

1 **Engineers Seeking Knowledge: The Effect of Control Systems on the**
2 **Accessibility of Tacit and Codified Knowledge**

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11

12 **Abstract**

13 Engineering and construction organizations realize that knowledge sharing between
14 employees is essential to be competitive, yet few understand how knowledge sharing is affected
15 by management choices. This paper examines how managerial control systems, the structures and
16 routines used to influence organizational activities, influence knowledge accessibility, defined as
17 the effort that one takes to request and access knowledge from another person. Specifically, this
18 research examines and compares the effects of clan and bureaucratic control on the accessibility
19 of tacit versus codified knowledge. The researchers propose that individuals who perceive greater
20 clan control, or governance through common values and beliefs, will perceive greater accessibility
21 of both tacit and codified knowledge; while individuals who perceive greater bureaucratic control,
22 or governance through rules and procedures, will perceive increase in codified knowledge only.

23 To test the role of alignment between control systems and knowledge types in affecting knowledge
24 accessibility, a questionnaire was administered to all engineers located in North America (855
25 people) within one engineering organization, and data collected from 298 responses were analyzed
26 using linear regression analysis. The results in this research improve our understanding of
27 knowledge accessibility and is an important step toward integrating control systems, knowledge
28 type and knowledge accessibility.

29 **Introduction**

30 The Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) industry is primarily knowledge-
31 based, which means that the competitive advantage of organizations is significantly determined by
32 how effective organizations are at knowledge sharing. For example, to meet client needs, engineers
33 seek knowledge from each other when they encounter design challenges, take an unfamiliar
34 technical approach, or need someone to collaborate with them to solve a problem (Robinson 2010).
35 However, while practitioners acknowledge the critical nature of knowledge sharing for the success
36 of the organization, it is not readily apparent how organizations can govern knowledge sharing in
37 a way that best benefits project teams. Many organizations have focused on tools and knowledge
38 management systems that attempt to capture knowledge; but many of these systems, lessons
39 learned databases, and skills matrices fail to achieve their intent in practice (Storey and Barnett
40 2000). As a result, additional work is needed to determine how organizations can facilitate
41 knowledge sharing. To address this need, this research analyzes how control systems, the formal
42 and informal structures and routines used to influence organizational activities (Long et al. 2002),
43 affect perceptions of knowledge accessibility, or the effort that one takes to request and access
44 knowledge from another person (Woudstra et al. 2012). Knowledge accessibility is the initial step
45 in knowledge sharing, and is essential in project teams where engineers must access knowledge

46 quickly from their peers to meet project deadlines (Poleacovschi et al. 2017). Past work has
47 acknowledged the importance of knowledge accessibility by showing that teams and individuals
48 who have higher knowledge accessibility were more likely to have increased project and individual
49 performance (Cross and Cummings 2004; Haas 2006; Poleacovschi and Javernick-Will 2016).

50 While literature has increased focus on the mechanisms facilitating knowledge sharing and
51 knowledge accessibility (e.g., Hertzum 2014; Javernick-Will 2012; Wanberg et al. 2015), there
52 has been little work that investigates how the control systems initiated by management influence
53 an employee's ability to find and access knowledge needed to complete their projects. Managers
54 within EPC organizations adopt different control systems to influence individual behavior in a way
55 that best aligns with project and organizational goals (Tuuli et al. 2010a). Two forms of control
56 systems—clan and bureaucratic control— have been identified as distinct and critical systems to
57 govern individual behavior (Ouchi 1980). Clan control emphasizes the collective and, as a result,
58 values collaboration to achieve individual goals. In contrast, the management within bureaucratic
59 control systems monitors if employees follow the rules and procedures during their work (Long et
60 al. 2002). Both control systems operate through mechanisms or methods by which individual
61 action is governed (Cardinal et al. 2004). For instance, clan control relies upon common values,
62 traditions and beliefs, while bureaucratic control relies upon rules, standards and formal
63 procedures to complete work (Ouchi 1980). We theorize that control systems will influence
64 knowledge accessibility as they affect individuals' motivation in the process of knowledge
65 seeking. However, the relationship will also depend on the knowledge type. One of the most
66 important differentiating characteristics of knowledge is whether the knowledge is tacit or explicit
67 (Levin and Cross 2004; Nonaka 1994; Polanyi 1967). Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is
68 difficult to articulate in writing and can be explained easier through verbal and social interactions

69 (Polanyi 1967). Conversely, codified knowledge can be easily written down and does not
70 necessarily require social interactions for transferring (Polanyi 1967). Because knowledge applied
71 in EPC organizations can be both codified and tacit, the overall goal of the research is to contrast
72 the effects of clan and bureaucratic control on the accessibility of tacit and codified knowledge.

