

# 1 Development of a Protocol for Engineering Applications of Evidence

## 2 Theory

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### 5 Abstract

6 Recent data trends and analysis have highlighted the need to incorporate more imprecise, ambiguous, and  
7 unreliable data into uncertainty analysis traditionally handled by probability theory. Data fraught with  
8 potential error and missing information, however, are not well suited for analysis using probability theory  
9 due to high epistemic uncertainty. Evidence Theory offers an alternative method of assessing epistemic  
10 uncertainty and is well suited for expanded use in engineering applications. Unfortunately, a unified  
11 approach to the application of Evidence Theory is lacking. To address this gap, we develop a protocol for  
12 engineering applications of Evidence Theory. The protocol proposes a logical procedure for defining the  
13 frame of discernment, the initial assignment of belief mass, the selection of combination rule, and sensitivity  
14 analysis. A literature review of prevailing methods related to the application of Evidence Theory highlights  
15 concepts and considerations to address. The steps of the protocol are then explored and discussed using an  
16 example problem including several rule combinations in order to highlight differences in the results and  
17 implications of making different analytical decisions. The protocol proposed herein is intended to facilitate  
18 engineering applications of Evidence Theory and promote more widespread use of the theory in the field  
19 of Civil Engineering.

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## 20 Introduction

21 The visibility and predominance of uncertainty in our daily lives is a major driver of our thoughts, emotions,  
22 and actions. We gather information in order to evaluate our uncertainty and guide our decision-making, and  
23 we consider information frivolous unless it contributes to that (Kyburg 1988). The analysis of uncertainties  
24 and development of decision-making frameworks has led to the adoption of mathematical formulations to  
25 represent uncertainties, resulting in a quantitative analysis of uncertainty. Currently, probability theory is  
26 the predominant method employed in uncertainty analysis.

27 Probability theory-based methods, however, are challenging to apply in situations characterized by  
28 ignorance, where lack of information makes estimates of initial (often called prior) probabilities or  
29 probability distributions difficult to justify (Shafer 2016). Probability theory, based on the applicability of  
30 distributions to model the different states of random variables, is well suited to address aleatory uncertainty  
31 of randomness and chance (Oberkampf and Helton 2002). Epistemic uncertainty, the state of imperfect  
32 knowledge arising from ignorance, is, however, difficult to analyze accurately using probability theory  
33 (Oberkampf et al. 2002). This is because judgments based on probability theory suggest there is precise  
34 information not only about the event itself, but also about its contrary, which is often not appropriate in  
35 cases of limited quantitative knowledge (Corotis 2015). Furthermore, these subjective judgments pertain  
36 not only to the selection of unknown probabilities, but also to the selection of a model and underlying  
37 distribution.

38 Given these circumstances, engineering challenges require novel methods of uncertainty assessment to  
39 address this shortcoming of probability theory, and improve both our understanding and our quantification  
40 of epistemic uncertainty. An interesting framework of assessing epistemic uncertainty is Evidence Theory,  
41 also known as Dempster-Shafer theory or the theory of belief functions. Evidence Theory was originally  
42 conceived in the late 1960s and 1970s (Dempster 1968; Shafer 1976), and saw initial applications and  
43 concept development within the Artificial Intelligence community in the 1980s. Evidence Theory has

44 recently seen expanded applications to machine learning and practical engineering problems (Attoh-Okine  
45 et al. 2009; Behrouz and Alimohammadi 2018; Denoeux 2000, 2013). Notable features of Evidence Theory  
46 are that the mathematics are set-based and there is an explicit recognition of ignorance. The recognition of  
47 ignorance presents a valuable tool for treating epistemic uncertainty and a methodological alternative to  
48 probability theory, in which the probabilities for and against (i.e., its complement) a given event must sum  
49 to unity.

50 Despite the perceived advantages and recent expanded research into Evidence Theory, there is a lack of an  
51 agreed upon method of applying Evidence Theory (Smets 2007). Many different approaches have been  
52 developed under the umbrella of Evidence Theory; however, it is not clear which methods are appropriate  
53 for certain applications and how particular methods influence results. This presents a clear research gap:  
54 “There is no single method appropriate for combining all types of evidence in all situations dealing with  
55 epistemic uncertainty” (Helton et al. 2004 pp. 10–26). The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to develop a  
56 protocol for the application of Evidence Theory. The goal of the protocol is to provide a method of  
57 systematically applying Evidence Theory, enabling an understanding of alternative methods of Evidence  
58 Theory application. This paper aims to expand the use of Evidence Theory in practical applications through  
59 the identification, demonstration, and discussion of the protocol. The proposed protocol will also facilitate  
60 and provide guidance for the performance of sensitivity analysis on Evidence Theory applications. A  
61 framework for performing sensitivity analysis is a crucial step in enabling practical engineering applications  
62 of Evidence Theory (Oberkampf and Helton 2002).

## 63 **Background**

### 64 **Review of previous engineering applications of Evidence Theory**

65 Evidence Theory has seen use for uncertainty analysis in engineering applications in recent years. The  
66 following section provides an example of many of these applications. The list is not comprehensive, but  
67 provides an overview of practical applications of Evidence Theory. These applications cover many topics,

68 including system reliability, structural assessment, natural hazard impact assessment, and multicriteria  
69 optimization.

70 Early application of Evidence Theory was primarily to engineering system safety and reliability. Bogler  
71 (1987) investigated Evidence Theory for the fusion of data from multiple sensors on an aircraft. Inagaki  
72 (1993) looked at the use of Evidence Theory in decision making using the Challenger space shuttle  
73 explosion as an example. Hester (2012) analyzed aircraft maintenance times by combining expert opinions  
74 of failure sources using Evidence Theory. Alim (1988) explored the use of Evidence Theory in seismic  
75 analysis, motivated by the inherent imprecision of seismic parameters and the frequent use of linguistic  
76 labels to confer quantitative data. Agarwal (2004) applied Evidence Theory to optimization, using belief  
77 functions as constraints in an example sizing an aircraft subject to performance requirements. Chen and  
78 Rao (1998) apply Evidence Theory to multi-criteria optimization as well, analyzing a four-bar mechanical  
79 linkage for an optimum path of travel. Fetz et al. (2000) analyze queuing times for transport vehicles given  
80 constraints on excavator capacity. Hou (2021) proposed a method of sensitivity analysis in order to obtain  
81 an overall view of system level reliability.

82 Evidence Theory has seen limited publication in fields of applied infrastructure research. Attoh-Okine has  
83 published research on the use of belief functions in pavement management systems (PMS) decision  
84 frameworks, estimating construction costs, infrastructure re-development, and an urban infrastructure  
85 resilience index (Attoh-Okine and Martinelli 1994; Attoh-Okine 2002; Attoh-Okine et al. 2009; Attoh-  
86 Okine and Gibbons 2001). Seites-Rundlett et al. (2022) uses Evidence Theory in the prediction of pavement  
87 condition from remote satellite imagery. Evidence Theory has been applied in hydrological analysis to  
88 incorporate uncertainty (Behrouz and Alimohammadi 2018; Zargar et al. 2012). Evidence Theory has seen  
89 applications in predicting transportation planning and traffic analysis (Kronprasert and Kikuchi 2011; Souza  
90 et al. 2016; Tarko and Roupail 1997; Truong et al. 2019). Evidence Theory has also seen applications in  
91 instances of data fusion to guide decision making (Cai et al. 2018; Zhao et al. 2010; Zhou et al. 2018).

92 Evidence Theory has also been applied in instances of performance and structural assessment (Ballent et  
93 al. 2019; Bao et al. 2012; Talon Aurélie et al. 2014).

