

Forging the Pacific:
Peruvian-Japanese Diplomacy, Migration, and Empire,
1918-1930

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Abstract

This thesis examines the extent to which international collaboration spawning from Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy forged an international and regional consciousness among Pacific states in the interwar era (1918-1930). Dividing the interwar period into three distinct, chronological phases, this thesis paints a narrative of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy as a historical phenomenon which emerges, plateaus, and declines, as both an instigator and product of the contemporary geopolitical processes unfolding in the Pacific region. This paper utilizes direct correspondence between Peruvian and Japanese diplomats, as well as a dense array of secondary sources, to reconcile surface level diplomatic behavior with the deeper geopolitical ambitions of a state. Furthermore, by linking the seemingly distinct nineteenth century origins of Japanese labor migration to Peru with their twentieth century diplomatic consequences, this thesis additionally exposes the foundation of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy as an alliance of mutual desperation and convenience. This understanding spawns from analysis of Peru and Japan in the nineteenth century and reveals the significance of considering Peruvian-Japanese history beyond the traditional perspective of solely migration. This thesis also exposes the fundamental role played by the perception of empire in the 1920s Pacific, as fear of imperialism encouraged previously distinct states into transcontinental collaboration. Finally, this project examines racism as an avenue for geopolitical inclusion as the “Yellow Peril,” while excluding the Japanese conversely encouraged an unprecedented sense of commonality between states in the Americas. Ultimately, attributing a novel historical agency to the South American past and the historical role of non-Western, non-white states in creating an international community, this thesis reveals the consequences of diplomacy, migration, and empire in forging the modern Pacific world.

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Chapter One

Introduction

In 1919, Peruvian ambassador, M. de Freyre y Santander, petitioned the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs for diplomatic aid in the bitter Peruvian-Chilean dispute concerning the Tacna-Arica plebiscite:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a Memorandum, explaining, as briefly as possible, the stand my government has taken in the controversy pursued with the Government of Chile...In view of the well known interest displayed by the Imperial Government of Japan in the just settlement of international disputes, I venture to trust that Your Excellency will be pleased to become acquainted with the arguments and facts, which my government believes amply vindicate the attitude it has been bound to assume in the matter and the conclusions it has unavoidably reached.¹

With Japan as a newcomer to the highly fragile and competitive peace of early twentieth century South America, the prospect of Japanese aid appeared extremely alluring to South American governments seeking diplomatic leverage in the increasingly contentious chess match of Andean geopolitics. The arrival of the Japanese unleashed a furious diplomatic pursuit as both the Peruvians and Chileans heavily petitioned international support from the emerging national power in the Japanese government. Although incidental, thrusting the Japanese into Andean diplomacy set in motion the gears for the expansion of Japanese relations across Latin America. Establishing a diplomatic foothold with the Peruvians, enabled the Japanese to stimulate a new era of international collaboration across the Americas. This collaboration encouraged a

¹ Dr. Maurtua, Memorandum to Viscount Yasuya Uchida, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 26 1919, Document 13, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

community between previously distinct states in the region, forming, for the first time, a broader, regional pan-Pacific consciousness.

Within the correspondence over the Tacna-Arica plebiscite, the Peruvians regarded the lingering consequences of their war with Chile as “The Question of the Pacific.” Although unaware at the time, inviting the Japanese into the conflict vaulted the previously small, Andean dispute into a pan-Pacific affair. Japanese involvement subsequently expanded the “Question’s” scope from considering the Pacific as pertaining to a small region in South America, to a broader recognition of the Pacific as a transcontinental community.

I. Elaborating the Argument

This study examines the extent to which geopolitical, economic, and social collaboration spawning from Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy forged a regional and international consciousness among Pacific states in the interwar era (1918-1930). The opening of the twentieth century saw thousands of Japanese migrate to Peru as agricultural contract laborers. Yet the international and diplomatic contingencies and consequences of these migrations receive little attention in the traditional narrative of Pacific history. Through broadening previously accepted consequences of diplomacy, this thesis reinserts the South American past into the narrative of the Pacific, by emphasizing the fundamental role played by non-Western states in fostering an international community. Although we must consider Chile as a vital player to South American history, this thesis focuses primarily on the Peruvian diplomatic relationship with the Japanese. Consolidated out of mutual economic desperation, convenience, and political manipulation, the Peruvian-Japanese relationship evolved into an accidental, yet fundamental, development by connecting a region of disconnected states into the modern Pacific.

This project examines what this thesis defines as the interwar period (1918-1930), analyzing this narrative through three distinct phases: 1918-1923, 1924-1927, and 1928-1930. The 1920s evolved as fundamental to Pacific diplomatic history, as an era witnessing the development and culmination of the central issues of regional geopolitics between the world wars. While the Second World War arguably began in Asia in 1931 with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, this thesis defines the end of the interwar period at 1930, as a watershed year witnessing relations between the two nations deteriorate on the eve of the Second World War. Inquiries into the deportation of Nikkei individuals and the war years deserve their own fully dedicated study, thus this thesis leaves the discussion at 1930.²

While migration as a driver of diplomacy is not an unfamiliar argument, at the heart of this history exists a previously unexplored parallel in the Peruvian relationship with their Japanese counterpart: the manipulation of diplomacy as means to further a respective international agenda. Although contemporary Japanese militarism between the world wars misconstrues the Japanese as the aggressor in their interwar relationship with Peru, contrarily the Peruvian intention of manipulating Japanese relations with the intent to reclaim Tacna-Arica, reflects an ironic expansionist ambition. Furthermore, by the 1920s, the Japanese began applying historical lessons to international relations, consequently reviving the state's role in migration discourse. It is evident that the Peruvians misinterpreted this shift as the beginnings of Japanese imperialism in Latin America, and pursued anti-Japanese legislation as a response to this misconception. While the Japanese indeed pursued empire equivalent to their Western

² The term “Nikkei” broadly applies to numerous Japanese communities across South America. In this paper, unless otherwise specified, Nikkei refers to Peru's Japanese population.

counterparts, they did so only within the realm of East Asia.³ From this distinction emerges an irony in that the Peruvians sought to limit Japanese operations in Peru on the grounds of resisting imperialism, when at the beginning of the 1920s, the Peruvians pursued a Japanese alliance to fuel an expansionist ambition in South America.

As a primarily diplomatic history, this thesis accounts for the tremendous role of migration in stimulating diplomacy, yet maintains that diplomacy played a far larger part in the broader context of Peruvian-Japanese relations than did migration. As the Japanese encountered an extremely fragile peace in South America in the early twentieth century, the tradition of emigration to Peru, a phenomena beginning in earnest in 1899, provided a convenient stepping stone for the extension into diplomacy with the Peruvians. Japanese desires to enter Latin American geopolitics matched the Peruvian agenda to manipulate their relationship with Japan to bolster their own diplomatic position in the region. As the first South American government to open relations with Japan, diplomacy with the Peruvians forged an avenue for their South American neighbors to follow suit. In 1918, the two governments sought an ambitious alliance out of mutual political and economic desperation. Yet, on the eve of the diplomatic divorce between the governments in 1928, migration still served to make the alliance more convenient but no longer comprised the core of the relationship. Ultimately, migration sparked relations but broader government ambitions evolved as the center of interwar diplomacy.

From the intensification of relations into 1920s, emerge two distinct diplomatic themes which played a pivotal role throughout the interwar era. First, the adoption of legalistic

³ These lessons refer to Japan's witnessing of China's unsuccessful grapple with Western nations, the cruelty of the coolie labor trade, as well as the mistreatment of earlier Japanese labor migrants to Hawaii. Roger Daniels, "Japanese Diaspora in the New World: Its Asian Predecessors and Origins," in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 26, 29-30.

diplomacy into Japanese foreign relations, emerging as a societal phenomenon of the Meiji era, significantly increased their economic and diplomatic influence across the Americas. Newfound diplomatic and economic opportunity after the First World War, permitted the Japanese to pursue legalistic protections of their migrants in Peru, as well as establish new economic and diplomatic operations in the region. After years of corresponding with the Peruvians through the Japanese legation in Chile, the Japanese finally established a legation in Lima in 1921 through which the Japanese heavily pursued migrant rights and protections.⁴ Secondly, as international consciousness and collaboration gained steam across the Pacific region, there emerged a novel recognition of racial distinctions between the region's nations. By the late 1920s, this development impacted the Peruvian-Japanese relationship as influence from the American government to resist racial degeneration fueled the Peruvian government's already declining interest in a Japanese alliance. Consequently, although born from a racist rhetoric, collaboration to resist the Japanese forged another layer of international consciousness among Pacific states. The pursuit of racial distinction and, as we see in Chapter Seven of this thesis, the prospect of an alliance with the United States brought previously less connected governments into what Eiichiro Azuma terms a "hemispheric alliance."⁵ The subsequent hemispheric collaboration, although spurred from racism, greatly encouraged pan-Pacific consciousness of the region. This process illustrates once more how the developments of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy initiated commonalities and collaboration across the region, despite excluding the Japanese in this particular context.

⁴ *Japan Times Advertiser* Article, December 1920, Document 233, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

⁵ Eiichiro Azuma, "Japanese Immigrant Settler Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S. Racial-Imperialist Politics of the Hemispheric 'Yellow Peril,'" *Pacific Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (2014): 275.

This thesis reconciles seemingly distinct diplomatic processes with their social contingencies by revealing the intimate historical duality between the state and its citizens. Examining the broader temporal context of nineteenth century society in Japan and Peru, makes evident that Japanese immigration to Peru emerged as an unintended consequence of seemingly unrelated events. Desperation from both Japanese citizens and Peruvian plantation holders, *hacendados*, encouraged migration to a far greater extent than any special historical relationship between the two governments. Furthermore, once migration and diplomacy gained steam in the 1920s, it is evident that the insularity and relative economic success of Japanese communities on the eve of the Great Depression fostered social animosities, compounding the negative turn of diplomacy between the governments by 1930. Neither a story of just Peru or Japan, the history of Japanese labor migration proves contingent upon, and indeed influenced by, the paths of many nations. Tying together the various aspects of this story that previous scholars fail to fully associate, this thesis reconciles the individual social processes unfolding in Peru and Japan with the Pacific stage of the early twentieth century. Although never previously considered, South American social developments held tremendous influence in the regional diplomacy which forged an international consciousness in the Pacific.

The archival collections at the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Relations comprise the primary source base for this thesis. Particularly applying the archive's Collections 5-18 (correspondence between the Peruvian and Japanese foreign ministries) and 6-18 (correspondence between the Peruvian government and Japanese legation in Lima), this thesis constructs a narrative of interwar diplomacy through analysis of the direct correspondence between Peruvian and Japanese diplomats. These sources prove fundamental for investigating

the striking extent to which surface level diplomatic correspondence reflected the deeper geopolitical movements and ambitions of early twentieth century Pacific governments. Aside from a few, anomalous instances, quotations of these documents in this paper are translated from Spanish to English, with special care given to maintaining the authors' intentions and connotations in the translation process.

II. Imperialism and Expansionism

Fundamental to this story are the distinctions this thesis draws between the applications of imperialism and expansionism. This paper seeks neither to misapply these ideologies nor to present an imperialist or expansionist government in a negative light. Rather, it strives to understand and contextualize the international behavior of the Peruvian and Japanese governments in the age of growing international connection at the turn of the twentieth century. This thesis applies the ideology of imperialism to governments exerting a political or military occupation over a territory previously independent of that government's influence. This ideology accounts for Japanese colonization of Taiwan in the nineteenth century followed by occupations of Korea, Manchuria, and later mainland China in the twentieth century.

Although the Japanese forged empire in East Asia, their international pursuits in Latin America followed a different course. The Japanese furthered economic interests in the Americas and encouraged emigration and foreign settlement, yet pursued these actions without the ultimate desire to exert a military occupation in the region. Consequently, this thesis applies imperialism to define Japanese occupations in East Asia, while referring to their economic and political operations in Latin America as collaborative endeavors. These endeavors spawned from

Japanese legalistic diplomacy and the government's enhanced ability to devote resources to foreign relations after the First World War

This development highlights another distinction between imperialism and the perception of the fear of imperialism. In an era with a growing international resistance to empire in the decline of New Imperialism, the fear of empire spawned significant negative responses throughout the Pacific. For example, the perception of Japanese imperialism in East Asia spread across the Pacific Ocean, producing anti-Japanese imperialist fears and resistance in Latin America. Although Japanese diplomatic action in Latin America carried no hidden, imperialistic bent, South American governments, driven by the interpretation of imperialist fear, nonetheless perceived enhanced Japanese relations in the region as signaling a looming Japanese intent to forge empire in the region. Thus, the distinctions between the conception of the imperialist ideology, and its associated but not necessarily representative manifestation in government discourse, proves fundamental for this history.

Conversely, this paper's application of imperialism is not to overlap or account for the use of expansionism. This thesis defines a government as expansionist when their behavior seeks to exert political or national jurisdiction of a previously independent or foreign territory without military occupation or conquest. Expansionism subsequently applies to the pursuits of the Peruvian government in seeking to reclaim Tacna-Arica from the legal jurisdiction of the Chilean government. Although wielding an insufficient position to exert military force to occupy the territories, the Peruvians conversely sought legal and political leverage, vis-à-vis relations with the Japanese, to expand and restore Peruvian nationality to a region where the Peruvian government held no legal claim. While expansionism still implies a certain level of

political ambition or aggression, the application of the term in this thesis emits the military or occupational standards contingent upon the definition of imperialism.

III. Historiography

Ultimately, this thesis seeks to expand the field of Peruvian-Japanese relations to account for the broad historical themes which comprise the relationship. Although this thesis focuses on diplomacy, this paper additionally considers international, economic, social, and cultural developments. By incorporating a broader analytical scope to the overwhelmingly migration-oriented literature of Peruvian-Japanese history, this thesis seeks to establish a new field of Peruvian-Japanese history incorporating the diverse nature of this history. By tying together the various strains of relevant scholarship, this paper seeks to encourage further studies examining the consequences and contingencies of Peruvian-Japanese history beyond solely migration and migrant communities.

Three categories anchor the historiographical framework of this thesis. The first category considers the literature on Nikkei history, containing two subcategories, that in Spanish, and that in English. The Spanish language scholarship deserves substantial credit for pioneering an academic field of Nikkei history. These sources provided a much needed foundational narrative on the topic, yet contribute little to retrospective historical analysis. Additionally, like their Peruvian counterparts, the English language scholars forged an awareness and inquiry into Nikkei studies while overlooking a broader historical perspective. While this thesis explores beyond the Nikkei past, the vast majority of historical scholarship on the Japanese-Peruvian relationship focuses nearly exclusively on migrants themselves. For this reason, Nikkei studies form a substantial portion of the historiographical framework. This thesis seeks to tie together

the varied approaches of both the English and Spanish language scholars to provide answers to the “how and why” questions that this field so desperately needs answered.

The second set of sources examines the broader context of government and diplomacy in Latin America. This thesis parallels the significant research examining the extent to which the Mexican government manipulated American hegemony to increase Mexican influence in Central America, to the Peruvian government’s success in manipulating diplomacy with Japan to counter Chilean hegemony in the Andes. Comparing early twentieth century Peru to its counterpart in Mexico illuminates the surprisingly strategic behavior of geopolitically obscure governments in Latin America. Furthermore, the diplomatic and internal success of Peru’s government between the world wars owes its origins to the authoritarian politics of Augusto B. Leguía, Peruvian president throughout the 1920s. Through this theoretical scholarship, this thesis demonstrates that Leguía’s success, and that of other parallel cases in the region, in stimulating internal development and forging an international perception of national prestige and modernity, suggests that the political consistency brought by a dictator proves in retrospect a superior alternative to the political instability and violence previously plaguing development in many Latin American states.

The last historiographical category on which this thesis builds, accounts for the broad context of diasporas to the Americas. Considering this broader phenomena enlightens numerous sub-arguments of this study, such as disproving the imperialist intent behind Japanese diasporas, as well as reaffirming the link between social and diplomatic processes. This paper applies the depth of scholarship in this field to supplement the lack of depth in Nikkei historiography, as well as to confirm the supposition of the importance of the interwar period. These sources

provide powerful insight into the factors preceding Japanese immigration to Peru, which justifies this paper's emphasis of the significance of a broader temporal and regional perspective for this thesis.

III. Organization

Eight chapters comprise the structure of this thesis. This first chapter introduces the reader to the subject of this thesis, its main arguments, as well as a basic outline of the historiography upon which this paper builds.

Chapter Two elaborates upon the historiography of this topic and contextualizes this paper's argument within the existing scholarship. This section demonstrates a more refined and complete discussion of the literature discussed previously in this chapter.

Chapter Three analyzes the Japanese social and diplomatic processes preceding migration to Peru. This chapter argues that late nineteenth century social anxieties, economic hardship, and governmental transitions and reforms fostered a perfect storm leading to labor emigration to the Americas. Adversity wrought by Meiji reform encouraged many impoverished Japanese, as well as the state, to abandon their deep tradition of isolation, and resort to emigration to relieve internal pressure. Understanding the desperate origins of migration refutes the contention that Japanese migrated to Peru as a component of a Japanese imperialist endeavor in Latin America. This understanding additionally emphasizes the influence of quotidian social developments in spurring diplomatic behavior.

Exploring Peruvian history in the nineteenth century, Chapter Four analyzes how Peru emerged from Andean submission in the 1880s to Pacific acclaim by 1920s. Numerous boundary disputes and armed conflict with their Andean neighbors provided the Peruvian

government with invaluable experience in diplomacy, subsequently permitting the Peruvians to apply those lessons to relations with the Japanese. Mature actors in the geopolitical context, Peruvian officials manipulated Japan's diplomatic arrival to the fragile peace of South America as a means for individual gain. This assertion challenges the popular contemporary assumption that a special relationship between Japan and Peru instigated diplomacy. Moreover, this section illustrates that, despite spawning out of mutual desperation, the onset of Japanese migration benefited the Peruvians as much as it did the Japanese.

The first section of this paper's central analysis, Chapter Five explores the nature of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy between 1928-1923. This chapter accounts for the hesitant growth of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy in the wake of the First World War. Increased international prestige, economic growth, and the subsequent enhanced ability to attend to diplomacy after 1918, allowed the Japanese to extend their diplomatic branches across Latin America. Conversely, the Peruvians found themselves entrenched in a bitter territorial dispute with the Chileans over the Tacna-Arica plebiscite. A product of the Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), the plebiscite sought to decide the national fate of the territories of Tacna and Arica in 1894. Yet, due to legal ambiguity and mutual embitterment, the plebiscite controversy dragged into the 1920s, forming the Peruvian primary diplomatic concern throughout the decade. As a response, the Peruvians utilized relations with the Japanese to further their quest to reclaim the territories while the Japanese equivalently employed diplomacy with the Peruvians as an avenue for spreading discontent with the United States and League of Nations across the Pacific. This context of political desperation and manipulation makes evident that the governments of Peru and Japan each seized the opportunity to commence relations with

the other as a means to satisfy a hidden, geopolitical ambition. Shattering the notion that these governments commenced relations out of mutual amity, this opening era of interwar diplomacy set the stage for Japanese-Peruvians relations to fundamentally influence Pacific geopolitics on the whole.

Chapter Six addresses the second phase of interwar diplomacy revealing a growing robusticity of relations by 1923 and the establishment diplomatic stasis between 1924 and 1927. Each government utilized this era to foster internal development and modernity, while also pursuing national interests abroad. Aside from consolidating a new treaty with Peru in 1924, the Japanese additionally forged new treaties with Russia and Brazil consequently expanding the Japanese presence in the Pacific. This period additionally witnessed the Peruvians achieve tremendous internal development and cement an international image of geopolitical prestige. However, as this era witnessed the two governments divert interests away from diplomacy with the other, the end of 1927 revealed this diplomatic divergence as detrimental for relations.

