

The Use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Identify Pathways to Successful and Failed Sanitation Systems

Allie Davis¹, Amy Javernick-Will^{1*}, Sherri Cook¹

*Corresponding author email: amy.javernick@colorado.edu

¹Department of Civil, Environmental, and Architectural Engineering, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309

Abstract

Sanitation systems globally fail at high rates. Researchers and practitioners attribute the causes of both sanitation success and failure to numerous factors that include technical and non-technical issues. A comprehensive understanding of what leads to sanitation failure and how to achieve sanitation success is imperative to prioritize the use of limited resources. To determine which combinations of causal conditions led to successful and failed sanitation systems, we applied fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to 20 cases in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, India with small-scale sanitation systems. Two pathways led to successful sanitation systems, and four pathways led to failed sanitation systems. All successful systems required *Sufficient O&M Funds*, a *Clear O&M Plan*, and *Technical Support* in addition to either *Addressed Sanitation Priorities* and *Community Participation in Planning* or *Behavior Change Education* and *Municipality Involved in Planning*. All failed systems had *Lack of Municipality in Planning*, *Unaddressed Sanitation Priorities*, and *No Technical Support*. Most failed systems also had *No Clear O&M Plan*, *Poor Construction Quality*, *Lack of Community Participation in Planning*, and *Insufficient O&M Funds*. Two failed cases had unique pathways because *Government Barriers* permanently disrupted use and maintenance. Overall, implementing organizations who initiate sanitation projects in resource-limited communities should ensure that (1) communities have adequate technical and financial resources for maintenance; (2) community and municipality stakeholders are engaged in planning and know their maintenance responsibilities; and (3) appropriate technologies are selected that meet community needs and achieve community buy-in.

27 **Keywords**

28 Sanitation, success, failure, qualitative comparative analysis, developing communities

29 **1.0 Introduction**

30 Sanitation systems fail at high rates, with up to 70% of sanitation systems in resource-
31 limited communities failing within two years of construction (WHO and UNICEF, 2017).
32 Sanitation failure is a major problem because it leads to human and environmental health risks
33 (WHO and UNICEF, 2017). Despite the importance of and need for universal access to safe
34 sanitation, sanitation systems continue to fail. Therefore, there is a need to comprehensively and
35 systematically understand why systems are still failing to avoid negative outcomes and achieve
36 sanitation success.

37 Previous research has identified many factors that influence sanitation success and failure.
38 For example, sanitation failure has been attributed to supply-driven approaches (Starkl et al.,
39 2013), lack of maintenance (Katukiza et al., 2010), faulty designs (Sujaritpong and Nitivattananon,
40 2009), high operation and maintenance (O&M) costs (Cronin et al., 2014), lack of ongoing support
41 (Eales et al., 2013), lack of user acceptance (Bao et al., 2013), inadequate technical knowledge
42 (Kaminsky and Javernick-Will, 2012), or inappropriate technologies (Murphy et al., 2009).
43 However, persistent sanitation failure suggests that these factors may not fully explain the causes
44 of failure and/or these factors could be better addressed in the sanitation sector. Sanitation success
45 has been attributed to community participation (Roma and Jeffrey, 2010), user satisfaction
46 (Seymour, 2014), affordability (Mwirigi et al., 2014), appropriate technologies (Black, 1998;
47 Bouabid and Louis, 2015; Murphy et al., 2009; Palaniappan et al., 2008), maintenance support
48 (Sansom, 2011), and low maintenance complexity (Brikké and Bredero, 2003). Despite this
49 knowledge, studies have found contrary results for the same factor. For example, in a study of
50 sanitation in India, Battacharyya (2015) found that community participation, good quality
51 construction, and water supply were each positively correlated with success, but Banerjee (2013)
52 found that these same factors are present in failed systems in India. Also, in a literature review by


53 Mansuri (2004), community participation had either positive, negative, or no impacts on sanitation
54 outcomes; thus, those authors suggested that participation may not be the only driver of success or
55 failure. Overall, analyzing factors in isolation has been insufficient to characterize the complex
56 causes of sanitation success and failure.

57 While most research has analyzed individual factors associated with success or failure of
58 sanitation systems, a few studies have focused on identifying combinations of factors. For
59 example, one study found that poor quality construction of school toilets could be overcome by
60 the simultaneous presence of multiple other factors, such as a maintenance plan, a sanitation
61 champion, and government support (Chatterley et al., 2014). Another study, of rural water supply
62 systems, found that success could still be achieved, despite the absence of post-construction
63 support, if good financial management and community participation were both present (Marks et
64 al., 2018). Comprehensive evaluations that identify which combinations of factors, including the
65 integration of social, institutional, technical, and economic factors (Tilley et al., 2014; Törnqvist
66 et al., 2008; WaterAid, 2011), are needed to better understand sanitation systems' outcomes.

67 A common method to holistically examine how factors combine together to produce an
68 outcome is qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA has been used extensively in the social
69 sciences (Fischer and Maggetti, 2017; Nair and Howlett, 2015) and is being used increasingly in
70 engineering (Jordan et al., 2016; Kunz et al., 2015; Opdyke et al., 2018). QCA results in both in-
71 depth case knowledge and generalizable results (Ragin, 1987) by using set theory and Boolean
72 algebra to analyze combinations of factors (i.e., pathways) that lead to an outcome of interest
73 (Ragin, 2008). There can be multiple pathways identified for a given outcome, allowing for a better
74 understanding of the complex causes of success and failure and to highlight alternative pathways
75 to success. QCA has been successfully used to evaluate pathways to success in resource-limited

76 communities for water supply systems (Marks et al., 2018) and for management of school toilets
 77 (Chatterley et al., 2014), and this method may be useful to investigate sanitation systems to
 78 improve success and universal access.

79 To this end, this study used fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) to investigate the causes of success or
 80 failure of 20 small, community-based sanitation systems in India. Specifically, we aimed to
 81 determine which factors, in combination, led to sanitation system success or failure in order to
 82 provide recommendations for implementing organizations, municipalities, and communities to
 83 improve sanitation use, maintenance, and performance. The participating communities were in
 84 India, which has the world’s fastest growing population and faces significant challenges for
 85 sanitation: more than 50% of sanitation systems in India have failed (Chaplin, 2011) and 60% of
 86 the population lacks access to safely managed sanitation (WHO and UNICEF, 2017). These issues
 87 of failure and lack of sanitation access are also present globally, thus it is important to understand
 88 strategies to reduce failure. We selected ten successful and ten failed systems and completed in-
 89 depth case studies in each community. Next, we used fsQCA to determine combinations of factors
 90 that led to success or failure of sanitation systems (Figure 1). Finally, by comparing the resulting
 91 pathways, we identified holistic strategies that lead to successful sanitation systems. Identifying
 92 sanitation success pathways can guide implementing organizations, communities, and
 93 governments to focus their limited resources to avoid failure-prone scenarios and promote success.



94

95 **Figure 1.** Overview of data collection and analysis methods used to identify pathways to success and failure of
96 sanitation systems.

97 **2.0 Methods**

98 **2.1 Research Context**

99 The 20 communities (i.e., cases) in Karnataka or Tamil Nadu, India were selected to ensure
100 variability between outcomes and factors (i.e., causal conditions). Specific case details and
101 additional methods details are included in the Supporting Information (SI). Major variations
102 between cases included sanitation technologies, implementing organizations, and current system
103 outcomes (SI Table S1). To reduce the total number of causal conditions analyzed, we ensured
104 each case had the following similarities: had one small-scale sanitation system, which was
105 implemented by an external non-governmental organization (i.e., implementing organization)
106 between 2008 and 2010; served 800 to 1000 users; and required community members help
107 maintain the system. Each case was a peri-urban slum resettlement in southern India where local
108 municipalities were responsible for infrastructure and service provision and most residents were
109 from India's lowest caste, were employed as day laborers, and had low incomes (5,000 rupees
110 (\$70)/household/month, on average).

