistics as “where speakers of one or more languages cease to use their ancestral language in favor of some other language, often the language of a larger majority community.” (Grenoble 2021). Modern language shift has been associated with nationalism practically since the rise of nationalist movements in the late 19th century. The rise of Irish nationalism and separatism coincided with the revival of Irish Gaelic in the early 20th century (Hutchinson 2012), and

similarly the rise of Zionism coincided with the revival of Hebrew (Kuzar 2001). While the Irish and Zionist nationalist movements were based on their ethnic and religious grounds (the Irish ethnicity and the Jewish religion respectively), the revival, subsequent mass education, and use of their languages are still pertinent to Ukraine and Latvia and the shift away from the Russian language.

Ukraine

Several scholars have examined the recent history of ethnic and national identity in Ukraine. Volodymyr Kulyk is the most prominent, having published about Ukrainian nationality and ethnic identity since the late 90s, and has observed all of the major political upheavals in Ukraine since its modern independence. He developed a specific focus in language and language policy around the 2000s, having written about language and identity in the public sphere (Kulyk 2006), analyzing data from nationwide surveys on language use in Ukraine (Kulyk 2007, Kulyk 2023), and the Ukrainian government's policy on language (Kulyk 2013). Kulyk has consistently shown that language is becoming increasingly important to the Ukrainian government and population's sense of national belonging, and identity that separates them from Russia. His longevity in studying this subject has proven immensely useful, as he has witnessed Ukraine's tense political scandals and the changing sentiment towards Russia, leading to a massive rise of the Ukrainian language and identity in the media, government, and personal lives of Ukrainian citizens. He has written about "Language Policies and Language Attitudes in Post-Orange Ukraine" (Kulyk 2009), general national identity in a post-Euromaidan and 2014 Russian invasion Ukraine (Kulyk 2016), the shifting identity of Russian speakers in Ukraine since the fall

of the Soviet Union (Kulyk 2017), and many articles on Ukrainian national identity and language use since the advent of the full-scale 2022 Russian invasion (Kulyk and Hale 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025). Kulyk has found that in pretty much every area of Ukrainian society, Russian has gradually been abandoned, and has only accelerated since the Russo-Ukrainian War.

While Kulyk is the most eminent scholar in the realm of Ukrainian language policy, most who publish about Ukrainian national identity inevitably touch upon it. Many scholars recognize the weight language has on nation-building in post-Soviet states, usually agreed to stem from early Leninist policy at the beginning of the USSR, which promoted the use and education of the national languages of each republic, and the subsequent suppression of these languages through Stalin's "russification" policies (Pavlenko 2008). Natalia Kudriavtseva is primarily a social and cognitive linguist who has written extensively on Ukrainian language policy, writing about monolingualism and bilingualism before the 2022 invasion (Soroka et al 2023), and articles about post-2022 invasion, such as the specific motivations for why Russophones are learning Ukrainian in a war-time context (Kudriatseva 2023a), and the Ukrainian state's increasing efforts regarding language education towards Russian speakers (Kudriatseva 2023b), which highlights the growing nationalist sentiment in Ukraine. Maria Chayinska, a scholar specializing in social identities, is also a scholar who has touched upon language in Ukraine. While she has written a few things on general Ukrainian nationalism, she has one article, written in 2021, titled "National identity and beliefs about historical linguicide are associated with support for exclusive language policies among the Ukrainian linguistic majority". This article analyzes survey data that measures Ukrainian citizen's beliefs on linguicide (suppression of languages by force), compared

to their in-group attachment (how Ukrainian they feel) and collective angst (how afraid they are about the status of the Ukrainian language). She finds that these beliefs have

Another scholar who has looked at Ukrainian language policy is Juliane Besters-Dilger, an associate of Kulyk's. Her work involving Ukraine is mostly on Ukrainian language education, but she has produced some great articles on Ukrainian language policy and its place in media, such as "Language Policy in Mass Media" (Besters-Dilger 2009), a small general overview of Ukrainian language policy (Besters-Dilger 2023) and serving as the general editor for *Language Policy and Language Situation in Ukraine: Analysis and Recommendations* (Besters-Dilger 2009), which features scholars (such as Kulyk) giving an overview on language policy in Ukraine at the time, including in education, media, and the government bureaucracy. "At the time" must be stressed, as while all of these articles from the 2000s have findings that are generally comparable to language use in Ukraine today, the political situation in Ukraine is very different from where it was two decades ago, chiefly from the Russian invasion tweaking and accelerating Ukrainian nationalistic ideals.

Taras Kuzio is also a heavily published and cited author on Ukrainian national identity (especially its relationship to contemporary Russian identity), but also does not have a focus on language like Kulyk does. Still, Kuzio has a widely-encompassing knowledge of Ukrainian politics, first publishing about Ukraine in the late 80s under glasnost, so when he does touch on language use and policy, it is not something to be discounted. His 1998 book *Ukraine: State and Nation Building* is a very insightful view into all aspects of early post-Soviet Ukraine's government and national identity, including a whole section devoted to language policy, where he criticizes and commentates on various contemporary scholars's views on newly-independent

Ukrainian language policy. He pushes back on the view that Ukraine is suppressing Russian by the government increasingly using solely the Ukrainian language in official documents, and clarifies that this does not constitute Ukraine as an ethnically Ukrainian state, saying that “A Ukrainian nation-state can still exist as a political nation based upon Ukrainians as the titular nation and their language as the only state language” (Kuzio 1998). He shows contemporary survey data that illustrates the rising public usage of the Ukrainian language, how important a singular national language is in nation-building, and how previous Soviet nationality policy that linked language to national identity probably informed Ukrainian views on language in relation to nationality today. Kuzio also points out how the contemporary data shows a discrepancy in Ukrainians recording if Ukrainian is their native language, and if Ukrainian is their ethnic identity. It shows that while ethnic Ukrainians were dominant in most oblasts (the exception being Crimea), the Ukrainian language as reported being the respondent’s “native language” varied widely, but usually being significantly below the percentage of people who responded as ethnically Ukrainian. Kuzio then goes on to show how even in the 90s the percentage of respondents who claimed Ukrainian was their native language varied throughout the years nationwide, going between 60 and 50 percent (although later surveys, including those in the previously mentioned Kulyk articles, show that this statistic stabilized and has continuously risen since).

Latvia

The majority of the literature regarding Latvian language policy appeared in the late 1990s and early 2000s, most likely as a response to Latvian independence and their subsequent

nation-building, along with Latvia's rapid alignment with Europe, culminating in them joining the European Union in 2004. Ina Druviete, when taking her view of the linguistic situation in Latvia in 2002, acknowledges that language policy is an important factor regarding the future of Latvian, and that Latvia's ascension into the EU, thus making Latvian one of the official EU languages, will help in that effort (Druviete 2002). Other scholars have compared Latvia's language policies with those of the other Baltic States (Lithuania and Estonia), and generally agree that Latvia has some of the strictest (Hogan-Brun et al. 2008; Cilevičs 2007).

