# Unexpected Consequences:
# 9/11 and U.S.-Mexico Relations

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**Abstract**

The purpose of this research is to identify 9/11's affects on relations between the United States and Mexico. In this thesis I examine relevant policy process theories that that explain the nature of policy formulated after a crisis. Namely, how policy resulting from the reorganization of attention at the national level is used as a causal pathway by which policy after 9/11 could impact relations between the two nations. Data to support this hypothesis was gathered from congressional hearings before and after 9/11. Although the results of this thesis did not fully reject the null hypothesis, they do not rule out the thesis being correct if the data was reworked.

**Introduction**

The 20th Century witnessed the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), significantly reducing trade barriers and economically intertwining the countries involved to an extent that had never been seen before. This was followed by the elections of Presidents George Bush and Vicente Fox, who not only had good rapport with one another, but also agreed on issues that had plagued relations between the two countries for decades. (Santa-Cruz 2012) The first year of the Bush and Fox presidency was possibly the peak of relations between the two nations. President Bush, previously a border governor representing the state of Texas, had strong ties to Mexico and had witnessed firsthand the inefficiencies of national policy that did not foster cooperation between the two nations. (U.S.-Mexico Binational Council 2000) Hope that relations would continue down this path of cooperation and compromise was shattered when terrorists brought down the World Trade Center in New York City. Immediately forcing change in the U.S. position on issues the two countries had been working to resolve. As 9/11 shifted federal and bureaucratic attention away from improving relations and towards anti-terrorism and homeland security; a policy agenda focused on shared economic and other cooperative border reform interests were suddenly redirected to strengthened border security.

How did these attacks affect a seemingly unrelated aspect of U.S. policy, and how did policy subsequently affect relations between U.S. and Mexico? Why did attacks on New York City by Islamic extremists affect a policy agenda unrelated to either, instead focused on increasing cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico? The

policy process will be the starting point defining 9/11 as an event that changed policy focus. Although they do not adequately explain how policy focus changed after 9/11, major policy process theories within political science such as multiple streams, advocacy coalition framework, and punctuated equilibrium will be used as a foundation for new theories, like policy regimes and policy disruption, which better explain the connection. Each is described in the "Literature Review" section of this paper. A policy regime explains how an event such as 9/11 can refocus attention on a national level towards a unifying policy idea. Policy disruption will be a key descriptive factor, as it explains how major events or crises reshuffle a national policy agenda that normally has stable and slowly evolving policy goals. How policy attention is organized in bureaucracies because of policy disruptions and regimes will build on this, followed by how bureaucratic structure shapes the implementation of policy after bureaucracies interpret it. How bureaucracies interpret and implement policy handed down from the apex of the federal government is used to explain why 9/11 could cause a shift in relations between the two nations. Finally, real world examples of disrupted relations between the two nations are used to show what the consequences of new policy focused on stopping terrorism looks like.

But what does any of this matter? The federal government is charged by the people to plan for and address the uncertainty of the future. This is seen at all levels of government, whether it's Social Security, diplomatic relations with other nations, immigration and customs, or investment in infrastructure. Typically decisions that affect these plans are made over the course of months or years through stable policy

processes. Unfortunately major policy disruptions can quickly change the policy process, undermining otherwise stable and incremental policy developments. Policy created as a reaction to quick changes tends to be narrowly focused and generally only aims to resolve the issue exposed by the disruption. Due to the narrow focus, the resulting policy can have unforeseen consequences in subsystems not related to the disruption event, challenging the stability policy subsystems are meant to enforce. In the constantly evolving world we live in, policy disruption is guaranteed to occur over a long enough timeline; a fact long-term policy planning overlooks. The results of this thesis may imply that larger questions about the nature of policy disruption need to be addressed. How as a nation we might better deal with disruption if consideration to what the externalities might be for narrowly focused policy. That the "knee jerk" reactions to crisis may symbolically look successful, but could be improved if there was some sort of institutional capacity that retained stability typically lost to policy disruption.

The analysis that follows starts with a review of the policy process literature that attempts to explain how issues get attention at the national level and in what order issues get attention. This is followed by the "Hypothesis" section, which formally states the argument for why relations between the U.S. and Mexico changed after 9/11. Next is the "Methodology" section; describing how the data was gathered and coded along with a description of the statistical tests used. "Methodology" is followed by an "Expected Results" and "Results" section. "Expected Results" explain why each statistical test was chosen and the models they were based on. Also included in this section are arguments for why each test would prove

or disprove the hypothesis they are based on. The "Results" section describes the findings of this paper and if they prove or disprove the null hypothesis.

## Literature Review

The primary, and most fundamental, literature this thesis will rely on is that which explains policy processes. The policy process will be used to draw connections linking 9/11 to a setback in relations between the United States and Mexico. The idea behind this is a large-scale policy redefinition can determine the fundamental direction of public policy for decades, and this shift in direction can have unforeseen consequences. When specifically related to this project it theorizes that 9/11 was a big enough policy disruption to setback and redefine the relations between the U.S. and Mexico through various policy channels.

Academic literature regarding the policy process is extensive, with many theories competing to explain how policy is formed, influences on policymakers, effects of policy, how agendas are affected by policy, etc. Identifying what theories best explain policy resulting from 9/11 is the first step for relating this event to changing relations between the U.S. and Mexico. The work of Matthew Nowlin and José Real-Dato outline the strengths and weaknesses of multiple Stream, punctuated equilibrium and advocacy coalition framework. Real-Dato's article takes this a step further by proposing a synthetic explanatory framework aimed at combining the three theories so that weaknesses in one theory are compensated by the other two.

Multiple steams (MS) theory of policy process states that there are three separate and independent steams that influence policy making: the problem stream, the politics stream, and the policy stream. Policy change occurs when a policy

entrepreneur[1] combines all three streams, coupling an idea from the policy stream to an issue in the problem stream at a time when coupling the two will work with the political stream. (Nowlin 2011, 44-45; Kingdon 1984, 188) Immediately a problem arises with the assumption that streams are separate when applied to policy after 9/11. Multiple steams argues that involvement in one steam limits involvement in the other two streams. However, Robertson and Eller in their work on participation in school violence prevention provide examples of individuals and organizations that participate in both the problem stream and policy stream. (Nowlin 2011, 45) In order to compensate for this problem the policy regime theory has been advocated, which will be discussed in detail later.

Additional weaknesses in MS start with overlooking micro level processes. (Real-Dato 2009, 119) How institutional factors can effect actor's decisions on policy is not sufficiently explained under MS. (Real-Dato 2009, 119) This thesis's focus on institutions and MS's underestimation of their importance, causes MS to not be an ideal fit when explaining institutional changes after 9/11. The importance MS places on environmental factors, aka outside influences on political stream, but not boundary relationships creates another issue. Boundary relationships are "relationships between policy subsystems and their environment, and particularly the mechanisms through which causal influences traverse subsystem boundaries both inwards and outwards." (Real-Dato 2009, 120)  Applied, this criticizes the assumption that policy entrepreneurs are static, waiting for an opportunity within

[1] Policy entrepreneurs are advocates who invest their resources to promote a position in return for future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits.

their boundaries and not considering subsystems[2] outside their boundaries. (Real-Dato 2009, 120) This leads into the final problem with MS, its limited explanatory scope. MS favors environmental factors outside of the policy system to explain policy change and by favoring one causal path of policy change; it overlooks other paths that may cause policy change. (Real-Dato 2009, 120-121)

Punctuated equilibrium (PE) deals with two aspects of policymaking, long periods of stasis and rapid policy change. PE research treats information as "signals", these signals go through information processing or "collecting, assembling, interpreting, and prioritizing those signals" (Nowlin 2011, 49-50) Information processing assumes groups or individuals use selective attention and attention-driven choice to interpret signals. Selective attention means individuals are limited mentally in their ability to process all available information and attention-driven choice states individuals "ignore or overreact to the information signals from their surroundings". (Nowlin 2011, 50) Both cause policy outcomes depending on how individuals setting policy, process the information. Building on selective attention and information processing, Daniel Nohrstedt cites literature explaining how actors within subsystems respond to signals. Actors are more likely to choose signals compatible with their existing belief systems and ignore signals that challenge it. (Nohrstedt 2010, 9) The U.S. government typically faces an oversupply of information, major events like 9/11 compound the problem due to the amount of attention it receives and subsequent information generated. This forces a group like Congress, through attention-driven choice, to prioritize information and delegate

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[2] Subsystems are established coalitions of interests whose participants advance ideas or problem definitions about a particular set of issues.

information processing to the bureaucracy. (Nowlin 2011, 50) Delegation of information processing can have some unforeseen consequences that will be discussed in the section on how the bureaucracy responds to policy disruption.