111 **2.2 Data Collection**

112 We collected extensive empirical evidence from interviews, documentation, and sanitation
113 system evaluations and observations to thoroughly understand the causal mechanisms for each
114 sanitation system's outcome, to generate case knowledge (Figure 1). We collected data from June
115 to August 2016 and from January to May 2017.

116 **Interviews.** Semi-structured interviews were conducted with community members,
117 community leaders, sanitation system operators (a male operator or women's self-help group
118 (WSHG) members), implementing organizations, and local municipalities. Interviews explored
119 system use, maintenance, and history; technology selection; and stakeholder roles in planning and

120 maintenance. Examples of interview questions included: *Can you describe how the sanitation*
121 *system was planned?* and *What support does your organization provide to the community*
122 *regarding the sanitation system?* In total, 507 participants were interviewed (SI Table S2).
123 Interviews with community members aimed to achieve balanced gender, age, and geographical
124 representation. Participants were selected using door-to-door sampling in the morning, midday,
125 and evening to capture perspectives from domestic, employed, and unemployed individuals.
126 Interviews concluded in each case when theoretical saturation was reached (i.e., when no new
127 themes or topics were mentioned in a subsequent interview). Interviews with community members,
128 leaders, and sanitation system operators were conducted using local translators who had experience
129 with sanitation fieldwork and were trained to follow the Institutional Review Board-approved
130 protocol (#16-0026). Interviews with implementing organizations and municipalities were
131 conducted in English.

132 **Documentation.** We collected documentation from implementing organizations and
133 municipalities that included: standard operating procedures describing planning and
134 implementation strategies; feasibility studies describing decision-making and project goals;
135 planning meeting notes summarizing stakeholder roles in technology selection, construction, and
136 maintenance; detailed project reports describing final system designs, cost information, and
137 material quantities and quality; and sanitation system monitoring and evaluation reports describing
138 historical performance data, system damage, number and type of maintenance tasks performed,
139 user fees collected (where applicable), resource recovery profits, and ongoing technical and
140 financial assistance from implementing organizations or municipalities.

141 **Sanitation System Evaluations and Observations.** Sanitation system performance was
142 evaluated using the three regulated parameters for domestic wastewater in India: chemical oxygen

143 demand (COD), biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), and pH (SI Table S3) (Central Pollution
144 Control Board, 2017). Influent and effluent wastewater samples were taken from fourteen of the
145 twenty cases; for the remaining six cases, effluent samples could not be taken because of system
146 damage or lack of wastewater. We also evaluated construction quality based on damage, design
147 errors, and material type. To estimate the percentage of community members who were using the
148 sanitation system, we triangulated data on frequency of use from interviews and researcher
149 observations of the number of individuals using the toilets for two hours in the morning and
150 evening on two separate days, the amount of open defecation at community-reported open
151 defecation sites, the wastewater levels in the treatment tanks, and the cleanliness of at least one-
152 third of a case's toilets, selected randomly, to help evaluate proper use or misuse.

153 **2.3 Data Analysis**

154 Interview transcriptions, observation notes, and documentation were uploaded into QSR
155 NVivo, a qualitative coding software (QSR International, 2015). Qualitative data were coded using
156 both deductive and inductive methods (Saldana, 2009). In deductive coding, researchers use theory
157 to hypothesize important themes related to system success or failure. For example, the theme
158 *Community Participation in Planning* was identified prior to the start of coding because literature
159 states that community involvement may increase willingness to use and maintain the sanitation
160 system (Chatterley et al., 2013; Eales et al., 2013; Marks et al., 2014). In inductive coding,
161 researchers remain open to new themes related to success or failure that emerge from the case
162 knowledge. For example, the theme *Formal Sanitation System Handover* was identified during
163 coding because participants described how handover was important to reinforce O&M
164 responsibility. To ensure internal validity, a coding dictionary was developed iteratively between
165 two coders. Inter-coder agreement was measured using Cohen's Kappa coefficient (Bazeley and
166 Jackson, 2013); the final coefficient was 0.59, which reflects acceptable coding agreement.

167 Conflicting statements between participants were resolved by triangulating answers with
168 documentation and observations (Basurto and Speer, 2012).

169 **2.4 Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis**

170 A variant of QCA that uses fuzzy logic is fsQCA (Ragin, 2008), which is useful when cases
171 do not dichotomously fall fully in or fully out of a set, such as when implementing organizations
172 involve community members in planning to varying extents. In fsQCA, fuzzy sets for the causal
173 conditions and outcomes were defined through an iterative process called calibration, which
174 ensures that fuzzy set definitions provide a consistent measure for meaningful differences between
175 cases (Basurto and Speer, 2012).

176 **Domain and Causal Conditions Identification.** Causal conditions are factors
177 hypothesized to influence an outcome, identified from theory or case knowledge. In total, we
178 analyzed nine causal conditions for all 20 cases (Table 1). First, we identified an initial list of
179 causal conditions from literature (SI Table S4). For example, Eales et al. (2013) asserts that
180 sanitation systems with *Technical Support* are more likely to meet regulations, based on case
181 studies from decentralized sanitation systems in Indonesia. Second, we identified which of those
182 causal conditions were domain conditions, which are conditions that do not vary across the cases
183 and are therefore removed from the analysis (Ragin, 2008). The domain conditions included:
184 regulations (Hawkins et al., 2013), sanitation system age (Sabogal et al., 2014), system size
185 (Brikké, 2000), technology complexity (Brikké, 2000), community socio-economic status
186 (Mwirigi et al., 2009), culture (Mwirigi et al., 2009), capital costs (Eales et al., 2013), community
187 financial contributions to capital costs (Marks and Davis, 2012), and community participation in
188 construction activities (Roma and Jeffrey, 2010). Third, we identified additional causal conditions
189 from case knowledge. For example, interviews uncovered *Government Barriers* because some
190 municipalities had taken deliberate actions to disrupt a sanitation system. Finally, the full list of

191 causal conditions was evaluated to remove conditions if they had low necessity scores (i.e., less
 192 than 0.3, a conventional cutoff for condition inclusion (Opdyke et al., 2018)), and case knowledge
 193 indicated that the condition was not an important driver of success or failure; if they were too
 194 similar to another condition (i.e., those conditions were combined into one); and if they were found
 195 to be least-important during the QCA minimization process (discussed below).

196 **Table 1.** Causal conditions hypothesized to influence sanitation system success and failure.

Causal Conditions*	Definition	Source
<i>Addressed Sanitation Priorities</i>	The sanitation system is an appropriate technology that therefore addresses a majority of the community's (most important) sanitation priorities; quantified using the priority addressment protocol (Davis et al., 2019).	Black, 1998; Davis et al., 2019; Hacker and Kaminsky, 2017; Murphy et al., 2009; Palaniappan et al., 2008; Seymour, 2014; Case Knowledge
<i>Behavior Change Education</i>	Behavior change theory is used to teach community members the benefits of sanitation and to reduce open defecation.	Mosler, 2012; Rosenquist, 2005; Wegelin-Schuringa, 2000; Case Knowledge
<i>Clear O&M Plan</i>	All required maintenance tasks are known, and all stakeholders agree on whose responsibility it is to perform and finance each task.	Brikké and Bredero, 2003; Chatterley et al., 2014; Case Knowledge
<i>Community Participation in Planning</i>	Community members are regularly and meaningfully involved in planning, which includes attending meetings and helping to make decisions such as site selection and appropriate technology selection.	Battacharyya, 2015; Black, 1998; Bouabid and Louis, 2015; Mansuri, 2004; Roma and Jeffrey, 2010; Palaniappan et al., 2008; Case Knowledge
<i>Construction Quality</i>	The sanitation system is well-constructed based on high material quality and correct implementation.	Chatterley et al., 2014, 2013; Case Knowledge
<i>Absence of Government Barriers</i>	The local municipality has not taken deliberate actions that prevent or disrupt sanitation system use, maintenance, or performance.	Case Knowledge
<i>Municipality Involved in Planning</i>	The local municipality is regularly and meaningfully involved in planning, which includes attending meetings and helping to make decisions such as site selection and appropriate technology selection.	Bouabid and Louis, 2015; Harris et al., 2011; Kooy and Harris, 2012; Sansom, 2011; Case Knowledge
<i>Sufficient Funds for O&M</i>	Funds are available from user fees or implementing organization or municipality assistance equal to or in excess of the system's O&M costs.	Bouabid and Louis, 2015; Eales et al., 2013; Starkl et al., 2013; Case Knowledge
<i>Technical Support</i>	Adequate technical capacity for maintenance is available through a	Bouabid and Louis, 2015; Chatterley et al., 2014; Eales et al., 2013; IDECK, 2015;

