Voter Identification Laws and Their Effects on Voter Turnout

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Abstract

Voter identification (voter ID) requirements have become a salient political issue recently as more states have moved to implement increasingly strict voter ID requirements. I conjecture that, especially due to the politicized debate surrounding voter ID, conservatives rationally propose the laws to produce a negative effect on poor and minority turnout. I empirically evaluate these claims surrounding voter ID laws. Specifically, I examine the impact of voter ID laws on overall turnout and on racial and socioeconomic gaps in turnout. I find no results when examining the effect of voter ID on levels of turnout in states or their racial gaps in turnout. I then look at individual level data, and similarly find no effect for voter ID laws on any important variable. Voter ID effects, I argue, have been overstated. Estimates proposed by other authors sit far outside the confidence intervals of my models.

Introduction

Turnout rates vary significantly across demographic and social classifications. African-Americans, Latinos, the poor and the poorly educated vote less often than white, highly educated, or high income voters (Hill and Leighley 1999; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Avery and Peffley 2005; Lijphart 1997). Widespread non-voting leads to failures in representation because politicians become beholden not to the population as a whole, but rather to the specific class of people who vote (Lijphart 1997). Low voter turnout leads to negative consequences because voters are not an accurate representation of the population as a whole. Voters are more likely to be older and more conservative than the general populace (Leighley and Nagler 1992). The goal of my research is to determine if voter ID laws are exacerbating these problems posed by low turnout, including racial and socioeconomic gaps.

The vast majority of inquiry into voter turnout can trace its roots to *The Economic Calculus of Voting.* In this seminal piece, Anthony Downs (1957) breaks down the voting decision into a simple equation: citizens decide whether or not they will vote if the potential

benefits of doing so outweigh the potential costs. According to this model, voting is costly because voters must spend time gathering information, registering and traveling to the polling place (Downs 1957). According to Downs' model, because it is unlikely that any given voter will cast the deciding vote, the potential benefits associated with voting are low. This model thus concludes voting to be irrational. Since the advent of this model, researchers have sought to refine and build upon Downs's cost-benefit model to explain this "paradox of voting". One study added an individual's sense of civic duty to the equation, thus making the voting decision rational to those with a strong civic identity (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). The costs of voting break down into two primary dimensions: "the number of physical trips needed to vote" and "the number of discrete tasks needed to vote" (Larooca and Klemanski 2011). According to this model each added task or trip increases the cost associated with voting, making it less likely that a citizen will participate in an election (Larooca and Klemanski 2011). Theories of voter participation rooted in the cost-benefit model would predict additional restrictions on voting, like voter ID requirements, to increase the material costs associated with voting, reducing participation.

Political scientists have repeatedly found close election margins to be associated with higher voter turnout (Geys 2006; Barzel and Silberg 1973; Gray 1976; Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Cox and Munger 1989). This pattern is consistent with the cost benefit model of voting, reducing the information gathering costs (Aldrich 1993; Cox and Munger 1989). A potential voter is more likely to believe that their individual vote will influence the final outcome in a close election (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Additionally, close elections are typically correlated with a spike in campaign spending, often focused on voter mobilization efforts such as ad campaigns, direct mail campaigns and door knocking campaigns (Cox and

Munger 1989; Gerber and Green 2000; Caldeira, Patterson and Markko 1985). Campaign expenditures often reduce the cost burden placed on voters seeking to cast a ballot (Cox and Munger 1989). In an environment highly saturated with political communication, potential voters will be able to learn about the candidates more easily thus making voting less costly overall.

Further research demonstrates that voter turnout is positively correlated with campaign activity and mobilization efforts such as personal canvassing and direct mail (Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Caldera and Patterson 1983; Gerber and Green 2000; Caldera and Patterson 2000; Caldera, Patterson and Markko 1985). The heightened level of readily available information in the weeks preceding a hotly contested and expensive election should serve to raise awareness about the election and lower the costs associated with voting (Jackson 1996; Cox and Munger 1989). However, citizen interest and non-universal registration create diminishing returns in election competitiveness and campaign expenditures' relationships with voter turnout.

The primary determinants of whether or not an individual actually votes are the demographic characteristics of that individual and whether or not the individual is registered (Jackson 1996). Voter registration has been one of the primary material costs associated with voting since its near universal adoption by the states (Highton 2004). Registration requirements make voting a multi-step process. Registration is often time consuming and inconvenient, especially for poor citizens. As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) explain, "Registering to vote is often more difficult than voting itself, requiring a longer journey at a less convenient time to complete a more complicated procedure before the peak of the campaign". There is a demonstrable negative correlation between registration requirements and voter turnout; estimates of the depression range from 7.6% to 9% (Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Rosenstone and

Wolfinger 1980). Liberalizing registration requirements could lead to significantly higher turnout (Piven and Cloward 2000; Avery and Peffley 2005; Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Lijphart 1997).

Research demonstrates that the institutional barrier of voter registration affects citizens of lower socioeconomic status most predominantly (Mitchell and Wlezien 1995, Piven and Cloward 2000; Highton 2004; Avery and Peffley 2005; Jackson, Brown, and Wright 1998). Physical costs associated with voting affect some people more than others. For example, registration requirements will have the biggest impact on turnout among voters who are poorly educated, low income or racial minorities because economic adversity leads to preoccupation with their personal lives and a disinterest in politics (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1978). Research finds minority and low income voters to be more elastic in their voting behavior, causing the institutional barriers to have a disproportionate impact on these voters (Piven and Cloward 2000; Avery and Peffley 2005; Jackson, Brown, and Wright 1998). Voter registration requirements serve as an institutional barriers that depress turnout and further inequality in the socioeconomic and racial distribution of voting; it therefore merits examining whether voter ID laws could have a similar effect.

Theory

I see four primary ways in which voter ID laws can distort the democratic process: they will lead to lower aggregate turnout; they will have a greater impact on turnout among low income voters; they will have a greater impact on minority populations; they will have a greater impact on voters with lower levels of education.

Since 2000, voter ID laws have become increasingly prevalent in the United States (NCSL 2015; Bentele and O'Brien 2013; Biggers and Hanmer 2013; Hicks, McKee, Sellers, Smith 2014; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2013, Davidson 2009; Wilson and Brewer 2013). Because these requirements represent an additional step in the voting process, especially for those who do not already possess proper identification, I expected the increase of voter ID laws to correlate negatively with voter turnout both at the individual and aggregate level. Since 2000, the introduction and implementation of voter ID laws has been universally spearheaded by Republican legislatures (Hicks, McKee, Sellers, Smith 2014; Weiser and Norden 2012; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2013). Moreover, the adoption of voter ID requirements is more likely in states with Republican legislatures that are electorally competitive and ethnically diverse, suggesting an effort to swing close elections and shut out minority voters (Hicks, McKee, Sellers and Smith 2014; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2013).

According to Downs' cost-benefit model, an individual will vote when the benefits of voting outweigh the costs, and voter ID requirements represent additional physical costs. Looking at the impact of voter ID in the context of Larooca and Klemanski's (2011) trips and tasks mode, voter ID has the potential to either add a discrete trip before or after voting. The costs for an individual lacking proper identification are the time spent traveling to and waiting at the proper government office, the actual monetary cost associated with obtaining an ID and the opportunity cost of the time and money lost. A potential voter lacking proper ID may have to study registration requirements well in advance of the peak of the election season to acquire the ID in time. Alternatively, most voter ID laws require the voter to cast a provisional ballot and return to the polling place the week of the election with proper identification for their vote to be

counted, an added discrete trip that many may decline to make. These costs would combine with preexisting institutional barriers to voting like registration requirements which also disproportionately affect that that potential voter. Cost-benefit theories of voter participation would predict that these additional costs of voting to prove an impediment to participation.