Like MS, PE does not sufficiently explain micro level processes like institutional affects on individuals (Real-Dato 2009, 119) However, PE checks its own weakness when dealing with institutions, literature calling for a more in-depth examination with recent articles attempting to rectify this. (Real-Dato 2009, 120) PE also has a better grip on boundary relationships than MS, as PE advocates conflict expansion outside subsystems boundaries as cause for policy change, which is further explained with policy regimes. (Real-Dato 2009, 119) PE also suffers from its limited explanatory scope and problem of the explanandum. Like MS, PE's limited explanatory scope involves the theories tendency to favor one causal path for policy change, namely emphasis on policy entrepreneur's strategic behavior. (Real-Dato 2009, 121) The problem of the explanandum reveals the real world affect policy change has, or what changes when policy changes. Here PE shares another problem with MS, in that it looks at the number of regulations passed or budget allocations as measures of successful policy adoption. (Real-Dato 2009, 121) This overlooks what changes occur in the bureaucracy with policy adoption, a major point in this thesis.

Before moving onto Advocacy Coalition Framework, further explanation of signals and stimuli are needed along with how the federal government chooses information. Signals are important because they let society direct the government

and let the government direct society.[3]  (Rose 1989, 234 & 237) In terms of the

policy process, signals are amplified when involved with policy that produces a

large change in society or government. (Rose 1989, 239) Experts are considered

crucial to how the government interprets signals from society. Notably, experts are

crucial in problem identification and awareness, and deciding what the appropriate

policy response is. (Rose 1989, 238). Richard Rose concludes that signals coming

from laws or expert opinions have a greater impact and importance than signals

from society. (Rose 1989, 239) Coupled with signals is how the federal government

produces official information that steers policy discussion. Just as experts are

important for interpreting signals from society, expertise is also important to the

production of information that influences policy attention and discussion. Elizabeth

Jagger states "knowledge is not objective or neutral, but always related to

power…and how this relates to "truths" being produced." (Jagger 1997, 447) This

means information is seen as irrelevant or illegitimate if not presented by a

qualified and authorized speaker, whose aim is to promote a shared understanding

with individuals the speaker is addressing. (Jagger 1997, 447-448) Policy is more

likely to incorporate expert knowledge, if said knowledge fits into policymakers

existing belief structure. (Jagger 1997, 446) This makes information hierarchically

categorized by government, with information seen as more legitimate than other

information depending on how it fits into belief structures. (Jagger 1997, 448)

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[3] Signals to the government from society are in the form of votes, street
demonstrations or private lobbying. The government sends signals back by enacting
laws and other policy that tell society what it should and shouldn't do.

Advocacy coalition framework (ACF) focuses on policy learning and policy change within a subsystem, explaining policy change as a result of policy learning[4] and external or internal shocks[5] to a subsystem. (Nowlin 2011, 46; Real-Dato 2009, 127). Applied to subsystems involved in the aftermath of 9/11, external shocks of crisis and public opinion will be the foci. Also useful is ACF's distinction between major and minor policy change. Change in core policy for governmental programs is major and a change in secondary aspects of the same programs is minor. (Nohrstedt 2010, 7) ACF also explains how shared core beliefs translate into homogeneous advocacy coalitions, which have better patterns of policy coordination and are stable over time. (Nowlin 2011, 46) This is similar to the idea government will categorize information as more important if it fits into existing belief structures. It should be noted ACF does not face the same pitfalls as MS and PE, but still has one major drawback. ACF focuses on policy change and stability over a longer time period, about ten or more years. (Real-Dato 2009, 118-119) Changes after 9/11 happened rapidly, within the span of a year or two, making the ACF framework less than ideal for this thesis.

Daniel Nohrstedt helps fix the aforementioned problem with ACF, using crisis as his measure of external shock. Characteristics of a crisis he defines are "surprise, threat to core societal values, uncertainty, and urgency regarding important decisions" that result in periods of "disorder in the seemingly normal development

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[4] Policy learning refers to the production of knowledge oriented towards a better understanding, or redefinition, of the relationship between policy design and their consequences.
[5] External and internal shocks can be change in public opinion, changes in governing coalitions, outputs from other subsystems, and focusing events.

of a system and wide-spread questioning or discrediting of established policies, practices, and institutions" (Nohrstedt 2010, 5) Crisis fitting this definition is expected to cause the following reactions. Significant managerial challenges arising because of the symbolic challenges to governmental power the crisis creates. This challenge comes from the crisis discrediting the existing political order. (Nohrstedt 2010, 5-6) Nohrstedt also helps us further define subsystems, with additional help coming from Peter May. Subsystems contain an unlimited number of components (institutions, actors, issues, etc.) that interact to produce outputs for policy. Actor's integration into a subsystem can make them autonomous from other subsystems. Each subsystem must have a degree of authority in order to produce policy outcomes. Subsystems structure political conflict by limiting entrants and debate through established patterns of policymaking that are occasionally punctuated by major disruptions. (Nohrstedt 2010, 7-8; Jochim & May 2010, 308) Basically subsystems function to bring stability to an otherwise volatile process.

There are three causal mechanisms that link crisis to major policy change. First is a redistribution of political resources, such as financial resources, public opinion, access to authority, mobilizable supporters, skillful leadership, and scientific and technical information. (Nohrstedt 2010, 11) A visible crisis focuses attention on problems and potential solutions, giving policy entrepreneurs and actors within subsystems access to new political resources. (Nohrstedt 2010, 11) The second causal mechanism is exploitation of crisis by a policy entrepreneurs and minorities seeking change, waiting for policy opportunities that can cause change in accordance with their belief system. (Nohrstedt 2010, 11) Lastly, how the crisis

makes members of the dominant coalition reconsider existing beliefs through crisis-induced learning, the event causing reassessment of policy beliefs. (Nohrstedt 2010, 11 & 18) Rarely will a crisis introduce new problems, but amplify a pre-existing one. (Nohrstedt 2010, 17) The combination of this idea with the causal mechanisms linking crisis to policy change explains why many counterterrorism policy changes implemented after 9/11 were already on the intelligence policy agenda. (Nohrstedt 2010, 17)

Building on all the three theories, and using Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)[6] as a foundation; José Real-Dato proposes a synthetic explanatory framework. Important elements of this not taken into account by other policy process theories are as follows. Participants within a subsystem that influence policy do so on an institutional or design level. At the institutional level are individuals responsible for making day-to-day decisions based on national policy within a subsystem. The design level involves two types of participants, public policymakers who hand down policy to the institutional level, and insiders who have access and some degree of influence over the policymakers. (Real-Dato 2009, 122) This all occurs in the action arena, defined as the social space where all individuals interact. The action arena is outlined by boundary relationships that incorporate all relevant action arenas into a single subsystem. (Real-Dato 2009, 123) Real-Dato attributes policy stability to the decisional core of a subsystem being isolated from the influence of other subsystems. (Real-Dato 2009, 124) Policy is more stable because hierarchical institutional design isolates the decisional core of a

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[6] IAD is a theory of policy process focusing on how institutional arrangements influence policy.

subsystem and connects policy to accepted social norms and political values, making potential deviations from policy difficult. (Real-Dato 2009, 125) Stable policy is also the result of a subsystem seeing similar situations repeat themselves over time, but situations cannot be excessively complex for this to hold true. (Real-Dato 2009, 129)

The final aspect of a synthetic explanatory framework, conflict expansion, leads into policy regimes. This connects policy regimes to the synthetic explanatory framework, and by extension MS, PE and ACF. Conflict expansion turns isolated subsystems into connected ones, through image redefinition.[7] (Real-Dato 2009, 131-133) The theory of policy regimes explain connected subsystems, attempting to describe the narrow view policymakers have when addressing policy issues that span multiple subsystems. (Jochim & May 2010, 306) The fundamental idea behind policy regimes is major issues can have trans-subsystem change among linked subsystems, linked by overlapping issues and interests. Subsystems are joined by events such as 9/11, defined later as a policy disruption event (Jochim & May 2010, 306; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 286) Russell Williams follows this to its extreme, theorizing policy spillovers can create an entirely new subsystem with new institutions and actors. (Williams 2009, 34) Peter May argues a more moderate theory suggesting boundary spanning policy regimes are the end product of multiple individuals within multiple subsystems working towards a similar policy goal. (Jochim & May 2010, 307) Pressure to work towards a similar policy goal comes from centralized authority focused on resolving a single issue; resolved by

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[7] Image redefinition is change that attracts individuals attention by redefining the policy issue, incentivizing actors to "do the right thing", which is decided by social norms

governing arrangements that foster integrative policy and effective action among subsystems. (Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 286; Jochim & May 2010, 307) Therefore policy regimes are "governing arrangements that span multiple subsystems", governing arrangements attempting to use elements from each relevant subsystems to bring stability and cohesion to the policy regime. (Jochim & May 2011, 308)

A policy regime is made up of four facets: ideas, issues, interests, and institutions. Ideas serve to create a set of common policy purposes that key players in separate subsystems can act upon. (Jochim & May 2011, 312) The commonality of ideas sets a course for the direction of governing arrangements, organizing policy and action. (Jochim & May 2011, 312) Issues focus attention of individuals and subsystems, and in this way act to integrate related subsystems. Widespread crisis or problems expose the issue to a broad range of individuals, creating the demand for policy solutions. (Jochim & May 2011, 311; Kettl 2003, 257) How different interests involve themselves determines the level of consensus or conflict the policy regime will face. (Jochim & May 2011, 312) Interests lend strength to a policy regime, but must be realigned in the same direction to strengthen a policy regime. (Jochim & May 2011, 312) Institutions, congressional committees, and government agencies, are central to informational flow and policymaking; a crucial integrative force for subsystems and the uptake of ideas (Jochim & May 2011, 313) The degree that institutions can foster policy cohesion relies on institutions unifying under subsystems. Examples of this are a policy czar, dominant congressional committee, or agency with authority concentrated at the apex (Jochim & May 2011, 313)