Examining the processes of 1928-1930, Chapter Seven analyzes the decline of Peruvian-Japanese relations, exposing the downfall's beginnings with Peruvian limitations on Japanese economic operations in Peru, before furthering legislation directly affecting Japanese migrant communities. The decline of relations originated from a perfect storm of diplomatic difference brewing since the end of the First World War. The Peruvian government interpreted the growing Japanese economic and diplomatic presence across the Pacific as a signal of a looming Japanese intent to forge empire in Peru. Although inaccurate, this fear thrust distinctions in political ideology, spawning from the middle era of relations, to a head in 1928. These process additionally exposes the fundamental role of racial prestige in fueling Peruvian

desires to achieve racial superiority over their Japanese counterparts through subscribing to the “Yellow Peril.” Although excluding the Japanese, the hemispheric racial movement inadvertently encouraged commonality between states in the Americas. Relations additionally collapsed as the associational prestige achieved through an alliance with the United States encouraged Peruvian separation from Japanese relations.

Chapter Eight concludes the thesis with a retrospective analysis of the significance of studying Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy. This chapter examines why 1930 provides a logical stopping point for this thesis and examines what questions this history raises about the broader histories of Latin America and the Pacific region.

Ultimately, these thesis tells the story of how the governments of two non-Western, non-white states, forged a regional community traditionally considered to be only the realm of the United States. The legacy of this narrative looms far beyond the histories of Peru and Japan, but rather illuminates the consequences of diplomacy, migration, and empire for the modern Pacific. Inserting the South American past into the broader narrative of Pacific history demonstrates the fundamental, yet little considered, role played by non-Western states in forging the modern world.

Chapter Two

Historiography

I. Overview

This thesis builds upon a diverse historiographical framework. Due to the overall novelty of scholarship on the Japanese-Peruvian relationship and people, the field is rather fragmented, such that it exists through various, distinct studies rather than as a field which developed in historiographical conversation. Much of the existing research focuses on one particular theme, such as migrant communities, yet fails to reconcile the story of migrant communities with the broader historical processes which both produced and spawned from migration. Additionally, there exists a broad, sociological field examining modern Nikkei communities, which, although informational, aids little in historical analysis.

Consequently, this thesis seeks to distinguish a new historiographical field encapsulating a wider perspective on Japanese-Peruvian history. While the field of Nikkei history is important for highlighting the Japanese experience in Peru, this paper strives to distinguish the Nikkei past from the wider context of Peruvian-Japanese history. This distinct field considers broader historical phenomena, such as diplomacy, geopolitics, economics, and social constructions. While indeed migrant communities comprise an important pillar in Peruvian-Japanese history, this broader perspective additionally considers migration's previously ignored international ramifications in the Pacific region. The history of Peruvian-Japanese relations transcends far beyond labor migration, consequently requiring historians to account for the broader contingencies and consequences of migration within Pacific geopolitics. Thus, the ultimate historiographical contribution of this thesis comes in uniting the various strains of this field,

which may consider one historical aspect while omitting another, to forge a novel consciousness of the broader consequences of Peruvian-Japanese history. Linking these scholarly strains exposes a more holistic perspective on the influence of diplomacy between non-Western states in forging the modern world.

Three categories comprise the historiographical framework of this thesis. The first category considers previous scholarship on Japanese labor migration to Peru. Focusing primarily on Nikkei communities and history, these sources expose the fundamental for exploration of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy in the 1920s. This is so because all previous studies have approached Peruvian-Japanese relations through the perspective of migration. There exists no research specifically examining diplomacy in light of the nineteenth century political, social, and economic factors stimulating Japanese migration to the Americas. This paper unites these distinct approaches in previous studies to consider a plethora of relevant themes. This thesis divides this category into English and Spanish language sources to account for a difference in approach, as well as distinctions in sources. The second historiographical category concerns a broader discussion of government and diplomacy in Latin American history. This thesis applies and expands upon several significant studies on Mexico in the twentieth century, to understand how Peru grew from obscurity to importance in the Pacific within a few short decades in the early twentieth century. Exploration into early twentieth century Mexican history fits perfectly as a comparative example, as the Mexican government too, rose from political struggle to geopolitical competency through diplomatic manipulation of their neighbors. This theme further illustrates the largely ignored strength of seemingly diplomatically inferior governments in international discourse. The third and last category of scholarship on which this thesis builds,

considers another broad phenomena in Japanese diasporas across the Americas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Considering this field supports several of this paper's sub-arguments, such as the refutation that Japanese labor migration to Peru carried a secret imperialist ambition

I. Japanese-Peruvian/Nikkei Context

Although this thesis assumes primarily a diplomatic perspective, we must still consider the social field of Nikkei historiography as a vital discourse for contextualizing diplomacy in the wake of migration and social processes.

The Spanish-language historiography on Peruvian Nikkei history serves a good starting place for understanding this field. Conforming to the Latin American model of scholarship, these historians draw from theory but refrain from contributing a new argument to the historiographical conversation, consequently voiding this field of contrasting debates. The leading scholars in this field are Amelia Morimoto and Isabelle Lausent-Herrera.

Providing some of this first and most influential research into the histories of Japanese migration to Peru, Morimoto's publications remain extremely influential for the field today as the vast majority of studies rely heavily on Morimoto's narrative. Although many of Morimoto's studies are primarily hagiographical, by providing a foundational narrative Morimoto instigated further historical research on the topic. For example, basic figures such as the number of immigrants arriving annually as well as the names of the main players in the process, reveal Morimoto's publications as more data-driven than analytical. While this information provides a basic narrative, these publications prove unhelpful to broader analysis. However, Morimoto

devoted countless hours to the archives in order to provide this platform on which future studies rely heavily.

Another leading Nikkei scholar, Lausent-Herrera focuses primarily on contemporary Nikkei studies. She examines the female role in Nikkei communities, as well as modern Chinese-Peruvians. Overall, Lausent-Herrera's contributions aid in contemporary analysis yet offer little beyond a basic narrative for early Japanese migration. Yet, the scholarly contributions of Lausent-Herrera, and additionally Morimoto, reveal how the pioneers of the Japanese-Peruvian past rely on primary sources. These scholars cite documents from the Peruvian foreign ministry, yet this thesis applies an alternative diplomatic perspective to these primary sources to reach beyond a chronological narrative in understanding the international consequences of labor migration.

That none of these scholars examine nineteenth century social processes as the precursor to Peruvian-Japanese history in the twentieth century, substantially drove the direction of this thesis to examine the late nineteenth century through the 1920s. Each scholar provides a summary of the fundamental events of early migration yet fail to connect the dots of this history. For example, Japanese migrated to Peru after nineteenth century laws prohibited both the Chinese labor trade and African slave labor. Additionally, the exclusion of Japanese migrants from the United States forced the Japanese government to look to Latin America to relieve increased population growth. These processes propelled the Japanese into desperation, forcing the government to seek labor migration to alleviate internal pressures. Equivalently, the desperation faced by the severe Peruvian need for labor led the two governments with no previous geopolitical relevance to consolidate an alliance founded on migration. While the

aforementioned scholars casually mention these events, the authors fail to link the intimate connection and diplomatic contingency of these developments to the wider past of the Pacific region. This thesis illuminates the international consequences of these preceding factors, their culmination in the arrival of Issei immigrants by 1899, and the subsequent Pacific diplomatic narrative of the 1920s. By grounding the origins of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy in international factors and desperation, this paper challenges the popular Peruvian assumption that Japanese migrated to due to special relationship between the two nations.

The English-language historiography, while pioneering and informational, additionally suffers from a lack of depth and analysis. Because these scholars face the challenge of simply establishing a field, their theses remain relatively short sighted. However, C. Harvey Gardiner's publications in the 1970s deserve significant credit for producing the first substantial academic histories of Peru's Nikkei in English. Gardiner's ground-breaking publications acknowledge migration in the context of diplomacy, yet fail to address migration's global origins. Gardiner additionally devotes substantially more focus to Japanese deportation during the Second World War and the post-war reconstruction of the Nikkei community, rather than the prewar period. The broader perspective assumed in this paper demonstrates that the legacy of migration looms far beyond the basic narrative of Japanese on the ground. Thus, Gardiner helped establish this field in English by contributing a more retrospective history, yet overlooks the significance of the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries.

Additionally, modern scholars of Nikkei history, the research of Daniel Masterson and Roger Daniels, focus on Japanese communities across Latin America, with special attention to Peru and Brazil. Masterson emphasizes the social undercurrents in Japan leading to emigration.

His studies provide a wealth of information on the topic and drew attention to the importance of the nineteenth century in the history of Japanese involvement in Latin America. Masterson's research, and additionally that of Roger Daniels concerning the Chinese coolie labor trade and earlier Japanese migrations, attribute the active approach towards diplomacy assumed by interwar Japan as the culmination of significant lessons learned from witnessing China's unsuccessful grapple with foreign nations. This realization evolves as a central theme for this thesis as witnessing Chinese international failures stimulated Japanese legalistic diplomacy. With a tradition of fierce isolation, it is quite remarkable that many impoverished Japanese turned to emigration as a response to the social and economic hardships wrought by the Meiji reforms. Daniels additionally attributes the origins of this transformation to the lessons Japan's government learned from witnessing China's unsuccessful interactions with the West. From the cruelty and sufferings of the coolie labor trade to the embarrassment in the Opium Wars and unequal treaties, the Japanese sought a superior fate by conceding certain concessions in diplomacy and international trade to the West.⁶ Ultimately seeking to oversee migration and diplomacy on their own terms, the Peruvians misinterpreted the legalistic origins of these actions as the manifestations of imperialist ambition.⁷

II. Government and Diplomacy Context

As a diplomatic history, this thesis expands upon on previous studies of government and diplomatic theory, specifically focusing on Latin America. This paper is particularly influenced

⁶ Roger Daniels, "Japanese Diaspora in the New World: Its Asian Predecessors and Origins," in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 26, 29-30.

⁷ Jonathan Dresner, "Instructions to Emigrant Laborers, 1885-94: 'Return in Triumph' or 'Wander on the Verge of Starvation,'" in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 52, 54.

by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al, who suggest that the *selectorate*, “a set of people with a say in choosing leaders and with a prospect of gaining access to special privileges doled out by leaders,” contribute fundamentally to the governmental process and diplomatic behavior.⁸ This theoretical approach emerges in this thesis by presenting the Peruvian economic elite, as well as common Peruvian citizens as the *selectorate* in Leguía’s Peru. Despite the contradiction in applying historical agency in Peruvian government to both commoners and elite, this paper argues that historical changes on the ground fundamentally impacted the diplomatic approaches by the Peruvian government throughout the 1920s. As we see in Chapter Seven of this thesis, Peruvian elites held a dramatic and hypocritical influence in swaying the Peruvian working class against Japanese migrants, through blaming migrants for economic hardships wrought by corruption by these economic elites.⁹ Simultaneously, once social sentiment overwhelmingly incriminated Japanese migrants for economic competition, which in actuality emerged as products of the Great Depression, pressure from common Peruvian citizens both influenced, and provided further justification for the Peruvian government’s decision to further anti-Japanese legislation by the end of the 1920s.

Furthermore, this thesis contends that Latin American governments with seemingly little geopolitical influence, conversely brandished significant power in twentieth century Latin America. Friedrich E. Schuler’s research on Mexico provides a contextual platform for this contention on Peruvian diplomacy: “Mexican diplomats told foreigners what they wanted to hear. At the same time, they stayed focused on their long-term objectives and used

⁸ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2003), xi.

⁹ Daniel M. Masterson with Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 66.

opportunities...to their advantage.”¹⁰ In the same vein, Jürgen Buchenau, in his investigation of Mexican-Central American diplomacy in the early twentieth century, defined Mexico in relation to the United States as existing in “the shadow of a giant.” Through this approach, Buchenau argued that the Mexican government manipulated the American branding of Mexico as the model of democracy in Latin America in order to further a Mexican agenda in Central America. This diplomatic maneuvering simultaneously countered American hegemony in the continent. Through these means, the Mexicans expanded their political influence from a much weaker position relative to the United States.¹¹ Buchenau additionally examined how the Mexican government manipulated their relationship to the Americans in order to settle a border dispute with Guatemala without losing Mexican sovereignty.¹² This process clearly echoes the Peruvian drive to manipulate Japanese relations to favorably settle the Tacna-Arica plebiscite. In a similar argument, Jerry García employed the term “diplomatic weapons of the weak” to define how Porfirio Díaz (Mexican president 1876-1910) sought Japanese labor migrants in order to develop the Mexican economy, despite Mexico’s weaker position to the United States.¹³ Although Leguía’s ambitions in seeking Japanese labor paralleled Díaz’s in Mexico, this thesis exposes the novel perception that Peru wielded a relatively much more powerful position than Mexico during the *Porfiriato*. These regional parallels reveal diplomacy as a vital avenue for understanding how governments manipulated geopolitics to stimulate internal development. The Mexican

¹⁰ Friedrich Schuler, *Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 1-2.

¹¹ Jürgen Buchenau, *In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central America Policy, 1876-1930* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996), 3.

¹² Buchenau, *In the Shadow of the Giant*, 16, 21.

¹³ Jerry García, *Looking Like the Enemy: Japanese Mexicans, the Mexican State, and US Hegemony* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2014), 5, 10.

search for Japanese labor echoes the Peruvian approach in manipulating their Japanese counterpart to counter Chilean hegemony in Andes in the early 1920s.

Bolstering the Peruvian diplomatic reputation in South America, achieved through relations with the Japanese, permitted the Peruvians to devote substantial resources to industrialization and internal development which in turn brought modernization. This understanding exposes one of the explanations for how Peru, within a few short years in the 1920s, emerged from obscurity to prominence in the Pacific through an alliance with Japan. Japanese affinity helped mobilize Peruvian action resisting the Chileans, however, once the plebiscite controversy developed favorably, and as the Peruvian government came into their own diplomatically, the Peruvians no longer needed to rely so heavily on an alliance with the Japanese.

III. Japanese Diasporas Context

The third field of historiography upon which this thesis builds concerns the broader theme of Japanese diasporas to the Americas. Particularly important are Nobuko Adachi's theories on the phases assumed by Japanese migrations. Adachi argues that Japanese migrations to Latin America began with what she terms as "incipient/labor diasporas." She contends that these initial generations experienced a period of calm and mutual benefit with their host nations before the occurrence of the "displaced diaspora," defining the era of Latin American nations deporting many of their Japanese residents.¹⁴ Ultimately, Adachi's research provides an avenue to contextualize Japanese migration to Peru within the phenomenon of Japanese diasporas across the Americas. This paper applies and expands upon this perspective, illustrating that Japanese

¹⁴ Nobuko Adachi, "Introduction," in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1-22.

migration to Peru, as the opening manifestation of a much larger global phenomenon, allowed the Japanese to commence relations with numerous South American governments. Migration discourse evolved into diplomacy which proved fundamental for Pacific history in the twentieth century.

Another primary influence in this field is Toake Endoh. Earning a controversial reception, Endoh's research argues for the unorthodoxy of Japanese migration to South America as migrants left a developing Meiji economy for inferior economies in South America. Endoh additionally states that Japanese migrant laborers carried a defined sense of Japanese nationhood, intending to bolster Japan's image abroad. Furthermore, he draws the parallel of emigration to Latin American with that to Japanese colonies in Asia to argue the imperialist intent behind migration to the Americas.

This thesis directly challenges Endoh's primary assertions. First, Endoh's insistence upon the inferiority of South American economies in the waning decades of the nineteenth century proves incorrect as Peru's robust international economy exported high quantities of guano, cotton, sugar, and other nitrates across the Americas and Europe. In contrast, the Meiji economy struggled heavily due to an unprecedented population boom, lack of resources, unemployment, and subsequent high inflation.¹⁵ Furthermore, Endoh mistakenly argues for a national Japanese imperialist agenda embedded in migration to the Americas. Endoh asserts: "This colonist model [referring to Japanese colonization of Hokkaido] would later be deployed in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria...the same expansionist ambition would also be applied toward

¹⁵ James Stanlaw, "Japanese Emigration and Immigration: From the Meiji to the Modern," in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 38-41.

Latin American soil.”¹⁶ The following chapter of this thesis directly invalidates this argument by emphasizing that social anxieties wrought by the Meiji Restoration, a striking population boom, as well as the introduction of Western influence to Japan, fostered a perfect storm leading many impoverished Japanese to consider migrating for work. Thus, migrating for temporary labor to Peru presented an alternative, a desperate alternative albeit, to the hardships of Meiji Japan, rather than a nationalist mission to spread Japanese influence. As we see in the coming chapters, the increased role of the state in migration policy occurred two decades after the initial migrations, as did the overall reinvigorated role of the state in foreign affairs. Migration even remained a semi-private enterprise until the 1920s.¹⁷ This development evolved as the product of learned lessons rather than an imperialist agenda, thus refuting Endoh’s argument of Japanese imperialism in South America.

This discussion emphasizes the importance of analyzing both diplomacy and social developments in this period. This thesis attributes the significance of migration to kickstarting diplomatic relations, yet also vital is understanding the social developments that manifested in the international relations between the governments of Japan and Peru. Endoh assumes a historical perspective, however misinterprets the duality of the social and the diplomatic, leading to false conclusions.

Fundamental to this history, scholars must consider the role of racial difference in generating diplomatic processes. Eiichiro Azuma explores the influence of the American government in spreading a hemispheric “Yellow Peril” by exploiting political influence to resist Japanese operations in the Americas. Azuma suggests that once the Japanese gained a sizeable

¹⁶ Toake Endoh, *Exporting Japan: Politics of Immigration in Latin America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 61.

¹⁷ Endoh, *Exporting Japan*, 59.

influence in “America’s ‘backyard,’” referring to Latin America, the American government refreshed “its commitment to the time-honored Monroe Doctrine shifting main attention away from traditional European rivals to the Japanese racial enemy.”¹⁸ This thesis applies this process directly to the Peruvian context by exploring how the Peruvian government abandoned focus on their traditional competitors in Chile and Bolivia, to counter Japanese influence in South America. As discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis, the Japanese treaty with Brazil created significant new agro-economic opportunities for the Japanese, as well as the permission to expand settlement in the South American state. Vaulting Japanese influence into Peru’s backyard, the action further encouraged the Peruvian government’s enactment of anti-Japanese legislation. By subscribing to the “Yellow Peril,” the Peruvians claimed racial superiority over the Japanese while simultaneously maintaining strong relations with the United States by conforming to their racist diplomatic model. As non-Western, non-white states, both the Peruvians and Japanese found themselves racing for the elusive title of second best amid the American monopoly on international and racial prestige. As we see in the coming chapters, employing a racial rhetoric to gain an upper hand in Pacific geopolitics evolved into a central theme of Peruvian-Japanese interwar diplomacy.

¹⁸ Eiichiro Azuma, “Japanese Immigrant Settler Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S. Racial-Imperialist Politics of the Hemispheric ‘Yellow Peril,’” *Pacific Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (2014): 256.

Chapter Three

The Perfect Storm: Origins of Japanese Labor Migration to Peru

I. Introduction

The more one considers nineteenth century Japan, the more remarkable it is that a nation with a deep tradition of self-imposed isolation resorted to emigration to resolve internal pressure. Especially migration to a region with previously no geopolitical relevance to Japan. This chapter analyzes the Japanese social, economic, and political factors preceding emigration to Peru. Further examination makes evident that late nineteenth century social anxieties, political transitions, and economic hardship, essentially fostered a perfect storm culminating in the inception of Japanese labor migration to South America.

Understanding migration within the perfect storm of Meiji Japan is vital for several reasons. First, this approach validates the unfolding processes of nineteenth century for understanding Japanese and Peruvian relations in the twentieth century. Despite including the nineteenth century as part of their narrative of Japanese migration, the majority of scholars of this field fail to reconcile these processes with their twentieth century international consequences. Secondly, paralleling twentieth century developments with the nineteenth century origins reveals the historical duality of social and diplomatic developments for this story. That political transitions paired with social anxieties on the ground to foster an environment conducive to labor emigration, illustrates the intimate connection of political and social processes embedded within Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy. Furthermore, conceptualizing the perfect storm of the nineteenth century provides insight into the distinct motivations of both the state *and* Japanese individuals. This reality refutes the argument that labor migration to Peru

carried a hidden imperialist design. And lastly, we must consider the broader theme of Japanese diasporas across the Americas, as Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy emerged as both a product and a driver of labor migration.