Institutional barriers to voting have been shown to be among the most reliable predictors of variation in voter turnout across states and time (Erickson 1981; Highton 2004; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Oliver 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Valentino and Neuner 2016). I contend that voter ID requirements represent a new such barrier that could decrease voter turnout. Research has long shown how changes in election institutions have disparate impacts by demographic group, with an especially concerning aspect being the long history of electoral institutions designed to exclude minority voters (Berinsky 2005; Highton 2004; Larocca and Klemanski 2011; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2013). As many as 11% of eligible voters do not possess proper government ID; this percentage is higher among people of color, seniors, low-income voters and students (Brennan Center 2014). With this in mind, I hypothesize that these requirements will have a greater effect in these populations.

Voter registration has been consistently cited as one of the primary physical costs to voting, so any inquiry into an institutional barrier to turnout should look to this well developed literature (Highton 2004; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1978; Highton 2004; Piven and Cloward 2000; Avery and Peffley 2005). There are two things to keep in mind about registration requirements in the context of the cost-benefit model of voter turnout. First, requiring a large amount of time and energy to be spent on registration deters voters from voting. As the physical

costs of registration increase, citizens will be less likely to turn out. Second, these physical costs affect some people more than others, with the biggest impact on turnout among the poorly educated (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1978). Registration requirements require a citizen to take an additional step before they are allowed to cast their vote. These requirements often have deadlines that are weeks before an election, meaning that a potential voter must decide that they want to vote before interest in the election reaches its peak just before election day. These stricter registration requirements also have hidden physical costs, such as transportation, child-care and missed wages, that are more onerous for low income voters.

Less restrictive voter registration requirements will lead to an increase in turnout among groups that are less educated, poor, black and young (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1978). These groups are less likely to be able to withstand the burdens of stricter registration requirements and benefit more from less stringent requirements. Additional research has confirmed this correlation and its magnified effect on minority groups and those of lower socioeconomic status (Highton 2004; Piven and Cloward 2000; Avery and Peffley 2005; Jackson, Brown, and Wright 1998). It is clear that the noted disparity in turnout between minority and white voters, as well as between low- and high-income voters, has been shown to be caused in part by the disproportionate impact of institutional barriers like voter registration. Because voter ID laws also represent an additional institutional barrier to voting, I expected that their impact would be similar to that of registration requirements.

Fewer restrictions on voter registration translate to higher participation among groups less likely to turn out. “Political environments conducive to registration” translate into greater turnout among disadvantaged and minority groups; conversely, there is a positive correlation

between racial diversity and more stringent voter registration requirements (Hill and Leighley 1999). These findings suggest that, because voter ID requirements represent a new institutional barrier in the voting process, they will likewise have a negative effect on voter turnout, especially among groups that have been shown to be impacted more substantially by institutional barriers to voting. The results of my analysis did not confirm this idea.

For a citizen without proper voter ID, the costs associated with voting could be substantial. The Brennan Center for Justice (2014) found that 11% of the population nationwide did not possess proper ID. African-Americans and Latinos, they found, were much less likely to possess ID than whites. There is a large gap among racial groups in ownership of proper ID: 93% of white registered voters, 79% of African-American registered voters and 90% of Hispanic registered voters have the required ID (Stewart 2013). Additionally, state data shows that the rate of ownership of proper ID among registered voters in Texas was 89% for white registered voters but only 79% for black voters and 83% for Hispanic voters (Ansolabehere 2012). In Indiana, 83% of eligible white voters owned the proper ID while only 72% of eligible black voters did (Barreto, Nuno and Sanchez 2009). Similar racial gaps of identification ownership were also observed also seen in South Carolina, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Georgia (Stewart 2012, Beatty 2012, Bullock III and Hood III 2007, Barreto and Sanchez 2012). These findings provide ample support for the idea that strict voter ID requirements will disproportionately impact minority populations.

Republicans across the country are passing voter ID laws as an electoral strategy to depress turnout. Lawmakers pushing for tougher voter ID requirements consistently cite rampant voter fraud to stress the urgency of voter ID legislation (Davidson 2009; Hood and Gillespie

2012; Wang 2012; Weiser and Norden 2012; Wilson and Brewer 2013; Bentele and O'Brien 2013; Heller 2009). Proponents of voter ID laws argue that they are necessary to protect the integrity of the voting process from fraud and to ensure public confidence in the electoral process (Davidson 2009; Hood and Gillespie 2012; Wang 2012; Weiser and Norden 2012;Wilson and Brewer 2013; Heller 2009). There is a high degree of support for voter ID laws among those who perceive voter fraud to be common, and allegations of voter fraud are racially biased (Wilson and Brewer 2013). The perception that African-Americans are more likely to commit voter fraud reinforces perceptions that anti-fraud measures are necessary (Wilson and Brewer 2013). White citizens were found to be much more likely to support voter ID laws when shown images of African-Americans voting and then asked to express their opinions surrounding the implementation of these laws (Wilson, Brewer and Rosenbluth 2014). Racial imagery has a powerful ability to influence public policy preferences among white Americans (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino et al. 2002; Wilson, Brewer and Rosenbluth 2014). The racial motivations behind the implementation of voter ID laws can be seen in the efforts to enact voting restrictions in recent years in states experiencing growth in minority populations and political participation (Haygood 2012). Pew Center data showed that since 2005, 30% of African-American non-voters from Georgia reported voter identification regulations to have kept them from voting (Bullock, Hood and Smith 2009).

These laws have been passed with accelerating frequency over the last 16 years to allegedly prevent voter fraud. Yet, substantial evidence shows that the sort of in-person voter fraud these restrictions are supposed to prevent continues to be exceedingly rare, bordering on non-existent (Minnite 2013; Scher 2011 ; Hasen 2012 ; Hood and Gillespie 2012 ; Wang 2012;

Heller 2009). In fact, a comprehensive investigation of voter impersonation found that out of one billion votes cast there were only 31 credible incidents of voter fraud anywhere in the country from 2000 to 2014 (Levitt 2014). Lawmakers in Indiana, Georgia and Missouri failed to produce evidence of voter fraud while defending the implementation of their respective voter ID laws in court (Heller 2009). However, as previously noted, support for voter ID laws is positively correlated with perceptions of voter fraud. So, the actual presence of voter fraud, or lack thereof, has not mattered to those pushing for the adaptation of these regulations. As long as there is a widespread perception of voter fraud, there will also be widespread support for voter ID laws (Wilson and Brewer 2013). Intentional amplification of the "voter fraud mythology" to drum up fear of stolen elections and garner support for voter ID laws has contributed substantially to the increasing rate at which restrictive voter policies have been implemented (Bentele and O'Brien 2013). This amplification "has come to represent a cornerstone of the Republican electoral strategy" (Minnette 2010). As the Republican House Majority Leader of Pennsylvania said, "voter ID...is going to allow Governor Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania" (Blake 2012).

The Republican Party has moved to implement tougher voter ID restrictions as part of a broader electoral strategy undertaken in response to changing demographics and shifting electoral fortunes. Voter ID implementation is more prevalent in highly competitive areas under Republican-dominated governments than in states with Democratic-controlled governments (Bentele and O'Brien 2013). Likewise, attempts by state legislatures to implement new and tougher forms of voter ID requirements are part of a broader struggle for electoral advantage "between two highly polarized and demographically differentiated parties trying to maintain their coalitions." (Hicks, McKee, Sellers, Smith 2014). The heightened partisan competition

prevalent in recent years likely drives Republican efforts to implement voter ID requirements as well as Democratic opposition to these efforts.