	skilled operator and external maintenance assistance.	Kooy and Harris, 2012; Sakhivel et al., 2014; Tilley et al., 2014; Case Knowledge
--	---	---

197 *The presence of causal conditions is hypothesized for success, and the absence is hypothesized for failure.

198 **Causal Condition Calibration.** The complete calibration guide for all causal conditions
 199 is included in the SI (Table S5, Figures S1 and S2). Seven of the nine causal conditions had mostly
 200 qualitative data, so we calibrated these conditions indirectly (i.e., set membership is defined
 201 qualitatively, based on case knowledge and theory (Basurto and Speer, 2012)). First, we defined
 202 the anchor points for in-set membership (fuzzy set score of 1), out-of-set membership (fuzzy set
 203 score of 0), and the crossover point (fuzzy set score of 0.5) for each causal condition based on
 204 theory. Next, we adjusted these definitions until meaningful differences between the 20 cases were
 205 accurately reflected by the calibrations. For example, out-of-set membership for *Community*
 206 *Participation in Planning* was when community members were entirely uninvolved in planning
 207 and learned of the project only after construction began; we added “community members attended
 208 exposure visits” to the in-set membership definition because case knowledge indicated that
 209 exposure visits (i.e., where nearby successful sanitation systems were visited to learn about
 210 technology options and O&M needs) differentiated cases with in-set membership from cases with
 211 partial membership. The remaining two of the nine causal conditions were calibrated directly (i.e.,
 212 set membership is defined by continuously normalizing raw quantitative data within anchor points
 213 (0, 0.5, 1) (Ragin, 2008)). For *Addressed Sanitation Priorities*, raw data for each case was a
 214 quantitative priority addressment score, which reflects the extent to which priorities were
 215 addressed based on importance (i.e., how appropriate the technology was to the local context)
 216 (Davis et al., 2019) (SI Figure S1). For *Sufficient O&M Funds*, raw data for each case was the
 217 amount of available funds as a percentage of monthly O&M costs (SI Figure S2).

218 **Outcome Classification and Calibration.** Each case’s sanitation system was classified as
219 being either successful or failed. Success was defined as the presence of three criteria (Davis et al.,
220 2019, 2018): (1) the system is used by at least 75% of the community; (2) at least 90% of
221 maintenance tasks are performed correctly and on time; and (3) the system complies with local
222 regulations for pH, COD, and BOD. Cases were classified as failed if they did not meet at least
223 one of the success criteria. Use was directly calibrated (SI Figure S3). In-set membership was
224 defined as more than 75% of the system’s target population using the system correctly, daily, and
225 exclusively (i.e., no open defecation) (Andres et al., 2014; Harris et al., 2017) while out-of-set
226 membership was defined as less than 25% using it correctly, daily, and exclusively. Maintenance
227 was also directly calibrated (SI Figure S4). In-set membership was defined as at least 90% of the
228 total required maintenance tasks were completed correctly and on time (Brikké, 2000; Eales et al.,
229 2013) while out-of-set membership was defined as less than 25% completed correctly and on time.
230 Performance was indirectly calibrated using a three-value fuzzy set (SI Table S6). In-set
231 membership was defined as complying with all applicable pH, BOD, and COD regulations while
232 out-of-set membership was defined as failing to comply with all three regulations; an intermediate
233 value of 0.3 was defined as a system failing to comply with only one regulation. For the fsQCA,
234 success outcome scores were determined by taking the minimum of the fuzzy set scores for use,
235 maintenance, and performance (SI Table S7). The outcome of failure was analyzed using the
236 negated (i.e., absence) of the success outcome scores.

237 **Pathway Identification and Interpretation.** Fuzzy set scores for all conditions and
238 outcomes were assigned for every case and summarized in a QCA truth table (Table 2). We used
239 the software fs/QCA (Ragin, 2013) to minimize the truth table and to calculate, using Boolean
240 algebra and fuzzy logic (Ragin, 2008), pathways to success and to failure. Minimization was

241 performed by comparing all possible combinations of causal conditions in a stepwise process to
242 remove least-important causal conditions and identify the simplest combinations of causal
243 conditions needed to produce an outcome. Each pathway is a combination of causal conditions
244 that results in an outcome. To interpret each pathway's validity, we used four main QCA metrics.
245 Consistency evaluates each pathway's reliability; it is the fraction of cases that exhibit the same
246 pathway and outcome, and fractions above 0.8 are required for a pathway to be "consistent"
247 (Ragin, 2006). Necessity evaluates how commonly a causal condition is present with an outcome;
248 it is calculated using the same process as consistency, and fractions above 0.9 are required for a
249 causal condition to be "necessary" (Ragin, 2008). Coverage helps evaluate the generalizability of
250 findings; of cases with the same outcome, it is the fraction explained by the same pathway (Rihoux
251 and Ragin, 2009) such that higher coverage indicates that that pathway explains more cases.
252 Sufficiency evaluates how commonly a causal condition results in a positive outcome; it is
253 calculated the same way as coverage, and fractions above 0.8 are required for a causal condition
254 to be "sufficient" (Ragin, 2008).

Table 2. The truth table summarizes the fuzzy scores for each causal condition and the outcome for all 20 cases.

Case Number	Causal Conditions									Outcomes				
	Addressed Sanitation Priorities	Behavior Change Education	Clear O&M Plan	Community Participation in Planning	Construction Quality	Government Barriers	Municipality Involved in Planning	Sufficient O&M Funds	Technical Support	Maintenance	Performance	Use	Success [min(Use, Maintenance, Performance)]	Failure (1-Success)
1	0.22	0.67	1	0.33	1	0	1	1	0.67	0.96	1	1	0.96	0.04
2	0.82	0.33	0.67	0.67	1	0	0.33	1	1	0.92	1	1	0.92	0.08
3	0.62	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0	1	0.88	0.67	0.92	1	0.98	0.92	0.08
4	0.03	0.33	0	0.67	0.33	0	0	0.51	0	0	0	0	0	1
5	0.04	0	0	0	0.33	0	0.33	0.27	0	0	0.3	0.01	0	1
6	0.11	1	0.33	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.21	0.33	0.07	0	0.43	0	1
7	0.96	0.67	1	0.33	1	0	1	1	0.67	1	1	1	1	0
8	0.7	0.67	1	0.33	0.67	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.99	0.99	0.01
9	0.24	1	0.67	0.67	0.67	1	0	0.07	0.33	0.14	0	0.98	0	1
10	0	0	0	0.67	0.33	0	0	0.88	0	0	0.3	0	0	1
11	0.97	0.67	1	0.67	1	0	0.67	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
12	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0	0.33	0.32	0.33	0.07	0	0.06	0	1
13	0.96	1	1	1	1	0	0.33	0.99	1	1	1	1	1	0
14	0.98	0.67	1	0.67	1	0	0.33	1	0.67	1	1	1	1	0
15	0.66	0.67	1	0.33	0.67	0	1	1	0.67	0.92	1	0.99	0.92	0.08
16	0.01	0	0	0.67	0.33	0	0	0.5	0	0.05	0.3	0.06	0.05	0.95
17	0.02	0.33	0	0.33	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.14	0	0.99	0	1
18	0.98	1	1	1	1	0	0.67	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
19	0.03	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.43	0	0.5	0	0.98	0	1
20	0.01	1	0.67	1	0.33	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1

Note: Scores greater than 0.5 indicate membership in the set for the condition or outcome; scores less than 0.5 indicate non-membership in the set for the condition or outcome. Success outcome scores greater than 0.5 are considered to be successful cases; success outcome scores less than 0.5 are considered to be failed cases.