Ultimately, this chapter attributes the origins of migration to social anxieties wrought from an abrupt introduction to Western influences, overpopulation and lack of employment opportunities, severe economic hardship, and an overall sense that the Japanese government ignored its people. This larger scale understanding of the nineteenth century exposes a flaw and an irony in the fear of Japanese imperialism capitalized on by numerous Pacific nations to resist Japanese migration and influence. Emphasizing the duality of internal and international aspects of this history, this context contributes to our understanding of the roles played by diplomacy, empire, and migration in forging the Pacific world.

II. Anxieties of Meiji Reforms

Returning Japan to direct imperial rule, the radically reformist Meiji Restoration of 1868 highlighted new distinctions between old and new in Japanese society, propelling Japan into direct social and cultural engagement with Western influences. Unprepared to handle the question of who could partake in Western practices, and how such influences affected the people, the transformations fostered deep anxieties among the Japanese populace. For example, the period replaced the importance of the village unit with a novel national emphasis achieved through urbanization.¹⁹ Moreover, donning Western attire emerged as a symbol of status in Meiji Japan, as wealth allowed one to pursue and attain Western materials. This process marked another layer of distinction between commoners and elite, compounding the already distinct

¹⁹ Daniel M. Masterson with Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 6.

class structure of pre-Meiji Japan. Where previously practicing traditional Japanese culture marked an individual with status, the Meiji era saw traditional culture downgraded to inferiority.

These social changes plugged into the political as the Japanese government modeled their leadership to emulate Western models of rule. Meiji leaders labeled the Charter Oath of 1868 as a constitution, a substantially Western phenomenon. The Charter Oath even promoted Western models of learning as a means to strengthen the state. Other examples included the extent to which the “Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors,” as well as the “Rescript on Education,” aspired to model the Western system for fostering state consciousness.

Economic transformations and hardships additionally fostered anxieties in Japanese society. After centuries of population stagnation, the Meiji era witnessed Japan’s population explode beyond a size for which the Japanese government could provide food and employment. With a population remaining at approximately 30 million from the mid-seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, the year 1892 witnessed the population rise to approximately 41 million, before reaching approximately 52 million by 1912.²⁰ Tremendous population growth dramatically inflated the Japanese economy, pushing new economic reforms, much to the chagrin of many impoverished citizens. Land economics transformed with the end of Tokugawa feudalism, and subsequent new land taxes forced many Japanese commoners off of their land.²¹ Another example came with The Education Ordinance of 1872. Legally mandating education, this new requirement added yet another layer of financial burden on poor Japanese suffering insufficient resources for their children’s education.²² The Japanese government additionally

²⁰ James Stanlaw, “Japanese Emigration and Immigration: From the Meiji to the Modern,” in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 40.

²¹ Stanlaw, “Japanese Emigration and Immigration: From the Meiji to the Modern,” 38.

²² Masterson and Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 8.

followed the Western model and adopted the gold standard, embracing a new system of currency unfamiliar to the Japanese. These transformations fueled a growing fire of discontent among many impoverished Japanese compounded by hunger-infused rice riots, natural disasters, and enforcement of mandatory conscription.²³

Examination of these processes is important for constructing the virtual perfect storm of Meiji society which pushed impoverished Japanese citizens with a deep sense of nationhood and insularity, to consider migration to a culturally and geographically distant region in South America. Where previously Japanese society emphasized prioritizing community, anxieties over the introduction of Western ideals and economic hardships forged new individualist ideologies such as *risshin susse*.²⁴ Translated as: “making one’s way in the world,” the spreading mentality fostered a social environment which enhanced the draw of labor migration, as well as reflected the consequences of Meiji reform on working class Japanese.²⁵ Through both pushing commoners away from Japan, and luring them to the promise of higher wages in Peru, the anxieties of the Meiji period cultivated an environment in which migration appeared an attractive alternative to lack of employment, low wages, and social anxiety in Japan.

These hardships consequently gave way to a sense of neglect by the Japanese populace at the hands of the government.²⁶ As peasants witnessed their situations deteriorate, impoverished Japanese responded to the Education Ordinance of 1872 with “violent resistance, the Popular

²³ *Ibid.*, 44, 41, 39.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Harumi Befu, “Globalization as Human Dispersal: Nikkei in the World,” in *New Worlds, New Lives: Globalization and People of Japanese Descent in the Americas and from Latin America to Japan*, ed. Lane Ryo Hirabayashi, Akemi Kikumura-Yano, and James. A. Hirabayashi (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 11.

Rights Movement and temporary emigration.”²⁷ Simultaneously noting the promise of higher wages and employment in Latin America, difficulties posed by the Meiji economy became accentuated when compared to the attractive and prosperous Peruvian economy. This distinction both refutes the notions of previous scholars, such as Endoh Toake, who asserts that Japanese migrated to inferior economies in South America, while also emphasizing the opportunities provided by migration to Peru. These processes reveal that the anxieties of Meiji Japan escalated into a perfect storm, leading to the arrival of *Issei* immigrants to Peru in 1899.²⁸

III. The Age of Global Japanese Diasporas

Japanese migration to Peru represented a pivotal component of the age of global Japanese diasporas. The waning decades of the nineteenth, and opening decades of the twentieth centuries, saw thousands of Japanese migrate across the Americas, arriving in dense numbers to Latin America.²⁹ Nobuko Adachi’s examination of Japanese migration as an international phenomena relates to this thesis for demonstrating the difficult realities of migrant life, as well as for revealing the desperate nature of Japanese migration to Peru. Adachi terms the opening waves of Japanese migrants to a region, as part of an “incipient diaspora.” These first generations sought temporary foreign residence for labor, with the ultimate intention of returning to Japan. Adachi notes the complexity of the ambiguity in defining these early migrations: “[incipient migrants] should not be considered immigrants since they were not allowed to remain in their host country and they could be forced by the government to leave at any time...They lived in a state of legal

²⁷ Masterson and Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁹ Roger Daniels, “Japanese Diaspora in the New World: Its Asian Predecessors and Origins,” in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 31.

and political subordination, economic insecurity, and social marginalization.”³⁰ This statement exposes the hardships experienced by many Japanese migrants, further emphasizing that Japanese only turned to migration out of desperation. Hardships in Peru must still have outweighed life in Meiji Japan, considering migration as an unnatural behavior for a nation with a longstanding tradition of isolation.

Understanding desperation as a pillar of Japanese migration to Peru, further refutes any argument for Japanese migrants as the physical indicators of an ultimate threat of Japanese empire in Latin America. The research of Endoh Toake epitomizes this scholarly fallacy: “This colonist model [referring to colonization of Hokkaido] would later be deployed in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria...the same expansionist ambition would also be applied toward Latin American soil.”³¹ Yet, as emphasized earlier in this chapter, many impoverished Japanese citizens felt victimized by Meiji reforms, producing direct resistance and sentiments of neglect by the state. It appears very unlikely that hungry Japanese citizens struggling for economic footholds, angry with their government, and seeking migration for a temporary period, secretly formed the basis of an imperialist ambition from the Japanese government. Even in the context of the government itself, permitting labor migration to nations such as Peru, a nation with no previous geopolitical relevance to Japan, reflected that the government too found itself in a situation desperately seeking to resolve pressures of overpopulation, unemployment, and lack of food. South America additionally emerged as a center for Japanese migration partly because of exclusion from other potential destinations such as the United States.³² Understanding the

³⁰ Nobuko Adachi, “Introduction,” in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 7-8.

³¹ Toake Endoh, *Exporting Japan: Politics of Immigration in Latin America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 61.

³² Daniels, “Japanese Diaspora in the New World: Its Asian Predecessors and Origins,” 32.

nineteenth century origins of Japanese migration illuminates the flaw of many Pacific governments in the twentieth century in applying fear of Japanese empire as justification for diplomatic action against the Japanese.

On another note, the Japanese government's role in migration to Peru evolved as a product of lessons learned from witnessing the course of previous Asian migrations to the region. Firstly, the Japanese government learned sobering lessons from the slave-like treatment experienced by initial generations of Japanese laborers sent to Hawaii, consequently stimulating the encouragement of the Japanese government for migration companies to enforce strict contracts for labor migrants.³³ Second, and more importantly, the Japanese government learned deep lessons from witnessing China's unsuccessful migratory endeavors and failed grapple with Western nations. With the global exposure of the sufferings of the coolie labor trade, the global trade of low-status Chinese laborers,³⁴ the Japanese government witnessed the extent to which poor treatment of Chinese migrants in the Pacific simultaneously weakened the international conception and prestige of a Chinese government reeling after military defeat.³⁵ As a government seeking an equal recognition with its Western counterparts, the Japanese desired to avoid what they perceived as mistakes of the Chinese government, such as engaging Western nations in war.³⁶

The Japanese government consequently applied these lessons as a means of protecting Japanese prestige across the Pacific, an objective the Chinese government failed to see through.³⁷ Even in 1902, long before the Japanese government truly invested itself in diplomacy with its

³³ Endoh, *Exporting Japan*, 60.

³⁴ Masterson and Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 20.

³⁵ Daniels, "Japanese Diaspora in the New World: Its Asian Predecessors and Origins," 26-29.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

Peruvian counterpart, the Japanese demonstrated interest in applying diplomacy as a means to protect migrants. A Japanese diplomat wrote in 1902 to the Peruvian foreign minister: “In light of the numerous Japanese subjects who reside in Peru, as well as the growing activity in relations between Japan and your Republic, my government desires to [further diplomatic relations].”³⁸ Thus, the origins of a Japanese legalistic concern for nationals abroad, and the pursuit of protecting migrants as a means of avoiding damage to the Japanese international reputation, while only emerging in the late nineteenth century, commenced from lessons learned from other Asian migrations in the Pacific, as opposed to an ambition to exert a political influence in foreign territories.

IV. The First Generations of Japanese Migrants in Peru

Despite the temporary intention of the first *Issei* generation of migrants, Japanese communities conversely cultivated permanent residences in Peru in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Longer residence in Peru expanded when the initial contract structure for migration gave way to a free labor system, and many families of migrant workers traveled to reconcile with their loved ones in Peru.³⁹ However, the sprouting of migrant communities, came hand in hand with increased hardship. For example, many Japanese sought a return to Japan, yet found themselves unable to purchase a return voyage.⁴⁰ Furthermore, due to social marginalization and the insular tradition of Japanese communities, migrants in Peru established “nations within nations,” as migrant communities operated within and for themselves.⁴¹ These

³⁸ Amaro Sato, Japanese Ambassador to Peru, Letter to Peruvian Foreign Minister, April 2 1902, Document Not Numbered, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

³⁹ C. Harvey Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), 27.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁴¹ Masterson and Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, xii.

communities established Japanese language periodicals, such as *Andeseu Jiho* (Andean Times), formed communal organizations such as the Central Japanese Association,⁴² and even created schools only for children of Japanese migrants.⁴³ These communities received a constant influx of migrants as Japanese emigration companies notoriously recruited Japanese to migrate to Peru by advertising letters spreading positive notions of migrant life from previous emigrants. Many Japanese migrants became fooled by the false advertising after discovering the challenges posed by life in Peru, yet found themselves forced to remain in South America without the necessary resources to fund a return voyage.⁴⁴ Although unintentional, many Japanese migrants formed permanent residences in Peru, eventually forming a pillar of the Peruvian government's concern of an impending Japanese imperialism in Peru.

V. Conclusion

The year 1912 saw the Meiji era come to as close with the establishment of Taisho Democracy, ushering in a new era of Japanese engagement with Western powers. As the Japanese government achieved dramatic strides in placing Japan among the ranks of the Western elite, the government applied extra resources to pursue the diplomatic aspirations mentioned in this chapter. The subsequent diplomacy, as we see in the coming chapters, forged an international consciousness across the Pacific, creating new foundations for alliances and avenues for communication throughout the region.

Understanding how political transformations compounded social anxieties and economic hardships, reveals that the reformist essence of Meiji society produced in Japan a perfect storm,

⁴² *Ibid.*, 67-68.

⁴³ Daniel M. Masterson, "The Japanese of Peru: The First-Century Experience and Beyond," in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 149.

⁴⁴ Masterson and Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 36, 59.

encouraging certain sectors of the populace to abandon an insular Japanese tradition for the superior individual prospect of temporary labor in Peru. Through this perspective, this chapter shatters the misconception that Japanese labor migration to Peru carried a secret imperialist ambition. This reality is fundamental for understanding the entirety of this thesis, as inaccurate perceptions of Japanese empire eventually fueled anti-Japanese racial rhetoric across the Pacific world.

Despite the absence of an expansionist ambition in South America, the Japanese government in nineteenth century indeed exhibited the origins of numerous behaviors which proved fundamental for the interwar period. The emergence of legalistic diplomacy and concern for contract labor in order to avoid the misfortunes faced by coolie laborers, exposes the origins of a relentless Japanese legalism which took root in the 1920s. As we see later in this thesis, Japanese legalism forged international collaboration across the Pacific in the 1920s while simultaneously confirming Peruvian fears of Japanese imperialism in South America. Through this legalistic approach, the Japanese began expressing a concern for their migrants abroad, despite the fact that the government found themselves in an insufficient position to truly do so until after the First World War. Examination of the Meiji era exposes this concern to be the product of the Japanese government's witnessing of China's surrender and defeat by the West, subsequently linking historical consciousness with diplomatic action.

Ultimately, this chapter analyzes why a government after centuries of self-imposed isolation, and a populace with a culture of insularity and prioritization of the community, resorted to emigration to the distant region of Peru as a means for alleviating domestic pressures. This realization illustrates migration as the initial spark commencing Peruvian-Japanese

diplomacy. Sharing a history of migration and because Peruvian plantation owners sought Japanese migrants, the opportunity of mutual benefit brought the Japanese and Peruvian governments into a substantial diplomatic relationship in 1918. While understanding and contextualizing migration in the nineteenth century is fundamental for this history, the following chapters reveal how migration served only to make a potential alliance of desperation more convenient.

Chapter Four

Peru and South America in the Nineteenth Century

I. Introduction

Typical of most Latin American independence movements, Peruvian independence unraveled extremely rapidly in 1821. Once a central colonial stronghold of the Spanish Empire, Peruvian independence emerged largely from the roles of outside individuals in Simon Bolívar and San Jose Martín. Consequently, Peruvian leaders found themselves unprepared and unaware of how to legitimize a central government. Without a materialized direction for the state, post-independence Peru experienced debilitating political turbulence, economic hardship, and social unrest. These calamities bottomed out with the defeat to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), as the Peruvians ceded the territories of Tacna-Arica and became submitted to the political hegemony of their neighbor and rival.⁴⁵

Yet, despite these difficulties, Peru emerged by 1920 as a nation of strong political, diplomatic, and economic influence in South America. Championing an emerging economy founded on plantation agriculture, Peru achieved an economic and political trajectory unprecedented to the nation's history. This chapter analyzes how the Peruvians achieved this recovery, arguing that a history of fierce rivalries with their South American neighbors provided the Peruvian government with a dense knowledge of diplomatic relations. Later applying this experience to relations with the Japanese in the 1920s, the Peruvians manipulated diplomacy to further a geopolitical agenda in South America.

⁴⁵ C. Harvey Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), 43.

Examination of nineteenth century Peru further demonstrates that, despite consolidating an alliance with the Japanese out of desperation, Japanese labor migration benefited Peruvian agro-economies as much as it relieved Japanese domestic pressures. This understanding emphasizes the importance of tracing the origins of migration in order to understand why the Peruvian government permitted and promoted Japanese labor. This perspective reveals that the intimate connection of the social and diplomatic formed as substantial a foundation for the individual Peruvian diplomatic agenda as it did for Japanese-Peruvian relations on the whole.

Overall, this approach shatters the popular dominant assumption expressed by Peruvians and Nikkei communities today, suggesting that Japanese migrated to Peru as the product of a special or allied relationship between the nations. Rather, migration proved only the opening stage of an accidental relationship which blossomed into a fundamental development for Pacific diplomatic history.

II. Peru and South America in the Nineteenth Century

Like many of its Latin American counterparts, early post-independence Peruvian governments suffered the substantial growing pains of forging nationhood. As the last colonial stronghold of the old Spanish Empire to gain independence in 1821, Peru enjoyed no tradition or platform on which to build a state. With rulers unable to institutionalize or legitimize a government, and accompanied by an ambiguous concept of nationhood among the populace, Peru succumbed to the tumultuous Latin American tradition of *caudillos*, military rulers who consolidated power through and for themselves, as opposed to an institution. As the obstacles to

a healthy, legitimate nationhood mounted, the Peruvian economy suffered the consequences with little trade activity and little formidable industrial development.⁴⁶

As former Spanish colonies in South America achieved independence, there emerged the need to define national territories. Under the Spanish system, particular regions served as colonial strongholds, such as Lima and Santiago. There existed no need to strictly define or enforce precise boundaries or territories for these regions as they all resided under Spanish colonial rule. Consequently, South American states agreed upon the reigning ideology of *uti possidetis*, mandating that newly independent states approximately retain their “colonial demarcations at the time of independence.”⁴⁷ However, this agreement collapsed into conflict once Andean governments discovered the rich resources and potential economic opportunities residing in many of these formerly nationally ambiguous regions. Disregard gave way to numerous boundary disputes, as governments aggressively pursued territorial jurisdiction. The contestation over territories in the Andes ultimately paved the way for the War of the Pacific in 1879.⁴⁸

Tensions emerged as the governments of Peru and Bolivia, traditionally friendly and united under the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, butted heads with a Chilean government who recently learned of the potential wealth of resources in the Chilean Northern frontier. Where previously, the Chileans held little interests in the region, they discovered the massive deposits of and potential exportation of guano,⁴⁹ an industry on which the Peruvian government found

⁴⁶ Daniel Masterson, *The History of Peru* (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 2009), 68, 72-73.

⁴⁷ William E. Skuban, *Lines in the Sand: Nationalism and Identity on the Peruvian-Chilean Frontier* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 4.

⁴⁸ Skuban, *Lines in the Sand*, 3.

⁴⁹ A type of bird dropping used as fertilizer.

increasing success and dependence in the mid-nineteenth century.⁵⁰ As the three governments began probing and seeking to exploit these territorial “grey areas” in the Atacama Desert, the Chileans countered with war, ultimately overthrowing the Peruvian *caudillo* Andrés de Santa Cruz, putting an end to the Peru-Bolivia Confederation in 1839. With a superior military position, the Chileans found themselves in a position of power in the Andes, simultaneously fostering animosity from the other states in the region. The subsequent Mutual Benefits Treaty of 1866 further established boundaries in the Andes, granting to Chile the rights of the aforementioned Northern frontier with Bolivia. In this region, the Chileans additionally discovered massive deposits of sodium nitrate, another mineral which held a bottomless export demand by industrializing nations in Europe and the United States.⁵¹

While already in a position of inferiority to the Chilean government, tensions with the Peruvians boiled as the potential of Peruvian export economies diminished. Although Peru enjoyed a booming nitrate industry operating out of the province of Tarapacá, a southern region of Peru, the enterprise unfortunately saw its guano supply nearly drained by the 1870s.⁵² This economic decline proved fundamental for the Peruvian national economy as well as for Peruvian elites. As Gregory T. Cushman suggests: “the history of guano and the Pacific World has been intimately tied to the rise of professional scientists, engineers, physicians, economists, and other experts to positions of political authority.”⁵³ Consequently, elite Peruvian investors held a drastic stake in the guano economy as a threat to the industry’s successes subsequently threatened their individual gain. As we see in the coming paragraphs, the connection between

⁵⁰ Skuban, *Lines in the Sand*, 6-7.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 6-8.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵³ Gregory T. Cushman, *Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World: A Global Ecological History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 18.

elites and the guano economy held drastic consequences for the onset of Japanese migration, as it was such Peruvian elites and landholders who found themselves desperately seeking to revive agro-economies without the luxury of abundant labor. Consequently, Japanese migrants proved a grand solution, due to the Japanese government's severe need to alleviate the pressures of overpopulation.

