Operation Clean Sweeps' Dirty Past:

A Historical Analysis of Police Raids in The Projects and the Demolition of Public Housing in Chicago

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Introduction

"Just because you live in low-income housing doesn't mean you should be treated like an animal," Freda Ligon, a resident of public housing in Chicago said.[1] Like that of her mother, her grandmother, and her great grandmother, their homes have been controlled by those that have a more "prominent" place in society whether it is a slaveholder in the antebellum south, or a policymaker who controls and oversees how law and order is carried out. Her great grandmother was previously enslaved and had lived in slave quarters on a plantation. The minute her grandmother and grandfather stepped off the train in Chicago during the Great migration, they were immediately directed by the police, like a herd of sheep, to The Black Belt, where the vast majority of Black Southerners lived. Due to redlining, her mother remained within certain neighborhoods, impoverished and rundown, unable to move to areas with greater economic opportunity. By the time Freda moved into public housing, specifically the one on 2822 S. Calumet, segregation and control were so ingrained in her family's history that being "treated like an animal" was the norm.

Freda's family tree illustrates the struggles of multiple generations of a single black family that lived without autonomy of their own space. After the Civil War, African Americans sought to own land to prevent further prejudice by land and slave owners as well as obtaining a sense of security and privacy but were constantly met with discriminatory practices that prevented them from doing so. Freda's family is not an isolated incident but rather encapsulates the African American experience and the inability to special autonomy: the more things change the more they remain the same. The most evident modern example of this is during The War on Drugs and public housing in Chicago's South Side, specifically in an operation known as Clean Sweep.

[1] Pressley, Zionne N. "Privacy or Safety: A Constitutional Analysis of Public Housing Sweep Searches (1996).

In the late 80s and early 90s, the CHA (Chicago Housing Authority), which is the organization that funds and controls public housing throughout Chicago, realized there was a growing problem of criminal activity throughout public housing, mostly gang and drug related. Also known as "the projects," they were clusters of tall apartment buildings concentrated in low-income neighborhoods. They displayed the result of horrendous policy decisions, from their initial construction to punitive law enforcement tactics during the War on Drugs. As a response to growing concerns of drug and gang related crimes in high-rises, the CHA instituted a new enforcement policy with their high-rises.

In 1988, the Chicago police partnered with Chicago Housing Authority and raided their first public housing high rise, actively seeking out gang and drug violence. Police officers would go through drawers, cabinets, and the homes of those living in The Projects often unwarranted.[2] The residents also had a curfew where if they were not in their own apartment by a specific hour, they could get in serious trouble; being in a neighbor's apartment past curfew could get each individual a citation for "suspicious activity."[3] Many residents claimed that these officers "planted drugs, framed suspects, and bullied victims into false confessions," causing hundreds of people to be arrested for nonviolent drug possession leading to a massive increase in incarceration rates.[4] Despite Operation Clean Sweep lasting until 1994, along with the general racist law enforcement on vulnerable communities during the War on Drugs, it has been ineffective, which has been proven through interviews, rates of crime, and the demolition of The Projects.[5] The families remain in the same cycle of injustice: vulnerable, impoverished, and segregated.

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[2] Hagan, John. *Chicago's Reckoning : Racism, Politics, and the Deep History of Policing in an American City (*Oxford University Press, 2022).
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] I will discuss more in the following sections.

Operation Clean Sweep during the War on Drugs is not an isolated incident but rather one of the many examples of when Chicago's government and law enforcement resorted to punitive surveillance tactics to keep Black Americans separate from American society. Not only so, but it is not an isolated incident throughout the country either as these sweeps were implemented in various cities. However, the sweeps in Chicago were significant in comparison to other cities for a variety of reasons: First, Chicago had just as high crime rates compared to cities such as Washington DC or New York.[6] However, the concentration of crime in specific neighborhoods was a lot more apparent in Chicago. Secondly, HUD claimed that Chicago was one of the worst public housing systems in the country.[7] Additionally, Chicago is labeled as one of the most segregated major cities in the United States as of 2020.[8] Finally, Chicago is the only city that completely demolished every single project after Operation Clean Sweep.[9] Therefore, Chicago is the center of this thesis because it sticks out in its crime rates, corrupt management, influential policy decisions, and the lasting legacy of segregation that exists today. Given the multidimensional history of institutional racism within Chicago, I want to find out if Operation Clean Sweep was the result of Chicago's policing and housing systems. Thus, my research question is: How do the legacies of racism, segregationist housing policies embodied in traditions of redlining, and new theories of more aggressive law enforcement amongst politicians amid the War on Drugs, all consolidate into the Operation Clean Sweep program in the late 1980s?

Historiography

[6] In 1985, Chicago had a violent crime rate of 1,061.8 per 100,000 population, while New York had a rate of 1,046.7 and Washington, D.C. had a rate of 1,264.1. "Crime in the U.S." FBI. FBI, July 15, 2010. https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s.
[7] Jane Gross, "New Hope for Old Projects, Vince Lane and the Revival of Public Housing," *New York Times*, August 11, 1996.
[8] Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, University of California, Berkeley. "Most and Least Segregated Cities."
[9] Foderaro, Lisa W. "The Towers Came Down, and With Them the Promise of Public Housing." *New York Times*, February 6, 2018.

Literature Review

Most of the literature conducted on Operation Clean Sweep has been from the perspective of political theorists and social scientists. Their insights help to identify the factors that feed into the continuous cycle of poverty perpetuated by the law and law enforcement, and ultimately, the failure of public housing in Chicago. The cycle of poverty is defined as "families often have limited or no resources to create opportunities to advance themselves, which leaves them stuck in the poverty trap. On paper, the cycle of poverty has been defined as a phenomenon where poor families become impoverished for at least three generations."[10] However, one piece of knowledge remains missing: how does the *history* of Black families in Chicago being ruptured by policing and government systems lead to the moment where Operation Clean Sweep began? Also, *why* did Operation Clean Sweep start and *why* did it end? The history of The Great Migration, redlining, public housing, and policing in Chicago are multifaceted and need to be examined to understand the unwarranted raids of Chicago's public housing units. Thus, my historiography comes in two parts: the brief literary review of Operation Clean Sweep itself and the longer historiography of institutional factors that caused Operation Clean Sweep.

Many studies of Operation Clean Sweep focus on the constitutionality of the program, but these studies are not by historians and instead by political scientists who claim that the raids were unwarranted and violated the Fourth Amendment.[11] Zionne Pressley, a professor of political science at Boston University, published a law review article in 1996, "Privacy or Safety: A Constitutional Analysis of Public Housing Sweep Searches," two years after the sweeps ended, that claimed the Chicago Housing Authority and the Chicago Police Department's actions had

[10] World Vision Canada. "What Is the Cycle of Poverty?" https://www.worldvision.ca/stories/child-sponsorship/what-is-the-cycle-of-poverty.

[11] "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause," U.S. Const. amend. IV.

been unconstitutional because they never obtained official warrants. “People should not be treated differently simply because the government supports them in some way,” she concludes. “Only when people are treated with respect will society be close to solving its problems as well as the problems in public housing facilities.”[12] Even though the government funds and owns the public housing units, Pressley argues, it still does give them the right to abuse their power and limit Constitutional rights. Although Pressley refers to the United States Constitution, a historic and powerful document, Pressley fails to mention why Operation Clean Sweep began in the first place, a crucial piece in understanding the raid's origins. Not only so, but this also points to how violation of constitutional rights was not seen as a big deal when it involves people of a lower socioeconomic status.

In another law review article published by Northwestern University School of Law in 1993, Steven Yarosh claimed that the raids were constitutional because even though it was an invasion of privacy, they were warranted because the police officers had probable cause that illegal activity was occurring in The Projects. “The purpose of the search certainly falls within the bounds of a legitimate state interest,” Yarshow explains, “stemming a widespread outbreak of gangs, drugs, and crimes in public housing.”[13] Yarshow adds, however, that focusing the raids on gang and drug violence, “place tenants at risk of criminal penalty,” which “indicates a high degree of individual intrusion and weighs heavily in favor of a warrant requirement.”[14] In further defense of the sweeps, Yarshow adds a quote by former CHA Director, Vince Lane, saying “we are not infringing on rights; we are restoring rights. We are restoring our residents' rights to a safe and decent environment."[15] In his conclusion, Yarshow summarizes his law review by

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[12] Pressley, Zionne N. "Privacy or Safety: A Constitutional Analysis of Public Housing Sweep Searches.” *The Boston University Public Interest Law Journal* 6 (April 1, 1997): 777.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.

stating that the CHA's warrantless housing sweeps do not violate the Fourth Amendment because the sweeps occur within the context of a "supervisory relationship," allowing the warrantless searches fall under the "special needs" exception[16] to the warrant requirement.

Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas, David Smith has written extensively on issues related to civil rights, public policy, and law enforcement including Operation Clean Sweep. Smith has also been a consultant to the Department of Justice and other government agencies. In *Clean Sweep or Witch Hunt?: Constitutional Issues in Chicago's Public Housing Sweeps* Smith makes the argument that Operation Clean Sweep was a violation of the Fourth Amendment as blanket searches of entire buildings are not appropriate without suspicion of individuals.[17] Alternatively, Smith suggests that more effective methods of combating crime in public housing like rehabilitation and community policing would be better. Smith argued that the sweeps were an accumulation of larger societal issues such as racism and institutional poverty and that these issues must be addressed first in order to improve the overall living condition of The Projects and the people who reside in them.

Pressley, Smith and Yarshow are a few of the many advocates that make legal arguments on the constitutionality of the sweeps.[18] The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, in 1994 declared that the CHA's sweeps violated the fourth amendment. This reveals that the courts agreed with a legal interpretation that the raids were unconstitutional and ultimately led to the sweeps ending all together. These opposing law reviews reveal that Operation Clean Sweep is not objective, but instead can be viewed through various lenses that tell different sides of the same story.

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[16] The "special needs" doctrine, "under which a warrantless search is permissible if it takes place pursuant to a special government needs beyond the capability of normal law enforcement." Ibid.
[17] "Clean Sweep or Witch Hunt?: Constitutional Issues in Chicago's Public Housing Sweeps." *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 69 (January 1, 1993): 505.
[18] For further reading, see "The Fourth Amendment's Forcing of Flawed Choices: Giving Content to Freedom for Residents of Public Housing," and Prud'homme, A., and N. Burleigh. "Chicago's Uphill Battle."

The social historiography of the Chicago Housing Authority touches on resident dynamics and how it led to gang violence and failed community policing initiatives. Based on observations by the researchers and resident surveys, *The Hidden War: Crime and the Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago,* which was written by various historians and sociologists six years after the raids ended, painted a portrait of daily life in three housing projects and explained how actions to improve quality of life have failed. The environment these families were placed in were due to a variety of factors: the families in the housing projects consist of single-parent and female-headed households[19] who were "victims of the violence around them," while also being "closely connected to its perpetrators."[20] Also, the binds of race and poverty created problems that were too hard to escape, making the outside world "inaccessible." By narrowing in on these sociological factors, the book concluded that the vulnerability of these families and their situations allowed gang violence to continue a chokehold on those around them. Thus policies like community policing, where residents would try to keep each other accountable, failed because gangs had all the power.

The social historiography about The Projects also emphasizes wealth disparities between residents who lived in The Projects and those who did not live in public housing. Professors of Economics at the University of Chicago, Steven D. Levitt and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, completed a series of studies about the men who have lived in the high rises and how much money they make, or the lack thereof, compared to those who do not live in The Projects over a period of ten years. Their research suggested that growing up with their mother or a motherly figure in their home is strongly correlated with an income that is $8,000 more annually than those who do not. They also added that "the quality of the home environment is an important

[19] Only 6% of households were headed by a married couple, Popkin, Susan J. and others. *The Hidden War : Crime and the Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago*. Rutgers University Press, 2000, 6.
[20] Ibid, 7.

determinant of later outcomes."[21] Levitt and Venkatesh pointed out that education is a significant factor, but that not being in a gang and having fewer siblings also led to greater future economic success of adolescent men in The Projects. Levitt and Venkatesh pointed out how these factors contribute to the cycle of poverty that persists in the high rises that house tens of thousands of families. This study highlights that being in such a confined space, where many are part of a gang or come from a broken family, makes it difficult for individuals to escape and find economic freedom. Levitt and Venkatesh argued that these factors contribute to the rate of crime and drug use that occurs in public housing. Yet rather than the Chicago Housing Authority focusing on these root problems, they took a more punitive approach by implementing Operation Clean Sweep.

As shown, most of the scholarship on Operation Clean Sweep, the Chicago Housing Authority, family dynamics, economic disparities, and other factors have been from the perspective of sociologists, economists, and political theorists. To study history is to study the change of Black families and their relationship with law enforcement in Chicago and the transformation of it over time. Numerous events have contributed to the deterioration of Black family's economic conditions in Chicago throughout history and cannot be boiled down to a single factor. By focusing on the CHA in the late 80s and early 90s and how they have not only enabled racist law enforcement but contributed to the utter hopelessness of those living in The Projects, I will help others understand the historical causes that have led up to Operation Clean Sweep and its effects. With my research, I hope to add the final piece to the puzzle that paints the picture from Black families migration to Chicago in the early twentieth century, to the legacy of The Projects that persist today.

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[21] Levitt, Steven D., and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh. "Growing up in The Projects: The Economic Lives of a Cohort of Men Who Came of Age in Chicago Public Housing." *American Economic Review* 91, no. 2 (May 1, 2001): 79.

Historiography of The Great Migration, Redlining, and Policing

After the Civil War, Black southerners moved to the north to escape the Jim Crow laws as well as to seek industrial jobs and for many, Chicago was their final destination. *Land of hope: Chicago, Black southerners, and the Great Migration*, a history written by James Gossman, described the first wave of the Great Migration (1910-1940). State Street, on the South Side once represented the opportunity for former slaves who were hoping to own property and become more integrated in U.S. society. After World War II, however, the area slowly became "lined with dismal high-rise public housing projects sheltering thousands of Black urbanites who have little hope of escaping poverty or the physical environment in which it thrives."[22] Grossman argued that moving north became correlated with the Black American search for independence but quickly went downhill through racism.

During the Great Migration, when Black Southerners hopped off the train from the South, they were immediately directed by police officers to specific living areas that were designated solely for them. They were also advised by their Black friends and families who migrated before them to stay away from northern, predominantly white, neighborhoods. White Chicagoans bluntly assumed that all Black migrants "belonged" in the ghetto, Gossman states. The logic behind this, Grossman argued, is the "significance-if not the visibility-of Chicago's color line, as well as the importance of various aspects of community within black Chicago."[23] Shaped primarily by the white metropolis around them, old influences of the south seeped their way into the north, and a "Black Metropolis" emerged on the South Side. Despite racism's persistence, the South Side was a vibrant community unified by race, culture, social class, and creating friendships that turned into family.

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[22] Grossman, James R. *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration*. (University of Chicago Press, 1989), 9.
[23] Ibid, 123.



*Mapping Inequalit*y. United States, 2016. Web Archive. https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0026813/.

It was not until the 1930s, during the New Deal era, that residents of Chicago's South Side were legally bound to stay there through redlining. During the Great Depression, people in all areas of Chicago were in a financial crisis. Black and white Americans lost their jobs, their homes, and were desperate for financial aid. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were federal agencies created under Roosevelt and were responsible for carrying out mortgage bailouts so people could pay for their homes, as well as giving out loans. But there was one part of the policy that significantly disadvantaged Black Chicagoans: these agencies were legally not allowed to give loans or to bailout homeowners who lived within "hazardous to invest" areas. Specifically, Chicago's South Side was marked with "red" pen, indicating that African Americans were deemed unable to pay back the HOLC and the FHA, making it difficult to pay off their own home, also making it difficult for them to move into other neighborhoods.