May follows his discussion on policy regimes with six examples that fit the criteria for a regime. One regime acknowledged is homeland security, which becomes the focus of his second article. Homeland security is a crisis-driven regime; meaning widespread attention makes the issue seem more urgent and forces policymakers to act quickly (Jochim & May 2011, 316) Each regime is compared in terms of strength and durability[8]. (Jochim & May 2011, 317 & 320) Strength of a regime is a function of the four facets that create a regime discussed above. Using this framework to analyze homeland security, May finds the regime to be weak. Weakness starts with the idea behind homeland security, "protecting the homeland". The idea suffers from multiple definitions by political leaders and does not attract attention well, shown by the fact it was not widely embraced by key individuals within the regime. (Jochim & May 2011, 318) The regime also suffers from lack of interest support, with a large mobilization of interests directly following the attack but fading support as the crisis passed. (Jochim & May 2011, 319; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 291) Additionally, although the institution of homeland security is highly centralized in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the institution faces intense bureaucratic competition that hampers its strength. (Jochim & May 2011, 319; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 288) The factors that contribute to the regimes weakness also cause the regime to produce unstable policy. However, homeland security does have a redeeming factor due to

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[8] Strength is the ability of a given regime to bring about the integration of elements of relevant subsystems and to reduce policy fragmentation with respect to a particular messy problem. Durability is the regimes ability to stay connected over time.

the fact that regime strength does not necessarily translate into regime durability. The issue that underscores the homeland security regime is highly salient and difficult to displace due to continued concerns about terrorism, making the regime to be highly durable. (Jochim & May 2011, 320) Therefore it can be concluded the homeland security regime produces unstable policy over a long period of time.

In order to create a policy regime, first there must be a policy disruption event. Policy is redefined by disruptions through the disruptions introduction of new ideas or attributes to a problem. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 171) Disruptions have three effects on subsystems. The first being refocused attention of policymakers to the disruption, also discussed in the section on a synthetic explanatory framework, signals, and production of information. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 189-190) In relation to 9/11 this looks at attention given to terrorism prior to, and after the disruption. The second part examines policymakers refocused attention and its effect on policy making. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 189-190) This sheds light on how increased attention causes a shift in policy making. Finally, the effect of the disruption itself coupled with policymakers response and what this translates into for federal agencies. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 189-190) In regards to anti-terrorism it would mean what level of importance terrorism was for specific federal agencies before and after 9/11.

Major disruptions have a typical response of centralizing government efforts in order to regain control and stability lost in the disruption. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 174) An example of this would be the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the many agencies it absorbed. This has the effect of

redirecting multiple priorities of multiple agencies towards a central goal. Redirection of priorities could conceivably cause issues unrelated to the disruption to also be redirected to reflect a central goal. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 174) Therefore relations between the U.S. and Mexico could possibly be affected because of centralized organization and its results on various subsystems. How much subsystems are affected can be measured by system engagement, or the degree to which policymakers take on the issue through hearings and laws. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 176)

Policy disruption and its effects on national agendas is only one piece of the puzzle. Understanding how disruption events reverberate in the bureaucracy is equally important. Crisis makes policymakers grapple with the events implications and the issues exposed by attempting to create policy that will regain stability. Typically this policy tells bureaucratic agencies to "do things better" or "do things differently", which by definition is disruptive to those agencies existing agenda. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 517) How agencies organizational attention is changed because of policy demands is crucial to understanding the full impact of implementing new centralized policy.

Bureaucratic structures have two ways of organizing information; the first is delegation of authority and use of formal routines and the second is centralized authority and the use of informal procedures. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 518) The first is a prototypical response of a bureaucracy, "incorporating policy signals into existing information channels, involving delegation of tasks to expertise at lower levels of the organization, and invoking existing routines for bureaucratic

policymaking." (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 521) The second way of organizing information is used when policymakers' demands require substantial change, like what is required after a disruption event. The highest levels of the government attend to policy; leaders retaining decision-making power and creating new ways to process information. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 521) Channeling policy change through delegation of authority and formal routines lessens policy signals and slows organizational response whereas policy change through centralization and informal procedures quickly pushes attention and energy towards the policy goals. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 522) A bureaucracy processing new policy through existing channels may slow response, but also creates more stable policy implementation. In contrast centralized authority makes a bureaucracy very responsive to the demands of a leader and flexible in its operations, but at the cost of stable policy implementation. The policy following 9/11 is an example of centralized authority, as the Bush administration was very successful in focusing agencies towards an antiterrorism agenda. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 519)

Since organizational structure organizes information, it is not unreasonable to think by extinction it also organizes attention because "the structure influences which options are to be compared, in what sequence, and by whom" (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 520) How attention is focused is indicated by centralized authority handing down information, or guidance as a means to direct an agency. Guidance manifests itself in agency-generated policy statements and grant program guidelines, both of which are not legally binding in the way formal rules are. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 524) Since guidance is not legally binding it gives the

agency flexibility when addressing issues and channeling attention. However this flexibility cannot be achieved without significantly disrupting any ongoing tasks within the organization and taking away the organizations ability to deal with multiple issues at once. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 523) Another indication of centralized authority focusing agencies attention is the amount leaders of federal agencies reinforce agenda items when speaking to audiences or at congressional hearings, using the issue at hand as their focal point. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 525)

Attention focused on anti-terrorism has unintended consequences, as little attention and resources are left for programs unrelated to terrorism that now found themselves under the DHS. Since most funds were appropriated for anti-terrorism, agencies that did not have this as part of their agenda were forced to change programs focus in order to receive funding. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 535) State and local governments were also frustrated by the uncertainty of DOH grant programs, causing an unstable relationship. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 536) Another consequence of the attention shift was an inability to align with stable congressional principles, as agencies found themselves in an environment defined by unstable policy. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 536) The combination of unstable policy and budgets may cause distrust amongst individuals in different bureaucratic agencies, hampering working relationships centered on new policy. Abdulkareem Abdulrazaq Kayode's work provides insight to how the bureaucracy can affect foreign relations. The most relevant point is that the bureaucracy is important to the governments ability to handle multiple issues at once, with each bureau or agency

assigned certain roles. (Kayode 2008, 7) Bureaucracies are influential in terms of

foreign relaitons because not only do they execute and implement policy, but are

also indirect policy makers. They may not directly create policy, but their

importance cannot be overlooked for interpretations of said policy though drafting

memoranda, preparing policy agendas, negotiating funds, and working out

priorities. (Kayode 2008, 7)

The subsystem most important to the thesis will be border protection.

Border protection will be a crucial aspect because it is where relations between the

two nations begin and end. (Andres 2005, 1) This means relations between the two

nations almost always involves the border in some capacity. Therefore the book

*Inevitable Partnership* provides an excellent starting point. Part I outlines the history

of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Mexico through 2000. Throughout this

history, issues such as immigration, trade, and drug trafficking are major focal

points. (Smith 2000, 59-87; Smith 2000, 117-143) It also touches on the difference

in rhetoric towards the U.S. from Mexico by different presidents and vice versa from

the 1970s to early 2000. The pattern of language that emerges is one reflecting

increased cooperation, starting with President George H.W. Bush and Salinas, and

continuing with President Clinton and Zedillo. (Smith 2000, 59-87; Smith 2000, 89-

100) Since the book was published before the terrorist attacks, it is optimistic for

continually improving relations between the two nations, providing insight to the

trajectory relations were on before 9/11.

Like *Inevitable Partnership*, the report from the U.S.-Mexico Binational

Counsel is published the year before the events of 9/11 and outlines specific policy

recommendations for President Bush and Fox. Although recommendations rarely translate directly into laws, the report suggests the direction relations were headed between the U.S. and Mexico before 9/11. Recommendations include: an open border much like the one between the U.S. and Canada, direct phone lines between governors on opposite sides of the border, and more communication between the U.S. Congress and its Mexican counterpart. (U.S.-Mexico Binational Council 2000, x-xv)

The Center for Comparison Immigration Studies provides literature looking into border controls pre- and post-9/11. This notes how traditional border issues such as trade and migration were handled before 9/11, with major security concerns focused on illegal immigration and drug trafficking, not terrorism. (Andres 2003, 2-4) NAFTA had begun opening up the border in order to increase trade flows, economic prosperity trumping security concerns. (Andres 2003, 4) The attacks that followed made it impossible to view traditional border issues without a national security lens. Viewing the border through a national security lens shifts attention away from economic issues towards securing the border, creating paradox for NAFTA policies that encouraged a borderless economy. (Andres 2003, 3) Providing insight to how the subsystem of border security felt policy disruption and bureaucratic policy responses.