Democrats seek to enhance voter turnout because large voter turnout has been shown to be beneficial to their party's electoral outcomes (Herron and Smith 2012; Hicks et al 2014). In contrast, Republicans have embraced a strategy of depressing voter turnout to increase the influence of their voters in the electoral process (Palast 2012, 114; Hicks et al 2014). Demobilization of certain groups has therefore become a central part of the Republican electoral strategy (Cloward and Piven 1989; Schier 2000; Hicks et al 2014; Minette 2010). The push to enact new and more strict voter ID requirements could fit well within this strategy if groups likely to vote Democratic are affected by these laws. U.S. Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner said "There is only one motivation for imposing burdens on voting that are ostensibly designed to discourage voter-impersonation fraud...to discourage voting by persons likely to vote against the party responsible for imposing the burdens" (Hiltzik 2014). Judge Posner also asserts that photo ID laws are "highly correlated with a state's having a Republican governor and Republican control of the legislature and appear to be aimed at limiting voting by minorities, particularly blacks" (Hiltzik 2014). With this in mind, I hypothesised that increasingly strict voter ID requirements would have their intended effect: reducing voter turnout over all and especially among minority voters, though this is not borne out in the data.

Critics of voter ID laws, including the NAACP and Former Attorney General Eric Holder, have likened such laws to a legacy of discrimination that includes "Jim Crow and poll taxes" (Wilson and Brewer 2013). Voter ID laws could function like a poll tax because many states charge citizens a fee for obtaining official identification. There are costs associated with

getting proper documentation to even be able purchase a proper ID in the first place. The cost associated with obtaining a birth certificate is as high as forty five dollars in some states; this, in addition to the time and additional money needed to obtain proper ID, would serve as a substantial increase in the physical costs associated with voting. In 2014, the Supreme Court stated that the 2014 implementation of Wisconsin's voter ID law "would impose severe burdens on voters who could not afford to pay for underlying documents, like an out-of-state birth certificate, to prove identification, and on those voters who, through no fault of their own, could not establish their identity under the exacting rules established by the state" (Hasen 2016). The law was later upheld and will be in effect for the 2016 cycle. The effect of Voter ID laws, when that has previously been measured empirically, appears more pronounced for racial minorities (Logan and Darrah 2007). All of this serves to provide substantial support for the idea that voter ID laws are more likely to impact turnout among minority populations.

Voter ID laws, some argue, could even prove to violate section two of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) if they are demonstrated to disproportionately impact the voting rights of people of color (Overton 2007). This section of the VRA provides that no voting measure shall be adopted that "results in the denial or abridgment of any citizen to vote on the account of race." Racial disparities in ownership of proper ID are important evidence that ID laws will have disproportionate impact on populations of color. Overton (2007) articulates the need for data proving that these requirements cause a disproportionate impact on minority populations. My research sought to provide empirical evidence for the disproportionate impact ID laws have on populations of color.

As previously noted, institutional barriers to voting serve to depress turnout because they are associated with increased costs. The body of research analyzing the effect voter ID laws may or may not have on turnout is extensive. The results of this research, however, are often contradictory and thus inconclusive. Alverez, Bailey and Katz (2008) shared my hypothesis that voter participation would decline in response to more strict identification requirements. To test their theory, they categorized voter ID requirements on a 1-7 scale that ranged from least strict to most strict. Using aggregate statewide turnout and demographic data they found no evidence that voter ID requirements decrease voter turnout at the aggregate level. Nevertheless, at the individual level they found a relationship between turnout and voter ID requirements and a stronger effect on voters of lower education and income levels. My research seeks to reexamine their findings because the scope of their data was limited. They conducted their research using data from the Current Population Survey ranging from 2000-2006 when significantly fewer states had voter ID requirements. Since then, the number of states with some form of voter ID requirement has more than doubled, and no state had implemented the strictest form of voter ID until after 2006.



Figure 1: Voter ID laws within states broken down by voter Id categorization. (NCSL 2015)

Research published earlier this year in a working paper sought to address hypotheses similar to mine (Hajnal, Lajevardi and Nielson 2016). Their test sought to build on the findings of previous researchers given the lack of consensus on whether or not voter ID laws affect turnout. They used data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study to run a more comprehensive test. Their results suggest that voter ID laws have a small negative impact on the turnout of African-American and Latino Americans (Hajnal et al. 2016). Although the authors concede that their test results could not definitively show a link between voter ID laws and voter turnout at the aggregate level, they note a measurable impact on the participation of groups more likely to vote Democratic, especially naturalized citizens and racial minorities (Hajnal et al. 2016). These results point to voter ID laws having the potential to cause a partizan distortion in the electorate. I sought to build on these findings by using turnout data from the CPS, CCES and

Election Project over a longer period of time, as well as using the same dataset (CCES) with different modeling techniques.

Voter ID laws have also been shown to play a role in the depression of turnout even among those who possess the proper ID. In a survey of non-voters in the 2014 midterm elections, in Texas' 23rd Congressional District, 6% of non-voters stated that voter ID requirements were the primary deterrent and for as many as 12% of nonvoters these laws played some role in their decision not to vote (Jones, Granato and Cross 2015). When further questioned, many of these voters were found to actually possess the necessary ID. These findings suggest that voters can be deterred from the process by ID requirements before showing up to the polls despite possessing the necessary ID.

There is also a significant body of research that finding no correlation between voter ID laws and voter turnout. A study analyzing data from 2000-2006 found no significant correlation at the aggregate or individual level between voter ID and voter turnout (Mycoff, Wagner and Wilson 2007). However, at the time, no state had the strictest form of voter ID law and substantially fewer states had any sort of ID requirement at all. Another study found that voter ID requirements not to be a significant barrier to voter turnout (Ansolabehere 2012). This conclusion is based on small sample size, analyzing only the 2006 midterm general election and the 2008 Democratic primary election. This survey used a data set that only included those who had shown up to vote on election day and were turned away based on an ID requirement (Ansolabehere 2012). These methods would limit the scope of his findings to exclude anyone who had been deterred from voting by voter ID requirements and therefore not shown up on Election Day. Moreover, there is no comparison of turnout over time and no control for outside

factors that may have affected turnout in these years. Finally these methods preclude the possibility that voters are deterred by voter ID laws without knowing it. According to the cost benefit model, a voter will decide to vote if the benefits associated with doing so outweigh the costs. Voter ID laws could be a factor in voters calculation of overall cost without necessarily being the primary factor that led a citizen not to vote. Directly asking voters precludes from observing this.

In 2007, Jeffrey Milyo examined the change in voter turnout across select Indiana counties after the implementation of a strict form of ID law. He found that turnout increased after the passage of the law. His study found a positive correlation between turnout and voter ID in Indiana especially in counties with a high number of minorities or people of lower socioeconomic status. The research was based on a comparison of election data from two elections, 2004 and 2006 (Milyo, 2007). Once again, this is an example of research with a limited scope because Indiana had not implemented the most strict form of ID. Additionally, it would be difficult to reach a definitive conclusion only using data from one state across two elections. These studies highlight the possibility that voter ID laws do not suppress turnout. However, given the recent increase in the number of states with voter ID laws and the severity of these laws, a more comprehensive approach to aggregate data is needed. I hypothesized that the data would reflect a negative correlation between voter ID and turnout in the aftermath of these more restrictive laws but found no results at the aggregate or individual level.