94 Since its formal definition and introduction, Evidence Theory has garnered interest and research from the  
95 Expert Systems and Artificial Intelligence Communities (Denoeux 2000). This interest stemmed from the  
96 applicability of Evidence Theory to the realm of uncertain judgment, particularly due to the flexibility of  
97 the theory and its wide range of uses in decision-making (Murphy 2000). Many recent applications in  
98 machine learning take advantage of Dempster's rule of conditioning and Evidence Theory as a tool for  
99 fusing and transforming information into useful output (Denoeux 2019). Applications of Evidence Theory  
100 to supervised classification include the evidential K-nearest neighbor rule (EK-NN) (Denœux 2008a),  
101 binomial logistic regression (Denoeux 2019), and applying Dempster's rule to combine multiple classifiers  
102 into ensemble predictions (Bi et al. 2008). Recent research applications for Evidence Theory in  
103 unsupervised machine learning include deep learning and neural networks (Denoeux 2000, 2019; Huang et  
104 al. 2021) and clustering (Denœux et al. 2015). These have led to the development of machine learning  
105 classification models constructed with Evidence Theory at their base (Chen et al. 2014; Denoeux 2019; Liu  
106 et al. 2013).

107 These applications have led to a deeper understanding of the possibilities and potential of Evidence Theory,  
108 and the wide potential for the application of evidence theory to civil engineering problems. They have also  
109 led to the identification of a research gap in identifying and developing a methodological protocol for  
110 engineering applications.

## 111 **Evidence Theory**

112 Evidence Theory, as initially conceptualized by Dempster (1968), interpreted statistical inference based on  
113 the concepts of upper and lower probabilities, as opposed to the confidence intervals developed by Neyman  
114 (Lehmann 2011). The theory was then further developed by Shafer (1976) with his introduction of a theory  
115 of evidence based on belief functions. Dempster had interpreted upper and lower probabilities as bounds

116 on degrees of knowledge, however Shafer interpreted these upper and lower probabilities as bounds on  
117 degrees of belief, and renamed these limits belief functions. Yager and Liu (2008) provide an historical  
118 development of the theory, including a collection of published research critical to its development.

119 Evidence theory is often described as a generalization of the Bayesian subjective degree of belief  
120 interpretation. This is because Evidence theory encompasses aspects of probability theory using set-based  
121 mathematical approaches to uncertainty analysis. A distinguishing feature of Evidence Theory, however, is  
122 that belief functions allow the calculation of three beliefs, each bounded by 0 and 1: the amount of belief  
123 favoring an outcome for any given event, the belief against, and the belief of don't know (i.e., ignorance)  
124 (Dempster 2008). This explicit recognition of ignorance as belief to quantify is a special feature of Evidence  
125 Theory, freeing it from the probability theory restriction that the probabilities for and against (i.e., its  
126 complement) for a given event must sum to unity. In addition, the calculation of beliefs on sets allows  
127 information to be applied to a set of events without complete distribution of belief to individual events  
128 themselves.

### 129 Evidence Theory Definitions

130 The major terms, methods, and mechanics of Evidence Theory will be defined in this section. The first  
131 definition is the frame of discernment, which represents the set of all possible events or outcomes. The  
132 frame of discernment (often represented as  $\Omega$ ) is analogous to the sample space of probability theory (Yager  
133 and Liu 2008). The frame of discernment represents the power set of possible outcomes, meaning that the  
134 set is comprised not of just single elements representing mutually exclusive outcomes, but also compound  
135 elements representing one or more possible outcomes. For example, in Figure 1 an example set consisting  
136 of three mutually exclusive outcomes  $\{A, B, C\}$  is expanded to the power set used for calculation in  
137 Evidence theory. The outer ring (black) represents the singleton events A, B, and C. The inner ring  
138 represents the compound elements (i.e., elements that represent all multiple event subsets of the power set)  
139  $\{AB\}$ ,  $\{BC\}$ , and  $\{AC\}$ . Compound elements allows the explicit representation of non-specificity or  
140 ignorance induced by a given piece of evidence. The inner circle (black) represents a unique compound

141 element, the universal set or  $\Omega$ , which denotes complete ignorance or lack of belief. The presence of  
142 compound elements and the universal set is valuable in the task of recognizing non-specificity in highly  
143 uncertain data.

144 The state of belief induced by relevant evidence or data is represented by assigning mass of belief to each  
145 element of the frame of discernment. The function for assigning mass of belief is known as the Basic Belief  
146 Assignment (BBA), mass function, or Möbius Measure. The term BBA will be used to discuss this function  
147 hereafter and its typical representation is  $m(A) = X$ , defined as set A has been assigned a mass of belief  
148 equal to X. The value of the mass of belief assigned to any given element must be between  $[0, 1]$  and all  
149 masses of belief assigned across the entire frame of discernment must sum to unity  $[1.0]$ . The individual  
150 BBAs are said to be normalized when the summation to unity is achieved.

151 The state of belief induced by relevant evidence can also be represented by functions other than BBAs, such  
152 as the belief function (Bel), the plausibility function (Pl), and the commonality function (Q). Each of these  
153 functions has advantageous properties in describing the information encompassed in the state of belief in  
154 certain situations. However, fundamentally, each of these functions is an equivalent representation of the  
155 state of belief, and the transformations between each are accomplished using BBAs. These other functions  
156 appear best suited for efficiently performing certain calculations (Reineking 2014). One may consider  
157 BBAs, however, as the mathematical foundation of Evidence Theory and as such, all discussions here of  
158 assigning belief using Evidence Theory will use them as the basis of discussion. The choice of using BBAs  
159 to define belief assignment is motivated by the similarities between BBAs and classical probability  
160 measures and the desire to allow the reader to more readily compare the approach applying Evidence Theory  
161 to the approach applying probability theory. The choice of defining belief assignment using BBAs or any  
162 other belief function would have no impact on the selection of the combination method or the outcome of  
163 the analysis.

164 A number of terms have been defined to describe specific belief structures in Evidence Theory. Any element  
165 of the frame of discernment with a BBA greater than 0, e.g.,  $m(X) > 0$ , is called a 'focal' set or element. A

166 BBA that assigns all belief (1.0) to an element of the frame of discernment other than the universal set is a  
 167 logical belief and represents certainty. A BBA that assigns all belief (1.0) to the universal set ( $\Omega$ ), and  
 168 therefore no belief (0.0) to other elements, is a vacuous belief, and represents total ignorance. If the  
 169 assignment of all belief is to singleton sets, which represents only one unique possible outcome each, then  
 170 the state of belief is Bayesian, and this represents the situation where the mathematics of Evidence Theory  
 171 reduce to that of Bayesian Theory. Table 1 summarizes these belief structures, in addition to other names  
 172 for common specific belief structures, using definitions provided by Denoeux (2006) and Yager and Liu  
 173 (2008).

#### 174 Dempster's Rule of Combination

175 The combination of evidence holds a central role in the application of evidence theory, particularly when  
 176 combining data from multiple sensors or opinions from multiple experts. The original method for  
 177 combining the belief induced by two or more pieces of evidence is Dempster's rule of combination. To  
 178 calculate the combined mass of belief for each element of the frame of discernment, Dempster's rule of  
 179 combination multiplies the mass of belief assigned to sets whose intersections are not empty, and then sums  
 180 them, as shown in Equation (1). Dempster's rule therefore represents a Boolean conjunctive rule for  
 181 combination.

$$182 \quad m_{1,2}(A) = \frac{\sum_{B \cap C = A} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C)}{1 - c}, \quad \text{where } c = \sum_{B \cap C = \emptyset} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C) \quad (1)$$

183 Where,  $c$  is conflict;  $A, B, C$  are symbolic representations for different sets. BBAs are represented by  $m(X)$ ,  
 184 with  $m_1(X)$  representing the first piece of evidence,  $m_2(X)$  representing the second piece of evidence, and  
 185  $m_{1,2}(X)$  representing the combined result.  $B \cap C = \emptyset$  means that sets  $B$  and  $C$  have no intersections.

186 The nominator of Equation (1) is the combined belief before normalization. If there is any conflict ( $c$ ),  
 187 defined as the mass of belief associated with sets whose intersections are empty, the combined mass of  
 188 belief for each non-empty set after combination is proportionally normalized so that the sum of the mass of



189 belief for all elements of the frame of discernment ( $\Omega$ ) is 1. Note that Dempster's rule is both commutative  
190 and associative. Therefore, for combinations of greater than two independent sources of evidence, one can  
191 execute a regression series of combinations, incorporating each unique belief function structure into the  
192 combined result.