259 **3.0 Results**

260 Two pathways to success were identified (Figure 2a) and demonstrate alternative ways to
261 achieve the same outcome of success. Together, they described all ten successful cases. Each
262 success pathway had five causal conditions, of which three were shared: *Sufficient O&M Funds*,
263 *Clear O&M Plan*, and *Technical Support*. The first success pathway, which described five of the
264 ten successful cases, also had *Addressed Sanitation Priorities* and *Community Participation in*
265 *Planning* causal conditions. The second success pathway, which described seven of the ten
266 successful cases, also had *Behavior Change Education* and *Municipality Involved in Planning*
267 causal conditions. Two cases, Cases 13 and 18, had all eight causal conditions present and were
268 thus described by both pathways. Both success pathways highlight the importance of leveraging
269 local knowledge to incentivize system buy-in and of establishing adequate resources and clear
270 responsibilities for maintenance.

271 Four pathways led to failure (Figure 2b). All four, which together described all ten failed
272 cases, shared three common causal conditions: *Lack of Municipality in Planning*, *No Technical*
273 *Support*, and *Unaddressed Sanitation Priorities*. The first failure pathway described six of the ten
274 failed cases and also included *No Clear O&M Plan* and *Poor Construction Quality*; the second
275 described four of the ten failed cases and also included *No Clear O&M Plan*, *Lack of Community*
276 *Participation in Planning*, and *Insufficient O&M Funds*; the third described one unique case (Case
277 20) and also included *Government Barriers* and *Poor Construction Quality*; the fourth described
278 another unique case (Case 9) and also included *Government Barriers* and *Insufficient O&M Funds*.
279 Cases 5 and 19 were described by both the first and second failure pathways. Overall, the failure
280 pathways each highlight that failed systems were unable to overcome inadequate maintenance
281 resources, especially when municipalities and communities were uninvolved in planning.

282 While the high consistency and coverage of the success and failure pathways highlight the
283 strength of the results, the number of cases and the focused context limit our ability to evaluate
284 and consider all possible combinations of causal conditions that could influence sanitation
285 outcomes. Additionally, pathways represent the combinations of conditions that together were
286 sufficient to produce the outcome of success or failure. Causal conditions in a pathway are
287 presented in order of decreasing necessity scores; the order is not chronological. Finally, the results
288 demonstrate alternative combinations of conditions. For a given outcome, each pathway was
289 sufficient to produce that outcome; one is not necessarily better than the other.


Figure 2a: Success Pathways



Condition	Necessity
Sufficient O&M Funds	0.99
Clear O&M Plan	0.94
Technical Support	0.85
Addressed Sanitation Priorities	0.81
Municipality Involved in Planning	0.73
Behavior Change Education	0.72
Community Participation in Planning	0.59

Solution Consistency = 0.93
Solution Coverage = 0.75

Figure 2b: Failure Pathways



Condition	Necessity
Lack of Municipality in Planning	0.92
Unaddressed Sanitation Priorities	0.92
No Technical Support	0.90
No Clear O&M Plan	0.79
Poor Construction Quality	0.64
Lack of Community Participation in Planning	0.55
Insufficient O&M Funds	0.53
Government Barriers	0.36

Solution Consistency = 1.00
Solution Coverage = 0.70

290
291
292
293
294
295
296

Figure 2. Results of the combinations of conditions that led to (a) success and (b) failure. **Bold** conditions have necessity scores greater than or equal to 0.90. **Bold** case numbers indicate cases that are uniquely explained by one combination of conditions; Underlined case numbers indicate cases that are explained by more than one combination of conditions. The causal conditions in the pathways are not chronological or linear; causal conditions are presented based on necessity scores, with the exception of *Government Barriers* in failure pathways 3 and 4, which is presented first to differentiate these two pathways. Case numbering matches cases from Davis et al., 2019, 2018.

297 **4.0 Discussion**

298 **4.1 The Importance of Operation & Maintenance for Success**

299 Adequate managerial, technical, and financial resources for maintenance were imperative
300 for success, while their absence was a major driver of failure. All successful cases had a *Clear*
301 *O&M Plan*, where technical and financial responsibility for each well-specified maintenance task
302 was assigned and agreed upon by the implementing organization and community, and eight of the
303 ten failed cases lacked an O&M plan. Implementing organizations should focus their efforts on
304 reducing O&M vulnerabilities by creating clear and comprehensive O&M plans, bolstering
305 operator skills and reliability, and securing ongoing financial, technical, and managerial support
306 for the duration of the systems' lifetimes.

307 Clear responsibility meant that all successful cases also had *Technical Support*, where
308 technical maintenance assistance from the implementing organization or municipality and a skilled
309 operator were both regularly present. Skilled operators were essential for daily maintenance and
310 recognizing larger system issues that would require technical assistance (e.g., pump failure). Two
311 systems were operated by well-organized community WSHGs; six had male operators from the
312 community; two were operated by male employees from the municipality or implementing
313 organization. In the successful cases, the WSHGs and male operators from the communities did
314 not previously have experience as operators but received effective training that provided them the
315 knowledge and skills to diagnose problems, perform corrective action, and complete regular
316 maintenance tasks correctly. The male operators from the implementing organizations or
317 municipalities were professional operators with formal education in sanitation (e.g., sanitary
318 engineering degrees). Technical maintenance assistance was important to train new operators and
319 assist with maintenance during operator changes and transitions. Overall, technical maintenance
320 assistance provided accountability and redundancy to community maintenance efforts, which

321 aligns with existing literature that found that communities are often unable to adequately perform
322 maintenance independently (Bouabid and Louis, 2015; Chowns, 2015; Marks et al., 2014). Since
323 sanitation system size and the number of required O&M tasks were similar across all 20 cases,
324 both conditions are domain conditions and their influence on success or failure could not be
325 analyzed (Ragin, 2008).

326 When technical support was not provided, systems failed. All ten failed cases had *No*
327 *Technical Support*, where no technical maintenance assistance was provided by the implementing
328 organization or the municipality, and operators did not exist (four cases) or were unskilled (four
329 cases). As a result, communities were not prepared to take responsibility for the sanitation system
330 and unable to perform essential maintenance like desludging, subsequently leading to poor system
331 performance. Additionally, eight failed cases had *No Clear O&M Plan* (failure pathways 1 and 2,
332 Figure 2b), where technical and financial responsibilities were not clearly assigned, and
333 communities or municipalities claimed that maintenance was not their responsibility.