Scholars have recognized that in Latvian language policy, education plays a crucial role. Most of Latvia's language policy has been about schooling, and many have pointed out that Latvia has implemented education reform focusing on the Latvian language much more rapidly than Ukraine, much to the protest of Latvia's Russian population, who have the the highest attendance at minority-language schools in the Baltics (Hogan-Brun 2006). There was also a smaller focus on citizenship policy and Latvia's problem with non-citizens (Coulby 1997) but much of the analysis on Latvian language policy in the media sphere came from international organizations such as the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 2011). However, after the 2000s, virtually no scholarly analysis of Latvian language policy was published until the late 2010s and early 2020s, where attention scholars began to analyze the complimenting processes of Latvian language policy in education and in citizenship (Maksimovtsova and Umland 2019).

Almost nothing analyzing language policy in Latvia since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been published, and language usage statistics are non-existent during this time. Because of this, I have had to largely look at the policy on my own to compare it with Ukraine's.

Methodology

This analysis consists of data regarding language policy and usage statistics from just before the fall of the Soviet Union to the present day, specifically 1989 to 2025. 1989 is a good starting point since it is when the last Soviet census was taken, allowing a pre-independence view on language use, although after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, not many surveys and censuses were undertaken in both Latvia and Ukraine until the early 2000s. There were virtually no surveys undertaken asking about language use after the fall of the USSR until the late 1990s. Ukraine and Latvia's language policies will be compared to each other qualitatively in chapter 3, and in tandem the actual language usage data in census and education statistics enacted near or soon after the policy will be analyzed.

It is useful to separate each country's language policy's history into separate distinct time periods, roughly corresponding to the modern political periods of each country. While Ukraine and Latvia have had a very different political history post-USSR, especially in regards to language policy, each can be separated into four eras that correspond to distinct political moments in each country's history. These eras are:

1. Post-USSR (1991-2004, going through independence to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and NATO accession in Latvia)
2. Europeanization (2004-2014, going through the Orange Revolution and Latvian NATO accession)
3. Beginning of Russo-Ukraine Conflict and aftermath of Euromaidan (2014-2022, from Euromaidan and initial to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine)

4. Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022-Present, going through the Russian invasion to the present)

Each of these political eras represent different goals and legislation of each government, and are also reflected in each country's language policy.

Obtaining survey data regarding language use is difficult, especially in post-Soviet states, where official government surveys can be sporadic or non-existent. Ukraine's census, while recording the language usage of the respondents, was last held in 2001, a significant time before any fears of a Russian invasion in 2014, and again in 2022. Luckily, Ukraine has a robust (non-governmental) institutional and academic polling agencies, such as the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), and Rating³, both being internationally recognized and focused solely on Ukraine. Latvia on the other hand has a much more robust census and government survey system (such as with the Latvian State Language Centre), accompanied by a good amount of EU surveys done because of Latvia's EU membership, and a smaller amount of independent academic surveys. It is useful to compare Latvia against Ukraine because as where Ukraine has a heavily mixed usage of Russian and Ukrainian among both ethnicities (Arel 2002), the usage of Russian and Latvian in Latvia is strictly divided with each ethnicity preferring to use their titular language (Platt 2024). Still, a survey done in one country might not have an equivalent in the other,

³ Formally known as the "Sociological group "Rating""

Chapter 3: A Comparison of Ukrainian and Latvian

Language Policy

From the very onset of independence in 1991, both Ukraine and Latvia largely kept their 1989 Laws on Language intact and in force. This meant that while Ukrainian and Latvian were each the official state languages for their respective countries, Russian was still allowed to be used on an official level, and essentially had a parallel status with the national language (Druviete 2002; Kuzio 1998). This would not last long, and in the 1990s both states would strengthen their titular languages legally, while Russian's status began to weaken in various spheres, such as in the government and education. The Russian language's status would continue to weaken and soon be targeted by both Latvia's and Ukraine's legislation.

Post Soviet Era

General Language Policy in the Post Soviet Era

Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, while Ukrainian was immediately made official due to the fallback on the 1989 Soviet Language Law, Russian retained a protected status through the 1992 Law on National Minorities, which gave the right of linguistic minorities to speak their native language, teach it in schools, and for ethnic public associations to give linguistic assistance to those minorities, as well for those associations to contact and maintain relationships with their respective home countries (Verkhovna Rada 1992). The 1996 Ukrainian Constitution would further elevate the status of Ukrainian, by stating in article 10 that Ukrainian

is the official language in Ukraine, and that the state must facilitate the development and use of Ukrainian in all spheres of public life. At the same time, it states that the use and development of minority languages (specifically naming Russian) is under the protection of the state (Verkhovna Rada 1996). Still, there were debates on what “state” language meant, and whether that was an “official” language (Besters-Dilger 2023). President Leonid Kuchma (first term 1994-1999) made a campaign promise that Russian would become an official language (Mycio 1994) although this would go nowhere, as in 1999 the Constitutional Court of Ukraine would rule that “official language” and “state language” were one of the same, and that introducing another state or official language would go against the Ukrainian constitution (Besters-Dilger 2023).

Ukraine would also go on to join the Council of Europe in 1995 and be required to sign and ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages within one year of joining. While other post-Soviet states (such as Russia and Moldova) did not fulfill this requirement, Ukraine did, and named Russian as a minority language protected by the European Charter (Besters-Dilger 2023). However, the European Charter mandates that these be *minority* languages, and at this time Russian was spoken by more than half of the population (although not all natively) (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2001), making its status under the Charter tricky. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages would not come into effect until 2006, and how Ukraine implemented this will come up later.

Latvia was quickly more strict with their language policy, beginning with amending its citizenship law in October of 1991. The Latvian government adopted a resolution that reverted their citizenship requirements to that of the pre-Soviet Latvian Republic, meaning anyone who became a citizen after the Soviet Union took over was no longer a citizen, unless their parents

were Republic of Latvia citizens (UN. General Assembly. 3rd Committee. Chair [1992] 1). This left around 700,000 citizens without citizenship, and a naturalization law was soon proposed, setting out a plan to separate these “non-citizens” into different cohorts to be naturalized from 1996 to 2003, but with such controversy that it took three years to pass (Nørgaard 1996). Interestingly, one of the few exceptions to this process that granted immediate citizenship was to those “who have an excellent command of Latvian” (Nørgaard 1996), highlighting that Latvian citizenship law is to not be based on your ethnicity, but on your language (Ozolins 1999).

Latvia further cemented Latvian as the official language by amending its Soviet Language Law in 1992. Besides making Latvian the official language of government and requiring all employees to be proficient and work in it exclusively (including elected members of office), it required companies in Latvia to keep their records in Latvian, all documents sent to Latvian citizens by private bodies must be in Latvian (although in addition to Latvian a translation may be provided in other languages), and open events must be presented or translated into Latvian (with exceptions for religious and cultural associations). All public posters, signboards, or price indicators put up by anyone must be in Latvian, and if that sign or poster includes another language, its size and form must not put it above Latvian. The 1992 Language Law still provides certain protections for minority languages, allowing Russian and German to be used by residents in correspondence with the government and private businesses, although the government or business must still provide a response in Latvian, with the addition of other languages optional. It is important to note that all of Latvia’s language policy in the private sector during this time *only* applied to record-keeping and employees who interacted with the public. During the 1993 Latvian parliamentary (*Saeima*) elections, the first since pre-Soviet

independence ending in 1934, several newly elected members did not meet the Latvian language requirements stipulated by the 1992 Latvian Language Law. Instead of requiring these members to learn Latvian before starting their term, the Saeima voted to ignore the Language Law on this specific occasion, showing the beginning of a willingness to bend and disregard their language legislation in certain instances (Ozolins 1999).