73 The research uses survey data and linear regression analysis to test whether clan and
74 bureaucratic control increases accessibility of tacit and codified knowledge. We administered the
75 survey questionnaire to 855 engineers located in North America within one EPC organization, and
76 analyzed responses using linear regression analysis for knowledge accessibility and control
77 systems. Based upon the 298 responses received, we show that increased clan control is positively
78 associated with accessibility of tacit and codified knowledge, while bureaucratic control is
79 positively associated with accessibility of codified knowledge only.

80 **Literature Review**

81 This work falls at the intersection of control systems, knowledge accessibility, and
82 knowledge type, which are reviewed briefly below before developing the hypotheses.

83 ***Control Systems***

84 The concept of control systems was proposed by Ouchi (1980) to describe how
85 organizational control mechanisms manage individual behavior. The bureaucratic and clan
86 systems are two distinct and important control mechanisms in EPC organizations (Tuuli et al.
87 2010a; b). Bureaucratic control encourages employees to follow organizational and management
88 procedures to access knowledge from others in the organization. This approach emphasizes
89 structure and rules of the management (Lam 2000; Weber et al. 1958). In bureaucracies, seekers
90 tend to work according to formal organizational charts and procedures. Thus, bureaucratic control
91 emphasizes the importance of documentation, reporting, and standardization as ways of executing

92 everyday work. In contrast, clans are groups of people who have common understanding, values,
93 and beliefs. In clans, collaboration, reciprocity and common understanding become the norm
94 among team members (Kirsch et al. 2009). Individuals work towards a common goal, which
95 becomes an individual value. A culture of collaborative work de-emphasizes a hierarchy of actors
96 and emphasizes the importance of the parts (people) to the whole (project). In EPC organizations,
97 both control mechanisms are used to influence individual behavior, although managers choose to
98 use bureaucratic control mechanisms more frequently than clan control (Tuuli et al. 2010b; a).
99 Because control systems cannot be disconnected from individual behavior and motivation (Foss et
100 al. 2010; Grandori 1997; Turner and Makhija 2006), the research presented in this paper studies
101 how control systems influence knowledge accessibility.

102 ***Knowledge Accessibility***

103 Past research on knowledge accessibility has primarily focused on the antecedents of
104 knowledge accessibility between two individuals. This work has shown that accessibility is
105 influenced by individual attributes (e.g. gender, tenure, hierarchy level) (Borgatti and Cross 2003)
106 and dyadic attributes, or attributes regarding the relationship between the knowledge seeker and
107 knowledge provider (Hertzum 2014; Vancouver and Morrison 1995). For instance, men were
108 likely to perceive decreased knowledge accessibility compared to women (Lee 2000); and
109 relationship quality (Vancouver and Morrison 1995), tie strength (Levin and Cross 2004) and trust
110 (Abrams et al. 2003; Levin and Cross 2004) were found to be important, as people who have close
111 relationships can communicate and access knowledge easily. While individual- and dyad- level
112 attributes are essential, this research addresses another important factor – control systems
113 implemented by management – to determine the influence of managerial control systems on
114 knowledge accessibility among employees.

115 Building on previous research, Woudstra et al. (2012) proposed an integrative framework
116 to define and measure accessibility based upon the social, cognitive and physical effort that people
117 take when seeking for knowledge. Social effort represents the level of psychological comfort that
118 people experience when interacting with the knowledge source. For instance, an engineer may
119 perceive decreased accessibility with a provider because he or she does not want to reveal his/her
120 lack of knowledge to the provider. Cognitive effort refers to the effort that arises based on people
121 who speak different professional languages or who have a different perspective of the project work,
122 requiring additional time to interpret their expertise. Cognitive effort can occur between two
123 engineers who have different technical expertise because they speak different professional
124 language. Physical effort is important for accessibility based upon the potential inconvenience that
125 occurs as a result of accessing knowledge from people who are located in different locations and
126 time zones. For instance, two engineers who work virtually may exert additional effort to
127 communicate compared to two engineers who work in the same office location. The framework is
128 theoretically and analytically suitable for the concept of knowledge accessibility, as it examines
129 the different forces that may influence people's desire to approach other people for knowledge.

