

A COLONIAL REGIME EMBATTLED? THE ELIZABETHAN  
PRIVY COUNCIL IN IRELAND, c. 1580 - c. 1604

by

SHEENA MARSHALLA BARNES

B.A., University of Colorado, 2012

A dissertation submitted to the  
Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment  
of the requirement for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Department of History  
2022

Committee Members:

Paul E. J. Hammer

Virginia Anderson

Katherine Eggert

Matthew Gerber

Rory Rapple

## ABSTRACT

Barnes, Sheena Marshalla (Ph.D., History)

A Colonial Regime Embattled? The Elizabethan Privy Council in Ireland, c. 1580 - c. 1604

Thesis directed by Professor Paul E. J. Hammer

The latter half of Elizabeth's reign saw a new group of Irish councilors who came to dominate Irish politics and who strove to achieve financial and political success. However, the story of these Irish councilors and how they worked to achieve their goals and perform the duties of their office involves more than the individuals who comprised the council. The interplay between the queen and privy council in England and the Irish council had a significant impact on how the Irish council functioned as an institution. But rather than a narrative of Irish councilors as mere puppets of great men at the English court, this study argues that the Irish council between 1580 and 1604 had more agency and authority than previously thought.

The power and influence of the Irish council were nowhere more visible than in the years leading up to the Nine Years' War. Though they struggled initially, as they tried to balance the needs of the Irish government with their own personal interests, they nonetheless found ways to adapt to the conditions of Ireland. As the Irish councilors worked to fulfill their duties, they faced many challenges in managing English government in Ireland, including a fiscally-poor administration and viceroys who threatened to undermine the councilors' authority both in England and Ireland. When convenient, the councilors formed alliances to ensure their political survival. Over time, the Irish councilors became increasingly confident of their authority, at times disregarding the directives of the Westminster government in England. The outbreak of the Nine Years' War saw the continuation of their agency in their managing of the war.

The narrative of the Irish council during these years and their effect on the development of the Nine Years' War highlight the importance of studying colonial administrators in the environments they sought to exercise control over. The story of England's relationship with Ireland was (and continues to be) complicated. However, by examining institutions like the Irish council, we can unravel some of the tensions that underlay the Elizabethan colonial regime in Ireland.

This dissertation is dedicated to my husband and our two children, Aiden and Sophie.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has become customary for scholars to compare the writing of a dissertation to an excessively long gestation process. In fact, I had to determine which "child" deserved more attention; the dissertation lost *nearly* every time until the final moments of its completion. For almost ten years, I had to juggle being a single mother of two children, a teaching assistant, a bookstore employee, and a graduate student. With such commitments, I am quite proud that it *only* took ten years. I am also beyond grateful to all those who supported me and made it possible for me to prioritize my actual children.

First, I want to thank the History Department at the University of Colorado, Boulder. From the department chairs to the graduate directors to the professors and administrators, I had immense support: John Willis, Paul Sutter, Marcia Yonemoto, Elizabeth Fenn, and especially Susan Kent—thank you for all your hard work, advice, and encouragement over the years. A special thank you to Scott Miller, who though now retired, listened patiently and was always a pillar of support to not only me, but also other graduate students within the department.

I am grateful to the professors (many of whom were on my dissertation committee), who fed my curiosity and passion for history. I was fortunate enough to enter the orbit of Mark Pittenger and Martha Hanna, both of whom never failed to answer the many questions that I and others threw at them. Katherine Eggert forced me to think more critically about literature and Shakespeare, but also to enjoy reading. Marcia Yonemoto encouraged me to think more about the connections between America, Europe, and Asia, as well as the utility of questioning ideas about women, work, and family. Marcia also imparted some wisdom that has stuck with me throughout the years: there is still so much of history left to be written. Céline Dauverd inspired my love of cultural history and was always a joy to be around. I learned substantially about the

practice of history from Virginia and Fred Anderson, both of whom were incredibly kind even in their incisive critiques of my work. Fred, who taught me not to be intimidated by others and just do the work, and Virginia, whose book, *Creatures of Empire*, changed my perspective of Atlantic and early colonial history and who understood well the challenges within and outside the profession. For over twelve years, Matthew Gerber nurtured me from my academic career as an undergraduate to graduate student. Every hours-long conversation was enlightening and intellectually stimulating. In these conversations, I learned about history, but also life. I gained confidence about my work and my ideas. Moreover, Gerber's willingness to devote his time and attention to me (as a scholar and a human) was a source of great comfort when I needed it most.

I learned how to teach from two exceptional instructors, Vilja Hulden and David Paradis. Vilja and David's ability to engage students, even in a digital format, was incredible. Learning about the Vietnam War and immigration policies in the U.S. were two highlights in my career, and both courses were taught by Vilja. I only wished that I had met Vilja sooner. Conversely, I have known David since I was an undergraduate, and it was his classes that pushed me into the direction of a history major, and eventually, a history graduate student. Everything I learned about teaching, I learned first from David.

Throughout these years, I have been encouraged to pursue my passion (no matter how long it takes) by my advisor, Paul Hammer. I would enter his office terrified and unsure of myself, but left feeling happy and supported. His kindness and patience were felt from my honors thesis to my dissertation, both of which he directed. He devoted countless hours to discussing my ideas and reviewing my work. I am more grateful than I ever express here.

I have also met some other great humans along the way. I met Micaela Cruce by chance in the graduate student lounge, but our continued friendship is deliberate. Abby Lagemann came

into my life only later in my graduate student career, despite having the same advisor. Still, in a short time, I discovered that Abby is an amazing, strong, and funny woman. She is who I aspire to be. Outside of CU, I also have my wonderful group of friends and our book club: Kate Mattes, Cara DeStefano, Jen England, Cayla Eagon, and Janet Sublich. They are all kind and caring humans with whom I look forward to a future of books, friendship, and love.

A wonderful thing happened on my journey: I met someone whose presence I now cannot live without. To my husband, Shane, I love you as much (if not more) than you know. Thank you for bringing me into your world.

Lastly, Aiden and Sophie, I love you to infinity and beyond.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   |         |
|---|---------|
| INTRODUCTION .....  | 1       |
| CHAPTER ONE: Elizabeth's Irish Privy Council Post-1578 .....                        | 38      |
| <br><b>PART ONE: Before the Nine Years' War, c. 1580- 1593</b>                      |         |
| CHAPTER TWO: Finances and Corruption in Elizabethan Ireland .....                   | 84      |
| CHAPTER THREE: Strategies of Reform in the Irish Reformation .....                  | 133     |
| CHAPTER FOUR: Factional Rivalries and Politics in the Irish Council .....           | 185     |
| <br><b>PART TWO: The Nine Years' War, c. 1593-1603</b>                              |         |
| CHAPTER FIVE: War, Politics, and Policy During the Nine Years' War, 1593-1595 ..... | 219     |
| CHAPTER SIX: The Politics of Information and the Costs of War, 1595-1597 .....      | 268     |
| CHAPTER SEVEN: An End to Negotiations, 1597-1603 .....                              | 340     |
| <br>CONCLUSION .....  | <br>417 |
| <br>APPENDIX: Lists of Irish Privy Councilors .....                                 | <br>423 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .....  | 429     |



## LIST OF TABLES

### Table

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 2.1 Irish Military Expenditure, c. 1580-1593 ..... | 90  |
| 5.1 Irish Privy Council, c. 1593 .....             | 228 |
| 6.1 Irish Military Expenditure, c. 1593-1603 ..... | 305 |
| 7.1 Irish Privy Council, c. 1599 .....             | 383 |

## LIST OF IMAGES

### Image

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. Sir Henry Sidney's progress through Ireland from John Derrick, <i>Image of Irelande</i> ..... | 40  |
| 2. Letter from Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 1589 .....              | 42  |
| 3. Letter from the Privy Council to the Mayor of Chester, 1593 .....                             | 44  |
| 4. Portrait of Adam Loftus .....   | 47  |
| 5. Portrait of Sir Richard Bingham.....  | 51  |
| 6. Portrait of Sir George Carew .....  | 63  |
| 7. Portrait of Sir John Perrot, 1584 .....   | 164 |
| 8. Portrait of Thomas Lee, 1594 .....  | 254 |
| 9. Engraving of Sir William Russell .....  | 256 |
| 10. Cipher devised by Wallop, 1579 .....   | 285 |
| 11. A Cipher or alphabet for the queen from the Lord Justice of Ireland, 1579 .....              | 286 |
| 12. Cipher for Ireland to be retained by Lord Treasurer, 12 July 1595 .....                      | 288 |
| 13. John Derrick, <i>Image of Irelande</i> , 1581 .....  | 341 |
| 14. Portrait of Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, c. 1596 .....                                    | 375 |
| 15. Charles Blount, Baron Mountjoy, c. 1600-1625 .....   | 399 |
| 16. The taking of the earl of Ormond, 1600 .....   | 402 |

## LIST OF MAPS

### Map

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. Lordship of Ireland .....   | 10  |
| 2. Ireland, c. 1520s .....   | 115 |
| 3. John Goghe's <i>Map of Ireland</i> , c. 1567 .....                        | 116 |
| 4. Richard Bartlett's <i>A Generall Description of Ulster</i> , 1602-3 ..... | 117 |
| 5. Siege of Enniskillen, 1594 .....  | 243 |
| 6. English defeat at the Battle of the Yellow Ford, 1598 .....               | 369 |
| 7. Ireland during the Nine Years' War .....                                  | 387 |
| 8. The Siege and Battle of Kinsale, 1601 .....                               | 412 |

## LIST OF APPENDICES

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1A. List of Irish Privy Councilors, c. 1580 ..... | 423 |
| 1B. List of Irish Privy Councilors, c. 1584 ..... | 424 |
| 1C. List of Irish Privy Councilors, c. 1588 ..... | 424 |
| 1D. List of Irish Privy Councilors, c. 1594 ..... | 425 |
| 1E. List of Irish Privy Councilors, c. 1597 ..... | 425 |
| 1F. List of Irish Privy Councilors, c. 1599 ..... | 426 |
| 1G. List of Irish Privy Councilors, c. 1600 ..... | 427 |
| 1H. List of Irish Privy Councilors, c. 1603 ..... | 428 |

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| <i>APC</i>                      | <i>Acts of the Privy Council</i>                 |
| <i>Cal. Carew</i>               | <i>Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts</i>         |
| <i>Cal. Pat. Rolls</i>          | <i>Calendar of Patent Rolls</i>                  |
| CELT                            | Corpus of Electronic Texts                       |
| <i>CSPDom</i>                   | <i>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series</i> |
| <i>CSPFor</i>                   | <i>Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series</i>  |
| <i>CSP Ire</i>                  | <i>Calendar of State Papers, Ireland</i>         |
| <i>CSP Ire, revised edition</i> | <i>Calendar of State Papers, Ireland, Tudors</i> |
| <i>CSP Sco</i>                  | <i>Calendar of State Papers, Scotland</i>        |
| <i>CSP Sp</i>                   | <i>Calendar of State Papers, Spain</i>           |
| CP                              | Cecil Papers                                     |
| <i>DIB</i>                      | <i>Dictionary of Irish Biography</i>             |
| EEBO                            | <i>Early English Books Online</i>                |
| <i>EHR</i>                      | <i>English Historical Review</i>                 |
| <i>HoP</i>                      | History of Parliament                            |
| <i>IHS</i>                      | <i>Irish Historical Studies</i>                  |
| <i>ODNB</i>                     | <i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i>   |
| <i>OED</i>                      | <i>Oxford English Dictionary</i>                 |
| SP                              | State Papers                                     |

## **A NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION AND DATES**

All dates are rendered in the Old Style, with the new year beginning on January 1.

This dissertation uses a semi-diplomatic transcription for clarity. Superscript (or raised) letters have been lowered and contractions expanded with the author's edits in brackets. The 'thorn' (þ or y) has been replaced as "th." However, spelling, brevigraphs ("&"), punctuation marks, and letters i/j and u/v have been retained in their original form.

## INTRODUCTION

*“There is nothing in this world more worthie then to hold soueraintie ouer people and nations.”*<sup>1</sup>  
- Geoffrey Fenton, 1574

What began in 1593 as a small localized Irish rebellion against English occupation and government escalated into a full-scale war that would not end until 1603 and nearly destroyed England's hold over Ireland. The war was brought about by years of England's colonization of Ireland, of asserting control over its land, peoples, and their culture. As the Tudor state expanded further into Ireland, in both geographical and constitutional terms, it also penetrated Irish spaces, traditions, and practices, which unsurprisingly created friction between the local population and the occupying force. This tension erupted on a few occasions in local "rebellions," but none so large-scale as the Nine Years' War. The Irish lords in Ulster, led primarily by Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone, formed political and religious alliances that stretched across the island and even into Scotland and Spain. For several years, Irish lords strategized and fought successfully against an English monarchy that struggled to cope with the war in Ireland, the wider Anglo-Spanish War, religious tensions, and the unmentionable issue of succession. With such pressures, the queen and privy council hoped for the war's conclusion each year but were left frustrated by reports of English military losses. They did not expect to lose to an insurgent army which they saw as lacking in their military capacity. Consequently, those reports were "of very great waight and difficulty, and mucche contrary to her expectacion to see that lande so chargeable beyond all former tymes and the state thereof so dangerous."<sup>2</sup> The privy councilors were further surprised by the lack of progress as the war in Ireland continued:

---

<sup>1</sup> Geoffrey Fenton, *A forme of Christian pollicie* (London: 1574), dedication [unnumbered], *Early English Books Online* (EEBO): <http://eebo.chadwyck.com>.

<sup>2</sup> *APC*, vol. 25, p. 267.

wee must confesse that it is not a lytle greuou vs to heare so pittypfull Reportes, as are daylie brought, especially when wee consyder, her Ma[jes]t[es] excessiue charg of an Army there mayntayned, thought sufficient in respect of their nombers not only to defend, but in most mens Iudgm[en]t[es] thought able to gayne vppon the Rebells, as long as they make the warre w[i]thout any strangers force.<sup>3</sup>

And when in 1599, the queen and privy council sent Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, with a large force of 16,000 foot and 1,300 horse, only for Essex to achieve little and flee Ireland, the queen could barely contain her outrage.<sup>4</sup> How could such a strong military commander with such a large force not bring Tyrone and the other Irish lords to their knees? England was not a major military power in the sixteenth century.<sup>5</sup> Still, it had vastly greater resources at its command than the Ulster lords and, ultimately, spent over £2 million on the war.<sup>6</sup> Never before had England devoted so many resources to its Irish kingdom. How, then, are we to explain England's near failure in Ireland in the last decade of Elizabeth's reign? Why did they nearly lose territorial and constitutional sovereignty in an area they had held for centuries?

Given that the English nearly lost the war, historians have highlighted several factors to account for England's poor performance. One factor was the degree to which England was militarily superior. Cyril Falls argued that, in the collision of two civilizations, England was superior, for English royal army in Ireland had better leadership, weapons, and discipline.<sup>7</sup> These

---

<sup>3</sup> The Privy Council to the Lords Justices Loftus and Gardener and the Council, 13 July 1598, SP 63/204/pt. 2, 100, f. 82; *CSP Ire*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 201.

<sup>4</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 339-341.

<sup>5</sup> John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (1988; repr., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 7-14.

<sup>6</sup> The figures vary in how much the English monarchy spent on the war. I use John McGurk's estimate which comes from primary sources [McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The Burdens of the 1590s Crisis* (New York; Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2009), 15, 264].

<sup>7</sup> Cyril Falls, *Elizabeth's Irish Wars* (1950; repr., New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970), 343. G. A. Hayes-McCoy also reached this conclusion. See Hayes-McCoy, "Gaelic Society in Ireland in the Late Sixteenth Century," *Historical Studies IV: Papers Read Before the Fifth Irish Conference of Historians*, eds. Hayes-McCoy, et. al (London: Bowes & Bowes; Chatham, England: W. & J. Mackay, 1963), 45-61; Eoin Ó'Neill, "Towards a New Interpretation of the Nine Years' War," *The Irish Sword* 26 (2009): 241-262.



characteristics would feature prominently in the larger debate about a "military revolution" in early modern Europe. The debate matters in the context of Elizabethan England because it explains England's arrogance towards the Irish; the belief that they would ultimately emerge victorious because the Irish could not match their military capability, both in resources and experience. And yet, Irish historians would show that the Irish, having perceived that their army was lacking in comparison to England, instituted changes which prolonged the war and rendered them more militarily capable than previously thought.

The debate began in 1955 with Michael Roberts, who famously argued that Europe underwent a "military revolution" between 1550 and 1660.<sup>8</sup> This revolution was an outgrowth of the so-called "gunpowder revolution," as European armies devised new battlefield tactics to take better advantage of gunpowder weapons.<sup>9</sup> Changes in tactics and more ambitious strategies meant an increase in the size of armies and a greater reliance on firearms. Soldiers now had to be drilled to use their weapons and to maneuver according to the new tactics, and the continual need for training led to the rise of permanent armies.<sup>10</sup> While maintaining these large, permanent

---

<sup>8</sup> Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (1955; 1967; rev. and repr., Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 13-35.

<sup>9</sup> The military revolution thesis was also born out of the Weberian modernization theory, whereby the military was a vital component in ushering the "modern" bureaucratic state.

<sup>10</sup> For a general overview of the military revolution debate, see Paul E. J. Hammer, "Introduction," in *Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1450-1660* (New York; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016), xi-xxxv. For critiques on Roberts's thesis, see Clifford Rogers, "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War," *The Journal of Military History* 57 (April 1993): 241-277, esp. 276-277. Rogers suggested that the changes witnessed by Roberts were evident in the Hundred Years' War, and, as such, there was no single military revolution. Rather, Europe experienced a series of revolutions, and the process was one of *evolution* marked by periods of rapid innovation as well as stasis. See also, Geoffrey Parker, "'The Military Revolution, 1560-1600'—A Myth?" in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (1976; rev. and repr., Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 37-54. Parker, like many others, took issue with Roberts's chronology. He argued that the tactical innovations in the military revolution thesis were evident earlier and, therefore, were not new (43). His examples were the Spanish army and *trace italienne* fortifications in the early part of the sixteenth century, the latter he argued was the real causal factor that sparked innovations in the military. Parker would later suggest that the military revolution enabled the rise of empires in the West and extended the chronology of the revolution further to the eighteenth century. However, scholarship on the conquest of the Americas, in particular, stresses how animals, disease, and other factors outside of technology and warfare played a role in European colonialism. See Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural*

armies was extremely costly and placed a greater burden on subjects, the demands of sustaining and paying for these armies contributed to the growth of "the state" in early modern Europe.

Until recently, historians have been dismissive of modernization in Tudor England.<sup>11</sup> However, more recent work has taken a more positive view of England's military efforts in this period.<sup>12</sup> Tudor Ireland was also similarly dismissed as a kind of backwater in comparison to England and the rest of Europe. But there were major changes in the fighting of wars on both sides in this era, especially in the latter half of the sixteenth century.

England was more militarily capable than has been previously recognized, particularly in its ability to put limited resources to good use. Although England lacked a standing army domestically, it nonetheless maintained a large number of troops in both the Low Countries and Ireland for more than a decade. There were also several key changes like the establishment of trained bands for the defense of the realm, the increasing reliance on firearms and training, and the scale of warfare which seemed to rise with England's military commitments in Ireland and on the continent. Richard Stewart also draws attention to England's "Irish road" (which paralleled the famed "Spanish road"), a supply route system that enabled the movement of arms and other supplies to armies in Ireland.<sup>13</sup> After the English suffered a major military defeat in 1598, the

---

*Consequences of 1492* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972); Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and John Robert McNeill, *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>11</sup> See Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 27-28.

<sup>12</sup> See Paul E. J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); John S. Nolan, "The Militarization of the Elizabethan State," *Journal of Military History* 58 (1994): 396-412; David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995); Mark Charles Fissel, *English Warfare, 1511-1642* (London: Routledge, 2001); Gervase Phillips, "The Army of Henry VIII: A Reassessment," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 75 (1997): 8-22.

<sup>13</sup> Richard W. Stewart, "The 'Irish Road': Military Supply and Arms for Elizabeth's Army During the O'Neill Rebellion in Ireland, 1598-1601," in *War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650*, ed. Mark Charles Fissel (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1991), 16-37.

loss prompted the crown to commit even more resources to Ireland.<sup>14</sup> The army supply system substantially improved with this new commitment. Such improvements, coupled with great leadership, made England's victory possible. England's ability to maintain large troops over a prolonged period, its reliance on firearms, its access to military resources and the army supply system, as well as the navy, which enabled the transport of those resources to Ireland—all contributed to the military strength of the Elizabethan monarchy.

Having witnessed firsthand England's military capabilities through his own earlier service in the crown army, Tyrone introduced changes in Irish warfare to match England. These changes, Irish historians have argued, amounted to a "military revolution." G. A. Hayes-McCoy, for example, noted some structural changes in the Irish military during the Nine Years' War under Tyrone, among which was the emergence of a "native militia" who were trained and used modern weaponry like muskets and calivers.<sup>15</sup> This native militia enabled a more reliable and permanent army, while their training and weapon skills put the Irish army closer to the English standard. Cyril Falls indicated that these changes were a noticeable difference from earlier in the sixteenth century, when the Irish lacked experience in continental-style warfare and had little, if any, access to gunpowder weapons.<sup>16</sup> The war in the Netherlands and employment in the English army gave them valuable military experience. He also suggested that Armada survivors likely trained the Irish to use firearms.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Stewart, "The 'Irish Road'," 28.

<sup>15</sup> G. A. Hayes-McCoy, "The Army in Ulster, 1593-1601," *The Irish Sword* 1 (1953): 109-117. See also, Hayes-McCoy, "Strategy and Tactics in Irish Warfare, 1593-1601," *IHS* 2 (1941): 255-279.

<sup>16</sup> Cyril Falls, "The Growth of Irish Military Strength in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century," *The Irish Sword* (1956): 104-105.

<sup>17</sup> Falls, "The Growth of Irish Military Strength," 105; Hayes-McCoy, "The Army in Ulster, 1593-1601," 112.

James O'Neill has added to this debate about a "military revolution" in Ireland in his book, *The Nine Years' War*, the first complete modern account of the war in Ireland.<sup>18</sup> O'Neill draws heavily on Roberts's thesis of a military revolution and asserts that modern assumptions about Irish military capabilities in the 1590s have ignored, for example, the development of pike and shot units in the Irish army.<sup>19</sup> He argues that, despite England's access to more improved weaponry and soldiers, the English were outmatched militarily by Irish lords, who adapted to the changing needs of war, like other European states. The Irish only lost because many of their leaders prioritized regional and self-interests.<sup>20</sup> However, O'Neill's narrative is entirely military-focused, which raises questions about the political and religious context of the war.

O'Neill's view of a military revolution in Ireland led primarily by Tyrone built upon the earlier work of Hayes-McCoy, Falls, and Hiram Morgan.<sup>21</sup> In *Tyrone's Rebellion*, Morgan argues that Tyrone was "one of the most adept politicians in Irish history" because he successfully deceived the English monarchy; galvanized his allies to challenge English sovereignty; and utilized Scottish, Spanish, and wider Catholic support for the war.<sup>22</sup> These authors collectively provided one significant explanation to the question posed above: England struggled to win the war for so long because they fought against Irish lords who resisted English authority and were skilled politically and militarily.

---

<sup>18</sup> James O'Neill, *The Nine Years War, 1593-1603: O'Neill, Mountjoy and the Military Revolution* (Portland, OR; Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 2017).

<sup>19</sup> O'Neill, *The Nine Years War*, 21.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 250. Conversely, John McGurk argued that though England won the war in Ireland, it did so at such a high cost that the reconquest was ultimately "an expensive failure," for "it left a smouldering foundation for future national resistance to the exercise of English political power in church and state" (*The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland*, 267). Therefore, McGurk stressed the military deficiencies of the English government in Ireland—the structural problems, for instance, in the levying of more troops and provisioning for the army—and the impact of the war on English and Welsh communities.

<sup>21</sup> Hiram Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion: The Outbreak of the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland* (London; Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society, 1993).

<sup>22</sup> Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion*, 214. Other historians based their studies on Red Hugh O'Donnell instead. See, for example, Darren McGettigan, *Red Hugh O'Donnell and the Nine Years' War* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2005).

But a "military revolution" in England and Ireland does not adequately explain what happened during the Nine Years' War. David Parrott convincingly argued that the problem with Roberts and Parker's "military revolution" theses was its overemphasis on tactical changes and how changes in the military arose out of necessity.<sup>23</sup> Finance and logistics constrained the degree to which more ambitious tactics and strategies could be implemented.<sup>24</sup> An inadequate military administration, which failed to control and discipline corrupt officers or correct the problem of desertion, had a more significant impact on the ability of states to wage war than enemy attacks.<sup>25</sup> An effective administration—like the army supply system—could be a more potent catalyst for success than tactics.

At present, the military context dominates secondary literature on the Nine Years' War, much to the neglect of the administrative context in the 1590s. The Irish council in Dublin, modeled after the English privy council, was the primary centralized administrative institution in Ireland. Its councilors were responsible for the provincial government, military and financial administrations, the judicial system, and they served on grand councils and in parliament. Some of the Irish councilors, for instance, were the heads of military administration—the chief commissioner in Connacht and lord president in Munster, the muster master, the master of the ordnance, the treasurer-at-war, and the marshal of the army. Therefore, an examination of the Nine Years' War should include the administrators, who managed England's military and financial resources in Ireland, devised war strategies, and administered intelligence communications.

---

<sup>23</sup> David Parrott, "Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The 'Military Revolution'," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 2 (1985): 7-25.

<sup>24</sup> Parrott, "Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War," 16.

<sup>25</sup> Parrott, 19.

And yet, while many scholars allude to the dysfunction of the Irish administration during the war, the subject remains largely unexplored. The only sustained study of the Irish council has been Jon G. Crawford's *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*.<sup>26</sup> Crawford's book, however, only extends to the mid-Tudor period, leaving the period after 1580 and, most crucially, the war years of the 1590s unexamined. In his article on Elizabeth's mismanagement of Ireland, Morgan addresses the viceroys but not the institution of the Irish council.<sup>27</sup> Like most histories on Elizabeth's Irish administration, the focus is mainly on the viceroys, not the Irish councilors. Consequently, the Irish council receives some—albeit passing—attention in studies of viceroys, as well as in general histories of Tudor and Stuart Ireland.<sup>28</sup> The subject of the Nine Years' War is also given a cursory nod. The war is usually appended to Tudor histories of Ireland at the end, to illustrate the completion of the English conquest of Ireland or, at the beginning, as context for the new Ulster plantation and as a prelude to the War of the Three Kingdoms in the seventeenth century.<sup>29</sup> These histories have, to some extent, been useful, for they suggest another lens

---

<sup>26</sup> Jon G. Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland: The Irish Privy Council and the Expansion of Tudor Rule, 1556-1578* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press in association with the Irish Legal History Society, 1993). Other notable studies of the Irish council are David B. Quinn, introduction to "Calendar of the Irish Council Book 1 March 1581 to 1 July 1586," *Analecta Hibernica* 24 (1967): 93-105; Steven G. Ellis, "The administration of the lordship of Ireland under the early Tudors" (PhD diss., Queen's University, Belfast, 1979); R. Dudley Edwards and Mary O'Dowd, *Sources for Early Modern Irish History, 1534-1641* (New York; Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 12-15.

<sup>27</sup> Hiram Morgan, "Never Any Realm Worse Governed': Queen Elizabeth and Ireland," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 14 (2004): 295-308.

<sup>28</sup> Ciaran Brady, for instance, focused almost exclusively on the viceroys, discussing the Irish council only in relation to these figures. See Brady, *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536-1588* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). He later argued that the events of 1594-1603 were too discontinuous and halting to constitute a war ["The Captains' Games in *A Military History of Ireland*, eds. Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 137-138]. On the subject of Ireland's viceroys, see David Edwards, "Questioning the Viceroys: Toward a New Model of English Government in Tudor Ireland, 1534-1594," in *Early Modern Ireland: New Sources, Methods, and Perspectives*, ed. Sarah Covington, Vincent Carey, and Valerie McGowan-Doyle (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 147-165. Edwards stopped short of the war, while Brady ended his study in 1588.

<sup>29</sup> See, for example, Richard Bagwell, *Ireland Under the Tudors*, 3 vols. (London, 1885-1890); Steven G. Ellis, *Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community, and the Conflict of Cultures, 1470-1603* (London; New York: Longman, 1985); Pádraig Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest: Ireland 1603-1727* (Oxfordshire, England; New York, New York: Routledge, 2014); S. J. Connolly, *Contested Island: Ireland 1460-1630* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

through which to view the Nine Years' War and a path forward to answering the question posed earlier; that perhaps England's military weaknesses stemmed partly from state and institutional weaknesses.

### **Ireland and the English State**

For some time now, historians have grappled with the issue of English state-building and centralization in Tudor Ireland. Historians generally agree that English rule in Ireland was nominal across much of the island before the sixteenth century. English kings had claimed authority over all of Ireland since the pope granted the lordship of Ireland to Henry II in the twelfth century, which enabled the Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland. But while the Anglo-Normans had gained some control in Ireland, the Treaty of Windsor of 1175—which ceded some territories to the Irish king, Ruaidrí Ua Conchobair—effectively reduced the extent of their authority. They controlled only a small portion of Ireland called the Pale, and it was the center of English authority. It was an enclave located at the eastern edge of the island from County Louth through Meath and Dublin into County Kildare. The Pale was the political and, by the fifteenth century, the physical boundary of English rule, though there were pockets of influence outside its boundaries [see Map 1].<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> S. J. Connolly, *Contested Island: Ireland 1460-1630* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 44.



Map 1 - Lordship of Ireland, c. 1525 from Ellis, *Tudor Ireland*, 383.

Over time, these areas expanded and contracted and expanded again when specific events or crises brought Ireland into England’s purview. In the early fourteenth century, Edward II had



difficulty maintaining royal authority in Ireland due to his preoccupation with Wales and Scotland. Edward's defeat at the Battle of Bannockburn by the king of Scots, Robert the Bruce, paved the way for the Bruce's brother, Edward, to invade Ireland. The result of the invasion was not only independence for the kingdom of Scotland but also de-stabilized English authority and influence in Ireland.<sup>31</sup> In the 1390s, Richard II led two grand military campaigns in Ireland to defend English territorial control on the island, but in doing so he left England unguarded. This enabled Henry of Bolingbroke to seize control of the English throne. Ireland later served as a Yorkist base during the Wars of the Roses in the fifteenth century. These events help to illustrate the nature of English involvement in Ireland before the Tudors. They turned their attention to Ireland intermittently, mainly whenever domestic or continental politics dictated a refocus on the island.

The English did not view Ireland as a consistently urgent “problem” until the politics of the Henrician Reformation made it so. Henry’s schism jeopardized the legitimacy of England’s claim over Ireland. The English monarch had received the lordship of Ireland from the pope, and Henry’s break with Rome and subsequent excommunication threatened the legitimacy of the English overlordship of Ireland. Ireland was also largely Catholic. In 1539, there were rumors that the Irish were trying to replace the English monarch with the Catholic King of Scots, James V.<sup>32</sup> When Thomas Fitzgerald, “Silken Thomas,” revolted against the English government in 1534, he claimed that he did so in defense of Catholicism and the papacy, rather than because of the threat which the English government posed to Geraldine ascendancy.<sup>33</sup> He objected to

---

<sup>31</sup> Steven G. Ellis, *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, 1447-1603: English Expansion and the End of Gaelic Rule* (1998; repr., London; New York: Longman, 2014), 21.

<sup>32</sup> Christopher Maginn, *William Cecil, Ireland, and the Tudor State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 43.

<sup>33</sup> “Silken Thomas” is in reference to the silk lining of the jackets that his men wore when he spoke against the king at an Irish council meeting on 11 June 1534 (Connolly, *Contested Island*, 86).

English royal authority and utilized the international crisis over religion in an attempt to rally support for his cause. Henry sent an army to crush the rebellion before papal forces or co-religionists intervened. Henry's royal authority over Ireland had to be reinforced in constitutional terms. Thus, in 1541 the Irish Parliament declared, with Irish chiefs in attendance, that Ireland was a separate kingdom within the English state and Henry VIII as its monarch. The Crown of Ireland Act followed in 1542, which officially recognized the English monarch and its future heirs as the ruling monarchs of Ireland. It was a political maneuver meant to pre-empt the pope's revocation of England's lordship over Ireland. Only with Henry's break with the pope did the long-term reform of Ireland become a priority.<sup>34</sup> The attention to Ireland would also become increasingly important after the forced abdication of the Mary Queen of Scots in 1567 and the fear that the Scottish would invade England through Ireland, giving new significance to the old proverb:

Qui Angliam vincere vellet  
ab Ybernia incipere debet  
(He who would England win,  
In Ireland must begin).<sup>35</sup>

The Tudors had, therefore, “discovered” Ireland, but unlike the Columbian expedition in the Americas, there was no conquest.<sup>36</sup> Ireland, in the Tudor mindset, was already conquered.

---

<sup>34</sup> The Reformation had also encouraged the incorporation of Wales into the English monarchical state. The Statute of Wales in 1284 only united a specific region of Wales with England. Much like Ireland, the Reformation Parliament sought to solidify England's imperial claim over Wales. It instituted the Acts of Union in 1536 and 1543 which recognized Wales as a “dominion, principality, and country” within the crown of England (27 Henry VIII. c. 26). The 1536 statute then extended English royal control over the entire region of Wales.

<sup>35</sup> James Anthony Froude, *History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, vol. 10, (London: Longmans, Green and co., 1870), 221; Latin text as quoted in John J. Silke, *Kinsale: The Spanish Intervention in Ireland at the End of the Elizabethan Wars* (1970; repr., Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts, 2000), 76.

<sup>36</sup> Christopher Maginn and Steven G. Ellis, *The Tudor Discovery of Ireland* (Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts, 2015). The authors argued that the discovery was borne out of English ignorance of Ireland and its peoples.

Instead, the goal was to create in Ireland an English kingdom with similar political, legal, and cultural institutions to those in England.<sup>37</sup> But, as some scholars argued, this process of anglicizing Ireland could not be achieved without a "Tudor revolution in government" in Ireland. The idea of a Tudor administrative revolution was proposed by Geoffrey Elton regarding the English government.<sup>38</sup> Elton asserted that until the 1530s, England utilized medieval-style governance where the household performed the administrative functions of government. However, after the 1530s, England underwent an administrative revolution with Thomas Cromwell, the secretary of state, at the forefront of England's transformation into a "modern sovereign state" with a "national character."<sup>39</sup> This transformation involved several bureaucratic reforms, namely the establishment of the exchequer, a department to manage royal finances; the development of the privy council, a formal advisory body distinct from its medieval predecessor; the importance of the secretary of state in managing the administration; and the repeated use of administrative models like the regional councils in the north of England, the marches of Wales, and in Ireland. For Elton, these changes in government were a consequence of Cromwell's conscious planning. Cromwell moved the business of government away from the household to national, bureaucratic institutions.

Elton's "Tudor revolution" has been the subject of considerable criticism.<sup>40</sup> Many historians have taken issue with Elton's overemphasis on Cromwell as the great statesman and the 1530s as a period of innovation. John Guy would point out that, if anything, Cromwell, much

---

<sup>37</sup> Maginn and Ellis, 16.

<sup>38</sup> G.R. Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government: Administrative Changes in the Reign of Henry VIII* (Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press, 1953); Elton expanded on this thesis in subsequent publications. See Elton, *England Under the Tudors* (London: Methuen, 1955); idem, *Reform and Renewal: Thomas Cromwell and the Common Weal* (Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press, 1973); idem, *Policy and Police: The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Thomas Cromwell* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973)

<sup>39</sup> Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government*, 3-4.

<sup>40</sup> For critiques on Elton's thesis, see Christopher Coleman and David Starkey, *Revolution Reassessed* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

like other government officials, was pragmatic; he responded to the crises of Henry's marital problems and the resistance the crown faced during the Reformation.<sup>41</sup> They further challenged the notion of an administrative "revolution," suggesting instead that the reforms were an *evolution* and the reforming impulse born out of many, not any single individual.

Despite the many criticisms of Elton's thesis, he nonetheless inspired a great deal of scholarship on early modern governments and institutions. Elton's former student, Brendan Bradshaw, disagreed with many of Elton's ideas but still drew on Elton's theory and applied it to sixteenth-century Ireland. He approached the subject of English administration in Ireland by marking shifts in the ideological approach towards Ireland. He argued that there was a constitutional revolution that began with the reform movement among the Anglo-Irish (Old English) and the policies of Thomas Cromwell but that these were later transformed in the 1540s under the liberal administration of lord deputy, Sir Anthony St. Leger.<sup>42</sup> The foundation behind Cromwell's policy towards Ireland in the 1530s could be seen in his establishment of the principle of unitary sovereignty, a jurisdictional framework that sought to limit local autonomy in the king's dominions (Ireland, Wales, the north of England, and Calais) and to establish the central administration in London as the only source of authority. This principle also meant the restraining the executive authority of the Dublin administration, as well as the parliament in Ireland.<sup>43</sup> Cromwell's approach to Ireland was also that of conquest, introducing a permanent English garrison in Ireland.<sup>44</sup> But Cromwell's policies produced such hostility in Ireland that St. Leger felt it necessary to undertake a more liberal reform program. Unlike Elton, Bradshaw

---

<sup>41</sup> John Guy, "The Privy Council: Revolution or Evolution?" in *Revolution Reassessed*, eds. Christopher Coleman and David Starkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 79-80.

<sup>42</sup> Brendan Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century* (New York; Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

<sup>43</sup> Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century*, 139-154.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

contended that the figures who primarily led the constitutional revolution were Anglo-Irish reformers and St. Leger, not Cromwell, and that the substantial change occurred in the 1540s after Cromwell. Therefore, the drive for change came from Ireland, not the central administration in England.<sup>45</sup>

St. Leger's liberal approach could be seen in the changing status of Ireland from a lordship to a kingdom ruled by Henry VIII and the "surrender and regrant" policy, whereby the English monarchy coopted and integrated local Irish magnates into the English fold through legal means and with their consent. The "surrender and regrant" policy was a significant development. The Irish practiced succession by election, an Irish custom whereby the heir-apparent was chosen from the patrilineal dynasty of the current chief. This decentralized Irish political system was inherently competitive, but it was fought between Irish rivals. The system also effectively excluded English interference in Irish politics. Though the *tánaiste*, or designated successor, was sometimes the eldest son of the chief, his ascendance to the lordship was by no means guaranteed. Even if the English had managed to exert some modicum of authority with the ruling chief or *tánaiste*, their influence would have been marginal. The proliferation of Irish lordships in late medieval Ireland made such an attempt futile. But with the "surrender and regrant" policy, Irish chiefs would renounce their traditional titles and lands; the king would return their territory as feudal grants and recognize them as hereditary noblemen. Conn O'Neill, king of Tír Eógain, thus became the earl of Tyrone, and Murrough O'Brien, the king of Thomond, became the earl of Thomond. This policy was a conciliatory strategy, meant to accommodate Irish lordships while bolstering and expanding Ireland's English authority. It was also a legal mechanism designed to establish male primogeniture and recognize English sovereignty in Ireland.

---

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 183.

The reform program could only work with the cooperation of Irish lords and the commitment of government officials. But the program failed. Bradshaw attributed the failure to the "disenchantment of the crown to the liberal experiment"; the emergence of new English administrators who were less committed to St. Leger's conciliation policies and were more radical; and the Irish response to Ireland's new constitutional status, which created a nationalist ideology.<sup>46</sup> The "surrender and regrant" policy also created new Irish dynastic struggles. Irish clans continued to practice succession by election, but they did so in conjunction with male primogeniture and the descent of English-style noble titles. This mix of Irish tradition and English legal convention fueled the rising of Shane O'Neill over the inheritance of the Ulster lordship in the 1560s and later contributed to the Nine Years' War in the 1590s.

Though some scholars rejected various aspects of Bradshaw's thesis (especially the emergence of the new ideology of nationalism in the 1540s and the use of more modern categories like conservatives, liberals, and radicals), the consensus view is that the Reformation ushered in a new state apparatus that sought greater control of Ireland than in the past.<sup>47</sup> Scholars like Ciaran Brady and William Palmer, for example, argue that the English takeover of Ireland was not deliberate or sustained until the Henrician Reformation. Instead, it arose in response to a series of crises that threatened England's domestic security and financial sustainability.<sup>48</sup> The

---

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 189, 275.

<sup>47</sup> For critiques of Bradshaw's thesis, see book reviews by Art Cosgrove, *The Irish Jurist* (1979): 198-200; Michael P. Maxwell, *Canadian Journal of History* 15 (1980): 441-442; Mortimer Levine, *The American Historical Review* 85 (1980): 892; Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, *History* 65 (1980): 301; J. M. W. Bean, *Renaissance Quarterly* 34 (1981): 605-607; Nicholas Canny, *The Historical Journal* 24 (1981): 1023-1026; Helga Robinson-Hammerstein in *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 33 (1982): 306-309; Penry Williams, *EHR* 96 (1981): 390-392; and Jon G. Crawford, *The American Journal of Legal History* 25 (1981): 167-169. Many of these authors take issue with the central claims advanced by Bradshaw about the 1540s, one of which was the humanist influence in the reform movements and his limited use of sources as evidence for an Anglo-Irish reform movement.

<sup>48</sup> Palmer, *The Problem of Ireland in Tudor Foreign Policy*, 11-12; Ciaran Brady, "England's Defence and Ireland's Reform: The Dilemma of the Irish Viceroy, 1541-1641" in *The British Problem c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago*, eds. Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 93; idem, "From Policy to Power: the Evolution of Tudor Reform Strategies in Sixteenth-Century Ireland" in *Reshaping*

1530s marked the beginning of an attempt to expand state authority, which continued into the 1540s with the Act for the Kingly Title and the creation of an Irish council, an institutional replica of the council in England.

If the Henrician Reformation government experienced a constitutional revolution, what of the mid-Tudors? How did they expand state authority? The once orthodox view was that the mid-Tudor period underwent a crisis in authority that ended reform and policymaking in Ireland. Bracketed between the revolutionary period of Henry and the final conquest of Ireland under Elizabeth (the so-called “high noons” of Tudor success), the mid-Tudor regime was regarded as one of discontinuity and chronic instability. The Edwardian and Marian regimes were thus considered militaristic, authoritarian, and coercive. Yet, when placed within a larger context, the exigencies of the period warranted the diversion from constitutional reform to defense. The establishment of English military garrisons and the proliferation of fort-building in Ireland were a consequence of mounting pressures: the fear of foreign invasion with the presence of Scots in Ulster; periods of open war with Scotland and France; uncertainty over the succession; the loss of Calais; and severe inflation following the debasement of both English and Irish currency. England was also at war with Scotland in 1547. Revisionists have thus shown that the mid-Tudor focus on defense was part of a sustained effort to control Ireland, and this strategy enabled stability leading into Elizabeth's reign.<sup>49</sup>

The mid-Tudor period also introduced English settlements and plantation, namely in Leix-Offaly. After that, colonization schemes became a popular mechanism to expand state

---

*Ireland 1550-1700: Colonization and its Consequences: Essays Presented to Nicholas Canny*, ed. Brian Mac Cuarta (Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2011), 21-42.

<sup>49</sup> D. M. Loades, *The Mid-Tudor Crisis, 1545-1565* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 6; Ciaran Brady, *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536-1588* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 54-56.

authority, which Elizabeth sanctioned through private enterprise. Nicholas Canny argued that colonization became the pattern for the English conquest of Ireland under the lord deputy, Sir Henry Sidney.<sup>50</sup> He maintained that, while Ireland was constitutionally a kingdom, English officials also perceived the island as a colony.<sup>51</sup> D. B. Quinn had earlier showed that Ireland was not only part of an English Atlantic colonial system, but that it provided the experience that would inform English colonialism in North America.<sup>52</sup> It was no coincidence, then, that some of the first English adventurers to North America—among them Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Sir Thomas Smith—drew on their experiences in Ireland in their dealings with Native Americans. However, not all scholars have agreed with Quinn and Canny on Irish colonialism, and the debate over Ireland's place within a British Atlantic colonial paradigm is hotly contested.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> Nicholas Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-76* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1976), esp. his conclusion, 154-163.

<sup>51</sup> Nicholas Canny, *Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World, 1560-1800* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 17.

<sup>52</sup> D. B. Quinn, ed., *The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*, 2 vols. (London, 1940); idem, "Sir Thomas Smith (1513-1577) and the Beginnings of English Colonial Theory," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 89 (1945): 543-560; idem, "Ireland and Sixteenth-Century European Expansion," in *Historical Studies*, ed. T. D. Williams (London, 1958), 22-32; idem, "The Munster Plantation: Problems and Opportunities," *Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Society* 71 (1966): 19-40.

<sup>53</sup> John Gibney, 'Early Modern Ireland: A British Atlantic Colony?', *History Compass*, 6 (2008): 172-82. Niall Ferguson's *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2002) posits that Ireland was the "experimental laboratory of British colonization" and Ulster the "prototype plantation" (57). On early modern Ireland as a laboratory for empire, see also Jane Ohlmeyer, "A Laboratory for Empire? Early Modern Ireland and English Imperialism," in *Ireland and the British Empire*, ed. Kevin Kenny (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 26-59. However, Alison Games dismisses the argument that the English utilized their conquest of Ireland in their colonization and conquest of North America [*The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 216, 255-256]. In Games's view, the failure of the experiment in Ireland was enough to dissuade the English government from implementing similar practices across the Atlantic. For regional studies on the colonial question for early modern Ireland, see Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland, 1583-1641* (New York; Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press, 1986), 282; Raymond Gillespie, *Colonial Ulster: The Settlement of East Ulster, 1600-1641* (Cork, 1985).



Nonetheless, the colonial question brought other issues to the fore—like that of state violence—as was also the case in histories of colonialism in the Americas.<sup>54</sup> For historians such as David Edwards and Vincent Carey, the primary characteristic of early modern English rule in Ireland was one of unrestrained violence.<sup>55</sup> They contend that the English utilized force and martial law, even during times of constitutional reform, though they concede that such violence was more pronounced in the 1590s. Of late, much has been written on the violence and destruction that characterized Tudor Ireland and the Elizabethan regime in particular. Some scholars have suggested that the scorched-earth tactics of the English government in the last years of the war were the unsurprising result of a long-standing ideological conflict between the English and the so-called "barbarous" Irish. Recent scholarship has taken this precept even further by highlighting where massacres, such as those on Rathlin Island and in Smerwick, serve as examples of escalating English violence against the Irish. They were episodes of extraordinary violence—"genocidal fury"—which characterized the Elizabethan adoption of institutionalized terror in Ireland since the 1570s that continued with the Nine Years' War.<sup>56</sup> However, Neil Murphy has argued that violence and colonialism were not unique to Ireland or North America but present in England's occupation of Boulogne in the 1540s; that the colonial strategies

---

<sup>54</sup> Malcolm Smuts, "Organized Violence in the Elizabethan Monarchical Republic," *History* 99 (2014): 439, 440-443. Brendan Kane, "Ordinary Violence? Ireland as Emergency in the Tudor State," *History* 99 (2014): 466.

<sup>55</sup> David Edwards, "Beyond Reform: Martial Law and the Tudor Re-conquest of Ireland" *History Ireland* 5 (Summer 1997): 16-21; idem, "The Escalation of Violence in Sixteenth-Century Ireland," in *Age of Atrocity: Violence and Political Conflict in Early Modern Ireland*, eds. David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan and Clodagh Tait (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 34-78; Vincent Carey, "John Derricke's *Image of Ireland*: Sir Henry Sidney and the Massacre at Mullaghmast, 1578," *IHS* 31 (1999), 305-27; idem, "'What Pen Can Paint or Tears Atone?' Mountjoy's Scorched Earth Campaign" in *The Battle of Kinsale*, ed. Hiram Morgan (Bray: Wordwell Press, 2004), 205-16; idem, "Atrocity and History: Grey, Spenser and the Slaughter at Smerwick" in *Age of Atrocity*, 79-94; William Palmer, "Toward a New Moral Understanding of the Tudor Conquest of Ireland," *Historical Reflections* 45 (2019): 1-21; and Rory Rapple, "Historiographical Reviews: Writing about Violence in Tudor Kingdoms," *The Historical Journal* 54 (2011): 829-854.

<sup>56</sup> Carey, "Elizabeth I and State Terror in Sixteenth Century Ireland," in *Elizabeth I and the 'Sovereign Arts': Essays in Literature, History, and Culture*, eds. Donald Stump, Linda Shenk and Carole Levin, (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 2011), 201-202.

introduced into Ireland were by men who had served in France.<sup>57</sup> He even went so far as to compare England's expansionism and rule to Adolf Hitler's terrorizing of Eastern Europe.<sup>58</sup> While the broader contemporary conversation about genocide and violence is undoubtedly important, it represents a moralizing argument meant to condemn the English—in both historical time and the present. However, Rory Rapple has argued that the Elizabethan government in Ireland did not have a policy of brutality.<sup>59</sup> Instead, when English officials in Ireland committed violence on Irish lords and the local population, they acted independently.<sup>60</sup>

The Tudor constitutional revolution, colonization, and state violence have illuminated the various ways in which the early modern English state sought to expand its authority in Ireland. Even debates on the so-called "failed Reformation" in Ireland have revealed the strategies employed by English officials to advance Protestantism in Ireland.<sup>61</sup> These approaches have highlighted the challenges that early modern England faced in trying to govern Ireland and why the problems that arose in the Nine Years' War were, in many ways, a continuation of earlier

---

<sup>57</sup> Neil Murphy, "Violence, Colonization and Henry VIII's Conquest of France, 1544-1546," *Past & Present* 233 (2016): 6. Murphy, *The Tudor Occupation of Boulogne: Conquest, Colonisation and Imperial Monarchy, 1544-1550* (New York; Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019), esp. chap. 6.

<sup>58</sup> Murphy, "Violence, Colonization and Henry VIII's Conquest of France," 51.

<sup>59</sup> Rory Rapple, "Taking Up Office in Elizabethan Connacht: The Case of Sir Richard Bingham," *EHR* 123 (2008): 278.

<sup>60</sup> Rory Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558-1594* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Similarly, Ciaran Brady maintains that English state violence in Ireland occurred during times of crisis, "The Captain's Games: Army and Society in Elizabethan Ireland" in *A Military History of Ireland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 136-59. See also James O'Neill, "Like Sheep to the Shambles? Slaughter and Surrender During Tyrone's Rebellion, 1593-1603," *For the Irish Sword* 31 (Winter 2018): 366-80. O'Neill contends that rather than unrestrained violence, there were moments of clemency on both sides.

<sup>61</sup> On the Irish Reformation, see Brendan Bradshaw, "Fr. Wolfe's Description of Limerick City, 1574," *North Munster Antiquarian Journal* 17 (1975): 47-53; idem, Bradshaw, "Sword, Word and Strategy in the Reformation in Ireland," *The Historical Journal* 21 (1978): 475; Nicholas Canny, "Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland: Une Question Mal Posée," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 30 (1979): 423-450; Karl S. Bottigheimer, "The Reformation in Ireland Revisited," *Journal of British Studies* 15 (1976): 140-149; Aidan Clarke, "Varieties of Conformity: the first century of the Church of Ireland" in *The Churches, Ireland and the Irish*, eds. W. J. Shiels and Diana Woods (Oxford, 1989); James Murray, *Enforcing the English Reformation in Ireland: Clerical Resistance and Political Conflict in the Diocese of Dublin, 1534-1590* (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Alan Ford, *The Protestant Reformation in Ireland, 1590-1641* (Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1997).

state-building processes in Ireland which were incomplete. The Nine Years' War cannot be disassociated or divorced from these processes, and I have made a conscientious attempt to confront some of these broader issues throughout this project.

English state-building in Ireland was also stymied by England's involvement in wars on the continent. Hostilities with France and Spain crippled England's finances, the consequence of which was the low priority afforded to Ireland and repeated cost-cutting measures like the reduction of garrisons in Ireland and the sanctioning of private colonial enterprises. The plantation schemes in the 1570s were disastrous, as they incited opposition to English rule and left the crown covering the cost of private wars.<sup>62</sup> As crown policies in Ireland became more rigid, Irish lords resisted as they sought to retain control of their lordships and authority. Such resistance came in the form of "rebellions," which were present in nearly every decade of Elizabeth's reign leading up to the Nine Years' War in the 1590s.

Added to these already serious problems in Elizabeth's control of Ireland was the conflict over religion. When Hugh O'Neill resisted the English government and its occupation of Ireland, he raised not only the issue of English sovereignty but also of religion and the Reformation. He claimed the defense and restoration of Roman Catholicism in Ireland.<sup>63</sup> Having framed his rebellion as Irish Catholic resistance against the Protestant English crown, he vigorously pursued the support of co-religionists on the continent to remove English hegemony on the island. O'Neill was not the first to couch his dissent in religious terms. Both Shane O'Neill and the earl of Desmond had done the same in previous decades in their opposition to English rule. However,

---

<sup>62</sup> Hammer, 76-77.

<sup>63</sup> O'Neill's religious convictions have been its own subject of debate, particularly in consideration of the "faith and fatherland" thesis advocated by Bradshaw and Morgan. Canny challenged this thesis in his essay, "Taking Sides in Early Modern Ireland: The Case of Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone," in *Taking Sides? Colonial and Confessional Mentalities in Early Modern Ireland*, eds. Vincent Carey and Ute Lötze-Heumann (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2003), 94-115.

Hugh O'Neill's appeals to Catholicism came towards the end of Elizabeth's reign, when the success of the Protestant Reformation in Ireland seemed questionable. Elizabeth's colonial regime in Ireland was, undoubtedly, embattled and the conquest manifestly incomplete.

Elizabeth also faced a unique set of challenges because of her gender and the issue of the succession. She was a female monarch who depended greatly on her male councilors, especially in managing England's wars. This system of dependency—and male prejudices about a female ruler—encouraged the challenging of Elizabeth's authority.<sup>64</sup> She had also seemingly resolved the religious conflict introduced by her father and exacerbated by her siblings with the Act of Uniformity in 1559, which demanded only outward conformity to Protestantism. But the post-Reformation period made it clear that religious tensions continued, particularly as the Catholic Reformation insinuated itself within Tudor kingdoms. She witnessed the destabilizing force of her cousin, Mary Queen of Scots—whose marriage into the French monarchy, adherence to Catholicism, and subsequent presence in England—threatened Elizabeth's authority. Others acting on Mary's behalf, and even Mary herself, opposed the Protestant queen and sought her removal as monarch. Mary was an attractive alternative to Elizabeth because she was a Catholic, available for marriage, and because she had given birth to a son, James, who became the king of Scotland. She had done what Elizabeth had not—provided a male heir and secured the succession to the Scottish throne. Elizabeth remained unmarried and refused to name an heir, mainly out of fear—fear of Catholic plots against her and fear that in naming an heir, all would gravitate towards the “rising sun,” eclipsing Elizabeth in the process and endangering her life. However, her privy councilors acted for her, not only in the backroom dealing to block Mary

---

<sup>64</sup> Hammer, 3-4. For a good discussion on the issue of the politics of gender and representation in Elizabeth's reign, see Carole Levin, *The Heart and Stomach of a King': Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). The title of Levin's book was part of a quote attributed to Elizabeth in 1588: "I may have the body of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and stomach of a king" (1).

Queen of Scots from succeeding (the "Elizabethan Exclusion Crisis") and later with King James VI to ensure a successor, but also in contingency planning in the 1580s to establish the legal process if the queen died without naming an heir.<sup>65</sup>

In recognizing the sometimes competing interests of Elizabeth and the privy council, historians of early modern England have rightly acknowledged that the privy councilors were a kind of sovereign power in the authority they held. The independence and enormous power they wielded constituted, what Patrick Collinson termed, a "monarchical republic."<sup>66</sup> In Collinson's estimation, there were two governments: "the queen and her council...two somewhat distinct poles of authority."<sup>67</sup> From the emergence of the privy council in the 1530s to the 1570s, and arguably earlier, the council evolved into a powerful institution with full executive authority. Their centrality in managing the English government has thus generated considerable scholarship on the institution and its power in England.<sup>68</sup>

The same cannot be said of the Irish council. In Ciaran Brady's view, the Irish councilors were undoubtedly powerful figures, but not the Irish privy council as an institution because the council was "an inactive and highly unrepresentative instrument of government" and offered little to those who sought political advancement through patronage as "there was no Irish court."<sup>69</sup> Crawford set out to prove that the Irish council was not as ineffective as Brady and

---

<sup>65</sup> Patrick Collinson, "The Elizabethan Exclusion Crisis and the Elizabethan Polity," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 84 (1994): 51; Gerald Bowler, "'An Axe or an Acte': The Parliament of 1572 and Resistance Theory in Early Elizabethan England," *Canadian Journal of History* 19 (1984): 349-59.

<sup>66</sup> Patrick Collinson, "The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I," *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 69 (1987): 394-424.

<sup>67</sup> Collinson, "The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I," in *Elizabethans*, ed. Collinson (1987; repr., London; New York: Hambledon and London, 2003), 42.

<sup>68</sup> See, for example, Michael Barraclough Pulman, *The Elizabethan Privy Council in the Fifteen-Seventies* (Berkeley, Calif., 1971); G. R. Elton, "Tudor Government: The Points of Contact. II: The Council," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, 25 (1975): 195-211; D. E. Hoak, *The King's Council in the Reign of Edward VI* (New York; Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Natalie Mears, "The Council," in *The Elizabethan World*, eds. Susan Doran and Norman Jones (London; New York: Routledge, 2014), 59-75. There are also, of course, numerous biographies on the individual English privy councilors.

<sup>69</sup> Ciaran Brady, "The Government of Ireland, c. 1540-1583" (PhD diss., Trinity College of Dublin, 1981), 6.

others had supposed. He asserted that the Irish council was the "most important political institution in Ireland."<sup>70</sup>

### **The Irish Council**

The Irish council—modeled after the one in England—was the primary mechanism for English governance in Ireland, much like the regional councils in the north of England and Wales. Like their English counterpart, the Irish council was the main advisory body in the Irish government. The institution evolved out of the late medieval council attendant and the great council of local magnates. Relatively little is known about the Irish council in the late medieval period. Edward IV formalized the council as an institution with a 1479 ordinance, which stipulated that nothing could be deemed an act of council unless the viceregent, with the advice of the king's council, gave his assent.<sup>71</sup> The members listed were the chancellor, the treasurer, the king's chief justice, the chief baron of the king's exchequer, the clerk (or master) of the rolls, and the king's sergeant. Over time, membership on the council would expand to include government and religious offices.

The Irish council would thereafter gain more independence from the viceregents and bore a closer resemblance to its counterpart in England. Its position strengthened in correlation with the restraining of chief governors' authority.<sup>72</sup> In the 1495 statute, for example, lords deputy were no longer allowed to appoint for life ministers of justice (the chancellor, treasurer, judges, etc.) who had *ex officio* membership on the council; the right was exclusively reserved for the king, and appointment was to be made only by letters patent and during "his pleasure," meaning the

---

<sup>70</sup> Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, 19.

<sup>71</sup> Peter Crooks, ed., *A Calendar of Irish Chancery Letters, c. 1244–1509*, Close Roll 19 Edward IV, §11, <https://chancery.tcd.ie/roll/19-Edward-IV/close>; Ellis, *Tudor Ireland*, 155.

<sup>72</sup> *CIRCLE*, CR 19 Edw. IV, §11.

length of service could only be determined by the king.<sup>73</sup> The crown also added several officers to the council to shift the balance away from the near-autonomous power of the lords deputy.<sup>74</sup> Poyning's law in 1495 placed further restrictions on their authority.<sup>75</sup> After the Kildare rebellion in 1534, the practice of using local magnates as viceroys ended, and the monarchy was able to exert greater control of the lord deputy and council with the appointment of chief governors from England. Therefore, the conciliar institution that merged in Ireland in the 1530s was more independent from the governors than in the past, and the English government in Ireland became increasingly centralized and more formally structured. Only after 1534 would the Irish council move closer to the privy council model in England, when the privy council was itself still forming.<sup>76</sup>

By the Elizabethan period, the Irish council comprised the main officials in the administration: the provincial governors, the treasurer-at-war, the marshal of the army, the chief justices, clerics, the secretary of state, and military advisors.<sup>77</sup> The councilors managed the other governing institutions in Ireland, including the provincial councils, the court of castle chamber (similar to the English star chamber, newly created on the initiative of the Irish council), the exchequer, and the chancery.<sup>78</sup> They sat in the Irish parliament, though there were only 11 sessions during Elizabeth's reign and parliamentary activity ceased after 1586.<sup>79</sup> The base of

---

<sup>73</sup> 10 Henry VII c. 2 [Ireland].

<sup>74</sup> Ellis, 152-154.

<sup>75</sup> Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, 23-24.

<sup>76</sup> Ellis, 155-156.

<sup>77</sup> Whether the lord deputy in Ireland constituted as a member of the Irish council is debatable. The issue is not comparable in the regional council in Wales, which has a "lord president of the council." Ireland, in this case, appears unique among England's regional councils. I discuss the issue further in Chapter 4 when the Irish council challenges its relationship with the lord deputy in governing Ireland.

<sup>78</sup> Crawford, 18-28.

<sup>79</sup> There were three iterations of the council evident with the Tudors: the central privy council, the "afforded" or common council, and the great council. The last two councils consisted of Irish privy councilors, local magnates, and ecclesiastical peers. They would discuss, for example, the issue of cess. However, the council records which would have enabled further identification of these councils are lost to us.

operations for the Irish council was Dublin. In Dublin Castle, the council worked on fulfilling the English colonial project of anglicizing Ireland. Among its key objectives were to expand English jurisdiction across the realm; provide access to the English legal system, the common law; increase revenues; maintain order; and, given the presence of clerics on the council, convert the Irish from the old religion, traditional Catholicism, to the new, Protestantism.<sup>80</sup> The Irish council was thus a powerful institution comprised of individuals who managed the most critical aspects of the English administration in Ireland.<sup>81</sup>

The council bore the burden of managing the entire government of Ireland with orders and instructions from the Westminster government. It was the responsibility of the lord deputy and council to carry out the queen's orders and ensure that the business of government ran smoothly. However, the broad range of power made the Irish council a powerful institution in a realm with relatively little oversight and accountability. Consequently, in Ireland, the theory of state-building and governance diverged from practice. In theory, the councilors, even the viceregent, lacked absolute executive authority. They could issue proclamations, but they could not formulate policy, only advise and enforce the directives given to them by the queen and the privy council in England. They did, however, influence the formulation of policy and frequently offered their opinions on how the government should function. Though they shared the responsibility of managing English government in Ireland alongside the Irish magnates—the earls of Kildare, Ormond, Clanricard, and, at one point, Desmond—it was primarily the officeholders on the council who dictated Irish politics and governance. But the offices were not the sole basis of their power. Instead, institutional power arose from traditional patron-client

---

<sup>80</sup> Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, 1. For his magisterial study of the star chamber in Ireland, see Crawford, *A Star Chamber Court in Ireland: The Court of Castle Chamber, 1571-1641* (Dublin: Four Courts in association with The Irish Legal History Society, 2005).

<sup>81</sup> By "state" I mean the extension of the English state in Ireland, not a separate or independent state in Ireland.



networks, both within and (crucially) outside Ireland. Therefore, the personal dimensions of power demand attention. Their machinations determined how the institution influenced English state-building in Ireland. Moreover, their policies and actions during the Nine Years' War, as will be shown, had a significant impact on the course of the war.

As the only full-length study available on the Irish council, Jon Crawford's book, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, has occupied a prominent space in scholarship on Tudor Ireland. Crawford's institutional study of the council from 1556 to 1578 examined the anglicizing project for which the council was responsible and challenged many of the ideas advanced by earlier scholars, such as Elton, Bradshaw, and Canny. Rather than an administrative or constitutional revolution, as proposed by Elton and Bradshaw, Crawford instead saw the evolution of a single, institutional body in Ireland: the Irish privy council.<sup>82</sup> He subsequently argued that, although the reform programs of lords deputy like St. Leger had failed, the Irish council strengthened as an institution by 1578.<sup>83</sup> Unlike Canny, he discerned no pattern of conquest and colonization in this era and, in further opposition to Bradshaw, no evidence of proto-nationalism.<sup>84</sup>

Instead, Crawford maintained that the first two decades of Elizabeth's government in Ireland were a period of balance and compromise, owing to the effectiveness of the Irish council.<sup>85</sup> What the councilors achieved—the slow expansion of English authority—was despite Elizabeth's fiscal "restraints" and ultimately was able to withstand the Desmond Rebellions and the Nine Years' War.<sup>86</sup> He argues that even the supposed alienation of the Anglo-Irish (or Old

---

<sup>82</sup> Crawford, 414.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 414-415.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 412, 422.

English) in English government, which had been prevalent in older histories on Tudor Ireland, was not an issue, as the queen valued the experience and competence of her Anglo-Irish councilors.<sup>87</sup> While there were still concerns about the loyalty of Anglo-Irish officials, whatever tensions that existed between the old and the new had no substantial effect on the composition of the council nor its ability to function as a working group towards anglicization.<sup>88</sup>

After 1578, with the death of the majority of the mid-Tudor councilors—except for two survivors into the 1590s—the constitution and character of the Irish council changed substantially. The council in the 1580s was of a "new temperament, a different countenance from the one which had prevailed since 1556, as it met new crises and faced greater internal divisiveness than ever before."<sup>89</sup> Therefore, this new council lacked the coherence and efficacy of the mid-Tudor council. However, a study of the divisions that arose between the new councilors, understandably, went beyond the scope of his book.

This dissertation takes up the narrative begun by Crawford, but which ended with the largely new group of councilors in the 1580s. It examines the Irish council from an institutional perspective to unravel the changing dynamics of power between the English monarchy and the Irish councilors, as well as between the lord deputy and council. It also suggests, like Crawford, that tensions between Old and New English officials did not prevent the Irish councilors from forming alliances when necessary and working together, as will be shown in the chapters that follow. Although some of the Old English had revolted against Elizabeth earlier in the 1570s and early 1580s, they aided the Elizabethan regime during the Nine Years' War.<sup>90</sup> Some Old English

---

<sup>87</sup> Crawford's use of the term "Anglo-Irish" was itself evidence of his views that the Anglo-Irish were both culturally English and Irish in their language and customs, and thus not so far removed from their English identity (91).

<sup>88</sup> See, for example, Nicholas P. Canny, "Identity Formation in Ireland: The Emergence of the Anglo-Irish," in *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, eds. Canny and Anthony Pagden (Princeton, 1987), 160-164.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>90</sup> Ruth Canning, "Profits and Patriotism: Nicholas Weston, Old English Merchants, and Ireland's Nine Years' War, 1594-1603," *Irish Economic and Social History* 43 (2016): 85-112.

merchants like Nicholas Weston helped the English war effort, with Weston pairing with the Irish secretary of state, Sir Geoffrey Fenton, to gather war intelligence. Consequently, this study continues the thread sewn by Crawford. However, where Crawford focused on the efficacy of the Irish council in the management of government, this present study explores the political life and career of the Irish councilors within the English and Irish context of the late Elizabethan period, as well as their responsibilities in the various financial, religious, and military administrations.<sup>91</sup>

### **Methods and Sources**

This dissertation utilizes primarily two methods: chronology and prosopography. The narrative itself is broadly chronological—before the war (Part One), the interwar years (Part Two), and after the war (the conclusion). It is the author's contention that the period before the Nine Years' War (1580-1593) is, unsurprisingly, contextually relevant to the war years, particularly in light of the Irish councilors who managed Irish government before and during the war. A chronological narrative also illuminates most effectively change over time in how Elizabethan governments in Westminster and Dublin managed Irish administration. Within this broad chronological scheme is a thematic study of the Irish council and how its councilors dealt with the problems of finance, advancing the Protestant Reformation in Ireland, and personal conflicts within the administration. As will be shown, all three were important were issues present during the war, and which partly determined the course of the war.

The other method employed for this project is prosopography, the study of politics through collective biography. The benefits of a prosopographic approach, particularly for institutional studies, are many. By examining the individual men who were part of the Irish

---

<sup>91</sup> The topic of religion and the English Reformation in Ireland is conspicuously absent in Crawford's book.

council and the commonalities that existed between them, the historian can discover the interplay between the interests of the group and how they acted politically.<sup>92</sup> Prosopographical studies are inherently concerned with people, especially small groups of ruling elites. These studies highlight the genealogy, kinship ties, and economic interests of the group to understand their political actions and how the institution to which they belonged functioned.<sup>93</sup> As such, this dissertation explores the background of the councilors and traces the trajectory of their careers—from their appointment to the Irish council to the networks they established and the power they wielded. Crawford, to some extent, has accomplished this feat in his study of the earlier Elizabethan Irish council. However, his narrative focused on the administrative functions of the council rather than the domestic and international politics of the period; his study notably ends when the second Desmond Rebellion begins. This dissertation fills this gap by examining the Irish council and its members during an incredibly fraught period in English and Irish history. Elizabeth's wars on the continent, the issue of the succession, the Protestant Reformation, and the Nine Years' War were all forces with which the Irish councilors had to contend, along with their own familial, political, and economic interests.

Given the focus on the English conciliar institution in Ireland, the main source utilized for this project is the Irish state papers (SP 63), which (for our purposes) covers Elizabeth's reign through the Stuarts and beyond. Most of the council records in the Public Record Office of Ireland did not survive, except for the council book for 1556-1571 and the calendar of the

---

<sup>92</sup> Lawrence Stone, "Prosopography," *Daedalus* 100 (1971): 46-47; Coleman A. Dennehy, "Institutional History and the Early Modern Irish State," in *Early Modern Ireland: New Sources, Methods, and Perspectives*, eds. Sarah Covington, Vincent Carey, and Valerie McGowan-Doyle (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 187-188. Of late, Kirsty Wright has argued for a prosopographical examination into the mid-Tudor privy council and exchequer. IHR seminar, "Conciliar Connections: Prosopography in the Mid-Tudor Privy Council." <https://www.history.ac.uk/events/tudor-and-stuart-history-joint-session-1>.

<sup>93</sup> See J. E. Neale, *The Elizabethan House of Commons* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); L. B. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1929); G. E. Aylmer, *The King's Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-1642* (London: R. & K. Paul, 1961).

council book for 1581-1586. Consequently, the Irish state papers are the best extant source for a study of the Irish government as the state papers contain an extensive collection of official conciliar letters to the queen and privy council in England (especially correspondence between the principal secretaries of state), financial records from the Irish exchequer and muster master accounts, and private letters of English officials in Ireland, among others. These manuscripts are all accessible on *State Papers Online* (SPO), which includes a calendar reference with brief—and sometimes entire—summaries of the document and facsimile images of the manuscript.

The Irish state papers are quite large: for the period of this study (1580-1603), about 144 of the 216 volumes for Elizabeth's reign, though some chapters by necessity, extend to the 1560s and 1570s. As such, the calendar for state papers has been especially useful due to the overwhelming volume of information. It has made the research process of sifting through the manuscripts more efficient. However, the calendar alone does not suffice. The financial records for Elizabethan Ireland have mostly only the briefest of summaries, though the manuscripts themselves may be highly detailed and comprised of multiple folios. In some cases, the calendar does not mention postscripts, as with several Irish conciliar letters, especially those in the early 1580s. The Irish secretary of state, Sir Geoffrey Fenton, would sometimes write postscripts in his own hand after his clerk had written the letter. He engaged in this practice whenever he wanted to communicate sensitive or private information beyond the watchful eyes of the clerk. At times, the calendar also neglects to mention the councilors' signatures on an official letter. The lack of signature for a Dublin councilor could be meaningful in terms of dissent from the main viewpoint of the official letter. When relevant, these exceptions are highlighted either in the main body of the text or in a footnote.

In addition to the Irish state papers, SPO also includes domestic and foreign papers, *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, as well as collections outside of the National Archives at Kew: the Yelverton, Cotton, and Lansdowne manuscript collections at the British Library and 24 volumes of the *Calendars of the Cecil Papers* at Hatfield House. Images of the Cecil manuscripts were available on Cecil Papers Online for transcription and review. The six-volume *Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts* at Lambeth Palace Library was also a rich source material. The work of collecting and arranging those original manuscripts was done by the Irish councilor and lord president of Munster, Sir George Carew. He was an experienced officer and prominent member of the Irish administration, having served in Ireland and having long-standing familial ties there. Carew also had considerable access to information due to his close relationship with the English principal secretary, Sir Robert Cecil. The published calendar of his manuscripts provides a chronological coherence to the manuscript collection and has been used liberally for this study.<sup>94</sup> A dear colleague also provided her research material from the Chester Record Office to supplement the discussion of the military administration in Ireland during the Nine Years' War.

The *Annals of the Four Masters* offered a much-needed Irish perspective to challenge the narratives presented by English officials in Ireland. Also of interest is the tracking of Irish councilors, whenever possible, through the *Annals* and Irish responses to the individual councilors. As with any source, bias is to be expected and treated with caution. Both the *Annals* and the State Papers show clearly how bias can obfuscate—and also help reveal—the nature of early modern colonial governments and relations between people. And yet, one of the main contentions presented here is the inadequate attention given to the Irish council from the 1580s to

---

<sup>94</sup> A separate detailed edition of letters between Carew and Cecil was published by the Camden Society in 1864 [*Letters from Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew*, Camden Society Series, vol. 88, ed. John MacLean (London, 1864)].

the conclusion of the Nine Years' War. Therefore, this present study takes as its central focus the perspective of English officials in Ireland to complement the already abundant scholarship on the aims and machinations of the Irish lords during the war.

Lastly, a prosopography of the Irish council was undertaken using biographical articles from the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* Online, the History of Parliament, and the *Dictionary of Irish Biography*. When biographies of individual councilors were not available from these sources, my own research filled in the gaps using manuscripts and printed sources. These sources were vital in determining the commonalities between the councilors and in constructing tables for representation purposes.

Writing a dissertation during a pandemic made the research process challenging. Archival research at Trinity College in Dublin and the National Archives at Kew would have been beneficial, considering that some manuscripts were not digitized. However, the pandemic effectively eliminated such possibilities, forcing this author to rely mainly on sources accessible online. Although the Irish state papers were the most relevant source for this dissertation, any further work on this project would necessarily involve trips to the Dublin and London archives. The material in these archives may challenge or complement the ideas expressed here about the Irish council and Elizabethan governance of Ireland.

### **Structure and Outline of Chapters**

This account of the Irish Council and its role in the Nine Years' War is divided into two parts. Part One, which consists of four chapters, examines the Irish council in the years before the Nine Years' War (1580-1593) and the conditions that gave rise to the problems visible during the war. It takes as its central focus the patronage system that enabled membership on the Irish council but ultimately became perverted due to finance and personal interest problems. Part Two,

which deals exclusively with the war in Ireland (1593-1603) in three phases and over three chapters, assesses how the English governments in Westminster and Dublin dealt with the war, given the problems that had been evident years earlier. After 1598, with successive English military losses in Ireland and a dysfunctional Irish administration, the Westminster government exerted greater control than previous in the war and of the administration. Each chapter, therefore, explains how this development came to be.

Chapter One introduces the Irish council and its members during the period of this study. It considers how patronage served as a practical means to achieve state power through the institution of the Irish council. Those who gained membership to the Irish council depended heavily on patronage networks in England, particularly as the backgrounds of the individual councilors reveal that most of these men were younger sons. They went to Ireland with high career aspirations and ambitions of financial and political success. A case study of the Irish secretary of state, Sir Geoffrey Fenton, illustrates how vital patronage was in Fenton's early career in Ireland and how he managed to achieve significant influence and power within the Irish council over time.

Chapter Two delves further into the dependent relationship between the Irish councilors in Dublin and the queen and privy council in Westminster through a study of finances. Unlike younger sons on the continent, the Irish councilors were not self-reliant; therefore, they needed the centralized power of the state to impose their authority. But England lacked the means to ensure that its Irish councilors were financially sound, leaving the councilors searching for alternative sources of income. Aware of the Irish administration's fiscal problems, the Westminster government allowed certain concessions to appease their administrators in Ireland.



Though this system balanced the needs of the state with those of the officials employed in government, it also encouraged the prioritization of personal interests over the state.

Chapter Three explores how England's fiscal constraints extended to the Reformation in Ireland. The traditional methods employed for establishing and spreading the Protestant Reformation—reading, preaching, and education—were insufficient. The crown relied on its bishops in Ireland to oversee and contribute financially to the Reformation. This responsibility placed undue financial stress on clergymen in Ireland who were already struggling to support themselves amidst violence and instability. A case study of the career of Adam Loftus, the lord chancellor and archbishop of Dublin, from the 1560s to the mid-1580s illuminates this aspect of the Reformation. Moreover, the debate between Loftus and the new lord deputy, Sir John Perrot, over establishing a university in Ireland illustrates burgeoning factionalism in the Elizabethan Irish council.

Chapter Four takes the claims of the previous chapters further and asks how the system of patronage and state-building could be disrupted by the dynamics of power between the councilors, which was most evident in the treason trial of Lord Deputy Perrot. The overlapping of jurisdictional authority and the constitutional question of the lord deputy's place in Irish government—whether he was part of the Irish council or above it—created such tensions that the Irish council in the mid-1580s to early 1590s devolved into factionalism. Irish councilors divided based on old political allegiances and formed new alliances that fell outside of the patronage system. Clients with different patrons now collaborated to secure their personal interests and political futures. Although the factional grouping that emerged in this period essentially dissolved after Perrot's demise, the incident instilled confidence within the Irish council. They

would continually challenge successive lords deputy, each other, and the queen and privy council during the Nine Years' War.

Chapter Five signals the beginning of a new section that focuses entirely on the Nine Years' War. It dissects the policy decisions made early in the war and the debate among the Irish councilors and between the Westminster and Dublin councils. Crown policy and Irish conciliar policy differed, especially over the suspected involvement of Hugh, the earl of Tyrone. However, the issue was not merely one of differing policies and approaches to Ireland's war. The lord deputy and council acted in opposition to England's queen and privy council.

Further divisions within the Irish administration highlighted some of the dysfunctions already evident in the pre-war years. Their in-fighting had significant implications on England's attempt to regain some semblance of control in Ireland. Thus, in Chapter Six, I discuss how in the second phase of the war, information—about insurgents, the Irish councilors, and resources—became of greater significance to the Westminster government. This fostered a greater dependency on the Irish councilors, and informers generally, for information, which the queen and privy council counterbalanced by utilizing multiple intelligence networks.

The final chapter considers how the intelligence the monarchy had received—and continued to receive—convinced the Westminster government to devote more resources to the war effort and exert greater pressure on and manage the Irish council. Ultimately, while the story of the Nine Years' War is one of continuing tensions between the English and the Irish and of structural deficiencies in government and the military, the war is also a story of the relationship between England and its central institution in Ireland.

The conclusion examines what happened to the Irish councilors after the war under the new monarch, James I. Most of the Irish councilors who survived the Nine Years' War retained

their positions within the Irish administration and their seat on the Irish council. A few even managed to achieve greater political success under James, who—despite padding the Irish council with a large number of additional men—rewarded some of the older councilors for their long experience and service in Ireland.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### Elizabeth's Irish Privy Council Post-1578

As the principal officers of state, the Irish council occupied a central position within the Irish administration. It was the council's responsibility to oversee English governance in Ireland under the leadership of the lord deputy, the viceregent in Ireland, and the assistance of local magnates such as the earls of Kildare and Ormond. Many of the councilors were officeholders in the financial, judicial, and military administrations and clerics within the Church of Ireland. Provincial governors in Connacht and Munster were also part of the Irish council. Meanwhile, the privy council in Dublin undertook the governing of Leinster and some parts of Ulster.<sup>1</sup> Their power and influence thus extended beyond Dublin to all English-occupied areas on the island.

The centrality of the Elizabethan Irish council in managing the English administration in Ireland merits a closer study of the composition of the council and its members. Jon Crawford provided an excellent starting point with his examination of the Irish councilors in Elizabeth's reign through the 1570s. As many of the earlier councilors died and were replaced by a new group of councilors in the 1580s, this chapter delves into the lives of the men who comprised the new conciliar regime in Ireland, with particular emphasis on those who also held offices. In tracing the political and social circumstances that led to their appointment to the Irish council, the chapter illustrates the role of patronage in England and the resourcefulness of the councilors in Ireland. It argues that the success these councilors achieved in elevating their status and office was not simply due to beneficent patrons in England but also reflected their determination to make life in Ireland work. Nowhere was this more evident than in the career of Sir Geoffrey

---

<sup>1</sup> David B. Quinn, introduction to "Calendar of the Irish Council Book 1 March 1581 to 1 July 1586," *Analecta Hibernica* 24 (1967): 103.

Fenton, the secretary of state. And thus, the last section of this chapter explores how a man like Fenton, with little administrative experience, rose to prominence as the Irish secretary of state and became a dominant force on the council.

### **The Composition of the Council**

At the head of the English government and council in Ireland was the viceregent, who held the title of lord deputy or lord lieutenant.<sup>2</sup> Following the Kildare rebellion in the 1530s, the crown had destroyed the old model of using local magnates (like the earls of Kildare) as lords deputy; future chief governors now came from England and required a garrison of their own. As viceroys, they could grant pardons; make treatises; introduce and initiate new policies and utilize martial law. Sir Anthony St. Leger, for example, spearheaded many of the reform policies that contributed to the establishment of English authority in Ireland during his time as lord deputy.<sup>3</sup> Sir Henry Sidney was another lord deputy who changed the face of Irish government. He not only established regional councils to expand the reach of English authority across the island but also introduced composition, a tax scheme devised to increase the self-sufficiency of the Irish government by imposing a fixed yearly rent on Irish lords. Many of Sidney's reform programs failed, as he faced opposition from both Palesmen and the Irish lords. He nonetheless sought to recast his failures as successes in John Derrick's famous *Image of Irelande*, a series of woodcuts produced in 1581 to showcase his viceregal status (see Image 1).

---

<sup>2</sup> The title of lord lieutenant was typically reserved for earls.

<sup>3</sup> S. J. Connolly, *Contested Island: Ireland 1460-1630* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 106. See also, Ciaran Brady, *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536-1588* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).




Image 1 - Sir Henry Sidney's progress through Ireland from John Derrick, *Image of Ireland* (London, 1581) woodcut plate, Edinburgh University Library.

Sidney's propaganda efforts and his writing of "Vindication" came notably after his deputyship and the subsequent violence that followed.<sup>4</sup>

Although lords deputy were powerful figures, they could not, for instance, appoint a councilor or bestow the offices attached to the council on anyone.<sup>5</sup> This authority had been stripped down in the late medieval period to restrain their power and allow for a more

<sup>4</sup> Sir Henry Sidney, *A Viceroy's Vindication?: Sir Henry Sidney's Memoir of Service in Ireland, 1556-1578*, ed. Ciaran Brady (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, 28-37. See also, Instructions to the Earl of Sussex, 20 Mar. 1558, SP 62/1/28, f. 52; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 143. The offices mentioned in Queen Mary's instructions were, to name a few, the lord chancellor, the vice treasurer, the chief justices of the bench and common pleas, etc. The list also extended to those not generally present on the council, namely the receiver-general, the ordnance chief justice (of the army), the attorney solicitor (or solicitor-general), the serjeant-at-law, and the chief engrosser. The lord deputy and council could recommend an individual for these offices, but ultimately, the queen and the privy council decided.

independent Irish council that advised the lord deputy. And yet the constitutional status of the lords deputy, and their inability to effect changes in the constitution of the Irish council, raised questions about their relationship to the council: were they part of the Irish council or separate and above the institution? If separate, were they still accountable to the Irish council or only to the queen and the privy council in England?<sup>6</sup> These questions were especially confounding given the role of the lord deputy *within* the institution. He presided over council sessions to discuss matters of government in Dublin Castle. The lord deputy, when present, also signed the council letters alongside the Irish councilors (see Image 2).

---

<sup>6</sup> The instructions from the queen suggest that the two were, in fact, separate (Instructions to the Earl of Sussex, 20 Mar. 1558, SP 62/1/28, f. 51; *CSP Ire*, 1509-1573, p. 143). The queen's intentions for the Irish council were to be an advisory body to the lord deputy, to assist the lord deputy in managing the realm's affairs. The commonly-used phrase "lord deputy and council" also implies a separation between the viceroy and the council, much like "the queen and the privy council." The latter phrase was also used by scholars to identify the agency of the privy council, who sometimes acted independently without the queen's knowledge or consent. In Ireland, the same was also true. Still, Crawford has also suggested that the interdependence of the lord deputy and council meant that one could not function effectively without the other. As such, any discussion of the Irish council necessarily must include the lord deputy.




Image 2 - Letter from Lord Deputy Sir William Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 15 May 1589, SP 63/144/36, f. 126; CSPIre, p. 184.

When he could not attend, the lord chancellor held the meeting. However, if both were absent, then the meeting could not take place.<sup>7</sup> Whenever the lord deputy traveled outside Dublin, he

<sup>7</sup> Crawford, 60.



generally took some of the Irish council with him, leaving the others (including the chancellor) in Dublin. With this split council—one in the field and the other in Dublin—conciliar work could continue, although the Dublin council seemed more limited in its authority, likely owing to the absence of the lord deputy.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, as the council letter shows (see Image 2), there was a clear hierarchy within the Irish council (the signing of the names by rank from left to right), and the lord deputy (in this case, Sir William Fitzwilliam) was at its head. This practice of signing by rank mirrored those of the English privy council, with the critical distinction that *only* the privy councilors signed the council letter (see Image 3).

---

<sup>8</sup> Crawford, 58-59.




Image 3 - Letter from the Privy Council to the Mayor of Chester, Chester Record Office, ZML 1/42. Image courtesy of Dr. Abby Lagemann.

It was conceivable, then, that the lord deputy was part of the Irish council and its highest member. But the viceroys did not see themselves as such. They had privileged access to the queen, which the Irish council generally did not have. Written communications between the Irish council and the Westminister government were mediated by the privy council in England. The Irish councilors were of lower status, many without the independent wealth characteristic of

lords deputy. And the large households and retinues extended to lords deputy only reinforced their superiority. Like Sidney, some governors took their viceregal status seriously and became "overmighty officers" who rejected the Irish council's advice and challenged their institutional and individual power.<sup>9</sup> Sir John Perrot was one notable example of a lord deputy who overstepped the boundary between vicerealty and sovereignty and found himself at the center of a conspiracy among the Irish councilors to have him imprisoned for high treason—the subject of chapter four. Perrot's case, though exceptional in its intrigue, illustrated that chief governors were accountable to both their Westminster superiors in England and the privy councilors in Ireland. They could be—and at times were—dismissed from office for not working well with others.

In fact, there was a high turnover rate for the office of lord deputy. Within the roughly 20-year period of this study alone, there were seven chief governors and four periods (collectively totaling about six years) where no lord deputy was present in Ireland. It was rare for a lord deputy to maintain the position for more than six years, unlike the Irish councilors who consistently held their offices and membership within the council for many years. In Elizabethan Ireland, the lord deputy was consequently a transitory figure in the Irish administration. He was, in some respects, more replaceable than the Irish councilors, who managed the business of government.

Nevertheless, the removal of a lord deputy from service in Ireland, whether due to ill health, death, or politics, left a hole in the Irish central administration which would be filled according to law and custom. In 1541, the Irish parliament passed the statute, "An Act for the Election of the Lord Justice," which confirmed—what had been established by legal precedent

---

<sup>9</sup> Hiram Morgan, "Overmighty Officers: The Irish Lord Deputyship in the Early Modern British State," *History Ireland* 7 (1999): 17-21.

and common practice—the right of the Irish council to choose by election a lord justice in the absence of a lord deputy, until the appointment (by the king) and the arrival of a new deputy in Ireland.<sup>10</sup> Under the statute, the lord chancellor (the highest judicial officer in Ireland) and the other Irish councilors would choose a man of English birth present already in Ireland and "being of no spiritual person" to take over in governing the realm.<sup>11</sup> If no such person was present, they were to elect two persons from the Irish council "of English blood and surname" and, again, no spiritual persons to serve as lords justices.<sup>12</sup> Once the election concluded and the new lord justice (or justices) sworn into office, he would enjoy thereafter the authority of deputies before him.

The process of electing a lord justice, though formalized, operated differently in practice. It was more often the case that two persons filled the position rather than one. There were only two occasions under the Tudors where a single man served as lord justice, and only then by circumstance: first in 1578 with Sir William Drury, the lord president of Munster, and later, upon the death of Drury in 1579 with Sir William Pelham, the military general.<sup>13</sup> Despite the authority of the Irish council to elect the lord justice, the queen exercised her royal prerogative in approving or rejecting the justice chosen. For example, in late 1597, when the Irish council selected the lord president of Munster, Sir Thomas Norris (the brother of the late military commander and Irish councilor, Sir John Norris), to become the new lord justice, the queen replaced him several weeks later and appointed two others on the council.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the stipulation that only men of English birth could occupy the office was always followed, but less so that no spiritual persons assume the role. During the period of this study, four instances

---

<sup>10</sup> 33 Henry VIII c. 2 [Ireland].

<sup>11</sup> 33 Henry VIII c. 2 [Ireland].

<sup>12</sup> 33 Henry VIII c. 2 [Ireland].

<sup>13</sup> Initially, both Drury and Sir William Gerrard, the lord chancellor, were elected in Apr. 1578, but Gerrard's declining health was an issue. Drury fell sick in late September 1579 and later died in October that year.

<sup>14</sup> The Irish Council to the Privy Council, 29 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/38, f. 86; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec 1597, p. 430.

warranted the use of lords justices, three of which involved insurgencies against the crown—the second Desmond rebellion, and the Nine Years' War. One man filled the role of lord justice three times during these years: Adam Loftus (see Image 4), who served as the archbishop of Armagh, the archbishop of Dublin, and the lord chancellor—the last two offices he held simultaneously.



Image 4 - Portrait of Adam Loftus, date unknown, Trinity College Collection, Dublin.

Loftus's last appointment as lord justice came after the sudden (and unlicensed) departure of Robert, earl of Essex, and lord lieutenant of Ireland, in 1599. Essex's unanticipated appointment of Loftus came only after he had failed miserably in his military campaigns against Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone. He was desperate to leave Ireland and return to the center of politics in England. Before Essex left, he co-opted the authority of the queen and the Irish council to determine the lord justice. What happened with Essex was exceptional, as was the election of a lord justice in 1603. Sir Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, while lord deputy, was also

made lord justice in 1603 owing to the queen's death and only a few days before the Nine Years' War ended. The Irish council substantiated this decision by citing ancient and parliamentary precedent.<sup>15</sup> It was only after Lord Mountjoy became lord justice that he accepted the submission of Hugh O'Neill.

These practices, which were sometimes uncharacteristic, highlighted the nature of governance in Elizabethan Ireland, namely that theory frequently diverged from practice. Such difference caused some confusion, for instance, in the status of the lord deputy in relation to the council. When the Irish councilors complained in the 1560s of their ranking, they found immediate resolution in the list provided by the queen.<sup>16</sup> This issue over lords deputy and whether they were part of the Irish council or above the council was never entirely resolved, which explains, in part, what happened to Perrot.

Second to the lord deputy (and lord justice) was the lord chancellor, who held the highest civil office in the Irish administration. Whoever had the chancellorship also received an appointment as lord keeper of the great seal and maintained custody of the seal used to authenticate Irish government documents. In the sixteenth century, mainly judges and archbishops occupied the role.<sup>17</sup> Adam Loftus, the archbishop of Dublin, served as lord keeper for nearly three years when there was a vacancy in the office of lord chancellor. He was eventually confirmed in the chancellorship and held it for 24 years. Retaining the office for over two decades was a notable achievement, unmatched by anyone else who assumed the office before and after him. Loftus also exerted more influence as lord chancellor than his predecessors.

---

<sup>15</sup> *CSPIre*, James, [July 1603-Dec 1625], p. 10.

<sup>16</sup> D. B. Quinn, "Additional Sidney State Papers, 1566-70," *Analecta Hibernica*, no. 26 (1970): 94; Crawford, 45.

<sup>17</sup> J. R. O'Flanagan, *The Lives of the Lord Chancellors and Lord Keepers of the Great Seal of Ireland*, 2 vols. (London, 1870); F. E. Ball, *The Judges in Ireland, 1121-1921*, 2 vols. (London, 1926).

Like most offices within the Irish council, much of the political power of the office depended on the person who occupied it.

Loftus held both civil and ecclesiastical authority by combining the chancellorship with the office of archbishop of Dublin. During his 45 years in Ireland, Loftus outlasted 12 lords deputy, as well as Queen Elizabeth, and remained on the Irish council longer than any other councilor. Equally notable is the influence that Loftus maintained on the council even after his death. His brother-in-law and protégé, Thomas Jones, the bishop of Meath, became lord chancellor upon Loftus's death. Loftus's nephew and namesake, Sir Adam Loftus, first viscount of Ely, also served as lord chancellor from 1619 to 1639.<sup>18</sup>

Alongside the lord deputy and the lord chancellor, the other councilors included the vice treasurer and treasurer-at-war, who had the challenging task of collecting revenues for the crown and managing the government's finances; the four chief judicial officers in Ireland (chief justice of the queen's bench, chief justice of common pleas, master of the rolls, and chief baron of the exchequer); the two military officers (the marshal of the army and master of the ordnance) and various other military men; the three clerics (the archbishops of Dublin and Armagh and the bishop of Meath); the leading magnates of the realm (the earls of Clanricard, Kildare, Ormond, and Desmond), whose inclusion on the council was nominal; the secretary of state; and clerks of the council. Structurally, the Irish privy council resembled its English counterpart. One notable difference was the exclusion of the royal household, given the queen's permanent residence in England.<sup>19</sup> Also, there was less flexibility in the offices that the Irish councilors held compared to England.<sup>20</sup> Except for the magnates, military advisors, and the bishop of Meath, the offices

---

<sup>18</sup> *ODNB*, "Loftus, Adam."

<sup>19</sup> Crawford, 42-43.

<sup>20</sup> David J. Crankshaw, "The Tudor Privy Council, c. 1540–1603," *State Papers Online, 1509–1714*, Cengage Learning EMEA Ltd, 2009.

listed carried *ex officio* membership to the Irish council and, after 1569, included the provincial presidents.

Although the Irish privy council—with its base in Dublin—was the central institution of the English administration in Ireland, other councils were also operating in Ireland. While serving as lord deputy, Sir Henry Sidney established two regional presidencies and councils in Munster and Connacht. They included a president, justices, bishops, and a clerk (or secretary). Modeled after the provincial governments in Wales and northern England, the goal was to expand legal jurisdiction beyond the Pale to the outlying provinces. The government also considered establishing a presidency and council in Ulster, but the region was too unstable and required more manpower and money than the English government wanted to invest. However, the same could also be said of the provincial governments in Munster and Connacht. Their effectiveness depended on the fluctuating cooperation of the leading magnates in the region. Provincial presidents faced local opposition in these regions, which frustrated the attempts of the English government to enlarge their judicial presence outside of the Pale. As such, the men who held the office of lord president were nearly all military men, with one exception. Sir Edward Fitton served as the first lord president of Connacht in 1569, even though he had little to no prior military experience. Yet even he regarded the presidency as a military endeavor.<sup>21</sup> He disregarded local customs and utilized martial law tactics, which inspired the resistance of local magnates. With such opposition and insufficient financial means to cover the expense of government, the presidency in Connacht failed.<sup>22</sup> In 1572, following the resistance of the earl of Thomond and the earl of Clanricard's sons in Connacht, the queen instituted some changes, one of which was to restrict the authority of the lord president there and change his title to "chief

---

<sup>21</sup> *ODNB*, "Fitton, Sir Edward."

<sup>22</sup> Ciaran Brady, "The Government of Ireland, c. 1540-1583" (PhD diss., Trinity College of Dublin, 1981), 210.



commissioner."<sup>23</sup> The title change did little to restrain the martial activities of successive chief commissioners like Sir Richard Bingham (see Image 5).<sup>24</sup>



Image 5 - Portrait of Sir Richard Bingham, artist unknown, 1564, National Portrait Gallery, London.

In trying to increase the province's revenues to support the local army and government, Bingham made some powerful enemies. Some of them later joined Hugh O'Neill in his fight against the English government in the 1590s.

Despite the authority given to provincial councils, the lord presidents and their fellow councilors answered to both the Westminster and Dublin councils. Therefore, the lord deputy and Dublin council were conduits between Ireland's central and local governments and between

---

<sup>23</sup> Queen Elizabeth to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 1572, *CSPIre*, [1571-1575], p. 251.

<sup>24</sup> Rory Rapple, "Taking up Office in Elizabethan Connacht: The Case of Sir Richard Bingham," *EHR* 123, no. 501 (2008): 277-99; idem, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558-1594* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

England and Ireland.<sup>25</sup> In fact, each regional council had the assistance of one justice on the Dublin council. Sir Nicholas White, the master of the rolls, served as the second justice in Munster, and Sir Robert Dillon, chief justice of the common pleas, advised the Connacht council.<sup>26</sup> In theory, such oversight should have increased the efficacy of provincial governments, but, as with the lord deputy, the personality of the man who occupied the presidency mattered. In practice, Sir Richard Bingham's brutality in Connacht alienated the local magnates and eventually the Irish privy council. When he fled Ireland in 1596, he did so in fear of his life from his fellow council members.

The regional councils, like the Dublin council, also included clerks. Clerks of the council were primarily in charge of recording conciliar meetings and correspondence in the council book or journal. At present, the only surviving remnants of the Irish council books for the period of this study are calendared versions of the 1581-1586 journal, which due to missing pages and the lack of any detailed information about council meetings (dates, places, and attendance lists) makes a comprehensive study of the Irish council and its members difficult. Even the formal register or "act book" of the council, the Black Book, which would have contained information about when new councilors took their oaths into office, appeared to have been used less frequently over time, as the journal gradually superseded the register as the main record for the Irish council.<sup>27</sup> However, it is possible to identify the councilors and their time in office through

---

<sup>25</sup> Sir Geoffrey Elton, "Presidential Address: Tudor Government: The Points of Contact: I. Parliament," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 24 (1974): 183–200; idem, "Presidential Address: Tudor Government: The Points of Contact: II. The Council," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (1975): 195–211; idem, "Presidential Address: Tudor Government: The Points of Contact: III. The Court," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 26 (1976): 211-28.

<sup>26</sup> Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, 307-323.

<sup>27</sup> David B. Quinn, introduction to "Calendar of the Irish Council Book, 1581-1586," *Analecta Hibernica* 24 (1967): 103, 105.

other documents, such as the chancery rolls or outgoing correspondence to the Westminster government and between English officials in Ireland.

Lesser-known figures like the clerks of the council rarely signed council letters, and it is consequently difficult to determine in some cases when their conciliar membership began and ended. From 1580-1603, there were four clerks of the Irish council: Lodowick Bryskett, Nathaniel Dillon, and William Ussher.<sup>28</sup> Bryskett served as clerk from the mid-1570s until Nathaniel Dillon succeeded him in May 1582.<sup>29</sup> Upon Dillon's death in 1594, Ussher obtained the office, though the matter was of some dispute. Ussher had been named as Dillon's successor prior to the clerk's death.<sup>30</sup> However, Adam Loftus, the lord chancellor and archbishop of Dublin, received information that the office would instead be given to Bryskett, the former clerk.<sup>31</sup> Loftus believed the issue was one of prejudice because Ussher was an Irishman. Loftus, therefore, pleaded to Burghley that although Ussher was Irish, he had received an English education at Cambridge and had no knowledge of the Irish language. Moreover, Loftus reminded Burghley that Bryskett's father was Italian and that Bryskett was raised in Italy.<sup>32</sup> He was successful in lobbying for Ussher, who not only obtained the clerkship but remained in office until at least 1636, whereby the office was then jointly split between himself and another.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> It should be noted that there was no other Bryskett, aside from Lodowick, serving as a clerk of the council at that time. Lodowick Bryskett's Italian name makes him easily identifiable. But the variant spellings of his name make it difficult to capture a full record of his life. The *ODNB* article on Lodowick [Lewis] Bryskett offers some factual details about his service in Ireland until the Nine Years' War and then briefly captures his movements across continental Europe (*ODNB*, "Bryskett, Lodowick [Lewis]").

<sup>29</sup> Lodowick Bryskett to Walsingham, 10 May 1582, SP 63/92/29, f. 88; *CSPIre*, 1574-1588, p. 366. Precisely when Bryskett became a clerk of the council is unclear, as some records suggest 1576 and 1577 (see, for example, *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 102).

<sup>30</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 8 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/7, f. 17; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 230.

<sup>31</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus to Burghley, 1 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 267.

<sup>32</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus to Burghley, 1 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 267.

<sup>33</sup> The Lords Justices to Lord Dorchester, [undated] 1630, SP 63/251/1809, f. 164; *CSPIre*, 1625-1632, p. 576. See also, William Wright Ball and Sir William Betham, *The Ussher Memoirs; or, Genealogical memoirs of the Ussher families in Ireland (with appendix, pedigree and index of names)*, compiled from public and private sources (Dublin: Sealy, Bryers & Walker, 1889), 126-137.

Although it is unclear whether Ussher died in office or retired, he served as clerk of the council for well over 40 years.

One final group worthy of mention are the Irish magnates: the earls of Kildare, Ormond, Clancare, and Desmond. They were nominal members of the Irish council whose participation in Irish government extended only to the afforced and great councils. The imposition of cess, for example, was one issue that demanded greater political representation beyond that of the working administrative council, that is, the "lord deputy and council." However, these formal councils were rarely in session after the 1570s, and some earldoms were suppressed following direct involvement or support of insurgent movements in Ireland against the English crown. The earls of Kildare and Desmond (the Geraldines) were effectively marginalized or convicted as traitors in the 1560s and 1570s. Although the earldom of Kildare remained active in title, many of the estates had been granted to other members of the Irish council. The disappearance from the council of most of the territorial magnates in Ireland loosely paralleled a similar trend in the English privy council, but also reflected politics in Ireland. By the 1580s, such politics enabled the dominance of the earl of Ormond (Thomas Butler) and his Irish allies (the earls of Clanricard and Tyrone). Even so, in contrast to Ormond, the earls of Clanricard and Tyrone were noticeably absent from the Irish council, as was another territorial magnate, the earl of Thomond. Ulick Burke, 3rd earl of Clanricard, and Donough O'Brien, 4th earl of Thomond, were only appointed to the regional council in Connacht.<sup>34</sup> Hugh O'Neill, Baron Dungannon, gained recognition as the earl of Tyrone in 1587, but he was never appointed to the Irish council and forfeited the earldom when he left Ireland in 1608.

---

<sup>34</sup> *ODNB*, "Burke, Ulick"; *idem*, "O'Brien, Donough."

## Membership

Appointment to the Irish council depended primarily on patronage and familial connections. One of the most distinctive features of early modern governments is the reliance on patronage as a technique to expand state authority and power. The patronage system was a mechanism that enabled state-building through patron-client networks. Patrons provided support and protection to their clients, and, in return, clients offered loyalty and service to their patrons. The patronage system was, therefore, a mutually beneficial, though unequal, relationship. Patrons could also develop clienteles, or networks of clients, to increase their prestige and political power.<sup>35</sup> While much work has been done on patrons, a "bottom-up" approach—which highlights the role of clients and how they help foster the growth of the state—is more useful in discussions of Elizabethan Ireland, given that the most powerful and influential patrons were in England and their clients in Ireland. Clients formed their own local networks (usually through kinship ties), which could simultaneously enhance patron and state interests. Clients could also garner greater power and authority in their local communities and with their patrons. Patronage was also a vital component of early modern state-building in its facilitation of the expansion of royal authority and, in Elizabethan Ireland, allowing for the monarch's absence.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 4-5.

<sup>36</sup> For a fuller discussion on patronage in Elizabethan England, see J. E. Neale, "The Elizabethan Political Scene," in *Essays in Elizabethan History* (1948, repr. London, 1958), 59-84; Wallace MacCaffrey, "Place and Patronage in Elizabethan Politics," in *Elizabethan Government and Society: Essays Presented to Sir John Neale*, eds. S. T. Bindoff, Joel Hurstfield, and C. H. Williams (London, 1961), 95-126; A. G. R. Smith, *Servant of the Cecils: The Life of Sir Michael Hickeys, 1543-1612* (London: J. Cape, 1977); Simon Adams, "Faction, Clientage and Party: English Politics, 1550-1603," *History Today* 32 (1982): 33-39; idem, "The Patronage of the Crown in Elizabethan Politics: the 1590s in Perspective," in *The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade*, ed. John Guy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20-45; Paul E. J. Hammer, "Patronage at Court, Faction and the Earl of Essex," in *The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade*, ed. John Guy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 65-86.

Royal patronage was the most highly sought after but also the most difficult to attain without independent wealth and prestige. The geographical distance between the queen and her Irish councilors made such connections difficult to develop. The common route to pursue patronage was to solicit significant figures at the English court, usually the privy councilors in England. Men such as Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the lord treasurer, and Sir Francis Walsingham, the principal secretary of state, and Sir Christopher Hatton provided patronage to individuals who became their clients. These clients would, in turn, advance the interests of their patrons. Although the queen named Irish councilors by letters patent, her privy councilors in England used their influence to nominate their clients or suitors for offices in the Irish administration, some of which held *ex-officio* membership on the Irish council. For individuals who desired a career in Ireland, patronage through the privy council in England was the best means of achieving this goal.

However, the Irish councilors also obtained their positions through personal or familial connections. At least four councilors came from influential Old English families, some of whom had previously served on the Irish council. Some English-born men received conciliar offices for the same reason. The office of marshal of the army passed to Sir Henry Bagenal when the previous occupant, his father, resigned. Sir Thomas Norris served as vice-president in Munster under the aegis of his brother, John, and temporarily assumed the role of lord president in his brother's absence. These familial connections extended to fathers and their sons—the St. Legers (Anthony and Warham) and the Brabazons (Sir William and his son, Edward); brothers—the Pelhams (William and Edmund); uncles and their nephews—the Dowdalls (George and his

nephew, James); and cousins—the Dillons (Sir Lucas and Sir Robert) and the Carews (Sir Peter and Sir George).<sup>37</sup>

Some of the councilors were also related by marriage. Sir Lucas Dillon, chief baron of the Irish exchequer, married the daughter of James Bath, another former chief baron.<sup>38</sup> Sir Geoffrey Fenton, the secretary of state, married the daughter of Robert Weston, a former lord chancellor. Fenton's daughter, Catherine, then married Sir Richard Boyle, a younger son, and an adventurer. He later became the earl of Cork and one of the richest men in the Atlantic archipelago.<sup>39</sup> Both Dillon and Fenton themselves married the daughters of former councilors. Thomas Jones, the bishop of Meath, married the sister-in-law of the current lord chancellor and archbishop of Dublin, Adam Loftus. Just as in England, therefore, many of the leading members of the Elizabethan establishment in Ireland were tied by bonds of kinship and marriage.

Advancement to the Irish council, or even within the administration, was by no means guaranteed regardless of one's familial connections. Walsingham's servant, Patrick Foxe, tried for over a year to obtain an "ordinary" clerkship within the Irish administration but found that his brother-in-law and clerk of the Irish council, Nathaniel Dillon, rejected his suit.<sup>40</sup> Nathaniel may have suspected that Foxe sought his office in particular, as there were rumors to that effect.<sup>41</sup> However, Foxe had served on some prior occasion as the deputy for the clerk of the council and stated that he only desired to regain his former office. Despite the intercession of

---

<sup>37</sup> Sources used in the compilation of this list: *ODNB*, *DIB*, *History of Parliament Online*, and Cokayne, *Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the United Kingdom, Extant, Extinct, or Dormant*, 8 vols. (London: G. Bell & sons, 1887-98).

<sup>38</sup> *ODNB*, "Dillon, Sir Lucas"; idem, "Dillon, Sir Robert."

<sup>39</sup> *ODNB*, "Boyle, Sir Richard." Boyle's wealth and status have made him the focus of several studies, including Nicholas Canny, *The Upstart Earl: A Study of the Social and Mental World of Richard Boyle, First Earl of Cork, 1566-1643* (New York; Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1982); David Edwards and Colin Rynne, eds., *The Colonial World of Richard Boyle, First Earl of Cork* (Dublin, Ireland; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2018).

<sup>40</sup> Patrick Foxe to Walsingham, 26 Sept. 1588, SP 63/136/51, f. 206r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 43.

<sup>41</sup> Foxe to Walsingham, 8 Feb. 1589, SP 63/141/16, f. 41; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 120.