With the 1992 Language Law, Latvia also set up an official language administration institution known as the “Latvian State Language Inspectorate” (*Valsts valodas inspekcija*), which enforces and implements the language policy set forth by the Latvian government through the operation of “Latvian State Language Centre” (*Valsts valodas centrs*)⁴. The inspectorate was given broad responsibilities in making sure every organization in Latvia was using the official state language and using it “correctly. Any institution, organization, or corporation was required to follow all instructions sent by the state language centre (with appeals possible). If you didn’t follow these instructions or otherwise broke the state language law, the state language centre had the power to punish you (although the law does not specify how) (Latvijas Vēstnesis 1992). This model of language policy enforcement was common in the Baltics post-independence, with Estonia and Lithuania also possessing state language centres (Hogan-Brun et al. 2008). During this time, Ukraine had no equivalent state language center, and would not have a similar enforcement mechanism until 2019 with the establishment of the State Language Protection Commissioner.

By 1995 the Russian language in Latvia had lost all official status and was grouped in with the minority languages (Ozolins 1999). In 1998 the Latvian language secured its place as

⁴ The state language center has since absorbed the inspectorate and its duties.

the official language with an amendment to the Latvian constitution. A new language law was introduced in 1999 that further solidified the status of Latvian. Article 10 made it so that citizens could no longer write in government documents in any other language other than Latvian, overruling the allowed use of German and Russian in the 1989/92 Language Law. If you were to write in these documents in a language other than Latvian, it must be accompanied by an official notarized translation (Cilevičs 2007).

Education Policy in the Post-Soviet Era

In the aftermath of the USSR breakup, Ukraine largely kept schooling the same. Russian schools continued, as Article 10 of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine says that

“In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed. The State promotes the learning of languages of international communication (...)”

Article 53, establishing Ukraine’s public schooling program, also stipulates that

“Citizens belonging to national minorities shall be guaranteed, in accordance with law, the right to education in their native language, or to study their native language at the state and communal educational establishments or through national cultural societies.”

This was further enforced by the Law “On Education”, first passed in 1991.

These measures could have been partially motivated by controversy and fear in the Ukrainian east and south⁵ regarding compulsory Ukrainian language education and “forced

⁵ Historically more linguistically and ethnically Russian than the rest of Ukraine.

Ukrainization” (Besters-Dilger 2023). Still, the Ukrainian government attempted to actively promote the education of the Ukrainian language. A 1992 decree by the Ministry of Education required that, by September of 1993, the number of first-grade students in Ukrainian schools studying Ukrainian was to be proportionally equal to the number of Ukrainians residing in the region. These efforts would continue into the early 2000s, with President Kuchma issuing the edict “National Doctrine of Educational Development” which reiterated national minorities’s right to education in their native language, but that those minority language schools “should have all the necessary conditions for the study of the state language”, although this could be interpreted as allowing a school to teach entirely in Russian until a child who only speaks Ukrainian enrolls. Other legislative efforts in the early 2000s included several competing draft laws, some of which sought to downplay Ukrainian in education and make the study of Russian at times compulsory, while others sought to make Ukrainian compulsory in both primary and secondary education, but reaffirmed national minorities’s right to be taught their native language in schools and to have their language be the one of instruction (Besters-Dilger 2009). The ensuing Orange Revolution in 2004 halted all of these efforts, as widespread protests took place in response to the corruption and economic stagnation in Ukraine. Presidential elections were incoming, and President Kuchma endorsed the Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich against the opposition Viktor Yushchenko. While Yanukovich was announced to have won the election, widespread fraud was found, and after a reelection, the defeat of Yanukovich and victory of Yushchenko shook up the legislature.

Regarding statistics, we have from the 1990s that gives a good look at the education situation in Ukraine during this time. From 1990 to 1998, the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed

school children rose from 47.9% to 62.8% nationwide. Conversely, the percentage of Russian-instructed school children declined from 51.4% to 36.4% nationwide (Janmaat 1999). These changes are most likely a direct result of Ukrainian education policy, which promoted Ukrainian education proportionally with the amount of Ukrainians in the local population, meaning that while education in Ukrainian would increase, minority language education would not be fully removed. Still, starting in 1993, all students wanting to enter higher education must pass a Ukrainian language exam, possibly contributing to a sharp rise in Ukrainian language school attendance (Janmaat 1999).

Latvia, like Ukraine, promoted the use of Latvian after independence from the USSR, but offered little support to minority languages. Chapter Four Article 10 of the 1992 Latvian Language Law provides the right for residents of other nationalities to receive an education in their native language, but the following Article 12 requires all educational institutions starting from secondary school to teach Latvian and have all state examinations be in Latvian. The Latvian constitution reaffirmed Latvian's central place in education. Like in Ukraine, Latvia allowed schools to instruct in any language they like, provided they also teach Latvian as well. In addition to the State Language Centre, which oversees the more legal and compliance concerns of Latvian language legislation, the Latvian government also set up the Latvian Language Agency (LLA). Established under the Ministry of Education and Science in 2003, its responsibility was to study the active situation of the Latvian language to inform future legislation and to foster the development of the Latvian language. The LLA championed many efforts to promote Latvian, which included (but not limited to) developing study materials and dictionaries, pedagogical materials, and online resources, and the education of Latvian abroad

and at home, where they tailor the education to each citizen. Is the citizen a child or an adult? Are they a government employee, a soldier, or a doctor? All of this is taken into consideration by the LLA in teaching Latvian both at home and to diaspora abroad (Druviete and Valdmanis 2017).

Like Ukraine, no education statistics from the Soviet era are readily available, but data shows that of the 1095 schools in Latvia in 2000 and 2001, 66.3% instructed in Latvian, and 33.3% instructed in Russian. There is still evidence of minority populations (including Russians) assimilating and adopting the Latvian language, as in 2000 only 9% of minorities claimed to have no Latvian language skills, compared to 22% in 1996, and 80% in 1989 (Druviete 2002). The rise in Latvian speakers during this era could be due to the government beginning to require knowledge of Latvian in certain areas (such as the constitutional amendment in the late 1990s where all communication with the government must be in Latvian), and with such a large change in just 11 years Latvia's language policy proved successful.

Mass Media Policy in the Post-Soviet Era

. Russian enjoyed special minority status in Ukraine outside education as well, such as in media, where article four of the 1993 "Law on Television and Radio", which article 4 of stipulates that the state must not stop foreign broadcasts in minority languages, and specifically says broadcasters can broadcast in minority languages targeting specific minority regions. The 1992 "Law on Printed Mass Media (Press)" also gave freedom to the press to use any language they'd like. At the same time, the state worked on a small bit of legislation to strengthen Ukrainian, such in the 1998 "Law on Cinematography", which article 4 of stipulates that all

foreign films must be subtitled or dubbed in Ukrainian, while allowing, but not requiring, films to be subtitled or dubbed in the languages of the national minorities as well. These laws functionally did very little in promoting Ukrainian as the primary language of the media. There were no restrictions on language use, nor quotas for the use of the Ukrainian language in the media. As such, Ukrainian's status as the "official language" in the media during the 1990s was largely symbolic, allowing the more popular and better-funded Russian language media to dominate Ukraine.