*The Management of Border Security in NAFTA* is a similar article detailing changes in border security after 9/11. It differs by comparing the U.S. border relationship with Canada and Mexico. The explanation for our more open border with Canada after 9/11 is twofold. First, economic interests with Canada have

outbalanced the threats. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 6) The second part involves the application of image theory, in this case how nations perceive each other. American policymakers see Canada as an ally, a nation of cultural and political equals with similar values. On the other hand Mexico is viewed through a colonial image, or a nation of incompetent people who need direction from a superior perceiver. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 12) The latter part of this explains why policy set by the U.S. affecting Mexico leaves little room for autonomous policy choices by Mexican authorities. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 14) This could mean changes in policy by the U.S. may have pronounced consequences in terms of relations. The article also examines the track record for cooperation with drug enforcement issues between the nations. On the U.S. side of the border 50 different agencies are in some way responsible for drug-related policing. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 20) Although connected through the DEA, the number of agencies causes problems in regards to what needs to be done, who has authority, and how to share resources. This leads to limited cooperation with Mexican authorities. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 20)

Finally the books *Two Nations Indivisible* and *Mexico-United States Relations, The Semantics of Sovereignty* describe changes seen in policy and relations between the two nations after 9/11. Presidents Bush and Fox are described as, "both ranch-loving former border governors" who got along well. (O'Neil 2013, 71) However, this cooperation became another victim in the terrorist attacks; the focal point of cooperation, immigration policy, becoming another tool to combat terrorism. (O'Neil 2013, 71) Since the attacks reshaped the U.S. view of immigration; foreign policy focused on fighting terrorism reduced the agenda importance of increasing

cooperation with Mexico. Causing the U.S. to offer no compromises in new immigration policy that followed 9/11. (Santa-Cruz 2012, 115-116) This conduct by the U.S. following 9/11 was unpopular with Mexican citizens and government officials. (Santa-Cruz 2012, 157) 9/11 also caused the largest bureaucratic restructuring of the U.S. intelligence and military communities. (Santa-Cruz 2012, 100) The military side of this restructuring was seen in a new combatant command[9] established by the Pentagon; Mexican military leadership disliking the idea of working through a combatant command instead of dealing directly with the Secretary of Defense or chiefs of staff. (Santa-Cruz 2012, 100)

**Hypothesis**

Policy demands after a disruption like 9/11 create unstable policy that is difficult for bureaucracies to respond to. No longer part of an isolated subsystem, they are incorporated into a policy regime that has a different set of narrowly focused policy goals. New policy goals are quickly pushed into the bureaucracy through centralization that refocuses bureaucratic attention to reflect refocused national attention. Centralization disrupts agency agendas that are based on long-term planning and delegation of problems to different parts of the bureaucracy, causing policy instability. Long-term planning is stable because stability is gained from policy learning through repeated events that are not overly complex and isolation of bureaucratic structures from outside influence. 9/11 represents not only a new event, but also one that introduces extremely complex issues. Bureaucracies involved in addressing and maintaining the United States

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[9] U.S. Northern Command, responsible for military action in Canada, part of the Caribbean, and Mexico.

relationship with Mexico, like the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services or U.S. Customs and Border Protection, use policy learning to created long-term policy goals through formal routines, reflecting the long-term policy signals from the federal government. After 9/11 both were incorporated into a policy regime focused on homeland security, meaning issues such as immigration and customs were now analyzed within the context of homeland security. Any long-term planning involving Mexico would be crowded out by the new organizational structure focused on homeland security, destabilizing policy affecting Mexico. Previously stable bureaucratic policy towards Mexico becoming destabilized and results of this, can be summed up by, "talk of mutual prosperity fell victim to a U.S. obsession with border security." (O'Neil 2013, 71) This hypothesis attempts to explain why a change in relations between the U.S. and Mexico occurred, outlined at the end of the "Literature Review" section.

**Methodology**

Data for this study was collected from the online archives of the U.S. Government Printing Office. The data itself was gathered from all available Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings from the 106th and 108th Congresses; closed hearings are omitted because they are not available to the public. Congressional hearings were chosen because they convey the strongest signals from policymakers to the bureaucracy, including signals from the interpretation of existing laws, the views of experts, and positions of key elected officials. The 106th Senate hearings were chosen because these took place during the last full congressional session before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Hearings of the 108th Congress were selected

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because these were scheduled in the first full session after the attacks and the organization of the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, the 108th Congress is a full year after the attacks, which decreases the amount of "knee jerk" legislation presented and symbolic hearings produced in response to the attacks.

The data set includes 86 Senate hearings from the 106th Congress and 108 Senate hearings from the 108th Congress. This brings the total number of hearings included in the data gathered to 194, each coded separately for the words *terrorism* and *Mexico*. Documents included in the hearings official record are counted as part of that hearings discourse. Words coded in these documents are attributed to the individual who submitted them into the hearing record. Words are not counted if part of an individual's or document's title because the words in titles are typically repeated during the individual's introductory statement or in the documents submission in the hearing. Doing so enhances the statistical data by avoiding a single word being counted twice. The word was counted if part of a footnote, but not if it is part of a citation. Footnotes add depth to the document by further explaining rhetoric in a document, where citations do not. Variations of each word are also counted: such as *anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, terrorist, narco-terrorism,* etc. Similarly, *Mexican* was counted as an acceptable variation of Mexico in order to count when individuals mentioned *Mexicans, the Mexican government,* and *Mexican military.* The words *terror* and *terrorize* are omitted because their use did not always mean terrorism was the foci of that sentence. *Mexico* was not counted when it referred to the *Gulf of Mexico* or *New Mexico*.

Coding the data involved counting the number of times each word is used in a hearing and by whom each word is used. An individual's use of the word is coded into eleven categories initially, and condensed into four: *elected officials, department heads, lower level department officials, and experts. Elected officials* are a combination of Senators and Members of the House. Staff members writing on behalf of the elected official is coded as the official. In addition to department secretaries, heads of independent government agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development are also included in the *department heads* category. A full list of independent agencies coded this way is available in Appendix A. General statements from a department not attributed to an individual are coded under the *department heads* variable. Military commanders at the head of a military branch or in charge of a theater/region are also coded under *department head* in the condensed categories. *Lower level department officials* are defined as anyone working under the department secretary such as assistant secretaries, under secretaries, and deputy secretaries. *Experts* are considered to be anyone who fell outside of the previous three categories and included: representatives from Non-Governmental Organizations, academics, representatives from a company, former government employees, and in some cases U.S. ambassadors. Each was considered to be an expert because of their capacity at the hearing; their purpose was to provide the hearing with expertise on the issue under discussion.

Hearings are also coded by focus and what subcommittee they appeared before. A hearings focus was determined by reading the opening statement of the presiding Senator, in which they outline topics that will be covered in that specific

hearing. Coding for focus was done very specifically, resulting in 62 categories, then reduced to twelve broad categories: *bureaucracy, specific region or country, international organization, human rights, national security, trade/economics, conflict, foreign relations, justice/crime, terrorism, aid,* and *Middle East*. Hearings can have multiple focuses, as it helps regains some of the specificity lost from reducing the number focus categories. As previously noted, hearings are also coded by subcommittee. The eight possible subcommittees presiding over each hearing are listed at the beginning of every hearings record. These are: *African Affairs; East Asian and Pacific Affairs; European Affairs; International Economic Policy, Export, and Trade Promotion; International Operations; Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs;* and *Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism*. It is important to note in the 108th Congress *International Operations* becomes *International Operations and Terrorism*; while *Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics, and Terrorism* becomes *Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics*. A full explanation of all the variables listed in the previous paragraphs can be found in Appendix A.

The question being tested in this analysis focuses on the effects of disruption on policy agendas. Hearings before Congress allow agencies to present their plans, and also allow members of Congress to discuss their own agendas. In general, we expect agency agendas to reflect long-term planning. What effect does a sudden and unexpected event such as 9/11 have on policy agendas? Do the various actors in the agenda-setting environment return to the same issues following the disruption, or does the disruption create a realignment of the agenda itself? The independent variable for the statistical test is 9/11, the disruption, coded depending on if the

hearing was before or after the attack. The primary dependent variable is change in the number of time each word-*Mexico* and *terrorism*-was used. The secondary dependent variable is number of times different individuals use each word, while the control variables are hearing focus and subcommittee. From this two-sample t-tests[10] are run to determine the correlation between each word before the disruption (the independent variable 9/11), then compared to the correlation between each word after the disruption. This test is run again to determine the correlation for individual's use of each word before and after the disruption. The two-sample t-test is also reworked to determine hearing attendance for *department heads* before and after the disruption. With this, two separate ordered logistic regressions[11] are run with the addition of two other independent variables: hearing focus and subcommittee. This regression will determine how use of each word changes depending on the focus of the committee or subcommittee the hearing is before.