334 All successful cases also had *Sufficient O&M Funds*, where O&M funds came from user
335 fees and/or funds provided by the implementing organization or municipality. Five cases (Cases
336 7, 11, 13, 15, and 18) generated equal to or more than 100% of O&M costs; four cases (Cases 2,
337 3, 8, and 14) generated an average of 67% of O&M costs; one case (Case 1) did not generate
338 income. Income was generated primarily through user fees, and in four of the ten successful cases,
339 additional O&M income was generated by selling resources recovered from the sanitation system:
340 vegetables grown using recycled water (Case 11), compost sales (Cases 13 and 14), and biogas for
341 cooking fuel (Cases 13 and 18). In these four cases, this income provided additional benefits
342 beyond sanitation. For example, excess system income was lent as micro-loans to women (Cases
343 11 and 18) or used to improve other community infrastructure (e.g., community hall (Case 18)).

344 These non-sanitation benefits may have contributed to these cases' strong commitment to using
345 and maintaining the systems. All successful cases also had external financial assistance, where the
346 implementing organization (Case 2) or the municipality (Cases 1, 3, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 18)
347 agreed to and consistently paid for large O&M costs (e.g., desludging) and/or covered all costs
348 that were not covered by system income generation. Case knowledge indicates that successful
349 systems still required this financial redundancy and external assistance (i.e., subsidies) particularly
350 when large, unexpected O&M costs arose or when community members irregularly paid user fees.
351 Literature supports the finding that adequate O&M funds are essential for success and are
352 particularly important to be secured prior to system implementation (Bouabid and Louis, 2015;
353 Eales et al., 2013; Palaniappan et al., 2008; Starkl et al., 2013). While these systems were
354 successful, there is still progress to be made towards sustainability. Additionally, system capital
355 costs from all 20 cases were almost entirely subsidized (i.e., negligible community contributions)
356 by the implementing organization (ten cases), municipality (six cases), or by both (four cases);
357 since capital costs and community contributions did not vary across the 20 cases, the effects of
358 these conditions were not analyzed.

359 In contrast, five of the ten failed cases had *Insufficient O&M Funds* (failure pathways 2
360 and 4), where income generation and financial assistance were less than 50% of O&M costs. As a
361 result, operators were un-paid or under-paid, and maintenance tasks that significantly impacted
362 performance (e.g., desludging) were not done. The lack of funds were because (i) community
363 members did not pay user fees, because they could not afford to, did not see the benefit of
364 sanitation, or were unsatisfied (e.g., "why should I pay to use the toilet when the toilet is never
365 clean?"); (ii) there were no funds provided by the implementing organization because they did not
366 intend to support maintenance long-term; or (iii) there were no funds provided by the municipality,

367 because the implementing organizations did not include the municipality in planning or the
368 municipality did not have the resources to pay for sanitation. Four failed systems (Cases 4, 10, 16,
369 and 17) generated 71% of O&M costs on average but received no external financial assistance and
370 were therefore unable to pay for costly maintenance (e.g., desludging). One failed system (Case
371 20) generated over 100% of O&M costs, but *Government Barriers* ultimately disrupted
372 maintenance (described further below). Overall, implementing organizations must ensure that
373 adequate funds are available for O&M long-term, especially to incentivize operator retention.

374 **4.2 The Importance of Local Stakeholder Engagement and Community Buy-In for Success**

375 Local Stakeholder Engagement. Engagement of local stakeholders was important in both
376 pathways to leverage local knowledge for appropriate technology selection and define
377 maintenance responsibilities. For successful cases, implementing organizations either involved the
378 community *or* the municipality in planning; two successful cases (Cases 13, 18) had both involved.
379 Local stakeholder engagement also better supported long-term relationships with the
380 implementing organizations, which helped ensure ongoing technical and financial assistance. The
381 success pathways also demonstrate that local engagement needed to be combined with *Addressed*
382 *Sanitation Priorities* if the community was engaged or with *Behavior Change Education* if the
383 municipality was engaged to help achieve community acceptance and willingness to use and
384 maintain the system. All failed cases lacked the engagement of local stakeholders, which meant
385 that implementing organizations were unfamiliar with local norms and sanitation priorities and
386 thus implemented inappropriate systems or ineffective management strategies. Local stakeholder
387 engagement is considered essential for community buy-in (Roma and Jeffrey, 2010), appropriate
388 technology selection (Palaniappan et al., 2008), and ongoing maintenance (Battacharyya, 2015).

389 One particularly effective approach of local engagement was *Community Participation in*
390 *Planning*. In the first success pathway, implementing organizations recognized the importance of

391 engaging the community in planning, especially when the municipality did not have the resources
392 to participate in planning. This helped to create a strong O&M plan and encourage system use and
393 maintenance. *Community Participation in Planning* positively influenced success when
394 community members had moderate to high citizen power, meaning they were well-informed of the
395 project, attended meetings, co-identified project goals, and provided input for how the sanitation
396 system should be designed and managed. Case knowledge further indicates that *Community*
397 *Participation in Planning* in all cases in the first success pathway increased community buy-in and
398 the likelihood that priorities were incorporated into appropriate technology selection and design.
399 In contrast, *Lack of Community Participation in Planning* in the second failure pathway meant
400 community members were uninformed of the sanitation project and were not bought into the goals
401 of sanitation system and that the sanitation technologies may have been inappropriate for the local
402 context. A common theme expressed by these failed cases, as summarized by one community
403 member, was: “the first time we learned about the sanitation system was when the contractor came
404 and started building.” Implementing organizations that did not engage the community typically
405 thought that community members lacked the technical skills to be involved in the planning of a
406 sanitation system. This exacerbated unclear O&M responsibilities, left the communities
407 unprepared to independently perform maintenance, and meant that sanitation priorities were
408 unknown and therefore unaddressed.

409 However, *Lack of Community Participation in Planning* did not always contribute to
410 failure if the municipality was involved. Five successful cases (1, 3, 7, 8, and 15) in the second
411 success pathway had limited community participation in planning where communities were only
412 informed of the project and had no decision-making input, but the municipality was involved and
413 dedicated to the sanitation system’s success. Implementing organizations recognized the

414 importance of *Municipality Involved in Planning* because a national policy in India places the
415 responsibility for the provision and management of sanitation infrastructure on the local
416 municipality (Ministry of Urban Development, 2008). Thus, implementing organizations made
417 significant efforts to accommodate the limited time and resources of municipalities. One
418 implementing organization’s engineer stated, “We know that government is important. We must
419 do more than just ask for permission for the project to be successful. We must ask them for help
420 in the planning.” Therefore, the municipalities in the second success pathway attended planning
421 meetings, helped define maintenance responsibilities, made financial contributions for capital
422 costs, provided oversight during construction, assisted with training of operators, and committed
423 to providing financial and technical maintenance assistance.

424 In all failed cases, there was a *Lack of Municipality in Planning*. In three cases, the
425 municipality was not informed of the project and thus was not given a chance to be involved in
426 planning. In seven cases, the municipality was asked to participate in planning but was
427 uninterested, unable, or unwilling to be involved. Community members and implementing
428 organizations still expected the municipality to support maintenance despite the municipality never
429 agreeing to do so, and as a result, failed cases struggled with uncertain O&M responsibilities. For
430 example, in Case 16, formal handover to the municipality did not occur, so the municipality stated,
431 “We cannot interfere with a project until it no longer belongs to the [implementing organization].”
432 Since most implementing organizations did not intend to provide long-term technical or financial
433 assistance and because municipalities also did not commit these resources, all failed cases had *No*
434 *Technical Support*, eight had *No Clear O&M Plan*, seven had *Poor Quality Construction*, five had
435 *Insufficient O&M Funds*, and two had *Government Barriers*. Engaging the municipality in the
436 early planning stages could have potentially mitigated these challenges. Implementing

437 organizations need to prioritize engagement of municipalities, and municipalities need to budget
438 time and resources to provide technical and financial assistance for sanitation.