Latvia's 1995 "Radio and Television Law" was much more forceful in promoting the official language than Ukraine's 1993 "Law of Television and Radio". Besides also requiring foreign films to be at least subtitled in the official language, article 19 of the law required that foreign films targeting children would have their audio tracks replaced to be Latvian. It also required that television must be subtitled in Latvian, with exceptions made for news or language programs. Most importantly, it introduced a monthly quota for Latvian usage in national broadcasting: all broadcasters must have at least 70% of their content be in Latvian⁶. Latvia's 1995 Radio and Television Law also contains a chapter devoted to a "National Order"⁷, allowing the state broadcasters, Latvian Radio and Latvian Television, to allocate at most 20% of annual broadcasting time to broadcasts in any of the national minority languages, which could include foreign films subtitled in Latvian.

In the context of each nation, these policies made sense. Ukraine had, for centuries before the USSR, experienced Russian migration and Russian cultural-political dominance through russification (that only accelerated during Soviet rule), which caused much of the Ukrainian

⁶ Exceptions were made for cable and satellite television, although much of the population didn't possess either (Maherzi 1997).

⁷ *Pasūtījums* in Latvian, which means something like "command".

population in the 1990s to rely on both Ukrainian and Russian in essentially all aspects of life, especially in the media (Kulyk 2022). Ukraine's language policy during the 1990s reflects this, as it promotes Ukrainian through efforts like requiring foreign films to be subtitled in Ukrainian, but essentially allowed freedom of language in all media. Latvia on the other hand has historically had a strong ethnic divide between Latvians and Russians (Schulte et al. 2025), one that is more pronounced with the return of Latvian independence and the end of russification.

While statistics on language usage in media such as television and film during the 1990s are not available, there are some for newspapers. Figures 1 and 2 both show that the number of Ukrainian newspaper titles and their circulation declined after 1992, with the number of Russian titles and circulation rising slightly 1992-93. The slight rise in Russian newspapers could be due to the 1992 Print Media Law, but it is too insignificant to tell. Both languages's number of publications and circulation would only begin to rise in the late 1990s, and while the Ukrainian language would always have more publications than those in Russian, Ukrainian readership would be overtaken by Russian in 1995, with Russian newspaper circulation numbers shadowing Ukrainian starting in the late 1990s and continue to into the 2000s (Shpak 2021).

Europeanization

The new millennium brought many challenges for Ukraine. As touched upon before, there started to be a growing pro-Russian faction in Ukrainian politics, headed by presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich. A month before the 2004 election, Yanukovich called for the

Russian language to be raised to official status on par with Ukrainian (Bandow 2004). This only angered the western regions of Ukraine and the Ukrainian intelligentsia, fueling Yanukovich's opposition, the pro-western candidate Viktor Yushchenko (Kulyk 2009). In the period between Yanukovich's disputed election and the redo of the election, known as the Orange Revolution, the Yushchenko bloc stressed that the protests were against the fraud and corruption of Yanukovich and his government and not Yanukovich's primary electorate, the south and eastern regions of Ukraine, who were the target of Yanukovich's reforms promoting the Russian language were targeted towards. Still, these regions felt humiliated at the annulment of Yanukovich's presidential victory, which "instilled a sense of exclusion from 'Orange-controlled' political process" (Wolczuk 2007), and language policy was used as ammo by the elites on both sides of the increasingly polarizing political aisle (Kulyk 2009).

Immediately under Yushchenko, the status of Ukrainian initially didn't change much from the 1990s. The two primary language policies introduced around this time were a change to the Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure and the 2006 Law on Radio and Television. The change to the Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure reaffirmed the primary status of Ukrainian in judicial proceedings, but allowed those incompetent in Ukrainian to be able to use the language of their choice, provided they pay for a translator. This was met with resistance from some pro-Russian parties in parliament, such as the United Social Democratic Party, who said that the change to the administrative code constituted depriving "most of the country's population of full fledged legal defense" (Kulyk 2009), but said resistance went nowhere. Ukraine's 2006 Law on Radio and Television will be discussed later in this chapter.

Shortly before the 2006 parliamentary elections, the Russian-sympathetic Party of Regions and Crimean political elites started a referendum in Crimea calling for making Russian the second official language. Crimea, an autonomous republic of Ukraine, adopted in 1998, largely follows Ukraine's constitution in their own, affirming Ukrainian as the state language but adding that "the functioning, development, utilization, and protection of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and the languages of other nationalities shall be assured" (Wolczuk 2007). Following Crimea, several other majority Russian oblasts of Ukraine (all controlled by the Party of Regions) enacted policy that competed the Russian language against Ukrainian. In March and April 2006, Kharkiv, Lugansk, and the city of Sevastopol enacted legislation that declared Russian as their regional language, with Party of Regions members claiming this was all in line with Ukraine's ratification of the "European Charter of Regional Languages or Languages of Minorities". Donetsk soon followed suit. The Ministry of Justice shot all of this down, saying that these were all outside the jurisdiction of local governments. (Kolisnichenko and Rosenbaum 2008),

The Ukrainian 2006 Parliamentary elections sparked a political crisis when Yanukovich's Party of Regions came out with the largest number of seats but failed to form a coalition government with President Yushchenko's party Our Ukraine, and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, also a party associated with the Orange Revolution, meaning no prime minister could be selected (Kulyk 2009; Maksymiuk 2006). After multiple coalition attempts and political agitation such as sit-ins by the Party of Regions during parliamentary session, a coalition government was formed composed of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Socialist Party of Ukraine. The crisis ended when Yushchenko and Yanukovich signed the Universal of National Unity, a declaration of cooperation in parliament that attempted

to reconcile several national issues that contributed to the polarization in politics (Socor 2006). A chief sticking point in the Universal was language, and the Party of Regions made sure for the Universal to specify that while Ukrainian will remain the sole functioning language of the state, Russian and other native languages are guaranteed for “all vital needs” (Ukrainian Pravda 2006). The rest of Yushchenko’s years as president did not produce much else in language policy. Kulyk describes them as having unchanged funding for the development of Ukrainian (although the preceding Orange Revolution years did increase funding compared to the 1990s) and that this stagnation was caused not by “prejudice” against the Ukrainian language but a “general ineffectiveness of bureaucracy” (Kulyk 2009).