Robert Erickson and Loranne Minnette (2009) explored contemporary research and data concerning voter ID and voter turnout. They dispute statistical arguments showing a measurable negative effect on turnout as a result of voter ID, claiming there is no conclusive evidence. Their

study highlights the problems within the methodology of collecting relevant data. Most commonly, these data came from self-reported voting records from the Current Population Survey (CPS) (Erickson and Minnette 2009). They adjusted the models to reanalyze the CPS data from the 2002 and 2006 midterm elections by using state samples. Their conclusion was that existing data on voter turnout and voter ID was not up to the task of providing conclusive results. They stress the need for more detailed analysis of collected data within and between states, rather than relying solely on CPS data. I attempted to address these concerns by looking at a broader sample of CPS data along with precise aggregate turnout data based on ballots cast and survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey.

Counter mobilization efforts could serve to offset the negative impact voter ID laws have on turnout. Strong emotional reactions to the public debate surrounding the issue of voter ID might serve to mobilize Democrats, counterbalancing the disenfranchising effect (Valentino and Neuner 2016). A growing body of literature suggests that emotions play a powerful role in determining the varying degrees to which individuals participate in politics (Brader 2006; Marcus, Neuman & MacKuen 2000; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, and Davis 2008; Valentino and Neuner 2016). Democrats are especially reactive to the implementation of voter ID requirements. The anger Democrats felt in reaction to these laws was strongly linked to participation both in the form of voting and voter mobilization (Valentino and Neuner 2016). Anger associated with perceived threats of voter fraud were associated with participation among all partisans (Valentino and Neuner 2016). The very existence of voter ID laws could serve as a motivating factor in the mobilization of Democrats.It was important to account of in person voter mobilization.

Informing low propensity voters of a new voter ID requirement raised turnout by 1 percentage point (Citrin, Green & Levy 2014). Though this seems a small effect, an 1 percent increase in turnout due to campaign activity could conceal statistically significant results from appearing using models similar to the majority of researchers who have sought to address this issue. The findings of these researchers could provide an explanation as to why so many political scientists have failed to find a result showing voter ID laws to have a statistically significant effect on voter turnout. Accordingly, I examine whether voter mobilization efforts undertaken in reaction to the implementation of voter ID laws have served to offset any potential effect these laws have on turnout. The results of my aggregate level model suggest a positive interaction between voter contact and voter turnout, although a small one. This warrants future research in to whether or not voter mobilization efforts offset the effect of voter ID laws at the aggregate level.

The literature on the topic points to several logical hypotheses concerning voter ID requirements and voter turnout. I suspected that increasingly prevalent and strict voter ID requirements would serve to drive down aggregate turnout. Keeping in mind the potential political motivations behind the passage of these laws, as well as the noted intensified effect institutional barriers have on minority voters, I hypothesized that voter ID laws would affect voter turnout among minority groups at a higher level than among whites. Finally, I expect to see this effect be more profound among voters of lower education levels and income levels.

Taking an approach similar to that of Alvarez, Bailey and Katz (2008), I seek to contribute to the existing literature by including the additional variable of "strict photo ID" requirements. Much of the existing research on this topic was conducted using data prior to 2008. At that time, there were no states that had implemented the strictest form of voter ID law.

The pool of available data from elections in states having these strict ID laws has greatly expanded since 2008 and my goal is to examine the effect these laws have had on voter turnout. Research on this topic has yielded inconsistent and contradictory results. I argue that broadening the scope of this research to include recent elections in states with stricter forms of ID laws will help paint a clearer picture on whether or not there is any effect in voter turnout as a result of voter ID legislation.

I test four primary hypotheses about the impact of voter ID laws:

H_1: Voter ID laws will lead to lower aggregate turnout

H_2: Voter ID laws will decrease turnout disproportionately among low income voters

H_3: Voter ID laws will have a greater impact on minority populations

H_4: Voter ID laws will have a greater impact on voters with less education

Data

The best way to model the effects of a state level independent variable, voter ID laws, on an individual level behavior, voting, is to use a multilevel model. An alternate approach, used by many authors (Erickson and Minnitte 2009), is to aggregate voting into total turnout by state. A shortcoming of this approach is that it precludes individual level controls. My main results will comprise two regressions: the first using state level data and the second multilevel. The advantages of the state level voting data are that it goes back further in time and, at least in the case of state level aggregate turnout data, is not reliant on surveys. Use of individual level data allows for inquiries into an individual behavior that could confound the aggregate model, overreporting voting, as well as myriad individual level controls.

The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) categorized voter ID laws into five types: no ID required, non-strict non-photo, non-strict photo, strict non-photo, and strict photo. The NCSL breaks down the procedures states use when a voter fails to show the specific form of ID into two categories: non-strict and strict. In a non-strict state, voters without acceptable ID have the option to cast a ballot that will be counted without further action by the voter, either by signing an affidavit or casting a provisional ballot. In states with strict ID requirements, voters without the necessary ID must vote on a provisional ballot and may have to return to the polling place with proper ID before the provisional ballot is counted.

According to this categorization, there are currently nine states with strict photo requirements, two strict non-photo, eight non-strict photo and 14 non-strict non-photo, the remaining states have no voter ID requirement. The number of states with strict ID requirements has been rising rapidly since 2008 with no strict photo ID requirements existing prior to 2008 (Figure 1). I expected increases at the lower ends of the scale to have less of an impact on turnout than the jump from strict non-photo to strict photo. This illustrates the major challenge posed by the NCSL data: it is an ordered categorical variable. The benefit of NCSL data is that it does not simply code a binary variable for voter ID laws. With 5 possible levels for NCSL score, and the score being the central piece of the model, I chose to sacrifice the degrees of freedom and examine it as a categorical variable. The regression outputs will therefore show the specific effects of each level. Level 3 on the NCSL scale, strict non-photo, comprises only 2 states, Arizona and Ohio, and will therefore be unlikely to yield valuable results.



Figure 2 Map of states broken down by voter ID law categorization. (NCSL 2016)

To quantify voting behavior, I needed individual level voting data and individual level controls. I used data from the United States Election Project, which publishes data on ballots cast and the voting eligible population for every recent election. Voting eligible population, a phrase coined by the project's curator Michael McDonald (Election Project 2016), is calculated by subtracting non-citizens, disenfranchised felons and mentally incapacitated individuals from the voting age population. These data, because they concern the actual results of voting, allowed me to test for an aggregate effect on turnout within states without having to deal with the problems posed by survey data.

The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a poll taken biennially by the Census Bureau every Congressional election year since 1976 and asks respondents if they voted. These data are broken down at the state level by race. The CPS has two key advantages. First, the scope of

available CPS data will allow me to examine variations in voting laws dating back to 1996. Secondly, using these data will allow me to test the impact voter ID laws have on turnout within each state broken down by race. Unfortunately, CPS data poses problems, the first of which is overreporting (Traugott and Katosh 1989; Alvarez, Bailey and Katz 2007; Erickson and Minnette 2009; Hajnal, Lajevardi and Nielson 2016). Traugott and Katosh (1989) note that turnout figures have been off by as many as 16% points as a result of over reporting. Moreover, minority voters have been shown to be especially likely to overreport (Shaw et al. 2000). This is problematic because I am seeking to pinpoint the effect voter ID laws have on the very population most likely to overreport. Second, small sample sizes within states lead to non constant error variance along the dimension of population. Large errors in small states pose a problem for my standard errors because those states tend to be white and Republican.

To address the over-reporting issue, I used data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), a biennial survey led by Stephen Ansolabehere. Every year since its inception in 2006, the CCES has had at least 36,000 people respond to its survey, in recent years around 55,000. Accordingly, the scope of CCES data covers the elections in which states have had strict voter ID laws in place, 2006 and onward. The CCES is uniquely useful for my research because it attempts to correct for overreporting. It does so by verifying people's claims that they voted by checking people identifying information against public vote history. The CCES takes a stratified random sample to ensure that all states are well represented, correcting another issue posed by the CPS. One downside is that responses from Virginia all had missing values for the vote variable because the state does not maintain vote history files. It is conducted online, so any characteristic unique to non-Internet users is not represented in the survey. Though the CCES

takes care to be representative by race, state, and age, the survey takers are biased towards characteristics common among internet users (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012). The CCES estimates of turnout and partisan voting behavior effectively track actual results, suggesting the sample is not biased on partisan lines or towards likely voters.