According to Richard Rothstein's *The Color of Law,* "government's housing rules pushed these cities into a more rigid segregation than otherwise would have existed. The biracial character of many neighborhoods presented opportunities for different futures than the segregated ones that now seem so unexceptional."[24] Thus, if it were not for redlining through the HOLC and FHA, it would have been possible for Black Americans to not be as limited and move into other parts of the city or pay off their homes. Through racist policies, Black Americans were trapped in Chicago's South Side with no way out.

In 1937, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) was created to house veterans and low-income families after World War II. Although public housing was being built throughout the city originally, over time it was concentrated in redlined areas.[25] By the 1960s, the HOLC and

[24] Rothstein, Richard. *The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America* (2017).
[25] I will discuss this transition in detail in Section 1.

FHA agreed that one area of the South Side, the area within 90th and 95th street, was the "best location" for low-income housing. The Chicago government purposely marked this area with a green line, indicating where public housing should be constructed, despite it being surrounded by red zones, in order to prevent public housing from being built anywhere else.[26]

In, *The Hidden War: Crime and the Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago*, the authors who are historians and sociologists, state that the public housing projects were doomed from the beginning, displaying "the result of a series of disastrous policy decisions, from high-rise construction, to the racial politics that determine their siting, to the decades of poor management and underfunding that led to today's crumbling and crime ridden projects."[27] While The Projects were originally a progressive way to house low-income families, the CHA administration who took over the projects in the 1960s, did not invest adequately in their upkeep.

In the decades that followed their initial construction, continuing into the 1950s and early 1960s, the materials of The Projects were cheap and deteriorated overtime. For example, the earlier CHA projects such as the Jane Addams Home, which was built in 1938, was built with red brick. Other projects, such as the Robert Taylor Homes which was completed in 1960 was built using concrete, resembling the inside of a jail cell.[28] These changes were not immediate, but emerged overtime when the demographic of the projects became mostly African American. By the 60s, not only were the buildings poorly designed,[29] but they were infested with rats, mice, and roaches. The hallways were vandalized and had light bulbs that did not work, creating areas of darkness around the clock. Within each apartment, the walls were made of cinder block, had

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[26] Xu, Wenfei. "Legacies of Institutionalized Redlining: A Comparison Between Speculative and Implemented Mortgage Risk Maps in Chicago, Illinois." *Housing Policy Debate* 32, no. 2 (January 1, 2022): 249–74.
[27] Popkin, Susan J. and others. *The Hidden War : Crime and the Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago*. (Rutgers University Press, 2000), IX.
[28] Pacyga, Dominic A., and Ellen Skerrett. "Public Housing." In The Electronic Encyclopedia of Chicago, edited by James R. Grossman, Ann Durkin Keating, and Janice L. Reiff. Chicago Historical Society, 2005.
[29] The buildings were roughly 15 to 30 stories tall which meant that families were living on top of one another, putting them in environments where gang and drug violence was consolidated. Popkin, Susan J. and others. *The Hidden War,* 38.

cracked tile floors, and lacked amenities such as curtains or working appliances.[30] Popkin and Susand described The Projects the same way one would describe a prison, "grim and institutional."[31]

Into the 1970s, the rhetoric around poverty and The Projects became heavily associated with drugs, gangs, and violent crime which became one of the United States top issues. The term "War on Drugs" was first coined in the United States in the early 70s with the goal of combating drug use by using moral panic rhetoric, "tough on crime" policies, and punitive law enforcement tactics. In June of 1971, President, Richard Nixon declared the abuse of drugs to be "public enemy number one,"[32] and therefore increased federal funding for drug-treatment and drug-control programs.

Although the War on Drugs was first established in the 70s, it did not gain a substantial amount of government funding until President Ronald Reagan's administration. Rather than focusing on drug-treatment programs (and other mitigation solutions), he strengthened punitive law enforcement measures by investing more money into the police and into the mass incarceration of nonviolent drug offenders. As the concern for illicit drug use increased throughout the American public, the support for Reagan's punitive stance on drugs increased, causing the U.S. Congress to pass the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which allocated nearly $2 billion of federal spending towards "mandatory minimum" prison sentences for various drug offenses.[33] This bill primarily affected poor communities of color because the sentences differentiated the punishment for possession of crack cocaine and powder cocaine: five year sentence for possession of 5 grams crack cocaine, and a five year sentence for possession of 500

[30] Popkin, Susan J. and others. *The Hidden War,* 11.
[31] Ibid.
[32] *The War on Drugs : A History / Edited by David Farber* (New York University Press, 2022), Chapter 1.
[33] Crandall, Russell. *Drugs and Thugs : The History and Future of America's War on Drugs* (Yale University Press, 2020), 165.

grams of powder cocaine.[34] One of the problems with a policy like this is that there is not a chemical difference in the long term effects of either drug.[35] Although drug use, along with substances such as marijuana, is the same among African Americans and white Americans, African Americans were prosecuted at an alarmingly higher rate than any other race.[36] These policies implemented during the War on Drugs, paired with tremendous disparities in sentencing, illustrate one of the clearest examples of structural racism in modern U.S. history. [37] This is reinforced by law enforcement agencies' maltreatment of marginalized people, such as the blanket search and seizures which have affected the home lives of African American families. Although there are many incidents of this occurring throughout the nation during the War on Drugs, these actions became increasingly prevalent on Chicago's South Side.

From the Great Migration to the 1970s, there is no doubt that the Chicago police department played a key role in maintaining segregation through law-and-order tactics. "Law and Order" refers to the social and political philosophy that strict and punitive laws and regulations are necessary to prevent crime and maintain public order. It also emphasizes the presence of a strong justice system such as a strong police force, strict courts, and aggressive sentencing. This resulted in the increase of criminalization and the increase of incarceration for Black Americans by the Chicago Police Department, more than any other race or ethnic group.[38] This piece of the puzzle arguably deserves its own historiography but for now, I present a quote

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[34] Sandy, Kathleen R. "The Discrimination Inherent in America's Drug War: Hidden Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria over Crack." (*Alabama Law Review*, 2003), 669.
[35] Ibid.
[36] For further reading, McConnell, Brendon, and Imran Rasul, "Racial and Ethnic Sentencing Differentials in the Federal Criminal Justice System;" Beck, Allen J., and Alfred Blumstein, "Racial Disproportionality in U.S. State Prisons: Accounting for the Effects of Racial and Ethnic Differences in Criminal Involvement, Arrests, Sentencing, and Time Served;" Walker, Samuel, *The Color of Justice : Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America / Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn, Miriam DeLon.*
[37] For further reading, Alexander, Rudolph, and Jacquelyn Gyamerah, "Differential Punishing of African Americans and Whites Who Possess Drugs: A Just Policy or a Continuation of the Past;" Spohn, Cassia, "Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries."
[38] As of 2010, 4347 Black men were incarcerated per 100,000 whereas only 678 white men were incarcerated per 1000,000. Drake, Bruce. "Incarceration Gap Widens between Whites and Blacks." Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, August 27, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/06/incarceration-gap-between-whites-and-blacks-widens/.

from Simon Balto in *Occupied Territory* who is referring to police brutality in Chicago's metropolis: "Modern practices of stop- frisk, profiling, neighborhood sweeps and saturation... all borrow from ideas and practices established long before their current practitioners were even part of the police force (or even, in many cases, born)."[39] Balto argues that policing in Black neighborhoods during the War on Drugs was not an entirely new concept, rather it was a modernized method of control.

Although the historiography of housing segregation and policing during the 20th century in Chicago is multidimensional, while also perhaps being a thesis of its own, this thesis examines how Operation Clean Sweep fits into all of this. The history of race, housing segregation and discrimination and policing help to identify the effects of the continuous cycle of poverty and criminalization perpetuated by the government and the police, and ultimately, the failure of public housing in Chicago. To study history is to study change. However, with this thesis, I argue the opposite: the more things changed the more they remained the same for much of Chicago's public housing residents. The "modern policing" efforts of Clean Sweep were merely refinements of past practices, and all change is essentially illusory.

By narrowing in on the CHA in the late 80s and early 90s and how they have not only enabled racist law enforcement but contributed to the utter hopelessness of those living in The Projects, I will help others understand the historical causes that have led up to Operation Clean Sweep and its effects. This brings me to my argument: Operation Clean Sweep started in 1988 because in the decade leading up to it, the CHA received constant criticism by the federal government for not having control over the gangs and the residents of public housing. Not only so, but due to the centralized power of CHA's chairman, he was able to implement the program

[39] Balto, Simon. *Occupied Territory: Policing Black Chicago from Red Summer to Black Power* (University of North Carolina Press, 2019), 257.

with very few checks and balances. Despite implementing punitive approaches and forceful methods of control in hopes of making public housing safer, Operation Clean Sweep ended in 1994 because the sweeps were deemed unconstitutional and ineffective. Ultimately, The Projects were demolished because politicians believed that it was the only viable solution left to address concentrated crime and poverty in Chicago. Thus, Operation Clean Sweep is not an isolated incident, but instead fits into the broader concept of surveillance and policing, disastrous policy decisions, and a history of institutional racism in Chicago.

Section 1: White Flight, Chicago's Second Skyline, and a New Chairman

Although Operation Clean Sweep occurred in the 80s and 90s, there were a series of events, policies, and prejudices that led to the very moment the raids began. First, I will discuss the origins of the CHA and how its original mission conflicts with the agency's outcomes. Next, I will discuss white flight and how that affected public housing's demographics. Then, I will discuss the physical deterioration of The Projects along with its downfall in the 70s and early 80s which was influenced by federal agencies. Finally, I will discuss Vince Lane's role as Chairman and how he influenced the raids.

White Flight

The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) was founded by Elizabeth Kelly in 1937 and she was the chairman until 1954. The CHA was established as a response to the severe housing shortage and deplorable living conditions in Chicago. The agency was created to provide safe and affordable housing for low-income families, many of whom were living in overcrowded and unsanitary tenements. The first public housing complex in Chicago was the Jane Addams

Homes, which opened in 1938. Named after the pioneering social reformer and founder of Hull House, the Jane Addams Homes were located in the Near West Side neighborhood of Chicago. The development was designed to promote social interaction and community-building among residents, with community rooms and outdoor spaces intended to foster a sense of belonging and shared responsibility. The Jane Addams Homes served as a model for future public housing developments in Chicago and across the country. Kelly's vision was to integrate white and Black veteran families in the same public housing units; however, that vision quickly fell apart when there was a demand for public housing.

After World War II, millions of veterans returned home and the "baby boomer" generation increased in population, thus making the demand for housing in Chicago outweigh the supply. Although 375,000 Black Americans, many of whom were veterans, were living in the South Side, the housing there, both private and public, only accommodated 110,000.[40] They had to find another space to live, and the only way to do so was for them to move to majority white, working-class neighborhoods.

Nicknamed the Airport Homes, on the southwest side of Chicago near Midway Airport, high-quality public housing was quickly constructed to meet the demand for public housing. It was not built for Black families specifically, but rather for people of all ethnicities and races. There were hundreds of homes, each one separated from the other and each housed one family, many of which were white working-class Americans. Although African Americans did live in the Airport Homes, they were segregated from the other white residents. In 1945, however, that changed as a group of Black residents filed a complaint with the Chicago Commission on Human Relations (CCHR), declaring that the segregation within the Airport homes violated their

[40] Learning for Justice, "Housing Book Excerpts Handout," (2019).

civil rights. The CCHR agreed, and suggested to the CHA that they must integrate the Airport Homes.

When Theodore Turner, a Black veteran, arrived at his public housing unit that he already signed for in 1946, dozens of white people, which included at least ten police officers, gathered in his front lawn to prevent him from moving in. His neighbors threw stones and garbage while shouting slurs at him. Turner quickly got in his car and drove away. Down the block, residents flipped the car of Homer Jack, a white member of Chicago Council against Racial and Religious Discrimination (CCARD) who supported integration in the Airport Homes.[41] Although there were additional movements to integrate housing, the backlash from white residents, as well as the lack of protection from the government, made it difficult for African Americans to feel safe in their own homes.

Violence and protest did not stop with Turner or Jack, but rather escalated and occurred daily. Black veterans who lived in the Airport Homes were also harassed on their way to work or church. In one incident, a Black family, the Forts, were at home when suddenly four gunshots were fired through their window. Everyone was safe but they remained frightened and moved back to the South Side with the rest of their extended family.[42] Although there was some police protection provided by the CCHR for a few Black families in the Airport homes, many became tired of constantly being harassed, assaulted, and degraded and just like the Forts family, they moved back to the South Side as well.

For the Black residents who stayed in the Airport Homes, the CHA was concerned that the integration and riots would decrease property value and considered stopping integration. After pressure from the CCHR, Black residents, and civil rights organizations such as the

[41] Feagin, Joe R., and Eileen O'Brien. "Racialized and Gendered Urban Social Landscapes." In Race and Ethnicity in Society: The Changing Landscape, edited by Elizabeth Higginbotham and Margaret L. Andersen, 3rd ed., 213-23. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2014.

[42] Ibid.

Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), disagreed and worked towards further integration. CORE was one of the first civil rights organizations to launch a major campaign for fair housing in the United States. The NAACP was another major civil rights organization that advocated for the legal rights of Black Americans. Specifically, they provided legal assistance to residents that faced discrimination in the Airport Homes. After nearly a decade of advocating, in 1955 the CHA agreed to keep the Airport Homes integrated.

The legal assistance by the NAACP can be viewed as an early grassroots activism campaign that acts as the precursor of the more widely known Civil Rights Movement. While people often assume that the Civil Rights Movement was an intense period of activism in the late 50s and early 60s, historians such as Jacquelyn Dowd Hall argued that the Civil Rights Movement actually began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and persisted well past the 60s. Hall argues that the long civil rights movement is "not just struggles for legal equality but also for economic, political, and cultural rights and access."[43] Despite the challenges and resistance that integration faced, it helped to pave the way for further progress in the fight for equal housing opportunities for all. But it did not last long.

White residents of the Airport Homes rallied together and solidified their consensus about integrating Black veterans and their families. According to the "Letters to the Editor" section in *The Calumet Index*, the residents of the Airport Homes stated that it was less of a race issue and more of a property value issue, and that “the fact remains that property values do decrease where mixed races are allowed to live and through no fault of their own are unable to live up to the financial standard set by the community."[44] In the same article, another opinion stated that, “let

[43] Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," The Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (2005): 1233-63.

[44] Ibid, 62.

anyone take a look at Chicago and see for himself what a terrible blight has come over every neighborhood that the Negro has settled in."[45] When the CHA tried to integrate various incomes and races into public housing units in neighborhoods on the south and west sides of Chicago, the same response by white residents occurred. Due to this, many white residents fled to the North Side so that they would not have to deal with the concept of mixed neighborhoods. To white people, integrated housing threatened their own safety so much that it was easier for them to flee.

The Making of a Second Skyline

The demand for public housing persisted, but how it was constructed changed. By 1955, nearly two-thirds of all public housing residents were Black and the construction of it was densely compacted in red-lined neighborhoods.[46] In previous years, like with the Airport Homes project, the CHA was able to build The Projects out. Now, they built The Projects up. The Abbott project was composed of over forty buildings, many of which were fifteen-stories and y-shaped. Each building could hold almost 1,500 occupants, more than any other previous public housing project. These large public housing buildings were contained to the South Side and by 1959, about 85% of all tenants were black.[47] Not only did the CHA do this to meet the demands for housing, but also to minimize the space being used to keep costs low.