130 ***Knowledge Type***

131 Knowledge type influences the ways employees interact to access and obtain needed
132 knowledge. The most common knowledge type emphasized in the literature is tacit and codified
133 knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1996; Lam 2000; Nonaka and von Krogh 2009; Polanyi 1967; Su
134 and Contractor 2011). Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is contextual, requiring rich descriptions
135 of the problem's context and ease of communication between the knowledge seeker and provider.
136 Tacit knowledge is frequently used within project-based organizations where project members
137 need to share complex knowledge and create innovative solutions to project details. Codified

138 knowledge is also important in the context of EPC organizations, as quality control processes and
139 checklists are often needed to ensure compliance with professional standards and codes.

140 Because of the importance of the two characteristics of knowledge for everyday
141 construction engineering tasks, previous work identified the antecedents of transferring tacit and
142 codified knowledge (Hansen 1999; Holste and Fields 2010; Levin and Cross 2004). For instance,
143 Hansen (1999) showed that transferring tacit knowledge requires strong ties, or connections that
144 have frequent interactions, while codified knowledge can be transferred using weak ties, or
145 connections that have less frequent interactions. Holste and Fields (2010) have shown that
146 individuals need to build trust in order to easily share tacit knowledge. Nevertheless, these studies
147 have primarily focused on the relational and individual level antecedents of seeking and
148 transferring knowledge, leaving the effect of control systems on knowledge accessibility
149 understudied.

150 **Hypotheses Development**

151 The study of control systems on accessibility is primarily rooted in studies researching the
152 fit between control systems and organizational outcomes. While not directly using the term
153 “accessibility”, the accessibility of knowledge is implied in this past work when using the term
154 “fit” and “alignment” (Lam 2000; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Turner and Makhija 2006). For
155 instance, scholars identified the alignment between control systems and the dominant knowledge
156 type (tacit or codified) that described the work conducted by the organization (Lam 2000; Osterloh
157 and Frey 2000; Turner and Makhija 2006). It was theorized that clans would be appropriate for the
158 accessibility of tacit knowledge, while bureaucratic control would be the best fit for the
159 accessibility of codified knowledge (Lam 2000; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Turner and Makhija
160 2006). In other words, if the complexity of a construction project is reduced to more specialized

161 and repetitive work, or codified knowledge, then the management could adopt a bureaucratic
162 approach with increased rules and procedures. However, this past work did not empirically
163 evaluate the effects of control systems on knowledge accessibility at the dyad level.

164 Bureaucratic control encourages employees to follow organizational and management
165 procedures to access knowledge from others in the organization. Within bureaucracies, individuals
166 may have autonomy, but they have more difficulty transferring tacit knowledge with others due to
167 the increased formality of the working processes (Lam 2000). Specifically, tacit knowledge is more
168 difficult to transfer as it is often context-specific and requires close social relationships and
169 frequent communication with the knowledge provider. For instance, Levin and Cross (2004) have
170 shown that people need to trust the knowledge provider in order to seek knowledge from them. In
171 bureaucracies, seekers tend to work according to formal organizational charts and procedures,
172 which may not facilitate verbal and *ad hoc* conversations necessary for accessing and transferring
173 tacit knowledge. Thus, bureaucracies advantage formality and create communication channels that
174 allow the easy transfer of knowledge that is written, or codified, such as standards and codes. As
175 such, we expect that knowledge seekers will perceive increased accessibility of codified
176 knowledge.

177 ***Hypothesis 1: Bureaucratic control will be positively associated with accessibility of codified***
178 ***knowledge but not tacit knowledge.***

179 In clans, collaboration becomes the norm among team members who seek to function based
180 on trust and reciprocity (Kirsch et al. 2009). Within clans, individuals will value other employees'
181 expertise and provide their knowledge to whomever needs it, rather than relying on formal
182 hierarchical or social positions. This is expected to increase the accessibility of knowledge.
183 Specifically, we expect tacit knowledge to be accessed easily due to increased social interactions

184 within clans. Similarly, we expect that the accessibility of codified knowledge will also be
185 increased among clans, as the transfer of codified knowledge requires minimal effort given the
186 well-established communication channels present in clans. As a result, we can expect that in an
187 environment in which clan control is enhanced, knowledge accessibility of both tacit and codified
188 knowledge will increase.