Flaws of the guano-dependent economy accentuated when the Peruvian government nationalized the nitrate industry in 1875, ending the benefits yielded to the industry's primary Chilean and British investors. The decision angered the ambitious Chileans, which compounded when a financially reeling Peruvian government "defaulted on its foreign debt" a year later, leaving the Chilean government with no profit. Diplomatic contention ensued as exports across South America lost demand, forcing these states into a state of economic desperation.⁵⁴ Subsequently, the Peruvians and Bolivians rekindled relations with a defensive pact in 1873. Embittered over the perception of Chile as an expansionist and economic bully, the revived Peruvian-Bolivian alliance cultivated "the preconditions for war between the three nations."⁵⁵

The preconditions disintegrated into the War of the Pacific in 1879, from which the Chileans emerged undisputedly victorious in 1883. The Chilean government wielded a superior navy to Peru and Bolivia, demonstrating a marked superiority in distinct victories over the Peruvians. A result of the conflict, the Chilean military seized the regions of Tacna and Arica. Although residents of the region identified as Peruvian,⁵⁶ the Treaty of Ancon, ending the conflict in 1883, granted the territories to Chile.⁵⁷ Article III of the treaty mandated a ten-year

⁵⁴ Skuban, *Lines in the Sand*, 10.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 9-12.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

plebiscite over the territories to be decided in 1894 once tensions quelled and diplomatic relations normalized. This occurred primarily because the Peruvian government refused to cede the territories outright to Chile as such an action would inspire massive uproar from an already humiliated and demoralized Peruvian populace.⁵⁸

Yet, the plebiscite proved an immense controversy as both governments accused the other of ill will, consequently dragging the ordeal long beyond its intended culmination in 1894. The controversy unleashed a flurry of aggressive diplomacy between the two governments, as the Peruvians actively strove to legally nullify the article of the treaty. The Peruvians accused the Chileans of exporting Peruvian residents in an effort to “Chileanize” the region. The Chileans, conversely, attributed the unending affair to “lack of the requisite protocol” for determining the nationality of the regions. The dispute devolved into diplomatic hostility, as the governments found themselves unable to resolve the contest.⁵⁹ The plebiscite was eventually settled in 1929, with Peru receiving Tacna and Chile retaining Arica.

Central to the investigation of this Andean history, is that the plebiscite controversy emerged as the medium for which Peruvian and Chilean governments invited the Japanese government into South American geopolitics. Gaining a diplomatic foothold in the Americas through relations with the Peruvians, paved the way for the onset of substantial Japanese diplomatic and economic operations in the region. As we see in the coming chapters, the onset of Japanese influence in the region evolved as pivotal for the formation of a Pacific regional consciousness. Consequently, we must attribute historical agency to the little considered role of the Andean past in the formation of the modern Pacific world.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 13-16.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 13-17.

II. The Peruvian Recovery and History of Asian Migrations to Peru

Defeat to Chile bottomed out Peruvian hardship in the nineteenth century, as the following decades witnessed the Peruvian government slowly revive the national economy through stimulation of agro-economies with foreign labor. Although internal violence shook the nation in the years following defeat to Chile, Peru held vast potential in numerous agro-economic sectors, as foreign investors and Peruvian elite invested in plantation economies and spurred industrialization. Despite their potential, many of these agriculturally rich regions resided in extremely rural areas, resulting in a difficulty in amassing a local populace for labor.⁶⁰ Lack of labor in the countryside compounded as modernization and industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century generated a wave of urbanization.⁶¹ Furthermore, the abolition of the African slave trade in 1855, and the government's inability to attract either Peruvian indigenous or European labor migrants, fashioned the prospect of Japanese labor as extremely attractive in the 1890s.⁶² Realizing the economic flaw of utter dependence on a diminishing guano supply, the Peruvian government permitted rural plantation owners to seek foreign labor on their own accord.⁶³ This was an overall familiar phenomenon, as before the illegalization of the coolie labor trade, tens of thousands of Chinese arrived in Peru for work on plantations and guano fields in the nineteenth century.⁶⁴ However, the scramble for foreign labor assumed another form in the 1890s as the Peruvian government and *hacendados* (Peruvian plantation owners), resorted to Japanese workers. This shift evolved as a product of Pacific governments learning of the

⁶⁰ Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 22.

⁶¹ Daniel Masterson with Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 287.

⁶² Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 22.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Masterson, *The History of Peru*, 75.

slave-like treatment of these supposedly free Chinese laborers, resulting in the global illegalization of the coolie trade in 1874.⁶⁵ Desperation for Japanese labor matched well the desperation faced by Japan's government and certain sectors of the Japanese populace, as we saw in the previous chapter.

Furthermore, within the narrative of the War of the Pacific emerges the little considered contribution of Chinese laborers to the Chilean cause, and their connection to the onset of Japanese emigration to Peru. In the immediate wake of the abolition of the coolie slave trade, many coolies remained in Peru laboring through deplorable conditions. The slave-like treatment of coolies produced drastic animosities between workers and *hacendados*, coming to a head when invading Chilean forces freed many of these laborers. Numerous Chinese joined the Chileans, waging war on their former employers.⁶⁶ Earning a reputation of severe violence, the stigma of Chinese laborer-turned-soldiers emerged as a scapegoat for the humiliating loss suffered by the Peruvians. Unimportant here was whether or not these laborers truly contributed to the swift Chilean invasion of Peru, yet the perception of the role of the Chinese nonetheless lessened the allure of Chinese labor as a sustainable labor source for the Peruvian future. Compounded with the recent development of the illegalization of African slave labor, the perceived role of Chinese in the conflict encouraged the Peruvian government to further consider Japanese labor by the 1890s.

This process gave rise to new distinctions between the nationality of migrants which the Peruvian government attracted, and the nationality of migrants the government sought. In no position to refuse a dependable workforce in Japanese migrants, the Peruvian government of the

⁶⁵ Masterson with Funada-Classsen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 22-23.

⁶⁶ Bruce W. Farcau, *The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1987-1883* (Westport, Connecticut and London, 2000), 160.

1890s accepted these Japanese laborers out of convenience and desperation. Yet, with the turn of the twentieth century and the dramatic recovery of Peru by the 1920s, the Peruvian government contrarily sought idealized migrants from European nations. As we see in Chapter Seven, one Peruvian diplomat noted:

For labour, we have to rely a great deal on native Indians, and some Japanese immigrants, but some day or other the great emigratory currents from Europe, which are now absorbed by other Latin-American Republics, may find their way to the territory where possibilities are better, perhaps than anywhere else in the American Continent. [referring to Peru].⁶⁷

By the 1920s, migration appeared the ideal avenue for commencing substantial diplomacy with powerful European states, as the ambitious Peruvian government pursued diplomacy as a means for generating an international Peruvian reputation.

That the Peruvian government evolved from accepting the only opportunity they encountered in Japanese labor in the 1890s, to openly petitioning for alternative migrants in the late 1920s, exposes the dramatic increase in diplomatic influence the Peruvians enjoyed over the course of three decades. This shift in diplomatic position originated primarily from the experience and harsh lessons learned from submission to the Chileans earlier in the nineteenth century. Experience in diplomacy from armed conflict paved the way for the emergence of the politically savvy Peruvian government in the 1920s.

III. Diplomatic Origins of Japanese Labor Migration to Peru

In the context of the aforementioned circumstances, the exposure of the *Cayatlí* and *María Luz* incidents exploded across the Pacific, bringing the governments of Peru and Japan

⁶⁷ *The North China Daily News* Article, September 20 1927, Document 128, Collection 5-18, ACMRE

into deliberation and diplomatic awareness.⁶⁸ Although the affair concerned the illegal sale of Chinese laborers, legal proceedings of the incident primarily involved the Peruvians and Japanese, additionally including judgements from English lawyers and the Russian government. Lack of involvement from the Chinese government rested primarily in the disadvantaged position in which the Chinese found themselves in the late nineteenth century, as well as the enthusiasm with which Western governments met the opportunity to eradicate any sale of humans comparable to the deplored trans-Atlantic slave trade.⁶⁹ Lack of diplomatic influence from the Chinese yielded larger involvement in these incidents from other states, inadvertently introducing the Japanese and Peruvian governments. Although the Peruvian and Japanese governments shared no tradition of relations, the international controversies in Pacific waters cultivated a mutual interest and communication.⁷⁰ After the *Cayatlí* and *María Luz* incidents resolved, the governments of Japan and Peru consolidated the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Commerce in 1873.⁷¹ Intended to spur trade, the treaty ultimately proved mutually ineffective as each nation's trade goods posed no attraction to the other. Yet, once embedded in social and economic hardships in the 1890s, desperation brought the nations together once again, ultimately leading to the first generation of Japanese migrants arriving in Peru in 1899.

These developments reveal that Peruvian Japanese diplomacy originated from international discourse unrelated to labor migration. In the 1890s, migration only emerged as a

⁶⁸ The mutiny of coolie laborers onboard a ship sailing in Pacific waters in 1868 (the *Cayatlí* incident), as well as the exposure of maltreatment and illegal shipment of coolies in 1872 (the *María Luz* incident), fostered Peruvian-Japanese relations. Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 1-17.

⁶⁹ Daniel V. Botsman, "Freedom without Slavery? 'Coolies,' Prostitutes, and Outcastes in Meiji Japan's 'Emancipation Moment,'" *American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (2011): 1323-1347, <http://ahr.oxfordjournals.org/content/116/5/1323.full.pdf+html>.

⁷⁰ Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 1-17.

⁷¹ Isabelle Lausent-Herrera, "Pasado y Presente de la Comunidad Japonesa en el Perú," *Collection Minima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos*, (1991): 9-80, <http://ilausent.free.fr/>, 12.

desperate side effect of subtly-emerging diplomacy, albeit an important and government approved side effect. In this realization, diplomacy spurred migration. Yet, because diplomacy remained relatively limited until 1918, the tradition of migration conversely served to stimulate substantial diplomacy in the 1920s. Consequently, although this thesis attributes the origins of interwar diplomacy to migration, we must remember that the Peruvian-Japanese relationship resided on solely a platform of diplomacy until the 1890s. This changed in 1895 when mutual recognition of the inadequacy of the 1873 treaty pushed the governments to ratify a new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. C. Harvey Gardiner wrote:

The new treaty was largely economic in tone, featuring most-favored treatment in reference to goods, property, taxes, duties, and shipping charges. Considering both countries' almost nonexistent commercial awareness of the other, this emphasis optimistically looked toward the future.⁷²

Thus, the states' governments refreshed their relations to the other, not necessarily due to a mutual affinity, but rather out of economic desperation. Desperate lack of labor for Peruvian agro-economies matched perfectly with the severe overpopulation and lack of sufficient resources faced by the Japanese government.

This pact ushered in a new era of Pacific history with the arrival of the *Issei* generation of Japanese migrants to Peru in 1899. Despite the commercial implications of the treaty, people proved the most common exchange between the nations until the need to engage with the other emerged anew after 1918. At that point sharing the connection of a robust migrant community in Peru, migration provided a convenient avenue for the growth diplomacy during the interwar era.

⁷² Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 19-20.

IV. The First Generations of Japanese Labor Migrants

Although diplomatic treaties prompted the inception of Japanese labor migration to Peru, migration began as a private enterprise operated by *hacendados* and Japanese emigration companies. The path of migration began in 1898 when extremely powerful *hacendados* such as Augusto B. Leguía, the future multiple term president of Peru and figure of focus later in this thesis, commenced negotiations with officials of the Morioka Emigration Company.⁷³ An ambitious businessman, Leguía exploited Japanese labor for a lucrative profit, laying the foundations for his tendency to engage with the Japanese government during his presidency in the 1920s. The Morioka Emigration Company oversaw the arrival of the first generations of Japanese to Peru, before competitive enterprises emerged such as the Meiji Colonization Company and Overseas Development Company in the early 1900s. Working primarily in sugar and cotton plantations,⁷⁴ the initial generations of migrants operated under a wage system, which contractualized the working conditions, wages, and assigned working locations of Japanese laborers.⁷⁵

Although Japanese contract labor officially ended in 1923 due to dissatisfaction with the contract systems, even starting in the early 1900s, many Japanese arrived in Peru as free laborers or as families of migrants already in Peru.⁷⁶ As the 1900s and 1910s unfolded, Japanese “organized themselves as *Kenjinkai* (home districts in Japan),” and formed communities based

⁷³ Augusto B. Leguía served two terms as president. He first served between 1908 and 1912, and then again from 1919-1930. While he was elected and ruled democratically for his first term in office, his term in the 1920s followed a significantly more authoritarian course. This thesis considers Leguía’s second presidency as his second term influenced Peruvian history to a far greater extent in the 1920s.

⁷⁴ Lausent-Herrera, “Pasado y Presente de la Comunidad Japonesa en el Perú,” 26.

⁷⁵ Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 25-28.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

around occupations in Peru.⁷⁷ Many migrants entered into retail economies, barber shops, or eateries, consequently forging a stable economic niche Lima.⁷⁸ The economic stability of these migrant communities, as well as the cultural and racial distinctions between Japanese and Peruvians, fostered significant hardships for these early generations. Ignorance of contracts on the part of *hacendados* bred mistreatment of migrants, compounding daily adversities wrought by disease,⁷⁹ violence, and discrimination.⁸⁰ Such social friction ultimately drove animosity between the governments of Japan and Peru in the late 1920s, with the onset of the Great Depression.

These processes emphasize the linkages of social and diplomatic processes in this history. Daily mistreatment of Japanese migrants proved no solution to Peruvian discontent over the economic robusticity of migrant communities. Discrimination encouraged the insularity of these communities, further distinguishing Japanese and Peruvians in quotidian life.⁸¹ These emerging animosities grew to monumental importance in the 1920s as mistreatment of migrants activated the Japanese government to seek fair treatment. Aggressively pursuing legal equality mandated by the treaty between the governments, incidentally accentuated a wariness of the threat of Japanese influence in South America.

V. Conclusion

With a diminishing industry in nitrate and guano exportation, a government reeling after decades of political inconsistency, and an angry populace well-versed in hardship, late nineteenth century Peru hardly appears the predecessor of Peru in the 1920s, which conversely wielded

⁷⁷ Masterson, *The History of Peru*, 103.

⁷⁸ Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 34.

⁷⁹ Masterson with Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 36.

⁸⁰ Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 26.

⁸¹ Masterson with Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 287.

tremendous influence across the Pacific region. Yet understanding the origins of the plebiscite controversy, and of Peru on the whole in the nineteenth century, reveals a Peruvian government extremely well-versed in international relations by the early twentieth century. A positive offshoot of economic contention and armed conflict with Chile, experience in diplomacy proved invaluable for the Peruvian government between the world wars, when the Peruvians employed this experience to manipulate relations with the Japanese.

While arguing that preceding events cause subsequent developments appears an axiomatic suggestion, contextualizing interwar diplomacy within the developments of the nineteenth century, attributes a previously ignored agency to South American history for examining Pacific history on the whole. As we see in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy cultivated an international consciousness across the Pacific. Although Peru, Japan, and the United States comprise the primary diplomatic characters of this thesis, this chapter exposes the South American stage which allowed these governments to forge the Pacific. This stage owes its origins to the histories of several small Andean nations previously ignored as major players in world history.

Exploring the origins of Peruvian-Japanese relations contributes two fundamental layers to our analysis of interwar diplomacy. First, investigation of the nineteenth century reveals Japanese migration to Peru as the product of diplomacy and economic interest. The flurry of diplomacy instigated by the *Cayatlí* and *María Luz* incidents brought nations with no geopolitical relevance into direct engagement over international political controversies. Illustrating that international diplomacy bred migration, requires recognition of a diplomatic approach as vital to the history of any region. Secondly, and subsequently, this understanding

shatters the academic and popular misconception that Japanese-Peruvian relations stemmed from a special relationship shared by the two governments. Analysis of the international factors promoting migration, reveals that the two governments consolidated an alliance based on desperation. Prior to 1895, the nations shared no political or commercial compatibility, unsurprising when considering the insularity of pre-Meiji Japanese society and the turbulence of early post-independence Peru. Yet numerous Peruvian Nikkei scholars, and the contemporary Nikkei community in Peru, consistently refer to the relationship as the product of a special affiliation or good will. Conversely, mutual desperation, convenience, and geopolitical ambitions constructed the foundation of each government's geopolitical agenda by 1918.

Chapter Five

1918-1923: The Hesitant Growth of Peruvian-Japanese Relations

Three distinct phases emerge within the narrative of interwar Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy. Spanning the years 1918-1923, the first period reflects the subtle, hesitant growth of diplomacy as each government branched out in an increasingly internationally-conscious Pacific world. 1924-1927 characterize the growth and amelioration of relations as Japanese migration peaked, and both states pursued nationalist endeavors. The last phase, 1928-1930, defines the downfall of relations as numerous bubbling tensions came to a head within the context of the Great Depression and the Japanese empire in East Asia. Ultimately these phases comprise a narrative, demonstrating how Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy emerged and disintegrated as both as instigator and product of contemporary Pacific geopolitics.

I. Introduction

The end of the First World War fostered conditions which grew Peruvian-Japanese relations into an association spanning beyond just labor migration. As each government spread their branches internationally, their preliminary relations saw each side providing each other memoranda concerning each nation's histories, militaries, primary geopolitical concerns, as well as their general state of being in the early 1920s.⁸² The Japanese recounted their recent conflicts with China and Russia, as well as introduced the Peruvian government to their grievances at the lack of provisions received from the Paris Peace Conference by the United States. Despite

⁸² Relations remained relatively formal during this point, with correspondence frequently addressing each government's desire to foster and expand relations. Such a formality, which disappears during the 1924-1927 phase of relations, signaled the developing trust on each side.

receiving First Nation status at the conference, placing them equivalent to their powerful Western counterparts, the Japanese nonetheless interpreted their concessions received from the conference as inadequate. The Peruvian primary diplomatic concern rested in the competition with Chile concerning the Tacna-Arica plebiscite. A product of the War of the Pacific, the plebiscite controversy dragged into the 1920s, eventually coming to a head as both Peru and Chile sought Japan as an ally. As a newcomer with no predisposed stakes in South American politics, the Japanese represented a strategic geopolitical actor, spawning from a revived Japanese prestige after the First World War. Consequently, as the Peruvians aggressively sought Japanese affinity in order to further a nationalist political agenda, it is evident that the Peruvians exerted previously unconsidered expansionist tendencies in South America during this period.

As an offshoot of diplomacy came a new distinction in racial consciousness between the Japanese and Peruvians, as each government strove to limit racial-degeneration from exposure to the other's populace. Despite the irony that each government employed a racial rhetoric in an attempt to establish themselves as racially superior, new racial distinctions grew fundamentally important throughout the 1920s. With the United States exerting a monopoly on racial prestige, the materializing drive to attain prestige through American association, fueled international discourse and the formation of alliances across the Pacific.

Examining this period of relations additionally reveals several distinct themes which, although only emerging at this point, played a tremendous role in the expansion and eventual downfall of the Peruvian-Japanese relationship. These were: the onset of Peruvian political power as evidenced by an expansionist drive to reclaim Tacna-Arica, racial consciousness, as well as the emergence of a strong Japanese legalism and concern for their migrants abroad.

Investigation of these themes introduce the transcendent significance of interwar Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy. That these years planted the seeds which eventually destroyed the relationship by the end of the 1920s, justifies exploring this introductory period, as well as the investigation of interwar diplomacy on the whole through three distinct phases.

II. The Peruvian Context

As the Tacna-Arica plebiscite comprised the primary Peruvian political concern throughout the 1920s, educating the Japanese on the controversy comprised the center of the Peruvian correspondence with Japan. Labeled “The Question of the Pacific,” the controversy remained unsettled due to various factors, however the Peruvians blamed the Chilean failure to follow the treaty’s clauses, as the primary source of conflict.⁸³ Although Chilean hegemony stood over the Peruvian government, the Peruvians sought to reclaim Tacna-Arica as fiercely as the Chileans wished to retain legal jurisdiction over the territories. However, after decades of Chilean occupation, local sentiment in Tacna-Arica gave way to a sense of abandonment towards the Peruvian government despite the region’s residents traditionally identifying as Peruvian.⁸⁴ Consequently, the Peruvian government embarked upon a patriotic goal of reclaiming the territories. Even Agosto B. Leguía, Peruvian president during the 1920s and former *hacendado*, adopted this controversy as a pillar of his platform for the 1920 presidential election.⁸⁵ From a seemingly weaker position, driven by political and patriotic sentiment, and guided by a leader wielding the controversy as a means for attaining capital and reputation,⁸⁶ the Peruvian

⁸³ Dr. Maurtua, Memorandum to Viscount Yasuya Uchida, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 26 1919, Document 13, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

⁸⁴ William E. Skuban, *Lines in the Sand: Nationalism and Identity on the Peruvian-Chilean Frontier* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 111.