193 The sets represented by  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$  could be, for example, different states of condition (e.g., good, fair, and  
194 poor condition). One of the important features of the rule of combination is the Boolean relationship  
195 identified in the summation.  $B \cap C = A$  means the common elements that intersect in sets  $B$  and  $C$  are fully  
196 included in the set  $A$ .  $B \cap C = \emptyset$  means that sets  $B$  and  $C$  have no intersections (i.e., the conjunction of sets  
197  $B$  and  $C$  produces the null set), and are thus omitted.

198 Dempster's rule implies 'subjective independence' among the distinct pieces of evidence combined.  
199 Subjective independence requires that the evidence does not share a common source of uncertainty.  
200 Therefore, two different outputs from the same sensor cannot be considered subjectively independent, as  
201 the uncertainty of the output is dependent on the sensor's functioning. The intent of the independence  
202 requirement is that no piece of evidence is counted twice. Therefore, one should apply Dempster's rule only  
203 to combine distinct, independent information. It is not appropriate to apply Dempster's rule to synthesize  
204 redundant, repetitive, and overlapping information.

## 205 Conflict in the Combination of Evidence

206 One interesting feature of Evidence Theory and Dempster's rule of combination is that it allows the  
207 quantification of the conflict between the pieces of evidence being combined. Indeed, one must always  
208 identify conflict and use it for normalization in the application of Evidence Theory. One of the primary  
209 differences among competing methods of applying Evidence Theory is the treatment of conflict. Conflict,  
210 as defined in Evidence Theory, will be present when combining beliefs held in mutually exclusive  
211 outcomes. Therefore, holding more belief in singleton outcomes will increase conflict (because singletons  
212 cannot share an intersecting set) compared to holding belief in less specific, compound sets that share  
213 intersections (e.g.,  $AB$ ,  $BC$ ,  $AC$ ,  $ABC$ ). Conflict can be found when the evidences to be combined are in

214 agreement or disagreement. In cases of agreement, there may be internal conflict. Internal conflict is  
215 possible in situations when belief is not held in intersecting sets or when belief mass is assigned to at least  
216 two elements of the power set of the frame of discernment besides the universal set (Yager and Liu 2008).  
217 Internal conflict results when beliefs for some of the power set events lead to basic belief assignments for  
218 mutually exclusive events. Disagreement will produce external and typically larger conflict. These concepts  
219 can be illustrated with a simple example in which experts estimate the winner of a race. Only one person  
220 can win any given race, and the full belief in a winner will be distributed among the various participants. If  
221 two independent experts provide predictions of the outcomes by spreading their belief among the  
222 participants, and their predictions are combined with Evidence Theory, there will necessarily be conflict  
223 (i.e., internal conflict) (Martin et al. 2008). Using this same example, external conflict derived from a  
224 disagreement may exist if one expert places majority belief in Runner A and another expert places majority  
225 belief in Runner B.

## 226 Reliability and Weights of Evidence

227 The final core concept of Evidence Theory warranting discussion is the reliability function. The reliability  
228 function is a characteristic of the evidence used to define the mass of belief and a belief function structure.  
229 The reliability function, with values ranging from 0 to 1, is intended to be combined with the belief function  
230 structure to yield an estimate of the total information embodied by the evidence. Reliability could be based  
231 on objective specifications (e.g., when prior data are available to mathematically define reliability) or  
232 subjective judgment (e.g., when using expert opinions). Reliability, therefore, represents a justification for  
233 weighting different pieces of evidence, a concept discussed within the Evidence Theory literature (Shafer  
234 1990; Smets 1992; Yager and Liu 2008). Shafer initially defined the term ‘weights of evidence’ for the  
235 application of a discounting function to Evidence Theory. The concept of weight of evidence, as defined  
236 above, is additive when used in conjunction with Dempster’s rule, allowing a simple calculation of  
237 reliability when multiple pieces of evidence are to be combined. The reliability concept is also equivalent  
238 to discounting methods discussed within Evidence Theory. Discounting reduces specificity by moving mass

239 of belief into the universal set to account for unreliable information embodied in evidence (Yang and Xu  
240 2013).

## 241 **Combination Methods**

242 Previous publications (e.g., Oberkampf and Helton 2002; Reineking 2014; Sentz and Ferson 2002; Smets  
243 1992; Yager and Liu 2008) document well the multitude of combination methods within the field of  
244 Evidence Theory. The consequence is that a plethora of combination methods have been developed (Smets  
245 2007), and it is unclear which to apply with Evidence Theory for practical problems involving uncertainty  
246 traditionally handled by probabilistic methods. The fundamental consideration here is that different  
247 combination methods produce different results, most notably when the number of combinations is  
248 increased, and therefore guidance is required about when to use and avoid certain rules.

249 Rather than trying to determine a priori which combination method is superior, the most important concept  
250 to consider is the implication of each, and the relationship of that to the goals of an analysis. One important  
251 consideration is that many competing methods are related to each other. For example, many methods  
252 incorporate Dempster's rule at their base and primarily differ in the normalization of conflict and the  
253 distribution of belief mass to different elements of the frame of discernment (Sentz and Ferson 2002; Smets  
254 2007). Different methods of normalizing conflict or distributing belief masses introduce non-Boolean and  
255 case-specific properties to some methods. This makes it clear that the Evidence Theory methods represent  
256 a spectrum between precision and explicit recognition of uncertainty. Bayesian updating and Dempster's  
257 rule in its original form represent one end of the spectrum, which does not explicitly account for uncertainty  
258 but presents precise and repeatable methods of application. Non-Boolean and case specific 'ad hoc'  
259 methods of applying Evidence Theory represent the other end of the spectrum, where uncertainty is  
260 explicitly incorporated into the analysis, but the result may lack precision, context, or the ability to  
261 incorporate further evidence (Sentz and Ferson 2002; Smets 2007).

262 The evaluation of results must address both ends of the spectrum between precision and explicit recognition  
263 of uncertainty in order to avoid making quasi Type-I and quasi Type-II errors in the application of Evidence  
264 Theory. Quasi Type-I errors represent instances where a false or uncertain outcome is favored among the  
265 results, such as in Zadeh's example (Zadeh 1984). Quasi Type-II errors represent instances where a true or  
266 certain outcome is not selected because belief is too widely distributed, reflecting the practicality concerns  
267 of Webb and Ayyub (2017). Both of these errors arise from the nature of the initial assignment of belief  
268 masses, the combination rule selected, and the applied method of conflict normalization.

269 The next subsections present a summary of the most common alternative combination methods and a  
270 discussion of their relation to each other. Table 2 presents a summary of the attributes of these different  
271 methods. Note, that the discussion of alternative combination methods only addresses common rules  
272 intended for application to independent and distinct sources of evidence. Alternative methods that handle  
273 dependent and non-distinct sources of evidence are discussed, but are not included in the guidance provided,  
274 in order to maintain a concise scope addressing the common combination rules in Evidence Theory.

### 275 Dempster's Rule

276 Dempster's rule of combination is appealing due to certain characteristics. Primarily the fact that it is  
277 commutative and associative, meaning that the order information is received does not matter. This rule has  
278 shortcomings, as new evidence given complete reliability can significantly alter prevailing beliefs.