In 2010, presidential elections were held once again in Ukraine, and Viktor Yanukovich was declared the winner of an election deemed fair and legitimate, unlike his previous attempt in 2004 (Protsyk 2011). However, Ukraine under Yanukovich would experience the government consolidating power within the presidency through moves such as staffing positions such as those in the constitutional court with Party of Regions loyalists (Malek 2010) and beginning to institute censorship in the media (Moser and Umland 2013). Several human rights organizations began to report that Ukraine was experiencing democratic backsliding, such as Freedom House excluding Ukraine from its list of “free countries” in June 2011 (Kramer et al. 2011) and Reporters without Borders ranking Ukraine under the category of “heavy falls” in its Press Freedom Index of 2010 (Reporters Without Borders 2010). At the same time, Ukraine began to foster a closer relationship with Russia, such as extending Russian naval presence on the Crimea Peninsula until the 2040s with the 2010 Kharkiv Pact. In late 2010, a draft law replacing the Law on Language would come to public attention that seemed to elevate the status of Russian. These

mainly supported the previous efforts by those regions who tried to make Russian the co-official language in 2006 - allowing the free use of any language in education and the media, and the 10% regional minority threshold needed to allow the minority language to be used in administration. This draft law would die in 2010, but Yanukovych and his supporters would continue to campaign for the promotion of Russian as the “second state language” throughout late 2010 and 2011 (Moser and Umland 2013), and soon their efforts would prevail.

In August 2012, President Yanukovych would sign a new language law titled “On the Principles of State Language Policy”, making the 10% rule introduced in the previous draft law legal, requiring support for minority languages in bodies of the state, bodies of local self-government, school, and any other areas of social life deemed to be included in the scope of the law. It also made it so any derogation or disrespect committed against Ukrainian or any minority language, such as “intentional distortion in official documents or texts” would be a criminal offense, the first time Ukraine has brought criminal charges like these into language policy. The law basically allowed Russian and other regional minority languages to be used anywhere now, such as in parliament, elections, on your passport, in court, and more. Ukrainian was still the official state language, and while this new law protected it and ensured state development of Ukrainian, it also gave essentially the same support to Russian and other minority languages (Verkhovna Rada 2012). Odessa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Crimea, and other municipalities declared Russian their official language after this law went into effect, much like as they did in 2006 (Pifer and Thoburn 2012). This law was met with widespread protest, and would not survive after Euromaidan, which will be discussed in the next section.

Latvia's only significant political event regarding language during this era was a nationwide 2012 Latvian Constitutional referendum, asking voters if Russian should become the 2nd state language in Latvia. This effort was spurred by a former National Bolshevik leader, Vladimir Linderman, who wrote a petition for Russian to become an official language, and gathered the required signature amount for the petition to be sent to parliament (K.S. 2012). Parliament rejected the petition, causing it to become a nationwide referendum. The results of the referendum were 75% against, and 25% for, with a 70% voter turnout (Herszenhorn 2012), interestingly roughly corresponding to 30% of the population being Russian speaking and 70% being Latvian speaking. The failure of the referendum was criticized by Russia abroad, who pointed out that Latvia's 300,000 non-citizens (who are almost all Russophones) could not vote (Herszenhorn 2012).

Besides the 2012 referendum, not much happened in regards to language policy in Latvia at this time. There was a United Nations Human Rights case known as Raihman v. Latvia where Raihman, a Latvian non-citizen and member of the Russian minority, had his cyrillic name on his passport changed to romanized Latvian, and had the Latvian masculine singular ending -s added to his last name. Raihman argued this was discriminatory. The UN Human Rights Committee agreed, saying that specifically the adding of the -s was not reasonable, since it changed the phonetic pronunciation of the name and was already unchanged for decades before (United Nations Human Rights Committee 2010). The Latvian government responded by saying that while they would take the United Nations's decision into consideration for crafting future language policy, they would not change anything at the present moment. The Latvian government did not change Raihman's name on any of his documents, and the Supreme Court in

2017 reaffirmed that the government required the -s at the end of his name on all official documents, directly contradicting the United Nations's decision (Latvian Supreme Court 2017)

The Council of Europe's Venice Commission criticized Latvia's lack of effort in the development and protection of minority languages at the time. The Venice Commission notes that the most common form of discrimination in Latvia is not on an ethnic basis, but on the victim's level of proficiency in Latvian. It suggested that Latvia make an effort to include minority languages in the public sector, that their current law restricts language use in public-facing jobs too harshly, and that testing requirements for non-citizens to earn citizenship were too stringent (Council of Europe 2011).

Education Policy during Europeanization

In Ukraine, language policy in education remained largely unchanged from pre-Orange Revolution. The 1990s language laws, and to a lesser extent, the Soviet-era 1989 Law on Languages, remained in effect, where Ukrainian was compulsory, but minority languages could be taught in localities where said minority was an ethnic majority. It is important to emphasize *ethnic* here, as these did not include linguistic minorities, such as Ukraine's large Russophone population (Kulyk 2009), who numbered over five million in 2001 (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2001). This spurred resentment, with Russian-speaking respondents to a 2006 survey expressing disappointment in their children getting an education primarily in Ukrainian and the lack of Russian lessons and literature in the curriculum (Kulyk 2013).

The new 2012 "On the Principles of State Language Policy" law changed this. Article 20 deals with language use in schools, and promoted the status of minority and regional languages.

It opens up by declaring that “the free choice of the language of instruction is an inalienable right of citizens of Ukraine”, and that compulsory study of Ukrainian is only needed until “the extent sufficient for integration into Ukrainian society”. It goes on to require any school in Ukraine, no matter where, to offer instruction in a minority language if enough students (or their parents) submitted applications requesting such. The law grants municipalities basically free reign on what language to teach in, saying that local councils may decide the scope of the instruction in a minority language taking into account the prevalence of that language’s local population. The only situations where Ukrainian is absolutely required to be spoken are in Ukrainian language literature classes. The state must also provide pedagogical support to these schools, even in training staff in the minority language (Verkhovna Rada 2012). All of this basically allowed the Ukrainian language to be relegated to the periphery in schooling, and Russian elevated, if a local government so wished.

After the Orange Revolution, we continue to see an increase in Ukrainian language schooling, with the number of Ukrainian schools going from 81.5% to 83.7% from 2004 to 2008, and the number of students being taught Ukrainian going from 76.8% to 80.4% in the same time period (Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 2010). These statistics suggest that Ukrainian language policy during this time has been successful, and the relative close gains both number of schools opened and school attendance during this time suggest they were complimentary of each other.

Latvia took a very different approach, and restricted the use of Russian in schools throughout the 2000s and early 2010s. For example, back in 1998, Latvia passed a law requiring all secondary schools (grades 10-12) to only teach in Latvian, in effect starting in 2004. This was

met with much pushback by the Russian speaking population of Latvia, and it was later amended for schools to teach up to 40% of their curricula in a minority language, becoming known as the “60/40” rule (Astratova et al. 2025). The 2004 reform also specified that parents could self select if they wanted their child to attend a minority language school (Ivlevs and King 2014), contrasting with Ukraine, where the language your child’s school taught in depended on the ethnic makeup of your locality, and later under Yanukovich, if enough parents had submitted requests for the school to teach in a minority language, or if your municipality’s council simply decided it so.

While no hard numbers on schools or attendance can be found from this time period, the share of Russian pupils reporting good knowledge of the Latvian language had a modest increase from 7% in 2004 to 13% in 2010, surveys found that parents felt that Latvian was forced upon their children, and headmasters saying that unfamiliarity with Latvian made Russian students read less. Other survey results report that the motivation to learn Latvian to get a job decreased from 74% of respondents in 2004 to 58% in 2010 (Ivlevs and King 2014), highlighting frustration and ostracization in Latvia’s Russian speaking communities.