Adam Loftus, the archbishop of Dublin, John Garvey, the then bishop of Kilmore who soon after became the archbishop of Armagh and an Irish councilor, and Sir Lucas Dillon, the chief baron of the exchequer, Nathaniel was unmoved and supposedly even wrote against Foxe.<sup>42</sup> Finding Nathaniel to be a "malicious man[n]," Foxe then sent a report of abuses committed by the clerk against him, alleging that Nathaniel said "yt was not fitt" that Foxe should serve in Ireland having an already esteemed position as Walsingham's servant.<sup>43</sup> To this charge, Foxe claimed that although he did not wish to forego being Walsingham's servant, some other man needed to occupy the office of clerk of the Irish council. Foxe's appeals were partially successful. He was restored to his former office as deputy to the clerk of the Irish council, but had to work under his brother-in-law, who remained in office until his death in 1594.<sup>44</sup>

While the inclusion of relatives was visible in Irish administration, the practice elicited charges of corruption and nepotism. Irish councilors faced criticism from others whenever they procured employment for their kin in the administration, as in England. Old English families were accused of nepotism in the 1570s, as were New English councilors like Loftus from the 1580s and onwards. In theory, employing one's kin encouraged loyalty to the kinship group and indirectly to the state. Such practices created a clientele network based on kinship. States could, therefore, draw on the individual power of their officers through their families. Moreover, patron-client relationships, which were integral in selecting individuals for the Irish council, mimicked the bond of kinship; when no familial bonds existed, they were created. But, in

---

<sup>42</sup> Foxe to Walsingham, 26 Sept. 1588, SP 63/136/51, f. 206; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 43.

<sup>43</sup> Foxe to Walsingham, 12 Apr. 1589, SP 63/143/26, f. 107r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 152.

<sup>44</sup> Sir Lucas Dillon and Sir Nicholas White to Walsingham, 28 Feb. 1590, SP 63/150/82, f. 234; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 314. Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 8 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/7, f. 17; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 230.



practice, prejudice could undermine the effectiveness of kinship networks in the state-building process.

The process for clerics to become Irish councilors was also through the patronage system and by letters patent, though this change had only been implemented in 1560. Previously, the elections of archbishops and bishops of Ireland proceeded from a writ of *congé d'élire*, which conferred this authority on the deans and chapters of the various Irish dioceses.<sup>45</sup> But long delays in the election process affected the ability of the bishop-elect to collect revenues from the diocese and subsequently forced the crown to provide temporary means of income to the individual.<sup>46</sup> Elizabeth streamlined the process by removing elections for prelates and ordered that bishops be advanced only by letters patent, as with the Irish councilors. The appointment of the three prelates—in Dublin, Armagh, and Meath—who sat on the Irish council was now the queen's.

Like the other Irish councilors, prelates often obtained their religious offices through their relationships with chief governors. Loftus and John Garvey had both been chaplains to Thomas Radcliffe, third earl of Sussex, who was lord lieutenant in Ireland in the 1550s and 1560s. Similarly, Thomas Lancaster was chaplain to Sir Henry Sidney, the lord deputy in the 1560s and 1570s. All three men—Loftus, Garvey, and Lancaster—served as archbishops for Armagh. On the other hand, Thomas Jones became the bishop of Meath due to his close relationship with Loftus. Loftus had appealed to Burghley, and likely also Walsingham, for Jones to be made

---

<sup>45</sup> 2 Elizabeth I c. 4.

<sup>46</sup> While the statute provides little detail about the "great costes and charges" of long delays in elections, Loftus's delayed election to the archbishopric of Armagh in 1562 is one example that illustrates the financial burden the crown undertook because of the delay. Elizabeth had issued a *congé d'élire* for Loftus's election to the archbishopric even after the statute, but events made it painfully obvious that the system was ineffective. 2 Elizabeth I c. 4.

bishop.<sup>47</sup> He even later petitioned that Jones be made an Irish councilor.<sup>48</sup> Owing to Loftus's status and prestige on the Irish council, his recommendation of Jones received support from the Westminster government. Jones and Loftus remained close until Loftus died in 1605. The vacuum created by his death left an opening for Jones, who gained the two offices that Loftus had previously held—the archbishopric of Dublin and the chancellorship.

### **Characteristics of the Councilors**

In contrast to the Westminster privy councilors and the Irish councilors between 1556 and 1578, most of those who served as Irish councilors from 1580 to 1605 were younger sons who came to Ireland from England.<sup>49</sup> Some post-1580 councilors came from large families with three or more sons. Sir Geoffrey Fenton and Sir Arthur Chichester both were one of seven.<sup>50</sup> Sir John Norris was one of six sons, and his younger brother, Thomas, was also on the council.<sup>51</sup> There were some elder sons on the Irish council, but most of them came from prominent Irish or Old English families or, if English-born, served as lords deputy. Thomas Lord Burgh, Sir George Carey, Robert, earl of Essex, Sir William Fitzwilliam, Sir Arthur Grey—nearly all served as

---

<sup>47</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 20 Jan. 1584, SP 63/107/40, f. 116; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 491. Lord Justice Loftus to Burghley, 11 Mar. 1584, SP 63/108/12, f. 33; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 499. Loftus also thanked Walsingham for the secretary's nomination of Jones (Loftus to Walsingham, 6 Apr. 1584, SP 63/109/11, f. 19; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 505).

<sup>48</sup> Lords Justices Loftus and Wallop and Council to Walsingham, 6 June 1584, SP 63/110/62, f. 133; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 515. The only other councilor who signed the letter was Edward Waterhouse.

<sup>49</sup> The Irish council from 1556 and 1578 was a mix of elder and younger sons. Although some familial data about the older councilors is not available, the existing information suggests no one group dominated the other. This is also the conclusion Crawford reached in his examination of the Irish council in this period. However, for the information available for the post-1580 period, there were 53 men total, 8 of whom birth order cannot be determined for lack of evidence. Of the 45 men, 26 were younger sons and 19 elder sons. The numbers, though, are somewhat deceiving. Of the elder sons, at least seven were born in Ireland. Of the younger sons who were Irish, there was only 1. The data, therefore, suggest that there were more younger sons from England than there were elder sons. Further, the Irishmen on the council was almost entirely elder sons. Rory Rapple observed that most men who went to Ireland as captains were younger sons, and of the nine men he named, six were Irish councilors. See Rory Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558-1594* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 58.

<sup>50</sup> *ODNB*, "Fenton, Sir Geoffrey"; idem, "Chichester, Arthur, Baron Chichester."

<sup>51</sup> *ODNB*, "Norris [Norreys], Sir John"; idem, "Norris [Norreys], Sir Thomas."

lords deputy or lord lieutenant. The exception was Sir Henry Wallop, who instead became vice-treasurer. The eldest sons of some of the Gaelic magnates (the Kildares and Ormonds) also sat on the council, as well as those from distinguished Old English families—Sir Lucas Dillon, Sir Robert Dillon (Louis's cousin), and Edward Brabazon.<sup>52</sup>

Elder sons from England showed less inclination to take up service in Ireland.<sup>53</sup> The system of primogeniture practiced in England guaranteed the inheritance of family estates to the eldest son. The importance placed on birth order was to the disadvantage of younger sons, but it also left elder sons generally unwilling to leave their homes for Ireland. For elder sons with political ambitions in Westminster, Ireland was too far removed from the center of political activity. Emigrating out of England to an alien island also offered little appeal, except to those men who wanted to make their own fortune or recover the loss of their family's fortune. Even if these men had a large salary in Ireland, investing one's wealth in a foreign venture could be financially disastrous. Holding office in England and Ireland carried the expectation that the holder's own personal wealth would be utilized to carry out the duties of the office. For example, as England's principal secretary, Sir Francis Walsingham invested a significant portion of his wealth, some of which he used to build an intelligence network to counteract Spanish and Catholic threats to the realm. Though he developed an international reputation as a "spymaster," he did so at great expense and died heavily in debt.<sup>54</sup>

The potential for recouping one's financial losses while in office was not a guarantee of success. The chances were likely significantly less in Ireland due to chronic underfunding—the

---

<sup>52</sup> *ODNB*, "Dillon, Sir Lucas"; idem, "Dillon, Sir Robert." On Edward Brabazon, see G. E. Cokayne, *Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the United Kingdom, Extant, Extinct, or Dormant*, vol. 2 (London: G. Bell & sons, 1887-98), 1.

<sup>53</sup> I include only sons under the category of elder sons since their position in the family carried the same status as an elder son.

<sup>54</sup> Conyers Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth*, 3rd ed., vol. 3 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1967), 442-445.

focus of chapter two. Before he was appointed vice-treasurer in Ireland, Sir Henry Wallop was the eldest son of a wealthy landowner in Hampshire. He had been knighted by the queen in 1569 and participated extensively in local government. Like other eminent gentlemen, he had no desire to go to a land that could bring about his financial ruin. When he received news of his appointment in Ireland, he tried to respectfully decline the office; he expressed his thanks and emphasized his inadequacy for the post.<sup>55</sup> Once it became clear that the queen would insist upon his appointment, he dragged his feet and eventually departed for Ireland in September 1579, not long after the start of the Desmond rebellion in Munster.<sup>56</sup> The rebellion lasted for four years and became a significant drain on Ireland's—and Wallop's—finances. Whatever money the crown had given him disappeared quickly, and, as he petitioned for more money, he resorted to borrowing money from others to fulfill his duties.<sup>57</sup> Over the years, Wallop petitioned on numerous occasions to receive grants to help him recoup the financial losses he had incurred while in office.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, he was also accused of using office to enrich himself on a large scale.

For many Englishmen, especially elder sons, Ireland was a frontier zone they did not want to enter. However, for younger sons, Ireland offered the potential for financial independence and success, career advancement, and status. That the Irish council consisted of many younger sons out of England after 1580 represented a substantial change in the composition of the council.

Many of these councilors had prior military experience, which was as expected, since younger sons also tended to pursue careers within the church or the military. The politics of the

---

<sup>55</sup> Sir Henry Wallop to Walsingham, 30 July 1579, SP 63/67/69, f. 155; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 177.

<sup>56</sup> *ODNB*, "Wallop, Sir Henry."

<sup>57</sup> Note of certificate by Treasurer Wallop, Nov. 1579, SP 63/70/38. I, f. 100; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 198.

<sup>58</sup> See for example, Wallop to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/53, f. 194; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 135.

1580s and 1590s—Irish resistance, the Catholic threat, and war with Spain—meant the large-scale and sustained employment for military men in Ireland who could defend and maintain English hegemony on the island. Since the 1540s, the Tudors established a pattern of using men who had served in France and transferring them to other frontiers in Scotland, the Low Countries, and Ireland.<sup>59</sup> Sir John Norris had a distinguished military career on the continent before commanding troops in Ireland, and he also moved between service in the Low Countries and Ireland. He eventually ascended to the Munster presidency. Sir Richard Bingham's military and naval experience in Europe resulted in his dispatch to Ireland during the Second Desmond Rebellion, though he had no prior experience in Ireland.<sup>60</sup> By the 1570s and 1580s, voyages to the New World became another theater of English military activity, and officers, such as Sir George Carew, gained military experience across the Atlantic (see Image 6).



Image 6 - Portrait of Sir George Carew, c. 1615-1620, National Portrait Gallery, London.

---

<sup>59</sup> Neil Murphy, *The Tudor Occupation of Boulogne: Conquest, Colonisation and Imperial Monarchy, 1544-1550* (New York; Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 238.

<sup>60</sup> Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture*, 255.

In 1578, Carew was a naval captain in Sir Humphrey Gilbert's expedition to the West Indies. Later in 1596 and 1597, he accompanied Robert, earl of Essex, in the Cadiz and Azores expeditions.<sup>61</sup>

These martial men obtained high political offices in Ireland because of their military background and, for some, despite their violent pasts. Despite murdering a man in England and fleeing to Ireland, Sir Nicholas Bagenal's protection under Conn O'Neill and his military experience in France led to his appointment as marshal of the army in 1547. Though he lost the post in 1553 under Mary I, he eventually regained it in 1565 and retained it until 1590.<sup>62</sup> Likewise, in 1583, George Carew murdered an Irishman whom he believed to have killed his brother.<sup>63</sup> But his military and naval service under Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and his relationship with Sir Robert Cecil, eventually enabled his advancement to lord president of Munster in 1600.<sup>64</sup>

The Irish councilors also created a support network among themselves. With the help of a fellow councilor, they could achieve their aims, and, on several occasions, they sought to do so outside the purview of the queen and the privy council. They utilized the recommendations of their fellow councilors to further their own suits for offices, money, and land grants. They also cooperated with lords deputy, who was the closest parallel in Ireland to the queen. But the high

---

<sup>61</sup> *ODNB*, "Carew, George, earl of Totnes."

<sup>62</sup> *ODNB*, "Bagenal, Sir Nicholas."

<sup>63</sup> Following the death of George's brother, Peter, he wrote to Walsingham that the loss he sustained "by this wicked nacyon is to greyveous to Remember, if hope of Reuenge did not bread me Compforte" (George Carew to Walsingham, 20 Nov. 1580, SP 63/78/50, f. 112r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 270). Carew seemed to have gotten his revenge. Lords Justices Loftus and Wallop reported in 1583 that Carew had stabbed and killed an Irishman named Owen O'Nasye, whom he believed to be his brother's killer. According to the lords justices, O'Nasye had been hired by the Irish council to apprehend the brother of Viscount Baltinglas, Walter Eustace (Lords Justices to the Privy Council, 25 June 1583, SP 63/102/108, f. 241; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 454). It does not appear that Carew received any punishment for this killing.

<sup>64</sup> *ODNB*, "Carew, Sir George."

turnover rate of viceroys meant a greater dependence on the other Irish councilors. Thus, during the years of this study, the councilors in Dublin—Adam Loftus, Sir Henry Wallop, Thomas Jones, Sir Lucas Dillon, Sir Robert Dillon, Sir Robert Gardener, Sir Nicholas White, and Sir Geoffrey Fenton —formed a core nucleus, as they were the councilors who primarily attended council meetings to discuss Irish affairs.<sup>65</sup>

Of the core group of Irish councilors, Sir Geoffrey Fenton provides the best example to illustrate many of the points about the council enumerated in this chapter. Charting Fenton's career from literary scholar to Irish secretary of state reveals the ambitions of men who came to Ireland, their appointment to the Irish council, and how they used the office and other councilors to achieve their goals. Such a study is possible because, as secretary, Fenton was also a prolific writer. The Irish State Papers holds as many as 1,000 letters, many of which were either penned by Fenton or a clerk in his employ. His letters have been used by scholars in their studies of Elizabethan Ireland, but only a select few have looked to Fenton as a figure worthy of attention.<sup>66</sup> Doing so now shines a spotlight on a figure who, by his office and career aspirations, wrote prodigiously on the council and thus contributed extensively to the writing of this dissertation.

### **Sir Geoffrey Fenton and the Rise of the Secretary of State in Ireland**

---

<sup>65</sup> Carew later became a major political figure in the 1590s because of his close relationship with Sir Robert Cecil, the principal secretary at the time.

<sup>66</sup> Judith Barry, "Sir Geoffrey Fenton and the Office of Secretary of State for Ireland, 1580-1608," *IHS* 35 (2006): 137-159. Barry concluded that Fenton's disputes with various lords deputy ultimately hurt the authority of the office. Mark A. Hutchinson has also brought attention to Fenton, although his interest in Fenton is solely on the secretary's contribution to developing a modern state in Ireland. See Hutchinson, "The Emergence of the State in Elizabethan Ireland and England, ca. 1575-99," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 45 (2014): 659-682, p. 674; idem, "'The State': Ireland's Contribution to the History of Political Thought," *The Irish Review* 48 (2014): 28-35; idem, *Calvinism, Reform and the Absolutist State in Elizabethan Ireland* (London; New York: Routledge, 2016).

As a younger son in a family of seven children—six of whom were sons—Geoffrey Fenton had to find his own path to success.<sup>67</sup> He could not rely, as the elder son did, on the family's fortune. Fenton traveled across Europe and became a translator of popular international texts.<sup>68</sup> His translated works were, like the originals, a success. In fact, the first edition of *Holinshed's Chronicle* was inspired by Fenton's English translation of Francesco Guicciardini's *Storia d'Italia*.<sup>69</sup> Likewise, Shakespeare utilized Fenton's texts as a resource in the writing of his plays.<sup>70</sup> But a life of literary achievement was not Fenton's goal. Instead, he sought a career in royal service—whether in the British archipelago or on the continent—and recognized that he needed the support of a powerful patron. Therefore, he utilized the dedicatory pages of his works to capture the attention of the prominent political figures at the English court.

From Fenton's dedications, it was clear that he targeted the patronage of three men in particular—Sir William Cecil (Lord Burghley), Sir Francis Walsingham, and Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester. In 1567, he dedicated *Certain tragicall discourses* to Lady Mary Sidney, sister of the earl of Leicester and mother of the famous Elizabethan poet, Sir Philip Sidney.<sup>71</sup> Fenton also

---

<sup>67</sup> On the genealogy of the Fenton family, see George William Marshall, ed., *The Visitations of the County of Nottingham in the Pears, 1569 and 1614*, vol. 4 (London: Harleian Society, 1871), 33-34.

<sup>68</sup> ODNB, "Fenton, Sir Geoffrey." His translated works were, like the originals, a success. In fact, the first edition of *Holinshed's Chronicle* is based on Fenton's English translation of Francesco Guicciardini's *Storia d'Italia*. See

<sup>69</sup> Jeannette Fellheimer, "Geoffrey Fenton's *Historie of Guicciardin* and *Holinshed's Chronicles* of 1587," *Modern Language Quarterly* 6 (1945): 285-298. For a more complete discussion of Fenton's literary contributions, see Fellheimer, "Geoffrey Fenton: A Study in Elizabethan Translation" (PhD diss., Yale University, 1941). Or a more recent publication, Andrew Hadfield, "Sidney's Comments on History in *An Apology for Poetry* and Geoffrey Fenton's *Tragicall Discourses*: A Note," *Sidney Newsletter & Journal* 15 (1997): 48-51.

<sup>70</sup> Some scholars have argued that Shakespeare's reliance on Fenton's translations illustrates a connection between Fenton and the "real" Shakespeare, Edward de Vere, the earl of Oxford. This spurious Oxfordian alternate theory of Shakespeare's authorship places great emphasis on the relationship between Fenton and de Vere, particularly de Vere's easy access to Fenton's works, thus establishing how and why Shakespeare came into contact with his literature. See, for example, J. Thomas Looney, *"Shakespeare" Identified in Edward De Vere, the Seventeenth Earl of Oxford* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes co., 1920). Though the Oxfordian theory has been debunked, it is worthy of mention given the role of Fenton in its thesis. The real-life connection between Fenton and Shakespeare is flawed, but it gives continued relevance to this oft-neglected figure.

<sup>71</sup> Geoffrey Fenton, *Certaine tragicall discourses* (London, 1567). Mary was also the wife of Sir Henry Sidney, who at the time was the lord deputy of Ireland.



wrote dedications to Lady Hoby, the sister-in-law of Burghley, and finally, in 1574, he dedicated *A forme of Christian pollicie* to Burghley himself.<sup>72</sup>

Fenton seems to have had some success because, by September 1574, his signature was on an official Irish administrative document, presumably as a clerk or deputy of the Dublin administration.<sup>73</sup> This position would have been a good starting point for Fenton since clerks were essential functionaries in the business of Irish government. As a clerk of the Irish council, he would have been responsible for writing and maintaining council records; attending meetings; writing reports, letters, and summaries; recording submissions, proclamations, and town petitions; and delivering conciliar messages to London.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, through his clerkship, he could gain access to important figures and their secretaries, who could then advocate on his behalf to Leicester, Burghley, or Walsingham.

In Fenton's case, he also had a familial connection because his older brother, Edward Fenton, was already working in Ireland. Edward was, like his brother, well-educated. However, while Geoffrey looked to Ireland to start his political career, Edward focused his attention on the navy and made crucial connections between Elizabeth's court and Ireland. He had accompanied Martin Frobisher as lieutenant general on his voyages to Baffin Island in Canada in 1577. These expensive expeditions had sponsorship from prominent figures in the Elizabethan regime and also had the advantage of connecting Edward to Burghley and, indirectly, the queen. Edward also married the daughter of Benjamin Gunson (or Gonson), a treasurer in the Royal Navy, and

---

<sup>72</sup> Fenton, *A forme of Christian pollicie* (London, 1574).

<sup>73</sup> *Cal. Carew, 1515-1574*, pp. 481-483. It is possible that Fenton was a mere deputy, tasked with writing and recording conciliar activity for the Irish council book. Still, he seemed to have had some experience with the Irish council. Carew's dating of this document to 1574 seems odd. Perrot's name also appears on the document, but according to the *ODNB* and confirmed in *State Papers*, he had already left Ireland in July 1573. Perrot's next public appointment was in Wales. It is possible that Carew misdated the document, and its original date may have been a year or two earlier.

<sup>74</sup> I owe this list of clerks' duties entirely to Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, 69-78.

the son of Sir William Gunson, another naval administrator.<sup>75</sup> He thus formed some important connections within the Navy, and his maritime ventures afforded him political support from England's major players.<sup>76</sup>

When Geoffrey obtained his brother's help, Edward was a soldier employed under the military commander and lord justice, Sir William Pelham, a client of Leicester. In 1579, he had employment in Ireland, serving Pelham, another Frobisher adventurer, during the Desmond Rebellion. He frequently wrote to Walsingham with information on the progress of their campaign.<sup>77</sup> Edward thus had direct access to a prominent figure at the English court. In October 1579, while extolling the virtues of Pelham in a letter to Walsingham, Edward thought fit to briefly mention his brother's "poore sute."<sup>78</sup> In his letter dated January 1580, he implored Walsingham to "ymploye my brother Geffraye in any foreaine service whereunto he is bente," noting that his brother wanted only to be a "poore follower" of Walsingham's.<sup>79</sup>

Edward's solicitation of Geoffrey's employment was timely. He had worked closely with Pelham and was probably aware of the lord justice's dislike of his secretary, John Chaloner. Only a month after Edward's letter to Walsingham, Pelham denounced Chaloner in his own letter to Walsingham.<sup>80</sup> At this point, Geoffrey had only worked as a messenger for Pelham

---

<sup>75</sup> ODNB, "Fenton, Edward."

<sup>76</sup> In 1582, Leicester would fund Fenton's voyage to the Moluccas and China, another expensive venture. See Nathan J. Probasco, *Sir Humphrey Gilbert and the Elizabethan Expedition: Preparing for a Voyage* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 188-189.

<sup>77</sup> ODNB, "Fenton, Edward."

<sup>78</sup> Edward Fenton to Walsingham, 16 Oct. 1579, SP 63/69/64, f. 0136r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 192.

<sup>79</sup> Edward Fenton to Walsingham, 3 Jan. 1580, SP 63/71/2, f. 5r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 204.

<sup>80</sup> Lord Justice Pelham to Walsingham, 16 Feb. 1580, SP 63/71/46, f. 102r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 209. Also, *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, p. 250. His endorsement of Geoffrey may have been because he was Edward's brother or simply because his own secretary, Edward Waterhouse, had petitioned to be discharged of his place as secretary. Waterhouse was the de facto secretary of state, but he did not want the office and petitioned on numerous occasions to be discharged of the office. See for example, The Lord Justice and Council to the Council in England, 1580 Jan. 10, *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, p. 196; Pelham's letter stating that Waterhouse was working as secretary of state (*Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, pp. 191-192).

during the Munster rebellion and the president of Connaught, Sir Nicholas Malby.<sup>81</sup> Despite Fenton's inexperience, he made one final plea to the earl of Leicester upon hearing of a new lord deputy coming to Ireland. He noted the custom of governors appointing men to offices based "more by p[art]ialitie and affection, then just Respects to the virtue and Merits of men."<sup>82</sup> He added that, without his lordship's favor, he would be compelled to return to England before having had a chance to make himself useful in matters of intelligence.<sup>83</sup>

Fenton had cast a wide net in his solicitations for office. Though he had supplied Burghley with information about the situation in the Low Countries and had served as a conduit for the lord justice and his brother concerning the Munster rebellion, he wanted an official government position with a salary.<sup>84</sup> And with the appointment of Arthur Lord Grey de Wilton to serve as the new lord deputy in Ireland, Fenton got his wish. He was awarded the position of secretary of state.

---

<sup>81</sup> *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, pp. 182-183; *idem*, p. 186; Fenton to Burghley, 16 Feb. 1580, SP 63/71/47, f. 104; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 209. Fenton seems to have held Pelham in high regard, judging from his reports to Walsingham and Leicester. In his letters in the fall of 1580, he frequently praised the efforts of Pelham in the Munster rebellion. See for instance, Fenton to Leicester, 8 Aug. 1580, SP 63/75/27, f. 57; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 242. Fenton to Leicester, 8 Sept. 1580, SP 63/76/19, f. 32; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 249. Sir Nicholas Malby to Burghley, 4 Nov. 1579, SP 63/70/3, f. 5; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 193.

<sup>82</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 10 July 1580, SP 63/74/17, f. 30r; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 231.

<sup>83</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 10 July 1580, SP 63/74/17, f. 30; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 231.

<sup>84</sup> In 1578 Fenton provided Burghley with intelligence in the Low Countries (Observations touching Don John, the state of his camp, 29 Apr. 1578, SP 83/6/827, f. 73; *CSPFor, 1577-1578*, p. 642). Burghley labeled the report as a declaration made by a "Mr fento[n]s." One might be tempted to view this "Mr. Fenton" as his brother Edward, given his frequent travels across the continent, but the handwriting and idiosyncrasies within are clearly Geoffrey's. Edward was also preoccupied with Martin Frobisher's expeditions to Baffin Island in Canada. Though Edward had returned to England sometime in 1577 and was still there in 1578 (planning a voyage to discover the "Meta Incognita," the northwest passage), it is unlikely that he had insinuated himself within political landscape of the Low Countries. He would have had to spend a considerable amount of time in Hainault to have gained the intelligence we see in the letter. In 1572, Geoffrey had written a letter to Richard Wrothe, the former secretary to the earl of Sussex and lord lieutenant of Ireland. The letter, written entirely in French, was an inquiry into service in the Low Countries. It is far more likely that Fenton's inquiry about service in the Low Countries resulted in his placement there. Money was also of great concern to Fenton. He wrote on several occasions to Leicester, Burghley, and Walsingham about a patent for the office and the associated fee (Fenton to Burghley, 22 July 1580, SP 63/74/59, f. 114; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 236. Fenton to Burghley, 8 Aug. 1580, SP 63/75/26, f. 54; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 242).

It was unclear which appeal—Edward, Pelham, or Geoffrey’s—had been successful.<sup>85</sup> Nevertheless, Fenton was politic in his congratulatory letters to all three potential patrons. He politely thanked Burghley for his new post, offering to serve as his intelligencer in Ireland—and wrote nearly identical letters to Leicester and Walsingham with the same proposal. It is worth noting here that Fenton did not propose being a mere informant. Anyone could report information to the government, and, like most early modern European governments, non-state-sponsored surveillance was an inexpensive means of obtaining information. Fenton, however, wanted to be an intelligencer, actively involved in defending England's interests in Ireland from domestic and foreign threats.

By offering to be an intelligencer, Fenton was also trying to utilize his skills as a scholar to help negotiate a "knowledge transaction" with potential patrons.<sup>86</sup> In exchange for patronage, he would gather information and generate intelligence reports. Leading political figures during Elizabeth's reign employed the services of such scholars with the intent of using their scholarly expertise in gathering information to their political advantage. Following the example of Burghley and Walsingham, Robert, earl of Essex, acquired well-educated men to serve in his secretariat.<sup>87</sup> He also dispatched them to the continent to gather intelligence. There were

---

<sup>85</sup> Pelham had written a letter on 14 July 1580 thanking Walsingham for Fenton's placement as secretary, especially considering that Chaloner's age made him "unapt to travel" and the other secretary, Edward Waterhouse, was executing duties in the Irish exchequer (*Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, p. 276). Geoffrey had another brother, Henry, who was a servant of the earl of Warwick, Leicester's brother (SP 15/27/pt. 1, 91, f. 139; *CSPDom*, Addenda, 1580-1625, p. 63). This may have been another point of contact for Fenton.

<sup>86</sup> Lisa Jardine and William H. Sherman, "Pragmatic Readers: Knowledge Transactions and Scholarly Services in Late Elizabethan England," in *Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain: Essays in Honour of Patrick Collinson*, eds. Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 104. See also Jardine and Anthony Grafton, "'Studied for Action': How Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy," *Past & Present* 129 (Nov. 1990): 30-78.

<sup>87</sup> Paul E. J. Hammer, "The Uses of Scholarship: The Secretariat of Robert Devereux, Second Earl of Essex, c. 1585-1601," *EHR* 109 (1994): 26-51; idem, "The Earl of Essex, Fulke Greville, and the Employment of Scholars," *Studies in Philology* 91 (1994): 167-180; idem, "Essex and Europe: Evidence from Confidential Instructions by the Earl of Essex, 1595-6," *EHR* 111 (1996): 357-381; idem, "How to Become an Elizabethan Statesman: Lord Henry Howard, the Earl of Essex and the Politics of Friendship," *English Manuscript Studies 1100-1700* 13 (2007): 1-34.

opportunities available for scholars to enter the political arena. Fortunately for Fenton, he could transfer his skills as a scholar directly to his new office as secretary and broaden his network.

With Fenton's new post as secretary of state in Ireland, he now wielded authority. In early modern Europe, the secretary of state was an important position in government. Secretaries of state were essential figures in the functioning of government and the making of policy. They were record-keepers, in charge of the collection and preservation of information, and, in the sixteenth century, the volume of information rose to unprecedented levels.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, their routine proximity to the monarch afforded them an even greater influence in politics and policy. In Tudor England, the three most prominent principal secretaries—Thomas Cromwell, William Cecil, and Francis Walsingham—ascended to positions of great power. They were leading political figures whose influence stemmed from their management of state correspondence. They were privy to information inaccessible to most. And they capitalized on the office by extending their authority to matters of policy.

From the outset, Fenton recognized the opportunity for political success that his new position as secretary provided him in a way that the former secretary, John Chaloner, did not. At the time of its creation in 1560, the queen envisioned the position of secretary of state in Ireland as the Irish equivalent to the principal secretary in England. As such, the Irish secretary was not merely a clerk of the council. He was a figure of greater authority and importance and even had custody of the new privy seal of Ireland.<sup>89</sup> Yet lords deputy frequently undermined the secretary of state. They regarded the office as a subsidiary of, and inferior to, their own personal secretaries.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>88</sup> Paul M. Dover, "Introduction: The Age of Secretaries," in *Secretaries and Statecraft in the Early Modern World*, ed. Paul M. Dover (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 1-15.

<sup>89</sup> Instructions to the Earl of Sussex, 1560, SP 63/2/18, f. 38; *CSP Ire*, 1509-1573, p. 160.

<sup>90</sup> Crawford, 73-76.

The character and personality of the first secretary had also rendered the office inconsequential. Chaloner had been appointed based on the recommendation of Lord Lieutenant Sussex.<sup>91</sup> However, Chaloner did not want the position. He spent several years trying to resign the office. Although his brother, Thomas Chaloner, was a highly respected and prominent figure in the Elizabethan political sphere, John had no such intentions.<sup>92</sup> In a letter to Burghley, he wrote that he had no ambition to become secretary, partly because he thought himself unqualified to occupy the office—even after serving three years as secretary of state. He argued that his work in Calais as an auditor had not prepared him to take up such vital work in Ireland.<sup>93</sup> Although Chaloner officially retained the office, he was of little consequence in the making of policy and reform.

Fenton, however, would use the office as a platform to advance his political career. His first task was securing himself in the office. Chaloner's role as secretary had not been officially revoked. Therefore, Fenton technically shared the office and its fee with Chaloner. Lodowick Bryskett, who was himself making a career in Ireland via the pen, believed that the dual occupation of the office of secretary was intentional because of Fenton's inexperience: "it is to be supposed that some man of experience is to be appointed to supplie that charge and to be ioyned with Mr ffenton for the execuc[i]on of that place."<sup>94</sup> Upon Chaloner's death, the new secretary of

---

<sup>91</sup> Instructions to the Earl of Sussex, 1560, SP 63/2/18, f. 38; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 160.

<sup>92</sup> Sir Thomas Chaloner served as resident ambassador in Spain and was active in intelligence gathering. He provided intelligence from the Low Countries and many of his letters were either fully or partially in cipher. For example, Chaloner to Cuerto, 29 July 1562, SP 70/39/392, f. 193; *CSPFor*, 1562, p. 195. [Chaloner] to the Queen, 18 Sept. 1559, SP 70/7/1353, f. 49; *CSPFor*, 1558-1559, p. 557. [Chaloner] to Cecil, 19 Sept. 1559, *CSPFor*, 1558-1559, 1341 (A), p. 563. Thomas also communicated with his other brother, Francis, on matters of intelligence (Francis Chaloner to Sir Thomas Chaloner, 18 Dec. 1563, SP 70/66/1500, f. 92; *CSPFor*, 1563, p. 623).

<sup>93</sup> John Chaloner to Cecil, 28 May 1563, SP 63/8/51, f. 109; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 218.

<sup>94</sup> Lodowick Bryskett to Burghley, 25 Apr. 1581, SP 63/82/53, f. 137r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 301.

state, Bryskett argued, should be himself.<sup>95</sup> Burghley clearly thought otherwise, for Fenton succeeded Chaloner as sole secretary upon the latter's death in 1581.<sup>96</sup>

The new secretary immediately went to work. He devoted considerable effort to gathering and reporting intelligence. His earliest reports concerned the Desmond and the Baltinglas rebellions in the early 1580s. He frequently wrote about the movements of Irish insurgents and enemy sympathizers based on the information he received from his informants.<sup>97</sup> He also solicited the English privy councilors for an increase in his fee due to the expense of paying informants: “my ordinarie ffee being farre insufficient to putt meate in my mouthe, there is nothinge like to answer the rewardes of intelligencers and other chardges for the generall service belonging most to my place yf I use yt as it ought to be.”<sup>98</sup> In this same letter, Fenton claimed to have spent £40 on “espialles” and other “employ[en]tes,” charges which he deemed necessary for revealing the “most secrett councelles and intenc[i]ons of their treasons.”<sup>99</sup> He believed that men like James de Barry, Viscount Buttevant, acted like good subjects but were

---

<sup>95</sup> Bryskett was more qualified to serve as secretary of state than Fenton. By his own account, he had at least 16 years of experience in Irish government (Bryskett to Burghley, 25 Apr. 1581, SP 63/82/53, f. 137; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 301). He had been a servant to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam in the early 1570s and a clerk of the council since 1577 (*CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 102). The only person allowed to keep the signet was the secretary of state. The patent, however, suggests that Bryskett may have been used by the council as a de-facto secretary of state. What bears explanation is why Bryskett failed to receive the appointment of secretary. In May 1581, he told Burghley that the lord deputy “thought it expedient that some man of experience in this Countrey service shold succede Mr Chaloner in the place of Secretarie” (Bryskett to Burghley, 15 May 1581, SP 63/83/27, f. 71r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 305). He wrote another letter to Burghley that Burghley may have received some false information about him, and also that he knew Burghley received advertisements from others (Bryskett to Burghley, 7 Apr. 1581, SP 63/82/19, f. 41; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 297). Fenton was, of course, one of the men supplying Burghley with information on the state of Ireland.

<sup>96</sup> White to Burghley, 13 May 1581, SP 63/83/15, f. 43; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 304. Notes in July 1581 indicates that Chaloner was now dead, and Fenton wanted all the fees and rights of the office (Notes for Mr. Fenton's dispatch from the Court, July 1581, SP 63/84/55, f. 129; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 314).

<sup>97</sup> For example, Fenton's letter about the enemy's burning of a small town within a mile and a half of Dublin (Fenton to Walsingham, 10 Sept. 1580, SP 63/76/25, f. 47; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 250). Fenton also received a report from William Wendover about the death of the traitor, John of Desmond, which he then related in a separate letter to Burghley (Fenton to Burghley, 12 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/14, f. 30; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 340 and William Wendover to Secretary Fenton, 6 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/14. I, f. 32; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 340). See also, Fenton to Leicester, 22 July 1580, SP 63/74/60, f. 116; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 236.

<sup>98</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 14 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/22, f. 48r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 341.

<sup>99</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 14 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/22, f. 48r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 341.

secretly consorting with enemies of the government. Fenton suspected that these men, who resided mainly in the Pale, were being protected either because of their "greatnes heare, or for the Authoritie of their frinds in the Cort."<sup>100</sup> They should serve, he argued, as an example and be punished, the "better to hold in terror all others of that infection" because a public spectacle would prove a better deterrent to rebellion than garrison and forces.<sup>101</sup>

Convinced that covert intelligence was the key to detecting enemies of the crown, Fenton took to his role as intelligencer with vigor. He collected and managed information from spies employed in enemy camps.<sup>102</sup> He also started using cipher alphabets and numbers in his letters. When conveying the Irish council's suspicions of Edward Waterhouse's alleged corruption in 1582, Fenton attempted to hide the identity of the complainants by substituting their names with codewords. Thus, Sir Henry Wallop, the vice treasurer of Ireland, was "twenty" and the lord deputy, "ten."<sup>103</sup> Fenton gave Leicester the impression that the Irish privy councilors, especially Loftus and Wallop, thought Waterhouse was corrupt but tolerated Waterhouse because Walsingham was his patron.<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 29 July 1580, SP 63/74/78, f. 157r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 238.

<sup>101</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 22 July 1580, SP 63/74/60, f. 116; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 236.

<sup>102</sup> See, Fenton to Walsingham, 10 Sept. 1580, SP 63/76/25, f. 47; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 250. Fenton to Walsingham, 29 July 1580, SP 63/74/78, f. 157; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 238. Fenton to Burghley, 8 Aug. 1580, SP 63/75/26, f. 54; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 242. Because Fenton is sometimes writing to all three men, he relays similar information with minor differences in the extent of details about the rebellions. His letter to Burghley on August 8 contains information about the Countess of Desmond and her attempts to get her husband to submit (Fenton to Burghley, 8 Aug. 1580, SP 63/75/26, f. 54; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 242). Fenton tells Burghley that he hopes that Desmond will submit because of the misery he feels rather than his wife's doing. He writes on the same day to Leicester, relaying much of the same information; only in this letter does he tell Leicester that the Countess of Desmond wants assurances of a pardon which they have not promised (Fenton to Leicester, 8 Aug. 1580, SP 63/75/27, f. 57; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 242).

<sup>103</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 13 Aug. 1580, SP 63/75/35, f. 78; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 242. Fenton to Leicester, 16 Oct. 1580, SP 63/77/36, f. 86; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 260. Fenton to Leicester, 1 Feb. 1582, SP 63/89/4, f. 8; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 347. In 1587, when Waterhouse was again accused of abusing his office, he recounted in his list of objections that he served as secretary of state and resigned the office freely to Fenton, a "token" which he thought proved that he was neither "covetous nor ambitious" (*CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 295).

<sup>104</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 1 Feb. 1582, SP 63/89/4, f. 8; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 347.



In utilizing codewords for the councilors, Fenton may have also tried to conceal his actions from the other councilors, even as he cooperated with them on some matters. He seemed very willing to supply the English privy council with information about government officials, particularly those he found disagreeable. He had issues with Sir John Perrot, the lord deputy, Sir Richard Bingham, the chief commissioner of Connacht, and others—as discussed below, in chapters four and five. Fenton tried to appear as a dispassionate observer. But there was always an underlying motive in his reports against others. For example, he claimed that the constable in charge of Dublin Castle, Jacques Wingfield, was not only "popish," but that three prisoners had escaped on his watch, which Fenton believed could not have occurred without "corruption & Briberie in the Constable."<sup>105</sup> Moreover, there were "Liberall intelligences betwene the p[ri]soners in the Castle and the yll affected abroade," which implied that the constable was either complicit or inadequate for the post.<sup>106</sup> Therefore, he advocated that the constable should be removed and that the charge of the prisoners and Dublin Castle be given to the Irish council—with himself as manager.<sup>107</sup> Clearly, the secretary was not as objective as he portrayed himself.<sup>108</sup> Fenton was never above promoting his own cause and using his service to the queen and the state as his justification.

Throughout the early 1580s, Fenton tried—with varying degrees of success—to promote the utility of his office. He described the “vniversal unsoundness” of Ireland and proposed reform strategies. He argued that the queen needed to prosecute wars with a stronger hand due to the supposedly natural Irish inclination to rebel and that those suspected of treason should be

---

<sup>105</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 5 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/49, f. 173r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 327.

<sup>106</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 5 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/49, f. 173r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 327.

<sup>107</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 5 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/49, f. 172; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 327.

<sup>108</sup> The subjective nature of Fenton's reports was not unusual, as government officials generally used, or manipulated, information to their own benefit.

apprehended and brought to justice; never mind that he had advocated the opposite only a few months earlier.<sup>109</sup> When Lord Deputy Arthur Grey's political stock was still high, Fenton echoed the lord deputy's view towards the rebellion; only later did he denounce the latter's approach as too harsh once it became apparent that Grey was unpopular.

Fenton also informed the English privy councilors about upcoming vacancies in the Irish administration and openly shared his recommendations for who should fill them. One example was the office of lord chancellor, which became available in 1581 due to the infirmity of the current officeholder, Sir William Gerard. Fenton recommended that Leicester hasten the selection and nomination of a new chancellor. In this letter, he used a clerk's hand to copy the main part of the letter and then added a postscript in his own handwriting. As well as adding a personal touch to the letter, this was a covert and common secretarial practice to impart sensitive and private information this way, outside of the watchful eyes of the clerk.<sup>110</sup> On this occasion, Fenton had his clerk write general information about the availability of the office of lord chancellor and then, in his own handwriting, included his advice on the next occupant. The new chancellor, he wrote, should be devoted entirely to Leicester and need not have experience in Irish government:

yor L. nedeth not to bee further carefull then to instruct hym in the gen[er]all grounds of o[u]r gov[er]nem[en]t, leavinge to me to informe hym in all p[ar]ticularities of State, and w[i]th what humors of men he is to deall w[i]thall, both of suche of the Councell and others of more populer vocacion: yf yt please yor L., you may also Referr hym to me to soart hym and Confederat hym w[i]th suche of the Councell as he is to Reappose

---

<sup>109</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 30 Sept. 1580, SP 63/76/77, f. 159; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 256. Fenton to Walsingham, 24 July 1583, SP 63/103/38, f. 112; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 459. Fenton to Burghley, 6 Dec. 1583, SP 63/106/4, f. 6; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 482 on the reform of Munster. In the latter, Fenton proposes that Munster should be made an English Pale.

<sup>110</sup> For an intriguing discussion on the increase of covert letter-writing in Elizabethan England, see James Daybell, "Secret Letters in Elizabethan England," in *Material Readings of Early Modern Culture: Texts and Social Practices, 1580-1730*, eds. James Daybell and Peter Hinds (Hampshire, Eng.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 47-64; idem, *The Material Letter in Early Modern England: Manuscript Letters and the Culture and Practices of Letter-Writing, 1512-1635* (Hampshire, Eng.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

confidence and frindshipp in.<sup>111</sup>

As Fenton outlined it, the plan meant the new chancellor would depend heavily on the secretary for assistance. Thus, the new chancellor, the second most powerful figure in Ireland (the first being the lord deputy), would be under Fenton's thumb. It was a bold proposition. It was also a thinly veiled attempt to manipulate Leicester and to insinuate himself into a position of greater power and authority. It was no wonder then that he wrote this proposal in his own hand.

Though Adam Loftus, the archbishop of Dublin, was chosen as the new lord chancellor, Fenton continued to insert himself in matters beyond his secretarial duties. After the Desmond rebellion in the early 1580s, the crown confiscated the lands of those who had acted in concert with insurgents. Consequently, the attainted lands were now available for purchase. Fenton recommended to Burghley that a commission should be appointed to distribute these lands.<sup>112</sup>

The commissioners he proposed were the new lord chancellor Loftus, Sir Henry Wallop (the vice treasurer), Sir Nicholas Malby (lord president of Connaught), Sir Nicholas White (master of the rolls), Sir John Plunkett (chief justice of the queen's bench), Richard Beeling (solicitor), Sir Lucas Dillon (chief baron of the exchequer), and of course, the secretary of state. Noticeably excluded from the list was the current lord deputy, Lord Grey.

---

<sup>111</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 11 Mar. 1581, SP 63/81/19, f. 42r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 291. Fenton also wrote to Walsingham about the opening of the office, but he restrained himself from making the same suggestions as he had to Leicester just two days before. In another letter to Leicester, this one in May, he inexplicably recommended Sir Luke Dillon to serve as the new chancellor, perhaps because of Dillon's well-respected reputation and their close ties. The two had worked together with Lord Justice Pelham during the Desmond rebellions. Fenton later made several petitions on behalf of Dillon (Fenton to Leicester, 8 Sept. 1582, SP 63/95/16, f. 33; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 395). Fenton to Walsingham, 8 Sept. 1582, SP 63/95/17, f. 35; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 395). And when he offered a list of councilors to serve on the commission for Munster, he put forth Dillon as a candidate, arguing that Dillon (though prone to other inclinations) would be held upright by the other commissioners (Fenton to Burghley, 12 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/14, f. 30v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 340).

<sup>112</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 12 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/14, f. 30; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 340.

Rumors of Grey's abuse of the office—the enrichment of himself and his favorites and his liberal use of martial law—had reached the ears of the privy council. Fenton had written favorably of Grey in the past because the two had shared similar views on the strict punishment of insurgents.<sup>113</sup> In late 1581, he had written to Walsingham that the lord deputy was trying to “fynd owt the waies w[hi]ch might do most good to the seruice,” but it may be that either the “savage and brutish nature of this people” or “an hereditorie destynie hanging over the land” that made the people work against him.<sup>114</sup> The Irish, in Fenton's estimation, saw Grey as a man of “severitye and sharpnes of nature.”<sup>115</sup> For all of Grey's good intentions, “where is so greate an antipathye or dissimilitude of humors and mann[er]s betwene A people and their gov[er]nor, there the gov[er]nem[en]t can not bee caryed in iust Rule.”<sup>116</sup> While arguing that Grey was an unfit choice for Ireland, Fenton's tone was not one of condemnation; in fact, he appeared sympathetic to the lord deputy. And yet, only two weeks later, he joined his colleagues in their complaints against the lord deputy's alleged misappropriation of the escheated lands in Munster.<sup>117</sup>

Once the tide had turned fully against Grey, Fenton immediately advanced his choice for the new lord deputy: Sir Henry Sidney.<sup>118</sup> It would take well over a year for Fenton to discover that his suggestion of Sidney had been rejected, partly because Sidney did not want to return to

---

<sup>113</sup> Fenton was involved, though it is unclear to what extent, in the examination and torture of enemies of the crown (Confessions of John Cusake of Ellistonreade, 23 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/47, I, f. 126; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 346). In one instance, he was present during the examination of a Dr. Hurley, who stood accused of being a messenger between the pope, Desmond, and Baltinglas. The lords justices, Loftus and Wallop, commissioned Waterhouse and Fenton for the examination and, supposedly on the advice of Walsingham, tortured Hurley by toasting “his ffeet against the ffyer wth hot Bootes” (Lord Justices to Walsingham, 7 Mar. 1584, SP 63/108/8, f. 25r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 498).

<sup>114</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 5 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/49, f. 172v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 327.

<sup>115</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 5 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/49, f. 172v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 327.

<sup>116</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 5 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/49, f. 172v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 327.

<sup>117</sup> Loftus, Malby, and Fenton to Burghley, 20 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/71, f. 224; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 329.

<sup>118</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 5 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/49, f. 172; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 327. Fenton to Leicester, 25 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/82, f. 247; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 330. Fenton to Burghley, 5 Dec. 1581, SP 63/87/4, f. 10; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 331.

the position. The office would remain open for nearly two years after Grey was recalled in August 1582. The two lords justices, Loftus and Wallop, governed Ireland in the interim. Fenton developed a working relationship with Lord Chancellor Loftus.<sup>119</sup> While the exact nature of their relationship is unknown, there is evidence of cooperation, and possible closeness, between the two men. Both shared an enthusiasm for Protestantism and reform.<sup>120</sup> Upon the death of Fenton's younger brother, Captain James Fenton, the former constable of Bear Haven, Loftus commemorated the captain in a letter to Burghley.<sup>121</sup> Loftus and Fenton also supported each other in their petitions to the crown. When Loftus accused two clerks, Edward Waterhouse and Richard Colman, of corruption and fraud in the Irish exchequer, he requested that Colman be removed and recommended Fenton as his replacement.<sup>122</sup> Fenton was, according to Loftus, a "verie syncere and vpright" man who was the "fitteste" to reform abuses concerning the queen's revenues.<sup>123</sup>

The cooperation or friendship which Fenton enjoyed with one lord justice was, however, quite the opposite with the other. Wallop, in a letter to Walsingham, denounced Fenton as "a most aparent brybe taker."<sup>124</sup> One incident in particular concerned Fenton and Colman. It occurred several months before Loftus's charge of Colman's corruption. According to Colman, the secretary desired to take Colman's office of chief remembrancer and had tried to solicit the

---

<sup>119</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and Fenton to Burghley, 28 Dec. 1581, SP 63/87/61, f. 164; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 337.

<sup>120</sup> Loftus to Sir William Cecil, 26 Oct. 1570, SP 63/30/88, f. 186; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 435.

<sup>121</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 12 May 1583, SP 63/102/23, f. 54; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 446.

<sup>122</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 15 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/27, f. 60; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 341. Loftus believed that a great injustice had been committed against Fenton for this office. He claimed that Colman was intended to serve for some time, and then the office was to be given to Fenton, but Waterhouse had allegedly turned the lord deputy against Fenton. Burghley had accused Colman of fraud (Burghley to Wallop, 6 Mar. 1580, SP 63/72/5, f. 7; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 211), in which Wallop came to Colman's defense (Wallop to Burghley, 1 Apr. 1580, SP 63/72/30, f. 78; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 214). The other accused, Waterhouse, had just collected £100,000 (Waterhouse to Walsingham, 13 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/17, f. 38; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 340), a large sum to be in his possession. Fenton maintained his stance that Waterhouse was corrupt and that others had disclosed his corruption, including the former secretary, Chaloner (Fenton to Leicester, 1 Feb. 1582, SP 63/89/4, f. 8; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 347).

<sup>123</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 15 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/27, f. 60v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 341.

<sup>124</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 11 Oct. 1582, SP 63/96/8, f. 24r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 403.

post from Lord Deputy Grey before his recall. Grey, finding no basis for Colman's removal, refused Fenton's request. Fenton then allegedly attempted to bribe Colman for the office. Supposedly, Colman declined the bribe and claimed Fenton threatened to raise the issue with Burghley.<sup>125</sup> Wallop likely knew about the dispute, given his position as vice treasurer in the exchequer. When Fenton asked Wallop to write on behalf of his deceased brother, James, Wallop did so. But rather than commend the service of the late captain, he instead criticized Fenton's brother for his love of "wyne and women" and claimed that James died with a debt of £522.<sup>126</sup>

Even though Fenton was unsuccessful in acquiring the post of remembrancer, he continued his pursuit for other offices because doing so meant more money and influence. His ambitions caught the attention of another Irish privy councilor, Sir Robert Dillon, chief justice of the common pleas. The two men became embroiled in a conflict over the office of general collector, which had only recently been created. Dillon thought this new office was of "no benefite" to the queen and that the fees for the office could be used to ease the composition burden of the country.<sup>127</sup> However, he stated that when he voiced these concerns to Fenton, the secretary allegedly threatened to use his contacts in England against him—a nearly identical claim in Colman's report when he and the secretary were at odds.<sup>128</sup> Either Wallop and Colman were conspiring to disparage the secretary, or Fenton had indeed made those claims. Nothing became of the incident, and Fenton maintained his position.<sup>129</sup> Six months later, Fenton tried to

---

<sup>125</sup> Richard Colman to Burghley, 20 May 1581, SP 63/83/30, f. 76; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 305. Colman was Drury's former secretary and had only recently occupied the office of Remembrancer (Drury to Walsingham, 7 July 1579, SP 63/67/27, f. 57; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 172). He pleaded his innocence to Burghley and Walsingham and was successful since he remained in office until 1597. He was, however, involved in another dispute with his former deputy, Robert Legge, in the early 1590s.

<sup>126</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 12 May 1583, SP 63/102/24, f. 56r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 446.

<sup>127</sup> Sir Robert Dillon to Walsingham, 13 Nov. 1583, SP 63/105/63, f. 0211r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 478.

<sup>128</sup> Sir Robert Dillon to Walsingham, 13 Nov. 1583, SP 63/105/63, f. 0211; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 478.

<sup>129</sup> Sir Geoffrey Fenton to Burghley, 25 Sept. 1592, SP 63/166/65, f. 181; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 590.

take over another office: the office of clerk of the check. Its current occupant, Owen Moore, was sick at Chester, but he eventually recovered.<sup>130</sup>

Although Fenton was frequently unsuccessful in obtaining additional offices, the goal was never the office itself. Instead, the secretary wanted more money. Dillon had recognized this about Fenton as well. Fenton's seeming desperation to increase his fees was partly because he was in debt. He owed money to Richard Wrothe, the earl of Sussex's personal secretary, and Wrothe demanded repayment.<sup>131</sup> Fenton could only point to his poor estate and profess that "yt was not want of will but lacke of habylitie" that kept him indebted.<sup>132</sup> His pleas for an increase in his fees either went unanswered or were outright rejected by the privy council in England. Undeterred by his financial problems, however, Fenton eventually increased his social and political capital in June 1585 by marrying Alice, the daughter of Dr. Robert Weston—the former lord chancellor of Ireland—and widow of the bishop of Meath, Hugh Brady, who died in February 1585. It was only upon marrying Alice that he seemed to finally gain the approval of Wallop.<sup>133</sup>

Fenton served as secretary from 1580 until he died in 1608. During that time, he stood witness to the Desmond rebellions, the landing of the Spanish Armada survivors on the coasts of Ireland, and the Nine Years' War, which for ten years threatened to destroy all English government and authority on the island. As a member of the Irish council, he not only worked alongside figures like Sir John Perrot and Sir Richard Bingham but also participated in the ruin

---

<sup>130</sup> White to Burghley, 5 Apr. 1584, SP 63/109/10, f. 17; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 505.

<sup>131</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 14 Sept. 1584, SP 63/111/85, f. 186; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 526.

<sup>132</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 14 Sept. 1584, SP 63/111/85, f. 186r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 526. He wrote another letter to Walsingham in October claiming that he was trying to settle his debts (Fenton to Walsingham, 29 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/54, f. 125; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 535). The two men, Fenton and Wroathe, were acquired earlier in the 1570s when Fenton was attempting a career in foreign service (Fenton to Richard Wroathe, Sept. 1572, Cotton Titus B/VII/179, f. 378).

<sup>133</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 15 June 1585, SP 63/117/29, f. 78; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 568.

of their careers on the island. As shown below, Fenton consistently displayed a shrewd political awareness of how things worked in Ireland and how to use the office to his advantage.<sup>134</sup>

---

<sup>134</sup> Fenton had reconstituted the office of secretary of state. Barry argues that it was the absence of a strong governor that had enabled the office to expand, and, to some extent, Fenton worked within this liminal space and improved his political clout (Barry, 141 & 184). But he had also occupied the office during times of crisis. After the recall of Sidney in 1578, Pelham and Drury both served as lords justices. Once Drury died in October 1579, Pelham was left to deal with the Desmond and Baltinglass rebellions. He needed someone to regularly report information back to England since he could not do so himself. Pelham's personal secretary, Waterhouse, simply had too much to manage with his additional duties in the exchequer. In this political climate, Fenton became the main agent in transmitting information on the course of the rebellions. Thus, it was the Irish resistance movements which created the conditions favorable to Fenton's political ambitions. It made the information that Fenton provided invaluable. Even after the rebellions had passed, he maintained his usefulness to English privy councilors by reporting on the behavior of his fellow officeholders in Ireland and then later with the Nine Years' War.



# **PART ONE**

Before the Nine Years' War, c. 1580-1593

## CHAPTER TWO

### The Problem of Finance and Corruption in Elizabethan Ireland

Elizabethan Ireland was an attractive prospect to those without an inheritance and in search of a career, be it political, military, or religious. Younger sons went to Ireland, envisioning the opportunities and potential for wealth through the acquisition of land, as well as political influence and power.<sup>1</sup> However, once they arrived, it became clear that prosperity in Ireland was not assured and came at a cost. Success required the constant financial support of the English government back home, a government which was disinclined to invest or fulfill the ambitions of its officers. Most English officeholders in Ireland complained of, what was to them, meager fees for office. Consequently, they petitioned the queen and the privy council for pensions, fee farms, increases in their yearly salaries, or lesser offices with additional income potential. This was especially true for the Irish councilors. The councilors' reasoning for these requests varied, but they often bemoaned their "poor estate" and the inadequacy of their current fees. Some claimed that they had spent their allowances for office while performing the queen's service. Others compared their fees to other privy councilors in Ireland, noting the grants and concessions given to others but not themselves.

In many ways, their appeals were standard practice. Royal officeholders in England also complained of low salaries and fees for office, and they found other ways to supplement their

---

<sup>1</sup> Lisa Jardine and Keith Pluymers have both illuminated, in their respective works, the dearth and scarcity rhetoric within early modern colonial, promotional literature for Ireland and North America. This literature justified expansion and settlement outside England by emphasizing England's decayed and overpopulated state; success could only be achieved elsewhere, in colonial ventures. For more on this subject, see Jardine, "Mastering the Uncouth: Gabriel Harvey, Edmund Spenser and the English Experience in Ireland," in *New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought*, eds. John Henry and Sarah Hutton (London: Duckworth, 1990), 68-82; Pluymers, "Colonizing Lands and Landscapes in the English Atlantic, c. 1580-c.1640" (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2015); Paul Warde, "Fear of Wood Shortage and the Reality of the Woodland in Europe, c. 1450-1850," *History Workshop Journal* 62 (2006): 28-57.

income. Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, for example, held several patents of monopoly on the sale or manufacture of certain goods. He was also known to under-assess the value of his income drastically to avoid paying higher taxes.<sup>2</sup> Although such practices went unchecked, historians have suggested that these abuses in England's fiscal administration arose out of the financial constraints of government and the failure to reform.

Elizabethan officials in Ireland were in a similar predicament but worse off because of Ireland's dire financial crises. Elizabeth had inherited a kingdom in which the expenditures far outweighed the revenues. The Desmond Rebellions had also forced the English crown to spend heavily to secure their Irish kingdom. Once hostilities with Spain increased in the late 1580s, Ireland, and the potential for fiscal reform became of secondary concern. Despite an awareness of the problems and the need for reform, England directed its attention to war in the Low Countries and in defending England itself, which impeded improvements in Irish finances.

Like other officials in Ireland, Irish councilors felt these pressures keenly, particularly as these constraints resulted in the tight-fisted fiscal approach to Ireland that so characterized the Elizabethan government. The councilors' dreams of personal, financial, and political success, as well as status, could not be achieved on their government salary alone. Like their counterparts in England, they found other means to earn additional income. They devised schemes, which only came to light during audits or through the complaints of others. The Westminster government knew of such activities and, though the queen and privy council issued warnings to the Irish councilors, they nonetheless allowed these practices to continue. Most of the Irish councilors who faced charges of corruption were not removed and remained in their offices until death. As Paul E. J. Hammer noted, the "very parsimony of Elizabethan government itself encouraged a

---

<sup>2</sup> *DNB*, "Cecil, William, first Baron Burghley."

culture of corruption and resistance to administrative reform."<sup>3</sup> The English crown could not control the aggrandizing behavior of their councilors, and other officeholders, in Ireland, as the government played a vital part in encouraging those behaviors. The queen and privy council also understood that some corruption was to be expected, and so tolerated their colonial administrators.

Corruption was part of the structure of government, and endemic in a colonial environment like Ireland, where the monarch was always absent and her Westminster councilors rarely present.<sup>4</sup> Enforcement of policies that would eliminate corruption was expensive and would have removed an unsanctioned reward system for government service. However, information provided by individuals was a means of surveilling the Irish councilors and tracking the extent of corruption. When writers such as Barnaby Rich, or deputies in the Irish exchequer like Robert Legge, complained that the Irish councilors were corrupt, this information was a vital resource for the Elizabethan government. Information ultimately bolstered royal authority and provided leverage to deny grants or petitions and potentially remove an official from office. The problem for the Westminster government was their dependence on the experienced members of the Irish council. The government needed able administrators and, in the case of Ireland, experience trumped allegations of corruption, which were notoriously difficult to prove and nearly always linked to politics and personal rivalries.

Interrogating the problem of finance and corruption in Ireland presents several challenges to the historian, which perhaps explains why there are so few studies on England's financial

---

<sup>3</sup> Paul E. J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government, and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 207.

<sup>4</sup> Sir Francis Knollys, for example, visited Ireland on three occasions, but the Cecils (both Burghley and his son, Robert) never visited Ireland. *ODNB*, "Knollys, Sir Francis." The standard practice was to dispatch government officials like Edmund Tremayne into Ireland to report on Irish affairs or to permit one or two of the Irish council to present such reports in person.

administration in Ireland. All estimates for revenues, expenditures, or wages in Ireland must account for the debased Irish coinage and the English pound sterling, both of which were used in Ireland. The other concern is the accuracy, or rather inaccuracy, of some reports due to improper accounting or corruptive practices. Despite the difficulty in rendering a financial history of Tudor Ireland, Anthony Sheehan has made some important strides in this field.<sup>5</sup> It is his careful analysis of Ireland's financial accounts and Hammer's *Elizabeth's Wars* which undergirds this study of finances under Elizabeth. However, because Sheehan's interest was in a broad overview of Ireland's fiscal state, he understandably did not discuss salaries and fees for Irish administrators. A concerted effort is made to include those figures, as such estimates pertain directly to the Irish councilors. Lastly, the incompleteness of sources on Irish finance requires the use of documents from earlier in Elizabeth's reign. However, this chapter will briefly show the estimates for Irish councilors' fees for office in James's reign are largely consistent with those in the 1560s and 1570s.

### **Elizabeth's Fiscal Policies in Ireland**

Elizabeth's finances need to be viewed in the context of expenditure by her immediate predecessors. Henry VIII's preoccupation with martial glory had led England into costly wars with France and Scotland in the 1540s. By the end of his reign, he had spent over £2 million on wars. Under the minority rule of Edward VI, the council continued the wars begun in Henry's reign and, consequently, spent over £1.3 million. Mary then inherited a debt of £185,000 and, to make financial matters worse, went to war in 1557 in support of her Spanish husband and lost Calais to the French.<sup>6</sup> The selling of crown lands to service and repay these debts reduced crown

---

<sup>5</sup> Anthony Sheehan, "Irish Revenues and English Subventions, 1559-1622," *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature* 90C (1990): 35-65.

<sup>6</sup> Estimates are from Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars*, 43, 45.

revenues, while expenditure on war soared to high levels. Thus, when Elizabeth came to power, her financial resources were considerably less, as she inherited the debts of her late sister.<sup>7</sup>

Where her predecessors engaged in continental wars, Elizabeth focused instead on meeting her current financial obligations and even trimming expenses, wherever possible, to reduce costs. Her economizing tendencies extended to the Court and even her own royal household. She constantly weighed the risks of open warfare and its potential to not only undermine her authority and threaten the security of her realm, but also place an even greater financial burden on the crown's resources.

Elizabeth also introduced changes to the coinage. Her father, Henry, had resorted to debasing Irish coins (minted in England) by reducing the silver content of the coinage to cut costs in Ireland and, therefore, limit the need for the English exchequer to cover Irish expenses. This policy of debasement in Ireland resulted from the reevaluation of the currency in England to fund its wars and subsequently led to inflation in Elizabeth's Irish kingdom.<sup>8</sup> In 1560, Elizabeth reformed the coinage by removing most of the base coins in circulation, increasing the silver content, and enabling the circulation of English currency in Ireland at a greater value—one third above the Irish.<sup>9</sup> The exchange rate for Irish coinage fell to three-fourths of an English pound, where £1 sterling equaled £1 6s. 8d. Irish.<sup>10</sup> The reduced Irish currency would make it possible for the English government to cover their expenses without spending more money, provided expenditures did not increase. Consequently, there was no concerned effort to immediately

---

<sup>7</sup> In *Making of the British Isles: The State of Britain and Ireland, 1450-1660*, co-authors Steven G. Ellis and Christopher Maginn state that Elizabeth inherited a debt of £300,000 from Mary (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007), 223.

<sup>8</sup> Hammer, 39.

<sup>9</sup> Hammer, 44, 62; Sheehan, "Irish Revenues and English Subventions," 50.

<sup>10</sup> Sheehan, 50.

remove the debased coinage from years prior. But even the exchange rate was not enough to relieve the overwhelming burden of debt.

In Ireland, Elizabeth's preoccupation with cutting costs was a consequence of her earlier spending suppressing Shane O'Neill in the early 1560s, followed by the even more costly Desmond Rebellions. The second engagement with Desmond's forces took an unusually large army of nearly 8,000 men and the use of royal warships to reduce the threat. The early withdrawal of 3300 men over the winter of 1581-1582 allowed Desmond's forces to recover, forcing the queen to spend more money, which, by its end in 1583, amounted to nearly £300,000. The heavy expense encouraged Elizabeth to reduce the size of garrisons in Ireland even further and enforce parsimonious fiscal policies.<sup>11</sup>

Much of the crippling cost of governing Ireland went towards its administration and defense—the fees, allowances, and pensions of military and administrative officials; their retinues; the army's wages; the building and maintenance of garrisons; and the costs of transporting food and other supplies. There were also extraordinary expenses, such as allowances for losses and charges in victualing and “espial” money, among other things. But the bulk of the spending was on maintaining the Irish government, and, ultimately, English control in Ireland was buttressed by the army.

From 1580 to 1593, the revenue generated within Ireland was an estimated £460,00 Irish, with an average of £38,000 Irish annually (see Table 2.1).<sup>12</sup> The clear remain (the money left over after administrative costs had been covered) would then be used for military expenses. At first glance, the revenue estimates appear high, but even after the clear remain, the English

---

<sup>11</sup> Hammer, 109-110.

<sup>12</sup> Sheehan presents the calculations based on contemporary accounting practices. As such, the tables within are divided by year in the Exchequer (1 Oct-30 September) and then by terms based on religious observances—Michaelmas (1 October-31 March) and Easter (1 April-30 September), 46-48.

government still sent additional funds taken primarily from the exchequer back in England.

| Table 2.1   |          | Irish Military Expenditure, c. 1580-1593 |                                 |          |                    |  |
|---|----------|--|---------------------------------|----------|--------------------|--|
|   | Revenues | Clear remain                             | Payments from English exchequer |          |                    |  |
|   | Irish    | Irish                                    | Sterling                        | Irish    |                    |  |
| <b>1580-1581</b>  | £31,572  | £14,912                                  | £49,142                         | £65,523  | <b>1580-1581</b>   |  |
| <b>1581-1582</b>  | £28,694  | £8,091                                   | £60,280                         | £80,373  | <b>1581-1582</b>   |  |
| <b>1582-1583</b>  | £34,549  | £13,387                                  | £44,206                         | £58,941  | <b>1582-1583</b>   |  |
| <b>1583-1584</b>  | £29,525  | £7,688                                   | £58,420                         | £77,894  | <b>1583-1584</b>   |  |
| <b>1584-1585</b>  | £36,123  | £8,717                                   | £35,736                         | £47,648  | <b>1584-1585</b>   |  |
| <b>1585-1586</b>  | £40,371  | £7,975                                   | £34,608                         | £46,144  | <b>1585-1586</b>   |  |
| <b>1586-1587</b>  | —        | £7,722                                   | £42,320                         | £56,427  | <b>1586-1587</b>   |  |
| <b>1587-1588</b>  | £42,773  | £12,073                                  | £27,753                         | £37,005  | <b>1587-1588</b>   |  |
| <b>1588-1589</b>  | £40,689  | £8,154                                   | £18,389                         | £24,519  | <b>1588-1589</b>   |  |
| <b>1589-1590</b>  | £40,930  | £9,361                                   | £36,389                         | £48,519  | <b>1589-1590</b>   |  |
| <b>1590-1591</b>  | £50,144  | £18,262                                  | £21,191                         | £28,255  | <b>1590-1591</b>   |  |
| <b>1591-1592</b>  | £47,902  | £18,764                                  | £16,332                         | £21,776  | <b>1591-1592</b>   |  |
| <b>1592-1593</b>  | £38,720  | £8,145                                   | £13,944                         | £18,592  | <b>1592-1593</b>   |  |
| <b>Grand Total</b>  | £461,992 | £143,251                                 | £458,710                        | £611,609 | <b>Grand Total</b> |  |
| Average/yr  | £38,499  | £11,019                                  | £35,285                         | £47,047  | Average/yr         |  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Calculations are based on Sheehan's Tables 1-3. The clear remain totals also include the composition of the Pale, which was expressly used for military purposes.</li> <li>Payments from the English exchequer are listed first in sterling and then converted to reflect the Irish equivalent.</li> </ul> |          |  |                                 |          |                    |  |

Therefore, the costs of governing Ireland were so high that England had to inject a substantial amount of money into Ireland. These calculations do not even include money sent to specific individuals, meaning the payments were even higher. On average, the Elizabethan government spent about £35,000 a year on military expenditures alone for Ireland between 1580 and 1593, with fluctuations due to war.<sup>13</sup> During the second Desmond Rebellion, payments from England were substantially higher. It declined in years immediately following, with the notable exception

<sup>13</sup> One estimate for the garrisons and army by a clerk within the exchequer for a year was £35,375 18s. 3 3/4d. Irish (Estimate of the whole garrison and army in pay, 1 Mar. 1584, SP 63/108/4, f. 7; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 498). The estimate is only for wages for the army and does not include munitions, victuals, or transportation costs.



of 1586-1587 and 1589-90, when the Mayo Burkes in Connaught revolted.<sup>14</sup> The overall aim was to decrease, as much as possible, expenditures on the island and increase revenues, especially as England was then involved in open war with Spain in the Low Countries and at sea.

Most of the crown's revenues for Ireland came from lands and possessions—its ancient inheritance, lands resigned and attainted, religious houses, among others—and casualties, which included monies from compositions, rents, tributes, customs, and ecclesiastical and judicial incomes. However, there were structural issues related to the collection of revenues. For example, the crown was receiving revenues in Irish currency and funding the Irish military and administration in English sterling at a loss.<sup>15</sup> Periodic outbreaks of violence and war also temporarily diminished revenues, as wasted and uninhabited lands caused a decline in rents and income for those who owned leases.

In a review of Ireland's finances in 1586, the Westminster government accused Irish officers of abusing their offices by remitting debts and rents and granting special favors to their families and friends.<sup>16</sup> Such deception caused a decline in revenues from land. Customs management was yet another area of difficulty because it required proper regulation and enforcement. For instance, the tax or impost on wine in 1569 caused a reduction in its revenues.<sup>17</sup> While it is possible that wine imports slightly decreased due to taxation, it is far more likely that the port towns in Ireland simply had more incentive to evade the tax. Sheehan's study of Irish commercial centers like Waterford, Limerick, Cork, and Galway reveals that Irish towns

---

<sup>14</sup> The payments for 1589-90 are even more impressive when you include payments from the English court of wards and liveries for Irish expenses, which amounted to about £15,000 sterling.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Remembrances from the Queen, [26? Apr.] 1587, SP 63/129/30, f. 69; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 313.

<sup>16</sup> Certain remembrances touching the realm of Ireland, 30 Jan. 1586, SP 63/122/52, f. 112; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> Steven G. Ellis, *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, 1447-1603: English Expansion and the End of Gaelic Rule* (1998; repr., London; New York: Longman, 2014), 184; Auditor Thomas Jenyson to Burghley, 11 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/45, f. 172; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 127.

were independent, autonomous entities under Elizabeth.<sup>18</sup> The towns had certain rights and freedoms, such as the appointment of customs officers, which enabled them to manage customs outside the purview of the English government. As Sheehan notes, "almost every port in Ireland excluded or overruled royal customs officers where these existed and when duties were taken up by the towns, they were more often than not spent by the towns themselves."<sup>19</sup> Reforms on customs revenue would not occur until 1603 when the costs of the Nine Years' War compelled the English government to change its fiscal practices and restrict town liberties.<sup>20</sup>

Problems with the collection of revenues were second to the most glaring issue of corruption within the Irish exchequer and, more broadly, its administration. The financial management of Ireland's expenditures and revenues was primarily the responsibility of the Irish exchequer, which was modeled after the English exchequer. But it lacked the agency that characterized its English counterpart. Earlier in Elizabeth's reign, chief governors tried to resolve some of Ireland's money problems by imposing cess (a tax to subsidize the English army in Ireland) on local Irish communities. In the 1560s, the lord lieutenant, Thomas, earl of Sussex, cessed Palesmen on several occasions, as did Sir Henry Sidney in the 1570s. In the short-term, Sussex and Sidney were able to partly raise funds for the army, but, in the long-term, cesses provoked the ire of Palesmen, who complained to the queen and successfully resisted the chief governors.<sup>21</sup> The antagonisms that these attempts elicited would ultimately cripple the Irish administration and regime; thereafter, decisions over finances came directly from England. The

---

<sup>18</sup> Anthony Sheehan, "Irish Towns in a Period of Change, 1558-1625," in *Natives and Newcomers: Essays on the Making of the Irish Colonial Society, 1534-1641*, eds. Ciaran Brady and Raymond Gillespie (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1986), 93-119.

<sup>19</sup> Sheehan, "Irish Towns in a Period of Change, 1558-1625," 112.

<sup>20</sup> Victor Treadwell, "Establishment of the Farm of the Irish Customs, 1603-13," *The English Historical Review* 93 (1978): 580-602.

<sup>21</sup> Ciaran Brady, "The Government of Ireland, c. 1540-1583" (PhD diss., Trinity College of Dublin, 1980), 136-137, 205-235.

vice treasurer, responsible for supervising all finances in Ireland, had to abide by the fiscal policies set in Westminster. Moreover, the Henrician government had consolidated the offices of vice treasurer, treasurer-at-wars, and general receiver into a single post. From 1534 to 1616, the vice treasurer bore the burden of ineffective fiscal policies. The privy council looked to the vice treasurer to account for Ireland's fiscal crisis, and when debts increased—as they so often did—accusations of corruption followed. During the period of this study, all the men who served as vice treasurers—Sir William Fitzwilliam, Sir Henry Wallop, and Sir George Carey—were accused of using their offices to enrich themselves.

Other officers within the Irish exchequer assisted with managing finances: the treasurer's clerk or deputy, the auditor, the chief remembrancer, the chief engrosser, and others. With the creation of the auditor's office in 1547 and the establishment of a commission of accounts in 1552, the Westminster government had expected issues within the Irish exchequer would be resolved or perhaps attenuated. There were now more men to examine Ireland's financial accounts, and, in theory, such oversight would reduce corruption, making it less possible for Irish officers to defraud the exchequer. However, in practice, this was not the case, and more accountability in the review of accounts did not solve, for instance, the issue of doctored deeds. Sir Robert Gardener claimed that some land records had been tampered with to appear ancient; in other words, the claims by English adventurers like Sir Peter Carew that they had ancient rights to property in Ireland were suspect.<sup>22</sup> Also, the commissioners who reviewed the vice treasurer's accounts (i.e., Wallop's) were mainly the Irish councilors, with the addition of the auditor in Ireland. Judging from the records during this period, the other Irish councilors rarely, if ever, challenged the vice treasurer's accounts. Instead, such disputes usually arose out of

---

<sup>22</sup> Robert Gardener to Sir William Cecil [Lord Burghley], 6 Dec. 1586, SP 63/127/13, f. 38; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 218.

complaints made by auditors. In 1591, the auditor, Christopher Peyton, accused Wallop of receiving payment for an allowance twice, meaning one of the payments was fraudulent. Wallop denied the charge, claiming his demand for payment was "in truthe and honnestye and howsoever Mr. Peyton maie maliciouslie goe about to disprove them and make yor L[ord] beleve I ask dobble allowances."<sup>23</sup> Burghley apparently sided with Peyton and thought it necessary that Wallop should swear an oath to the truth of his accounts, to which Wallop took offense, given that no other vice treasurer had been made to do so. Wallop was willing to swear an oath, but only to the accounts that he had done himself (and not his deputies) because in his conscience, "they are most true."<sup>24</sup>

The two men, Peyton and Wallop, had been at odds ever since Peyton became the auditor in late 1585.<sup>25</sup> The central problem at the heart of their dispute was over jurisdiction. Peyton complained that Wallop not only detained books and records that should be in the custody of the auditor but also took captains' accounts and issued payments.<sup>26</sup> Peyton alleged that the lord deputy at the time, Sir John Perrot, had prohibited Wallop from taking captains' accounts, but neither Wallop nor his deputies followed the order.<sup>27</sup> Peyton made these complaints in 1589 while in England. During Peyton's nearly three-year-long absence from Ireland, Wallop requested to stay Peyton's fees for the auditor's office while he was away.<sup>28</sup> Sir William Fitzwilliam (Perrot's replacement) even suggested using Peyton's fees to cover the auditor's non-

---

<sup>23</sup> Sir Henry Wallop to Burghley, 15 June 1591, SP 63/158/39, f. 89r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 398.

<sup>24</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 15 June 1591, SP 63/158/39, f. 89v; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 398.

<sup>25</sup> *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 586. Wallop to Burghley, 14 Nov. 1587, SP 63/132/10, f. 22; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 436. Christopher Peyton to Burghley, 20 Nov. 1587, SP 63/132/15, f. 43; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 437.

<sup>26</sup> Articles exhibited by Auditor Peyton to the Privy Council, 2 Aug. 1589, SP 63/146/3, f. 6; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 224.

<sup>27</sup> Articles exhibited by Auditor Peyton to the Privy Council, 2 Aug. 1589, SP 63/146/3, f. 6; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 224.

<sup>28</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 7 Jan. 1592, SP 63/163/7, f. 11; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 454.

payment of his clerks.<sup>29</sup> Peyton eventually returned to Ireland in May 1592, whereupon Wallop claimed that the two men had conferred and reached an agreement and would no longer trouble Burghley with their disputes.<sup>30</sup> Their disagreements, however, persisted, and both men remained in their offices.

The constant bickering over financial accounting in Ireland forced the issue of corruption into the open, unlike in England, and enabled the Westminster government to receive more information about the activities of their Irish officers. From the disputes between their officers in Ireland, the queen and privy council "learned" where to apportion blame for Ireland's poor financial state, although accusations of corruption were almost always political. They attributed the continuing problem to the chief officers within the Irish exchequer and the Dublin council, especially those born in Ireland.<sup>31</sup> Their loyalty, the queen complained, rested with their family and kinship ties, not the English government. She believed that Irish officers willfully neglected their duty in collecting debts and arrearages, in part by allowing the remission of rents to suitors who claimed their land had been wasted. Chief officers within the Irish exchequer and the courts had also allowed their orders to be disobeyed. Moreover, she suspected that commissioners responsible for reviewing financial accounts extended their duties over a longer period than necessary and took advantage of the special pay and diet during the audit process.<sup>32</sup> If true, this practice also contributed to the problem of diminishing revenues.

---

<sup>29</sup> Lord Deputy William Fitzwilliam to the Privy Council, 26 Oct. 1591, SP 63/160/51, f. 112; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 431.

<sup>30</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 28 May 1592, SP 63/164/45, f. 106; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 489.

<sup>31</sup> Certain remembrances touching the realm of Ireland, 30 Jan. 1586, SP 63/122/52, f. 112; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 13.

<sup>32</sup> Certain remembrances touching the realm of Ireland, 30 Jan. 1586, SP 63/122/52, f. 112; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 13.

And yet, the much more significant issues were England's policy of expansion, and the increased costs to match the administrative and military needs of newly subdued territories.<sup>33</sup> This expansion policy also oddly presumed that the native Irish would not hinder its development, which they did. There was, as Crawford noted, a "profound disjunction between the ambitions of the policy-makers and the means which they were prepared to use in support of them."<sup>34</sup> Ireland's government needed reform, not expansion. However unwilling the English government was to invest in public spending, the building of churches, schools, and government buildings was necessary to further the goal of anglicizing Ireland. But rather than recognize the structural and basic policy issues, the Westminster government blamed their officers in Ireland. This left the Irish councilors beleaguered and under constant pressure, which consequently put them on the defensive.

The Irish administration was chronically underfunded, and this was especially the case with the army. In addition to captains, footmen, and horsemen, the Irish army also included trumpeters, standard-bearers, kernes (Irish foot soldiers), surgeons, messengers, and constables. All of them had to be paid for their service. With the crown preoccupied with war (or, until 1585, the prospect of war) in the Low Countries, there was a lack of available funds to cover Ireland's military expenses. In 1580, the former lord chancellor, Sir William Gerrard, reported that the English government owed eight months' back payment to its soldiers and later advised that soldiers' pay at 8*d.* Irish for footmen and 9*d.* Irish for horsemen should be increased.<sup>35</sup> Many Irish councilors noted that soldiers were suffering because they could not afford to feed

---

<sup>33</sup> Jon G. Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland: The Irish Privy Council and the Expansion of Tudor Rule, 1556-1578* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press in association with the Irish Legal History Society, 1993), 342.

<sup>34</sup> Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, 329.

<sup>35</sup> Sir William Gerrard to Walsingham, 5 Aug. 1580, SP 63/75/12, f. 24; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 240. Gerrard to Burghley, 18 Sept. 1580, SP 63/76/46, f. 98; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 253.

themselves. The daily wage was eventually increased by *2d.* sterling for footmen and *5d.* sterling for horsemen, amounting to a total of *8d.* for footmen and *12d.* for horsemen.<sup>36</sup> This wage increase in allowance would apply only to those who served in the army in Ireland, not England's armies elsewhere. In theory, then, soldiers in Ireland were to receive weekly payments, or "lendings," given to them by their captains (or rather, company clerks) and issued by the treasurer-at-war, Wallop. The set daily wage was now *8d.* (annually £12 3s 4d), from which would be deducted "defalcations" for seasonal clothing or weapons, leaving an annual wage of £8 0s. 10d.<sup>37</sup>

However, wage increases did not solve the issue of nonpayment. In 1585, George Beverley, victualler for the army in Ireland, remarked that the garrison there was desperate to have half their month's wages advanced in ready money, or "imprests," to purchase victuals.<sup>38</sup> The use of imprests was a system devised by the English crown which entailed issuing cash advances so that soldiers could acquire food and other necessities. This system allowed the crown to direct its limited resources to the Low Countries and delay soldiers' "full pay."<sup>39</sup> But, again, this payment method only worked if the soldiers were actually paid and if the costs of victuals did not increase beyond the capacity of the soldiers to pay. In practice, the transport of money from England to Ireland was inconsistent. The irregularity of these shipments led to

---

<sup>36</sup> The Queen to the Lord Justices, [12 Nov.] 1582, SP 63/97/29, f. 161; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 411. The Queen to Wallop, [12 Nov.] 1582, SP 63/97/30, f. 162; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 411. Walsingham to Burghley, 13 Nov. 1582, SP 63/97/36, f. 172; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 412. Certain things relative to the soldiers' pay to be considered, 1582, SP 63/91/9, f. 17; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 358. Extract of letters relative to the increase of the soldiers' pay in Ireland, 27 July 1583, SP 63/103/45, f. 130; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 460. The specific amount for the increase seems to have been taken on Sir Nicholas Malby's suggestion (*Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, pp. 461-465). The kerne were paid on a smaller scale, *4d.* a day.

<sup>37</sup> John McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The Burdens of the 1590s Crisis* (New York; Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2009), 195.

<sup>38</sup> George Beverley to Burghley, 26 Oct. 1585, SP 63/120/14, f. 40; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 583.

<sup>39</sup> Hammer, 169. See, for example, Wallop to Burghley, 12 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/46, f. 174; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 128.

adversity and, ultimately, corruption because the longer the wait, the greater the chance of financial abuse by captains and other officials when the money arrived.<sup>40</sup>

The pleas for payment only continued. In 1589, Nicholas Bagenal, marshal of the army, and his son, Henry, requested £1,716 to mostly cover the wages due to "poore men dyschardgede, who stande in greate neede thereof for the Relieffe of them, theize wyues, and children."<sup>41</sup> Then, nearly four years later, Henry petitioned for long outstanding payments due to soldiers.<sup>42</sup> Soldiers had little recourse in receiving payments for their service. They could petition for themselves or pass along their petitions to those with influence, like the Irish councilors. Even though the English government had spent hundreds of thousands on Irish military expenses, it was never enough. As the fiscal crises in Ireland compounded, it contributed to a growing concern over the poverty of soldiers upon their return home to England.<sup>43</sup>

Irish administrators did not face the same extreme problem of non-payment as the soldiers. Since the revenues covered mainly administrative costs, senior officials often had their salaries covered before others. However, there were instances when the queen's debts included money due to the lord deputy and chief officers.<sup>44</sup> The issue for administrators, like the Dublin councilors, was not the payment of their salaries and fees for office but rather its size. Those who worked in an administrative capacity were paid according to their office and social status. Each office carried an associated salary (or "entertainment"), which included fees (such as those incurred in the performance of one's duties) and diet (allowances for food and provisions).

---

<sup>40</sup> McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland*, 195. Ciaran Brady, "The Captain's Games: Army and Society in Elizabethan Ireland," in *A Military History of Ireland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 136-59.

<sup>41</sup> Petition of Sir Nicholas and Sir Henry Bagenal to the Privy Council, 6 Mar. 1589, SP 63/142/15, f. 40r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 133.

<sup>42</sup> H. Bagenal to Burghley, 21 Feb. 1593, SP 63/168/35, f. 133r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 76.

<sup>43</sup> Abby Lagemann, "The worthiest to be relieved: Disabled veterans in England, c. 1580-1630," in *The Routledge History of Poverty, c.1450-1800*, eds. David Hitchcock and Julia McClure (London: Routledge, 2020).

<sup>44</sup> See, for instance, Book of the moneys due from Queen Elizabeth to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and garrison of Ireland, 31 Dec. 1575, SP 63/49/1255.1, f. 113; *CSPIre, Tud*, 1571-1575, p. 771.



However, the social prestige of the person who occupied the office mattered; the higher the social status, the greater the benefits of office. Minor officers generally received payments of less than £40 a year. These officers included clerks, interpreters, constables, comptrollers, etc. Higher-ranking offices, like the auditor and the surveyor-general, had much larger fees due partly to service charges such as the employment of servants and traveling expenses.

The lord deputy had the highest salary with the greatest allowances in Ireland by virtue of his viceregal status. On average, a lord deputy's income from office ranged from £1500 to £2,000 *per annum*. He had additional allowances for various necessary expenses—his retinue, personal secretaries, household, property, travel, and transportation.<sup>45</sup> He paid expenses related to the diet and lodging of anyone in his employ, which, for a man of his social status, included a personal secretary, a steward, a treasurer, a captain, a petty captain, horsemen, footmen, a trumpeter, a standard-bearer, cooks, yeomen to care for horses, ushers of the chamber, chaplains, porters, etc. He was also given an allowance for the liveries of all his servants. The other councilors did not enjoy these privileges, at least not to a similar extent. And yet, even the lords deputy complained that their income for office was inadequate.<sup>46</sup> Although such complaints were common among Elizabethan officials, including those of greater wealth, there may be some modicum of truth in their grievances, given the dismal state of Ireland's finances.

The gross incomes for the Irish councilors are more difficult to discern, as often the only amount listed in accounting reports are the fees associated with an office. The Irish councilors, including the lord presidents, held fees of £100 or more, though there were some notable

---

<sup>45</sup> *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, pp. 461-465. Lord Deputy Perrot's fee accounted as £871 8s. 6 5/8d. for a half year. See also, A brief of the charges of household, wages, liveries, and stable of [Sir John Perrot] Her Majesty's Deputy, July 1586, SP 63/125/32, f. 73; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 113.

<sup>46</sup> See, for example, A brief of the charges of household, wages, liveries, and stable of [Sir John Perrot], July 1586, SP 63/125/32, f. 73; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 113. Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 24 Aug. 1588, SP 63/136/12, f. 41; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 8.

exceptions. Sir Richard Bingham, for example, received as his annual fee £100, with a diet of 10s. *per diem* in 1586.<sup>47</sup> He repeatedly complained that his fees and allowances were inadequate; the other lord president, John Norris, had similar complaints.<sup>48</sup> By 1586, Bingham's diet money had at least increased by 3s. 4d. *per diem* (£60 16s. 8d. *per annum*). Sir Robert Gardiner, chief justice of the King's Bench, reportedly also enjoyed a pay increase in 1586 from £100 Irish to £300 English sterling yearly.<sup>49</sup> The increase, however, was not as large as it appeared. The Irish pay did not include allowances for circuits, which in 1575 was 100 marks (or £150), whereas the £300 salary (in theory) included the allowances. According to Sir John Perrot, who was lord deputy at the time, Gardiner requested additional allowances for circuits and travel, well above the already substantial £300 fee.<sup>50</sup> Perrot's accounting, though, may also be inaccurate, as the token fee for chief justices was at least £200 Irish.<sup>51</sup> Wallop's appointment as treasurer-at-wars and general receiver in 1579 carried only a fee of £66 13s. 4d. Irish, and in 1592, the fee was the same.<sup>52</sup> However, with the inclusion of diets and allowances for household expenses, senior

---

<sup>47</sup> The entertainments of Sir Richard Bingham, 28 Oct. 1586, SP 63/126/67, f. 180; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 186. See also, Lord Deputy Perrot to the Privy Council, 13 July 1587, SP 65/12/40 (1), f. 28; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 386. A book of instructions touching the province of Connaught and the country of Thomond, by Sir Richard Bingham, 11 July 1588, SP 63/135/80, f. 217; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 557.

<sup>48</sup> Bingham to Walsingham, 30 Aug. 1584, SP 63/111/81, f. 176; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 525. Bingham to Walsingham, 1 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/1, f. 1; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 528. Bingham to Lady Walsingham, 14 Jan. 1585, SP 63/114/27, f. 53; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 547. See also, Sir John Norris to Walsingham, 28 Apr. 1587, SP 63/129/34, f. 82; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 324.

<sup>49</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 1 May 1587, SP 63/129/63, f. 132; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 337. The £300 sterling fee is mentioned again in two auditor reports—Richard Hoper and Nicholas Kenney's in 1589 and 1592, respectively (View of the account of Richard Hoper, deputy of Sir Henry Wallop, 8 July 1589, SP 63/146/7. I, f. 34; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 227. Certificate of fees, pensions, and annuities in Ireland, under the hand of Nicholas Kenney, Deputy Auditor, 1 June 1592, SP 63/165/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 518). See also, Judges and law officers with their fees, [undated] 1609, SP 63/227/557, f. 233; *CSPIre*, 1608-1610, p. 338.

<sup>50</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 1 May 1587, SP 63/129/63, f. 132; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 337.

<sup>51</sup> *CSPIre, revised edition*, 1571-1575, p. 916. Certificate of fees, pensions, and annuities in Ireland, under the hand of Nicholas Kenny, Deputy Auditor, 1 June 1592, SP 63/165/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 518.

<sup>52</sup> Patent for Sir Henry Wallop to be Under Treasurer and General Receiver of Ireland [Draft], 10 Aug. 1579, SP 63/68/29, f. 56; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 180. Nicholas Kenny listed Wallop's fee as £66 Irish (or £50 sterling) in 1592 (Certificate of fees, pensions, and annuities in Ireland, under the hand of Nicholas Kenny, Deputy Auditor, 1 June 1592, SP 63/165/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 518). Kenny's account gives the estimates in Irish sterling and then the English equivalent, suggesting that Irish administrators would now be paid only in sterling. Sir George Carey, who took the position after Wallop, also made at least £66 Irish (An abstract of such fees, pensions,

officers, like the vice treasurer and the marshal of the army, received salaries upwards of £1,000.<sup>53</sup>

Of the Irish councilors, the master of the rolls and the secretary of state seemed to have had the lowest fees assigned to their offices. Henry Draycott held the office of the master of the rolls in 1566 and stated the office only had a fee of £55.<sup>54</sup> Nicholas White is listed as earning £50 Irish for his fee in a 1592 auditing report.<sup>55</sup> Between October 1575 and March 1576, the fee for the office of secretary of state was £66 13s. 4d., which was lower than the clerk of the check, who received £70 18s. 3d.<sup>56</sup> By 1589, Fenton's fee for the secretary's office was listed as £80 with additional fees from the privy signet and the office of general collector, amounting to a total of £106 13s. 4d.<sup>57</sup> It remained so until at least 1606.

While these numbers are helpful in some respects, they are not entirely representative.

The token fees, or service charges for office, varied considerably in practice. Despite a token fee

---

and annuities as are payable out of His Majesty's revenues, [undated] 1606, SP 63/218/671, f. 82; *CSPIre*, 1603-1606, p. 429).

<sup>53</sup> *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, pp. 461-465. The estimates within are only for a half year.

<sup>54</sup> Henry Draycott to Sir William Cecil, 4 Mar. 1566, SP 63/16/44, f. 116; *CSPIre, Tud*, 1566-1567, p. 20. Draycott to Cecil, 30 Apr. 1566, SP 63/17/112, f. 104; *CSPIre, Tud*, 1566-1567, p. 53.

<sup>55</sup> Certificate of fees, pensions, and annuities in Ireland, under the hand of Nicholas Kenney, Deputy Auditor, 1 June 1592, SP 63/165/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 518. One could surmise that the English government displayed a notable prejudice in wages for Irish-born officers, particularly if you consider Sir Robert Dillon's substantially lower fee as chief justice (£67 Irish) compared to the English-born Sir Robert Gardener, who also served as chief justice. Some documents suggest that the fees were equal for the two chief justices (See *CSPIre, revised edition*, 1571-1575, p. 916). However, when Dillon was removed from office after allegations of corruption, he was replaced by Sir William Weston, an English-born judge, who upon entering the office received an increase in his fees. Immediately upon Weston's death and Dillon's reinstatement to office, Fenton requested that Dillon receive his old fees without any increase (as was the case in times past with judges from Ireland), and the increase should be used towards his (that is, Fenton's) expenses (Fenton to Burghley, 23 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176/34, f. 84; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 274). The chief baron of the exchequer, Sir Lucas Dillon, was also Irish-born and received less than £100 when he occupied the office. But, after his death in 1592, the government moved to enlarge his fees to £100. The next chief baron was an Englishman. See A note of such Irish causes as were moved to Her Majesty by the Lord Treasurer of England, 16 June 1592, SP 63/165/10, f. 134; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 527. Furthermore, Draycott, who served as master of the rolls before White, was born in England.

<sup>56</sup> Book of her majesty's charges in Ireland [prepared by the auditor, Thomas Jenyson], 1576, SP 63/55/37. III, f. 120; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 92.

<sup>57</sup> The profits appertaining to the Secretary of Ireland, Mar. 1589, SP 63/142/65, f. 155; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 141.

of only £66 for vice treasurers, in a six-month period between 1575 and 1576, Sir Edward Fitton received £427. Richard Hoper, Wallop's deputy, attested in 1589 that Gardiner's fees alone amounted to £400, and for Loftus for a half year period, £217 with allowances.<sup>58</sup> These fluctuating numbers suggest that living costs, or at the very least the cost to fulfill the duties of the office, were much higher than the budgeted amount. For the crown, the budget had the benefit of keeping costs low in the short term, allowing the government to redirect money elsewhere. Therefore, the crown's fiscal policy for the Irish administration was quite similar to its policy for the English army in Ireland.

The English crown's parsimonious policies transferred the burden of finances to the administrators. While some could bear the financial burden with their own wealth, they could only do so for a short time and only those with substantial means. Perrot stated that he had brought £4,000 to Ireland and received a further £4,000 in money and provisions out of England, all of which he lent to the treasurer, nobleman, captains, etc. Sir Henry Wallop also claimed to have used about £7,000 or £8,000 of his own money.<sup>59</sup> It was unsurprising that officers borrowed money from those who had such resources in Ireland and, if true, helps to explain why some in the Irish council accrued large debts. When Robert Legge, a deputy in the Irish exchequer office, examined the financial accounts of Irish officers, he found that they were greatly indebted to the queen, none more so than the Irish privy councilors. Some of the offices that the Irish councilors held generated income. This was especially the case for judges and clerics. Consequently, when Legge reported the large debts of the Irish councilors, they were primarily, if not entirely, officials within the judicial administration and clerics. He pointed to Loftus, Jones, Dillon,

---

<sup>58</sup> View of the account of Richard Hoper, deputy of Sir Henry Wallop, 8 July 1589, SP 63/146/7. I, f. 34; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 227.

<sup>59</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 23 Mar. 1587, SP 63/128/99, f. 204; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 284.

White, and other officers, including the attorney-general and one Nicholas Kenny, who apparently owed a staggering debt of £800. Kenny, as clerk of the first fruits, was also a client of Archbishop Adam Loftus. Legge believed Loftus and Kenny had conspired for over several years to defraud the Irish Exchequer.<sup>60</sup> However, Legge may not have been aware of the numerous remissions of debts that some of the Irish councilors, and even officers in Ireland, had been granted.

Though Legge did not make references to fiscal policies, only the auditing of accounts, he nonetheless believed that officers in Ireland prioritized their personal interests over their duty to the English crown. He argued that the men who occupied Irish offices had either gained their posts through the patronage of some powerful individual in England or Ireland, or they had simply purchased them.<sup>61</sup> This was a recurring complaint in Elizabeth's reign, and the problem continued without correction.<sup>62</sup> Jacques Wingfield, for example, went to Ireland with the Thomas, earl of Sussex and lord deputy. Through Sussex's patronage, Wingfield acquired two offices in Ireland as master of the ordnance and constable of Dublin castle. Despite incompetence and being absent from Ireland for four years, Wingfield was allowed to keep his office until he died in 1587.<sup>63</sup> It was also a consequence of the ambitious men, many of them younger sons (including Wingfield) in a society dominated by male primogeniture, who had gone to Ireland in search of personal enrichment. However, Elizabeth's cost-cutting policies in Ireland bred corruption within her Irish administration, effectively forcing the councilors to find other means for succor.

---

<sup>60</sup> Book by Robert Legge touching the debts of the Lord Chancellor, the Bishop of Meath, Sir Robert Dillon, etc., 1589-90, SP 63/150/52. II, f. 157; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 308.

<sup>61</sup> Book by Robert Legge touching the debts of the Lord Chancellor, the Bishop of Meath, Sir Robert Dillon, etc., 1589-90, SP 63/150/52. II, f. 157; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 308.

<sup>62</sup> Ellis, *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors*, 167.

<sup>63</sup> *HoP*, "Wingfield, Jacques." Hammer, 71.

## The Pursuit of Private Profit

The Dublin councilors employed a variety of means to increase their income, and they frequently did so using their offices. As officers, they had allowances; they could occupy lesser offices, recommend petitions on behalf of others, and acquire leases and grants of land. Once the Irish privy councilors realized they could turn these privileges to their own pecuniary ends, they did so. They increased their charges, occupied several offices simultaneously to reap the benefits from each office; took money from petitioners; and granted leases (from which they could sell or collect rents) to themselves, each other, and their family members. Some of these activities were discovered, though likely others never surfaced. Some councilors took care not to draw too much attention to themselves, while others shamelessly acquired as much money and property as possible. The Westminster government took notice but did little to curb their actions out of an awareness that their reluctance to supply Ireland with more money and men would inevitably breed corruption among the officers there. Though the aim was never to encourage institutional corruption, they had, out of necessity, to keep their Irish privy councilors relatively happy.

Allowances, particularly for travel, were one way for an Irish privy councilor to increase their income. As part of his duties as master of the rolls, Sir Nicholas White had an allowance whenever he went on circuit. In 1573, he held sessions in Offaly for nine days at the *per diem* rate of 13s. 4d., which amounted to £6.<sup>64</sup> Traveling expenses were common among the councilors, especially officers of the court, and thus often approved by the Irish council and the Westminster government. The amount of one's allowance depended, as with one's wages, on the office and social status. Lesser officers received significantly less for their allowance, which was true even among the councilors. Their budget for traveling expenses depended on the distance

---

<sup>64</sup> Note of the extraordinary charges for the quarter ending, 25 Sept. 1573, SP 63/42/713.1, f. 103; *CSPIre, revised edition*, 1571-1575, p. 421.

traversed, the time it took to arrive at a destination, and the time spent there before returning home. The councilors could exceed that budget, but they had to either explain their overages to get reimbursed or, likely, find the money elsewhere. If the expenses seemed excessive, the government could elect to only pay a portion, provided that the trip had even been approved.

The lord deputy and council were the first to approve warrants for travel for officials serving in Ireland. During Sir William Fitzwilliam's term as lord deputy, he approved a number of travel charges, which Sir John Perrot then tried to correct when he became lord deputy. If a councilor wanted to travel, he simply had to convince another councilor or the lord deputy that such travel was necessary. He also had the option of petitioning directly to the queen and the privy council in England. According to Perrot, Sir Robert Gardener requested an additional allowance "over and above his foresaid large stypende" for his circuits, sitting on commissions, and transportation costs.<sup>65</sup> Perrot complained to Burghley that Gardener had already received money for that very purpose and so found the request excessive and unnecessary. The charges, he argued, were not for Gardener's own expenses but those of his friends:

I wolde make no presidente untell yor L[ordshi]p's pleasure were knowne, as also to enforme you howe redde men haue byn to deuise iorneyes thereby to gett allowaunce when moste p[ar]te of there charges are borne by there ffrendes as they trauell.<sup>66</sup>

While it is nearly impossible to ascertain the pervasiveness of this practice, Perrot's report, as well as reprimands issued by the English privy council, suggests that such practices were common.

Most administrative costs, including travel, were generally paid out of the Irish revenues. If revenues were low in a particular season or year, those costs had to be funded externally from

---

<sup>65</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 1 May 1587, SP 63/129/63, f. 132r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 337.

<sup>66</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 1 May 1587, SP 63/129/63, f. 132r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 337.

England or carried forward until they could be paid. Sir Richard Bingham, for instance, had a £100 *per annum* allowance for fuel and carriages. He claimed he could not use that allowance in 1586 because revenues from composition were too low.<sup>67</sup> Therefore, his financial support had been substantially reduced. Allowances, whether for travel or other things, could also be contested when considered by another councilor excessive. Perrot found Bingham's allowance for food excessive, which Bingham attributed to the seasonal variation in market prices for meat.<sup>68</sup> Thus, even approved allowances sometimes demanded an explanation. Perrot also leveled this accusation of unreasonable allowances against the other Dublin councilors, to which the councilors responded:

wee may saffely and absolutely affirme vppon o[u]r Creddytes, that muche less that any of vs directly or indirectly; eyther for o[u]r selues or o[u]r fri[e]nds, haue attempted any vnresonable demaundes of allow[a]unce, or in any sort pressed his L. therevnto, seing wee had neuer so muche as the thought or Conceyt thereof, having more care to preserue her Ma[jes]tye proffytt that waye then to dymynishe yt.<sup>69</sup>

Special allowances, such as travel outside Ireland, were a different process. The first step was to petition for license to repair to England. Lesser officers could appeal to the lord deputy and council, but Irish councilors needed the approval of the queen and the privy council. Once granted, the councilors had a daily allowance for food and transportation costs. Whenever Fenton traveled to the English court, he had a 20*s. per diem* allowance. The queen and the privy council demanded that councilors sometimes make their reports in person, as was the case with Fenton. These physical appearances before the court were crucial for relaying important information about Irish affairs, particularly those of a confidential nature. It also offered an opportunity to

---

<sup>67</sup> The entertainments of Sir Richard Bingham, 28 Oct. 1586, SP 63/126/67, f. 180; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 186.

<sup>68</sup> The entertainments of Sir Richard Bingham, 28 Oct. 1586, SP 63/126/67, f. 180; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 186.

<sup>69</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and others of the Council of Ireland to Burghley, 15 May 1587, SP 63/129/83, f. 195r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 351.



present matters in a light favorable to oneself and to disparage others without the inconvenience of a paper trail. Of course, these other councilors could also request to appear before the court and defend themselves against any allegations. However, they needed approval for their travel.

The councilors seemed to think that travel to England was best when either short or permanent, for long absences threatened the tenuous hold they had in Ireland. Absence from Ireland could mean that others would co-opt one's fees, property, or even office. In Fenton's absence, he feared that Bingham would try to take his house and thus warned his clerk to stand guard. He also expressed concern when Philip Williams, the lord deputy's personal secretary, received his fees for the office of secretary of state; he sued to have those fees returned.<sup>70</sup> Sir Henry Wallop also worried that his office was in jeopardy when he learned that Sir Valentine Brown had petitioned for his office during his absence:

If yt be true that Sr Vallentine so thirsteth after my office as to sue to supplie yt in my absence w[i]thout fee, yt is easelie to be discerned what Course he would runn, protesting to yor honor for mine own p[ar]te that I haue delt so upprightlie and lyved so chargeably, that I haue yeerelie spent of mine own, over and besides all Comodyties whatsoever of mine office, and haue not employed eny p[ar]te of hir Ma[jes]t[es] monney to my private benefitt or Comodytie, wherein I as much reioyce as those, who by doing the Contrarie haue greatlie advaunched themselves.<sup>71</sup>

Wallop rightly recognized that Brown had likely disparaged Wallop in his suits for the office of vice treasurer. Such was the nature of politics in Ireland, where anyone could be a target in the search for opportunities for advancement.

Thankfully for Wallop, senior offices, like the vice treasurership, were much more secure than lesser offices. Because each office had an associated fee and allowances, councilors could

---

<sup>70</sup> Fenton's private requests, qv. June 1592, SP 63/165/29, f. 183; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 533. CP, vol. 4, p. 231.

<sup>71</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 25 June 1588, SP 63/135/51, f. 116r-v; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 524.

occupy a senior office within the Irish privy council and several lesser offices simultaneously. The most sought-after offices were those within the Irish exchequer. An usher or clerk within the exchequer could expect to earn close to £20 yearly, while the chief remembrancer received an annual token fee of £30 yearly.<sup>72</sup> Owen Moore, clerk of the check, received at least £20 in 1567 and then £33 in 1573 for his own use.<sup>73</sup> However, in a six-month period in the mid-1570s, the fees for Moore's office was £70 18s. 3d., a much heftier sum than the token fee. When Moore fell severely ill in spring 1584, Fenton immediately requested to succeed Moore in his exchequer office position, claiming that his fees for secretary of state were "too smale to Aunswer my Reasonable and nedefull expences."<sup>74</sup> Moore died in 1585, but his office was not bestowed on Fenton. Rather, Thomas Williams, one of Lord Deputy Perrot's men, received the post.<sup>75</sup> Fenton was the councilor who most frequently petitioned for other offices. At various points, he sought the office of clerk of the check, the bishopric of Meath, the constableness of Dublin castle and Duncannon, and the new office of general collector. The last office was the one he received and only then because he had created the position.<sup>76</sup>

Councilors who tried to obtain additional offices had to be careful in how many they acquired, lest they draw the ire of the other officers or of the Westminster government. Sir Edward Waterhouse collected an array of different offices—personal secretary to both Lord Deputy Henry Sidney and Sir Walter Devereux, first earl of Essex (during his failed plantation of

---

<sup>72</sup> View of the account of Richard Hoper, 8 July 1589, SP 63/146/7. I, f. 34; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 227. In 1582, Loftus claimed that the fee for the office of chief remembrancer was but £30 *per annum*, and it's possible that the pay later increased by £10 to acknowledge Richard Colman's long term in office (Loftus to Burghley, 15 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/27, f. 60; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 341).

<sup>73</sup> Sums of money paid in England on Lord Deputy Sidney's orders, Dec. 1567, SP 63/22/597, f. 186; *CSPIre, Tud*, 1566-1567, p. 254. Book of the issuing of £4,000 sterling, being £5,333 6s. 8d. Irish by Sir Edward Fitton, 23 June 1573, SP 63/41/619, f. 137; *CSPIre, Tud*, 1571-1575, p. 372.

<sup>74</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 9 Apr. 1584, SP 63/109/24, f. 44r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 506.

<sup>75</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 21 May 1585, SP 63/116/46, f. 116; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 563.

<sup>76</sup> Sir Robert Napier tried to do this as well with the office of alienations (Note by Mr. Napier, July 1596, SP 63/191/56, f. 280; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 66). Napier was actually knighted in 1593.

Ulster), clerk of the castle chamber, collector for the impost of wines, exchequer commissioner of the army, receiver general, collector of the casualties, and chancellor of the exchequer, among others.<sup>77</sup> Some of these offices he held simultaneously. Others he had to surrender in order to occupy other offices or to please the queen and the other Irish councilors. In 1583, he had to defend the numerous grants he had been awarded, which had likely been brought to the attention of the queen.<sup>78</sup> She revoked a grant that the lord chancellor and the other Irish councilors had approved for Waterhouse and his heirs, arguing that such a grant required a special warrant by the queen and the privy council.<sup>79</sup> Because he had held so many offices during his time in Ireland, Waterhouse had to defend himself against accusations of corruption through private gain. His argument rested on the claim that if he had truly profited from his offices, then he would not have needed to sell £4,000 of his livings in England.<sup>80</sup> The records indicate that he had sold his lands and leases in England, but they did not amount to £4,000 nor was it clear precisely when he had sold them.<sup>81</sup> It could have been before 1579, when he initially started to accumulate Irish offices. It is also unclear what he did with the proceeds, including whether he used the money to buy new assets in Ireland. Either way, obtaining and holding too many offices could

---

<sup>77</sup> *DNB*, "Waterhouse, Sir Edward."

<sup>78</sup> Lords Justices Loftus and Wallop to Burghley, 11 Aug. 1583, SP 63/104/16, f. 36; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 463. Edward Waterhouse to Burghley, 12 Aug. 1583, SP 63/104/19, f. 42; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 463. Lords Justices Loftus and Wallop to Burghley, 20 Oct. 1583, SP 63/105/28, f. 0082; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 474.