279 The mechanics of Dempster's rule concerning normalization of conflict have a significant impact on the  
280 results. The most notable effect is that the conflict normalization produces convergence toward the  
281 dominant opinion and increases the specificity of the result (Murphy 2000, Ballent et al. 2019). Notably, if  
282 any piece of evidence to be combined is represented as a completely Bayesian belief structure (i.e., all belief  
283 held in mutually exclusive singleton sets), then this belief structure is repeated in the result, thereby  
284 restricting the ability to calculate ignorance or non-specificity in the outcome. Multiple combinations of  
285 evidence will converge belief mass towards certainty because this process is repeated over and over again  
286 with multiple combinations. The effect of this combination rule is to accumulate belief mass in singletons

287 as opposed to compound elements of the power set of the frame of discernment. Results published in Ballent  
288 et al. (2020) show that a belief of 0.15 in an outcome can converge to 0.92 after 20 experts' opinions are  
289 combined. Although this convergence behavior has been noted as an advantage of Evidence Theory to  
290 converge toward likely outcomes and reject spurious sources of information (Appriou 1997), it is important  
291 to consider whether such convergence reflects the desired behavior. A famous critique of Dempster's rule  
292 is Zadeh's paradox, where the results converge to an unintuitive result due to significant conflict (Zadeh  
293 1984). Such limitations create the perception that Evidence Theory is best applied summarizing the current  
294 state of knowledge, not updating statistical evidence (Oberkampf and Helton 2002). It is important to  
295 consider and be sensitive to the fact that any analysis requiring multiple combinations or continual updating  
296 will lead toward convergence if Dempster's rule is applied. Furthermore, as with some of the other  
297 combination rules, assigning a zero belief to any element of the power set causes a veto effect on beliefs  
298 from other sources. This means that assigning zero belief to a given element of the frame of discernment  
299 effectively 'vetoes' any potential for that element to hold or be assigned belief after combination. Therefore,  
300 the veto effect may produce a quasi-Type I error if the true outcome is incorrectly assigned zero belief by  
301 one of the sources to be combined, as one of the other, presumably false, outcomes will necessarily be  
302 identified as the favored outcome after combination.

### 303 Yager's Rule

304 The most prominent modification of Dempster's rule of combination is Yager's rule (Sentz and Ferson  
305 2002; Yager 1987). Yager's rule is a modification of Dempster's rule that allocates all conflict to the  
306 universal set,  $\Omega$  (Equation 2). Doing so loses the desirable associative property of Dempster's rule.  
307 However, Yager's rule does not require normalization methods and assumes that conflict in reliable pieces  
308 of evidence is equivalent to ignorance, therefore moving this belief mass to the universal set. Notably,  
309 Yager's rule was developed to address the issue of applying Evidence theory in the role of updating  
310 statistical evidence (Sentz and Ferson 2002). Moving conflict to the universal set retains non-specificity in  
311 the combination and reduces the potential for future conflict in successive combinations.

$$m_{1,2}(A) = \begin{cases} \sum_{B \cap C = A} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C), & \text{when } A \neq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset \\ m_1(\Omega) \cdot m_2(\Omega) + \sum_{B \cap C = \emptyset} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C), & \text{when } A = \Omega \\ 0, & \text{when } A = \emptyset \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

### 313 Conjunctive Rule

314 The conjunctive rule is central to the transferable belief model (TBM) developed by Smets (1990). This  
 315 rule is a modification of Dempster's rule that does not require normalization of conflict. Instead of  
 316 normalizing, the belief mass associated with conflict is allocated to the null set. The TBM framework then  
 317 provides mechanisms for transferring belief mass held in compound elements to singleton elements for the  
 318 purpose of decision-making. For a complete discussion of the TBM framework and its associated equations  
 319 see Smets and Kennes (1994). This method is advantageous because the amount of conflict in each  
 320 combination is retained and cumulative, whereas Dempster's rule only summarizes conflict in a single  
 321 combination at a time. The rule, however, is not commutative and leads to convergence of belief in the null  
 322 set. Therefore, this rule may not be appropriate in applications of significant conflict and repetitive  
 323 combinations over time (Reineking 2014).

### 324 Disjunctive Rule

325 The disjunctive rule initially proposed by Dubois and Prade (1986) provides an alternative to the  
 326 conjunctive-based approach of Dempster's Rule. Fundamentally, Dempster's rule and similar conjunctive  
 327 rules apply 'AND' operations to sets holding belief assignments, while the disjunctive rule applies 'OR'  
 328 operations to these sets. Equation 3 provides the definition of the disjunctive rule. The disjunctive rule  
 329 shares a relation to Dubois and Prade's Rule (conjunctive based) as the joint of the basic probability  
 330 assignments is assigned to the product of the marginals in combination (Senz and Ferson 2002). Therefore,  
 331 the disjunctive rule does not calculate conflict and apply normalization as in other combination methods.

$$m_{1,2}(A) = \sum_{B \cup C = A} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C), \quad \text{when } A \neq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset \quad (3)$$

333 The disjunctive rule is intended for an application of mutual discounting of sources, where it is assumed  
334 that only one source is reliable. One limitation of this rule is that it is considered the most imprecise of the  
335 combination methods (Sentz and Ferson 2002). However, the conjunctive rule does play an important role  
336 in the calculation of conditional belief functions (Reinicken 2014). The calculation of conditional belief  
337 functions allows the combination of overlapping but non-identical frames of discernment through the  
338 assignment of combined belief to the product the focal sets (i.e., the sets holding belief) using the ‘OR’  
339 operator of the disjunctive rule.

#### 340 Proportional Combination Rules

341 Proportional combination rules (PCR) are central to the Dezert-Smarandache Theory (DSmT) for  
342 information fusion (Smarandache and Dezert 2005). The PCR rules first apply Dempster’s rule, then  
343 calculate each partial conflict arising from the combination of any two mutually exclusive focal sets, and  
344 finally apply methods to redistribute each partial conflict proportionally. PCR rules represent non-Boolean  
345 solutions, because they account for conflict by introducing rules for redistributing belief mass associated  
346 with partial conflicts. There have been multiple rules proposed, each intended to maintain certain properties  
347 of Dempster’s original rules, such as commutativity. PCR Rule 5 is considered the most mathematically  
348 exact redistribution of conflict by Smarandache and Dezert (2005) and will be applied in a later example.  
349 For brevity the equations associated with PCR Rule 5 are not reproduced here and the reader is referred to  
350 Smarandache and Dezert (2005) for further discussion and complete mathematical definitions.

#### 351 Dubois and Prade’s (Conjunctive) Rule

352 Another prominent modification of Dempster’s rule is Dubois and Prade’s Rule (Dubois and Prade 1986).  
353 Similar to Yager’s rule, the mass of belief associated with conflict is not normalized, and instead is moved  
354 to coarser elements of the frame of discernment. Equation 4 below describes the method. In Dubois and  
355 Prade’s rule, conflicting belief mass is moved to the set corresponding to the union of the individual sets  
356 producing the conflict. For example, if belief assigned to both element A and element B produces conflict  
357 in combination, then the value of conflict is assigned to the joint set, AB.

$$m_{1,2}(A) = \begin{cases} \sum_{B \cap C = A} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C) + \sum_{B \cap C = \emptyset, B \cup C = A} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C) & \text{when } A \subseteq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset \\ 0, & \text{when } A = \emptyset \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

359

### 360 Additional Methods

361 There are many additional methods that have been proposed and applied to combine data using Evidence  
 362 Theory. One primary field of research is into the combination of dependent, non-distinct data that do not  
 363 meet the subjective independence requirements of the rules identified above. The principal rules for  
 364 combining dependent information are the conjunctive cautious rule, the normalized cautious rule, and the  
 365 disjunctive cautious rule (which are parallel alternatives to the conjunctive rule, Dempster's rule, and the  
 366 disjunctive rule described above).

367 The cautious rule was created to address an assumption of Dempster's rule, that evidence to be combined  
 368 must be distinct and subjectively independent. This assumption was intended to prevent any piece of  
 369 information from being counted twice (Denoeux 2006). Therefore, the cautious rule was designed to be  
 370 idempotent, that is, the combination of a belief structure with itself will reproduce the original belief  
 371 structure. The cautious rule is accomplished by calculating weight values in w-space, an alternative  
 372 representation of BBAs calculated using the commonality function. The method takes the minimum weight  
 373 of evidence when combining non-distinct pieces of evidence. Therefore, only the minimum support for a  
 374 given element of the frame of discernment is retained in combination, as opposed to a convergence of belief  
 375 as observed in Dempster's rule.