The CCES asks respondents about their race, income, and education, which lets me examine each of the hypotheses using an interaction term. I used four binary variables to measure race: black, Hispanic, Asian and mixed race. Unfortunately, I cannot identify whether mixed race voters are black or Hispanic, which would expand the sample of minority voters for the analysis. When compared to voter files, people's reporting of their own race is very accurate (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012). Though some years the CCES asked more granular questions, the narrowest income categorizations available every year are income bands of $10,000 at the low end of the spectrum and over $150,000 at the high end. This should be effective to measure an individual's socioeconomic status. There is an overreporting bias on surveys asking about income (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012). However, there is no reason to believe overreporting of income covaries with any other variables of interest to me.

The CCES additionally asks voters if they were contacted by a political campaign and, if so, how. From there, I created one binary variable for contact and one for in person contact. These permit inquiries into the possibility that voter mobilization efforts are offsetting the effect of voter ID laws. CCES data includes demographic characteristics like age, religion and church attendance which are salient because regular church attendees and older individuals are more likely to vote (Olsen 1972; Verba and Nie 1972; Knack 1992; Cassel 1999). Homeownership, union membership, gender, political interest, political ideology, immigrant status, marital status,

student status, unemployment, religiosity and status as a parent are other individual level controls available in the CCES. These variables all cover socio-cultural factors that may affect to an individual's propensity to vote. These individual level controls allow far better isolation of impacts of voter ID laws when compared to previous aggregate level research.

Much of the existing research on this issue was undertaken using the CPS, and at a time when strict photo ID requirements were not widespread (Alverez, Bailey and Katz 2007; Erickson and Minnitte 2009; Vercelli and Anderson 2008). I ran a test with CPS data to evaluate how previous research holds in light of the recent proliferation of strict photo ID. Using the CCES, I can examine individual level turnout. Additionally, I can test the income and education hypotheses. The verification mechanism will fix the biases of self-reporting and their stratified random sampling techniques work to correct the sample size issues posed by the CPS. The disadvantages of the CCES are the plethora of missing values and the fact that these data only stretch back to 2006, limiting the breadth of data I can analyze.

As noted, electoral institutions have the ability to affect voter turnout. Citizens will be more likely to turnout if the material costs of doing so are low. As such it was necessary to control for the impact other state electoral regulations might have on voter turnout. States with early voting, same day voter registration, all mail elections and no excuse absentee voting have all seen a rise in turnout associated with these institutions (Piven and Cloward 2000; Avery and Peffley 2005; Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Lijphart 1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum and Miller, 2007; Southwell & Burchett 2000; Bullock, Hood and Smith 2009). I collected data on these metrics going back to 2004 to control for them. I used data from the Election Assistance

Commission dating back to 2004 to assess the proportion of ballots within each state that were cast early, by mail or no excuse absentee.

Turnout is consistently and significantly higher in presidential election years than it is during midterm elections. I controlled for whether it was a presidential election year when I didn't have year fixed effects in a model. Another key dynamic factor that needed to be controlled for was election competitiveness. As noted previously, the relative level of electoral competitiveness within each election has been shown to impact the overall level of turnout. This variable was measured for every state using data from the Congressional Quarterly's historical election data, to find margins of presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial contests. Uncontested races or years without an election of that type were treated as 100% margins of victory.

Like electoral competitiveness, campaign expenditures have been shown to impact turnout. It was therefore necessary to gather data on both hard − the party or candidate spending− and soft – independent electioneering spending – expenditures. Using data from the Federal Election Commission, I compiled disbursement figures from each senatorial and congressional race and broke this down by state year dating back to 2000. I added up statewide expenditures and subtracted refunds and transfers to other candidates to establish part of the spending variable. I repeated this process for hard money in gubernatorial, statewide races for attorney general, treasurer, etc and statewide spending on state legislature races using spending data collected from Follow the Money. Finally, data from Open Secrets and Follow the Money provided statewide figures for independent expenditures at the federal and state levels, respectively, dating back to 2004. Combining all of these values, I created a variable that was the total level of campaign spending in a state in a given year. These data prompted me to include a control

variable for population so that spending did not simply serve as a proxy for population, though most of that effect should have been captured by the state fixed effect.

Methods/Analysis

I ran two time series cross sectional regressions to test the effect voter ID laws have on turnout at the aggregate level as well as on the racial gap. Because the data are panel data, a time series cross sectional model was the best approach (Beck and Katz 1995). I estimated both state and year fixed effects to control for static factors within a state and national factors unique to certain elections. I also controlled for dynamic factors within a state known to affect turnout like election competitiveness, in person voter contact, campaign spending, same day voter registration, ballots cast before election day, provisional voting and absentee voting. The first model analyzes these predictors of variance in turnout by state year. Official state counts of voter turnout from Election Project were used to establish the the state year variable for the aggregate model. I did not anticipate needing to control for relatively static factors like education levels and income disparity thanks to the fixed effects in the model. This model output a coefficient showing the expected change in the voter turnout in response to a change in the NCSL score from 0 to 1, 0 to 2, 0 to 3, and 0 to 4.

In this model, I controlled for campaign spending, election margin in presidential, gubernatorial and senatorial elections, same day registration, minority candidates, in person voter contact, the number of ballots cast before election day, the number of ballots cast absentee and the number of ballots cast provisionally. Among the controls, campaign spending showed a statistically significant positive correlation with voter turnout. This relationship is consistent with the findings of previous researchers (Cox and Munger 1989; Gerber and Green 2000; Caldeira,

Patterson and Markko 1985). I took the natural logarithm of campaign spending data because I expected diminishing returns in the effect this spending would have on turnout. For gubernatorial election, the closer the election margin was to zero, the greater the impact on turnout. If the gubernatorial election margin was zero, there was an expected 5.75% increase in turnout overall. This relationship was also consistent with the findings of previous researchers (Geys 2006; Barzel and Silberg 1973; Gray 1976; Patterson and Caldeira 1983). My results also show that the number of ballots cast before election day is positively correlated with voter turnout with an increase of 3.8% similar to Biggers and Hanmer (2015). With a P-value of 0.07727, voter contact was close to statistical significance and was also positively correlated with turnout, this result was consistent with the findings of Gerber and Green (2000). The Honda test yielded statistically significant results for autocorrelation in aggregate turnout data. I included lag variables to eliminate the possibility of autocorrelation as is appropriate with time series data. Due to the unique nature of presidential and congressional elections, I lagged back to the 1996 presidential election and the 1998 congressional election.