In the 1960s, the CHA faced criticism for their choice in location and construction of public housing buildings in primarily Black neighborhoods. In one civil court case filed in 1966, *Gautreaux vs. CHA*, the American Civil Rights Committee argued that the housing projects were "in Negro neighborhoods and within the areas known as the Negro Ghetto because the Authority

[45] Ibid, 68.
[46] Bowly, Devereux. The Poorhouse: Subsidized Housing in Chicago. Southern Illinois University Press, 1978. ProQuest Ebook Central.
[47] Ibid, 99.

Midway Airport Homes, Chicago, IL. Aerial view at opening, 1941. Jack Delano, photographer. (Library of Congress, LC-USW3-000787-D).

The Grace Abbott Homes c. 1970 (Digital image collection, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Illinois, Chicago).

has deliberately chosen sites for such projects which would avoid the placement of Negro families in white neighborhoods," and thus were in violation of the 14th amendment because they were discriminating on the basis of color.[48] The judge ruled that the CHA must eliminate their discriminatory tenant assignment practices and properly distribute Black families amongst white and Black housing units throughout Chicago. The judge also ordered the CHA to figure out how to ensure that the four white CHA public housing units do not become majority Black buildings. The CHA did this by implementing a quota where the white public housing units such as the Trumbull Park Homes, the Julia C. Lathrop Homes, the Lawndale Gardens, and the Bridgeport Homes had to have at least 15% of its residents be Black.[49] The goal of these quotas was to prevent the white residents of public housing from fleeing to predominantly white neighborhoods while also meeting the demands of equal housing rights for Black families.

Although this order was meant to integrate housing, it did the complete opposite. The *Gautreaux* case also prohibited the CHA from building public housing in areas of Chicago that were mostly African American, from building high-rises, and building dense concentrations of public housing in any single neighborhood.[50] These orders were meant to reform public housing, but instead stopped the construction of it all together.

Public housing dropped the property value of the areas surrounding it, causing serious pushback from local politicians and white residents. There are several reasons why public housing decreases property value. First, is the stigma where it made it difficult for people to sell or buy homes that were near public housing and therefore lowered the perceived desirability of

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[48] "Housing. Public Housing. District Court Orders Housing Authority Not to Build in Black Ghetto and to Institute New Tenant Assignment Plan in Order to Remedy Past Discriminatory Practices. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 66c 1459 (N. D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1969), Modifying 304 F. Supp. 736, Enforcing 296 F. Supp. 907." *Harvard Law Review* 83, no. 6 (April 1, 1970): 1441–49. doi:10.2307/1339825.

[49] Kusmer, Kenneth L. "Restructuring the Urban Regime: The Transformation of Public Housing in Chicago." Journal of Urban History 25, no. 3 (1999): 420-47, 21.

[50] Ibid, 28.

the neighborhood. Secondly is the concentration of poverty where people felt that the higher levels of crime, lower education levels, as well as other social problems were contagious and therefore did not want to be near The Projects. Thirdly, is racism. Many white residents correlated crime and drugs with Black Americans that were deep rooted in biases and stereotypes about the poor and people of color. All these factors contributed to the decrease in property value and the negative impact of public housing. At this point, public housing was no longer seen as a public good supporting people of all races and social classes, but rather as a "handout" that stigmatized poor people and people of color. What was now left of The Projects were these already decades-old high-rise buildings that were neglected and in disrepair.

In the decade leading up to the War on Drugs, there were a series of complaints from the tenants about the physical state of The Projects, and the lack of eagerness to fix them. In 1977, Marvin Trotter was born and next to his bed was a horizontal bare pipe connected to the radiator and controlled the heating for the building. Despite Marvin's grandmother constantly complaining to CHA about the danger of the hot pipe and the lack of maintenance to fix it, the CHA ignored her complaint. Eleven months later in December of 1977, when Marvin started to stand and crawl, Marvin fell from his bed and onto the bare steam pipe and had severe burns all over his tiny and delicate body.[51] His bed itself, which also came with the apartment complex, had no guardrails. This incident could have been avoided if the CHA took Marvin's grandmother more seriously and inspected the bare pipe more thoroughly.

Marvin's grandmother took this incident to court, under the pretense that the CHA should be held liable for the injuries and pay for the medical expenses to heal the burns. The court ruled, however, that "a landlord is not liable for injuries sustained by a tenant on premises leased to the tenant," The court transcript stated, "In multiple-unit dwellings, a landlord owes his tenants a

[51] *Smith v. Chicago Housing Authority*, 543 N.E.2d 852, 187 Ill. App. 3d 798, 135 Ill. Dec. 284 (App. Ct. 1989).

duty of reasonable care in the management and maintenance of areas open for use by all tenants."[52] Thus, the court ruled the CHA was not liable because the incident took place in a private area and the CHA is only responsible for injuries that occur in public areas such as the lobby or hallway. However, this ruling was contradicted by another ruling that took place a few years later.

In another incident that took place in August of 1979, a 9-year-old girl was standing next to an elevator shaft in the Rockwell Gardens building. This elevator rarely worked and when someone would press the button to open the elevator door, it would open to a shaft that had a 15 to 16 feet drop. The 9-year-old girl got into a fist fight with someone her age, the girl's opponent pushed her into the open elevator shaft, and she fell to the bottom and fractured her left leg to the point where she could not walk again.[53] Due to the previous reasoning from Marvin's case, one would think that the judge would react more compassionately to the 9-year-old girl, as the incident did occur in a public area.

This case was also taken to court on behalf of the 9-year-old girl's family on the basis that there were no warning signs posted or barriers to the elevator shaft to prevent injury. Although the jury should have concluded from the evidence that the CHA was aware of the condition of the elevator as the doors were "frequently disengaged from the bottom sills; that such doors hung parallel, top to bottom, so that their defective condition was not readily observable [by tenants]; and that such doors continued to operate," the CHA were not charged as they argued that the broken elevator was an act of vandalism from a "third party," or another tenant.[54]The final judgment declared the CHA not reliable for the injuries. Despite the incident occurring in a public space as well as being aware of the danger, the CHA once blamed the tenants and their

[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.

behavior rather than taking responsibility. These disastrous decisions and claims from the CHA were not an isolated incident, but rather similar incidents of the same caliber kept occurring throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s as the lack of upkeep, maintenance, and sympathy continued as well.

The state of The Projects in the 1970s contradicts with the vision of public housing CHA had in the 1940s. Originally seen as a beacon of hope for those who sacrificed their lives for the United States during WWII, it became a stigmatized area that was isolated from the rest of society. Although there were movements to integrate incomes and races within certain housing project sites, Black Americans were faced with severe violence as well as a grand exodus of white Americans into less diverse neighborhoods, making it impossible for the CHA to continue their vision. The intentional placement and blueprints of its construction led to civil cases and detrimental court decisions that only further perpetuated prejudice and housing segregation. Furthermore, the lack of maintenance and accountability on behalf of the CHA in the 1970s led to its deterioration. By the end of the decade, generations of public housing residents faced poverty, segregation, racism, and isolation from the rest of Chicago. The 1980s were no better.

As previously stated, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 increased the federal spending by $2 billion for punitive solutions that severely impacted poor communities of color. In the same year, Congress approved a $4 billion bill that would pay for “drug eradication, interdiction, rehabilitation, treatment and education.”[55] Also on the federal level, the House of Representatives proposed a $4 billion package that would “allow police to use evidence obtained [without a warrant] against individuals charged with drug-related offenses.”[56] This led to the

[55] Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-2 (1986).
[56] "Reagan harnesses national hysteria for war on drugs." *Globe & Mail* [Toronto, Canada], September 20, 1986, D3. *Gale General OneFile* (accessed March 21, 2023). https://link-gale-com.colorado.idm.oclc.org/apps/doc/A165385637/ITOF?u=coloboulder&sid=bookmark-ITOF&xid=aa1fe783.

"stop-and-frisk" procedures where police could stop individuals on the street if they appeared "suspicious" or "criminal-like." A year later, President Reagan proposed spending $3 billion instead of the originally $4 billion instead, eliminating a Justice Department program for assistance and rehabilitation as well as halving spending for education and treatment.[57] Through these series of federal government decisions drug use was treated as a moral and criminal issue rather than a public health one. Regan especially did not prioritize long-term causes or effects, but rather more immediate solutions.

In order to increase the funding for punitive programs under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 without increasing federal taxes in another area, Reagan preferred that most of the funding would come from state and local officials as well private companies and large corporations.[58] According to an article published by the New York Times in 1997, here are a series of budget cuts that Reagan made in order to carry out his War on Drugs: $200 million for anti-drug education would be reduced to $100 million, $505 million to prevent drug abuse would be cut by $184 million, and $455 million for treatment programs for drug users would decrease to $244 million."[59] The new budget also made room for longer punitive sentences under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. These cutbacks affected cities with high levels of poverty, who relied on these government-funded programs for treatment. The idea of more centralized federal funding also caused further underrepresentation of smaller communities, such as the South Side of Chicago, making it difficult to advocate for specialized needs. These consequences were devastating to libraries, schools, and shelters, where many of which had to close their buildings entirely.

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[57] Bernard Weinraub, *A National Crusade: In Reagan's Drug War, Congress Has the Big Guns*, New York Times, May 15, 1987.
[58] Thomas, Evan, and Barrett Seaman. "CRACK DOWN Reagan Declares a War on Drugs and Proposes Tests for Key Officials." *TIME Magazine* 128, no. 7 (August 18, 1986): 12. https://discovery-ebsco-com.colorado.idm.oclc.org/linkprocessor/plink?id=20f5db39-76e3-3d1b-8b37-94afc694c114.
[59] Weinraub, *A National Crusade,* 1987.

The most dramatic cut in federal funding during Reagan's reign, was for low-income housing. In his first year in office, 1981, he reduced federal housing assistance by half, from $35 billion to $17.5 billion.[60] By 1989, federal housing assistance was reduced to less than $7 billion.[61] These budget cuts on a federal level left officials on a state and city level scrambling. As discussed above, they provided little maintenance and other assistance programs to public housing units before the budget cuts, so this only further exacerbated pre-existing problems.

Harold Washington, the first African American Mayor of Chicago, took office in the year 1983 and was quickly faced with the social and fiscal problems created by Reagan's War on Drugs. These difficulties affected how Washington's administration responded to the city's gang violence and drug use, with little resources to solve the problem. In response to the state and local budget cuts, Washington stated that Reagan waged a "war on cities," and that "Chicago is a city crippled and divided by crime. The real Chicago is a city in which our citizens do not feel safe to walk the streets at night."[62] Although he did agree with Reagan that drug use and violence was a growing issue, he emphasized the need for resources on a state and city level.

Rather than taking a punitive approach to drug abuse like Reagan, Washington proposed to the White House to increase local funding in an effort to emphasize prevention, treatment, and enforcement. Washington believed that enforcement should only be used as a "last resort" option. "In the anti-city policies that date back to 1981," Washington stated in a speech, "the Federal administration began to sow the wind. In our cities five years later, in 1986, we are reaping the whirlwind."[63] Washington also added that the "defense budget," where money goes towards law enforcement and harsh sentencing laws, "are breaking the city's back," and "a host of federal

[60] Peter Dreier, "Reagan's Legacy: Homelessness in America," Shelterforce, November 23, 2022.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Losier, Toussaint. "The True Defense Needs of Our Cities: Chicago Mayor Harold Washington and the Reagan Era War against Drugs." *Wayne Law Review* 63, no. 1 (March 15, 2017), 24.
[63] Ibid, 47.

funds whose loss would further devastate our scarred cities."[64] Washington's balanced approach of thinking about drug abuse as more than just a law enforcement issue did not align with Reagan's more dominant fiscal plans. Despite Washington being reelected and his well-balanced approach shaping the rest of his political career, he passed away in 1987. To many Black Chicagoans, Washington was a beacon of hope for racial justice because he understood firsthand the systems of oppression in place and how to change them. Although there was still plenty of work to be done by the time of his passing, he helped to bridge the gap amongst race and class.

Despite the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) being aware of these growing problems in Chicago's War on Drugs within the sector of public housing, and bringing these issues to light, the CHA did little to change their solutions. HUD was created in 1965 under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Before HUD was created, housing and urban development policies were primarily the responsibility of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). However as there was an increased need for public housing in urban areas, there was also a need for a specific sector of the federal government to address it. HUD's role is to cover the difference in costs while maintaining operations.[65] Their funds are also used for maintenance and to pay CHA employees.

In its early years, HUD received substantial funding from the federal government, as the Johnson administration made urban renewal and affordable housing a priority. For example, in 1965, HUD's budget was $4.7 billion.[66] By 1981, it was $32 billion[67] and by 1988, with Reagan in office, it was reduced to $14.5 billion. Besides it being underfunded, HUD also had to look over every public housing program in the country. In 1988, there were nearly 1.5 million public

[64] Ibid, 47.
[65] "Hud.gov / U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)." HUD.gov / U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Accessed March 21, 2023. https://www.hud.gov/.
[66] Ibid.
[67] "Public Housing History." National Low Income Housing Coalition, October 17, 2019. https://nlihc.org/resource/public-housing-history.

housing units in the United States spread across 23,000 buildings.[68] This made it hard to evaluate agencies, like CHA, in person; they mostly reviewed quarterly reports and various types of information sent in without seeing the issues firsthand.[69] Despite CHA having less deferral funding due Reagan's budget cuts, they still received far more than any other city in the US.[70]

In 1982, the CHA was in desperate need of financial help. The CHA received a $50 million loan from HUD to keep their sinking ship afloat. In the Newman Report published in 1983 by HUD, however, they identified that a lack of money was not the main issue, but "from finance to maintenance, from administration to outside contracting, from staffing to project management, from purchasing to accounting, the CHA was found to be operating in a state of profound confusion and disarray." They continued, "No one seems to be minding the store; what's more, no one seems to genuinely care."[71] It may be easy to pinpoint the Reagan administration or budget cuts as the leading cause for the downfall of public housing. Certainly, punitive approaches like the increase in policing and incarceration did not help the deeply-rooted and intertwined issues of poverty and racism. But there were also other factors to consider as well.

Although budget cuts during the Reagan administration made it difficult for welfare programs such as public housing to operate in an efficient way in Chicago, it also revealed internal management problems within the CHA that also led to The Project's downfall in the 1980s. During this turbulent decade, there were more than eight different chairmen who led the CHA, whereas in decades past there would only be one to two different chairmen every decade.

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[68] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (1988). *The State of Public Housing: A Report to Congress*. Office of Public and Indian Housing. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
[69] Government Accountability Office. *Public Housing: Chicago Housing Authority Taking Steps to Address Long-standing Problems*. GAO Reports, GAO/RCED-89-125, U.S. Government Printing Office, 6 June 1989, 4.
[70] Hunt, D. Bradford. *Blueprint for Disaster : The Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing / D. Bradford Hunt*. University of Chicago Press, 2009, Chapter 8.
[71] Isikoff, Michael. "Chicago Housing Agency Called One of Worst in U.S." *New York Times*. March 18, 1982.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published over 48 reports issued since 1979 that showed consistent financial and management problems. The GAO argued that lack of centralized power, lack of fiscal responsibility, and constant turnover of top management have led to the deterioration of The Projects.[72] The constant turnover in leadership made it difficult for drastic changes to be implemented and carried out because by the time a fiscal or social plan would be approved, a new chairman would enter the scene and start the process over again.