376 Another method of combining data using evidence theory uses the averages of combined beliefs to provide  
 377 context to Evidence Theory predictions and results. Murphy (2000) studied the tendency of Dempster's  
 378 rule to either converge to certainty or veto a majority of opinion. Among alternative methods to address  
 379 these problems, averaging was found to identify unintuitive combinations, showing an alternative  
 380 distribution of belief.



381 Although additional combination methods may be useful to any given analysis, these methods will not be  
382 applied and discussed further in this paper. This paper will only address the combination of distinct pieces  
383 of evidence, which are assumed to meet the subjective independence requirement of Evidence Theory. The  
384 identification of impacts on results and guidance for applying these additional rules is considered a topic  
385 for future research. For published papers discussing the application of the cautious rules see Denoeux (2006,  
386 2008b).

### 387 Combination Methods Summary

388 Table 2 summarizes the common combination methods discussed. Brief guidance is provided concerning  
389 when to use and when to avoid certain rules if conditions are met. The table also identifies particular  
390 properties that are implicit in each rule and how the methods differ from the fundamental Dempster's rule.

## 391 Methods – Protocol Concepts

392 This paper has considered a wide assortment of published Evidence Theory literature. We postulate that it  
393 is possible to map specific evidence combination methods to specific contexts under which they are  
394 applicable. The goal of this paper is to develop a protocol for the application of Evidence Theory to practical  
395 problems in the domain of Civil Engineering. In order to develop a protocol, it is necessary to link research  
396 gaps discussed above to specific steps in the process of applying Evidence theory. Users of Evidence Theory  
397 could utilize such a protocol to guide the proper application of certain analytic methods and improve the  
398 applicability and understandability of Evidence Theory.

399 The unique challenge in the development of the protocol for engineering applications, is to clarify the  
400 difference in methods and the interpretation of the results between Evidence Theory and Probability Theory.

401 The primary difference in application between Evidence Theory and Probability Theory is in the pre-  
402 processing of data. While Probability Theory must pre-process data in order to fit axioms and constraints  
403 of probability theory, Evidence Theory does not require pre-processing of data and can address uncertainty  
404 in the data through the development of the frame of discernment and initial assignment of belief masses.

405 Furthermore, engineering applications must consider the uncertainty embodied in the results and provide a  
406 discussion of sensitivity analysis to justify methods applied and decisions made using the model. The  
407 proposed protocol addresses this unique challenge by introducing a method to understand the selection of  
408 combination method and sensitivity of results.

409 The key to developing such a protocol is to highlight the commonalities and implications of various existing  
410 methods. The definition of terms and discussion of combination methods raised several key concepts to  
411 consider when applying evidence theory. These concepts include:

- 412 • Definition of the frame of discernment
- 413 • Initial assignment of belief mass
- 414 • Single or multiple combinations
- 415 • Conflict normalization and combination rule selection
- 416 • Reliability weighting and sensitivity analysis

417 Discussion of these five concepts will highlight important implications when evaluating information and  
418 making decisions using belief functions. The following sections summarize topics and questions requiring  
419 extra attention and clarity relating to these concepts. The flow diagram of Figure 2 provides a visual  
420 reference to the methodological steps in the protocol.

421

## 422        **Discussion of Concepts**

### 423                Definition of the Frame of Discernment

424    An important consideration in the development of the frame of discernment is the granularity of data.  
425    Traditional uncertainty analyses based on probability theory assign belief only to singletons, and therefore  
426    seek to obtain and process data to the finest granularity possible. An analysis based on probability theory  
427    using data with insufficiently coarse granularity must apply assumptions and methods, such as the principle  
428    of insufficient reason or interpolation techniques, to process the data to a granularity in agreement with the  
429    goals and outcomes upon which decisions and predictions must be made. Evidence Theory, however, is  
430    more tolerable to the incorporation of coarser granularity data, owing to the compound sets included in the  
431    frame of discernment. The combination methods of Evidence Theory then work to converge belief from  
432    less specific coarser sets to more specific finer outcomes and decision points. The definition of the frame  
433    of discernment therefore represents a unique difference in approach when applying evidence theory as  
434    opposed to probability theory. Additionally, the definition of the frame of discernment enables the  
435    incorporation of qualitative and heterogeneous data sources. If these data can be associated with sets defined  
436    within the frame of discernment, then initial belief masses can be assigned, and the data can be incorporated  
437    into an analysis.

438    The evidence theory approach is not concerned with processing the data to the granularity needed, but rather  
439    evaluating the data available to determine which and how many compound sets to include in the frame of  
440    discernment. The combination rules of evidence theory lend themselves to data bearing on these compound  
441    sets. Many of the combination rules, however, either generalize to, or do not offer improvement over,  
442    prevailing probability theory-based methods when dealing with Bayesian belief structures, where belief is  
443    only assigned to singleton elements of the frame of discernment. Another term for such belief structures is  
444    dogmatic, i.e., there is no basic belief assigned to the universal set ( $\Omega$ ). However, the application of  
445    Evidence Theory in such instances is justified by the argument that belief and evidence are not certain, and  
446    all belief should be represented by so-called non-dogmatic belief functions, where some belief is assigned

447 to the universal set (Denoeux 2008b). The user could also ask if they are justified by placing some of this  
448 discounted belief in compound sets, and which compound sets are therefore necessary to define. This  
449 process forms the core of applying reliability weighting and performing sensitivity analysis to be discussed  
450 in below.

451 Further considerations in the definition of the frame of discernment are whether variables of interest are  
452 discrete or continuous and whether they are bounded. In the case of discrete and finite applications, the  
453 definition of the frame is less flexible and open to less interpretation. In the case of continuous and infinite  
454 applications, definition of the frame is more flexible and subject to additional scrutiny and consideration of  
455 the decision consequences. One of the major concerns of Evidence Theory is that adding additional  
456 elements to the frame of discernment increases computational complexity (Reineking 2014).

#### 457 Initial Assignment of Belief Masses

458 The initial assignment of belief masses follows the definition of the frame of discernment, as there is a need  
459 to define belief among the elements of the power set of the frame of discernment. The initial distribution of  
460 belief masses can have impacts on the outcome of the analysis. One common method providing guidance  
461 for this step is the Least Commitment Principle (Denoeux 2019). According to this principle, when selecting  
462 among several equivalent initial assignments of belief, the least informative shall be selected. A  
463 mathematical definition may be provided to further specify the application of this rule; however, the general  
464 guidance stands as the most widespread approach to selecting initial assignment of belief masses. The  
465 general guidance suggests that a belief structure with more belief assigned to less-specific compound sets  
466 will be less committed than one with more belief assigned to specific singleton elements. One should also  
467 note that assigning all belief from one source to the universal set will not affect the combined beliefs from  
468 additional sources (Dezert and Tchamova 2011). Thus, such belief from one source will have negligible  
469 effect on the prevailing state of beliefs from all sources.

470           Single or Multiple Combinations

471   The applicability of evidence theory to a process of continual updating given new evidence is an open  
472   question in the field. The primary concern when performing multiple combinations involving Evidence  
473   Theory is the nature of Dempster’s Rule to produce convergence towards a favored outcome. Because of  
474   this, previous researchers viewed Evidence Theory as inapplicable in domains of continuous updating. For  
475   example, “Evidence Theory does not embody the theme of updating probabilities as new evidence becomes  
476   available...in Evidence Theory the emphasis is on accurately stating interval valued probabilities given the  
477   present state of knowledge.” (Oberkampf and Helton 2002 p. 3). However, recent applications of Evidence  
478   theory to classification and neural networks (e.g., Denoeux 2019) have demonstrated a role for Evidence  
479   Theory in applications of repetitive updating given new information. Given that many Civil Engineering  
480   applications require continuous updating, the application of Evidence Theory must include this capability.  
481   The identification of whether there will be a single or multiple combinations is a logical consideration for  
482   users of Evidence Theory.