Aggregate Turnout:

$$Turnout_{st}=f_s+f_t+Y_{t-1}\beta_1+Y_{t-2}\beta_2+NCSL1_{st}\beta_3+NCSL2_{st}\beta_4+NCSL3_{st}\beta_5+NCSL4_{st}\beta_6+x2_{st}\beta_7\ldots+\varepsilon_t+\varepsilon_s+\varepsilon_{st}$$

None of the other control variables tested yield statistically significant results. This meant that my findings ran counter to previous research in a number of ways. Same day voter registration laws were not found to impact turnout at the aggregate level. Additionally, the election margin in senatorial & presidential elections did not yield results suggesting a statistically significant relationship with turnout. My findings run counter to the findings of

previous research (Piven and Cloward 2000, Avery and Peffley 2005, Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Barzel and Silberg 1973; Gray 1976; Patterson and Caldeira 1983). These researchers may have found results because they lacked the diverse set of controls and fixed effects model I used. The root mean square error measure shows that the typical prediction for aggregate turnout is off by 2.3%. I took the same approach to test the question of how voter ID laws affect the racial gap in voter turnout while using CPS data. A time series cross sectional model was used to test the impact voter ID laws have on the racial gap in turnout. The racial gap in this model was calculated by subtracting the proportion of African-American and Hispanic voters from the number of white voters. A positive racial gap indicated that whites voted more than racial minorities in a given year, while a negative racial gap showed turnout among minority groups to be above that of white voters. Again, with the NCSL score arranged categorically, I also controlled for state and year fixed effects and dynamic factors known to impact turnout.

Using official turnout data from the Election Project, the results do not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between voter ID laws and voter turnout at the aggregate level. These results are similar to the findings of, Erickson and Minnette (2009) and Mycoff et. al (2007). Though not close to statistically significant, the results tend to point towards a very slight negative impact of voter ID laws on turnout. It could be, as argued by Erickson and Minnette (2009), that the power of the test poses a major issue when examining aggregate level data. There is a contrast in results between studies looking at the aggregate level and finding no effect and studies examining larger samples at the individual level and finding effects (Hajnal et al. 2016). For context, note that the power of the aggregate level test is very low and the power of the individual level test very high in my models. No aggregate level study has found significant

results for voter ID, and it does not surprise me that my underpowered regression had a similar fate.

Using data from the Current Population Survey, I calculated the racial gap in turnout in every state for every presidential and congressional election dating back to 1996 by subtracting Hispanic and African-American turnout from white turnout at the state level. I then analyzed the impact that voter ID laws have on the racial gap. Again, these results failed to confirm any of my hypotheses. There is no statistically significant relationship between a change on the NCSL scale from 0 to 1,2,3 or 4. Although not statically significant, there is a positive relationship for changes on the scale from 0 to 3 and 0 to 4. This would suggest a positive relationship between the presence of voter ID laws and the racial gap, meaning that the presence of voter ID laws would cause the racial gap in turnout to increase.

The only control variable yielding a statistically significant impact on the racial gap was the margin in presidential elections. Closer results of presidential elections relative to the average election margin within a given state lead to a decrease in the racial gap. The Honda test did not yield statistically significant results for autocorrelation in the racial gap. I nevertheless included lag variables to eliminate the possibility of autocorrelation. The lagged variables were insignificant and did not improve the goodness of fit of the model. Due to the unique nature of presidential and congressional elections I included a variable lagged two elections in the past. None of the other controls yield statistically significant results. The relationship between in person voter contact and the racial gap is noteworthy. These results estimate that in person voter contact could be correlated to an increase in the racial gap, but was not statistically significant. The root mean square error (rmse) measure shows that the typical prediction for the racial gap is

off by 5.779%. With a rmse of .05779 it appears that our model is missing significant components of the racial gap.

For both, the aggregate turnout and racial gap regressions, I found that the data to have no modelling issues. I found a "well behaved" residual versus fitted plot with no unusual data points or outliers. The residual versus leverage plot shows no influential outliers. I also found a low enough variance inflation factor, showing that the regression assumptions hold.

Independent Variables	Aggregate	Racial Gap
NCSL score of 1	-0.003640 (0.0079907)	-0.0066 (0.018932)
NCSL score of 2	-0.007728 (0.012133)	-0.0089224 (0.028889)
NCSL score of 3	0.009587 (0.013562)	0.011146 (0.033072)
NCSL score of 4	0.008422 (0.011443)	-0.012443 (0.027089)
Log(Spending)	.01984*** (0041411)	-0.0060923 (0.010464)
Gubernatorial Election Margin	-0.005752** (.0053517)	-0.024667 (0.045509)
Senatorial Election Margin	-003195 (.0052148)	0.0065909 (1.2704e-02)
Presidential Election Margin	-.04191 (.025206)	0.23354 ** (0.089903)
Same Day Registration	(.007450) (.011140)	-0.0073204 (2.6773e-02)
Population	.000000002692 (.0000000040557)	-0,0000000021005 (0.0000000097161)
Minority Statewide Candidate	-.007067 (.0068674)	0.00031230

		(0.018910)
Lagged Aggregate Turnout 1	.2016*** (.048155)	0.12256 * (0.056396)
Lagged Aggregate Turnout 2	.1118` (.050731)	-0.12884 * (0.052980)
Voter Contact	.025250` (.016237)	-0.069985 (0.058852)
Early Voting	.038403* (.016890)	-0.022156 (0.038426)
Provisional	-.069331 (.18119)	0.30861 (0.40311e-01)
Absentee	-.004059 (.0048012)	-0.0093106 (0.010452)

Aggregate Turnout Adj. R-Squared : 0.17722 RMSE 0.0230512

Racial Gap: Adj. R-Squared : 0.040339 RMSE 0.0579943

`P < 0.1 * P ≤ 0.05 ** P ≤ 0.01 *** P ≤ 0.001

I analyze the interaction between voter ID laws and voter turnout both at the individual level. The individual level test was ran using CCES data and sought to explain whether or not increasingly strict voter ID laws affected voter turnout using a multilevel model logistical regression (MLM). Ignoring the multilevel nature of the CCES data could have led to a number of statistical problems including clustering, nonconstant variance and underestimation of standard errors (Anderson and Singer 2008; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Because this technique allows for an analysis of data at both the state and the individual level, I was able to draw conclusions about how voter ID laws impact turnout both overall as well as within and

across variant groups (e.g. low income or minority voters) while using multiple data sets. At the group level I was able to look at variation in turnout according to aggregate level factors like campaign spending and voter ID laws. By using a multilevel model, I was able to assess how voter ID laws affected turnout across and within groups based on information from multiple data sets. Finally, the multilevel model allowed me to synthesize data, the 250 data points of aggregate data from states in the last five years and the 220,000 data points from the CCES in those years. Use of a panel logistical regression was appropriate given the dichotomous nature of voter turnout and the panelized nature of the data. However, a multilevel logistic regression cannot converge on data the size of the five years of the CCES. Forced to choose between a logistic regression with single level effects and a multilevel linear regression, I chose to run both.

Due to the depth of the CCES survey, I was able to analyze the effects the laws might have within numerous subsets of the population. Analysis of CCES data allowed for tests into how voter ID laws affected voters according to their educational level, income level, race, employment status, religion, party affiliation, and immigrant status. Both models find a significant positive effect on voter turnout for the NCSL scores of 3, but that is not informative because it does not vary intertemporally and is confined to exclusively Arizona and Ohio. Otherwise, voter ID laws are shown to be unrelated to a voter's probability of voting. Most other variables, included because research had found significant relationships between them and turnout, showed a significant relationship (a contrast with the middling results for well-researched state variables, though an increase in power surely contributed). It is important to note that a very slight relationship is statistically significant when examining data as large as the CCES. The power of tests being very high, it is especially important to examine practical

significance in these individual level data. Interestingly, parents and union families seem to be disproportionately affected by voter ID laws. This squares well with cost of voting predictions, time and child care being added burdens faced by these potentials.