<sup>79</sup> The Queen to Lord Chancellor Loftus and others of the council of Ireland, 26 Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/81, f. 174; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 32.

<sup>80</sup> The answer of Sir Edward Waterhouse to certain objections, 18 Apr. 1587, SP 63/129/15, f. 21; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 295.

<sup>81</sup> Note of lands and leases sold by Sir Edward Waterhouse, 10 Apr. 1587, SP 63/129/5, f. 8; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 293. The sale also included two leases in Ireland (£625) and occurred "since his first service in Ireland." Like most councilors, Waterhouse left Ireland periodically and returned to fulfill his official duties. It should be noted that Waterhouse may have contributed financially in the fight against the Desmond rebellion. See Note of certificate by Treasurer Wallop of the receipt of money in England and of that borrowed in Ireland, Nov. 1579, SP 63/70/38. I, f. 100; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 198. Wallop named Waterhouse as one of the men from whom he had borrowed money.

draw unwanted attention to the councilor in question. It could also jeopardize authorization of future grants.

A more inconspicuous way for the Irish councilors to earn money was through the forwarding and recommendation of petitions to the queen and privy council. They could, and sometimes did, charge a small fee for providing this service. Just two years into his position as secretary, Fenton had forwarded so many suits to Walsingham that he felt compelled to apologize.<sup>82</sup> He even got into some trouble because of one suit in particular. In 1597, Jeffrey Story brought a complaint against the secretary for taking his money and failing to perform a service. According to Story, he had been granted a pension of 2*s.* a day for his military service, but Fenton's constant writing against him had resulted in the detaining of the pension, or so Story had been told by another. Six years prior, Fenton had promised to further Story's suit to the queen for the reversion of some lands in Ireland and, in return, Story would give him £6. When Fenton did nothing on his behalf, Story turned to Henry Maynard, secretary to Lord Treasurer Burghley, and promised Maynard £100 for his help procuring Burghley's favor. Maynard was deemed a more important figure than Fenton because of Maynard's closeness to Burghley, hence the substantial difference in the amount proffered. Allegedly, Fenton intervened to take the money with the promise of furthering Story's suit. Once again, the secretary did not do as he promised, despite supposedly advancing another petitioner's suit from whom he had supposedly received £100 and other rewards.<sup>83</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 10 Apr. 1582, SP 63/91/21, f. 47; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 360.

<sup>83</sup> CP, vol. 7, p. 393; Jeffrey Story to Burghley, 23 Sept. 1597, SP 63/200/138, f. 342; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 405. Petition of Jeffrey Story to Burghley, [23 Sept.] 1597, SP 63/200/139, f. 344; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 405.

Over fifteen years earlier, Sir Henry Wallop had accused Fenton of taking bribes, but he had provided no evidence to support his claim.<sup>84</sup> Yet, considering Story's suit and Fenton's avaricious attempts to increase his fees and wealth, it is likely that the secretary was taking bribes—and it is possible that other officers were doing so as well. In this instance, bribery only came to light because the service had not been done. It is unclear the level of participation among the councilors in this business of accepting rewards for recommending suits, but it was not uncommon in England. As so many others did, Jeffrey Story thought that appealing to Burghley's secretary, Henry Maynard, was one means of receiving satisfaction for his suit. Another of Burghley's secretaries, Michael Hickes, garnered a reputation for accepting bribes for the forwarding of suits.<sup>85</sup> Hickes thus used his office to increase his earnings, and in so doing, he amassed enough wealth to become a moneylender in his own right.

There was, however, a balance to be struck. The frequency with which councilors made recommendations was an area of concern for the queen and the privy council, who noted this practice with distaste.<sup>86</sup> The councilors had written so many letters of recommendation and approved so many licenses for travel to England that the Westminster government could not keep pace with the requests, especially since they were already inundated with English suitors. They did not address the frequency of recommendations, only that such practice needed to be curtailed owing to the large number of suitors.

Land was the other principal means to increase one's income. Unlike adventurers, whose sole purpose in Ireland was acquiring land, the Irish councilors were administrators within the Irish government. They could only acquire land in Ireland by purchasing leases or governmental

---

<sup>84</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 11 Oct. 1582, SP 63/96/8, f. 23; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 403.

<sup>85</sup> Alan G. R. Smith, *Servant of the Cecils: The Life of Sir Michael Hickes, 1543-1612* (London: J. Cape, 1977), p. 68.

<sup>86</sup> The heads of those things wherein, [27 Oct.] 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 5, 116, f. 360; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 501.

grants like fee farms.<sup>87</sup> Fee farms were land grants with an annual rent without the expectation of homage or fealty. These grants offered an opportunity to make money as the landholder could expect profits in excess of rents owed to the crown. The Dublin councilors, as well as a number of Irish officials, were quite prolific in their requests for fee farms.<sup>88</sup> Another huge land-grabbing opportunity for Irish officials came after the second Desmond Rebellion and the establishment of the Munster plantation.

### **The Munster Plantation and the Reordering of Irish Spaces**

Everything on which the English colonial project in Ireland depended—expansion, settlement, and financial success—concerned the control over land. With control over land, the crown could reaffirm its ideological hegemony over Ireland and its peoples. For the Dublin privy councilors, land was also the most effective means of realizing their own private ambitions while advancing state interests.

Establishing plantations, which enabled English settlement in the region, became a major focus of the English crown in Ireland, especially during the Marian and Elizabethan governments. They tried to establish three major plantations within Ireland: the Leix-Offaly plantation in the late 1540s, private enterprises in Ulster in the 1570s, and the Munster plantation in the 1580s. But the expansion of English authority across the island meant intrusion into spaces inhabited by the native Irish. It also meant the rejection of Irish notions of property, wherein land

---

<sup>87</sup> See, for example, Wallop's letter to Burghley, wherein he confessed to purchasing a number of leases (12 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/48, f. 182; *CSPire*, 1586-July 1588, p. 48). In another letter, he stated that the purchase of leases was a common practice (Wallop to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/53, f. 194; *CSPire*, 1586-July 1588, p. 135).

<sup>88</sup> There are too many to account for here, but to name a few: Petition of Wallop to the Privy Council, 16 Dec. 1585, SP 63/121/38, f. 153; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 587. Wallop to Burghley, 26 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/53, f. 175; *CSPire*, 1586-July 1588, p. 48. White to Walsingham, 15 June 1589, SP 63/145/8, f. 14; *CSPire*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 206. Of course, Fenton also appears on this list.

was a communal resource to be shared, not private property.<sup>89</sup> In introducing the idea of property as personal possession and reinforcing those claims with boundary markers, the English turned land into a commodity. Lands held by the crown were then leased to English settlers, who in turn became undertakers, or landlords, responsible for sub-leasing lands, ideally to English tenants—a project which echoed the Roman model of colonization and that resembled the surrender and regrant policy the crown had introduced in Ireland in the 1540s. The development of a new rent-based economy in Ireland fell in line with the goals of the English crown: increase profits and reduce expenses. The consequences of English plantation schemes were many. They included the exclusion of indigenous claims to land and their subsequent displacement out of their ancestral homes, and those not forced to relocate were exploited as tenants by their English overlords.

The profitability of land in the colonialist agenda depended on mapping the landscape. With the exploration and "discovery" of new worlds, there was a growing map consciousness in the sixteenth century.<sup>90</sup> This was especially true for Ireland, whose physical geography differed from England with its mountainous regions, coastal highlands, and large areas of peat bog. Redesigning its topography by the clearance of woodlands, the erection of borders, and the building of fortresses and bridges, was a form of "geographic conquest" or "topographical colonialism," reordering the Irish landscape to suit English colonial purposes.<sup>91</sup> Maps were

---

<sup>89</sup> R. A. Houston, "People, Space and Law in Late Medieval and Early Modern Britain and Ireland," *Past and Present* 230 (2016): 84; Hans Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland: A Study in Legal Imperialism* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 164.

<sup>90</sup> See, for example, Bernhard Klein, *Maps and the Writing of Space in Early Modern England and Ireland* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002).

<sup>91</sup> Glenn Hooper, "Writing and Landscape in Early Modern Ireland," *Literature & History* 5, no. 2 (1996): 9; William J. Smyth, *Map-Making, Landscapes and Memory: A Geography of Colonial and Early Modern Ireland, c. 1530-1750* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press in association with Field Day, 2006), esp. chapter 2. See also, James A. Delle, "'A Good and Easy Speculation': Spatial Conflict, Collusion and Resistance in Late Sixteenth-Century Munster, Ireland," *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 3 (1999): 11-35. Delle specifically explores the complex issue of space in the English colonial project; the restructuring to reflect English ideas of space, native opposition and collusion, and how the domination of Ireland through space manifested in material, social, and cognitive processes.

integral in these processes. Cartographic representations of the land were rarely neutral, as they were frequently employed for geopolitical ends. Maps, then, were a kind of "imperial eye," operating as instruments of survey, surveillance, and conquest.<sup>92</sup>

Few men in Elizabeth's government understood the utility of mapping Ireland as Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, did. He recognized the usefulness of maps in drafting military strategies, as the location of forts, castles, and other key sites became part of the planning process. Through maps, Burghley also had more precise information on Ireland's political geography and the important families within each region. After the military conflict with Shane O'Neill in Ulster in the 1560s, Burghley pushed to produce newer, more accurate maps of Ireland. From the earliest surviving Tudor map of Ireland in the 1520s (see Map 2) to the more detailed maps of Elizabeth's reign (see Map 3), much was accomplished in the sixteenth century, with Burghley's support. Cartographers such as John Goghe, Robert Lythe and Richard Bartlett constructed comprehensive maps of Ireland, which included more detailed mapping of the provinces (see Map 4).<sup>93</sup> These maps accorded to the Elizabethan government greater control and authority over Ireland, and maps overall would figure prominently in the Nine Years' War.

---

<sup>92</sup> Smyth, *Map-making, Landscapes and Memory*, 25.

<sup>93</sup> On the Elizabethan cartographers, see J. H. Andrews, *The Queen's Last Map-Maker: Richard Bartlett in Ireland, 1600-3* (Dublin: Geography Publications, 2008).





Map 2 - Ireland, c. 1520s, British Library, Cotton Augustus I.ii f. 21.



Map 3 - John Goghe's Map of Ireland, c. 1567, The National Archives at Kew, MPF 1/68. Note the east-west orientation of Ireland.



Map 4 - Richard Bartlett's *A Generall Description of Ulster*, 1602-3, The National Archives at Kew, MPF 1/35.

Map-making could not be accomplished without surveying the land. The most opportune moments were after a rebellion, when the destruction wrought by violence made the imposition of order seem necessary. Acts of violence by Gaelic and Old English lords meant the forfeiture of lands and its transfer to the English crown. Once the earl of Desmond had been attainted in 1579 for instigating the second Munster rebellion, his landed possessions were confiscated by the English government. The newly confiscated lands in Munster were then reorganized to maximize their money-making potential.

The expectation of a new plantation in Munster was present in 1580, three years before the rebellion had even ended. As one councilor noted, appropriation of enemy lands could cover the costs of the war.<sup>94</sup> Plantation offered the English an opportunity to make good on colonial claims of remaking Ireland. Yet, for England, the paradox of plantation was the failure to provide financial resources and the significant financial investment that such a scheme required to be successful. War was expensive, and the expectation of acquiring land through which England could turn a profit was a powerful incentive to stay the course. For Elizabeth, she could never afford to lose Ireland as her sister had lost Calais: doing so would threaten the political, financial, and domestic security of her kingdoms.

The plantation scheme for Munster involved repopulating the province with English settlers, in effect creating a new enclave of English society in Ireland. Surveys of the area would determine the extent of land that the government had seized and its value. A special commission in Ireland would oversee the surveying and distribution of those lands with instructions from England. The Dublin council would then ensure that the lands were disposed of according to the queen's plans.

Before the rebellion had even ended, the Irish councilors inserted themselves into the business of plantation. By virtue of his position as vice treasurer, Sir Henry Wallop was involved in the process. Whenever the Westminster government transported money into Ireland, Wallop was responsible for distributing those funds according to the crown's wishes. During the Desmond Rebellions, he also had to oversee military expenses and provisions in the province. He and Lord Justice William Pelham wrote a "plat" for Munster after the province had been cleared

---

<sup>94</sup> Waterhouse to Walsingham, 14 July 1580, SP 63/74/30, f. 57; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 233.

of the insurgents.<sup>95</sup> In their plan, they discussed ways to manage the province, one of which was to "extirpe them [the Irish in Munster], and to plant in their places the naturall borne subjectes of the Realme of Englande."<sup>96</sup> Geoffrey Fenton had a different suggestion. He extolled the land in Munster, specifically Kerry in the southwest: "Kerrye is A part of desmonds Contrey, and by siytuacion, almost an Iland: yt is lardge in Circuit and full of p[ro]ffytts and pleasures."<sup>97</sup> He, therefore, argued that Kerry should be granted to either the treasurer-at-war, Wallop, or Philip Sidney (with whom Fenton had some connection during his previous career as a translator), and the title of baron should be conferred on the receiver. It is possible that Fenton's suggestion proceeded from the threat posed by papal forces, who had been expected since May to land along the western coast of Kerry to assist the Irish insurgents in Munster.<sup>98</sup> Several days after Fenton's letter, Catholic forces landed in Smerwick, only to be captured and slaughtered a month later by the English crown army. However, it is more likely that the suspicions surrounding the involvement of the Irish baron of Kerry left open the possibility that an Englishman could take over the title.

Fenton also proposed that some of the Dublin councilors, along with the solicitor-general, form the special commission to survey the escheated lands.<sup>99</sup> Commissions were a regular feature of government in Ireland, and there were a variety of them—judicial, ecclesiastical, and financial. There were also special or ad hoc commissions, such as those for oyer and terminer,

---

<sup>95</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 22 Apr. 1580, SP 63/72/59, f. 160; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 219. Wallop to Walsingham, 19 May 1580, SP 63/73/19, f. 0043; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 223. Pelham to Walsingham, 14 July 1580, SP 63/74/28, f. 53; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 233. Pelham also wrote a more extensive plan for Munster, noting the need for order, obedience, and religious reform (Plan for the government of Munster by Sir William Pelham, 28 July 1580, Add. Mss. 48017/7, f. 79; *Yelverton Mss.* 48000-48196, p. 67).

<sup>96</sup> Plan for the government of Munster by Sir William Pelham, 28 July 1580, Add. Mss. 48017/7, f. 79r; *Yelverton Mss.* 48000-48196, p. 67.

<sup>97</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 8 Sept. 1580, SP 63/76/19, f. 33v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 249.

<sup>98</sup> Nicholas Lumbarde to the Master of the Rolls (Nicholas White), 24 May 1580, SP 63/73/27, f. 0073; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 224.

<sup>99</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 12 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/14, f. 30; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 340.

martial law, the apprehension of insurgents or pirates, and surveys for concealed or escheated lands, to name a few. Irish officials would regularly utilize commissions to conduct the business of government. However, special commissions generally depended on the assistance of local officials. This was especially true for surveying land in territories largely unfamiliar to the Dublin councilors, despite their assistance during the rebellion.<sup>100</sup> Thus, it would have been unusual for the Munster commission to be comprised mainly of the Dublin councilors. However, Fenton thought the project was of such importance that the Irish councilors should be involved. In the end, precedence in England and Ireland determined the composition of the 1584 commission to survey Munster. The commission included mainly those within the Irish exchequer and only one Dublin councilor—Wallop.<sup>101</sup>

As a commissioner, one could expect to receive additional fees and allowances while employed as a commissioner. This included daily wages for diet and entertainment, as well as covering costs associated with traveling. Lancelot Alford, one of the surveyors, received 13s. 14d. sterling *per diem* for the survey. Even those who assisted the commissioners received an allowance.<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, 12. Of course, as MacCarthy-Morrogh notes, the principle of attainders assumed that a Gaelic lord owned all of the property within his territory.

<sup>101</sup> Commission to Sir Henry Wallop, Sir Valentine Browne, Thomas Jenyson, Lancelot Alford, and Christopher Peyton, 19 June 1584, SP 63/110/74, f. 155; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 516. Fenton had indirect involvement in the Munster plantation. He carried the instructions from England to the Irish councilors. The Dublin councilors did, however, become more involved with the 1586 survey of Munster. The lord deputy and council raised questions about the quality of land in the assessment. Pluymers discusses this in his dissertation (see above, fn. 1), but he mistakenly assumes that because Fenton signed the document, the responses within were a reflection of the secretary alone despite the heading, “Thaunsw[e]r and resolution of the Lo. Dep[ut]ie and Councelle.” He neglects to take into account Fenton’s secretarial responsibilities within the Irish council and misidentifies Fenton as a personal secretary of the lord deputy. Outside of these oversights, both his dissertation and his associated article, “Taming the Wilderness in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Ireland and Virginia” provide great comparative insight into the colonial literature for the two colonies [*Environmental History* 16 (2011): 610-632].

<sup>102</sup> A collection of such sums of money as have been defrayed to diverse commissioners and others about the survey, Sept. 1587, SP 63/131/44, f. 153; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 415. See also, Valentine Browne’s request 1584; SP 63/126/23, f. 66 approved for 40s. Charges for the survey of Munster, [25 Sept.] 1586, SP 63/126/24, f. 67; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 156.

The 1584 survey of Munster lasted for thirteen weeks, during which time the commissioners held inquisitions to inquire into the value of land and traveled to the various counties.<sup>103</sup> As they journeyed throughout the province, they described the landscape as wasted, desolate, and uninhabited.<sup>104</sup> It was indeed wasted, being the site of prolonged warfare, but the commissioners were also painting Munster as a land in need of colonization. In this way, the commissioners participated in the legitimizing narratives of colonialism. Wallop, for instance, noted that the "Iorney thoroughe these waste p[ar]tes, hath bene very harde and troublesome to us all," as the terrain had been difficult to traverse.<sup>105</sup> Likewise, Peyton remarked on the journey as travel through a "most desolate and wast" land.<sup>106</sup> The bleakness of the land seemed to infect English bodies, as one commissioner became sick and another, Sir Valentine Brown, nearly drowned on a few occasions. Brown himself reported on the "daungerous waters" and the utter ruin and emptiness of some parts of Munster.<sup>107</sup> Though the commissioners had encountered "many desertes" in their travels, they insisted that the land could be revitalized:

God graunt her Ma[jes]tie may take such a course as she may repeopel it againe w[i]th a better Race and kynde of peopell then the form[er] were or the remaine or osspringe of them I feare will prove who for the more p[ar]te have neither trew taste of the knowledge of god nor of ther dutie to ther prynce and Sov[er]aigne.<sup>108</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> Historians have traditionally referred to the 1584 survey as the "Peyton Survey" because of the auditor, Christopher Peyton, who served on the commission.

<sup>104</sup> Anthony M. McCormack, "The Social and Economic Consequences of the Desmond Rebellion of 1579-1583," *IHS* 34 (2004): 1-15. McCormack discusses the physical destruction of the landscape, significant depopulation in the province, famine, disease, and the disruption of trade.

<sup>105</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 16 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/10, f. 19v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 529.

<sup>106</sup> Christopher Peyton to Burghley, 17 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/15, f. 30r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 530.

<sup>107</sup> Sir Valentine Brown to Burghley, 18 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/18, f. 36r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 530.

<sup>108</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 16 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/10, f. 19v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 529. MacCarthy-Morrogh rightly places these 1584 reports in conjunction with those in 1582 on famine, plague, and depopulation in Munster. I am greatly indebted to the insight and sources provided by MacCarthy-Morrogh. To add further complexity to this argument, there had been reports of famine even earlier. See, for instance, Pelham's letters to privy councilors in England (*Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, pp. 216, 220-21).

For the Munster plantation, those Englishmen who received grants of land, or seignories, would become “undertakers,” so named for “undertaking” the arduous task of settling the lands. The 1584 survey valued the escheated lands at approximately £10,000, with well over 500,000 acres. The government divided the lands into seignories of 12,000, 8,000, 6,000, and 4,000 acres. Their expectation was that about 90 English families would settle on a seignory of 12,000 acres. The goal was to have over 11,000 English settlers with over 2,000 households.

Before the survey had been completed, Wallop requested fee farms for the friaries of Adare and the abbey of Nenagh in Limerick and Tipperary, respectively.<sup>109</sup> But the queen had objected to his requests. She was against the idea of deputies and treasurers purchasing land in Ireland.<sup>110</sup> Wallop maintained that, unlike others, he had never purchased land, only leases.<sup>111</sup> The issue, however, was not the purchasing of land, but rather that the lands which Wallop requested had been originally granted to Gregory Rigges, a former captain who had served in Ireland. Yet, the lands were not in Rigges's possession, but rather Wallop's. How, then, had Wallop acquired these lands? Wallop explained that he and Lord Chancellor Adam Loftus had signed a *fiant*, or a warrant for letters patent, to recognize Rigges's grant in 1584, but Rigges did not "hasten."<sup>112</sup> Perrot, the new lord deputy, had only recently arrived in Ireland and wanted to establish a house at Athlone, but the land had been in Wallop's possession.<sup>113</sup> Wallop had

---

<sup>109</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 17 Sept. 1584, SP 63/111/90, f. 199; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 527. In 1579, he had also requested a fee farm for St. Mary's Abbey near Dublin, which had formerly been granted to the Earl of Desmond's ancestors (Wallop to Burghley, 27 Nov. 1579, SP 63/70/38, f. 96; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 198). See also, Particular of a part of the lands of St. Mary's Abbey, 1579, SP 63/70/38. III, f. 109; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 198.

<sup>110</sup> Sir Francis Knollys had even remarked to Burghley that, "Hir Majestie hath lateyle sayde that in no wyse she woll allowe that my L of Essex should be Deputie of Yreland bycawse she wold have no man that hath the lands of inheritance there to be Deputie" (Sir Francis Knollys to Burghley, Court, 24 Jan 1574, Harleian MS 6991, f. 76r). However, the queen broke this rule in 1599 when she appointed Essex (who owned land in Ireland) as lord lieutenant.

<sup>111</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 12 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/48, f. 182; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 48.

<sup>112</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 18 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/42, f. 132r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 44.

<sup>113</sup> Wallop's possession of Athlone is another interesting case. Sir Nicholas Malby owned the property until his death on 4 March 1584. Malby was sick in the month before his death and, in that time, Wallop was already petitioning for the house (Lord Justice Wallop to Burghley, 11 Feb. 1584, SP 63/107/94, f. 248; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585,



yielded the castle to Perrot, who had then offered the lands (which should have belonged to Rigges) to Wallop in return for the castle at Athlone. Wallop claimed that he found Lord Deputy Perrot to be "so extreme" that he could only accept the lord deputy's offer.<sup>114</sup> Since Rigges had been absent for over a year, Wallop accepted the lease of 21 years for the abbeys of Adare. He maintained that he had not sought the land; it was offered to him and if he had rejected the offer, then it would have been given to someone else. He was thus willing to return the lease for the abbeys of Adare if Athlone could be restored to his possession.<sup>115</sup> Rigges's later petition to have his grants restored supported Wallop's account that the lord deputy had in fact disposed of the initial grant.<sup>116</sup>

Nearly two weeks later, Wallop wrote to Burghley that Rigges was not content with the abbeys of Adare and now wanted the abbeys of Nenagh and Negeilaughe and the friaries of Adare as well. That Rigges wanted the other lands, in addition to the abbeys of Adare, was not surprising given that the original lease included the aforementioned lands. They were a package deal. Yet, according to Wallop, he had purchased these lands from Rigges for six score pounds, that is £120. Rigges had been "fullye satysfied, and contented" with the sale.<sup>117</sup> The lands (or rather their lease), therefore, should belong to Wallop. All he wanted now was the fee farm of those lands, as well as adjoining lands and another friary in Adare. If, however, the queen and privy council returned the lands to Rigges, then Wallop wanted the castle at Athlone back.<sup>118</sup>

---

p. 496). By April, Wallop had taken possession through a patent he granted to himself while serving as lord justice. Wallop also noted Perrot's interest in the house, two months before the lord deputy's arrival in Ireland (Lord Justice Wallop to Burghley, 9 Apr. 1584, SP 63/109/23, f. 42; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 506). Wallop preemptively acquired the house, knowing that Perrot desired it.

<sup>114</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 18 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/42, f. 132v; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 44.

<sup>115</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 18 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/42, f. 132; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 44.

<sup>116</sup> Petition of Gregory Riggs to Burghley for Her Majesty's letters to the Lord Deputy to pass him the lease of Adare, [18 Apr.] 1586, SP 63/123/43, f. 134; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 43.

<sup>117</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 26 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/53, f. 175r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 48.

<sup>118</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 30 May 1586, SP 63/124/45, f. 90; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 62. Request of Wallop for restitution of Athlone, Mar. 1587, SP 63/128/101, f. 210; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 286.

The records support both Wallop and Rigges's claims. The lands mentioned had been granted as a single lease in 1577 to Sir William Drury, the then lord president of Munster, for 21 years with a rent of £22 17s. 8d.<sup>119</sup> They had then been granted in 1583 to James Gold, the queen's attorney in Munster, for 40 years with the same rent.<sup>120</sup> Rigges petitioned for the lease of Adare in 1584 once it had been forfeited by Gold.<sup>121</sup> The queen approved the warrant for Rigges's lease and noted that the lord deputy was acting contrary to royal order.<sup>122</sup> It was not clear why in 1584 the lord deputy did not follow royal order, but Wallop yielded the castle at Athlone to Perrot by July 1584, which coincidentally was the same month that Rigges originally petitioned for the lands in Munster, meaning Perrot had already planned how to use the lands.<sup>123</sup> Wallop now held the lease in 1585 for the abbeys and friaries in Adare and Nenagh, as Drury had, for a term of 21 years with the same rent of £22 17s. 8d.<sup>124</sup>

The timeline, along with Wallop and Rigges's narrative of the events, suggests that the lord deputy had purposefully withheld the lease so that he could offer the lease to Wallop as recompense. Wallop stated that Perrot "p[re]tendyth grete ffryndshyp" to him in order to acquire

---

<sup>119</sup> *The Fourteenth Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records in Ireland / presented to both houses of the Parliament by command of Her Majesty* (Dublin: Printed by Alexander Thom for Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1882), 1577, no. 3174 (2671), p. 59 [volumes available through [Internet Archive](#)].

<sup>120</sup> *The Fourteenth Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records in Ireland / presented to both houses of the Parliament by command of Her Majesty*, no. 4124 (3461), pp. 201-202; The humble suit and offer of James Gold, Her Majesty's Attorney in Munster, to the Privy Council, 6 Jan. 1583, SP 63/99/5, f. 8; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 422. Petition of James Gold to the Queen, 6 Jan. 1583, SP 63/99/7, f. 11; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 422.

<sup>121</sup> Gregory Rigges to Walsingham, 10 July 1584, SP 63/111/17, f. 39; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 518. He made several other petitions concerning the lease of Adare. See Petition of Rigges to Burghley, [18 Apr.] 1586, SP 63/123/43, f. 134; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 43. Petition of Rigges to the Privy Council, [12 Aug.] 1586, SP 63/125/49, f. 184; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 135. Petition of Rigges to Walsingham, [12 Aug.] 1586, SP 63/125/50, f. 186; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 135.

<sup>122</sup> The Queen to Burghley, 1584, SP 63/113/52, f. 112; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 543. Although the letter is a draft, it does indicate the aforementioned points. The queen does not mention the specific lands, only that a lease had been granted to Rigges.

<sup>123</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 9 July 1584, SP 63/111/13, f. 31; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 517.

<sup>124</sup> *The Fourteenth Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records in Ireland / presented to both houses of the Parliament by command of Her Majesty*, no. 4757 (3892) and 4758 (3897), p. 123; Particulars of abbey lands in Adare leased to Sir Henry Wallop July 20 and 23, [23 July] 1585, SP 63/118/34; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 573. Wallop to Walsingham, 19 Aug. 1585, SP 63/118/73, f. 143; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 576.

the house in Athlone.<sup>125</sup> Both Wallop and Rigges implied that the lord deputy was acting in his own self-interest and was thus corrupt; that he was hiding the truth from the queen and privy council. If Perrot was corrupt in this particular instance, then why had he not immediately given the lease to Wallop? Why had he waited nearly a year before doing so? In July 1584, the month of Rigges's petition, an army of Scots had landed in Ulster. Perrot had journeyed northward to confront the Scots and had subsequently presided over parliamentary sessions where he encountered opposition to his reformation plans. These events would undoubtedly have kept him busy and could serve as a plausible reason for Perrot's inaction on the lease. It is also possible that the lord deputy had intentionally waited, so as to not draw attention to the exchange of lands, especially since he had disobeyed the queen's orders. In regard to Athlone, Perrot confessed in 1585 to using the castle there for his horses.<sup>126</sup> The governor of Connaught confirmed Perrot's use of the land as a range and occasional temporary residence.<sup>127</sup> Such an act would not have been unusual considering the extensive traveling required of lords deputy. Perhaps, then, the not-so-subtle implication of the lord deputy's corruption was, in fact, not so.

While the issue of Perrot's corruption is unclear, the situation concerning the lease reveals the back room deals between Irish privy councilors and their willingness to circumvent royal orders when convenient. Robert Legge touched upon this issue when he complained about their corruption. He noted, for instance, that Sir Nicholas White had withheld records of leases, grants of fee farms, wardships, and other things. When White returned these records to the

---

<sup>125</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 9 July 1584, SP 63/111/13, f. 31v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 517.

<sup>126</sup> Lord Deputy Perrot to Burghley, 24 Sept. 1585, SP 63/119/32, f. 101; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 580. Perrot also mentioned that he was giving the profits of the land to the constable there, John Norton.

<sup>127</sup> A note of Sir Richard Bingham, 5 Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/64. I, f. 144; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 23. Bingham also made allegations of collusion between Perrot, Wallop, the constable at Athlone, and Waterhouse. He also felt that the house of Athlone rightfully belonged to the governor of Connaught, and the queen and privy councilors agreed. See the answer of Sir Richard Bingham to Mr. Treasurer Wallop's letter touching the house of Athlone, [15 Feb.] 1587, SP 63/128/43, f. 88; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 259. The Queen to Lord Deputy Perrot, Nov. 1587, SP 63/132/23, f. 61; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 439.

auditor, Legge noted that White had not only been "kepinge backe many thing[es]," but had also been issuing his own grants.<sup>128</sup> Wallop had done the same when he had issued a grant to himself for the castle at Athlone.

Judging by Wallop's account, he had already acquired lands in Munster. Therefore, why did he repeatedly request to have the lands granted as fee farms, even though they were already in his possession? That the lands in question were in Munster was important. Once the Westminster government had decided on a course of action for the Munster plantation, they gave instructions to Secretary Fenton, who was in England at the time. He then relayed the instructions to the lord deputy and council in Ireland upon his return. One directive was for the lord deputy and council to examine current leases in the province. The goal was to consolidate the lands and their leases under the Munster plantation plot, the implication being that freeholders and leasees had to prove their right to maintain custody of the land and accept the conditions associated with the plot.<sup>129</sup> Despite being a member of the Irish privy council, the prospect of examining leases in Munster being scrutinized is likely what precipitated Wallop's defense of the lands he held there and his request to turn the leases into fee farms. Wallop, therefore, wanted to keep the lands in his possession.

Wallop had two motivations for his requests; one, born out of necessity (he was about to be audited by his fellow councilors), and the other, out of an interest in acquiring additional properties among the escheated lands and becoming an undertaker in the Munster plantation

---

<sup>128</sup> Book by Robert Legge touching the debts of the Lord Chancellor, the Bishop of Meath, Sir Robert Dillon, 1589-90, SP 63/150/52. II, f. 166v; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 308.

<sup>129</sup> Heads of an instruction for Secretary Fenton to be communicated to Lord Deputy Perrot for peopling Munster, Nov. 1585, SP 63/121/28, f. 119; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 586.

scheme. He had requested escheated lands before, but sometime in February or March 1585, Lord Deputy Perrot had refused to grant Wallop's suit.<sup>130</sup> Wallop, however, was persistent:

The feefarme of that w[hi]ch alredie I haue in lease I hope will not seeme eny greate matter, and the rest being but smale percells I require but as an vndertaker by hir Ma[jes]t[es] assignem[en]t, wherevnto others are vrged, and I offerr my self, w[i]th a sinceere intenc[i]on asmuch of the service asof mine owne comodytie. ffor I knowe right well, that the reedefienge of the howsee, the peopling, and stocking of the land[es], will bee a matter of greater chardge, then the Comodytie will countervayle in many yeeres. and whether the enfourmer, haue the lyke will and meanes to do good in those p[ar]ts that I haue, I leaue yt to yor L. grave judgm[en]t.<sup>131</sup>

To make his case, Wallop suggested that, like the rest of Munster, his lands had also been destroyed; they were in disrepair; there were only three tenants; and the yields had been low. The lands were in such a sorry state that he was not able to "reape any comodytie by them" and, consequently, the cost of maintenance was excessive.<sup>132</sup> He further claimed that he was hesitant to repair the lands out of fear they would be spoiled again. But, as an undertaker in the Munster plantation, Wallop would maintain possession of the lands and have the assistance of the English government, as well as the added benefits accorded to undertakers.<sup>133</sup>

Undertakers had seven years to settle Englishmen on the lands. In the meantime, they were exempt from paying rent until Michaelmas 1590 and then only half rent until three years later, a suggestion initially proposed by Wallop.<sup>134</sup> Since rent was based on acreage and location, this exemption would be most beneficial for those with large plots of land in Limerick and

---

<sup>130</sup> Lord President of Munster, John Norris, to Walsingham, 20 Mar. 1585, SP 63/115/31, f. 62; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 555. Walsingham had told Wallop to ask the lord deputy for a fee farm (Walsingham to Wallop, [Jan.] 1585, SP 63/114/53, f. 123; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 550).

<sup>131</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 13 Dec. 1586, SP 63/127/28, f. 106r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 227.

<sup>132</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 26 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/53, f. 175v; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 48.

<sup>133</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/53, f. 194; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 135. Wallop to Burghley, 20 Apr. 1587, SP 63/129/16, f. 23; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 296.

<sup>134</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 11 Oct. 1585, SP 63/120/9, f. 30; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 583.

Kerry.<sup>135</sup> Undertakers were also exempt from paying customs on provisions and commodities for themselves and their tenants for seven years. The tenants were expected to come from England, but, as Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh has noted, there was little to prevent undertakers from leasing or selling land to Irish tenants, increasing their rents, and pocketing the money in the meantime.<sup>136</sup> Yet another advantage was the policy allowing undertakers to be absentees in special cases. This enabled men like Sir Walter Raleigh, Edmund Spenser and the English privy councilors, Sir Francis Walsingham and Sir Christopher Hatton, to become absentee landlords.<sup>137</sup>

In addition to these incentives, the government made clear that the value of the seignory would increase over time and thus so too would the potential for large profits. They would also have the privilege of becoming "cheif lord of so greate a Signorie."<sup>138</sup> The only requirement was for undertakers to be gentlemen of good behavior and credit.<sup>139</sup> The English government wanted to attract wealthy men of social prestige in England. The hope was that these gentlemen undertakers would invest their own money to revitalize the province after the devastation caused by the Desmond Rebellion.

Wallop, unfortunately, was neither a gentleman of good behavior nor credit, at least in the eyes of the queen and the privy council. Though he had been part of the planning process for

---

<sup>135</sup> MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, 33.

<sup>136</sup> According to MacCarthy-Morrogh, undertakers also listed Irish tenants using English names. This seems to have been some issue of concern for the queen and the privy council since they reiterated in their instructions to Sir Valentine Browne (who had been part of previous Munster surveys) to discover how many planters had disobeyed their stipulations on occupancy and precisely how many Irish tenants inhabited the lands [*Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, pp. 458-60]. Robert Payne's contemporary tract highlighted some of the abuses of undertakers in this regard, *A Briefe Description of Ireland: Made in this Year, 1589, by Robert Payne unto xxv of his Partners* (London, 1590). Government knew of this and asked Browne to find out how many Irish tenants there were (Instructions to Valentine Browne, [15] Mar. 1588, SP 63/134/15, f. 77; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 496).

<sup>137</sup> Plat of the attainted lands in Munster and how the same is allotted to the undertakers, 17 June 1586, SP 63/124/80, f. 167; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 77. Some of these men rescinded their land grants.

<sup>138</sup> Note of the profit and advancement that may grow to the younger houses of English gentlemen by planting in Munster, Dec. 1585, SP 63/121/61, f. 202r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 590.

<sup>139</sup> Note of the profit and advancement that may grow to the younger houses of English gentlemen by planting in Munster, Dec. 1585, SP 63/121/61, f. 202; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 590.

the Munster plantation, the Westminster government was unwilling to consider Wallop as a potential planter. Wallop bore the brunt of the blame for low revenues and high expenditures on the project because of his position as vice-treasurer and treasurer-at-war. He was responsible for the fiscal management of Ireland and, thus far, he had failed to rectify the fiscal crisis. Also, reviews of his accounts in the 1580s raised questions about possible corruption. Wallop's reputation suffered as a result, making it less likely that the government would approve his requests. Burghley was also of the opinion that officers in Ireland should not benefit from grants of escheated lands because their presence was transitory, not permanent.<sup>140</sup> It was an odd statement given the explicit allowance for absenteeism among the planters. Likely, Burghley's opinion reflected a general concern that, outside of an advisory role, existing officers in Ireland should be removed from becoming planters themselves. It was, for Burghley, a potential conflict of interest since officers had duties in the Irish administration to fulfill. Burghley was suggesting that the responsibilities of a planter could detract from the business of governing Ireland, and Wallop was apparently already struggling in his official duties.

The refusal of the Westminster government to grant his requests upset Wallop greatly since it illustrated to him, quite strongly, that his service was not appreciated:

servinge in the place I do so paynfully and chargeably these vii yeres, and to be stucke w[i]t[h] for so small a thyng as xx greater in my tyme haue byn grantyd even to very base parsons [sic], maketh me thynk my self ether unfortunate or my servyce not weyed as yt hathe deservyd.<sup>141</sup>

His colleague, Loftus, had also noted that Wallop received little thanks for his work as vice treasurer. When a vacancy opened in the chief governorship, Loftus recommended that Wallop

---

<sup>140</sup> Burghley to Wallop, 18 Feb. 1582, SP 63/91/2. I, f. 5; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 358.

<sup>141</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/53, f. 194r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 135.

become the new lord deputy, for his worthiness of the position but also to "ridde his handes of the thankelesse office of the Thre[asure]rshippe (being the thinge I knowe he earnestlie desireth) w[hi]ch in trothe is altogether as troublesom to hym as the sole charge of the gouernme[n]t."<sup>142</sup> His appeals were either rejected or went largely unanswered. In 1587, he lost the lease for the abbeys and friaries in Adare and Nenagh to a captain named Robert Collum.<sup>143</sup>

Only one of the Irish councilors had land grants in Munster (Ormond), although some of the undertakers who were already councilors established in Ireland later became planters.<sup>144</sup> In addition to a conflict of interest, most councilors lacked the social or economic capital to become undertakers. They did not garner the same social prestige as their counterparts in England because they served as colonial administrators rather than in the metropole. Some Irish councilors, like Sir Nicholas White, had also been born in Ireland and, thus, were automatically excluded from plantation. One notable exception was Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond. Also, most Irish privy councilors owed large debts to the crown, judging by auditing accounts and,

---

<sup>142</sup> Loftus to Walsingham, 24 Mar. 1583, SP 63/100/42, f. 76v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 435.

<sup>143</sup> *The Fourteenth Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records in Ireland / presented to both houses of the Parliament by command of Her Majesty*, no. 5116 (6601), p. 59. See also, A particular note of such lands as Sir Henry Wallop holdeth of Her Majesty in Ireland, 1590, SP 63/156/36, f. 106; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 379.

<sup>144</sup> Walsingham suggested that Ormond had taken some of the escheated lands before the queen could distribute them (Walsingham to Wallop, [Jan.] 1585, SP 63/114/53, f. 124v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 550). There are three names listed in the calendar (*CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 58) as undertakers who are worthy of attention: Sir Thomas Norris, Sir Warham St. Leger, and Sir George Bouchier. All three received land grants of varying sizes, and all three were military advisors. Two of these men were not councilors when the lands had been granted. Norris occupied the vice presidency of Munster in December 1585 while his brother, John, was in the Low Countries. His name does not appear on Fenton's 1592 account of the Irish councilors, but he is present for 1593 and 1596. It is unclear precisely when he became an Irish councilor. The same can be said of St. Leger. Bouchier does appear to have been an Irish councilor before 1590 since he appears on a list of councilors in January 1589 attending the lord deputy and on subsequent lists [Names of such of Her Majesty's Councillors, Horsemen, Footmen, Pensioners and Leaders of kerne as attended upon the Lord Deputy in the Northern journey, [1 Jan.] 1589, SP 63/140/2, f. 10; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 105]. He received a land grant of 12,880 acres in Munster in 1589. Valentine Browne received as a reward for his service as commissioner a seat on the Irish council [Remembrances to pass from Her Majesty to the Lord Deputy and Council of Ireland, ([26 Apr.?] 1587, SP 63/129/30, f. 69; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 313)]. It should also be noted that Lord Deputy Fitzwilliams' brother got a £50 a year fee farm in Munster (Lord Deputy Sir William Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 31 July 1588, SP 63/135/96, f. 262; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 579).



therefore, were not in a position to take on such a significant financial burden without assistance from the Westminster government.

Over time, the initial restrictions gradually loosened, as the difficulties of plantation caused a decline in the number of prospective and current undertakers. The venture proved to be very expensive and not worth the expense to some. Sir Edward Fitton, the son of the former Irish vice-treasurer and lord president, claimed he spent £1,500 in costs associated with plantation, including £500 on hiring horsemen to defend his new property. He professed to be "out of hope ever to see that good in that Contrey."<sup>145</sup> Some undertakers lost lands through ownership disputes.<sup>146</sup> Some were absent from their seignories, having left Munster once rent came due.<sup>147</sup> This problem of absentee undertakers meant that, in 1588, a decision was taken to permit Munster provincial officials to become undertakers. However, the issue persisted into the 1590s, when Wallop was able to reacquire the lease for the abbeys and friaries in Adare and Nenagh due to Collum's absence.<sup>148</sup> Though it took several years to achieve, Wallop finally became a planter—just three years before the overthrow of the plantation.

In its conception, the Munster plantation made some sense. Although previous private enterprise efforts in Ulster in the 1570s had failed disastrously, private investment had the potential of saving the crown from the heavy financial burden of establishing a plantation. To an economical queen, the decision to use private investors seemed a good idea, especially in light of her war with Spain and the looming Spanish naval assault on England, the *Gran Armada*. The

---

<sup>145</sup> Sir Edward Fitton to Burghley, 19 Dec. 1588, SP 63/139/10. I, f. 20r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 87.

<sup>146</sup> Anthony Sheehan's study of the Munster plantation reveals that in judicial cases, the English government ruled in favor of native claimants and against English undertakers, thus complicating the traditional colonial narrative of planter or settler domination ["Official Reaction to Native Land Claims in the Plantation of Munster," *IHS* 23 (1983): 297-318].

<sup>147</sup> MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, pp. 114-115.

<sup>148</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 15 Feb. 1588, SP 63/133/50, f. 103; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 475. It is not clear who owned the lease during the extensive gap between 1588 and 1595.

plantation was also meant to secure the southern coast of Ireland from another Catholic invasion such as the one in 1580 in Smerwick. But the problems that beset the plantation, including the hostilities that developed in the region, impeded England's complete control of the province.

Once the English government struggled to find investors, more advertisements appeared to attract new undertakers. Robert Payne's *Brief Description of Ireland* was one such example, as was Edmund Spenser's now infamous work, *View of the Present State of Ireland*. Although Spenser wrote *View* later in the 1590s, both Payne and Spenser extol the island's fertile soil and abundant natural resources, emphasizing to potential investors the economic possibilities available to those who conquered the land:

it is yett a most bewtifull and sweete Country as any is under heaven, seamed thoroughout with many godlie rivers, replenished with all sortes of fishe most abundantlie; sprinkled with verie many sweete Ilandes and goodlie lakes, like litle inland seas, that will carrie even shippes uppon theire waters; adorned with goodlie woodes, fitt for buildinge of houses and shipes, so commodiouslie, as that if some princes in the world had them, they would soone hope to be lordes of all the seas, and er longe of all the worlde.<sup>149</sup>

---

<sup>149</sup> Edmund Spenser, *View of the Present State of Ireland*, [unnumbered], CELT. The original text was circulated in 1596 and then later printed in 1633.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### Strategies of Reform in the Irish Reformation: Print, Preaching, and Clerical Poverty

"I humblie beseche you to be a meane to hir Ma[es]tie that in respecte of my longe service, in this miserable Lande, and the present daunger I stande in here, throughe the malice of some, it might please her to give me leave to repaire to hir presence, to be a moste humble suter to hir highnes, to bestowe on me some meane lyvinge in England, w[hi]ch of all worldlye thing[es] I moste wisse, that so I may be ridd from this vnhappie contrey, a lande above all other that ever I hearde or read of, cursed of god, and ende myne olde and woefull yeares in my natyve soile."<sup>1</sup>

- Adam Loftus, the archbishop of Dublin

Writing on the Reformation in Ireland, Alan Ford observed that the "essential problem which dogged the reformation" was that it was "conceived in England and imposed upon Ireland as an exercise in dynastic politics."<sup>1</sup> Once Henry VIII formally established his dominion over Ireland, he attempted to impose the Reformation in Ireland based on the principle of *cuius regio eius religio*, which enabled the prince to determine the religion of their subjects. Successive Tudor monarchs operated under the same principle. The minority rule of Edward VI instituted strict Protestant reforms, which his sister, Mary, later repealed in her desire to restore Catholicism in England and its kingdoms. Elizabeth, however, took a different approach. She adopted a religious policy, a *via media*, or middle way, between Catholicism and the newly reformed church of England, the Anglican Church.<sup>2</sup> But the Irish lords' defense of Catholicism, particularly during the Nine Years' War, indicated that her way had decisively failed.

The distinctly Catholic character of the Nine Years' War and the persistence of a Catholic identity in Ireland produced a wave of historical scholarship that searched for causes to explain

---

<sup>1</sup> Adam Loftus to Burghley, 14 June 1581, SP 63/83/52, f. 127r-v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 307.

<sup>1</sup> Alan Ford, *The Protestant Reformation in Ireland, 1590-1641* (Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1997), 23.

<sup>2</sup> The term, *via media*, has come under scrutiny in recent years, particularly with the publication of Eamon Duffy, *Fires of Faith: Catholic England Under Mary Tudor* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). Duffy argues that the religious persecution under the Marian regime persisted in the 1570s and after, only Elizabeth framed sedition in political terms, i.e., treason, and not heresy. More recently, Peter Milward has rejected the term as a relic of the nineteenth century, and instead illuminated the persecutions of Catholics and Puritans under Elizabeth (Milward, "A Via Media in the Elizabethan Church?" *The Heythrop Journal* 52 (2011): 392-398.

the eventual failure of the Irish Reformation under the ostensibly Protestant Tudors. The famous nineteenth-century English historian, Richard Bagwell, attributed this failure to the strong presence of Catholic priests and emissaries on the island and, above all, Henry's dismantling of ecclesiastical structures, which created tensions over religion and resulted in the failure of the Tudor conquest as a whole.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, for Bagwell, "there never was the slightest chance of native Ireland embracing the new doctrines."<sup>4</sup> Whatever problems Elizabeth faced—corruption within the Irish Protestant episcopate, the lack of good Protestant preachers, and crown poverty—mattered little within this context, for the failure of the Reformation had already been foretold. Failure was, in other words, inevitable following the religious policies of Henry VIII and only further solidified Irish loyalty to Catholicism and the papacy. The Irish historian Robert Dudley Edwards made similar claims about the stronghold Catholicism had over the Irish and even went so far as to label the subtitle of his epilogue, "Failure an inevitable event."<sup>5</sup> This inevitability, he argued, arose from the strength of the Catholic Reformation, which had "anticipated the Reformation itself" and secured "its hold over the minds and hearts of the people."<sup>6</sup> However, unlike Bagwell, Edwards dated the failure of the Irish Reformation to the end of the Nine Years' War and Elizabeth's reign.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Richard Bagwell, *Ireland Under the Tudors with a Succinct Account of the Earlier History*, vol. 1 (2 vols., London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1885) [<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/42046/42046-h/42046-h.htm>].

<sup>4</sup> Bagwell, *Ireland Under the Tudors*, 287.

<sup>5</sup> R. D. Edwards, *Church and State in Tudor Ireland: A History of Penal Laws Against Irish Catholics, 1534-1603* (London; New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), 305.

<sup>6</sup> Edwards, *Church and State in Tudor Ireland*, 305.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 305. When Bagwell and Edwards wrote their histories, Ireland's relationship to England was a hotly debated subject. The Protestant-led Irish parliament had enforced penal laws against Catholics continuously since 1695, which had restrained their economic and political activities, among other things. Though the laws were eventually abolished by the mid-nineteenth century, calls for the disestablishment of the church of Ireland from England and Irish independence steadily gained traction. The debates that took place in politics seeped into histories of the Irish Reformation. See Marc Caball, "History and Politics: Interpretations of Early Modern Conquest and Reformation in Victorian Ireland," in *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe*, vol. 7, eds. Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 149-169. See also Alan Ford, "'Standing One's Ground': Religion, Polemic and Irish History Since the Reformation," in *As by Law Established: The Church of Ireland Since the Reformation*, eds. Ford, James McGuire and Kenneth Milne (Dublin:

A new generation of historians resumed the debate in the 1970s. Although they uniformly accepted the failure of the Irish Reformation, they disputed its inevitability and the underlying causes. In contrast to older interpretations that saw failure from the outset, Brendan Bradshaw, in his pioneering studies, argued that such failure was not evident until the 1570s under Elizabeth.<sup>8</sup> The changes introduced in Mary's reign, with the brief restoration of Catholicism and the presence of the Catholic Reformation movement in Ireland, were lasting. Thereafter, "the momentum thus gained was never lost."<sup>9</sup> Though Bradshaw had pushed the failure of the Reformation to the Elizabethan era, the Reformation had nonetheless been lost in the Marian period with a renewed commitment among the Irish to Catholicism. Moreover, the Elizabethan abandonment of the conciliatory policies of years earlier and its adoption of more coercive colonization strategies provoked both the Gaelic and Anglo-Irish (or Old English) communities. Thus, it was the combined influence of the Catholic Reformation and the aggressive Elizabethan policies which aided the development of a nationalist ideology in sixteenth-century Ireland.<sup>10</sup>

---

Lilliput Press, 1995), 1-14; and Ford, "That Noble Dream!: Objectivity and the Writing of Irish Church History," in *The Church of Ireland and Its Past*, eds. Ford, Mark Empey, and Miriam Moffitt (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017), 1-18. The Irish nationalist and politician Alexander Martin Sullivan wrote *Story of Ireland*, a self-professed book for "young people" which presented the Reformation in Ireland as one imposed by so-called greedy, base English and Anglo-Irish lords and officials.<sup>7</sup> In admitting that his work was not one of historical scholarship, Sullivan seemed at ease in presenting Irish history as one of Irish Catholic self-determination and national consciousness. A. M. Sullivan, *The Story of Ireland* (1883; repr., Ireland: M. H. Gill & Son; Burns & Oates, Ld: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1894), 211; Caball, "History and Politics," 161-169. Bagwell, a trained historian and Unionist opposed such nationalist sentiments in his politics and writing. He eschewed Irish nationalist arguments and turned instead to the Catholic Reformation and Tudor Reformation policies to explain its failure. Several years after Bagwell, Edwards reiterated many of Sullivan's claims on Irish nationalism and Catholicism. Edwards's interest in the Irish Reformation coincided with his nationalist agenda to discover the origins of Irish nationhood and the continuing struggle of the Irish to maintain their Catholic identity. Though these writers all provided varying interpretations of the failure of the Irish Reformation, they nonetheless took for granted that the Reformation had failed.

<sup>8</sup> Brendan Bradshaw, "Fr. Wolfe's Description of Limerick City, 1574," *North Munster Antiquarian Journal* 17 (1975): 50. Bradshaw got into a contentious debate with Karl S. Bottigheimer following a critique of his work. See Bottigheimer, "The Reformation in Ireland Revisited," *Journal of British Studies* 15 (1976): 140-149. Bradshaw, "Revisionism and the Irish Reformation: A Rejoinder," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 51 (2000): 587-591.

<sup>9</sup> Bradshaw, "Fr. Wolfe's Description of Limerick City, 1574," 51.

<sup>10</sup> Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century*, 258-275. The book's title was an obvious reference to Sir Geoffrey Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government: Administrative Changes in the Reign of Henry VIII* (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1953). See also Bradshaw, "Irish Nationalism: An Historical Perspective," *The Month* 31 (1998): 364-369. Bradshaw had clearly found Edwards's nationalist arguments

The loss of local support from the Anglo-Irish, who had initially supported the Henrician Reformation, proved by the 1570s to be damning to the progress of the Reformation.

Other historians writing on the Irish Reformation focused instead on the alienation of local Old English elites and expanded the discussion beyond Elizabeth's reign. Ciaran Brady argued that it was the imposition of cess (a tax to support the army) in the 1580s which distanced the Old English from the Reformation, effectively stifling any chance of its success.<sup>11</sup> Nicholas Canny also agreed on the importance of local support in advancing the Reformation but believed Bradshaw had been too quick to assert that the Reformation had failed by the 1570s.<sup>12</sup> However, while conceding that the Catholic Reformation had made some ground in Tudor Ireland, Canny nonetheless contended that neither the Protestant nor the Catholic reformations had decisively swayed the local population until "the second Reformation" in the nineteenth century; only then had the Reformation failed.<sup>13</sup>

---

convincing. He described Edwards's *Church and State in Tudor Ireland* as "the only relevant monograph on the Reformation in sixteenth-century Ireland that meets acceptable standards of scholarship and objectivity" [Bradshaw, "Sword, Word and Strategy in the Reformation in Ireland," *The Historical Journal* 21 (1978): 475].

<sup>11</sup> Ciaran Brady, "Conservative Subversives: The Community of the Pale and the Dublin Administration, 1556-86," in *Radicals, Rebels & Establishments: Papers Read before the Irish Conference of Historians, Maynooth, 16-19 June 1983*, vol. 15, ed. Patrick Corish (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1985), 11-32. Alec Ryrie also dated the failure to the 1580s, but the turning point for Ryrie was the militant actions undertaken by the English to suppress the second Desmond Rebellion, which culminated in the alienation of the Old English. Once the rebellion had ended, the "battle for Ireland's soul was already over" (285). See Ryrie, *The Age of Reformation: The Tudor and Stewart Realms, 1485-1603*, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2017).

<sup>12</sup> Nicholas Canny, "Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland: Une Question Mal Posée," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 30 (1979): 423-450. Canny admits to using Lucien Febvre's work on the French Reformation as his inspiration for the title. See Febvre, "Une question mal posée: les origines de la Réforme française et le problème général des causes de la Réforme," *Revue Historique* 161 (1929): 1-73.

<sup>13</sup> Canny, "Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland: Une Question Mal Posée," 450. Canny would later revise his original thesis to recognize the missed opportunity presented in the early years of the Stuarts. See Canny, "Revisiting the Past: Reflections on 'Why the Reformation failed in Ireland: *une question mal posée*,'" in *The Church of Ireland and Its Past: History, Interpretation and Identity*, eds. Mark Empey, Alan Ford and Miriam Moffitt (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017), 237-246. Michael A. Harbin dated its failure much earlier—the eleventh century ["Tale of Two Henries: Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland," *Fides et Historia* 50 (2018): 100-112]. He traced the "foundation of Irish intransigence" to the Reformation to the Norman Conquest, which introduced an Anglo-Norman culture into Ireland. Since then, he argued, the two cultures have been at odds and English policies in Ireland only further reinforced the cultural divisions between the English and the Irish.

Canny's vision of a *long* Reformation emphasized the contingent nature of the Reformation over determinist narratives of innate Irish commitment to Catholicism. In Canny's view, the failure of the Reformation in Ireland was not inevitable. Nor had the Reformation in Ireland failed by the end of the sixteenth century. This reasoning aligned with the debate on the English Reformation in England. From the 1960s and onwards, scholars writing on the English Reformation implemented the writings of other disciplines, such as those of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Sigmund Freud.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, they explored the social, economic, and psychological forces at play and their interaction with religion and policy. Historians such as A.G. Dickens wrote on the political Reformation imposed from above and the widespread Reformation from below.<sup>15</sup> In so doing, interpretations of the Reformation shifted to reflect religious change as a process rather than an event and raised the question of whether the English Reformation was a uniquely sixteenth-century phenomenon.<sup>16</sup>

Bradshaw had recognized the Reformation as a process, as did Canny.<sup>17</sup> However, Canny regarded the Irish Reformation as a project begun in the sixteenth century, but which extended well beyond the Tudors. The events of the sixteenth century, though damaging to the goal of spreading the Reformation in Ireland, by no means constituted a decisive failure. For Canny, the question, then, of "why the Reformation failed" was *mal posée* ("badly posed") because it presumed failure. Karl S. Bottigheimer disagreed with Canny's *long* Reformation and argued that our inability to precisely date the failure did not constitute the overly broad parameters set by

---

<sup>14</sup> Rosemary O'Day, *The Debate on the English Reformation*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 169.

<sup>15</sup> A. G. Dickens, *The English Reformation* (London: B.T. Batsford, 1964); O'Day, *The Debate on the English Reformation*, 156-159. In early modern Irish history, see Raymond Gillespie, *Devoted People: Belief and Religion in Early Modern Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

<sup>16</sup> O'Day, *The Debate on the English Reformation*, 4.

<sup>17</sup> Bradshaw literally titled one of his chapters as "the process of secularisation" in *Dissolution of the Religious Orders in Ireland Under Henry VIII* (London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 181-205.

Canny. Nor did it mean that such failure had not been evident before the nineteenth century.<sup>18</sup>

Bottigheimer repeatedly asserted that the question of its failure was not *mal posée* but *bien posée*, as evidence of its failure could be seen certainly by 1640 and possibly even earlier.<sup>19</sup>

Bottigheimer's contribution to the Irish Reformation was most evident in his comparative approach. Working alongside the German historian Ute Lötze-Heumann, Bottigheimer challenged the assumption of Irish exceptionalism concerning the Reformation.<sup>20</sup> Ireland only appeared exceptional because the writing of its history was from a nationalist perspective, and nationalism inherently presumed exceptionalism.<sup>21</sup> Ireland, in comparison to the rest of the Atlantic archipelago, appeared unique, given the success of the Reformation in England, Wales, and Scotland. But, in contrast to continental Europe, Ireland was typical.<sup>22</sup> One could find European parallels to Ireland in places like Brandenburg and Norway, where princely reforming efforts were met with resistance. Such resistance was not due to Catholicism, for "any faith could become the religious banner to which local elites rallied and from which they claimed to resist princely authority, whether in political or religious matters."<sup>23</sup> The cause could also not be attributed to a foreign ruler or a foreign language, as this was also the case in Norway. And yet, the Reformation in Norway succeeded. The authors contended that the crucial difference between Norway and Ireland was timing. Norway owed its success to the age of Reformation when the possibility of religious reform still existed. Conversely, Ireland owed its failure to the age of confessionalization when the "'uncertainties' from which Luther and contemporary

---

<sup>18</sup> Karl S. Bottigheimer, "The Failure of the Reformation in Ireland: Une Question Bien Posée," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36 (1985): 197.

<sup>19</sup> Bottigheimer, "The Failure of the Reformation in Ireland," 197.

<sup>20</sup> Karl S. Bottigheimer and Ute Lötze-Heumann, "The Irish Reformation in European Perspective," *Archiv Für Reformationsgeschichte* 89 (1998): 268-309.

<sup>21</sup> Karl S. Bottigheimer, "Ireland and the European Reformation," *History Ireland* 6, no. 4 (1998): 14.

<sup>22</sup> Bottigheimer and Ute Lötze-Heumann, "The Irish Reformation in European Perspective," 308.

<sup>23</sup> Bottigheimer, "Ireland and the European Reformation," 16.



reformers had benefited in Germany, were replaced by hardened religious certitudes."<sup>24</sup> By the late sixteenth century, it was simply too late for monarchs to advance the Reformation.

Monarchs, both in continental Europe and Ireland, could no longer impose religion on their subjects with success.

Bottigheimer and Lötz-Heumann's conclusions are derived almost entirely from a top-down perspective. They wholly rejected the notion of a popular Reformation or a Reformation "from below" in Ireland.<sup>25</sup> In their view, the Irish Reformation was "from above" but also "from outside."<sup>26</sup> The impetus for the Reformation did not come from the people; it came from England, and thus it relied on the Reformation framework from the continent.<sup>27</sup> Bottigheimer and Lötz-Heumann asserted that if the Irish Reformation had failed, then it was because the monarch had not exerted greater political control. The English crown had not introduced the programs or policies necessary to build an effective Protestant church through which its subjects could conform. The authors were thus careful to distinguish "conformity" (outward, or visible, compliance) from "conversion" (the wholesale adoption of religious belief).<sup>28</sup> Continental Europe had illustrated that nominal, outward conformity was enough to declare the Reformation a success. This explanation is also why Bottigheimer could consider whether the Irish

---

<sup>24</sup> Bottigheimer and Lötz-Heumann, "The Irish Reformation in European Perspective," 306. See also, Lötz-Heumann, "Confessionalisation in Ireland: Periodisation and Character, 1534-1649," in *The Origins of Sectarianism in Early Modern Ireland*, eds. Alan Ford and John McCafferty (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 24-53. Lötz-Heumann applied a confessional paradigm to early modern Ireland, wherein he identified 5 phases in the process of confessionalization. His model came from scholars like Samantha Meigs and Christopher Haigh. Both referred to the reformation in the plural, "reformations," to distinguish different phases in either the English or Irish Reformation. See Haigh, *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society Under the Tudors* (New York: The Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1993); Meigs, *The Reformations in Ireland: Tradition and Confessionalism, 1400-1690*, Early Modern History: Society and Culture (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St Martin's Press, 1997). It should also be noted that even without the pluralization of the term, scholars had recognized even earlier different phases in the Reformation, hence the attention to differences in each reign, as Bradshaw had suggested in the 1970s.

<sup>25</sup> Bottigheimer and Lötz-Heumann, 269.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 269.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 268.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 269.

Reformation would have been successful if the English monarchy had utilized more coercive measures.<sup>29</sup>

And yet, implicit in their argument on the success or failure of the Reformation was the extent to which people resisted or cooperated with their rulers. The idea that by the late sixteenth century, confessionalism had started to take root in Ireland and had, therefore, hardened the religious convictions of the Irish, and even the Old English, necessarily implied a symbiotic relationship between rulers and their subjects. In theory, the monarchy could impose any policy and utilize whichever strategy seemed suitable, whether conciliatory or coercive. But, in practice, such power was shared between the monarch and their councilors and between the monarch and their subjects. This explains, in part, the principle behind the *via media* approach and Elizabeth's reluctance to employ coercion as means of conversion. No amount of coercive pressure could force people to act, a fact which Bottigheimer seemed cognizant of a decade earlier in his career when he noted: "And yet the failure of the Reformation in Ireland exemplifies above all the inability of the appropriate 'prince' to mould a society to his will."<sup>30</sup> However, by the late 1990s, the nuances in his argument shifted when he introduced the comparative model alongside Lötze-Heumann. He now stressed political forces over social and religious.<sup>31</sup> Perhaps this was simply an unintended consequence of the method itself. Still, it helps to explain why the methodology did not find a wider audience.<sup>32</sup> While it was true that a foreign ruler had imposed the Irish Reformation and similar conditions existed elsewhere in Europe, no other place contained all the

---

<sup>29</sup> Bottigheimer, "Taking Sides? Lingering Problematics in Irish Church History," in *The Church of Ireland and Its Past: History, Interpretation and Identity*, eds. Mark Empey, Alan Ford, and Miriam Moffitt (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017), 250-255; Henry A. Jefferies, "Conversion by Coercion? The Reformation in Ireland," *History Ireland* 26 (2018): 14-17.

<sup>30</sup> Bottigheimer, "The Failure of the Reformation in Ireland," 205.

<sup>31</sup> See Bottigheimer, "Revisionism and the Irish Reformation," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 51 (2000): 581-586. He argues that secular factors determined the success or failure of the Reformation in Europe.

<sup>32</sup> Bottigheimer, "Taking Sides? Lingering Problematics in Irish Church History," 253.

factors that were present in Tudor Ireland. The continental framework, then, was intriguing and useful in some respects. Still, the model did not satisfactorily explain the course of the Reformation in sixteenth-century Ireland, particularly in the last decade of Elizabeth's reign.

One had to look, for example, at the relationship between English officials in Ireland and the queen and privy council in England, as well as the specific conditions in Ireland which may have contributed to the difficulty of advancing Protestantism. Bradshaw identified internal divisions between the central administrations in Dublin and England about which reforming strategies to employ to advance Protestantism: the sword or the word; coercion or persuasion. He argued that this lack of consensus enabled the gradual commitment to Catholicism among the Anglo-Irish and Gaelic communities and determined the direction the Reformation would take.<sup>33</sup> Likewise, Aidan Clarke drew attention to problems within the internal structure of the church of Ireland, particularly inadequate livings for the reformed clergy. Steven G. Ellis also took up the issue of clerical finance. Using an oft-neglected source, the *Valor Ecclesiasticus*, Ellis surveyed the state of Irish benefices in various dioceses and concluded that the church in Ireland was comparatively and substantially poorer than both the English and Welsh churches.<sup>34</sup>

Clarke also drew attention to the continued presence of Marian Catholic personnel within the Elizabethan Protestant church.<sup>35</sup> As James Murray illustrated in his diocesan study of Dublin, removing Catholic influence from the Irish church became a priority for the leading Protestant clergy in the region, especially under Elizabeth.<sup>36</sup> Murray identified the failure of the

---

<sup>33</sup> Bradshaw, "Sword, Word and Strategy," 501.

<sup>34</sup> Steven G. Ellis, "Economic Problems of the Church: Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 41 (1990): 239-265. See James Murray's criticism on Ellis's use of the *valor* as an inadequate source because of the gaps in its record ["The Sources of Clerical Income in the Tudor Diocese of Dublin, c. 1530-1600," *Archivium Hibernicum* 46 (1991): 139-60].

<sup>35</sup> Aidan Clarke, "Varieties of Conformity: the first century of the Church of Ireland" in *The Churches, Ireland and the Irish*, eds. W. J. Shiels and Diana Woods (Oxford, 1989), 105-22.

<sup>36</sup> James Murray, *Enforcing the English Reformation in Ireland: Clerical Resistance and Political Conflict in the Diocese of Dublin, 1534-1590* (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2009); idem, "The Tudor Diocese of Dublin:

Reformation in Ireland in the early 1580s when the Irish councilor, Adam Loftus, became the archbishop of Dublin. Loftus tried to remove the conservative clergy in the diocese but failed in this task, which suggested to Murray that the "revival of the old religion in the mid-Tudor period created an ideological force which was impervious to the theology, worship, and ideas espoused by the reformers."<sup>37</sup> The failure of the Reformation, therefore, was not due to the "heroic spirit of the Irish nation, nor in the ideology of post-Tridentine catholicism," but instead to the conservative clergy, who had "long sustained the identity of the old colonial community in a hostile world."<sup>38</sup> Murray's study supported what had been suggested earlier by Bradshaw and Canny in a local context, though he departed from their chronology. Henry A. Jefferies further showed that Elizabethan Ireland lacked reformers through which to fill the Church of Ireland, forcing the English to retain Catholic priests in their church.<sup>39</sup> According to Jefferies, the Reformation failed because the English monarchy did not devote the resources necessary to produce a native Protestant ministry.<sup>40</sup> But he challenged the notion of clerical poverty in Ireland, arguing that many of the benefices—even some which carried adequate funding for the reformed ministry—went unfilled.<sup>41</sup>

The debate on the Reformation in Ireland had thus progressed from religion and belief to a practical consideration of the resources of the English monarchy. Clarke, Ellis, and Murray suggested that clerical poverty was an issue within the Church of Ireland. However, their studies of clerical poverty concerned clergy's livings, and less so the constraints imposed by the English

---

Episcopal Government, Ecclesiastical Politics and the Enforcement of the Reformation, c. 1534-1590" (PhD diss., University of Dublin, 1997).

<sup>37</sup> Murray, "The Tudor Diocese of Dublin," 27.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>39</sup> Henry A. Jefferies, "Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland," *IHS* 40 (2016): 169.

<sup>40</sup> Jefferies, "Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland," 163. He advanced this argument further in *The Irish Church and Tudor Reformations* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010), 136-154.

<sup>41</sup> Jefferies, *The Irish Church and Tudor Reformations*, 282.

monarchy on their clergy in Ireland. The reformed clergy during Elizabeth's reign were expected to shoulder the burdens of the Reformation in various ways. Their task was to promote and expand the Reformation in Ireland, which, of course, included preaching. But the clergy also had to help raise funds for the translation and publishing of Protestant texts, the establishment of schools in their dioceses, and the founding of a Protestant university. Even in preaching, the clergy found their linguistic skills challenged by a native population who did not understand English. And yet, medieval statutes in Ireland prohibited the English from learning Irish.

This heavy reliance on the clergy in Ireland affected archbishops as well, who were responsible for spreading the Reformation in their dioceses and—for those who occupied a seat on the Irish council—developing ecclesiastical networks to expand state authority in Ireland. For clerics on the council, these goals were obviously intertwined since Protestantism was the religion of the English state. But these goals were sometimes in opposition, as the conditions of late Elizabethan Ireland make clear. Both the establishing of networks to expand state power and the advancing of the Reformation required resources, which, as some of these authors have acknowledged, were lacking in Elizabethan Ireland. *If* the Reformation failed in Elizabethan Ireland, then perhaps the combined factors of clerical poverty and the competing interests of conciliar clerics are worthy of greater consideration.

The following chapter, then, places the Irish Reformation within the context of the constrained financial circumstances of the English crown and the Irish clergy. The chapter further demonstrates that the lack of crown support in ensuring the long-term financial viability of its clergymen in Ireland significantly affected those most responsible for the Reformation's success: the prelates, that is, the bishops or the diocesan administration. The absence of parish registers and churchwarden accounts in Ireland for the Elizabethan period makes a study of the

parish clergy difficult. However, the bishops, especially those who served on the Irish council, left many surviving records, making this study possible. These bishops were Adam Loftus, the archbishop of Dublin and lord chancellor; Hugh Brady and Thomas Jones, successive bishops of Meath; and Thomas Lancaster, John Long, John Garvey, Henry Ussher, all of whom served as archbishop of Armagh. Of these clerics on the Irish privy council, none was more influential than Loftus, whose influence eventually eclipsed even that of the archbishop of Armagh, the nominal primate of Ireland. Thus, the last section focuses entirely on Loftus and the oft-debated subject of establishing a Protestant university in Dublin for religious education. Often regarded as a symbol of the corruption of the Irish church, Loftus will be discussed here as one who struggled to fulfill his obligations to the Protestant cause.

### **Reading and Preaching the Reformation: The Religious Climate**

There were two books of special significance for the Anglican Church: The Bible and the *Book of Common Prayer*. Initially published in 1549 and revised in 1552, the Prayer Book was a conglomeration of every rite utilized in English church services and an important vehicle in the transmission of Protestantism.<sup>42</sup> Queen Mary had repealed the original Edwardian acts, which mandated its use in English churches, prohibiting its use in her restoration of Catholicism.<sup>43</sup> However, Queen Elizabeth revised and reinstated the book with the Act of Uniformity in 1559.<sup>44</sup> Clergymen in Ireland, therefore, were legally bound to use *The Book of Common Prayer* in their churches. The challenge was in acquiring printed copies of the Prayer Book.

---

<sup>42</sup> Kenneth Stevenson, "Worship by the Book," in *The Oxford Guide to the Book of Common Prayer: A Worldwide Survey*, eds. Charles Hefling and Cynthia L. Shattuck (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 44.

<sup>43</sup> 2 & 3 Edward VI c. 1.

<sup>44</sup> 1 Elizabeth c. 2.

As Raymond Gillespie aptly stated, the printing industry in sixteenth-century Ireland was a "story of inactivity."<sup>45</sup> Though one could detect the expansion of print culture on the island in the seventeenth century, such gains were largely absent in the sixteenth century. What Ireland needed to kickstart its print industry was a large investment of capital. In England, affluent individuals undertook the responsibility of raising the capital required to start a printing press.<sup>46</sup> However, in Ireland, those with the means—predominantly wealthy Gaelic chieftains, local merchants, or English adventurers—were unwilling to undertake such a risky enterprise. Financing a printing press meant procuring the type needed for printing, paper, ink, and labor. Even when funding was available, recouping the costs associated with printing would prove difficult as there was no guarantee that the books would sell, particularly if the works were in English.<sup>47</sup> For potential investors, printing in Ireland was commercially unviable. This left the English crown and the bishops in Ireland to manage its production and costs, but they had neither the financial resources nor the sustained commitment to achieving its goals.

In 1550, the privy council granted Humphrey Powell £20 sterling as capital to establish a royal press in Ireland.<sup>48</sup> As His Majesty's Printer in Ireland, Powell now held the exclusive rights to publish proclamations, the Bible, and service books like *The Book of Common Prayer*. The first known book of movable type in Ireland was Powell's 1551 printing of the Prayer Book. But

---

<sup>45</sup> Raymond Gillespie, *Reading Ireland: Print, Reading, and Social Change in Early Modern Ireland* (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), 56.

<sup>46</sup> Colm Lennon, "The Print Trade, 1550-1700," in *The Oxford History of the Irish, Book 3: The Irish Book in English, 1550-1800*, eds. Raymond Gillespie and Andrew Hadfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK, 2006), 61; John Barnard, "The Financing of the Authorized Version 1610-1612: Robert Barker and 'Combining' and 'Sleeping' Stationers," *Publishing History* 57 (2005): 5-52. Although the work is a case study of early seventeenth-century England, Barnard focuses specifically on the publishing and sale of the Bible and the Prayer Book, which has proved helpful in this discussion of the print industry. See also Jason Peters, "The King James Bible and Its Readers: Constructing Readable Space in Post-Reformation England" (PhD diss., University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 2009), 46-99.

<sup>47</sup> Lennon, "The Print Trade," 65-67.

<sup>48</sup> *APC*, vol. 3, p. 84.

its efficacy hinged, in part, on the language in which the books were printed. The Protestant Reformation had popularized publishing religious works in the vernacular, as opposed to the Catholic Church, which produced texts mainly in Latin.<sup>49</sup> England followed its Protestant counterparts on the continent by publishing its Bible and the Prayer Book in English. The crown sought to follow the same principle in Ireland.<sup>50</sup> However, it would be over a half-century from the date of its first non-English translation in 1551 before the publication of an Irish-language version of the Prayer Book in 1608.

Despite the crown's investment in Powell's press, it was of little significance.<sup>51</sup> Powell lacked the resources needed to produce Irish translations of Protestant texts. A key element in the printing of translations was the availability of bilingual scholars or, at the very least, those with reading proficiency in English and Irish. These individuals were either local scholars or clergymen. However, in Ireland, English statutes in Ireland prohibited the English from learning

---

<sup>49</sup> Niall Ó Ciosáin and Raymond Gillespie have recently added some nuance to our understanding of the linguistic orientations of the Reformation Protestant and Catholic churches. Both authors, for instance, recognize the printing of Catholic texts on the continent in the Irish vernacular. See Ó Ciosáin, "Print and Irish, 1570-1900: An Exception among the Celtic Languages?" *Radharc* 5, no. 7 (2004-2006): 73-106; and Gillespie, "The Louvain Franciscans and the Culture of Print," in *Irish Europe, 1600-1650: Writing and Learning*, eds. Gillespie and Ruairí Ó hUiginn, The Irish in Europe series, 5 (Dublin: Four Courts, 2013), 105-120.

<sup>50</sup> Robert Wright, "Early Translations," in *The Oxford Guide to the Book of Common Prayer: A Worldwide Survey*, eds. Charles Hefling and Cynthia L. Shattuck (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 155. Though seemingly ironic, the Latin translation made sense when placed within the context of the Reformation. Latin was the language best known to the wider European community. By producing the Prayer Book in Latin, it expanded the reach of Protestantism. The same could be said of the other translations, with the exception of Welsh. Yet Irish was neither the first translation the crown undertook, nor was it the second. The first non-English translation of the Book of Common Prayer was Latin in 1551, followed by French in 1553. Welsh came next in 1567, along with the New Testament in Welsh, and Greek in 1569.

<sup>51</sup> In 1571, the Irish council compiled copies of 170 statutes to be printed in England, another indication that despite the investment in Powell's printing press, the print industry in Ireland did not have the capacity to print such a large quantity of texts. Once printed, they would then be transported to Ireland (Petition of James Stanihurst, 4 Jan. 1572, SP 63/35/5 f. 29; *CSP Ire*, 1509-1573, p. 464; *Cal. Carew*, 1515-1574, p. 341)). The license to print the statutes had been granted to John Vowell, or Hooker, in 1569 (*Cal. Carew*, 1515-1574, p. 387). For more on the printing of the statutes in Ireland, see David B. Quinn, "Government Printing and the Publication of the Irish Statutes in the Sixteenth Century," *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* 49 (1943): 45-129.



Irish.<sup>52</sup> Another setback was in acquiring the necessary technology. Printing in Irish required a different type or font since Irish and English belonged to different language groups. In 1567, Elizabeth tried to solve this problem when she directed the two archbishops in Ireland, Adam Loftus, and Hugh Brady, to oversee the making of the letters. She granted £66 13s. 4d. to the archbishops, for which she expected repayment only if the bishops failed in printing the letters.<sup>53</sup> In 1570, the queen paid an additional £22 13s. 4d. for the stamps, matrices, and fonts needed for the project.<sup>54</sup> Yet when two texts—one of which was a Protestant primer—appeared in the Irish type in 1571, the funding came from John Ussher, a wealthy merchant and alderman in Dublin.<sup>55</sup> Two Irishmen had worked on the primer: John Kearney, an English-educated clergyman and treasurer of St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin; and Nicholas Walsh, the Irish privy councilor and chief justice of the common pleas. Kearney and Walsh also worked on the translation of the Irish New Testament. They finished a translation, but it remained unprinted.<sup>56</sup> The Irish type

---

<sup>52</sup> The Statute of Kilkenny in 1366, for instance, aimed at preventing the "gaelicization" or degeneracy of the English in Ireland. One notable feature was the prohibition of the English from using the Irish language and intermarrying with the Irish.

<sup>53</sup> Remembrances taken upon the account of Sir William Fitzwilliam, 1567, SP 63/22/70, f. 207; *CSPire*, 1509-1573, p. 356.

<sup>54</sup> Lennon, "The Print Trade," 64.

<sup>55</sup> Ussher was also responsible for a broadside printed in Irish in 1571; *DIB*, "Ussher, John." Lennon, "The Print Trade," 64. There's some speculation that the type in 1571 was not precisely the Irish type but only a reconfiguring of the Anglo-Saxon type. If it was only a mere reconfiguration, then it raises questions about the project itself and whether the crown's intention was to, in fact, produce an all-new type for Irish. See E. R. McClintock Dix, "William Kearney, the Second Earliest Known Printer in Dublin," *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy. Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* 28 (1910): 157-61. Bruce Dickins suggests it is unlikely that the printer utilized the Anglo-Saxon type for Irish because of the variations in the two languages [Dickins, "The Irish Broadside of 1571 and Queen Elizabeth's Types," *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society* 1 (1949): 49]. More recently, Dermot McGuinne has identified the type used as "Queen Elizabeth's Irish Type" [McGuinne, *Irish Type Design: A History of Printing Types in the Irish Character* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992), 4-22].

<sup>56</sup> *APC*, vol. 15, p. 438. Loftus wrote in 1595 that another priest, Nehemias Donnelan, had finished the translation (Loftus to Burghley, 28 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/132, f. 305; *CSPire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 308). However, it is unknown whether the priest utilized the previous translation by Kearney and Walsh or started anew.

languished for many years afterward, due to the technical expertise required and the cost of production. Meanwhile, Catholic books remained readily available to the Irish.<sup>57</sup>

The project of printing Irish Protestant literature gained renewed focus in 1587 under William Kearney, a trained printer and relative of John Kearney, who had acquired a mastery of printing in Irish. Kearney, however, was not a clergyman. He also lacked the financial means to have the copies printed. It seems that the privy council did not provide any capital to Kearney, as they had with Powell.<sup>58</sup> The English privy council again directed the bishops in Ireland to oversee the completion of an Irish New Testament once again and, more importantly, to embark on a fundraising campaign for its printing.<sup>59</sup> The privy council stressed the importance of printing the scriptures in the vernacular. Still, they were also of the opinion that bishops and other clergymen, as well as "some other well dysposed persons," could contribute financially to its printing.<sup>60</sup> The financing of the project thus fell to the clergy in Ireland.

Likely, the clergy was expected to use revenues from their dioceses. But clergymen there already complained loudly about the poverty of Irish churches, which their revenues alone could not cover. Bishops petitioned the queen and the privy council to discharge or remove entirely the debts they had accumulated from ecclesiastical taxes. In 1592, the archbishop of Cashel, Miler Magrath, raised this issue in his lengthy report to the queen.<sup>61</sup> He asserted that, in Ireland, those

---

<sup>57</sup> Raymond Gillespie, "Print Culture, 1550-1700," in *The Oxford History of the Irish, Book 3: The Irish Book in English, 1550-1800*, eds. Gillespie and Andrew Hadfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK, 2006), 17-33; M. Pollard, *Dublin's Trade in Books, 1550-1800* (New York; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 33-34.

<sup>58</sup> Kearney later printed a proclamation against Hugh O'Neill and his supporters in 1595 and the imprint, which indicated the site of its printing, was Christ Church Cathedral in Dublin (Proclamation against the Earl of Tyrone and his adherents, 12 June 1595, SP 63/180/48. II; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 332). Kearney also had a printing chamber in Trinity College, Dublin in 1596. See E. R. McClintock Dix, *The Earliest Dublin Printing* (Dublin: O'Donoghue and Co., 1901), Appendix II, 28-30. These sources reveal that Kearney did not have a printing shop of his own.

<sup>59</sup> *APC*, vol. 15, p. 438.

<sup>60</sup> *APC*, vol. 15, p. 438.

<sup>61</sup> Certain Articles set down by the Archbishop of Cashel to the Queen, 30 May 1592, SP 63/164/47, f. 110; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, pp. 489-502.

who supported the translation and printing of Irish religious texts could not afford the costs involved and those who could were unwilling to do so. He proposed that the queen and the privy council write to "well affected p[er]sons" in both England and Ireland, so that "suche as be willinge maie gyve benevolence toward[es] the Charge thereof."<sup>62</sup> With funding from William Ussher—son of John, the Dublin alderman—Kearney finally printed and published the Irish New Testament (*Tiomna Nuadh*) in 1603.<sup>63</sup> Unfortunately, the publishing of the New Testament came only at the end of Elizabeth's reign and was not printed until the Prayer Book several years after. This delay left the clergymen in Ireland woefully unaided in spreading the Reformation. Until Protestant materials were available, the clergy in Ireland focused instead on the other vehicle of transmission for the Reformation: preaching.

For Protestants, the spoken word was the primary vehicle through which the message of the Reformation could be transmitted, and the pulpit a principal means of conversion. From the outset, the English crown understood the importance of preaching as an effective strategy for

---

<sup>62</sup> Certain Articles set down by the Archbishop of Cashel to the Queen, 30 May 1592, SP 63/164/47, f. 120v; *CSPire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, pp. 489-502.

<sup>63</sup> Kearney had the help of Irish bishops, one of whom was Nehemias Donnelane [or Donelan] (Earl of Ormond to Burghley, 24 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/112, f. 269; *CSPire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 307). Lennon, "The Print Trade," 64. Despite the long gestation of the Irish New Testament and Prayer Book, there was never any guarantee that the printing of these texts would have caused the Reformation in Ireland to flourish. Though Andrew Pettegree had popularized the role of print in the Reformation, he has since suggested that the impact of print varied throughout Europe. See Andrew Pettegree, *The Book in the Renaissance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); idem, *Brand Luther: 1517, Printing, and the Making of the Reformation* (New York: Penguin Press, 2015); idem, and Matthew Hall, "The Reformation and the Book: A Reconsideration," *The Historical Journal* 47 (2004): 785–808. While it was clear that in the 1520s the Lutheran Reformation in Germany depended heavily on print media, the substantial role that print played in Germany did not constitute a "normative for the experience of Reformation" elsewhere—and this was especially true for both England and Ireland. Pettegree and Hall, "The Reformation and the Book: A Reconsideration," 790. The technology of printing was still relatively new in England. It had only been introduced into England by William Caxton in the late fifteenth century. Thus, England lagged behind the major players in the printing industry—Germany, France, and Italy—until the latter half of the seventeenth century. The authors include several tables related to publishing by country, including Table 3 which locates printing centers throughout Europe and lists England with six printing centers and Ireland only one (Dublin), 793. For a more in-depth analysis of England's nascent book trade, see John Hinks, "The Book Trade in Early Modern Britain: Centres, Peripheries and Networks," in *Print Culture and Peripheries in Early Modern Europe: A Contribution to the History of Printing and the Book Trade in Small European and Spanish Cities*, ed. Benito Rial Costas (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 101-126. The other issue at play is Irish literacy in the English language. Generally, literacy rates were low in early modern Europe.

religious reform. But several structural problems made this particular reform strategy challenging: the continued influence of the Catholic Church and the Catholic Reformation in Ireland; the decayed state of parish churches; the austerity of Protestant churches compared to ornate Catholic churches; the lack of qualified clergy because there was no university in Ireland to train them; and the lack of vernacular preaching because clergymen often arrived out of England and did not know the Irish language.

The Catholic Church also recognized the significance of preaching the Reformation. There was a strong Catholic presence in Ireland even with the Dissolution of the Monasteries, a policy introduced in the 1530s and partially realized in the 1540s.<sup>64</sup> The Franciscans, in particular, had firmly planted roots in Ireland, and they became an influential group in the post-Tridentine movement in Ireland. Of the Catholic orders in Ireland, the Franciscans were the largest group.<sup>65</sup> The Dominicans and the Franciscans had the reputation of being exceptional preachers and highlighted preaching as a vital component in their Catholic campaign.<sup>66</sup> As part of their seminary training on the continent, Catholic Reformation clergy had learned the art of rhetoric. Some acted as bridge-builders between Tridentine practices on the continent and local Irish customs.<sup>67</sup> They also had greater knowledge of, and familiarity with, the Irish language, in

---

<sup>64</sup> See, for example, Extent and survey of the lands and possessions of the dissolved monasteries in the county of Dublin, 1540, *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 56.

<sup>65</sup> Colman N. Ó Clabaigh, "Preaching in Late Medieval Ireland: The Franciscan Contribution," in *Irish Preaching, 700-1700*, eds. Alan Fletcher and Raymond Gillespie (Portland; Dublin: Four Courts, 2001), 81.

<sup>66</sup> Raymond Gillespie, "Traditional Religion in Sixteenth Century Gaelic Ireland," in *Christianities in the Early Modern Celtic World*, eds. Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin and Robert Armstrong (New York; Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 33.

<sup>67</sup> Bernadette Cunningham, "Zeal for God and for Souls," in *Irish Preaching, 700-1700*, eds. Alan Fletcher and Raymond Gillespie (Portland; Dublin: Four Courts, 2001), 112; Gillespie, *Devoted People: Belief and Religion in Early Modern Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 8.

contrast to secular Protestant clergy.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, despite the closure of their monastic houses, they found pathways to reach the Irish through itinerant work and resettlement in old friaries.<sup>69</sup>

The post-Tridentine movement further reinforced ties to Catholicism in Ireland with the efforts of the Jesuits and seminary priests. One of the objectives of the Council of Trent was to establish seminaries to educate its Catholic missionaries better. This had important consequences for religion in Ireland because of the quality of Catholic missionaries who went to Ireland and the migration of the Irish to seminaries on the continent. By the 1590s, there were a significant number of seminary priests in Ireland who helped in generating recusancy against Protestantism and the English monarchy.<sup>70</sup> Their work in Ireland enabled further commitment to Catholicism among new generations of Irishmen.<sup>71</sup> These priests also assisted in the migration of new generations of Irish Catholics to seminaries on the continent. Irish Catholics matriculated at well-established universities or newly-found Irish colleges for missionary training, thereby strengthening their connections to Spain and the papacy.<sup>72</sup> This migration and training led to the development of a network of Irish missionaries that spread across the Atlantic.<sup>73</sup> The English, meanwhile, struggled to compete in Ireland with the better-funded and popular Catholic Church.

---

<sup>68</sup> Cunningham, "Zeal for God and for Souls," 113.

<sup>69</sup> Captain W. Piers the [younger] to Burghley, 15 Sept. 1583, *CSP Ire*, 1574-1585, p. 469. See Archbishop of Cashel's letter on monasteries still used by friars in Ulster, Connaught, and within the Pale (30 May 1592, *CSP Ire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 489).

<sup>70</sup> Jefferies, "Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland," 165-166.

<sup>71</sup> Jefferies, 165.

<sup>72</sup> Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin, "Catholic Reform in Ireland in a European Context," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 106 (2017): 459-461. Establishing these Catholic institutions was part of the renewal strategy of the Catholic Church. On this subject, see Helga Robinson-Hammerstein, "Aspects of the Continental Education of Irish Students in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I," *Historical Studies* 8 (1971): 145-6. Hammerstein clarifies that the colleges founded specifically for Irish students did not occur until the early 1590s, and it was Irish priests who had a hand in their establishment. These colleges were at Salamanca (1592), Lisbon (1593), and Douai (1594).

<sup>73</sup> Matteo Binasco, *Making, Breaking and Remaking the Irish Missionary Network* (Springer International Publishing, 2020), 1-21. Aware that Irish clerics left Ireland to attend seminaries and colleges on the continent, the English government kept abreast of their movements through intelligence reports. Captains played a significant role in the tracking and apprehension of Irish clerics from the continent, which makes sense in light of their profession. The privy council also fined captains and others who aided in the departure of these priests out of Ireland (*APC*, vol. 22, p. 551). In 1583, when news arrived that the Duke of Guise had erected a new seminary in Normandy for Englishmen and the Irish, the queen, and the privy council tried to block their admittance. [Robert Beale] to

In the Church of Ireland, the Protestant clergy faced many obstacles in their attempts to convert the Irish. They lacked the materials that would aid in conversion to Protestantism, and the presence and influence of Catholic orders on the island challenged their authority. They had trouble even getting the Irish to attend the reformed church.<sup>74</sup> In the Elizabethan Religious Settlement, the queen enforced a policy of outward conformity to Protestantism, whereby Catholics could maintain their religious identity in conscience but were obliged by law to attend Protestant church services. The law applied to Ireland as well. Officials in Ireland, then, had the legal right to demand attendance and prosecute recusants (those who refused to attend) in pursuance of the statute. The state archives reveal cases where officials forced the native Irish to attend church, though the practice was infrequent.<sup>75</sup> For example, Sir Henry Sidney reported in 1583 that the two sons of the earl of Clanricard, Ulick and John, had been made to attend a

---

Cobham, 27 Aug. 1583, SP 63/78/10, f. 32; *CSPFor*, July 1583-July 1584, p. 82. Instructions for Sir Edward Stafford, *CSPFor*, July 1583-July 1584, p. 115; Sept. 1583, SP 78/10/137, f. 42; *APC*, vol. 14, p. 118. Report of a new seminary in Valladolid, Spain, which housed 10 English and 10 Irish priests (William Griffith to Walsingham, 31 May/10 Jun. 1589, SP 99/1/490, f. 66; *CSPFor*, Jan-July 1589, p. 290. They also gathered intelligence on which Irish priests had gone to the continent and returned as missionaries and which priests from the continent were present in Ireland. See Note [by the Archbishop of Cashel] of popish bishops, doctors, and seminary priests now in Ireland, 17 Dec. 1590, SP 63/156/12, f. 55; *CSP Ire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 375. They noted who had been present at the Council of Trent, who had recently come out of Rome, and those recently converted and ordained by priests in Ireland. See also, Barnaby Rich to Burghley 20 May 1591, SP 63/158/12, f. 21; *CSP Ire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 399. Discourse addressed to Lord Burghley, 1591, SP 63/161/52, f. 116; *CSP Ire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 449. Of Romish bishops and seminary priests in the Cashel diocese, they would send an Irishman to apprehend these individuals (*APC*, vol. 22, p. 551). Examination of Christopher Roche, [19 Jan.] 1592, SP 63/163/12, f. 22; *CSP Ire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 455.

<sup>74</sup> Raymond Gillespie addressed one aspect which made the Protestant conversion of the Irish difficult, namely converting the way in which the Irish laity constructed their religious beliefs. Their understanding of the world, of religion, and of belief arose from their everyday experiences and the social exchange of ideas through family or the community. See Gillespie, *Devoted People*, 14. Therefore, their experience of religion and belief was diverse and did not fall along confessional lines. Instead, they incorporated different ways of thinking into their religious views. Traditional Catholicism, in this respect, had much to offer. It had been woven into the fabric of their lives and provided ritual solutions to the problems of witchcraft and demonic possession, which English Protestantism did not. Removing these cultural bonds would take considerable effort. One could argue that such an arduous task could never actually be accomplished, given English stereotyping of Irish religious practices and beliefs as pagan and superstitious. See also Gillespie, "Preaching the Reformation in Early Modern Ireland," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Early Modern Sermon*, eds. Hugh Adlington, Peter McCullough, and Emma Rhatigan (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 290; Gerard Farrell, *The 'Mere Irish' and the Colonisation of Ulster, 1570-1641* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 99-100.

<sup>75</sup> Henry Jefferies, "Elizabeth's Reformation in the Irish Pale," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 66 (2015): 529-530.

church sermon by a reformed "countryman of their own" who could speak Irish, English, and Latin.<sup>76</sup> In 1590, the archbishop of Dublin, Adam Loftus, described the growing obstinacy among the Irish in religion and accused his fellow councilor, Sir Lucas Dillon (chief baron of the exchequer), of recusancy.<sup>77</sup> He proposed the reinstatement of an ecclesiastical commission to "imprison and fyne all such as are obstinate, and disobedient," for "this people are but poore and feare to be fyned."<sup>78</sup> It should be noted that, while ecclesiastical commissions focused on enforcing religious conformity, the commissions were also a revenue stream for the church and the English government. Loftus also reflected on the futility of preachers who labored in the church without listeners. Just as the "sword alone w[i]thout the worde is not sufficient," so "unless they be inforced, they will not once come to heare the word preached."<sup>79</sup> While forced attendance could ensure that the Irish were physically present in the church, the laity at times appeared to disregard the statute entirely.<sup>80</sup> Once inside the church, the Irish could also choose whether or not to listen.<sup>81</sup> Thus, there was no guarantee that religious statutes or preaching could lead to conversion.

---

<sup>76</sup> *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, p. 353.

<sup>77</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 22 Sept. 1590, SP 63/154/37, f. 129; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 365. It would be remiss of me not to mention the context in which Loftus wrote, that is, the hostility between Loftus and Perrot. The disagreements between the two men extended as well to their supporters, and, in this case, Dillon was a supporter of Perrot.

<sup>78</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 22 Sept. 1590, SP 63/154/37, f. 130r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 365.

<sup>79</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 22 Sept. 1590, SP 63/154/37, f. 129v-130r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 365.

<sup>80</sup> See, for example, Andrew Trollope to Burghley, 26 Oct. 1587, SP 63/131/64, f. 200r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 428. Andrew Trollope to Walsingham, 12 Sept. 1581, SP 63/85/39, f. 96; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 318. Trollope to Burghley, 6 Oct. 1587, SP 63/131/51 f. 173; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 424. Trollope to Burghley, 19 Oct. 1587, SP 63/131/62, f. 198; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 427. Trollope to Burghley, 26 Oct. 1587, SP 63/131/64, f. 200; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 428. Trollope to Burghley, 27 Oct. 1587, SP 63/131/65, f. 207; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 428. For a case on forced attendance in England, see Michael Questier, "Sermons, Separatists, and Succession Politics in Late Elizabethan England," *Journal of British Studies* 52 (April 2013): 290–316. Questier recounts from 1599 the compulsion of Catholic prisoners in York Castle to attend Protestant sermons once a week for a year and its eventual abandonment.

<sup>81</sup> Gillespie, "Preaching the Reformation in Early Modern Ireland," 288-291. Some of the Irish laity who did attend Protestant church services were known to be disruptive. See Jefferies, *The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations*, 141.

One incident in 1581 was particularly revealing, as the event highlighted the struggle to enforce the Reformation in Ireland and the belief by one notable preacher that the Irish were too obstinate in their adherence to the old religion. Thomas Jones—who would become an Irish councilor three years later in 1584—was a preacher in Dublin at the time, involved in taking the confessions of Roman Catholics who had participated in the resistance movement against the English crown. On several occasions, he also accompanied prisoners to the scaffold for their execution.<sup>82</sup> In 1581, two Irish prisoners—George Netterville and Robert Scurlock—were set to be executed.<sup>83</sup> According to Jones, on the day of their execution, Netterville and Scurlock joined together at the castle gate in Dublin. They proceeded to repeat verse by verse Our Lady's Psalter as they were taken through the streets of Dublin. Jones intercepted them and encouraged them to "praie onlie vnto god," to which Netterville apparently responded that Jones's labor was for naught because it was not possible to move them from the old religion to the new.<sup>84</sup> Netterville then gnashed his teeth, pushed Jones with his elbows, and repeated a Bible verse in Latin: *vade Satana vade Satana, vade post me Satana* ("Go Satan! Go Satan! Get thee behind me, Satan!").<sup>85</sup> Whenever Jones tried to exhort the authority of the Protestant religion to Netterville, the accused supposedly only answered with *vade Satana*.

Finding Netterville a lost cause, Jones appealed to Scurlock instead, who on prior occasions had seemed "verie reformable to ovr relligion, a right protestant in all respect[es], & in word[es] a dysliker & a destester of papist[es]."<sup>86</sup> Scurlock had made several confessions to Jones before, of which Jones reminded the man. But Scurlock professed that, now that he was

---

<sup>82</sup> *ODNB*, "Jones, Thomas."

<sup>83</sup> Jones also mentions a Christopher Eustace, who had some connection to the Nugent conspiracy which had occurred in the same timeframe. A true report by Mr. Thomas Jones, 18 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/69, f. 220; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 329.

<sup>84</sup> A true report by Mr. Thomas Jones, 18 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/69, f. 220r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 329.

<sup>85</sup> A true report by Mr. Thomas Jones, 18 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/69, f. 220r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 329.

<sup>86</sup> A true report by Mr. Thomas Jones, 18 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/69, f. 220r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 329.



condemned to die, nothing could move him from his faith. He refused to listen to Jones and even plugged his ears against the preacher. When the time came for the two men to be executed, Jones tried to get them to read a prayer from an English service book, which Jones had likely brought with him from England. However, they refused, and Netterville snatched the book away and tore it. When the men climbed the ladder to be hanged, they said, "Now all good catholik[es] praie for us."<sup>87</sup> The incident was striking and obviously bore some significance to Jones, who recorded the event and reported it to his superiors. While there are certainly elements of fiction in Jones's narrative of what occurred, the fact remained that some Irish were unmoved by the Protestant religion: perhaps the depth of loyalty to Catholicism could not be overcome. Although Jones did not share his thoughts on the incident, he would later advocate preaching and a hard stance against Catholics in Ireland.

The chancellor and archbishop, Adam Loftus, also pushed the efficacy of preaching and the need for able ministers. In 1583, Loftus wrote to Walsingham concerning the state of religion in Waterford. He formed an ecclesiastical commission to preach in the city in hopes of reforming the abuses there. The commissioners included Thomas Jones, then dean of St. Patrick's, and Henry Ussher, who would both later become archbishops and gain *ex officio* membership on the Irish council. From the commissioners' reports, Loftus gathered that the Irish were willing to attend church and listen to sermons. Even those who committed abuses against the church "submitted them selv[es], w[i]th confess[i]on of their fault[es] & everie of them, hath willinglie tied him self in Recognizance, for his conformitie hereafter."<sup>88</sup> For Loftus, the ecclesiastical commission in Waterford proved that the Reformation could succeed in Ireland, given the positive reception of their sermons. What the city needed was a learned resident ministry:

---

<sup>87</sup> A true report by Mr. Thomas Jones, 18 Nov. 1581, SP 63/86/69, f. 220v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 329.

<sup>88</sup> Lord Justice Loftus to Walsingham, 12 Sept. 1583, SP 63/104/71, f. 169r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 468.

I am advertised of one principall deserte, w[hi]ch assuredlie hath bene the cause of their form[e]r backwardnes, they haue not emongest them one preach[e]r the wante wherof many of them lanient. If by your honorable meanes provision were made, for the placinge of some lerned, sober, & discreete, preacher emongest them. I haue no doubt, but in verie shorte time, that cytie wolde be reduced to verie good conformitie.<sup>89</sup>

The most pressing issue, then, was the lack of qualified Protestant ministers in Ireland.

What Loftus observed about the state of Protestantism and clergymen in Ireland in the 1580s had, in fact, been noted at least twenty years earlier. At the time that Loftus wrote to Walsingham about preaching in Waterford, he was over twenty years into his service in Ireland. Loftus had arrived on the island in 1560 as the chaplain of Sir Thomas Radcliffe, the earl of Sussex and newly-appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland. Born in Yorkshire and educated at Cambridge, Loftus's coming had generated excitement from the bishop of Kildare, Alexander Craik. Craik had felt isolated in the preaching of "godd[es] most holy Worde" among "rud & barbarouse people."<sup>90</sup> In the preaching of the gospel, he had been "all alone" save now for Loftus, but Ireland needed more "bysshoppes mynystres & offycers of all estates" in order to "extynct abholysse & deface, all sup[er]styc[i]on & Idolatrye."<sup>91</sup>

In part, Craik celebrated the arrival of another Protestant minister in Ireland because he knew the difficulty of getting English-born preachers to the island. Convincing clergymen to advance the Protestant cause there was challenging because the land seemed foreign and its peoples were hostile to the aggrandizing behavior of English settlers and adventurers.<sup>92</sup> The bishoprics were also worth little, church property wasted, and the local people unmoved in

---

<sup>89</sup> Lord Justice Loftus to Walsingham, 12 Sept. 1583, SP 63/104/71, f. 169r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 468.

<sup>90</sup> Alexander Craik to Cecil, 13 Sept. 1561, SP 63/4/53, f. 113r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 180.

<sup>91</sup> Craik to Cecil, 13 Sept. 1561, SP 63/4/53, f. 113r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 180.

<sup>92</sup> Adventurers like Sir Peter Carew had manufactured ownership of Irish property through claims of ancient inheritance. Loftus, however, recognized that religion was also a factor. In an early letter to Cecil, he wrote: "the myndes of the Irishry be so estra[u]nged from vs...p[ar]tly by reason of o[u]r religion, w[hi]ch those savage and wicked people, do so deadly hate" (Loftus to Cecil, 26 Oct. 1570, SP 63/30/88, f. 186r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 435).

religion.<sup>93</sup> The value of a diocese depended on the amount of revenues it could generate through tithes, or offerings, which would also serve as financial support for the clergy. Since offerings included crop harvests, especially corn and hay, any damage done within the diocese had devastating effects on the inhabitants and the clergymen. The value of tithes was also subject to fluctuating market prices.<sup>94</sup> Parish churches and their clergy derived their income from the dues or offerings of the locals, but such income also depended on the number of people within the area. And in the early modern period, the population in Ireland was by no means dense, apart from major town centers like Dublin.<sup>95</sup> Though the income of clergymen could improve with greater tithes, revenues from church lands had also declined as laypeople acquired church property.<sup>96</sup> Furthermore, the destruction or disrepair of many churches had also become a financial burden for clerics.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, taking up a clerical office in Ireland was unappealing. These factors aid our understanding of Craik and his enthusiasm for new ministers from England. Surely one such as Loftus praised as "discrete well Lerner" with a "goodly gyfte of vtturance in the pulpet" would be a boon to the Reformation effort in Ireland.<sup>98</sup>

What remained unclear was whether Loftus could preach in the Irish vernacular. One of the barriers to proselytizing the Reformation, which had caused Craik's "continualle and daly

---

<sup>93</sup> Craik to Lord Robt. Dudley 30 Apr. 1561, SP 63/3/62, f. 165; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 170.

<sup>94</sup> The Dignities of St. Patrick's, [Aug.] 1592, SP 63/166/54, f. 148; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 575.

<sup>95</sup> Steven G. Ellis, *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, 1447-1603: English Expansion and the End of Gaelic Rule* (New York; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge), 39-40. Also, the expectation that with the peopling of Munster, tithes would increase, and the money could be used to obtain and support preachers (*Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, p. 458). The privy council expected that those unreformed in religion should be removed from benefices in Munster (*Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, p. 440).

<sup>96</sup> Nicholas P. Canny, "Irish, Scottish, Welsh Responses to Centralisation, c. 1530-c. 1640: A Comparative Perspective," in *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History*, eds. Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer (London: Routledge, 1995), 150.

<sup>97</sup> In 1588, Daniel Kavanagh, the bishop of Leighlin, wrote to Lord Deputy Perrot about the decay and ruination of churches and chapels within his diocese (*Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, pp. 457-458). On the general decay of churches in the Tudor period, see Jefferies, *The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations*, 171-2.

<sup>98</sup> Lord Lieutenant Sussex to the Queen, 2 Sept. 1562, SP 63/7/2, f. 3r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 203. The Queen to the Archbishop of Dublin, 30 Oct. 1561, SP 63/4/64, f. 140; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 181. Congé d'élire to the dean and chapter of Armagh, 30 Oct. 1561, SP 63/4/64. I, f. 141; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 181.

torment," was language.<sup>99</sup> Craik had lamented that he could neither "preach vnto the people nor the people vnderstande" him.<sup>100</sup> Though Englishmen employed in Ireland sought the placement of other English-born men in secular and ecclesiastical positions, they later discovered that knowledge of the Irish language occasionally trumped English descent. Craik, Loftus, and even the queen recognized the importance of ministers who could preach in Irish.<sup>101</sup> They based their recommendations for vacant clerical offices on linguistic ability. Loftus recommended an Irishman for the bishopric of Cork, professing that "a man ignorant of the country language shall be able to do little or no good there."<sup>102</sup> Nicholas White, master of the rolls, also recommended John Garvey, the Irish-born bishop of Kilmore, for the vacant see of Armagh because Garvey was bilingual in English and Irish.<sup>103</sup> In Ireland, then, the Irish council based their recommendations for bishops on the church's needs and, sometimes, the crown listened.<sup>104</sup> However, English prejudice against the Irish could not be overcome so easily, despite the need for such preachers.

---

<sup>99</sup> Craik to Lord Robt. Dudley, 20 Apr. 1561, SP 63/3/62, f.165r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 170.

<sup>100</sup> Craik to Lord Robt. Dudley, 20 Apr. 1561, SP 63/3/62, f.165r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 170. Craik to Cecil, 26 Oct. 1562, SP 63/7/32, f. 100; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 208.

<sup>101</sup> The queen recommended Robert Daly for bishopric of Kildare, following Craik's death in the same year, because of his ability to preach in Irish (The Queen to the Lord Lieutenant and Lord Chancellor, 16 Apr. 1564, SP 63/10/49, f.111; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 234). See also, Lord Deputy Sidney's letter to the queen on the nomination of Hugh Brady, an Irish minister and the want of ministers versed in the Irish language (28 Apr. 1576, SP 63/55/38, f.129; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 92). Same sentiment echoed again in nomination of Rowland Lynch to bishopric of Kilmacough in Connacht, "in consideration of his having been born in that province, speaking both languages, and having wholly applied himself to the service of divinity" (*Patent Rolls*, 1576-1603, p. 129); on Henry Ussher for archbishopric of Armagh, Lord Deputy and Council to Burghley, 10 Apr. 1595, SP 63/179/24, f. 56; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 311.

<sup>102</sup> Archbishop of Dublin to Burghley, 26 Nov. 1571, SP 63/34/30, f. 85; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 460.

<sup>103</sup> Nicholas White to Burghley, 3 Feb. 1589, SP 63/141/4, f. 9; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 118. *DIB*, "Garvey, John." The push for the placement of Irish-speaking preachers came not only from Irish councilors and bishops, but also planters like Sir William Herbert, a Welshman who became a planter in Ireland following the Munster rebellion in the early 1580s. See *DIB*, "Herbert, Sir William" and [June] 1588, *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 527. There is some speculation on whether the author is Sir William Herbert.

<sup>104</sup> The crown's recognition of what the church of Ireland needed stood in contrast to their own practices in the selection of bishops in England, where such selection was due more to secular politics. See O'Day, *The Debate on the English Reformation*, 209-210.