483           Conflict Normalization and Selection of Combination Rule

484   Conflict normalization is a critical component of decision making with Evidence Theory, as normalization  
485   is necessary in order to transform belief masses into probabilities for use in prediction or secondary  
486   mathematical analysis. Conflict normalization is also the distinguishing feature among the different  
487   conjunctive combination methods (see Table 2). For example, “The issue of conflict and the allocation of  
488   the BBA mass associated with it is the critical distinction among all of the Dempster-type rules” (Sentz and  
489   Ferson 2002 p. 16). One must define the method of conflict normalization and the impacts of this method  
490   on the overall goals of the analysis in any application of evidence theory.

491   Conflict quantification can be used to redistribute belief mass to specific sets, such as in the case of Yager’s  
492   rule. Internal or external conflict can be addressed differently, and conflict quantification can be logically  
493   linked to threshold values, thereby addressing small conflict and large conflict combinations differently.

494 One of the primary importance of incorporating the concept of conflict normalization into the protocol is  
495 to introduce a common practice of performing sensitivity analysis on conflict normalization rules.

#### 496 Reliability And Sensitivity Analysis

497 The reliability of a piece of evidence, often referred to as ‘weights of evidence’ in the published literature,  
498 is often reflected by applying a discounting function. The discounting function moves belief mass to less  
499 specific (i.e., compound) sets, e.g., the universal set ( $\Omega$ ), thereby creating a less committed belief function  
500 structure. The application of discounting functions is especially important to address conflict between  
501 sources. Applying a discounting function and moving belief mass to less specific compound elements such  
502 as the universal set will reduce the amount of conflict in a combination using Dempster’s rule.  
503 Investigations into different methods of applying reliability functions has a clear parallel to training model  
504 weighting parameters when applying common machine learning algorithms to data.

505 The application of a reliability function is well suited to play a major role in follow-up sensitivity analysis.  
506 The application of a reliability function provides the user with the ability to manipulate the initial belief  
507 mass assignments before combination, thereby offering the opportunity to address any potential  
508 complications or unintuitive results that arise from multiple combinations.

#### 509 Summary

510 The goal of defining a protocol is motivated to allow a user to be aware of applicable methods of data  
511 processing (pre- and post-) and combination given the desire to update existing beliefs or make decisions  
512 using Evidence Theory. The protocol is not intended simply to establish a prediction tool, whereby evidence  
513 is gathered in order to produce a prediction as output subject to the mathematics of Evidence Theory. The  
514 definition of a protocol, rather, facilitates a secondary analysis, which evaluates the information embodied  
515 within the results of an uncertainty analysis applying evidence theory. The secondary analysis is of crucial  
516 importance and aligns with the research focus of using evidence theory for exposing uncertainty and  
517 ignorance embodied within an analysis. The secondary analysis could be a programmed algorithm or expert

518 system that evaluates belief function structures for specific tasks. The point is that the belief functions  
519 themselves are not the ultimate step of applying Evidence Theory to uncertainty evaluations, but rather the  
520 building blocks.

521 The development of the protocol is also intended to provide a framework for performing sensitivity  
522 analysis. Each concept provides a means to perform sensitivity analysis and determine the implications of  
523 decision made in assigning belief mass and combining evidence. The lack of a common approach to  
524 sensitivity analysis is a major research gap to be addressed for the widespread adoption of evidence theory  
525 to practical engineering applications (Oberkampf and Helton 2002).

526 Belief functions present information about the nature of the uncertainty considered and evidence available.  
527 The development of a protocol, enabling common application methods and sensitivity analysis, allows for  
528 an explicit understanding of assumptions and actions made when applying Evidence Theory. The definition  
529 of such a protocol also allows the user to consider all possible combination rules, non-Boolean algebras,  
530 and calculation methods. Any calculation method, considering that one can define situations when it is and  
531 is not applicable, can be incorporated into such a protocol. The advancement of Evidence Theory with such  
532 a protocol, therefore, goes beyond the definition of any specific elegant calculation method, because the  
533 ultimate product of this protocol development is a more collaborative and mutually understood means of  
534 applying Evidence Theory to practical problems. In the next Section, the steps of the protocol will be  
535 developed, along with a practical example demonstrating the concepts.

## 536 **Commentary on Theory Implications**

### 537 **Definition of Example Problem**

538 The guidance embodied in the proposed flow chart will be demonstrated through the discussion and  
539 presentation of an example problem. The data chosen for use in the example is from a post-disaster  
540 structural damage assessment survey from Ballent et al. (2019). The survey includes 5 different images of  
541 Haiti taken shortly after the 2010 earthquake that occurred in the country. The goal is to estimate the amount

542 of destruction (from 0% to 100%) in the area of the image. The participants evaluated each image to assess  
543 their belief that the area of the image sustained damage in the range of 0-33%, 34-66%, 67-100%, 0-66%,  
544 and 34-100%. The survey asked participants to first assign belief in the smaller ranges (i.e., 0-33%, 34-  
545 66%, 67-100%). In the event the participant is not confident assigning all of their belief in these smaller  
546 ranges, the remainder of belief was to be assigned to the larger ranges (i.e., 0-66%, and 34-100%). The  
547 survey collected 40 valid responses, and combined these into five groups of eight responses each. Ground  
548 inspection was also performed at the site of each of the five images used in the survey, so that the actual  
549 damage range could be ascertained for each case. These data were chosen because they represent a past  
550 application of evidence theory with both expert opinions and the observed real damage amount. The simple  
551 example will be used to demonstrate the implications and sensitivities of certain decisions made within the  
552 proposed protocol. The results of the survey for a particular image are summarized in Table 3. The results  
553 for each group represent a combined belief of eight valid survey responses. The column ‘All 40’ denotes  
554 the combination of all 40 survey responses. Note, that the survey results identify both the belief values  
555 (calculated using BBAs and the belief function) and BBAs ( $m$  values). The juxtaposition of belief and BBA  
556 values highlights the difference in data representation when selecting among possible alternative  
557 representations of belief. In Table 3, boldface cells are used in the initial assignment of belief mass.

### 558 **Definition of Frame of Discernment**

559 The frame of discernment is dictated by the survey question. The singleton elements are the smaller ranges.

560  $[0, 33\%], [34, 66\%], [67, 100\%]$

561 The compound elements represent the possible combinations of the singleton elements.

562  $[0, 66\%], [34, 100\%], [0, 33\%] \cup (67, 100\%], [0, 100\%]$

563 It is notable that the compound elements  $[0, 33\%] \cup (67, 100\%]$  and  $[0, 100\%]$  (i.e., the universal set) are not  
564 included in the survey, but are included in the frame of discernment. The inclusion of these sets in the frame  
565 of discernment, however, is necessary in order to apply the methods of evidence theory, including



566 calculating belief and plausibility functions and applying certain combination rules (such as Dubois and  
567 Prade's rule or Yager's rule).

### 568 **Initial Assignment of Belief Masses**

569 The initial assignment of Belief mass is dictated by the survey results. For purposes of this example, two  
570 groups of survey results will be combined using Evidence Theory. The two groups chosen to represent the  
571 sources of evidence are Group 2 and Group 3 identified in Table 3. Group 3 was chosen, because this group  
572 distributes their belief among the possible outcomes most uniformly. Group 5 was not chosen because it  
573 assigns the entirety of its belief to one outcome, thereby evoking the veto principle. Group 2 distributes  
574 belief in agreement with the other groups, which place most of their belief in one outcome. The choice of  
575 Group 2 among the remaining groups was then arbitrary, as either Group 1 or 4 could have also been  
576 selected and produced similar results when combined with Group 3.

577 The compound elements  $[0,33%)\cup(67,100%]$  and  $[0,100%]$  (i.e., the universal set) are not included in the  
578 survey, and therefore no initial belief is explicitly assigned to these sets. The impact of the lack of initial  
579 belief assigned to these elements will be discussed in the continued analysis of the example problem. The  
580 survey does permit participants to assign less than 100% of their belief, allowing for an indirect initial  
581 assignment of belief to the universal set. The presence of only an indirect path for the assignment of belief  
582 to the universal set impacts the initial belief assignments, because belief assignment to the compound and  
583 universal sets will necessarily be minimal, as observed in the low values (max 0.03) from the survey results  
584 above.