439 Community Buy-In. Beyond local engagement, efforts to incentivize community buy-in
440 were also important in both success pathways. In the first success pathway, community members
441 cited *Addressed Sanitation Priorities* as an important reason why they continued to use and
442 maintain the sanitation system. In these five successful cases, community members were more
443 involved in decision-making and implementing organizations were familiar with the communities,
444 so more priorities were addressed by the sanitation systems. In successful Cases 11 and 18,
445 implementing organizations also conducted extensive priority assessments that focused on
446 identifying sanitation-specific priorities, which informed technology selection and design; as a
447 result, priorities were extremely well-addressed in these two cases. In successful Cases 2, 13, and
448 14, implementing organizations did not conduct priority assessments, but priorities were still well-
449 addressed because those organizations were already familiar with the communities (through
450 previous projects such as water supply). In contrast, all ten failed systems had *Unaddressed*
451 *Sanitation Priorities*, likely due to a combination of the lack of local stakeholder engagement, the
452 lack of priority assessments, and poor-quality construction (i.e., implemented systems did not
453 match intended designs). Case 20 was the only failed case where the implementing organization
454 identified sanitation priorities; all other implementing organizations for failed cases either did not
455 conduct a priority assessment or only identified priorities unspecific to sanitation. In all ten failed
456 cases, priorities did not influence decision-making and system design, so community buy-in did
457 not occur, suggesting that technologies may not have been appropriate to the local context
458 (Bouabid and Louis, 2015; Palaniappan et al., 2008).

459 However, unaddressed priorities did not always lead to failure; community buy-in could
460 be achieved alternatively through *Behavior Change Education*. In the second success pathway,
461 community members did not participate meaningfully in planning and their sanitation priorities
462 were not well-addressed, but *Behavior Change Education* was used to convince community
463 members of the value of sanitation. Through educational activities that communicated sanitation
464 health benefits such as seminars, street plays, community mapping to identify open defecation
465 sites, or games, community members accepted and used a system that still left some of their
466 priorities unaddressed. For example, priorities were poorly-addressed in successful Case 1, and the
467 community preferred decentralized, individual septic tanks with toilets placed farther from their
468 kitchens, but community members often stated, “We still use the toilets because we know it keeps
469 us from getting sick”. Beyond behavior change and addressed priorities, community participation
470 in construction has been theorized to influence buy-in (Roma and Jeffrey, 2010); however, all 20
471 cases had minimal or no participation in construction, so this condition was not explored in the
472 analysis. Together, the two success pathways demonstrate alternative ways to engage local
473 stakeholders and encourage community buy-in to lead to success, while the failure pathways
474 highlight negative consequences of inadequate stakeholder engagement and buy-in.

475 **4.3 Unique Pathways to Failure: Cases 9 and 20**

476 Two failed cases (9 and 20) were each described by a unique pathway, the third and fourth
477 failure pathways, which shared the three common failure conditions of *Lack of Municipality in*
478 *Planning, Unaddressed Sanitation Priorities, and No Technical Support*. These two pathways
479 diverged from the other two failure pathways because both had *Government Barriers*, which
480 included deliberate actions from the local municipality that permanently disrupted a sanitation
481 system’s use, maintenance, and performance.

482 Case 20, described by failure pathway 3, had strong potential to be successful. Initially,
483 Case 20's sanitation system generated over three times the amount of O&M costs from user fees
484 along with sales of recycled water for use in construction, biogas that was used to run a tea shop,
485 and biogas that was used to heat bathing water. After four years of operation, the municipality
486 revoked the land lease and took control of the system to gain access to the income generation. The
487 municipality did not allow the WSHG to continue to manage the system and instead neglected it
488 and eventually locked the toilets. Since the WSHG has struggled to regain ownership of the system,
489 this *Government Barrier* resulted in permanent system failure (i.e., closure).

490 Case 9, described by failure pathway 4, also had the potential to be successful. The WSHG
491 managing the system occasionally struggled to perform major maintenance, like desludging or
492 repairs from weather damage due to *No Technical Support* and *Insufficient O&M Funds* but
493 performed enough maintenance to keep the system functional. However, three years after
494 implementation, the municipality resettled another community nearby and overloaded the system
495 by connecting 120 new household toilets to the original sanitation system because the municipality
496 was uninvolved in planning and did not understand the system's intended design. Case 9 did not
497 have sufficient funds to rectify the resulting issues of tank and sewer damage. Also, the
498 municipality was unwilling to repair or expand the system. So, the *Government Barriers*
499 contributed to permanent failure. While difficult to anticipate, these disruptions could be mitigated
500 if implementing organizations engage municipalities in planning and if communities and
501 implementing organizations build strong, long-term relationships with municipalities.

502 **4.4 A Comparison of Top-Down and Bottom-Up Implementation Approaches**

503 Comparing the two success pathways shows that both top-down (organization- and
504 municipality-driven) and bottom-up (community-driven) approaches were able to achieve success.
505 The first success pathway had cases where the implementing organizations were able to employ a

506 bottom-up approach. In these cases, implementing organizations engaged the community in
507 planning and decision-making and addressed local priorities in the design and implementation of
508 the sanitation system. Notably, bottom-up strategies were only effective as long as communities
509 were not expected to maintain sanitation systems without any technical or financial assistance.
510 Despite a strong call in the sanitation sector to move away from top-down implementation
511 strategies (Breslin, 2003; Gabe et al., 2009; Hubbard et al., 2011), most implementing
512 organizations relied on top-down strategies (five successful and eight failed cases). The second
513 success pathway demonstrates that systems implemented with top-down approaches can still
514 achieve success even if there is a lack of community participation and priority assessments. Local
515 engagement and community buy-in were still essential but were achieved with alternative
516 strategies of engaging the municipality and incentivizing community use through extensive
517 behavior change education efforts. In successful top-down approaches, municipalities took
518 ownership of sanitation service delivery and prioritized long-term technical and financial
519 assistance, demonstrating that municipalities are important implementation partners. Top-down
520 strategies resulted in failure (eight cases) when behavior change education was absent and neither
521 communities nor municipalities were engaged.

522 Finally, successful Cases 13 and 18 employed a combination of top-down and bottom-up
523 strategies in planning. Each implementing organization initiated a sanitation project and each
524 community was actively engaged in determining the sanitation system's technology and
525 design/ability (resource recovery) that would best address their priorities. The communities also
526 had strong relationships with the municipalities, so community members played an active role in
527 engaging the local municipality. This cooperation provided redundant technical and financial
528 resources, which both supported the sanitation system and had additional benefits. For example,

529 both cases generated the most income from sales of resource recovery products, and because the
530 municipalities financially supported O&M, the communities used the extra income to improve
531 solid waste management (Case 13) and water supply (Case 18). In turn, these extra benefits further
532 strengthened community buy-in and the municipalities' understanding of the importance of
533 sanitation. Overall, regardless of the implementation approach, implementing organizations should
534 aim to increase community acceptance and satisfaction for sanitation systems by improving the
535 quality of service delivered, addressing local priorities, and ensuring systems receive maintenance
536 support.

537 **5.0 Conclusion**

538 Two pathways led to successful sanitation systems, and four pathways led to failed
539 sanitation systems. All successful systems required *Sufficient O&M Funds*, *Clear O&M Plan*, and
540 *Technical Support* in addition to either *Addressed Sanitation Priorities* and *Community*
541 *Participation in Planning* or *Behavior Change Education* and *Municipality Involved in Planning*.
542 Overall, the pathways to success demonstrate the importance of involving municipalities and
543 communities in all project phases to ensure that appropriate technologies are selected that match
544 the local context. Either pathway can lead to success, therefore implementing organizations should
545 focus on the pathway that best aligns with available resources, expertise, and context-specific
546 needs. Since adequate O&M funds, clear O&M plans, and technical support were in both success
547 pathways, we recommend that implementing organizations should prioritize creating a clear O&M
548 plan that identifies reliable and trained operators, establishes long-term technical support, and
549 secures sufficient local O&M funds to ensure long-term use and maintenance. Failed systems
550 lacked many of these important conditions for success, and these results demonstrate that there are
551 many complex causes of sanitation failure. All failed systems had *Lack of Municipality in*
552 *Planning*, *Unaddressed Sanitation Priorities*, and *No Technical Support*. Most failed systems also

553 had *No Clear O&M Plan, Poor Construction Quality, Lack of Community Participation in*
554 *Planning, and Insufficient O&M Funds*. Two failed cases had unique pathways because
555 *Government Barriers* permanently disrupted use and maintenance. The pathways to failure
556 emphasize the importance of engaging local stakeholders—especially the local municipality, as
557 well as establishing clear mechanisms for ongoing technical, managerial, and financial support for
558 resource-limited communities.