189 ***Hypothesis 2:*** *Clan control will be positively associated with accessibility of tacit and codified*
190 *knowledge.*

191 **Methods**

192 The context of this research is one large EPC organization. The organization focuses
193 primarily on providing design and construction services in water and wastewater.

194 ***Data Collection***

195 Initially, a pilot survey was sent to a random sample of 50 employees at the organization
196 to validate the clarity of the survey questions and to check the reliability of the measures for key
197 variables (knowledge accessibility, control systems). Based upon the feedback received, the order
198 of the survey questions was rearranged from two sections into three sections, allowing respondents
199 to reflect between sections. The Cronbach's alpha for the items for measuring variables of
200 knowledge accessibility and control systems was always above 0.7, which validated the use of the
201 items for the final survey.

202 The final survey was administered to 855 employees in the company who represented the
203 entire group of technical employees (e.g. engineers, architects, scientists) in the North America
204 region. 298 valid responses were returned, representing a survey response rate of 34.8%. In the
205 questionnaire, individuals were asked to identify two people from the organization whom they
206 sought knowledge from (Borgatti and Cross 2003; Cross and Cummings 2004): "*During our work,*

207 *we sometimes encounter problems we do not know how to solve and need additional information*
208 *and advice. Please identify two people at [the company] that you have approached for information*
209 *or advice to solve a problem.”* Afterwards, the respondents were asked to evaluate knowledge
210 accessibility, attributes of the knowledge provider and themselves (the knowledge seeker), and to
211 rate the level of clan and bureaucratic control employed by their managers. The unit of analysis of
212 the independent variable represents the respondent’s assessment of clan and bureaucratic control,
213 and the unit of analysis of the dependent variable represents the accessibility of the knowledge
214 providers. 41 respondents rated only one provider, but these respondents’ answers were included
215 in the empirical analysis for completeness. As a result, the analyses in this paper is based on 555
216 dyads.

217 ***Variables and Measurement***

218 Dependent Variable

219 Our dependent variable is *Knowledge accessibility*. Woudstra et al. (2012) proposed a
220 three-item framework to measure knowledge accessibility, defined as the effort, including
221 physical, cognitive and social, that one takes to ask and request knowledge from another person.
222 Drawing on Woudstra et al.’s (2012) framework, the following eight items were used to measure
223 accessibility: 1. *This person’s information and advice is easy to comprehend and use* (Anderson
224 et al. 2001); 2. *The person’s information and advice is easy to understand* (Xu et al. 2006); 3. *I*
225 *feel comfortable approaching this person* (Morrison and Vancouver 2000); 4. *I feel nervous*
226 *approaching this person* (Xu et al. 2006); 5. *I do not feel comfortable revealing my lack of*
227 *knowledge to this person* (Fidel and Green 2004); 6. *I feel indebted to this person when asking*
228 *questions from them* (Borgatti and Cross 2003); 7. *Approaching this person takes significant*
229 *physical effort* (adapted from Woudstra et al., 2012); 8. *Approaching this person takes significant*

230 *time* (adapted from Woudstra et al., 2012). Respondents were asked to assess the eight items based
231 on the following scale (from 1 to 5): “Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree not disagree,
232 Agree, and Strongly agree.” The dependent variable, *accessibility*, was calculated by averaging
233 the eight items. The Cronbach’s alpha for the items was 0.78, which showed the reliability of the
234 items measuring accessibility.