### 585 **Single or Multiple Combinations**

586 The survey data includes 40 valid responses, and the intent is to combine all 40 responses together to  
587 evaluate the effect of such a large combination. Therefore, this application represents multiple combinations  
588 and we must evaluate the presence of zero belief assignments (step 2a.i) and the potential for conflict (2a.ii).

589 The evaluation of zero belief assignments reveals that the larger damage ranges (compound sets) all are  
590 assigned zero or near zero initial belief. This therefore represent a near Bayesian belief structure (See Table  
591 1). We use the term “near” here because the negligible amount of belief initially assigned to the universal  
592 set (0.01 or 0.03). The impact of the Bayesian belief structure is a constraint on the results, thereby  
593 restricting the ability of the compound elements (i.e., larger damage ranges) to hold belief after a  
594 combination using Dempster’s rule. Therefore, without any modification to the evidence, one would expect  
595 the assignment of zero belief to the compound sets to produce high belief assignments to singletons after  
596 combination.

597 Evaluating the potential for conflict, it is necessary to review the initial belief mass assignments held by the  
598 singleton elements. Since the majority of belief is held by the singleton elements and distributed among  
599 them (i.e., internal conflict,), there is significant potential for conflict. Since belief in the larger ranges is  
600 only requested after belief is first assigned to the smaller ranges, nearly all belief sits in the smaller ranges  
601 to start. This is a common occurrence, for example when attempting to convert a previous probability theory  
602 analysis to evidence theory. The presence of significant potential for conflict will drive convergence  
603 behavior, particularly with negligible belief assigned to the compound sets.

#### 604 **Selection of Combination Rule**

605 The example will be continued by the combination of the two initial belief assignments summarized in  
606 Table 3. The two initial belief assignments differ slightly. Group 2 assigns belief strongly favoring the  
607 lowest damage range, while Group 3 distributes their belief assignments more among the alternative  
608 singleton damage ranges, while still favoring the lowest damage range. These two survey responses will be  
609 combined using each of the rules identified in Table 2. The results of this combination are summarized in  
610 Table 4.

611 Reviewing the results of Table 4 produces some notable observations. First, the calculated conflict is 0.43,  
612 and therefore a good amount of the belief to be assigned after combination must either be normalized or

613 redistributed. As anticipated, the assignment of the majority of belief to the singletons produced results  
614 heavily favoring the singletons. The application of Dempster's rule and its normalization method produces  
615 convergence behavior, as the combination shows a 0.99 assignment of belief in the lowest damage range  
616 after combination, which exceed the belief assigned this range by either piece of evidence (0.55 and 0.97,  
617 respectively). Yager's rule mitigates this convergence by assigning conflicting belief into the universal set.  
618 The Conjunctive rule prevents this convergence by assigning conflicting belief to the null set, indicating  
619 the possibility of unaccounted for outcomes. PCR Rule 5 produces similar convergence behavior to  
620 Dempster's rule, but owing to its mechanics for partial redistribution in lieu of normalization, the combined  
621 estimate (0.91) does not exceed the highest belief assigned by either of the pieces of evidence (0.97). Dubois  
622 and Prade's (conjunctive) rule and the Disjunctive Rule avoid a convergence outcome by assigning  
623 conflicting belief to the compound ranges associated with partial conflicts. The belief assignments in these  
624 compound sets are informative as to the nature of the partial conflicts, particularly when compared to the  
625 results of Dempster's rule. Finally, the Disjunctive rule is nearly equivalent to Dubois and Prade's rule,  
626 only differing in a small amount of belief assigned to the universal set after combination.

627 In order to demonstrate trends in the application of the combination rules, the initial belief assignments of  
628 Table 3 were modified in order to perform additional combinations. The process of redistributing belief is  
629 fundamental to applying reliability discounting and performing sensitivity analysis, see below for further  
630 discussion. The initial belief assignments of Table 3 were adjusted to reassign belief from the singleton  
631 element  $[0,33]$  to the compound sets that both include this range, namely  $[0,66]$  and  $[0,33) \cup (67,100]$ . This  
632 was achieved by reducing 0.5 assigned belief from  $[0,33]$  and assigning 0.25 belief to  $[0,66]$  and  
633  $[0,33) \cup (67,100]$ , respectively. This is an illustrative example and these values we chosen to demonstrate  
634 the effect of holding belief in singleton versus compound sets. The modified initial belief assignments are  
635 summarized in Table 5. Similar to Table 4, the modified initial belief assignments are combined with each  
636 of the rules identified in Table 2. The results of the combination are summarized in Table 5.

637 Reviewing the results of conflict in Table 5 reveals interesting trends. First, the calculated conflict is 0.32,  
638 which is lower than the amount of conflict in the Table 4 combinations. This reduction of conflict is  
639 expected when assigning more belief to compound sets. The nature of convergence moving belief  
640 assignment from compound to singleton sets is on display here as well. The total belief assigned to the  
641 compound sets before combination is 0.5, but is a maximum total belief of 0.2 (0.1 maximum for belief  
642 associated with any individual compound set) for Dempster's rule, Yager's rule, the Conjunctive rule, and  
643 PCR rule 5. Only Dubois and Prade's Rule and the Disjunctive rule assign more 0.1 belief to any of the  
644 compound sets, due to their assignment of belief associated with partially conflicting belief assignments to  
645 the union of the conflicting sets.

646 In order to further explore trends in the application of the combination rules, the initial belief assignments  
647 of Table 4 were modified in order to perform additional combinations. The initial belief assignments of  
648 Table 4 were modified to reassign half of the remaining belief from the singleton elements to the universal  
649 set. The modified initial belief assignments are summarized in Table 6. Similar to Table 4 and Table 5, the  
650 modified initial belief assignments are combined with each of the rules identified in Table 2. The results of  
651 the combination are summarized in Table 6.

652 Reviewing the results of Table 6, conflict is now reduced to 0.11 (compared to 0.43, then 0.32 in the  
653 previous combinations). This again reinforces the influence on conflict when assigning more belief to  
654 compound sets, including the universal set. One can also notice how the additional belief assigned to the  
655 universal set now produces greater belief assignments in the other compound sets. For example, the  
656 compound sets  $[0,66]$  and  $[0,33] \cup (67,100]$  now retain most of their initially assigned belief (0.42 out of  
657 0.50) after combination with Dempster's rule. With so much belief assigned to the compound sets, there is  
658 now much less convergence towards the singletons. None of the combination rules assign more than 0.40  
659 belief after combination to the set  $[0,33]$ , although this outcome is still favored. Most interestingly, the  
660 results for all of the rules (excluding the Disjunctive Rule) are now more in agreement as compared to Table  
661 4 and Table 5. This highlights the focus of evidence theory on handling coarser granularity data and the

662 applicability of these rules when belief is assigned primarily to the compound sets. The imprecise nature of  
663 the disjunctive rule is also on full display in Table 6, as after combination the singletons retain negligible  
664 belief and the universal set is the favored outcome.

665 The results of the combination examples above can also be compared to average survey responses and  
666 actual damage in order to evaluate the combination rules (actual damage results were available following  
667 ground inspection, see Definition of Example Problem above). Inspection of the survey averages reveals  
668 that the estimates of the damage range were far more distributed than the initial belief assignments suggest.  
669 Comparison of the survey averages in Table 7 with the original combination results in Table 4 show how  
670 the convergence towards certainty in the [0,33] damage range fails to capture this distributed belief and  
671 lack of uncertainty among the survey responses, despite the fact that the combinations converge to the actual  
672 damage range. This highlights the value of alternative methods, such as Yager's rule retaining belief in the  
673 universal set or Dubois and Prade's rule placing belief associated with partial conflicts in compound sets.  
674 The more distributed results when applying these rules reveal the lack of certainty in the survey responses.