Use of the CCES posed its own unique set of challenges. Given the length and breadth of the survey data and the opportunity to skip questions, missing values were common. I used multiple imputation with chained equations to estimate the missing values after excluding participants with numerous missing values. This kept means and variance close to their observed values while vastly expanding the available data, a route of which Hajnal et al. did not take advantage. The CCES has yet to validate its vote responses from 2014, but with the rest of the data available and respondents having been asked if they voted, I imputed the 2014 responses. I could do so confidently because I saw no correlation between vote overreporting and voter ID laws, so I was not introducing bias by estimating voting behavior based on reported voting and other factors. While imputing dependent variable missing values is accepted practice, imputing a such a large portion and an entire year of data is a questionable choice, I nonetheless feel confident that I have not introduced biased or overestimated values for 2014.

My results run counter to Hajnal et al., even though our methods and data were similar. Hajnal et al.'s work employed a logistical analysis (without fixed effects but with a robustness check for them) of CCES data to draw its conclusion that voter turnout among minority population is impacted by the presence of Voter ID laws. Hajnal et al. do not include my religiosity, church attendance, spending, minority candidates and political interest variables which I found very strong relationships. Additionally, Hajnal. et al. choose to run important

variables such as voter contact, state and year fixed effects and partisanship in separate models, and it is not clear if he measures in person voter contact.

$Yis=\beta_{0i[s]}+X1_{is}\beta_{1s}+X2_{is}\beta_{2s}\ldots+\varepsilon_i$
$B_{1s}=\gamma_{00}+NCSL1_s\gamma_{01}+NCSL2_s\gamma_{02}+NCSL3_s\gamma_{03}+NCSL3_s+x2_s\gamma_{06}+x3_s\gamma_{07}\ldots+\varepsilon_s$

Multilevel model

State (Random)	Variance=.02249
(Intercept)	-1.218*** (0.07215)
NCSL Score 1	0.07095** (0.02636)
NCSL 2	0.02491 (0.02606)
NCSL 3	0.5532*** (0.04149)
NCSL 4	0.2357*** (0.03261)
Foreign Born Citizen	0.3054*** (0.01188)
First Generation	0.3583*** (0.01132)
Second Generation	0.3823*** (0.01106)
Third Generation	0.3827*** (0.01091)
2012	0.3694*** (0.01724)
2010	0.03455*** (0.003154)
2008	0.3865*** (0.01688)
2006	-0.02349*** (0.00384)
Income	0.00622*** (0.0004753)
Age	0.002848*** (0.00007491)
Education	0.01715*** (0.0009481)
Student	-0.004879 (0.00624)
Parent	-0.02005*** (0.00308)
Unemployed	-0.02125*** (0.004906)

Home Ownership	0.05995*** (0.003163)
Catholic	-0.006868** (0.002565)
Jewish	0.001186 (0.005777)
Agnostic	-0.01395*** (0.002818)
Evangelical	0.005481 (0.003505)
Other Religion	-0.008784 (0.006853)
Religiosity	-0.0113*** (0.001686)
Party	0.0006205 (0.0007782)
Ideology	0.007918*** (0.001538)
Insured	0.02563*** (0.003781)
Voter Contact	0.08307*** (0.00206)
In Person Contact	0.02221*** (0.002677)
Church Attendance	0.01103*** (0.001042)
Minority House Candidate	0.007559** (0.002485)
Union Household	0.01696*** (0.00159)
Marital Status	-0.003855* (0.001823)
log(Spending)	0.03274*** (0.003394)
Minority Statewide Candidate	0.03617*** (0.003627)
Same Day Registration	0.01811*** (0.005305)
Early Ballots	-0.04525*** (0.007194)
Provisional Ballots	-2.694*** (0.1028)
Absentee Ballots	0.05507*** (0.002407)
Political Interest	0.1013*** (0.001585)
Gubernatorial Margin	0.004462 (0.003542)
Senatorial Margin	0.03291*** (0.003035)
Presidential Margin	0.219*** (0.01951)

Black	0.01156* (0.004601)
Hispanic	-0.0193*** (0.00477)
Asian	-0.02631*** (0.007222)
Mixed	0.009133 (0.007626)
NCSL1:Black	-0.01861* (0.008107)
NCSL2:Black	0.02366* (0.009351)
NCSL3:Black	0.002284 (0.01268)
NCSL4:Black	0.01195 (0.01043)
NCSL1:Hispanic	-0.0097 (0.00862)
NCSL2:Hispanic	0.007994 (0.00986)
NCSL3:Hispanic	0.01363 (0.01421)
NCSL4:Hispanic	-0.002134 (0.0164)
NCSL1:Mixed	0.01094 (0.01671)
NCSL2:Mixed	0.02368 (0.01597)
NCSL 3:Mixed	-0.01039 (0.02414)
NCSL4:Mixed	-0.03695` (0.02037)
NCSL1:Income	-0.001157 (0.0008648)
NCSLl2:Income	-0.001145 (0.001011)
NCSL3:Income	-0.002732* (0.001309)
NCSL4:Income	-0.001636 (0.001264)
NCSL1:Immigrant Status1	-0.03137 (0.02579)
NCSL2:Immigrant Status1	0.005884 (0.02397)
NCSL3:Immigrant Status1	-0.01502 (0.04047)
NCSL4:Immigrant Status1	-0.2199*** (0.03214)
NCSL1:Immigrant Status2	-0.0295 (0.02462)
NCSLl2:Immigrant Status2	-0.01046 (0.02329)

NCSL3:Immigrant Status2	0.04887 (0.03833)
NCSLl4:Immigrant Status2	-0.2208*** (0.03094)
NCSL1:Immigrant Status3	-0.04308` (0.02384)
NCSL2:Immigrant Status3	-0.03193 (0.02259)
NCSL3:Immigrant Status3	0.002405 (0.03703)
NCSL4:Immigrant Status3	-0.2272*** (0.0297)
NCSL1:Immigrant Status4	-0.03174 (0.0235)
NCSL2:Immigrant Status4	-0.02758 (0.02218)
NCSL3:Immigrant Status4	0.01534 (0.03661)
NCSL4:Immigrant Status4	-0.2115*** (0.02877)
NCSL1:Home	0.001488 (0.005844)
NCSL2:Home	0.0343*** (0.006583)
NCSL3:Home	0.005909 (0.008647)
NCSL4:Home	0.02511** (0.007956)
NCSLl1:Education	-0.002979` (0.001727)
NCSL2:Education	-0.00467* (0.001984)
NCSL3:Education	-0.006158* (0.002617)
NCSL4:Education	-0.003214 (0.002487)
NCSL1:Parent	0.00179 (0.005229)
NCSL2:Parent	0.009449 (0.006267)
NCSL3:Parent	0.001186 (0.008198)
NCSL4:Parent	-0.0137` (0.007615)
NCSL1:Union Household	-0.01012** (0.003206)
NCSL2:Union Household	-0.005743 (0.003587)
NCSL3:Union Household	0.0006406 (0.004684)
NCSL4:Union Household	-0.01131* (0.005005)

NCSL1:Political Interest	-0.01339*** (0.002866)
NCSL2:Political Interest	0.00193 (0.003218)
NCSL3:Political Interest	-0.004373 (0.004204)
NCSL4:Political Interest	-0.01597*** (0.003817)

Logistical Regression

(Intercept)	-13.01 (0.6094) ***
NCSL1	-0.2309 (0.1936)
NCSL2	0.04234 (0.1694)
NCSL3	3.105 (0.319) ***
NCSL4	0.4275 (0.2481) .
Immigrant Status1	1.669 (0.07836) ***
Immigrant Status2	1.975 (0.07587) ***
Immigrant Status3	2.102 (0.07448) ***
Immigrant Status4	2.104 (0.07362) ***
2012	2.503 (0.3269) ***
2010	0.2166 (0.02017) ***
2008	2.586 (0.3244) ***
2006	-0.1632 (0.02533) ***
Income	0.03797 (0.002918) ***
Age	0.01746 (0.0004546) ***