Mass Media Policy in Europeanization

Shortly before the Orange Revolution, a controversial law was passed in April 2004 that banned the Russian language from national broadcasts in television and radio, with the national council for television and radio claiming that this is needed so that networks do not treat Ukrainian as a minority language (BBC 2004). Local broadcasts were not affected, and the council claimed that this would not hurt Russian speakers whatsoever (Radio Free Europe 2004).

However, this still wasn't strictly enforced, and Russian-language media in Ukraine continued to exist, both from cross-border broadcasts from Russia and domestically (Kulyk 2009).

This law was reversed under Yanukovych and the 2012 "On the Principles of State Language Policy" law, which expanded the use of Russian in the media. Article 24 of the law allowed national broadcasters to broadcast in any language at their own discretion, and slashed the requirement of Ukrainian to be at the very least subtitled in all media. It even allowed broadcasters to broadcast the media in multiple languages at the same time, provided they have the technical capabilities to do so. The law states that the volume of media in any given language should correspond to the presence and population of that language, but gives no way to enforce this (Verkhovna Rada 2012). Even though enforcement of Ukrainian requirements in the media sphere were lackluster post Orange Revolution, this new law completely undid any elevated legal status Ukrainian had before.

In Figures 1 and 2, we again see that while the number of newspapers for each language remained relatively constant from 2004 onwards, until 2012, when Ukrainian newspapers sharply dropped by 50%, while Russian newspapers remained constant. While the 2012 Language Law did promote Russian, it did nothing to harm Ukrainian, so it seems the drop in Ukrainian newspapers was more due to societal or economic conditions rather than language policy. Throughout the same time, Ukrainian book publication and circulation rose from 2005 to 2012, although Russian did as well (Bookchamber of Ukraine 2025).

There was no new legislation in Latvia regarding language in the media at this time. Their 1995 law remained in effect, meaning that broadcasters could transmit up to 20% of their content in a minority language, but they were not forced to, and Latvian was compulsory across

the board. This policy survived well into the 2010s, with its longevity and relatively little to no controversy proving its effectiveness. While there was no new legislation, the Latvian language in the media consumed by Russian speakers rose, albeit slowly. Latvian media consumption among Russian speakers actually declined at first, going from 82% in 2002 to 72% in 2004 in television watching, although this number had reached 85% by 2008. Similar changes were found for newspaper consumption, with only radio remaining unchanged (Baltic Institute of Social Sciences 2008).

Beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict and aftermath of Euromaidan

In 2014, Yanukovich fled from Ukraine after widespread protests over his refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement, an event known as Euromaidan. Yanukovich's government was replaced with an interim, new elections were called for, and constitutional reforms were beginning to be proposed (Shevsky 2022). A day after Yanukovich fled, the Ukrainian parliament attempted to reverse his "On the Principles of State Language Policy" 2012 law, with more than an 80% vote to do so, although it was shot down by the parliament speaker Turchynov and the new Ukrainian President Poroshenko. Internal commentators, such as the Organization for Security and Co-Operation High Commissioner in Europe advised officials not to sign the law, saying it would cause unrest among Russian populations in Ukraine. While the law did not end up being signed, the cat was already out of the bag, and "Kiev bans Russian Language from Ukraine" was a headline spreading in Russia and eastern Ukraine. This became a trigger and

partial justification for Russia's military invading and annexing Crimea later that month, and their material support of the armed pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's eastern region of Donbas. Yanukovych's pre-Euromaidan language law would only be repealed in 2018 by the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, not on the grounds for its content, but for violating parliamentary voting rules. However, by the time this was done, much of what Yanukovych's law did was already nullified, discussed more in the education and mass media sections below (Besters-Dilger 2023).

With Russian aggression now painfully present, Ukraine began to separate itself from its Soviet past, enacting in 2015 the "Decommunization Laws". The first of these laws, Law 2588, banned both communist and nazi symbols from being displayed in Ukraine, including publicly playing their anthems⁸ and displaying quotations by prominent members. Importantly for our purposes, the law requires the various local governments of Ukraine to begin a massive renaming process, as it requires all geographic placenames named after prominent Russians or USSR officials to be Ukrainized. Later it was clarified that this included railroad and bus station signs as well, and that these signs are only allowed to be in Ukrainian and English (Verkhovna Rada 2015; Dettmer 2022). Here we see one of the first instances of Ukraine's new post-Euromaidan pro-western ideals leeching into language policy. Ukraine's native English population is small, especially compared to their Russian (and exclusively Russian speaking) population, so an act like this is a clear signal of moving away not just from their Communist past, but Russia as a whole.

⁸ This explicitly included the former anthem of the Ukrainian SSR.

The most important law of this era regarding the Ukrainian language was the 2019 “Law on supporting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the State language”, signed by President Poroshenko just days before he left office. This law is very strict on promoting the status of the Ukrainian language, as it requires the exclusive use of Ukrainian in practically all aspects of civil life, including business, education, in healthcare and medicine, banking, law, advertising, and in civic organizations registered in Ukraine (Besters-Dilger 2023; Verkhovna Rada 2019). Its preamble says that protecting and promoting Ukrainian is essential to the functioning and security of the Ukrainian state itself, highlighting the need for national unity during a time of Russian aggression. The law obliges all citizens to learn Ukrainian and speak it (Verkhovna Rada 2019), a sharp contrast from the previous stance of protecting an individual’s right to use any language they please.

Exceptions in this law were carved out for various indigenous peoples of Ukraine, such as for the Crimean Tatar language, and for other languages of the European Union, explicitly naming English once again, even though Ukraine was not in any official negotiations to join the European Union at this time. Russian, Yiddish, and Belarusian were not included in this list of exemptions, something noted by many international parties (Council of Europe 2019; Henrard 2023). The Venice Commission gave a scathing analysis of the law, criticizing its adoption, claiming parliamentary members of a national minority were not adequately consulted, the vagueness of the law in both its definitions and scope, and that the law unduly infringed on speaker’s language rights. Throughout the new language law, the Rada references a law that specifies the rights and protections of national minorities, although the Venice Commission

points out that this law had yet to be drafted, and that it should've been before this new language law was put forth (Council of Europe 2019).

Besides legislation in education and media, which will be discussed below, Latvia barely had any language legislation during this time. Most of it was procedural and amended already existing laws. For example, the Law on Administrative Punishments in the Fields of Public Administration, Public Order and Usage of the State Language was amended to add a fine for sending unsolicited fliers and catalogues in foreign languages through the mail without prior permission from the sendee. It also made the fine system more complex, where before fines were applied on a blanket basis without taking your citizenship status into account, new amendments made it so you could be fined a different amount if you were a “natural person” (citizens and non-citizens) versus a “legal person” (corporations) versus if you were a public official (Kuzmin 2020).

Education Policy in the aftermath of Euromaidan

In 2017, Ukraine adopted a new education law, one that included strict new language rules. National minorities were now no longer allowed to be instructed in their native language beyond primary school (5th grade onwards), and foreign language study in secondary schools were restricted to languages of the European Union, giving special status to English throughout the text (Verkhovna Rada 2017b). The new law was widely condemned by several other countries, such as Hungary and Romania. Hungary's response was more harsh than Russia's as President Viktor Orbán of Hungary threatened to block any attempt Ukraine made at joining the European Union until the new law was reversed (Kulyk 2018). The 2019 Language Law

essentially took the exact text of the 2017 Education Law's section on language and applied it into itself in a section about education. The 2019 Language Law's education section was later amended to allow up to 100% of instruction to be done in a native language for Ukraine's indigenous minorities (such as the Crimean Tatars), up to 60% from grades 6-9 and 40% grades 10-12 for minorities whose language has official status in the European Union (such as Hungary and Romania) and 20% 5th grade onward for Russians (Csernicskó et al. 2020).