During the 1980s, crime also became a more serious problem at the CHA projects. In its 1985 application for modernization funding, CHA stated, "The extent of crime in and on Chicago Housing Authority properties constitutes a reign of terror which is real, palpable and measurable.... CHA residents and staff are increasingly afflicted by the most... severe crime problems-serious assault, rape, robbery, burglary and arson. Those are precisely the crimes that people fear the most."[73] In 1987, the Chicago Police Department found that there was an 11.5 percent increase in criminal activity since 1985. There were also 54 homicides, nearly 300 sexual assaults, over 1,000 robberies, and nearly 3,000 aggravated assaults.[74] Although this data does help to track trends, it also begs the question, was there actually an increase in crime, or was it always there and just an increase in policing and surveillance implemented through the Anti-Drug Abuse Bill?

In Sudhir Aladi Venkatesh's book, *American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto*, he argues that the increase in policing and surveillance implemented through the Anti-Drug Abuse Bill had negative and positive effects. On one hand, residents were often scared to report crimes to the CHA or to the Police department for two reasons: the police were corrupt and would not take the report seriously, or because they feared that the people

[72] Government Accountability Office. *Public Housing,* 2.
[73] Ibid, 22.
[74] Ibid, 22.

committing the crimes would figure out who was "snitching" on them. This led to the underreporting of crime, making it difficult for the CPD to accurately assess the problems that plagued The Projects. On the other hand, the increase in police presence leads to an increase in crime reporting. One example is that cameras in common areas such as hallways and lobbies were installed after the Anti-Drug Abuse Bill was implemented. Therefore, residents felt like they could go to police officers as there was already another "witness" besides the resident.

Not only so, but the perception of police statistics during this time were heavily publicized by the media and government to persuade public opinion. An article published by political scientist, Wesley Skogan, in 1984 discusses how the Chicago Police Department's reporting of robbery statistics became incredibly political during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Skogan argues that the department began to include "attempted robberies," a section that they never accounted for before, as a way to show a starker contrast in police intervention.[75] The goal of this was to persuade the public to be in favor of tougher law enforcement and police resources. Nonetheless, at the time, people interpreted Chicago Police crime statistics at face value and recognized that the high-volume of crime in such a dense area jeopardized the safety of its tenants and needed to be dealt with.

Not only did crime itself persist, but the family makeup of the public housing tenants was made up of a vulnerable population to crime: single mother headed households with young children who are surrounded by violence and close to gang members.[76] These factors contribute to the cycle of poverty that persists in the high rises that house tens of thousands of families. Being in such a confined space, where many are part of a gang or come from a single parent household, makes it difficult for individuals to escape and find economic freedom. These factors

[75] Skogan, Wesley G. *The Politicization of Crime Statistics: The Case of Robbery*." Crime and Justice 6 (1984): 149-169.
[76] Popkin, Susan J. and others. *The Hidden War*, 7.

contribute to the rate of crime and drug use that occurs there but rather than the Chicago Housing Authority solving these problems, they took a more punitive approach.

Although there were proposals by the government to help mothers with housing and welfare in the 1970s and 1980s, the decline in social welfare funding and support made it difficult for their living conditions to improve in public housing. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) which helps families with nutritional support and food assistance, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which gives money to families with dependent children were cut during the Reagan administration. In 1981, for example, Reagan reduced the SNAP program by 25%, which cut benefits for nearly 8 million people nationwide.[77] These cuts made it difficult for mothers to access basic necessities, especially those who did not have a steady income, as they were also the primary caretakers. This resulted in making families more vulnerable and therefore susceptible to gang and drug violence.

A New Chairman

Vincent Lane, a private developer who grew up on Chicago's South Side, became the new Chairman of the CHA in 1988 and took his position at a time when the CHA had severe financial and social problems, high rates of crime, and poor management that stemmed back a decade. To many, he was a "refreshing change," that took a new approach to the problem of public housing.[78] The reason why Lane was able to "get more done," came from his accumulation of power. Chairmen in the past proposed policies blocked by the housing board who oversaw the day-to-day operations of the CHA, but Lane said he would only take on the

[77] Sherman, Arloc. "Safety Net Effective at Fighting Poverty but Has Weakened for the Very Poorest." Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 6, 2009.
https://www.cbpp.org/research/safety-net-effective-at-fighting-poverty-but-has-weakened-for-the-very-poorest.
[78] *The Associated Press.* August 15, 1989, Tuesday, BC cycle.
https://advance-lexis-com.colorado.idm.oclc.org/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJF-DY00-002S-Y14N-00000-00&context=1516831.

position unless he was the chairman *and* the day-to-day operator. This meant that he was not only in charge of larger issues such as the general problem of gang violence and drugs on the board level, but also the activities that the residents and CHA employees participated in daily.

Lane believed that the root of the problem was the so-called “cycle of poverty.” However, rather than seeing it as a trap or the outcome of institutional racism, he views it as the individual's fault. “Kids have got to see somebody get up and go to work rather than sitting around waiting for the welfare check," Vince said in an interview when he first took the position. "Kids have got to have role models other than the drug dealer or the pimp or the gang leader."[79] This approach, that individuals need to work instead of relying on welfare, critiques how people are too dependent on the government to fulfill their needs. Lane’s perspective is consistent with Reagan’s and much of national conservative politics that argued that people need to be more responsible for their own economic shortcomings. Both Lane and Reagan do not see “the root problem of poverty” as systemic or institutional, which others argued dated back to the United States’ founding, but they rather see it as cultural. Ultimately, this perspective blames the residents of CHA rather than the reasons they were there in the first place.

Reagan and Lane’s perspective on the culture of poverty is a significant shift from former president Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society approach of the 1960s. The Great Society program was a wide-spread fight against poverty that advocated for urban renewal, removal of barriers to the right to vote, and control and prevention of crime. Overall, his goal was to break the generational cycle of poverty by helping poor communities develop skills and further their education. During this time, Congress was in favor of these actions with implementing 226 of the 252 legislative requests.[80] Public opinion was also high, as he had a 90% approval rating in his

[79] Ibid.
[80] “Lyndon B. Johnson.” National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed March 21, 2023. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/1600/presidents/lyndonbjohnson.

first term and was reelected in 1964.[81] However, his ratings due to his inability to address international affairs such as Vietnam. Additionally, presidents who preceded him such as Nixon, Reagan, and Bush I also influenced an entire generation of Americans and their views on poverty. Two years into Reagan's candidacy he said on live television that the Great Society programs "destroyed the economy and made Americans poorer than they were 15 years ago."[82] Due to the shift from liberalism to conservatism, so did the idea of the cycle of poverty to the culture of poverty.

Despite growing concerns from tenants about their living conditions, Lane viewed drug culture as the biggest threat instead, which led him to believe that making The Projects a safe place first would then lead to success in other areas such as maintenance, education, and rehabilitation. In one interview, Vince Lane said that the CHA "had lost control," and that "the gangs would not even permit our employees to come in and clean the building."[83] However, as discussed later, that was not even true. Other members of the CHA board compared public housing to malaria: "to effect a cure, you must first drain the swamps."[84] Certainly, this is not the first time the figurative and literal language of "cleaning" when applied to disease has occurred; this language has a turbulent history for Black Americans.

In the past, this language has been used to justify policies and practices that are discriminatory towards Black Americans. One example of this is in the 19th and 20th centuries in the South. Jim Crow Laws were implemented and were a series of laws that specifically enforced racial segregation and discrimination with the goal of boosting white supremacy. The laws often used the language of "cleansing" to justify the prejudice of excluding Black

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[81] Ghitza, Yair, Andrew Gelman, and Jonathan Auerbach. "The Great Society, Reagan's Revolution, and Generations of Presidential Voting." *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*, September 1, 2022. doi:10.1111/ajps.12713.
[82] Weisman, Steven R. "REAGAN BLAMES 'GREAT SOCIETY' FOR ECONOMIC WOES." *New York Times*. May 10, 1983.
[83] Johnson, Dirk. "Target: Gangs That Plague Housing." *New York Times*. May 20, 1989.
[84] Ibid.

Americans from public spaces including the Jim Crow practice of white Americans and Black Americans using different public bathrooms. Certain restrooms that were designated for Black Americans were dirtier and unkempt. Even though it was dirty due to the lack of upkeep, people blamed it on the uncleanliness of Black Americans. While Jim Crow laws were not implemented directly in the North, similar practices were also in place in Chicago and other cities in the North and Northeast.

Additionally, During the 1970s and 1980s, when public housing began to speed downhill quickly, the HIV/AIDS epidemic began and heavily impacted communities of color where there were fewer healthcare resources. Phrases like “eradicating” and “cleaning” were used to discriminate against people who have HIV and/or AIDS, and their experiences were ignored by policymakers who viewed the problem as "promiscuous," rather than a larger public health issue. Oftentimes, this language was used to justify behavior that was discriminatory. It is no wonder, then, that it was used to justify the implementation of the sweeps.

Vince Lane did have some checks-and-balances in place during his time at Chairman. He had the council to guide his decisions, as well as the state and federal regulations he had to abide by. However, Lane’s critics felt that he had far too much power, and that his board was not doing a good job of keeping him in check. The Chicago Tribune said that "Lane has proved to be a difficult and often controversial leader. He has shown himself to be more interested in getting things done than in playing by traditional political rules."[85] Despite these public critiques Lane was able to, at the snap of his fingers, implement Operation Clean Sweep in August of 1988 with the stated goal of preventing further deterioration of Chicago’s public housing.

[85] O`Malley, Kathy, and Hanke Gratteau. “Housing Woes: Chicago Housing Authority Chairman Vince Lane.” *Chicago Tribune*. January 19, 1989.

Operation Clean Sweep was meant to be the first step in Vince Lane's "crisis management" approach, a team made up of qualified individuals to completely reform public housing. The goal of which was to increase accountability, meet regularly with tenants, improve maintenance, as well as increase the hiring standards for new employees. Lane implemented this approach by having the police "evict squatters and gang members then locking them out by sealing the building entrances and elevators with steel mesh, armed guards, and a sophisticated security system."[86] Also, to further ensure control of The Projects, "he has reportedly begun instituting 9pm curfews for visitors until such time as all apartments are filled with people who want decent housing."[87] The surprise searches were also part of his maintenance inspections. The police officers, CHA argued, had "probable cause" to enter apartment units because of the need to ensure appliances were up to standards. However, in this process, police officers would secure weapons and drugs instead without putting in any sort of maintenance request. On one hand, the increase in surveillance was meant to increase safety and quality of life according to the CHA and police. On the other hand, activists and some of the residents would say that the way the sweeps were carried out were dishonest.

Also under this program, CHA claimed their goal was to decrease crime and remove unauthorized tenants living in The Projects. They did this by issuing photographic identification cards and sign-in procedures for residents and guests. In one report published in 1989 the Government Accountability Office stated, "violent crime at the Rockwell, Cabrini-Green, and Ickes projects is down 32, 36, and 8 percent, respectively, from 1987 and that decreased drug and criminal activities have improved the quality of life for the tenants."[88] Overall, according to Vince Lane, violent crime decreased by 9 percent in 1988.

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[86] Government Accountability Office. *Public Housing,* 51.
[87] Ibid, 51.
[88] Ibid, 55.

The raids also occurred at times when people were not there, so during the day when children are at school or parents are at work. Thus, residents did not know that their apartment was inspected until they came back at the end of the day. One police officer claimed that he found a plastic explosive in an electrical cabinet with the intent of it harming him.[89] It is important to note that amidst all the underfunding of the CHA, the continued maintenance and construction issues, that the sweeps were not exactly cheap; each time they swept a building it cost $150,000.[90] Although CHA claimed they were making progress in turning around public housing, they failed to carry out the rest of their "crisis management" approach. They were too focused on short-term solutions, such as decreasing drug and gang violence, that they failed to recognize the larger problems of the cycle of poverty, and how to prevent individuals from obtaining drugs and weapons in the first place.

Another significant change that Lane implemented was the make-up of the police task force. Lane enlisted tenants as part of his police force and his goal was to reward individuals by giving them food stamps or financial payments, as well as strengthen the relationship between residents and law enforcement. However, this approach is problematic because people may place themselves in potentially dangerous situations. However, this community policing tactic turned out to be unsuccessful because due to the history of the relationship between Black Americans and police enforcement, people felt more loyal to the gangs that protected them, and felt a sense of belonging to, than the people who minimized their basic rights.

As shown in the first chapter, Operation Clean Sweep was created by Vince Lane, who viewed The Projects as a culturally broken place, and felt that a punitive approach was the best way to address it. The history of the Chicago Housing Authority is plagued with interconnected

[89] Ibid, 61.
[90] Ibid, 61.

issues that have riddled the organization for decades. Lane and the CHA started Operation Clean Sweep to address crime and the "culture of poverty" within The Projects. It was not enough, however, as the incident of Theodore Turner, the case of *Gautreaux vs. CHA* case, the constant turnover of the CHA board, highlighted that the solution was more complex than a punitive cure. The disastrous policy decisions made by both Reagan and Lane only added to the CHA's woes. While Operation Clean Sweep was initiated in one way, it was carried out in another, making national news, and affecting the lives of many.

Section 2: Operation Clean Sweep's Varying Opinions and Sweeps in other Cities

Opinions of those in Charge

Operation Clean Sweep produced mixed reactions. Rather, it varied based on individual experiences and sometimes ideology. For some, the sweeps were seen as the best solution to combat crime and the problems that plagued housing, whereas for others, it only exacerbated problems that already existed. This section will cover public opinion of the sweeps including residents, local, state, and federal officials, as well as the media. I will also compare Chicago's sweeps to sweeps in other cities and how they were different, but also the same. Overall, this section argues that policymakers were far too dependent on policing and surveillance tactics to control low-income neighborhoods. Specifically, some Black policy makers leaned towards punitive policing for their own gains. The state and federal government and the CHA relied on a blanket approach, and that the lack of understanding of varying residents and their experiences, as well as various cities and their experiences, lead to the perpetuation of prejudices that remain unsolved.

As Operation Clean Sweep gained national attention, it also received plenty of praise. Jack F. Kemp served as the Secretary of HUD under President George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1993 and admired Vince Lane for his work. Mr. Kemp stated that he was determined to deny drug dealers and drug abusers access to public housing and to evict those who were already tenants. This was part of his efforts to improve the living conditions and safety of residents in public housing communities. He was a firm believer that the sweeps made public housing safer and more livable, viewing Chicago as "a model for the rest of the country."[91] Although Kemp did not have the power to implement sweeps on a state or local level, his public opinion did influence certain policies on a federal level. For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 passed and was signed into law and included the reduction of drug-related crime in public housing as one of the goals. HUD also supported evicting tenants who were criminals and provided law enforcement support to agencies such as CHA. While these initiatives did not equal Operation Clean Sweep, Kemp represents the broader federal effort to combat crime and drug use in public housing communities and reflect a growing national concern among politicians and citizens. Later in this section, sweeps in other cities will be examined, but for now it is important to note the impact of high-level government officials. Since Kemp saw the sweeps as positive, so did the rest of the nation because that was the narrative published on television, newspapers, and in speeches.