In cases where the English government could acquire an English preacher who knew Irish, they favored these preachers over the native clergy. In another letter—this one in conjunction with the lord deputy and bishop of Meath—Loftus advised the placement of Christopher Brown, the English prebendary of Wicklow, in the bishopric of Down because he could preach in Irish.<sup>105</sup> When the queen appointed John Alen over Brown, Lord Deputy William Fitzwilliam appealed to the queen: "The use of a lernid englishe preacher is not so needefull in those part[es], as the use of a discrete wise and dutifullie affected man having the language to be imployed in dealings with the Irishrie. Suche a one is Browne, and of the English race."<sup>106</sup> The strong preference for English descent and English-educated ministers was born out of a distrust of the Irish and a questioning of their allegiance to the English crown. Consequently, even Old English clergy had to receive endorsement by New English officials before they could gain preferment within the Church of Ireland.

The contradiction, of course, was the pervasive fear among the English that learning the Irish language was indicative of becoming "native," of being contaminated or infected with Irish culture: hence, the Statute of Kilkenny, which legally enforced a cultural separation between the English and the Irish.<sup>107</sup> The statute forbid the English from speaking the Irish language. Though

---

<sup>105</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, Loftus, and Brady to Burghley, 1 Oct. 1572, SP 63/38/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 484. Murray discusses this in terms of the conflict between the two groups. He argues that Brown was a conservative prebendary, and therefore, Loftus wanted to prevent Brown from becoming the dean of St. Patrick's (234-274). Loftus had indeed learned earlier of Brown's intention to obtain the deanery (Loftus to Burghley, 26 Sept. 1571, SP 63/34/13, f. 36; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 458). Judging from Loftus's many appeals for the deanery, he clearly wanted the deanery for himself. He would also later describe Brown in favorable terms when he defended the remaining prebendaries of St. Patrick's Cathedral, suggesting that the issue for Loftus, in this instance, may have also been motivated by personal interest.

<sup>106</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to the Queen, 19 Feb. 1573, SP 63/39/30, f. 85r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 495.

<sup>107</sup> The Statute of Kilkenny enforced a separation between the English separated and the people they colonized. Recently, Michael Harbin argued that the continued reinforcement of these divisions over time became intractable and hardened Irish resolve against the English ["A Tale of Two Henries: Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland," *Fides et Historia* 50 (2018): 107]. Though Harbin was right to stress the importance of the cultural divide, his linear narrative from the ancient to the early modern period is disconcerting. In searching for the origins of Irish intransigence to the Reformation, Harbin committed the same error as earlier historians who wrote the inevitable failure of the Reformation in Ireland. Though published in 2018, Harbin's article indicated a reversion to the

Poyning's law had repealed the language prohibition in 1494, the prejudice towards the Irish language persisted.<sup>108</sup> This helps explain why neither the English government in Westminster nor in Dublin advocated that English ministers learn the Irish language.<sup>109</sup> If some English clerics already knew Irish, then convenience dictated that they be used in Protestant churches; otherwise, it was the native clergy who were forced to learn another language. The solution for the English government was to impose the English language, and religion, on the Irish through the development of grammar schools, and for the native clergy, training at a Protestant institution. Only through education could the English hope to counter the influence of the post-Tridentine movement in Ireland.

The plan was to establish free grammar schools in every diocese for the learning of English, and a university in the Pale for Protestant clerical training.<sup>110</sup> At university, scholars would learn the linguistic and rhetorical skills needed to preach the Word and have access to a forum through which to discuss Protestant theology.<sup>111</sup> The first step was to build the schools, and here the need for funding arose once again. The 1570 Act mandated the erection of schools

---

determinist narratives that once dominated the discourse on the Irish Reformation. For a more intriguing discussion on the Statute of Kilkenny, see David Green, "The Statute of Kilkenny (1366): Legislation and the State," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27 (2013): 236-262. Green places the statute within the broader context of English legislation and the attempts by the crown to reconstitute the social structures that had been broken following the Black Death.

<sup>108</sup> 10 Henry VII c. 4.

<sup>109</sup> Preserving England's "linguistic integrity" in Ireland, noted by Patricia Palmer as its own form of "linguistic nationalism," was a key feature of English colonial ideology [Palmer, *Language and Conquest in Early Modern Ireland: English Renaissance Literature and Elizabethan Imperial Expansion* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 108-147]. Resistance to English assimilation of Irish language had important consequences on the ability of English colonists to communicate with the Irish, and vice versa. Because the prevailing attitude was one of discouragement towards learning Irish, Englishmen in Ireland relied on interpreters. See Palmer, "Interpreters and the Politics of Translation and Traduction in Sixteenth-Century Ireland," *IHS* 33 (2003): 260-261; Farrell, 118-120. At a privy council meeting in England, they mention a William Doyne, who served as an Irish interpreter (*APC*, vol. 22, p. 551). Some recommendation letters by the lord deputy and council also included those who had served as interpreters. For example, A note of private suits of Ireland to be answered, 25 Jan. 1592, SP 63/163/17, f. 30; *CSP Ire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 456.

<sup>110</sup> 12 Elizabeth c. 1. On the discussion of education and religion in Elizabeth's reign, see Colm Lennon, "Education and Religious Identity in Early Modern Ireland," *Paedagogica Historica* 35 (1999): 57-75.

<sup>111</sup> Lennon, "Protestant Reformations, 1550-1641," in *The Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 2, 1550-1730*, ed. Jane Ohlmeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 198.

within each diocese, as well as the appointment of schoolmasters. The archbishops and bishops of the four major dioceses—Dublin, Armagh, Meath, and Kildare—would have the right to nominate, institute, and appoint schoolmasters within their own diocese. The lord deputy and council would appoint schoolmasters for the other remaining dioceses. The schoolhouses were to be built in the principal towns of each diocese, and the costs and charges, including the salary of the schoolmaster, would be divided into thirds within each diocese: ordinaries would pay a third, and parsons, vicars, prebendaries, and other ecclesiastical persons, two-thirds.<sup>112</sup> An ordinary was someone with ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and it could be an archbishop, a bishop, or the bishop's deputy.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, "all churches, parsonages, vicarages, and other ecclesiasticall livings...shall bee charged to this payment and contribution."<sup>114</sup> The clergy and all those with ecclesiastical authority, therefore, were responsible for the costs of the schools and its maintenance.

Some bishops managed to erect schools as they had been directed. John Long, the archbishop of Armagh and an Irish councilor, established a school in Waterford.<sup>115</sup> William Lyon, the bishop of Cork, Cloyne, and Ross also founded a school within his own diocese.<sup>116</sup> However, some bishops could not afford to do so. Thomas Lancaster, the archbishop of Armagh before Long, frequently requested help in the building of a grammar school in Drogheda, which fell within his diocese.<sup>117</sup> The charges included not only the costs of building the school, but also

---

<sup>112</sup> 12 Elizabeth c.1.

<sup>113</sup> *OED*, "ordinary."

<sup>114</sup> 12 Elizabeth c.1.

<sup>115</sup> *DIB*, "Long, John."

<sup>116</sup> Sir Warham St. Leger to Burghley, 13 Apr. 1591, SP 63/157/63, f. 129; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 390. St. Leger claims the bishop also repaired the church at Ross at his own costs, seven or eight score pounds, i.e., £140 or £160.

<sup>117</sup> Thomas Lancaster to Walsingham, 12 Oct. 1580, SP 63/77/29, f. 71; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 260. Lancaster to Walsingham, 26 Apr. 1581, SP 63/82/58, f. 156; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 302. Lancaster to Walsingham, 24 June 1581, SP 63/83/60, f. 146; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 308.

a schoolmaster and usher, the costs of which he estimated to be £30 a year.<sup>118</sup> Such requests made plain the dysfunctional management of education in Ireland. The "plan" for its implementation was basic at best. Without an institutional framework that outlined a timeline or schedule, such building occurred irregularly and in varied places. Some dioceses had schools, and others did not. In the long-term, the erratic nature of this building process would undoubtedly affect the number of students who would eventually enroll at university. In the short-term, the act relied too much on the ability of the clergy and ordinaries to contribute their own funds to the project.

The queen recognized some of the shortcomings of the 1570 Act, but not in the way one might expect. Rather than mitigate the costs on the clergy, she instead instructed the lords justices in 1583 to ensure its execution. She noted, for instance, that observation of the statute in Limerick was "slenderly" or ignored altogether.<sup>119</sup> The clergy apparently refused to pay and there was no school or schoolmaster in Limerick. Her solution was to have the mayor of Limerick "sequester yearly and from time to time so much of the living, tithes, and other comodities as belong to the Bishop of Limerick and other ecclesiastical persons in that diocese respectively," until the obligation was met.<sup>120</sup> In other words, if the clergy did not pay, then they would be forced to do so. Moreover, the inclusion of the mayor, a civil officer, took enforcement of the policy outside of the church. The mayor, now accountable for collecting the payments needed for schools, had little choice but to comply.

Funding a university, however, would be more costly than a grammar school. It would require the employment of teachers, clerks, ushers, etc. Cecil estimated that the costs would

---

<sup>118</sup> Lancaster to Walsingham, 12 Oct. 1580, SP 63/77/29, f. 71; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 260. He wrote the value of £30 as sterling.

<sup>119</sup> *Patent Rolls*, 1576-1603, p. 42.

<sup>120</sup> *Patent Rolls*, 1576-1603, p. 42.



amount to £1,270 12s.<sup>121</sup> The caveat to Cecil's scheme was that it depended on diverting church funds and property towards the university project; specifically, it involved the conversion of the Dublin cathedral, St. Patrick's, into a university. The impetus to turn St. Patrick's Cathedral into a college came first in 1547 at the behest of George Browne, then the archbishop of Dublin.<sup>122</sup> With a revenue listed as £1,400 in 1547, Browne proposed to use the money from the cathedral to fund the new university.<sup>123</sup> In October 1563, the queen and the privy council instructed Sir Thomas Wroth and Sir Nicholas Arnold to conduct a survey of the cathedral and the possessions tied to it. Wroth and Arnold were to determine whether it could serve as the site of a university in Dublin.<sup>124</sup> Three years later, Loftus—then the archbishop of Armagh—advocated its transformation into a "howse of Lerninge" for the benefit the "manie godlie ministers and lerned preachers" that would be placed there.<sup>125</sup> However, when the issue arose again in the mid-1580s, Loftus now stood against it.<sup>126</sup>

### **Directing the Reformation: Adam Loftus and the University Debate**

The obvious question, which has captured scholarly attention, was why Adam Loftus—a preeminent figure in the Church of Ireland and on the Irish council—objected to the erection of a university which would enable the development of a newly reformed ministry. How had he gone from being an advocate of the university to its critic? Scholars have addressed this question and

---

<sup>121</sup> Device of a college to be erected in Dublin, SP 63/9/49, f. 112; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 225.

<sup>122</sup> Device of George Brown, 1547, *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 78. Murray discusses the intent of this "device" in "St. Patrick's Cathedral and the University Question in Ireland c.1547-1585," in *European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation*, ed. Helga Robinson-Hammerstein (Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1998), 3-11.

<sup>123</sup> Murray, "St. Patrick's Cathedral and the University Question in Ireland," 5.

<sup>124</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1515-1574, pp. 359-60.

<sup>125</sup> Loftus to Cecil, 10 June 1566, SP 63/18/13, f. 13; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 304. Loftus to the Privy Council, 10 June 1566, SP 63/18/12, f. 12; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 304. Lord Deputy Sidney and Council to the Privy Council, 13 Apr. 1566, SP 63/17/8, f. 14; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 294.

<sup>126</sup> Loftus to Walsingham, 4 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/4, f. 7; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 529.

the role Loftus played in the Reformation, but the university debate has chiefly been cited as evidence of the failure of the Reformation and the Irish Elizabethan bishops.<sup>127</sup> The bishops in Ireland had been responsible for overseeing the spread of the Reformation, and in this task they had seemingly failed. Loftus, in particular, was portrayed as the chief figure of corruption within the church and the Irish council. His role in delaying the establishment of a university in Ireland has been regarded as proof of his greed and corruption; supposedly he was unwilling to further the scheme because he misappropriated church funds to serve the interests of himself and his family.<sup>128</sup>

In fact, this image of Loftus—and Irish Elizabethan bishops overall—was formed by contemporaries, and later perpetuated by scholars. It was Loftus's adversary, Sir John Perrot—the lord deputy who tried to advance the scheme for the university in the mid-1580s—who brought charges of corruption against Loftus (see Image 7).



Image 7 - Portrait of Sir John Perrot by U. Green, 1584, British Museum.

---

<sup>127</sup> Jefferies, *The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations*, 131-136.

<sup>128</sup> Jefferies, 227-230.

After an examination of the cathedral, Perrot provided a detailed list of the members of the cathedral administration, many of whom he believed were either laymen or related to Loftus.<sup>129</sup> Perrot's indictment of Loftus was one among many accusations which Loftus faced during his employment in Ireland. Robert Legge, a deputy remembrancer in the Irish exchequer, also accused Loftus on many charges of corruption, to which Loftus had to formally answer to the English privy council.<sup>130</sup> Even those who had not written of Loftus's alleged corruption intuited as much. For example, Barnaby Rich, the English soldier and writer, wrote on the Irish clergy's negligence in their duties.<sup>131</sup> Rich claimed that his observations about the clergy upset Loftus, who, "knowinge his owne gyltines did take the matter insuche grevyous sorte" that he "fell into A dislyke" of Rich.<sup>132</sup> An anonymous report also disparaged Loftus, noting how he "allyed and strengthened him self," and had formed "lynes of freendshipp, to heythen and vphold his Loftyneesse vnmesurable, and his Ambytion insaciabile."<sup>133</sup> The notoriety of these allegations, and others, came to define Loftus's career.

Loftus, however, was not the only Elizabethan bishop in Ireland to face such criticism from contemporaries, as Helen Walshe acknowledged in her study of Hugh Brady, the bishop of

---

<sup>129</sup> The State of St. Patrick's, [4 Aug.] 1585, SP 63/118/46; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574.

<sup>130</sup> Book by Robert Legge touching the debts of the Lord Chancellor, etc., 1590, SP 63/150/52. II, f. 157; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 308. The answers of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland to certain articles objected against him by Barnaby Rich and Robert Legge, 17 Sept. 1592, SP 63/166/59, f.162; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 581.

<sup>131</sup> The relation of Barnaby Rich, [15 July] 1592, SP 63/166/27, f. 55; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 547. Rich also notably complained about the poverty of soldiers and critiqued the lavishness and corruption of Elizabeth's court. Rory Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558-1594* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 63-73.

<sup>132</sup> The relation of Barnaby Rich, [15 July] 1592, SP 63/166/27, f. 55r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 547. Rich would also apparently accuse Loftus of intending to murder him in Dublin, which Loftus denied. See The answers of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland to certain articles objected against him by Barnaby Rich and Robert Legge, 17 Sept. 1592, SP 63/166/59, f. 162; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 581.

<sup>133</sup> A note on the archbishop of Dublin, ~1592, SP 63/63/165/32, f. 178v; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 534.

Meath and another Irish councilor.<sup>134</sup> Brady was one of the few Irish bishops who gained respect among his contemporaries, but other bishops were not so fortunate. Miler Magrath, the archbishop of Cashel, came under intense scrutiny when a burgess of Cashel filed complaints against him to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam.<sup>135</sup> Fitzwilliam had his own issues with the archbishop. He claimed that Magrath had threatened to bring false charges against him, which he reasoned concerned the preferment of Magrath's adversary, Sir Charles O'Carroll, by the lord deputy and council.<sup>136</sup> On this and other occasions, Fitzwilliam criticized the archbishop for his "greedie mynde to heape together Large possessions & contentious nature allwayes bent to quarrel."<sup>137</sup> Magrath escaped prosecution in 1591, but he dealt with numerous allegations during his ecclesiastical career, including treason.

Some bishops were also subjected to criticism by their peers in the church. When the Irish councilor, John Garvey, took over as archbishop of Armagh, he blamed his predecessor, John Long, for the ruined state of the primacy, the cathedral, and the bishop's houses in Termonfeckin and Drogheda.<sup>138</sup> He alleged that Long had leased out church lands at low rents for several years, which resulted in the reduced value of the bishopric to about £120 a year.<sup>139</sup> Garvey requested (and received) remittance of his first fruits, a debt of £137 13s. 1d.<sup>140</sup> A

---

<sup>134</sup> Helen Coburn Walshe, "Enforcing the Elizabethan Settlement: The Vicissitudes of Hugh Brady, Bishop of Meath, 1563-1584," *IHS* 26 (1989): 352-376.

<sup>135</sup> Book of articles of treason, felony, simony and extortion exhibited against the archbishop of Cashel and Emly, 21 Aug. 1591, SP 63/160/4. I, f. 9; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 418. See also, Answer of Miler Magrath to the malicious book, 10 Oct. 1591, SP 63/160/29, f. 69; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 424.

<sup>136</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 22 June 1591, SP 63/158/53, f. 109; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 399.

<sup>137</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 22 June 1591, SP 63/158/53, f. 109r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 399.

<sup>138</sup> John Garvey to Burghley, 11 May 1589, SP 63/144/12, f. 29; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 168. Garvey to Burghley, 20 Feb. 1592, SP 63/163/28, f. 51; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 458.

<sup>139</sup> Henry Ussher also made the same claims when he obtained the primacy after Garvey (Ussher to Burghley, 10 Apr. 1596, SP 63/188/24, f. 59; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 508).

<sup>140</sup> Garvey to Burghley, 26 June 1590, SP 63/153/27, f. 92; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 354. Warrant from Queen Elizabeth to the Lord Deputy to remit to John Garvey, 12 July 1591, SP 63/159/10, f. 13; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 404.

churchwarden at Youghal named Thomas Wethered also found himself under attack when he pursued the bishoprics of Waterford and Limerick. Upon hearing of this intent, William Lyon, the bishop of Cork, Cloyne, and Ross, denounced Wethered as "so wicked a man" that there was "no faith, fidelitie nor honestie in him."<sup>141</sup> Incensed by the possibility of Wethered's continued presence within the church, Lyon called him a "drunkard and an incestious person," who, having fled to England, could not be censured by the church for his crimes.<sup>142</sup> He wanted Wethered removed entirely from the church. Lyon did not get his wish. The queen nominated Wethered for the bishoprics, which Wethered held until his death.<sup>143</sup> And yet, these bishops accused of corruption also bore the ignominy of debt and, for some, imprisonment. Long and Wethered both died in debt.<sup>144</sup> Craik did as well, but first he suffered imprisonment at the Marshalsea prison in England.<sup>145</sup> Even the respectable Brady died in debt of about £140.<sup>146</sup>

Surprisingly, even as she noted the "unkindness" of scholars in their treatment of the Elizabethan bishops, Walshe also remarked on the notoriety of their greed, identifying Loftus by name.<sup>147</sup> Walshe did, however, concede that "genuine poverty forced many of them into a display of cupidity which adequate remuneration would have rendered unnecessary."<sup>148</sup> Despite the widespread recognition of the impoverished state of the church of Ireland, its clergy, and the colonial administration, scholars persist in these subjective portrayals of Elizabethan bishops in

---

<sup>141</sup> An Extract out of certain Remembrances by William Lyon, 12 Feb. 1589, SP 63/141/21. VII, f. 63r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 122.

<sup>142</sup> An Extract out of certain Remembrances by William Lyon, 12 Feb. 1589, SP 63/141/21. VII, f. 63r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 122.

<sup>143</sup> *Patent Rolls, 1576-1603*, p. 182. By 1592, the bishoprics became void after the death of Wethered at an unknown date (*idem*, p. 244).

<sup>144</sup> The debts of Thomas Wethered, 1558-1603, SP 46/25, f. 111.

<sup>145</sup> Craik to Cecil, 1563, SP 63/8/62, f. 126; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 220. Non-payment of the first fruits and twentieth for the bishopric of Kildare led to Craik's imprisonment.

<sup>146</sup> Notes for Ireland to be considered upon, 1586, SP 63/122/60, f. 134; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 19.

<sup>147</sup> Walshe, "Enforcing the Elizabethan Settlement," 354.

<sup>148</sup> Walshe, 354.

Ireland. Loftus may not have been the only bishop to be found wanting in character, but he is the most visible by virtue of the correspondence that survives.

Helga Robinson-Hammerstein offered a different interpretation of Loftus, one that considered his religious convictions.<sup>149</sup> According to Robinson-Hammerstein, Loftus was a survivor, one who had developed his own strategies in response to Ireland's religious and political conditions but who also maintained his Puritan zeal for religious reform.<sup>150</sup> Therefore, there was no change in Loftus's stance when he opposed the university in 1585. Robinson-Hammerstein's assertions are, as will be shown, convincing. What Robinson-Hammerstein did not explain was the financial motivations behind Loftus's actions. His experience in Ireland undoubtedly shaped his religious views, but they also influenced his actions on the council and in the church. Since Loftus began his service in Ireland in the 1560s, this chapter will necessarily address the period before 1580 as a crucial lens through which to understand Loftus's long career in Ireland, the struggle over establishing a university, and the continued delay in the progress of the Reformation in Ireland. The intent is not to vindicate Loftus but to suggest an alternative reading of his career and motives up to the mid-1580s. By examining Loftus's career in the 1560s and 1570s, his change in stance about converting St. Patrick's into a university becomes clear.

Loftus's money problems had been evident early in his career and took nearly twenty years to improve. His election to the archbishopric of Armagh occurred at an exceptionally inopportune moment—a resistance led by Shane O'Neill against the English government was in full force. Situated in northern Ireland within O'Neill's territory, Armagh was a key site in the conflict. Lord Deputy Sussex had stationed a garrison there of at least 200 soldiers to fortify the

---

<sup>149</sup> Helga Robinson-Hammerstein, "Archbishop Adam Loftus: The First Provost of Trinity College, Dublin," in *European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation*, ed. Robinson-Hammerstein (Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1998), 34-52.

<sup>150</sup> Robinson-Hammerstein, "Archbishop Adam Loftus," 39.

church, which held victuals for the soldiers.<sup>151</sup> Loftus's election to the archbishopric was stalled by the insurgency. The dean, Terence Daniel, had to assemble the chapter to officially elect Loftus, but both the dean and the archdeacon were involved in obtaining indentures from O'Neill and his supporters.<sup>152</sup> Their absence, along with some other members, meant that the election could not proceed, which forced the queen to order an ecclesiastical commission within the Armagh diocese to obtain rents from the possessions of the archbishopric in order to confer them on Loftus.<sup>153</sup> The intent was to provide Loftus with some financial assistance, but such rents would have been meager given the recent troubles. The queen also granted Loftus the deanery of St. Patrick's *in commendam*. This was a temporary grant entrusted to the custody of a valued clergyman, usually to augment his earnings. The archbishop of Dublin usually held the deanery, but the queen and privy councilors wanted to show Loftus favor because of his good reputation.<sup>154</sup> However, they were also aware that Loftus faced some financial difficulty due to his diminished revenues in Armagh and so determined that he should have the deanery "for some ayde to the charg[es] of his lyving...untill we shall otherwise provyde for hym."<sup>155</sup> Yet, even after Loftus received the deanery, he requested on multiple occasions to be exempt from the tax of the first fruits for the deanery, which the queen granted.<sup>156</sup> The request was not unusual given the frequent petitions by bishops in Ireland to temporarily lift this financial obligation. Bishops

---

<sup>151</sup> Sir William Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 22 June 1561, SP 63/4/11, f. 15; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 174. *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 175; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 177; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 226.

<sup>152</sup> Proclamation by the Queen in favour of Shane O'Neill, 5 May 1562, SP 63/6/6, f. 9; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 194. Instructions given by the Lieutenant and Council to Terence Daniel and John Garvey, 31 July 1562, SP 63/6/60, f. 164; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 200. Terence Daniel to Cecil, 28 Nov. 1563, SP 63/9/66, f. 141; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 227.

<sup>153</sup> The Queen to Lord Lieutenant Sussex, 11 Oct. 1562, SP 63/7/25, f. 82; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 206.

<sup>154</sup> The Queen to Lord Justice and Lord Chancellor, 6 Jan. 1565, SP 63/12/3, f. 0009r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 249.

<sup>155</sup> The Queen to Lord Justice and Lord Chancellor, 6 Jan. 1565, SP 63/12/3, f. 0009r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 249.

<sup>156</sup> Loftus to Leicester, 8 Apr. 1565, SP 63/13/8, f. 21r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 257. Loftus to Cecil, 16 July 1565, SP 63/14/22, f. 81; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 267. The Queen's warrant to the Barons of the Exchequer, 15 June 1565, SP 63/13/61, f. 151a; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 263.

consistently complained of the inadequacy of their ecclesiastical livings, or benefices, and their inability to pay the first fruits tax.

By 1566, Loftus wanted to resign the archbishopric of Armagh. He stated that the profits were only £20 a year and that the towns within the bishopric had been wasted and destroyed by insurgents.<sup>157</sup> He was persistent in his appeals to be promoted or discharged of his debts, and the queen eventually decided that Loftus would become the next archbishop of Dublin.<sup>158</sup> Once he learned of the queen's intention, he requested that he be permitted to continue to hold the deanery of St. Patrick's *in commendam*, as he had as archbishop of Armagh. He reasoned that the bishopric of Dublin was only worth about £400 English sterling (£533 Irish), had twelve score acres of ground, and he still had to pay the first fruits for the see of Dublin. According to Loftus, the first fruits of Dublin was worth as much as the bishopric itself, which would leave him in a worse state than present. The promotion, therefore, would be worthless to him.<sup>159</sup>

Loftus did indeed become the archbishop of Dublin, but he lost the deanery to Dr. Robert Weston, dean of the Arches, who became the new lord chancellor.<sup>160</sup> The two offices, the archbishopric and the chancellorship, would now be held by two men, rather than one, as had been with the case with Curwen. In the end, therefore, Loftus lost the deanery of St. Patrick's. He nonetheless continued to petition to have first fruits for the archbishopric of Dublin discharged

---

<sup>157</sup> Loftus to Cecil, 3 Nov. 1566, SP 63/19/31, f. 67; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 316.

<sup>158</sup> For example, Loftus to Cecil, 14 Nov. 1566, SP 63/19/46, f. 96; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 318. The Queen to Lord Deputy Sidney, 16 Jan. 1567, SP 63/20/8, f. 18; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 324. Sidney informed Loftus of this news in March 1567 [Lord Deputy Sidney to Loftus, 11 Mar. 1567, SP 63/20/52 (i), f. 111; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 328].

<sup>159</sup> Loftus to Cecil, 21 Mar. 1567, SP 63/20/52, f. 109; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 328.

<sup>160</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Sidney, 10 June 1567, SP 63/21/6, f. 12 [draft]; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 335. Weston has to give up the deanery when he leaves chancellorship; Weston given 200 marks for travelling expenses, 100 marks to be repaid from his entertainment or taken from revenues of the deanery.



and even had the assistance of Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam in this suit.<sup>161</sup> He eventually received remission for half of his first fruits.<sup>162</sup>

By June 1568, Loftus shifted his attention to a new ecclesiastical commission in the Pale, which he led alongside Sir Robert Weston, the lord chancellor. Its stated purpose was to inquire into offenses committed against the queen's laws concerning religion and the royal supremacy.<sup>163</sup> The commissioners focused their efforts on invalidating the influence of the conservative clergy at St. Patrick's cathedral in Dublin and examining offenses committed by the laity. By negating the influence of the cathedral clergy, who still participated in and supported the old religion, the commissioners hoped that the removal of these men would offer a greater chance of success for the reformation of the Pale.<sup>164</sup> Therefore, they deprived some of the conservative clergy of their livings and imposed lenient fines for recusancy on the laity.<sup>165</sup> Depriving the conservative clergy of their livings also allowed the crown to confer those livings on Protestant clergymen. Also, enforcing fines was another means of creating revenues for a colonial government in dire

---

<sup>161</sup> Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 26 Mar. 1568, SP 63/23/84, f. 84; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 371. Loftus to Cecil, 13 June 1568, SP 63/25/4, f. 7; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 379. In the spring of 1568, Loftus learned of a bill proposal that would eliminate the ancient privileges of his see and immediately sought to prevent its passing. The issue for Loftus, and those who wrote on his behalf, was its impact on the archbishop's financial means (Loftus to Cecil, 2 Apr. 1568, SP 63/24/1, f. 1r; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 372. Loftus did not blame the lord deputy, but instead the judges and barons of the exchequer. See also, Petition of Lewis Chaloner to Cecil, 27 Mar. 1568, SP 63/24/40, f. 131; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 379). Loftus was concerned about maintaining the ancient privileges of his see, as the proposed statute would not only cause a 50% decline in the archbishop's yearly revenues, but also place the burden of an annual salary for seneschals and constables on the archbishop. The statute, if passed, would significantly affect the archbishop's income. Indeed, it could be ruinous to his finances. It would also affect the ministry's ability to do their work and their esteem among the people since they would no longer have the protection of the monarch (Loftus to Cecil, 2 Apr. 1568, SP 63/24/1, f. 1; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 372). Fortunately for Loftus, the queen and privy council agreed and deferred the statute (Loftus to Cecil, 13 June 1568, SP 63/25/4, f. 7; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 379).

<sup>162</sup> Loftus to Cecil, 2 July 1570, SP 63/30/64, f. 141; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 432.

<sup>163</sup> *Patent Rolls*, 1566-69, pp. 173-4.

<sup>164</sup> Murray, "The Tudor Diocese of Dublin," 241-253.

<sup>165</sup> In some respects, the commissioners had shown restraint. They could have, for instance, assigned harsher fines for recusancy, and yet they did not. Also, the inhabitants' ability to pay the fines was likely another justification for leniency. The reason for this, according to Murray, was that their strategy was not reformation through coercion, but rather through persuasion. As such, they assigned moderate fines for recusancy (Murray, "The Tudor Diocese of Dublin," 251-253). The commission's activities thus illustrated a move towards more conciliatory reform policies in matters of religion.

financial need. With these measures, the commission could diminish the impact of clerical poverty in Ireland by taking care of their fellow clergymen without relying on the English crown for assistance. The commission in 1568 was thus one example of how the Irish councilors based their approach to religious reform on the practical and financial needs of the clergy in Ireland.

When Loftus advocated that the revenues of St. Patrick's cathedral should be used towards the establishment of a university in the mid-1560s, he had done so because religious conservatives had a strong presence in the cathedral administration.<sup>166</sup> However, when he opposed Perrot's plan for the university in the 1580s, it was due to his own experience in Ireland. Even after the ecclesiastical commissions and the reappropriation of church livings to Protestant clergymen, Loftus's financial situation, in particular, did not appear to improve significantly. In May 1573, Loftus received the position of keeper of the great seal, used to authenticate official documents, following the death of Weston. The position was a temporary one, and the fee for the office was £246 13s. 4d. Irish.<sup>167</sup> This fee was substantial, but it covered any costs associated with the office, which likely included charges for travel and board.

Loftus's new appointment came only a few months after the first Desmond Rebellion, which ended in February 1573. Though it had begun in Munster, the violence of the rebellion had spread to the Pale, and Loftus reported not only the "murders, burnings, and robberies" which now regularly took place, but also the murder of his own nephew.<sup>168</sup> It was in fear of his life that he proclaimed, "it were better for us to be beggars in England then to feel the miseries that are like to fall in Ireland," suggesting that being poor in England was preferable to the threat

---

<sup>166</sup> Murray, "The Tudor Diocese of Dublin," 345.

<sup>167</sup> In a letter to Burghley, Loftus also stated that the income for the keeper was 10s. a day (Loftus to Burghley, 24 Feb. 1580, SP 63/71/58, f. 127; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 210).

<sup>168</sup> Loftus to Sir Henry Sidney, 11 May 1573, SP 63/40/36, f. 89; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 503.

of violent death in Ireland.<sup>169</sup> In the intervening years that led up to the conflict with Perrot over the university, Loftus continued to bemoan his poor financial state. In 1574, he reported a debt of £350 sterling for first fruits and twentieth.<sup>170</sup>

Meanwhile, Sir Henry Sidney, then lord deputy, objected to Loftus's retention of the seal and its fees. He argued that the queen paid £300 a year for the office, but the man who held it "nevar sitteth in Court, to order and decree Cawsies, nor doth any thing els incydent to the office of a Chauncelor, but onelie kepeth the Seale."<sup>171</sup> Sidney opposed payment to individuals who did not execute the expected duties of their office. Although Loftus was not the lord chancellor, Sidney expected him to assume the role of one, given the healthy fee for the office of keeper of the seal. The problem, it should be stated, did not lie with Loftus, but rather with the queen and the privy council. They allowed Irish officers and the clergy to hold multiple offices or church livings.<sup>172</sup> In other words, they effectively sanctioned pluralism. But they did so to compensate for the lack of financial resources available to those employed in Ireland.<sup>173</sup> Sidney pushed for the appointment of Sir William Gerrard, his former colleague and friend, for the chancellorship.<sup>174</sup> Gerrard eventually occupied the office.

By 1576, Loftus had become disillusioned with the progress of the Reformation in Ireland and begged to be discharged from service.<sup>175</sup> Loftus did not get his wish to be transferred

---

<sup>169</sup> Loftus to Sir Henry Sidney, 11 May 1573, SP 63/40/36, f. 89; *CSPIre*, 1509-1573, p. 503.

<sup>170</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 23 Apr. 1574, SP 63/45/81, f. 217; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 20. Loftus wanted remission for his debt, arguing that he was unable to pay (Loftus to Walsingham, 28 Oct. 1574, SP 63/48/30, f. 67; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 42). Loftus to Burghley, 29 Oct. 1574, SP 63/48/34, f. 75; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 42.

<sup>171</sup> Lord Deputy Sidney to the Privy Council, 27 Feb. 1576, SP 63/55/19, f. 59r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, pp. 89-90. Loftus also held the position after death of Chancellor Gerrard.

<sup>172</sup> See, for example, Instructions from the Queen to Loftus and Robert Garvey, commissioners for faculties in Ireland, 13 Apr. 1579, Add. Mss (Yelverton Ms. 17), 48017/2, f. 44; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 165.

<sup>173</sup> See *Patent Rolls*, 1566-67, p. 3, on license for Loftus to hold *in commendam* "one or more ecclesiastical benefices or prebends, of the value of £100 a-year."

<sup>174</sup> Lord Deputy Sidney to the Privy Council, 27 Feb. 1576, SP 63/55/19, f. 59r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, pp. 89-90.

<sup>175</sup> Loftus to Walsingham, 14 Sept. 1576, SP 63/56/27, f. 60; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 98.

back to England. He remained in Ireland. At some point, he got married and had numerous children, twelve of whom survived.<sup>176</sup> Murray argues that the consequence of Loftus's experience had rendered him "battle hardened," with a new resolve to form the connections that would make him more influential and powerful than previously.<sup>177</sup> Through Loftus's own marriage and later those of his children, he gradually developed a network of powerful people in Ireland, including noble families in the Pale.<sup>178</sup>

Loftus also began to pursue the office of lord chancellor in early 1580, after the long absences of Lord Chancellor Gerrard.<sup>179</sup> Gerrard's health declined, and he wished to return to England.<sup>180</sup> Gerrard died in early May 1581, whereupon Loftus was granted custody of the Seal once again and renewed his appeal for the chancellorship in the same month.<sup>181</sup> Loftus argued that his bishopric in Dublin, valued at less than £400 a year, had been spoiled by the recent Baltinglas Rebellion in the Pale.<sup>182</sup> As a consequence of the rebellion, the wasting of the

---

<sup>176</sup> *ODNB*, "Loftus, Adam." It is not clear precisely when Loftus got married.

<sup>177</sup> Murray, "The Tudor Diocese of Dublin," 275.

<sup>178</sup> *ODNB*, "Loftus, Adam."

<sup>179</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 24 Feb. 1580, SP 63/71/58, f. 127; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 210.

<sup>180</sup> Petitions of Gerrard to the Queen, 9 May 1580, SP 63/73/10, f. 0025; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 222. Gerrard to the Queen, 14 Jan. 1581, SP 63/80/6, f. 23; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 280. Gerrard to Burghley, 14 Jan. 1581, SP 63/80/7, f. 25; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 280. Gerrard to Walsingham, 3 Mar. 1581, SP 63/81/7, f. 15; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 290.

<sup>181</sup> Warrant for Patent of Custody of the Great Seal to Adam Loftus, 6 May 1581, SP 63/83/15. I, f. 44; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 304.

<sup>182</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 14 May 1581, SP 63/83/17, f. 51; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 304. Loftus had also written to Walsingham a year prior absolving himself from blame in Baltinglas's rebellion (Loftus to Walsingham, 11 Sept. 1580, SP 63/76/26, f. 51; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 250). According to Loftus, Viscount Baltinglass (James Eustace) had fled to Rome and returned obstinate in religion; accused of teaching a mass and called before an ecclesiastical commission in June 1578; by statute, he would have been required to pay a fine of 100 marks or be imprisoned for six months. Loftus claims that he found Baltinglas "symple" and so sought to "wynne hym by p[er]swac[i]on dealing in trothe w[i]th ouermuche lenitie towards hym" (f. 51r.) yet pressured by Sidney to proceed according to the statute; Baltinglass was brought to Dublin Castle for recusancy and where he remained for 24 hours, after which he submitted and granted a pardon by Sidney (2 Aug. 1578, SP 63/76/26. III, f. 57; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 251). He was then set at liberty without paying anything. Loftus says this is the only occasion where he dealt with Baltinglas in matters of religion; Baltinglass's rebellion then not due to his experiences with the Irish govt in matters of religion, or so Loftus says. ("the contrarie course of remisnes and ouermuche tollerance, haue not deserued more blame, then the severite now complayned of." (v)). Chancellor Gerrard reported that Loftus was afraid all of their throats would be cut (Gerrard to Burghley, 3 Aug. 1580, SP 63/75/6, f. 12; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 239).

bishopric had caused a significant decline in its value to the amount of £220 a year.<sup>183</sup> The addition of the chancellor's office would provide succor, as it was now estimated to be worth under £300 a year, especially as the deanery of St. Patrick's typically attached to the office had been given to another preacher.<sup>184</sup> Loftus made several appeals for the chancellorship, but it when appeared that it would go to another, he made an impassioned plea a month later to retain the custody of the seal:

The broyles and rebellions of this contrey lately stirred vpp by Baltinglas and his confederates as they haue wrought the beggerie of many, so especialye they haue empouerisshed the poore bisshopricke of Dublin. The envy and malice of the rebelles againste my selfe hathe beene so greate, that the beste and greateste p[ar]te of my Bisshopricke borderinge vpon the enemyes is layde quite waste: my Townes burned: the inhabitant[es] either fledde or muredred: so that nowe I haue not to live on, aboue twoo hundrethe poundes Irishe a yeare.<sup>185</sup>

Noticeably, within the space of a month, Loftus reported a £20 decline in the value of his bishopric. It is unlikely that the decline had been quite as drastic as Loftus claimed. Rather, he intended to highlight his seemingly desperate state. He added that the lord deputy and council had already granted him custody of the seal as relief. If they did not grant his request, then he desired a living in England, which undoubtedly meant a threat to a government that valued his extensive experience in Ireland. It worked. Within weeks, Loftus received word that he would be granted the chancellor's office.<sup>186</sup> The chancellorship was followed by his appointment as lord justice for two years, alongside Sir Henry Wallop. Thereafter, Loftus immediately made further

---

<sup>183</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 14 May 1581, SP 63/83/17, f. 51; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 304. He reiterated the same plea in his letter to Walsingham, 14 May 1581, SP 63/83/18, f. 53; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 304.

<sup>184</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 14 May 1581, SP 63/83/17, f. 51; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 304.

<sup>185</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 14 June 1581, SP 63/83/52, f. 127; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 307. Three years later, Loftus noted that though the value of the bishopric had increased to £320, it was still not above £400 a year. Lord Justice Chancellor Loftus to Burghley, 9 Feb. 1584, SP 63/107/86, f. 229; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 495.

<sup>186</sup> Loftus to Walsingham, 28 June 1581, Cotton Titus B/XIII/124, f. 344; Loftus to Walsingham, 23 Sept. 1581, SP 63/85/59, f. 143; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 321.

petitions to improve his finances.<sup>187</sup> Like other officials in Ireland, he asked for a portion of the rebel viscount Baltinglas's land.<sup>188</sup> However, Walsingham decided not to present Loftus's suit to the queen, fearing that she would dislike it. Instead, the secretary offered to provide Loftus with a bishopric in England, but Loftus declined. He cited his age (he was now in his 50s) and his family, now established in Ireland.<sup>189</sup>

By the time Perrot arrived in Ireland as lord deputy, Loftus had acquired both the office of lord chancellor and the archbishopric of Dublin. And yet, he was insecure about his position within the administration. When he heard of a rumor in spring 1584 that he would be replaced as lord chancellor, he begged the Westminster privy councilors to maintain the office.<sup>190</sup> Then, only months later, he received notice from Perrot of the latter's intention to turn St. Patrick's Cathedral into a university. In response, Loftus appealed to Walsingham. He maintained his position on the need for a university in Ireland. However, he did not believe it should be at the expense of the ministry or the progress of the Reformation. Loftus argued that the suppression of the cathedral would leave the Pale destitute of preachers, for they resided in the church and served parish churches within the county. Its conversion would thus remove the

only place w[i]thin this realme, for the maintena[u]nce of good and godly preachers, especially of thenglishe nac[i]on, bothe for the civilitie of the place and quiet habitac[i]on and also for sufficiency of living. w[hi]ch if yt be suppressed, there can in this land no one place be found wherein a lerned man (especially of o[u]r nac[i]on) w[i]thout im[m]inent daunger may safely thrust his heade.<sup>191</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> Loftus to the Privy Council, 12 Sept. 1582, SP 63/95/46. I, f. 102; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 398.

<sup>188</sup> White to Burghley, 14 Sept. 1582, SP 63/95/43, f. 95; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 398. Loftus to Walsingham, 15 Sept. 1582, SP 63/95/46, f. 101; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 398.

<sup>189</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 14 Dec. 1582, SP 63/98/44, f. 113; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 418. Walsingham to Loftus, 1 Feb. 1583, SP 63/99/44, f. 91; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 426 [Draft].

<sup>190</sup> Lord Justice Loftus to Burghley, 8 Apr. 1584, SP 63/109/17, f. 31; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 505. Lord Justice Loftus to Walsingham, 11 Apr. 1584, SP 63/109/30, f. 57; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 506.

<sup>191</sup> Loftus to Walsingham, 4 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/4, f. 7; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 529. This plea was a reiteration of earlier arguments against the dissolving of St. Patrick's for a university. See Murray, "Tudor Diocese of Dublin," 365.

For Loftus, the cathedral was a safe refuge from the dangers of life in Ireland, which was already evident by the late rebellions only a year earlier. The cathedral was also a means of preferment for learned men to enter church administration. It served as a reward for the ministry; without it, they would lose the opportunity for advancement within the church. Most importantly, preachers depended on the church's livings and, if it were taken away from them, it would be to the "vtter discouragement, in this beginnyng of sowing the seede of the gossPELL."<sup>192</sup> The consequence of its conversion would effectively bring an end to the potential for religious reform: "I greatlie feare yt wilbe the ou[er]throwe of all true relligion in this cuntry w[hi]ch for the most p[ar]te being drowned in Idolatry and sup[er]stic[i]on, standeth in nede of preachers to reduce them to the knowledg of the truthe."<sup>193</sup> The archbishop may have overplayed his hand in his plea to preserve the cathedral, but he felt it necessary to emphasize how vital the cathedral was to the clergy in Ireland. To Loftus, it made little sense to suppress the church and strip the cathedral administration of its livings only to build a university to attract men who would be educated to serve as ministers in the church. Not suprisingly, the prebendaries of St. Patrick's agreed with Loftus's reasoning, and they stated as much in their petition to the privy council.<sup>194</sup> They too noted that Perrot's plan would be the "vndoinge of all the prebendaries and members of the same and their famelies."<sup>195</sup> They even listed the many personnel of the cathedral, including twenty-six dignities and prebendaries, twenty-six petty canons, vicars, the choir, and questers,

---

<sup>192</sup> Loftus to Walsingham, 4 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/4, f. 7; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 529. It should be noted that there was another cathedral within Dublin called Christ Church, but it was gradually eclipsed by the more Protestant church of St. Patrick's. See Murray, "Tudor Diocese of Dublin," 393.

<sup>193</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 7 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/5, f. 9; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 529.

<sup>194</sup> Petition of prebendaries of St. Patrick's to the Privy Council, Dec. 1584, SP 63/113/56, f. 120r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 544. Reasons against the legality, 1584, SP 63/113/56. II, f. 122; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 544.

<sup>195</sup> Reasons against the expedience of the dissolution, 1584, SP 63/113/56. I, f. 121r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 544.

twenty scholars, two schoolmasters, an usher, and others. The cathedral's revenues supported more than just the dean and the chapter.

These arguments rested on the displacement of all who worked within the cathedral administration, and Perrot took issue with this premise. He presented several problems concerning the cathedral and its revenues, particularly the lack of resident preachers. He counted only two amongst the cathedral administration, arguing that the rest were "all non resident[es] moast of them Laie men and boyes spending the Living[es] abroad to no vse at all."<sup>196</sup> He devised a plan for those resident preachers to be incorporated into the new college administration, and he swore, "ffor God is my witsse I have no mallice to St. Patrick[es] nor to anie man in it or Longing to it, But onlie a desier to be an instrument of good to this miserable State."<sup>197</sup>

Perrot later submitted a report to the queen and the privy council in England, wherein he provided yearly estimates on the value of clerical positions within the cathedral.<sup>198</sup> The report also recorded the ecclesiastical offices, its incumbent, and notes on whether the incumbent was a preacher or layperson, resident in the diocese, and their relation to Loftus. For example, Perrot noted that Gilbert Purdon was the prebendary for Tipper but also a brother of the archbishop's wife and that his non-attendance at church was as a secular man.<sup>199</sup> He further noted two men directly related to the archbishop: his son, Edward, and one Godfrey with the same surname. The notes were a clear indication of Perrot's claim and purpose. The archbishop, he believed, was mishandling the cathedral administration by allowing laypersons to hold church offices, non-

---

<sup>196</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 6 Nov. 1584, SP 63/112/69, f. 156v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 536.

<sup>197</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 6 Nov. 1584, SP 63/112/69, f. 157v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 536.

<sup>198</sup> The state of St. Patrick's, [4 Aug.] 1585, SP 63/118/46; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574. Though the document does not bear Perrot's signature, he assumes ownership of it in another letter (Perrot to Burghley, 24 Sept. 1585, SP 63/119/32, f. 101; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 580).

<sup>199</sup> The state of St. Patrick's, [4 Aug.] 1585, SP 63/118/46; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574.



resident preachers to maintain their livings, and using the cathedral to favor his own family. The issue, however, was not strictly nepotism. Nepotism was clearly present in England as well, none more so visible than the Lord Treasurer Burghley and his later placement of his son, Robert, in high offices. But, unlike Loftus, Burghley spent several years training his son to assume the role of principal secretary.<sup>200</sup> The same could not apparently be said of Loftus, or so the lord deputy alleged when he described Edward as merely the archbishop's son.

For his part, Loftus admitted his self-interest in St. Patrick's cathedral: "I haue speciall interest in the cause since the gifte of all the dignities & pr[e]bend[es] of St patrick[es] (two onely excepted) reste in my selfe, (being the best remaynder of my decayed bushopricke.)"<sup>201</sup> He addressed all of the Perrot's allegations for every position, including those held by his kinsman. He defended his wife's brothers, Gilbert and Adam Purdon, arguing that Gilbert was a "godlie & zelous minister" and that Adam's absence out of Ireland was due to his schooling in England to become a minister.<sup>202</sup> Gilbert retained his prebendary until his failing health brought him to England.<sup>203</sup> Loftus also confessed to bestowing a prebend on his son, Edward, whom he had consecrated to the church and ministry for his special skills in Latin and Greek.<sup>204</sup> The prebend was meant to support Edward at university, as was also the case for Adam Purdon.<sup>205</sup> Perrot had noted that several of the prebendaries were scholars, with some students away at Cambridge.

---

<sup>200</sup> William Acres, introduction to *The Letters of Lord Burghley, William Cecil, to His Son Sir Robert Cecil, 1593–1598*, by Sir William and Robert Cecil, Camden Fifth Series 53, ed. Acres (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2017), 1-86.

<sup>201</sup> Loftus to Walsingham, 4 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/4, f. 7; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 529.

<sup>202</sup> Note of the livings of St. Patrick's, 1585, SP 63/118/44. I, f. 85r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574. Loftus would later deprive Adam of this living once it became clear that Adam did not "profit" from being at university (The answers of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland to certain articles objected against him by Barnaby Rich and Robert Legge, 17 Sept. 1592, *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 581).

<sup>203</sup> The King to the Lord Lieutenant and Deputy, 12 Sept. 1604, *CSPIre*, 1603-1606, p. 196.

<sup>204</sup> Note of the livings of St. Patrick's, 1585, SP 63/118/44. I, f. 85r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574.

<sup>205</sup> Note of the livings of St. Patrick's, 1585, SP 63/118/44. I, f. 85r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574. Loftus acknowledged that in 1592 that Edward had received his degree and entered the ministry (The answers of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland to certain articles objected against him by Barnaby Ryche and Robert Legge, 17 Sept. 1592, *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 581).

However, where Perrot had noted absences for Arthur Atye, the chanter, and Richard Bancroft, the prebend of Malahidert, Loftus provided convincing evidence that justified their non-residence. According to Loftus, both Atye and Bancroft had been called to England by the queen, and their livings had been conferred before Loftus's time as archbishop.<sup>206</sup> This information would prove accurate. Leicester had given Atye the chantry in 1581.<sup>207</sup> Bancroft had license to be absent in England.<sup>208</sup> The queen acknowledged the presence of both Atye and Bancroft in England in 1593.<sup>209</sup> Most notably, Bancroft, in particular, did not lose his prebendary in the cathedral until 1597, when he received a promotion to the bishopric of London.<sup>210</sup> This evidence suggests that the two men did, in fact, have license to be in England. It may be that Atye had never even visited Ireland, but he was allowed to enjoy some of the financial benefits of the position, owing to his employment as secretary of the earl of Leicester.<sup>211</sup> Loftus was, therefore, keen to note that "a vicar ys indowed upon his lyvinge," emphasizing that the directive came from England.<sup>212</sup> Even positions within the Church of Ireland, then, were used by patrons in England as a means of bestowing favor on their clients.

Part of Loftus's strategy was to enable the training of Protestant ministers in England, with the goal of their returning to Ireland to serve as ministers in the reformed church and oversee the education of new generations of ministers. He consequently sent his kinsmen to England to receive a Protestant education for their eventual service in the Church of Ireland. In this way, Loftus's familial interests aligned with the state's on religious reform. Loftus also tried to get Thomas Cartwright, the famous Puritan minister in England, to succeed him as archbishop

---

<sup>206</sup> Note of the livings of St. Patrick's, 1585, SP 63/118/44. I, f. 84r-84v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574.

<sup>207</sup> *Patent Rolls*, 1576-1603, p. 31.

<sup>208</sup> *Irish Fiants*, 1567, p. 159. The license was only for 6 years, though it was likely renewed.

<sup>209</sup> *Patent Rolls*, 1576-1603, pp. 247-248.

<sup>210</sup> *Patent Rolls*, 1576-1603, p. 432.

<sup>211</sup> *HoP*, "Atye, Sir Arthur."

<sup>212</sup> Note of the livings of St. Patrick's, 1585, SP 63/118/44. I, f. 84v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574.

of Armagh. In the 1560s, Cartwright had worked with Loftus as his chaplain for at least two years, but Cartwright was a controversial and vocal figure in England whose Presbyterianism angered many.<sup>213</sup> Although Loftus's plan to install Cartwright into the archbishopric failed, his aim and method were clear. In other words, Loftus was trying to support and increase the number of reformed ministers in Ireland first and then establish the university of which these men could contribute. But Perrot seemed uninterested in Loftus's plan, only in dissolving the cathedral. This was an especially impolitic move, given that Atye and Bancroft were clients of powerful patrons on the privy council in England.

Perrot's report also provided rough yearly estimates on the income of the livings, including lands and other spiritualities. However, the accounting—though sometimes easily calculated—is imprecise.<sup>214</sup> Some figures are represented in pounds, while others in marks. More importantly, there is no clear indication of whether the values are in English or Irish currency. Further, he does not list the lands associated with the church, perhaps operating under the assumption that the English privy councilors already had access to this information. Loftus, of course, challenged the values within Perrot's report, arguing that Perrot had been misinformed and was thus "greatly mistaken" on the values.<sup>215</sup> He did not provide counterarguments for every

---

<sup>213</sup> *ODNB*, "Cartwright, Thomas." Patrick Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 112.

<sup>214</sup> On this point, the estimates are curious if we consider a document earlier in 1585 from Perrot, wherein it detailed the amount of grain—down to the peck—due to him. He noted that he had taken the tithes of the deanery of St. Patrick's since there was no incumbent following Jones's advancement to the bishopric of Meath. The estimates on St. Patrick's cathedral may have been composed in haste so that the report could be included in Fenton's dispatch for England. See *The account of grain, 1585*, SP 63/114/63, f. 142; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 551. The manuscript has been mislabeled in the state archives. It appears as "the valuation of the deanery of St. Patrick's," but an examination of its contents suggests otherwise. It is not a valuation of the deanery, but instead an account of grain due to Perrot from different persons throughout Ireland and divided by county. He cites the counties of Dublin, Kildare, Meath, etc. He also identifies some Irish councilors who have no association with the cathedral: Fenton, Sir Lucas Dillon, Sir Robert Dillon, and Sir Nicholas White, to name a few. For this reason, I've chosen to relabel the manuscript using the first folio number that appears on the manuscript itself, being 142, and not 141 as listed. I've also removed the precise day and month (listed as 2 Feb.), since the only dating on the manuscript is in Latin, indicating that it is for the year ending in 1584 and likely presented in early spring 1585.

<sup>215</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 12 Aug. 1585, SP 63/118/63, f. 124r; *CSPIre, 1574-1585*, p. 575.

estimate, but he noted that at least 11 livings had a lower value than those Perrot reported.<sup>216</sup> It is not clear if he included the value of the benefices with lands and other spiritualities, or whether the values had declined and had not yet risen to their pre-rebellion state.<sup>217</sup>

Although Perrot claimed to have no malice towards anyone associated with the cathedral, he complained to Burghley of Loftus's alleged "dubble and under-hand dealing[es]."<sup>218</sup> He stated that Loftus had originally consented to the university scheme and offered to "do anie thing for the convecion therof that reasonable I coulde demaunde."<sup>219</sup> To Perrot's surprise, Loftus then worked against him. Perhaps it was true that Loftus had initially consented to the scheme. Maybe the two men had tried to reach an agreement in the early stages of Perrot's deputyship. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Loftus approved of the university, but not of the suppression of his cathedral, and, on this point, he had never wavered. When the issue of the university arose in parliament, he denounced it and successfully squashed the scheme to convert

---

<sup>216</sup> Loftus mentions in this letter to Burghley that he had sent over an earlier "book," but it is not clear as to which report he means. It may have been the same document discussed above (Note of the livings of St. Patrick's, 1585, SP 63/118/44. I, f. 85; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 574). It is however possible there was another report now presumably lost.

<sup>217</sup> Much later, in 1604, he produced a certificate alongside Thomas Jones, the bishop of Meath, wherein he accounted for the whole diocese of Dublin (including Christ Church cathedral). In this report, Loftus listed the number of rectories attached to the offices. The figures bear some similarity to Perrot's, but there are also some inconsistencies, which is to be expected given the gap in years between the two reports. See Archbishop of Dublin and Bishop of Meath to the Lords of Council, 5 Mar. 1604, SP 63/216/223, f. 30; *CSPire*, 1603-1606, p. 151. Certificate of the Diocese of Dublin, 1604, SP 63/216/267, f. 59; *CSPire*, 1603-1606, p. 169. To complicate matters even further, there is an anonymous report from 1592, which also lists the supposed values of the cathedral (Dignities of St. Patrick's bestowed as followeth, Aug. 1592, SP 63/166/54, f. 148r; *CSPire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 575). For the most part, the values in the 1592 are slightly larger than Loftus's from 1585 with one exception: a £20 discrepancy for the prebend of Kilmactalwey (this discrepancy does not conform with Perrot's estimate or the 1604 certificate). But there are three instances where Loftus provides estimates that are significantly more than the 1592 version. Compare, for example, Loftus's estimates for the chanter (£100), the prebend of Castleknock (£40), and the prebend of Malahide (£40); these values are respectively reported in 1592 as £50 5s., £20 6s. 4p., and £18. Nonetheless, the 1592 account bears no author, and the veracity of the account is, like Perrot and Loftus's, questionable. Jefferies, however, uses the anonymous 1592 report as conclusive proof of Loftus's corruption (*The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations*, 229-230). This report was clearly composed by an adversary of Loftus, as it also notes which of the cathedral clergy were kinsmen of Loftus. Moreover, it mistakenly assumes that Loftus was the sole person responsible for the placing of the cathedral clergy. It provides no context for how the men came to be in their positions, only that "his L: gaue it." This report also appears in the same year as another anonymous report mentioned earlier on Loftus's children and their marriages (1592, *CSPire*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, pp. 534-36).

<sup>218</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 24 Sept. 1585, SP 63/119/32, f. 103r; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 580.

<sup>219</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 24 Sept. 1585, SP 63/119/32, f. 103r; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 580.

St. Patrick's.<sup>220</sup> He believed it was possible to erect a university in the Pale, but not at the expense of the cathedral clergy. Therefore, in 1592, Loftus founded a university, Trinity College, on the site of an old Catholic monastery outside Dublin.

As Perrot once admitted, he was a "Straunger vnto that Church, and was Lead vnto it by a spetiall instrucc[i]on."<sup>221</sup> The queen and the privy council had provided Perrot with instructions to see to the erection of a university using the revenues from St. Patrick's cathedral.<sup>222</sup> They had also maintained that they could not suppress the cathedral, given its aid of the ministry in Ireland. They had advised Perrot to meet with the archbishop to consider how the revenues may be converted "in some parts to such use [...] without takeing from the Ministrie and the Cures that which apertaineth unto them."<sup>223</sup> Furthermore, Burghley—who seemed to advance the university scheme earlier—changed his mind.<sup>224</sup> Burghley had expressly told Perrot that he could never allow the conversion of the cathedral, based on what he had witnessed in England.<sup>225</sup> The conversion of churches left a gaping hole in the reformation of the island. It was Perrot who persisted in advancing the scheme, despite the admonitions of the privy council.<sup>226</sup> Perhaps, then, the central administration in England was not to blame for the lack of progress in the Reformation where it concerned the establishment of a university for the reformed ministry.

---

<sup>220</sup> See, for example, Sir Nicholas White's account of parliament and the issue between Perrot and Loftus (White to Burghley, 27 May 1585, SP 63/116/56, f. 136; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 564).

<sup>221</sup> Perrot to Burghley, 8 Sept. 1585, SP 63/119/13, f. 59r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 579.

<sup>222</sup> Memorial for Perrot to consider of erecting a college in Dublin, 19 Jan. 1584, SP 63/107/39, f. 114; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 491.

<sup>223</sup> Memorial for Perrot to consider of erecting a college in Dublin, 19 Jan. 1584, SP 63/107/39, f. 114v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 491.

<sup>224</sup> Murray, 359-363.

<sup>225</sup> Burghley to Perrot, 6 Nov. 1584, SP 63/112/68, f. 153; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 536.

<sup>226</sup> Perrot had even suggested that the cathedral be utilized as a courthouse (Perrot to Walsingham, 21 Aug. 1584, SP 63/111/71, f. 158; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 524).

Their directives, in this case, had been neither contradictory nor ambiguous.<sup>227</sup> The lord deputy had simply overstepped.

Perrot had served in Ireland before in the early 1570s. But his long absence had left him out of touch with the workings of the Irish government, particularly regarding the church and the clergy. He would experience the full consequence of his actions in the early 1590s with his infamous treason trial— the subject of the next chapter.

---

<sup>227</sup> Bradshaw, "Sword, Word and Strategy in the Reformation in Ireland," 501.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Factional Rivalries and Politics in the Irish Council

“every governor for his time maketh fair weather, like a bad physician qualifying, not curing, the disease.”<sup>1</sup>  
- Sir George Carew

That there was great fractiousness in the Irish council in the 1580s is undisputed. Often described by historians as dysfunctional, divisive, and ineffective, the Irish council in these years achieved little as the constant competition between the councilors disrupted the effectiveness of government.<sup>2</sup> Their bitter rivalries were of such consequence that the viceregent, Sir John Perrot, had to be removed from Ireland after serving four years as lord deputy. Less than two years later, Perrot was charged with treason, based on allegations that concerned his deputyship in Ireland. He was eventually convicted and died while in prison. Perrot's contemporaries and historians have since grappled with the question of how this once powerful figure with viceregal authority came to such a disgraceful end.

The most widely-accepted explanation is that the lord treasurer and English privy councilor, Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, orchestrated Perrot's fall, and that he worked through his client in Ireland, Sir William Fitzwilliam, the lord deputy who succeeded Perrot.<sup>3</sup> This interpretation rests heavily on the notion that politics and patrons in England dictated the course of Irish politics.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, when the privy councilors in England competed for power,

---

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, pp. 468-469.

<sup>2</sup> Jon G. Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland: The Irish Privy Council and the Expansion of Tudor Rule, 1556-1578* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press in association with the Irish Legal History Society, 1993), 420-423.

<sup>3</sup> Hiram Morgan, "The Fall of Sir John Perrot," in *The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade*, ed. John Guy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

<sup>4</sup> Both Ciaran Brady and Nicholas Canny share this view of Irish politics as being almost entirely determined by politics in England. See Brady, "The Government of Ireland, c. 1540-1583" (PhD diss., Trinity College of Dublin, 1980); Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-76* (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1976). In "England's Defence and Ireland's Reform: The Dilemma of the Irish Viceroy, 1541-1641," Brady stated, "All of the governors who failed were brought down by troubles that originated primarily not in Ireland, but in England—in palace coups, or campaigns of courtly intrigue and slander, by sudden political reversals or by profound constitutional conflicts—where the actual character of their conduct in Ireland was either of secondary

their disputes supposedly found expression in their patronage networks, such as those in Ireland. In this view, the competition was not fought between the Irish councilors and the lord deputy *per se*, but rather between Burghley and Sir Francis Walsingham, the principal secretary in England. But such an interpretation depends on the existence of political rivalries in Elizabeth's Court. However, Simon Adams has convincingly shown the collegiality that existed between the English privy councilors during most of Elizabeth's reign.<sup>5</sup> There was no deep-seated rivalry between Burghley and Walsingham or Burghley and Leicester. Walsingham's death in 1590 did create an opportunity for Burghley to expand his influence and control Ireland, on which he capitalized. Yet, to argue that divisions within the Irish council fell entirely along patronage lines would be to prioritize the politics of the center over those of the periphery, and to ignore the political groupings that arose within the Irish council.<sup>6</sup>

Personal rivalries and competition for patronage certainly produced tension among the Irish councilors. Yet there was also more cooperation than previously supposed. Perrot—with his brash personality and belief in his own sovereignty—jeopardized the councilors' livelihoods, status, and authority. He repeatedly circumvented the advice of the Irish council and even tried to introduce a surveyor or comptroller office to oversee the officers in Ireland.<sup>7</sup> Perrot thus threatened to undermine their power and position within the council and, more broadly, in

---

importance, or of no importance at all” (90). Assumptions about the Irish council and the dominating influence of English patrons persist and have been adopted by various scholars to explain or interpret Irish politics in the 1580s and 1590s.

<sup>5</sup> Simon Adams, *Leicester and the Court: Essays on Elizabethan Politics* (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press: Palgrave, 2002), esp. the essay, “The Patronage of the Crown in Elizabethan Politics: the 1590s,” 20-45.

<sup>6</sup> Ciaran Brady, “England’s Defence and Ireland’s Reform: The Dilemma of the Irish Viceroy, 1541-1641,” in *The British Problem c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago*, eds. Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 89-117.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Legge to Walsingham, 26 Apr. 1585, SP 63/116/23, f. 71; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 561.



Ireland. Under such pressures, the Irish council divided, not according to their patrons back in England, but instead along factional lines.

The term "faction" has been a tricky one to define.<sup>8</sup> Thankfully, Adams has provided a useful definition of faction which most accurately describes what occurred in Ireland in the mid-1580s and early 1590s. A faction was one group in opposition with another, and while factionalism could emerge out of disagreements over patronage and policy, at "its essence was a personal rivalry that over-rode all other considerations."<sup>9</sup> The rivalry that ensued between Perrot and Loftus after their dispute over the conversion of St. Patrick's cathedral into a university had a significant impact on Irish conciliar politics. Their dispute, and lack of support for Perrot from the English crown, effectively crippled the lord deputy's ambitions for religious reform during the Irish parliament of 1585-1586.<sup>10</sup> But whereas some scholars argued that the disagreements between the two men were based on their different approaches to religious reform—Perrot's conciliatory or temporizing stance versus Loftus's Protestant militant attitude—these distinctions ignore the factional politics within Ireland. Expediency and convenience sometimes mattered more than ideological differences. It allowed for allegiances based on religion and policy, as well as a conflict in personalities.<sup>11</sup>

The story of the fall of Perrot, then, does not begin with Sir William Fitzwilliam's official complaint or the subsequent treason trial. Rather, the prosecution of Perrot was the conclusion to

---

<sup>8</sup> Paul E. J. Hammer, "Patronage at Court, Faction and the Earl of Essex," in *The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade*, ed. John Guy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 65-68.

<sup>9</sup> Simon Adams, "Faction, Clientage and Party: English Politics, 1550-1603," *History Today* 32 (1982): 34.

<sup>10</sup> Victor Treadwell, "Sir John Perrot and the Irish Parliament of 1585-6," *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* 85 (1985): 259-308. For more information on the Irish parliament in these years, see F. J. Routledge, "Journal of the Irish House of Lords in Sir John Perrot's Parliament (3 May 1585-13 May 1586)," *The English Historical Review* 29 (1914): 104-117.

<sup>11</sup> Brady made a similar observation about "alliances of convenience" in terms of the formulation of Irish policies (See Brady's, "Government of Ireland," 61). However, I would contend that these alliances extend beyond policy. Brady also emphasizes the role of inter-ethnic factions in Irish politics.

a long-standing feud with most of the Irish councilors. What follows, therefore, is a reinterpretation of a specific moment in sixteenth-century Irish history from the perspective of faction and conciliar politics in the 1580s. The existing narrative of this episode also favors the viewpoints of Perrot, Loftus, and Burghley. However, the inclusion of the Irish secretary of state, Geoffrey Fenton, adds another layer to the discussion, for there was still some fluidity in his quest for patronage. Until the mid-1580s, Fenton had pursued three patrons simultaneously: Leicester, Walsingham, and Burghley. Leicester was preoccupied with the Low Countries and left England to serve as governor-general in the Netherlands in late 1585. Walsingham was still a viable option, as was Burghley. But when Fenton came into conflict with Walsingham's most important client in Ireland—the new lord deputy Sir John Perrot—he became less inclined to share information as he had once done. His dislike of Perrot pushed him towards Burghley.

### **Origins of a Conflict**

Initially, Geoffrey Fenton was on good terms with the new lord deputy. When Sir John Perrot arrived in Ireland in June 1584, he found the secretary of state eager to please. Fenton described Perrot, only a few weeks after his arrival, as "Affable and pleasing seking by good meanes to recou[er] the harts of the People that weare somewhat estraunged...painefull and well experienced in the dispatche of Causes...sinceare and Just, he escheweth all p[ar]tyalyty and Respect of p[er]sons."<sup>12</sup> Fenton seemed optimistic about Perrot and his capabilities, just as he had been with Sir Arthur Grey, the previous lord deputy. Perrot also had the benefit of prior experience in Ireland, having previously served as provincial president in Munster in the early 1570s.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, Fenton had every reason to hope that "from theis, good growndes many good

---

<sup>12</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 10 July 1584, SP 63/111/16, f. 37v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 518.

<sup>13</sup> *ODNB*, "Perrot, Sir John."

effectes will growe to the good of this pore torne Contrey."<sup>14</sup> Nearly a year into Perrot's term as lord deputy, Sir Edward Waterhouse noted that Fenton appeared as a loyal servant to Perrot.<sup>15</sup> Their relationship only soured after that between Loftus and Perrot deteriorated.

As noted above, Perrot wanted to finance a new university in Dublin by appropriating revenues from St. Patrick's cathedral, which had been entrusted to Loftus. Loftus, unsurprisingly, disagreed and argued for the church's vital role in the "planting and grounding of religion in this decayed contry."<sup>16</sup> He later complained about a "malicious booke" against himself and the ministers of the cathedral. The document highlighted allowances for men who were either absent, of which there were many, or those who had profited because of their personal relationship with the archbishop.<sup>17</sup> It was clearly intended to be used against Loftus and was likely authored by Perrot. According to Loftus, this report would be presented to the privy council. Fenton had recently departed for England and, presumably, took the report with him. It is possible that the secretary had informed Loftus of the document's existence and the lord deputy's intention to use it against him. Tellingly, Loftus wrote Walsingham that Perrot planned to use Fenton against the archbishop while the secretary was in England.<sup>18</sup> To Burghley, he outlined Perrot's plan for his undoing: "he will nowe write by Mr ffenton, of whose forwardenes in aggravatinge any cause againste me, I nothinge doubtte, for that he hath professed him self an utter enemye, to me, and my poore churche."<sup>19</sup> While Perrot eventually backed down over St. Patrick's, the hostility between Loftus and Perrot signaled growing tension within the Irish council, with Perrot as the leading figure of opposition, and Fenton caught in the crossfire.

---

<sup>14</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 10 July 1584, SP 63/111/16, f. 37v; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 518.

<sup>15</sup> Sir Edward Waterhouse to Walsingham, 18 June 1585, SP 63/117/39, f. 97; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 569.

<sup>16</sup> The Chancellor Archbishop Adam Loftus to Sir William Cecil, 10 Jan. 1585, SP 63/114/17, f. 34; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 546.

<sup>17</sup> The State of St. Patrick's, [4 Aug.] 1585, SP 63/118/46; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 574.

<sup>18</sup> Loftus to Walsingham, 18 June 1585, SP 63/117/42, f. 102; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 569.

<sup>19</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 7 June 1585, SP 63/117/11, f. 36r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 566.

It is understandable why Loftus thought the secretary could be used against him or was, in some way, allied with Perrot. The lord chancellor and secretary had been allies in 1582 in the interim before Perrot arrived. Yet Fenton had also developed good working relationships with the Old English councilors, Sir Nicholas White and Sir Lucas Dillon, two recognizable figures in Perrot's faction.<sup>20</sup> White had assisted Fenton on several occasions in increasing the secretary's fee.<sup>21</sup> Fenton's relationship with Dillon extended back to 1581, before Loftus had been chosen as the new lord chancellor. Fenton had not only requested to be custodian of the deanery of St. Patrick, but had also recommended Dillon as his pick for the chancellorship.<sup>22</sup> Over the years, the secretary continued to recommend Dillon's suits, extolling Dillon's "devotion and fydellitie" as chief baron of the exchequer and asserting that no other officer in Ireland "(whether of thenglishe or Irishe byrthe) hath deserued better then he, nor Carieth more sufficiencye euery waie for the admyinstrac[i]on of the govern[en]t, besides the malice and envye he hath pulled vpon him for comynge his Course so constantlie in the seruice heare."<sup>23</sup> Fenton even claimed that Dillon "hath done nothings for privat gayne and Comoditie, as some of his name hath done."<sup>24</sup> He was referring to Dillon's cousin, Robert, with whom he had a dispute in which Fenton allegedly threatened him. After that incident, Fenton came to the defense of the aging councilor and his friend, White, against Robert Dillon over superiority in the council. Robert Dillon, as chief justice of the common pleas, alleged that it was the custom of the times and the governors to favor his office over that of the master of the rolls. To Fenton, the chief justice

---

<sup>20</sup> Treadwell, "Sir John Perrot and the Irish Parliament of 1585-6," 303.

<sup>21</sup> Sir Nicholas White to Burghley, 5 Apr. 1584, SP 63/109/10, f. 17; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 505. White, 24 Aug. 1585, Lansdowne, 45/2, f. 4.

<sup>22</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 10 May 1581, SP 63/83/3, f. 5; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 302.

<sup>23</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 8 Sept. 1582, SP 63/95/16, f. 33r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 395. Fenton to Walsingham, 8 Sept. 1582, SP 63/95/17, f. 35; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 395. Fenton to Walsingham, 28 Oct. 1584, SP 63/112/52, f. 121; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 535.

<sup>24</sup> Fenton to Leicester, 8 Sept. 1582, SP 63/95/16, f. 33r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 395.

seemed "in troath to shadowe an Ambicion more then is convenient."<sup>25</sup> White, on the other hand, was of a different character, for he was not "addicted to contencion" and would have remained silent on the issue were it not for the need to defend himself against the chief justice.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, White's claim to precedence depended on the wording of his patent for the office, a better ground for defense than one based on custom. In the quarrel between the two Old English councilors, Fenton allied with the councilor who had promoted his political, social, and economic ambitions. His hostility towards Robert Dillon was inconsequential until the feud between Perrot and Loftus, when the secretary and the chief justice found themselves, once again, in opposing camps.

By virtue of Fenton's relationship with White and Lucas Dillon, he should have allied with the Perrot faction against Loftus. But this was not the case, which became clear in December 1585, when Fenton returned from England with a new set of instructions for Perrot.<sup>27</sup> All good accord—or pretense of it—ended abruptly. The queen and the privy councilors decreased the lord deputy's budget, restrained his use of martial law, and demanded that he act in consultation with the Irish council.<sup>28</sup> The Irish councilors were quick to report that Perrot had taken the dispatch quite personally. He had been, they wrote, wounded, and felt insulted by the restrictions placed on his powers as viceroy.<sup>29</sup> Fenton added that the lord deputy thought the

---

<sup>25</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 14 Dec. 1584, SP 63/113/27, f. 58r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 542.

<sup>26</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 14 Dec. 1584, SP 63/113/27, f. 58r; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 542.

<sup>27</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, pp. 409-410.

<sup>28</sup> Certain remembrances touching the realm of Ireland, 30 Jan. 1586, SP 63/122/52, f. 112; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 13. The Queen seemed convinced that revenues and profits were being used by deputies and justices to enrich themselves and their friends.

<sup>29</sup> White to Burghley, 12 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/31, f. 106; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 43. Fenton to Burghley, 15 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/36, f. 115; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 43. Loftus to Burghley, 26 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/54, f. 177; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 48.

privy councilors had restrained his power in a manner that was undignified and unusual for a viceroy.<sup>30</sup> Fenton wanted Perrot removed from office.<sup>31</sup>

Perrot had few supporters, and, unlike his predecessors, he was uniquely vulnerable due to a broadly hostile council in Ireland and an unsupportive one in England. So, understandably, Perrot wanted out. He had written previously that he hoped Fenton would return with news of his revocation.<sup>32</sup> The queen and the privy council in England knew that Perrot wanted to leave his post, but refused to grant his request.<sup>33</sup> Undaunted by their refusal, Perrot reached out to his friends in England to help procure his revocation.<sup>34</sup> He also entrusted his friend, Sir George Carew, who was due to appear before the Queen shortly, to pass along some notes. The notes contained a list of points in Perrot's defense against the "villainous reports" and "malicious fables" of others.<sup>35</sup> He suspected that the Irish councilors were poisoning the privy council in England against him, but he had expected the Queen to dismiss the rumors, rather than have him answer to them.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Fenton also mentioned his disagreement with Perrot's approach to the insurgent, Sorley Boy. Perrot wanted to prosecute him and end the war by sword, but Fenton advocated the need for restraint, especially since Sorley wanted to submit himself for pardon (Fenton to Burghley, 19 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/46, f. 139; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 45). Perrot thought otherwise and he told Burghley that liberty destroyed the Irish (Lord Deputy Perrot to Burghley, 16 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/39, f. 126; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 44). Sorley Boy submitted not long after and was eventually pardoned.

<sup>31</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 1 June 1586, SP 63/124/63, f. 136; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 70. Fenton to Burghley, 14 June 1586, SP 63/124/76, f. 158; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 75. Fenton to Burghley, 15 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/36, f. 115; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 43. Submission noted as June 10 (A breviae of certain orders and entries made in the government of the Right Honourable Sir John Perrot, 31 July 1586, SP 63/125/28, f. 62; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 108); *Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, pp. 427-428.

<sup>32</sup> Lord Deputy Perrot to Walsingham, 12 Jan. 1586, SP 63/122/24, f. 56; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Perrot made the request quite early into his deputyship (Lord Deputy Perrot to Walsingham, 11 Nov. 1585, SP 63/121/4, f. 8; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 585); Walsingham to Lord Deputy Perrot, Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/94, f. 205; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 34. Walsingham informed the lord deputy that the queen was not happy and, furthermore, Perrot's adversaries claimed that he was more interested in enriching himself than bettering the government. But he assured Perrot that Burghley would defend the lord deputy's actions against those who sought his disgrace.

<sup>34</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/36, f. 115; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 43.

<sup>35</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, p. 423-42. Note that he wrote Carew again in May, asking what the Queen had said about his "true" report on the state of Ireland (*Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, p. 427).

<sup>36</sup> He suggested later in Feb. 1588 that Thomas Jenyson, the late Auditor, who "lyved lyke a hogg & dyed lyke a dogg" was the reason the Queen thought Perrot was mishandling his finances, for he thought Jenyson reported more

Perrot was also affronted that the councilors, especially Loftus, had "superintendency" over him.<sup>37</sup> This was particularly egregious because, in constitutional terms, the chief governor was the most important figure in Ireland due to his viceregal status. And yet, in practice, he could be eclipsed by others within the council, especially the lord chancellor. Though this had not been the case for the previous lords deputy, it was for Perrot. The opposition he encountered in the Irish council had no comparison in the governorships prior. Perrot had been instructed to improve the financial administration in Ireland; to impose taxes, decrease expenditures, and increase revenues. Improvement, in this case, could not be achieved without reform, without evaluating the existing financial infrastructure, and without exposing corruption where evident. Some governors opted to participate in, rather than uncover, unethical behavior in the Irish administration. And while the issue of Perrot's own possible corruption remains unclear for lack of evidence, Perrot appeared indifferent to the damage which such exposure could cause to his relations with the other Irish councilors. The business with Loftus and St. Patrick's illustrated this attitude. It was this indifference, however virtuous in the pursuit of ending corruption, which would lead to his demise.

Threatened by Perrot's actions and with their personal interests at stake, the Irish councilors discovered that they could work against him if they worked in concert. It was primarily the monarch and the privy council who could discipline chief governors, but the Irish councilors found that they could indirectly intervene in this process. They could precipitate discipline by the nature of their reports. If the queen and the privy council had the impression that Perrot was overstepping his boundaries, it was because the councilors made it so.<sup>38</sup> They did

---

money than the lord deputy actually had (Lord Deputy Perrot to [Unknown], 16 Feb. 1588, SP 63/133/51, f. 107r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 475).

<sup>37</sup> Lord Deputy Perrot to Burghley, 16 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/39, f. 126r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 44.

<sup>38</sup> David Edwards, "Questioning the Viceroys," 155-160.

not ascribe the same importance to the office of chief governor that Perrot did. They viewed the role of the lord deputy as another official charged with doing her majesty's service. In fact, they suggested as much in their joint letter with the lord deputy: "wee were all here of one nac[i]on and tied together w[i]th one consent in Religion and dutie."<sup>39</sup> Cooperation was essential to the functioning of Irish government. Loftus wrote to this effect, offering reconciliation and promising to be a "most faithful assistant" to the lord deputy. But if the lord deputy was unwilling to collaborate with the Irish council, then he needed to be replaced. Perrot, it seemed, was not a team player. So, while Loftus agreed to communicate with Perrot, he also reported that the lord deputy had become even more unpleasant after receiving Fenton's dispatch. He claimed that Perrot denigrated any work that had not been performed by himself or his men.<sup>40</sup> In this case, there may be some truth to the accusation since Perrot brought with him a number of Welshmen to serve as household officers in Dublin Castle, a fact later used against Perrot during his trial. Both Perrot and his enemies, it would seem, wanted an end to his term as lord deputy. However, the manner in which they sought to achieve this aim diverged substantially.

Loftus likely would have come across as being petty and his criticism of Perrot dismissed were it not for the number of complaints which the privy council also received from the other Irish councilors. Fenton, for his part, wrote consistently of the lord deputy's inaction concerning the Queen's instructions. At first, he stated on 1 June 1586, that it was the Irish council who wanted to deal with other matters first and then the instructions.<sup>41</sup> Thomas Jenyson, the auditor, stated two weeks later that the lord deputy was not to blame for the deferring of the

---

<sup>39</sup> Lord Deputy and Council to the Privy Council, 28 Jan. 1586, SP 63/122/47, f. 101r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 10. Fenton did not sign the letter because he was in England.

<sup>40</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 26 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/54, f. 177; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 48.

<sup>41</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 1 June 1586, SP 63/124/63, f. 136; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 70.



instructions.<sup>42</sup> However, by June 23, Fenton placed the blame squarely on the lord deputy. He complained that, although he had frequently prodded the lord deputy about appointing commissioners for escheated lands in Munster (a matter of importance in the November 1585 instructions and Fenton's own personal interest), nothing had been done. Moreover, when he tried, he was given only one answer: "that when the other affaiors shalbe past over those instructions shalbe called to question."<sup>43</sup> Fenton was accusing Perrot of negligence in doing the Queen's service and he was also deflecting any blame that could be attributed to himself as secretary; the secretary's job was to read the dispatch aloud to the Irish council. He wanted it known that he had done his job as the queen and privy councilors had requested, and the fact that the lord deputy deliberately ignored their instructions could in no way be construed as Fenton's fault. However, in a curious move, Fenton asked Burghley to write a letter to the Irish council stating that the Irish secretary *had* been negligent in his charge. Fenton hoped that by deliberately misidentifying the culprit for the delay, the council could proceed with following through on the instructions. It is also possible that in offering to take the blame, he may have tried to prevent Perrot from feeling attacked again, although this interpretation assumes that Fenton could look past his personal issues with Perrot. At the very least, it enabled Fenton to show Burghley that he was devoted to the queen's service in Ireland—he would take the blame for someone else to push things forward. Whatever the reason, he implored Burghley to keep the ploy a secret between them.<sup>44</sup> It was a peculiar scenario, but it was constructed to inspire action on an issue from which Fenton and his benefactors in England could profit. It also suggested that the lord deputy had to

---

<sup>42</sup> Thomas Jenyson to Burghley, 17 June 1586, SP 63/124/82, f. 170; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 78.

<sup>43</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 23 June 1586, SP 63/124/90, f. 193r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 91. The instructions sent in December 1585 allowed for some time to be allotted to settling the north and then the strengthening of Munster against potential invasions from the Spanish.

<sup>44</sup> Fenton does this twice (Fenton to Burghley, 1 June 1586, SP 63/124/63, f. 136; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 70. Fenton to Burghley, 23 June 1586, SP 63/124/90, f. 193; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 91).

be dealt with using underhanded means. The lord deputy was, in this respect, like his predecessors, who also chose to disregard royal instructions.<sup>45</sup>

By August 1586, it was clear that Fenton was no longer a devoted servant of the lord deputy. He brought to Burghley's attention a concordatum that he, along with the Irish council, was forced to sign by Perrot. He claimed that in the Rolls record, Maguire owed the queen 500 beeves for his submission and pardon and that this meat was not to be shared or diminished; if so, then it was a manifest deceit and abuse of the queen's property. The lord deputy, Fenton alleged, was guilty of such deceit, for he had supposedly taken for himself 200 beeves (out of the 500) but claimed that it was for making Maguire captain of his country. Therefore, Fenton wanted Burghley to revoke the concordatum because he had signed it prior to finding the official record and, if not, then at least to withdraw his signature from the document, "seinge my conscience was not satisfied but that I had consented to an untruthe and wronge to her Ma[jes]tie, wherin I have not nor can not p[re]vaile."<sup>46</sup> Fenton was suggesting that the lord deputy was withholding property that rightfully belonged to the Queen. Whether or not Perrot was aware of this accusation leveled against him is unknown. However, before he departed from Ireland in 1588, he mentioned that he had collected 500 cows from Maguire.<sup>47</sup> It is possible that Perrot, in the learning of Fenton's reporting of the incident, corrected his behavior and turned in the missing 200 cattle; or that Fenton had manufactured the entire incident to help procure Perrot's revocation from Ireland.

Throughout September 1586, Fenton and other councilors made it clear that the lord deputy was acting of his own accord, contrary to the operation of government. On September 14,

---

<sup>45</sup> Edwards, "Questioning the Viceroys," 154-155.

<sup>46</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 22 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/60, f. 217v; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 142.

<sup>47</sup> A brief declaration of part of the services done to your Majesty by Sir John Perrot, [14] Dec. 1588, SP 63/139/7, f. 14; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 78.

Fenton wrote in outrage to Burghley that Perrot had banished him from his chamber. This exclusion, he argued, barred him from doing her Majesty's service since the chamber was the site where councilors convened to discuss the realm's most important affairs.<sup>48</sup> Only two days later, he complained that Perrot was intercepting the Irish council's letters to the privy council because they contained information against the lord deputy.<sup>49</sup> Fenton made a similar claim to Walsingham, stating that the council was now "terrefyed greatly by that unaccustomed violence."<sup>50</sup> If we believe Fenton's complaints, Perrot was a man on the edge, desperate to assert his authority over the Irish council. Fenton was vocal in his dislike of Perrot, but he was also not the first Irish councilor to paint Perrot as a corrupt governor with idealized visions of his own sovereignty. Two years before, in 1584, the lord deputy had gone into Connaught and made peace with the Scots, an act once praised by Fenton.<sup>51</sup> But now, two years later, when the lord deputy left on September 21 to deal with the Scots in Connaught again, the Irish council made it clear that he had done so against their advice.<sup>52</sup> Sir Henry Wallop remarked that the council had tried to discourage the lord deputy from going but that "some myndes thinke themselves yoked if they have their wills circumscribed w[i]thin the lymitts of reason."<sup>53</sup> Bingham had told Wallop of

---

<sup>48</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 14 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/11, f. 44; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 151.

<sup>49</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 16 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/14, f. 52; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 153.

<sup>50</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 28 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/29, f. 75; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 160. Fenton to [Burghley?], 28 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/28, f. 74; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 159. Letters by Oliver Plunket, fourth Baron of Louth, earlier in February allege that the lord deputy threatened to ruin him (Plunket to Walsingham, 4 Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/63, f. 140; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 20. Plunket to Burghley, 4 Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/62, f. 138; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 20).

<sup>51</sup> Fenton to Walsingham, 10 July 1584, SP 63/111/16, f. 37; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 518.

<sup>52</sup> Loftus, Sir Robert Gardiner, Edward Brabazon, and Fenton to Burghley, 27 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/27, f. 72; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 158. On 13 Aug 1586, Wallop told Walsingham that the lord deputy went to Connaught because he hated Sir Richard Bingham (Wallop to Walsingham, 23 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/62, f. 220; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 143); Bingham wrote on 18 Oct. that the lord deputy only came to Connaught to hear complaints against him (Bingham to Wallop, 18 Oct. 1586, SP 63/126/57, f. 160; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 182).

<sup>53</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1586, SP 63/126/82, f. 211v; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 194. He put forth the argument that the lord deputy sought absolute authority.

the excessive charges that the lord deputy's ill-advised journey had cost the province and the Irish government—that it would have been better for the lord deputy to have stayed in Dublin.<sup>54</sup>

The queen warned Perrot not to entertain any more "rashe" and "unadvised journeys" without good cause.<sup>55</sup> The Elizabethan government discouraged unauthorized travel due to the additional expense. All travel, within and outside Ireland, had to be first approved by the queen and privy council. Elizabeth also instructed him that he should not "attempte anie matter of weighte tending to anie extraordinarie increase of chardges of ymportance, or burthen of our good Subiecte[s], w[i]thout the pryvitie and assente" of the Irish council.<sup>56</sup> The lord deputy had refused to take the advice of the Irish council. And when the Scots were overthrown the next day, before Perrot had even arrived, Burghley took note.<sup>57</sup>

Perrot was openly disobedient and appeared unwilling to recognize the authority of others. Fenton described Perrot's tenure as lord deputy as one of oppression with an absolute ruler at its head: "yt is seene heare by experience that when gouernors are not preuented by reasonable lymitacions, they take lyberty under an opynion of absolute power, to do many things by affection against her Ma[jes]tys proffytt."<sup>58</sup> The queen and the privy council believed the councilors' complaints concerning the lord deputy's absolute authority.<sup>59</sup> And the following incident only bolstered this view. Fenton's next letter was from the Marshalsea in Dublin. He had

---

<sup>54</sup> Bingham to Wallop, 18 Oct. 1586, SP 63/126/57, f. 160; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 182.

<sup>55</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Perrot, 14 Apr. 1586, SP 63/123/34, f. 112r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 43.

<sup>56</sup> The Queen to the Lord Chancellor and others of the Council of Ireland, 26 Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/81, f. 174r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 32.

<sup>57</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 29 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/31, f. 79; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 160. Wallop to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1586, SP 63/126/82, f. 210; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 194. See also, Mr. Robert Rosyer, Attorney General of Munster, to Burghley, 25 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/22, f. 64; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 154. Rosyer provided the exact date the lord deputy left Dublin for Connaught, and Burghley wrote the date of the overthrow in the margins. Burghley's date aligns with Bingham's letter to Fenton on Sept. 23, where he claims victory over the Scots (Bingham to Fenton, 23 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/31. I, f. 81; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 161).

<sup>58</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 4 Dec. 1586, SP 63/127/6, f. 25; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 213. Fenton to Burghley, 2 Jan. 1587, SP 63/128/2, f. 5; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 244.

<sup>59</sup> The Queen to the Lord Chancellor and others of the Council of Ireland, 26 Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/81, f. 174r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 32.

been committed to jail by the lord deputy for a debt of £70 (he had borrowed £50 from one Russell, described as the lord deputy's man, and, in Fenton's absence, his wife borrowed another £20). Fenton maintained that he had always acknowledged it as a debt, though he could not pay it. With the assistance of Sir Robert Dillon, the chief justice of the common pleas, Perrot had Fenton committed to the Marshalsea in less than 15 minutes without summons or writ except by a private warrant. To add to the secretary's humiliation, he had also been carried through the streets on market day with a great assembly of onlookers.<sup>60</sup> When the queen heard of this incident, she soundly reprimanded Perrot:

we cannot but find straung & w[i]thout example in any gouernor, yor predecessor, against a gentleman of his place being in a mere cause of debt to so small a valesw [...] albeit we would be lothe to do any act that might tende to the publike disgracing of yor authority, knowing how fitt it is to haue the same countenanced & cherished by us in all thing[es] honourable & lawfull.<sup>61</sup>

She directed Perrot to release Fenton and forego these hard measures for like cases thereafter.

Perrot had orchestrated the imprisonment and public humiliation of the secretary. The lord deputy disliked Fenton and thus acted maliciously against him. But his commitment of Fenton illustrated a side of Perrot that the queen found spiteful and ill-suited to a man of his stature. She thought it alarming for the council to be so divided.<sup>62</sup> The whole incident reflected poorly on the Irish council and the English government in Ireland more broadly. It compromised the goal of expanding English authority and bringing the Irish into the English administrative and judicial system. Instead, the flagrant use of the court and court officials illustrated not only open

---

<sup>60</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 26 Jan. 1587, SP 63/128/18, f. 37; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 247. Barry claims that the antagonism between Fenton and Perrot resulted in the decline of the office of secretary of state in Ireland. However, I contend the opposite to be true—supported by his fellow privy councilors, Fenton not only survived the lord deputy but also rose in power.

<sup>61</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Perrot, 9 Feb. 1587, SP 63/128/35, f. 71v; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 255.

<sup>62</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Perrot, 9 Feb. 1587, SP 63/128/35, f. 71; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 255.

dissension within the Irish council, but also that the councilors could and *did* use the judicial system as a means to act on personal grievances. Councilors in England, of course, exploited the courts as well, often to remove political opponents, but they did so under the law, and when those laws did not exist, they created it.<sup>63</sup> The *appearance* of legality was essential. And yet the proceedings with Fenton in Ireland showed a blatant disregard for common law practices which the Irish Council was supposedly responsible for upholding. Such an act could not go unpunished, and yet strangely it did. Fenton was acquitted February 20, though he still believed that Perrot had it out for him.<sup>64</sup>

In the few years since Perrot had arrived in Ireland, he had alienated many of the most powerful of the Irish councilors: Loftus, Wallop, Jones, Gardiner, and Fenton. With the exception of Nicholas White and Lucas Dillon, the Irish Council appeared firm in their resolve to obtain Perrot's dismissal.<sup>65</sup> Rumors of the lord deputy's recall circulated for months. Wallop discussed news of Perrot's removal in his secret communication with Walsingham. Using a numeric and symbolic cipher, the vice treasurer wrote on the factious dispute between Loftus and Perrot. He wanted no part of it. Yet he took time to mention that the lord deputy had an "evell wyll" against Bingham.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, Perrot's use of Lucas Dillon and White was only because "there [sic] humors are plausable and they soothe most thynges."<sup>67</sup> Wallop accused Perrot of being biased against councilors of English birth in Ireland. Loftus made a similar charge, adding

---

<sup>63</sup> See the Bond of Association in 1584 and the Act for the Surety of the Queen's Person in 1584-5. Both laws enabled the later trial and execution of Mary, Queen of Scots for her role in the Babington Plot.

<sup>64</sup> Acquittal of Sir Richard Bingham under the hands of the council, 20 Feb. 1587, SP 63/128/50, f. 104; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 267. Fenton to Burghley, 5 Feb. 1587, SP 63/128/55, f. 116; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 268.

<sup>65</sup> Both Sir Nicholas White and Sir Lucas Dillon were sympathetic to Perrot and wrote favorably of him to the privy council. See, for instance, White and Dillon's letters to Burghley about Perrot's desire to assist Bingham against the Burkes in Connacht and settle Ireland: White to Burghley, 13 Aug. 1586, SP 63/125/55, f. 202; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 138. Sir Lucas Dillon to Burghley, 26 Sept. 1586, SP 63/126/26, f. 70; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 157. White even stated that though he disliked the manner of the man, he could not deny the success of his government.

<sup>66</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 26 & 31 May 1586, SP 63/124/53, f. 115v; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 65.

<sup>67</sup> Wallop to Walsingham, 26 & 31 May 1586, SP 63/124/53, f. 116r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 65.

that the lord deputy had supposedly called the councilors "Beggars, and Squibbles, puppies, dogges, dunghill Churles."<sup>68</sup> Unlike many of the charges against Perrot, this charge perhaps had some truth. Perrot was prejudiced, to some extent, against English councilors in Ireland. He was cognizant of the common practice of English adventurers, who used Ireland as a platform to gain or enlarge their landed wealth, men who had no business or interest in improving the government there. But it would be inaccurate to generalize his relationships because he enjoyed friendships with both the English and the Gaelic Irish. For instance, Carew was one of Perrot's closest confidant in Ireland and he was of English birth. Carew's uncle, Sir Peter Carew, was one of the more ambitious adventurers, and yet neither the Carew family's history nor Carew's own English birth precluded him from becoming a trusted ally of Perrot's. Nevertheless, the Dublin council wanted to create an image of Perrot as absolutist and prejudicial. Unfortunately for Perrot, they were successful.

One last major episode is worthy of note during Perrot's deputyship and, once again, involved Fenton. It was the "Great Defiance"—a heated argument that devolved into a shouting match between the lord deputy and Sir Nicholas Bagenal, marshal of the army. It took place in the middle of the night on May 15, 1587. According to the initial report (likely penned by Fenton's clerk), the lord deputy called Sir Robert Gardiner, chief justice of the queen's bench, White, and Fenton to his private chamber for an examination of Patrick Cullan. Cullan had recently gone to England under the auspices of Turlough O'Neill (the Ulster chieftain) with a letter of complaint against Perrot. The location of the interrogation was strange—at least according to the report. It was the lord deputy's residence at St. Mary's Abbey in Dublin. The

---

<sup>68</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 4 Dec. 1586, SP 63/127/4, f. 22r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 211. White had accused Loftus's protégé, Jones, of instructing Fenton to exclude the Irish councilors in matters of importance in favor of those of English birth (White to Burghley, 10 July 1586, SP 63/125/12, f. 28; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 100).

report implied that conducting council business in one's private chamber was unusual, but in fact, such practice was common.<sup>69</sup> The issue was that the meeting did not take place in the lord deputy's private apartments within Dublin Castle, but rather outside of it. By seemingly breaking this custom, the meeting would have been regarded as clandestine and secret. The councilors in attendance voiced their objections to the meeting site, as they thought the setting improper and more suited to the council chamber. Perrot agreed. Then the marshal arrived, bursting into the chamber with a bill requesting that the lord deputy absent himself during the examination for fear of underhand measures. A shouting match ensued with each man challenging the authority of the other. The lord deputy then laid a flat hand on the marshal's cheek and told him that he could be hanged for defying a man of his place. The marshal had a staff and pretended to do the same. On witnessing the escalating tensions between the two men, the councilors started to intervene, but in the process, the marshal fell down. The matter, however, did not end there. The two continued to speak harshly to one another, with the marshal calling the lord deputy evil and the lord deputy threatening to commit him to prison, followed by accusations by both that one or the other was drunk.<sup>70</sup> It had been an eventful night.

Bagenal submitted his report of the incident with one striking difference. He claimed that Perrot using "unworthie and barborous tearmes [and] layde violente handes" upon him.<sup>71</sup> In his report, he asserted that the lord deputy struck and beat him to the ground.<sup>72</sup> He took care to make mention of his old age and the "decrepitt state" of his body after many years of service.<sup>73</sup> It was only his desire for justice, or so he professed, that prompted him to write to the privy council on

---

<sup>69</sup> Crawford, *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland*, 56-57.

<sup>70</sup> Speeches passed between the Right Honorable the Lord Deputy of Ireland and Sir Nicholas Bagenal, knight, 15 May 1587, SP 63/129/84, f. 197; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 353.

<sup>71</sup> Bagenal to Burghley, 16 May 1587, SP 63/129/87, f. 203r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 356.

<sup>72</sup> Bagenal to Burghley, 16 May 1587, SP 63/129/87, f. 203r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 356.

<sup>73</sup> Bagenal to Burghley, 16 May 1587, SP 63/129/87, f. 203r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 356.



the issue.<sup>74</sup> The marshal had been humiliated by the lord deputy, if not by force then by words. He was outraged and vowed: "I woulde take due revenge in his bloode for his villanie, though yt were to my owne overthrowe and the utter ruyne and distruction of my whole posteritie."<sup>75</sup> The lord deputy, by virtue of his position, could not be directly punished by the other councilors. This incident was a blow to the marshal's ego; that his authority and influence could not save him from such embarrassment was deeply upsetting.

There had been tension between the lord deputy and the marshal before this infamous confrontation. When the marshal's son, Dudley, had been killed in battle in March, he had petitioned the lord deputy for his grandson's wardship, but found that Perrot had already disposed of it.<sup>76</sup> The marshal's other son, Henry (who would later succeed his father as marshal), had also been implicated in the case with Cullan. The charge was that Henry had counterfeited the letter found in Cullan's possession. So, the marshal's presence at the lord deputy's chamber was primarily to vindicate his son. But he did not believe that Perrot could be an impartial participant in the proceedings. Bagenal, then, brought with him a petition requesting that the lord deputy should excuse himself from the examinations—though the marshal saw no issue with his own involvement in his son's interrogation.

The marshal wrote of another curious incident related to the night of May 15. Just four days after the episode, he claimed that Gardiner and Fenton wrote and signed a summary of what happened that night and of the lord deputy's violence against the marshal. The lord deputy supposedly knew of the summary and threatened Gardiner and Fenton to give it to him. White

---

<sup>74</sup> Bagenal wrote not only to Burghley, but also Leicester (*Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, p. 443) and the privy council (Bagenal to the Privy Council, 16 May 1587, SP 63/129/86, f. 199; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 354).

<sup>75</sup> Bagenal to Burghley, 16 May 1587, SP 63/129/87, f. 203r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 356.

<sup>76</sup> Bagenal to Burghley, 26 Mar. 1587, SP 63/128/107, f. 220; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 287. See also, *Cal. Carew*, 1575-1588, p. 441. Lord Deputy Perrot claimed that the marshal's son, Dudley, was killed because he took with him almost all Irishmen of poor character; he should have had Englishmen with him.

had also gone to Gardiner's house and convinced them to let him see the summary. When they gave it to him, White tore it up, and took the torn pieces of paper with him. All this was done, according to Bagenal, out of the lord deputy's desire to suppress the truth of what had happened on May 15.<sup>77</sup>

There are two sides to every story, but in this case, there were five. Three had been witnesses on both nights in question: White, Gardiner, and Fenton. The privy council requested their reports of the "pretended outrage" between the lord deputy and the marshal since they had already received accounts from Bagenal and Perrot. The incident seemed outrageous and the truth unclear. What is evident from the privy councilors' letter is that they were convinced that White did tear up a draft of the summary, though they could not guess why. The other Irish councilors believed White to be of Perrot's faction; otherwise, how else would one explain White's sympathetic view of the unpopular lord deputy? That White would defend Perrot was expected. In fact, White's account revealed that it was the lord deputy who had insisted he write his own report of the incident. White confirmed that Fenton wrote a draft of what had occurred and that he added, in his own hand, a note about a lie the marshal told the lord deputy. No mention is made of the particularities of the lie; it may have been about the marshal's petition and Cullan's examination. Either way, the men departed without signing the draft. Gardiner and Fenton took it with them and several days later, when the marshal learned of White's note—by some means—he threatened White. At this point, White heard rumors of a plan to shoot him. It was, then, with this rumor in mind that justified, at least for White, what followed. The three men met again at Gardiner's lodging and while there Fenton showed the draft to White before Gardiner had arrived. White destroyed the draft since it had not been signed yet. He also asserted

---

<sup>77</sup> Bagenal to the Privy Council, 19 May 1587, SP 63/129/88, f. 205; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 356.

that he had not turned in his report along with Gardiner's and Fenton's because they had sent theirs with the marshal's man.<sup>78</sup> At present, Gardiner's report is missing, and Fenton's was, in all likelihood, the initial report.<sup>79</sup>

Though no record survives of the lord deputy's report on the incident, we can guess at its contents.<sup>80</sup> He would have explained why he changed the venue of the examination to his private chambers and proclaimed his innocence in the charge of hitting the marshal. One clue about Perrot's response are two letters written by Loftus at the end of May 1587. The lord chancellor stated that, though he had not been present when the dispute took place, the lord deputy blamed him nonetheless: "your L: may see, how I stand as the only marke shott at to be overthrowen: that there can be nothing done (how secret & sodayne soever) but it imputid to me, whether I be pr[e]sent or absent, as yf I were the temperer & moderator of his L: & all men else."<sup>81</sup> Loftus believed that the lord deputy had accused the lord chancellor of orchestrating the incident in a letter. One might be tempted to dismiss Loftus's claims about the lord deputy's letter since the two were enemies. But Loftus also referred to a specific accusation made by the lord deputy. Perrot had accused Loftus of taking a trunk belonging to Rowland Cowick (a former clerk of the council) after the man's death. The accusation, for our purpose, is inconsequential. However, its specificity suggests Loftus had either seen or heard about Perrot's letter to the queen. Letters

---

<sup>78</sup> White to Burghley, 16 July 1587, SP 63/130/31, f. 69; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 376. It is possible that either Gardiner or Fenton told the marshal of White's personal note in the draft; or the marshal learned of its contents because his messenger received the draft.

<sup>79</sup> The handwriting bears a striking similarity to Fenton's and given that Fenton was the secretary of state and that he wrote a draft of the incident, one could reasonably assume that Fenton likely wrote another draft (since the first was allegedly destroyed), which became the official report.

<sup>80</sup> Lord Deputy Perrot to —, [4?] July 1587, SP 63/130/34, f. 74; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 379. It is a collection of the lord deputy's letters from March to July 1587. Under July, he mentions in a small note his report of what happened, but he does not elaborate.

<sup>81</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 22 May 1587, SP 63/129/91, f. 211v; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 359. See also, Loftus to Leicester, 22 May 1587, Cotton Titus B/XIII/156, f. 411. Loftus also came to the defense of the marshal, whom he called a "decrepit" and "innocent old gentellman" in the letter to Burghley.

from the Irish council to the privy council were sent in packets, meaning multiple letters from the councilors were transported to England in a collection of one or more packets. The mail correspondence system enabled the interception of letters from any of the Irish councilors before they had been sent. Fenton had accused the lord deputy of precisely this charge—tampering with their letters—but the practice may have been more common.<sup>82</sup> Regardless, Loftus wanted it known how far Perrot's dislike of him went.

It is unclear what followed the incident between the lord deputy and the marshal. Perrot, however, immediately became embroiled in another rivalry with the provincial president Sir Richard Bingham.<sup>83</sup> The lord deputy was at war with most of the Dublin administration. By the time he left Ireland on June 30, 1588, he had even quarreled with his close friend and defender, Carew, over the latter's appointment of the master of the ordnance. Perrot wanted the office to go to his son, but the queen was quite adamant that it should go to Carew instead.<sup>84</sup> Despite the disagreement, the two men remained close. Carew informed Perrot, now in England, on Irish affairs and defended Perrot when treason allegations arose. But the issue over the office of master of the ordnance had bothered his patron, Walsingham. The lord deputy was willfully ignoring Walsingham's directions by continuing to favor his son.<sup>85</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> The lord deputy did try to control accusations against him. On Oct 20, 1586, he wrote to Carew of whispers in the wind: "If my enemies have anything to say against me, let it be put upon paper, and I will disprove it. I only took this office to serve God and the Queen. But I am here amongst devils, who, coming up of nothing, care not what fables they make of any man that will not serve their turns" (*Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, pp. 434-435). He states that he's driven to answer every complaint for fear that if it goes unanswered, then his reputation will be ruined (Perrot to the Privy Council, 30 June 1587, SP 63/130/24, f. 56; *CSPIre, 1586-July 1588*, p. 371).

<sup>83</sup> Perrot had knighted Bingham in June 1584, but over the years, the two had become adversaries. See, for instance, Rory Rapple's, "Taking up Office in Elizabethan Connacht: The Case of Sir Richard Bingham," *The English Historical Review* 123 (2008): 277-299.

<sup>84</sup> Issue over office of Master of the Ordnance (*Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, p. 460).

<sup>85</sup> *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, p. 461. Carew informed him that the band of horsemen belonging to the office of Ordnance were to be mustered in name of the lord deputy's son and has issued warrants for their pay—but no money should be paid to Sir Thomas. He wrote again on 11 May 1588 to Wallop and Fitzwilliam (*Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, p. 465). The issue remained unresolved as Carew requested that Fitzwilliam's warrant to cancel the patents granted to Thomas to be put into effect (*Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, p. 467).

## The Trial

Though Perrot left Ireland at the end of June 1588, he remained involved in Irish affairs, to the dismay of the Irish councilors. Perrot learned that the new lord deputy, Sir William Fitzwilliam, spoke against him.<sup>86</sup> When on 16 February 1590, Fitzwilliam brought treason charges against Perrot, it came as little surprise. Perrot had made many enemies, but none more vindictive than the Irish council. In their constant complaints against the former lord deputy, they made it clear that the government in Ireland could not function with a lord deputy bent on actualizing his sovereignty. Their hostility to Perrot was mainly due to his threatening of their position and authority within the Irish council and their personal interests. For these men, Ireland represented the place where their ambitions could be fulfilled. Perrot had jeopardized those plans by contesting their expenses, fees, and, most importantly, their authority. He had an abrasive personality, to be sure, and he took the responsibility of the office seriously. Still, he failed to take into account how the councilors would respond when threatened. He could not grasp how a group of councilors could destroy a man of his stature because it had not been done before with a lord deputy.

The Irish councilors did have prior experience in ruining others. They had done it before in 1582 with the trial, conviction, and execution of Sir Nicholas Nugent. Nugent's trial was highly prejudicial and instigated by Sir Robert Dillon, who not only had a long-standing rivalry with the Nugents but who had also been passed over for the office of chief justice of common pleas. Nugent received the appointment. So, when his nephew, William Nugent, conspired

---

<sup>86</sup> Note of words spoken by the Lord Deputy that do concern Sir John Perrot, 9 May 1589, SP 63/144/6, f. 13; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 161. Sir John Perrot's answer to Sir William Fitzwilliam's reply of the 9th of May 1589, [9 May] 1589, SP 63/144/7, f. 17; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 164. Answer of the Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Sir John Perrot's objections, 9 May 1589, SP 63/144/34. VI, f. 102; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 182.

against the Irish government, Nicholas became guilty by association. William escaped punishment for his involvement, but not so for his uncle, who stood accused of plotting to assassinate the Dillons, Lucas and Robert. During the trial, Robert pressured the jury to return a guilty verdict, which they did. Nicholas was hanged, and Robert occupied his office. With the backing of Loftus and Wallop, Dillon had engineered the demise of his rival. However, the feud between the Nugents and the Dillons did not end there. William Nugent pursued revenge by bringing charges of treason and misdemeanors against Robert in July 1592. Nugent alleged that Dillon had incited the Gaelic chieftain, Brian O'Rourke, to rebellion. Dillon was put on trial, removed from office, and imprisoned by October 1593.<sup>87</sup> Both Fenton and Loftus defended Dillon and procured his release. Dillon was acquitted when Loftus declared him innocent, and he regained his former office.<sup>88</sup> In 1602, the Irish council also charged another member of the Nugent family, Christopher, with treason, and he died while imprisoned in Dublin Castle.<sup>89</sup>

Perrot underestimated the Irish councilors and the antagonism they bore towards him. He paid dearly for it. He was formally charged in December 1590. On the list of charges was speaking against the queen, which he admitted, and conspiring with the Spanish king to conquer Ireland and England. He was moved to the Tower in March 1591, tried and convicted in 1592, and died before formal execution.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup> *ODNB*, "Dillon, Sir Robert"; idem, "Nugent, Nicholas"; idem, "Nugent, William."