Education	0.1111 (0.005921) ***
Student	0.02352 (0.03479)
Parent	-0.1183 (0.01841) ***
Unemployed	-0.1115 (0.0285) ***
Home	0.3289 (0.01862) ***
Catholic	-0.04763 (0.01601) **
Jewish	-0.0004583 (0.03722)
Agnostic	-0.07701 (0.01704) ***
Evangelical	0.01995 (0.02173)
Other	-0.05814 (0.04062)
Religiosity	-0.06979 (0.01019) ***
Party	0.006442 (0.004719)
Ideology	0.04408 (0.009289) ***
Insured	0.1189 (0.02204) ***
Voter.Contact	0.4585 (0.01209) ***
In.Person	0.1702 (0.01803) ***
Church	0.07194 (0.006363) ***
Minority.House	0.03842 (0.0151) *
Union Household	0.09438 (0.00985) ***
Married2	-0.02588 (0.0108) *
Log(Spending)	0.3347 (0.02443) ***
Minority.Statewide	-0.2634 (0.02882) ***
Same.Day.Registration	-0.08657 (0.03484) *
Early	-0.1208 (0.04957) *
Provisional	-12.38 (0.7977) ***
Absentee	0.2604 (0.01832) ***

Interest	0.5121 (0.009078) ***
Gubernatorial margin	0.834 (0.1009) ***
Senatorial.Margin	0.3221 (0.02144) ***
Presidential.Margin	1.726 (0.3884) ***
Black	0.04495 (0.02717) .
Hispanic	-0.1144 (0.02803) ***
Asian	-0.1519 (0.04251) ***
Mixed	0.06948 (0.045)

NCSL1:Black	-0.08503 (0.04826) .
NCSL2:Black	0.1369 (0.05572) *
NCSL3:Black	0.03882 (0.07649)
NCSL4:Black	0.15 (0.06316) *
NCSL2:Hispanic	0.04135 (0.05855)
NCSL3:Hispanic	0.1517 (0.08313) .
NCSL4:Hispanic	0.06513 (0.09826)
NCSL1:Mixed	-0.004562 (0.1012)
NCSL2:Mixed	0.0218 (0.09395)
NCSL3:Mixed	-0.05035 (0.1435)
NCSL4:Mixed	-0.1669 (0.1262)
NCSL1:Income	-0.00682 (0.005323)
NCSL2:Income	-0.002354 (0.006359)
NCSL3:Income	-0.01882 (0.008128) *
NCSL4:Income	-0.007042 (0.007787)
NCSL1:Immigrant Status1	0.1822 (0.1861)
NCSL2:Immigrant Status1	-0.06541 (0.1528)

NCSL3:Immigrant Status1	0.1087 (0.2903)
NCSL4:Immigrant Status1	-0.7126 (0.2402) **
NCSL1:Immigrant Status2	0.1972 (0.1813)
NCSL2:Immigrant Status2	-0.1255 (0.1501)
NCSL3:Immigrant Status2	0.4687 (0.2826) .
NCSL4:Immigrant Status2	-0.6923 (0.2353) **
NCSL1:Immigrant Status3	0.136 (0.1772)
NCSL2:Immigrant Status3	-0.2533 (0.1458) .
NCSL3:Immigrant Status3	0.1955 (0.2752)
NCSL4:Immigrant Status3	-0.7085 (0.228) **
NCSL1:Immigrant Status4	0.203 (0.1755)
NCSL2:Immigrant Status4	-0.2365 (0.1433) .
NCSL3:Immigrant Status4	0.2726 (0.273)
NCSL4:Immigrant Status4	-0.6209 (0.2234) **
NCSL1:Education	-0.01692 (0.01072)
NCSL2:Education	-0.01732 (0.01259)
NCSL3:Education	-0.02469 (0.01654)
NCSL4:Education	-0.02106 (0.01542)
NCSL1:Parent	0.01611 (0.03129)
NCSL2:Parent	0.03483 (0.03758)
NCSL3:Parent	-0.00953 (0.04942)
NCSL4:Parent	-0.09652 (0.04637) *
NCSL1:Union Household	-0.05162 (0.01973) **
NCSL2:Union Household	-0.03991 (0.02265) .
NCSL3:Union Household	0.01762 (0.02963)
NCSL4:Union Household	-0.07107 (0.03058) *

Conclusion

My research took a comprehensive approach in seeking to answer the questions of whether or not voter ID laws impact voter turnout, the racial gap in turnout and the socioeconomic gap in turnout. Much of the available research surrounding this issue was conducted prior to the widespread implementation of strict ID requirements for voting. Accordingly, I believed that research addressing this issue was needed given the recent proliferation of strict photo ID laws. I was able to take a comprehensive look into how voter IDs might have affected turnout, by looking at statewide aggregate and individual level survey data. The results of my tests do not indicate that overall turnout levels have been impacted by increasingly strict voter ID laws, nor do they observe a disproportionate impact on turnout among minority citizens or citizens of lower socioeconomic status.

These results contrast with the findings of Alvarez, Bailey and Katz who found a negative correlation between voter ID laws and voter turnout while using a statistical model similar to the one used in my tests. This is noteworthy because the scope of available data concerning this issue had greatly expanded from the time that Alvarez et al. ran their test. My findings similarly run contrast with the conclusions drawn in the working paper released by Hajnal et al. earlier this year. Both my research and theirs employ the CCES to draw conclusions about how voter ID laws impact turnout at the individual level. Hajnal et al.'s results suggested a

negative correlation between voter ID and voter turnout as well as the racial gap while my results show no effect.

The presence of strict voter ID laws is a relatively new phenomena in the United States. Accordingly, further research will be needed to assess their long term impact on voter turnout. Controversy surrounding these laws is unlikely to subside anytime soon. In 2013 the Supreme Court struck down preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act, allowing nine Southern states to changing the election laws without advance federal approval (Liptak 2013). Since 2011, 13 states, including six of the nine preclearance states, have adopted some form of voter ID law. In 2014, when the Supreme Court upheld Texas's voter ID law, Justice Ginsburg wrote for the descent that the law affected "a sharply disproportionate percentage of those voters are African-American or Hispanic...racial discrimination in elections in Texas is no mere historical artifact" (Liptak 2014). As more states move to adopt increasingly strict voter ID requirements, opponents continue to paint their implementation as a civil rights issue. The results of my research provide little support for the idea that voter ID requirements represent a unique threat to the voting rights of minority or other disadvantaged populations. However, the effect these laws have on voter turnout could be difficult to capture with available datasets (Erickson and Minnitte 2009).

The scope of available data in which to study the effects these strict laws have on voter turnout is still limited because these laws became widespread relatively recently. There have only been four congressional elections and two presidential elections in which any voters faced the strictest form of voter ID law. Analysis over a longer period of time will paint a more clear picture as to how these requirements impact turnout and the racial gap and the socioeconomic

gap in turnout. As more elections occur in states with strict ID requirements, it will be important to look at close elections to see if voter ID laws are impacting the final outcome of elections. Further research into the impact that counter mobilization efforts or voter reactions have on voter ID laws would also serve to advance our understanding of how these kinds of effects could serve to minimize the impact ID laws have on voter turnout. More data surrounding campaign mobilization would allow for a better analysis of how these efforts could offset the potential impact these laws have on turnout. Additionally, emotional reactions within communities who feel targeted and disenfranchised by voter ID laws could limit the impact that these laws have within these groups. Further research could include survey questions tracking awareness of and attitudes towards voter ID laws in states with the strictest requirements. Potentially, such a survey would illuminate if knowledge of voter ID makes voters more or less likely to vote in the upcoming election, improving our current conjecture.

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