Eugene Sawyer served as the interim Mayor of Chicago from 1987 to 1989. He succeeded Harold Washington, who died in office, and served until the next mayoral election. Sawyer was the second African American to serve as the mayor of Chicago and his views of the sweeps aligned with those of Jack F. Kemp. In one interview, reported on live television, when asked how he would evaluate the performance of CHA's Vince Lane, and if he "backs the

[91] Deparle, Jason. "Washington at Work; Jack Kemp's Favorite Public Housing Tenant." *New York Times*. July 13, 1990.

controversial tactics he's employing in sweeping The Projects," he replied by saying that he supported Mr. Lane and thought he had done an excellent job. Sawyers asserted that Lane "never intended to violate anyone's rights."[92] To Sawyer, the sweeps are the "only way" to improve the conditions of public housing. Later in the interview, he also claims the sweeps improved CHA's relationships with HUD, allowing an open dialogue between the two agencies and what the future of public housing looks like. This side of the story tells people two things: punitive approaches to drug use are the only ones that work, and that there is collaboration and communication amongst all the moving players. Due to Sawyer's race, policymakers assumed that his voice represented all people of color which influenced the public's support of those who do not live in public housing. The assumption that Sawyer's views are a blanket for all African American views fits into the larger theme of "racial essentialism," which is the belief that all members of the same race share a set of fixed characteristics that define their experiences.[93] Policymakers and members of the public assume that Sawyer has a unique and authoritative perspective on an issue related to safety in public housing, and therefore lead to often inaccurate assumptions about the perspectives of Black Americans who live in public housing.

There are many reasons that Sawyer had the views that he did, despite never living in public housing himself. In James Foreman's book, *Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America,* he argues that some African American political leaders supported punitive solutions to drug use and crime in their communities during the War on Drugs because they thought it would make a difference. Black politicians believed that the tough-on-crime policies would truly promote "law and order" which would then lead to economic and social stability.

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[92] "Sawyer: Budget OK in '89, beyond". *Crain's Chicago Business.* February 13, 1989. https://advance-lexis-com.colorado.idm.oclc.org/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3S51-HJN0-001M-G2BY-00000-00&context=1516831.

[93] For further reading, see Caldwell, Kia Lilly. "Epilogue: Re-envisioning Racial Essentialism and Identity Politics" In *Negras in Brazil: Re-envisioning Black Women, Citizenship, and the Politics of Identity*, 177-182. Ithaca, NY: Rutgers University Press, 2006.

However, Forman also argues that the politics of the time led to the support of punitive approaches to crime and drug use among Black leaders. During the 80s and 90s, both Democrats and Republicans were competing to demonstrate that they were tough on crime, and leaders such as Sawyer saw this as an opportunity to gain credibility and influence. "The problems of black criminal justice cannot be overcome by just putting 'good' people in office or merely passing good laws," Foreman says. "Structural change is necessary."[94] Sawyer's belief that these sweeps were necessary for public safety reflects the type of punitive-centered approach that many Black leaders and politicians took during this time.

HUD and the Mayor of Chicago were not the only ones proud of the initiative that spread throughout the country, but Vince Lane himself also believed that the sweeps were making a positive impact on Chicago's most impoverished neighborhoods. In one interview that also took place on live television on CNN, Lane said that what he had done is "give people, decent people, a chance to live in a drug-free environment," and that he has rebuilt the community."[95] In the same interview, he precedes to say that he is an "expert on public housing," and he knows what his tenants want, and they want the sweeps. Although Lane grew up on the South Side of Chicago, he never lived in The Projects himself. The public perceived him as being "the lucky one" who escaped the South Side, when that was not really the case. He never lived in public housing. Like Sawyer, Lane's perception of solutions was skewed because he never had to deal with maintenance problems or crime in the same way CHA's residents did.

Opinions of those on the Ground

[94] Forman, James. "Locking up Our Own : Crime and Punishment in Black America," January 1, 2017, 308.
[95] Larry King;. "Drug War in the Projects". *CNN*. July 6, 1990.

Once opinions trickle down into lower ranks of power, however, is when the narrative starts to change. Another side of the story is the police officers who are stationed at The Projects at least forty hours a week. In one article published by the *New York Times* in 1988, one unidentified police officer said that Operation Clean Sweep is too costly, and the dense number of arrests were backing up the legal system. “All we have is more arrests," one police officer stated, “prisons are pushed past their capacities.”[96] Operation Clean Sweep was staffed by officers working overtime and $6 million of Operation Clean Sweep’s budget went toward overtime pay for officers. Another police officer from the same article said that the sweeps "create more problems than they solve,"[97] and that they often led to civil right violations, as well as the harassment of innocent residents.

On the other hand, Sargent Gail Spane of the East Chicago Avenue District stated "The sweeps have worked in the past. It's a good way to keep the dope out and keep the bad guys out.” Opposing views from police officers and other critics of Operation Clean Sweep suggest that the politics and approaches of the time were highly contentious and controversial, with differing views on the effectiveness and ethics of aggressive policing tactics. These opposing views from police officers indicate that the approaches and politics to Operation Clean sweep were contentious and controversial.

Opinions of the ACLU and the NRA

As the courts continued to get backed up another perspective of the sweeps emerged discussing it as a constitutional rights issue. Noted in the historiography, there was debate if the sweeps violated the Fourth Amendment, which presents search and seizures without probable

[96] "Police Official Admits Drug Program A Failure". *The Associated Press*. December 8, 1988, Thursday, PM cycle.
[97] Ibid.

cause. Bill Wilen, a lawyer with the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, criticized Vincent Lane for disregarding the civil liberties of tenants during his effort to reform the agency (LAFC). He specifically mentioned Operation Clean Sweep, where tenants' homes were searched without proper probable cause, as an example of Lane's "insensitivity to tenants' rights."[98] To Wilsen, Operation Clean Sweep is just "come in, look around, no probable cause."[99] This criticism was raised by Wilen questioning if the searches are even permissible to conduct in the first place, as the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent law enforcement from doing warrantless searches. While the CHA may have a legitimate reason in addressing crime by Operation Clean Sweep, such interests must consider the resident's rights.

Perhaps surprisingly, the National Rifle Association (NRA) was also amongst Lane's critics, and threatened to sue to challenge CHA's ban on firearms. During this time, the NRA faced serious internal changes when their new executive director, Wayne LaPierre, was appointed in 1981. Under his leadership, the NRA became more politically active and engaged in more proactive lobbying efforts. Specifically, the NRA claimed that there were many armed citizens in The Projects that used their guns to defend themselves against gang members and criminals. Armed citizens, the NRA argued, help to decrease crime and stricter gun control would only leave tenants vulnerable.[100]

In response, Lane told the Chicago Tribune that, "It's crazy for them to be a proponent of the continuing slaughter of young black males in these communities."[101] Although the LAFC and the NRA advocated for different things, this highlighted the thin pretense of Operation Clean Sweep's constitutionality. It also reveals that Operation Clean Sweep was not only about

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[98] Jane Gross, *New Hope for Old Projects*, 1996.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Prud'homme, A., and N. Burleigh. "Chicago's Uphill Battle." *TIME Magazine* 137, no. 24 (June 17, 1991): 30. https://discovery.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=3105a476-861e-3b56-b0a8-dde38f396255.
[101] Ibid.

combating crime in public housing, but also encapsulated political debates about law enforcement and constitutional rights during a time when the general public was more supportive of punitive approaches.[102]

Despite the objecting points of view, overall, the media, politicians and policy leaders mostly said that the sweeps were effective and people like Vince Lane should be admired for his work as chairman of the CHA. In a time of drug panic, violence, and decimated welfare programs Vince Lane, according to the Mayor of New York, Robert F. Wagner Jr., is "one of several energetic, even charismatic, local leaders trying to bring about a renaissance in American public housing,"[103] who brought about renaissance in the nation's public housing. Phrases such as these made the headlines, but the perspective was often missing from the people who actually dealt with the sweeps. Kemp, Sawyer, Lane and others all claimed that residents were safer, and the conditions were more livable than before the sweeps. But what did the residents have to say?

Opinions of Residents

The simple answer is their opinions were mixed. Residents had varying experiences with the sweeps, some said that they were now able to walk freely outside at night, others saying it did not help at all, or that it made their living situation worse. Typically, police officers would go into a high-rise and "secure the building." Once they felt like they had control of the residents and gangs, they would move onto the next high-rise, oftentimes not checking back in on the "secured building." In buildings where the security guards and police officers would be there for longer periods of time and prioritized community building, residents felt safer. Whereas in other

[102] In 1986, 88% of Americans were in favor of punishing criminals punitively over rehabilitative approaches. *Changing Attitudes to Punishment : Public Opinion, Crime and Justice / Edited by Julian V. Roberts and Mike Hough*. Willan Pub., 2002, 149.
[103] Ibid.

buildings, the minute the police would leave for the next high-rise, crime and violence continued in the way it did before.

There was one high-rise where residents were overwhelmingly in favor of the sweeps: The Harold Ickes Home, located on the near South Side of Chicago. According to one anonymous resident, the security guards were respectful. "If you're doing something wrong, they'll talk to you... They'll say whatever the problem is, or if it's kids being disrespectful, they'll come knock on your door or whatever."[104] In the Ickes home, the CHA was using its own security force which received more extensive training and was paid more hourly compared to the contract guards. The fact that the Ickes Home residents were in favor of the sweeps, indicates that they felt the security measures were necessary to make the building safer. However, this sentiment is not universally true for every project, especially due to the complex history of Black Americans and their relationship with the police.

Another key aspect residents looked for in their evaluation of the sweeps was the safety of the children who lived there. "It's much safer," one mother said. "Before the building was locked down with me on the first floor, it was hard for me and my kids to get to our apartment door because they [the drug dealers] used to stand right there... Sometimes now I have my door unlocked and I don't have to worry about nobody comin in and taking nothing. It's much better. It's quieter."[105] It is, however, important to note the demographic of people who lived in this specific housing project. The Ickes Home only had a 5% vacancy rate, had lower rates of crime in the first place, and the residents were generally older.[106] These factors may have aided the

[104] Popkin, Susan J., Lynn M. Olson, Arthur J. Lurigio, Victoria E. Gwiasda, and Ruth G. Carter. "Sweeping Out Drugs and Crime: Residents' Views of the Chicago Housing Authority's Public Housing Drug Elimination Program." *Crime and Delinquency* 41, no. 1 (January 1, 1995), 109.
[105] Ibid, 112.
[106] Ibid, 43.

perception of the success of the sweep as well because there were fewer issues to solve, allowing the police to consolidate their efforts to make the Ickes Home safer.

In another housing unit, a resident had a similar experience to the Ickes Home mother. In an article published in 1993 by the Baltimore Sun interviewed families who were impacted by the raids. One mother of six, Mattie Howell, said that before Operation Clean Sweep, she could not walk in the hallways because drug deals between gang members took place. “You couldn't go in and out when you wanted to. They had the door tied with wire so they could sell drugs in the lobby. When they were ready, the gang guys would open the doors to let you in."[107] Ms. Howell said in the article that she felt a lot safer living in public housing.

Other housing projects, however, were not as lucky. The residents of the Henry Horner Homes, which was also double the size and height of the Ickes Homes, had a more negative experience with the sweeps. One resident, Kenny Murphy, told reporters that "It really doesn't do any good because...they sweep one time and they're gone for six or seven months," they stated. "You need to do it every day. You need to put police on guard down here just like they have one at the White House… 24 hours a day." Murphy also said that the gangs come back after the officer leaves because they, the gangs, do not respect them.[108] Attempting to undo decades of mismanagement and violence, as well as the generational cycle of poverty, cannot happen overnight, like Lane assumed. This showcases the shortcomings and limitations of the sweeps working as a long-term solution to deterring crime. Even though some projects noticed a significant change after the sweeps, the Henry Horner Homes did not. If they were done consistently, like Murphy suggested, then there would have been a better outcome. This implies that although the security measures were effective, they were not consistently enforced leading to

[107] Fletcher, Michael A. “"Sweeps' of Projects Draw Mixed Reviews Chicago Tenants See Some Benefits.” Baltimore Sun, September 29, 2021. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-07-11-1993192024-story.html.
[108] Ibid, 94.

Wex, Charles. *Man Looking through a Wired Fence from Cabrini Green*. December 1, 2010. *NBC News* .

varied results. Murphy implied if the sweeps were more thought out, then they could have been more effective.

Some residents in the Henry Horner Homes said that the sweeps were an invasion of privacy. "If they [police] just burst into your house without the proper authorization that's invasion...and I wouldn't like it," a resident said. For many, they feared their home being broken into by police, not a gang member. "It's been like prison," said Patrick Page, a twenty-four year-old Horner Homes resident, he added that"The only difference is, they don't bring your food up."[109] Indeed, even the way The Projects are built, with barred windows and cage-like fences, signal that the residents must be controlled.

The largest problem the Henry Horner Homes faced was with the security guards. One resident said that one time, “They [the gangs] were shooting outside and [the guards] tell us they cannot let us in the buildings because they have to protect the inside.”[110] In this situation, the security guard did not contribute to any resident’s safety, but rather prioritized their own safety. Many figures, like Lane, during this time constantly said that the public housing residents want the sweeps. But Henry Horner resident Josephine Trotter disagreed. "How is that enhancing my safety? They're not.”[111] If Lane were truly listening to the residents and their qualms, he would understand that each resident does not have the same public housing experience. Lane is generalizing based on convenience for his own punitive solution. which ties into the theme of racial essentialism, and that each unit perhaps needed a different way to combat crime due to their demographics.

The security guards in the Henry Horner Homes are different from those in the Ickes Homes, who had an overall more positive experience with the sweeps. In a study compiled by

[109] "Marriage Proposals Sprout in Wake of Housing-Project Sweep by Police". *The Associated Press.* October 17, 1988, Monday, AM cycle.
[110] Popkin, Olson, Lurigio, Gwiasda, and Carter. “Sweeping Out Drugs and Crime,” 89.
[111] "Police sweeps of public housing begin". *United Press International*. October 20, 1992, Tuesday, BC cycle.

Susan J. Popkins for the Urban Institute, she interviewed residents at various public housing units, including the Horner and Ickes homes. Ickes residents certainly felt that some guards were more problematic than others such as sleeping on the job or making snarky comments, but at Horner, the problems with the guards were more systemic.[112] Some residents were wary of the guards as they believed that they were being bought off by the gangs since the security's responsibilities, as well as the risks, were not being properly compensated by the CHA. As mentioned earlier, the Ickes homes had its own security force developed by the CHA, but Horner had to settle for contract guards which had far less training, and compensation, resulting in a worse outcome.[113] Black residents also felt like they were being treated differently than the few white residents, resulting in disproportionate arrests and treatment.[114] These biases contributed to the larger picture of racist policing, where those in power do not focus on combating crime, but instead focus on using their power to express dominance.

In another article, published by the *Chicago Reader* in 1990, one resident described her encounter with the police in her resident building. Lenie Richmond came home from work and saw police officers lining up residents in the hallway. One of her neighbors, who was disabled, was also forced to stand in line. Lenie described the scene as her neighbor saying, "What's going on, I'm crippled, I can't stand in line" and then the police replied, "Don't worry about it." Lenie described him being thrown down on the cement, despite being elderly and disabled.[115] Again, residents felt more threatened by the police than they did gang members.