<sup>88</sup> Fenton wrote Sept 1594 that Dillon should be restored to his original office, and he regained office 15 March 1595 by patent. It should also be noted that Fenton was involved in the trial of Nugent (Confessions of John Cusake of Ellistonreade, 13 Jan. 1582, SP 63/88/47. I, f. 126; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 346).

<sup>89</sup> *ODNB*, "Nugent, Christopher."

<sup>90</sup> Roger Turvey regards Perrot's death as highly suspicious and believes the former lord deputy may have been murdered by poisoning; Turvey, "Sir John Perrot (1528-1592): A Fourth Centenary Retrospective," *Journal of the Pembroke Historical Society* 5 (1992): 15-32. Robert Naunton, a contemporary of Perrot, suggested that the queen, upon hearing of Perrot's conviction, swore "by her wonted oath, that the Jury were all Knaves" and that she refused to sign the warrant for his execution because Perrot was an "honest and faithfull man" (*Fragmenta Regalia*, printed 1641, p. 28-29).

Different explanations have been offered about Perrot's spectacular fall from grace, but Perrot's own defense was consistent. Perrot believed himself to be a victim: "And now I make my complaint to God and all good men that I have been most falsely accused through the malice and envy of some wicked and evil-disposed persons, scholars of Marcheivil [Macchiavelli], that I have been a traitor to my Queen and country."<sup>91</sup> Perrot's contemporaries, Walsingham and Sir Robert Naunton (who later married Perrot's granddaughter) suggested that Perrot was an honorable man with good intentions, and this view has commonly been repeated by modern scholars.<sup>92</sup> After all, what is more, intriguing in the world of politics than an innocent man condemned to death and the conspiracy surrounding it? This dominant narrative assumes that Perrot was the honest councilor who exposed corruption, not participated in it; that if he was guilty of anything, it was his impolitic approach which inspired enemies to plan his destruction. That he did not placate his enemies was a sign of his virtuous character and a moral failing of the Tudor government. Perrot's tragedy, according to Pauline Henley, was "that conscious of his high position, and utterly fearless, [but] he failed to realise that the more he strove to be just, the more certain he was to have the hand of every exploiter, every privilege holder, every corrupt official raised against him, implacable enemies who would bring to nought his generous schemes for the betterment of Ireland."<sup>93</sup> Likewise, Roger Turvey expressed a similar sentiment, arguing that Perrot's "choleric nature and haughty pride combined with the envy and competition of

---

<sup>91</sup> CP, vol. 4, p. 193; Collection in Burghley's hand of the material points against Sir John Perrot, 15 Nov. 1591, SP 63/161/19, f. 37a; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 439.

<sup>92</sup> In Sjr Robert Naunton described Perrot as a "goodly Gentleman," a "wise" and "brave" courtier, whose temper and "boldnesse of speech...laid him open to the spleen and advantage of his enemies" [Naunton, *Fragmenta regalia or observations on Queen Elizabeth, her times & favorits* (London, 1641), 25, EEBO]. Naunton also identified Sir Christopher Hatton as Perrot's adversary and Hatton as a man with "too much of the season of envy" and a "meer vegetable of the Court, that sprung up at night, and sunk again at his noon" (27). According to Naunton, Perrot had mocked Hatton to his face for Hatton's dancing (26).

<sup>93</sup> Pauline Henley, "The Treason of Sir John Perrot," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 21 (1932): 422.

others contributed to his downfall."<sup>94</sup> In the now classic article, "The Fall of Sir John Perrot," Hiram Morgan stated in his study of the treason trial that "the object is not to vindicate Perrot, that much is obvious from a glance at the *Calendar of State Papers*, but rather to show how he was deliberately and systematically framed and in conclusion to offer some explanation of the mysterious fall of such a staunch supporter of the Elizabethan regime."<sup>95</sup> But without an in-depth analysis of Perrot's activities, especially his finances, we cannot conclusively say that he was innocent. What we do know is that the "anonymous few who brought him down" were neither anonymous nor few.<sup>96</sup>

Fitzwilliam brought the indictment against Perrot. He has widely been recognized as the main conspirator in Perrot's treason trial. Henley declared that Fitzwilliam "pursued the ruin of Perrot with malignant diligence."<sup>97</sup> Turvey also pointed the finger at Fitzwilliam and three others: Loftus, the priest Denis O'Roughan, and Burghley. Morgan argued that Burghley had conspired to ruin Perrot, not Sir Christopher Hatton, as previously thought. Fitzwilliam brought the charges, but it was the competition between Burghley and Essex (since Walsingham died in 1590) that had a damaging effect on the outcome of the trial. Burghley protected his client, Fitzwilliam, and, in doing so, he helped orchestrate the fall of an innocent man.

---

<sup>94</sup> Roger Turvey, "Sir John Perrot (1528-1592): A Fourth Centenary Retrospective," 28. Turvey also wrote on Perrot's treason trial and the myth that Perrot was the bastard son of Henry VIII; Turvey, *The Treason Trial of Sir John Perrot* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005); Turvey, "Sir John Perrot, Henry VIII's Bastard? The Destruction of a Myth," *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1992): 79-94. It would be difficult to read Turvey's published works on Perrot and not leave with the impression that Turvey deeply admired and respected Perrot. His attempts to resuscitate this seemingly honorable councilor is not unique but it is problematic because it labors under the impression that Perrot was not corrupt without providing the evidence to support this assumption. Turvey also wrote the current *ODNB* article on Perrot, wherein he pointed the finger at Burghley as the chief "architect" of Perrot's downfall.

<sup>95</sup> Morgan, "The Fall of Sir John Perrot," 109.

<sup>96</sup> Turvey, "Sir John Perrot (1528-1592)," 28.

<sup>97</sup> Henley, "The Treason of Sir John Perrot," 405.



Implicit in Morgan's view, more so than Henley and Turvey, is the notion that it was politics in England that primarily dictated politics in Ireland.<sup>98</sup> To some extent, there is truth to this perspective—what happens in the center has some influence on the periphery. However, arriving at such a conclusion depends on the historian's process of selection. Both Henley and Morgan are interested in the trial—the charges, the witnesses, the evidence, and the courtroom drama. Morgan trumpeted studies that explored the "conspiratorial underbelly of Elizabethan politics."<sup>99</sup> Unveiling the underhand practices of the Elizabethan government can reveal many things: the legal process and methods employed for treason trials and, most importantly, how the Elizabethan government treated enemies of the state. Yet the Perrot case is an instance, much like Essex and Mary Queen of Scots, where what came before the trial is actually the most revealing. We know from scholarly sources that treason trials were sometimes mere legal formalities; the guilt of the accused had already been decided, and the trial was the final legal mechanism to convince the public—both domestic and foreign—of their guilt. Perrot's guilt was his failure to consult and cooperate with the Irish councilors, and it had been determined well before the trial.

When Fitzwilliam brought charges against Perrot, he bore a grudge against the former lord deputy, who continued to have his nose in Irish affairs. His vengeance, however, could not be realized without the cooperation of the Irish council. And yet, curiously, Fitzwilliam wrote Burghley that he could not inform the Irish councilors of his actions prior to the charge. For one, he feared that one of Perrot's supporters in the council would inform Perrot of the charges,

---

<sup>98</sup> It's a similar claim to Ciaran Brady's "England's Defence and Ireland's Reform: The Dilemma of the Irish Viceroy, 1541-1641" in *The British Problem c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago*, eds. Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 90.

<sup>99</sup> Morgan, "The Fall of Sir John Perrot," 109.

leaving Perrot time to mount a defense.<sup>100</sup> For another, he claimed that they were all Perrot's favorites, and they looked forward to Perrot's return to Ireland. He specifically identified White as an ally of Perrot and that he could not use one councilor without excluding the others for fear of appearing to conspire against Perrot.<sup>101</sup> But this was obviously a lie. The hostility between Perrot and the Irish councilors was well-documented and widely known. The animosity they held for him was no secret. Perrot remarked on it on numerous occasions, and their dealings with him were a testament to this plain fact. It is one of the reasons why Perrot wanted his case heard before a group of impartial judges. Furthermore, Loftus had delivered the papers that Fitzwilliam would use to bring charges against Perrot.<sup>102</sup> Thus, Fitzwilliam's portrayal of the Irish council (comprised of roughly the same members from the 1580s) as a faction devoted to Perrot was not only an inaccurate one, but also a deliberate attempt to mask their involvement. If he was going to take on the former lord deputy, he needed help.

Perrot's indictment was based on events that occurred during his governorship while Fitzwilliam had been in England. Fitzwilliam had left Ireland in September 1575 and did not return to serve as lord deputy until June 1588.<sup>103</sup> He would not have been aware of the particular circumstances of O'Roughan and Bird's imprisonment, and their connection to Perrot save for the Irish councilors who knew of the incident in 1586. This explains, in part, why Perrot called for Wallop, Gardiner, Fenton, and Sir Thomas Williams (his cousin) to be examined about what they knew of the priest.<sup>104</sup> Both Wallop and Gardiner confirmed the counterfeiting scheme for which

---

<sup>100</sup> Lord Deputy to Burghley, 28 Feb. 1590, SP 63/150/76, f. 214; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 313. He reported that the Bishop of Leighlin, Richard Meredith, knew prematurely of the charges against Perrot and would inform him.

<sup>101</sup> Lord Deputy to Burghley, 30 Apr. 1590, SP 63/151/93, f. 253; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 335.

<sup>102</sup> Loftus to the Bishop of Meath and other commissioners, 6 May 1590, SP 63/152/12, f. 44; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 340.

<sup>103</sup> *ODNB*, "Fitzwilliam, Sir William."

<sup>104</sup> Notes delivered by Sir John Perrot, 4 May 1590, SP 12/232/5, f. 9; *CSPDom*, 1581-1590, p. 662. Perrot had given the office of the clerk to his cousin, Sir Thomas Williams despite the queen giving it to Capt. Errington.

the two men had been arrested.<sup>105</sup> Fenton testified that he had not been privy to the secret dealings of the lord deputy. He knew that the priest was a prisoner, but not whether Perrot had used the priest as a spy.<sup>106</sup> Perrot *did* use the priest as a spy, but some of the Irish councilors were ignorant of this fact because, on at least one occasion, an Irish councilor had the priest arrested for popery.<sup>107</sup> The secrecy around Perrot's actions was possible given his exclusion of some members of the Irish council.

O'Roughan was a convicted counterfeiter and a former Catholic priest. He was distrusted by all, including the prosecution. Loftus even described him as a "moste lewde and vayne man."<sup>108</sup> Given that O'Roughan was the key witness in the trial, one must wonder why the prosecution used such a figure and why the councilors substantiated the priest's claims. One obvious reason was that they could not deny that O'Roughan was a criminal. His guilt had already been proven. There was some question as to whether the priest was still a papist, which both Fenton and Loftus alleged were true.<sup>109</sup> So, the issue was not whether O'Roughan was of bad character but rather how this degenerate priest became a pawn in Perrot's traitorous plans. The intent was to show that because Perrot knew of O'Roughan's crime of counterfeiting, he could have plausibly used the priest and later claimed innocence. After all, who would believe a convicted criminal against a lord deputy? But that was precisely the point. O'Roughan's

---

<sup>105</sup> Wallop also claimed ignorance, stating that he knew the priest was a prisoner and that on the priest's testimony, others had been apprehended. Wallop admitted that Perrot told them he was going to employ Denis as a spy (Answer of Sir Henry Wallop to certain interrogatories, 4? May 1590, SP 12/232/6, f. 11; *CSPDom*, 1581-1590, p. 662). Answer of Mr. Justice Robert Gardiner to the articles ministered by Sir John Perrot, 4? May 1590, SP 12/232/7, f. 13; *CSPDom*, 1581-1590, p. 663.

<sup>106</sup> Answer made by Sir Geffery Fenton, 30 May 1590, SP 12/232/31, f. 48; *CSPDom*, 1581-1590, p. 668.

<sup>107</sup> Morgan, "The Fall of Sir John Perrot," 111-112. Archbishop of Cashel, Miler Magrath, apprehended O'Roughan according to Wallop's testimony in footnote above. See also, Statement of the matter against Sir John Perrot, 1592, SP 12/241/7. I, f. 13; *CSPDom*, 1591-1594, p. 166.

<sup>108</sup> Loftus to the Bishop of Meath and other commissioners, 6 May 1590, SP 63/152/12, f. 44; *CSPire*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 340.

<sup>109</sup> Loftus to the Bishop of Meath and other commissioners, 6 May 1590, SP 63/152/12, f. 44; *CSPire*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 340. Fenton's answers to notes delivered to him, 30 May 1590, SP 12/232/31, f. 48; *CSPDom*, 1581-1590, p. 668.

criminality did not exclude him from participating in the conspiracy. The hope was that Perrot would be found guilty by association.

O'Roughan's testimony would be corroborated, at least in part, by the Irish council and also by Philip Williams, another important witness. Williams was Perrot's former secretary and now served Fitzwilliam. Before the trial, Williams had languished in prison for many years for the crime of disclosing Perrot's private information to Loftus.<sup>110</sup> It was the Irish councilors, Loftus, Wallop, and Gardiner, who had forwarded Williams's letters to Burghley.<sup>111</sup> They had backed Williams's claims that the lord deputy had mistreated him, which resulted in his release.<sup>112</sup> Williams provided evidence that the lord deputy had instructed him to write a letter in Spanish to King Philip and had spoken treasonous words against the queen. Perrot denied the former but admitted to the latter.<sup>113</sup> His admission of guilt in one regard made possible that he was guilty in others.

In all of this, the appointment of commissioners for the trial was crucial. The first commission that the privy council employed for investigating the charges were almost all from the Irish council: Richard Meredith (the bishop of Leighlin), Thomas Jones (the bishop of Meath), Sir Lucas Dillon, White, Waterhouse, Sir Edward Moore, Sir Nicholas Walsh (chief

---

<sup>110</sup> Loftus to the Lord Chancellor Hatton, Burghley, and Walsingham, 12 July 1587, SP 63/130/38, f. 93; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 383. Phillip Williams to Burghley, 1 Jan. 1592, SP 12/241/1, f. 2; *CSPDom*, 1591-1594, p. 163.

<sup>111</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 18 Dec. 1586, SP 63/127/34, f. 116; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 228. Loftus, Wallop, and Gardiner to Burghley, 21 May 1587, SP 63/129/90, f. 209; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 358. Williams to Burghley and Lord Buckhurst, 12 May 1587, SP 63/129/78, f. 181; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 348. Loftus to Hatton, Burghley, and Walsingham, 12 July 1587, SP 63/130/38, f. 93; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 383.

<sup>112</sup> Loftus to Hatton, Burghley, and Walsingham, 12 July 1587, SP 63/130/38, f. 93; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 383. Also, Loftus, Wallop, and Gardiner to Burghley, 21 May 1587, SP 63/129/90, f. 209. Interestingly, Williams also came into conflict with Fenton in 1593. Fenton claimed Williams (who was now personal secretary to Fitzwilliam) took fees in his absence in 1590 (*APC*, vol. 24, p. 329) Williams wrote to Burghley and the Council that Fenton wrote him a threatening letter and seeks the protection of the Council from Fenton's "unconscionable and violent demande" (Philip Williams, 10 June 1593, Lansdowne vol/75/42, f. 94).

<sup>113</sup> Andrew Gordon placed the alleged counterfeit letter within the context of the culture of textual forgery and epistolary treason in "Material Fictions: Counterfeit Correspondence and the Culture of Copying in Early Modern England," in *Cultures of Correspondence in Early Modern Britain*, eds. James Daybell and Andrew Gordon (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 85-109.

justice of Munster), and Charles Calthorpe (attorney-general).<sup>114</sup> Other than Jones, most of the commissioners were Perrot sympathizers. Meredith was Perrot's former chaplain. He had also taken over the deanery of St. Patrick's from Loftus.<sup>115</sup> Calthorpe liked Perrot and had been one of the officials who lamented Perrot's recall.<sup>116</sup> Walsh and Moore had worked well with Perrot previously and maintained their support of the former lord deputy, as did Dillon and White.<sup>117</sup> Unsurprisingly, the commission did not indict Perrot. They had temporarily saved Perrot from imprisonment. The drawback was that they wound up in prison themselves.<sup>118</sup>

One glaring, or perhaps deliberate, oversight was that the first commission did not include Wallop, Gardiner, Loftus, or Fenton. The second commission, however, included Fenton, who had been knighted by Fitzwilliam in 1589.<sup>119</sup> He was appointed a commissioner a few months before the formal December 1590 indictment, and he remained a commissioner for Perrot's trial until at least June 1592. As a commissioner, Fenton had many privileges. He had access to Brian O'Rourke, the purported Irish insurgent linked to Perrot. Fenton's servant, Nicholas, was directed to serve as O'Rourke's interpreter for his testimony concerning Perrot. Nicholas would have nearly unrestricted access to the prisoner.<sup>120</sup> And, undoubtedly, he would then pass information to his master, Fenton. In addition to this privilege, the privy council

---

<sup>114</sup> *APC*, vol. 18, pp. 424-426. See also Privy Council to the Lord Deputy, 20 Mar. 1590, SP 63/151/21, f. 71; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 321. *APC* lists the first three men, Meredith, Jones, and Dillon and Irish State Papers lists all 8 commissioners (Privy Council to the Bishops of Meath and Leighlin, Sir Lucas Dillon, White, Sir Ed. Moore, Waterhouse, Justice Walshe, and Charles Calthorpe, 20 Mar. 1590, SP 63/151/22, f. 73; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 322).

<sup>115</sup> Capt. Christopher Carleill to Walsingham, 9 July 1588, SP 63/135/79, f. 215; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 557.

<sup>116</sup> Charles Calthorpe to Burghley, 7 Mar. 1588, SP 63/134/8, f. 57; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 489.

<sup>117</sup> *ODNB*, "Moore, Sir Edward."

<sup>118</sup> Note of persons imprisoned for Sir John Perrot's cause, 1591, SP 63/161/61, f. 136; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 451.

<sup>119</sup> Fenton, William Danyell, and James Dalton to Hatton and Burghley, 9 Sept. 1590, SP 12/233/65, f. 113; *CSPDom*, 1581-1590, p. 687. Petitions of Fenton, 1591, SP 63/161/55, f. 124, where Fenton asked for an allowance since he would be in England for at least a year and a half.

<sup>120</sup> *APC*, vol. 21, p. 109.

granted Fenton permission to confiscate any writings related to the Perrot case.<sup>121</sup> This greatly troubled Perrot, who feared that the secretary would tamper with his papers.<sup>122</sup> Fenton also took part in the examinations of the witnesses or suspected persons. He interrogated the bishop of Leighlin, and Malachias O'Mollony, a Catholic bishop incarcerated alongside O'Roughan. Fenton found out through O'Mollony that O'Roughan had plans to depart for the continent, where he would then reveal the truth of the case.<sup>123</sup> In other words, the prosecution's key witness was in danger of recanting. The examination of O'Mollony revealed the unreliability of the priest, so the testimony of Philip Williams was added to the formal indictment. In a strange turn of events, another incarcerated priest in Dublin Castle accused another councilor, Sir Robert Dillon of treason, though Dillon would have more success than Perrot in escaping conviction.<sup>124</sup>

Perrot had made himself an enemy of the Irish council and, by extension, the Westminster government. News about Perrot's troubles in Ireland and his trial soon reached the continent.<sup>125</sup> Spanish sources mentioned Perrot's unpopularity and dissension within the Irish council.<sup>126</sup> It was not a positive image for a state at war. The appearance of unity and cohesion was significant, given the war with Spain. The crown not only had to manage itself (the government and its officials) effectively but also appear in control of its territories as well (Ireland) in a way that the Spanish were not in the Low Countries. But rather than fighting

---

<sup>121</sup> *APC*, vol. 21, p. 94; Fenton to Burghley, 8 Sept. 1591, SP 12/240/7, f. 16; *CSPDom*, 1591-1594, p. 103.

<sup>122</sup> Perrot to the Council, 5 Dec. 1590, SP 12/234/44, f. 71; *CSPDom*, 1581-1590, p. 701.

<sup>123</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 22 Nov. 1590, SP 12/234/22, f. 36; *CSPDom*, 1581-1590, p. 699.

<sup>124</sup> On the 20th of October Sir Fenton came to the Lord of Delvin, 20 Oct. 1592, SP 63/167/22. IV, f. 85.

<sup>125</sup> The deposition or declaration of Edward Shergold (18 Mar. 1592, SP 63/163/68. I, f. 134) suggests Essex was in France but coming shortly to be a suitor to Sir John Perrot's cause, he also went to plead his case in France over troops; Essex writes to Burghley that he will plead for Perrot and hopes Burghley will back him, thinks argument against Perrot weak and if Burghley has proof otherwise, he should show the Queen (Essex to Burghley, 3 May 1592, SP 12/242/4, f. 7; *CSPDom*, 1591-1594, p. 218).

<sup>126</sup> 'Simancas: June 1587, 1-15', in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 4, 1587-1603*, ed. Martin A. S. Hume (London, 1899), pp. 92-101. British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol4/pp92-101> [accessed 26 May 2020], Bernardino De Mendoza to the King, no. 100.

against their enemies, they were fighting among themselves. Such discord had the potential for Spain to undermine the English state and their authority. Perrot and his treason trial compromised the careful script they had constructed.

## **PART TWO**

The Nine Years' War, 1593-1603



## CHAPTER FIVE

### War, Politics, and Policy During the Nine Years' War, 1593-1595

Precisely when Hugh, the earl of Tyrone, turned against the English government is a subject of debate. Until the publication of Hiram Morgan's *Tyrone's Rebellion*, the prevailing view of the earl was as a loyal, albeit conflicted, servant of the English crown.<sup>1</sup> Morgan, however, presented a Machiavellian version of Tyrone, one who schemed against the crown from at least the late 1570s before entering into open resistance during the Nine Years' War.<sup>2</sup> James O'Neill, a former student of Morgan's, limited the scope of Tyrone's planning to the war years.<sup>3</sup> O'Neill convincingly argued that the war actually began with Maguire's Rebellion in spring 1593. Though the evidence is circumstantial, he deduced that Tyrone took advantage of the opportunity created by the Maguire Rebellion, which started with Lord Deputy William Fitzwilliam's appointment of a new sheriff in Fermanagh. The subsequent encroachment of the sheriff on Hugh Maguire's lands led to his uprising in 1593.<sup>4</sup> Tyrone then utilized the proxy wars in Ulster and Connaught between 1593 to 1594 to amass an army that would challenge English sovereignty on the island.

More recently, Morgan expanded on his earlier view of Tyrone by assessing the earl's complicity in committing acts of violence against his kinsmen and Spanish survivors after the Armada to further his ambitions.<sup>5</sup> Morgan asserted that Tyrone's actions were best understood

---

<sup>1</sup> Nicholas Canny, *From Reformation to Restoration: Ireland, 1534-1660* (Dublin: Helicon, 1987), 138-141.

<sup>2</sup> Hiram Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion: The Outbreak of the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland* (London; Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society, 1993).

<sup>3</sup> James O'Neill, *The Nine Years War, 1593-1603: O'Neill, Mountjoy and the Military Revolution* (Portland, OR; Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 2017).

<sup>4</sup> O'Neill, *The Nine Years' War*, 25-28.

<sup>5</sup> Morgan, "'Slán Dé fút go hoíche': Hugh O'Neill's Murders," in *Age of Atrocity: Violence and Political Conflict in Early Modern Ireland*, eds. David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan and Clodagh Tait (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 95-118.

within the European context of Machiavellian statecraft and, as such, Tyrone had acted out of "expediency and political necessity rather than mere cruelty."<sup>6</sup> Despite this exercise in justifying Tyrone's violence contra the state's, this was a timely reminder that acts of violence did not solely belong to the Tudor state, but could also be—and were—employed by the Irish against the Irish.

Morgan's essay appeared in the infamous collection, *Age of Atrocity*. The book included essays from a wide range of scholars, many of whom were well-known for their contributions to early modern Irish history: David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan, Clodagh Tait, Vincent Carey, Morgan, and John McGurk. Their essays collectively argued that the history of early modern Ireland was primarily one of brutality, violence, and destruction; of dispossession and loss; of conquest and coercion; and of unrestrained violence.<sup>7</sup> The volume's conclusions on the genocidal violence of the English state in Ireland reverberate still in recent scholarship.<sup>8</sup>

The atrocity argument was partly formed by the absence of violence in twentieth-century scholarship on early modern Ireland.<sup>9</sup> In response to what the authors considered a glaring

---

<sup>6</sup> Morgan, "'Slán Dé fút go hoíche'," 95.

<sup>7</sup> David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan, and Clodagh Tait, eds., *Age of Atrocity: Violence and Political Conflict in Early Modern Ireland* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007). See also, Edwards, "Beyond Reform: Martial Law and the Tudor Re-conquest of Ireland," *History Ireland* 5 (Summer 1997): 16-21; idem, "Ideology and Experience: Spenser's View and Martial Law in Elizabethan Ireland" in *Political Ideology in Ireland, 1541-1641*, ed. Hiram Morgan (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999), 127-57. Vincent Carey, "John Derricke's *Image of Ireland: Sir Henry Sidney and the Massacre at Mullaghmast, 1578*," *IHS* 31 (1999), 305-27; idem, "'What Pen Can Paint or Tears Atone?' Mountjoy's Scorched Earth Campaign," in *The Battle of Kinsale*, ed. Hiram Morgan (Bray: Wordwell Press, 2004), 205-16.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, Brendan Kane, "Ordinary Violence? Ireland as Emergency in the Tudor State," *History* 99, no. 336 (2014): 444-467.

<sup>9</sup> Rory Rapple has written an excellent review of this historiographical trend and identifies it as a continuation of an argument that began in the nineteenth century, but which found expression and particular significance in the extremist violence of the late 1960s to 1990s by the paramilitary group, the IRA, and the revisionist movement (Rapple, "Writing about Violence in the Tudor Kingdoms," *The Historical Journal* 54 (2011): 829-854). The reassessment of Tudor Ireland in Irish history has also resulted in sharp criticism of Elizabeth's rule in Ireland. See, for example, Hiram Morgan, "Never Any Realm Worse Governed': Queen Elizabeth and Ireland," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 14 (2004): 295-308; idem, "'Tempt not God too Long, O Queen': Elizabeth and the Irish Crisis of the 1590s," in *Elizabeth I and Ireland*, eds. Brendan Kane and Valerie McGowan-Doyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 209-238; Malcolm Smuts, "Organized Violence in the Elizabethan Monarchical Republic" *History* 99 (2014): 439, 440-443.

omission, they set out to show the bloody escalation of violence in early modern Ireland. They pointed to massacres, such as Rathlin Island and Smerwick, to serve as examples of English brutality towards the Irish. These episodes of extraordinary violence, of "genocidal fury," characterized the Elizabethan adoption of institutionalized terror in Ireland since the 1570s and only continued in the Nine Years' War.<sup>10</sup> Due to its episodic focus, the *Age of Atrocity* provided only one essay on the war, McGurk's "Pacification of Ulster, 1600-3," a discussion of the crown's scorched earth tactics. By confining the history of the war to its final years, the book and the essay conveniently ignores the first seven years of the war. And it is in filling this gap that O'Neill's military account of the war serves as a nice counterpoint to the atrocity argument. Ciaran Brady had already shown that the scorched earth strategy was the least employed or advocated for by chief governors because of its destructiveness.<sup>11</sup> It was, as Brady recognized, an "emergency measure to be used only in restricted circumstances and for a limited period."<sup>12</sup> O'Neill expanded on this further by highlighting the early years of the war, when there were battles but, owing mainly to Tyrone's pretensions of loyalty, there were also peace negotiations, truces, and periods of cessation. These periods of non-military engagement were particularly welcome to the English government during the Anglo-Spanish War, when crown resources were severely limited.

Still, up to O'Neill's narrative, histories of the Nine Years' War showed a preoccupation with battles at the expense of understanding the practical aspects of waging war, negotiations to end the war, the role of religion, and the broader European context.<sup>13</sup> O'Neill's account seemed to

---

<sup>10</sup> Vincent Carey, "Elizabeth I and State Terror," in *Elizabeth I and the 'Sovereign Arts'*, eds. Donald Stump, Linda Shenk, and Carole Levin (Tempe, Ariz.: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2011), 201-202.

<sup>11</sup> Ciaran Brady, "The Captains' Games: Army and Society in Elizabethan Ireland," in *A Military History of Ireland*, eds. Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 139-140.

<sup>12</sup> Brady, "The Captains' Games," 140.

<sup>13</sup> Eoin Ó'Neill, "Towards a New Interpretation of the Nine Years' War," *The Irish Sword* 26, no. 105 (2009): 249-250.

resolve many of these issues. Nevertheless, it was an unbalanced approach, neglecting religion and leaning more towards Tyrone and his allies. The English crown and its officers are nearly always presented as being on the defensive, where they merely respond to the actions of insurgents until the scorched earth campaigns in the 1600s. They cannot keep pace with their enemies. To some extent, this picture is fairly accurate, particularly as enemy forces often dictate the course of war; their actions create the crisis to which the government responds unless the crown preemptively goes on the offensive. But the deliberations between the Westminster and Dublin councils in the early years of the war show an acute awareness of enemy strategies and tactics. They also suspected Tyrone would work against them. However, the councils in England and Ireland disagreed about how to respond. They had trouble determining war policy, namely whether to apply military force to bring about a quick end to the war or to engage in peace negotiations. Ultimately, they chose both, but this was, in part, a reflection of differing opinions. The queen and privy council in England repeatedly ordered the use of force, while the Irish council consistently advocated pacification or negotiation. Although the Irish council had considerable evidence which signaled that Tyrone conspired against the crown, they appeared willing to work with Tyrone against the demands of the Westminster authorities. It took nearly two years for the crown to finally proclaim Tyrone a traitor.

Since the success of Tyrone's deception depended on the willingness of the Irish council to negotiate and to delay prosecuting him, a central question which this chapter seeks to answer is why this was the case. Were the Irish councilors dupes in Tyrone's Machiavellian scheming, or were they willing to temporize with Tyrone for other reasons? Nicholas Canny argued that the Old English councilors distrusted Tyrone, but the New English councilors overruled them

because he was crucial in their plans for Ulster.<sup>14</sup> The crown wanted to use Tyrone to counter the influence of his rivals among the O'Neills, thereby creating the opportunity for state expansion into the region. Morgan insinuated that though the New English councilors suspected the earl's duplicity, they continued to support Tyrone because they had been bribed.<sup>15</sup>

This chapter will show that both the Old and New English councilors doubted the earl, and that bribery alone does not satisfactorily explain the Irish councilors' actions. The Irish councilors tried to use Tyrone as they had in the past: a political tool to gain ascendancy in the province of Ulster. The problem for the Irish council was that this policy put them at odds with the queen and privy council. When neither the insurgents nor the earl capitulated, it deepened the divide between the Westminster and Dublin councils and sowed internal conflict among the Dublin councilors. In the chapters on the war, what follows is not a highly-detailed military accounting of the war—O'Neill has already accomplished this feat. Instead, it will trace the broad contours of the war and examine the politics of the war primarily through the lens of the Irish council.

### **Debating War Policy and Strategy**

The English crown recognized that Ulster was different from the other provinces.<sup>16</sup>

Unlike the other parts of Ireland, Ulster had long retained its Irish traditions despite the

---

<sup>14</sup> Canny, *From Reformation to Restoration*, 138-139.

<sup>15</sup> Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion*, 103-104; idem, 107. Morgan suggested that Tyrone was bribing them. But the evidence is unconvincing, as it is based either on Irish and Spanish sources or the highly-biased book by Micheline Kerney Walsh, *"Destruction by Peace" Hugh O'Neill after Kinsale, Glanconcadhain-Rome 1616* (Armagh, Northern Ireland: Armagh Diocesan Historical Society, 1968). However, it does not eliminate entirely the possibility of bribery between Tyrone and the Irish councilors. It only makes more evident the need for less subjective sources.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Opinions of the Justice Gardiner and Sir Henry Wallop for the Reformation of Ulster, 19 May 1590, SP 63/152/39, f. 129; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 345. Gardiner and Wallop recommended that the lord deputy take residence in Armagh and the employment of an Irish sheriff to help settle the area, among other things. They envisioned the reformation as a long process that took many years and would require soldiers. Although they advised the removal of some soldiers after two years, they perceived the continued use of a garrison as the English anglicized the area.

numerous attempts by the English to destabilize and supplant Irish lords in the area. The increasing presence of the English in Ulster from the 1570s and onwards resumed tensions between the crown and Ulster lords. In the 1570s, the failed plantation projects of Sir Thomas Smith and Sir Walter Devereux, the first earl of Essex, had instilled in the crown a begrudging policy of accommodation. In 1589, the crown inserted itself directly into succession disputes in Monaghan, which resulted in the execution of Hugh Roe MacMahon and the confiscation of his lands by the crown.<sup>17</sup> Successive attempts by crown officials to encroach further into Ulster led supposedly to a meeting in late 1592 between the Roman Catholic primates and the Ulster lords: Hugh Maguire, Hugh Roe O'Donnell, and Brian O'Rourke.<sup>18</sup> The purpose of the meeting was to solicit Spanish aid in overthrowing the English government.<sup>19</sup> Thus, when Maguire revolted in spring 1593, it renewed fears about Spanish foreign intervention in Ireland. As tensions escalated in Ulster, the question of how to respond became paramount.

The crown had to decide whether to end Maguire's revolt by force or pacify the insurgents through negotiation.<sup>20</sup> When the Connacht lords, the O'Rourkes, revolted in 1589, the queen and privy council had commissioned various Irish council members and the bishop of Kilmore to discuss how to reach an agreement. Sir Richard Bingham, the chief commissioner in Connacht, seemed to frustrate these plans when he attacked insurgents against the orders of the Dublin council. Nevertheless, for the crown, pacification—rather than force—was the preferred option. Brokering peace through conciliatory means was cheaper than applying military pressure.

---

<sup>17</sup> Cyril Falls, *Elizabeth's Irish Wars* (York: Barnes & Noble, 1970), 168-169.

<sup>18</sup> Neither the Catholic Church nor the Church of Ireland recognized the validity of the other. Consequently, the Catholic Church appointed its own succession of bishops for Ireland.

<sup>19</sup> O'Neill, 27-28.

<sup>20</sup> The use of the term "pacification" varied. It could mean the use of force or coercion to elicit the cooperation of a population, but in the period of this study, its use most frequently coincided with the appointment of a commission to reach an agreement between the English and the Irish. *OED*, "pacification."

Within the range of military options, a policy of using military force, if successful, was the most aggressive but also the most expensive response for the crown. There were three strategies that the crown could employ: total war, garrisoning, and the general hosting.<sup>21</sup> Total war, as the name suggests, meant unrestricted warfare. Such a strategy permitted even the use of scorched earth tactics. It had been used earlier in the Desmond rebellions in the Munster province and would be employed later in Mountjoy's campaign towards the end of the Nine Years' War. On occasions where the crown pursued the total war strategy, it emerged victorious. However, this strategy wrought devastation and had a significant impact on the civilian population. It also had the potential of turning once obedient subjects against the crown. Establishing garrisons across the island to police and enforce conformity to English laws was another strategy. Unlike England, Tudor Ireland had a standing army. Garrisons were stationed throughout English-controlled areas. Once established, those troops were costly to maintain over long periods. Inadequate funding could leave the surrounding area at risk of attack, as it had in the late 1540s when the English utilized garrisoning in lowland Scotland.<sup>22</sup> Fortifications were also expensive to build and required maintenance. Private enterprise could reduce the financial burden associated with fortifications, and yet, like the establishment of schools in Ireland, such buildings would depend significantly on the interests of wealthy individuals. Moreover, as the 1570s showed, when private interests failed, the crown had to spend heavily to fix the resulting mess. The last military strategy was the general hosting, the use of large armies for short campaigns. Of the three strategies, it was the most expensive (particularly if the war dragged on), the most ineffective in the long term, and, oddly, the most practiced. While the use of grand

---

<sup>21</sup> This discussion of military strategy in Elizabethan Ireland incorporates valuable information from Brady, "The Captains' Games" and O'Neill, *The Nine Years' War*.

<sup>22</sup> Paul E. J. Hammer, introduction to *Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1450-1660*, ed. Hammer (New York; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016), xxiv.

armies for viceregal tours throughout the provinces could be efficacious for diplomacy and reform, it was less helpful as a military strategy for Ireland.<sup>23</sup> Large bodies of troops were challenging to maneuver and manage across unfamiliar territories and for extended periods. Their large size also exposed the army to guerilla-style attacks for which it was unprepared.<sup>24</sup>

As David Heffernan has noted, various strategies could be adopted simultaneously depending on the circumstances.<sup>25</sup> This was especially true for Ireland, given its standing army and use of garrisons already. And yet, the policy of military force was expensive and logistically cumbersome. It required the mobilization of soldiers and provisions for the army. Because the English already had troops garrisoned in major towns and borders in Ireland, the crown could redirect those soldiers to assist where needed, as it had during the Desmond rebellions. However, the Irish councilors and army officials argued against this practice, as it would mean leaving those areas where soldiers had been removed vulnerable to attack. The privy council could also order the levying of additional troops from England and Wales and their transport across the seas from ports like Chester into Dublin. The local officials of English port towns then had to cope with the influx of these recruits.<sup>26</sup> They negotiated and secured vessels from their owners and acquired the necessary provisions before departure. Even after the procurement of soldiers and provisions, contrary winds could delay the process, putting a greater strain on the town to house the soldiers and increasing the likelihood of desertion. These circumstances notwithstanding, the crown also had to pay for wages of the soldiers and daily allowances for diet. The crown also

---

<sup>23</sup> Brady, "The Captains' Games," 152.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 142.

<sup>25</sup> David Heffernan, "Political Discourse and the Nine Years' War in Late Elizabethan Ireland, c. 1593-1603," *Historical Research* 94, no. 264 (2021): 293.

<sup>26</sup> John McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The Burdens of the 1590s Crisis* (New York; Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2009), 30-31.



faced severe difficulties in devoting greater resources to Ireland because England was also preoccupied with the Anglo-Spanish War on the continent. War was a complicated affair.

Pacification by negotiation was an attractive and expedient political solution to these problems. However, the nature of pacification, in some ways, conflicted with the aims of the English colonial regime, that is, the acquisition of territory to expand English rule. In forging agreements with Irish lords, the crown recognized—albeit reluctantly—the power of native lords and their clans. Still, the economic and political pressures of the late Elizabethan period made such recognition necessary to maintain peace during the Anglo-Spanish War. Pacification, then, was a temporary measure to placate the Irish lords until the crisis with the Spanish had passed. Whichever policy the crown adopted in its governance of Ireland, the Spanish threat loomed large in its considerations.

The general practice was for the crown to issue its policy directives to the lord deputy and Irish council, who was then responsible for carrying out those orders. As shown in previous chapters, the Dublin councilors did not always act upon the directives given to them by the queen and the privy council in Westminster. They found ways to act independently and asked for forgiveness afterward. While such disobedience was customary, it became a matter of great significance during the Nine Years' War when the Irish councilors acted on their own.

When the war began in 1593, the Irish council had undergone some changes since the recall of Perrot and his replacement as lord deputy by Sir William Fitzwilliam (see Table 5.1).<sup>27</sup> An aging Sir Nicholas Bagenal had resigned from the office of marshal of the army and his son,

---

<sup>27</sup> List compiled using the manuscript, Names of the Privy Councilors in Ireland, 1593, SP 63/172/46, f. 239; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 195. For the purposes of this chapter, I have included the lord deputy, who is not on the original document. Military advisors became councilors upon the orders of the queen and privy council. A list would have afforded the councilors (in England and Ireland) some ease in identifying current, non-officeholding councilors.

**Table 5.1 Irish Privy Council c. 1593**

| <i>Office</i>                             | <i>Occupant</i>               |
|---|-------------------------------|
| <i>Lord Deputy</i>                        | Sir William Fitzwilliam       |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                    | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>               | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>               | John Garvey                   |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                     | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                    | Thomas Jones                  |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>    | Sir Henry Wallop              |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i>  | Sir Robert Gardiner           |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>      | Sir William Weston            |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>       | Sir Robert Napier             |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>                | Sir Anthony St. Leger         |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connaught</i>    | Sir Richard Bingham           |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>             | Sir John Norris               |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>                | Sir Henry Bagenal             |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                 | Sir Geoffrey Fenton           |
| <i>Vice President of Munster</i>          | Sir Thomas Norris             |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>             | Sir George Bouchier           |
| <i>Second Justice of the King's Bench</i> | Nicholas Walsh                |
| <i>Other Councilors</i>                   | Edward Brabazon               |
|   | Sir Warham St. Leger          |
|   | George Carew*                 |
|   | Sir Edward Moore              |
|   | Sir Robert Dillon             |

\*Sir George Carew was not on the list of Irish privy councilors, likely because he had been promoted from master of the ordnance in Ireland to lieutenant of the ordnance in England. CP, vol. 4, p. 555. He became a privy councilor sometime in July 1590. See, Carew to Burghley, SP 63/153/52, f. 156; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 357.

Sir Henry, obtained the office in October 1590. Only a few months later, the senior Bagenal died.<sup>28</sup> In 1591, a rival of Sir Robert Dillon, the chief justice of the common pleas, alleged that Dillon had incited Brian O'Rourke to rebellion. Dillon's removal from office and impending treason trial left an opening on the Irish council. Two Old English councilors, Sir Lucas Dillon

<sup>28</sup> *ODNB*, "Bagenal, Sir Nicholas."

and Sir Nicholas White died in 1592. The latter died while imprisoned in the Tower of London.<sup>29</sup> These deaths left vacancies in the offices of chief baron of the exchequer and master of the rolls. The queen filled all three positions at once with the appointment of men from England: William Weston, Robert Napier, and Anthony St. Leger.<sup>30</sup> This was a deliberate move to prevent the partiality the queen saw in justices native to the land.<sup>31</sup> Of the 20 Irish councilors in 1593, now only four were Irish born: Sir Robert Dillon (imprisoned in London), Nicholas Walsh, Edward Brabazon, and Thomas Butler, the earl of Ormond.

At the time of Maguire's revolt in Ulster, several Irish councilors were preoccupied elsewhere. Sir Warham St. Leger and Edward Brabazon had relatives in Connacht and Ulster during the war, but the councilors themselves had little, if any, involvement in the war.<sup>32</sup> The archbishop of Armagh, John Garvey, also does not appear to have been involved, and his brother-in-law, Henry Ussher, succeeded him as archbishop shortly after Garvey's death in March 1595.<sup>33</sup> Ussher was also absent from war proceedings. Weston, the newly appointed chief justice of the common pleas, had some involvement in summer 1593 but died by December 1594.<sup>34</sup> Nicholas Walsh, the chief justice in Munster, maintained his judicial duties in that province and assisted in the war towards the end of the 1590s.<sup>35</sup> Sir Thomas Norris had been

---

<sup>29</sup> *ODNB*, "White, Sir Nicholas." *APC*, vol. 23, p. 45.

<sup>30</sup> Queen Elizabeth to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 16 Apr. 1593, SP 63/169/12, f. 70; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 91.

<sup>31</sup> Instructions for Thomas, Lord Burgh, 7 Feb. 1597, SP 63/197/68, f. 242; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 227.

<sup>32</sup> Warham's nephew (of the same name) and Edward's younger brother, Anthony, were captains who served in the Nine Years' War. The elder Warham, however, was a colonist in Cork who had been on the council since the late 1560s. By the early 1590s, his involvement in the council was nominal at best. He was involved in land disputes in the Munster province (which he lost), complained of sciatica in his left hip in 1594, and died in 1597. See *ODNB*, "St. Leger, Warham" and Warham to Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst, 25 May 1594, SP 63/174/64, f. 246; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 247. Edward Brabazon was a member of parliament for the county of Wicklow, knighted in 1594, and proposed and involved in the later plantation of Ulster [*CSPIre*, 1611-1614, p. 102; *Cal. Carew*, 1603-1623, p. 92. Christopher Maginn, *William Cecil, Ireland, and the Tudor State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 193]. He too appeared to be of little influence in the Nine Years' War.

<sup>33</sup> *ODNB*, "Garvey, John."

<sup>34</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 22 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176/31, f. 78; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 274.

<sup>35</sup> *ODNB*, "Walsh, Sir Nicholas."

away at Court, but he returned by summer 1593 and journeyed to Ulster with the lord deputy in 1594.<sup>36</sup> His elder brother, Sir John Norris, led an army in Brittany and only returned to Ireland in 1595. These absences initially left the lord deputy, Sir William Fitzwilliam, and only part of the council's membership to determine how to deal with Maguire: Bagenal, Bingham, Sir George Bouchier, Sir Geoffrey Fenton, Sir Robert Gardiner, Thomas Jones, Adam Loftus, St. Leger, and Sir Henry Wallop.

The issue of precisely *how* to respond to Maguire's raiding along the Connaught-Ulster borders was a matter of disagreement among the councilors. The location of the raids in northern Connacht prompted the chief commissioner there, Bingham, to act on his previous convictions. When Bingham heard of "Romishe and Traiterous" bishops in Ulster, he seemed to lament that he was in Dublin and away from his province, for he wrote thus: "But those Traitors are not w[i]thin anie part of Connaght, Otherwise I durst (w[i]th god[es] p[er]mission vndretake to p[ro]cure their app[re]henc[i]on, whereas nowe I haue no meane to do that service."<sup>37</sup> While he could do little for the time being concerning the Catholic bishops, he argued that Maguire and O'Donnell were plotting—through the bishops—with the Spanish king for a foreign invasion in Ireland. The continuous threat of Spanish invasion kept the lord deputy and council on the watch for any sign of Spanish involvement in Ireland. The councilors saw such signs in reports of the arrival of Catholic bishops in Ulster and their conspiring with Irish lords there. Given that this information turned out to be accurate, Bingham had been right to suspect their plotting.<sup>38</sup> He thus wanted permission from Burghley to employ the garrison already present in Ireland against them

---

<sup>36</sup> *ODNB*, "Norreys [Norris], Sir Thomas." See also, Sir Thomas Norris to Burghley, 6 Mar. 1593, SP 63/168/52, f. 192; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 80. Petition of Moris FitzThomas Geralt and James Meagh to Burghley, [6 Mar.] 1593, SP 63/168/53, f. 194; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 80.

<sup>37</sup> Sir Richard Bingham to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 6 Mar. 1593, SP 63/168/68. I, f. 228r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 82.

<sup>38</sup> John J. Silke, *Kinsale: The Spanish Intervention in Ireland at the End of the Elizabethan Wars* (1970; repr., Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000), 25.

and to reduce the lords to obedience by force.<sup>39</sup> He had already urged this course to the lord deputy and council, but he claimed that they had forbidden him from attacking Maguire and O'Donnell. Bingham thought the Dublin councilors were being too lenient and that the lord deputy was protecting Maguire, which he found inexcusable.<sup>40</sup> For Bingham, no temporizing manner could turn the enemies into better subjects.<sup>41</sup> He, like some of the military men on the Irish council, advocated force for obvious reasons. Force was their answer to resolving the problem of disobedient subjects. In their view, military engagement also provided them an opportunity to command larger troops and thus gain greater prestige and increase the potential for patronage and profit.

However, the martial men on the Irish council were not the only ones to advocate the use of force. Fenton seemed to agree with Bingham regarding Maguire. Fenton advised Burghley that the "onely waie to weaken him for eu[er], w[i]thowt chardge to her Ma[jes]tie" would be to leave Maguire "destytute both of men, and meanes to wage men," by offering them mercy, as well as taking away his boats and castle.<sup>42</sup> Taking his lands and boats would mean that Maguire would be left "onely to the bogge and bush w[i]thowt howss to cou[er] him, or freind to succor him," as Irish lords and followers would be less inclined to give him aid.<sup>43</sup>

However, the other Dublin councilors disagreed. They saw the utility in negotiating peace with their enemies and acted upon it. The man they sent in to deal with Maguire was none other than Hugh, earl of Tyrone. This was a curious choice, as Tyrone's loyalty was in doubt. The lord deputy and council had received information that the earl was in league with Maguire,

---

<sup>39</sup> Bingham to Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, 17 Apr. 1593, SP 63/169/16, f. 78; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 91. Bingham to [Burghley], 17 Apr. 1593, SP 63/169/18, f. 82; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 91.

<sup>40</sup> Bingham to the Privy Council, 28 June 1593, SP 63/170/18, f. 47; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 110.

<sup>41</sup> Bingham to Burghley, 6 June 1593, SP 63/170/3, f. 7; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 103.

<sup>42</sup> Sir Geoffrey Fenton to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/17, f. 86r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 172. *ODNB*, "Maguire, Sir Hugh [Aodh Mág Uidhir]."

<sup>43</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/17, f. 86r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 172.

O'Donnell, and the Spanish king. However, they found these accusations "so odious both for the matter and the person whom it touched," especially as they had investigated the "Roote and bottom" of the information against the earl.<sup>44</sup> In their letter to the privy council, they explained that they had gone to Dundalk to hear the accusations and examine the earl in person. Upon further examination, they found Tyrone more trustworthy than his accusers. He had appeared before them "without word or protection but also most readily sent for all others, whom we required."<sup>45</sup> This conduct implied that the earl had nothing to hide. The councilors found it more likely that the allegations were against the earl's followers and not the earl himself. He was not directly tied to the raids and attacks against government forces. Therefore, they could not prosecute the earl for foreign conspiracy as the queen had directed.

Loftus, the archbishop of Dublin and lord chancellor, defended this course with Tyrone. Though he apologized for using Tyrone in the negotiations, he had found neither proof of the earl's alleged dealing nor of his taking of the sacrament from the Catholic primates.<sup>46</sup> If the councilors had committed Tyrone into their custody, then Loftus believed this would also have upset the delicate balance in Ulster, and the consequences would spread to the Pale. Especially disconcerting and hazardous to the entire security of the kingdom, Loftus explained, was the frequent raiding and pillaging of the English Pale. The Pale was the heart of the kingdom and Dublin its center; any damage to the Pale threatened to disrupt the entire system of English government in Ireland and—though unstated—the Irish councilors' estates in Ireland. Loftus also

---

<sup>44</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 30 June 1593, SP 63/170/23, f. 59r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 110. Tyrone wrote to the lord deputy and council that Maguire wanted assurance Bingham would be restrained from prosecution [Earl of Tyrone to Lord Deputy and Council, 2 July 1593, SP 63/170/38. I, f. 125; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 123].

<sup>45</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 30 June 1593, SP 63/170/23, f. 59r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 110.

<sup>46</sup> Adam Loftus and Thomas Jones to Burghley, 3 Aug. 1593, SP 63/171/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 137.

reiterated that the crown did not have the men or resources to combat enemy forces, and the lord deputy was sick daily.<sup>47</sup> The lord deputy had requested his revocation months earlier, citing age and illness. It should also be noted that Loftus and Jones, the bishop of Meath, were themselves facing corruption charges.<sup>48</sup> So, it seemed that the lord deputy and council wanted to avoid war for various reasons.

When the lord deputy and council heard of Maguire's actions, they had considered how they could "salve the p[re]sent soare, and also p[re]vent further daungerus sequeyles hereafter" with the awareness that to "temp[er] w[i]th Maguyre by pacyficac[i]on, w[hi]ch yf yt succeed well, maie stopp the evell for the tyme, though not cure yt altogether."<sup>49</sup> They sought a temporary peace and thus found the earl of Tyrone—with his connections in the province—the most likely means of convincing Maguire to disband his forces and conform to obedience. Moreover, they had no other choice, "as the time and affaires do stand heare."<sup>50</sup> They simply did not have the forces necessary to engage in war. Fitzwilliam also defended his restraint of Bingham, arguing that they needed to reserve troops for a possible Spanish invasion.<sup>51</sup> He asserted that "it was no time to kindle a fire, that we doubted howe or when it mighte be quenched."<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Adam Loftus and Thomas Jones to Burghley, 3 Aug. 1593, SP 63/171/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 137.

<sup>48</sup> Book by Robert Legge touching the debts of the Lord Chancellor, the Bishop of Meath, Sir Robert Dillon, etc., 1589-90, SP 63/150/52. II, f. 157; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 308. Lord Chancellor Loftus and Thomas Jones, the bishop of Meath to the Privy Council, 2 Aug. 1592, SP 63/166/41, f. 109; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 564. Lord Chancellor and the Bishop of Meath to Burghley, 21 Nov. 1592, SP 63/167/23, f. 96; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 28.

<sup>49</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 30 June 1593, SP 63/170/23, f. 60r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 110.

<sup>50</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 30 June 1593, SP 63/170/23, f. 60r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 110.

<sup>51</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 20 July 1593, SP 63/170/47, f. 171; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 129.

<sup>52</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 10 Oct. 1593, SP 63/172/2, f. 22v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 153.

The queen and privy council, however, did not share this view. The privy council had already ordered the mustering of 1,200 soldiers to be sent via Chester and Liverpool to Dublin.<sup>53</sup> Once the queen discovered what had happened, she made her dissatisfaction with the proceedings clear. She wrote Bingham of the lord deputy's fault in prohibiting the use of force, adding further fuel to the fire brewing between her Irish councilors. She also applauded all Bingham and his brother, George, had done against the insurgents and gave him license to "offend them and ther Contrees" without danger to his person.<sup>54</sup> She added that, if it should be found that the lord deputy's proceedings were successful and Maguire and the others yielded with assurances of peace, then Bingham should refrain from using force.<sup>55</sup> To the lord deputy and council, she noted the "many causes of great mislikinge" in their approach to the current crisis.<sup>56</sup> She reprimanded Fitzwilliam, in particular, for restraining Bingham's use of force against the insurgents and the Catholic bishops, given the damage they had inflicted in Ulster and Connacht. Furthermore, the decision of the lord deputy and council to use Tyrone in their proceedings with Maguire was especially confounding to the queen and the Westminster privy council. They did not agree that the lord deputy and council had just cause to stay the proceedings against the earl after examining the "multitude" of accusations against the earl.<sup>57</sup>

### **The Earl of Tyrone: Loyal Subject or Traitor?**

There had been suspicions surrounding Tyrone's loyalty to the English crown for many years. Born a second son to Matthew O'Neill, the earl had lost his claims to the O'Neill lordship

---

<sup>53</sup> The Privy Council to the mayor of Chester, Giles Brooke, 24 June 1593, Chester Record Office, ZML 1/42.

<sup>54</sup> Draft of the Queen to Bingham, 6 July 1593, SP 63/170/35, f. 118v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 122.

<sup>55</sup> Draft of the Queen to Bingham, 6 July 1593, SP 63/170/35, f. 118; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 122.

<sup>56</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council, 6 and 7 July 1593, SP 63/170/36, f. 120r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 123.

<sup>57</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council, 6 and 7 July 1593, SP 63/170/36, f. 120r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 123.



when his uncle, Shane, took over the lordship, followed by Turlough Luineach. Over the years, the earl had made several attempts to claim the O'Neill lordship. In 1579, when it appeared that Turlough might be sick, Hugh—then the baron of Dungannon—had tried to secure his succession to the O'Neill lordship by marrying Turlough's daughter. He had been willing to cast aside his current wife to form this marriage alliance and become the successor to Turlough. The plan fell through when relations between Turlough and Hugh became strained. But the incident had aroused suspicion in the Irish council that the baron was a dissembler and a hypocrite.<sup>58</sup>

Whenever the ruling O'Neill seemed on the verge of death in 1590, Tyrone again tried to secure his succession to the lordship.<sup>59</sup> Despite the instructions of the lord deputy and council, Tyrone had also executed Hugh Gavelach MacShane.<sup>60</sup> For this action, Tyrone had been forced to agree to twenty-five articles meant to diminish his influence in Ulster and to relinquish his claims to the O'Neill lordship.<sup>61</sup> His secret elopement with the marshal of the army's sister, Mabel Bagenal, in 1591 aroused even greater suspicion and Bagenal's anger. When rumors surfaced that Tyrone had secretly met with Maguire, the lord deputy and council recommended drawing him to Dublin under a false pretense until either the threat of Spanish invasion had passed or until they had discovered the "truth of the conspiracie."<sup>62</sup> Then, in June 1593, more allegations were brought before the lord deputy and council: the earl's killing of Phelim Mac Turlough O'Neill and rumors of his conspiring with foreign kings.

---

<sup>58</sup> Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion*, 93-94.

<sup>59</sup> *ODNB*, "O'Neill, Hugh [Aodh Ó Néill]." There are two biographical dictionary entries on Tyrone, one of which is Nicholas Canny's entry in the *ODNB* and the other located in *DIB* and written by Hiram Morgan. Both have been useful in forming a portrait of the earl.

<sup>60</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 27 Feb. 1590, SP 63/150/75, f. 213; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept 1592, p. 312.

<sup>61</sup> *APC*, vol. 19, pp. 239-245. Notes of point wherein the Earl of Tyrone is to be restrained, drawn out by Fenton, 1590, SP 63/152/41. I, f. 141; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 345.

<sup>62</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to Burghley, 29 Apr. 1593, SP 63/169/23, f. 104r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 94.

In light of these incidents, the decision to use Tyrone to parley with Maguire in summer 1593 appeared misguided. Bagenal also thought using Tyrone was a bad idea, as he felt the earl had likely instigated the troubles in Ulster by having "his men and kinsmen slayne."<sup>63</sup> Bagenal warned that Tyrone had "ever a more absolute comaund throughout" the Ulster province.<sup>64</sup> The marshal hated Tyrone and his letters made plain this bias. And yet, considering Morgan's recent work on the violence Tyrone committed in Ulster against other Irish lords, Bagenal may not have been too far off the mark.

The decision of the Irish council to use Tyrone made little sense because they knew of his attempts to succeed to the O'Neill lordship. In 1587, Loftus, Sir Nicholas Bagenal, and Bingham had written to Burghley of the earl's "Longinge desire...to investe himself in the name and tytle of Oneyle."<sup>65</sup> This suspicion, though, had arisen during their struggles with Perrot. They had claimed Perrot had allowed the earl to strengthen his position in Ulster.<sup>66</sup> This was likely regarding the commission, wherein Perrot left the governing of Ulster to Turlough Luineach, Sir Nicholas Bagenal (the then marshal of the army), and the earl of Tyrone.<sup>67</sup> Perrot had argued that he had tried to divide O'Neill's country, but the queen had given the earl too many lands.<sup>68</sup> Assigning blame to the queen was an impolitic move. Once Fitzwilliam had taken over as lord deputy, he and the Irish council declared their mistrust of Tyrone to the Westminster privy

---

<sup>63</sup> Sir Henry Bagenal to Burghley, 1 July 1593, SP 63/170/27, f. 99v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 120.

<sup>64</sup> Bagenal to Burghley, 1 July 1593, SP 63/170/27, f. 99r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 120.

<sup>65</sup> Loftus, Bagenal, and Bingham to Burghley, 28 Jan. 1587, SP 63/128/20, f. 43r; *CSPIre*, 1586-Jul. 1588, p. 248.

<sup>66</sup> Loftus, Bagenal, and Bingham to Burghley, 28 Jan. 1587, SP 63/128/20, f. 43; *CSPIre*, 1586-Jul. 1588, p. 248.

<sup>67</sup> CP, vol. 3, p. 67. Fitzwilliam had reservations about whether peace could be maintained between the two factions—Tyrone and O'Neill. He also specifically mentioned the commission and proposed that governance of the area should be passed to the marshal rather than the earl. See, Memorial delivered by Fitzwilliam, 14 Nov. 1587, SP 63/132/8, f. 17; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 432.

<sup>68</sup> A brief declaration, [14] Dec. 1588, SP 63/139/7, f. 14; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 78. A year prior the queen had granted castles, lordships, and territory in the county of Tyrone. See, Indenture between the Queen and the earl of Tyrone, 13 May 1587, CP, vol. 13, p. 343. However, as the agreement stipulated, these grants had originally been issued in Henry VIII's reign. Elizabeth set more prescribed limits about the extent of the territory. She also left the job of surveying the lands and castles to the lord deputy and council.

council.<sup>69</sup> The signatories to this letter were Fitzwilliam, Loftus, Jones, Wallop, Gardiner, L. Dillon, and White, five of whom were still councilors in the early 1590s. While it would be too simplistic to imply that the five councilors had the same opinion about Tyrone because their signatures were on the letter, their later correspondence showed a persistent uneasiness about the earl. They only trusted him out of political expediency.

On several occasions, the Irish councilors had seemed willing to give Tyrone leadership over the north. Yet, the presumption was always that he would be working *for* the English government, not against it. However, Tyrone's taking the Irish title of O'Neill was to recognize the power of Irish lordships in a province that the English desperately wanted to control. They had maneuvered throughout the years to counter his authority in the region by supporting Tyrone's enemies and reducing his estates, just as they had used Tyrone against Turlough. Still, as much as the English intervened in Ulster politics, they alone could not determine the course of politics in Ulster, for the crisis over succession to Irish lordships was determined primarily by Irish lords. They could negotiate settlement agreements, but the Irish lords could—and, on many occasions, did—break them, Tyrone included. Nevertheless, they sought to temper the earl's desires for the O'Neill lordship even as they used him to influence Ulster politics. This was mainly done to serve the English colonial agenda. They played the game of politics, hoping that their political futures would be secured.

Despite the admonition of the queen and privy council, the Irish council persisted in their course with Tyrone and continued to restrain Bingham's urging of military force.<sup>70</sup> Bingham, once again, lamented this course of action, for the Irish were to him a people who were "not

---

<sup>69</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 12 Oct. 1588, SP 63/137/10, f. 45; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 53.

<sup>70</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to Bingham, 17 July 1593, SP 63/170/44. IV, f. 162; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 128.

tamed w[i]th woordes but w[i]th swords."<sup>71</sup> He had been forced to remain on the defensive while the lord deputy and council undertook—what appeared to him—an insufficient, temporizing course.<sup>72</sup>

The negotiations between Tyrone and Maguire seemed successful for a time. Maguire promised to submit and disperse his forces. But he did not do what he had promised. As the fight against Maguire and O'Donnell continued, the government received more intelligence reports implicating Tyrone. By September 1593, the Irish council speculated to the privy council that, sometime in Tyrone's negotiations with Maguire, he had joined the enemy.<sup>73</sup> Then, in early October, the lord deputy and council wrote to Tyrone and informed him of their suspicions.<sup>74</sup> During the Battle of Belleek that same month, where the English forces won a small victory against Maguire, Tyrone proudly touted to the Westminster and Dublin councils the injury he had sustained for the crown as proof of his loyalty.<sup>75</sup> The injury did not produce the intended effect, as it did little to quiet his accusers or quell suspicions.<sup>76</sup> Bagenal, the marshal of the army and the earl's reluctant brother-in-law, seemed unwilling to praise Tyrone's service and continued his dislike of the earl.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> Bingham to Burghley, 19 July 1593, SP 63/170/45, f. 167r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 128.

<sup>72</sup> Bingham to Burghley, 19 July 1593, SP 63/170/45, f. 167; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 128.

<sup>73</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 16 Sept. 1593, SP 63/171/34, f. 140; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 147. Bingham to Burghley, 19 Sept. 1593, SP 63/171/36, f. 145; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 150. Bingham to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 30 Sept. 1593, SP 63/172/2. XIII, f. 33; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 161. Intelligence brought to Sir Richard Bingham, 29 Sept. 1593, SP 63/172/2. XIV, f. 34; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 163.

<sup>74</sup> Tyrone to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council, 5 Oct. 1593, SP 63/172/2. XVI, f. 37; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 164. Tyrone to Lord Chancellor Loftus, 11 Oct. 1593, SP 63/172/7. I, f. 62; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 167.

<sup>75</sup> Tyrone to the Privy Council, 5 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/13; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 170. Tyrone to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council, 4 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/18. V, f. 99; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 173.

<sup>76</sup> Sir Phillip Hollis to Cecil, 18 Oct. 1593, SP 63/172/8, f. 64; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 168. Capt. John Dowdall to Capt. Henshaw, 6 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/18. VI, f. 101; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 173. Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 16 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/19, f. 106; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 174.

<sup>77</sup> Sir Henry Bagenal to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 11 Oct. 1593, SP 63/172/4. I, f. 47; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 165.

There were, however, some members of the Irish council who still maintained that the earl was a good subject. Loftus, Bingham, and Fenton all wrote favorably of Tyrone. Loftus commended Tyrone's service to the crown after receiving a letter from him, wherein the earl remarked on the valor of Loftus's son, Dudley, during battle.<sup>78</sup> Tyrone's appreciation was timely and, more than likely, calculated. It helped convince Loftus that he was loyal—though not entirely. While Loftus praised Tyrone's actions at the Battle of Belleek, he added, "though I may be deceived in a ma[n]." <sup>79</sup> Such statements were a political maneuver to leave open the possibility that he could be wrong. Bingham had a similar approach:

I see noe reason but to holde averie good & honorable opinion of Therle of Tirone, for her Ma[jes]tie: and the state hath sett him vpp, and the state must vpphold him still, or ells he will fall and besides he is wyse and well experienced in the Course of thing[es] but all men of Iudgem[en]t here, and such espialls and beggers as I imploy into ffermanagh doth wholie assure me that Maguire dothe nothing w[i]thout Therles advise...Thoughe for my owne p[ar]te I can not distrust therle, but doe hope he will prove an honorable and good subiecte.<sup>80</sup>

The chief commissioner clearly thought well of the earl, or so he wanted the privy council to believe. Though there had been many intelligence reports of Tyrone's conspiratorial activities, they were not conclusive proof of his treason. In the absence of such proof, Bingham did not believe the crown should stray from their support of the earl. He could do nothing but trust the earl and *hope* he remained loyal. Like Bingham, Fenton also professed a high opinion of Tyrone,

---

<sup>78</sup> Tyrone to Lord Chancellor Loftus, 11 Oct. 1593, SP 63/172/7. I, f. 62; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 167.

<sup>79</sup> Loftus to Burghley, 16 Oct. 1593, SP 63/172/7, f. 60r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 167.

<sup>80</sup> Bingham to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 30 Sept. 1593, SP 63/172/2. XIII, f. 33v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 161. Bingham's use of the term "state" is interesting. Mark A. Hutchinson has argued that the concept of the "state" emerged in Elizabethan Ireland and Fenton was its progenitor. See, for example, Hutchinson, "The Emergence of the State in Elizabethan Ireland and England, ca. 1575-99," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 45, no. 3 (2014): 659-682. However, my reading of these documents suggests otherwise. When the Irish councilors used the term "state," its meaning was not the traditional notion of a bureaucratic, modern state. Instead, the Irish government was an extension of the English crown because of its interdependent and colonial status. Though its government sometimes acted independently of England, it remained tethered to the metropole. The use of the word could also indicate an exaggerated sense of self-importance, i.e., they're working for the "state."

and apparently the earl thought similarly of the secretary of state.<sup>81</sup> Perhaps the friendship between Fenton and Tyrone explains the secretary's defense of the earl. He described the earl as the "greatest amongst them and havinge eyther directlie or indirectlie an awfull supioryty ou[er] Them, he wold be as yt weare a good pleadge of them all, both to keepe them in obedyence, and to conforme them."<sup>82</sup> Fenton believed the earl had significant influence in Ulster and was, thus, the most useful to the crown. The earl could be employed against the Irish lords in the north. Fenton advised that, if the Irish council approved Tyrone's suit to defend his innocence in England in person before the queen and privy council, then his absence would indirectly temper Maguire and the other northern Irish lords. Removing Tyrone was a preventive measure, as the Irish lords were unlikely to enlarge the rebellion while the earl was away.<sup>83</sup>

This was a strategy that Fenton favored above all others: remove a powerful figure in the group, and the rebellion would die out. It was the course he had advocated earlier for Florence MacCarthy. The English government had eyed MacCarthy, a respected but ambitious Irish chieftain, with suspicion. On several occasions, MacCarthy had been detained and imprisoned in the Tower of London.<sup>84</sup> This practice was not uncommon when an Irish lord appeared powerful and thus threatening to English authorities. When Fenton had heard of the grand reception MacCarthy's young child had received in Munster, he had recommended to Burghley that since Florence was in London or near the Court, he should be detained in England until the end of summer. His justification was that if there were any foreign attempts in Munster to take over

---

<sup>81</sup> Tyrone to Fenton, 22 Mar. 1589, SP 63/142/58. III, f. 132; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 140. The earl claimed that he counted Fenton among his best friends. It is unclear as to the closeness between the two men. Either one or the other may have been deceived as to the nature of their "friendship."

<sup>82</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/17, ff. 86r-v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 172.

<sup>83</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/17, f. 86v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 172. Fenton to Burghley, 23 Dec. 1593, SP 63/172/39, f. 224; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 192. Fenton to Burghley, 14 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/26, f. 87; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 210.

<sup>84</sup> *ODNB*, "MacCarthy Reagh, Florence [Finian Mac Cárthaigh Riabhach]."

Ireland, MacCarthy would likely be a leader if he were present in the province.<sup>85</sup> If he could not be detained in England, then he should be made to pledge allegiance to the queen.<sup>86</sup> Fenton recommended the same course for dealing with Tyrone.<sup>87</sup> He suggested this plan as the most practical option to forestall the earl's growing influence and power in the north, and prevent the rebellion from escalating further.

The war, however, continued into 1594, despite the English victory over Maguire's forces at Belleek. For his part, the king of Scotland, James VI, issued a proclamation restraining his subjects from assisting the Irish insurgents, which pleased Queen Elizabeth but, as we shall see, this had little effect.<sup>88</sup> James, however, had to show his support for England given that he wanted to inherit the English throne after the death of Elizabeth. He was duplicitous, playing both sides to achieve his own ends. He sought to simultaneously support the Irish insurgents and secure his succession to the English throne, which, despite his matrilineal claims to the throne, was not inevitable.<sup>89</sup> James, therefore, was insecure and had to work for his inheritance. When his mother, Mary Queen of Scots, was still alive, he separated himself from her to maintain good relations with Elizabeth.<sup>90</sup> He made overtures (through his advisors and agents) to English

---

<sup>85</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Mar. 1593, SP 63/168/62, f. 211; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 82. William Lyon, bishop of Cork and Cloyne, to [Fenton], 8 Mar. 1593, SP 63/168/62. I, f. 212; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 82. Fenton to Burghley, 1 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 437. He also recommended this course with Donnough O'Connor Sligo (Fenton to Burghley, 24 June 1595, SP 63/180/48, f. 150; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 331).

<sup>86</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 17 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/90, f. 294; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 421.

<sup>87</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 23 Dec. 1593, SP 63/172/39, f. 224; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 192. Fenton to Burghley, 14 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/26, f. 87; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 210.

<sup>88</sup> Queen Elizabeth to King James VI, 4 Jan. 1594, SP 52/52/202, f. 19; *CSPSco*, 1593-1595, p. 258.

<sup>89</sup> Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes, introduction to *Doubtful and Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England*, eds. Doran and Kewes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 7-12; David Edwards, "Securing the Jacobean Succession: The Secret Career of James Fullerton of Trinity College, Dublin," in *The World of the Galloglass: Kings, Warlords and Warriors in Ireland and Scotland, 1200-1600*, ed. Seán Duffy (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 193.

<sup>90</sup> Doran and Kewes, "The Earlier Elizabethan Succession Question Revisited," in *Doubtful and Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England*, eds. Doran and Kewes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 35-36.

Catholics and Catholics on the European continent by promising to tolerate Catholicism if they recognized his right of succession.<sup>91</sup> He utilized his marriage connections on the continent to outmaneuver and prevent Philip II (and his daughter, the Infanta Isabella) from becoming England's next ruler. To protect his inheritance from Spain, James also tried to manage Elizabeth by preventing her from making peace with Spain. He feared that England and Spain would reach an agreement, which would jeopardize his own succession claims. He thus tried in various ways to orchestrate his succession to the English throne, and he did so by manipulating politics to his benefit.

The proclamation that James had issued prohibiting Scots from assisting the Irish insurgents was to show his loyalty to Elizabeth. However, the proclamation failed to produce the effect that the queen desired. It did not stop the Irish lords from procuring war supplies from Scotland or Scottish merchants on the coasts of Ireland. At the same time, Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam's health declined, leaving him sometimes unable to direct war proceedings. As the lord deputy begged for his revocation, English forces led by Captain John Dowdall besieged the castle of Enniskillen (see Map 5).<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup> Thomas McCoog, "A View from Abroad: Continental Powers and the Succession," in *Doubtful and Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England*, eds. Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 259-260.

<sup>92</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Sir Robert Cecil, 30 Jan. 1594, SP 63/173/10, f. 35; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 201.





Map 5 - Siege of Enniskillen, 1594, British Library, Cottonian MS Augustus I. ii, f. 39.

The secretary of state thought this siege an unwise decision given the captain's small and weakened forces.<sup>93</sup> Any success in taking the castle would be to a "small purpose," as the Irish would fight to reclaim the castle.<sup>94</sup> Moreover, the consequences of taking the castle and then losing it would be dishonorable to the state and "a dange[r]us preparac[i]on to all the Irishrie to esteeme lesse of hir ma[jes]t[es] strength, w[hi]ch they haue alwaies hethervnto feared."<sup>95</sup> On this point, Fenton was right. Warding the castle seemed more trouble than it was worth. The

<sup>93</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 1 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/16, f. 47r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 202. Captain Dowdall attested to the weakened state of his soldiers, many of whom had been sent away for sickness. He feared the loss of the castle and requested relief to the soldiers. [Dowdall to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 3 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/19. II, f. 66; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 208]. The lord deputy requested that more men be brought in to assist in keeping the castle [Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 3 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/17, f. 51; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 203].

<sup>94</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 1 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/16, f. 47r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 202.

<sup>95</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 1 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/16, f. 47r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 202.

castle siege lasted over a year, and the English eventually lost the castle, and its garrison was executed by Irish insurgents.<sup>96</sup> It had taken several relief expeditions to reinforce and resupply the castle, only for the siege to end with the killing of its officers.

The siege of Enniskillen in early 1594 had also renewed attention on the activities of Hugh Roe O'Donnell, the lord of Tirconnell in Ulster. As English forces fought at Enniskillen, Bingham reported that O'Donnell had seized two castles previously held by the English.<sup>97</sup> As with his father-in-law, Tyrone, the Irish councilors suspected that O'Donnell secretly aided and conspired with Maguire.<sup>98</sup> Reports of his involvement increased as the war continued. However, most of the Irish councilors were wary of the consequences of explicitly declaring O'Donnell a rebel. Fenton, in particular, offered this advice:

yt weare good...to haue all p[ro]ceedinge against him wth force; forborne for a tyme; and rather to wynke; then to seeme to see that, w[hi]ch w[i]thowt manie daungerose sequelles cannot be remedied, for yf hee shold be sett upon as an enemye yt were to open the Capp for a warr in the Northe; and to leave a foote for the Spaniarde to worke upon, besydes yt maie be feared that some other unstaied p[ar]ts of the Realme, w[hi]ch are apt to Ronne w[i]th occasion and oportuintie; wold not be ydle to play theyr p[ar]ts; yf they shold see the Northe in an alteracōn.<sup>99</sup>

Fenton recognized the potential for the rebellion to spread if the crown were to openly prosecute O'Donnell with force. Better for the crown to "wink" at O'Donnell's duplicity for the time being rather than act against the Irish lord. He, therefore, recommended against the use of force, at least temporarily. It was a matter of timing, and the Spanish war took precedence.

---

<sup>96</sup> Mayor of Waterford to Lord Deputy Russell, 29 Nov. 1594, SP 63/177/30, VI, f. 124; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 285. Lord Deputy Russell and Council to Privy Council, 18 May 1595, SP 63/179/82, f. 179; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 317.

<sup>97</sup> Bingham to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 19 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/45, f. 128; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 212.

<sup>98</sup> See, for example, Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 21 Oct. 1593, SP 63/172/10, f. 66; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 169.

<sup>99</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1593, SP 63/172/17, f. 86r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 172.

On one occasion, the queen and privy council agreed that pacification was the right course. In December 1593, they asked Tyrone to assist in pacifying O'Donnell and to attack him if he protected the crown's enemies.<sup>100</sup> Tyrone agreed to help, but he had one stipulation: his brother-in-law and marshal of the army, Bagenal, could not be involved in the proceedings, and he would advise O'Donnell likewise.<sup>101</sup> Tyrone pointed to the marshal and the lord deputy, accusing them both of seeking his life.<sup>102</sup> These accusations against the two Irish councilors had the air of legitimacy because of the well-known enmity between the two men and Tyrone. Both Bagenal and Fitzwilliam had tried to frustrate Tyrone's plans to dominate the Ulster province. The allegations also made things logistically difficult. While Bagenal as marshal could step aside, the lord deputy could not. The lord deputy's responsibility was to oversee the commission, even if he was not present during the proceedings. The only recourse would be to minimize the lord deputy's involvement as much as possible.

The lord deputy and council tried to follow the queen's orders concerning the commission and the use of Tyrone. The three commissioners—Loftus, Gardiner, and St. Leger—were to meet with Tyrone and O'Donnell near the Ulster-Leinster border. The Irish council gave Tyrone the authority to protect O'Donnell and 20 of his attendants until their meeting.<sup>103</sup> They also,

---

<sup>100</sup> Tyrone to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council, 8 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/22. II, f. 79; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 209.

<sup>101</sup> Tyrone to Marshal Bagenal, 17 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/64. V, f. 175; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 215. Tyrone had also mentioned that he refused to participate in the conference because, on previous occasions, he had been slenderly recompensed for his services.

<sup>102</sup> Tyrone to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council, 19 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/64. I, f. 167; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 215.

<sup>103</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to Tyrone, 23 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/64. II, f. 169; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 215. Commission granted to Lord Chancellor Loftus, Sir Robert Gardiner, and Sir Anthony St. Leger, 7 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/91. I, f. 252; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 227.

unsurprisingly, defended the lord deputy against the Tyrone's accusations, but not for long.<sup>104</sup>

For his part, the lord deputy maintained that he had always treated Tyrone with favor.<sup>105</sup>

When the meeting took place, O'Donnell was not present. Tyrone said that he could not persuade O'Donnell to attend. Nonetheless, the commissioners reached some peaceful conclusion with Tyrone, with the latter promising to be an obedient subject and not assist the rebels.<sup>106</sup>

Following the meeting, the commissioners recommended that Maguire be pardoned.<sup>107</sup> In their letter to the privy council, the commissioners laid out their justifications for the pardon. They found only two ways to proceed against the insurgents: war or pacification. If the Westminster government wanted to use force, then the commissioners advised that they do so without delay and send more soldiers and victuals. If they sought pacification, then the commissioners argued that it could not be achieved without pardoning Maguire. Though the commissioners had provided two courses to follow, the course which they preferred was clear. Pacification, they posited, was useful for many reasons: they could prevent the incursion of the Scots, reduce further damage to the Pale, and save the crown the costs of war. In its current "unready" state, the English army could not effectively confront enemy forces, estimated to be at least 2,000 men.<sup>108</sup> Although they took care not to mention their personal stake in advising negotiation, it is likely that they also feared the destruction of their estates with the war.

---

<sup>104</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 27 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/64, f. 165; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 214.

<sup>105</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 28 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/65, f. 187; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 218.

<sup>106</sup> Conclusion between the Commissioners and the Earl of Tyrone, 15 Mar. 1594, SP 63/174/43. II, f. 155; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 242.

<sup>107</sup> Loftus, Gardiner, and St. Leger to the Privy Council, 16 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/89, f. 232; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 221.

<sup>108</sup> Loftus, Gardiner, and St. Leger to the Privy Council, 16 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/89, f. 232; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 221.

Not all the Irish councilors agreed on this course, particularly after Tyrone gave the commissioners an itemized list of his grievances.<sup>109</sup> One of his complaints concerned the earlier commission with Maguire in summer 1593. According to Tyrone, Lord Chancellor Loftus had promised that he would join the marshal in the queen's service, but Tyrone claimed he had never seen the commission, nor had he been named a commissioner. Still, he claimed to have kept his promise to assist in attacking Maguire. In so doing, he had incurred many expenses, supposedly £3,000 sterling without recompense, and was himself wounded at the Battle of Belleek. What Tyrone related warrants further explanation. He had parlayed with Maguire, and on several occasions, the Irish council made it known to the privy council that Tyrone had been given approval to do so.<sup>110</sup> The real source of contention for the earl was likely whether this had officially been granted. If so, then he was liable to receive fees for the service. Given his concern about money, Tyrone claimed that he had performed a service for the crown for which he had not been paid. He was, in this respect, like so many English officers employed in Ireland.

The more serious complaints made by Tyrone concerned the lord deputy and marshal. He reiterated several of the accusations he had made earlier about the two men. He even named the marshal as his adversary and claimed the marshal and the lord deputy were "knitt together" against him.<sup>111</sup> He also alleged that the two men had taken bribes from Maguire.<sup>112</sup> The earl's most interesting claim was item 12: his opinion on how the war started. Tyrone blamed Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam for employing Sir Humphrey Willis in Fermanagh, as it was Willis's

---

<sup>109</sup> Earl of Tyrone's griefs delivered to the commissioners, March 14 1593-4, SP 63/173/89. II, f. 238; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 226.

<sup>110</sup> Earl of Tyrone to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council, 2 July 1593, SP 63/170/ 38. I, f. 125; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 123.

<sup>111</sup> Earl of Tyrone's griefs delivered to the Commissioners, 14 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/89. II, f. 240r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 226.

<sup>112</sup> Eighteenth Article sent to the Earl of Kildare by the Earl of Tyrone, 1594, SP 63/174/37. XIV, f. 120; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 241.

encroachment on Maguire's lands which had antagonized and had forced Maguire to act.<sup>113</sup>

Tyrone's justification has since become a widely accepted explanation of why the war started, and it is not difficult to ascertain why. Tyrone provided a narrative with a clear (i.e., dateable) incident of provocation and no uncertainty as to the perpetrators. It does, however, raise questions about the earl's reliability as a narrator in events which directly concerned him.

Maguire's rebellion likely provided the justification Tyrone needed to be at war with the crown and, in this, he had the support of other Ulstermen.

Tyrone's charges against the lord deputy prompted Fitzwilliam to change course. Rather than favoring pacification, he now sought Tyrone's prosecution with military force. Fitzwilliam thought the earl manufactured grievances against him with the aim of "standing vpon a defence to drawe her ma[jes]tie: by a course of pacificac[i]on to give him remedie for some of his privat greif[es] against me and the m[ar]shall."<sup>114</sup> In other words, the lord deputy alleged that Tyrone was trying to use process of pacification to satisfy his own personal animosity against the two men. Bagenal likewise thought that Tyrone created "imaginatife quarrell[es]" to disparage him, while the earl brought Ulster to his "absolute dependencie."<sup>115</sup> Whether or not these allegations against the lord deputy and the marshal were justifiable, the accusations served their purpose. They enabled the queen to consider pacification, as this course was a means to correct the wrongdoing of English officers in Ireland and to regain the earl's loyalty. Were the English officers not at fault, then the queen may have been less inclined to negotiate peace, or so Fitzwilliam reasoned. The lord deputy could no longer defend Tyrone as he had previously.

---

<sup>113</sup> Earl of Tyrone's griefs delivered to the Commissioners, 14 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/89. II, ff. 240v-241r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 226.

<sup>114</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 21 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/92, f. 262r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 228.

<sup>115</sup> Bagenal to Burghley, 26 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/97, f. 281v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 229.

Instead, in a council letter dated March 1594, he requested 1,500 soldiers from England to Ireland to confront militarily Tyrone, O'Donnell, and any others in league with them.<sup>116</sup> This stance stood in stark contrast to his earlier defense of Tyrone and of the course advocated for war against Maguire.

Now that Fitzwilliam had joined Bingham and Bagenal in supporting calls for a large-scale campaign, the Irish council was, once again, at odds. It mattered little when Bagenal and Bingham dissented from the opinion of the councilors at Dublin. The Dublin councilors could still effectively do as they wished while the two martial men were preoccupied in small battles. The lord deputy's new stance, however, was of greater significance because he led the Irish council. The problem for the Irish councilors—and for the queen and the privy council in England—was the naming of the lord deputy in Tyrone's list of grievances. The conflict now seemed personal or private in nature. They considered whether the immediate revocation of Fitzwilliam could solve their problems with Tyrone.<sup>117</sup> They had done the same with Perrot in 1588, removing an incendiary and unpopular figure in Irish politics. The Irish councilors sought

---

<sup>116</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to the Privy Council, 20 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/91, f. 250; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 227.

<sup>117</sup> See, for example, Sir William Weston to Sir John Puckering, Keeper of the Great Seal, 9 Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/81, f. 218; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 221. Fenton advised the dismissal of both Bagenal and Fitzwilliam (Fenton to Burghley, 4 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/5, f. 12; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 230). Fenton's previous letter to Burghley had addressed the lord deputy's growing sickness (Fenton to Burghley, 17 Feb. 1594, SP 63/173/40, f. 118; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 212). It should be noted that the relationship between Fitzwilliam and Fenton was a rocky one. Like the lords deputy prior, Fenton had a good working relationship with them initially. Over time, their relationship deteriorated, and Fitzwilliam was no different. Though the two shared similar views on military policy, the two men clashed. While Fenton was in England, working for almost two years as a commissioner in the trial of Perrot, Fitzwilliam had allowed his personal secretary, Philip Williams, to infringe on Fenton's secretarial duties and usurp his fees (Fenton's private requests, qv. June 1592, SP 63/165/29, f. 183; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 533). Williams stated that he feared for his life after receiving a letter from Fenton, and thereafter Williams begged the Council to rescue him from Fenton's "unconscionable and violent demande" (Philip Williams to Burghley and the Privy Council, 10 June 1593, *Lansdowne* 75, f. 94). Recognizing that his return to the Irish council would be fraught with tension, Fenton had requested that the privy council write to the Irish council of their good opinion of him (Remembrances of Fenton, qv. June 1592, SP 63/165/28, f. 181; *CSPIre*, p. 533). They assented and added that despite the late "unkindness between the two men," Fenton should be used favorably by the lord deputy (*APC*, vol. 23, pp. 57-59). The advice was not taken. Fenton found himself at odds with the lord deputy and, at times, alienated from the Irish council. The war, then, offered a convenient means to rid himself of Fitzwilliam.

to do the same with Fitzwilliam in the hopes of regaining Tyrone's loyalty, and they had the support of the Westminster government.<sup>118</sup>

Fitzwilliam's revocation had been initiated earlier in 1593 following the proceedings with Tyrone and Maguire. His removal now seemed expedient (given the earl's complaints) and urgent. The queen appointed Bingham and Gardiner to serve as lords justices when the lord deputy's illness seemed grave.<sup>119</sup> The lord deputy was supposed to transfer power to the lords justices, but the two men complained that Fitzwilliam still retained the sword. This meant that he would continue to act as chief governor.<sup>120</sup> Pressed to explain why he did not relinquish authority to the lords justices, Fitzwilliam claimed that Gardiner was unfit for the office.<sup>121</sup> He alleged that Gardiner took bribes and implied that the judge had a close relationship with the traitorous earl. Just three days after Fitzwilliam wrote this letter and was bedridden, his secretary reported that the Irish councilors had entered the lord deputy's bedchamber to demand he give up the sword to the lords justices.<sup>122</sup> According to the report, the councilors stated that it was the queen's wish to have Tyrone "put from feare."<sup>123</sup>

---

<sup>118</sup> The Westminster and Dublin councils enlisted the help of the earl of Ormond to communicate personally with Tyrone. Fenton to Ormond, 23 Mar. 1594, SP 63/174/43. I, f. 153; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 242 and Fenton to Ormond, 9 May 1594, SP 63/174/43. IV, f. 158; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 243. Burghley to Ormond, 7 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/6, f. 14; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 230. Ormond to Tyrone, 19 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/59. I, f. 228; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 247. Tyrone promised to live dutifully (Tyrone to Ormond, 7 May 1594, SP 63/174/59. III, f. 230; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 247).

<sup>119</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council [Draft], [14?] Mar. 1594, SP 63/173/85, f. 225; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 221.

<sup>120</sup> Sir Robert Gardiner to Cecil, 21 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/21, f. 66; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 2.

<sup>121</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 19 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/18, f. 43; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 231.

<sup>122</sup> Relation of the speeches delivered by the Lord Chancellor to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 21 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/23. I, f. 72; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 237. The councilors present during this incident were: Loftus, Jones, Gardiner, Napier, St. Leger, and Weston.

<sup>123</sup> Relation of the speeches delivered by the Lord Chancellor to the Lord Deputy, 21 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/23. I, f. 72r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 237.



When the councilors explained their actions to the queen and privy council, they emphasized the urgency and seriousness of the situation.<sup>124</sup> They were trying to procure a meeting with Tyrone to ascertain his loyalty as the queen had ordered. However, they doubted that the earl would meet with them because the lord deputy retained the sword, and the earl had a "deepe distrust" of him.<sup>125</sup> Nevertheless, they did not think that sending for Tyrone now would increase his fears, as he already had great forces prepared and they lacked the military resources to confront him on the battlefield. Any further delay in securing Tyrone's submission, they claimed, would cause more significant problems, and they had already received reports that Spanish forces would soon be invading Ireland. They summed up their position thus:

Wee all, vppon theis reasons and ground[es], and foreseing besyd[es], what long tyme might be spent in sending and receaving direcc[i]ons from hir ma[jes]tie; and what p[er]ills might ensue thereby, by giving therle tyme to pr[e]pare himself further for anie bad attempt[es], and leaving o[u]rselues vnpr[e]pared.<sup>126</sup>

They simply could not afford to wait. They seemed convinced that Tyrone was preparing for war and sought to prevent it by any means. That they had entered the lord deputy's bedchamber while he was sick to force him to resign seemed necessary considering escalating tensions.

Fitzwilliam rejected the idea that the Irish councilors acted out of political necessity. He believed they wanted to be rid of him and were eager to seize for themselves his authority.<sup>127</sup> He maintained that Gardiner and Weston were corrupt, for they supposedly defended two officers who had refused to take the oath of supremacy. He may have had personal issues with Weston and Gardiner or truly found them incompetent in their offices. But Fitzwilliam was himself under

---

<sup>124</sup> The Irish Council to the Privy Council, 22 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/22, f. 68; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 237. The signatures on the letter now also include Fenton and Walsh.

<sup>125</sup> The Irish Council to the Privy Council, 22 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/22, f. 68r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 237.

<sup>126</sup> The Irish Council to the Privy Council, 22 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/22, f. 68r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 237.

<sup>127</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 22 Apr. 1594, SP 63/174/23, f. 70; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 237.

attack. Tyrone's accusations of the lord deputy's misconduct motivated Fitzwilliam to defend his actions while he was still the lord deputy, despite his declining health. He likely feared the kind of retrospective punishment that Perrot had faced.<sup>128</sup> This was especially true now that the Irish councilors had turned against him.

It was within this hostile environment between Fitzwilliam and the Irish councilors that Captain Thomas Lee, a kinsman of the earls of Essex and longtime army officer in Ireland, complained about Fitzwilliam at the English court.<sup>129</sup> Lee fought in the Nine Years' War and had helped English forces at the Battle of Belleek. His supposedly friendly relationship with Tyrone led to his role as a "peacemaker" in negotiations between the earl and the commissioners in March 1594.<sup>130</sup> Lee wrote two tracts, the "Information" and a "Brief declaration of the government of Ireland," detailing the corruption of Fitzwilliam's government and blaming Fitzwilliam as the instigator of the war.<sup>131</sup> Lee repeated many of the same points from Tyrone's articles of grievances.<sup>132</sup> He also stated that the country's stirring up proceeded from Fitzwilliam's appointment of a new sheriff. Lee's principal criticism of Fitzwilliam was his reputedly lousy character, which had rendered the former lord deputy susceptible to taking bribes. The former lord deputy had, according to Lee, "neither care nor conscience."<sup>133</sup> Rather than serve the queen honestly, Fitzwilliam was charged with using his office for personal gain

---

<sup>128</sup> Hiram Morgan, "The Deputy's Defence: Sir William Fitzwilliam's Apology on the Outbreak of the Nine Years' Ireland," *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* 114C (2014): 195.

<sup>129</sup> *ODNB*, "Lee, Thomas."

<sup>130</sup> John McGurk, "Hugh O'Neill, 2nd Earl of Tyrone & Captain Thomas Lee, Double-Agent," *Dúiche Néill* 15 (2006): 11- 25. McGurk mentions that the relationship between the earl and Lee is somewhat unclear, though Lee did serve as a broker during war negotiations (11). See also, James P. Myers, "Murdering Heart...Murdering Hand": Captain Thomas Lee of Ireland, Elizabethan Assassin," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 22, no. 1 (1991): 47-60; Hiram Morgan, "Tom Lee: The Posing Peacemaker," in *Representing Ireland: Literature and the Origins of Conflict 1534-1660*, eds. Brendan Bradshaw, Andrew Hadfield, and Willy Maley (Cambridge, U.K; NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>131</sup> Lee, *Informacion given Queen Elizabeth against Sir William Fitzwilliam; his government in Ireland; idem, Brief Declaration of the Government of Ireland* in John Lodge, *Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica I*, (Dublin, 1772).

<sup>132</sup> McGurk, "Hugh O'Neill," 24.

<sup>133</sup> Lee, *A brief Declaration of the Government of Ireland*, 601.

and to favor his followers.<sup>134</sup> These were bold claims that seemed to convey the opinion of most of the Irish council on Fitzwilliam's bad leadership.

A major problem with Lee's accusations against Fitzwilliam is not only that they were a repetition of Tyrone's articles, but also that Lee had a hostile relationship with Fitzwilliam before writing the treatises. The two men had been at odds. Fitzwilliam had refused to pay Lee's horsemen in sterling money; he had supported another councilor, Sir Nicholas White, in an incident involving the burning of Lee's house (which Lee attributed to White's friends); and had supposedly taken lands that belonged to Lee.<sup>135</sup> Lee, therefore, held a grudge. His treatises should consequently be read with extreme caution. Still, recognition of Lee's biases does not mean that what Lee alleged about Fitzwilliam was entirely false. Fitzwilliam may very well have been corrupt. He died in 1599 heavily in debt, leading one to suspect that his financial situation may have induced him to corrupt practices. However, without concrete proof from less biased sources, one can only guess what may have happened. Whether Lee's allegations of Fitzwilliam's corruption are true has not, as yet, been convincingly proven.

What we do know is Lee's affinity for Tyrone. Lee believed the earl to be genuine in his protestations of loyalty and that he had served the queen well. Lee emphasized that Tyrone had come before the lord deputy and council without pardon or protection. Any disobedience on Tyrone's part could be explained by the earl's complaints against the Irish council.<sup>136</sup> After all, if the earl was really "so bad as they [the lord deputy and council] would enforce [...] he might very

---

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 601. Fitzwilliam, of course, wrote his own tract in defense (Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 12 June 1594, SP 63/175/5, f. 33; *CSP Ire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 250). It is difficult to ascertain the veracity of Fitzwilliam's Apology. Like others before him, he wrote reports defending his actions as lord deputy. He recollected and justified events that had occurred several years prior. As Morgan acknowledges, Fitzwilliam had likely written the Apology only a few months before his death in June 1599. He made his will in March of that same year. For these reasons, the Apology is suspect.

<sup>135</sup> *ODNB*, "Lee, Thomas."

<sup>136</sup> Myers, "Murdering Hand...Murdering Heart," 52-53.

easily cut off many of your majesty's forces which are laid in garrison in small troops [...] and overrun all your English pale to the utter ruin thereof."<sup>137</sup> Lee's defense of Tyrone could easily be regarded as treasonous. However, Lee's 1594 mission to England and the Gheeraerts portrait of him were two mediums through which he portrayed himself as a peacemaker (see Image 8).<sup>138</sup>



Image 8 - Portrait of Thomas Lee by Marcus Gheeraerts the Younger, 1594.

---

<sup>137</sup> Thomas Lee, *A brief Declaration of the Government of Ireland; opening many corruptions in the same; discovering the discontentments of the Irishry; and the causes moving those expected troubles: and shewing means how to establish quietness in that kingdom honourably, to your majesty's profit, without any encrease of charge.* in *An Historical and Critical Review of the Civil Wars in Ireland [...]*, vol. 1, transcr. John Curry (Dublin, repr. 1810), p. 596, CELT.

<sup>138</sup> Morgan, "Tom Lee," 141.

He wanted to serve as an intermediary, or broker, between the English crown and Tyrone. With his portrait, he reminded Elizabethans of his service and loyalty to the crown. The portrait itself is an allegory from Livy about the Roman hero, Gaius Mucius Scaevola, and the war between Rome and Clusium. Scaevola supposedly thrust his hands into a fire to illustrate the bravery of Romans, and when the Clusian king heard of this sacrifice, he agreed to make peace with Rome. Scaevola was then rewarded for his role in ending the war.<sup>139</sup> Using this classical allusion, Lee suggested to the crown that, like Scaevola, he was also making a sacrifice. He was willing to figuratively become an Irishman—as indicated by his attire of an Irish kerne in the portrait—in service of the English state. His relations with Tyrone, therefore, were to effect a peaceful conclusion to the war.

Lee failed to convince the Westminster government of his utility during this 1594 mission, and he upset Burghley in the process with his excessive criticism of Burghley's client, Fitzwilliam.<sup>140</sup> He returned to his former post in Ireland but continued to make repeated attempts to mediate. He would later gain the opportunity to play peacemaker, but his mediation efforts failed. In the end, Lee's trust in Tyrone was misplaced. Of Lee, Sir Robert Cecil, Lord Burghley's son, professed that Lee "doth pretend he could do much to cure these needless jealousies in the Earl of Tyrone, which keep him from repairing to the State."<sup>141</sup> But Lee was duped by Tyrone, which indicated to Morgan, "a measure of O'Neill's Machiavellian character that he was able to convince Lee of his pacific intentions and employ him as a messenger-boy which in turn misled the government or at least a section of it to his own advantage."<sup>142</sup>

---

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 143.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 144-145.

<sup>141</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 180.

<sup>142</sup> Morgan, 158.

## A Change in the Irish Administration

By May 1594, the queen informed the lord deputy and council of the appointment of Sir William Russell as the new lord deputy (see Image 9).<sup>143</sup>



Image 9 - Engraving of William Russell, later 1st Baron Russell of Thornhaugh, William Greatbach, Scottish National Portrait Gallery, date unknown.

In her instructions to Russell, she noted that Tyrone only pretended to live in fear and, if the earl's promises proved false, then Russell was to use force to bring Ulster to obedience.<sup>144</sup>

Russell arrived in Ireland at the end of July.<sup>145</sup> Meanwhile, the Irish council received more

---

<sup>143</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council, 3 May 1594, SP 63/174/34, f. 93; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 238. Instructions for Sir William Russell, 3 May 1594, SP 63/174/35, f. 95; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 238. *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 90-92.

<sup>144</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 90-92.

<sup>145</sup> Russell did not officially assume the governorship until 11 August 1594 (Memorial of the affairs of Tirone from 17 May 1593 to 11 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/45, f. 209; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 261).

reports of Tyrone's actions against the crown.<sup>146</sup> These reports prompted the councilors to advise the Westminster government that it was "but a dangerous p[ro]traction to expect by anie furth[e]r treatie to drawe him and his to anie Conformitie."<sup>147</sup> They were now primarily of one opinion that "this Erle (as is the vsuall manner of all traitors and ever hath bene) seeke to Cover (as vndre a vaile) his long fore intended deseignes."<sup>148</sup> And they requested, once again, the sending over of 1,500 soldiers. Most of the Irish councilors were now in agreement with Fitzwilliam's earlier advice on the need for military force.

Only Fenton still seemed hesitant, though he recognized that Tyrone aspired to dominance in Ulster. The secretary of state still feared the repercussions of acting against him since he had many followers in the north. This remained the reason to pursue pacification by negotiation rather than force, which would be "full of inconveniences and daungerus sequell[es]."<sup>149</sup> By August, however, Fenton feared that Tyrone's discontentments had a "more Inwarde Roote."<sup>150</sup> Fenton now saw that it was no longer just an issue of personal antagonism towards the lord deputy and marshal, but rather against English authority and government. Moreover, he suspected the Irish were attempting a smoke and mirror gambit. He believed that they deliberately excluded Tyrone's name so that "in his owne p[er]son he might stand clearie, to be an instrum[en]t to worke for them, when oportunitie shold serue."<sup>151</sup> In all of their workings,

---

<sup>146</sup> Among the reports they received from captains and other officers, they also received intelligences. See, for example, Note of intelligences received out of the North, [20 May] 1594, SP 63/174/55, f. 215; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 246.

<sup>147</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to Privy Council, 5 May 1594, SP 63/174/37, f. 101r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 239.

<sup>148</sup> Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and Council to Privy Council, 5 May 1594, SP 63/174/37, f. 101r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 239. Gardiner did not sign the letter. Fitzwilliam sent his secretary, Zachary Peers, to get Gardiner's signature, but Gardiner said he did not sign the council letter because he was sick and not present when the letter was drafted. According to Peers, though Gardiner liked what the lord deputy and council had done, Gardiner could not put his hand to it (Certificate of Zachary Peers, 7 May 1594, SP 63/174/38. I, f. 123; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 241).

<sup>149</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 7 May 1594, SP 63/174/43, f. 151v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 242.

<sup>150</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 2 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/36, f. 186r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 260.

<sup>151</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 2 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/36, f. 186r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 260.

"therle is not sene in p[er]son, he kepeth a Looffe, and writeth to the State that he hath noe intermedling in theis doinges."<sup>152</sup> Tyrone, Fenton alleged, pretended to be angry at his followers and claimed that he could do little to restrain them. But it was all an act.

In mid-August 1594, Tyrone submitted on his knees before Lord Deputy Russell and the council, professing that with the arrival of a new lord deputy, he could now offer his services to help the crown army.<sup>153</sup> This display of loyalty to the English crown seemed to produce the intended effect, for it cast further doubt on Fitzwilliam and Bagenal. Russell claimed that the council was divided about Tyrone's allegations against the two men.<sup>154</sup> Despite the evidence which Bagenal provided to show Tyrone's involvement in the violence that had occurred, the Irish council deferred charges against the earl.<sup>155</sup> Russell, in particular, seemed moved by Tyrone's coming into Dublin without security or without assurances of safety.<sup>156</sup>

And yet, when the Irish councilors tried to negotiate peace terms, Tyrone made excuses, once again, to avoid such discussions. These delays prompted an irate letter from the queen.<sup>157</sup> She mostly absolved Russell because he was new.<sup>158</sup> Instead, she pointedly criticized the Irish council for accepting the earl's "excuses and subterfuges."<sup>159</sup> Their failure to detain Tyrone considering the charges against him was, the queen stressed, "as foul an oversight as ever was

---

<sup>152</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 2 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/36, f. 186r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 260.

<sup>153</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 95-97.

<sup>154</sup> Sir William Russell to Cecil, 16 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/52, f. 230; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 262.

<sup>155</sup> Articles preferred by Marshal Bagenal against Tyrone, 17 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/71. I, f. 279; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 265. Resolution of the Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 17 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/56. IV, f. 246; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 263. *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 97-99.

<sup>156</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 18 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/56, f. 237; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 263.

<sup>157</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 99-100.

<sup>158</sup> This seemed to be a pattern with new chief governors and Tyrone. When Fitzwilliam had returned to Ireland in 1588 to serve as lord deputy, he too had supported Tyrone even though Tyrone had had to defend his execution of Gavelach in front of the privy council. See, for example, Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 27 Mar. 1590, SP 63/151/39, f. 126; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 326.

<sup>159</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 100. The queen wrote similarly in spring 1595 when she reprimanded the temperate course they had taken with the earl (Queen to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, [20] Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/99, f. 236; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 305).



committed in that kingdom."<sup>160</sup> They should have detained Tyrone until the queen and privy council had issued further instructions. To the lord deputy, the queen wrote a private letter. She admonished Russell, as she had the councilors, but added that it was strange that he had not found "some underhand way to bring in the Earl."<sup>161</sup> She reminded the lord deputy that he had not been sent to Ireland to "'cry 'aim' to the Council, but to sharpen and quicken their conceipts, if either partiality or timorousness do make them cold or negligent."<sup>162</sup>

The Irish council's willingness to let Tyrone leave Dublin seemed at odds with its recent calls for military action against him. Judging by the surviving correspondence, only Fenton continued to advise negotiation.<sup>163</sup> He was, however, only one voice among many. The majority of councilors had either changed their minds and convinced the lord deputy to accept Tyrone's supposed submission, or Russell had acted on his own during the proceedings. It is unlikely that the councilors reverted to their previous pacification policy because they had already suspected the earl of deception. Though Russell doubted Tyrone, like most of the councilors, the queen had instructed him to apply force *only if* the earl's promises proved false. Clearly, there was still some miscommunication about how to proceed with the earl, or so the lord deputy wanted the queen and privy council to believe.

Months later, Russell provided further reasons why he had released Tyrone. He claimed he had no justification for holding him because he was never acquainted with the charges against Tyrone for treason, either before he came or when he had arrived in Ireland. However, this explanation is contrary to the surviving evidence, particularly the queen's instructions for Russell

---

<sup>160</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 100.

<sup>161</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 101.

<sup>162</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 101.

<sup>163</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 19 Aug. 1594, SP 63/175/68, f. 272; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 265.

where she had made it explicitly clear that Tyrone was untrustworthy.<sup>164</sup> It is also more than likely that the Irish councilors would have voiced their opinions, many of whom (apart from Fenton) advocated for force against Tyrone. Nevertheless, Russell professed ignorance, claiming that he had not been appropriately briefed about the earl. He further stated that he did not know of the previous proceedings with Tyrone because the documents which contained this information had not been delivered to him until the day before he had met with the earl. He suggested that the man to blame was the previous lord deputy, Fitzwilliam. Fitzwilliam was supposed to prepare the documents before Russell's arrival and before he departed for England. However, Russell claimed that he had failed to do so, leaving the new lord deputy to assume that the earl's treasons were trivial.

Though Fitzwilliam had been sick in the months preceding Russell's arrival (which Russell conveniently neglected to mention), Russell also accused Fitzwilliam of mismanaging the situation:

If the imputinge of yt to others might lessen my error I could also alleadge the whole course of this action from the first to haue ben so ill managed by S[i]r Willm ffitzwillms as thing[es] being as I founde them we could in reason haue done no otherwise then wee did. But I will not be tedious in discoursing thereof, onely this one point I will touche, that the very originall of all the Earles insolencies and disloyall actions, hath proceeded of the escape of Odonell, and Shane Oneiles son[n]es: And the discharging of the former Constable w[i]thout cause and placinge his owne man doth vehemently vrge a suspic[i]on of some greate composic[i]ons in that matter being lightlie passed ou[er] after the escape, and consideringe that Sr Iohn Perrott had tolde him self that he had bene offerd 1500li. for to sett him at libertie.<sup>165</sup>

Russell, therefore, admitted his error but placed the blame squarely on Fitzwilliam. Moreover, he

---

<sup>164</sup> Instructions for Sir William Russell to be Lord Deputy of Ireland, 3 May 1594, SP 63/174/35, f. 95; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 238.

<sup>165</sup> The reasons of the lord deputy Russell for not detaining Tyrone, 3 Apr. 1595, SP 63/179/6, f. 9v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 309.

made a serious allegation of treason against Fitzwilliam. He hinted that the former lord deputy had taken a hefty bribe to have the sons of Ulster lords released from prison; Hugh Roe O'Donnell, the now insurgent, was among this group. This incident occurred in 1592 while Fitzwilliam was still serving as lord deputy.<sup>166</sup> At the time, Russell was in England after serving in the Low Countries and likely heard rumors of the incident before leaving England.<sup>167</sup> Russell's recall of an incident for which he had been absent indicated a strong dislike of Fitzwilliam, as the rumor suggested that Fitzwilliam had some involvement in the release of prisoners who would lead the Nine Years' War.

Russell still had to contend with the current issue of how to get the Ulster lords to negotiate an end to the war. O'Donnell, Maguire, and Tyrone repeated the pattern of promising to be obedient subjects but, once again, only delayed their submission. These stalling tactics provided further evidence that the Irish council had been wrong to let Tyrone go in the summer of 1594.<sup>168</sup> Lord Deputy Russell certainly regretted this choice.<sup>169</sup> Bingham thought the time they had wasted over the summer had allowed the insurgents to further their efforts.<sup>170</sup> They seemed to be continually gathering greater forces. Tyrone had also recently taken up the Catholic cause, which Fenton believed was really "a Cloke to cover his ambicion and to make him stronge and popular thorow the whole Realme."<sup>171</sup> He was reaching out to foreign princes and with some

---

<sup>166</sup> Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion*, 110.