235 Independent Variables

236 The two independent variables related to control systems (*Bureaucratic control* and *Clan*
237 *control*) were measured by following Long et al.’s (2011) approach. To measure the level of
238 bureaucratic control and clan control, respondents were asked to assess five items each using the
239 scale of “Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree not disagree, Agree, and Strongly agree”.
240 Specifically, for bureaucratic control, respondents were asked to assess the following five items,
241 where “X” represents the name of the connection indicated by the respondent: (1) *X (supervisor)*
242 *primarily monitors how well I execute standardized rules and procedures when I do my work;* (2)
243 *X (supervisor) emphasizes the need for employees to follow rules and procedures in doing their*
244 *job;* (3) *X (supervisor) rewards employees who accurately follow rules and procedures in doing*
245 *their jobs.* (4) *Whether I succeed or not in this organization is largely determined by how well I*
246 *execute formal rules and procedures;* (5) *In doing my job, I spend most of my time executing rules*
247 *and procedures.* For clan control, respondents were asked to assess the following five items: (1) *X*
248 *(supervisor) primarily monitors how well I get along with my co-workers;* (2) *X (supervisor)*
249 *emphasizes the need for employees to get along with each other;* (3) *X (supervisor) rewards*
250 *employees who get along well with their co-workers.* (4) *Whether I succeed or not in this*
251 *organization is largely determined by how well I get along with my co-workers.* (5) *In doing my*
252 *job, I spend most of my time collaborating with colleagues on work activities.* Given that all items

253 were theorized to have equal weight in measuring control systems (Long et al. 2011), the two
254 independent variables, *Bureaucratic control* and *Clan control*, were calculated as an average of
255 the first set of five items, and the second set of five items, respectively.

256 Another independent variable, *Knowledge tacitness*, was measured by using three items
257 from Hansen (1999): (1) *How much of the information/advice that came from X was explained to*
258 *you in writing (in written reports, manuals, e-mails, faxes, etc.) [None, Almost none, Less than*
259 *half, Half, More than half, Almost all, All]; (2) How well documented in writing, was the*
260 *information/advice that you received from X? Consider all the information or advice. [Not well*
261 *documented, Less documented, Somewhat less documented, Somewhat well documented,*
262 *Documented, Well documented, Very well documented]; (3) What type of information/advice came*
263 *from X? [7=mainly reports, manuals, documents; 4=half knowledge explained verbally, half*
264 *reports/documents; 1=mainly personal practical knowledge explained verbally]. The variable*
265 *Knowledge tacitness* was calculated by averaging the three items.

266 Control Variables

267 Based on previous literature, the following variables were controlled for that may affect
268 knowledge accessibility:

- 269 • Similar age (*Sim_age*): Respondents were asked to indicate their age in number of years.
270 They were also asked if they were in the same age group as the knowledge provider (plus
271 or minus 5 years). The variable was treated as dichotomous. It was coded as “1” while
272 difference of age was coded as “0”. This control variable was included since people of
273 similar age may have similar ways of sharing knowledge (Sanaei et al. 2013).
- 274 • Similar race (*Sim_race*): Respondents were asked to identify their race (Hispanic or Latino,
275 Black or African-American, White, Asian Pacific Islander, or Other) and if they were of

276 the same race as the knowledge provider. The variable was treated as dichotomous. It was
277 coded as “1” while difference of race was coded as “0”. This control variable was included
278 because previous work has shown that similarity of race is essential to how people form
279 friendship relationships that may affect knowledge sharing (Mollica et al. 2003).

280 • Similar expertise (*Sim_expertise*): The primary area of expertise for the knowledge seeker
281 and provider was obtained from the database provided by the focal organization. The
282 database included areas of expertise in civil engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical
283 engineering, process engineering, environmental engineering, structural engineering,
284 architecture and construction. The variable was treated as dichotomous. It was coded as
285 “1” while difference in expertise was coded as “0”. This control variable was included
286 because people with similar expertise have a good mutual understanding of their expertise,
287 facilitating their knowledge seeking (Borgatti and Cross 2003).

288 • Similar hierarchy level (*Sim_level*): A provider’s hierarchical level was obtained by asking
289 respondents to specify the provider’s level in the hierarchy, in relation to the provider
290 (“*He/she is the same hierarchy level; He/she is higher hierarchy level; He/she is in lower*
291 *hierarchy level; or We do not work together*”). The variable was treated as dichotomous.
292 It was coded as “1” while difference in level was coded as “0”. This control variable was
293 included because people seeking knowledge from providers in higher levels may not want
294 to reveal their lack of knowledge to them.

295 • Similarity of office location (*Sim_location*). Respondents were asked if they worked in the
296 same office location as the provider. The variable was treated as dichotomous. It was coded
297 as “1” while difference in location was coded as “0”. This control variable was included

298 because people in the same location are likely to share and transfer knowledge more
299 frequently (Wanberg et al. 2015).