675 Inspection of the averaged combined belief (Table 7) and the combined belief for all 40 survey responses  
676 (Table 3) also highlights the impact of assigning zero belief and the veto principle. Although the averaged  
677 beliefs show there was considerable belief assigned to the damage range [34-66], the combined result  
678 produces zero belief in any set including the range [34-66]. One survey response for which zero belief is  
679 assigned to this range is sufficient to produce this result and 'veto' any possibility that the truth is in this  
680 range. In this example, this result can be justified because the actual damage is in the [0-33] range. However,  
681 such circumstances repeated in another scenario could cause an analysis to reject and place zero belief in  
682 what could be the actual outcome (i.e., a quasi-Type I error), it is therefore necessary to evaluate and review  
683 instances of zero belief assignment before, during, and after performing combinations of data using  
684 Evidence Theory.

685        **Reliability and Sensitivity Analysis**

686        The three combination examples above demonstrate the effects of reassigning belief before combination,  
687        and therefore the ability to address convergence, zero belief assignments, and unintuitive results. Although  
688        belief is reassigned in the above examples in a subjective and ad hoc manner, the combination examples  
689        show how reliability could be applied to reassign belief mass to the elements of the frame of discernment.  
690        In this case, that meant assigning belief to the compound sets to identify how this belief is redistributed  
691        after combination.

692        For example, consider Figure 3. This shows a simple combination (using Dempster's rule) of two identical  
693        belief functions covering a three event (A, B, and C) frame of discernment similar to the one used in the  
694        example above. The red box on the left of the figure demonstrates the case of discounting the evidence and  
695        moving belief mass to the universal set. Notice that the universal set ( $m'(ABC)$  in Figure 3, dark blue  
696        triangles) retains the majority of belief after combination and conflict is very low when a reliability function  
697        has been applied to move belief to the universal set before combination. Now, in the red box on the right  
698        of the figure, the impact of removing the discounting function is presented. Notice that conflict increases  
699        and the mass of belief retained in the universal set converges to zero (0.0). Also of note is the fact that the  
700        combination converges belief to Event A at the expense of Event B. The discounting of the evidence allows  
701        a retention of a higher level of belief in Event B.

702        Simple sensitivity analysis, as is plotted in Figure 3 could prove useful for a practical application of  
703        Evidence Theory. Denoeux (2008b) summarizes a simple method of applying discounting and sensitivity  
704        analysis, by transforming a dogmatic belief structure into a non-dogmatic belief structure (by discounting  
705        and assigning belief to the universal set), for which many of the rules are intended for application. The  
706        amount of belief discounted and reassigned can be modified to observe the impact on results as it  
707        approaches 0 and approaches 1, providing a framework to evaluate the sensitivity of the combination to  
708        belief assigned to the universal set. The reliability concept of the proposed protocol offers the opportunity  
709        to demonstrate the impacts of certain distributions of belief mass and methodological decisions in the

710 analysis. This illuminates the methods upon which Evidence Theory application relies and provides a more  
711 detailed application of Evidence Theory to an uncertainty analysis.

## 712 Conclusions

713 This paper has been motivated by the lack of a common method of applying Evidence Theory to engineering  
714 applications. Evidence Theory provides a framework to address epistemic uncertainty, and therefore is well  
715 positioned to treat data fraught with missing information, imprecise estimates, and metrics of differing  
716 granularity. Since uncertainty analysis has been traditionally performed using probability theory,  
717 engineering applications using such data must begin with data pre-processing methods and the acceptance  
718 of assumptions in order to fit the available data to the constraints of probability theory. The Evidence Theory  
719 approach, however, does not place such an emphasis on pre-processing. The Evidence Theory approach  
720 instead asks the analyst to evaluate the lack of precision in the data and develop a frame of discernment that  
721 can incorporate data of all granularities available. Since the approach can differ so significantly from  
722 probability theory, it is necessary to introduce and develop a protocol for engineering applications of  
723 evidence theory.

724 The proposed protocol incorporates two phases. The first phase is necessary to initiate the analysis. The  
725 first step of the first phase addresses the development of the frame of discernment. The user should consider  
726 things such as data granularity and precision in the frame of discernment and develop a frame that can  
727 handle all the data available and meet the goals of the analysis. The protocol reminds the user of the  
728 difference in approach between initiating an analysis based on probability theory and one based on Evidence  
729 Theory. The second step of the first phase asks the user to review the initial assignment of basic belief  
730 masses. Considerations of this step pertain to awareness of convergence of belief in Evidence Theory and  
731 the potential to veto majority opinion. The initial assignment of belief mass is a field into itself, with  
732 published guidance on assigning belief mass available, for example (Chen et al. 2014; Jiang and Hu 2018).  
733 The user, however, is reminded of a few basic concepts to consider. The evaluation of whether their belief

734 structure is as least committed as possible is the first step. The user must also consider whether this will be  
735 a single combination or multiple combinations. In instances of multiple combinations, it is necessary that  
736 the user review instances of zero initial basic belief assignment and evaluate the potential for conflict.

737 The second phase of the protocol provides reasons for the selection of a particular combination rule and a  
738 framework for performing sensitivity analysis. Guidance pertaining to the selection of a combination rule  
739 is linked to the particular properties of the rule, with conditions identified as when to apply or avoid the  
740 rule. Primarily, the user should be familiar with the common characteristics associated with Dempster's  
741 rule, such as convergence of belief. The application of multiple rules also facilitates discussions concerning  
742 the additional context to the combination results that certain rules can reveal. For example, the application  
743 of a PCR rule or Dubois and Prade's rule require the calculation of partial conflicting masses and provide  
744 context in comparison to Dempster's rule as to how conflict is distributed and what effect normalization is  
745 having on converging belief or identifying a most likely outcome.

746 The application of different combination rules compliments the process of performing sensitivity analysis.  
747 A framework for performing sensitivity analysis is seen as a crucial step in enabling practical engineering  
748 applications of Evidence Theory (Oberkampf and Helton 2002). A framework for performing sensitivity  
749 analysis is discussed using reliability weighting together with comparing the results of applying different  
750 rules. The application of reliability weighting permits the reassignment of belief mass before combination,  
751 allowing an analysis of sensitivities related to initial assignment of belief and conflict normalization. Such  
752 an analysis provides valuable additional context, such as revealing unintuitive convergence or an uncertain  
753 outcome assigned majority belief after combination (e.g., Zadeh's Paradox (Zadeh 1984)). The performance  
754 of sensitivity analysis is necessary to evaluate pseudo-Type I and pseudo-Type II errors. Pseudo-type I  
755 errors are considered by exploring the sensitivity of the result to convergence and information contained in  
756 partial conflicts, in order to determine if the result converged on a false or uncertain outcome. Pseudo-type  
757 II errors are considered by exploring the sensitivity of the results to holding more belief in imprecise (i.e.,



758 compound) sets, thereby exploring whether belief in a true or certain outcome is excessively reduced by  
759 imprecise data or slow convergence

760 The protocol is intended to expand the use of Evidence Theory in practical applications through the  
761 identification, demonstration, and discussion of the protocol proposed. It is hoped that the proposed protocol  
762 will also facilitate and provide guidance to new users of Evidence Theory and expand its use in engineering  
763 applications. The introduction of a logical procedure for evaluating an Evidence Theory analysis is detailed,  
764 including how to define the frame of discernment, initial assignment of belief mass, selection of  
765 combination rule, and sensitivity analysis. for the performance of sensitivity analysis on Evidence Theory  
766 applications. The continued development of guidance and discussion around the application of Evidence  
767 Theory, including additional combination rules based on combining dependent data is a topic of future  
768 research to improve and expand the protocol. The primary limitation in the acceptance of the proposed  
769 protocol is that it lacks an exact method of applying Evidence Theory and obtaining results, but rather  
770 focuses on the secondary analysis of results. Continued research and development around the application  
771 of Evidence Theory and the framework of the protocol will address this limitation and facilitate more  
772 detailed guidance and discussion about conditions for which to use or avoid certain methods. Persistence  
773 in the development of a protocol for engineering applications of evidence theory is crucial in expanding  
774 Evidence Theory's application and widening tools to address ignorance and epistemic uncertainty.

775

#### 776 Data Availability Statement

777 All data, models, or code that support the finding of this study are available from the corresponding author  
778 upon reasonable request.

779

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