<sup>167</sup> *ODNB*, "Russell, William, first Baron Russell of Thornhaugh." Russell likely discussed the situation in Ireland with Essex before leaving, as Essex's sister was married to Perrot's son and had sought to save Perrot in 1592. On this connection, see Paul E. J. Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 134.

<sup>168</sup> O'Donnell to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 25 Aug. 1594, SP 63/176/11. II, f. 23; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 270. Maguire to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 26 Aug. 1594, SP 63/176/11. III, f. 25; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 270. Tyrone to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 1 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176/11. IX, f. 34; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 270.

<sup>169</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 22 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176/32, f. 80; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 274.

<sup>170</sup> Bingham to Sir John Puckering, 23 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176/35, f. 86; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 274.

<sup>171</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 5 Dec. 1594, SP 63/177/31, f. 126r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 285.

success, as intelligence reports indicated.<sup>172</sup> There was news that an Irishman had recently returned from Spain and had declared that a small pinnace was sent out of St. Anderos heading for the north of Ireland about twenty days ago.<sup>173</sup> Regardless, the report bolstered the crown's view that Tyrone was plotting with the Spanish king. The lord deputy and council now admitted that they had erred in their dealings with him.<sup>174</sup> He had undermined the government in secret, while pretending to be a good subject. He made "fryvolus surmises" about the threat to his life to avoid going to Dublin and discussing peace.<sup>175</sup> He was also mustering forces and stockpiling gunpowder.<sup>176</sup> One thing was now clear: Tyrone was preparing for war, and so too should the crown.<sup>177</sup>

So it was that, in late 1594, Fenton slowly changed his tune. While he maintained that military action was still too costly and would take time, he now conceded that pacification might not be the best route. Pacification could cure the wound for a time, but the scar would remain and the "easy saluing of so greate soares, a daungerus example is given both to theis Rebels, and all others yll affected, to breake Loose againe in an after tyme, and insult w[i]th a greater insolency."<sup>178</sup> Yet, Fenton seemed deeply conflicted. In one letter, he requested the sending over of more forces to terrify the enemies.<sup>179</sup> Then, two weeks later, he debated the advantages of temporizing with the enemies.<sup>180</sup> He agreed that Tyrone was of dubious character, but he was

---

<sup>172</sup> Certain advertisements lately sent concerning the Earl of Tyrone, 28 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176 /60. IV, f. 165; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 278.

<sup>173</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1594, SP 63/177/11, f. 36r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 282. Fenton to Burghley, 15 Dec. 1594, SP 63/177/43, f. 154r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 287.

<sup>174</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to Queen Elizabeth, 5 Dec. 1594, SP 63/177/31. II, f. 130; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 285.

<sup>175</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 5 Dec. 1594, SP 63/177/31, f. 126r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 285.

<sup>176</sup> Memorandum in Fenton's hand addressed to "Your Honor," [? Nov.] 1594, SP 63/177/28, f. 88; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 284.

<sup>177</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Dec. 1594, SP 63/177/43, f. 154; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 287.

<sup>178</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 15 Nov. 1594, SP 63/177/11, f. 36r-v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 282.

<sup>179</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 23 Jan. 1595, SP 63/178/15, f. 32; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 292.

<sup>180</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 6 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/38, f. 82; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 296.

unsure of the course they should take and whether they should proclaim the earl a traitor.<sup>181</sup> As Fenton prevaricated in his personal letters to Burghley, the lord deputy and the rest of the Irish council did not. Nearly the entire province of Ulster was now in revolt. They needed more troops. Temporizing was no longer an option.<sup>182</sup>

It took a long time for the Irish council to conclude that Tyrone was a traitor and needed to be dealt with by force. However clever Tyrone had been, the Irish council had always had misgivings about his loyalty. They had suspected his involvement from very early on, hence the queen and privy council's dissatisfaction with using Tyrone for negotiations and the subsequent need to explain their dealings with him. Most of the Irish councilors, especially the martial men, had pushed for using military force against Tyrone and the other Ulster lords from the beginning. Only a select few had held out hope that he would be a loyal subject, and it was this wishful thinking—and fear of the worst—which had pushed councilors like Fenton to advocate for pacification by negotiation. By the time of Fitzwilliam's removal, only one councilor expressed uncertainty over the policy of force, even as negotiation seemed less and less likely.

Political and financial pressures had demanded that the Irish councilors create or provide opportunities for negotiation. The crown could not afford a war in Ireland, and the Irish councilors were unwilling to jeopardize their own estates in Ireland. The queen did not equivocate. She consistently maintained that the insurgents should be dealt with by force. In the brief moments when she considered pacification, it was to return a once loyal and politically useful subject back to the crown and end the war.

---

<sup>181</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 3 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/68, f. 166; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 301.

<sup>182</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 5 Dec. 1594, SP 63/177/30, f. 91; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 284. Lord Deputy Russell to Cecil, 8 Dec. 1594, SP 63/177/37, f. 142; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 286.

But the war did not proceed as the crown hoped. Rather, it escalated quickly in 1595. In January, the English and Irish councils focused on mustering forces to send into Ireland. The queen and privy council resolved to reallocate soldiers from Brittany and transport them to Dublin.<sup>183</sup> Meanwhile, the lord deputy prepared troops for a general hosting into Ulster.<sup>184</sup> In February, English forces surrendered the fort at Blackwater.<sup>185</sup> By the end of March, Tyrone clashed with Bagenal and his troops at the Battle of Clontibret.

When the English lost at the Battle at Clontibret in 1595, they realized that they had underestimated the enemy forces. Upon examining a lieutenant who had fought at Clontibret (Tucher Perkins), the lord deputy reported that the Irish army had "manie verie well trayned shott, and to the number of 300 in red Coates like to our English souldiers bearing pikes."<sup>186</sup> In another letter, he wrote, "their Armor and weapons, and their skill and practise therein farr exceeding their wonted vsage, having not onely greate store of Pykes and musketts, but also many trayned and experienced leaders."<sup>187</sup> This new Irish army was "wonderfully altered from their Irish mann[er] of Armes and weapons."<sup>188</sup> Sir John Norris also backed this view, suggesting to Burghley that the Irish army had better arms and more men and munitions.<sup>189</sup> Although neither

---

<sup>183</sup> Notes of a consultation of the privy council relative to sending soldiers to Ireland, 7 Jan. 1595, SP 63/178/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 289. See also, Lord Deputy Russell to Cecil, 24 Jan. 1595, SP 63/178/17, f. 36; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 292. Lord Deputy Russell reported that Tyrone knew the Brittany forces were being redirected to Ireland before the privy council's letter had arrived, suggesting a possible leak in intelligence (Lord Deputy Russell and Council to Privy Council, 26 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/54, f. 126; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 299). Russell thought this knowledge had caused the earl to become more destructive (Lord Deputy Russell to Cecil, 26 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/55, f. 133; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 299).

<sup>184</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to Privy Council, 26 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/54, f. 126; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 299. Lord Deputy Russell and Council to Privy Council, 8 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/80, f. 198; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 303.

<sup>185</sup> Declaration of Edward Cornwall concerning the assault and surrender of the fort and two castles of the Black Water to Arte MacBaron, 19 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/70. I, f. 172; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 301. Also, Declaration of Henry March, 20 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/53. II, f. 120; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 298.

<sup>186</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/6, f. 14v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 322

<sup>187</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/5, f. 9r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 321.

<sup>188</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/5, f. 9r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 321.

<sup>189</sup> Norris to Burghley, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/8, f. 40; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 323.

the lord deputy nor Norris was present during the battle, the lieutenant who was, Tucher Perkins, noted similarly. He noted that there were shot in Tyrone's army and that the Irish seemed to have a large supply of gunpowder.<sup>190</sup> It was this battle at Clontibret that convinced high-ranking military officials in Ireland that the war would not be easily won, and that Tyrone fought for the Irish.

Further reports of Tyrone's intimidation tactics against the Ulster lords only bolstered the crown's view of his involvement in the war.<sup>191</sup> The crown proclaimed Tyrone a traitor in June, and, in August, Tyrone and O'Donnell reportedly offered the kingship of Ireland to Archduke Albert, governor of Spanish Netherlands.<sup>192</sup> There were other reports that Tyrone obtained gunpowder from Glasgow and other areas in Scotland.<sup>193</sup> Perhaps the most disturbing news of all came in a hastily scribbled note by the Irish secretary of state: Turlough was dead, and Tyrone had gone to the inauguration stone chair known as *Leac na Ri* (the "flagstone of kings") to take the name and title of O'Neill.<sup>194</sup> Intercepted letters by Tyrone and O'Donnell to the king of Spain were the final confirmation of the earl's aggressive intentions.<sup>195</sup>

The English regime in Ireland was now forced on the defensive. Whether or not they could pacify the enemies or force them to obedience, they had to shore up their defenses in the extreme likelihood that the war would continue. As they waited for reinforcements of men,

---

<sup>190</sup> Declaration of Lieutenant Tucher Perkins, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/5. II, f. 12; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 322.

<sup>191</sup> O'Neill, *The Nine Years' War*, 40-41.

<sup>192</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 24 June 1595, SP 63/180/48, f. 150; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 331. Fenton to Burghley, 26 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/63, f. 251; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 372.

<sup>193</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 26 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/63, f. 251; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 372.

<sup>194</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 10 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/23, f. 76; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 386. See also, Edward Brandon and Patrick Stanley, bailiffs of Dundalk, to the Lord Deputy, 10 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/42, f. 96; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 296. There was also the likelihood that merchants were selling the insurgents gunpowder (Lord Deputy Russell and Council to Privy Council, 27 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/57, f. 136; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 300).

<sup>195</sup> O'Neill, alias Tirone, and O'Donnell to the Philip II, king of Spain, 27 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/60 f. 200; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 406. O'Neill, alias Tirone, and O'Donnell to Don John de L'Aguila, 27 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/62, f. 204; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 407.

victuals, and munitions, they focused on weak spots in Ireland likely to be used by foreign forces. Even the secretary of state assisted in fortifying towns. Fenton traveled along the coasts of Munster, assessing the state of defense in cities like Waterford, Cork, and Kinsale.<sup>196</sup> As he went from city to city, he took charge of the erection of beacons, where needed, and the appointment of people to keep watch over the beacons. He also made note of the defensibility of the walls and the number of men who could be enlisted as soldiers. Of particular concern to Fenton as he passed through these cities was how likely the citizens were to oppose the Spanish were they to invade. Despite the people being "corrupted in religion," Fenton believed the great majority of them remained loyal to the Queen, "for having of long tyme tasted of the sweetnes of hir Ma[jes]ty gou[er]nem[en]t they will not chaunge yf for the tyrannous yoke of the Spaniarde."<sup>197</sup>

The shoring up of defenses seemed for naught when, in October 1595, Tyrone agreed to a cessation of arms for two months.<sup>198</sup> While the pause would allow the English government in Ireland to receive reinforcements and recover from insurgent attacks, it would also provide their enemies an opportunity to regroup and likely receive aid from beyond the island. New reports flooded in almost daily of the involvement of Scots and the Spanish in assisting the Irish. Despite the King of Scots' proclamation prohibiting the transport of munitions or arms from Scotland to Ulster, powder and muskets continued to be transported out of Scotland to Lough Foyle, as did Scotsmen.<sup>199</sup> Intelligence reports also indicated that the Spanish were sending ships to Ireland. The island, therefore, remained a battleground for Anglo-Spanish hostilities, particularly as the

---

<sup>196</sup> Note of the beacons which Fenton has caused to be erected, 3 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/76. I, f. 251; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 411. Fenton to Lord Deputy Russell, 3 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/80. III, f. 266; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 417. Fenton to Burghley, 17 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/90, f. 294; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 421.

<sup>197</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 5 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/76, f. 249r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 411.

<sup>198</sup> Articles agreed upon with Tirone in the cessation of arms, 27 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/108. II, f. 339; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 425.

<sup>199</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 10 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/27, f. 65; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 489.



Spanish could use Ireland as a diversion to draw the queen's attention away from the Low Countries and Brittany. With the English occupied in Ireland, they could not intervene or cause trouble for Spain elsewhere.<sup>200</sup> However, like the English, the Spanish also suffered setbacks, and its wars with England and France were a significant drain on its resources.<sup>201</sup> It was not until the northern lords had experienced some success against English forces that Philip finally agreed to help.<sup>202</sup> As the Irish councilors tried to broker peace with the earl and the other Ulster lords, they knew the insurgents were biding their time. But they had little option. What they feared now seemed imminent.

---

<sup>200</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 27 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/25, f. 93; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 457.

<sup>201</sup> Silke, *Kinsale*, 26-28.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

## CHAPTER SIX

### The Politics of Information and the Costs of War, 1595-1597

"the Rebelles here of the North, having intelligence thereof before wee, as the Earle of Tyrone acknowledged he had, and that he could heare anie thing out of England, sooner than the deputie could."<sup>1</sup>

- Lord Deputy Sir William Russell

Concerns over Tyrone's loyalty and the likely involvement of the Scots and the Spanish generated fear in the Elizabethan establishment. By 1595, events in Ireland became of serious concern, forcing the queen to redirect men like Sir John Norris, the military commander and Irish councilor, to Ireland. Since the mid-1580s, Norris had served as one of Elizabeth's senior and most successful generals in the Low Countries, Spain, Portugal, and France.<sup>2</sup> His recall, therefore, reflected a substantial shift in the regime's attention to Ireland. Ireland was now another major theater in the expensive war against Spain.

Tyrone's pretensions of loyalty and his conspiratorial dealings with Spain also made more apparent the need for information of all kinds, particularly as the English now understood that, despite their efforts to negotiate, the war would continue. Such information came in various forms: intelligence on the movements of the insurgents and their supporters; secret reports detailing the actions of Irish councilors like Sir Richard Bingham and his managing of the war in Connacht; muster reports which helped in determining the allocation of resources to Ireland; correspondence which indicated a conflict between the lord deputy and Irish councilors. This chapter, therefore, highlights the role that information played in the war, and how both the Westminster and Dublin governments tried to use the information to their benefit.

---

<sup>1</sup> Lord Deputy Sir William Russell to Sir Robert Cecil, 26 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/55, f. 133r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 299.

<sup>2</sup> *ODNB*, "Norris, Sir John."

However, a major problem with intelligence, as shown here, was that, while information was certainly useful in determining what was happening in Ireland, it also created conflict among the Irish councilors and between the Westminster and Dublin governments. Aware of the importance of information, the Irish councilors used it to promote their own value to the Elizabethan government. Fenton had done this in the early years of the war, reporting on the movements of Tyrone and the Ulster lords. The intelligence he gathered became a means of influencing policy. He would continue to do so throughout the war, and he would be joined in doing so by his fellow Irish councilors. The Irish councilors were thus careful and deliberate in what kinds of information they passed on to the Westminster government. In such an environment—and as the queen and privy council searched for answers to explain the lack of progress in the war—they competed for power and information. But the debates over policy and the events thereafter would convince the queen and privy council that their Irish councilors were ineffective in managing the war in Ireland. As the war progressed, the information that the queen and privy council received in England about the war and their Irish councilors—reports on corrupt officer and the mishandling of crown resources in Ireland—would further the impression that the Irish councilors needed more supervision.

### **Cryptography and War Intelligence**

Intelligence was a vital component of any early modern government—as it remains today—but it became of even greater significance and urgency for the Elizabethan regime in Ireland during the Nine Years' War. War reinforced the need for accurate and timely intelligence. Any reliable information on the insurgents—their names, their whereabouts, the locations of their troops and military stores, and their tactics—was invaluable. Intelligence allowed the

English crown to identify, assess, anticipate, and avoid risks that could potentially destabilize government in England and in Ireland.

Intelligence-gathering had enabled the English to emerge victorious in 1588 with the Spanish Armada. Although the English had known for years that the Spanish were planning to launch a great armada, they had received contradictory intelligence reports as to when the attack would occur. This armada, although considered the "worst-kept secret in Europe," was difficult to pin down as Spanish preparations varied.<sup>3</sup> There was, as De Lamar Jensen, recognized, "no single Armada plan," which reduced the likelihood that the English could predict when and where it would strike.<sup>4</sup> And yet Sir Francis Walsingham's intelligence network revealed that the Armada was set to leave Lisbon in May which, remarkably, it did.<sup>5</sup> This information enabled the English navy to form a defense plan using Walsingham's intelligence on the Spanish fleet. The Spanish Armada in 1588, therefore, had illustrated the great utility of intelligence-gathering.

But the great spymaster, Walsingham, had died in 1590, leaving Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, and his son, Sir Robert Cecil, to manage intelligence.<sup>6</sup> Some of their plans would be frustrated by Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, who interjected himself into domestic and continental intelligence affairs. As Ireland became a battleground for Anglo-Spanish hostilities, intelligence-gathering efforts on the island were stepped up. The Westminster and Dublin governments wanted information on continental plans to invade England through Ireland. By

---

<sup>3</sup> De Lamar Jensen, "The Spanish Armada: The Worst-Kept Secret in Europe," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 19, no. 4 (1988): 638.

<sup>4</sup> Jensen, "The Spanish Armada," 638.

<sup>5</sup> M. G. Richings, *Espionage: The Story of the Secret Service of the English Crown* (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd, 1934), 151. On Walsingham's network, see Hsuan-Ying Tu, "The Pursuit of God's Glory: Francis Walsingham's Espionage in Elizabethan Politics, 1568-1588" (PhD diss., University of York, 2012).

<sup>6</sup> William Dixon Acres, "The Early Political Career of Sir Robert Cecil, c. 1582-1597: Some Aspects of Late Elizabethan Secretarial Administration" (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 1992). See also, Acres, introduction to *The Letters of Lord Burghley, William Cecil, to His Son Sir Robert Cecil, 1593-1598*, ed. Acres, vol. 53 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2017). Acres has done a remarkable job in illuminating the intelligence activities of Burghley and his son, which has been invaluable to these war chapters.

learning the circumstances or manner such attempts would take, they could frustrate those plans and simultaneously expand England's influence and authority. Moreover, as expenses for war increased and England faced a severe fiscal crisis, intelligence became a financially expedient means of ending the Nine Years' War.<sup>7</sup>

Gathering useful and accurate intelligence was, however, no easy task. The crown passed the responsibility of information-gathering onto its councilors in England and Ireland. In Ireland, this meant that high-ranking English officials formed local intelligence networks, which they would then report to the privy councilors in England. These reports, which contained private or sensitive information, were sometimes intercepted by local or foreign enemies of the crown, creating, in some cases, the need to mask what the English government knew or planned by deliberately releasing false information. The political maneuvering involved with the managing intelligence and the constant need for more information resulted in a substantial volume of information being sent to the Irish councilors and to the Westminster government. Reports came in daily from Ireland and the Westminster and Dublin councils had to determine how best to use—and how far to trust—the information.

Though intelligence was managed primarily by the privy councilors in England, the lord deputy and councilors in Ireland played a significant role in intelligence operations there. Correspondence on intelligence depended not only on patrons and informers, but also on the functionaries who managed the exchange of information. In theory, it was the lord deputy and

---

<sup>7</sup> Given the importance of intelligence, it is thus surprising that there has been no sustained study of early modern English intelligence in Ireland. Histories on Elizabethan intelligence tend to leave out Ireland and the Cecils machinations there. See Susan Bleiweis, "The Elizabethan Intelligence Service, 1572-1585" (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 1976); Alison Plowden, *The Elizabethan Secret Service* (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf; St. Martin's Press, 1991); Alan Haynes, *Invisible Power: The Elizabethan Secret Services, 1570-1603* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Stephen Alford, *The Watchers: A Secret History of the Reign of Elizabeth I* (London: Allen Lane, 2012); Christopher Mains, "Sir Robert Cecil and Elizabethan Intelligencing, 1590-1603" (PhD diss., The Open University, 2020).

council who determined which information from informers and spies to include or exclude in their letters to England. Individual councilors in Ireland would gather or receive intelligence reports and pass pertinent information along to the lord deputy. However, they would also disclose the information directly to their patrons on the English privy council. In bypassing the lord deputy, the Irish councilors could streamline the process and win political credit for themselves. Sometimes this practice was done out of convenience. For example, if the lord deputy was on campaign, then the secretary of state (if not accompanying the lord deputy) managed the council's correspondence. However, in some cases, this practice enabled the Irish councilors to avoid a lord deputy they disliked, as was the case with Sir John Perrot and later with Sir William Russell. Of course, continuing this practice without regard to the lord deputy's presence created problems within the Irish council, particularly as the lord deputy had access to most communications concerning Ireland.<sup>8</sup> And yet, for some ambitious councilors, intelligence-gathering was a means of gaining political favor and was thus worth the risk of irritating the lord deputy and other members of the Irish council. Intelligence was, as Stephen Alford noted, a form of "political currency to buy favour and reputation and to damage court rivals."<sup>9</sup> Elizabethan Ireland may not have had a "court," but there were power politics at play which made intelligence-gathering and reporting another means of competition between the Irish councilors.

Because of their position in the Irish government, Irish councilors had the authority and means to undertake independent intelligence ventures, whether with their fees or money given to them by the queen and privy council for this specific purpose. Of all the crown officers in Ireland, the lord deputy had the largest fees for office, so naturally, he employed his own spies,

---

<sup>8</sup> For example, Sir John Norris found his letters had been perused, and he pointed to Lord Deputy Russell, who had received the package beforehand (Acres, "The Early Political Career of Sir Robert Cecil," 228).

<sup>9</sup> Alford, *The Watchers*, 13.

using either a portion of his yearly allowance or his own money. When the crown did allow for an intelligence budget of sorts, it was considered an "extraordinary" expense which meant the value fluctuated from year to year.<sup>10</sup> This informal means of paying for intelligence services suggested an impermanence and variability of intelligence in Ireland in the Elizabethan period. The same had been true for English intelligence for a long time. Sir Francis Walsingham developed an intelligence network using mostly his own money. When the costs of intelligence rose during a crisis, like that of the Armada, the queen provided some support, though only on occasion.<sup>11</sup> Walsingham received between £750 to £2,000 as an allowance for intelligence during the years 1585-1588, when the threat of Spanish invasion threw England into a panic.<sup>12</sup> Walsingham's personal investment in intelligence led to his crippling debts. In 1596 when Cecil was formally appointed to succeed Walsingham, England finally instituted an official budget for intelligence, undoubtedly in response to continued hostilities with the Spanish and the Nine Years' War. Despite this innovation in England, intelligence-gathering in Ireland continued to operate on an ad-hoc basis, and councilors employed spies and informants only as the need arose. Whenever Connacht erupted into violence, Bingham, as chief commissioner, employed spies and forwarded the intelligence to the lord deputy and directly to the Westminster government. Acts of violence that threatened English authority were likely one of the few occasions that moved the crown to provide funding for intelligence. Irish councilors were thus careful with their spending when it came to intelligence because they funded the gathering of information using their own money.

---

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, *Cal. Carew, 1575-1588*, p. 46. In 1576, the crown approved an allowance of £59 2s. 2d. for "espial money" for half a year post-Desmond Rebellion.

<sup>11</sup> Richings, *Espionage*, 141.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen Alford, "Some Elizabethan Spies in the Office of Sir Francis Walsingham," in *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, eds. Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 50.

In addition to the lord deputy and Irish council, military officers or high-ranking government officials requested payment or reimbursement for spies. These requests often coincided with a rebellion or potential threats along the Irish coasts. In the 1570s, religious hostilities between Catholics and Protestants on the continent, along with Spain's growing power, seemed to influence events in Ireland. James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald challenged the English crown in Munster in the first Desmond Rebellion. Despite receiving a pardon, he obtained support from Catholics on the continent, including Pope Gregory XIII and Philip II, the king of Spain. Thomas Stukeley, a once-loyal English soldier, also received Catholic support for a Spanish invasion of Ireland.<sup>13</sup> This chain of events would explain why some officers in Ireland received compensation for intelligence purposes. In 1572, Lord Deputy William Fitzwilliam reported that Stukeley's presence on the continent had resulted in a swarm of "spies and varmen."<sup>14</sup> The lord deputy's servant, Richard Chichester, disbursed £42 6s. for a bounty, or head money, on insurgents and to pay spies for "sounding thentenc[i]ons of the Erle of desmonde."<sup>15</sup> In 1574, Sir Nicholas Bagenal, marshal of the army, sought reimbursement of £50 for "giftes & rewardes by him disbursed to sondrie espials, & messengers."<sup>16</sup> To combat resistance to his enterprise in Ulster, Sir Walter Devereux, the first earl of Essex, employed his own spies and, while he did not appeal for reimbursement from the government, he proposed alternative payment through grants.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> Instances where Englishmen schemed to overthrow the queen illustrate that the fight was not simply between the English and the Irish. There were Old English and New English officers who supported Irish causes and Irishmen who fought alongside the English.

<sup>14</sup> Answers of Martin de Ouerres [with a note by Sir William Fitzwilliam], 1572, SP 63/35/23. V, f. 85v; *CSPire*, 1509-1573, p. 466.

<sup>15</sup> Extraordinary charges for one quarter ending, 30 Sept. 1574, SP 63/47/69, f. 172r; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 39. See also, Lord Deputy Sir William Fitzwilliam to Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, 25 Oct. 1574, SP 63/48/24, f. 55; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 41.

<sup>16</sup> Extraordinary charges for one quarter ending, 30 Sept. 1574, SP 63/47/69, f. 172r; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 39.

<sup>17</sup> Sir Walter Devereux, earl of Essex, to Queen Elizabeth, 12 May 1574, SP 63/46/10, f. 19; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 22. Memorial touching the service of the earl of Essex, 2 Oct. 1574, SP 63/48/1, f. 1; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 39.



In the 1580s, the outbreak of war with Spain drastically increased the need for all kinds of intelligence, including in Ireland. In 1586, Sir John Perrot warned Walsingham that “the Irish here do harken gredelie for the coming over of forrein forces” and that his spies reported, “secreat” intelligence that “some part of this Spanish p[re]paration is for this lande.”<sup>18</sup> He proposed to send his spies into Spain from Ireland to discover the validity of this information and offered to send a cipher containing the characters (aliases) of these spies so that Walsingham would know their identity upon receipt of their letters.<sup>19</sup>

The Spanish Armada in 1588 only exacerbated these fears, as it brought the Spanish, quite literally, to Ireland. Atlantic storms and poor navigation left several Spanish vessels shipwrecked on Irish coasts. There was a pervasive fear among the councilors in England and Ireland that the Irish would utilize the unexpected presence of the Spanish in Ireland to rise against the English crown. During this crisis, the Irish councilors received intelligence that the Spanish were in Ireland and conspiring with the Irish.<sup>20</sup> Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish diplomat, wrote to King Philip from his post in France that the landing of Spaniards in Ireland had “caused the Queen and Council much anxiety, as they greatly fear such a war, which they look upon as the most ruinous of any that could happen to them.”<sup>21</sup> Mendoza confirmed what the English had long suspected: that the Spanish meant to use Ireland as an outpost to invade England. The presence of Spanish soldiers in Ireland, however incidental, was therefore deeply

---

Essex to Sir Francis Walsingham, 31 July 1575, SP 63/52/79, f. 206; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 77. Essex had his own network of spies, but it is unclear to what extent he shared information with the Elizabethan state. It does not appear that anyone knew the identity of his spies.

<sup>18</sup> Lord Deputy Sir John Perrot to Walsingham, 11 Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/70, f. 155r; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 26.

<sup>19</sup> Lord Deputy Perrot to Walsingham, 11 Feb. 1586, SP 63/122/70, f. 155; *CSPIre*, 1586-July 1588, p. 26.

<sup>20</sup> Geoffrey Fenton to Walsingham, 19 Sept. 1588, SP 63/136/48, f. 199; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 43. Fenton to George Bingham to Sir Richard Bingham, 6 Oct. 1588, SP 63/137/10. XV, f. 64; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 55. Fenton to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 7 Oct. 1588, SP 63/137/10. IV, f. 50; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 53. Fenton to Burghley, 28 Oct. 1588, SP 63/137/49, f. 196; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 68.

<sup>21</sup> *CSPSp*, 1587-1603, pp. 474-492.

alarming, as can be seen in the flurry of letters from the Irish councilors to those in England. Though the Irish secretary of state, Fenton, reported the weakness of those Spaniards who came ashore, they were nonetheless hunted down by the lord deputy and his army so that they would not be left as "vermyn to infect the people further."<sup>22</sup>

The Spanish searched for an opportunity to redeem themselves after the dramatic failure of the Armada in 1588. They sought to capitalize on religious and political tensions within the British archipelago, which would enable the re-establishment of Catholicism in Ireland, the removal of Queen Elizabeth, and the installation of a Catholic sovereign on the English throne. So, Philip II provided aid to Irish insurgents whenever possible, and various popes continued the Roman succession of Catholic bishops which challenged the authority of the Church of Ireland. The Nine Years' War thus became a convenient moment to realize both Spanish and Catholic ambitions, and English intelligence-gathering was focused on countering such ambitions.

After 1588 and Walsingham's death in 1590, it was also apparent to the privy councilors in England that intelligence would be key. At the English court, Robert Devereux, earl of Essex and Sir Robert Cecil, Burghley's son, competed for supremacy in intelligence with Essex adopting some of Walsingham's former agents. While Essex was able to develop an intelligence network that expanded across the continent, intelligence for Ireland belonged to the Cecils. In the 1590s, when the Spanish threatened further invasions into England by way of Ireland, expenditures on intelligence increased and Sir Robert Cecil expanded his network even further by employing additional intelligencers (those who reported information) and double-agents (those who actively dealt with the enemy and sought to deceive them). Once Cecil formally became the principal secretary of state in 1596, he received an annual royal budget of £800 for

---

<sup>22</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 28 Dec. 1588, SP 63/139/20, f. 72r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 91.

intelligence and, later, an additional grant.<sup>23</sup> The importance of the war in Ireland in Spanish designs to invade England enabled Cecil to grow his intelligence network in Ireland, surpassing Essex in the process. The Nine Years' War, then, influenced politics at the English court, for Cecil's ascendance in gathering information was a blow to Essex's ambitions.<sup>24</sup>

With the Nine Years' War came an influx of information—often titled "advertisements"—to the Irish administration and the queen and privy council in England. This information came most often from merchants and captains or from hired informers and spies. The news dealt with enemy plans, both domestic and foreign, and their movements across the realm. Yet because Ireland lacked an organized system for intelligence, there was no mechanism to ensure the regularity, accuracy, or reliability of the information. Consequently, the Irish councilors received advertisements, but the reports came in at random, only when the informer found it expedient to relay information to the government.

Things became especially tricky when the Irish administration received information from Irish intelligencers. It was not solely a question of loyalty but rather English interference in Irish disputes. For example, David Burke, a MacWilliam, had served as justice of the peace in county Mayo and had left to pursue his studies in London at the Inns of Court.<sup>25</sup> However, in late 1596, he sought employment in Connacht as an intelligencer for the Irish administration. In exchange for providing information on Tyrone, O'Donnell, and MacWilliam, Burke wanted the English crown to support his interests against his nephew, Theobald (or Tibbot) MacWalter Kittagh. The latter had recently been inaugurated as the MacWilliam.<sup>26</sup> David complained that Theobald was

---

<sup>23</sup> Paul E. J. Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 198.

<sup>24</sup> Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics*, 152-198.

<sup>25</sup> Petition of David Burke, [Oct.] 1596, SP 63/194/58. I, f. 292; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 155.

<sup>26</sup> David Burke to [the Lord Deputy], 15 Oct. 1596, SP 63/194/20, f. 86; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 144. Burke to Cecil, 31 Oct. 1596, SP 63/194/58, f. 291; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 155.

trying to usurp his inheritance (which would have furthered Burke's studies in London) and had even detained David's brother in prison. Several months later, David worked as an intelligencer and actively prosecuted his nephew.<sup>27</sup> Theobald, at this point, had already joined O'Donnell in his attacks on Connacht. In this instance, the Irish administration benefitted from the information they gained through Burke, but it had taken the losing side in a succession dispute. Not all intelligence reports were so complicated. They do, however, illustrate how intelligence-gathering differed in comparison to England.

As the Irish council determined the best strategy to employ against their enemies in 1595, they tried to collect, for example, estimates of rebel forces. Fenton told Burghley in May 1595 that he could not get an accurate account of Tyrone's horse and footmen because the numbers kept changing as more and more Irishmen (and Scots) joined the rebel cause.<sup>28</sup> The privy council had received estimates from other sources, but Fenton believed the numbers reported so far were based on opinion rather than fact.<sup>29</sup> Tyrone continually gathered more forces, and any speculation about the number of his troops also had to include the assistance of Scots and other foreigners, which made it impossible to know the strength of his army with any certainty. Their enemies, however, appeared to have detailed intelligence on crown forces and strategy. Some Irish councilors feared that Irish spies had infiltrated the English army. This suspicion explains why in March 1595 the lord deputy kept his plans to march on Waterford secret (except from Fenton) for fear of their enemies having warning beforehand.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Lord Chancellor Adam Loftus and others of the Council to the Privy Council, 9 May 1597, SP 63/199/21, f. 39; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 284. Burke to Sir Conyers Clifford, 5 May 1597, SP 63/199/21. III, f. 43; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 285.

<sup>28</sup> Sir Geoffrey Fenton to Burghley, 22 May 1595, SP 63/179/88, f. 222; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 318.

<sup>29</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 7 June 1595, SP 63/180/17, f. 62; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 327. *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 73.

<sup>30</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 20 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/102, f. 247; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 306. Francis Stafford had also revealed to Fenton in June 1595 that Tyrone had intelligence of their coming to the Newry ten days before their arrival (Francis Stafford to Fenton, 1595 June 4, SP 63/180/17. II, f. 66; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 327).

Even without the fear that enemies had foreknowledge of the council's plans, secrecy was an important intelligence issue. As much as the English administration in Ireland tried to guard their plans, there were security leaks, many of which arose out of the system of letter-writing. Putting one's plans to paper left a trail that could be traced back to the correspondents. Consequently, English officials developed strategies to avoid such discoveries by using ciphers, aliases, the signing of letters with a mark or monogram specific to an intelligence agent, the burning of letters, and relating the most crucial information in-person or through messengers.<sup>31</sup> It was only when councilors neglected (or deliberately failed) to burn private letters that scholars discovered such practices.<sup>32</sup> Information could also be gained through the interception of public and private letters, which were generally collated in one package. This meant that letters from the Westminster and Dublin councils, as well as private letters between Irish councilors and their patrons in England, were susceptible to being stolen or, at the very least, viewed by others than the intended recipients. On one occasion, Fenton sought fit to deliver a packet himself out of fear that it would be intercepted.<sup>33</sup> This method of intercepting letters was also a means by which the English gained information on the Irish insurgents.

The secrecy demanded of intelligence left some councilors confused and, evidently, out of the loop. In March 1595, Fenton informed Burghley of intelligence he had received through a local merchant.<sup>34</sup> The news concerned an Englishman named Captain Williams, alias Morgan, who had recently departed from Spain and would arrive shortly in Ireland. Upon his arrival, Williams claimed that, during his extensive time abroad in Spain, he had been working as an

---

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Sir William Warren to Cecil, 24 Dec. 1599, SP 63/206/100, f. 250; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 339. Gilbert Gifford apparently signed his intelligence reports using a mark (Alford, "Some Elizabethan Spies in the Office of Sir Francis Walsingham," 52).

<sup>32</sup> Memorandum by Fenton, 18 Apr. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 119, f. 292; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 105. Cecil directed Fenton to burn the paper after reading, but he clearly did not.

<sup>33</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 2 July 1599, SP 63/205/103, f. 191; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 77.

<sup>34</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 3 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/68, f. 166; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 301.

intelligencer for the queen. Neither the merchant nor Fenton could ascertain the veracity of Williams's claims. They were unsure of his true identity but suspected that he had been sent by the Spanish king as a counterspy.<sup>35</sup> Once Williams arrived in Ireland, Fenton promptly turned him over to the lord deputy. After receiving the man's reports, the lord deputy then sent Williams to Burghley.<sup>36</sup>

This incident with Williams appeared odd to Fenton but was a common practice in intelligence. Usually, only the secretaries or clerks of men like Walsingham and Burghley had access to such sensitive information.<sup>37</sup> The identity of intelligencers, and especially double-agents, was a closely guarded secret. In 1594, Essex's intelligence network "uncovered" a plot to kill Queen Elizabeth. The Lopez Plot, as it was called, was a conspiracy purportedly by the Portuguese-Jewish doctor and a physician to Elizabeth's royal household, Roderigo Lopez, to poison the queen. This incident led to Lopez's trial and conviction for treason, but the queen intervened and ordered a stay of execution for Lopez. However, Burghley then schemed to have Lopez transferred and convicted by a higher court, after which Lopez was then executed. Burghley's circumvention of the queen's orders was to hide his secret correspondence with a Portuguese double agent working for Philip II. Lopez had translated state documents into Portuguese and was thus aware of Burghley's private dealings. In this one instance, Burghley had gone to extreme lengths to prevent revealing the identity of his double-agent, as well as

---

<sup>35</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 3 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/68, f. 166; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 301.

<sup>36</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 10 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/81, f. 190; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 303. Lord Deputy Russell also noted that Morgan was a stranger. Russell used the information provided by Morgan to not only apprehend a priest for saying mass (even in Dublin), but also discover persons who treasonously communicated with Spain, conveyed victuals out of Ireland, and sent their children to "seminaries and nurseries of treason and Rebellion" (Lord Deputy Russell to Cecil, 23 May 1595, SP 63/179/90, f. 226r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 319).

<sup>37</sup> On secretaries and their use in intelligence, see Jacqueline D. Vaughn, "Secretaries, Statesmen and Spies: The Clerks of the Tudor Privy Council, c.1540-c.1603" (PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 2007).

cover up his own role.<sup>38</sup> This incident also indicated that even important men like Essex were ignorant of some of the intelligence activities of the other privy councilors. There were many cases of spies claiming to work for a specific privy councilor and other councilors being left "out of the loop."

The secrecy surrounding intelligence extended as well to Ireland, even for those like Fenton who were involved in managing intelligence. The flow of information was largely one-sided. Irish councilors forwarded intelligence to England, but the English councilors were not obligated to share any information they received. Thus, when Williams arrived in Ireland claiming to be a spy for the English crown, it was not inconceivable that he was telling the truth.

When dealing with informants and spies, there was always an aura of uncertainty and doubt—especially whether an informant and the information which they provided could be trusted. Even when the councilors found the information reliable, they could still disregard it, as they did with early intelligence news on Tyrone's conspiracy. They employed spies to enter enemy camps and even enlisted the help of other Ulster lords. The English, therefore, did not lack for information. Where they floundered was in utilizing the information they received.

Of the Irish councilors, the primary person in charge of managing information was the secretary of state, who also served as the main vehicle of communication between the Westminster and Dublin governments. Being so far removed from the center of English government gave the position of secretary in a colonial government even greater importance. The war only reinforced this dependency. The lord deputy and other councilors undoubtedly influenced intelligence in Ireland as well. Before the Nine Years' War, several councilors participated in intelligence-gathering and utilized coded communications, among them were the

---

<sup>38</sup> John Guy, "Imagining and Detecting Conspiracy, 1571-1605." <<http://www.tudors.org/public-lectures/imagining-and-detecting-conspiracy-1571-1605>> [no longer accessible].

lords deputy and lords justices, the marshal of the army, and the treasurer-at-war. Their duties, however, often left them preoccupied as they engaged in warfare or managed wages and supplies for troops.

The secretary's position was the primary office which closely aligned with intelligence, and it was no wonder that the principal secretaries in England—Burghley, Walsingham, and later, Cecil—all managed intelligence.<sup>39</sup> Fenton was no different in this regard, though he lacked the international and management experience of his counterpart in England. As the Irish secretary, he had spent thirteen years providing information on the Second Desmond Rebellion, the state of Ireland, and his fellow councilors. His direct involvement in intelligence activities, however, was somewhat limited. Although he had gathered intelligence during the Second Desmond Rebellion and again with the Spanish Armada in 1588, he did not exert substantial control over intelligence operations.<sup>40</sup> The Nine Years' War would change the nature of his involvement with intelligence, as the large scale of the war demanded a greater frequency and variety in intelligence accounts.

A key problem was where to direct the information. Fenton recognized the importance of intelligence but showed some ignorance as to the significance of the stream of information. Some reports he directed to the entire privy council in England, while others went primarily to Burghley and later Cecil. Once a patronage relationship had been established, the flow of information was from client to patron. To do otherwise might create tension and competition

---

<sup>39</sup> The same was true of George Nicolson, the secretary in Scotland, who managed Scottish intelligence alongside Robert Bowes, the former English ambassador in Scotland, and relayed information to Cecil.

<sup>40</sup> Also briefly involved with Sir Horatio Palavicino, the Italian ambassador who managed foreign intelligence on the continent. Allowance for Horatio's diet agreed upon a year ago and set down by Fenton with approval from Fitzwilliam (Fenton to Burghley, 31 Oct. 1591, SP 63/160/57, f. 123; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 433). The account of Sir Horatio Palavicino for the diet money and ransoms of the 61 Spaniards, 1591, SP 63/160/57. I, f. 124; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 433. Palavicino reported on Irish affairs to Cecil, but it is unclear what kind of relationship, if any, he had with the Irish secretary of state.



between councilors and potentially sever the ties between patron and client. On one occasion, Fenton came close to losing Burghley's favor when he made a private appeal to Sir Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst, and Sir Thomas Heneage, the vice chamberlain, on the affairs of government before having replied to a previous letter of Burghley's.<sup>41</sup> He had done this before in the early 1580s when he had sent information to three potential patrons. However, two of those patrons were now dead: Leicester died in 1588 and Walsingham in 1590. The Cecils—Burghley and son—were now his sole patrons. When Burghley got wind of the Irish secretary's letter to the two privy councilors, he admonished Fenton to such an extent that the secretary felt compelled to remind Burghley of his long and loyal service. In fear of losing Burghley's favor, Fenton apologized and explained that the letter only concerned his request for more soldiers and horses, not serious matters of intelligence. Deeply chastised, Fenton promised to apply himself "more Iudiciously to the Sonne onely; and rather behold the starrs then followe them."<sup>42</sup>

What had been permissible in the 1580s was no longer the case by the mid-1590s. Fenton's attempt to gain favor from other important men at court undermined Burghley's control of information about Ireland. Politics at Elizabeth's court had changed to reflect, for one, the growing polarization between the Cecils and Robert, earl of Essex. Although Fenton had corresponded with Heneage and Buckhurst, both of whom were friends and allies of Burghley, he had used intelligence as the means, which threatened Burghley's ability to control what Elizabeth, and others of the privy council in England, knew about Ireland. The incident also brought up the issue of a client's need for approval from a patron before sharing intelligence. Patrons sometimes used the fruits of their intelligence network to deepen friendships with other courtiers or privy councilors. Fenton was not to interfere with the politics of information in

---

<sup>41</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 31 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/78, f. 287; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 374.

<sup>42</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 31 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/78, f. 287v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 374.

England. Intelligence was thus a complicated affair, and Fenton learned this through Burghley's reprimand. It was an important lesson for Fenton in patronage, diplomacy, and the transmission of information.

To facilitate a secret channel of communication, Burghley devised an encryption key, which he then sent to Fenton.<sup>43</sup> The key was likely created by one of his clerks, or possibly the cryptographer, Thomas Phelippes, who famously deciphered a purportedly treasonous letter of Mary Queen of Scots. While Phelippes was originally Walsingham's intelligence agent, Burghley and Essex both used Phelippes for his skills in cryptography.

In order to encrypt private information, the correspondents would write to each other using a pre-determined code, which served as a key in deciphering coded information. The key often included both a cipher alphabet and codewords. Codewords were simple and could be decoded without a key. One could guess the codeword merely through context. Therefore, the strength of the key depended greatly on the ciphers contained within. The more variety a cryptographer utilized increased the security of the encryption. One simple key created by Wallop in 1579 employed numbers in place of the queen and privy councilors in England and Ireland (see Image 10).

---

<sup>43</sup> Cipher for Ireland, Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/64, f. 255; *CSP Ire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 372. There are three versions of this cipher worthy of mention here. The earliest in the State Papers is dated 12 July 1595 (SP 63/181/25, f. 53; *CSP Ire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 340) and described as a cipher to be retained by the Lord Treasurer. It includes the original cipher with additions. The next cipher is dated 1595 and is a copy of the cipher sent by Burghley (Copy of the Cipher, SP 63/182/63. I, f. 253; *CSP Ire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 372). In this cipher, the handwriting is noticeably different. It is a secretary's hand (likely a clerk of Burghley) and the entire document is of the same hand, including the additions. It is a polished version of the July and August manuscripts. The August cipher is the only manuscript that does not include the additions and is almost certainly the original sent by Burghley to Fenton. The July cipher, therefore, is Fenton's revision with the added names, which was then sent to Burghley and the 1595 manuscript is the finalized version.




Image 10 - Cipher devised by Wallop, 1579, SP 63/70/70. I, f. 176; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 202.

For example, the queen was 24; the privy councilors in England were 360; the lord chancellor of Ireland was 20.<sup>44</sup> In this case, one could still guess the word through context, particularly if the same numbers appeared numerous times throughout a single letter. Another key in 1579 had a cipher alphabet and a codebook, wherein words, numbers, and symbols were substitutes for nouns (see Image 11).<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Cipher devised by Wallop, 1579, SP 63/70/70. I, f. 176; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 202.

<sup>45</sup> A cipher or alphabet for the queen from the Lord Justice of Ireland, Sir William Pelham, 1579, SP 63/70/69. I, f. 173; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 201.





Image 11 - A cipher or alphabet for the queen from the Lord Justice of Ireland, 1579, SP 63/70/69. I, f. 173; *CSPire*, 1574-1585, p. 201.

This cipher had been created presumably by the former lord justice, Sir William Pelham, likely in consort with Walsingham, as the process of establishing secret means of communication was collaborative. The greater complexity of this 1579 codebook could be seen in the variety of

symbols, numbers, and words used. The baron of Dungannon was "Mars," while Sir Henry Wallop was a symbol with swords, reflective of his office as treasurer-at-war. The use of symbols was to prevent the decryption of the cipher by analyzing the frequency of letters or words. This technique deliberately disrupted the logical pattern of letter-writing and would be more difficult to decipher without a key. By intermixing letters and symbols, the cryptographer sought to make decryption challenging. The letter could be intercepted, though it would be difficult to guess the full meaning without the key. It would take a skilled cryptographer to work through the numerous variations, which could be rendered less useful by time.

25 Additions 114  
53

|                          |               |                              |                  |
|--------------------------|---------------|------------------------------|------------------|
| Q. of England.           | Avubra facta  | Idomell a                    | Lorando.         |
| R. of Switzer.           | Avubia pteca. | M. gair a                    | ventoso          |
| Dublin.                  | Argema        | O. Quirke                    | Lorido           |
|                          | Capia.        | Comouffe                     | Intirmato        |
| E. of Tirone             | Cam.          | S <sup>r</sup> Rac's Bonham  | Imprindo         |
| Dungannon.               | Canaan.       | Earl of Carlisle             | Rebute           |
| Kerry.                   | Castilia.     | Earl of Ormond               | Lentulo          |
| England.                 | Damasus.      | Foagh m' Hugh                | vechio           |
| Scotland.                | Agyptus.      | S <sup>r</sup> H. Harrington | Tornanti         |
| Tirbrough Leragh.        | Jamabot.      | S <sup>r</sup> H. Waller     | Rigile.          |
| L. Deputy of Ireland     | Athenani.     | S <sup>r</sup> R. Gardiner   | Amario           |
| Justices of Ireland.     | Nymdians.     | L. Chamberlain               | Flora<br>Ziancho |
| Ireland.                 | Patria.       | Earl of Lifford              | Fabulofo.        |
| S <sup>r</sup> J. Hurdis | Scipio.       |                              |                  |
| Ulster.                  | Sabulon.      |                              |                  |
| L. Treas. of England     | Titus.        |                              |                  |



|       |                            |
|-------|----------------------------|
| A. 4. | o. 0.                      |
| B. 3. | I. T.                      |
| C. 2. | 2 S.                       |
| D. 7. | R. 6.                      |
| E. 5. | S. 4.                      |
| F. 6. | T. w                       |
| G. 1. | V. 5                       |
| H. 8. | X. E.                      |
| I. 9. | Y. Z.                      |
| K. 2. | <i>Nihil significatia.</i> |
| L. 6. | 14.                        |
| M. 7. | 20.                        |
| N. 11 | 30.                        |
|       | 25.                        |
|       | Dalmatia.                  |
|       | Epyrus.                    |

52

Image 12 - Cipher for Ireland to be retained by Lord Treasurer, 12 July 1595, SP 63/181/25, f. 53; CSPIre, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 340.

The key that Burghley sent to Fenton was fairly simple (see Image 12). It contained a cipher alphabet and codewords. The codewords that Burghley provided were largely Latin-based

and in reference to the Roman Empire. The substitutions for Queen Elizabeth, the king of Scots, and Scotland were all references to Rome's former provinces in Egypt and the Middle East. Sir John Norris, the recently returned army general for Ireland, was "Scipio," the famous Roman military commander and hero, Scipio Africanus. Also worthy of note were three other codewords: the earl of Tyrone as the Biblical "Cain" (the murderer of Abel), the soldiers of Scotland as "Numidians," and the lord deputy as "Menelaus" (the wronged husband of Helen of Troy, who started the war). The use of "Cain" possibly hinted at Burghley's view of Tyrone as one who had repaid royal favor with betrayal and murder. Numidia had been a Roman province in North Africa, but they had fought alongside Rome's enemy, the Carthaginians, during the Punic Wars. To Burghley and Fenton, the comparison was apt, as some Scots now assisted Irish insurgents against the English crown.<sup>46</sup> The codenames that were chosen, therefore, alluded to the politics of the period and revealed Burghley's habit of using codenames that held moral significance, which Fenton then repeated.

Upon receiving the encryption key, Fenton added new codewords to supplement the existing ones.<sup>47</sup> The amended list of codewords now included the Irish lords currently in revolt—O'Donnell, Maguire, O'Rourke, and Feagh McHugh O'Byrne—as well as the earls of Ormond, Clanricard, and Kildare. The additions also included a few Irish councilors—Bingham, Wallop, Gardiner, and the lord chancellor, Loftus. Excluded from the list were Sir Nicholas White, Sir Lucas Dillon (both had died recently), and Sir Robert Dillon, who faced treason charges and had been replaced by Sir William Weston. The secretary's coded communication concerning his

---

<sup>46</sup> It was not only that some Scotsmen provided aid to the Irish insurgents, but also the Spanish Blanks plot in 1593, the discovery of blank letters with the signatures of Scottish Catholic noblemen directed to the king of Spain, Philip II.

<sup>47</sup> CIPHER for Ireland to be retained by Lord Treasurer Burghley, 12 July 1595, SP 63/181/25, f. 53; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 340.

colleagues was unsurprising and necessary for security purposes. Ciphers for Ireland generally included the Irish councilors. The aforementioned cipher by Wallop also had the names of the Irish councilors. It reflected the political milieu in which the councilors lived. They reported information on the activities of their colleagues to the privy councilors in England.

In the case of Ireland during the Nine Years' War, such information enabled the queen and privy council to determine which councilors to retain or remove from office. Therefore, intelligence on the Irish councilors offered the Westminster government the opportunity to exert greater control over their Irish officers and by extension, the war. However, as they had with policy decisions in the opening years of the war, the Irish councilors frustrated this potential through their individual actions.

### **Trouble in the West**

With the key established, Fenton and Burghley could now communicate secretly about the war. The uprising in Connacht, in particular, captured their attention. Initially, Fenton thought that the insurgents in Ulster encouraged disobedience in Connacht.<sup>48</sup> However, he later suggested to Burghley that the complaints in Connacht concerned the chief commissioner, Sir Richard Bingham ("Improvido") and his officers. This codename for Bingham suggested that he was an improvident chief commissioner who lacked the foresight to govern effectively. Since becoming chief commissioner in June 1584, Bingham had faced numerous oppositions to his leadership within the province and had the reputation of exercising martial law too readily.<sup>49</sup> Though there were periods of relative peace, the province was unstable. Bingham's tenuous hold over Connacht declined even further when he received news in June 1595 that his cousin,

---

<sup>48</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 22 May 1595, SP 63/179/88, f. 222; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 318.

<sup>49</sup> Rory Rapple, "Taking Up Office in Elizabethan Connacht: The Case of Sir Richard Bingham," *The English Historical Review* 123 (2008): 278.



Captain George Bingham, had been murdered by some of his own officers while writing a letter to the chief commissioner in his chamber. The coup had resulted in the loss of the castle at Sligo.<sup>50</sup>

The murder of Bingham's cousin raised questions about the reason for the attack. Presumably, the murder was committed by the insurgents to gain a military foothold by killing the wards and taking over Castle Sligo. Reporting on the incident, Sir Ralph Lane—the muster master general who would become an Irish councilor in 1596—suggested otherwise.<sup>51</sup> Lane claimed to have received credible intelligence from a spy in the earl of Tyrone's camp that the Bingham had provoked the attack. According to Lane, the chief commissioner had invaded Tirconnell by sea and had devastated Donegal. The captain—acting under Bingham's orders—had also killed some in the area, including Scots at sea on their way to Tirconnell. It was only upon the captain's return to the castle that he had been murdered. Lane believed that the attack by the Bingham several months earlier had caused the earl of Tyrone to act against the English. Here, then, was another justification for why Tyrone had revolted, only this time Bingham, and not Fitzwilliam or Bagenal, was at fault.<sup>52</sup> Fenton believed the captain's death was either an act of personal revenge against the Bingham, "whose name is hated in the Contrey," because the murder had been committed by the captain's company of Irish soldiers or a conspiracy to draw

---

<sup>50</sup> Bingham to Lord Deputy Russell, 6 June 1595, SP 63/180/22, II, f. 79; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 328.

<sup>51</sup> Sir Ralph Lane to Burghley, 9 June 1595, SP 63/180/23, f. 82; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 328.

<sup>52</sup> Lane to Burghley, 9 June 1595, SP 63/180/23, f. 82; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 328. Though Lane had been knighted by Fitzwilliam, he appeared to have had a good working relationship with Bingham, which lends more credence to his report of this incident. On a related note, it is unclear precisely when Fitzwilliam knighted Lane. However, one source in particular suggests the knighting occurred sometime in the 1590s before Fitzwilliam's departure from Ireland. See, Names of such gentlemen, English and Irish, as have been knighted by Fitzwilliam, 1593-4, SP 63/173/8, II, f. 29; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 200. Lane is among the men listed, along with some Irish councilors: Sir Thomas Norris and Sir Geoffrey Fenton. Also included was Sir Dudley Loftus, the lord chancellor's son. Lane came under fire himself when he faced charges of corruption by the comptroller of the musters, Ralph Birkinshaw. He, of course, alleged the same of Birkinshaw (Lane to Cecil, 1 Feb. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 82, f. 218; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb 1600, p. 449).

the English army into the province from elsewhere in Ireland.<sup>53</sup> Based on Lane's assessment of the incident, Fenton's suspicion that the murder was an act of revenge may not have been far off the mark, especially given the continuing hostilities between the chief commissioner and Irish magnates in the region.

As Bingham had recommended in the case of Maguire and other Irish lords, he wanted to use military force against the insurgents—namely O'Donnell—and retake Castle Sligo. However, crown forces led by Lord Deputy Russell and Sir John Norris focused primarily on Ulster.<sup>54</sup> Bingham stated that, although the lord deputy seemed willing to go into Connacht, the Irish council rejected this plan and so restrained both the lord deputy and himself. Bingham refused, however, to stand idly by and gathered forces to prosecute O'Donnell.<sup>55</sup> He requested of the Irish council that additional soldiers, including the lord deputy's forces, be used to fight the war in Connacht. The council again disagreed and chose instead to supply the lord deputy with the greater force.<sup>56</sup> Lord Deputy Russell stated that he had offered to assist the chief commissioner in Connacht but maintained that he had received no response from Bingham.<sup>57</sup>

The queen apparently found fault with the Irish council for their failure to redirect forces to Norris in Ulster and Bingham in Connacht. She accused them essentially of mismanaging resources in the two major areas of the war. She had ordered in June additional soldiers, money, and victuals to be sent into Ireland. Yet, the Irish council stated that these provisions had not yet

---

<sup>53</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 7 June 1595, SP 63/180/17, f. 62r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 327.

<sup>54</sup> Bingham to Burghley, 17 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/48, f. 207; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 370.

<sup>55</sup> Bingham to Lord Deputy Russell, 6 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/5. III, f. 19; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 375. Bingham seemed convinced that O'Donnell had drawn Connacht into the war and enlisted the aid of Scotsmen. While Bingham prosecuted O'Donnell, the lord deputy seemed as intent in his prosecution of Feagh McHugh O'Byrne from 1595 through 1597.

<sup>56</sup> Bingham to Burghley, 6 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/16, f. 89; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 361.

<sup>57</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 4 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/10, f. 44; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 359. Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 14 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/32, f. 114; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 393.

arrived by August.<sup>58</sup> This delay left them unable to adequately prosecute the war in Ulster and also strengthen Bingham in Connacht.<sup>59</sup> They believed the best and proven course to prevail in the war was to divide the army into two. One army, led by the lord deputy, would advance from the Pale into Ulster and the other, led by the governor of Connacht, Bingham, from Tirconnell. The council contended that Bingham had been present when they discussed these plans and that they had asked for his advice. They said he had agreed to the council's course of action. They recognized that Bingham's forces were weak and thought his demand for more troops reasonable. The problem they encountered was in supplying the troops needed for their plan. The Irish councilors argued that if they had redirected the forces already present in Ireland, then it would leave the Pale defenseless—the implication being that the councilors' lives and livelihoods, as well as the wealth and political influence of Palesmen and merchants, would be vulnerable to attack. It was no wonder, then, that they chose to prioritize the Pale, their residence, and the "seate and hart" of the government.<sup>60</sup>

A joint letter from Loftus, (Anthony) St. Leger, and Gardiner to the lord deputy suggested either that some of the councilors had not consented to the above plan, or that they sought to assign blame elsewhere.<sup>61</sup> These three councilors took exception when Russell claimed that he had wanted to assist Bingham in Connacht but had been restrained by the council.<sup>62</sup> In

---

<sup>58</sup> George Beverly reported that some ships had arrived in mid-August with soldiers and victuals, but others delayed by contrary winds at Chester. Beverly complained that the lord deputy took no care of his advertisements or others on the state of provisions. Beverly did not want to be blamed for inattention to his duties in victualing soldiers in Ireland (Beverly to Burghley, 15 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/40, f. 182; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 369). In November, the privy council renewed their order from June for more reinforcements to Ireland (*APC*, vol. 25, p. 47).

<sup>59</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 6 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/13, f. 59; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 360.

<sup>60</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 6 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/13, f. 59v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 360.

<sup>61</sup> Their signatures were on the council's August letter to the privy council, as well as those of Wallop, Fenton, and Bouchier.

<sup>62</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 4 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/71, f. 224; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 408. Russell stated that the Irish councilors did not approve of his assisting Bingham, though he had thought his help "most necessarie" (224r.)

doing so, Russell implied that the councilors had overruled the lord deputy and acted independently.<sup>63</sup> They reminded the lord deputy that they had been of one mind and voice when they asserted the importance of Connacht ("more to be respected than Ulster") and the need for extra forces there.<sup>64</sup> But Russell had been "resolutlie determynd" to go to the borders of Ulster instead.<sup>65</sup> Russell's letters to Burghley show some of this determination as well.<sup>66</sup>

This disagreement among the councilors sounded eerily familiar. It had occurred in 1586 when the former lord deputy, Perrot, resolved to go to Connacht against the council's advice. In both cases, the Irish council suggested that the lord deputy had refused their counsel. In 1595, however, the lord deputy claimed restraint of his authority. Bingham had not supported Perrot's claims in 1586. Now, however, he supported Russell's earlier statements on his willingness to go to Connacht were it not for the Irish council's dissent.<sup>67</sup>

Loftus identified Sir Robert Napier as the only judge who had advised the lord deputy to go to the borders of the Pale and explained why the other two judges—St. Leger and Gardiner—had requested to write jointly to the lord deputy.<sup>68</sup> St. Leger and Gardiner had apparently agreed with Loftus when the latter insisted that additional forces be given to Norris and Bingham. Loftus was, therefore, disavowing the council letter they had all signed, suggesting that the letter reflected the opinion of the lord deputy and Napier rather than the majority of the council. This disavowal was not altogether unusual, given the council letters Fenton had signed earlier

---

<sup>63</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and others to Lord Deputy Russell, 18 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/48. I, f. 166; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 396.

<sup>64</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and others to Lord Deputy Russell, 18 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/48. I, f. 166v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 396.

<sup>65</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and others to Lord Deputy Russell, 18 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/48. I, f. 166v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 396.

<sup>66</sup> See, for example, Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 8 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/21, f. 97; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 364.

<sup>67</sup> Bingham to Burghley, 17 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/48, f. 207; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 370.

<sup>68</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus to Burghley, 24 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/148, f. 163; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 396.

advocating military force and his private letters to Burghley pushing for negotiation. In this case, Fenton also claimed that the forces would have been better used for Connacht but that the other councilors had overruled him.<sup>69</sup> He admitted, however, that if the lord deputy had not gone to the borders, then the harvests there would have been spoiled by their enemies or consumed by enemy troops. The issue of subsistence affected both crown and enemy forces. What *was* unique about this incident was the greater number of councilors who now dissented from what they had previously agreed.

Clearly, the issue of where to direct limited military forces caused tension among the Irish councilors. Some councilors maintained they had pushed for reinforcement in Connacht. However, extenuating circumstances called for a different strategy. Bingham did not receive the troops he had requested, and his campaign was unsuccessful.<sup>70</sup> He returned to Dublin defeated. By October 1595, the crisis in Connacht had only increased, and many officers believed that the province was essentially overthrown.

The seeming loss of Connacht occurred precisely as Norris was negotiating peace terms with Tyrone and O'Donnell in Ulster. Both men signed their submission in mid-October and agreed to a cessation of arms.<sup>71</sup> With Ulster apparently close to being settled, the Westminster and Dublin governments tried to ascertain whether the insurrection in Connacht proceeded first from Ulster or was a consequence of internal problems within Connacht. The queen and privy council ordered an investigation into the grievances of the insurgents there.<sup>72</sup> The war had now

---

<sup>69</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 10 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/23, f. 76; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 386.

<sup>70</sup> Bingham to Lord Deputy Russell, 6 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/5. III, f. 19; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 375.

<sup>71</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 125-126. Notably, Hugh O'Donnell blamed Sir John Perrot, the former deputy, and Perrot's "ill usage" of him as the cause for his offences.

<sup>72</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 18 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/91, f. 296; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 422. The queen and privy council had intended a commission into Connacht earlier in May, but the process had been delayed by the war (*APC*, vol. 25, p. 414).

impressed upon them the need for negotiation with the Ulster lords. Resolving issues in Connacht was potentially one way to end the conflict.

From the outset, the purpose of this investigation in Connacht seemed aimed at uncovering the presumed guilt of Bingham and his officers. The lord deputy's letter insinuated as much when he requested a written account of the "grievances and extortions com[m]itted ether by the governor," his officers, or any Englishmen in the province.<sup>73</sup> Fenton also appeared certain of the Bingham's guilt. He thought it necessary that the Irish administration ensure the safety of complainants against retaliation from Bingham or his officers.<sup>74</sup> He advocated Bingham's removal from the province during the proceedings and employment in France or the Low Countries or service at sea, as Bingham's absence would enable the better management of Connacht. The lord deputy, with the assistance of the other councilors, could settle the province once Bingham had left. Implicit in Fenton's suggestions was the attempt to orchestrate a less humiliating and dishonorable dismissal for Bingham. He further added that those councilors in alliance with Bingham—Wallop and Gardiner—should be excluded from the proceedings.<sup>75</sup> The privy council chose Wallop, along with Loftus and Fenton, to accompany the lord deputy. When Wallop declined to travel because of his poor health, Fenton noted that Wallop had managed to

---

<sup>73</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 18 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/91, f. 296r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 422. Bingham, unsurprisingly, vehemently disagreed (Bingham to Burghley, 30 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/65, f. 210; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 407 and Bingham to the Queen, 22 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/99, f. 317; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 423).

<sup>74</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 21 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/44, f. 151; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 396.

<sup>75</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 21 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/44, f. 151; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 396. He later amended this statement when he recommended in cipher that Fitzwilliam, Norris, the earl of Ormond, Loftus, Wallop, Gardiner, and himself be part of the commission (Fenton to Burghley, 31 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/109, f. 344; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 425). Norris also thought that Gardiner had too much affection for Bingham and, therefore, unlikely to be impartial (J. Norris to Lord Deputy Russell, 19 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/47. I, f. 268; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 128).

escape the order to investigate Bingham's governance under "pretence of the weakenes of his body."<sup>76</sup>

When Bingham received news of the proceedings, he vigorously rebutted the complaints against him in his appeals to the privy council and to Burghley.<sup>77</sup> He argued that the troubles in Connacht had a direct relation to the Ulster insurrection and were not the result of his governance.<sup>78</sup> An indifferent trial composed of men who did not seek his undoing, he suggested, would reveal the truth about his governorship.<sup>79</sup> Though he initially aimed the proposal at the complainants, he suspected the lord deputy and lord chancellor had already concluded his guilt.<sup>80</sup> This misgiving explained why he offered to appear before the privy council in England or the whole of the Irish council at Dublin.<sup>81</sup>

Bingham had just cause to believe that Lord Deputy Russell, Loftus, and Fenton were working against him. They asserted that Bingham circumvented their work through some "couert and vnderhand workinge."<sup>82</sup> Bingham, they alleged, made private offers (some with money) to prevent his enemies from submitting complaints against him.<sup>83</sup> In another letter, Fenton voiced his concern that the proceedings would be impeded: "there seemeth to be such a hartbarninge in the people towards Improuido [Bingham] and his name, as neyther will the rebell come in, nor

---

<sup>76</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 9 Nov. 1595, SP 63/184/17, f. 61v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 432. Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 7 Nov. 1595, SP 63/184/5, f. 7; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 427.

<sup>77</sup> Sir Richard Bingham's answers to the 43 slanderous articles delivered to Lord Deputy Russell, Nov. 1595, Cotton Titus B/XIII/178, f. 458 and Sir Richard Bingham's answers to the slanderous articles exhibited against him by Leman, 30 Nov. 1595, Cotton Titus B/XIII/179, f. 461.

<sup>78</sup> Bingham to Cecil, 20 Nov. 1595, SP 63/184/28, f. 107; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 433.

<sup>79</sup> Bingham to the Privy Council, 25 Nov. 1595, SP 63/184/32, f. 117; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 434.

<sup>80</sup> Bingham to Burghley, 16 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/20, f. 48; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 439.

<sup>81</sup> Bingham to Burghley, 16 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/20, f. 48; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 439.

<sup>82</sup> Lord Deputy Russell, Lord Chancellor Loftus, and Fenton to Burghley, 13 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/13, f. 31r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 439.

<sup>83</sup> Lord Deputy Russell, Lord Chancellor Loftus, and Fenton to Burghley, 13 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/13, f. 31; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 439.

the subiect thinke himself saff, so longe as he governeth."<sup>84</sup> And yet, the Irish lords of Sligo and Roscommon went anyway. They presented reports of their grievances against Bingham and the other provincial officers.<sup>85</sup> However, this early investigation was suspended as further negotiations with the insurgents in Ulster delayed the proceedings.

In May 1596, Fenton pushed for a new commission to be sent into Connacht to renew the investigation.<sup>86</sup> His reasoning was that problems in Connaught jeopardized a peaceful conclusion to the war in Ulster. According to Fenton, the lord deputy and council wanted Norris and himself as commissioners, and for Bingham to be kept at Dublin. The queen and privy council agreed. They had heard of the "monstrous accusac[i]ons" against their officers there and the oppression of "so many of those poor people."<sup>87</sup> The queen resolved to remove Bingham if he was found guilty and to reform Connacht with "sword to the obstinat" and "iustice to the oppressed."<sup>88</sup> The Irish council, therefore, must be united in counsel and resolve the problems in that province without "ffaction or partiallitie."<sup>89</sup>

Explicit in the queen's letter was her distrust of the ability of her Irish councilors to investigate the issues properly: "wee shall hold it a weaknes in yow (to whom the goverment of o[u]r kingdome w[i]th thaduisse of o[u]r Counsell is commytted) yf wee shalbe dryven dayly

---

<sup>84</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 11 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/12, ff. 29r-v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 438. Norris, though absent from these proceedings, identified O'Donnell as the culprit who interfered with the proceedings, not Bingham (J. Norris to Cecil, 26 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/32, f. 151; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 443). Fenton had also mentioned O'Donnell's involvement as well.

<sup>85</sup> Grievous complaints of Dermot O'Connor, 30 Nov. 1595, SP 63/184/40, f. 137; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 435. Articles presented to Lord Deputy Russell and Council against Sir Richard Bingham, [13 Dec.] 1595, SP 63/185/14, f. 35; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 439. Fenton to Burghley, 1 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/2, f. 3r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 437.

<sup>86</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 10 May 1595, SP 63/189/20, f. 44; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 518.

<sup>87</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 25 May 1596, SP 63/189/43, f. 107v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 521.

<sup>88</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 25 May 1596, SP 63/189/43, f. 107r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 521.

<sup>89</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 25 May 1596, SP 63/189/43, f. 107r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 521.



from hence to dyrect yow in all partyculer[es]."<sup>90</sup> Being in England, the queen and the privy council could not manage the proceedings in Ireland themselves, but neither could they depend on the Irish council, whom they believed had bungled war negotiations thus far. Yet, despite their reservations, the queen and privy council had no other choice. Their unease seemed justified when the commission descended into personal disputes. Justice—if such a thing could be achieved in colonial governments—would be delayed.

As Fenton had requested, the queen appointed Norris and himself to serve as commissioners to investigate grievances in Connacht. This decision upset Bingham. He begged in private letters to Burghley for the other Irish councilors to be included on the commission, as Norris and Fenton were his adversaries and "maliciouslie entented" against him.<sup>91</sup> He believed them incapable of being impartial in their proceedings. Norris wanted to install his brother, Thomas, in Bingham's office and Fenton had been his adversary these past seven years.<sup>92</sup> Fenton had resumed his secret communication with Burghley to discuss Bingham in late 1595.<sup>93</sup> He did so once again during the 1596 commission. Though he stopped using the codewords for the other councilors, he continued to do so for Bingham, albeit inconsistently. At times, he would use the codeword for Bingham, "Improvido," and on other occasions, he would simply use Bingham's name.<sup>94</sup> When he advocated Bingham's revocation, he used the codeword for the governor. This inconsistency meant his encryption could be easily decoded. If Bingham, or any of his supporters, had access to these letters, then Fenton deceived no one.

---

<sup>90</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 25 May 1596, SP 63/189/43, f. 107v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 521.

<sup>91</sup> Bingham to Burghley, June 1595, SP 63/190/51, f. 230r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 544. Bingham to Burghley, 18 June 1596, SP 63/190/28, f. 124; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 534.

<sup>92</sup> Bingham to Cecil, 24 June 1596, SP 63/190/36, f. 154; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 540. J. Norris to Cecil, 26 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/32, f. 152r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 443. J. Norris and Fenton to the Lord Deputy and Council, 16 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/51. I, f. 282; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 133.

<sup>93</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 11 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/12, f. 29; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 438.

<sup>94</sup> See, for instance, Fenton to Burghley, 27 April 1596, SP 63/188/69, f. 183; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 515.

Bingham was right to suspect the secretary's motives. The two had once been friends and had spoken of each other favorably, that is, until 1589 when the lord deputy at the time, Fitzwilliam, pursued charges against Bingham. Before this incident, Fitzwilliam and Bingham had managed to cooperate, despite their differences.<sup>95</sup> However, once the hostility between the MacWilliam Burkes in Mayo and Bingham had intensified in spring 1589, Fitzwilliam had appointed commissioners to investigate the accusations that the Burkes made against Bingham.<sup>96</sup> One of the commissioners had been Fenton and another, Norris. Both men had sided with Fitzwilliam and the complainants.

Feeling betrayed by Fenton, his former friend, and convinced that the lord deputy was out to get him, Bingham had complained to the privy council. He had written to Walsingham several times that the lord deputy was using the other Irish councilors against him. He had named the co-conspirators as Loftus, Jones, Robert Dillon, and Fenton. Walsingham had also been of the same opinion: "you and some others thincke, by yor conninge dealinge, to drawe vppon S[ir] Richard, the cause and blame of all these trowbles in Connaught, and therebie to overthrowe the gentleman: but this practise of yors [...] ys sufficientlie discour[er]ed alredie; from that Realme."<sup>97</sup> Walsingham accused Jones and Dillon of acting against Bingham because he had discovered an illicit activity of theirs involving land. Bingham, however, had believed then that Fenton, more than all the others, could damage his reputation the most since the secretary was set to meet with the privy councilors in England.<sup>98</sup> To Bingham, Fenton was cunning and had participated in the political machinations to have him removed from office. Though Bingham was eventually

---

<sup>95</sup> Rory Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558-1594* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 278.

<sup>96</sup> Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture*, 278-279.

<sup>97</sup> Walsingham to Thomas Jones, 24 June 1589, SP 63/145/21, f. 61r; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 208.

<sup>98</sup> Bingham to Walsingham, 11 July 1589, SP 63/145/63, f. 149; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 219.

acquitted in late 1589, the relationship between the chief commissioner and the secretary had been irrevocably broken. Here then was a major cause of the friction evident in 1595, and why Bingham did not want Fenton's involvement in the commission.

In both commissions, 1589 and 1595, Fenton had supported Bingham's adversaries and, in turn, became an adversary to Bingham. The instinct may have been a political one: it made more sense to back most of the Irish council than the unpopular provincial governor. Fenton may have also felt threatened by Bingham's behavior as governor. The revolts in Connacht jeopardized English authority more broadly in Ireland, as well as Fenton's personal interests on the island. The commission in Connacht had also occurred at a timely moment for Fenton because he stood accused of concealing crown lands in Munster.<sup>99</sup> Prosecuting Bingham and settling Connacht in 1596 was, therefore, a path to redemption. It is also possible that Fenton's objection to Bingham was ideological. He may have recognized that English authority in Ireland could only expand through conciliatory means, and Bingham's brutal reign in Connacht compromised that possibility. Whatever the reason for Fenton's abrupt turn, he used the revolts in Connacht as an opportunity to discredit a governor he found disagreeable.

When Bingham later fled Ireland in September 1596 (without license), he justified his flight by referring to a murder plot orchestrated by the commissioners, Norris and Fenton, to overthrow him "in a moste indirect and vngodlie waie."<sup>100</sup> He feared that he would be murdered

---

<sup>99</sup> Note delivered by Patrick Crosby to Wallop and Gardiner, 1596, SP 63/186/11. I, f. 28; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 447. Crosby worked as a clerk for Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and as an intelligence agent for Cecil. Although Crosby is discussed further in the next chapter, it should be noted here that Crosby's "note" came after Fenton's allegation in 1594 that Crosby had reduced the rent of certain lands and pocketed some of the money for himself (Fenton to Burghley, 12 June 1594, SP 63/175/12. II, f. 104; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 255). What makes Fenton's claim more legitimate is its backing by Sir William Weston, Sir Robert Napier, and Sir Anthony St. Leger (Weston, Napier, and St. Leger to Burghley, 14 June 1594, SP 63/175/11. I, f. 96; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 254).

<sup>100</sup> Petition of Sir Richard Bingham to the Lord Deputy and Council, 18 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/23. I, f. 205r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 112. Bingham made this claim both before and after his departure to England. Causes which moved Sir Richard Bingham to repair into England to appeal for justice, 30 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/51,

by his enemies in Ireland *en route* to Athlone, where his trial was set.<sup>101</sup> Upon his arrival in England, he was imprisoned and replaced in his governorship by Sir Conyers Clifford. To the commissioners, Bingham's flight was not only proof of his guilt, but also an attempt to skirt justice.<sup>102</sup> Tellingly, Fenton reported that Connacht was settling on the same day that he informed the privy council of Bingham's flight to England.<sup>103</sup> Fenton clearly sought to associate disorder with Bingham's presence in Ireland and to assert that there was stability once Bingham had left. Owing to the hostility between the Irish councilors, the privy council decided to move the proceedings to England. However, it does not appear that the privy council continued the investigation. By absconding to England, Bingham brought politics in Ireland to England. He successfully maneuvered the situation back into his favor, so much so that he was ultimately able to return to Ireland with a higher-ranking position as marshal of the army in 1598.<sup>104</sup>

### **A Dearth in Men, Money, and Provisions**

The dispute between Bingham and the other Irish councilors in 1595 and 1596 brought to the fore the recurring and intensifying problem of resource scarcity and money in Ireland. By virtue of their offices, several of the Irish councilors were directly involved in managing army maintenance, among them the treasurer-at-war (Wallop), the muster-master (Lane), the master of the ordnance (Bourchier), and the lieutenant of the ordnance (Carew). The Irish administration

---

f. 281; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 131. Fenton to Burghley, 24 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/28, f. 213; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 114. Lord Chancellor Loftus, and others of the Council, to the Privy Council, 29 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/47, f. 266; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 128. There is no evidence of a murder plot against Bingham. It may have been a ploy to justify his departure from Ireland. However, the nature of politics in Ireland gives some potential legitimacy to Bingham's suspicions.

<sup>101</sup> Causes which moved Sir Richard Bingham to repair into England to appeal for justice, 30 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/51, f. 281; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 131.

<sup>102</sup> Both Fenton and Norris stated that in leaving England, Bingham had escaped justice (Fenton to Burghley, 27 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/42, f. 249; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 124 and J. Norris to Burghley, 27 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/40, f. 245; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 121).

<sup>103</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 24 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/28, f. 213; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 114.

<sup>104</sup> *ODNB*, "Bingham, Sir Richard."

frequently begged for more soldiers, money, and other provisions for the army. Inundated with these appeals, the queen and the privy council debated in England on how to meet the demands of their Irish officers.<sup>105</sup> They issued numerous orders for the levying of troops in England and Wales throughout the war period, which only rose in frequency as the war continued.<sup>106</sup> The queen and privy council also redirected troops from their stations in Europe (Brittany and the Low Countries) to Ireland.<sup>107</sup> The crown was now more seriously committed to the war in Ireland, as evidenced by their transfer of the great military leader, Sir John Norris, and veteran troops from the continent into Ireland in spring 1595.

While the Westminster government worked to reinforce their army in Ireland, they also demanded accurate accounts for the number of troops and provisions already present in Ireland.<sup>108</sup> When the queen and privy council received information contrary to what they had supplied, they suspected deception by their officers. On several occasions, the number of men listed as employed in the army did not match the number of soldiers available for war.<sup>109</sup> In other words, there were more soldiers on the books than there were in the field. The implication was that army officers failed to report the status of their soldiers—how many men were still present and how many had died or absconded from service—yet continued to collect money from these

---

<sup>105</sup> See, for example, Notes of a consultation of the privy council relative to sending soldiers to Ireland, 7 Jan. 1595, SP 63/178/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 289.

<sup>106</sup> John McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The Burdens of the 1590s Crisis* (New York; Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2009), pp. 58-59, 62. McGurk's book is especially useful in understanding the practical considerations and logistics of mustering and managing an army for Ireland. In the last third of his book, "Elizabethan Military Service in Ireland," he provides figures for the maintenance of the army, focusing mainly on the later years of the war, 1598-1601, and less on the years, 1593-1597.

<sup>107</sup> Muster of 1,304 soldiers brought out of Brittany by Sir Henry Norris, 7 Apr. 1595, SP 63/179/23. I, f. 43; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 311.

<sup>108</sup> See, for example, A list of Her Majesty's whole forces in Ireland, 26 Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/54. I, f. 130; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 299 and A list of Her Majesty's forces in Ireland, Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/38, f. 114; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 194.

<sup>109</sup> *APC*, vol. 26, p. 174.

absentee soldiers.<sup>110</sup> This deceit would explain the demand for more troops from companies that should be full.

Burghley also highlighted this discrepancy to the Irish council. In response, Fenton explained that the total number of soldiers in Ireland also included the garrisons stationed throughout the provinces (mainly Connacht, Munster, Leinster, and the Pale) and were not considered for field campaigns into Ulster.<sup>111</sup> These troops were to "abyde in their settled places."<sup>112</sup> While these garrisons were comprised of new soldiers or old is impossible to guess, but one may speculate that the Irish council may have placed new recruits in these garrisons in order to train them before field service. Lists of the crown army in Ireland generally do not include information about the individual soldiers who served in the army, only their captains. Regardless, the queen and privy council expected to reinforce the army, but mainly in areas that would directly help in prosecuting the war against the Irish insurgency. Whatever misgivings the queen and privy council had about transporting more soldiers into Ireland, they had little choice but to do so, particularly as they distrusted the negotiations with the Ulster lords.<sup>113</sup>

The Westminster government also ran into major difficulties in funding the war in Ireland (see Table 6.1).

---

<sup>110</sup> *APC*, vol. 26, p. 174. They sent Maurice Kiffin, a muster-master, to review the muster reports since Lane was sick.

<sup>111</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 20 July 1595, SP 63/181/44, f. 112; CSPIre, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 345.

<sup>112</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 20 July 1595, SP 63/181/44, f. 112r; CSPIre, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 345.

<sup>113</sup> *APC*, vol. 26, pp. 42-46.

| Table 6.1   |        | Irish Military Expenditure, 1593-1603 |                       |                   |
|---|--------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
|   |        | Clear Remain                          | Payments from England |                   |
|   |        | <i>£ Irish</i>                        | <i>£ Irish</i>        | <i>£ Sterling</i> |
| 1593-1594   | 17,456 |                                       | 42,793                | 32,095            |
| 1594-1595   | 8,813  |                                       | 71,433                | 53,575            |
| 1595-1596   | 23,035 |                                       | 89,814                | 67,360            |
| 1596-1597   | 11,024 |                                       | 111,213               | 83,410            |
| 1597-1598   | 3,182  |                                       | 91,107                | 68,330            |
| 1598-1599   | 15     |                                       | 261,335               | 196,001           |
| 1599-1600   | -215   |                                       | 250,778               | 188,084           |
| 1600-1601   | 657    |                                       | 84,546                | 63,410            |
| 1601-1602   | 175    |                                       | 1,761                 | 1,320             |
| 1602-1603   | 4,447  |                                       | n/a                   | n/a               |
| ✧ The table is based on Sheehan, "Irish Revenues and English Subventions, 1559-1622," 45, 47. |        |                                       |                       |                   |

Money was crucial to sustaining the war effort and, as the war continued, more and more money had to be sent from the English exchequer into Ireland. To be fair, this was not a new phenomenon. England frequently had to ship over money to support the Irish military and administration, as discussed in Chapter Two. The great hope which the Westminster government harbored was that Ireland would eventually become self-sufficient. It did not. Instead, the Nine Years' War vastly reinforced the financial dependency in Ireland on payments from England. The clear remain—the Irish revenues leftover after administrative costs had been covered—diminished dramatically. As revenues in Ireland declined due to the effects of war, the machinery of Elizabethan government in Ireland suffered. There was very little of the revenues left to cover military expenses. For the two-year period between 1598 and 1600, the clear remain was at its

lowest, forcing payments from England of over £510,000. The queen and privy council had to prioritize their fiscal policies towards one end: maintaining the security of its kingdoms against the ever-present Spanish threat.

The Westminster government tried to mitigate the high costs of war, in some instances, by waging offensive attacks on Spanish ships and in Spanish territories, in the hopes of reducing the military capacity of the Spanish state and seizing its wealth for English purposes. The successful capture of the Spanish port of Cadiz in 1596 appeared useful towards this end, but victory quickly erupted into dissent as the bulk of the spoils failed to make their way to the royal treasury.<sup>114</sup> The sack of the city, rather than the merchant fleet, meant that it was army officers who claimed the plunder, not the naval officers or even the queen. The queen demanded an investigation to determine which of her officers had taken the booty. She even directed Sir George Carew—her Irish councilor and lieutenant of the ordnance—to recover munitions from the Cadiz expedition to use for the war in Ireland.<sup>115</sup> The financial rewards she had hoped to gain from Cadiz seemed elusive, and the volume of demands for more men, money, and provisions in Ireland continued unabated. This pressure on England's political, financial, and economic ability to maintain war affected the queen and privy council's response, as well as her Irish councilors, to the demands of war. The queen's Irish officers would soon discover that the crown labored under burdens it could not support.

As the queen's servants in Ireland persisted in their requests for more resources, they expected that the quality of soldiers sent into Ireland would enable an English victory. They assumed that the soldiers would be trained and experienced. However, once the new troops

---

<sup>114</sup> Paul E. J. Hammer, "Myth-Making: Politics, Propaganda and the Capture of Cadiz in 1596," *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 3 (1997): 621-625.

<sup>115</sup> *APC*, vol. 26, p. 260. Ironically, Carew was suspected of stealing 44,000 ducats from a castle in Cadiz (See *HoP*, "Carew, Sir George").



arrived, the inadequacy of many recruits for military service became apparent. Lane reported that the inexperience of soldiers led not only to his being shot twice and his two horses "shott throwe vnder himselfe," but also the overtaking of Connacht by enemy forces.<sup>116</sup> Seeing in the company the "wante of all kinde of trayning," he offered to train them for two or three days for the queen's service *before* their transport to Ireland.<sup>117</sup> Sir John Norris stated that, though men had been sent into Ireland, they were deficient as soldiers.<sup>118</sup> Some had died during the journey, and others were "so weake and simple" that they were "not worthie to be made pioniers."<sup>119</sup> There were similar reports commenting on the weakness or sickness of the soldiers, especially those newly arrived out of England.<sup>120</sup> According to Sir Henry Norris, brother of Sir John, the soldiers' legs had been weakened from their journey into Ireland, which made them ill-suited for the long marches in Ireland.<sup>121</sup>

Sir John Norris called for a better supply of men: "artificers and young men; hable to endure some hardnes and not pore old plowmen and rogues."<sup>122</sup> However, training soldiers cost money, and the increasing demands for more soldiers placed pressure on English and Welsh towns to provide men, regardless of their lack of suitability for soldiering. As the war in Ireland persisted, the composition of soldiers sent into Ireland changed and became a form of solution to

---

<sup>116</sup> Lane to Burghley, 14 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/16, f. 39r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 439.

<sup>117</sup> Lane to Burghley, 14 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/16, f. 39r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 439. James Fullerton also noted the unpreparedness of the soldiers, particularly those transported out of Chester (Fullerton to George Nicolson, SP 52/55/96, f. 96; *CSPSco*, 1589-1603, Appendix 1543-1592, p. 679). Fullerton was a spy for King James VI of Scotland. On Fullerton, see David Edwards, "Securing the Jacobean Succession: The Secret Career of James Fullerton of Trinity College, Dublin," in *The World of the Galloglass: Kings, Warlords and Warriors in Ireland and Scotland, 1200-1600*, ed. Seán Duffy (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 188-219.

<sup>118</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 10 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/21, f. 72; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 386.

<sup>119</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 10 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/21, f. 72r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 386.

<sup>120</sup> Sir Henry Norris to Burghley, 13 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/90, f. 204; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 304. Fenton to Lord Buckhurst, 30 July 1595, SP 63/181/66, f. 198; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 348. Lane also noted their sickness (Lane to Burghley, 14 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/16, f. 39; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 439).

<sup>121</sup> H. Norris to the Lord Deputy, 26 Mar. 1595, SP 63/178/119, f. 283; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 307.

<sup>122</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 10 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/21, f. 72r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 386.

England's vagrancy problem.<sup>123</sup> John McGurk maintains that the English government used vagrants and other men deemed "degenerate" as a "social cleansing" policy and a way to fulfill mustering requirements.<sup>124</sup>

The need for more troops also forced a greater reliance on Irish soldiers and Scottish mercenaries to make up numbers. The Irish had fought alongside Englishmen for a long time, and the queen had allowed Irish soldiers to join the royal army.<sup>125</sup> These Irish soldiers were paid less than their English counterparts, making them an attractive option for an administration with severe financial problems.<sup>126</sup> But the English constantly feared that the Irishmen they employed would turn against them. Fenton considered the recruitment of the Irish in the royal army a dangerous recourse because they could be spies or could switch loyalties and provide intelligence about English forces and plans to the enemy.<sup>127</sup> To limit the risk, the queen placed restrictions on the number of Irishmen in each company, though to little effect.<sup>128</sup> Necessity dictated their continued use.

The same could be said of hiring Scots as mercenaries. The Scots, however, were a problem of a different sort. They had a long history with the Irish, given their shared Gaelic culture and heritage. The Scots had also traditionally served as mercenary soldiers in Irish armies as galloglasses in exchange for land and later in the sixteenth century as "redshanks" on short-

---

<sup>123</sup> A. L. Beier, *Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England, 1560-1640* (London: Methuen, 1987), 94. McGurk, 33-34.

<sup>124</sup> McGurk, 33.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 41-44.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>127</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 7 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/9, f. 39; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 381. Sir Conyers Clifford to Sir Robert Cecil, 9 Aug. 1597, SP 63/200/83, f. 230; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 371. Some errors to be reformed in the government of Ireland, Aug. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 55, f. 97; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 249.

<sup>128</sup> McGurk, 41-42. See also, Kiffin to Burghley, 18 Feb. 1597, SP 63/197/105, f. 344; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 236. Kiffin claimed that the Irish accounted for more than half of some companies in the royal army in Ireland. He further alleged that when he brought this issue to the lord deputy and council, some councilors did not count those born in the Pale as Irish. Kiffin did not agree.

term contracts for Gaelic lords.<sup>129</sup> Employing Scotsmen now placed the English crown in a precarious position. Tudor monarchs had tried on numerous occasions to expel the Scots from Ireland. The hiring of Scottish mercenaries and the intermarriage between the Scots and the Irish was so concerning to the English government that it had even declared these practices treasonous in 1557. Of course, this law did not entirely discourage these practices, and the Nine Years' War made it clear that Scotsmen were still a reserve for the Irish when needed. In the 1590s, Elizabeth wrote to James VI and the most powerful Scottish nobleman, the earl of Argyll, to put an end to the mercenary trade between Ireland and Scotland. Now, the English proposed to employ the Scots to do their own ends. Irish officers repeatedly proposed using Scottish forces, though their plans did not bear fruit until 1600.<sup>130</sup> For now, they had to make do with the soldiers they had already, most of whom, by all accounts, did not want to be in Ireland.

Englishmen and Irishmen alike deserted their companies.<sup>131</sup> In July 1595, Fulk Alderley, the mayor of Chester, reported the desertion of some men before they had even embarked to Ireland. He described the companies gathered at Chester as "verie dissordered, daylie fightinge and quarrelinge, and lykeli to growe into muteines, makinge demandes of allowances not due vnto them."<sup>132</sup> Another report indicated that the recruits had to be threatened "vppon payne of deathe" or imprisonment to embark on the ship for Ireland.<sup>133</sup> Even with the threat of death, some men still refused to go.

---

<sup>129</sup> Galloglasses were originally heavy armed and armored, while redshanks were lightly equipped with archers. By the 1590s, they were using pikes and firearms.

<sup>130</sup> McGurk, 45. For more on the western highlands project, see Acres, "The Early Political Career of Sir Robert Cecil," 253-269.

<sup>131</sup> Instructions given by the Lord General Sir John Norris to Sir Henry Norris, 27 July 1596, SP 63/191/45, f. 237; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 49.

<sup>132</sup> Alderley to the Privy Council, 20 July 1595, SP 63/181/45, f. 114r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 345.

<sup>133</sup> Peter Proby to Sir R. Cecil, 5 Apr 1596, SP 63/188/12, f. 23r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 507.

The lord deputy and council tried to determine the cause for desertion and heaped some of the blame on abusive captains.<sup>134</sup> However, Alderley attributed the soldiers' discontent to concern about their wages and provisions. Before they arrived at port towns to await shipping, the new recruits were supposed to receive coat and conduct money, which would cover their expenses for uniform, food, and lodging.<sup>135</sup> The soldiers' wages were an important part of the process of mustering forces for Ireland, and their non-payment before they had even left England spoke volumes about their military service in Ireland. These money problems only compounded once the soldiers arrived at their destination, with the Irish councilors appealing to the queen and privy council on the soldiers' behalf.<sup>136</sup>

Besides the arrears in wage payments, there were problems with provisions for the army. In April 1595, for example, the lord deputy announced that the soldiers arrived, but not their victuals.<sup>137</sup> Lacking food, the soldiers turned to Irish towns and, lacking money as well, harassed townfolk for their goods.<sup>138</sup> Norris believed these companies were "driven into verie great extremetie for want of vittles, and money to relieue them."<sup>139</sup> A petition by some inhabitants in Kildare suggested the same as well. They stated that the soldiers extorted the queen's poor subjects for "provision of dyet such as they haue not or cannot spare, devouringe the same in most ryotous manner [...] taking money in one place and meate and money in another."<sup>140</sup> The

---

<sup>134</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 26 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/63, f. 251; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 372. Lord Deputy Russell to the Privy Council, 2 Apr. 1596, SP 63/188/3, f. 5; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 506. McGurk, 196-197. Justice Nicholas Walsh to Burghley, 12 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/31, f. 75; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 489.

<sup>135</sup> McGurk, 30-31.

<sup>136</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 24 May 1595, SP 63/179/91, f. 230; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 319. Sir Thomas Norris to the Lord Deputy, 15 May 1596, SP 63/189/25, f. 59; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 519.

<sup>137</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 22 Apr. 1595, SP 63/179/46, f. 103; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 314. Not long after the receipt of these soldiers, lord deputy requested an additional 1,000 soldiers and more victuals because the forces of their enemies had increased, along with their weapons, order, and discipline (Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/6, f. 14; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 322).

<sup>138</sup> Philip O'Reilly to Thomas Jones, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/10, f. 46; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 326.

<sup>139</sup> J. Norris to the Lord Deputy, 8 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/84. III, f. 279r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 420.

<sup>140</sup> The humble petition of the distressed inhabitants of the county of Kildare, [24 July] 1597, SP 63/200/53, f. 160r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 354.

people in Kildare clearly thought the issue was one of provisions. However, Loftus and Jones informed Burghley that in parts of Leinster, the inhabitants suffered many "greevous extortions & oppressions" by the queen's army, *especially* the band of soldiers under Lord President Norris.<sup>141</sup> The two clerics thought the soldiers lacked discipline, yet stated they could do nothing as the authority to correct such behavior lay in "martiall causes, from w[hi]ch wee are secluded."<sup>142</sup>

In addition to the reports of the inadequacy of many soldiers and the frequent problems with supplies and discipline, there were concerns about fraud in the claims for payment by captains. The queen and privy council appointed Maurice Kiffin to review the muster accounts and certificates that had been signed by Sir Ralph Lane, the current muster master in Ireland.<sup>143</sup> Upon reviewing these accounts, Kiffin alleged that both Lane and his deputy were corrupt, allegations which the lord deputy and council apparently supported.<sup>144</sup> He found at least three glaring issues for which he blamed concerned Lane: inaccurate certificates of the number of soldiers in Ireland; an excessive number of Irishmen in the English army; and the misuse of the dead pay system. Kiffin declared that Lane made his certificates in Dublin "w[i]thout any knowledge, either of vew, or Muster, had of them."<sup>145</sup> He also reported that, in some bands, the number of Irishmen was more than half than that of Englishmen, well surpassing the maximum

---

<sup>141</sup> Loftus and Jones to Burghley, 22 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/27, f. 70v; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 167.

<sup>142</sup> Loftus and Jones to Burghley, 22 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/27, f. 71r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 167.

<sup>143</sup> *APC*, vol. 26, p. 174.

<sup>144</sup> Kiffin to Burghley, 18 Feb. 1597, SP 63/197/105, f. 344; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 236. Lane to Burghley, 25 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/45, f. 151; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 252.

<sup>145</sup> Kiffin to Burghley, 18 Feb. 1597, SP 63/197/105, f. 344v; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 236. This particular claim by Kiffin raises many questions about the accuracy of certificates produced for the queen and privy council. Kiffin also alleged the theft and sale of soldiers' victuals by clerks and inferior officers (Kiffin to Burghley, Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/58, f. 186; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 255). It seems that the victualler, Robert Newcomen, was charged for selling corn due to the soldiers. The councilors argued that the crime had been committed by some captains and officers. If Newcomen had been guilty of such action, then the councilors would have had knowledge of it (Lord Deputy Russell and Council to Burghley, 15 May 1597, SP 63/199/35, f. 72; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 290).

allowance of 20 Irish in a band of a hundred. Perhaps the most grievous abuse was the fraud committed with dead pays. The dead-pays system in the 1590s was used to supplement the income of captains and better enable them to meet necessary expenses. The allowance was generally for ten men per company and at a reduced rate rather than full pay.<sup>146</sup> This was the practice in the Low Countries. In Ireland, however, the dead pay allowance appeared to have been only for six men. Captains requested an additional allowance from six men to ten—to match the practice in the Low Countries—but nothing came of their request. Instead, the dead-pay system was abolished in 1600, though captains continued to receive dead-pay allowance through the end of the war.<sup>147</sup> Using this small fund, captains could increase their own wages and also pay others in their company, such as surgeons or preachers.<sup>148</sup> An obvious abuse of the dead-pay system involved captains' taking most or all of the dead-pay allowance for themselves, whether out of greed or to compensate for their own lack of pay. However, Kiffin also alleged that Lane and his deputy, "neither knowing, nor caring" who received the dead-pay allowance, simply certified checks for full pay, meaning that they made excessive charges to the royal treasury.<sup>149</sup>

Lane claimed that all three charges stemmed from the inadequate system for creating muster reports.<sup>150</sup> He thought it impossible to account for the exact number of forces, and the number of Irishmen in each band, more than once in a half year, as the task required extensive travel throughout the provinces, and he had only one deputy. He had, therefore, created the certificates "by discretion."<sup>151</sup> This limitation effectively allowed a higher rate of Irishmen in the

---

<sup>146</sup> Charles G. Cruickshank, "Dead-Pays in the Elizabethan Army," *The English Historical Review* 53 (1938): 93-94.

<sup>147</sup> McGurk, 199; Cruickshank, 96-97.

<sup>148</sup> McGurk, 199.

<sup>149</sup> Kiffin to Burghley, 18 Feb. 1597, SP 63/197/105, f. 344r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 236.

<sup>150</sup> Lane to Burghley, [11 Apr.] 1597, SP 63/198/83, f. 260; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 263.

<sup>151</sup> Lane to Burghley, [11 Apr.] 1597, SP 63/198/83, f. 260v; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 263.

companies than was permitted. Lane stated that, within a few months of the arrival of new English soldiers, they fell sick or died of disease. Captains would then take the apparel and equipment of the dead soldiers and give them to Irishmen to serve in the royal army. This scheme would account for the number of Irishmen in the army and the warrants for full pay. Lane thus admitted that the certificates were really estimates, as some companies he had not checked in several months. The solution, he proposed, was to adopt the continental practice of employing commissaries to take monthly musters. This revised system would enable more accurate information and better mustering.<sup>152</sup> He had actually requested commissaries nearly two years before, but nothing had come of his requests.<sup>153</sup> Now, the queen and privy council agreed, though only after Lane's admission that he had made the musters by his discretion and had not viewed the troops.<sup>154</sup>

What Lane described seemed to be a logical explanation. The Elizabethan government had skimmed in the hiring of additional men to oversee the musters and Lane, in circumventing the structural problem, was now considered negligent and corrupt. The queen and privy council had expected that the job could be accomplished by Lane and his deputy. However, with the large number of soldiers that arrived in Ireland—by Kiffin's estimation—the expectation was a ludicrous one. The sending over of Kiffin and his single deputy enabled the better recording of musters. But Kiffin had not been sent to Ireland to assist Lane in accomplishing his duties. Kiffin had been sent to supervise Lane's accounts. It was no wonder, then, that Lane took offense at Kiffin's employment, and the two men remained at odds until Kiffin's death. The queen and privy

---

<sup>152</sup> Lane to Burghley, [11 Apr.] 1597, SP 63/198/83, f. 260; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 263.

<sup>153</sup> Lane to Burghley, 28 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/75, f. 276; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 373. The privy council had even raised the issue in 1590 (Privy Council to the Clerk of the Check, 24 Feb. 1590, SP 65/12/70 (1), f. 175; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 312).

<sup>154</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Burgh, 1 July 1597, *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 328.

council had effectively created a personnel dispute. However, it did not end with Kiffin. Lane also continued to face the suspicion of his peers on the Irish council. In this instance, the Westminster government had failed to respond to the needs of their Irish officers. Moreover, the controversy surrounding Lane's corruption arguably distracted attention from the central issues: Ireland needed aid and the soldiers still needed help.

By nearly everyone's account, the soldiers in Ireland were suffering. Sir John Norris wrote to Cecil of the misery of the soldiers, who, having "neyther money vittauls, nor clothes," told their superior officers that "they wyll run away, and steale rather than famysh."<sup>155</sup> Wallop warned Burghley that, if the soldiers did not receive money for their diet and clothing, hunger and cold would consume them, as they would have no way to defend themselves against the "violence of the weather, but [were] driven to goe (in some manner) naked."<sup>156</sup> He further disclosed how, for want of beer, the soldiers drank water, which made them sick.<sup>157</sup> In fall 1595, the privy council sent £12,000 to Ireland, which was a large sum and would help in paying the soldiers, but, according to Wallop, payment for wages alone would amount to £8,500. Victuals would add another £7,700 and would cover 2,000 men for six months—but the army consisted of over 7,000 men.<sup>158</sup> Wallop's letter is a clear indication that payments for the army were in arrears. One account indicated that £12,000 had been spent mainly on debts due to senior officers, including Wallop and others of the Irish council, captains, and victuallers.<sup>159</sup> Any treasure that arrived in Ireland went towards addressing the arrears but did not cover all of the

---

<sup>155</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 2 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/5, f. 16r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 356.

<sup>156</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 5 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/12, f. 54r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 360. Wallop to Burghley, 1 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/1, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 351.

<sup>157</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 27 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/57, f. 186; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 397

<sup>158</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 27 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/57, f. 186; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 397

<sup>159</sup> A brief collection of all the payments made out of £12,000 sent into Ireland, 13 July 1596, SP 63/191/20. III, f. 158; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 34.



necessary expenses. Wallop guessed that, by the end of the month in December 1596, the queen's debt in Ireland would have risen to "litle less" than £60,000!<sup>160</sup>

Meanwhile, the condition of the soldiers, and at least some of its officers, seemed unimproved. In May 1597, Kiffin recalled that, when visiting a company in Connacht, he had had to restrain the soldiers from spoiling the area, though such an act would have been fruitless given the distressed state of the province.<sup>161</sup> He described the "extreme penurie and famine" he had witnessed with "so many dead hungerstarven Carasses of men and women lye spredd up and down the fields and wayes."<sup>162</sup> Having no recourse to satisfy their hunger, Kiffin stated that both he and the soldiers had eaten horsemeat.<sup>163</sup> The queen's servants in Ireland were in dire need.

Even so, the State Papers archive shows that the queen and privy council continually tried to meet the demands of their army and administration in Ireland, albeit not entirely for humanitarian reasons. They needed soldiers to win the war and an administration to manage resources. So, the Westminster government supplied reinforcements for troops and issued numerous warrants to Wallop to pay for soldiers' wages and their maintenance.<sup>164</sup> But they were in a constant state of financial crisis. Accounting for money spent was a priority because the crown had large debts to repay. Thus, Lane's misuse of army funds was a significant problem because such corruption fuelled a distrust in the Irish administration and added to the huge burden on the royal treasury.<sup>165</sup> When the queen and privy council sent money into Ireland, they

---

<sup>160</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 8 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/15, f. 53v; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 187.

<sup>161</sup> Kiffin to Burghley, 18 May 1597, SP 63/199/39, f. 79; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 291.

<sup>162</sup> Kiffin to Burghley, 18 May 1597, SP 63/199/39, f. 79r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 291.

<sup>163</sup> Kiffin to Burghley, 18 May 1597, SP 63/199/39, f. 79r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 291.

<sup>164</sup> For example, numbers of soldiers levied out of several counties for the service of Ireland, 25 Aug. 1596, SP 63/192/28, f. 77; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 88. CP, vol. 6, p. 558. McGurk's tables on the levying of troops show this as well. See also, *CSPDom*, 1595-1597, p. 300 and 306. The Queen to [the officers of Exchequer], SP 15/33/65 f. 141; *CSPDom*, Addenda, 1580-1625, p. 377.

<sup>165</sup> The Privy Council to the Lords Justices Loftus and Gardiner and the Council, 26 Jan. 1598, SP 63/204/pt. 1, 39, f. 66; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 43. In this particular letter, the privy council noted, once again, discrepancies

lost much of their control over its spending. Although they issued orders directing where the money should be spent, there was no way for them to determine if the money was used as directed. They could only trust reports and certificates, which, as we have seen, could be manufactured. And though the queen reprimanded Wallop for prioritizing payments to himself and other officers, men like Wallop were difficult to replace during wartime.<sup>166</sup> Furthermore, however much her servants in Ireland needed support, the same was true for her forces in the Low Countries and elsewhere.

### "Slack and Cross Counsels"

The 1590s were a challenging decade for much of western Europe, and England was no exception. It was a decade of great hardship due to climate change, harvest failures, plague, and war.<sup>167</sup> Adverse climatic conditions caused by the Little Ice Age resulted in recurring harvest failures, especially in the years 1593-1597. The decline in crop yields led to food shortages and high prices on grain products.<sup>168</sup> In the search for more food, urban places like London with a large population expanded their reach into other areas, thereby increasing the demand and pressure on provincial markets.<sup>169</sup> In provisioning and embarkation sites like Chester, the problem of food shortages and high prices was exacerbated by the shipment of food into Ireland

---

in Lane's accounts in comparison to another. They requested that the Irish council inform them of all the particulars concerning the commissaries for the musters.

<sup>166</sup> *Cal. Carew, 1589-1600*, pp. 177-178.

<sup>167</sup> Peter Clark, introduction to *The European Crisis of the 1590s: Essays in Comparative History*, ed. Clark (London; Boston: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985), 3-22.

<sup>168</sup> R. B. Outhwaite, "Dearth, the English Crown and the Crisis of the 1590s," in *The European Crisis of the 1590s: Essays in Comparative History*, ed. Peter Clark (London; Boston: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985), 23-43; Peter Clark, "A Crisis Contained? The Condition of English Towns in the 1590s," *The European Crisis of the 1590s: Essays in Comparative History*, ed. Peter Clark (London; Boston: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985), 45-46; Geoffrey Parker, "History and Climate: The Crisis of the 1590s Reconsidered," in *Climate Change and Cultural Transition in Europe*, eds. Claus Leggewie and Franz Mauelshagen (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018), 120. Parker argues that the 1590s was not a mere cyclical crisis, but rather one of global catastrophe due to the Little Ice Age. See also, W. G. Hoskins, "Harvest Fluctuations and English Economic History, 1480-1619," *Agricultural History Review* 12 (1964): 38.

<sup>169</sup> Clark, "A Crisis Contained? The Condition of English Towns in the 1590s," 48.

and Scotland, areas which were also affected by dearth.<sup>170</sup> Plague epidemics and other diseases, such as influenza and smallpox, also left their mark on urban communities, although the effects of plague were not as severe as, for instance, in Scotland and Spain.<sup>171</sup>

In comparison to other parts of western Europe, England fared relatively well. It experienced neither a subsistence crisis nor a demographic collapse, and dearth failed to produce widespread rebellion in England.<sup>172</sup> And yet, the period was still one of great instability and suffering, not only because of the climactic, economic, and health crises, but also owing to Anglo-Spanish hostilities and the war in Ireland. As local populations turned to the central government to alleviate their problems, the fiscal crisis in England became acute. Between the periods 1588-1593 and 1597-1603, England experienced such severe financial problems that the crown searched for ways to raise money: parliamentary approval for heavy new taxation within the realm; the borrowing of money; and even the drastic measure of selling crown lands, an important revenue stream.<sup>173</sup> The fiscal crisis was so well known that anxieties over the crown's finances, particularly in relation to the Nine Years' War in Ireland, entered the popular sphere

---

<sup>170</sup> Clark, 48. Take, for example, an economic crisis in Chester due to the procuring of victuals for the army in Ireland. Alderley, the mayor of Chester, had worked with the muster-master general, George Beverley to amass supplies for the army. When Beverley acquired victuals within the city, Alderley complained that the market prices had subsequently increased to the "the dearth and scarsetie" to Chester inhabitants (Alderley to Burghley, 17 Apr. 1595, SP 63/179/40, f. 90; *CSP Ire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 313. Alderley to the [Privy] Council, 17 Mar. 1595, SP 12/251/61, f. 103; *CSP Dom*, 1595-1597, p. 18). Despite this complaint, Alderley had little choice but to rely on some of the goods Beverley had attained though he sought permission to obtain provisions from other towns where the prices of corn and other victuals not so high as Chester. In 1595, an anonymous treatise advised taking victuals from Ireland to support England, for the food could support the English navy and the rest could be sold to merchants (Device how Ireland may be drawn to a contribution to bear its own charge, Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/ f. 164; *CSP Ire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 301). The writer even went so far as to claim that the "Great aboundaunce of victell is the Cause of theyr disloyaltie and Rebellion many tymes" (f. 164r). Fortunately, the advice was not taken, and the lord deputy and council issued a proclamation against such a scheme (*Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 120).