### Expected Results.

Measuring the unintended consequences of expansive federal policy is a difficult task to undertake. A policy's success or failure is typically measured by the results it is expected to produce, in our case, keeping the public safe from additional terrorist attacks. Connecting policy to results it was not expected to produce is a difficult phenomenon to quantitatively observe. In attempting to alleviate this, data

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[10] T-test shows the difference between means of two random samples of independent observations. Results determine how probable it is the two samples correlation is not due to random chance.
[11] Ordered logistic regression is used to predict the outcome of an ordinal dependant variable with two or more independent variables.

and methods used were modeled on data and methods run by Peter May in his articles examining policy disruption, policy regimes, and responses of the bureaucracy to agenda disruption. Each of which is also difficult to measure quantitatively. It should be recognized that the data collected for this thesis is not as extensive as the data it is modeled after, however in the interest of time and manpower this was the only option. May's work on policy disruptions is where the idea to gather data from congressional hearings originates, along with coding those hearings by focus. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 180) The literature constructing policy regimes also uses Congressional hearings as a data set. However, this analysis differs from the policy disruption data by coding the involvement of different actors at hearings and measuring ideational uptake[12] of core ideas to the policy regime. (Jochim & May 2011, 317; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 293)  The first tests modeled on this looks at changes in *elected officials, department heads, lower level department officials* and *experts* use of each word. The second tests, measuring ideational uptake, looks for consistent use of the word *terrorism* regardless of hearing focus. Consistent use of the term *terrorism* regardless of hearing focus or presiding subcommittee would show ideational uptake across multiple subsystems. Finally, in responses of the bureaucracy to agenda disruption, May again uses hearings and codes for actors. What differs is his attention to heads of federal agencies, coding their attendance and rhetoric at hearings. (May,

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[12] Ideational uptake reflects the extent to which actors in different subsystems embrace the ideas, interests, and institutions that serve to contribute to the formation and strength of a policy regime.

Workman & Jones 2007, 524-525 & 534) This is the foundation behind counting *department heads* use of each word and binomially coding their attendance.

If this thesis is correct, running statistical tests on the data collected should produce results that demonstrate a strong negative correlation between the words *Mexico* and *terrorism*. This correlation is fundamental in supporting the hypothesis that 9/11 caused a disruption in the relations between the U.S. and Mexico. A negative correlation would show increased use of *terrorism* and decreased use of *Mexico*. Increased use of *terrorism* is expected and important for the following reasons. To start, a policy disruption event refocuses the attention of individuals, namely policymakers, to the issue it exposes. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 172-173) Using data from congressional hearings shows not only increased attention to the issue, but system engagement[13] as well. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 176) This points to issue redefinition of terrorism, and therefore conflict expansion of terrorism into multiple subsystems. (Real-Dato 2009, 131-133)

Expansion into multiple subsystems leads to the policy disruption being significant enough to create the foundations for a policy regime. Statistical tests that would support terrorism creating a homeland security policy regime are two-sample t-tests that track changes in individuals use of the term *terrorism* and ordered logistic regressions looking at consistent use of this term regardless of hearing focus or subcommittee. The t-tests would show homeland security emerging as a crisis driven regime, creating consensus among individuals at the

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[13] System engagement is defined as the degree to which policymakers grapple with issues by holding hearings or passing laws than simply making pronouncements.

federal level about a central policy problem. (Jochim & May 2011, 312 & 316) On the other hand, regressions would support homeland securities ideational uptake as an issue now relevant to multiple subsystems. Ideas behind the homeland security regime serve to create common policy goals that actors in separate subsystems can act on. (Jochim & May 2011, 312; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 293)

       The real world effects of an emerging crisis driven policy regime can be witnessed with the redistribution of political resources and centralization of government efforts to regain control and stability lost by the event, seen in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 174; Nohrstedt 2010, 11) Creation of the DHS is the largest federal government restructuring since the Department of Defense was created in 1947, and most complicated federal reorganization in U.S. history, combining 22 federal agencies with 165,000 employees. (Kettl 2003, 259) Issue redefinition caused agencies previously seen as unrelated to homeland security or terrorism, to be reorganized under the DHS. Reorganization caused the DHS to be involved in the following subsystems: information security, food safety, border security, transportation safety, technological hazards, public health emergences, domestic security, and natural disaster preparedness and response. (Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 296) Although the research finds homeland security to be a weak policy regime over the long term due to lack of interest support, the immediate aftermath of the crisis (which the 108th Congressional hearings are situated within) saw a large mobilization of interest support. (Jochim & May 2011, 319; Jochim, May

& Sapotichne 2011, 291) Therefore, even as a weak policy regime, ideational uptake should still be observed due to the disruption being very recent.

Homeland security as a policy regime is the first indicator to why relations between the U.S. and Mexico were disrupted because of 9/11. In the synthetic explanatory framework Real-Dato attributes policy stability to subsystems isolation from other subsystems. (Real-Dato 2009, 124) Since policy regimes incorporate multiple subsystems, by extension of his argument, policy regimes would also produce unstable policy. But why would unstable policy affect our relations with Mexico? Explaining this involves how the bureaucracy organizes attention following centralized shifts in policy. As an organizational response to 9/11, 97 percent of policy responses from the DHS are attributed to centralized authority focusing bureaucratic attention, the highest of any policy regime May studied. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 529) Policy change through centralization of authority and informal procedures is the preferred response of the federal government when it involves policy that requires substantial changes because of the disruption (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 522) In contrast to the alternative, delegated authority and formal routines, centralization makes the bureaucratic response faster and more flexible than is typical for bureaucratic behavior. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 522-523) There are two measures that would reveal centralized control. The first is a two-sample t-test focused on *department heads* and the change in their use of the word *terrorism* after the disruption. Second is a two-sample t-test focused on the same *department heads*, tracking their attendance at hearings before and after the disruption. Both tests would support bureaucratic attention being redirected by

centralized authority to digesting new policy demands. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 522-523 & 525) The final statistical piece of the puzzle brings us back to the original two-sample t-test that looks for a negative correlation between the words *terrorism* and *Mexico*. Increased use of the term *terrorism* in Senate hearings and decreased use of *Mexico* supports the hypothesis that centralization causes a bureaucratic organization to lose the ability to process issues in parallel; increased attention to homeland security disrupts and takes away attention from policy unrelated to homeland security. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 523 & 534) Relating the negative correlation to the bureaucracy's loss of processing issues in parallel can be done by focusing the t-test on *lower level department officials*. If centralization focuses their attention on homeland security, it could disrupt attention given to policy regarding Mexico, shown by a significant decrease in use of the word *Mexico* by *lower level department officials.*

Centralization has been discussed in some detail, but what has not been explained is what externalities come with centralization. Externalities are the final piece to relate 9/11 to a possible disruption in relations between the two nations. This brings up the importance of policy signals coming from hearings directed towards the bureaucracy. Stronger signals should result in stronger agency responses; centralization being one way signals are strengthened. Rose also concludes that signal strength is amplified through experts taking up the issue in hearings. (Rose 1989, 239) Experts amplify signals because they provide information to elected officials in hearings, influencing the amount of attention an issue is given. (Rose 1989, 236) Jagger examines the effect expertise has on policy,

information being seen as more legitimate depending on how, and by whom, it is presented. (Jagger 1997, 448) This organizes information hierarchically, with information at the apex coming from "legitimate" sources. Congressional hearings are a legitimate source because they occur in a very formal setting and involve people with high levels of authority. Signals and how information is interpreted as legitimate explains why centralization results in faster responses from the bureaucracy.

The use of informal procedures by central authorities is often arbitrary compared to formal routines through delegated authority. Informal procedures that signal policy change to the bureaucracy do so by telling them to "do things better" or "do things differently", disrupting their current policy. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 517) Central authority establishes these policy demands, but the agency decides how to respond due to the arbitrary nature of the demand. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 529) In contrast, the alternative delegates policy tasks to lower levels of the bureaucracy using existing policy channels, which slows responses, but keeps policy responses stable due to clear demands. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 522) Demands coming from centralization are arbitrary because the very same signals that direct the bureaucracy are also signals of reassurance to the general public. This is because centralization amplifies signals the government sends to society, centralized policy change coming from highly visible levels of government. (Rose 1989, 239) Although this paper has primarily dealt with shifts in attention caused by 9/11 within the federal government, the public's attention also shifts. Now focused on their own safety, the public expects the government to create policy that

will provide a blanket of protection that will keep them safe from all future attacks, no matter how impossible that may be. (Kettle 2003, 262-264 & 269) Therefore reorganization, seen in the DHS, is symbiotically important because it sends signals to the public about where policymakers issue attention is focused. (Kettle 2003, 258)

## Results

The results from statistical tests carried out through this research provide evidence that supports the original hypothesis, but not enough to reject the null hypothesis. Expanded upon in the findings that follow, policymakers significantly shifted the focus of Senate hearings in the post-9/11 period. Specifically, terrorism became a major issue focus for most individuals speaking at hearings. Additionally, in the post-9/11 period terrorism became relevant in hearings where the issue focus would not be relevant to terrorism pre-9/11. Supporting the null hypothesis are tests aimed to expose changes in Mexico-related issues at senate hearings. The hypothesis would expect rhetoric on these issues to decrease, reflecting their decreased importance on the agenda due to the introduction of terrorism. Unfortunately this was not observed in the test results.