559

560 **Acknowledgements**

561 We thank our research assistants, Vijay Kumar and Sridhar Selvaraj, and all participants in this
562 research for their indispensable time and support.

563 **Funding**

564 This work was completed with financial support from the Mortenson Center in Engineering for
565 Developing Communities at the University of Colorado Boulder.

566 **Conflicts of Interest**

567 The authors have no conflicts of interest.

568 **References**

- 569 Andres, L.A., Briceno, B., Chase, C., Echenique, J.A., 2014. Sanitation and Externalities:
570 Evidence from Early Childhood Health in Rural India (Policy Research Working Paper).
571 The World Bank, South Asia Region.
- 572 Banerjee, A., 2013. Legal and policy framework for wastewater treatment and reuse in India: A
573 background review. GIZ-India.
- 574 Bao, P.N., Aramaki, T., Hanaki, K., 2013. Assessment of stakeholders' preferences towards
575 sustainable sanitation scenarios: Assessment on sanitation scenarios. *Water Environ. J.* 27,
576 58–70. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-6593.2012.00327.x>
- 577 Basurto, X., Speer, J., 2012. Structuring the Calibration of Qualitative Data as Sets for Qualitative
578 Comparative Analysis (QCA). *Field Methods* 24, 155–174.
579 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X11433998>
- 580 Battacharyya, U., 2015. Community participation in water and sanitation services: role of
581 Panchayati Raj in India, in: *Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Services beyond 2015:*
582 *Improving Access and Sustainability*. Presented at the 28th WEDC International
583 Conference, Loughborough, England.

- 584 Bazeley, P., Jackson, K., 2013. *Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo*. Sage Publications.
- 585 Black, M., 1998. *Learning What Works: A 20 Year Retrospective View on International Water*
586 *and Sanitation Cooperation*. UNDP - World Bank Water and Sanitation Program,
587 Washington, D.C.
- 588 Bouabid, A., Louis, G.E., 2015. Capacity factor analysis for evaluating water and sanitation
589 infrastructure choices for developing communities. *J. Environ. Manage.* 161, 335–343.
590 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2015.07.012>
- 591 Breslin, E.D., 2003. Demand response approach in practice: why sustainability remains elusive.
592 *WaterAid, Mozambique*.
- 593 Brikké, F., 2000. Operation and Maintenance of rural water supply and sanitation systems. *Train.*
594 *Package Manag. Plan. IRC Int. Water Sanit. Cent. WHO*.
- 595 Brikké, F., Bredero, M., 2003. Linking technology choice with operation and maintenance in the
596 context of community water supply and sanitation. *WHO and IRC WASH, Geneva,*
597 *Switzerland*.
- 598 Central Pollution Control Board, 2017. *Environmental Standards: Water Quality Criteria [WWW*
599 *Document]*. Cent. Pollut. Control Board. URL
600 http://www.cpcb.nic.in/Water_Quality_Criteria.php (accessed 5.17.16).
- 601 Chaplin, S.E., 2011. Indian cities, sanitation and the state: the politics of the failure to provide.
602 *Environ. Urban.* 23, 57–70. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247810396277>
- 603 Chatterley, C., Javernick-Will, A., Linden, K.G., Alam, K., Bottinelli, L., 2014. A qualitative
604 comparative analysis of well-managed school sanitation in Bangladesh. *BMC Public*
605 *Health* 14, 1–14.
- 606 Chatterley, C., Linden, K.G., Javernick-Will, A., 2013. Identifying pathways to continued
607 maintenance of school sanitation in Belize. *J. Water Sanit. Hyg. Dev.* 3, 411–422.
- 608 Chowns, E., 2015. Is Community Management an Efficient and Effective Model of Public Service
609 Delivery? Lessons from the Rural Water Supply Sector in Malawi: Is Community
610 Management Efficient and Effective? *Public Adm. Dev.* 35, 263–276.
611 <https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1737>
- 612 Cronin, A.A., Ohikata, M., Kumar, M., 2014. Social and economic cost-benefit analysis of
613 sanitation in Odisha State, India. *J. Water Sanit. Hyg. Dev.* 4, 521.
614 <https://doi.org/10.2166/washdev.2014.150>
- 615 Davis, A., Javernick-Will, A., Cook, S., 2019. Priority Addressment Protocol: Understanding the
616 Ability and Potential of Sanitation Systems to Address Priorities. *Environ. Sci. Technol.*
617 53, 401–411. <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.8b04761>
- 618 Davis, A., Javernick-Will, A., Cook, S., 2018. A comparison of interviews, focus groups, and
619 photovoice to identify sanitation priorities and increase success of community-based
620 sanitation systems. *Environ. Sci. Water Res. Technol.* 4, 1451–1463.
621 <https://doi.org/10.1039/C8EW00391B>
- 622 Eales, K., Blackett, I., Siregar, R., Febriani, E., 2013. Review of Community-Managed
623 Decentralized Wastewater Treatment Systems in Indonesia. *WSP*.
- 624 Fischer, M., Maggetti, M., 2017. Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Study of Policy
625 Processes. *J. Comp. Policy Anal. Res. Pract.* 19, 345–361.
626 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2016.1149281>
- 627 Gabe, J., Trowsdale, S., Vale, R., 2009. Achieving integrated urban water management: planning
628 top-down or bottom-up? *Water Sci. Technol.* 59, 1999–2008.
629 <https://doi.org/10.2166/wst.2009.196>