- 300 • Gender (*Seeker_gender*) and similarity of gender (*Sim_gender*). Previous work
301 (Poleacovschi et al. 2017) showed that the knowledge seeker’s gender (Lee 2002) and
302 similarity in gender between the seeker and provider play an important role in knowledge
303 seeking.
- 304 • Tie strength (*Tie_strength*): Respondents were asked to assess the frequency of interactions
305 with providers using the following scale: “Once every 3 months - Once every 2 months -
306 Once a month - Twice a month - Once a week - Twice a week - Once a day”. The measure
307 for tie strength was taken from previous research (Hansen 1999; Levin and Cross 2004).
308 The variable was coded on a continuous scale from 1 to 7. This control variable was
309 included as past work has shown that knowledge accessibility increases with the frequency
310 of communication (Hertzum 2014).

311 ***Statistical Approach***

312 Data were analyzed using linear regression analysis. To test the hypotheses on the effects
313 of *Bureaucratic control* (H1) and *Clan control* (H2) on the accessibility of codified and tacit
314 knowledge, respectively, the coefficient estimates of the two independent variables and their
315 significance levels were examined by performing subsample analysis, with the split of the full
316 sample at the mean value of *Knowledge tacitness*. This created a “Codified Knowledge
317 Subsample” where observations have a below-the-mean value of knowledge tacitness, as well as
318 a “Tacit Knowledge Subsample” where observations have an above-the-mean value of knowledge
319 tacitness. Subsample analysis is widely used for comparing coefficients between groups due to the
320 many advantages it offers (Greene 2008): subsample analysis does not require that unexplained

321 variances be identical between the two groups of firms, and it allows the effects of the right-hand-
 322 side covariates to differ between the groups, leading to consistent within-group estimates (Hoetker
 323 2007).

324 In addition to comparing the signs and significance levels of the estimated coefficients on
 325 *Bureaucratic control* and *Clan control* across the subsamples, another analysis was performed to
 326 test the two hypotheses formally. Specifically, using the full sample (all observations), an
 327 interaction term was created between an independent variable (*Bureaucratic control* or *Clan*
 328 *control*) and a dummy variable (*Tacit subsample*) indicating whether a focal observation was in
 329 the Tacit Knowledge Subsample (taking the value 1) or the Codified Knowledge Subsample
 330 (taking the value 0). Regressions were run, and the sign and significance level of the estimated
 331 coefficient on the interaction term was examined (*Bureaucratic control * Tacit sample*, or *Clan*
 332 *control * Tacit sample*). This approach provides a more formal test of whether the estimated
 333 coefficient on *Bureaucratic control* (or *Clan control*) is significantly different between the two
 334 subsamples.

335 Results

336 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables.

337 **Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

	Number of Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Min.	Max.
Accessibility	555	4.3	0.56	1.25	5.12
Sim_race	555	1.70	0.47	1	3
Sim_age	555	1.38	0.51	1	3
Sim_gender	555	1.63	0.49	1	3
Sim_location	555	1.59	0.53	1	3
Sim_level	555	1.13	0.34	1	2
Tie_strength	555	5.17	1.74	1	7
Seeker_gender	555	1.63	0.48	1	2
Bureaucratic control	555	3.23	0.69	1	5

Clan control	555	3.30	0.57	1	5
Knowledge tacitness	555	4.60	1.21	1	7
Tacit subsample	555	0.53	0.50	0	1

338

339 Table 2 presents hypotheses testing results. Models 1-3 report results testing Hypothesis 1,
 340 and Models 4-6 report results testing Hypothesis 2. Specifically, Models 1 and 4 are the Codified
 341 Knowledge Subsample, Models 2 and 5 are the Tacit Knowledge Subsample, and Models 3 and 6
 342 are the Full Sample with all observations.