As a result, the share of Russian language schools and students went down during this era. While there were only 385 Russian schools during 2015, compared to Ukrainian's 13,620, this had decreased to 128 Russian schools in 2019, compared to Ukrainian's 14,211. In 2015 we also see that there are 70,638 children attending just 385 Russian schools, while there are 1,214,199 children attending 13,620 Ukrainian schools. Doing some quick math tells us that's about 185 children per Russian school, and 80 children per Ukrainian school, meaning Ukrainian schools have much less stress put upon them in attendance⁹. By 2019, there were 22,508 children going to 128 Russian schools, and 1,197,509 going to 14,211, showing the decline of Russian education.

Latvia introduced an educational reform in 2018 that stipulated at most 50% of instruction to be in a minority language up to grade 6, 20% in grades 7 through 9, and 0% in grades 10 through 12. This was met with criticism both abroad and from Latvia's ethnic Russian population, but the Latvian Constitutional Court deemed the reform legal in 2019, on the grounds of Russian not having official status in Latvia (Mitablinda 2023). While this largely was seen as

⁹ Of course, student capacity will be different for each school, but for the purposes of this paper, this is a useful rough estimate.

more restrictive than the former “60/40” rule, a child in a Russian school would still get more Russian instruction in grade 6 at 50% than they would in Ukraine at 20%.

While no equivalent statistics to Ukraine can be found for this period in Latvia, the Latvian language agency has published reports on the language situation in Latvia, and they have found between 2015 and 2019 there was 8% increase in the use of Latvian in educational contexts, being 75% who preferred to use Latvian in 2015, and 83% in 2019 (Druviete et al. 2017, 2022).

Mass Media Policy in the aftermath of Euromaidan

In 2017, the television and cinematography laws of Ukraine were amended to require at least 75% of media to be in the Ukrainian language for national and regional broadcasts, and 60% for local (Verkhovna Rada 2017a), a sharp contrast to the *laissez-faire* approach in media under Yanukovich. These amendments received little attention until the 2019 Language Law, in which Ukraine introduced even more strict usage quotas for the Ukrainian language in the media. It increased the amount of Ukrainian required by national and regional broadcasters from 75% to 90%, and for local broadcasters from 60% to 80%. President Poroshenko also signed a law in 2016 that banned book imports from Russia. While not targeting the Russian language in particular, it was still seen as an attack on the Russophone community by Ukraine’s Russians and Russian speakers (Council of Europe 2019). Similarly, another decree in 2017 banned many Russian online services most prominently VK, the most popular social network in both Russia and Ukraine at the time (Miller 2017).

Not many media consumption surveys were conducted in Ukraine during this time. The only results that can be found span from 2015 to 2018, and they report decreases in Russian

media consumption. While nearly 100% of the nation reported watching national TV within the last 30 days in 2015, only 12% reported watching Russian TV, and this had gone down to 6% by 2018. Likewise, only 7% reported reading Russian newspapers or magazines in 2015, while 3% reported doing so in 2018. Those respondents resided mostly in eastern and southern Ukraine, the areas with the highest ethnic Russian population (Internews 2018).

Lviv stands out at this time as being the only region in Ukraine that instituted what could be called an actual ban on Russian. In 2018, the oblast council of Lviv, a western region in Ukraine, enacted a ban on all Russian media until the Russo-Ukrainian conflict ended. This included Russian movies, television, music, and books, and was widely lambasted both by politicians domestically and abroad as “playing into Russia’s hand” (to provoke further aggression) (Miller 2018) and as of 2022, had not been repealed despite several fights in the courts (Lviv Rada 2022). As we will see in the post-2022 invasion era, other regions of Ukraine would mimic Lviv’s efforts in the coming decade.

In regards to the media sphere, the only new legislative effort regarding language was a change to their Electronic Mass Media Law in 2018 that required foreign-made media to provide an audio track in Latvian, and for broadcasters to air at least 20% of content that was initially produced in Latvian (Druviete et al. 2022), a more strict policy than Ukraine’s, which only required foreign media to be at least subtitled in Ukrainian (although Ukrainian audio tracks were encouraged). Unfortunately, almost no statistics for language use in the media in Latvia during this time period can be found, except for the 2010-2015 Latvian Language Report, which found that between 2012 and 2014, Latvian media consumption decreased across the board, but still maintained a dominance of around 80% or more. Russian media consumption increased only

slightly, usually by only one or two percent, and the reason for the decreases in Latvian is probably due to more respondents answering with No answer / Not sure (Druviete et al. 2017).

Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine

In February of 2022, Russia invaded mainland Ukraine, sparking the most intense war Europe has seen since World War II (Brands 2024). Language policy suddenly became very topical in Ukraine, with large numbers of both Russophone Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Ukraine signaling a desire to move away from the Russian language (Kudriavtseva 2023). Bans on importing publications such as books and newspapers from Russia (only referred to as “the aggressor state”), Belarus, and the occupied territories of Ukraine were put in place in June 2022. The importation of Russian books from other countries required special permission. In July, music from those same territories was banned from being played in public, unless the artist was on a whitelist, which to be on required a public condemnation of the war (Davies 2022; Gupta 2022). A new general statewide language policy targeting Russian like the 2019 Language Law has not been drafted, with the 2019 law functioning apparently well enough for the present day. There have been a few policies instituted on the municipal level however. Most famous is the case in Kyiv, which in 2023 banned the public display of any Russian books, movies, music, theatre, or any other cultural product in the Russian language (Kulyk 2024; Kyiv City Council 2023).

Around the same time, President Zelenskyy initiated a bill in parliament to make English the official language of international communication, requiring several positions of government to learn English to a certain level, including parliamentary staff, military officers, police officers, tax authorities, and heads of educational institutions. It also provides a 10% standard government salary bonus to those employees of these positions that attain a B2 English proficiency or higher. The law goes on to say that the Ukrainian government must support and accept English as it does with Ukrainian, such as in emergency calls, paperwork, and in publishing on the internet. The state must also actively support English education and cultural development in Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada 2024). This is a complete reversal of Soviet and early post-Soviet policy in Ukraine, where Russian had the same status that English does now. Ukraine's promotion of English, the *lingua franca* of the western world (the historical enemy of the Soviet Union), all of this while not even being an EU member, shows an intense desire to westernize and distance itself from its closest cultural neighbors.

In 2023, Ukraine passed a national minority law, designed to be the same as mentioned in their 2019 Language Law and what the Venice Commission criticized was missing when the language law was adopted. While the Venice Commission supported most of the new legislation, the new minority law copied the same language used in the 2019 Language Law, with no consideration to the Commission's previous suggestions, so the Commission repeated their criticisms of how vague the language was, and how it potentially infringed on individual rights (Council of Europe 2023). In 2025, the Ukrainian Parliament amended their national minority law, with the section on linguistic rights still unchanged. This removed Russian from the list of minority languages, effectively snubbing out the little presence the Russian language had left in

government, education, and media (Dascotte 2025; Verkhovna Rada 2025) The Venice Commission has yet to comment on this.