⁸⁵ Skuban, *Lines in the Sand*, 23.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

government employed Japanese diplomacy to charge a nationalist ambition to reclaim territories legally belonging to a foreign government.

Additionally, both the Chilean and Peruvian foreign ministries accused the other of imperialist aggression over Tacna-Arica. In 1920, M. de Freyre, the Peruvian Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan, delivered to the Japanese a dense memorandum illustrating the Peruvian perspective on the history and current state of the controversy:

the war between Peru and Bolivia on the one side, and Chile on the other, [referring to the War of the Pacific (1879-1883)] was caused by the premeditated scheme of Chile to seize the wealthy nitrate deposits pertaining to Peru and Bolivia...[and] that Chile has consciously violated the stipulation contained in article III of the treaty of Ancon...[making the treaty] thereby null and void.⁸⁷

As a response, the Chilean Foreign Minister delivered in Tokyo a memorandum titled “The Chilean Policy of International Cooperation.” Another counter to the Peruvian narrative, the document distinctly demonstrates the equivalent Chilean attempts to manipulate relations with the Japanese to retain jurisdiction over Tacna-Arica. Freyre summarized the Chilean minister’s accusations towards Peruvian actions for:

3.) pursuing imperialism with respect to Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia; 4.) pursuing imperialism with respect to Chile; 5.) refusing to follow article III of the Treaty of Ancon...[placing such actions contrary to] Chile [whom] represents an ordered nation, laborious, and animated only by the pure spirit of pan-americanism.⁸⁸

As if both the Chilean and Peruvian governments sought to argue the last word in the matter, the Chilean minister’s memorandum reflects the fragile peace in South America during this time.

Although the controversy resolved in 1929 as Peru received jurisdiction over Tacna, and Chile

⁸⁷ Dr. Maurtua, Memorandum to Viscount Yasuya Uchida, May 26 1919, Document 13 and 39, Collection 5-18, ACMRE

⁸⁸ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, April 15 1920, Documents 85-86, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

retained Arica, the extent to which each nation sought Japanese support for the issue reveals the prestige of a Japanese alliance in the early 1920s. By framing the conflict as the fault of an aggressive, imperialist, and unjust Chile, the Peruvians strove to present themselves as the victim, simultaneously placing themselves in a superior position to consolidate a Japanese alliance. As a newly emerged and esteemed international power after receiving First Nation status at the Paris Peace Conference, Japanese sympathy would undoubtedly aid in the Peruvian quest to reclaim Tacna-Arica.

Important in this process was that, while embroiled in a fierce contention to reclaim Tacna-Arica, the Peruvian government sought a Japanese diplomatic alliance out of the same desperation and convenience with which the Peruvian government sought Japanese laborers in the 1890s. With a tradition of Peruvian emigration and no predisposed opinions on South American politics, the newly arriving Japanese government appeared an uninvolved, convenient, and potentially powerful ally whose sympathy could provide a pathway for strengthening the Peruvian position by countering Chilean hegemony in the Andes. Especially since Peruvian diplomatic activity with the Japanese remained at this juncture under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Legation to Chile.⁸⁹ Moreover, this scramble for Japanese favor, as a means to further a national, political agenda, reveals the geopolitical worth of Japanese allyship in the early 1920s. Allying with Japan could potentially boost Peru onto the Pacific stage.

Although imperialism in this era is more commonly associated with Japan, this context of Japanese-Peruvian diplomatic relations demonstrates that the Peruvian government exerted certain expansionist tendencies in South America. Despite finding themselves in no position to

⁸⁹ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, April 15 1920, Documents 85-86, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

consolidate empire in the Andes, the Peruvian government nonetheless capitalized on the plebiscite's ambiguous legal precedents, as well as diplomacy with the Japanese, in an effort to claim a region that legally belonged to another state. While one could argue that because Tacna Arica previously resided as Peruvian territories, the Peruvian plebiscite campaign emerged not as expansionist but rather an endeavor to reclaim territories they perceived as rightfully Peruvian. However, while this thesis entertains this possibility, the larger importance of this story was that the Peruvian government, from a seemingly weaker position in the Andes, nonetheless brandished a manipulative geopolitical strategy to to claim territories in which the government held no legal claim, thus qualifying these actions as expansionist.

This understanding reveals the plebiscite ordeal as a vital avenue for exploring the manner in which Peru emerged from submission to geopolitical strength in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Exposing Japan at the center of this Peruvian expansionist diplomatic approach, emphasizes that political manipulation and desperation constructed the base of the Japanese-Peruvian relationship. The Peruvian government never pursued an alliance with the Japanese out of mutual amity, but rather the Peruvians perceived Japan as a powerful force to manipulate within the fragile complex of South American geopolitics.

III. The Japanese Context

Similarly, Japan's government equivalently provided the Peruvian foreign ministry with numerous memoranda on the central Japanese state of affairs in the early century. This correspondence ranged from quantitative documents highlighting the growth of Japanese exports to South America, to accounts of their most pressing geopolitical concerns.⁹⁰ As the Peruvians

⁹⁰ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, August 19 1919, Documents 66 and 68, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

strove to present themselves in a fair light internationally, the Japanese followed suit. For example, the Japanese projected and justified their involvement in the conflict in Shandong and the conquest of Jiao-zhou as part of an endeavor to protect East Asian peace, as the Japanese introduced themselves as a dominant in the region.⁹¹ In addition to justifying conflict with other East Asian nations, the Japanese government, as did those of Chile and Peru, framed their government as the region's premier model, whose actions promoted greater international peace. M. De Freyre wrote in 1919 on behalf of the Japanese foreign ministry: "It has been only 50 years since Japan, discarding their outdated laws and customs, adopted the methods and forms of government which promote the progress of Asian nations."⁹² Encountering a furious market in South America for an internationally prestigious ally, the Japanese strove to present themselves as an emerging modern power worthy of pursuit by South America's equally ambitious states.

The branching out and emergence of the Japanese into Pacific diplomacy exposes the importance of Japanese-Peruvian relations for the larger narrative of the 1920s. The Japanese achieved enhanced diplomatic involvement in the Americas due to economic development provided with the end of the First World War. M de Freyre wrote of Japan before the war:

a cause of overpopulation was an abundance of labor, such that before the war, wages were extremely low. Industries were not perfected, and their products could not compete with products from Europe. The primary manufactured good was textiles, an industry which employed women, but without regard to their rights and with little effort to protect them...And finally, Japanese laws prohibited free action, and impeded any concerted action by the working class.⁹³

⁹¹ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, September 12 1919, Documents 80-81, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

⁹² Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, September 15 1919, Document 84, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

⁹³ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, February 15 1920, Document 27-28, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

However, the end of the war relieved these pressures and Japanese exports soared, economic opportunities emerged, and “subsistence-wages in Tokyo grew by 100%.”⁹⁴ The Japanese additionally expanded their international economy through inquiring about Peruvian agricultural and mining industries. The Japanese probed the possibility of Japanese future involvement in these enterprises, as well as expressing the desire to maintain Japanese emigration as a means to further stimulate these industries.⁹⁵

Hand in hand with fervent economic growth, this era saw the Japanese substantially expand their military. This theme influenced Japanese diplomacy in the Pacific as military expansion grew into a major point of diplomatic contention with the United States. The Japanese asserted that three world military superpowers from the end of the First World War, in the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. However, to the dismay of the Japanese, this decade witnessed numerous naval conferences in which the Western powers limited the navies of their Asian counterparts. Striving for “having their voice be heard with respect among the great powers,” the Japanese distinctly attributed this inferior treatment to racism.⁹⁶ The Japanese argued that the United States intentionally restricted the Japanese navy while simultaneously expanding the American military.⁹⁷

As contention with the Americans simmered, the Japanese devoted substantial effort to correspondence with the Peruvians in justifying Japanese political influence in East Asia as well as refuting American accusations of Japanese diplomatic malintent. For example, the Americans

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, October 15 1919, Document 103, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

⁹⁶ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, July 30 1919, Documents 49, 50, 55, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

⁹⁷ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, September 15 1920, Documents 199-203, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

argued that a substantially smaller nation in Japan with an invulnerable position in East Asia did not require “16 ‘Super-Hoods’” for defense. The Japanese counterclaimed that the large Japanese navy owed its origins to the lessons wrought by the insufficient navy in both the Sino and Russo-Japanese wars. An inferior naval force crippled the Japanese effort to secure the entirety of the provisions they sought from the defeated Russians.⁹⁸ The Japanese further refuted American accusations through presenting Japanese settlement into less populated regions of East Asia as crucial to alleviate the pressures of overpopulation, as opposed to the United States’ unwarranted encroachment into Central and South America.⁹⁹ The Japanese elaborated to suggest that while American expansion/commerce in Central America provided a means for profit, Japanese commercial expansion in China and Siberia comprised a vital platform for Japan’s survival. The Japanese founded these claims in the argument that their extreme overpopulation and mere 20% soil fertility required relief through broader economic outlets in Asia. The Japanese foreign ministry even claimed their influence in China as a necessity due to the instability resulting from the warlord era of Chinese government.¹⁰⁰ Despite the irony of employing an imperial rhetoric to refute militarist aggression, this development reveals the blatant pressure felt by the Japanese to defend international conduct.

Japan’s foreign ministry even went so far as to accuse the Americans of conspiring to strengthen China as means for countering Japanese influence in East Asia.¹⁰¹ The Japanese,

⁹⁸ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, March 31 1921, Documents 59, 60, 62, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

⁹⁹ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, August 31 1921, Documents 23-24, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁰⁰ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, August 31 1921, Documents 23-24, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁰¹ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, March 31 1920, Documents 65-70, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

while unhappy with the League of Nations as a symbol of the discriminatory results of the Paris Peace Conference, accused the Americans of rejecting the Treaty of Versailles. M. de Freyre suggested that because the United States rejected the treaty, “the League of Nations is thus weakened, and that France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan consequently suffer from the destruction of the pact, whose clauses should govern the global reorganization and maintenance of peace.”¹⁰²

While Chapter Three of this thesis invalidated an imperialist ambition embedded in Japanese diasporas through illustrating desperation as the foundation of emigration, the early 1920s additionally witnessed the Japanese devote substantial attention to delegitimizing suspicions of imperialist ambitions in Latin America. Sensing pressure to refute suspicions of imperialism, suspicions largely invigorated by the United States, the Japanese government’s refutations ultimately served to further present Japan as an innocent and worthy ally in the increasingly competitive chess match of Pacific diplomacy. M. de Freyre opined on behalf of the Japanese: “Overall, Japanese migration seems to obey natural causes [such as overpopulation], and not, as some pretend, an artificial plan stimulated by the government with the purpose of extending a political influence.”¹⁰³ Freyre further attributed the insularity of migrant Japanese communities to traditional Japanese culture, as opposed to any inferiority, inability to integrate into foreign cultures, or danger posed by immigrants.¹⁰⁴ This discrepancy

¹⁰² Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, March 31 1920, Document 65, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁰³ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, October 31 1919, Document 113, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁰⁴ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, October 31 1919, Document 116, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

between quotidian Peruvians and Japanese migrant communities eventually contributed to crippling the Japanese-Peruvian relationship by 1928.

The drastic extent to which resisting the United States and the League of Nations formed a pillar of the Japanese diplomacy with the Peruvians, exposes how and why the Japanese manipulated diplomacy as an avenue for countering American hegemony in the Pacific. Perceiving Peru as a small piece of the West, the Japanese seized the opportunity to further relations with the Peruvians to fortify a diplomatic influence in the Americas. Once flowered, relations with Peru could provide a political foothold across the Pacific region through which the Japanese could counter American hegemony, and employ South American alliances to further nationalist goals. The Japanese even openly admitted in 1921 that the Americans most likely suspected them of fostering anti-American sentiments in South America in order to consolidate military treaties with South American states.¹⁰⁵ A world power in theory, the Japanese sought to realize the title by manipulating diplomacy in South America to counter racial, naval, and political limitations imposed by American influence.

Exposing the mutually politically manipulative and desperate foundation of Peruvian-Japanese interwar relations, this process exposes a previously ignored historical parallel. In the same manner that the Peruvians pursued Japanese affinity to resist Chilean hegemony in South America, Japan equivalently sought an ally in Peru to counter American aggression towards Japan. This is evident in how the Japanese, intending to establish legations in Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, and Persia, elected instead to establish legations in only Turkey and Peru.¹⁰⁶ Paralleling the mutual justification/courting process unfolding between the nations

¹⁰⁵ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, January 15 1921, Document 8, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁰⁶ *Japan Times Advertiser* Article, December 1920, Document 233, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

during this period reflects diplomacy as a useful tool for understanding the concealed ambitions of emerging nations. As we see in subsequent chapters, the international consequences of this diplomatic parallel contributed immensely in stimulating a novel Pacific consciousness throughout the region. Increased Japanese involvement in South America opened the door for a new era of pan-Pacific collaboration. With agency in Pacific history traditionally attributed to powers such as the United States, examination of Peru and Japan conversely proves the importance of non-Western, transcontinental geopolitics in initiating the modern Pacific.

IV. Japanese Legalism and Migrant Rights in the Growing Pains of Peruvian-Japanese Diplomacy

In addition to the increased economic and military actions of the Japanese, we can also view in this era the inception of numerous characteristics of Japanese diplomacy which prove fundamental for the course of interwar Japanese-Peruvian relations. These two primary themes were the inception of Japanese legalism, and an associated concern for Japanese nationals abroad. A developing national and social phenomenon since the late nineteenth century, the Japanese legalistic mentality inserted itself into the emerging relationship with the Peruvian government when the Japanese foreign ministry vigorously began requesting Peruvian legal records in the early 1920s. These requests spanned from records of Peruvian treaties with other states, to one request on Peruvian laws concerning:

- 1: the public or secret associations, political or otherwise;
- 2: the public or secret meetings, political or otherwise;
- 3: the political or social demonstration
- 4: the public speeches of objectionable character...on the streets or public places; [as well as] The violent acts, threats, slander or agitation in connection with the economic strikes or lockouts or the carrying of dangerous weapons.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Seizaburo Shimizu, Japanese Ambassador to Peru, Letter to Dr. Alberto Salomón, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, May 19 1923, Documents 34-36, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

These requests appear harmless, yet signaled the start of a relentless Japanese legalistic diplomatic approach leading the Peruvians to feel as though they were consistently being probed by the Japanese. Without a tradition of legally infused diplomacy with Japan, the transition to an intense, legalistic discourse spurred Peruvian concern by the late 1920s.

Peruvian resistance to the reinvigorated Japanese diplomatic approach, although relatively minimal in this period, began with a complacency in relations. As the Japanese remained prompt and active in diplomacy, the Peruvians grew increasingly passive, consequently delaying various diplomatic concerns. This theme unfolds in the subsequent chapters, primarily evident in the Peruvian delay in finalizing a new treaty between the two governments. A manifestation of national interest originating from a Japanese drive to increase international prestige, legalism proved an initial avenue for the two governments to butt heads over distinct diplomatic approaches.

Hand in hand with increased legalistic diplomacy, came a revived concern for Japanese nationals abroad. Until the 1920s, Japanese migration to Peru remained a semi-private enterprise as Japanese emigration companies and Peruvian *hacendados* settled migrant contracts.¹⁰⁸ However, Japan's growth after the First World War allowed the government to attribute greater resources to ensuring the well-being of Japanese abroad. This development began in 1922 when the Japanese established a Legation in Lima.¹⁰⁹ Previously, all Japanese-Peruvian correspondence traveled through the Japanese Legation in Chile as the Japanese had not yet established a Legation to Peru.¹¹⁰ However, as trade and relations expanded, the new Legation

¹⁰⁸ C. Harvey Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), 18.

¹⁰⁹ Manuel de Freyre y Santander, Letter to Señor Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, December 8 1920, Document 231, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹¹⁰ *Japan Times Advertiser* Article, December 1920, Document 233, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

allowed the Japanese to advocate for their migrants in Peru.¹¹¹ For the first time in the Japanese-Peruvian relationship, the Japanese consistently requested justice for crimes committed against Japanese migrants, as well as petitioned for Japanese-trained doctors to practice in Peru. Seizaburo Shimizu, a Japanese ambassador, wrote to the Peruvian Foreign Minister in 1923 that the Japanese inability to speak Spanish prohibited migrants from describing their ailments to Peruvian doctors. Up to this point, the Peruvian government prohibited the practice of Japanese medics in Peru, as Japanese doctors consistently failed the Peruvian medical exam. However, Seizaburo argued this outcome as the simple product of the language barrier, contending that Japanese medical professions were internationally respected, approved by the British Central Medical Board, and thus refusal of their practice in Peru brought immense danger to Japanese migrants. Seizaburo even went so far as to label this issue “a question of humanity.”¹¹² Another example, spurred directly from requests from Japanese citizens, came when the Japanese foreign ministry campaigned to uncomplicate the process for migration to Peru. Previously, aspiring Japanese emigrants needed to submit their passports to the Japanese Association in Tokyo for the approval by the Peruvian government. Only once approved, which often took months, could intending migrants retrieve their passports and commence their voyage to Lima. These examples signaled the start of a Japanese government adamant on protecting their migrants in Peru. Migrants who previously remained subject to ruthless betrayal of contracts by *hacendados*, and a government wielding insufficient means of ensuring their care.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Although distinct from diplomacy but sponsored by both governments, numerous Japanese-Latin American associations emerged in this era. Organizations intended to extend communication and relations among Japan and the countries of South America, these associations additionally signaled the mutual interest between the Japanese and Latin American states. *The Japan Advertiser* Article, May 10 1919, Document 31, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹¹² Seizaburo Shimizu, Letter to Dr. Alberto Salomón, April 21 1923, Documents 22-25, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹¹³ Daniel M. Masterson with Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 36.

Despite the relatively minor character of such issues at this point, Japanese legalism contributed to the initial butting of heads between the two governments. Displaying the “growing pains” nature of this opening era of relations, the Peruvian and Japanese foreign ministries disputed over issues of military service of foreigners in Peru, as well as the provisions of the 1895 treaty between the nations. In 1922, the Japanese argued that the Peruvian government failed to follow a provision of the treaty, mandating the exoneration of Japanese migrants from Peruvian military service as part of the most favored nation status Japan enjoyed in Peru.¹¹⁴ Moreover, and on a broader scale, the Japanese asserted that the Peruvian government failed to abide by an equality clause of the 1895 treaty which demanded that Japanese migrants receive rights equal to those enjoyed by Peruvian citizens. This Japanese approach proved a remarkable transition as only a few years earlier the government played nearly no role in migration discourse; yet by the early 1920s, began pursuing specificities of the 1895 treaty in order to enforce equal treatment of Japanese nationals abroad. This stark diplomatic shift planted the seeds for what the Peruvian government eventually interpreted as increased Japanese involvement in Latin America signaling the ultimate Japanese desire to exert empire in Peru.

V. The Emergence of Pacific Race-Consciousness

As the Pacific world extended its branches, race-consciousness formed a pillar of the growing pains, and later dissolution of, Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy in the 1920s. In 1918, the Peruvian Congress ratified a law intending to avoid ethnic or economic degeneration of the Peruvian populace due to Asian influence. The preamble read: “Considering that it is necessary to defend the national population from ethnic degeneration involving crossing with the yellow

¹¹⁴ Seizaburo Shimizu, Letter to Dr. Alberto Salomón, April 25 1922, Document 30, Collection 6-18, ACMRE. And Seizaburo Shimizu, Letter to Dr. Alberto Salomón, May 10 1922, Document 32, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

race; it is also the duty of the state to create jobs for the working class a means for avoiding depopulation and misery.” Although ironic considering that the Japanese equivalently feared racial degeneration, the Japanese angrily demanded justification for the law, arguing that migrant communities posed no threat to Peruvian ethnicity and that any economic hardship or origins of “depopulation and misery” were completely independent from Japanese migration.¹¹⁵ The increasing competition for Peruvian jobs throughout the 1920s easily framed economically successful Japanese migrants as scapegoats for this economic competition. Marking the start of Pacific governments striving to establish superior racial distinctions across the Pacific world, contention over racial degeneration reveals the link between economic competition and racial difference.