<sup>171</sup> Clark, introduction, 6.

<sup>172</sup> John Walter and Keith Wrightson, "Dearth and the Social Order in Early Modern England," *Past & Present* 71 (1976): 22, 27-28. See also, Walter, "A 'Rising of the People'? The Oxfordshire Rising of 1596," *Past & Present* 107 (1985): 90-143.

<sup>173</sup> Outhwaite, "Dearth, the English Crown and the Crisis of the 1590s," 26.

with plays by William Shakespeare.<sup>174</sup> Added to these already weighty problems was the unresolved succession and the loss of many of Elizabeth's most trusted councilors, among whom were Walsingham (1590), Sir Christopher Hatton (1591) and, later, the great Burghley himself (1598).<sup>175</sup> In this context, it appeared that the crisis of the 1590s effectively crippled the crown's ability to ameliorate the hardships of its subjects. By the start of 1598, the privy council in England was forced to warn its counterpart in Ireland about its inability to meet demands from Ireland for more food: "wee knowe not howe to satisfye yow w[i]th such quantitie as it seemeth yow desire, consydering the great want, and extreme dearth here in the Realme, and therw[i]th the extreame and vncertayne charges of transportac[i]on by sea."<sup>176</sup>

What happened in England, therefore, affected the course of the war and the response of the Westminster and Dublin councils towards the Irish insurgents. Both strategies—pacification and force—were now terribly expensive. Peace negotiations were useful only if they resulted in the war's conclusion. Short-term cessations simply enabled both sides to recover and replenish their forces, ensuring that the war would soon continue, along with the expense. Whenever the Irish councilors made cessation agreements, they had to explain their actions to the queen and privy council. Their justification was always predicated on the weakness of the army in Ireland and the need for provisions. When they agreed to a cessation of arms in October 1595, for example, they professed that the "many wantes and extremities," namely the "weaknes of hir Ma[jes]t[es] forces falling away dayly by sicknes and diseases."<sup>177</sup> Once the cessation ended in

---

<sup>174</sup> Aaron Spooner, "Shakespeare's Itinerant Soldiers and Foreign Wars: The Elizabethan Crisis of Debt in the Economy of Hal's England," *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 12 (2012): 49-84; Jane Yeang Chui Wong, "The (Mis)Fortunes of the Nine Years' War: Accountability and War Profiteering in Shakespeare's *Richard II* and *Henry IV*," *ELH* 88 (2021): 27-30.

<sup>175</sup> Outhwaite, 24.

<sup>176</sup> The Privy Council to the Lords Justices Loftus and Gardiner and the Council, 26 Jan. 1598, SP 63/204/pt. 1, 39, f. 68r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 43.

<sup>177</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to Burghley, 30 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/108, f. 335r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 425.

January 1596, the two commissioners, Sir Henry Wallop and Sir Robert Gardiner, assented to another temporary truce though they knew the queen would disapprove of prolonging the cessation owing to the expense.<sup>178</sup> Still, they defended their actions by again citing weak forces and want of victuals.<sup>179</sup> They extended the cessation to May, during which time the queen appointed Sir John Norris and Sir Geoffrey Fenton to replace Wallop and Gardiner as commissioners. The queen made her frustration about the January 1596 commission pointedly clear: "You signify that, upon the return of the Commissioners to treat with Tyrone and O'Donnell, you do find the traitorous intent of the traitors to continue in their rebellion."<sup>180</sup>

The appointment of Norris and Fenton likely proceeded from Burghley, as they were both his clients, and they shared the same view in their policy towards the insurgents.<sup>181</sup> All three men advocated pacification through negotiation as the most expedient and cost-effective means to conclude the war.<sup>182</sup> Norris and Fenton believed that the queen's forces in Ireland were ill-equipped to defeat the insurgents on the battlefield. Moreover, they found cessations unhelpful because local insurgents could ignore the terms of a truce, effectively inhibiting the ability of the

---

<sup>178</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 159-160. What upset the queen greatly was the commissioners' use of "your louing freends" in their correspondence with Tyrone (Note of Her Majesty's great mislikes that the Commissioners Wallop and Gardiner should keep no manner of greatness in their communing with the rebels, 10 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/25, f. 46; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 488). Wallop defended the course of their proceedings with Tyrone and noted that some malicious and cunning person had willfully misconstrued their negotiations (Wallop to Burghley, 21 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/49, f. 118; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 501). Wallop and Gardiner had closed their letter to Tyrone using the above expression, though it may have been done to effect friendly relations with an enemy of the crown. Tyrone and O'Donnell used the same expression in their correspondence to the commissioners, which seems a bit tongue in cheek.

<sup>179</sup> Wallop to Burghley, 21 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/49, f. 118; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 501. Fenton to Burghley, 27 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/25, f. 93; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 457. Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 31 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/32, f. 112; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 461.

<sup>180</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 166.

<sup>181</sup> One could argue that Norris and Fenton only held these opinions to keep their patron happy. However, Fenton advocated this course from the beginning and rarely shifted his view. When he debated pacification or force, he did so with uncertainty, for while he knew that the Irish lords plotted with Spain, he doubted enough forces could be sent for the successful prosecution of a full-scale war in Ireland.

<sup>182</sup> J. Norris to Lord Deputy Russell, 30 Aug. 1595, SP 63/183/10. II, f. 46; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 383.

English crown to relieve their garrisons.<sup>183</sup> Burghley, meanwhile, thought pacification the "most plausible" option.<sup>184</sup> His son, Sir Robert Cecil, was also, unsurprisingly, of the same opinion.<sup>185</sup> By employing Norris and Fenton as commissioners, the Cecils hoped that these officers could accomplish what no other had done: bring a peaceful end to the war.

This policy, however, was not shared by the queen or the other Irish councilors. The lord deputy and "council" pushed for forceful prosecution of the insurgents. As the Irish council stated to the privy council, the insurgents had shown their "disloyall resoluc[i]on to shake of her ma[jes]t[es] governm[en]t, and a settled wilfulnes to bringe in forreine rule."<sup>186</sup> Norris and Fenton appeared to be the only two dissenters.<sup>187</sup> While they had served as commissioners, Wallop and Gardiner expressed their doubt that the war would come to any "safe or honorable end" because the Ulster lords were "insolent and daungerous," and "yf anie part remayne, no assurance of long quietnes is to be expected."<sup>188</sup> The martial men, Bagenal and Bingham, also continued to advocate for an aggressive military response.<sup>189</sup> Lord Deputy Russell strenuously and loudly complained that pacification could not work, being now convinced that the insurgents meant no peace. He wrote to Cecil that "this whole kindom is endaungered: for generally all the Irishrie are alreadye eyther in action or conspiracie of rebellion and expect such assistance from

---

<sup>183</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 12 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/59, f. 201; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 473. J. Norris to Burghley, 14 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/62, f. 209; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 473.

<sup>184</sup> Memoranda of Burghley's reflections on perusing Sir John Norris's letters, Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/68, f. 218; p. 407.

<sup>185</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 179-180.

<sup>186</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 9 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/51, f. 179r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 468. Norris did not sign the council letter, however, Fenton did. This is not unusual. Fenton frequently reserved dissenting opinions for his private correspondence with Burghley.

<sup>187</sup> Of course, the absence of dissent does not mean that the Irish councilors agreed with the policy of prosecution. However, the individual correspondence of the Irish councilors suggested that they agreed with the policy. See, for example, Wallop to Cecil, 9 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/52, f. 183; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 468. Wallop advocated the general hosting and dividing the army into three to launch three separate attacks.

<sup>188</sup> Wallop and Gardiner to Lord Deputy Russell, 20 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/22. XVI, f. 83r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 456.

<sup>189</sup> Project by Sir Henry Bagenal for the prosecution of the earl of Tyrone, 20 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/76, f. 243; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 476.

Spaine as the secrete intelligence nowe sent will discover."<sup>190</sup> Russell was referring to a letter supposedly written by Philip II of Spain to Tyrone, which had now come into the Irish council's possession.<sup>191</sup> Russell could agree to cessations, which bought time to reinforce crown forces, but not a general pacification because the majority of the Irish council distrusted that the insurgents would cease all military preparations. The Irish council did not even trust that the insurgents would keep the January 1596 cessation agreement and barely two weeks after it had been agreed upon violence broke out.<sup>192</sup>

These differences in policy and approach bred further disagreements within the Irish council, particularly between Norris and Russell. The two men harbored a great dislike towards one another, which began during their former service together in the Low Countries in the previous decade when the simmering rivalries among Leicester's army had almost exploded into deadly violence.<sup>193</sup> They had different patrons: Russell (Robert Devereux, earl of Essex) and Norris (Burghley). Of the patrons, Burghley was the most influential especially in Irish affairs. Even Russell sought to gain Burghley and Cecil's patronage. At the time that the war started, Norris had been away in Brittany, where he served as Lord General. He had successfully led a small army against the Spanish there and had returned to England in early 1595.<sup>194</sup> Pressed by the Westminster privy council, and even Russell himself, to help with the war in Ireland, Norris had relented. But it quickly became apparent that the old rivalry between the two men would not be resolved. The manner in which Norris had returned to Ireland did not help. He had been

---

<sup>190</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Cecil, 26 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/24, f. 91r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 457.

<sup>191</sup> *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 527.

<sup>192</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 15 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/66, f. 217; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 474. Tyrone to J. Norris, 13 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/44. I, f. 105; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 495.

<sup>193</sup> *ODNB*, "Norris, Sir John." For more on this conflict between Leicester and Norris, which nearly resulted in the killing of Norris's brother, see Paul E. J. Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 50.

<sup>194</sup> *ODNB*, "Norris, Sir John."

granted a special patent to manage the war in Ulster as Lord General *independent* of the viceroy's authority.<sup>195</sup> This was likely not what Russell had expected when he had asked for help, and this demeaning situation for the lord deputy renewed tensions between the two men.

The trouble between Norris and Russell started not long after Norris had arrived in Ireland on 4 May 1595. Only a month later, Norris complained of the lord deputy's course and his mishandling of the Irish council.<sup>196</sup> He accused Russell of acting on his own wishes when the latter diverged from the proposed plan of assailing Tyrone simultaneously with three reinforced armies, one of which would have included Bingham's in Connacht. Moreover, when the council met to discuss their resolution about their war, Norris informed Cecil that the lord deputy, "hauynge acquaynted the Counselers of the longe robe that her [Majesty's] pleasure is the Counsels of the warr shalbe managed by men of the sword, hath so distasted them that they wyll scarce geue any voyces."<sup>197</sup> Norris, therefore, strongly suggested that the lord deputy had monopolized the council proceedings, effectively reducing counsel to those with military experience and stifling all opinions potentially contrary to his own. Being a man of extensive military experience, Norris concluded that the army in Ireland was not sufficient to inflict great damage on enemy forces and acquiring the men necessary for such a task would increase the queen's charges to an unrealistic degree. In light of this glaring constraint, he did not understand how the lord deputy could pursue a strategy of military force without a substantial number of soldiers.<sup>198</sup>

---

<sup>195</sup> *ODNB*, "Norris, Sir John."

<sup>196</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/9, f. 42; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 323.

<sup>197</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/9, f. 43v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 323.

<sup>198</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 4 June 1595, SP 63/180/9, f. 42; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 323.



Once Russell became aware of the lord general's dislike of his actions, he claimed that he had already "yielded" direction of the war in Ulster to Norris.<sup>199</sup> Russell, however, neglected to mention to the queen and privy council that he had done so, instead claiming that the failure to report this was due to his secretary. Furthermore, he did not feel it necessary to burden the Westminster government with such an "unhappy accident," one which he hoped to forget.<sup>200</sup> The issue, Russell affirmed, was over between himself and Norris and they were now "good friends concurring in all good sort, both in the service, and otherwise."<sup>201</sup> The following months would prove the disingenuousness of Russell's statement.

Things quickly went sour between the two men, with each lodging complaints against the other. Nearly everything became a battleground for their dispute. They competed over intelligence, which Russell lost.<sup>202</sup> They each criticized the other for the performance of their office.<sup>203</sup> Russell seemed conscious that his personal conflict with Norris could appear as a petty squabble to his superiors in England and thus narrowed his attacks on Norris to his military skills and counsel.<sup>204</sup> Norris took the opposite approach and levied complaints of all kinds against Russell. The more serious grievances against the lord deputy concerned the war: that the lord deputy refused his assistance; that he had taken a large proportion of victuals intended for the

---

<sup>199</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 22 July 1595, SP 63/181/48, f. 144v; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 345. *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 113.

<sup>200</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 22 July 1595, SP 63/181/48, f. 145r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 345.

<sup>201</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 22 July 1595, SP 63/181/48, f. 145r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 345.

<sup>202</sup> Acres discusses their rivalry in intelligence quite effectively in his published work (*The Letters of Lord Burghley*, 61-62), and of greater length in his dissertation (223-252).

<sup>203</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 12 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/58, f. 196; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 469. J. Norris to Cecil, 14 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/63, f. 211; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 473. Also, J. Norris to Cecil, 29 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/89, f. 297; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 481.

<sup>204</sup> See, for example, Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 9 Nov. 1595, SP 63/184/14, f. 55; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 432.

garrison at Armagh for his own troops; and that he deliberately had not resupplied Norris's company.<sup>205</sup> By February 1596, Fenton reported the issue to Burghley:

I wish that there weare a more firme concurrency betweene Menelaus [the lord deputy] and Scipio [Norris], touchinge the milytary affayres, in whome so longe as their priuate emulac[i]on aboundeth her ma[jes]ts seruice can not be caryed as yt ought.<sup>206</sup>

The division between the two men grew so contentious that Sir Robert Cecil, who was becoming a greater figure in Irish politics, informed the lord deputy that the "drynesse" between him and Norris was apparent to everyone, in Ireland and England.<sup>207</sup>

The lord deputy did not heed Cecil's advice. In April 1596, Norris and Fenton communicated to Russell that they had obtained the submission of several insurgents and made agreements with Tyrone and O'Donnell.<sup>208</sup> They promised to fully inform the lord deputy of the proceedings upon their return. In response, the lord deputy complained that the two men returned without having taken any pledges or conferring with the two principal enemies, Tyrone and O'Donnell.<sup>209</sup> He further argued that any agreement made between the government and Tyrone and O'Donnell resulted from the mediation efforts of others. Fenton and Norris, he thus implied, were taking credit for a service they had not performed—despite discrediting the notion that any such agreement could have taken place. The lord deputy also enclosed advertisements which

---

<sup>205</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/36, f. 128; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 465. J. Norris to Cecil, 3 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/9, f. 11; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 483. Instructions given by the Lord General Sir John Norris to his brother Sir Henry Norris, to advertise the Queen and Privy Council of the state of Ireland, 27 July 1596, SP 63/191/45, f. 237; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 49.

<sup>206</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 12 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/59, f. 201r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 473.

<sup>207</sup> Cecil to Lord Deputy Russell, 9 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/20, f. 36r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 488.

<sup>208</sup> Lord General Norris and Fenton to the Lord Deputy, 24 Apr. 1596, SP 63/188/67. I, f. 172; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 514.

<sup>209</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 27 Apr. 1596, SP 63/188/67, f. 170; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 514. Ironically, Robert Bowes had already told Cecil that Tyrone and O'Donnell were making offers of submission while preparing their forces (Bowes to Cecil, 18 Apr. 1596, SP 52/58/161, f. 62; *CSPSco*, 1595-1597, p. 188.

showed that Tyrone had allied with Spain.<sup>210</sup> The sighting of Spanish ships in May only further entrenched the lord deputy in his commitment to military action.<sup>211</sup> He requested additional forces.

Fenton also received advertisements about Tyrone's involvement with the Spanish. Some intelligence reports indicated that ships, likely Spanish, had been sighted on the coast of Lough Foyle, presumably to provide aid to Ulster lords. Others suggested there were 17 or 18 ships with a Spanish force of 5,000.<sup>212</sup> Fenton could not be sure if the information were true, but intelligence from Captain Francis Stafford indicated that the sightings had been greatly exaggerated. There was only one Spanish frigate or bark, and it contained two messengers sent by the Spanish king to Tyrone with promises of men, money, munition, and victuals. Tyrone had entertained the men, and, then they had left.<sup>213</sup> This last report turned out to be accurate.<sup>214</sup>

Much to the government's surprise, Tyrone himself informed them of the Spaniards' arrival and his meeting with them. The earl's transparency seemed to be proof of his good intentions. The Ulster lords were standing firm in their obedience. They had, so far, done nothing to breach their agreements. They appeared receptive to further meetings with the commissioners to settle their grievances. Tyrone even seemed helpful in assisting the government with O'Donnell and the others.<sup>215</sup> He had sent a letter he received from the king of Spain to the lord deputy and council.<sup>216</sup> According to Fenton, Tyrone had also written to the government with

---

<sup>210</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 27 Apr. 1596, SP 63/188/67, f. 170; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 514.

<sup>211</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 14 May 1596, SP 63/189/26, f. 60; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 519. Also, Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 27 May 1596, SP 63/189/46, f. 114; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 522.

<sup>212</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 10 May 1596, SP 63/189/20, f. 44; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 518.

<sup>213</sup> Captain Francis Stafford to Fenton, 21 May 1596, SP 63/189/37, f. 92; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 521.

<sup>214</sup> Enrique García Hernán, "Philip II's Forgotten Armada," in *The Battle of Kinsale*, ed. Hiram Morgan (Dublin: Wordwell Ltd, 2004), 52.

<sup>215</sup> Tyrone to Lord General Norris and Fenton, 25 May 1596, SP 63/190/1. I, f. 4; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 526. Captain Warren to Fenton, 20 July 1596, SP 63/191/34. I, f. 205; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 42.

<sup>216</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 141.

assurances of his loyalty. Tyrone's latest efforts went some way toward proving his loyalty, but many remained suspicious and were cautious in their dealings with him.<sup>217</sup> Norris and Fenton, meanwhile, received their appointment to serve as commissioners in Bingham's trial in Connacht, owing to their seemingly successful negotiations in Ulster.<sup>218</sup>

When the Ulster lords did not make their formal submission in late June, Lord Deputy Russell attested that no peace had been concluded, and the charges of the forces lying in wait only increased.<sup>219</sup> The queen and privy council were also concerned about the delay in receipt of pardons and informed the lord deputy and council that without further progress, the commissioners were to "use no further myldnesse towards them."<sup>220</sup> Cecil, however, reminded the lord deputy that the queen had adopted the course of pacification on the advice of the lord deputy and council.<sup>221</sup> Had they advocated force, then the queen and privy council would have given their consent. This statement was not entirely accurate, as shown in Chapter Five. The queen and privy council had commanded their Irish officers to use force, but they had acted otherwise. Regardless, Cecil wanted Russell to be aware of his role in the course they now had undertaken.

To everyone's surprise, excepting perhaps Norris and Fenton, Tyrone made his submission to the queen in late July 1596, for which Fenton hoped that the earl "might be cheryshed and borne up in his weldoinge."<sup>222</sup> Fenton even solicited Tyrone's help with O'Donnell

---

<sup>217</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 2 June 1596, SP 63/190/6, f. 25; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 527. Wallop to Burghley, 8 June 1596, SP 63/190/12, f. 69; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 532.

<sup>218</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Russell and Council, 25 May 1596, SP 63/189/43, f. 107; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 521.

<sup>219</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 30 June 1596, SP 63/190/47, f. 214; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 544. He wrote a similar letter to Cecil (Lord Deputy Russell to Cecil, 30 June 1596, SP 63/190/48, f. 224; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 544.

<sup>220</sup> *APC*, vol. 26, p. 40.

<sup>221</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 179-180.

<sup>222</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 21 July 1596, SP 63/191/34, f. 203r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 41.

and the other insurgents in Connacht.<sup>223</sup> Though Tyrone had taken his pardon, the war had not concluded, as hostilities continued in Connacht. Fenton hoped that the Irish insurgents would hear news of England's recent victory over Spain at Cadiz and abandon their hopes of Spanish aid.<sup>224</sup> Norris and Fenton were eager to settle the province and maintain their Ulster peace agreements, and the situation in Connacht put them in a precarious position.<sup>225</sup> From their perspective, how they dealt with the Connacht insurgents would be telling to the others in Ulster. At this time, Bingham had not yet fled to England and, given that the insurgents complained of Bingham's government, the commissioners pushed for Bingham's permanent removal. Removing an officer was the easiest solution, for it showed some commitment to resolving grievances without binding themselves to any structural change. The goal was to maintain peace and Norris and Fenton had already proved their inclination towards pacification with the Ulster lords. At this crucial juncture in the war, if the insurgents in Connacht blamed Bingham's governance, then Bingham would likely be removed. When Bingham eventually fled several months later, this complicated matters because the commission to determine whether he was at fault had not yet been concluded. Justice, therefore, had not been served, and Connacht remained unsettled.

Though he had trouble proving Tyrone's involvement in Connacht, the lord deputy finally obtained the evidence which seemed to confirm Tyrone's continued scheming, only now in Munster.<sup>226</sup> A letter came into the council's possession, one signed by Tyrone, O'Donnell, O'Rourke, and McWilliam. In it, the four Irish lords vowed never to conclude peace with the English and incited the clans in Munster to join them in confederacy and in defense of the

---

<sup>223</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 27 July 1596, SP 63/191/48, f. 262; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 61.

<sup>224</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 2 Aug. 1596, SP 63/192/2, f. 2; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 67.

<sup>225</sup> Norris mentioned that during his proceedings with the Ulster lords in the summer, it was apparent that Fenton believed Connacht significant to pacification (Certain notes [by John Norris], [June or July] 1596, SP 63/191/46. I, f. 245; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 55).

<sup>226</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 17 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/20, f. 189; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 110.

Catholic religion.<sup>227</sup> Munster had been the one province which had so far seemed to have escape the war.<sup>228</sup> The south, which some considered a likely invasion point for the Spanish, now became a key site in the ongoing conflict.

In September 1596, the Irish council feared that Tyrone and others was aiding the insurgents in Connacht and inciting O'Connor Sligo to revolt against the queen.<sup>229</sup> Tyrone was also suspected of secretly maintaining correspondence with O'Donnell and the Spanish king. Stafford, once again, announced the arrival of a Spanish ship in O'Donnell's country and that Tyrone was to meet with the Spaniards.<sup>230</sup> Particularly concerning, and likely to give credence to Stafford's statement was that, according to Fenton, Tyrone had not written to the government for two weeks. His silence was construed as proof of his "unsoundness."<sup>231</sup>

When more news came of another Spanish ship newly arrived at Killybegs, Fenton sent the informer who had delivered the report to scout the coast from Killybegs to Lough Foyle. The spy Fenton sent into Ulster to discover "the secretts of the Irish" was a merchant named Patrick Caddell.<sup>232</sup> Caddell had initially advertised that there were four Spanish ships with a force of 1,000 men or more at Killybegs and Donegal. He claimed to have spoken with a messenger who had been sent to deliver a book to a bishop in Brenny. The messenger told Caddell that the original destination had been Galway, but the ships re-directed to Killybegs once they learned

---

<sup>227</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 179.

<sup>228</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 179.

<sup>229</sup> Fenton to the [Lord Deputy Russell], 5 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/9. III, f. 145; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 102. Also, Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 9 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/9, f. 138; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 100 and Norris and Fenton to the Privy Council, 14 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/12, f. 162; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 104.

<sup>230</sup> Capt. Francis Stafford to [Fenton], 25 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/45. II, f. 258; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 126 and Fenton to Sir Robert Cecil, 27 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/42, f. 249; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 124.

<sup>231</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 30 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/49, f. 276r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 129.

<sup>232</sup> Advertisements by Patrick Caddell, 10 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/25. VIII, f. 65r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 166.

that the town had a garrison.<sup>233</sup> Though Fenton believed the rumors to be an exaggeration, he nonetheless passed on the information. The lord deputy, however, urged a military response, as of late Tyrone had also prevented the victualling of crown forces despite their truce: "he hath given so many apparent proofs of his bad meaning to this State, and namely the public restraint he made of all victuals to be carried to Armagh."<sup>234</sup> He asked for a massively increased force of 14,020 soldiers.<sup>235</sup>

Bolstered by news of Tyrone's duplicity, Russell used the occasion to criticize Norris. He condemned Norris' handling of the Connacht commission, believing Norris to be guilty of nepotism by placing the interests of his brother over the current governor. He made it clear to the privy council that he sided with Bingham.<sup>236</sup> He did not think Bingham and his officers were responsible for the revolts in Connacht, instead blaming Tyrone, who consistently showed himself to be a traitor.<sup>237</sup>

The internecine conflict between the lord deputy and the lord general divided the council as it had earlier with Perrot and later Bingham. Loftus and Fenton informed Cecil that they were trying to reconcile Russell and Norris, but it was proving to be a challenge.<sup>238</sup> As tensions escalated, Fenton wrote to Burghley about the effects of the dispute on the functioning of government. Using the prescribed codenames for Russell and Norris, he advised that the "broken

---

<sup>233</sup> Although Caddell first reported this sighting and interaction with the messenger to Thomas Jones, the Bishop of Meath, he later recounted the same information to Fenton. See Thomas, Bishop of Meath to the Lord Chancellor, 1 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/1, f. 127; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 98. He seemed to be more of an agent of Fenton than Jones (Lord Deputy Russell to the Privy Council, 22 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/25, f. 54; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 164).

<sup>234</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 187.

<sup>235</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 196-199.

<sup>236</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 13 Aug. 1596, SP 63/192/6, f. 9; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 68. Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 18 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/23, f. 203; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 112.

<sup>237</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 13 Aug. 1596, SP 63/192/6, f. 9; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 68.

<sup>238</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and Fenton to Cecil, 27 Oct. 1596, SP 63/194/50, f. 244; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 153.

gouvernem[en]t" could not be recovered until "the ii Princypall heads, Menelaus, and Scipio may be compounded and their emulac[i]ons staid."<sup>239</sup> Though he called Russell a "superior magistrate" and Norris a "great comaunder at warrs," he nonetheless thought that the two were "seeking to beare up their owne doings, w[i]th their best reasons and pretenses, thinkinge yt sufficyent for their Iustefiac[i]on, to make a probable defence for themselues."<sup>240</sup> It was a pointed criticism meant to illustrate that the two great heads of Irish government were not working together, but rather were engaged in private quarrels. Ironically, only a few months earlier, Fenton himself had been at odds with Bingham. His remonstrations about the dispute between Russell and Norris echoed the sentiment of the queen and the privy council. They clearly knew of the division in the Irish council and disapproved. The queen had even rebuked the council, especially the lord deputy, for not pursuing Norris's counsel or offering him advice.<sup>241</sup>

Fenton claimed, in this one instance, not to take sides: "It is not easy, nor saff for me; to lay downe in what points eyther of them do err most."<sup>242</sup> And yet, when Loftus and Jones stated that the insurgents had broken their peace agreements, Fenton attributed their violence to the lord deputy's intense prosecution of Feagh McHugh O'Byrne.<sup>243</sup> Even though the queen and privy council had ordered their Irish council to show leniency towards O'Byrne and receive his submission, the lord deputy pursued him aggressively.<sup>244</sup> Norris informed Cecil that Tyrone had

---

<sup>239</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 4 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/4, f. 16r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 182.

<sup>240</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 4 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/4, f. 16r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 182.

<sup>241</sup> *APC*, vol. 26, p. 378.

<sup>242</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 4 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/4, f. 16r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 182.

<sup>243</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 25 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/37, f. 101; p. Norris had initially thought that force should be used towards O'Byrne (Certain notes [by John Norris], [June or July] 1596, SP 63/191/46. I, f. 245; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 55). Now, he was uncertain about how to proceed with O'Byrne (*Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 183).

<sup>244</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 181-182. A review of the State Archives and Russell's journal of his activities from 1594-1597 clearly show his intent to capture O'Byrne in late 1596 to his recall in May 1597 (*Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 247-259).



written to the lord deputy and council, threatening to use force if O'Byrne was not pardoned. By continuing to pursue O'Byrne, the lord deputy appeared to provoke Tyrone to violence.<sup>245</sup> In this same letter, Norris reported that Fenton was being excluded from councils, followed soon after by Fenton's own letter of complaint.<sup>246</sup>

Fenton appealed to the Cecils, both father and son, reminding them of his 17 years of service to the government. His exclusion from council deliberations, particularly concerning Gardiner's recent departure for England, was confounding because of his prior attendance in "the most secrett and waighty Counsell of the Realme."<sup>247</sup> He thought it more likely that the lord deputy was punishing him out of envy for his appointment alongside Norris in the treaties of Ulster and Connacht.<sup>248</sup> Once again, Fenton had elicited the ire of a lord deputy.

Once Russell excluded Fenton from council sessions, Fenton spoke more openly against him. In a particularly scathing letter, Fenton wrote "God hath not blisshed this gou[er]nem[en]t in the hands of Menelaus."<sup>249</sup> Under Russell's leadership, the queen had lost territories, her subjects had grown in disobedience, and Irish countries had "relapsed to their wonted tyranycall custumes of tanaistrie."<sup>250</sup> In order to "stopp this bleding before the bodie languish to extremetye," the only remedy was the revocation of Russell and the appointment of a "new man to guide the helme."<sup>251</sup> Fenton's allegations of the lord deputy's poor management of the kingdom could be expected given his late troubles with Russell. But what gave Fenton's claims more legitimacy was not the backing of Norris, but rather Russell's lack of success, his incessant demands for

---

<sup>245</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 6 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/10, f. 30; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 184.

<sup>246</sup> J. Norris to Cecil, 6 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/10, f. 30; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 184. Fenton to Cecil, 10 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/18, f. 59; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 187.

<sup>247</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 10 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/18, f. 59r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 187. Fenton to Burghley, 13 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/20, f. 63; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 188.

<sup>248</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 10 Dec. 1596, SP 63/196/18, f. 59; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 187.

<sup>249</sup> Fenton to [Burghley], 13 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/20, f. 57r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 210.

<sup>250</sup> Fenton to [Burghley], 13 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/20, f. 57r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 210.

<sup>251</sup> Fenton to [Burghley], 13 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/20, f. 57r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 210.

more forces and provisions, and his personal disputes with Norris and Fenton.<sup>252</sup> Fenton could no longer work with the lord deputy and sought not only Russell's revocation, but also Norris' appointment as the new lord deputy: "for a ship that hath bin so long tyme tossed w[i]th stormes and tempests, cannot so easely be fashioned to a good courss; when a raw man upon a sudden is put to guid[e] the helme."<sup>253</sup> Tyrone also requested that Norris serve as lord deputy, though he was stoking the fire against Russell to his own ends.<sup>254</sup> Lord Deputy Russell received notice of his recall in December 1596, though he stayed in Ireland until May 1597. He was, however, not succeeded by Norris, but instead Baron Thomas Burgh. Norris had been sick for many years and returned to his presidency in Munster.

By the end of the year and the beginning of the next, Norris and Fenton no longer trusted that Tyrone would keep the peace. In January 1597, Tyrone prevented the revictualing of Armagh. Although he later consented to the victualling, Norris and Fenton doubted his

---

<sup>252</sup> Fenton would claim in early 1597 that the lord deputy hindered negotiation proceedings with Tyrone. Norris, Fenton, and George Bouchier were the commissioners appointed to negotiate with Tyrone. Gardiner, having recently stood audience with the queen and the privy council, was supposed to return with their instructions about the negotiations. The commissioners, however, had not received the instructions. As such, they feared taking further action with Tyrone until they had the dispatch. There was no reason, Fenton asserted, for the dispatch to be kept from the commissioners, for he had been present at council meetings (Fenton to [Burghley], 24 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/45, f. 173; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 219). According to Fenton, Gardiner claimed that the secretary had been very sick and holed up in his bedchamber when the councilors were discussing the dispatch. Fenton, of course, disputed this. He admitted to being sick, but also that he had been present for several council sessions prior and no mention was made then of the dispatch (Fenton to Cecil, 25 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/49, f. 180; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 220). Norris also complained that the commissioners had received no instructions (J. Norris to Cecil, 13 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/17, f. 51; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 209). Both Norris and Fenton noted the lack of instructions that was supposed to have been given to them by the lord deputy and Gardiner. Norris thought this was a deliberate act by the lord deputy to blame Norris, in particular, and the commissioners whether there be peace or war (Norris to Burghley, 15 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/15, f. 45; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 207). Gardiner also appeared opposed to Norris, as Norris defended himself Gardiner's allegations that he had personally profited from dealings in Connacht (Norris to Cecil, 24 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/44, f. 171; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 218).

<sup>253</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 26 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/52, f. 195r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 222.

<sup>254</sup> Tyrone to J. Norris, Bouchier and Fenton, 15 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/27. I, f. 87; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 246.

sincerity.<sup>255</sup> Thereafter, intelligence operations in Ireland expanded, as the Westminster and Dublin councils made an increased effort to discover the extent of Tyrone's plotting.

### **Intelligence Through an Old English Merchant Family**

Although Fenton had always reported intelligence, he became directly involved in more secret intelligence in 1595 with Burghley when they created a cipher through which to communicate. His coded communications with Burghley over Bingham and the crisis in Connacht from 1595 to 1597 was only one aspect of his intelligence activities. The other was espionage.

In May 1595, Fenton mentioned that he received information from an unnamed servant working for the earl of Tyrone's chamber.<sup>256</sup> The servant's name was Richard Weston, brother of Nicholas Weston, an Old English Protestant merchant and alderman in Dublin with an outstanding reputation among Irish administrators like Fenton.<sup>257</sup> As a merchant with special trading privileges with Spain, Nicholas was a prime candidate to serve as a government informer, which he did.<sup>258</sup> Ruth Canning's works on Nicholas Weston have been especially useful in understanding the motivations of the Old English community in the Pale—which was by no means homogenous—and how they "struggled to reconcile their Catholicism, Irish birth, and increasing political alienation with their loyalty to a distant English Protestant ruler."<sup>259</sup> Nicholas

---

<sup>255</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 4 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/1, f. 1; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 199. J. Norris to Burghley, 13 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/15, f. 45; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 207.

<sup>256</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 19 May 1595, SP 63/179/85, f. 215; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 318.

<sup>257</sup> Fenton was also related to the Westons through marriage. His wife, Alice, was the daughter of Sir Robert Weston, the former lord chancellor of Ireland. One of Robert Weston's sons was John, father to the Nicholas mentioned above. See Sir Henry Wallop to Sir Francis Walsingham, 15 June 1585, SP 63/117/29, f. 78; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 568. Also, *DIB*, "Weston, Nicholas" and *ODNB* "Weston, Robert."

<sup>258</sup> Jasper Prife described as a "factor" of Nicholas Weston's (Intelligence by Jas. Prife, 25 Apr. 1591, SP 12/238/133, f. 198; *CSPDom*, 1591-1594, p. 31. Also, Advertisements by Nicholas Weston, 1592, SP 63/164/16, f. 31; *CSPIre*, Aug. 1588-Sept. 1592, p. 479.

<sup>259</sup> Ruth Canning, "Profits and Patriotism: Nicholas Weston, Old English Merchants, and Ireland's Nine Years' War, 1594-1603," *Irish Economic and Social History* 43 (2016): 86. See also, Canning, *The Old English in Early Modern*

Weston, in particular, was part of a mercantile community that both undermined and aided the English crown in Ireland. On the one hand, some Old English merchants profited from the war by selling munitions and supplies to insurgents.<sup>260</sup> Some even helped the Catholic Reformation movement in the migration of the Irish to Catholic institutions on the continent.<sup>261</sup> On the other hand, some helped finance the Irish administration and the war.<sup>262</sup> They provided supplies for the crown army and assisted in the later development of a hospital for soldiers.<sup>263</sup> Some also became informers for the English crown, reporting on the movements of enemy forces. Thus, as Canning convincingly shows, political allegiances were not the motivating factor for Old English merchants but rather commercial interests; they worked with both sides.<sup>264</sup>

Nicholas Weston, however, sided with the English crown and contributed to the war effort in many ways.<sup>265</sup> One such means was with intelligence, for as Fenton stated, it was Nicholas who established a means by which his brother, Richard, could pass information to the Irish administration.<sup>266</sup> Richard had been in Tyrone's employ since at least 1594.<sup>267</sup> He would effectively become a double agent—one who worked in close quarters with the earl of Tyrone while simultaneously feeding the Irish administration information on the earl's movements and plans.

---

*Ireland: The Palesmen and the Nine Years' War, 1594-1603* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY, USA: The Boydell Press, 2019).

<sup>260</sup> Canning, "Profits and Patriotism," 91-102.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, 104-105.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, 102-107.

<sup>266</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 12 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/13, f. 44; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 450.

<sup>267</sup> Sir Henry Duke to Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, 3 May 1594, SP 63/174/37. X, f. 115; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 241.

Fenton received intelligence from Richard Weston, which primarily concerned Spanish preparations towards Ireland.<sup>268</sup> Yet, it seemed that the Irish government was one step behind. Rather than preventing or even anticipating Spanish designs, they knew of things only as they happened.<sup>269</sup> More often than not, the Irish councilors received advertisements on the sighting of Spanish ships along the coasts or the landing of Spanish forces. Preparing for an attack or invasion was nearly impossible without prior knowledge.

When Fenton thought of a solution, he turned to Cecil rather than Burghley. Fenton had dealt largely with Burghley throughout 1595 and 1596 in matters of intelligence. He sent reports of Weston's intelligence to Burghley. But as Burghley's health declined over the years, he wrote more frequently to his son, Robert. He even pledged a "p[er]petual bond" to serve Cecil for the rest of his life.<sup>270</sup> He was slowly transferring his allegiance from one Cecil to the other, especially after Robert became the principal secretary in England in 1596. It was likely also apparent to Fenton that of the two Cecils, he stood a better of expanding his intelligence network to continental Europe with Robert. Despite some intelligence-gathering activities, Burghley had little interest in continuing Walsingham's secret operations.<sup>271</sup> He was also likely aware of the competition between Sir William Russell, the former lord deputy, and Sir John Norris, the late lord general, over intelligence with Cecil. Russell may have been Essex's client, but he rightly intuited that in Irish affairs Cecil was a more influential figure.

---

<sup>268</sup> On September 27, Fenton reported to Cecil that he had been informed by a Dublin merchant (likely Nicholas Weston) from his agent in Lisbon of Spanish preparations for Ireland next year. He also touched on the landing of Spaniards in O'Donnell's country, information he had received—likely in late September—from one of the Weston brothers (Fenton to Cecil, 27 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/42, f. 249; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 124. Advertisement of the landing of Spaniards in O'Donnell's country, 1596, SP 63/193/31. I, f. 221; the advertisement was directed to be sent to either the Treasurer, Wallop, or Fenton. It appears that both men had knowledge of the letter).

<sup>269</sup> See, for instance, Richard Weston to [Unknown], 29 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/48. II, f. 274; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 129.

<sup>270</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 28 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/26, f. 99r; *CSPIre*, Oct 1592-June 1596, p. 459. See also, Fenton to Cecil, 20 Mar. 1596, SP 63/187/47, f. 113; *CSPIre*, Oct 1592-June 1596, p. 499.

<sup>271</sup> Acres, introduction, 27-29.

These Irish councilors were not amiss in their assessment of Cecil and Cecil's interest in furthering intelligence. By the 1590s, Cecil already had experience in intelligence concerning Ireland. In 1594, he protected his father's secret intelligence with Dr. Roderigo Lopez, the queen's physician who was tried, convicted, and executed for treason.<sup>272</sup> Writing on Cecil's early secretarial career, William Acres has illustrated the extent to which Burghley trained Cecil in Irish affairs, as well as his introduction into the world of intelligence.<sup>273</sup> Cecil became involved in Irish intelligence when in December 1593 his father suggested using Irish soldiers as spies.<sup>274</sup> He had fostered relationships with Irish Protestant bishops, such as John Thornborough, Lord Chancellor Loftus, and Jones, the bishop of Meath, to track the movements of suspected priests in Ireland. Cecil not only adopted his father's intelligence network, but also added substantially to this international network throughout the years and employed new agents.<sup>275</sup>

The solution that Fenton offered to Cecil in October 1596 was to employ two Irish agents into Spain.<sup>276</sup> He recommended two men. One was a young Dublin man "of good spiritt, and discretion," who knew the language and customs of Spain.<sup>277</sup> The other Irishman was in the west and had been employed by Fenton during the Desmond rebellions. As Irishmen, Fenton believed that these men could pass safely into Spain, presumably without suspicion.<sup>278</sup> An examination of the Dublin merchant, John Gough proved this was false, as he affirmed the imprisonment of

---

<sup>272</sup> Alford, *The Watchers*, 303-306.

<sup>273</sup> See above, fn. 6.

<sup>274</sup> Acres, "The Early Political Career of Sir Robert Cecil c. 1582-1597," 199.

<sup>275</sup> Acres, introduction to *The Letters of Lord Burghley, William Cecil, to His Son Sir Robert Cecil, 1593-1598*, 36-53.

<sup>276</sup> Fenton was not the only English administrator in Ireland to do this. Sir Thomas Norreys put forth his own candidate to serve as a spy in Spain, Philip Roche Fitz, a Kinsale merchant (Sir Thomas Norris to Cecil, 15 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/15, f. 37). See also, Examination of Philip Roche, 25 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/22. III, f. 70.

<sup>277</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 25 Oct. 1596, SP 63/194/44, f. 214r; *CSPire*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 151.

<sup>278</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 25 Oct. 1596, SP 63/194/44, f. 214r; *CSPire*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 151.

three Irishmen in Madrid whom the Spanish believed to be English spies.<sup>279</sup> Still, sending an agent into Spain was the best way to acquire the information they desired.

All Fenton needed was Cecil's consent and an allowance for these potential spies. A draft intended for Fenton indicated Cecil's ready approval of Fenton's plans. He too agreed that the Irish would not be suspected. Cecil wanted the young man, the one who knew Spanish, sent into Spain immediately. The man should go to a port town like Lisbon, where he could easily write to Fenton in Ireland. Fenton would inform the spy of Cecil's instructions. If the man could not provide useful intelligence, then Fenton could send another.<sup>280</sup> But judging by Fenton's letter to Cecil two weeks later, he had not received Cecil's directive. He did, however, disclose that the young man was a servant of Nicholas Weston and since the latter had cause to travel to England, Cecil could discuss the issue with him directly.<sup>281</sup>

Nicholas Weston seems to have gone to England.<sup>282</sup> By February 1597, Fenton confirmed that he was employing two of Weston's servants for intelligence work in Spain. To ensure the safe passage of information—and likely to protect the identities of the spies—Fenton suggested using a cipher, one he could devise and transmit to the spies and Cecil. At this time, the spies were still in Ireland but likely fearful of being seen meeting with English officials during an Irish rebellion against the State. So, the cipher had to be sent separately. If Cecil permitted the lord

---

<sup>279</sup> CP, vol. 5, p. 504.

<sup>280</sup> Cecil to Fenton, 12 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/14, f. 35; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 161.

<sup>281</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 24 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/33, f. 84; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 172. Fenton also penned a letter to Burghley recommending Nicholas Weston. Still, he made no mention of the servant or the intelligence plans he had suggested to Cecil (Fenton to Burghley, 24 Nov. 1596, SP 63/195/32, f. 82; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 172).

<sup>282</sup> See, for instance, CP, vol. 6, p. 529. Eastfield accused Nicholas Weston of providing lead to the earl to make bullets. He also made note of Weston's brother, unnamed, who had left the earl for Dundalk (where he met with Fenton) and Nicholas sent provisions to his brother, which the brother then passed to the earl. Despite Eastfield's accusations, Nicholas Weston continued to be an influential figure among English officials, though not in the Old English community. Canning argues that there's no evidence Nicholas helped the earl once the rebellion was underway (Canning, "Profits and Patriotism," 109).

deputy to be privy to the spies' employment in Spain, then the lord deputy could arrange a ship, carrying the cipher, to be sent into Spain.<sup>283</sup>

In the meantime, Richard Weston informed Fenton, using one of his aliases, that "there came two spanishe shippes to Callebegg [Killybegs]" and "therle is gone downe to them."<sup>284</sup> Captain Thomas Wingfield also had intelligence from a young merchant who reported secret communication between Tyrone and O'Donnell which contained news of the arrival of the Spaniards.<sup>285</sup> However, the merchant also heard that the ships numbered 20 or more. Wingfield had apparently spoken with Weston and remarked on the discrepancy between the two reports.<sup>286</sup> The lord deputy and council received these advertisements and found the reports inconsistent regarding the number of Spanish ships.<sup>287</sup> Weston's intelligence on the Spanish ships was in the same packet as Wingfield's letter and, as such, Fenton had knowledge of it. He then staunchly defended his double-agent, believing Weston's advertisement to be "most credible aboue all the rest, for that he is of discrec[i]on, and of honesty to report but a truth."<sup>288</sup> Fenton discredited the other report by stating "one maketh menc[i]on of xxtie ships or more" but no "great credytt" should be given to such report.<sup>289</sup> Furthermore, he was sorry to see such "sleight intelligences w[i]thowt ground or apparaunce of truth" taken as such.<sup>290</sup> A few days later, Fenton told Cecil

---

<sup>283</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 28 Feb. 1597, SP 63/197/115, f. 366; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 238.

<sup>284</sup> William Gelle to Fenton, 22 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/32. III, f. 103r; Fenton to Cecil, 24 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/35, f. 108; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 248.

<sup>285</sup> Captain Thomas Wingfield to Sir William Clarke, 22 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/32. II, f. 102; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p.

<sup>286</sup> Captain Thomas Wingfield to Sir William Clarke, 22 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/32. II, f. 102; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p.

<sup>287</sup> Lord Deputy Russell and Council to the Privy Council, 25 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/41, f. 127; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p.

<sup>288</sup> Note by Fenton testifying to credibility of Weston's intelligence, 25 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/41. IX, f. 139r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 251.

<sup>289</sup> Note by Fenton testifying to credibility of Weston's intelligence, 25 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/41. IX, f. 139r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 251.

<sup>290</sup> Note by Fenton testifying to credibility of Weston's intelligence, 25 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/41. IX, f. 139r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 251.



that there was no further news of Spanish ships, thus furthering the appearance of Richard Weston's trustworthiness.<sup>291</sup> All of this information had been received during a time when Sir John Norris, Fenton, and Bouchier were engaged in negotiations with Tyrone. The sighting of the ships and Tyrone's delay in taking his pardon suggested to the Irish council that he was clearly buying time as he waited for Spanish aid.

---

<sup>291</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 27 Mar. 1597, SP 63/198/49, f. 161; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 253.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### An End to Negotiations, 1597-1603

"it cann be no disgrace if it weare knowne that the killinge of a rebell weare practised [...] wee have alwayes in Irlande geven head money for the killinge of rebels, who ar evermore & claymed att a price. So was the Earl of Desmond & so have all rebels byne practiced agaynst."<sup>1</sup>  
- Sir Walter Raleigh

"now the axe is laid to the tree, I hope some branches will be cut off ere it be long; and it is high time that either the corrupt trunk of the tree be cut down, or some of his principal boughs be shred off."<sup>2</sup>  
- Sir Geoffrey Fenton

On 21 September 1597, two boys stumbled upon a head in a tree in north London.<sup>3</sup> The head was said to be that of Feagh McHugh O'Byrne, the Irish insurgent believed to have been killed by Captain Thomas Lee and his company a few months earlier. The head had been brought into England sometime in May by one John Lane, who sought financial compensation (i.e., head-money) for having brought in the head of a notorious enemy.<sup>4</sup> Lane went first to the earl of Essex, who then referred him to the secretary, Sir Robert Cecil. Cecil informed Lane that the money had already been paid to another and directed Lane to dispose of the head himself. Lane asked John Dewrance, the complainant, if he could leave the head with Dewrance or bury it on his grounds, which Dewrance refused to do. Then, Lane ordered Dewrance's son to bury the head beneath a tree nearby. When asked by his father about the incident, the boy said he had set the head on a tree, whereafter two boys in search of their cattle discovered it.<sup>5</sup>

Occasions such as this encourage the view that aggressive displays of violence characterized the Tudor regime in Ireland, where the killing and mistreatment of the colonized Irish body is a literal manifestation of the English colonial project and its subjugation of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Sir Walter Raleigh to Sir Robert Cecil, 26 Oct. 1598, SP 12/268/93, f. 151r; *CSPDom*, 1598-1601, p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Geoffrey Fenton to Cecil, 22 June 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 82, f. 240; *CSP Ire*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 190.

<sup>3</sup> CP, vol. 7, p. 395.

<sup>4</sup> The identity of John Lane is somewhat unclear, though he was likely the same man implicated in the earl of Essex's Rebellion, discussed further below (CP, vol. 11, p. 34).

<sup>5</sup> CP, vol. 7, p. 395.

Irish.<sup>6</sup> Such violence was not new in Tudor Ireland nor was the taking and displaying of heads characteristic of only English soldiers. It was also reflective of native traditions as well.<sup>7</sup> There were prior instances when the crown army returned from battle with the heads of their enemies mounted on their swords. The famous illustrations from John Derrick's *Image of Irelande* reflects this practice, showing the severed heads on swords as war trophies (see Image 13).



Image 13 - John Derrick, *Image of Irelande* (London, 1581) woodcut plate. Edinburgh University Library.

This practice was not unique to Ireland or even early modern Europe. It was a form of ritualized violence that, although sensationalized in early modern Europe, featured prominently in antiquity

<sup>6</sup> David Edwards, "Some days two heads and some days four," *History Ireland* 17.1 (2009): 18-21; Patricia Palmer, *The Severed Head and the Grafted Tongue: Literature, Translation and Violence in Early Modern Ireland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

<sup>7</sup> David Edwards, "The Escalation of Violence in Sixteenth-Century Ireland," in *Age of Atrocity: Violence and Political Conflict in Early Modern Ireland*, eds. David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan and Clodagh Tait (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 47.

as well.<sup>8</sup> In England, it was customary to behead "criminals" or "rebels" who were deemed traitors of the English crown and display their heads along walls and prison gates. Chronicles like the *Annals of the Four Masters* and illustrations such as John Derrick's show that the English continued this practice in Ireland as well.

Likewise, it was not uncommon for the crown to offer "head-money" for the most notorious "rebels." During the prosecution of O'Byrne, many of his followers had been killed, including his nephew and uncle, and their heads brought to Dublin.<sup>9</sup> If there was a bounty on the insurgent, then the head became valuable, not only as physical confirmation of death, but also as an opportunity for crown soldiers to earn money.<sup>10</sup> This practice of offering "head-money" had been carried out previously in Ireland, most notably during the second Desmond Rebellion. The constable of Castlemaine, Thomas Cheston, had employed spies against Desmond and found that he had hidden in a cabin.<sup>11</sup> At this discovery and with the help of others, they cut off Desmond's head and brought the head upon a sword to the lord general for payment of £1,000. Cheston, therefore, requested payment of the bounty.<sup>12</sup> The prosecution of O'Byrne fell along similar lines. After several months of chasing O'Byrne and his followers, Captain Lee and his company followed a tired O'Byrne into a cave, where they killed him.<sup>13</sup> Afterwards, they brought the head to Dublin to present to Lord Deputy Sir William Russell.

The vigorous pursuit and killing of O'Byrne were, in another respect, revealing. It suggested a reversion to the previous practice of resorting to violence and a change in attitude

---

<sup>8</sup> For example, see the near recent archaeological find by Sara Gummesson, Fredrik Hallgren, and Anna Kjellström, "Keep Your Head High: Skulls on Stakes and Cranial Trauma in Mesolithic Sweden," *Antiquity* 92 (2018): 74–90.

<sup>9</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 253.

<sup>10</sup> Even the killing of O'Byrne's followers seems to have warranted payment. Thomas Ball apparently received £15 for 17 heads belonging to followers of O'Byrne (A book containing the issue, as well of £15,000, parcel of a Privy Seal of £20,000, 16 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/33. I, f. 91; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 214).

<sup>11</sup> The petition of Thomas Cheston to Burghley, [8 Jan] 1584, SP 63/107/14, f. 36; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 489.

<sup>12</sup> The petition of Thomas Cheston to Burghley, [8 Jan] 1584, SP 63/107/14, f. 36; *CSPIre*, 1574-1585, p. 489.

<sup>13</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 259.

and direction towards the war in Ireland. By 1597, the prospect of a peaceful conclusion to the war seemed less and less likely. Though the Irish councilors continued to parley with Tyrone, their expectations that the negotiations would result in the earl's submission were low. When they met with Tyrone in January, they admitted that his "outward shewes are faire, and his othes deep and vehem[en]t; but whether his hart and Inward meaninge be agreeable, wee dare not assure, consideringe how often he hath slipped before."<sup>14</sup> They now collectively advocated military force and the vigorous prosecution of war, but their reasons remained a point of difference. Some councilors, such as Sir Richard Bingham and Sir Henry Bagenal, had always favored a military solution. They thought this strategy was the only way to return Ireland to a state of obedience.

Others, notably Sir Geoffrey Fenton, had initially been against relying upon armed force but now recognized the utility of negotiation as a temporizing measure to allow time to reinforce the crown army in Ireland. Early in the war, Fenton had solicited the help of Thomas Butler, the earl of Ormond and Irish councilor, to convince Tyrone to return to being a loyal subject. Tyrone had not relented. Then, in 1595, Ormond suggested that the crown issue a bounty on Tyrone's head. Three years later, he vehemently argued for military force against "those wicked traytors" with "fyre and sword till they be famyshed, as heretofore they were" when he had served against Desmond.<sup>15</sup> He further recommended the cutting off of insurgents' heads and head-money to be given according to the "quallitie of the Rebel."<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Sir John Norris, Sir George Bouchier, and Fenton to the Privy Council, 24 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/42, f. 163r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 217.

<sup>15</sup> Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond, to Cecil, 21 Oct. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 118, f. 228r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 293.

<sup>16</sup> Ormond to Cecil, 21 Oct. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 118, f. 228r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 293.

Though Ormond had reached this conclusion well before the other councilors in Ireland, he now found support in England. Before 1597, there remained for the English the possibility that Tyrone could become an obedient subject of the English crown once again. It was a consideration given to Tyrone because of his upbringing within the Pale and ties to England. He was, after all, the Irishman whom the queen had "rayseed from the dust."<sup>17</sup> Such leniency was not extended to the other Irish lords, hence Tyrone's frequent appeals for their pardon in addition to his own. However, by throwing his lot in with the other Ulster lords, he now all but guaranteed that he would be treated like them: an enemy of the English state.

After 1597, plots to assassinate the insurgents, especially Tyrone, gained traction. While the proclamation that declared Tyrone a traitor in June 1595 did not offer a bounty on his head, its language made it clear that the crown considered Tyrone to be the principal leader of armed Irish insurgency. Like Desmond, Tyrone was seen as the primary focal point of resistance by the crown, regardless of the importance of the other Ulster lords in the war. Tyrone was the target, and those involved in his prosecution reasoned that he would either submit or be killed if they could remove support from the earl. Such support mainly came from other Irish lords, townspeople, Scotsmen, and Catholic priests. Although the crown reserved bounties for notorious enemies, all those in support of the insurgents, including priests, would be pursued, apprehended, and likely punished, whether by torture, imprisonment, or death.

While the crown committed fully to a policy of force, the Irish councilors experienced a crisis in authority and influence. An aggressive military strategy afforded the Westminster government and, by extension, their agent and military commander in Ireland—the lord deputy—more control over the war. From 1597 onwards, the queen issued strict and detailed instructions

---

<sup>17</sup> Cecil to J. Norris, 12 Aug. 1595, SP 63/182/25, f. 106; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 364.

to her chief governors, outlining the precise course to follow and the need for their supervision of the whole Irish administration. On the one hand, instructions to chief governors invariably took this form. On the other hand, the queen had blamed her Irish councilors on several occasions for bungling the war in Ireland. She thus tried to reign in the Irish councilors' individual and institutional agency primarily through her chief governors, who surveilled (and were themselves under surveillance) by the council.

Under these conditions, the Irish councilors sought to reassert their authority. While the judicial councilors still focused on managing the routine business of government and the martial men focused on military action, the others searched for ways to reinforce their utility to the war effort. For the bishop of Meath, Thomas Jones, and Sir Geoffrey Fenton, the secretary of state, this meant gathering information on insurgents and their supporters. Unsurprisingly, the clerics on the council focused on Catholic priests, missionaries, and emissaries of the Spanish crown. At the same time, Fenton and Sir George Carew directed their attention to Tyrone and the other Ulster lords. Some were able to convince the Westminster government in England of their usefulness. Still, others like Sir Ralph Lane, the muster-general, and Sir Henry Wallop, the treasurer-at-war, succumbed under the pressure. These final years of the war, therefore, were crucial for the Irish councilors.

### **The State of the War, 1597-1598**

Before he passed the sword to the new lord deputy, Thomas Lord Burgh, Sir William Russell's final act was the military campaign against Feagh McHugh O'Byrne and his followers. In his journal, Russell wrote of the "great joy and gladness" in which the people had welcomed

him on his return trip back to Dublin.<sup>18</sup> It was a triumph, in his view, to have killed his target and, possibly, redeemed himself from his previous errors in judgment, both in failing to detain or capture Tyrone and in his contentious relations with Lord General John Norris. When Russell finally departed Ireland, he noted that the Irish councilors, the mayor, sheriffs, citizens of Dublin, and captains had all been present to see him off. This send-off seemed a peaceful end to a tumultuous term as lord deputy. However, the fanciful nature of Russell's writings belied the actual state of the war.

All four provinces now showed signs of trouble. In Ulster, where it had all started, few counties remained under crown control, and those that did were the areas closest to the Pale. The Irish council declared the region "universally revolted," for no part of Ireland was "free from hostility against her Majesty."<sup>19</sup> That so many northern counties stood against the crown was deeply troubling. For the crown, the main source of trouble in the northern province was Hugh O'Neill, the earl of Tyrone, who seemed to gain new supporters or confederates continuously within and outside the region. In Connacht, Sir Conyers Clifford inveighed against the machinations of O'Donnell, the O'Rourkes, McWilliams, and others, for in each of the six shires in the region, a different Irish lord was at the center of armed opposition to English rule. The Irish councilors also suspected that insurgents in Connacht were in communication with those in Munster, who of late had killed some English undertakers in the southern province. Leinster was also in crisis, despite the killing of O'Byrne, who had been of some influence in the area. Some of O'Byrne's followers offered to pledge their loyalty to the English crown, but many in the Irish council doubted the sincerity of such promises. The councilors suspected that some important Irish septs in the Pale aided the insurgents by providing them with goods and establishing

---

<sup>18</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 259.

<sup>19</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 216.



pathways to invade the area. As the Irish council debated how best to approach the crisis which they faced in each province, they made plans to strengthen the borders of English areas against domestic and foreign invasions until the arrival of a new viceregent.<sup>20</sup>

The new lord deputy, Thomas, Lord Burgh, had a difficult task ahead of him. Unlike the previous chief governors, Burgh had no prior experience in Ireland. Sir William Fitzwilliam, Sir John Perrot, and Sir William Russell had all been employed in Ireland before becoming chief governors. While Burgh's transfer from the Low Countries to Ireland followed a similar trajectory to that of other military officers, his inexperience in the particularities of Ireland was unusual for the position he now occupied as lord deputy. He did, however, possess the leadership skills from having served as governor of Brill in the Low Countries. Furthermore, his lack of knowledge of Ireland was attractive to a central government that wanted to restrain the independence of their local councilors in Ireland. The queen thought the Irish council incapable of managing the crown's interests in Ireland. In fact, she famously denounced her Irish councilors and blamed them openly for the disastrous state of the realm. She accused them of faults so "notorious as it is but to apparant to the whole world that never any Realme was worse gouerned by all o[u]r mynisters from the highest to the lowest."<sup>21</sup> Even the favorite, Sir John Norris, had his commission for the war in Ulster revoked. Burgh, then, became the figure on which the queen and privy council placed all their trust. He was the new broom who would sweep the Irish administration clean.

To make up for Burgh's ignorance of Ireland, Burghley provided a chronology of events in Ireland thus far to help orient the new viceroy.<sup>22</sup> The queen also issued detailed instructions on

---

<sup>20</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 216-219.

<sup>21</sup> The Queen to Lord Deputy Russell and the Council, 18 Apr. 1597, SP 63/204/25, f. 24; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 294.

<sup>22</sup> Chronological list of events in Ireland, Jan. 1597, SP 63/197 f. 220; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 226.

how to proceed with the war, as she did with every viceregent, only these instructions quite clearly targeted the Irish councilors' authority.<sup>23</sup> One such area was religion. Burgh was to ascertain "discreetely and quietly" the state of religion because the queen had received reports on the "notorious negligence" and lack of Protestant religious observance in parts of the realm, even in the Pale.<sup>24</sup> He was to have the assistance of the bishops on the council and, with the advice of the "better sorte of o[u]r Counsell there," was to compile a written report on how to reform religion on the island, seeing as religion was "one of the cheife points at w[hi]ch in all demaunds the Rebellls haue soe greedily aymed."<sup>25</sup> It was a pointed suggestion that religion was not solely the responsibility of the bishops in Ireland. Nor were they necessarily equipped to direct the reformation. The directive to use the "better sorte" of the Irish council also indicated that the queen thought more favorably of some councilors than others.

The financial and military administrations were other areas of concern to the queen and which she directed Burgh to supervise closely. She ordered Burgh to command the muster-master, Sir Ralph Lane, to produce in writing "p[er]fecte Rolls of all manner of p[er]sons that receaue paye" in Ireland "for any Marshall service in bands, in Garrisons, in wardes, or otherwise," along with their locations, their commanders, and the warrant and number of absent soldiers.<sup>26</sup> Burgh was also to examine for himself the list of pensioners (men who received payment for their military service in Ireland) and to determine their current state, whether they were impotent and unserviceable to the state or had died or left Ireland. When granting payment for pensions, he was to "earnestly to haue care," for some had received payments who "least

---

<sup>23</sup> Instructions for Thomas, Lord Burgh, 18 Apr. 1597, SP 63/198/95, f. 289; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 265.

<sup>24</sup> Instructions for Thomas, Lord Burgh, 18 Apr. 1597, SP 63/198/95, f. 289v; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 265.

<sup>25</sup> Instructions for Thomas, Lord Burgh, 18 Apr. 1597, SP 63/198/95, f. 289v; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 265.

<sup>26</sup> Instructions for Thomas, Lord Burgh, 18 Apr. 1597, SP 63/198/95, f. 290r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 265.

deserve it."<sup>27</sup> Burgh was effectively reviewing Lane's accounts and accounting practices. From the instructions, it was clear that the queen did not trust Lane's work, but with more resources being shipped to Ireland, the queen and privy council had to rely on their Irish councilors. However, she was going to use Burgh as their agent to help reduce corruption in accounting practices and military expenditures on the island, which now amounted to £12,000 a month.<sup>28</sup>

At the same time, the queen and privy council also tried to increase revenues from within Ireland where possible. With the help of the other councilors, Burgh would have two commissions: one to authorize leases for lands, their terms, and the rents due to the state, and the other to bring in those indebted to the crown and compel them to make payments. These were the duties of the exchequer office, which concerned most directly the vice treasurer, Wallop, and especially the chief baron of the exchequer, Sir Robert Napier. When Napier first came to Ireland, he claimed to have found numerous evidence of corruption within the exchequer, which he sought to resolve. But Napier was later connected to the adventurer, Sir Richard Boyle, well known for his exploits in the Munster plantation.<sup>29</sup> Boyle would come in conflict with Wallop, the latter imprisoning Boyle on several occasions, and Boyle, in return, alleging corruption against Wallop.<sup>30</sup> Given the issues that arose between English officials over land, the lord deputy would step to supervise property issues and the lord deputy would himself be accountable to other commissioners, that is, the Irish councilors.

Burgh was also to investigate the state of finances in Connacht. A justice, attorney, and other ministers had been appointed as commissioners for the government in Connacht and had

---

<sup>27</sup> Instructions for Thomas, Lord Burgh, 18 Apr. 1597, SP 63/198/95, f. 291r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 265.

<sup>28</sup> *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 330.

<sup>29</sup> On Boyle, see David Edwards and Colin Rynne, eds., *The Colonial World of Richard Boyle, First Earl of Cork* (Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2018).

<sup>30</sup> Edwards and Rynne, *The Colonial World of Richard Boyle*, 187.

received yearly stipends and entertainments for their service. The money came from the composition raised there, which in Bingham's time as chief commissioner amounted to nearly £4,000 a year. Out of the £4,000, Bingham was to pay himself and the other commissioners, amounting to some £2,313. Although there should have been an excess in funds, Bingham had demanded the use of all the money, allegedly with "p[re]tended extraordinary charges arising by the troubles of the Countrey."<sup>31</sup> Now, since the composition had declined due to war, the crown could no longer suffer the expense of some commissioners who maintained their former stipends without fulfilling their duties in the province. Moreover, because the composition of Connacht was low, these commissioners now received their payments from the treasury sent out of England for the crown army in Ireland, money which had been expressly reserved for the army.<sup>32</sup>

With the numerous abuses outlined by the queen and privy council, there was little expectation that Burgh had time to reform such practices in the Irish military and government. There was, after all, a war to be fought. Instead, their purpose in the spring of 1597 was to have a new man examine the state of things and relay information back to England. With time, the hope was that he would eventually reform the Irish government.

Burgh arrived in Ireland on May 15th and received the sword on the 22nd. Just two days later, Burgh reported the many difficulties which he had already encountered during his short time on the island: "vndewtifvll people factiovsly co[m]bined: a covntrey desolate in all miserye, and more advantageovs to the traytovr."<sup>33</sup> Ireland was, in his view, a wasteland of many empty

---

<sup>31</sup> Instructions for Thomas, Lord Burgh, 18 Apr. 1597, SP 63/198/95, f. 292v; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 265.

<sup>32</sup> The other major area of concern was the concealment of lands. The Westminster government believed that some suitors conspired with deputies who served the escheators and surveyors to defraud the state by leasing lands at rates below their traditional value (Instructions for Thomas, Lord Burgh, 18 Apr. 1597, SP 63/198/95, f. 289; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 265).

<sup>33</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to the Privy Council, 24 May 1597, SP 63/199/50, f. 96r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 296.

villages, untilled fields, and feeble crown soldiers.<sup>34</sup> Recognizing that the queen "mvst p[re]serve her kingdome by strong hand," he advised that the best means of offending the "boasting traytovrs and defend the qvenes right" was to provide the army with much-needed supplies.<sup>35</sup> Without proper maintenance of the army, "all description of what should be done, mvst nedes vanish w[i]thovt execvtion."<sup>36</sup>

Burgh understood his purpose in Ireland: to follow the queen's orders and engage Tyrone militarily in Ulster. He resolved to do precisely what had been commanded. Unlike Fitzwilliam and Russell, who had been willing to temporize with Tyrone, Burgh found Tyrone deceitful. Burgh bucked the trend that had developed amongst lords deputy of initially being lulled into friendly relations with Tyrone. He immediately perceived the danger Tyrone and the others posed. He noted that on the day he received the sword, Tyrone had made attempts on Knockfergus and Newry and enemy forces led by Tyrone's brother, Cormack, burned many villages in Westmeath and the surrounding area of Leinster.<sup>37</sup> These latest attacks were to Burgh "manifest prooffs" that Tyrone was "fully bent to all villany."<sup>38</sup> Further, he believed that Tyrone would do all he could to give the Spanish easy access into Ireland. Consequently, the lord deputy and council were resolute that there was no other course to hold with Tyrone except to "take him downe w[i]th force."<sup>39</sup>

The day after Burgh had received the sword, the nobility of the Pale gathered with the new lord deputy and council, wherein they agreed to a general hosting for the 6th of July. Burgh

---

<sup>34</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to Burghley, 25 May 1597, SP 63/199/58, f. 112r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 299.

<sup>35</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to Burghley, 25 May 1597, SP 63/199/58, f. 112r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 299.

<sup>36</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to Burghley, 25 May 1597, SP 63/199/58, f. 112r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 299.

<sup>37</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh and Council to the Privy Council, 31 May 1597, SP 63/199/66, f. 129; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 301.

<sup>38</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh and Council to the Privy Council, 31 May 1597, SP 63/199/66, f. 129r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 301.

<sup>39</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh and Council to the Privy Council, 31 May 1597, SP 63/199/66, f. 129v; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 301.

planned to attack the insurgents on two fronts: an army led by himself advancing into Armagh and another, consisting of Sir Conyers Clifford and his men, advancing into Tirconnell. The lord deputy would revictual English forts along the way and Clifford would pursue the other principal insurgents, O'Donnell and McWilliam, in the northwest. The two armies would then converge on Lough Foyle (where they would be revictualled by English ships) to further their prosecution of Tyrone in the heartland of his own territory.<sup>40</sup>

This plan was less ambitious than the three-army one proposed by Russell during his term as lord deputy. Instead of the nearly 14,000 men that Russell had requested, Burgh would use the soldiers already present in Ireland. All he asked for were victuals, munitions, and money. His strategy was to supply the forces in Ireland rather than demand more soldiers. The process of levying soldiers was cumbersome and time-consuming. Any delays would enable further attacks by enemy forces, and the crown army in Ireland would still be in dire need of supplies and money.

The scheme, if successful, could end the war. Military strategies that utilized attacks on multiple fronts (as the insurgents had done) had the potential for great gains, but there were many moving parts. Both armies had to be victorious as they advanced through the region. If one army failed to reach the rendezvous point, then the entire plan of overwhelming Tyrone would be ruined. Nonetheless, a two-front attack was already underway, though with less aim and purpose. Previous lords deputy had already attempted to pass into Ulster from the Pale, and both Bingham and Clifford had fought against O'Donnell and others in Tirconnell. With some exceptions, these campaigns had largely failed. Now Burgh advocated a strategy that depended on such success which had hithertofore not been achieved.

---

<sup>40</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh and Council to the Privy Council, 4 July 1597, SP 63/200/7, f. 6; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 333.

Burgh left for Newry as planned with about 3,500 soldiers and marched towards Blackwater.<sup>41</sup> He captured the fort at Blackwater and then headed towards Lough Foyle. However, he altered his plans after receiving intelligence that enemy forces would attack the Pale in his absence. He, therefore, decided to fortify the borders between the Pale and Ulster rather than continue on to Lough Foyle. Burgh says he received advice from the Irish councilors with him on the journey and principal officers in the army before he had changed his plans. Marshal Henry Bagenal believed strong garrisons rather than large campaigns would most effectively advance the war effort.<sup>42</sup> A letter from the Irish council to the privy council also stressed the importance of strengthening the borders of Leinster and the Pale.<sup>43</sup> Burgh maintained that he would have continued northwards had the council (comprised of army officers) not protested against the journey and his soldiers' complaints of want of victuals.<sup>44</sup> Meanwhile, Clifford launched a failed attack on the castle at Ballyshannon. He complained of having bands that were two-thirds Irish and that the number of his forces paled in comparison to those of the insurgents, who he estimated had three times the number of soldiers.<sup>45</sup>

In September, Burgh would eventually return to Dublin with plans to spend the winter along the borders.<sup>46</sup> Cecil wrote Burgh a personal letter to express his disappointment with the lord deputy's actions thus far.<sup>47</sup> Burgh had—it seemed to Cecil—been more intent than any experienced councilor there on marching to Lough Foyle, a strategy of which Cecil disapproved: "It was at first comended, and to be wished, but never expected you cold p[er]form it, and where

---

<sup>41</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to Cecil, 12 July 1597, SP 63/200/16, f. 42; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 339.

<sup>42</sup> Sir Henry Bagenal, marshal of the army, to Cecil, 13 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/15, f. 33; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 417.

<sup>43</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and others of the Irish Council to the Privy Council, 16 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/17, f. 37; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 419.

<sup>44</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to [Unknown], 23 July 1597, SP 63/200/55. I, f. 169; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 358.

<sup>45</sup> Sir Conyers Clifford to Cecil, 9 Aug. 1597, SP 63/200/83, f. 230; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 371.

<sup>46</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to Burghley, 10 Sept. 1597, SP 63/200/118, f. 302; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 392.

<sup>47</sup> Cecil to Lord Deputy Burgh, 17 Sept. 1597, SP 63/200/127, f. 321r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 398.

Sr Coniers Clyfford (as was written) shold haue mett you and taken Balysheannon, it was also held a matter like to be Theoricall but not Practicall, and by the success appearith he was in Perill."<sup>48</sup> Now, the lord deputy asked for more supplies for the winter season when he had previously promised to reduce charges for the army. Cecil hoped that the feeding of the garrisons and all the ships sent to Ireland with provisions would result in Burgh's reporting of the possession of Lough Foyle by his following letter.

To Cecil, it also appeared that Burgh managed too many things by himself and without the rest of the Irish council. He noted Burgh's writing of only private letters and not joint letters by the lord deputy and council, especially given that some councilors attended the lord deputy on his journey. Burgh had also undertaken the defense of the borders himself when he should have remitted the task to another. The lord deputy could not afford to be absent from Dublin for too long, and the skirmishes along the borders would not substantially affect the war's progress. Although Cecil encouraged the lord deputy to "proceed in all things as you fynd cause" because Burgh knew things that the Westminster government did not, the entire letter seemed to warn Burgh to foster a greater dependency on the Irish council, owing to the resources that Burgh had to manage.<sup>49</sup>

Burgh's following letter did not concern Lough Foyle, nor was it a joint letter with the council.<sup>50</sup> He sent another private letter to Cecil from Drogheda, explaining that the machinations of Tyrone and O'Donnell compelled him to return to the borders once again. Only then did the lord deputy finally beg for more men.<sup>51</sup> He had avoided making such appeals before because he thought the newly-arrived soldiers to Ireland weak. However, the reduction of his

---

<sup>48</sup> Cecil to Lord Deputy Burgh, 17 Sept. 1597, SP 63/200/127, f. 321r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 398.

<sup>49</sup> Cecil to Lord Deputy Burgh, 17 Sept. 1597, SP 63/200/127, f. 322r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 398.

<sup>50</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to [Cecil], 19 Sept. 1597, SP 63/200/129, f. 325; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 399.

<sup>51</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to [Cecil], 19 Sept. 1597, SP 63/200/129, f. 325; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 399.



forces due to death and desertion now warranted this request, for his next plan was to revictual the fort at Blackwater in October.<sup>52</sup> He intended to maintain the Blackwater fort because he believed the garrison there frustrated Tyrone's plans to keep the army in defense of the Pale. In this, Burgh would fail because he died unexpectedly in mid-October from ague.<sup>53</sup> Following Burgh's death, Philip Williams (his secretary) wrote: "he was as free from corrupc[i]on as man might be [...] But death having made an end of all, the traytor triumpheth as muche as the subiect lamenteth, and all thing[es] being to go as far againe backward as he had brought them forward."<sup>54</sup>

Yet another lord deputy had now failed. The suddenness of Burgh's death placed the Westminster and Dublin governments in a predicament. The queen and privy council needed to appoint a new viceroy or general to lead the war, especially after the death of the esteemed Sir John Norris in September 1597. Until then, the Irish council would be responsible for selecting a lord justice(s) to manage the war in the meantime. The 1542 statute in Ireland outlined this process for a transfer of power. The Irish council would elect the lords justices until the monarch appointed a new chief governor. The only stipulations were that the lords justices had to be of English birth with an English surname, and the man elected could not be a "spiritual person."<sup>55</sup>

The Irish council would convene at the end of October to elect one or two lords justices, but, in the meantime, they urged the need for a dispatch of a new lord deputy. They did so both in joint council letters and privately to Burghley and Cecil. Loftus pushed for the "speedy" consideration of a new chief governor who would be suitable to pursue either prosecution or

---

<sup>52</sup> Lord Deputy Burgh to [Cecil], 19 Sept. 1597, SP 63/200/129, f. 325; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 399.

<sup>53</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and others of the Irish Council to the Privy Council, 16 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/17, f. 37; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 419. Perhaps Burgh's death was not so unexpected, as he had been sick on several occasions. Perhaps his recurring illnesses contributed to his weakened state in October 1597.

<sup>54</sup> Philip Williams to Cecil, 20 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/25, f. 53r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 424.

<sup>55</sup> 33 Hen. VIII, c. 2 [Ireland].

pacification.<sup>56</sup> Wallop thought the present state of Ireland required that a "speedy choyse" be made for a lord deputy.<sup>57</sup> Fenton feared that the absence of a governor would "breed daungerus sequells in this estate."<sup>58</sup> He stated that the election of lords justices would be of little use. Moreover, the course of war and force "hath don no good to the clearing of this rebellion, but rather hath made yt worss," leaving Ireland exposed to the "daungerus rage of the forreine ennemy abroade, who yt is to bee thought, will not so sleightly pass ouer oportunityes future to invade this realme."<sup>59</sup> Fenton, then, used the occasion to advocate for pacification by negotiation once again. Nevertheless, nothing of consequence for the war could be done without a lord deputy, and their enemies took advantage of the occasion to assault the Blackwater fort and Carrickfergus. The impression from these Irish councilors was their reluctance to manage the war by themselves, likely out of fear of being blamed further. This explanation would account for the election as lord justice of Sir Thomas Norris, the brother of the deceased Sir John Norris and now the president of Munster.

The choice of Sir Thomas Norris was odd. After the death of his brother, Thomas moved from vice president to become lord president of Munster. He had also contributed to the war as a soldier employed under others. Therefore, his provincial office and martial service meant that he had limited involvement in the Dublin council. Perhaps the Irish councilors simply sought a military man to lead the realm, and Thomas was the nearest one available. Clifford was busy fighting the war in Connacht. He was also closely linked with the earl of Essex, which may not have endeared him to Burghley and Cecil. Sir George Carew was on an expedition to the Azores with Essex. Sir George Bouchier had attended Burgh when he went north, but he was also a

---

<sup>56</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus to Burghley, 18 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/22, f. 47r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 423.

<sup>57</sup> Sir Henry Wallop to Cecil, 18 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/23, f. 49r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 424.

<sup>58</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 17 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/19, f. 41r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 421.

<sup>59</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 17 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/19, f. 41r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 421.

supply officer in charge of munitions. He could not lead the war militarily and manage the munitions office. Bagenal was busy trying to defend the borders around the Pale. He was at odds with some of the Dublin councilors, as he alleged that the late lord deputy and treasurer-at-arms (Wallop) had spent the treasure from England primarily on themselves.<sup>60</sup> Despite his proximity to the Dublin councilors, Bagenal did not appear to be a strong candidate for the lord justice position, especially given the animosity between him and Tyrone.

What the Irish council desired was for the new governor was a man experienced in both martial and civil government. They appeared to have found such a person in Sir Thomas Norris. But Norris was "much against his owne mynd" and "made difficulty to obay o[u]r ellection."<sup>61</sup> Judging by the council's own letter and Norris's own appeals to Cecil, he did not want the position.<sup>62</sup> He did not feel that he had the experience necessary to perform his duties well and so pushed for his return to Munster.<sup>63</sup> The Irish councilors hoped nonetheless that the election would proceed, and it did. However, only two weeks later, the queen ordered Norris to return to govern Munster.<sup>64</sup> Instead, Adam Loftus, the lord chancellor, and Sir Robert Gardiner, the chief justice of the queen's bench, would assume control as lords justices. Thomas Butler, the earl of Ormond, would become the Lieutenant-General and command the army in Ireland.<sup>65</sup> Gardiner made similar excuses to Norris and asked to spend the rest of his days in England.<sup>66</sup> He did not receive the reprieve he requested but continued as lord justice.

In the meantime, news reports of Spanish forces headed for Ireland in late 1597 abounded. A Spanish Armada actually sailed for the archipelago in October, but adverse weather

---

<sup>60</sup> Bagenal to Cecil, 29 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/39, f. 88; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 430.

<sup>61</sup> The Irish Council to Cecil, 29 Oct. 1597, SP 63/201/38, f. 86r; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 430.

<sup>62</sup> Sir Thomas Norris to Cecil, 7 Nov. 1597, SP 63/201/61, f. 126; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 440.

<sup>63</sup> Sir Thomas Norris to Cecil, 12 Nov. 1597, SP 63/201/68, f. 153; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 448.

<sup>64</sup> CP, vol. 7, p. 449.

<sup>65</sup> CP, vol. 7, p. 449.

<sup>66</sup> Sir Robert Gardiner to Cecil, 2 Dec. 1597, SP 63/201/88, f. 205; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 460.

led to its failure, just as it had a year before. Despite the appointment of Ormond as Lieutenant-General and the lords justices, the absence of a lord deputy made the likelihood of Spanish invasion on the Irish coast more daunting. If the Spanish did land in Ireland, then the earl of Essex (who had been tracking their movements across the seas) was to go to Ireland and join his army with Ormond's, whereafter he would lead the army with Essex as the commanding officer.<sup>67</sup> The heightened fear surrounding the Spanish invasion—not only for Ireland but also England—likely contributed, in part, to negotiations between the earl of Ormond and the earl of Tyrone in December. The other factor was the lack of a chief governor to direct the war. Without such a figure, the crown would forego any large campaigns, which they found too expensive anyway; hence Ormond's truce agreement with Tyrone which lasted through May 1598. These agreements enabled both sides to recover and reinforce their armies and to strategize their next steps. They also afforded more time to Spanish and Scottish forces to assist in the war. The arrangement also enabled Catholic priests (seminary and Jesuit) to align with the Irish lords in the north and their fight against English sovereignty.

Although the Irish councilors were now back in control of government with two of their members serving as lords justices, there remained a concerted effort among them to contribute wherever possible to the war effort. Thomas Jones, the bishop of Meath, joined Fenton and others in reporting intelligence on the collusion between the Ulster lords and the Spanish, which he had done earlier in the year. The two men also worked diligently to track the movement of Catholic priests in Ireland who had now aligned themselves with the Ulster lords.

---

<sup>67</sup> The Queen to Lord General Essex, 28 Oct. 1597, SP 12/264/153, f. 220; *CSPDom*, 1595-1597, p. 521

## The Seduction of Seditious Priests

Throughout the Nine Years' War, and even before, the Irish councilors frequently remarked on the presence of Catholic priests in Ireland and their attempts to lure loyal subjects to the Catholic faith. To counter the Catholic threat, the Westminster and Dublin governments both tracked the movement of Catholic priests across the European continent and the archipelago. They saw in Catholic migration the continued destabilization of religion in England and its kingdoms, especially as the influence of Catholic priests challenged Protestantism and the Protestant monarchy. Those Catholics who supported the Spanish invasion of England and its territories posed a severe threat to the realm's security and the queen. Consequently, the Westminster and Dublin governments apprehended and imprisoned priests who sowed seeds of sedition among their subjects. These fears about Catholicism were, as Thomas McCoog asserted, "justifiably real," as were the anxieties about the Spanish invasion.<sup>68</sup> It was not a coincidence that Walsingham established an intelligence network partly to counter the Jesuit threat posed by Edmund Campion and Robert Persons.<sup>69</sup> Ireland during the Nine Years' War was the site where all these fears came together, and it left the English crown embattled on many sides.

1598 would be a pivotal moment in English Protestants' fight against Catholic forces. It marked the beginning of the Appellant (or Archpriest) Controversy in England and the re-

---

<sup>68</sup> Thomas M. McCoog, *The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland, and England, 1598-1606: Lest Our Lamp Be Entirely Extinguished* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017), 16. David Finnegan has rightly pointed out that because English officials in Ireland were so "inclined to see Jesuits everywhere" among them, scholars have given too much importance to the Jesuits and their influence in Ireland [Finnegan, "'For the Greater Glory': Irish Jesuit Letters and the Irish Counter-Reformation, 1598-1626," in *Debating the Faith: Religion and Letter Writing in Great Britain, 1550-1800*, eds. Anne Dunan-Page and Clotilde Prunier (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012), 91]. However, the aim here is not to assess their influence but rather to show how the crown's fear of Jesuit involvement in the Nine Years' War affected politics and religion in England, Ireland, and Scotland.

<sup>69</sup> M. G. Richings, *Espionage: The Story of the Secret Service of the English Crown* (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd, 1934), 138. The author suggests that it was *the* cause for the development of Walsingham's intelligence network. However, the Jesuits were only one factor in a series of threats to the English crown, including at least hostilities with the Spanish, the succession crisis, and the presence (and plotting) of Mary Queen of Scots in England.

establishment of the Jesuit mission in Ireland. In England, the Appellant Controversy (1598-1603) was a dispute between Catholic co-religionists over the appointment of an archpriest to manage the underground English Catholic clergy. Secular priests (the Appellants) were against the appointment, particularly as Pope Clement VIII designated George Blackwell as the archpriest, a man they assumed to be closely associated with their rivals, the Jesuits. Though Blackwell was not a Jesuit himself, the appointment caused some secular priests to reject Blackwell's authority and appeal to the pope, albeit with no success.<sup>70</sup> The English government exploited the divide between the Catholic clergy—secular priests and Jesuits—by allowing the publication of anti-Jesuit propaganda in England under the pretense that the tracts were being printed on the continent.<sup>71</sup> In consort with Richard Bancroft, the Protestant bishop of London who would later become the archbishop of Canterbury, Cecil effectively stoked the flames between Catholics to further the Protestant regime in England.<sup>72</sup>

But the English response to Catholics, particularly Jesuits, in England was also of significance in Ireland. English officials like Cecil could essentially favor secular priests in this dispute because at least these priests accepted a Protestant queen and seemed supportive of English plans for the accession of James VI to the English throne; the Jesuits did not.<sup>73</sup> Of the two Catholic groups, Jesuits were the greater threat. In their desire to restore Catholicism and overthrow the English Protestant government, Jesuits supported the Spanish invasion of England.

---

<sup>70</sup> On the subject of the Appellant Controversy, see Peter Lake and Michael Questier, "The Archpriest Controversy and the Issue of the Succession," in *Doubtful and Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England*, eds. Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 71-94. It should also be noted that despite the labeling of the dispute as one between two groups, there were some who did not favor one side over another.

<sup>71</sup> Lisa Ferraro Parmalee, *Good News from Fraunce: French Anti-League Propaganda in Late Elizabethan England* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1996), 42.

<sup>72</sup> Lake and Questier, "The Archpriest Controversy and the Issue of the Succession," 82-84.

<sup>73</sup> Lake and Questier clarify that, although the Appellants did not outright advocate for James to succeed, they did "pitch" to James's chief concerns in their writings.

The famous Jesuit, Robert Persons, had even founded two English colleges for Jesuit priests at Seville and Valladolid with the consent of the king of Spain.<sup>74</sup> Thus, the strong ties that Jesuits had with Spain were of major concern to the English crown, and it likely became more so as Jesuits proselytized in England, Scotland, and Ireland. They had attempted to convert King James VI in Scotland, which would have undoubtedly affected England's succession.<sup>75</sup> In Ireland, Jesuits and their defense of Catholicism could be co-opted by the insurgents to add further legitimacy to their resistance to the English. Thus, no other group captured the attention of English officials more than those clerics who conspired with the earl of Tyrone.

Catholic influence was evident from the start of the war in Ireland, as it had been since the 1530s. However, it would become increasingly troubling from 1598 onwards. In 1595, a report by Fenton's double-agent, Richard Weston, seemed important.<sup>76</sup> Weston informed Fenton that Tyrone had dispatched to Spain an English Jesuit named Monfort and an Irishman by the name of Fleming.<sup>77</sup> They aimed to get the Spanish king to provide forces to help maintain the war in Ireland. This information came to the Irish secretary only a month before Tyrone was openly proclaimed a traitor, which likely contributed to the proclamation. Monfort and Fleming

---

<sup>74</sup> McCoog, 3. See also, Examination of Jasper Young, 27 Aug. 1592, SP 12/242/122, f. 220; *CSPDom*, 1591-1594, p. 261.

<sup>75</sup> Jesuits were also named in the Spanish Blanks episode of 1592. See, Conspiracy of Scottish Papists, [Feb.] 1593, SP 52/50/29, f. 29; *CSPSco*, 1593-1595, p. 50.

<sup>76</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 19 May 1595, SP 63/179, f. 215; *CSPire*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 318.

<sup>77</sup> Whether or not Monfort was a Jesuit or seminary priest is unclear. Ruth Canning identifies Monfort as "Francis Mountford" using Robert Dudley Edwards, *Church and State in Tudor Ireland: A History of Penal Laws against Irish Catholics, 1534-1603* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1972), which labels Montfort as a seminary priest. For reference, Dudley Edwards points to Joseph Gillow, *A Literary and Biographical History, or Bibliographical Dictionary, of the English Catholics*, vol. 5 (London: Burns & Oates, 1885-1902), 82. Gillow does not explicitly state that "Mountford" was a seminary priest, only that he attended the English College at Rome. This college was known to be a seminary institution. However, a recent publication by Maurice Whitehead challenges this assumption by showing how the English College was effectively led by a Jesuit administration. Both Robert Persons and Joseph Creswell, known Jesuits, served as rectors at the English College at Rome. See Whitehead, "'Established and Putt in Good Order': The Venerable English College, Rome, under Jesuit Administration, 1579-1685," *Jesuit Intellectual and Physical Exchange between England and Mainland Europe, c. 1580-1789*, ed. James E. Kelly (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018), 317. Most of the letters about Monfort identify him as a Jesuit, although at least one labeled him a seminary priest. See, for example, Articles against Captain William Warren, Feb. 1599, SP 63/203/58, f. 114; *CSPire*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 483.

would first go to Scotland and then proceed to their final destination for passage into Spain. Their route indicated safe passage into Scotland and some Scottish involvement with the Ulster lords. Weston advised Fenton to intercept the two men while they were in Scotland, for they would have letters and instructions from the earl on their persons. This could be done with the aid of the English ambassador there, Sir Robert Bowes, who was Cecil's point person for intelligence in Scotland. The intercepted letters could then be used to prove the earl's treasonous correspondence with Spain.<sup>78</sup> However, Monfort and Fleming were not intercepted because, within two weeks of the initial intelligence, the lord deputy reported to Burghley that a seminary priest, Monfort, had gone into Spain and that soon after, Spain sent money to Tyrone.<sup>79</sup>

Identifying this "Fleming" has proven challenging. Ruth Canning proposes that he is James Fleming, a merchant from Drogheda who transported other priests to and from Ireland.<sup>80</sup> However, Fenton received intelligence in 1598 concerning Edmund Birmingham, Tyrone's secretary, and a man who had accompanied him called "Fleming."<sup>81</sup> When Birmingham left Ireland for Spain, he apparently sent news through this Fleming, who remained around Drogheda and Dublin before proceeding to Lough Foyle to meet with the earl. Fenton thought Fleming was

---

<sup>78</sup> The identity of the two men reported in Fenton's letter remains uncertain. Of all the Flemings in the state archives, there is one compelling reference to a "Thomas Fleming," an Irishman suspected to be defrauding subjects in county Louth (*APC*, vol. 21, p. 358). Robert Lalor accused Fleming and Richard Stanihurst in 1573 of conspiring to plot with the Spanish king on placing Lord Gerrat (the son and heir of the earl of Kildare) as viceroy to the king in Ireland and proposed marriage to the king's daughter (Colm Lennon's bio on Richard Stanihurst, Internet Archive <https://archive.org/details/richardstanihurst00lenn/page/36/mode/2up?q=loftus> ). Lennon casts serious doubts on the validity of the plot.

<sup>79</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 24 May 1595, SP 63/179/91, f. 230; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 319. He also mentioned a Thomas Fleming who had knowledge of an enterprise. He does not precisely state what the enterprise is, but the preceding paragraph concerns Monfort and Hall, a priest apprehending for saying mass. It is likely, then, that the enterprise involves the Ulster lords' use of Catholic priests to communicate with Spain. The Fleming mentioned in this letter is not the suspected Irishman traveling with Monfort.

<sup>80</sup> Canning, 23.

<sup>81</sup> [Unknown] to Fenton, 29 Mar. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 1. II, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 105. See also, Fenton to Cecil, 7 Nov. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 154, f. 334; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 344. Several months later, it appeared that Fenton still had the impression that Fleming was an Irishman, suggesting perhaps that Cecil did not share what he knew about Fleming to the Irish secretary.



an Irishman and stated as much in his letter to Cecil. However, Cecil had knowledge of Fleming already, for he wrote in the margins: "flemminge is A Scottishman, and an Agent for Tyrone to buy powder and other things."<sup>82</sup> In another intelligence report from 1598, there is further mention of a ship that came out of Scotland and carrying Fleming.<sup>83</sup> It was now in Lough Foyle, but headed for Spain, presumably with a letter from Tyrone and O'Donnell to the king of Spain.

The English priest is not as elusive, despite the many variations of his surname. He had been known to the Irish government for at least several months before Fenton's report. In September 1594, Sir Henry Duke notified the lord deputy (then Russell) of an English Jesuit recently returned to Dungannon named "Mountford."<sup>84</sup> Richard Beacon also stated that the earl of Tyrone conspired with the Spanish for their assistance, "w[hi]ch he laborethe by his Jesewit[es], and hathe sente one Momforde the cheife of them to that ende."<sup>85</sup> Given both Duke and Fenton's reports on this priest, it may seem surprising that the Irish administration did not keep close watch over this priest. However, if the reports are accurate, the Jesuits seemed to be a near constant presence in Ireland.

It was not until September that the councilors realized that he had not actually gone to Spain. Another priest, Piers O'Cullan, had been apprehended as a messenger working for Tyrone. During O'Cullan's examination, he admitted being in the presence of "Momford" at the earl's

---

<sup>82</sup> [Unknown] to Fenton, 29 Mar. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 1. II, f. 3r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 105. Cecil received information on a man named "Fleming," who was a servant of O'Neill and had lately been in the north of Ireland (*CSPSco*, 1597-1599, p. 319). Fleming claimed that O'Neill had letters from the king of Spain and that the king called O'Neill, the "prince of Ireland."

<sup>83</sup> Extracts of a letter of intelligence written to Sir Geoffrey Fenton, 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 110. I, f. 335; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 212. See also, Lords Justices Loftus and Gardiner to King James VI, 12 Oct. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 143. II, f. 304; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 333. There is mention in this last letter of a Fleming from Glasgow.

<sup>84</sup> Sir Henry Duke to Lord Deputy Russell, 30 Sept. 1594, SP 63/176/60. V, f. 166; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 278.

<sup>85</sup> Richard Beacon to the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, Sir John Puckering, 21 Jan. 1595, SP 63/178/13, f. 28r; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 292. In February, Lord Deputy Russell also mentioned a "Mounmforde" with Tyrone (Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, Feb. 1595, SP 63/178/58, f. 139; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 300).

house in Dungannon earlier in September. He had gone to Tyrone to claim ownership of a parsonage in Clogher, which he had received from the pope. Since the parsonage was in the earl's country, he demanded proof and allegedly directed O'Cullan to deliver his letters to Spain while acquiring the papal bull. The letters, however, were not written in the hand of the earl, but rather Momford and a black male servant of a countess. That the letters were in the handwriting of others suggests the earl was being overly cautious in case O'Cullan was apprehended. O'Cullan professed that he had no knowledge of the contents of the letters, only that he had been told by the earl to solicit an answer about Spanish aid.<sup>86</sup> O'Cullan was never able to deliver those letters as an agent working for the English crown intercepted him at Drogheda.<sup>87</sup> While imprisoned, O'Cullan, fearing further examination and torture, attempted to escape over the castle wall and, in the process, broke his neck—at least according to the lord deputy's report to Burghley.<sup>88</sup>

Although O'Cullan had met an untimely end, the original priest, Monfort, escaped capture. Captain Charles Egerton, in his report to the lord deputy, identified this mysterious priest with the varied surname as "Francis Momfort" and reported that the priest was going to meet with Earl Huntley in Scotland.<sup>89</sup> He wrote a similar report to Burghley and this time used the name, "Francis Mounford."<sup>90</sup> He had already written to Bowes and hoped the Scottish ambassador would apprehend the priest.<sup>91</sup> Another letter indicated that the priest was in England.<sup>92</sup> It seemed that Monfort was no longer a concern to the administration in Ireland, at least not until July 1596, when the lord deputy reported the priest, "Mumford," had won over

---

<sup>86</sup> Examination of Piers O'Cullan, 29 Sept. 1595, SP 63/183/71. VIII, f. 239; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 409.

<sup>87</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Cecil, 4 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/73, f. 243; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 410. Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 26 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/30, f. 143; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 442.

<sup>88</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 26 Dec. 1595, SP 63/185/30, f. 143; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 442.

<sup>89</sup> Captain Charles Egerton to the Lord Deputy, 5 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/84. IV, f. 280; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 420.

<sup>90</sup> Captain Charles Egerton to Burghley, 7 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/78, f. 256; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 412.

<sup>91</sup> Captain Charles Egerton to Burghley, 7 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/78, f. 256; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 412.

<sup>92</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 8 Oct. 1595, SP 63/183/81, f. 269; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 417.

insurgents in the Pale.<sup>93</sup> Once Tyrone received his pardon in late 1596, the priest also benefited from the pardon, a fact which upset the lord deputy.<sup>94</sup> The next year, Monfort fled to England, though he apparently wrote to co-religionists on the continent and provided intelligences called "Momfortes advises."<sup>95</sup>

Fenton's pursuit of Monfort had been for naught. Yet it did not prevent him from taking credit for the capture of O'Cullan. While recommending Nicholas Weston's suit for shipping victuals into Ireland, Fenton also noted that Weston's brother had provided the intelligence which had led to the apprehension of O'Cullan.<sup>96</sup> Fenton turned what was an intelligence failure into a success; they may not have captured Monfort, but they did apprehend at least one priest working for the earl.

After Ormond negotiated a truce with Tyrone in December 1597, the Superior General of the Order, Claudio Acquaviva, engaged in preparations to relaunch the Jesuit mission in Ireland in the spring of 1598.<sup>97</sup> The new Jesuit mission would be led by James Archer, who had been present in Ireland since 1596. The other men who would be part of the mission were Henry FitzSimon, Christopher Holywood, and Walter Talbot. The selection of these men had much to do with the fact that three of the four men were Irish born. Talbot also had familiarity with the Gaelic language. This criterion was a clear indication that, at least for Ireland, the Jesuits were sensitive to knowledge of the language as an important qualification for missionary work in

---

<sup>93</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 16 July 1596, SP 63/191/26, f. 188; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 37. Lord Deputy and Council to the Privy Council, 16 July 1596, SP 63/191/23, f. 171; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 34.

<sup>94</sup> Lord Deputy and Council to the Privy Council, 15 Oct. 1596, SP 63/194/19, f. 59; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec 1597, p. 142.

<sup>95</sup> Henry Knowlis to Cecil, 10 Jan. 1597, SP 63/197/6, f. 11; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 199. See CP, vol. 7, p. 87. Part of the difficulty in following the traces of these priests is their tendency to use aliases, which makes it difficult for historians to reconstruct the activities of individual priests, who often used multiple aliases.

<sup>96</sup> Fenton to Burghley, 12 Jan. 1596, SP 63/186/13, f. 44; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 450. The lord deputy claimed that it had been his man who had intercepted O'Cullan (Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 12 Feb. 1596, SP 63/186/58, f. 196; *CSPIre*, Oct. 1592-June 1596, p. 469).

<sup>97</sup> McCoog, *The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland, and England*, 72-81.

Ireland. In an effort to deflect criticism about Jesuit motives, Acquaviva issued this command to his missionaries: "do not get involved in political matters and matters of state but treat only that which pertains to the salvation of souls."<sup>98</sup> However, not all of the priests heeded Acquaviva's direction.

Of the four priests selected for the Jesuit mission in 1598, Archer and FitzSimon were the only ones able to embark on the mission.<sup>99</sup> Archer was from Kilkenny and had some notable experience working with the Spanish. He had once served as a chaplain under Sir William Stanley, the English captain military commander who took a regiment of Irish soldiers to the Low Countries, but subsequently defected to the Spanish with his troops in early 1587.<sup>100</sup> He was also implicated in a plot to murder Queen Elizabeth.<sup>101</sup> By the time he returned to Ireland in 1596, English officials were well acquainted with Archer and kept watch for him.<sup>102</sup> FitzSimon was also Irish, but unlike Archer, he focused more on religion and conversion than politics and had a reputation for being a skilled preacher.<sup>103</sup> These differences in their experience and outlook would also appear in the 1598 mission.

---

<sup>98</sup> As quoted in McCoog, *The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland, and England*, 75.

<sup>99</sup> McCoog, 80, 113. On Archer, see Thomas J. Morrissey, *James Archer of Kilkenny, an Elizabethan Jesuit* (Dublin, 1979); and *ODNB*, "Archer, James," also written by Morrissey. On FitzSimon, see Canning, *The Old English in Early Modern Ireland*, 29-45; FitzSimon, *Words of Comfort*. Archer and FitzSimon also appear in the corpus of Jesuit literature written by Jesuit scholars. The other missionaries did not make it to Ireland. Talbot died in Flanders, while Holywood was imprisoned in England. To conceal his identity as a priest, Holywood had tried to appear as a merchant when he sailed for Dover. However, once there, he refused to take the oath of supremacy, faced incarceration, and was later questioned by Cecil and Lord Cobham, warden of the Cinque Ports. His admission that he was a Jesuit resulted in his further detention. He remained in prison until 1603 and eventually returned to Ireland for a Jesuit mission in 1604. Holywood's replacement was Richard Field, an Old English Jesuit priest. See *ODNB*, "Holywood [à Sacro Bosco], Christopher."

<sup>100</sup> *ODNB*, "Archer, James."

<sup>101</sup> Declaration by John Daniel of certain practices invented beyond the seas against Her Majesty, 25 Feb. 1594, SP 12/247/91, f. 147; *CSPDom*, 1591-1594, p. 442.

<sup>102</sup> *ODNB*, "Archer, James." CP, vol. 6, p. 539.

<sup>103</sup> *ODNB*, "FitzSimon, Henry."

Once FitzSimon arrived in Ireland, he seemed set on conversion, for he described Dublin as a "second London" and "a hotbed of heresy."<sup>104</sup> He professed to have spent most of his time preaching. But by November 1598, he found himself hedged in by insurgent forces: "I cannot go out without manifest danger of my life, as the enemies prowle about in all directions."<sup>105</sup> He was especially critical of the insurgents and their claim of Catholic defense: "They boast of being Catholics, but they are only so in name, and they do not allow any one to correct their ignorance, or to curb their wickedness."<sup>106</sup> Although the work of Catholic priests imbued the war with a sense of righteousness for the Irish cause, FitzSimon thought the defense of Catholicism was a mere pretense by the insurgents to get others to rally to their cause.<sup>107</sup> Archer, however, saw in Irish resistance a unique opportunity to restore Catholicism. He initiated contact with the earl of Tyrone soon after the latter's victory at the Battle of the Yellow Ford in August 1598.<sup>108</sup>

Over the course of several negotiations, the cessation agreement between the crown and Tyrone had been extended to the beginning of June 1598.<sup>109</sup> At this point, the lords justices, Loftus and Gardiner, doubted that the crown army could resist insurgent forces, for they now understood how much the cessations and truce agreements had helped the Ulster lords:

Wee see, to o[u]r greate grieffe, howe by theis ceasations, protections, and protraction, the Rebells doe still combyne, and growe stronge; the tyme to prosecute them passeth awaie; the Cuntrye for the moste p[ar]te vtterly wasted; the subiect murdered and discouradged; hir Ma[jes]ties, exceeding greate chardge of treasure, victuell, and munition, consumed, and (especially the greate quantytie of corne lately sent wilbe wasted before any service can be attempted); hir Realme p[er]jilled; and wee her Highnes poore servant[es] and subiect[es] in daylie daunger to be massacred. Wee maye well bemoane o[u]r miserable and distressed estate, but having noe power or authoritie in o[u]rselves, to redress yt, otherwise then by advise, wee doe nowe make the same

---

<sup>104</sup> FitzSimon, *Words of Comfort*, 46.

<sup>105</sup> FitzSimon, *Words of Comfort*, 47.

<sup>106</sup> FitzSimon, *Words of Comfort*, 47.

<sup>107</sup> Canning, 16.

<sup>108</sup> There is some confusion about whether Archer had established contact with Tyrone before this battle (McCoog, 78-79).

<sup>109</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 11 June 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 62, f. 193; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 173.

knowne to your L[ordships]: to be speedylie considered of, in yor graue wysdome, and related to hir moste gracious Ma[jes]tie from whome onely next vnto God, o[u]r cumfort and releefe must proceed.<sup>110</sup>

The cessations had once served as a political tool to gauge enemy intentions and negotiate a peaceful conclusion during the break. These agreements then became a deliberate strategy to buy time to reinforce the crown army. Now, however, cessations appeared as a break before the eventual defeat of the crown army in Ireland to enemy forces. They were fighting a defensive war, but not by choice. There was also a sense that the Irish councilors felt powerless because the war had forced a greater dependency on England to provide resources for the war, including money, and that these resources came with greater strings attached. So, on the eve of the truce's expiration and after, the lords justices and Irish council had little hope of success.<sup>111</sup> Nonetheless, the Irish councilors stressed the importance of defending Leinster and the Pale but also prosecuting the war in Ulster, which they thought would lead to Tyrone's ruin.<sup>112</sup>

The crown, therefore, renewed its plans to attack the Ulster lords by sea through Lough Foyle. However, Tyrone and his supporters knew of these plans and struck pre-emptively to prevent the incursion of the English further into Ulster.<sup>113</sup> They spoiled areas in Leinster and blocked Cavan and the Blackwater fort to impede the English from reinforcing their garrisons there.<sup>114</sup> With Ormond preoccupied in the midlands, Sir Henry Bagenal (the marshal of the army) led his forces into Ulster. Outmanned and outmaneuvered by enemy forces, the crown army suffered a disastrous defeat at the Yellow Ford in August 1598 (see Map 6).

---

<sup>110</sup> Lords Justices Loftus and Gardiner to the Privy Council, 1 June 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 56, f. 182r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 169.

<sup>111</sup> See, for example, Ormond to Cecil, 18 June 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 77, f. 231; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 187. Also, Fenton to Cecil, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 79, f. 236; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 188.

<sup>112</sup> Lords Justices Loftus and Gardiner, Ormond, and the rest of the Irish Council to the Privy Council, 17 June 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 72, f. 209; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 178.

<sup>113</sup> O'Neill, 73.

<sup>114</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 11 June 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 62, f. 193; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 173.



Map 6 - English defeat at the Battle of the Yellow Ford, 1598, Trinity College, Dublin, IE TCD MS 1209/35.

The battle resulted in the highest casualties thus far, with the loss of many soldiers, and captains. Lord Chancellor Loftus's son would eventually succumb to the wounds he had sustained in battle.<sup>115</sup> The marshal, Bagenal, was also killed during the fight. In losing Bagenal, the crown lost an important figure who had fought in the war since the beginning. The fort at Blackwater was now lost to the enemy, and the plans for Lough Foyle fell through, once again, as the queen redirected incoming forces to defend the Pale.<sup>116</sup> The largest body of English soldiers in Ireland had effectively been destroyed, and the very continuance of English control over much of Ireland was now at risk.

Following the disaster at the Yellow Ford, the Irish councilors were on the defensive. The issue this time was who should be held responsible for the defeat. Some contemporaries blamed the Irish councilors, arguing that they were too committed to keeping the Blackwater fort.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>115</sup> See McGurk's table on the casualties for each side throughout the war (McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland*, 244). Though, as McGurk notes, casualty numbers are unreliable.

<sup>116</sup> O'Neill, 74-78.

<sup>117</sup> See, for example, Ormond to Cecil, 18 June 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 76, f. 229; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, 187. Also, Portions of some manuscript history of the time, [Oct] 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 140, f. 281; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 319.

Fenton indicated divisions within the Irish council, especially between the lord lieutenant, the earl of Ormond, and the lords justices, Loftus and Gardiner.<sup>118</sup> Captain Thomas Lee, the same man who had taken issue with Fitzwilliam, the former lord deputy, aimed his criticism at Ormond, with whom he had a hostile relationship.<sup>119</sup> Lee accused Ormond of orchestrating the entire war, using Tyrone as his puppet. He alleged that the two earls planned to divide Ireland amongst themselves. He also confessed to a plot of his own to take down Ormond by turning insurgent forces against the earl, a plan which would have placed a crown servant and the army in peril. Unsurprisingly, the Irish council had Lee imprisoned.<sup>120</sup>

Lee's wild allegations seem to have not been taken seriously, though there was some concern that Ormond's secretary had passed information to the enemy. Council letters sometimes fell into enemy hands, prompting the Westminster and Dublin councilors to alter their communication patterns to avoid further leaks in intelligence.<sup>121</sup> Because official letters from the Irish council were part of a packet that also contained private letters from the lord deputy, the councilors, and other officials in Ireland, there was a wealth of information that could be gained if the packet was intercepted before it had reached England. Following the suspicion that Ormond's secretary was a double agent working for the Ulster lords, Cecil directed Fenton to privately inform Ormond of the leak.<sup>122</sup> Fenton could not warn Ormond by letter as the earl's

---

<sup>118</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 16 Sept. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 70, f. 125; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 263.

<sup>119</sup> A report of certain speeches used by Captain Thomas Lee to the Bishop of Meath [Thomas Jones], 13 Nov. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 171. V, f. 382; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 373. An Act of Council, 14 Nov. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 171. I, f. 366; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 361. For more on the relationship between Lee and Ormond, see McGurk, "Hugh O'Neill," 15, 20-21.