The first statistically significant test that will be examined, supports 9/11 as a large enough focusing event to cause policy disruption. Results of the two-sample t-test explaining the change in the use of the term *terrorism* pre- and post-9/11 are seen in Table 1. The test compared the mean use of *terrorism* between the two time periods included in the analysis - hearings held pre-9/11 in the 106th Congress (1999-2000) versus those held post-9/11 in the 108th Congress (2003-2004)

Results in Table 1 reject the null hypothesis, which assumes that variances for the

two groups are the same. Instead, we can conclude that the differences are

statistically significant. Specifically, a t-statistic[14] of -2.7256 with 192 degrees of

freedom[15] yield a corresponding two-tailed p-value[16] of 0.007, which is less than

0.05, allowing us to conclude that the difference of means between the use of the

term *terrorism* in the 106th and 108th Congress is different from the null of 0. The

substantive differences are notable, showing that the use of the term *terrorism* in

Senate hearings increased by two-and-a-half times across the two congresses.

Specifically, *terrorism* was used about 18 times per hearing in the 106th Congress

and about 47 times per hearing in the 108th Congress. From these results we can

deduce several important observations. First, since the data were gathered from

Senate hearings, system engagement of the issue is noted. Furthermore, these

results show that 9/11 refocused the attention of policymakers to terrorism

through issue redefinition, and therefore possible conflict expansion into multiple

subsystems.

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[14] A t-statistic in two-sample t-tests is the difference between two group means,
calculated as the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error.
[15] Degrees of freedom are the number of values in a calculation that can vary or
change.
[16] P-value is the probability the two groups observed are actually the same, a low p-
value showing the two are significantly different.

**Table 1.**

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *terrorism* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interaval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | 18.11628 | 6.174069 | 57.25596 | 5.840576 30.39198 |
| 108th | 108 | 47.35185 | 5.416542 | 75.4437 | 31.07633 63.62737 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 34.39175 | 5.416542 | 75.4437 | 23.70853 45.07497 |
| Diff. | | -29.23557 | 10.72623 | | -50.39196 -8.079185 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                                 t =  -2.7256
Ho: diff = 0                                                        degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0              Ha: diff != 0                    Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0035     Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0070        Pr(T > t) = 0.9965

Since the first test proved to be statistically significant, policy disruption associated with conflict expansion of the issue into a policy regime can be examined. Tests that support creation of a homeland security policy regime because of 9/11 are the t-tests examining the change in individuals use of *terrorism* and ordinal logistic regressions examining ideational uptake of common policy goals in separate subsystems. The full results of each of the t-tests can be seen in Appendix B, in Tables B-1, B-2, B-3, and B-4. Table B-1 focuses on *experts*, who have been identified as important in directing the attention of policymakers and amplifying signals to the bureaucracy. Results form this t-test produce a statistically significant probability, with a two-tailed p-value of 0.0350, showing that the disruption explains the change in issue focus of *experts* testimony. Supporting a change in issue focus by *experts* invited to testify in Senate hearings is use of the term *terrorism* per hearing, averaging 6.7 in the 106th Congress and jumping to about 15 uses of the term in the

108th Congress. Table B-2 shows the change in use of *terrorism* by *elected officials* after the disruption event. The change in the use of the term *terrorism* by *elected officials* is likewise statistically significant across the two time periods with a p-value of 0.0024. Average use of the term in hearings by *elected officials* more than doubles, from about 4 uses in the 106th Congress to 10.9 uses in the 108th Congress. Table B-3 looks at *lower level department officials*, producing a p-value of 0.0923 for their change in the use of *terrorism.* Although our p-value for this test is not below 0.05, the results reject the tests null because the confidence interval only overlaps slightly, from 7.04 to 12.848. *Lower level department officials* use of *terrorism* in each hearing jumps from an average of about 6.5 uses in the 106th Congress to an average of 18.75 uses in the 108th Congress. Finally, the t-test for *department heads* change in the use of *terrorism* under Table B-4 does not produce statistically significant results (p-value of 0.2412), but still shows an increase of average use of the term: from .6744 to 2.4537 in the 106th and 108th Congresses respectively. The higher p-value in Table B-4 most likely results from the sample size of *department heads* speaking at hearings being too small, shown by the comparatively high standard error: at .4036231 for the 106th Congress's mean and 1.311239 for the 108th Congress's mean. Although the p-value for *department heads* and *lower level department officials* are higher than the others, looking at all four within the context of policy regimes shows attention redirected towards a core idea and consensus among individuals at the federal level about a central policy problem. Attention being redirected is shown by low p-values, allowing us to concluded that difference in means for use of the term *terrorism* by individuals in the 106th and 108th

Congresses was the result of something; hypothesized to be the formation of a policy regime due to the policy disruption event 9/11.

The preceding results demonstrate attention in U.S. Senate hearings experiencing a significant shift in agenda focus in the pre- and post-9/11 period. To what extent did this shift cause ideational uptake across subsystems because of the policy regimes refocusing attention to terrorism and homeland security? To put this simply, we would expect terrorism to be an important issue in hearings focused on national security, but to what extent did the issue of terrorism infiltrate hearings that were unrelated to terrorism before the policy disruption event? The results from the ordered logistic regressions meant to support the formation of a policy regime through ideational uptake across subsystems are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows how use of *terrorism* changes depending on the hearings focus. Table 3 shows how use of *terrorism* changes depending on what subcommittee the hearing is before. Both subcommittee and hearing focus are intended to represent different subsystems relevant to the hearing. Explanation of the variables listed in each table can be found in Appendix A.

**Table 2**

| Focus | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P>\|z\| | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. PrePost | 1.833311 | .3063666 | 5.98 | 0.000 | 1.232843 2.433778 |
| Bureaucracy | .2312853 | .3879053 | 0.60 | 0.551 | -.5289951 .9915657 |
| Specific R/C | -.3037766 | .3311874 | -0.92 | 0.359 | -.952892 .3453389 |
| Int. Org. | -.4639047 | .5147701 | -0.90 | 0.367 | -1.472836 .5450263 |
| HR | -.9219983 | .4998035 | -1.84 | 0.065 | -1.901595 .0575986 |
| Nat. Security | .323663 | .6007687 | 0.54 | 0.590 | -.853822 1.501148 |
| Trade/Econ. | -1.768805 | .4455311 | -3.97 | 0.000 | -2.64203  - .8955803 |
| Conflict | .3338296 | .4367936 | 0.76 | 0.445 | -.5222702 1.189929 |
| Foreign Relations | -.142553 | .407452 | -0.35 | 0.726 | -.9411442 .6560381 |
| Justice/Crime | .673796 | .7183981 | 0.94 | 0.348 | -.7342385 2.08183 |
| Terrorism | 4.20097 | .6599194 | 6.37 | 0.000 | 2.907551 5.494388 |
| Aid | -1.934585 | 5885666 | -3.29 | 0.001 | -3.088154  - .7810153 |
| Middle East | .2368527 | .4700889 | 0.50 | 0.614 | -.6845045 1.15821 |

**Table 3**

| Subcommittee | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P>|z| | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. PrePost | 2.081327 | .3167096 | 6.57 | 0.000 | 1.460587 2.702066 |
| No Sub. | .8901833 | 1.409702 | 0.63 | 0.528 | -1.872782 3.653148 |
| East Asian | -1.305508 | 1.429392 | -0.91 | 0.361 | -4.107065 1.496049 |
| West Hem. | .2300759 | 1.518031 | 0.15 | 0.880 | -2.74521 3.205362 |
| Europe | .4445266 | 1.35755 | 0.33 | 0.743 | -2.216222 3.105275 |
| Near East | 1.025796 | 1.360604 | 0.75 | 0.451 | -1.640938 3.69253 |
| Int. Operations | .5911228 | 1.496826 | 0.39 | 0.693 | -2.342602 3.524848 |
| Int. Econ. | -.8567424 | 1.454904 | -0.59 | 0.556 | -3.708302 1.994817 |
| African | -3.818159 | 1.780187 | -2.14 | 0.032 | -7.307262 - .3290561 |

To start, the chi-squared[17] test results in Table 2 are 135.72 with a p-value of 0.0000, meaning the ordered logistic regression as a whole is statistically significant. Unfortunately, statistically significant results do not show that multiple subsystems have the same ideational uptake, because focus of the hearing should not affect use of the term *terrorism* in a policy regime. However, these results can still support ideational uptake if we look into why the model as a whole is significant. Significance is derived from the three variables that have a p-value below 0.05: *Trade/economics, aid*, and *terrorism\*[18]. PrePost*'s p-value of 0.000 is not relevant

[17] Chi-square tests are used to compare observed data with data we would expect to obtain according to a specific hypothesis.
[18] The (\*) is used to differentiate between the variable for the term *terrorism* and the hearing focus variable *terrorism\*.*

because it was used as a categorical variable[19] in the regression to distinguish

between use of *terrorism* before and after the disruption. The first explanatory point

is that most hearings during the 108th Congress coded the focuses *trade/economics*

or *aid* with the focus *terrorism**. This is because after 9/11 the federal government

didn't want our economic relations with other nations, or aid given to other nations,

supporting terrorism. The second, and fairly obvious, point is that hearings coded

under the *terrorism** focus always involved the term *terrorism*, explaining why all

three have such low p-values. Combined, both points give us good reason to

overlook the three low p-values when using this regression to support ideational

uptake. Furthermore, this could be entirely avoided if the data was re-coded with

this fact in mind. The most important descriptive result of this test is the p-value for

the focus *Middle East*. We would expect this variable to have a p-value below 0.05

because the U.S. often equates terrorism and the Middle East. The hypothesis

explains this as a result of ideational uptake, which makes the issue equally relevant

in all subsystems. Therefore, this regression does provide evidence that the

disruption caused equal ideational uptake; seen in the other nine focuses that have

p-values significantly over 0.05. Meaning use of the term *terrorism* was likely not

effected by what focus or subsystem the hearing involved. The second ordered

logistic regression shown in Table 3 provides stronger evidence of equal ideational

uptake across subsystems, as eight out of nine subcommittees have p-values above

0.05. Most important is the p-value for the *Subcommittee on International Operations*

*and Terrorism*, which we would expect to have a p-value below 0.05 if the subsystem

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[19] A categorical variable is one that can take on a fixed number of possible values, for *PrePost* these values are "0" for the 106th Congress and "1" for the 108th Congress.

was not affected by policy regimes. Why the *Subcommittee on African Affairs* had a p-value below 0.05 cannot be explained with my knowledge of the data. However the majority of focuses and subcommittees, and therefore subsystems, do not affect use of the term *terrorism.* These results, in combination with the results for individual's use of *terrorism,* provide evidence for ideational uptake that would be witnessed with the formation of a policy regime.