Another key point to note is how Operation Clean Sweep helped with maintenance requests and repairs, or the lack thereof. The hope for residents was that it would make living

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[112] Popkin.. *The Hidden War,* IX.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid, 34.
[115] Juffer, Jane. "Clean Sweep's Dirty Secret." Chicago Reader. October 4th, 1990. https://chicagoreader.com/news-politics/clean-sweeps-dirty-secret/

conditions better, improving their general well-being and quality of life. In the same survey about the Ickes and Henry Horner Homes residents, only about one third of the residents reported that the CHA had made repairs following the sweep in their apartments. In fact, residents were rarely even asked if they needed repairs when the police broke into their homes.[116] Also in both buildings, residents were asked if graffiti, trash in the halls, and broken windows were more or less of a problem. Both groups of residents said that it had only gotten worse since the sweeps. This suggests that the "draining of the swaps" approach that Lane first initiated, never got carried out past the first step because no other changes were made besides the rate of arrests and the criminalization of people of color.

Residents had varying views of the presence of police in their homes. Some saw it as a necessary measure to keep them safe, while others felt that it was invasive. As the police primarily targeted The Projects during a time where drug use was the same amongst white and Black Americans, the sweeps were a reminder of the systemic institutional racism that they faced. Another point to consider is that historically, the likelihood that white residents' homes would be searched in the same way and to the same extent, has never happened in Chicago. The intentional targeting is part of a larger history of racial discrimination in urban areas, such as redlining and the incident of Theodore Turner in the airport homes. The searches also brought up concerns about privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights which were also violated disproportionately more in The Projects than other areas of Chicago. Overall, the varying views of residents during Operation Clean Sweep highlight the ways in which police and systems in place often gloss over problems, rather than attacking them at their roots.

Sweeps in Other Cities

[116] Ibid.

As stated earlier, Jack Kemp highly approved of the sweeps and wanted to implement the operation nationwide under HUD. Chicago was seen as a leading example, but the sweeps looked different from city to city due to demographics, resources, and politics. Smaller cities, with a more state-centered government style, implemented sweeps that prioritized education, rehabilitation, and community building whereas larger cities focused on punitive approaches. This is because smaller cities do not need to spread their funding as thinly, and therefore are able to allocate resources.

Orlando

Orlando, which is an inland city of Florida, was one of the few cities that implemented the sweeps in a rehabilitative way, but their demographics were different than Chicago's. The Orlando Housing Authority (ORA) owned and operated fourteen public housing complexes, with 5,773 residents, about 3% of the size of Chicago's public housing. Their resident demographic was also made up of mostly Black Americans and Latinx Americans. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, they described Orlando as not having the same management and fiscal problems that destroyed other public housing agencies. In 1992, Orlando reported a "high rent collection rate," meaning that the residents paid their rent on time, and the units are 99% occupied.[117] OHA also only had about 100 employees, far less than the CHA's tens of thousands.

Rather than prioritizing surveillance and control, like the CHA, the OHA implemented community-based policing tactics. The neighborhood's police officers spent most of their time with children and teenagers who reside in public housing, while also donating their time as athletic coaches and scout leaders. Also, among their accomplishments, the OHA persuaded the public school system to develop a General Education Development (GED) program, within one

[117] Webster, Barbara, and Edward F. Connors, The Police, Drugs, and Public Housing § (1992).

of the apartment complexes, making it easy for residents to obtain an education without having to leave the safety of their home. The OHA also arranged job fairs, summer youth programs, and field trips to inspire residents that there is a future beyond joining a gang or becoming a drug dealer. This represented the type of comprehensive approach to drug abuse and crime that some anti-punitive approach activists, such as the ACLU, had called for in cities such as Chicago.

As far as the sweeps themselves, in Orlando they did not abide by the "zero-tolerance policy," like the CHA. Instead, according to the Department of Justice, the OHA relied upon communication with tenants, and only evicted or arrested residents if there was a probable cause present.. Many Orlando police officers said that within a few months, hostility had diminished and that they no longer felt unsafe when they were in the public housing units. Indeed, it is important to note that it may have been easier to take this rehabilitative approach simply due to the scale of issues Orlando was dealing with. Not only that, but there are no sources about the residents' opinions about the sweeps either, so it is unknown if their opinions about the sweep differ from the official policy and government accounts. This reflects, however, the history of complex public housing in the United States and how each city has been shaped by a variety of social, economic, and political factors. The lesson, however, remains the same: punitive solutions are not a long-term solution that address the root of the problem, only exacerbate it. By prioritizing education and quality of life, the cycle of poverty breaks and therefore bettering future generations. Additionally, this approach has been overlooked by punitive approaches which have historically been favored by the general U.S. public.

Washington, D.C.

In contrast, Washington, D.C. followed Chicago's lead and implemented the same approaches, but it was considered a failure according to HUD and other federal and local agencies. District of Columbia Housing Authority (DCHA) operates 8,084 units, 40,000 residents, across 60 developments, each about five to seven stories tall, and are also densely packed in segregated areas due to redlining. By the early 80s, 20% of the units were vacant.[118] Despite being a fraction of the size of Chicago, D.C. was famously known for being the "murder capital of the United States," during the 80s and 90s and was the third most funded city for public housing, behind New York City and Chicago.[119] HUD also considered D.C. "one of the worst managed projects in the country," and said in another report that " significant problems plaguing the [public housing authority] are in the areas of tenant account receivables, vacancies, staffing, maintenance backlog, vacant unit turnaround time, annual unit inspections, evictions . . . and general management problems."[120] Of course, arresting people only increased the vacancy rate, required more staff, and increased the amount of maintenance complaints. Therefore, those larger issues that were hoping to be fixed by the sweeps, did not even address it. The problems in the DCHA and the CHA mirrored each other, so it is no surprise that when Operation Clean Sweep was implemented in one city, it carried into the other in the exact same way, hoping for the same result.

Within months of the operation, there was no sufficient evidence that led to a decrease in crime or an increase in resident safety. A year later, D.C. had over 30,000 arrests at a cost of over $5.5 million, with most of that funding going to overtime pay for the police officers that patrolled the public housing buildings. "The program is successful, no question about that," said

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[118] "Mapping Segregation in D.C. - D.C. Policy Center." D.C. Policy Center - Advancing policies for a strong and vibrant economy in the District of Columbia, January 18, 2022. https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publications/mapping-segregation-fha/.
[119] Atkinson, Rick, and Chris Spolar. "D.C. PUBLIC HOUSING A LEGACY OF DESPAIR." *The Washington Post*, March 26, 1989.
[120] Ibid.

Addison Davis, commander of the 5th Police District. "At the same time, we do recognize that it costs a lot to operate, and funds are not inexhaustible."[121] However, it is important to consider how people, such as police commanders, measure success. One metric was crime statistics, which also correlates with rates of arrests. Another measure is public perception, where if the media is saying the sweeps are successful, then citizens will begin to think that is true. Indeed, the success of Operation Clean Sweep in Washington DC uses various quantitative and qualitative data, but not once do they measure the program's success with employment rates, education level, or general wellbeing of residents. The sweeps jammed jails and backed-up courts with people suspected of crime, which was an issue because it demonstrated that Operation Clean Sweep was not a probable long-term solution due to the lack of direction and thought after the sweeps were carried out. The U.S. continues to deal with the problem of crime in the same way, despite history showing that this method is unsuccessful.

New York City

New York City's public housing was a monster of its own, but it was managed in a slightly different way. Until the late 1960s, public housing was still densely packed high-rises, but were more scattered throughout the city, and was primarily made up of white middle-class families, a different demographic makeup than Chicago around the same time. New York City's Housing Authority (NYCHA) loosened their selectivity in 1968 due to pressure from social justice activists and the federal government. To prevent white-flight, NYCHA had a three-tiered system: one-third welfare, one-third working class, and one-third elderly. This resulted in a 72%

[121] Horwitz, Sari, and Linda Wheeler. "D.C. OPERATION CLEAN SWEEP TO RESUME, OFFICIALS SAY." *The Washington Post*. April 19, 1987.

employment rate within public housing, compared to 10% in Chicago.[122] Therefore, NYCHA had achieved integration and social mobility that differentiated it from other large-scale projects.

However, by the 1980s, with the advent of the cocaine epidemic, it became a crime-ridden place like everywhere else. New York City has the largest public housing program in the nation, with 600,000 residents in 334 public housing developments. Due to the national attention of Operation Clean Sweep and its admirers, NYCHA implemented their own version, called "Operation Safe Home." The program was similar to Chicago's, with an emphasis on patrols and "taking back" the building. Although Operation Safe Home implemented rehabilitation and drug prevention programs, they were poorly funded and were unsuccessful in combating drug abuse.

Tens of thousands of arrests later, the results of Operation Safe Home were mixed. Residents and police agreed that there have been fewer crimes committed and that public housing feels generally safer since the program has been implemented.[123] The New York Times also believed that "the authority's robust management capabilities, financial resources and tough policing kept it afloat while public housing in the rest of the nation spiraled into disrepair and demolishment."[124] HUD also ranked NYCHA as the best in the country through measuring employment and crime rates. Data like that can be skewed, however as the jobs people were often employed in included the patrolling of their own public housing unit, which then resulted in higher rates of arrests of their fellow residents.

Other residents, however, disagreed. "I still don't feel safe here," says John Cruz, 24, a public housing resident in the Bronx. "The majority of people try to be inside before the sun goes down. People kill for leather jackets, and we have more poverty than anywhere. Anybody would

[122] Sadurni, Luis. "The Rise and Fall of New York Public Housing: An Oral History." *The New York Times*. July 9, 2018.
[123] Fagan, Jeffrey, Garth Davies, and Jan Holland. "The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New York City Public Housing." *Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy* 13, no. 3 (January 1, 2006): 415–60.
[124] Ibid.

get out if they had the chance."[125] He feels that instead of punitive policing, "'If you give people housing, education, and jobs, maybe you'll save a life. Another resident said, "They [NYCHA] promised to take us to the moon... They ended up dumping us in the sewer."[126] Cruz also notes that if Operation Safe Home focused on investing resources into other areas instead, then the Bronx would be more affluent. At the end of the day, Operation Safe Home only tore families apart and contributed to the utter hopelessness of its residents.

During all of this, from Chicago to Orlando to DC to New York, the sweeps correlated with an increased rate of incarceration amongst Black Americans during the War on Drugs. NYCHA and the New York Police Department (NYPD) contributed to hyper surveillance of residents, by emphasizing stop and frisk, zero-tolerance policies, as well as cameras placed unknowingly in NYCHA hallways that disproportionately impacted the residents, most of which are people of color. According to one study by the University of Colombia in 2021, analyzing census data from 2000 and 2010, "17% of the state's incarcerated population originated from public housing developments, even though those [public housing units] accounted for only 6.3% of New York State's population."[127] This is 4.6 times higher compared to non-NYCHA housing. Even though drug use is the same across all races and demographics of people in New York City, this suggests that impoverished people of color were disproportionately arrested.

Chicago was not much different. In 1980, the incarceration rate in all of Illinois was 162 people per 100,000. In 1990, two years into the sweeps, it rose to 408 per 100,000.[128] According to the Chicago Police Department's Annual Report, African Americans accounted for 67% of

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[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Targeted News Service. "Columbia: Study reveals pipeline from public housing to prison in New York City". *Targeted News Service.* August 31, 2022.
[128] Holder, Jay, Ivan Calaff, Brett Maricque, and Van C. Tran. "Concentrated Incarceration and the Public-Housing-to-Prison Pipeline in New York City Neighborhoods." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States* 119, no. 36 (September 6, 2022).

arrests, despite only making up 40% of the population, while white people made up 25% of arrests, despite also making up 40% of the population. These patterns persisted, as police continued to over-surveillance areas with public housing, as well as continue their raids. Additionally, these statistics only consider arrests made by the CPD, and do not actually reflect patterns of criminal behavior, since drug rates were the same amongst races and class. This disproportionate rate of incarceration affected public housing units significantly as it resulted in a decrease of economic opportunities, increased poverty, and social inequality. These are issues Black Americans have faced in America for centuries.

Operation Clean Sweep (or its related programs in other cities) was not the first nor the last time the U.S. government has exerted its control over people of color. Although people like Lane and Sawyer claim they had the residents of public housing's best interests at heart the program was part of a broader trend of aggressive police resulting in mass incarceration that intentionally impacted the South Side of Chicago. Although the intent was to crack-down on drug-related crime, the tactics used, such as stop and frisk, issuing IDs and evicting squatters, were excessive and did not combat crime rates long term. Also, these measures assume that everyone is collectively guilty or suspicious. The program ultimately focused on punishing individuals -drug users and drug dealers alike- which only led to further discouragement and marginalization. Overall, Operation Clean Sweep's legacy and the similar programs that occurred throughout the country proved that US leaders, on both a state and federal level, were dependent on punitive approaches. These approaches have a legacy that is detrimental to vulnerable communities. While the operation itself only lasted for a few years, its impacts are still felt in the decades that followed.

Section 3: The Legacy of Operation Clean Sweep

The End of Operation Clean Sweep

As Operation Clean Sweep continued into the early 90s, so did increases in the crime rate. Not until October 1993, did Vince Lane or Richard M. Daley, who was the mayor that succeeded Sawyer in 1988, realized that their approach to solving the social problems that manifested within The Projects was not working. Dantrell Davis, a seven-year-old boy who lived in the Cabrini-Green Projects was walking to school when he was shot and killed.[129] The shooter responsible was a man who claimed he was aiming for someone else but accidentally shot the little boy instead.[130] His mother filed a lawsuit accusing the CHA of "utter indifference" and neglect to public safety. Davis's death also prompted a truce amongst gangs temporarily. Even though Dantrell was not the first child to die of gang violence, it did gain national attention. This is because the Cabrini-Green Project was on the northside of Chicago, near the Magnificent Mile. The Magnificent Mile is a mile long and is known for its prestigious and famous shopping and commercial districts. The street is lined with luxury retailers, boutiques, restaurants, hotels, and high-rise apartments. This caused a growing concern amongst northern Chicagoans that crime was seeping its way into other parts of the city, from the South Side, and therefore awareness needed to be brought to it.

Cabrini-Green is a rare public housing complex as it was not only the largest and the most infamous project in the United States, but also stood across the street from affluent, majority white apartment buildings. There are a few reasons for this. Cabrini-Green was built in the 1940s and named after Frances Cabrini (the Chicago-area Catholic nun and eventual saint) and was situated in an area that went under serious demographic changes since then. Like

[129] "Mother accuses Chicago Housing Authority of indifference". *United Press International.* January 5, 1993, Tuesday, BC cycle.
[130] "MAN HELD IN KILLING OF BOY, 7, SAYS HE WAS AIMING AT TEENS". *St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri).* October 16, 1992, FRIDAY, THREE STAR Edition.

Midway Airport homes, it housed primarily Italian and other white immigrants, with just a few African American families. This allowed the development around Cabrini-Green to become more affluent and gentrified in the 1950s and 1960s. Due to this, the Italians and other white immigrants were able to move out as the jobs in that area were abundant, but for African Americans, it remained difficult. Therefore, African American families stayed, and it became majority Black by the 1980s. The portrayal of Dantrell Davis in the media played a significant role in forming public opinion. Since the news only focused on the negative parts of life in public housing, most of the general public equated public housing residents with criminals. As a result, this escalated a climate of fear and concern about public housing in general, and the idea that it would seep into the luxury of the Magnificent Mile.

Within weeks of Dantrell Davis' death, action was taken by the CHA and Chicago officials. The first of which was the immediate closing of the Cabrini-Green Project, which was part of Mayor M. Daley's 10-point plan to rid the city's gangs and violence once and for all. "We will not surrender," Daley told the press. "We refuse to stand by in a city where a 7-year-old cannot walk to his school."[131] Following the conference, Daley took the lead in vacating and sealing low-occupancy buildings, including Cabrini-Green which had less than a 50% occupancy rate at the time. The occupancy rate was low for a variety of reasons: it was considered the worst of all the housing projects in the United States due to the substantially higher rates of crime, derelict physical living conditions, and fewer job opportunities for Black Americans due to the stigma in the area about public housing residents. Therefore, many residents moved to other housing units instead.