That the Peruvian government already perceived in 1918 a Japanese economic threat infused with racial distinctions, demonstrates three pivotal themes in this story. First, this correspondence signaled a new era of the Peruvian government clearly distinguishing Japanese residents from their own citizens. This racism eventually contributed to the decline of Japanese-Peruvian relations as the Peruvians sought racial prestige from allying with the United States, as opposed to the supposedly racially inferior Japanese. Secondly, that the Peruvians, while desiring Japanese migrants for physical labor as well as partnership for geopolitical concerns, never truly desired full integration or friendship with the Japanese. This distinction emerges in the passive diplomatic approach the Peruvians assumed as the Japanese actively pushed for a new treaty in 1923.¹¹⁶ As we see in the coming chapters, once the Peruvians

¹¹⁵ Unknown Author, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, October 22 1918, Documents 20-21, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹¹⁶ On the whole, this era of relations saw frequent and numerous correspondence from the Japanese and much fewer and less timely correspondence from the Peruvian foreign ministry. On numerous occasions, Japanese ambassadors

achieved success in employing Japanese allyship to turn the Tacna-Arica plebiscite in their favor, the allure of a Japanese alliance diminished significantly. This curtailing diplomatic attraction to Japan fueled a racial rhetoric in justifying the dissolution of relations by 1930. Even as relations and trade cultivated in 1923, the Peruvians furthered legislation enacting that if a Peruvian-born child of a migrant family chose the nationality of his/her parents, that child consequently lost the “pleasure of Peruvian citizenship.” Although such children retained the rights and protections of Peruvian residency and constitution, the provision essentially represented a gesture maintaining the Peruvian drive for racial distinction and superiority.¹¹⁷

V. Conclusion

Ultimately, the years 1918-1923 witnessed the hesitant growth of interwar Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy. Each nation introduced their respective ambitions after the First World War, and each manipulated such as an avenue for furthering a national, geopolitical agenda. This exchange highlights the striking ambition of the governments of both Japan and Peru as emerging players in the increasingly connected Pacific world. The Peruvians pursued Japanese affinity out of political desperation, as the Japanese represented a strong potential ally in the contention with the Chileans. Laterally, Japan’s government regarded Peruvian relations as a means for spreading resentment against the United States and League of Nations. That the Japanese perceived the Peruvians as a worthy player in Pacific diplomacy as a means to gain a diplomatic foothold in the Americas, attributes a certain level of international prestige not commonly granted to the Peru in the early twentieth century.

respectively but deliberately requested the Peruvians to respond to pressing issues revealing the stark complacency of Peruvian correspondence.

¹¹⁷ Unknown author, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, October 22 1918, Documents 20-21, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

Understanding the unsuspected strength of Peru as an emerging power during this period exposes the fundamental role played by non-Western states in fostering an international consciousness across the Pacific region. A product of the Peruvian and Japanese governments manipulating international discourse as a means of furthering national agendas, international consciousness between Japan and Andean states paved the way for the Japanese to expand diplomacy across the Pacific.

While scholars previously attributed Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy as an offshoot of migration, this thesis suggests that migration generated the inception of relations only so far as making the alliance more convenient. Migration allowed two nations with no previous geopolitical relevance to engage in a substantial diplomatic relationship. Yet once migration created an avenue for relations, each government's national interests, and the shifting world of the early twentieth century, stimulated this uncommon relationship to a far greater extent than labor migration.

Racial competition spurred between these two non-Western, non-white nations, additionally reveals the ambiguity in defining racial prestige in the early 1920s Pacific. As we see in the coming chapters, the United States wielded a monopoly on racial prestige, as the Americans comprised the top of the international hierarchy. Wielding what Eiichiro Azuma terms a "racial empire," the Americans employed a racial rhetoric to further fears of Asian races while simultaneously limiting the influence of Japan as an emerging modern power. With the opportunity to define racial prestige by association, diplomacy with the United States emerged as a strategy to distinguish a racial hierarchy among non-white states competing for the ambiguous title of second best.

Examining the years 1918-1923 additionally demonstrates the planting of seeds which proved fundamental as the 1920s progressed. The onset of Japanese legalistic diplomacy, increased diplomatic and economic activity in Peru, and a subsequent motivated concern for Japanese migrants abroad, while initially un concerning to the Peruvians, eventually comprised a pillar of the Peruvian fear that the Japanese desired to exert empire in Peru. These approaches starkly contrasted with the Peruvian conservative diplomatic approach. As 1924 loomed and the original 1895 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation neared its expiration in 1925, the Japanese began actively pushing for the drafting of a replacement, thus forging a new era of Japanese-Peruvian relations. This era additionally saw the United States emerge as an ominous third party to the relationship, who eventually provided the Peruvians an ally alternative to the Japanese. Revealing convenience and strategy as the foundation of these opening relations, this era set in motion gears telling the story of diplomacy, the perception of empire, and the forging of alliances in the interwar Pacific World.

Chapter Six

1924-1927: Plateau of Diplomatic Relations

I. Introduction

As the growing pains of relations settled and each state came into their diplomatic own, the mid-1920s witnessed an unprecedented smoothing of Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy. The numbers of Japanese arriving in Peru, Japanese-Pacific interconnectedness, as well as Leguía's term in office, all saw their pinnacle during this period.¹¹⁸ These years additionally witnessed the governments consolidate a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, although the pact would not be ratified until 1928.¹¹⁹ In 1926, the Peruvian government even awarded Baron Shidehara, a pivotal Japanese diplomat of the era, "El Sol del Perú," the highest honor awarded by the Peruvian government.¹²⁰

However, despite the perception of this period as a peak, these years more accurately unfolded as a plateau. Relations calmed as the governments resolved their initial conflicts and because each state applied these years to pursue national interests, not because either truly felt a bond to the other. The Japanese consolidated additional treaties with Russia and Brazil, demonstrating the height of Japanese internationalism. Conversely, Leguía brought a reinvigorated international respect for Peru and furthered relations with the United States, a

¹¹⁸ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, July 25 1926, Document 45, Collection, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹¹⁹ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, December 29 1928, Unknown Document Number, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

Indeed a large contributor to the failure of ratification was the mutual inability to settle on the provisions allowing medical professionals trained in one country to practice in the other. An odd development, especially considering that both states already settled similar disputes in treaties with other nations. Peru held the "Conventions on mutual recognition of validity of Academic Titles and Certificates of Studies between Peru and Spain" (1904) and Japan held the "Convention relative to the free Exercise of the Medical Profession between Japan and Mexico" (1917). Seizaburo Shimizu, Peruvian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, September 30 1924, Document 20, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹²⁰ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, July 25 1926, Document 45, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

power contentious with the Japanese. Causing no weakening or strengthening of relations, the national pursuits of this era essentially diverted attention from the growing disparity between the two states which unraveled the relationship in 1928.

This era reveals ultimately that the governments of Japan and Peru proved allies of mutual convenience. From the respective internal pressures of the nineteenth century promoting migration, to diplomacy in the twentieth century, Japan and Peru consolidated an alliance of mutual desperation and strategy. However, examination of this phase of relations specifically illustrates how diplomacy serves as a medium for analysis of how two distinct yet related entities developed during a specific time period.

Furthermore, a heightened racial awareness accompanied the increase in communication between nations in the Pacific. Because the Peruvians never truly desired full integration with the Japanese, evolving racial distinctions fueled a racial rhetoric in Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy when the Peruvian government ultimately pursued a more prestigious associational racial prestige through an alliance with the United States. What started as a distant awareness forged by migration, exploded into a relationship providing tremendous, new insight into how alliances developed in the preface to the Second World War.

II. Perceptions of Peru Across the Pacific

As the Peruvian economy gained steam and the nation developed, news of this progress spread across the Pacific largely, and surprisingly, through the influence of English-language newspapers published in Asia. Private newspapers intended for an English-speaking, international audience in Asia, the primary of these periodicals were the *Japan Advertiser* and

The North-China Daily News.¹²¹ These international publications proved immensely influential for English-speaking Asian elite, Asian bureaucrats, as well as other English-speaking diplomats from the West. For example, in 1927, *The North-China Daily News* published an article on the international diplomatic tour of Colonel J. Ricardo Seminario, the Peruvian Consul at Large. Seminario traveled across Europe and Asia generating a cross-continental recognition of Peruvian development. The publication noted: “his country is now enjoying a period of peace and prosperity. Roads and railways are in different stages of construction all over the Republic, and mining, agriculture, cattle-raising, oil, and other chief industries are making considerable strides.”¹²² The article even quoted Seminario himself: “our population of four million people may seem small when compared to other countries like China or the United States, but our growth is rapid, constant and solid.”¹²³ Although private operations, such periodicals undoubtedly influenced an international, elite audience in Asia, subsequently escalating an awareness and perception of a modern Peru across the Pacific and into Europe.

Consequently, revived recognition of Peruvian development gave way to the perception that Peru had “made it” as a modern nation. Previously plagued by *caudillos*, internal violence, and political instability, Leguía led Peru from obscurity to acclaim on the international stage consequently legitimizing the nation as a worthy diplomatic ally.¹²⁴ This is evident in that the

¹²¹ We can attribute a level of importance to these periodicals as they appear frequently in the archives of the Peruvian Foreign Ministry. With a foreign ministry intimately in tune with relative, contemporary international developments, the Peruvian government must have recognized the influence yielded by these periodicals. Clearly reaching the upper-levels of government, it is evident that governments across the Pacific paid attention to the relevant contents of these international publications, despite the fact that such sources were published by private individuals rather than the state. Especially considering that in some circumstances, Spanish translations of article content accompanied copies of the publications in correspondence between Peruvian diplomats and the Peruvian government.

¹²² *The North China Daily News* Article, September 20 1927, Document 128, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Daniel Masterson, *The History of Peru* (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 2009), 73.

aforementioned non-Peruvian publications intended for a non-Peruvian audience nonetheless encouraged sympathy towards the South American state. Although Asian governments played no role in these publications, the periodicals nevertheless provided an influential account of Peruvian modernity to a highly significant audience across the Pacific diplomatic community.

Moreover, examining these historical publications reveals two themes vital to this era of diplomatic history. First, that these publications reached the highest levels of governments, reveal that these states held strong interests in understanding their nation's international reputation. Examining these newspapers thus provides an avenue for investigating how these governments assumed they were interpreted by their Pacific counterparts. In some cases, Peruvian diplomats abroad sent copies of these periodicals, accompanied with translations in Spanish, to the Peruvian foreign ministry. Although passing through the filter of these diplomats, these publications nonetheless contributed dramatically to the Peruvian government's understanding of the Peruvian perception abroad. And secondly, the sympathy towards Peru encouraged by these sources reflected the new, international sentiment recognizing Peruvian development. Again, although these sources operated free of any government influence, they clearly reached the top levels of Pacific governments, consequently reflecting the taking notice of Peruvian growth.

III. Peruvian Diplomatic and National Development

This era witnessed Leguía pursue a highly ambitious diplomatic objective throughout his time in office, as evidenced by the extension into relations with the United States. The Peruvian government's initial stance as the victim in the Tacna-Arica controversy, compounded with the Chilean government's defiance towards American intervention in the affair, ultimately spurred

an already simmering American-Peruvian relationship. For example, the Americans aided the Peruvian military by sending a mission in 1924 to develop the Peruvian navy, a mission still active by 1927.¹²⁵ Establishing a hand in the military of a prominent South American state allowed the Americans to further their influence across the Pacific. Furthermore, international publications contributed to this process through highlighting the fondness Peruvians felt towards Americans, the respect American diplomats held for Peru, as well as the expanding diplomatic friendship between the nations.¹²⁶ As we see in the coming paragraphs, as the Japanese-American relationship declined and the Peruvian-American relationship flowered, the allure of Japanese friendship consequently appeared significantly less attractive to the Peruvians. In the battle for geopolitical relevance, allying with the nation topping the international hierarchy, in this case the United States, appeared significantly more strategic than the increasingly ideologically and geographically distant Japanese.

As an offshoot of the international exposure of American-Peruvian relations, came an international recognition of Leguía's contributions and achievements as the Peruvian president. Crediting the president for Peruvian growth, one American ambassador praised Leguía for his intelligence, incredible leadership, and for "working 14 hours a day without rest for the eight years of his presidency."¹²⁷ Another article even included Seminario's characterization of Leguía, as "a financial and industrial genius, and one of the hardest working men I ever knew."

¹²⁸ Despite the historian's blatant need to account for the bias of these statements, such sentiments revealed the strengthened Peruvian-American bond and cemented Leguía's

¹²⁵ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, July 6 1926, Document 30, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹²⁶ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, November 2 1927, Document 142, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *The North China Daily News* Article, September 20 1927, Document 128, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

international reputation. Other publications additionally described the high esteem he enjoyed among his people:

President Leguía of Peru was the guest of a huge banquet attended by over three thousand persons recently at Lima, as part of a token of the nation's appreciation for the part their president played in the successful negotiations of the controversy with Chile...[he] was dragged from the Tennis Club to the Government House in his carriage by hundreds of enthusiastic citizens amid the acclamations of thousands.¹²⁹

Although both laymen and scholars alike remember Leguía as a brutal dictator, these publications in the 1920s consolidated a hero's perception on an international level, thus furthering the outlook of Peru as a modern, developed nation.

Leguía's reputation coupled with Peru's revived esteem to ultimately swing the international sympathy in the Tacna-Arica controversy in favor of the Peruvians. The controversy escalated when the United States delegated the American Plebiscite Commission to arbitrate the conflict.¹³⁰ With the entry of the United States as mediator, the Chilean populace rallied behind former president Arturo Alessandri Palma's cry of "Latin-America for Latin-Americans." Labeled the "unofficial spokesperson of Chile," Alessandri declared his resistance to the Monroe Doctrine, the 1823 policy in which the United States prohibited political encroachment into the Americas, and his allegiance to Pan-Americanism, an ideology stimulating cooperation among American states.¹³¹ Determined Chilean defiance ultimately compelled American president Calvin Coolidge to suspend relations with Chile.¹³² Consequently, international publications widely exposed the nature of such Chilean resistance, ultimately attributing the unending dispute to the fault of the Chilean government. Fostering

¹²⁹ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, November 16 1926, Document 76, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹³⁰ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, June 16 1926, Document 28, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹³¹ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, June 20 1926, Document 29, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹³² *The Japan Advertiser* Article, June 16 1926, Document 28, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

sympathy for the Peruvian position, The *Japan Advertiser* published in 1927: “It is regarded as certain that the world will be informed of the evidence of Chilean unfairness in possession of the United States Government and that the blame for the failure of the negotiations will be placed on the Chilean officials.”¹³³ Perhaps shifting the international consensus to favor Peru by default of Chilean defiance over foreign intervention, sympathy throughout the Pacific nonetheless swung to embrace the Peruvians and Americans as the “good guys” in the controversy.

IV. Government in Latin America

We transition now to examine these processes within a broader theoretical discussion of Latin American government. In light of his striking success in developing Peru, Leguía’s dictatorship, while brutal, proves in historical hindsight a superior alternative to the crippling and violent inconsistency of Peruvian government prior to his term in office. Where in a previous decade, the Peruvian government remained under the jurisdiction of its Chilean counterpart in diplomacy with the Japanese and sought political alliances to counter Chilean dominance, found themselves in 1927 in a powerful diplomatic position with both the United States and Japan seeking Peruvian affinity. Leguía’s term proved additionally fundamental as the Pacific became a center for international diplomacy in the 1920s as a response to trans-Pacific collaboration instigated by the Japanese, as well as the expanding influence of the United States. By association, prominence in the Pacific promised prestige on an international level.

Furthermore, Leguía’s term echoes the similar history of Porfirio Díaz’ presidency in Mexico (1876-1911). Although the corruption and decline of rights which transpired under the *Porfiriato* are widely recognized, there also exists the argument that political consistency

¹³³ *Ibid.*

brought by Díaz allowed for development impossible during Mexico's previous political eras. In contrast to the violence wrought by the legacy of *caudillos* such as Antonio López de Santa Anna and unending political violence, the *Porfiriato* restored to Mexico a geopolitical relevance, similar to Leguía's actions in 1920s Peru. Both Leguía and Díaz established a level of political consistency previously unseen in either nation, subsequently generating unprecedented opportunities for internal development.

For these reasons, authoritarian government proves in historical hindsight the more productive alternative to failed attempts at democracy by fledgling Latin American governments. While examining governmental theory in third world nations, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root suggest: "democratic governance does not necessarily engender effective policy performance."¹³⁴ Thus, while both Leguía and the Díaz arguably failed to consolidate truly durable, lasting political institutions favorable to their respective peoples, the two tyrannical governments perhaps provided the superior immediate alternative for two Latin American states desperately struggling for sufficient resources to modernize.

This understanding provides further insight into how Peru, within a few short years in the 1920s, emerged from obscurity to prominence in the Pacific through an alliance with Japan. Japanese affinity helped mobilize Peruvian action countering Chilean influence, however with the plebiscite controversy developing favorably, and as the Peruvian government came into their own diplomatically, the Peruvians no longer needed to depend on an alliance with Japan to forge a prestigious standing in the Pacific.

¹³⁴ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, "When Bad Economics is Good Politics," in *Governing for Prosperity* edited by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root (New Haven: University of Yale Press, 2000), 9.

V. Calm on the Outside While Unstable on the Inside: Peruvian-Japanese Diplomacy in the Mid-1920s

The year 1924 witnessed the two governments consolidate a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,¹³⁵ although the agreement was not ratified until 1928.¹³⁶ The failure to ratify the treaty rested primarily in the complacency of the Peruvian correspondence with the Japanese.¹³⁷ Where the Japanese promptly communicated on the matter, the Peruvians assumed an increasingly passive approach.¹³⁸ This discrepancy reflected the sustained Japanese commitment to a Peruvian alliance, and the developing Peruvian realization that an alliance with the Japanese proved neither as necessary or beneficial as it appeared only a few years earlier. As we see in the coming paragraphs, racial distinctions compounded the fact that after the Peruvians received what they desired from a Japanese alliance, vis-à-vis countering Chilean influence, the attraction to a Japanese relationship declined immensely. This contrast developed throughout this middle era of interwar relations and proved vital to dividing the nations by the end of the decade. As the 1920s progressed, and with the ratification of the treaty still hanging in the air, the Japanese actively pursued opportunities to illustrate their intentions. Conversely for the Peruvian context, investigation of the new treaty reveals that newfound international prestige allowed the Peruvian government to entertain the possibility of forging an alliance for the future alternative to Japan.

¹³⁵ Seizaburo Shimizu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, December 25 1924, Document 53, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹³⁶ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, December 29 1928, Unknown Document Number, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹³⁷ Peruvian diplomatic complacency even forced the nations to extend their previous treaty in 1923, 1924, and 1925 before they finalized the new agreement. Seizaburo Shimizu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, September 27 1923, Documents 63-66, Collection 6-18, ACMRE. And Seizaburo Shimizu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, January 3 1924, Document 3, Collection 6-18, ACMRE. And Seizaburo Shimizu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, December 25 1924, Document 53, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹³⁸ Japanese promptness vs. Peruvian complacency became a pivotal characteristic of each nation's diplomatic approach towards the other as the 1920s progressed.

However, despite such diplomatic complacency, the Peruvians maintained their pursuit of Japanese migration during this period as Japanese labor remained a pillar of the Peruvian economy. For example, Seminario publicly endorsed the Japanese migrant lifestyle, asserting that “there is no discrimination against them [Japanese migrants] in any class of society.”¹³⁹ Ignoring the reality of immense hardship faced by migrant communities, Seminario’s promotion supplemented the Japanese effort to promote migration to Peru. Moreover, this process reveals the dual nature of Peruvian ambition in this period. On the one hand, the Peruvians maintained the beneficial aspects of relations with Japan through migration, while on the other, keeping their options open in terms of electing a politically strategic ally for the future.