Since there are significant results pointing to the formation of a policy regime, the test measuring effect centralization has the bureaucracy can be analyzed. Table B-9 shows the results a two-sample t-test tracking the change in *department heads* attendance at hearings involving terrorism due to the disruption and resulting policy regime. Sending the most important person in a department sends signals to Congress that bureaucratic attention has been refocused towards the issues through centralization. The test gives us a p-value of 0.1533, not supporting the hypothesis that centralization caused an increase in attendance by *department heads* at hearings involving terrorism. The high p-value can also be seen in significant overlap of the confidence interval. With confidence intervals of 0.0011 to 0.0919 in the 106th Congress and 0.0439 to 0.1598 in the 108th Congress, overlapping from 0.0438 to 0.0919 and signifying the data sets are similar to each other. *Department heads* high level of importance and responsibility makes their appearances at committee hearings rare. Therefore a data set only including two congressional sessions does not seem to be enough to produce significant results for *department heads.*

Although the previous test did not provide linkage between centralization and how the bureaucracy organizes policy attention, we can still examine the last statistical tests. This leads to the final two-sample t-tests tracking changes in use of the term *Mexico,* and individuals use of the same word, pre- and post-9/11. The results of the t-test tracking overall change in the use of *Mexico* can be seen in Table 4. Results of the t-tests tracking: *experts, elected officials, lower level department officials,* and *department heads* change in use of *Mexico* are under Appendix B in Tables B-5, B-6, B-7, and B-8 respectively. A significant decrease of attention to Mexico in hearings supports the hypothesis that increased attention to the issue of terrorism disrupts the ability of the bureaucracy to process issues in parallel.

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**Table 4**

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *Mexico* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | 13.2 | 6.811874 | 62.80237 | -.3461581 26.74616 |
| 108th | 108 | 17.14815 | 7.965569 | 82.78063 | 1.357336 32.93896 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 15.40933 | 5.361703 | 74.48716 | 4.833922 25.98473 |
| Diff. | | -3.948148 | 10.82484 | | -25.29973 17.40344 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                                   t =  -0.3647
Ho: diff = 0                                                            degrees of freedom =    192

Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.3579       Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7157        Pr(T > t) = 0.6421
_____

Table B-4 gives us a very high p-value of 0.7157, meaning this test supports the null hypothesis. A drop in use of the term *Mexico* was not observed, with average use of the term actually increasing from about 13 uses in the 106th Congress to about 17

uses in the 108th Congress. Tables B-5 through B-8*; also produce statistically

insignificant results. Only experts mean use of *Mexico* drops; from an average of 9.7

to 7.3 uses in the 106th and 108th Congresses respectively. However, with a p-value

of 0.7221 and major overlap in the confidence intervals, the observed drop has little

statistical value. In contrast Table B-7, examining change in *lower level department*

*officials* use of *Mexico,* has the lowest p-value (0.2069) and shows an increase in

average uses per hearing for the term *Mexico;* from about 1.7 uses in the 106th

Congress to about 7 uses in the 108th Congress. Taken together, these results mean

increased attention to the issue of terrorism in hearings because of policy

centralization did not take away the bureaucracies ability to process issues in

parallel. Therefore, results from the data gathered supports the null hypothesis. A

possible explanation for this could be found in the last test described in Table B-7.

Since *lower level department officials* increased use of *Mexico* within the homeland

security policy regime, issues centered on Mexico may have still received attention

due to how the issues fit into the new policy regime. This would fall in line with the

examples cited at the end of the "Literature Review" that state because of 9/11 the

U.S. now viewed traditional relation issues with Mexico through a homeland

security lens. Table B-10 supports this notion, the table describing results of a two-

sample t-test showing change in hearings where both terms were used pre-and

post-9/11. The test gives us a p-value of 0.0808. Although the test is not statistically

significant due to its p-value, it does provide some evidence that after 9/11 hearings

in which both terms were used increased. This lends some evidence to the notion

Mexico centered issues received the same amount of attention but only because they

were redefined to mirror the new direction of national policy. However, this cannot overturn the null hypothesis and its only use is to provide descriptive depth for why attention was not taken away from issues involving Mexico.

## Conclusion

This paper concludes that the null hypothesis was proven; 9/11 did not cause a disruption in relations between the U.S. and Mexico. The results do support that 9/11 was a policy disruption event which was followed by the formation of a policy regime. However, the results do not support that a policy regime caused centralized control of the bureaucracy; that the policy regime caused Mexico to lose it place on the national agenda; or that centralization caused the bureaucracy to lose its ability to process policy issues in parallel. Although the results of this thesis support the null hypothesis, they do point towards the hypothesis being correct if a better data set was gathered. Comparing results from tests looking at how use of *terrorism* changed after 9/11, to results from the articles on policy regimes, policy disruption, how bureaucratic attention is organized, policy change after a crisis, and bureaucracy coordination exposes similarities. The data failed to hold up when use of the term *Mexico* and *department heads* attendance at hearings were tested. Possible remedies for this are expanding the words counted; coding for terms such as border security and immigration in addition to *Mexico* and looking for a positive, instead of negative, correlation. Additionally, expanding the data sets to include more congressional committees and years should also improve results, especially with respect to more data points for *department heads.* Therefore, explanations for

why progress halted on issues important to both nations, such as immigration and

border control, is beyond the grasp of this paper.

**Appendix A**
Description of Variables
(In the thesis and appendix, *italics* identify variables*.*)

*PrePost*-this variable was coded binomially, "0" for hearings in the 106th Congress before 9/11, and "1" for hearings in the 108th Congress after9/11.

Variables for Individual Use of Each Term

*Elected Official*-Use of either term was coded under this if spoken by policymakers (Senator or Member of the House). Also included were use of either term in written statements by elected officials staff.

*Department Head*-Anyone from the bureaucracy who is identified in the hearings "Contents" section as the head of a department or independent agency. Any statement using either term and coming from the department/agency as a whole was coded under this variable. Also included were military commanders at the head of a military branch or in charge of a theater/region. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, was also coded under *department head* for the hearing he attended. The full list of departments and agencies attending hearings can be seen in the next section *lower level department officials*.

*Lower Level Department Official*-Anyone from the bureaucracy who is identified in the hearings "Contents" section as an official lower in rank than the agency or department head. Additionally, anyone in the military who was not coded under the *department head* variable was coded under this variable. Departments included were the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, and Department of Homeland Security. Independent agencies included were the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Small Business Administration, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Peace Corps, U.S. Institute for Peace, and Broadcasting Board of Governors.

*Experts*-The broadest variable, use of either term was coded under *experts* if they did not fall under the previous three categories and provided information or descriptive depth to the hearings. Ambassadors and representatives from companies and non-governmental organizations were coded under this variable. Ambassadors were considered experts because more often than not their hearing testimony provided expertise about a country or region being discussed in the hearing. Representatives from companies and non-governmental organizations were considered experts because their testimony usually provided information and descriptive depth about the topic being discussed.

Variables for Hearing Focus
(Listed in the same order as Table 2)

*Bureaucracy*-This variable referred to any hearings that focused on bureaucratic organizations. Examples of this are hearings that reviewed department budgets, department effectiveness, or assessing changes in a department's structure and leadership.

*Specific Country/Region*-Variable that describes a country or region of the world the hearing focused on. Countries included under this variable in the 106th and 108th Foreign Relations Committee Hearings are: North and South Korea, Russia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Mexico, India, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Columbia, Libya, Kosovo, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Burma, Haiti, Vietnam, Japan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yugoslavia. Regions included under this variable mentioned in the 106th and 108th Congressional Hearings are: East Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Balkans, and Africa.

*International Organization*-Describes hearings focused on international organizations. Since the hearings coded were in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, International Organizations were mostly discussed in the context of effects on U.S. foreign relations/policy. International organizations included in this variable are: European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and United Nations.