- 630 Hacker, M.E., Kaminsky, J.A., 2017. Cultural preferences for the methods and motivation of
631 sanitation infrastructure development. *J. Water Sanit. Hyg. Dev.* 7, 407–415.
632 <https://doi.org/10.2166/washdev.2017.188>
- 633 Harris, D., Kooy, M., Jones, L., 2011. Analysing the governance and political economy of water
634 and sanitation service delivery. Overseas Development Institute, London, UK.
- 635 Harris, M., Alzua, M.L., Osbert, N., Pickering, A., 2017. Community-Level Sanitation Coverage
636 More Strongly Associated with Child Growth and Household Drinking Water Quality than
637 Access to a Private Toilet in Rural Mali. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 51, 7219–7227.
638 <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.7b00178>
- 639 Hawkins, P., Blackett, I., Heymans, C., 2013. Poor-inclusive urban sanitation: An overview,
640 Targeting the Urban Poor and Improving Services in Small Towns. WSP, The World Bank,
641 Washington, D.C.
- 642 Hubbard, B., Sarisky, J., Gelting, R., Baffigo, V., Seminario, R., Centurion, C., 2011. A
643 community demand-driven approach toward sustainable water and sanitation infrastructure
644 development. *Int. J. Hyg. Environ. Health* 214, 326–334.
645 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2011.05.005>
- 646 IDECK, 2015. Strengthening the operation & maintenance sector for servicing decentralised urban
647 sanitation infrastructure in Bangalore: Landscape synthesis report. CDD Society and
648 BORDA, Bangalore, India.
- 649 Jordan, E., Javernick-Will, A., Tierney, K., 2016. Post-tsunami recovery in Tamil Nadu, India:
650 combined social and infrastructural outcomes. *Nat. Hazards* 84, 1327–1347.
651 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-016-2489-4>
- 652 Kaminsky, J., Javernick-Will, A., 2012. Causes for Sustainable Maintenance and Operation of On-
653 Site Sanitation Systems, in: Proceedings of the 2012 Construction Research Congress. pp.
654 21–23.
- 655 Katukiza, A.Y., Ronteltap, M., Oleja, A., Niwagaba, C.B., Kansiime, F., Lens, P.N.L., 2010.
656 Selection of sustainable sanitation technologies for urban slums — A case of Bwaise III in
657 Kampala, Uganda. *Sci. Total Environ.* 409, 52–62.
658 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2010.09.032>
- 659 Kooy, M., Harris, D., 2012. Political economy analysis for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)
660 service delivery (Project Briefing). Overseas Development Institute, London, UK.
- 661 Kunz, N.C., Fischer, M., Ingold, K., Hering, J.G., 2015. Why Do Some Water Utilities Recycle
662 More than Others? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis in New South Wales, Australia.
663 *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 49, 8287–8296. <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.5b01827>
- 664 Mansuri, G., 2004. Community-Based and -Driven Development: A Critical Review. *World Bank*
665 *Res. Obs.* 19, 1–39. <https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkh012>
- 666 Marks, S.J., Davis, J., 2012. Does User Participation Lead to Sense of Ownership for Rural Water
667 Systems? Evidence from Kenya. *World Dev.* 40, 1569–1576.
668 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.03.011>
- 669 Marks, S.J., Komives, K., Davis, J., 2014. Community participation and water supply
670 sustainability evidence from handpump projects in rural Ghana. *J. Plan. Educ. Res.* 34,
671 276–286.
- 672 Marks, S.J., Kumpel, E., Guo, J., Bartram, J., Davis, J., 2018. Pathways to sustainability: A fuzzy-
673 set qualitative comparative analysis of rural water supply programs. *J. Clean. Prod.* 205,
674 789–798. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.09.029>

675 Ministry of Urban Development, 2008. National Urban Sanitation Policy. Government of India,
676 New Delhi, India.

677 Mosler, H.-J., 2012. A systematic approach to behavior change interventions for the water and
678 sanitation sector in developing countries: a conceptual model, a review, and a guideline.
679 *Int. J. Environ. Health Res.* 22, 431–449. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09603123.2011.650156>

680 Murphy, H.M., McBean, E.A., Farahbakhsh, K., 2009. Appropriate technology – A comprehensive
681 approach for water and sanitation in the developing world. *Technol. Soc.* 31, 158–167.
682 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2009.03.010>

683 Mwirigi, J., Balana, B.B., Mugisha, J., Walekhwa, P., Melamu, R., Nakami, S., Makenzi, P., 2014.
684 Socio-economic hurdles to widespread adoption of small-scale biogas digesters in Sub-
685 Saharan Africa: A review. *Biomass Bioenergy* 70, 17–25.
686 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2014.02.018>

687 Mwirigi, J.W., Makenzi, P.M., Ochola, W.O., 2009. Socio-economic constraints to adoption and
688 sustainability of biogas technology by farmers in Nakuru Districts, Kenya. *Energy Sustain.*
689 *Dev.* 13, 106–115. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2009.05.002>

690 Nair, S., Howlett, M., 2015. Scaling up of Policy Experiments and Pilots: A Qualitative
691 Comparative Analysis and Lessons for the Water Sector. *Water Resour. Manag.* 29, 4945–
692 4961. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-015-1081-0>

693 Opdyke, A., Javernick-Will, A., Koschmann, M., 2018. A Comparative Analysis of Coordination,
694 Participation, and Training in Post-Disaster Shelter Projects. *Sustainability* 10, 4241.
695 <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10114241>

696 Palaniappan, M., Lang, M., Gleick, P.H., 2008. A Review of Decision-Making Support Tools in
697 the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Sector. The Pacific Institute, Oakland, California.

698 QSR International, 2015. NVivo qualitative data analysis software. QSR International Pty Ltd.

699 Ragin, C.C., 2013. Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Department of Sociology,
700 University of Arizona, Tucson Arizona.

701 Ragin, C.C., 2008. Redesigning social inquiry: fuzzy sets and beyond. University of Chicago
702 Press, Chicago.

703 Ragin, C.C., 2006. Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage.
704 *Polit. Anal.* 14, 291–310. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpj019>

705 Ragin, C.C., 1987. The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and quantitative
706 strategies. University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif.

707 Rihoux, B., Ragin, C.C., 2009. Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative
708 Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Sage Publications, Inc.

709 Roma, E., Jeffrey, P., 2010. Evaluation of community participation in the implementation of
710 community-based sanitation systems: a case study from Indonesia. *Water Sci. Technol.* 62,
711 1028–1036. <https://doi.org/10.2166/wst.2010.344>

712 Rosenquist, L.E.D., 2005. A psychosocial analysis of the human-sanitation nexus. *J. Environ.*
713 *Psychol.* 25, 335–346. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2005.07.003>

714 Sabogal, R.I., Medlin, E., Aquino, G., Gelting, R.J., 2014. Sustainability of water, sanitation and
715 hygiene interventions in Central America. *J. Water Sanit. Hyg. Dev.* 4, 89–99.
716 <https://doi.org/10.2166/washdev.2013.130>

717 Sakthivel, S.R., Seshadri, A., Rahman, A., Chariar, V.M., 2014. Standardisation of Design and
718 Maintenance of DEWATS Plants in India. *India Inst. Technol. Tech. Pap. Ser.*

719 Saldana, J., 2009. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 2nd ed. Sage, London.

- 720 Sansom, K., 2011. Complementary roles? NGO-Government relations for community-based
721 sanitation in South Asia. *Public Adm. Dev.* 31, 282–293. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.609>
- 722 Seymour, Z., 2014. Sanitation in developing countries: a systematic review of user preferences
723 and motivations. *J. Water Sanit. Hyg. Dev.* 4, 681–691.
- 724 Starkl, M., Brunner, N., Stenström, T.-A., 2013. Why Do Water and Sanitation Systems for the
725 Poor Still Fail? Policy Analysis in Economically Advanced Developing Countries.
726 *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 47, 6102–6110. <https://doi.org/10.1021/es3048416>
- 727 Sujaritpong, S., Nitivattananon, V., 2009. Factors influencing wastewater management
728 performance: Case study of housing estates in suburban Bangkok, Thailand. *J. Environ.*
729 *Manage.* 90, 455–465. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2007.11.006>
- 730 Tilley, E., Strande, L., Lüthi, C., Mosler, H.-J., Udert, K.M., Gebauer, H., Hering, J.G., 2014.
731 Looking beyond Technology: An Integrated Approach to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
732 in Low Income Countries. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* 48, 9965–9970.
733 <https://doi.org/10.1021/es501645d>
- 734 Törnqvist, R., Norström, A., Kärman, E., Malmqvist, P.-A., 2008. A framework for planning of
735 sustainable water and sanitation systems in peri-urban areas. *Water Sci. Technol.* 58, 563–
736 570. <https://doi.org/10.2166/wst.2008.702>
- 737 WaterAid, 2011. Sustainability framework (Framework). WaterAid, London, UK.
- 738 Wegelin-Schuringa, M., 2000. Public awareness and mobilisation for ecosanitation, in: IRC
739 International Water and Sanitation Center, Delft, Netherlands. Presented at the
740 International Symposium on Ecological Sanitation, IRC International Water and Sanitation
741 Center, Delft, Netherlands, Bonn, Germany.
- 742 WHO, UNICEF, 2017. Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: Update and SDG
743 Baselines. Joint Monitoring Program, Geneva.