343

**Table 2: Results for the Effects of Bureaucratic and Clan Control
 on the Accessibility of Codified and Tacit Knowledge**

344

	(1) Codified Knowledge Subsample	(2) Tacit Knowledge Subsample	(3) Full Sample	(4) Codified Knowledge Subsample	(5) Tacit Knowledge Subsample	(6) Full Sample
Sim_race	-0.052 (0.070)	-0.043 (0.074)	-0.040 (0.050)	-0.030 (0.070)	-0.020 (0.074)	-0.017 (0.051)
Sim_age	0.068 (0.064)	0.177* (0.073)	0.115* (0.048)	0.043 (0.063)	0.175* (0.072)	0.103* (0.047)
Sim_gender	0.116 (0.077)	0.144 (0.092)	0.120* (0.059)	0.109 (0.076)	0.142 (0.091)	0.116* (0.058)
Sim_location	-0.060 (0.073)	-0.080 (0.074)	-0.072 (0.052)	-0.043 (0.072)	-0.098 (0.074)	-0.072 (0.052)
Sim_level	-0.007 (0.107)	0.109 (0.098)	0.071 (0.072)	-0.029 (0.106)	0.142 (0.098)	0.081 (0.072)
Tie_strength	0.035 (0.022)	0.070** (0.023)	0.051** (0.016)	0.041 (0.022)	0.074** (0.023)	0.056*** (0.016)
Seeker_gender	-0.131 (0.079)	-0.233* (0.092)	-0.179** (0.059)	-0.122 (0.078)	-0.233 ⁴ (0.091)	-0.175** (0.059)
Bureaucratic control	0.109* (0.052)	-0.0001 (0.049)	0.115* (0.052)			
Tacit subsample			0.398 [†] (0.230)			0.186 (0.278)
Bureaucratic control * Tacit subsample			-0.119 [†] (0.069)			

Clan control				0.169** (0.060)	0.130* (0.059)	0.168** (0.061)
Clan control * Tacit subsample						-0.051 (0.083)
Constant	3.876*** (0.293)	3.956*** (0.287)	3.707*** (0.239)	3.630*** (0.318)	3.448*** (0.329)	3.461*** (0.270)
<i>N</i>	260	295	555	260	295	555
<i>R</i> ²	0.049	0.077	0.058	0.062	0.093	0.070
<i>F</i> value	1.619	3.025	3.363	2.086	3.716	4.126

Standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

345
346 In Model 1, the coefficient on the variable *Bureaucratic control* is positive and significant
347 ($p < 0.05$), suggesting that bureaucratic control is associated with increased accessibility of codified
348 knowledge. In Model 2, the coefficient on *Bureaucratic control* is not significant, thus bureaucratic
349 control is not associated with accessibility of tacit knowledge. Taken together, results in Models 1
350 and 2 provide support for our H1 that bureaucratic control will be positively related to the
351 accessibility of codified knowledge but not that of tacit knowledge. In Model 3, the coefficient on
352 the interaction term *Bureaucratic control* * *Tacit subsample* is negative and modestly significant
353 ($p < 0.10$), suggesting that the effect of bureaucratic control on tacit knowledge is significantly
354 different (lower) than its effect on codified knowledge. This result also validates the significantly
355 positive coefficient on *Bureaucratic control* in Model 1 (codified knowledge) but the insignificant
356 coefficient in Model 2 (tacit knowledge). Overall, results in Model 3 provide further support for
357 H1.

358 In Model 4, the coefficient on the variable *Clan control* is positive and significant ($p < 0.01$),
359 suggesting that clan control is associated with increased accessibility of codified knowledge. In
360 Model 5, the coefficient on the variable *Clan control* is similarly positive and significant ($p < 0.05$),
361 thus clan control is also associated with increased accessibility of tacit knowledge. Taken together,
362 results in Models 4 and 5 provide support for our H2 that clan control will be positively related to

363 the accessibility of both codified and tacit knowledge. In Model 6, the coefficient on the interaction
364 term *Clan control * Tacit subsample* is not significant, suggesting that the effect of clan control
365 on tacit knowledge is not significantly different than its effect on codified knowledge. This result
366 is consistent with the finding earlier that the coefficient on *Clan control* is positively significant in
367 both Model 4 (codified knowledge) and Model 5 (tacit knowledge), and that the size of the
368 coefficient estimates (and standard errors) for *Clan control* in both models is relatively close to
369 each other. Overall, results in Model 6 provide further support for H2.