Daley amped up the sweeps for a few months including hiring National Guardsmen to monitor entrances and exits, as well as conduct the sweeps for illegal weapons and squatters

[131] Ibid.

more frequently. This was a collaborative effort with Vince Lane, who said the effort was "historic" and that "this is something that the residents want." Dantell's family, Lane mentioned, will be relocated to another public housing facility. Lane said he was optimistic that the boy's death might cause the city to reclaim its public housing. "It truly may be that the death of this little 7-year-old boy might be enough to galvanize the city of Chicago."[132] The closure of Cabrini-Green was part of a larger trend of gentrification that disproportionately impacted low-income communities of color. The fact that Dantrell's family was being relocated to another public housing facility suggests that the city's response may have been focused on moving people around rather than addressing the underlying issues of poverty and violence in the area.

ADI and the "New" Approach

With the decision to close Cabrini-Green, Daley and Lane decided that Operation Clean Sweep was not enough, and another program emerged. The Anti-Drug Initiative (ADI) grew out of the CHA chairman's new efforts to combat gangs and violence in 1994. When it was originally conceived, Daley and Lane believed that it had a greater goal for reducing disorder. It was not just police establishing a presence, but also incorporated elements that researchers believed would make more successful outcomes: It required collaboration between residents, management, and police, while also emphasizing drug treatment by establishing rehabilitation centers within The Projects.[133] With this, also came the closure of many buildings that had an occupancy rate of less than half, and those tenants would be moved to other housing projects.

For reasons that are vaguely known, Vince Lane and nine members of the CHA board resigned in 1995. There are very few reports on this from the time, but one source by the

[132] Ibid.
[133] Wendell A. Johnson, Lynn M. Olson, Susan J. Popkin, Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Victoria E. Gwiasda, and Jean M. Amendolia. "Combating Crime in Public Housing: A Qualitative and Quantitative Longitudinal Analysis of the Chicago Housing Authority's Anti-Drug Initiative." *Justice Quarterly* 16 (September 1, 1999): 529.

Chicago Tribune said that it was his decision to step down. "I can't take the time away from my business anymore. I can't take the pressure," said Lane, who was the chairman while also maintaining his private businesses.[134] Lane's decision to step down due to his business and personal pressures raises questions about his ability to effectively manage the CHA while also maintaining his private interests. This could be seen as a conflict of interest that potentially compromised his ability to make objective decisions about the organization's operations and priorities.

This came as a shock to many, including Henry Cisneros, secretary of HUD under President Bill Clinton from 1993 to 1997 and who had praised Lane earlier in the year for being a "visionary." Also, Clinton toured the Robert Taylor Homes with Lane in 1994 and described Lane as a "hero."[135] Yet, in an interview following Lane's resignation, the newspaper described Cisneros as being cryptic as he said, "one of our priorities will be to properly segregate accounts to make sure money is being used in an appropriate way."[136] It appears that there may have been some improprieties that were at least investigated, despite never being fully reported. Overall, the lack of transparency and accountability on the part of CHA leadership, paired with the inability to communicate effectively about the organization's priorities and challenges to the federal government, showcases oversight. Not only so, but public opinion revolving around Lane was originally positive and praised by high-profile figures like Henry Cisneros and President Clinton earlier in the year. This raised concerns about the effectiveness of the broader management structure that oversees public housing organizations like the CHA.

In 2001, six years after Vince Lane's resignation, he was sentenced to two years in prison for lying to banks to obtain nearly $3 million in loans for his private development work.

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[134] Debbie Howlett. "Chicago's housing in new hands". *USA TODAY.* May 31, 1995, Wednesday, FINAL EDITION.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.

Although there is little evidence that he lied to HUD or CHA for similar reasons, one tenant of Robert Taylor Homes advisory council board said that Vince Lane "became the biggest slumlord in public-housing history in Chicago. Poetic justice took its course. He destroyed himself. Nobody did it to him."[137] This suggests there was always a lack of trust and confidence in Lane's leadership, and a perception that he was more concerned with his own interests than with the needs of public housing residents. When Lane stepped down in 1995, Mayor Daley collaborated with HUD to implement a new program to combat crime.

Although ADI was meant to be a more well-rounded approach with a variety of solutions, it still yielded the same results as Operation Clean Sweep. The ADI intervention intended to focus on threats that persisted outside The Projects, with the intention to prevent drug dealers and criminals from entering the buildings in the first place, yet many of the people causing crime -selling drugs, using drugs, committing crime, vandalism- were not outsiders but rather relatives, partners, neighbors, and friends. Therefore, when community policing was implemented, residents did not confide in the police because gang members were not outsiders, but rather "the boys" or "the gangbangers" that they knew.[138] The relationship between CHA residents and criminals was complex, therefore the strategy of "combating outsiders," placed residents at risk.

The 1994 Crime Bill, officially known as the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, significantly influenced the ways in which the ADI program was carried out. The bill provided funding to a variety of cities, including Chicago, to carry out law enforcement initiatives and crime prevention. The bill was introduced by Bill Clinton and passed Congress with bipartisan support. As part of this bill Chicago received several key programming and funding allocations including money for: Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) which

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[137] Ibid.
[138] Johnson, Olson, Popkin, Rosenbaum, Gwiasda, and Amendolia. "Combating Crime in Public Housing." 553.

was implemented with $146 million between 1994 and 2000, with the goal of making the police department larger by hiring and training more police and money for Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants, which funded drug enforcement, gang prevention, and community policing and received over $300 million from 1994 to 2019.[139] While none of this funding went directly to the ADI program, it was still used to increase surveillance and policing in crime-riddled areas.

More generally, nearly $10 billion of federal funding went to the expansion of state and local police agencies around the nation. $10 billion went to the construction of new prisons. $1 billion went to youth programs such as after school activities and drug prevention programs.[140] The distribution of federal money of building prisons versus youth programs, reflects the priorities of the government during this time. Youth programs invest in education, job training, and provide individuals with the skills to pursue long-term goals. Building more prisons, on the other hand, only addresses the symptoms of crime by only increasing the number of people incarcerated, rather than the factors that potentially lead to their criminal behavior.

From 1994 to 1996, the CHA carried out the ADI program in hopes of combating crime once and for all in an approach that was both collaborative and comprehensive. However, it did not show any significant decrease in crime. In 1995, the CHA and the federal government targeted the Gangster Disciples (GDs), which was one of Chicago's largest gangs at the time. While the prosecution of GDs leaders led to the group's weakening, other gang groups took advantage of the situation and moved in on GD's territory, leading to a "flare up" in gang violence. Even places like the Ickes Home, a place that once had better living conditions than other projects, felt the effects of the gang war early on. When residents had already endured decades of violence, "the brutality of this gang war was especially intimidating." [141] By 1996, the

[139] United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. *Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 [Electronic Resource]*. [s.n.], 1994.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Johnson, Olson, Popkin, Rosenbaum, Gwiasda, and Amendolia. "Combating Crime in Public Housing." 550.

last year any program was implemented --Operation Clean sweep and ADI--nearly every entrance and exit to the Project was guarded by a gang member, and the police were driven out of the area.

The Demolition of the Projects

After decades of mismanagement, corruption, and neglect, HUD took control of public housing in Chicago in 1995, the year before the gang war, with the intention of setting it back on course. The Clinton administration and Congress rallied behind an initiative aimed to lead thousands of Chicagoans out of poverty and crime by breaking up the large apartment complexes and sprinkling families across neighborhoods in Chicago in hopes of making a more integrated city. The plan, which was sponsored by HUD, was backed by nearly $1 billion in bonds,[142] more than any amount of money CHA has ever seen before. While the federal government did attempt to find a long-term solution to public housing, it did not address the lack of education, job opportunities, and rehabilitative services. While $1billion is also a significant amount of money from the federal government, it was funding that was spread across multiple solutions, making it hard for any single solution to gain the momentum it needed to succeed.

HUD's plan with Chicago's public housing was to completely start over. First, HUD implemented the one-for-one plan. The plan dictated that before HUD would demolish a high-rise, they would ensure that other housing was available for each family being relocated. This meant being moved into another neighborhood with pre-existing public housing or constructing a low-rise mixed-income development. By ensuring that every family being relocated from a demolished high-rise would have a new home before the demolition, HUD

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[142] James L. Tyson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor. "Clinton Aims To Break Up Chicago's Huge Public Housing". *Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA).* April 20, 1994.

hoped to avoid the mistakes of the past. Additionally, the emphasis on mixed-income development was a departure from the previous approach, which often concentrated poverty in specific areas. The hope was that by dispersing public housing throughout the city, residents would have access to better opportunities and resources, and that this would ultimately lead to a reduction in poverty and crime.

Although HUD's initial goal was to break up the cycle of poverty amongst low-income families, the redevelopment of public housing faced new challenges. First, it takes a lot more time to build public housing than it does to demolish it. Therefore, families had to temporarily move in with friends or reside in homeless shelters. Clearly, there was not a well-thought-out plan for after the demolition, as the rate in which they demolished buildings was faster than the rate at which they built them. Also, section 8 vouchers, which is a "coupon" that low-income families can use to move into housing of their choice, were implemented as well to combat this issue.[143] However, due to this, the rental market for low-income, subsidized housing in Chicago became heavily saturated meaning that there were more residents using vouchers than there were available apartments. It is as if there was no actual long-term plan. Not only this but finding landlords who would be willing to accept relocated residents was difficult, due to the stigma surrounding public housing, as well as the criminal records that many residents had due to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.

Finally, the goal of creating mixed-income communities proved difficult. To do so, one-third of apartments in mixed-income housing were designated for higher-income residents, although their incomes were still lower than the city's average income. The goal of this was to create communities that were economically diverse, while also generating a steady stream of revenue to maintain the developments. Creating this quota, however, meant that there were fewer

[143] Foderaro, Lisa W. "The Towers Came Down." *New York Times*.

opportunities for housing for low-income residents who had been displaced. This mixed-income approach lasted well into the 2010s as the CHA continued to build new mixed-income housing projects. However, this raised questions about the use of tax abatements, which are tax breaks for investing in real estate. In the context of public housing in Chicago, tax abatements were used to encourage the development and investment of mixed-income properties. This also helped to cover some costs on behalf of the state government. However, tax abatements are only offered for a fixed term of around 10 years. These abatements also motivated developers to gentrify the surrounding areas, making it no longer affordable for the lower income families that make up two-thirds of mixed-income housing. These challenges resulted in limited options for many low-income families, contributing to the ongoing cycle of poverty and displacement and further complicating efforts to improve public housing in Chicago.

Although opinions varied amongst different demographics of people, HUD and the federal government felt that this was a step in the right direction. In a subcommittee hearing that occurred in 1997, Daley said that Chicago needs to "move beyond regret and worry about what has led us here and move toward how we solve this problem and give the people of my city the type of public housing they deserve. I am hopeful that this hearing will stay closely focused on that goal and not the politics at hand."[144] However, if one rejects the problems of the past, it is quite possible to repeat the same mistakes in the future. Henry Cisneros himself argued in response:

> "public housing in the city of Chicago didn't just recently fail. It failed because members of the city council back in the 1940's, in the early 1950's decided that public housing

[144] United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking and Financial Services. Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity. *HUD's Takeover of the Chicago Housing Authority : Hearing before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, June 7, 1995*. Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1995, 6.

> would not be shared throughout the city of Chicago, that it would be concentrated in a small geographical area and, therefore, with that concentration created the conditions where all the social pathologies have erupted to the embarrassment of all."[145]

The subcommittee hearing revealed that the city council decided to concentrate public housing in a small area, which created the conditions for concentrated poverty to develop in the 1940s and 1950s. The decision to concentrate public housing in specific areas resulted in a lack of opportunities for low-income families to move to better neighborhoods, and it perpetuated the generational cycle of poverty and crime.

While Cisneros comment is a breakthrough in the discussion around public housing, he too was caught in scandal causing him to resign in 1997. He had paid hush money to a previous mistress and lied about it causing him to be charged for making false statements to the FBI.[146] While he did resign from Secretary of HUD, he did continue his career in politics on a local scale in Texas, where he became an advocate for affordable housing there. This reveals that people in power succumb to corruption and despite his awareness of institutional racism, his own behavior prevented any solutions to occur. Additionally, this highlights how there is corruption on all levels of government and yet, through the actions of CHA in Operation Clean Sweep, residents were the ones who were assumed to be guilty of breaking the law.

Many felt that relocation still did not address other forms of structural inequality and racism that were in place in Chicago's public housing system (and perhaps Chicago's entire history of housing). "By dispersing the people with problems, you are just dispersing the problems - you still are not dealing with the root cause of the violence," said Robert Starks,

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[145] Ibid, 12.
[146] Miller, Bill. "Cisneros Pleads Guilty to Lying to FBI Agents." *Washington Post*, September 8, 1999.

associate professor of political science and inner-city studies at Northeastern Illinois University. CHA's plan to dissolve The Projects also came under fire as non-public housing residents said that scattering low-income families would "seed the entire city with the social problems that are deeply rooted in public housing."[147] These detractors suggested that if low-income families are relocated to other neighborhoods, they will bring with them the problems that are deeply rooted in public housing, such as poverty and crime. This implied a belief in social contagion as well, where people thought that the poverty from The Projects was like a disease.

This is not the first time Black Americans have been relocated, either by force or by choice, and this time did not feel any different for many public housing residents. Black Americans were displaced after the Reconstruction Era in hopes of finding new opportunities. Those who could, did so by migrating out of the South into large metropolitan cities such as Chicago. While the Great Migration was due to violence and segregation of the Jim Crow South, the displacement which resulted in public housing was a result of disastrous policy decisions and according to Chicago policymakers the hope to renew low-income communities of color. Nonetheless, there are still similarities that can be drawn between these two moments: both distributed established communities and networks. During the Great Migration, Black migrants were forced to leave their homes and families in hope for better opportunities socially and economically. In the displacement of public housing, the relocation of residents from their previous neighbors resulted in the loss of community and a feeling of belonging. Both highlight discrimination and systemic racism that Black Americans, with only a few generations between the two, have faced throughout the history of the United States.

Overall, residents had a negative perception of their quality of life after being relocated. In the Horner complex, which was replaced by 56 townhomes on the same plot of land, with 20

[147] Ibid.

of them being occupied by Horner residents, gang violence persisted. Displacement is often associated with negative consequences for the individuals being displaced, including loss of community ties and social networks, reduced access to essential services and amenities, and increased stress and mental health problems. Additionally, the fact that gang violence persisted in the new housing development suggests that displacement did not solve the underlying issues of poverty and crime that were prevalent in the original public housing complexes.