Consequently, the consistently ambitious and savvy Peruvian government began inspecting superior alternatives to the Japanese alliance in the hunt for furthering Peruvian prestige in the Pacific. Here we turn again to proclamations provided by individuals such as Seminario in international publications, where the exposure of Peruvian diplomatic perspectives served to advocate Peruvian ambition to the world. For example, in a *North-China Daily News* article, Seminario noted:

For labour, we have to rely a great deal on native Indians, and some Japanese immigrants, but some day or other the great emigratory currents from Europe, which are now absorbed by other Latin-American Republics, may find their way to the territory where possibilities are better, perhaps than anywhere else in the American Continent. [referring to Peru].¹⁴⁰

Although ironic considering the Peruvians desired to maintain the Japanese labor supply, the ambassador’s remark presented the Peruvian stance on Japanese migration as minimal and temporary, subsequently illustrating a desire to commence relations with other nations through

¹³⁹ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, 1927, Document 130, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁴⁰ *The North China Daily News* Article, September 20 1927, Document 128, Collection 5-18, ACMRE

migration and foreign settlement. Leguía thrust his nation into international prominence, affording him the opportunity to search for a potentially superior ally, and possibly superior migrants, to the Japanese. This ambition additionally served to divide the governments of Japan and Peru as Leguía expanded relations with the United States, a power increasingly contentious with Japan.

Thus, while relations of this period appeared stable on the outside as the states consolidated a new treaty, and as the national pursuits of both governments mutually diverted attention away from diplomacy with the other, deeper examination reveals an increasing division in the relationship. Diplomatic complacency and the drive for allies alternative to Japan set the stage for the downfall of Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy in 1928.

VI. The Japanese Context, Imperialism, and the Forging of a Pacific Community

Equivalently, the Japanese came into their diplomatic own during this era of interwar relations, as the Japanese stimulated collaboration across the Pacific. These new diplomatic efforts spurred substantially from the revived internationalist and legalistic tenants of Japanese diplomacy explored in the previous chapter. For example, Tokyo hosted the Third Pan-Pacific Conference in 1926.¹⁴¹ Epitomizing both the expanded nature of Pacific diplomacy during this period, as well as the Japanese role in stimulating collaborative endeavors, the conference marked a clear transition in Japan's diplomatic role in the region. Only a few years previous the newcomers to the Americas, the Japanese in 1926 found themselves stimulating and hosting extensive intercontinental collaboration. Aiming "to initiate and promote the cooperation and study of scientific problems relevant to the Pacific region, and particularly to obtain the

¹⁴¹ Ro Mori, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, August 31 1925, Numero de Oficio 25, 49, 64, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

prosperity and well being of the countries which reside in the region,” the Japanese emerged as the new, self-declared arbiters of Pacific collaboration.¹⁴² The Japanese additionally hosted the World’s Juvenile Exposition in 1927,¹⁴³ and the Japanese Association of Engineers contributed wholesomely in the period’s International Engineering Congress.¹⁴⁴

This context illustrates how Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy created an international community in the Pacific. As examined in previous paragraphs, the Peruvians instigated collaboration with the United States, and promoted international communication across the Pacific through various global diplomatic tours. Equivalently, the Japanese fostered international awareness and collaboration through the aforementioned trans-Pacific forums. These actions by the governments of Peru and Japan emerged fundamentally as a result of the two initiating an alliance in the early twentieth century. Realizing a diplomatic foothold with the Peruvians paved the way for the Japanese to simulate trans-Pacific collaboration across the Americas. The Japanese only found these novel opportunities because relations with the Peruvians invited Japan into Latin American geopolitics. This realization exposes how non-Western states contributed dramatically to the shaping of an international community traditionally thought to be dominated only by American influence.

This new face of Japanese diplomacy culminated in the consolidation of new Japanese treaties in the region. In 1925, the Japanese consolidated the Soviet-Japanese Basic Convention with the Russian government. Although the pact removed the Japanese military presence in the

¹⁴² Ro Mori, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, August 31 1925, Numero de Oficio 25, 49, 64, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹⁴³ M. Elias Bonnemaïson, Peruvian Minister to Japan, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, December 15 1927, Documents 155-158, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁴⁴ Keiichi Yamasaki, Peruvian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, November 21 1927, Numero de Oficio 68, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

Northern region of Sakhalin island, an occupation resulting from the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the agreement permitted the Japanese to colonize, explore, and retain rights to half of the oil reserves in North Sakhalin. Also promising to protect Japanese economic interests in the territory, the treaty expanded Japan's already substantial presence in East Asia.¹⁴⁵ Removing the military presence and increasing the Japanese economic operations and potential in the area, the pact altered the region to assume an increased Japanese functionality. Despite the lack of imperialist ambitions in this pact with Russia, and the fact that scholars emphasize the mid-1920s as a relatively calm period of Japanese imperialism, the agreement nonetheless heightened Peruvian concerns of Japanese empire in the region. As the Peruvians witnessed Japanese expansion from across the Pacific Ocean, they subsequently developed the fear that Peru could be next in line.

Where the treaty with Russia appeared concerning, the Japanese government's subsequent treaty permitting settlement in Brazil vaulted the perception of Japanese empire into Peru's backyard. The treaty granted Japanese the right to settle across 50,000 hectares of land in the Brazilian state of Pará.¹⁴⁶ An area with rich agro-economic potential with cotton, rice, tobacco, and rubber,¹⁴⁷ and near to the abundant water source in the Amazon River, this agreement extended the Japanese presence in the nation beyond Sao Paulo.¹⁴⁸ The pact established a substantial, new Japanese influence in South America, fueling the Peruvian fear of a domino effect of Japanese empire in the Latin America.

¹⁴⁵ Seizaburo Shimizu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, March 18 1925, Documents 2, 19, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹⁴⁶ M. Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, August 30 1927, Document 108, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁴⁷ M. Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, June 10 1927, Document 72, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁴⁸ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, August 30 1927, Document 109, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

The Japanese further expanded their international economic activity in 1925, when numerous Japanese fertilizer companies formed an association to import German sulphuric potassium.¹⁴⁹ This drive to extend an economic influence abroad compounded when the Japanese government additionally sought to nationalize their fertilizer industry. International periodicals even picked up on the action, designating fertilizer “a very important munition of war and the government is anxious to bring the domestic supply to where it equals the demand.”¹⁵⁰ By associating economic growth with war, these sentiments compounded the Peruvian fear of a Japanese government increasingly prepared to force political or military expansion in South America and Peru.

Furthermore, the passing of the Taisho Emperor in 1926 created yet another medium for which the Japanese could express the presence and pride of their empire throughout the Pacific. The ensuing festivities for the new emperor's coronation trickled into diplomacy as the Japanese eagerly invited important Peruvian officials to attend the enthronement. Appealing the attendance of Peruvian officials incidentally served to paint the processes of 1926-1927 with a new tinge of the Japanese government's confidence in their empire, consequently emphasizing the broadening Japanese presence throughout the region. Adding to the aforementioned political and economic expansion in Russia and Brazil, the diplomatic activity for the Showa Emperor's enthronement provoked a perfect storm of concern for the Peruvian government. Further encouraging the Peruvians to seek a Pacific ally for the future alternative to Japan, this era saw the Peruvian-Japanese relationship begin to fray at the edges.

¹⁴⁹ M. Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, August 15 1927, Document 97, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁵⁰ *Japan Advertiser* Article, June 1 1926, Document 34, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

VII. Conclusion

This middle phase of interwar diplomacy witnessed neither a weakening or strengthening of relations, but rather a delay of conflict as the mid-1920s proved a pivotal period of significant development for each nation. Despite the seemingly conflict-ready nature of relations in this period, the years 1924-1927 witnessed a stability of Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy as tensions simmered, but had yet to bubble over the surface. Settling the new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in 1924 allowed each government to put conflicts with the other on hold as each pursued national interests in the Pacific. Japan's government consolidated treaties with Russia and Brazil, consequently extending the Japanese presence and economic activity in the region. As the self-proclaimed arbiter of Pan-Pacific communication, the Japanese exerted their influence by stimulating numerous international conferences and collaborate efforts throughout the region. Conversely, the Peruvian government grew into their diplomatic own as the Tacna-Arica plebiscite turned in Peruvian favor, and recognition of Peruvian development spread across the region leading to increased diplomacy with the United States.

These developments in trans-Pacific communication reflect the substantial, and previously ignored extent to which Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy forged the Pacific community. In an era before the Pacific emerged as a fully recognized and connected region, these two non-Western states set the gears in motion for the region to grow into fundamental importance in the twentieth century. This chapter additionally emphasizes once more the fundamental role of South American history in shaping these diplomatic processes. Forged out of political manipulation, desperation, and convenience, Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy flowered from an accidental partnership into a relationship fundamental for the history of the Pacific region

From these processes emerges a distinction between the surface level and the deeper reality of this relationship. On the outside, the relationship peaked in this era, as the two governments consolidated a new treaty, endured no conflict, and exchanged diplomatic praises. One Peruvian official went so far as to note that “relations between Peru and Japan are all that could be desired. ‘Japanese immigrants in Peru are held in high esteem,’ he said, ‘both socially and commercially.’”¹⁵¹ Yet, underneath this misleading surface, as Peruvian fears of Japanese imperialism brewed, and the Japanese remained relentless in their diplomatic activity and prideful expression of the empire, deeper examination of this era reveals a bubbling perfect storm which came to a head on the eve of 1928.

Although this thesis explores in more detail the role of race in both the preceding and succeeding chapters, we must reconsider this theme in light of this era of stasis. Late November of 1927 heralded a new era of Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy as the Peruvian government forwarded legislation requiring all Asian migrants to enter the country through the “Sanitary Station of Callao” to be cleaned and approved sufficiently healthy before entering Peru.¹⁵² The racist provision marked the inception of the Peruvians acting on their fears/perceptions of Japanese imperialism. As the perfect storm emerged, incorrectly confirming Peruvian suspicions of Japanese political aggression, the 1927 provision exposed race as a core of diplomatic-consciousness even when relations appeared stagnant. Moreover, racism sparked diplomatic discrepancies from ignorable to fundamental in 1927, as the Peruvians embarked upon a path to secure associational racial prestige through allying with the United States.

¹⁵¹ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, 1926, Document 10, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁵² Japanese Ministry, Memorandum to Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Relations, November 8, 1927, Documents 60-63, Collection 5-18, 1927, ACMRE.

In 1918, the Peruvian government sought an alliance with the Japanese out of political desperation. Yet late 1927 saw the Peruvians remain equally geopolitically ambitious, but at that point wielding a manipulative savvy produced by the fact they no longer needed to rely on an alliance with the Japanese for international acclaim.

Chapter Seven

1928-1930: Decline of Japanese-Peruvian Relations

I. Introduction

Although consolidating a new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and emerging from a period of relative stasis, 1928 wrought a distinct downturn in Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy. The consequences of the nationalist mindset assumed by each nation during the previous phase of relations emerged as detrimental once various tensions, which at one point each government overlooked, came to a head. The Japanese aggressive legalistic mentality, as well as their growing presence in Brazil and East Asia, led the Peruvian government to determine that Peru was next in Japan's pursuit of internationalism and empire.

Furthermore, where the Japanese a decade earlier appeared a valuable ally for Peruvian political concerns in South America, now seemed a burden for a nation seeking friendship with the United States. Since the late nineteenth century, a distinct tension underlying Japanese-Peruvian relations came with the fact that these were two non-Western, non-white nations competing for international prestige in an increasingly internationally-conscious and connected Pacific world. As the 1920s progressed, it became increasingly evident that the governments of Japan and the United States were moving in ideologically opposite directions. And as Japanese-American relations declined and Peruvian-American relations flowered, the Peruvians perceived the United States as a superior strategic ally for the future. With the intent of attaining an associational prestige, the Peruvians followed the American model of selecting China as an ally in Asia alternative to Japan. Through these means, the Peruvians strove to place

themselves in a favorable light with the Americans by advancing relations with an American ally in China.

Relations deteriorated as the Peruvian government first limited Japanese economic activity in Peru before later pursuing provisions affecting Japanese migrants themselves. Through these processes, we see an imperialistic irony as the Peruvians pursued anti-Japanese legislation on the grounds of fear of Japanese imperialism, when the Peruvians initially sought Japanese affinity for aid in pursuing expansionist endeavors to reclaim Tacna-Arica.

II. Resolvement of the Tacna-Arica Plebiscite

The processes of 1928 and 1929 cemented the Peruvian national reputation as one of South America's dominants through achieving favorable outcomes in two substantial Andean boundary disputes. Signing the Treaty of Borders with Colombia in 1928,¹⁵³ the Peruvians resolved a longstanding territorial contention with Colombia, leading *The Japan Advertiser* to declare 1928 as:

an epochal year in Peruvian history...after virtually ten years of effort on the part of President Leguía...Peru gained territory previously ceded by Ecuador to Colombia South of the Putumayo, adjoining a region long in dispute between Peru and Ecuador and also among Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.¹⁵⁴

Success compounded in 1929 when the Tacna-Arica plebiscite finally came to a close.

Determining for Peru to claim Tacna, and Chile to retain Arica, 1929 put to rest the Peruvian primary diplomatic concern of the 1920s.¹⁵⁵ The diplomatic success further highlighted the esteem of Leguía's Peru across the region. Elias Bonnemaïson, Peruvian Minister to Japan noted

¹⁵³ Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, January 30 1928, Document Not Numbered, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁵⁴ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, No Date 1928, Anexo al Oficio Número 103, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁵⁵ William E. Skuban, *Lines in the Sand: Nationalism and Identity on the Peruvian-Chilean Frontier* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 111.

of the controversy: “overcome with patriotism, emotion, and comprehending the transcendental management which put an end to our litigation, [resolving the Tacna-Arica controversy] returns peace to the Continent, and opens the nation to new horizons of prosperity without the shock of war.”¹⁵⁶ Bonnemaison also emphasized the “profound affection” which Peruvians felt toward their president.¹⁵⁷ Remarkable achievements in settling the substantial Andean disputes allowed the Peruvians to emerge in 1930 as one of South America’s most powerful states.

Furthermore, Peruvian success in territorial disputes revived a sense of American continental regionalism, further placing the Japanese at an unfavorable distance. Leguía decreed in 1930: “the Confraternity among the American nations must be estimated as a permanent basis of their development and greatness.”¹⁵⁸ The decree reinforced the Peruvian commitment to allying with the United States while simultaneously distancing the Japanese by employing substantially less effort into diplomacy with the Japanese government. With the end of the conflict over which the Peruvians originally sought Japanese aid, allying with the Japanese appeared less attractive than ever before. The late 1920s saw the Peruvians further relations with the United States, Colombia, and China, while distancing themselves from the Japanese.

These processes expose two fundamental aspects of this story. First, race formed a substantial influence in leading the Peruvians away from the Japanese. As the top of the international hierarchy, the Americans defined racial status through brandishing a monopoly on racial prestige. Consequently, non-Western states such as Peru pursued the ambiguous claim of second best by associating with the Americans, as opposed to the increasingly imperialistic and

¹⁵⁶ Elias Bonnemaison, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, June 30 1929, Numero de Oficio 41, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁵⁷ Elias Bonnemaison, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, February 15 1929, Numero de Oficio 9, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁵⁸ *The Japan Advertiser* Article, No Date 1930, Document Not Numbered, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

distant Japanese government. And secondly, the Peruvians ultimately followed the American model of seeking the Chinese rather than the Japanese as an ally in East Asia. Chiang Kai-Shek reinforced strong relations with Leguía in 1929, and Peruvian correspondence with the Japanese in general after 1929 grew increasingly infused references to China and substance relating to Peruvian-Chinese diplomacy.¹⁵⁹ The Peruvians even delegated the extremely prominent ambassador Elias Bonnemaïson, previously Peruvian Minister to Japan, to Peruvian Minister to China.¹⁶⁰

Although the Chinese equivalently remained inferior within the American monopoly on racial prestige, the Chinese held a healthy diplomatic relationship with the Americans. While we can partly attribute enhanced relations with the Chinese as an offshoot of Chiang's consolidation of power in 1928, allying with China nonetheless permitted the Peruvians to retain an ally in East Asia while maintaining friendly relations with the United States. This process solidified Peruvian associational international prestige through furthering relations with the Americans, and by extending relations with an American ally in the Chinese. Overall, the constructions of race and the extent to which the prospect of American allyship dramatically influenced the forging of alliances between other Pacific states, reveals these as fundamental themes previously unexplored in studies of interwar diplomacy.

III. The Japanese Presence in the Pacific

At the turn of 1928, the Japanese maintained their persistent economic activity and collaborative efforts across the Pacific. A sector of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the

¹⁵⁹ Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, August 6 1929, Numero de Oficio 4, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁶⁰ Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, July 3 1929, Numero de Oficio 53, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

Japanese sent in 1928 a Japanese Commercial Mission to numerous Latin American nations.¹⁶¹ “With the purpose of intensifying the commercial relations between South America and Japan,” the endeavor additionally served to confine the Peruvians to a feeling of encroachment by the Japanese to the region, as the incursions compounded the political and economic initiatives in South America explored in the previous chapter.¹⁶² With a growing Japanese political presence in the region, this period witnessed numerous Japanese companies thriving in Peru. The subject of diplomacy and wielding enough influence to request meetings with Leguía, the influence of Japanese enterprises such as the Cotton Company of Peru, exposed the drastic influence of Japanese economic operations in South America.¹⁶³ Furthermore, the Japanese sought entrance into the once booming Peruvian guano economy. Relating to the Japanese desire to nationalize the fertilizer trade from 1926, their desire to import guano in 1929 further compounded the Peruvian sense of encroachment by the Japanese. Desiring “an agency for its sale in Japan,”¹⁶⁴ the Japanese claimed they had studied guano extensively and desired for the Y. Suzuka Shorten Ltd. corporation to sell the fertilizer in Japan.¹⁶⁵ Ultimately, these economic endeavors represented the culmination of Japan’s fervent international economic activity initiated during the middle phase of relations which in 1929 festered beyond ignorable by the Peruvian government.

¹⁶¹ Keiichi Yamasaki, Envoy Extraordinary and Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to Peru, Letter to Dr. D. Pedro José Rada y Gamio, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, January 5 1928, Numero de Oficio 1, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹⁶² Keiichi Yamasaki, Letter to Dr. D. Pedro José Rada y Gamio, February 16 1928, Número de Oficio 5, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹⁶³ Keiichi Yamasaki, Letter to Dr. D. Pedro José Rada y Gamio, June 3 1928, Document Not Numbered, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹⁶⁴ Elias Bonnemaïson, Peruvian Minister to Japan, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, November 11 1929, Numero de Oficio 129, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁶⁵ Unknown author, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, January 15 1930, Numero de Oficio 2, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

Furthermore, the expanded Japanese military activity abroad, as well as military-related discourse in diplomacy with the Peruvians, proved additional factors seemingly confirming Peruvian fears of the Japanese intention to exert empire in Peru. For example, the League of Nations provided an international stage for the assessment of international military conflicts. In 1930, the League openly reviewed the conflict the Japanese encountered with Chinese troops at Tsinan consequently accentuating Japanese military action abroad to an international audience.¹⁶⁶ The Japanese additionally remained relentless in inviting their Peruvian counterparts to attend Emperor Hirohito's nearing enthronement ceremony. Invitations to the coronation provided yet another avenue for the Japanese government to emphasize their presence in the Pacific as well as the pride in which the Japanese referred to the empire.

In the wake of the Japanese government's new treaties increasing economic operations and foreign settlement in Russia and Brazil, the infusion of imperial pride into diplomatic correspondence only furthered Peruvian diplomatic concerns. These concerns came to a head in 1930 when the Japanese delegated Shinichi Harada, the Infantry Captain of the Japanese Military,¹⁶⁷ to study the Spanish language at the Peruvian military school in Chorrillos.¹⁶⁸ Although the effort most likely aimed to bring the language to sectors of Japanese society beyond only diplomats and bureaucrats, the decision to send a significant military individual, rather than a scholar or linguist, to study the language represented highly imperialist behavior. Thus, where before 1928, Japanese increased economic, military, and political endeavors

¹⁶⁶ Elias Bonnemaison, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, September 15 1928, Document Not Numbered, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁶⁷ Saburo Kurusu, Envoy Extraordinary and Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to Peru, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, August 31 1929, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹⁶⁸ Saburo Kurusu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, October 26 1929, Numero de Oficio 21, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

appeared distinct, the processes of 1928 seemingly linked these actions in a highly imperialist manner, forging a “this is the last straw” diplomatic situation.