The only significant legislation Latvian put forward during this time regarding language were amendments to their immigration law in 2022 and 2024, forcing any Russophone non-citizens to pass a test of Latvian language proficiency, or be expelled from the country (Saeima 2022). News outlets reported Latvia started enforcement in 2025, and that many senior citizens struggled with the language tests, meaning people who had been living in cities like Riga for decades were being forced to leave (Peseckytė 2025). Other than that, Latvian language policy since the 2022 invasion has primarily only focused on education. In 2022, a law was adopted to make any schools teaching in Russian to transition their instruction into Latvian by the end of 2025, which will be explored more below.

Education Policy in the Aftermath of Full-scale Invasion

Removing Russian from the national minority language list squashed the little support Ukrainian schools could provide to Russophone students. While no legal commentary has been released since then, there has been concern with the education of displaced students, specifically those coming from the east, where the Russian language is more dominant (Kunyskyi 2025).

Latvia enacted a law in 2022 that required all Russian language schools to transition to a fully Latvian curriculum by 2025 (except in foreign language classes). While protests were made by Latvian citizens, the Latvian Constitutional Court deemed the law permissible (van der Jeught 2025). The United Nations Human Rights Office expressed concern with the removal of the Russian language in education, saying that Latvia had an obligation to protect its national

minorities, but Latvia responded saying that their actions were legal and that minority protections were not infringed upon (United Nations Human Rights Office 2023). As of 2025, Latvia's efforts in removing Russian instruction in education are ongoing, with no sign of stopping (Kuzmina 2025).

Mass Media Policy in the Aftermath of the Full-scale Invasion

Besides the removal of Russian from the national minorities law in Ukraine, which forwent any allowance the Russian language could have been allocated during broadcast time, Ukraine enacted laws that banned the importation of Russian publications from Russia, Belarus, and the occupied territories, and restricted Russian-language media imported from any other country (Dettmer 2022). With the Russian music ban, only Russian artists who have produced music after the fall of the USSR and denounced the invasion could apply to be on the whitelist, which would be vetted by the Ukrainian Security Service. It also required 40% of broadcasts on the radio to be in Ukrainian (Burchenyuk 2022). The share of Russian language books published in Ukraine dropped from 2576 titles being published in 2021 to 762 in 2022, and then to 111 in 2025. Circulation of Russian language books has seen the same trends, going from 2,504,000 in 2021 to 46,700 in 2025 (Bookchamber of Ukraine 2025).

In 2025, the Latvia Public Media station (LSM) announced that starting in 2026, content in the languages of Ukrainian, English, and Russian, would be relegated to digital content only, and that their Russian language radio station and television broadcasts would cease by the end of the year (LSM English 2025). In early 2026, the National Electronic Mass Media Council of Latvia urged parliament to consider banning private Russian language stations on Latvian radio

airwaves as well, although it has been yet to be seen if this will move forward (Popilnichenko 2026)

Chapter 4: Conclusion

In Latvia language policy was strict towards the promotion of Latvian and Latvian only from the 1990s, and continued this practice onward into the 21st century. Knowledge of Latvian was required in many aspects of life, even to be a citizen, so there was a high incentive for Russian speakers to learn and use Latvian. Latvia's language policies also highlight the great divide between their Latvian and Russian populations, as there has historically been little assimilation between the two. Even before Latvia was incorporated into the Soviet Union, it possessed a unique cultural identity, one that their government actively supported and protected. Now independent, Latvia's actions make sense in trying to build a national identity, even more so since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and language policy in education and media have only helped.

Ukraine has shown to be a more complex case than Latvia. Ukraine endured centuries of Russification before its incorporation into the Soviet Union, and thus has a high population of ethnic Ukrainians who speak Russian natively, something that is almost unheard of in Latvia. Thus, language policy in Ukraine has been more turbulent than Latvia's. We see that in the 1990s, while Ukrainian language policy promoted the use and protection of the Ukrainian language, it also took a very relaxed stance towards Russian. This would continue and even

intensify into the 2000s and 2010s, where pro-Russian politicians would elevate the status of Russian, almost to Ukrainian, and where their more pro-western opposition would do almost nothing. It wasn't until Euromaidan and subsequent Russian aggression in 2014 that created a "rally around the flag" effect that Ukraine reformed their language policy into something more like Latvia's, where they would enact strict media quotas and require knowledge of the Ukrainian language for many jobs, even low-skilled ones. This would only intensify during the full Russian invasion in 2022, with education and media requirements becoming more strict.

Still, in both countries's cases, pushback has been felt. The Council of Europe and their Venice Commission have issued critical opinions on Latvian and Ukrainian language policy, claiming that they are both too harsh and infringes on individual rights. This highlights the balancing act Ukraine and Latvia must maintain with coherent national identity and language protection on one side, and western pluralistic democratic norms on the other. Latvia, already in the European Union and NATO, does not seem too concerned with following these recommendations by the Council of Europe, but Ukraine must be careful in the accession process if it too wants to be a part of these international organizations and become more westernized. However, this may not even be needed, as since the 2022 invasion, both countries have tightened up their language policy even more, with little to no international condemnation.

The analysis and data shown here has several implications for those studying censorship and information science. How has restrictive language policy affected the free flow of information and knowledge? Has this affected other sectors of society such as science and industry? More work needs to be done looking at the specific pros and cons of language policy. While restricting the use of Russian in both states has helped strengthen each's national identity,

it has infringed on an individual's choice to both make and consume media in the language they please, something that can be interpreted as going against some universal human rights treaties, such as the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", which article 27 of states that minorities cannot be denied the right to participate in their own culture and use their own language. This can be extended to education as well, as seen by the European Union and Council of Europe's persistent warnings and advisories towards Ukraine and Latvia to clarify and modify legislation so that Russian speakers' (and those of other minority language groups) rights are protected. Unfortunately, a more thorough analysis is unlikely until more surveys are conducted and data is published.

It is also clear from looking at the comparative evidence that Latvian and Ukrainian language policy has been used to build national identities for both states. Each state's language policies have strengthened the status of their titular language, while lowering Russian's, whether deliberately or inadvertently, and each state's language policy fits their historical context. The treatment of Russian in both Ukrainian and Latvian language policy has been stringent and repressive. Immediately after independence, the Russian language briefly enjoyed significant protection and support from both states, but as each turned to focus on the development and protection of their national languages, Russian began to be phased out of public life, even when Russian speakers were a part of a large minority of each country's population. It is likely that as the war goes on, and Russia continues to position itself as a threat to Europe and the western world, both states will continue to strengthen their language policy, as we have already seen thus far.

Figures




Figure 1. Ukrainian (A) and Russian-speaking (B) newspapers by the number of titles in Ukraine (Viktor Shpak 2021)




Figure 2. Ukrainian (A) and Russian-speaking (B) by the annual newspaper circulation (thousands of copies) in Ukraine (Viktor Shpak 2021)

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