Relocation and the Breaking of Community Ties

In one mother's experience, the relocation of her family led to feelings of isolation and disconnectedness. Anne Ricks, a previous Cabrini-Green resident, was moved nearly six miles away from Chicago's South Side into Wentworth Gardens, which is a low-rise public-housing development, sandwiched between the White Sox baseball stadium and the Dan Ryan Expressway. Her new unit had up-to-date appliances, a newly tiled bathroom floor, and an outdoor courtyard shared with other families yet the only place nearby to buy food was a liquor store that doubled as a gas station. At first, she was upbeat about the move, but when violence broke out amongst drug dealers, the long-term residents of Wentworth said it was her fault, along with the other Cabrini-Green residents who moved in. "People at Wentworth think you're stepping on their turf," Ricks said. "This is not your turf. This is C.H.A.'s turf. You can't run me from my home. Because I do pay rent."[148]

Relocated families were foreigners in a new land with severed connections that left them without family, friendship, or protection. *The New York Times* described project residents as having, "by necessity, bartered services, shopped together, shared food, and stepped up when a

[148] Foderaro, Lisa W. "The Towers Came Down." *New York Times*.

neighbor lost a loved one.[149] Kenosha, Annie Rick's eldest daughter, moved to the west side with her family in her 20s. "I've been out here almost a decade, and I know three or four of my neighbors," she told *The New York Times*. "'They are from The Projects,' people say. But they don't know me. They weren't raised how we were raised. We were raised to stick together. If you're a neighbor, you let the next neighbor know what's going on. They don't do that out here."[150]

The Ricks family is not the only one who felt out of place after being relocated. A resident of the Ida B. Wells development told *The Chicago Defender* that the plan for transformation is like "taking a fish out of the water and watching to see how long it will survive... not everyone wants to move from one project to another."[151] Like a fish that is removed from its natural habitat, these residents were uprooted from their communities and familiar surroundings and thrust into new environments that they may not have been prepared for. The metaphor also implies that the relocation process was not necessarily done with the residents' best interests in mind and that they were being observed from a distance, like an experiment, rather than being treated as human beings with valid concerns and needs.

Residents felt like they were being set up for failure. Although moving from a poorly maintained and broken-down project into a furnished and wood floor apartment seemed like a good idea at first, due to the saturation of the market by the vouchers, many had to move into areas where rent was higher and unproportionate to their income and the vouchers covered rent but not utilities. *The Chicago Defender* described how one family had to move to a homeless shelter after a few months of living in their new apartment because they simply could not afford

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[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Chaney, Kathy. "Ida B. Wells' Residents Given One Month to Move." *Chicago Defender,* Aug, 2007.

the $1,500 gas bills or the $300 electricity bills. As one resident stated, “If you get your utilities shut off, you're automatically evicted.”[152]

Although the move was necessary, many residents had to upgrade their pocketbooks, or they were out. However, doing so was hard because unemployment peaked in the early 1990s, especially for Black Americans. It was at a staggering 17% rate, which did not include those who were incarcerated. In comparison, Chicago’s white unemployment rate in the 1990s was 3.5%, despite making up 43% of the population.[153] One of the main reasons why Black Americans migrated from the South was to contribute to a new Industrial Revolution in the first half of the 20th century by working in factories. However, due to recent technological advancements such as computers and other devices, there was not as great a need for the manual labor that so many Black Americans offered.

Another reason is that due to Operation Clean Sweep, many public housing residents were arrested for drug possession, drug use, and other crimes and were in prison for at least five years, even if they possessed only 5 grams of crack cocaine.[154] This is largely due to the 1994 Crime Bill which included mandatory minimum sentences, the three strike rule which mandated life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a violent or drug-related offense, and the expansion of the death penalty which could also be used for drug-related offenses.

In contrast, employment rates increased for white men, as job vacancies needed to jobs increased including a need for more law enforcement officers[155] Racial implications of this incarceration problem, exacerbated by legislation on behalf of the Reagan administration, Vince Lane’s Operation Clean Sweep, and the Clinton administration, made it difficult for specifically

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[152] Ibid.
[153] Mouw, Ted. “Job Relocation and the Racial Gap in Unemployment in Detroit and Chicago, 1980 to 1990.” *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 5 (October 1, 2000): 730–53.
[154] Hagan, John. *Chicago’s Reckoning : Racism, Politics, and the Deep History of Policing in an American City (*Oxford University Press, 2022), Chapter 2.
[155] Ibid.

Black men to enter the workforce after serving their time. Therefore, getting a job was difficult, and paying utility bills was even harder.

Nonetheless, the demolitions of The Projects and the relocation of nearly 50,000 residents was drastically behind schedule and often moved people to places they did not want to be. As two scholars from the University of Princeton noted, Daley watched the disappointing results of the 1990s--increase in crime, gang wars, drug abuse and unemployment rates-- unfold in real time from the fifth floor of his downtown mayor's office. He also declared public housing a failed experiment.[156] The fact that the increase in crime, gang wars, drug abuse, and unemployment rates was unfolding in real-time without any effective response from the city government further underscored a continued cycle of poor and uninvested leadership for lower-income families. Families were removed from concentrated areas of poverty, rather than removing poverty itself or structural racism.

In 1999, Mayor Daley worked out a deal with HUD to return public housing back to the CHA in exchange for a promise that Chicago would completely change its approach to public housing. This resulted in the Plan for Transformation, and not too soon after the demolition of nearly 20,000 housing units occurred at an accelerated rate. Thereafter, the goal was to build over 25,000 units over the course of five to seven years, but that number remains unreached even today. In a study conducted in 2015, of the 1,600 Stateway Garden units that have been destroyed, 637 new units were promised, but only 164 units were built. In the Robert Taylor Homes, 4,321 units were demolished, with 2,388 new units being promised, and with 335 units actually being built. In the Harold Ickes Homes, 1,006 units were demolished, 867 new units were promised, and 0 have been built.[157] CHA uses the 2008 recession as their main reasoning

[156] Ibid.
[157] Bittle, Jake, Srishti Kapur, and Jasmine Mithani. "Redeveloping the State Street Corridor." *South Side Weekly*. January 31, 2017.

for the tedious delays in the construction of new developments, despite falling behind their plan years before that. CHA also justified the delays by saying that the new developments were funded by banks and private funds, and it was hard to maintain those costs during the recession.

By the time Chicago entered the 21st century, the dispersed CHA residents were blamed for the city's surge in gun violence, as well as crime in the suburbs, as if they were spreading a disease. The comparison of residents to a disease also implies dehumanization and stigmatization, perpetuating negative stereotypes and reinforcing discriminatory attitudes. However, *The South Side Weekly*, a Chicago-based newspaper, has shown that residents did not spread chaos where they settled.[158] The blame for Chicago's surge in gun violence and crime was unjustly attributed to the dispersed CHA residents, reflecting the implicit biases and racism that view low-income and minority communities as inherently dangerous or criminal. These families were moved to areas of Chicago that were already lacking community, schools, jobs, and other resources.[159] Still, the vertical ghettos shifted into horizontal ghettos in neighborhoods that were still segregated. These neighborhoods were already lacking in community support, indicating that residents were not given the chance to thrive but instead were placed in precarious situations that perpetuate poverty and disadvantage.

The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same

The policing in these neighborhoods also closely resembled Operation Clean Sweep. In the CHA's first step in the "Plan for Transformation," they disassembled the CHA police force, which was made up of nearly 300 employees. Ideally, this would result in cutting down the cost of policing so that they could use that money in other areas, such as reconstruction of new

[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.

projects as well as services such as the Chicago Department of Human Services, the Chicago Department of Aging, and the Chicago Park District. However, this also included allocating funds to the Chicago Police Department. In 2002, $36 million was transferred to the CPD. By the end of 2003, CHA gave nearly $50 million to the CPD.[160] While the CHA argued the funds were intended to secure "supplemental police services, which are defined as over and above the baseline police services provided to residents of the City of Chicago,"[161] they used it to hire nearly 400 CPD officers to patrol public housing, which is double the number of 200 CHA officers that patrolled public housing in 1993 under the auspices of Operation Clean Sweep. This part of the transformation plan also called for increased car and foot patrol teams, concentrated efforts within targeted developments, and the need to "address concerns relating to relocation."[162]

In 2003, former residents of the Stateway Gardens housing unit, Morton Walker and Shawn Baldwin were walking to the Bee Branch Library. Morton was released from prison in 1999 after serving 9 years. Morton was homeless after his prison release, and Shawn lived in the neighborhood in a newly developed public housing complex. Morton and Shawn became friends because over the course of a few months, they ran into each other at the library as they worked side-by-side on the computers. They felt very welcomed at the Bee Branch library as they were greeted with hospitality, especially by those who worked there. "They [the employees] know who are the troublemakers and who are the ones who come in there to get information from the computers or from the library itself."[163] One morning, as they were on their way to the library, they were stopped by an unmarked police car. Three officers stopped them, ordered them to put their hands in the air, checked their ID's, and searched them. Once they were cleared, the police

[160] Kalven, Jamie. "The Policing of Public Housing." Invisible Institute. Invisible Institute, March 10, 2022. https://invisible.institute/state-street/the-policing-of-public-housing.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid.

officer said to them, “I’m gonna give you guys a pass today, but I don’t want to see you out here any more... Go over to Federal, if you want to hang out.” Morton replied, “There’s nothing over there but a bunch of drug dealers.”[164]

It was later revealed that their stop-and-frisk was not just racially biased policing by the officers, but also a direct order from Mayor Daley himself.[165] Demolition and relocation reduced the community of Stateway Gardens to two buildings, one of them ten stories and one of them seventeen stories. The rationale, as it was filtered through the ranks, was not to protect CHA residents, but to make the Stateway Gardens area enticing to developers.

The history of stop-and-frisk is also controversial, and it is a police tactic that stops people on the street, searching them from head to toe, without any probable cause or reason. In the 1960s, under the first Mayor Daley, the Chicago Police Department implemented it on a local scale as a crime prevention tactic. However, this led to racial profiling and police brutality. When Black Americans would speak up, it would often escalate as officers would use excessive force such as beatings, using sticks, and chokeholds. This was one of the complaints of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements in Chicago and in response, activists such as Fred Hampton, who was a Black Panther led the charge in ending police brutality. In 1969, he was killed by a police officer who raided his apartment alongside the FBI, who wanted to weaken the Black Panther Party, as it was seen as a radical group. While his death did spark outrage amongst Black Americans and the fight for civil rights, the thought that Daley is still implementing stop and frisk policies 30 years later as part of the “zero tolerance” strategy, shows how little had actually changed between the relationship of law enforcement and Black Americans since the tumultuous years of the 1960s.

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[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid.

In 2003, a member of the resident council named Pete, was walking on Stateway street when he was stopped by a police officer. “What are you doing standing there?” the police officers asked. “Don’t you know?” the police officers continued. “This ain’t CHA no more. It’s the white man’s land now. You can’t stand there.” This quote has a controversial and complicated history because it is used in the context of justifying displacement of groups and colonization, as well as to celebrate white supremacy. To Pete, it was a reminder that although his family has been in the United States for generations, they are still not welcomed into United States society.

Police presence outside public housing units persisted, as did police presence inside public housing units. In 2008, one raid conducted by the CPD arrested eight public housing residents: Jasmine "Boogie" Brown was charged for possession of marijuana, Deonta M. Giles was charged with delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, Shamika Crenshaw was charged with unlawful use of a weapon in a public housing complex, and the list goes on.[166] The presence of police both inside and outside public housing units is emphasized, indicating that these residents were subject to constant surveillance and scrutiny well into the 21st century. The article also mentioned a specific raid conducted by the CPD, in which several public housing residents were arrested on various charges. This suggests that these residents were specifically targeted for law enforcement actions.

Although the CPD did obtain search warrants, approximately 72% of all warrants in homes target Black men, despite drug use being the same amongst white and black residents, as well as only a third of Chicago’s population being African American. [167] The targeting of Black men for search warrants reinforces negative stereotypes and perpetuates the criminalization of Black communities. The use of such tactics in public housing units only exacerbates the already

[166] Gene Haschak. "Eight people arrested during raid in apartment building". *Chicago Daily Herald.* March 8, 2008 Saturday.
[167] Ferguson, Joseph M. “SECOND INTERIM REPORT: SEARCH WARRANTS EXECUTED BY THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 2017-2020.” Chicago, May 6, 2021.

precarious situation faced by residents, who are often living in poverty and lack access to resources and opportunities.

The demolition of the Chicago projects and the relocation of families is a major historical event that reflects similar incidents of the past. Although some leaders such as Daley and Cisneros saw it as a necessary step in addressing high rates of crime and poverty in concentrated areas, others saw it as a poorly thought-out or even a purposeful effort that only further marginalized already vulnerable populations. Regardless, the demolition had significant consequences for many project residents, particularly for those who had strong community ties. Perhaps most importantly for understanding the legacy of this program, surveillance and over policing did not end when Operation Clean Sweep did. In fact, it has only increased as body cameras and facial recognition have become more common in policing tactics. While leaders may argue that these measures are necessary to ensure Chicago's safety, others feel that it is dehumanizing, exacerbating the turbulent relationship between Black Americans and law enforcers. Indeed, The Projects themselves may have disappeared from Chicago's skyline but the problems that plagued public housing still have a lasting legacy that persist today.

Conclusion

Operation Clean Sweep during the late 80s and early 90s is not the first or last time Chicago's government and law enforcement utilized punitive surveillance tactics to inhibit Black Americans from achieving socioeconomic status. Indeed, the sweeps occurred in the late 20th century, but there were a variety of factors -political and social-- that act as a reminder of how Chicago got to that point: Theodore Turner got brutally assaulted for attempting to express his right to safe and affordable housing. A variety of lawsuits, including Gautreux vs. CHA, were filed to bring awareness to the horrid living conditions CHA's residents were dealing with.

Reagan, Lane, and eventually Clinton, made decisions that did not fix the problem of gang violence but rather put a Band-Aid over the bullet hole. Residents of the Henry Horner Homes such as Kenny Murphy and Josephine Trotter continued to feel unsafe after the sweeps were implemented. It took the murder of Dantrell Davis, an innocent child on his way to school, and many others before Daley realized the sweeps were not effective. None of these were a coincidence, but rather the result of Chicago's policing and housing systems embedded in the legacies of institutional racism, disastrous policy decisions made by ill-informed leaders, and the norm of punitive tactics to control minority groups.

The findings of my research are an accumulation of secondary and primary research including sociological studies, government documents, and records, as well as newspapers. Since Operation Clean Sweep is an event that occurred recently, I am thankful to have never run out of sources or materials. Indeed, the context in which most of these sources occur is during a period that experienced severe moral panic due to the cocaine/crack epidemic and increased rates of crime. Due to that, however, biases in sources were encountered frequently, as police officers would say completely different things than residents. However, from a historical perspective, this is very important to consider as history tends to leave out the stories of underrepresented groups.

Institutional racism is still a relatively new concept when compared to the entire field of history, as it can be dated back to the Civil Rights Movement in the 60s, and even gained more attention in the late 1990s. My historical analysis of Operation Clean Sweep contributes to the field because it challenges dominant narratives. I have suggested a counter-narrative to Lane, Daley, Reagan, and Clinton which is "the norm" and is used in society that only perpetuates certain attitudes. Additionally, by recognizing systemic issues through a historical lens, one can identify patterns that perpetuate inequality and oppression and recognize how it puts citizens at

either an advantage or a disadvantage. Most importantly, I have highlighted the struggles and achievements of the people in The Projects, which I hope inspires us to continue the fight toward a more just and equitable society. Finally, the history of Operation Clean Sweep provides a critical lens that can be applied to modern social, political, and economic systems in not only Chicago but throughout the country.

If I have the opportunity to continue my research in the future, I would travel to Chicago and spend time digging into the archives there, as well as interviewing people who experienced the sweeps firsthand. By conducting my interviews, I would be able to ask more specific questions that would benefit my work. Additionally, spending time in Chicago would give me access to resources that I do not have access to in Colorado. Overall, I am very pleased with the research I have conducted and the story I unraveled. I hope my thesis can act as a valuable study to policymakers on a state and national scale.

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