370 **Discussion**

371 This research sought to understand the influence of control systems (clan and bureaucratic
372 control) on knowledge accessibility based on knowledge types. The results showed that the effect
373 of clan control on accessibility was positive and significant for both tacit and codified knowledge.
374 This means that whenever respondents perceived clan control, they were likely to experience less
375 social, cognitive, and physical effort in accessing knowledge providers regardless of the type of
376 knowledge to seek. In contrast, bureaucratic control had a positive effect on the accessibility of
377 codified knowledge only, meaning that bureaucratic control is not systematically related to the
378 accessibility of tacit knowledge. While control systems have been shown to influence individual
379 behavior, existing literature has not yet studied the link between control systems and knowledge
380 sharing. This study is an important step toward integrating control systems, knowledge type and
381 knowledge accessibility at the dyad level. This research showed that, after controlling for relational
382 attributes (e.g. similarity of gender), the control mechanisms applied by management played an
383 important role on the accessibility of both tacit and codified knowledge. Specifically, people
384 perceived knowledge to be more accessible, regardless of knowledge type, whenever they
385 perceived a clan environment. The results contribute to literature on knowledge sharing and control

386 systems by analyzing the effect of two control systems and on the accessibility of tacit and codified
387 knowledge. As such, this research emphasizes the knowledge *context* as an important variable in
388 the relationship between control systems and knowledge accessibility (Agarwal et al. 2011;
389 Hertzum 2014). While existing work in construction and engineering has primarily focused on the
390 social relations and individual motivation as essential for knowledge sharing (Javernick-Will 2012;
391 Poleacovschi and Javernick-Will 2017; Sanaei et al. 2013), the findings from this research show
392 the importance of control effects on knowledge sharing, and emphasize inclusion of control
393 systems as an important variable in knowledge sharing behavior.

394 For practitioners, the link between control systems and knowledge accessibility presents
395 important managerial implications. Decisions of control systems should include thought regarding
396 the types of knowledge that employees need to access to complete their work. If their tasks are
397 complex and require them to access tacit knowledge, then clans would be more suited to enhance
398 knowledge accessibility. If the task can be completed based upon existing, codified knowledge
399 within the firm, then either clans or bureaucracies can be implemented. Nevertheless, project
400 managers should consider the costs of fostering bureaucratic and clan control. Employing clan
401 control is expected to be more expensive and time consuming due to socialization among clan
402 members and emotional labor to foster a clan identity. The costs should be especially considered
403 and compared in the case of codified knowledge which can be transferred using both control
404 systems.

405 **Limitations and Future Work**

406 As with any research, this research contains limitations. First, the assessment of control
407 systems represents the perceptions of the respondents. Future work can evaluate ways to measure
408 control systems using a more objective scale. Alternatively, the assessment of control systems can

409 be validated through an inter-rater reliability rating, where several employees who have the same
410 supervisors assess the control systems in the survey. Second, clan and bureaucratic control were
411 included, but not market-based control, because monetary compensation has minimal influence on
412 how people share and transfer knowledge (Javernick-Will 2012), and there is a lack of
413 organizations that employ market-based control mechanisms. This work is based on the US market
414 so that cultural differences in knowledge accessibility and control systems could be controlled for,
415 which limits the generalizability of the findings.

416 **Conclusion**

417 In knowledge-based EPC organizations, knowledge accessibility is critical for employees
418 to complete their work effectively. While advances have been made in better understanding how
419 individual and dyadic attributes between a knowledge seeker and provider influence knowledge
420 accessibility, there has been a dearth of research that investigates how managerial control
421 mechanisms influence knowledge sharing and accessibility. Thus, the goal of this research was to
422 determine how different control systems—bureaucratic and clan—influenced knowledge
423 accessibility based on knowledge type. To achieve this goal, a survey was administered to 855
424 technical specialists (i.e., engineers, architects and scientists) within North American offices in an
425 engineering organization and linear regression analysis was used to validate the hypothesis that
426 clan control, or developing an environment supportive of collaboration, positively affected
427 accessibility of both tacit and codified knowledge. In contrast, bureaucratic control affected the
428 accessibility of codified knowledge only. Theoretically, this research improves understanding of
429 knowledge accessibility by showing the link between the control systems and knowledge
430 accessibility, and by specifying that the type of knowledge is important factor in this relationship.
431 Practically, project managers who want to increase accessibility among employees may foster one

432 of the control systems based on the nature of the project work. If the work requires frequent access
433 to tacit knowledge, then they should consider governing through clan control.

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