*Human Rights*-Hearings were determined to have a human rights focus if the hearings discussed democracy, democratic rights, or violations to universal human rights considered a norm in the U.S. Included in this variable were hearings discussing proper treatment of children, whether it be cases of child abduction or adopting a child from poor conditions to improve quality of life. Also included was the treatment of Islam, or religious freedom, in U.S. foreign policy.

*National Security*-Any hearing examining issues that were considered by individuals at the hearing to be threats to the security of the U.S. or its citizens. This variable includes assessing the safety of Peace Corps officers overseas, embassy security, and revolutions/unstable governments that could threaten U.S. interests. Issues of terrorism were coded under *terrorism\** and not *national security.*

*Trade/Economics*-Hearings that reviewed issues involving trade between nations or the economy at some capacity. In terms of trade between nations, NAFTA and hearings that reviewed tax treaties or trade conflict were prominent. Hearings focused on agriculture were determined to be relevant to the economy. Energy issues were also considered economic issues along with climate change and environmental protection.

*Conflict*-Hearings coded under this variable involved issues of war and peace. Expanding this, conflict could mean rebellions in a country leading to violence, peace negations aimed to end violence, countries threatening conflict, nuclear weapons, and nonproliferation.

*Foreign Relations*-Defined as any hearings where issue focus was U.S. foreign policy towards other nations or foreign policy directed towards the U.S. Coded under this variable were also hearings focused on U.S. diplomacy, sanctions against nations, and treaties. A hearing focused on treaties was not included under this variable if the treaty applied to the *conflict* or *trade/economics* variable

*Justice/Crime*-Issues that examine criminal activity and justice or rule of law. Included in this variable are hearings focused on international drug cartels, corrupt governments and organizations, and law enforcement agencies. A hearing on the International Criminal Court in the 106th Congress, although technically fitting under the definition for *international organizations*, was included under this variable as it was thought to be more relevant to *justice/crime.*

*Terrorism\**-This variable was defined as any hearing focused on the threat of terrorism; terrorism defined by the individuals at the hearing and not myself to avoid debates of terrorist vs. freedom fighter. A hearing that fit this variable and *national security* was coded as *terrorism\*.* Hearings focused on the Taliban were also coded as *terrorism\** focused. The asterisk (\*) is used to note the difference between the variable *terrorism\** and the term *terrorism.*

*Aid*-Any instance where the hearing focused on assisting other countries in their development or providing emergency aid. Included in this variable were hearings on diseases, disaster relief, poverty, and hunger. Also included were hearings on developing Afghanistan during U.S. occupation.

*Middle East*-This variable was used to specify hearings focused on the region, and was not coded under *Specific Country/Region* if coded as *Middle East* or a country within it. Countries included in this variable are: Iraq, Israel, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan is not part of the region defined by geographers as the Middle East, it was included in this variable because policy involving the country is often developed within a Middle Eastern framework.

**Appendix B**
Statistical Test Results

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**Table B-1-**two-sample t-test exploring change in *experts* use of the term *terrorism* after 9/11.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *terrorism* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | 6.674419 | 2.211365 | 20.50735 | 2.277633 11.0712 |
| 108th | 108 | 15.2037 | 3.121619 | 32.44082 | 9.015458 21.39195 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 11.42268 | 2.01377 | 28.04856 | 7.450859 15.3945 |
| Diff. | | -8.529285 | 4.017347 | | -16.45309 -.6054836 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                          t = -2.1231
Ho: diff = 0                                          degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0                   Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0175        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0350        Pr(T > t) = 0.9825

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**Table B-2**- two-sample t-test exploring change in *elected officials* use of the term *terrorism* after 9/11.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *terrorism* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | 4.081395 | 1.620425 | 15.0272 | .8595564 7.303234 |
| 108th | 108 | 10.94444 | 1.520304 | 15.79946 | 7.930619 13.95827 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 7.902062 | 1.134122 | 15.79649 | 5.665197 10.13893 |
| Diff. | | -6.863049 | 2.234678 | | -11.27072 -2.455379 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                          t = -3.0712
Ho: diff = 0                                          degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0                   Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0012        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0024        Pr(T > t) = 0.9988

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**Table B-3**- two-sample t-test exploring change in *lower level department officials* use of the term *terrorism* after 9/11.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *terrorism* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | 6.581395 | 3.151812 | 29.2287 | .3147494 12.84804 |
| 108th | 108 | 18.75 | 5.905072 | 61.36731 | 7.043884 30.45612 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 13.35567 | 3.590395 | 50.00842 | 6.27422 20.43712 |
| Diff. | | -12.1686 | 7.192797 | | -26.35565 2.018444 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                                        t =  -1.6918
Ho: diff = 0                                                                  degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0                    Ha: diff != 0                    Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0462        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0923        Pr(T > t) = 0.9538

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**Table B-4**- two-sample t-test exploring change in *department heads* use of the term *terrorism* after 9/11.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *terrorism* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | .6744186 | .4036231 | 3.743046 | -.1280922 1.476929 |
| 108th | 108 | 2.453704 | 1.311239 | 13.62679 | -.1456738 5.053081 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 1.664948 | .7526678 | 10.48345 | .180438 3.149459 |
| Diff. | | -1.779285 | 1.513613 | | -4.764729 1.206159 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                                        t =  -1.1755
Ho: diff = 0                                                                  degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0                    Ha: diff != 0                    Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.1206        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2412        Pr(T > t) = 0.8794

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**Table B-5**- two-sample t-test exploring change in *experts* use of the term *Mexico* after 9/11.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *Mexico* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | 9.697674 | 6.087373 | 56.45197 | -2.405653 21.801 |
| 108th | 108 | 7.314815 | 3.487793 | 36.24621 | .4006714 14.22896 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 8.371134 | 3.316082 | 46.18768 | 1.83072 14.91155 |
| Diff. | | 2.38286 | 6.690376 | | -10.81322 15.57893 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                            t =  0.3562
Ho: diff = 0                                                          degrees of freedom =   192

Ha: diff < 0              Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.6389      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7221      Pr(T > t) = 0.3611

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**Table B-6**- two-sample t-test exploring change in *elected officials* use of the term *Mexico* after 9/11.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *Mexico* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | 1.337209 | .4573792 | 4.24156 | .4278169 2.246602 |
| 108th | 108 | 2.351852 | 1.240702 | 12.89375 | -.1076951 4.811399 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 1.902062 | .7192059 | 10.01738 | .4835494 3.320574 |
| Diff. | | -1.014643 | 1.449668 | | -3.873963 1.844678 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                            t =  -0.6999
Ho: diff = 0                                                          degrees of freedom =   192

Ha: diff < 0              Ha: diff != 0              Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.2424      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4848      Pr(T > t) = 0.7576

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**Table B-7**- two-sample t-test exploring change in *lower level department officials* use of the term *Mexico* after 9/11.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *Mexico* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | 1.744186 | .9626664 | 8.927401 | -.1698528 3.658225 |
| 108th | 108 | 7.111111 | 3.700947 | 38.46137 | -.2255855 14.44781 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | 4.731959 | 2.108357 | 29.36602 | .573579 8.890338 |
| Diff. | | -5.366925 | 4.237465 | | -13.72489 2.991037 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                         t = -1.2665
Ho: diff = 0                                                   degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0                Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.1034        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2069        Pr(T > t) = 0.8966

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**Table B-8**- two-sample t-test exploring change in *department heads* use of the term *Mexico* after 9/11.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean use of the term *Mexico* | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | .2674419 | .2559414 | 2.373503 | -.2414382 .7763219 |
| 108th | 108 | .3703704 | .2061669 | 2.142549 | -.0383314 .7790721 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | .3247423 | .1610006 | 2.242479 | .0071957 .6422888 |
| Diff. | | -.1029285 | .3248498 | | -.7436612 .5378041 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                         t = -0.3168
Ho: diff = 0                                                   degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0                Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.3759        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7517        Pr(T > t) = 0.6241

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**Table B-9**- two-sample t-test comparing changes in hearing attendance by *department heads* at hearings involving terrorism.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean attendance | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | .0465116 | .0228417 | .2118255 | .0010961 .0919271 |
| 108th | 108 | .1018519 | .0292393 | .3038634 | .0438884 .1598153 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | .0773196 | .0192261 | .2677889 | .0393993 .1152399 |
| Diff. | | -.0553402 | .0385965 | | -.1314678 .0207873 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                                 t = -1.4338
Ho: diff = 0                                                         degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                     Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0766        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1533        Pr(T > t) =0.9234

**Table B-10**- two-sample t-test comparing change in hearings where both *terrorism* and *Mexico* are used.

| Congress | Number of Senate Hearings | Mean hearings with both terms | Std. Err. | Std. Dev. | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106th | 86 | .244186 | .046597 | .4321233 | .1515386 .3368335 |
| 108th | 108 | .3611111 | .0464345 | .482562 | .26906 .4531622 |
| Combined (106th&108th) | 194 | .3092784 | .0332696 | .463392 | .2436597 .374897 |
| Diff. | | -.1169251 | .0666131 | | -.2483124 .0144623 |

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                                 t = -1.7553
Ho: diff = 0                                                         degrees of freedom =     192

Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                     Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0404        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0808        Pr(T > t) = 0.9596

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