As the Japanese intimately fused their economic, political, and military pursuits, a memorandum delivered to the Peruvians served to confirm these concerns beyond a doubt. Titled “A Few Points Concerning the Development of Japan,” the memorandum read like a speech delivered by a military general to his troops on the eve of battle. The document highlighted Japan’s greatness, economic progress, and industrialization in the wake of their successful nineteenth century wars. The memorandum ushered in a distinct turn for the worse of the Peruvian-Japanese relationship, as the document emphasized imperialist ideals, essentially providing the spark of evidence to confirm Peruvian fears. The memorandum noted of Japan’s historical accomplishments:

The previous states or periods to arrive at the present, can be seen as preliminary, or as purifications of the undeserving customs of its feudal society...Therefore, Japan, after the irruptions of China and India, has fought to preserve its natural tendencies, being an example of them for the better confirmation for what it feels are the Japanization of the teachings of Confucius...and the doctrines...that have formed Japanese Shintoism...The study of these questions [now referring to the economy] clearly demonstrate both the activity of this state in fomenting its commerce and its ability to provide [for] its industries..without having the base for these industries.¹⁶⁹

The memorandum represented a diplomatic coming out party, as the Japanese emphasized their remarkable historical journey into the self-proclaimed state model for East Asia. The document praised and highlighted Japan’s dramatic economic and industrial growth up to 1929, labeling the Japanese with a “spirit of industry.”¹⁷⁰ Both highlighting and justifying Japan as an

¹⁶⁹ Japanese Government, Letter to Guillermo Martínez R., Secretary of the Peruvian Legation in Japan, April 10 1929, Numero de Oficio 20, Pages 1, 2, 9, 11, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

international power, this document represented the consequences of the nationalist nature of the middle phase of interwar relations while also providing another effort to convince the Peruvians of Japan's worth. As 1924-1927 observed each government focus on issues aside from their relationship, 1929 exposed that time apart as a detriment to Peruvian-Japanese relations by exposing how distinct the governments had become. This process propelled Japan into an imperial power in 1929 encouraging the Peruvians to act on their suspicions to counter Japanese political influence.

IV. Realizing the Downfall

Aside from the late 1927 law mandating all Asian migrants pass through the port of Callao, anti-Japanese legislation began in earnest in 1928 through limiting Japanese economic activity in Peru. For example, the Peruvians grew complacent in enforcing Article 10 of the Cabotage Law, a provision in the new treaty between the nations. The article permitted Japanese cargo boats arriving in Peru to carry the same goods and operate under equal export rights and fees as Peruvian import ships.¹⁷¹ The Peruvian government additionally limited the actions of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship Company by assigning a patent limiting the enterprise's operations. Claiming the enterprise failed to provide the Peruvian government with proper income records, the action epitomized the realization of the Japanese-Peruvian diplomatic downfall. The Japanese countered the patent as unfair as the company emerged by 1929 as one of the Pacific's largest and most important steamship enterprises. The Japanese noted the unjust nature of these actions largely because the Peruvian government permitted the English, South American, and Italian Steamship Companies, as well as Grace Line, to operate without

¹⁷¹ Keiichi Yamasaki, Letter to Dr. D. Pedro José Rada y Gamio, October 22 1928, Número de Oficio 19, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

restrictions.¹⁷² The Japanese further claimed victims of inequality when the Peruvian government applied higher taxes on Japanese-imported porcelain than on European imports of similar goods. The Japanese asserted:

There does not exist in Peru any producer of porcelain, and for the previously mentioned reasons, it does not appear fair to assign such an unequal proportion [of taxes on Japanese-imported porcelain], while its counterpart, crockery [exported by European nations], remains extremely favored by the tariff....[Porcelain] is of absolute necessity even for people of limited resources.¹⁷³

In addition to prohibiting the importation of Japanese-produced medicine, this example further reveals how the developments of 1928-1930 transformed Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy from an era of stasis to direct contention.¹⁷⁴

The origins of economic animosity grew not from competition between the national economies, but rather due to daily economic competition between Japanese migrants and Peruvian citizens. As the Great Depression devastated the Peruvian working class, insular-functioning migrant communities suffered to a significantly lesser extent. Social anxieties fostered at the ground level between Peruvian citizens and Japanese migrants subsequently fueled a racial rhetoric for the Peruvian government to restrict large-scale Japanese economic operations in Peru. Although the Peruvian and Japanese national economies remained relatively distinct consequently posing no direct mutual threat, social processes and quotidian economic competition surged into substantial economic limitations at the national level.

¹⁷² Saburo Kurusu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, January 21 1930, Numero de Oficio 1, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹⁷³ Saburo Kurusu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, October 31 1930, Document Not Numbered, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

¹⁷⁴ Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, November 29 1929, Numero de Oficio 126, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

Due the explosion of these social animosities, economic limitations eventually gave way to legislation directly affecting and limiting Japanese migrants in Peru. In 1929, the Peruvians officially placed all Japanese migration under state jurisdiction and mandated that any aspiring migrant's passport receive direct approval from the Peruvian Director of Immigration. Increasing the bureaucratic process for migration, the new law dramatically curbed the number of Japanese arriving in Peru.¹⁷⁵ Through restricting migration, the most original, central, and common facet of the Peruvian-Japanese relationship, the law communicated a deeper message reflecting the Peruvians' significantly reduced desire to engage with the Japanese.

In the same vain that diplomatic complacency yielded complacency in enforcing economic equality, such an approach translated into the Peruvian government's failure to bring justice to crimes committed against Japanese residents. After a series of particularly frequent and impactful discriminatory crimes, Saburo Kurusu, a member of the Japanese legation in Lima, petitioned the Peruvians for justice on behalf of these offenses:

During the days on which occurred the political developments of August of this year; in certain cities, principally Lima and the surrounding areas, I regret to inform you of the unfortunately numerous cases of assaults and looting of property, committed by the [Peruvian] populace against industrial establishments held by Japanese subjects.¹⁷⁶

That the Japanese felt forced to petition for justice for these substantial physical and economic crimes, reveals a disturbing complacency in the Peruvian government's actions towards Japanese

¹⁷⁵ Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, July 15 1929, Numero de Oficio 57, Collection 5-18, ACMRE. And Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, September 15 1929, Numero de Oficio 93, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

¹⁷⁶ Saburo Kurusu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, December 23 1930, Numero de Oficio 20, Collection 6-18, ACMRE.

migrant communities. The Peruvians even denied numerous claims filed by Japanese residents for the losses suffered from burglary, stating the claims lacked sufficient documentation.¹⁷⁷

This theme exposes once more the intimate duality of social and diplomatic processes in interwar Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy. Peruvian diplomatic decisions affected Japanese on the ground by complicating processes for migration as well as failing to enforce justice for crimes committed. However, this discriminatory activity and legal complacency emerged significantly from the competition and conflict experienced between quotidian Peruvians and Japanese, as the onset of the Great Depression substantially affected the Peruvian working class. Because the Peruvian elite dominated the economy, elites monopolized commercial enterprises in Peru with little competition while distorting the unequal reality as the fault of Japanese migrants. Although this era of hardship most likely saw all minority communities marginalized to some extent, the economic insularity and sustained, relative success enjoyed by Japanese migrant communities, even after 1929, fashioned Japanese as easy targets for Peruvian discontent.¹⁷⁸ This economic disparity consequently generated fierce animosity between Japanese and Peruvians on the ground. Witnessed by a government desiring separation from their Japanese counterpart, the fact that Japanese companies and migrant communities enjoyed relative economic success while their own citizens suffered, provided additional justification for an intentional complacency in diplomacy and law.

Here we must revisit the imperialistic irony embedded within Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy. The Peruvians commenced diplomatic and economic resistance of Japanese institutions primarily grounded in the fear of Japanese imperialism. In retrospect, these actions

¹⁷⁷ 1935-Reclamaciones Japonesas, Informe Final de la Comisión Investigadora de Reclamaciones Extranjeras Japonesas Sobre Los Daños por los Acontecimientos Políticos de Agosto de 1930, (Junio-1930), ACMRE.

¹⁷⁸ Masterson and Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 66.

in the late 1920s appear highly ironic as the Peruvians initially sought Japanese affinity to strengthen a drive to reclaim territories under the legal jurisdiction of another government. Yet once the Peruvians furthered their objectives, forged an accord with the Americans, and ultimately gained the territory of Tacna, Japanese aid no longer proved necessary. Ultimately, the downfall of relations originated not from one factor in particular, but rather the culmination of Japanese legalism as explored in Chapter Five, the Peruvian pursuit of potentially more prestigious alliances in the Pacific, the distinct diplomatic paths each nation followed between 1924-1927, as well as increased Japanese operations in the region, all of which fueled a racial rhetoric employed by the Peruvian government to resist Japanese influence in Peru. Brewing a perfect storm, the Peruvians ironically capitalized on American racial models of resisting Japanese influence and empire in order to expand Peruvian influence in South America and solidify a prestigious associational standing in the Pacific.

The Peruvians bolstered limitations of the Japanese with a model of racial resistance employed throughout the region by the Americans. As a means of countering Japanese expansion, the American government instigated the regional phenomenon of fearing the “Yellow Peril” by framing Japanese migrations throughout the Pacific as evidence of a looming Japanese desire to exert empire across the region. Through these means, governments seeking American affinity, such as that of Peru, along with others in Central and South America united in what Eiichiro Azuma terms a “hemispheric alliance” to resist the Japanese presence. Abandoning America’s conventional competitors in Europe, the Americans encouraged anti-Japanese sentiments across the region.¹⁷⁹ Equivalently, the Peruvians, with the resolution of the

¹⁷⁹ Eiichiro Azuma, “Japanese Immigrant Settler Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S. Racial-Imperialist Politics of the Hemispheric ‘Yellow Peril,’” *Pacific Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (2014): 255-276.

contention with Chile, devoted attention away from traditional rivals in the Andes in order to unite in this new hemispheric resistance countering Japanese influence. This phenomena adds a new layer in the extent to which Japanese involvement in the Americas forged the modern Pacific community and illustrates the importance of diplomatic history in linking the seemingly distinct phenomena of race and geopolitical ambitions. Racial consciousness encouraged a commonality between Pacific states. Although the collaboration excluded the Asian nations, hemispheric racism nonetheless served as a collaborative endeavor fostering an international and regional consciousness on an escalated level.

V. Conclusion

Relations further deteriorated in late 1930 when Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro overthrew Leguía's presidency in a military coup.¹⁸⁰ The end of Leguía's term, a president overall sympathetic to the Japanese, marked the end of any hope for the two nations to rekindle healthy diplomatic relations in the early twentieth century. Cerro propelled Leguía's overthrow by attributing hardships wrought from the Great Depression, to Japanese migrants. Cerro consequently capitalized on economic competition and rising anti-Japanese sentiments in Peru,¹⁸¹ as well as the American position of opposing Japanese imperialism, to consolidate the presidency.¹⁸² Moreover, the inception of Cerro's term in 1930 marked the official end of Peruvian-Japanese interwar relations considered in this thesis as Cerro aggressively pursued limitations of Japanese migrant activity in Peru. The 80 Percent Law of 1932 mandated that all businesses in Peru, even those owned by Japanese residents, maintain a workforce of 80%

¹⁸⁰ C. Harvey Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), 48.

¹⁸¹ Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973*, 42.

¹⁸² Toake Endoh, *Exporting Japan: Politics of Immigration in Latin America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 24.

Peruvians.¹⁸³ Even later in the 1930s, Cerro's sucesor, Óscar Raymundo Benavides Larrea, revoked the Treaty of Commerce and Amity with Japan.¹⁸⁴

In retrospect, several factors came to a head in this phase of relations which unleashed the downfall of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy. First, relations blossomed between 1924-1927 partly because each government pursued national interests. Both governments developed relations with other nations and consolidated ties that ultimately served to pull them apart by 1928. Time spent apart ultimately divided the governments as the middle phase led the Japanese down an imperialist path, and the Peruvians toward an alliance with the United States, a power hostile to imperialism. Second, the middle era of relations saw neither a weakening nor strengthening of diplomatic ties but rather delayed the ultimate demise of the relationship. Third, as ideological distinctions between the nations emerged in 1928, numerous diplomatic themes, which at one point were ignorable, bubbled over the surface. For example, the Japanese government's relentless legalistic diplomacy, coupled with economic, political, and militaristic endeavors in the Pacific, all framed under the ideology of the glorious Japanese empire, forged a perfect storm conforming to the Peruvians that Peru could be next in the Japanese imperialist ambition in the Pacific. And lastly, Peruvian diplomatic achievement in South America, influence from the United States to favor China over Japan, as well as the pursuit of an associational prestige from allying with the United States, spurred Peruvian economic resistance to Japanese operations, followed by limitations on Japanese migrants.

The lesson exposed from the downfall of relations comes in understanding how governments in the Pacific consolidated alliances and capitalized on collaboration. This thesis

¹⁸³ Nobuko Adachi, "Introduction," in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures*, ed. Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 8.

¹⁸⁴ Masterson and Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 72.

explores the fundamental processes of why the Peruvian and Japanese governments consolidated and later severed relations throughout the interwar era. As the United States entered South American diplomacy in the 1920s as a dominant power, the allure of the benefit yielded through an alliance with the Americans outweighed the prospect of an increasingly geopolitically distant Japanese alliance. These processes explain why states forged alliances with particular states over others on the eve of the Second World War, subsequently granting a deep significance to the study of diplomatic history.

Although South American history traditionally receives little agency in the narrative of the Second World War, historical developments of the region held tremendous consequences for substantial groups of people. The consequences of the Peruvian decision to ally with the Americans and the Chinese, rather than the Japanese, unfolded during the Second World War when the Peruvian government deported thousands of their Japanese residents for internment in the United States. With many never returning to their homes in Peru, this development grants tremendous agency to the South American historical arc explaining Pacific geopolitics. Allies of convenience, desperation, and geopolitical strategy, the Japanese-Peruvian alliance accidentally blossomed into a fundamental development for Pacific history. An avenue for understanding a state's development, the origins of Pacific alliances, as well as the roots of the Pacific international community, investigating Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy in the 1920s emphasizes a previously ignored agency of the South American past in the broader narrative of world history.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

In retrospect, several factors explain why 1930 provides a logical stopping point for this thesis. First, as the 1930s progressed, Peruvian-Japanese relations continually devolved eventually sparking large anti-Japanese riots in Lima. The widespread explosion of anti-Japanese sentiment ultimately culminated with the Peruvian government deporting thousands of their Japanese residents for internment in the United States. Gardiner opined:

The mid-1930s had a chilling effect on Japanese-Peruvian relations: the 80 percent labor law, the denunciation of the treaty, the imposition of import quotas, the promulgation of an immigration decree, and suspension of naturalization procedure.¹⁸⁵

A product of the diplomatic processes of the late 1920s, from which the Peruvians elected the United States as an ally over Japan, the story of Japanese deportation and internment in the United States deserves its own study fully dedicated to the topic. For this reason, this thesis leaves the discussion concerning diplomatic processes at 1930. Secondly, the East Asian theatre of the Second World War began in 1931 with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Scholarship of wartime Japan has emerged as a prominent field of study, thus this paper seeks not to stretch itself too thin by entering into Japanese wartime historiography. Conversely, exploring the interwar era specifically enlightens how and why states consolidated alliances, consequently setting the sides between which conflict emerged in the Second World War. For these reasons, 1930 serves as a strong point for retrospective examination of the legacy of Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy within the broader arc of Pacific history.

¹⁸⁵ C. Harvey Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873-1973* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), 51, 49-55.

In addition to the historical phenomena shaping this process, this thesis questions the accepted role of race in the formation of Pacific states. Racism traditionally receives the label as a fundamentally exclusionary social construction. However, this thesis reveals that the racist diplomatic rhetoric stimulated across the Pacific by the United States, although excluding the Japanese, encouraged an unprecedented sense of inclusion and commonality between states in the Americas. This assertion seeks not to justify racism but rather to expose how a seemingly exclusionary phenomena contrarily fostered inclusivity between states involved in the racial alliance. This processes contributes another layer to the extent to which the consequences of Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy forged an international community in the Pacific. Although encouraged by the American government, the “Yellow Peril” evolved as an offshoot of Japanese-Peruvian diplomacy because broad hemispheric resistance to Japanese influence emerged only once Japan gained a sizeable diplomatic and economic foothold in South America, vis-à-vis relations with the Peruvians. American exclusion of Japanese migrants in the mid-nineteenth century forced the Japanese government to resort to Latin American destinations for emigration. Yet the growing robusticity of Japanese involvement in Latin America encouraged various strains of anti-Japanese sentiment, such as diplomatic limitations by the Peruvians or American racial resistance, into a broader, regional racism commonizing various states in the Americas.

Moreover, these developments shed new light on the emergence of various diplomatic phenomena of the twentieth century, such as the Good Neighbor Policy of 1933, within the overarching, emerging allure of pan-Americanism. An American policy mandating non-intervention in Latin American affairs, the provision simultaneously placed the United

States as the unofficial “overseer” in the continent. By mandating non-intervention, the Americans adopted a face of neutrality, while in reality solidifying the United States as the only dominant with the ability to assert influence in the Americas when convenient. This approach saw its explicit preview in the American encouragement of resisting Japanese influence in the “Yellow Peril.” The Americans capitalized on their position to offer an alliance as long as other states in the region cooperated with their geopolitical agenda. This contingency established the United States as both a diplomatic threat and potential friend in Latin America. This process emerged by the early 1930s as increasingly alluring to traditionally non-dominant governments, such as that of Peru, who sought allying with the United States as a means for attaining diplomatic leverage. This process subsequently encouraged a regional commonality and devotion to the United States, stimulating the origins of pan-Americanism. This regional phenomenon additionally placed regions such as East Asia at an unattractive geopolitical distance, subsequently ripening the formation of sides for the looming outbreak of the Second World War.

As a result of highlighting the drastic extent to which Peruvian history influenced the formation of the Pacific region, this thesis raises the questions of how the national histories of other non-Western states contributed to shaping the modern world. Although in this thesis a player of lesser relevance, Chilean history deserves further investigation. Unveiling the drastic regional importance of Peru, requires historians to additionally consider what role the phenomena imbedded in Chilean history, as well as that of other South American states, played in the development of the Pacific. In the East Asian context, this field also demands further research into the role of Chinese history in the emergence of the Pacific world. This thesis

suggests that further investigation into the histories of states traditionally ignored in the narrative of the Pacific's emergence will generate fresh perspectives on the historical contingencies and creation of the world today.

Retrospective analysis of these processes reinforces a central argument of this thesis: the dramatic role played by non-Western states and regions in forging the modern Pacific. This thesis applies a dense array of primary and secondary literature to reveal how Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy evolved from a distant alliance into a fundamental development for Pacific history. Inviting the Japanese into the Tacna-Arica controversy transformed a small, Andean dispute into a trans-Pacific affair inadvertently ushering in a new era of international consciousness and collaboration between East Asian and American states. This process exposes how the South American past, traditionally receiving little agency in influencing transcontinental historical mechanisms, conversely contributed dramatically to the creation and recognition of a Pacific community. This realization challenges scholarship overlooking the histories of traditionally non-dominant states, consequently reinforcing the historiographical contribution of this thesis.

And finally, this paper emphasizes the scholarly worth of diplomatic history. An avenue for insight into a state's internal development as well as their role in international affairs, the diplomatic approach synthesizes the consequences of seemingly distinct historical phenomena to construct a more holistic understanding of the past. The diplomatic perspective also links social processes and diplomatic behavior through reconciling surface level diplomatic correspondence, with the deeper national agenda of a state.

In the early stages of determining the focus for this project, I was asked: "why Peru, why Japan?" Initially, I answered this question through stating that diplomacy between the

governments held the potential to teach us about Peruvian and Japanese history in the early twentieth century. However, at the end of this project, it is evident that the legacy of interwar Peruvian-Japanese diplomacy looms far beyond the contexts of solely Peru or Japan, but rather tells the story of the consequences of diplomacy, migration, and empire in forging the modern Pacific world.

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