<sup>120</sup> An Act of Council, 14 Nov. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 171. I, f. 366; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 361.

<sup>121</sup> See, for example, Fenton to Cecil, 7 Nov. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 153, f. 332; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 343.

<sup>122</sup> Cecil to Fenton, 8 Aug. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 14, f. 18; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 222.



secretary might read the letter. He was able to discuss the issue with Ormond, who expressed his disbelief that such a thing could be done by someone he trusted.<sup>123</sup>

As much as English officials tried to prevent sensitive information from reaching the insurgents, information nonetheless slipped through, and it left some officials marveling at how much the insurgents knew. As one official stated:

It was a co[m]mon receaued opinion, settled amongst vs in the Camp: that the Rebels had such certain p[ar]ticular Intelligence from vs continually that if the Deputie took horse but at any tyme to ryde abroad or to take the ayer, they should forthwith haue p[er]fect notice geuen them both of the fashion of the apparell w[hi]ch he ware on that daie, as lykewise of the Cullor & stature of the horse he rode vpon.<sup>124</sup>

This concern extended as well to the use of Irish spies to gather enemy intelligence. The lords justices found in one instance that two men who had offered to discover enemy plans were duplicitous; they had only offered their services as intelligencers to obtain information and report back to enemy camps.<sup>125</sup> These breaches in information security likely played a role in the absence of surprise tactics by the royal army in Ireland: how could they surprise an enemy who knew so much?

Conversely, the English struggled to deal with surprise attacks throughout the war. Even when English officials in Ireland received information on enemy plans, they often failed to act preemptively. A lack of resources, as we have already seen, severely hindered their ability to do so. As a result, the crown army in Ireland was predominantly on the defensive for much of the war leading up to 1599. For the most part, they only dealt with problems as they arose. What

---

<sup>123</sup> Ormond to Cecil, 24 Aug. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 35, f. 65; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 243.

<sup>124</sup> A discourse or information by William Paul, 8 Jan. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 1, 17, II, f. 48r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 18.

<sup>125</sup> Lord Justice Gardiner to Cecil, 17 Oct. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 114, f. 217; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 288. Cecil to Lords Justices Loftus and Gardiner, 10 Nov. 1598, SP 63/204/pt. 3, 159, f. 98; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 345.

happened in the Munster province in 1598, then, was a consequence of how English officials managed Irish affairs generally, but it was hugely detrimental to the war effort and England's state-building project in Ireland.

Fresh off the victory at the Yellow Ford and likely aware of English plans to push further into the north, the Ulster lords tried to steer the crown army into the southern province of Munster. Before 1598, Munster had been relatively quiet in terms of the war. It was the only province that did not erupt into violence, despite the previous attempts by Ulster lords to incite resistance among the inhabitants there. They had little success, that is, until 1598. Things came to a head when there were reports of incursions into the borders of Munster. Upon assessing the situation, Sir Thomas Norris, the provincial president, requested that the lords justices provide more soldiers to help defend Munster. Cecil informed Norris that they had given order to the lords justices to send forces only as needed.<sup>126</sup> This directive to the lords justices was ambiguous and subject to interpretation. At what point would the lords justices deem the crisis in Munster worthy of reinforcement? Moreover, while Norris complained about his lack of resources, he also recognized that the Dublin councilors had other matters which demanded their urgent attention.<sup>127</sup> As the violence became progressively worse, the English privy council agreed to send an additional 2,000 forces into Munster.<sup>128</sup>

While the Westminster and Dublin governments connected the outbreak of violence in Munster to the war that had begun in the north, there were deeper issues at play, namely the anti-plantation movement. The establishment of the Munster plantation after the Desmond Rebellion in the 1580s had resulted in the displacement and dispossession of old inhabitants in favor of

---

<sup>126</sup> Norris to Cecil, 26 Sept. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 82, f. 144; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 270.

<sup>127</sup> Norris, James Gold, and George Thornton to the Privy Council, 4 Oct. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 96, f. 185; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 280.

<sup>128</sup> The Privy Council to Norris, 29 Oct. 1598, SP 63/204/3, 130, f. 97; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 303.

English settlers. Over time, personal grievances led to increased aggression towards English settlers, which was visible by 1596.<sup>129</sup> Both sides—the settler community and the old inhabitants—committed acts of violence, and this violence rendered the province unstable and susceptible to insurgent influence.<sup>130</sup> The undertakers who had settled in the area could have helped the crown army. Instead, they fled, leaving Norris to fight a desperate war in Munster and witness the resurgence of the Desmond earldom.<sup>131</sup>

It would be an understatement to conclude that the years 1597-1598 were challenging for the English monarchy. Sir Ralph Lane, who continued to serve as muster master in Ireland, reported that the monthly charges for the army were now £15,038 sterling, as opposed to £10,421 sterling in 1596.<sup>132</sup> The charge of the army over seventeen months—October 1597 to the end of February 1599—was £250,963.<sup>133</sup>

Repeated military failures and the deaths of the lord deputy and the marshal of the army also caused another crisis—one in leadership. After Lord Burgh died, Ormond served as lord lieutenant. The former marshal, Sir Henry Bagenal was killed at the Yellow Ford and his replacement was none other than the previous chief commissioner who had fled Ireland in 1596: Sir Richard Bingham. However, Bingham's term as marshal amounted to little, as he was often sick and died three months after his arrival back in Dublin. The position of marshal remained vacant until 1599. Ormond lost his position as lord lieutenant following the loss at the Yellow

---

<sup>129</sup> Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland, 1583-1641* (New York; Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press, 1986), 130-135.

<sup>130</sup> MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, 132.

<sup>131</sup> Names of certain castles and other places quitted by the undertakers in Munster, [20] Oct. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 117. I, f. 225; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 292.

<sup>132</sup> A breviat of Her Majesty's monthly charge in the realm of Ireland, 17 Feb. 1599, SP 63/203/50. I, f. 104; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 482. A collection of Her Majesty's monthly charge in Ireland, [Oct.] 1596, SP 63/194/27. II, f. 164; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 147.

<sup>133</sup> The charge of the army in Ireland for one year and five long months before the Earl of Essex his time, 28 Feb. 1599, SP 63/203/55, f. 106; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 483.

Ford and friction with the Irish council.<sup>134</sup> The Irish councilors frequently complained of Ormond's long absences from Dublin.<sup>135</sup>

The two highest military positions in Ireland had, therefore, undergone some significant changes. Coincidentally, in England, Burghley died in August 1598, and Philip II died in mid-September 1598. It was a precarious time for both England and Spain and, with the death of the Spanish king, the Ulster lords hoped they could retain Spanish interest in Ireland. Ireland needed a new commander. The man the queen and privy council chose to take charge of the crown army there was Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, who was well-known for his military exploits on the continent and his ability to command a large army (see Image 14).

---

<sup>134</sup> Ormond to the Queen, 18 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/14, f. 19; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 453. He complains that the lords justices are making decisions with him. In another letter—this time to the privy council—he accuses them of mishandling the victualling of the army (Ormond to the Privy Council, 18 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/15, f. 26; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 456).

<sup>135</sup> The Lords Justices Loftus and Gardiner and the Council to the Privy Council, 19 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/18, f. 41; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 462.



Image 14 - Portrait of Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex, by Marcus Gheeraerts the Younger, c. 1596.

### **The Earl of Essex: England's Great Hope**

The decision over whom to send to Ireland as lord deputy after Burgh's death was a contentious one. Politics in England had become increasingly polarized so that, after 1597, there was little cooperation between Essex and the Cecils. Their political rivalry had evolved along factional lines, leaving many courtiers and officials to choose which side to support. This polarization of the Elizabethan court in the 1590s affected Ireland as well. When the queen and privy council met in 1598 to discuss the appointment of a new lord deputy for Ireland, factional rivalries played a role in the selection process, where each side used the deputyship in Ireland as

a means of removing a rival from the English court. William Camden, the Elizabethan chronicler, reported what occurred during the meeting.<sup>136</sup> According to Camden, the queen chose Sir William Knollys, Essex's uncle, to serve as the new lord deputy. Essex, to avoid the sending of his own relative to the political graveyard that was Ireland, suggested that Cecil's friend, Sir George Carew go instead. When Essex failed to convince the queen that Carew was better suited for the deputyship, he turned his back on her, which elicited a strong reaction from the queen. She boxed his ears and "bade him get him gone and be hang'd."<sup>137</sup> In response, Essex supposedly put his hand on his sword and swore that "he neither could nor would put up so great an Afront and indignity, neither would he have taken it at King *Henry* the Eighth his Hands."<sup>138</sup> This incident highlighted the discord between the queen and Essex, which persisted until the latter's execution for treason. It also revealed how factionalized politics in England had become. Essex's suggestion that Carew serve as lord deputy was entirely political, as Carew was Cecil's client. Although Essex's plan failed, it nonetheless showed how important figures at court viewed the position of lord deputy in Ireland. Unfortunately for Essex, the Cecils already had a monopoly in Irish politics, which extended to the Cecils' intelligence network in Ireland as well.<sup>139</sup>

Leading up to the disastrous events in Ireland in 1599, Essex had little influence and power in Ireland.<sup>140</sup> After the death of Sir Francis Walsingham, the Cecils dominated Irish politics.<sup>141</sup> Some officers who had been sent to Ireland had worked with Essex previously—for example, Sir Richard Bingham (the former chief commissioner in Connacht), Bingham's

---

<sup>136</sup> William Camden, *The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth, Late Queen of England*, 4th edition (London, 1688), 555-556.

<sup>137</sup> Camden, *The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth*, 556.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 556.

<sup>139</sup> On the competition between Essex and the Cecils over intelligence, see Paul E. J. Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 5.

<sup>140</sup> Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics*, 132-137.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

replacement, Sir Conyers Clifford, and Sir William Russell (the previous lord deputy before Burgh). But Essex was not particularly close to these men.<sup>142</sup> Bingham had left Ireland in disgrace, and, though he later briefly returned, he died in January 1599, several months before Essex's arrival in Ireland. There was also little contact between Essex and Russell. Russell had provided intelligence to the Cecils when he had served as lord deputy in the early years of the war. Russell's decision to direct his information to the Cecils rather than Essex was telling, for it suggested that Russell considered the Cecils the better patrons, especially in relation to Irish affairs. Following Russell, Burgh also had close relations with the Cecils, judging by the private letters between the three men after Burgh's appointment as lord deputy. Of the men, Clifford seemed to have maintained contact with Essex while in Ireland, although inconsistently. He had served under Essex at Rouen and in the 1596 Cadiz expedition. Owing to Essex's influence, Clifford had also sat in parliament in 1593.<sup>143</sup> The presidents in Munster were off-limits to Essex as the three governors—the Norris brothers (John and Thomas) and Sir George Carew—were all clients of the Cecils. Essex was thus edged out of serious influence for Ireland.

Nevertheless, Essex was interested in Ireland. He owned land there and kept abreast of Irish affairs by participating in privy council discussions about Ireland.<sup>144</sup> He had even met, on at least one occasion, with the lord admiral and Lord Buckhurst at Burghley's house to discuss Ireland. He had also clashed with Sir John Norris over the appointment of new officers for Ireland, which showed Essex's key interest in Ireland in terms of military patronage. Then in 1596, he had approved the instructions for Norris and Fenton to negotiate with Tyrone.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 133-135.

<sup>143</sup> *HoP*, "Clifford, Sir Conyers."

<sup>144</sup> With the appointment of Essex as lord lieutenant of Ireland, the queen broke her long-standing rule that English officials should not own land in Ireland. See Sir Francis Knollys to Burghley, 24 Jan 1574, Harleian MS 6991, f. 76.

<sup>145</sup> Hammer, 133.

On several occasions, there had been talk of his taking command of the army in Ireland, with the latest being in 1596 once Russell's departure became apparent.<sup>146</sup> Although Essex had become increasingly involved in Ireland, he was still reluctant to serve in the capacity of chief governor there. He was afraid of being marginalized, removed from the court in England and away from the seat of politics. Some of Essex's circle, which included Sir Francis Bacon and Edmund Spenser, tried to convince Essex to become more directly involved in Irish affairs but with little success.<sup>147</sup> While he was resolved to establish military patronage networks in Ireland, he did not want to join the "miserable beggerly *Irish* war."<sup>148</sup> Once he had resolved to going, Essex told his cousin, Fulk Greville, that the queen had given him "the hardest task that ever any gentleman was sent about" and only upon his death would the queen realize her error.<sup>149</sup>

Essex's attitude towards Ireland changed in the late 1590s for several reasons. Burghley died in August, which left a potential power vacuum through which Essex could compete and counteract Cecil's influence in Ireland. The English defeat at the Battle of the Yellow Ford and the overthrow of the Munster plantation not long after indicated that Ireland needed better military leadership, especially considering that Ireland had been without a lord deputy for now eighteen months. Essex was a martial man above all else and sought opportunities, wherever possible, to engage in warfare because he had amassed political power and influence through his military successes. War also enabled Essex to build a client base and to offer patronage to those who worked under him.<sup>150</sup> His recognition of the need to reward soldiers made him a desirable leader for ambitious officers and help to explain why so many captains were eager to join Essex

---

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 136-137.

<sup>148</sup> [An apologie of the Earle of Essex], Oxford Text Archive, p. 45, <http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12024/A20374>.

<sup>149</sup> CP, vol. 9, p. 4.

<sup>150</sup> Hammer, 222-223.



in Ireland. They would also be joining a difficult war that, if won, would garner praise and glory. As England engaged in peace talks with Spain, the war in Ireland became more appealing. Ireland was, therefore, potentially another means of continuing the war with Spain. In the end, it took the death of Burghley, the loss at the Yellow Ford, and the escalation of conflict in Munster to finally convince Essex of the necessity of his going to the island, especially after his failed expedition in Azores in 1597. He had a chance at redemption, and the events of 1598 in Ireland meant he would be guaranteed command over an unprecedentedly large army.<sup>151</sup>

The employment of Essex in Ireland and the scale of the resources which he received—16,000 foot and 1,300 horse—showed how seriously Elizabeth and her government now viewed the insurgency in Ireland. In a proclamation published in early 1599, before Essex's arrival in Ireland, the Westminster government publicized its new resolve: "after so longe and almost impossible patience, we haue bene Compelled to take resoluc[i]on to reduce [tha]t kingdome to [tha]t obedience [...] by usinge an extraordinary power and force against them."<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, they recognized that the Ulster lords and their followers had drawn more people into the resistance movement using the rhetoric of English conquest:

we do p[ro]fess hereby to the world [tha]t we are so fare from any such purpose as the verie name of Conquest seemeth soe ridiculous to vs, as we cannot Imagine upon what grownd it Could enter into any manns Concept, that o[u]r actions tendinge onely to reduce a simple and barbarous Rabble of misguided Rebels, should neede any such Title of Conquest.<sup>153</sup>

Despite the massive size of Essex's new army, the Westminster government continued to assert that Ireland was already conquered and, therefore, the war was only a rebellion. Added to this

---

<sup>151</sup> The Queen to the Lieutenants of London, Nov. 1598, SP 12/268/121, f. 204; *CSPDom*, 1598-1601, p. 126. The queen confirmed this intent.

<sup>152</sup> Proclamation for Ireland [Draft], 25 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/25, f. 59v; *CSP Ire*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 468.

<sup>153</sup> Proclamation for Ireland [Draft], 25 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/25, f. 60v; *CSP Ire*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 468.

downplaying of the war's severity and importance to the English monarchy, they also dismissed the insurgents as "simple and barbarous," suggesting that the Irish were no match for the royal army. And yet, the insurgents had more gains than losses and had cost the crown a vast amount of money and resources.

The plan to send Essex into Ireland developed in late 1598 and early 1599. Elizabeth gave him a substantial army of 16,000 foot and 1,300 horse with an additional force of 2,000 men to be provided every three months. Essex would have a large army at his disposal, paid, furnished, and provided for by the crown of England. He also had the authority to grant pardon "to all persons in Rebellion," except to Tyrone, as well as bestow knighthood, but only with discretion due to prior abuse.<sup>154</sup>

The queen and privy council also expected Essex to do as the previous viceroys before him: discover the state of Irish affairs and report back whatever he found, for he "must geue light for others direction, and order to all for tymely execution."<sup>155</sup> Essex was to meet with the bishops in Ireland to account for the "great infection of Popery," where the performance of mass and idolatry were "winked at and tollerated."<sup>156</sup> He was also to reform the "monstrous abuses" in the muster office, namely the "corrupt and false Certificats" about the number of men in pay compared to those who actually served and the large number of Irishmen in the crown army who ran away with munitions and gave them to the enemy.<sup>157</sup> These instructions were another iteration of those provided to Burgh. Nearly two years later, the problems had not substantially

---

<sup>154</sup> Instructions for our Cousin and Councillor, Robert, Earl of Essex, 25 Mar. 1599, SP 63/203/94, f. 234v; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 495.

<sup>155</sup> Instructions for our Cousin and Councillor, Robert, Earl of Essex, 25 Mar. 1599, SP 63/203/94, f. 230r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 495.

<sup>156</sup> Instructions for our Cousin and Councillor, Robert, Earl of Essex, 25 Mar. 1599, SP 63/203/94, f. 231v; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 495.

<sup>157</sup> Instructions for our Cousin and Councillor, Robert, Earl of Essex, 25 Mar. 1599, SP 63/203/94, f. 232r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 495.

changed. The presence of Catholic priests in Ireland, especially Archer, who openly aligned himself with Tyrone, was one indication that religious tensions continued, if not worsened.

While the Westminster government extended power to the new lord lieutenant, they also asserted greater control over the Irish council, both through Essex and their own demands. They paid special attention to those councilors who dealt with military administration and demanded accurate certificates or estimates from them every two months. They issued this directive to Sir Ralph Lane, the muster-master general, with an additional request to track all the troops that came from England.<sup>158</sup> From Sir George Bouchier, the master of the ordnance, they wanted estimates every two months of munitions in Ireland.<sup>159</sup> And they asked the same of the new treasurer-at-war, Sir George Carey.<sup>160</sup> Judging by the privy council's letter to these men only a few months later, some of the Irish councilors did not do as they were told.<sup>161</sup>

The privy council in England did, however, manage to keep tabs on some of the Irish councilors, particularly on Lane. In 1596, Lane had come under the supervision of Maurice Kiffin after the queen had learned that Lane did not visit the troops before making his muster reports. She had sent Kiffin to assist Lane, but allegations of corruption and the way Kiffin had been brought in to supervise Lane's work resulted in friction between the two men. Once Kiffin died, he was eventually replaced by Henry Maynard, as the surveyor-general of musters and one of Burghley's own secretaries, and Ralph Birkinshaw, as the comptroller of the musters in late 1598. Lane now had two men overseeing his muster reports. Lane consequently complained to Burghley that Maynard acted as overseer of the musters and that Birkinshaw was trying to obtain

---

<sup>158</sup> The Privy Council to [Sir Ralph Lane], 24 Apr. 1599, SP 63/204/35, f. 160; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 15.

<sup>159</sup> The Privy Council to [Sir George Bouchier], 24 Apr. 1599, SP 63/204/34, f. 159; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 15.

<sup>160</sup> The Privy Council to Sir George Carey, 24 Apr. 1599, SP 63/204/33, f. 158; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 15.

<sup>161</sup> The Privy Council to Carey, Lane, and George Beverley, the comptroller of the victuals, 10 July 1599, SP 63/204/106, f. 175; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 80.

possession of the muster books.<sup>162</sup> With the number of resources that the queen now committed to Ireland, such oversight was deemed necessary, leaving Lane no choice but to accept the new state of things. Sir George Bouchier would also suffer the ignominy of losing some control of his office. Bouchier, the master of the ordnance, complained that since the arrival of Essex and his army, supplies had been pre-emptively distributed before he could administer them himself.<sup>163</sup> Essex was master of the ordnance in England, meaning his post was superior to the ordnance office in Ireland. Essex, therefore, was meant to supervise the Irish ordnance office. This kind of supervision reflected the queen's broader policy to manage English army supplies more effectively. She implemented similar changes as well in the Low Countries.

Once Essex joined the Irish administration, there were some notable changes to Irish government, especially the Irish council (see Table 7.1).

---

<sup>162</sup> Lane to Cecil, 8 Nov. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 158, f. 341; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 345.

<sup>163</sup> Richard W. Stewart, "The 'Irish Road': Military Supply and Arms for Elizabeth's Army During the O'Neill Rebellion in Ireland, 1598-1601," in *War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650*, ed. Mark Charles Fissel (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1991), 26.

| <b>Table 7.1 Irish Privy Council c. 1599</b> |  |
|--|--|
| <i>Office</i>                                | <i>Occupant</i>                                |
| <i>Lord Deputy (Lieutenant)</i>              | Robert Devereux, earl of Essex                 |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                       | Adam Loftus                                    |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>                  | Adam Loftus                                    |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>                  | Henry Ussher                                   |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                        | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond                  |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                       | Thomas Jones                                   |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>       | Sir Henry Wallop/<br>Sir George Carey          |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i>     | Sir Robert Gardiner                            |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>         | Sir Nicholas Walsh                             |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>          | Sir Robert Napier                              |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>                   | Sir Anthony St. Leger                          |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connaught</i>       | Sir Conyers Clifford                           |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>                | Sir Thomas Norris                              |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>                   | Sir Richard Bingham/<br>Sir Christopher Blount |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                    | Sir Geoffrey Fenton                            |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>                | Sir George Bouchier                            |
| <i>Other Councilors</i>                      | Sir Warham St. Leger*                          |
|  | Sir Edward Moore                               |
|  | Sir Henry Harrington                           |

\* This Warham St. Leger was not the same man as the previous councilor of the same name. However, the two men were related; the uncle died in 1597 and the nephew in 1600.

For the most part, the most experienced councilors stayed put: Loftus, Jones, Norris, Gardiner, Fenton, and Walsh. Two of the men on the council received promotions to a higher office. Walsh, formerly the second justice of the queen's bench, became the new chief justice of common pleas after Sir Robert Dillon died in 1597. Following the death of his brother, John, Sir Thomas Norris was promoted to become the president of Munster. Both Sir Henry Bagenal and Sir Henry Wallop had died: the former in 1598 and the latter in 1599.<sup>164</sup> Sir Richard Bingham

<sup>164</sup> Sir George Carey to Cecil, 16 Apr. 1599, SP 63/205/28, f. 33; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 12.

eventually replaced Henry as marshal, but he died early in 1599. Carey took over as treasurer-at-war.<sup>165</sup> At the time of Wallop's death, he was close to 70. He had been ill for some time and repeatedly requested to be excused from his service in Ireland.<sup>166</sup> He received approval of his request, likely owing to the corruption charges brought against him by Sir Richard Boyle, but Wallop died before he could return home to England.<sup>167</sup> The queen, though desirous for reform, thought Wallop's leaving office a sad occasion because their "affayres do rather Requyre the contynuanace of such p[er]sonnes as he is, whose long servyce there hath given him so good knowledg and experyence in that kingdome."<sup>168</sup>

By 1599, there were now only three Irish-born members on the council: Walsh, Ussher, and the earl of Ormond. This decline in the number of Old English on the Irish council was one notable difference in the Irish council from years prior. The Westminster government increasingly appointed men out of England. In fact, the queen had been quite determined in 1593 to replace vacant offices on the council with the New English.<sup>169</sup> This trend only continued, with Ussher's eventual replacement also being out of England.

Essex was clearly not responsible for all of the personnel changes in Ireland, though he did have a hand in changing the composition of the Irish government. Essex reorganized the military administration in Ireland by firing many of the long-time officers who had fought and lost at the Battle at the Yellow Ford and replacing them with his own men, including Sir Henry Docwra and Sir Oliver Lambert.<sup>170</sup> Essex understandably wanted to surround himself with men

---

<sup>165</sup> *ODNB*, "Wingfield, Richard, Viscount Powerscourt." Letters patents in favor of Carey, 15 Mar. 1599, SP 63/213/Add., 599, f. 81; *CSPIre*, 1601-1603 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 611.

<sup>166</sup> Wallop to Cecil, 13 June 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 2, 65, f. 198; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 174. Wallop to Cecil, 9 Aug. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 16, f. 21; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 223.

<sup>167</sup> Wallop to Cecil, 12 Sept. 1598, SP 63/303/pt. 3, 65, f. 113; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 260.

<sup>168</sup> The Queen to Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, 27 Mar. 1599, SP 63/204/110, f. 139r-v; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 502.

<sup>169</sup> *APC*, vol. 24, p. 210.

<sup>170</sup> Sir James Perrot, *The chronicle of Ireland, 1584-1608*, ed. Herbert Wood (Dublin, 1933), 161.

he knew and trusted from previous military expeditions. He brought some new officials into Ireland with him, including Sir George Carey who would replace Sir Henry Wallop as vice treasurer and treasurer-at-war. Wallop supposedly "yelded up the ghost" and died upon Essex's arrival in Dublin.<sup>171</sup>

Essex also tried to procure an appointment to the Irish council for his stepfather, Sir Christopher Blount.<sup>172</sup> The queen, however, disapproved, as it would mean sending another skilled military officer to Ireland.<sup>173</sup> Essex strenuously disagreed and thought Blount should be appointed as marshal of the army in Ireland and made an Irish councilor. He wanted Blount's counsel, especially considering how the queen "imputeth the losse almost of a kyngdome" to the current Irish council.<sup>174</sup> The queen granted only half of Essex's request, allowing Blount to serve as marshal in Ireland, but excluded him from becoming a councilor. Blount would be allowed to attend Irish council sessions.<sup>175</sup> Essex argued that the privilege of being an Irish councilor had been extended to Blount's predecessors in office. Moreover, Blount's exclusion would not only prevent Essex from communicating "secrett affaires of the realme," but also would encourage others to challenge Blount's authority.<sup>176</sup> The queen, however, maintained her stance, and Blount did not join the Irish council, even though he served as marshal there. She also rejected Essex's appointment of Henry Wriothesley, third earl of Southampton, as general of the horse in Ireland. Wriothesley was forced to return to England. The queen's fear was that Essex would use his power and influence in Ireland to establish his own personal dominance there. Essex had to

---

<sup>171</sup> William Farmer, "William Farmer's Chronicles of Ireland from 1594 to 1613," ed. C. Litton Falkiner, *The English Historical Review* 22 (1907): 112.

<sup>172</sup> Essex to the Privy Council, 1 Apr. 1599, SP 63/205/2, f. 3; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 1. Essex and the Council to the Privy Council, 28 Apr. 1599, SP 63/205/40, f. 54; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 20.

<sup>173</sup> The Privy Council to Essex, 2 Apr. 1599, SP 63/204/3, f. 147; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 2.

<sup>174</sup> Essex to the Privy Council, 5 Apr. 1599, SP 63/205/12, f. 19r; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 4.

<sup>175</sup> The Privy Council to Essex, 8 May 1599, SP 63/205/52, f. 77; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 27.

<sup>176</sup> Essex and the Council to the Privy Council, SP 63/205/40, f. 54r; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 20.

accept these unpalatable compromises in the battles over Blount and the earl of Southampton, for he had the war in Ireland to win.

After the loss at the Yellow Ford and the overthrow of the Munster plantation, there were many writers (among them the Irish councilors) who offered their opinions about how to overcome England's past military failures.<sup>177</sup> Those involved in the military administration of Ireland understood that traditional large campaigns would not work. The lords deputy and council had consistently suggested two- and three-front attacks for precisely this reason. Instead, military officials and treatise writers (including the Irish councilors) advocated garrisoning as the best strategy.<sup>178</sup> When the Westminster government sent troops to Ireland, the Irish council redirected the troops to various garrisons across the island. With garrisons, English frontiers could be reinforced as needed and this strategy allowed time for troops to become accustomed to Irish conditions. Because Irish officials valued forts like those at Belleek and Blackwater, they considered it a great loss when insurgents captured the forts. The fort at Blackwater held even greater significance because of its location. It was the main entry point into Tyrone's own country (see Map 7).

---

<sup>177</sup> David Heffernan, "Political Discourse and the Nine Years' War in Late Elizabethan Ireland," *Historical Research* 94 (2021): 284, 290. Captain Thomas Reade to Sir Robert Cecil, 9 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/7, f. 11; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 449.

<sup>178</sup> Wallop to Cecil, 27 July 1597, SP 63/200/55, f. 167; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 356. *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 199-203.





Map 7 - Key Sites in the Nine Years' War, taken from O'Neill, *Nine Years' War*, 11.

The Ulster lords understood the importance of these forts, which was why they requested that no garrisons be placed in their territories.<sup>179</sup> The queen and privy council also grasped the need for garrisons, but garrisons were expensive to maintain and sustain. They hoped that, by providing Essex with a large army, he would advance north into Ulster and confront the Ulster lords directly in battle. This would result in a quick victory and end the huge costs of the war in Ireland.

But Essex did not go north; instead, he went south. He informed the privy council that, after deliberating with the Irish councilors, they had collectively—by "universal consent"—decided to "forbear for a while the invasion of Ulster" and to focus their efforts on Leinster and then Munster.<sup>180</sup> Their reasoning was the same as in previous years: the defense of Leinster and the Pale—considered the "heart of the whole kingdom"—was more important than an invasion into the north. Moreover, they argued that it would be best to invade Ulster during early summer before harvest; their intent being to destroy the crops to cut off insurgents' access to food sources. Since the assault would be delayed until mid-June or early July, Essex now had time to assist Norris in Munster. The privy council wrote Essex and declared their approval of this plan.<sup>181</sup> A few weeks later, Essex informed the privy council of his meeting at Kilkenny with Norris, Ormond, and some of the Munster councilors.<sup>182</sup> At their urging, Essex resolved to stay in Munster for a time, before returning to Dublin, and then proceedingg to Ulster as planned with "more strengthe" and "lesse distraction of mynde."<sup>183</sup> The course of events mattered because

---

<sup>179</sup> See, for example, *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 151-155, 274.

<sup>180</sup> Essex and the Council to the Privy Council, 28 Apr. 1599, SP 63/205/38, f. 46; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 16.

<sup>181</sup> The Privy Council to Essex, 8 May 1599, SP 63/205/52, f. 77; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 27.

<sup>182</sup> Essex to the Privy Council, 20 May 1599, SP 63/205/63, f. 92; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 36. *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 302.

<sup>183</sup> Essex to the Privy Council, 20 May 1599, SP 63/205/63, f. 92r; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 36.

Essex would later claim that it was the council who advised him to go south, suggesting that he would not have done so otherwise.

For now, Essex did as he stated. However, he stayed in Munster for far longer than expected. A weary Essex finally returned to Dublin in mid-July, during which time the Westminster privy council demanded of their Dublin counterpart information about Essex and his journey in the south.<sup>184</sup> The privy council professed to have been forced to "walk in darkness" due to the lack of news from Ireland.<sup>185</sup> Fenton, who typically reported on Irish affairs as secretary of state, had not attended Essex on his journey into Munster. Fenton thought Essex was suspicious of him because of his friendship with the late Sir John Norris.<sup>186</sup> When Essex finally sent in his reports, it was clear that he had spent much of his time marching, fighting, overtaking castles, and establishing garrisons, "for by garrisons only the heart of the rebellious Irish is to be broken."<sup>187</sup> His goal was to shore up defenses along the southern coasts in an anticipation of a potential Spanish invasion. Although no such invasion occurred, there was great panic over the Spanish "Invisible Armada" in the summer of 1599.

Meanwhile, in Essex's absence, the crown army had faced several military crises. Over the summer, two Norris brothers—Sir Thomas, the lord president of Munster, and Sir Henry, a

---

<sup>184</sup> The Privy Council to the Lord Chancellor Loftus and the rest of the Council in Dublin, 31 May 1599, SP 63/204/73, f. 169; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 51. Cecil also received reports about Essex from others in Ireland. Carew, Carey, the bishops, John Clifford, mention that Buckhurst also involved with Ireland and sometimes working with Cecil, sharing information.

<sup>185</sup> The Privy Council to Essex, 10 July 1599, SP 63/204/107, f. 176; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 80.

<sup>186</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 7 May 1599, SP 63/205/51, f. 75; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 27. Fenton passed intelligence from Weston to Essex, see below, fn. 198. He even continued to provide intelligence to Essex upon the latter's return to England, which Essex then forwarded to Cecil. See, Fenton to Essex, 13 Oct. 1599, SP 63/205/207, f. 394; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 187 and CP, vol. 9, pp. 373, 375. However, it is unclear whether Fenton passed the information to Essex by order of Cecil or on his own cognizance; the latter is unlikely given the animosity Fenton had towards Essex. When Fenton thought Essex would return to Ireland, he offered to resign (Fenton to Cecil, 3 Dec. 1599, SP 63/206/66, f. 178; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 297).

<sup>187</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 307.

captain—had died.<sup>188</sup> One of the Irish councilors and military officers, Sir Henry Harrington, and the lord chancellor's son faced serious trouble near the town of Wicklow, south of Dublin. During a surprise attack, Loftus's son was killed, and the crown army fled back towards Wicklow.<sup>189</sup> Those who survived faced martial punishment, including Harrington who had led the company.<sup>190</sup> Harrington was imprisoned and later pardoned, but Essex had some of Harrington's men executed for their role in the incident. In Connacht, Clifford suffered a military defeat at Curlew Pass. He, along with many officers and soldiers, died in battle.<sup>191</sup>

The news was, undoubtedly, disappointing to the Westminster government. Essex appeared to be making little progress, despite whatever he had achieved in Munster. Essex had promised to undertake the journey into Ulster by July. When he failed to do so, the queen and privy councilors forcefully reminded Essex of his purpose in Ireland.<sup>192</sup> The privy council claimed that they had ensured that Essex had all the men, money, and supplies he needed for the task in Ulster, having made administrative changes in the army supply system.<sup>193</sup> There was thus no excuse to not follow through on the landing at Lough Foyle and the advance into Ulster.

However, when Essex left Dublin again, it was not to the north. Instead, he went into Leinster. The Irish council defended this journey to Offaly, arguing that recovering Leinster was

---

<sup>188</sup> Francis Cordale to his partner, Balthazar Gybels, 21 July 1599, SP 12/271/107, f. 172; *CSPDom*, 1598-1601, p. 253.

<sup>189</sup> Captain Linley suggested that Loftus was a coward and never came off his horse nor drew his sword (Report by Captain Linley on the overthrow near Wicklow, [July] 1599, SP 63/205/108. III, f. 203; *CSP Ire*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 89). The other issue was the number of Irishmen in the company, who Linley thought did not assist during the battle.

<sup>190</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 312. Sir Henry Harrington to Cecil, 12 July 1599, SP 63/205/108, f. 195; *CSP Ire*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 81.

<sup>191</sup> A note of the army under the command of Sir Conyers Clifford, 5 Aug. 1599, SP 63/205/130, f. 247; *CSP Ire*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 113. *AFM*, v. 6, p. 2133-2134 suggests that O'Rourke cut off his head and brought the head with him to Sligo.

<sup>192</sup> The Privy Council to Essex, 10 July 1599, SP 63/204/107, f. 176r; *CSP Ire*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 80. Queen Elizabeth to Essex, 30 July 1599, SP 63/205/121, f. 236a; *CSP Ire*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 105.

<sup>193</sup> Stewart, "The 'Irish Road': Military Supply and Arms for Elizabeth's Army," 27-29.

more important than an expedition into Ulster.<sup>194</sup> Earlier in 1599, Fenton had reported that insurgents were attacking Leinster, and had burnt the house of the Irish councilor, Sir Warham St. Leger, who had been wounded during battle.<sup>195</sup> St. Leger had been sick and was lying in bed when his house caught fire. Luckily, his men rescued him, but his house had been destroyed and the insurgents had taken his cattle and other goods.<sup>196</sup> The dramatic incident with St. Leger was described to remind the Westminster government of the danger that the Irish councilors faced, which the queen and privy council, being in England, could not see or experience for themselves. This was a recurring and fundamental issue that caused tension between the Westminster and Dublin governments. While the Irish councilors understood the importance of attacking Ulster, they were also concerned for their safety and their property. In such circumstances, military plans could be regarded as malleable, subject to change whenever the insurgents attacked Leinster and the Pale. But to the queen and privy council in England, the plans could not be altered; they were meant to be strictly followed.

When the queen received the Irish council's letter, she was outraged. She had already expressed that she thought the Irish council responsible for the state of war, government, and religion in her kingdom. Now, she added the latest insult they had committed against her in their counsel to Essex. She found in their letter "nothing but insinuations to dissuade that w[hi]ch should be done."<sup>197</sup> They had diverted Essex's course "when o[u]r Armye was in greatest strength by p[er]swading so long a Iourney into Mounster."<sup>198</sup> That they could now advise the privy council to keep the army out of the north was preposterous to the queen, especially considering

---

<sup>194</sup> CP, vol. 9, p. 263.

<sup>195</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 19 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/20, f. 49; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 465.

<sup>196</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 19 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/20, f. 49; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 465.

<sup>197</sup> CP, 133/182, f. 284r. She expressed similar sentiments elsewhere, *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 316, 325-326

<sup>198</sup> CP, 133/182, f. 284r.

the Irish councilors had requested 2,000 men for military engagement in the north: "What wold you haue vs beleeeue, if wee did not thinke you Loyall; but that ether some of you Cannot forgett yo[u]r old goodwills to that Traytor, or els are insensible of all thing[es], save yo[u]r owne p[ar]ticulars."<sup>199</sup> For how else could they, in Dublin, be so near to Ulster and yet continuously fail to invade the north? If the war did not end this year, then "this will worke in our Subiect[es] mynds that had greater hopes: what pryde it will raise in the Rebels, that had greater feares: and what dishonno[u]r it will do vs in forrayne p[ar]t[es]."<sup>200</sup>

Essex received conflicting instructions. However beholden to the English monarchy he was, he could not deny the realities of war in Ireland, of which the queen and privy council seemed ignorant. So, he appealed to both councils. He went to Leinster and then headed into Ulster at the end of August. By now, Essex was preoccupied with thoughts of returning home, especially given the Spanish invasion scare that summer and the machinations of the privy council in England to foster peace with Archduke Albert.<sup>201</sup> He feared that his enemies in England worked his undoing.<sup>202</sup> He also thought peace with Tyrone a more suitable alternative to open battle.<sup>203</sup> In early September, Tyrone requested a parley with the lord lieutenant, as he had with the other lords deputy. Essex agreed and the two men spoke for half an hour alone, after which they consented to a truce.<sup>204</sup> When the queen heard of Essex's private parley, she was

---

<sup>199</sup> CP, 133/182, f. 284v. The suggestion here made by the queen has been used by some scholars as further proof that the Irish councilors worked in consort of some kind with Tyrone; that Tyrone bribed the Irish officials. However, the remark was made in anger.

<sup>200</sup> CP, 133/182, f. 285r.

<sup>201</sup> ODNB, "Devereux, Sir Robert." Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars*, 215.

<sup>202</sup> Paul E. J. Hammer, "'Base Rogues' and 'Gentlemen of Quality': the Earl of Essex's Irish Knights and Royal Displeasure in 1599," in *Elizabeth I and Ireland*, eds. Brendan Kane and Valerie McGowan-Doyle (New York; Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 188.

<sup>203</sup> ODNB, "Devereux, Sir Robert." He had even entertained the possibility of invading England through Wales and solicited the help of Captain Thomas Lee to negotiate with Tyrone. Essex denied his involvement, but he had granted Lee pardon not long after he had arrived in Ireland.

<sup>204</sup> Cecil knew of Essex's meeting with Tyrone because he wrote to Fenton to prepare papers from the previous treatises with Tyrone for the lord lieutenant (Cecil to Fenton, 22 Sept. 1599, SP 63/205/174, f. 325; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 156).

suspicious, especially after a report by the spy William Udall described how Essex's men had tried to prevent the conversation from being overheard.<sup>205</sup> Only a few weeks after the parley, Essex returned—without license—to England. His return only brought him misery, for his career was in utter ruin. He was imprisoned and placed on house arrest. After a failed attempt to seize control from his rivals at court in early 1601, he was tried for treason, convicted, and beheaded.<sup>206</sup>

For Essex's part, he would claim that he had been deceived by the Irish councilors into not proceeding immediately with an attack on Ulster. As Elizabeth informed the lords justices and council in Ireland, Essex asserted that, "whatsoever he did [...], he did it contrary to his own proposition and desire, rather choosing to assent to so general a contestation in all you of the Council, who dissuaded it, than to venture to be taxed for a singularity in a matter whereof the success was doubtful."<sup>207</sup> Writing on the incident some years later, Fynes Moryson reported that Essex claimed that it had been the wrong season, being near winter, to go into Ulster, in addition to the Irish council's advice.<sup>208</sup> In response, the Irish councilors,

whereas some of them to excuse themselues, and charge him the deeper, had now written the contrary to the Counsell [in England]: he [Essex] protested deeply that therein they had dealt most falsely, and it seemeth (saith he) that God his iust reuenge hath ouertaken two of them already, the Earle of Ormond by blindnesse, and Sir Warham St Leger, by violent death.<sup>209</sup>

Whether Essex had been misled by the Irish council or had suffered an error in judgment for

---

<sup>205</sup> Curiously, when Ormond did the same in November 1599, he faced no repercussions or condemnations for having done so (Fenton to Cecil, 1 Dec. 1599, SP 63/206/57, f. 156; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 281). CP, vol. 9, p. 384.

<sup>206</sup> *ODNB*, "Devereux, Sir Robert."

<sup>207</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 339.

<sup>208</sup> Fynes Moryson, *An Itinerary* (London, 1617), 72 [EEBO].

<sup>209</sup> Moryson, *An Itinerary*, 72. Ormond was now blind, and Sir Warham St. Leger was killed alongside Maguire (Extracts of several letters written to Fenton, 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 35. i, f. 102; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 38).

which he then blamed the council, the queen and privy council ultimately believed Essex was at fault. He, being the lord lieutenant, should have taken better care to perform the duties for which he had been sent to Ireland.<sup>210</sup> As the queen warned the Irish council: "the errors were excusable in none of you that prolonged the time, though in him less than any other who best knew our pleasure in that and all other things."<sup>211</sup> Essex had failed because he "more directly and more contemptuously disobeyed" royal orders.<sup>212</sup>

Essex would himself receive all the blame for how the war had unfolded in Ireland in 1599. His court rivals, especially Cecil, directed the queen's attention to Essex's failings. Essex's political demise also brought attention to his allies. However, even those who had been closely associated with Essex escaped relatively unscathed. Sir Christopher Blount, whom Essex had pushed to become marshal of the army in Ireland, had the post, but he was wounded and removed from service in August 1599. In the same month, Sir Conyers Clifford was killed during battle, leaving the office of governor of Connacht vacant until 1601. Clifford's death, therefore, was a consequence of war, not Essex's political decline. Some of Essex's men found support under the new lord deputy, Lord Mountjoy. Before Essex left for England, he appointed his former officer, Sir Oliver Lambert, the provisional marshal. Under Mountjoy, Lambert would replace Clifford as governor in 1601. Sir George Carey, who had also arrived with Essex in Ireland, would maintain the vice treasurer office and, later, would succeed Mountjoy as lord deputy. Sir Henry Docwra was able to stay in Ireland, working under Mountjoy. His military successes in Ireland during the war made him a useful military officer, particularly when so many others had failed.

---

<sup>210</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 347.

<sup>211</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 347.

<sup>212</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 347.



There were, however, two men in Essex's faction who did not fare as well. Sir Henry Harington, owing to the disaster near Wicklow for which he had been court martialled, was never able to resuscitate his military career. His immediate decline had more to do with his poor performance as a commander than his alignment with Essex. Luckily for Harington, Sir George Carew, who was very close to Cecil, pleaded on Harington's behalf for Cecil's favor.<sup>213</sup> Harington would re-join the Irish council under the new lord deputy, Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy.<sup>214</sup> Captain Thomas Lee had been imprisoned for his plot to kill the earl of Ormond. He was released upon Essex's arrival in Ireland. Lee even returned to England with Essex when the latter left. He was subsequently put on house arrest. He later became embroiled in the treason trial of Essex, where he tried to obtain a warrant for Essex's release, only to be arrested, convicted, and executed for treason himself.<sup>215</sup>

After the queen reported to the Irish council that Essex "wholly layes vpon all yor vnitid counselles" the deferment of the Ulster campaign, the Irish councilors were on edge.<sup>216</sup> When two men, Sir Thomas Wingfield and a Captain Francis Stafford, arrived in Ireland to discover the true state of affairs, the Irish councilors were immediately on their guard.<sup>217</sup> Although Lord Justice Carey and Fenton knew that the men were coming, the men had arrived without instructions from Westminster. The Irish councilors feared that the men had been sent to gain

---

<sup>213</sup> Sir George Carew to Cecil, 6 Apr. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 89, f. 222; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 75.

<sup>214</sup> It is not clear precisely when Harington became an Irish councilor. A letter from Lord Deputy Mountjoy suggests that he was made a councilor sometime in spring 1600 (Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Cecil, 8 May 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 22, f. 60; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 164). Harington also signed a council letter in 1602 (*Cal. Carew*, 1601-1603, p. 358).

<sup>215</sup> *ODNB*, "Lee, Thomas."

<sup>216</sup> The Queen to Lord Justices Loftus and Carey and Ormond, [Oct] 1599, SP 63/205/244, f. 465v; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 219.

<sup>217</sup> Cecil to Lord Justice Carey and Fenton, 5 Dec. 1599, SP 63/204/73, f. 205v-206v; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 304.

"vnder hand" information on the councilors to report back to England.<sup>218</sup> The confusion was such that Cecil apologized. He explained that the two men had been sent by the queen and privy council to make a report of the state of Ireland because it was more satisfactory than relaying the information via messengers. He further stated that there had been a rumor that some "longe Robe member" of the Irish council (likely Gardiner) planned to make this report in England.<sup>219</sup> The queen objected to his coming, believing that a martial councilor would be better suited to reporting on the war. Once Lord Justice Carey and Fenton related this news to the other Irish councilors (as Cecil directed them to do), they now understood that the men had been sent without prejudice.<sup>220</sup>

However satisfied the Irish councilors may have been with Cecil's explanation, there likely remained among the councilors a sense that they had to be careful. It did not help when the councilors were accused of corruption by other officials in Ireland. The captain, Sir William Warren, accused Loftus of bribery. He claimed that Loftus had in his possession £40 sterling, which he had received from Tyrone and which Loftus tried to hide from Warren upon the latter visiting his house.<sup>221</sup> Loftus admitted that he had taken £40 from Tyrone back in 1584 or 1585, but it had been given to him by Warren as payment for Loftus's traveling charges.<sup>222</sup> That Warren now saw fit to use this incident against Loftus was significant because he made the allegation well after Tyrone had been proclaimed a traitor and at a precarious time for the Irish

---

<sup>218</sup> Cecil to Lord Justice Carey and Fenton, 5 Dec. 1599, SP 63/204/73, f. 206r; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 304.

<sup>219</sup> Cecil to Lord Justice Carey and Fenton, 5 Dec. 1599, SP 63/204/73, f. 205v; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 304.

<sup>220</sup> Lord Justice Carey and Fenton to Cecil, 24 Jan. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 39, f. 93; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 414.

<sup>221</sup> Sir William Warren to Cecil, 23 Jan. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 38, f. 91; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 413.

<sup>222</sup> Loftus to Cecil, 19 Jan. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 1, f. 77; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 406.

council. Upon closer study, the accusation came after noticeable tension between the two men.<sup>223</sup> Such accusations only added to the concern that the Irish councilors were ineffective in their management of the administration in Ireland.

It also did not help that the Westminster government continued to express their dissatisfaction with the managing of resources for the war. They issued a number of detailed instructions on how the councilors were to use the resources they sent into Ireland. They also created new posts within the Irish ordnance office to assist Sir George Bouchier: a lieutenant of the ordnance, a surveyor of the ordnance, and a clerk of munition.<sup>224</sup> Given the extent of resources that went into Ireland, the Irish councilors and officers needed help. The problem was that such "assistance" was frequently used as a means of supervising the Irish officers in their duties. The Irish council, therefore, were strongly affected by Essex's time as lord lieutenant.

1599 had been a disastrous year in Ireland for the English crown. They had devoted more resources than ever before to the cause and there was still nothing to show for it. Worse yet, the queen's favorite, who was considered England's best chance of winning the war, had mishandled things, whether because Essex had received bad counsel, or he had acted on his own. Curiously, much of the license which had been given to Essex as lord lieutenant was used against him upon his return to England. The queen had granted Essex authority to bestow knighthood "with discretion," but Essex had been too liberal, for he had conferred knighthood on at least 59 men, 38 of which the queen later came close to nullifying.<sup>225</sup> Even the chief baron of the exchequer,

---

<sup>223</sup> See, for example, Warren to Cecil, 24 Dec. 1599, SP 63/206/100, f. 250; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 339. It is clear from Warren's private letters to Cecil that he felt restrained by the Irish council, especially Lord Chancellor Loftus.

<sup>224</sup> The Privy Council to Lord Justice Loftus and Carey and the rest of the Irish Council, 10 Dec. 1599, SP 63/204/76, f. 207; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Dec. 1600, p. 308.

<sup>225</sup> Hammer, "'Base Rogues' and 'Gentlemen of Quality': the Earl of Essex's Irish Knights and Royal Displeasure in 1599," 184-185. Hammer raises the point that Essex bestowed these knighthoods for good reason; to reward men for their service, as well as to inspire loyalty to himself.

Sir Robert Napier, commented that Essex "neu[er] drew sword but to mak knights."<sup>226</sup> The larger issue for the queen, in this case, was Essex's willful disregard of her royal commands. She was trying to prevent Essex from redirecting the war policy that had been decided in England.<sup>227</sup>

While she was undoubtedly responding to a military commander who did not respect her royal authority as he should, other lords deputy had done the same. Fitzwilliam and Russell had both challenged the queen's authority when they initially delayed proceedings against Tyrone. At least Burgh had tried to follow through with the queen's orders, but he died early, leaving the queen in need of a commander with the military skills to engage in open battle and who would follow her policies. Essex was unquestionably skilled, but he acted as he saw fit. So, when the queen expressed her dissatisfaction and banished Essex from court, it was a consequence of not only her history with Essex, but also of her frustration with her other officers in Ireland.

Another campaign had failed to elicit the result she so desperately desired. And, in the process, she had lost a man she once favored and a highly decorated military officer. More importantly, she had spent a least a million pounds on the war thus far, had lost countless men, and the war continued. All eyes were upon her, and she appeared as a failing and ineffective monarch who could control neither her subjects nor her kingdoms.

### **The War After 1599**

Essex's abrupt departure from Ireland left the Irish government once again in the hands of lords justices, now Loftus and Carey. Though the queen and privy council decided on Essex's replacement by November 1599, the new lord deputy, Lord Mountjoy (see Image 15), did not arrive until February 1600. Until then, the Irish councilors focused on extending the truce

---

<sup>226</sup> Sir Robert Napier to Cecil, 18 Nov. 1599, SP 63/206/33, f. 71v; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 258.

<sup>227</sup> Hammer, 187.



Image 15 - Charles Blount, Baron Mountjoy, c. 1600-1625, National Portrait Gallery, London, NPG D19216.

agreement Essex had made with Tyrone. The agreement was set to expire at the end of October, but Ormond managed to prolong the truce to the beginning of January 1600.

During these proceedings, Cecil learned that the earl of Tyrone thought that he had secretly plotted to murder him via poisoning, using a man named Lapley.<sup>228</sup> Over a year earlier, Gardiner informed Cecil that two men, Lapley and Cawell, had arrived at his house, alleging that they had been sent by Cecil and Sir Walter Raleigh to "p[er]forme a great service."<sup>229</sup> Lapley had supposedly received £30 and a promise of reward for the service, but they had spent all of the money. Although they had been told not to discuss the service with any other, their circumstance now compelled them to ask for more money, exactly £10. Gardiner, of course, doubted whether the men had been telling the truth. But Lapley had shown Gardiner a letter from Cecil, which gave Lapley license of "quyet passage in his intended iournye."<sup>230</sup> Gardiner dismissed their claims, but the incident had clearly affected him because he wrote of the incident in a private letter to Cecil. His letter suggests that there was more legitimacy to the incident than it appeared. Moreover, the other accomplice, Cawell, may in all likelihood be the same George Cawell who reported enemy information to the Irish government in 1596.<sup>231</sup> Unsurprisingly, Cecil claimed ignorance of the plot but wanted Sir William Warren, who took part in the discussions with Tyrone, to tell the earl that they were indeed enemies.<sup>232</sup> If Tyrone wanted to cut off his head, as the earl had apparently proclaimed to Warren, then Cecil would, through secret means, engineer his ruin: "To send Spyes into his Contrye, to practyse Revolts, and make draughtes vpon him,

---

<sup>228</sup> Sir William Warren to Cecil, 5 Dec. 1599, SP 63/206/74, f. 202; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 305.

<sup>229</sup> Lord Justice Gardiner to Cecil, 17 Oct. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 114, f. 217r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 288.

<sup>230</sup> Lord Justice Gardiner to Cecil, 17 Oct. 1598, SP 63/202/pt. 3, 114, f. 217r; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 288.

<sup>231</sup> Lord Deputy Russell to Burghley, 25 Sept. 1596, SP 63/193/32, f. 222; *CSPIre*, July 1596-Dec. 1597, p. 117.

<sup>232</sup> Cecil to Warren, 6 Nov. 1599, SP 63/206/13, f. 202v; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 236. Although the dating of the letter precedes Warren's letter in December, it is clear from the contents within that Warren had likely written an earlier letter informing Cecil of Tyrone's speeches against him. Sir Walter Raleigh, who had some involvement in the plot (along with Fenton) essentially admitted that they had plotted to kill Tyrone (Raleigh to Cecil, 26 Oct. 1598, SP 12/268/93, f. 151r; *CSPDom*, 1598-1601, p. 112).

and his, yf I haue offended him I am gladd of it for I haue not ben ydle nor wylbe, and so I could wyshe he knewe it."<sup>233</sup>

Cecil kept true to his word, and he used primarily Fenton and Sir George Carew—the new lord president of Munster and close friend of Cecil—to achieve his aims. Cecil received a steady stream of information about Tyrone's activities from Fenton, who now had multiple agents, in addition to Richard Weston, in his employ, both in Ireland and on the continent.<sup>234</sup> Fenton also relayed information from his agents on events in Spain, Scotland, and even Brussels.<sup>235</sup> He utilized many of his spies to discover Tyrone's movements throughout the island, and he used messengers to not only communicate with his agents, but also to intercept the earl's letters.<sup>236</sup> He was careful to employ different messengers, and advised his intelligencers to do the same.<sup>237</sup> Fenton's intelligence network had thus expanded, and, in 1600, he collected £100 as reimbursement for his intelligence services to Cecil.<sup>238</sup>

Through his agents, Fenton learned of Tyrone's intent to publish a proclamation and twenty-four articles, as well as the earl's plans to invade the Pale.<sup>239</sup> He also got wind of a plot

---

<sup>233</sup> Cecil to Warren, 6 Nov. 1599, SP 63/206/13, f. 202v; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 236.

<sup>234</sup> Extracts from a letter written by Richard Weston to Fenton, 15 Jan. 1599, SP 63/203/19. I, f. 47; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 465. John Lye to Fenton, 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 2, i, f. 8; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 6. Fenton to Cecil, 10 Dec. 1599, SP 63/206/81. I, f. 216; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 316. Fenton's use of Weston would come under attack as it was reported that Weston was a double agent for Tyrone. See Certain articles of detection laid down for Her Majesty's further service by Owen McHugh McNeill More O'Neill, [17] July 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 4, 21, f. 55; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 309.

<sup>235</sup> Extracts from a letter in cipher directed to Fenton, 1599, SP 63/203/48. I, f. 98; *CSPIre*, Jan. 1598-Mar. 1599, p. 480.

<sup>236</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 11 Jan. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 24, f. 62; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 400 and Fenton to Cecil, 4 Feb. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 89, f. 243; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 459.

<sup>237</sup> A letter of advertisements written [by John Lye] to Fenton from the borders of Offaly, 14 Feb. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 104. I, f. 279; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 472.

<sup>238</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 11 Feb. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 98, f. 267; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 468. Lord Justice Carey to Cecil, [11 Feb.] 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 97, f. 263; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 466. A brief of concordatums granted and paid, [Feb.] 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 134, f. 353; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 500.

<sup>239</sup> Intelligences drawn out of several letters, lately written from the north to Fenton, 7 Jan. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 11. I, f. 28; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 388.

against Ormond.<sup>240</sup> The precise details were unknown to him, only that the insurgents meant to do Ormond harm. A few months later, Ormond was kidnapped, and Carew and the earl of Thomond witnessed what occurred (see Image 16).<sup>241</sup>



Image 16 - The taking of the earl of Ormond, 1600, Trinity College, Dublin, IE TCD MS 1209/13.

<sup>240</sup> [Unknown] to Fenton, 6 Dec. 1599, SP 63/206/81. II, f. 217; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 317. See also, Fenton to Cecil, 31 Mar. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 63, f. 172; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 61. Over time, the letters Fenton had received became increasingly detailed, and this letter, in particular, contained a great deal of information about Tyrone and several Irish lords.

<sup>241</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, pp. 380-384.



The man who kidnapped Ormond was Onie McRory O'More, who used the ruse of a parley to ambush Ormond.<sup>242</sup> O'More kept Ormond imprisoned in his castle, brought food to the prisoner himself (out of distrust of his servants), and supposedly used priests and Jesuits to try to convert Ormond.<sup>243</sup> In fact, Carew thought that James Archer, the Jesuit priest, had instigated the whole plot, and Ormond confirmed this while imprisoned.<sup>244</sup> Fenton installed a gentlewoman (codename: "Imperia Romana") around Ormond to learn more about Ormond's condition and to find opportunities for his escape.<sup>245</sup> O'More was apparently jumpy about Ormond escaping because he continually moved the earl. On one occasion, O'More transported Ormond at night to another castle using 20 guards and a decoy that looked and walked like the earl.<sup>246</sup>

During his imprisonment Ormond's health declined, and Fenton hoped that Ormond would pretend to be sicklier to gain his freedom.<sup>247</sup> Fenton suspected that O'More sought to profit monetarily from his capture of Ormond, in addition to O'More's demands for the removal of English garrisons from Leix and Offaly.<sup>248</sup> A sick and weak Ormond would eventually be released two months after he had been taken, and only due to a ransom of £3,000 raised by his

---

<sup>242</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 12 Apr. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 100, f. 248; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 87. Lord Deputy Mountjoy and Council to the Privy Council, 17 Apr. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 112, f. 275; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 96. *AFM*, v. 6, p. 2169 states that "all over Ireland," people rejoiced at the news of the earl's taking. Tyrone did as well. Copies of Tyrone's letters, [22 Apr./2 May] 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 141. i, f. 341; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 122.

<sup>243</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 26 Apr. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 142, f. 343; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 124.

<sup>244</sup> Extract of a letter from Carew, 12 Apr. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 101. i, f. 252; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 89. Ormond to Carew, 14 Apr. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 126. i, f. 308; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 110. He maintained Archer's involvement after his release as well. See Ormond to Queen Elizabeth, 16 June 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 110, f. 275; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 237.

<sup>245</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 10 May 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 27, f. 72; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 167.

<sup>246</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 14 May 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 36, f. 99; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 177.

<sup>247</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 18 May 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 38, f. 103; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 180. Some letters reported that Ormond had been released, but the information was false. See, John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 10 May 1600, SP 12/274/134, f. 228; *CSPDom*, 1598-1601, p. 434 and Dudley Carleton, 14 May 1600, SP 12/274/142, f. 237; *CSPDom*, 1598-1601, p. 436.

<sup>248</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 12 Apr. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 2, 100, f. 248; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 87. Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Cecil, 1 May 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 1, f. 1; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 137.

client network in Kilkenny and Tipperary.<sup>249</sup> Owing to his declining health and the kidnapping experience, Ormond spent most of the remaining war years at his castle in Kilkenny.<sup>250</sup> Fenton's intelligence network had ultimately alerted the Westminster and Dublin governments several months earlier to the likelihood that something would happen to Ormond. Unfortunately, his intelligence had not prevented Ormond's capture.<sup>251</sup>

While Fenton infiltrated Tyrone's camps with spies in Ulster, Carew worked to undermine Tyrone's supporters in Munster.<sup>252</sup> Carew, the lord president in Munster and an Irish councilor, exploited dynastic tensions over the Desmond earldom. Although the earldom had been suppressed after the Second Desmond Rebellion in the early 1580s, Tyrone had backed James FitzThomas in his push for the Desmond title. The unpopularity of the *sugán* ("straw-rop") earl left an opening for Carew. He plotted with Cecil to release James FitzGerald from prison in England to be a competitor for the title. The goal was to use FitzGerald to cause further friction among the Geraldines, who had dynastic claims to the earldom.<sup>253</sup> Cecil and Carew debated for a few months whether to send FitzGerald to Ireland, whether to grant him the earldom before his arrival, and the logistics necessary to carry out the plan. There was some concern that FitzGerald, having been imprisoned in the Tower of England for many years, would have trouble gaining followers. Many of his fellow Irishmen would likely suspect him of being under crown control. However, Cecil was adamant about proceeding with the plan despite these

---

<sup>249</sup> Ormond to Queen Elizabeth, 16 June 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 110, f. 275; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 237. Ormond to the Privy Council, 16 June 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 111, f. 278; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 238. Sir Francis Stafford to Cecil, 20 June 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 120, f. 305; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 255. *ODNB*, "Butler, Thomas."

<sup>250</sup> *ODNB*, "Butler, Thomas."

<sup>251</sup> Only a couple months later, Fenton received a report that McRory was shot with two bullets and "Imperia Romana" stated that McRory died from the injury. See, Fenton to Cecil, 23 Aug. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 4, 86, f. 230; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 364. *AFM* recorded McRory's death in August (v. 6, p. 2180).

<sup>252</sup> One way Carew achieved this was to use of Irishmen like Patrick Crosby and Florence MacCarthy—though he distrusted MacCarthy—to collect intelligence on other Irish lords.

<sup>253</sup> *Letters from Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew*, ed. John MacLean (London, 1864), pp. 4-5.

concerns. He even implored Carew to write a private letter to himself and a public letter to the queen, wherein Carew should express his sorrow at losing the opportunity owing to the long delay.<sup>254</sup> Cecil's tips to Carew were another illustration of how the English privy councilors manipulated the queen to act according to their wishes. The queen eventually consented to sending FitzGerald, but as suspected, FitzGerald failed to garner the support among the Irish lords in Munster.

Undeterred, Carew made several bold moves to sow distrust among Tyrone's followers in Munster.<sup>255</sup> He offered rewards and issued pardons to Tyrone's supporters with success; some of them defected from Tyrone.<sup>256</sup> Carew also offered head money of £400 for one Irish lord alone, and even plotted the assassination of the *sugán* earl's brother, John.<sup>257</sup> He hired a man named Nugent and gave him a horse, pistol, munition, and £10 to kill John. But Nugent foolishly told someone of his plan, and the man not only thwarted Nugent in his attempt, but also stood as his accuser during Nugent trial. Nugent confessed and implicated Carew. However, Carew denied all knowledge of the plot, and Nugent was subsequently hanged.<sup>258</sup>

The lord president, with the assistance of Miler MacGrath, the archbishop of Cashel, employed Derby O'Connor next for the assassination.<sup>259</sup> O'Connor went for the bigger target instead, and apprehended the *sugán* earl.<sup>260</sup> Apparently, Theobald Burke (Tibbot ne Long Bourke) discovered O'Connor's dealings with the Irish government and executed him.<sup>261</sup> The

---

<sup>254</sup> *Letters from Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew*, pp. 16-17, 25.

<sup>255</sup> *Cal. Carew*, 1589-1600, p. 401.

<sup>256</sup> O'Neill, *The Nine Years' War*, 135.

<sup>257</sup> Carew to the Privy Council, 3 June 1601, SP 63/208/pt. 3, 7, f. 12; *CSPIre*, Nov. 1600-31 July 1601, p. 369. *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 248.

<sup>258</sup> Carew to Cecil, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 114; f. 290; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 248.

<sup>259</sup> Miler Magrath to Cecil, 28 Jan. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 55, f. 131; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 424. Carew to Cecil, 18 June 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 115, f. 294; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 250.

<sup>260</sup> John Cantwell to Ormond, 20 June 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 122; f. 309; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 256.

<sup>261</sup> Miler Magrath to Cecil, 28 June 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 3, 132; p. 328; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 268. *APC*, 1600-1601, p. 103.

*sugán* earl would not be captured again until 1601, when he was seized by the White Knight, Edmund FitzGibbon, who was rewarded with the restoration of his ancient lands and granted the title of baron.<sup>262</sup>

Throughout Carew's presidency in Munster, he was aided by the man who replaced Essex: Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy. Although Mountjoy had little experience managing large armies and had not served in Ireland previously, he had served under Sir John Norris in the Low Countries for several years.<sup>263</sup> According to Fynes Moryson, Mountjoy professed to Cecil that though he had found the army in Ireland in chaos, "he had giuen it forme," and "finding it without spirit, he had giuen it life."<sup>264</sup> But many of the reforms and strategies that he implemented had been advocated and discussed in detail by the Irish councilors prior to Mountjoy's arrival in Ireland. He employed commissioners to help with the accounting of musters, as Sir Ralph Lane, the muster-master general, had advised in 1596. Mountjoy emphasized the training of soldiers, as Norris had when he offered to train soldiers before they arrived in Ireland. He restructured Ireland's military administration to remove absent and problematic officers, of which both Loftus and Fenton had complained about to Cecil.<sup>265</sup> He further benefited from the intelligence provided by the Irish council, even before his coming. Just a few days before Mountjoy's arrival in Ireland, Fenton—who had noted Tyrone's tendency to draw the crown army away from Ulster—deliberately reported false intelligence through his spies to Tyrone.<sup>266</sup> Fenton's ploy worked because Tyrone, who was in Munster at the time,

---

<sup>262</sup> *APC*, vol. 31, p. 434. *CSPIre*, 1603-1606, p. 182.

<sup>263</sup> *ODNB*, "Blount, Charles."

<sup>264</sup> Fynes Moryson, *An Itinerary* (London, 1617), 75-76 [EEBO].

<sup>265</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 8 Jan. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 11, f. 26; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 386. Lord Justice Loftus to Cecil, 20 Jan. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 34, f. 82; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 409. Fenton to Cecil, 4 Feb. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 89, f. 243; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 459.

<sup>266</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 11 Feb. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 98, f. 267; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 468.

returned to Ulster in haste.<sup>267</sup> This incident was further confirmation that Tyrone feared losing Ulster most of all. Once Mountjoy landed in Dublin, he then acted on this knowledge and set about invading Ulster.

Of course, not all of Mountjoy's actions can be attributed to the Irish council. Furthermore, it is more than likely that the stream of information flowed from the Irish councilors to Cecil first and then Cecil to Mountjoy. But Mountjoy would tell Cecil that he had little use for some of the Irish councilors:

And for my fellow Councillors, most of them do only lie at defence to save themselves harmless, some of them to entrap me, but none of them (which once more I will be bold to write unto you, although herein I persuade myself, Sir, that you do not much believe me), from whom I receive any manner of assistance to make this war as it should be, or as I have hitherto made it. Only some of them, that have gone long round in this kingdom like mill-horses, may tell me the form of the circle they have trod in, but I protest I think no men are more deceived touching the true estate of this kingdom and nature of this war than they are And I could never yet receive so much benefit by any of their experiences, as to receive the true nature of any ground or passage to fight on, until with my own eyes I had seen it.<sup>268</sup>

Mountjoy was unwilling to implicitly trust the Irish council. His attitude was likely a consequence of a reprimand he received from the queen and privy council.<sup>269</sup> Fenton went to England in the summer of 1600 to report on the state of the war and the Irish administration. Mountjoy believed that Fenton had not defended him well in England.<sup>270</sup> Further, Mountjoy felt that if he had known that he needed such defense, then he would not have sent Fenton.<sup>271</sup> He thought Fenton would have explained the difficulties of Irish governance, but instead, he had

---

<sup>267</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 11 Feb. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 1, 98, f. 267; *CSPIre*, Apr. 1599-Feb. 1600, p. 468.

<sup>268</sup> *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 513.

<sup>269</sup> *APC*, vol. 30, p. 506.

<sup>270</sup> Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Cecil, 31 Aug. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 4, 110, f. 298; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p.

<sup>271</sup> Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Cecil, 31 Aug. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 4, 110, f. 298; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p.

been "much deceived" in this expectation.<sup>272</sup> Despite this issue with Fenton (which was later resolved), Mountjoy nonetheless benefited from the work of the Irish councilors and the information they provided, whether it had been given to him directly or indirectly through Cecil.<sup>273</sup>

What Mountjoy seemingly overlooked in the criticisms against himself was that the queen had harsh words for her Irish councilors as well. The privy council in England relayed her message:

never State hath received greater perill or dishonor then that hath done, merelie for lacke of good government, all you [the Irish councilors] so excusinge yourselves uppon the Deputie's supream authoritye as fewe or none of you have done your owne particuler duties.<sup>274</sup>

She blamed Loftus and Thomas Jones, the bishop of Meath, for failing to properly direct the Reformation in Ireland. They had allowed abuses in the Church of Ireland to continue unabated and had tolerated idolatry. She was even displeased with the secretary, Fenton, for his silence when they questioned him; he should have been better informed of the state of things before he appeared before her and the privy council. Her final note was for the Irish council to proclaim Tyrone a traitor again, only this time with the offer of £2,000 for his capture and £1,000 to any person who brought in his head.<sup>275</sup> While the head-money for Tyrone was substantial, it indicated that the queen, if not her Westminster privy councilors, preferred that Tyrone was captured and not killed.

---

<sup>272</sup> *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 513.

<sup>273</sup> Lord Mountjoy to Fenton, 16 Jan. 1601, SP 63/208/pt. 1, 15. iii, f. 0037; *CSPIre*, Nov. 1600-31 July 1601, p. 155.

<sup>274</sup> *APC*, vol. 30, p. 509.

<sup>275</sup> *APC*, vol. 30, p. 515.

As the new lord deputy, Mountjoy had a lot to accomplish. After Essex's highly-publicized failure and Mountjoy's own fringe involvement in Essex's rebellion, Mountjoy was desperate to prove his loyalty to the crown.<sup>276</sup> Unlike his predecessor, Mountjoy had more time to strategize and initiate reforms before campaigning. He took advantage of the *ad hoc* reforms in the army supply system for Ireland. While the ordnance office in England began using cart trains rather than ships to transport weapons and equipment into Ireland to reduce the chances of their destruction, the ordnance office in Ireland established small storehouses in key areas in Ulster such as Carrickfergus and Newry.<sup>277</sup> Mountjoy then set up garrisons in these areas, which allowed for the better provisioning of troops. He was thus able to draw on logistical changes in the supply system which enabled his strategy of waging a war of attrition on the Irish insurgents.

Some scholars have suggested that Mountjoy, or the English more generally, indirectly profited from the 1601 debasement of Irish currency.<sup>278</sup> In April 1601, the queen reverted to the economic practices of her predecessors by introducing debased currency in Ireland. Earlier in her reign, she had reformed the coinage and reevaluated the sterling to pass at a higher exchange rate in Ireland. However, necessity dictated that she further decrease the crown's military expenditure in Ireland. The new coins minted were intrinsically now worth 75% less than the old money, which were decried.<sup>279</sup> Although the silver content of the old and new coins was the same (3oz. fine), the intrinsic value of the new coins was considerably less, owing to the queen's

---

<sup>276</sup> Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars*, 224.

<sup>277</sup> Stewart, 16-37.

<sup>278</sup> See, for example, Hiram Morgan, "Never Any Realm Worse Governed!: Queen Elizabeth and Ireland," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 14 (2004): 308. Morgan suggests that the debasement helped England avoid bankruptcy during the war. However, both Joseph McLaughlin and O'Neill argue that the 1601 debasement was a failure for the English crown. See McLaughlin, "'What Base Coin Wrought': The Effects of the Elizabethan Debasement in Ireland," in *The Battle of Kinsale*, ed. Hiram Morgan (Bray, Co. Wicklow: Wordwell, 2004), 198, 202; O'Neill, 153-154. McLaughlin concedes that after the battle of Kinsale, officers in Ireland desired land as a reward for their military efforts rather than the debased currency (202).

<sup>279</sup> McLaughlin, "'What Base Coin Wrought'," 195.

proclamation.<sup>280</sup> With this measure, the crown could pay their soldiers in Ireland at a reduced cost using the debased coins.<sup>281</sup>

However, the 1601 debased currency did not work for several reasons. The poorer quality and lesser intrinsic value of the new coins meant that, the old coins continued to be in circulation in Ireland. The new currency was also not widely accepted in foreign markets.<sup>282</sup> While unintended, this aided the new policy of debasement. Irish lords had previously used English sterling to buy arms and munitions in foreign markets. The debased currency was meant to restrain this practice, along with additional legal measures prohibiting the transport of English coin into Ireland.<sup>283</sup> It, therefore, had the potential of limiting the purchasing power of the Ulster lords. However, because the new currency did not have wider acceptance, even English officials in Ireland struggled in making purchases using the new coins.<sup>284</sup> It is also not clear whether the debased coins severely hindered the ability of Irish insurgents to procure war supplies.<sup>285</sup>

While the impact of the debased currency upon the outcome of the war is questionable, Mountjoy reaped more tangible benefits from the assistance of experienced military officers, who worked in different parts of the realm to put pressure on Tyrone and his supporters. Sir Henry Docwra planted a garrison at Lough Foyle and the mere presence of his forces caused some Irish lords to defect from Tyrone.<sup>286</sup> Sir Samuel Bagenal—the cousin of Henry Bagenal, the former marshal of the army—burnt some of Tyrone's storehouses, thus depriving the

---

<sup>280</sup> Anthony Sheehan, “Irish Revenues and English Subventions, 1559-1622,” *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature* 90C (1990): 50.

<sup>281</sup> McLaughlin, 200.

<sup>282</sup> O'Neill, 153.

<sup>283</sup> *Tudor Royal Proclamations, 1588-1603*, vol. 3, ed. P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin (London: Yale University Press, 1969), 234-235.

<sup>284</sup> O'Neill, 153.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, 154.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.



insurgents of vital resources. Mountjoy then marched on Ulster with a force of 2,400 men.<sup>287</sup> He pursued Tyrone continuously, regardless of the season, and launched attacks even in winter.<sup>288</sup> But he also paid attention to the planting and harvesting seasons.<sup>289</sup> He would target both crops and animals to induce famine, a starvation strategy utilized on previous occasions in Ireland to force submission. And in all of his prosecution of Tyrone, he was aided in the north by Docwra and in the south by Carew (who were themselves supported by some Irish lords who had defected); in the east by Sir Arthur Chichester; and on the seas by the English navy, who reinforced the army in Ireland with supplies.<sup>290</sup>

The defection of Irish lords in the north and south eroded some of Tyrone's power network. Carew was a key figure on this front, and he confidently exclaimed that "weare yt not for the hopes of ayde from Spaine (whereof in their opinions this Sommer they shall not fayle) the Rebellion wold instantly dye."<sup>291</sup> Such hopes were finally realized on 21 September 1601 when Spanish ships appeared off the coast of Kinsale.

For years, Tyrone had used news of Spanish aid to garner support among the other Irish lords; it was one strategy he employed to build and sustain the resistance movement, as well as his own power. He had also used the possibility of Spanish intervention as a threat to the English monarchy. But, while there had been numerous sightings of Spanish ships on the northern coast, they were small in number and used as a means to communicate with the Irish lords and deliver supplies. On the few occasions when the Spanish sent fleets to help the Irish lords, adverse weather conditions had forced them back. As more time passed and the Spanish failed to provide

---

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., 130.


<sup>288</sup> Ibid., 141-142.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid., 144.

<sup>291</sup> Carew to the Privy Council, 16 May 1601, SP 63/208/pt. 2, 74, f. 0221r; *CSPIre*, Nov. 1600-31 July 1601, p. 344.

the military assistance the Irish lords expected, Tyrone's alliances faltered; until 1601, he had not delivered on his promise of a Spanish attack on English sovereignty in Ireland. A year earlier, an intelligence report suggested, once again, that Spanish ships were off the northern coast of Ireland. Fenton, however, thought this was a rumor started by Tyrone to keep the hope of Spanish assistance alive among his confederates.<sup>292</sup> Nothing further came of the rumor.<sup>293</sup> The appearance, then, of Spanish ships on the southern coast of Ireland in 1601 presented a fresh opportunity to defeat the lord deputy, who had thus far gained more ground than his predecessors. It also provided the Irish lords a reprieve from the war in Ulster as the crown army began their march south.<sup>294</sup>



Map 8 - The Siege and Battle of Kinsale, 1601 from *Pacata Hibernia*, 1633.

<sup>292</sup> Intelligences of discovery of ships in north coast of Ireland [document endorsed by Fenton], 23 Aug. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 4, 87, f. 232; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 365.

<sup>293</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 28 Aug. 1600, SP 63/207/pt. 4, 94, f. 255; *CSPIre*, Mar.-Oct. 1600, p. 381.

<sup>294</sup> O'Neill, 162.

For Mountjoy, the Spanish landing at Kinsale was a fortuitous event. Despite reforms in the army supply system, he could only maintain his troops for so long. While his strategy of sustained pressure on Tyrone and the Ulster lords was effective, it was costly and challenging to maintain over a long period. However, the landing at Kinsale forced a direct confrontation with the Irish and their Spanish allies. He could thus use his depleting resources while he still had them. And most important of all, he could now concentrate his forces in one area. It was, in other words, the opportunity that the previous lords deputy had sought but were never afforded.

Under the leadership of Don Juan de Águila and Don Diego Brochero, thirty-three ships sailed out of Lisbon in August with 4,500 men, although the number was reduced to 1,700 due to storms.<sup>295</sup> Later reinforcements would bring the Spanish army up to 3,400 troops. Mountjoy then deployed his forces in Ulster and Leinster for the march south, leaving few men to defend the Pale.<sup>296</sup> Loftus, Jones, Carey, and Fenton, who had been left behind, requested that an additional 2,000 men be sent from England to help in the Pale's defense, while Mountjoy, Wingfield, Bouchier, Gardiner, Walsh, and Carew went to Cork.<sup>297</sup> Even with the threat to the Pale, the councilors in Dublin directed resources to Munster. English officials in Ireland were now all united toward the single goal of defeating the Irish insurgents and their Spanish allies.<sup>298</sup>

The landing of Spanish troops by Kinsale also forced Tyrone, O'Donnell, and some other Irish lords to move southwards, which they did several weeks after the Spanish had arrived.

---

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>296</sup> John J. Silke, *Kinsale: The Spanish Intervention in Ireland at the End of the Elizabethan Wars* (Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts, 2000), 116. See also Hiram Morgan, ed., *The Battle of Kinsale* (Bray, Ireland: Wordwell, 2004).

<sup>297</sup> Lord Chancellor Loftus and the Irish Council to the Privy Council, 4 Oct. 1601, SP 63/209/pt. 2, 123, f. 20; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 108.

<sup>298</sup> The Irish councilors even professed to have given Lord Deputy Mountjoy all the intelligence they had on Tyrone and the Spanish forces in Kinsale (Lord Chancellor Loftus and the rest of the Council to the Privy Council, 7 Nov. 1601, SP 63/209/pt. 2, 174, f. 156; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 156.

Meanwhile, Mountjoy besieged the walled town using bombardment and scorched-earth tactics to prevent the townspeople from lending their assistance to the Spanish and to impede access to food sources. The severe winter exacerbated conditions for soldiers, some of whom died from starvation or the cold, as well as animals.<sup>299</sup>

Águila and his men stood in need of money and reinforcements, while the English crown provided a steady stream of men and provisions for their army in Ireland through the communication network that the lord deputy and council established. Once news had arrived of the Spanish landing at Kinsale, Mountjoy wrote to Fenton to forego the sending of victuals to the north and in other parts until he had provided further instructions. Sir George Carey and Fenton then included Mountjoy's letter in their joint letter to Cecil, along with their request for an additional 2,000 men.<sup>300</sup> Once in the field, Mountjoy and the other councilors with him (Wingfield, Bouchier, Gardiner, Walsh, and Carew) wrote to the Dublin councilors (Loftus, Jones, Carey, and Fenton) news of what occurred at Kinsale and about their needs there.<sup>301</sup> Mountjoy expressly told Carey that he and the other councilors at Kinsale wanted to establish a working post between Cork and Dublin to better communicate the need for money, men, victuals, and munitions to the English privy council.<sup>302</sup> The Dublin councilors then managed the movement of supplies (under Mountjoy's direction) that were either already in Ireland or had

---

<sup>299</sup> Silke, *Kinsale*, 134.

<sup>300</sup> Carey and Fenton to Cecil, 25 Sept. 1601, SP 63/209/1, 99, f. 253; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 86.

<sup>301</sup> See, for example, Lord Chancellor Loftus and the Dublin Councilors to the Privy Council, 6 Oct. 1601, SP 63/209/2, 132, f. 37; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 113. Mountjoy and the councilors in Cork also directed the Dublin councilors on other affairs in Ireland. For instance, Mountjoy and the Irish councilors in Cork wrote to the Dublin councilors to direct Sir Arthur Chichester to continue building boats and to prepare for the plantation of Ulster [Lord Deputy Mountjoy and Councilors in the field to Lord Chancellor Loftus and Councilors in Dublin, 12 Oct. 1601, SP 63/214/632, f. 168; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 635].

<sup>302</sup> Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Carey, 1 Oct. 1601, SP 63/209/2, 116, f. 4; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 105. See also, Lord Chancellor Loftus and the Dublin Councilors to the Privy Council, 28 Oct. 1601, SP 63/209/2, 161, f. 109; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 142.

been transported into Dublin to Kinsale.<sup>303</sup> In October 1601, Mountjoy and the councilors at Kinsale directed the Dublin councilors to send some companies from the Pale to Kinsale, arguing that the Kinsale camp was more important: "If we win here the rest will all be ours, and if we lose here the rest will all be his."<sup>304</sup> Although such a move put the Dublin councilors at risk, they also agreed that the concentration of forces at Kinsale was necessary, and yet begged for more men to defend the Pale.<sup>305</sup> Of course, Mountjoy and the councilors at the Kinsale camp also wrote directly to the English privy council, along with personal letters to Cecil.<sup>306</sup> On at least one occasion, they also sent an emissary into England to relate news about the battle at Kinsale in-person to the queen and privy council.<sup>307</sup> In this way, the lord deputy and council, though separated in Kinsale and Dublin, stayed connected and sent a stream of information to the queen and privy council in England. The result was that Mountjoy received the aid he needed to combat the Spanish forces, as well as Tyrone and his supporters in Kinsale.

Mountjoy apparently had 11,500 foot and 857 horse at his command, and Tyrone had an estimated 6,000 infantry and 800 horse.<sup>308</sup> However, these numbers would decline with the major battle at the end of December, and the Ulster lords potentially also had Spanish forces now at their disposal. Irish and Spanish forces planned a coordinated attack, which went awry, in part, due to internecine conflict among the Ulster lords, and the delay of Águila's forces who had

---

<sup>303</sup> See, for example, Fenton to Cecil, 7 Oct. 1601, SP 63/209/2, 135, f. 45; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 116. Also, Lord Deputy Mountjoy to Carey, 30 Nov. 1601, SP 63/209/2, 203, f. 239; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 192.

<sup>304</sup> *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 147.

<sup>305</sup> *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 147.

<sup>306</sup> See, for example, Lord Deputy Mountjoy and Councilors in camp to the Privy Council, 7 Nov. 1601, SP 63/209/2, 172, f. 144; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 153.

<sup>307</sup> Journal of such Services as were done since the 13th of December when Sir Oliver St. John left the Camp, 13-24 Dec. 1601, SP 63/209/2, 247, f. 372; *CSPIre*, 1601-3 (with addenda 1565-1654), p. 237.

<sup>308</sup> Silke, *Kinsale*, 128, 134.

remained in Kinsale as the battle raged on around them.<sup>309</sup> By the time Águila realized what had occurred, the Irish army had already lost. Tyrone and O'Donnell fled and, on 12 January 1602, Águila surrendered.

The battle of Kinsale, while decisive in hindsight, did not immediately end the war. Mountjoy aggressively pursued Tyrone in Ulster, even destroying the O'Neill inauguration stone. There were mutterings that Tyrone would attempt another attack, possibly on the Pale, or that he was biding time for new Spanish reinforcements. After the English victory at Kinsale, the queen wanted to reduce the army in Ireland, but the lord deputy and council stressed that the insurgents still held out hope to continue the war. Fortunately for the English, O'Donnell had fled to Spain, where he died several months later, leaving behind rumors that he had been poisoned by an English spy hired by Carew.<sup>310</sup> Tyrone eluded Mountjoy for a while, but he eventually surrendered. With the signing of the Treaty of Mellifont on 30 March 1603, only days before Queen Elizabeth had died (and of which Tyrone had been ignorant), the Nine Years' War finally came to an end.

---

<sup>309</sup> Silke suggests that Aguila may have mistakenly believed that the signal he sought for from the Irish army was an English ploy to draw them out of the town (146). There is some rumor that Carew learned of the plan beforehand by bribing an Irish lord with whiskey, but as Silke insists, such rumors only bolster Carew's reputation and denigrate the Irish lord (142).

<sup>310</sup> On the intrigue surrounding O'Donnell's death, see Paul Walsh, "James Blake of Galway," *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* 50 (1937): 382-397; Frederick Jones, "James Blake of Galway and the Death of Red Hugh O'Donnell," *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* 75 (1951): 30-38; Lughaidh O'Clery, *Beata Aoda Ruaid Ui Domnaill = The life of Hugh Roe O'Donnell, prince of Tirconnell (1586-1602)*, eds. Denis Murphy and Cucogry O'Clery, Dublin: Sealy, Bryers, & Walker, 1893, cliii. However, historians disagree about whether or not Blake was involved in O'Donnell's death. See Canice Mooney, "The Death of Red Hugh O'Donnell," *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* lxxxix (1954): 328-345. Micheline Kerney Walsh, *'Destruction by peace': Hugh O'Neill after Kinsale, Glancocadhain 1602-Rome 1616* (Armagh, Northern Ireland: Armagh Diocesan Historical Society, 1986), 22-26. Hiram Morgan argues that O'Donnell most likely died of natural causes, possibly a parasitic worm. Morgan, "The Real Red Hugh" in *Beatha Aodh Ruadh, The Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell Historical and Literary Contexts*, ed. Pádraig Ó Riain (Dublin, 2002), 1-35. This lack of consensus illustrates well the shadowy world of intelligence and our inability to draw more definite conclusions. In May 2020, archaeologists uncovered bones in Valladolid, Spain that were presumed to be that of Red Hugh O'Donnell. However, in March 2021, the remains were not O'Donnell's. See Siobhan McNamara, "Update on Search for Red Hugh O'Donnell's Remains in Former Spanish Capital, Valladolid," *The Donegal Democrat*, 21 March 2021, <https://www.leitrimobserver.ie/news/home/619070/update-on-search-for-red-hugh-o-donnell-s-remains-in-former-spanish-capital-valladolid.html>.

## CONCLUSION

It had taken nearly ten years for the English to emerge victoriously in the Nine Years' War, during which time England's attention to, and relationship with, Ireland changed. With the Reformation in England and the Henrician "constitutional revolution" in the 1540s, Ireland had become a dominion of England, independent of papal authority. But outside of the claims of English sovereignty over Ireland, England struggled to maintain its control there. The Gaelic Irish and the Old English repeatedly and violently resisted English rule, especially during Elizabeth's reign, which saw three "rebellions" before the Nine Years' War. Fortunately for Elizabeth, Old English resistance against her rule in earlier years ceased to be a major cause for concern during the Nine Years' War, which was primarily led by the Irish lords in Ulster.

Added to these pressures within Ireland were the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reformation movement in Ireland and, most crucially, the Anglo-Spanish War. England faced an uphill battle in its attempts to spread the Protestant Reformation in Ireland and, to many scholars, it seemed that the Reformation had failed to take hold there. The post-Tridentine church introduced some reforms which directly affected Ireland. It encouraged the sending of trained missionaries to re-establish Catholicism on the island and the development of Irish seminary colleges on the continent to educate the Irish clergy. Such measures highlighted the lack of parallel developments within the Protestant Church of Ireland. There were few Protestant clergymen, no university to help foster the education of Protestant clergy, and, more broadly, little financial support. The founding of Trinity College in Dublin in 1592 was one step forward for the English crown. Still, the Nine Years' War and its seemingly Catholic character suggested that the institution had been established too late. The increased presence of Jesuits and seminary

priests in Ireland during the war raised concerns within the Elizabethan establishment over the problem of religion in its Irish kingdom.

However, the greatest threat to England's sovereignty over Ireland was Spain. Elizabeth's rival, the Catholic King Philip II, threatened to destabilize England's monarchy with the *Gran Armada* in 1588 and repeatedly thereafter. For the Ulster lords during the Nine Years' War, Spain was the ideal candidate through which to gain support for the war, as well as Scotland, whose king was the rumored, though unacknowledged, successor to the English throne. The Irish lords then drew on support from Spain and Scotland, which they used to acquire men, money, and supplies, including gunpowder. As some scholars argued, the formidable qualities of the Irish forces had much to do with the "military revolution" and the transformation that enabled the Irish to match the English crown army. English military losses in Ireland convinced high-ranking English officials that the war would take considerable effort. The crown was thus forced to devote far more resources to the island than anticipated or desired.

These problems were clearly factors that help explain England's performance during the Nine Years' War and why the English crown nearly lost control of its kingdom in Ireland, especially in 1598. But, as this dissertation argues, there is another factor to consider: the Irish council. The Irish council was a powerful institution that managed English administration in Ireland. Its councilors included provincial presidents, judges, the vice-treasurer, and clerics, some of whom acted as ancillaries in other areas of government. After the death of many of the Irish councilors by 1578, the new group of councilors that came to dominate the council were mainly younger sons who sought financial and political success on the island. These men utilized the patronage system in England to gain membership on the Irish council, and, subsequently, they formed client networks of their own within Ireland. And yet, these councilors struggled not



only to meet the demands of their office, but also to develop the status and prestige associated with the institution. There were structural problems that constrained their ability to execute their duties well.

No problem was more visible than the lack of funds. With England's attention on the war with Spain, Ireland was a secondary concern in the years leading up to the Nine Years' War. The queen was reluctant to spend more money in Ireland than absolutely necessary. However, what was deemed unnecessary to the queen was essential to the effective functioning of the Irish government. Her fiscal policy towards Ireland was such that English officials in Ireland frequently complained of low fees for office and high debts due to low revenues and the continual destruction of English property. But the rising costs of war had instilled in Elizabeth the need for reducing expenditure as much as possible. This approach resulted in fiscal policies that did not adequately cover administration costs, and it further encouraged corruption among English officials in Ireland. Very little was done to correct the existing problems, leaving the Irish councilors to find other means to increase their income, frequently outside the purview of the Westminster government. Consequently, the years before the Nine Years' War began were of an Irish council that acted more independently from the central government in England.

The early years of the Nine Years' War illustrated this agency of the individual councilors, some of whom had previously challenged and successfully eliminated the threatening former lord deputy, Sir John Perrot, in the early 1590s. They were now willing to act against royal orders, and they did so in matters of policy and the allocation of resources for the war. When the queen and privy council issued commands for using military force, some Irish councilors objected and pushed instead for pacification by negotiation. Having served in Ireland for several years, many of the Irish councilors feared the damage that would be done to their

property and their selves. They disobeyed instructions on how to manage resources, opting instead to alter military strategies, redirect forces, and to pay English officials in Ireland as they saw fit.

As the war continued and the English suffered one military loss after another, the Westminster government tried to control their Irish officers. The queen and privy council created new supervisory offices and sent in men to oversee the Irish councilors and whether they executed the duties of their office. While these officers in Ireland provided valuable information to the Westminster government, their presence bred conflict and encouraged further division between the Irish council and the queen and privy council in England. English military defeats deepened the divide further, as the queen and privy council blamed their Irish councilors for mishandling the war. Consequently, the chief governors who went to Ireland after 1597 distrusted the Irish council and attempted to alienate or outright blame the Irish councilors. However, the Irish councilors, particularly the administrators on the council, found ways to make themselves more valuable. Establishing intelligence networks and providing information to the Westminster government became a central preoccupation of Irish councilors like Fenton and Jones, who because of their positions in office, could not engage in fighting themselves. They worked to provide information on the movements of Irish insurgents and Catholic priests on the island. Their efforts, along with their fellow martial councilors, helped to win the war. Though it was by no means the only factor that led to England's victory, it was one important element.

After the Nine Years' War, the Irish councilors fared well. Some of the core councilors died right before the war broke out, including Sir Lucas Dillon, Sir Nicholas White, and Sir Nicholas Bagenal. Others died during the war: John Garvey, Sir Henry Bagenal, Sir Richard Bingham, Sir Conyers Clifford, Sir Warham St. Leger (uncle and nephew), and Sir Henry

Wallop. Of the surviving councilors, all of them retained their offices and council membership. However, Sir Robert Napier was forced to retire from the chief barony of the exchequer owing to his many absences in England.

Of all the Irish councilors who survived, Sir George Carew had a meteoric rise in political fortunes following the war. His close relationship with Sir Robert Cecil had already born fruit during the war but, after, he established himself in James's court, was created baron in 1605, and, later, the earl of Totnes at the start of Charles I's reign. Thomas Jones, the bishop of Meath, also experienced success. After Adam Loftus died in 1605, Jones gained succeeded him as lord chancellor and archbishop of Dublin. Sir Anthony St. Leger and Sir Robert Gardiner were both involved in creating the Ulster plantation following the "Flight of the Earls." This famous event saw several prominent Irish lords, including Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone, flee Ireland for the continent. The incident enabled the new king to seize their property in Ulster.<sup>1</sup> Conflict with the Ulster lords persisted even after the war, as did concern over Catholicism and Catholic priests on the island. Sir Geoffrey Fenton still kept apprised of the Jesuit, James Archer.<sup>2</sup> In 1603, Lord Deputy Mountjoy went into Munster to deal with a Catholic uprising which broke out after Elizabeth's death.<sup>3</sup> In 1605, King James called for the expulsion of Jesuits and seminary priests, but religious tensions in Ireland continued nonetheless. Though he had previously promised to tolerate Catholicism during the succession crisis, repeated attempts by Catholics to remove James from the throne of England (notably, the Main Plot in 1603 and the Gunpowder Plot in 1605) all but ensured that James would take a hard stance against Catholics. After all of his

---

<sup>1</sup> Proclamation on the Flight of the Earls Tyrone and Tyrconnell, 9 Nov. 1607, SP 63/222/447, f. 249; *CSPIre*, 1606-1608, p. 328.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Geoffrey Fenton to Sir Robert Cecil, 10 Aug. 1603, SP 63/215/108, f. 199; *CSPIre*, 1603-1606, p. 74. Fenton to Cecil, 14 Aug. 1603, SP 63/215/113, f. 205; *CSPIre*, 1603-1606, p. 76.

<sup>3</sup> *DNB*, "Walsh, Sir Nicholas." See also, Lord Deputy Arthur Chichester and Council to the Privy Council, 27 Oct. 1607, SP 63/222/419, f. 205; *CSPIre*, 1606-1608, p. 309.

earlier scheming with the Irish insurgents during the Nine Years' War and politically outmaneuvering the Spanish for the English throne, James was now king of "Great Britain."

One notable difference between Elizabeth's Irish council and James's was its size. When Irish councilors who were officeholders died, the queen usually filled those vacancies, but, as in England, she rarely appointed new Irish councilors. James, however, did. The Irish council expanded substantially to include, by 1611, nearly 30 additional men, many of whom served as military advisors and were knighted.<sup>4</sup> Though he did not die until 1608, Fenton faced competition for his office in 1603 when Sir Richard Cook arrived in Ireland with a letters patent for the secretary of state's office.<sup>5</sup> As he had in 1580, Fenton found himself sharing the office of principal secretary with another, only this time, he did not have to share the fees of office.

This expansion of the Irish council was one indication that James meant to use the council as a means of bestowing royal reward and favor, as it had been used traditionally. A comparative study of Elizabeth's post-1578 council and James's early council would help to highlight how regime changes affected not only the composition of the council, but also the institutional and personal power of the councilors. Did the large size of the council hinder James's Irish councilors from becoming too powerful? Were there attempts by James, as there was with Elizabeth, to manage the power and influence of the Irish council during peacetime? More importantly, did the Irish council evolve in more meaningful ways? However, these questions are an altogether different story than the one told here and must await future research.

---

<sup>4</sup> *CSPIre*, 1611-1614, p. 102.

<sup>5</sup> Fenton to Cecil, 3 Nov. 1603, SP 63/215/160, f. 246; *CSPIre*, 1603-1606, p. 101.

## APPENDIX

Although this dissertation has argued for the importance of the Irish councilors, the presence of a new lord deputy or lord lieutenant often changed the dynamic of the council and, sometimes, even its composition. This was especially true in 1599 when Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, appointed many of his own men to serve on the Irish council or in other privileged offices in the Irish administration.

The following lists for the Irish council have been compiled using primarily manuscript sources (e.g., council letters) and bibliographical entries for the individual councilors in *ODNB*, *DIB*, and *HoP*. Of all the Irish councilors, the most difficult to identify are the military advisors. They frequently did not participate in the council's routine management of government. However, they were sometimes sworn in as Irish councilors. Whenever possible, military advisors have been added.

| <b>1A. Irish Privy Council c. 1580</b>   |                                   |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Office</i>                            | <i>Occupant</i>                   |
| <i>Lord Deputy</i>                       | Arthur Grey, Baron Grey of Wilton |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                   | Sir William Gerrard               |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>              | Adam Loftus                       |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>              | Thomas Lancaster                  |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                    | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond     |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                   | Hugh Brady                        |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>   | Sir Henry Wallop                  |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i> | James Dowdall                     |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>     | Nicholas Nugent                   |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>      | Sir Lucas Dillon                  |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>               | Nicholas White                    |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connacht</i>    | Sir Nicholas Malby                |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>            | John Norris                       |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>               | Sir Nicholas Bagenal              |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                | Geoffrey Fenton                   |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>            | Jacques Wingfield                 |

| <b>1B. Irish Privy Council c. 1584</b>   |                               |
|--|-------------------------------|
| <i>Office</i>                            | <i>Occupant</i>               |
| <i>Lord Deputy</i>                       | Sir John Perrot               |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                   | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>              | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>              | John Long                     |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                    | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                   | Thomas Jones                  |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>   | Sir Henry Wallop              |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i> | Robert Gardiner               |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>     | Sir Robert Dillon             |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>      | Sir Lucas Dillon              |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>               | Sir Nicholas White            |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connacht</i>    | Sir Richard Bingham           |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>            | John Norris                   |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>               | Sir Nicholas Bagenal          |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                | Geoffrey Fenton               |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>            | Jacques Wingfield             |

| <b>1C. Irish Privy Council c. 1588</b>   |                               |
|--|-------------------------------|
| <i>Office</i>                            | <i>Occupant</i>               |
| <i>Lord Deputy</i>                       | Sir William Fitzwilliam       |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                   | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>              | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>              | John Long                     |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                    | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                   | Thomas Jones                  |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>   | Sir Henry Wallop              |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i> | Robert Gardiner               |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>     | Sir Robert Dillon             |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>      | Sir Lucas Dillon              |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>               | Sir Nicholas White            |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connacht</i>    | Sir Richard Bingham           |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>            | Sir John Norris               |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>               | Sir Nicholas Bagenal          |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                | Geoffrey Fenton               |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>            | Sir George Carew*             |

\* Carew became a privy councilor sometime in July 1590.

| <b>1D. Irish Privy Council c. 1594</b>   |                               |
|--|-------------------------------|
| <i>Office</i>  | <i>Occupant</i>               |
| <i>Lord Deputy</i>   | Sir William Russell           |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>   | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>  | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>  | John Garvey                   |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>  | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>   | Thomas Jones                  |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>   | Sir Henry Wallop              |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i>   | Sir Robert Gardiner           |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>   | Sir Robert Dillon*            |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>  | Sir Robert Napier             |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>   | Sir Anthony St. Leger         |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connacht</i>  | Sir Richard Bingham           |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>  | Sir John Norris               |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>   | Sir Henry Bagenal             |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>  | Sir Geoffrey Fenton           |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>  | Sir George Bouchier           |
| *Robert Dillon replaced in 1593 by Sir William Weston and then reinstated in 1594. |                               |

| <b>1E. Irish Privy Council c. 1597</b>   |                               |
|--|-------------------------------|
| <i>Office</i>                            | <i>Occupant</i>               |
| <i>Lord Deputy</i>                       | Thomas, Lord Burgh            |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                   | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>              | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>              | Henry Ussher                  |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                    | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                   | Thomas Jones                  |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>   | Sir Henry Wallop              |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i> | Sir Robert Gardiner           |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>     | Sir Nicholas Walsh            |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>      | Sir Robert Napier             |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>               | Sir Anthony St. Leger         |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connacht</i>    | Sir Conyers Clifford          |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>            | Sir Thomas Norris             |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>               | Sir Henry Bagenal             |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                | Sir Geoffrey Fenton           |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>            | Sir George Bouchier           |

**1F. Irish Privy Council c. 1599**

| <i>Office</i>                            | <i>Occupant</i>                                 |
|--|---|
| <i>Lord Lieutenant</i>                   | Robert Devereux, earl of Essex                  |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                   | Adam Loftus                                     |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>              | Adam Loftus                                     |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>              | Henry Ussher                                    |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                    | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond                   |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                   | Thomas Jones                                    |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>   | Sir George Carey                                |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i> | Sir Robert Gardiner                             |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>     | Sir Nicholas Walsh                              |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>      | Sir Robert Napier                               |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>               | Sir Anthony St. Leger                           |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connaught</i>   | Sir Conyers Clifford                            |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>            | Sir Thomas Norris/<br>Sir George Carew          |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>               | Sir Richard Bingham/<br>Sir Christopher Blount* |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                | Sir Geoffrey Fenton                             |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>            | Sir George Bouchier                             |
| <i>Other Councilors</i>                  | Sir Warham St. Leger                            |
|  | Sir Edward Moore                                |
|  | Sir Henry Harington**                           |

\* Sir Christopher Blount was famously made marshal of the army but the queen would not allow him to be sworn into the Irish council.

\*\*Harington was removed from council in 1599 and court martialled. However, he was reinstated under the new lord deputy, Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy.



**1G. Irish Privy Council c. 1600**

| <i>Office</i>                            | <i>Occupant</i>               |
|--|-------------------------------|
| <i>Lord Deputy</i>                       | Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                   | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>              | Adam Loftus                   |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>              | Henry Ussher                  |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                    | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                   | Thomas Jones                  |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>   | Sir George Carey              |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i> | Sir Robert Gardiner           |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>     | Sir Nicholas Walsh            |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>      | Sir Robert Napier             |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>               | Sir Anthony St. Leger         |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connacht</i>    | Sir Oliver Lambert*           |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>            | Sir George Carew              |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>               | Richard Wingfield**           |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                | Sir Geoffrey Fenton           |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>            | Sir George Bouchier           |
| <i>Other Councilors</i>                  | Sir Henry Harington           |

\*Lambert made governor of Connacht in 1601 by Mountjoy but does not become an Irish councilor until 1603.

\*\* Mountjoy made Wingfield the provisional marshal of the army and, in 1601, Wingfield was officially named as marshal.

**1H. Irish Privy Council c. 1603**

| <i>Office</i>                            | <i>Occupant</i>                                     |
|--|---|
| <i>Lord Lieutenant/Deputy</i>            | Charles Blount, earl of Devonshire/Sir George Carey |
| <i>Lord Chancellor</i>                   | Adam Loftus   |
| <i>Archbishop of Dublin</i>              | Adam Loftus   |
| <i>Archbishop of Armagh</i>              | Henry Ussher  |
| <i>Earl of Ormond</i>                    | Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond                       |
| <i>Bishop of Meath</i>                   | Thomas Jones  |
| <i>Vice Treasurer/Treasurer-at-War</i>   | Sir Thomas Ridgeway*                                |
| <i>Chief Justice of the King's Bench</i> | Sir James Ley                                       |
| <i>Chief Justice of Common Pleas</i>     | Sir Nicholas Walsh                                  |
| <i>Chief Baron of the Exchequer</i>      | Edmund Pelham                                       |
| <i>Master of the Rolls</i>               | Sir Anthony St. Leger                               |
| <i>Chief Commissioner of Connacht</i>    | Sir Richard Burke                                   |
| <i>Lord President Munster</i>            | Sir George Carew                                    |
| <i>Marshal of the Army</i>               | Sir Richard Wingfield                               |
| <i>Secretary of State</i>                | Sir Geoffrey Fenton                                 |
| <i>Master of the Ordnance</i>            | Sir George Bouchier                                 |

\* Ridgeway did not join the Irish council until 1606.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources

#### Manuscript Sources

British Library [Accessed via *State Papers Online*]

Lansdowne MSS

Additional Manuscripts, Yelverton MSS

Cottonian MSS: Augustus I, Titus B XII, Titus B XIII

Hatfield House Archives [Accessed via Cecil Papers]

Cecil Papers

The National Archives, Kew [Accessed online or via *State Papers Online*]

MPF 1 Maps and plans

SP 12 State Papers Domestic, Elizabeth

SP 15 State Papers Domestic, Edward VI – James I

SP 52 State Papers Scotland Series I, Elizabeth I, 1558-1603

SP 63 State Papers Ireland, Elizabeth I to George III, 1558-1782

National Portrait Gallery, London [Accessed online]

NPG D19216

Trinity College, Dublin [Accessed online]

MS 1209

## Printed Primary Sources:

- Acts of the Privy Council of England, 1542-1631.* Edited by John Roche Dasent. 46 vols. London: Public Record Office, 1890-1964.
- Annals of the kingdom of Ireland by the Four Masters from the earliest period to the year 1616.* Edited and transcribed by John O'Donovan. 7 vols. Third edition. Dublin, 1990. Brewer, J. S. and William Bullen, eds. Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts. 6 vols. London, 1867-1873.
- FitzSimon, Henry S. J. *Words of Comfort to Persecuted Catholics.* Edited by Edmund Hogan, S. J. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1881.
- The Fourteenth Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records in Ireland / presented to both houses of the Parliament by command of Her Majesty.* Dublin: Printed by Alexander Thom for Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1882.
- Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury, Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire.* 24 vols. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1883-1976.
- Lee, Thomas. *A brief Declaration of the Government of Ireland; opening many corruptions in the same; discovering the discontentments of the Irishry; and the causes moving those expected troubles: and shewing means how to establish quietness in that kingdom honourably, to your majesty's profit, without any encrease of charge. in An Historical and Critical Review of the Civil Wars in Ireland [...].* Transcribed by John Curry. Dublin, 1810. CELT.
- *Information given to Queen Elizabeth against Sir William Fitzwilliam, his government in Ireland.* Transcribed by Hiram Morgan. CELT.
- Letters from Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew.* Camden Society Series. Vol. 88, edited by John MacLean. London, 1864.
- The Letters of Lord Burghley, William Cecil, to His Son Sir Robert Cecil, 1593-1598.* Vol. 53, *Camden Fifth Series.* Edited by William Dixon Acres. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2017.
- Moryson, Fynes. *An itinerary: containing his ten yeeres travel through the twelve dominions of Germany, Bohmerland, Sweitzerland, Netherland, Denmarke, Poland, Italy, Turkey, France, England, Scotland and Ireland.* 4 vols. Glasgow, 1907-1908.
- Naunton, Sir Robert. *Fragmenta regalia or observations on Queen Elizabeth, her times and favors.* London, 1641.
- Perrot, Sir John. *The chronicle of Ireland, 1584-1608.* Edited by Herbert Wood. Dublin, 1933.

Rich, Barnaby. *A new description of Ireland*. London, 1610.

Quinn, David B. and Prendergast, John P., eds. "Calendar of the Irish Council Book 1 March 1581 to 1 July 1586." *Analecta Hibernica* 24 (1967): 93-105.

Spenser, Edmund. *A view of the present state of Ireland*. Edited by Alexander B. Grosart, 1894. CELT.

Stafford, Thomas. *Pacata Hibernia: Ireland appeased and reduced, or a history of the late wares of Ireland, especially in the province of Munster under the command of Sir George Carew*. Edited by Standish O'Grady. 2 vols. London: Downey and Co., 1896.

*The Statutes of the Realm, Vols. 1-4, Printed by Command of His Majesty King George III*. London, 1810-1819.

*Tudor Royal Proclamations, 1588-1603*. Vol. 3, edited by P. L. Hughes and J. F. Larkin. London: Yale University Press, 1969.

### **Primary Sources - Online Databases**

British History Online (BHO)  
<https://www.british-history.ac.uk/>

Cecil Papers, Hatfield House Archives (CP)  
<https://www.proquest.com/cecilpapers/>

Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT)  
<https://celt.ucc.ie/>

*Early English Books Online* (EEBO)  
<https://www.proquest.com/eebo/>

*History of Parliament Online* (HoP)  
<https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/>

*Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (ODNB)  
<http://www.oxforddnb.com>

*Oxford English Dictionary* (OED)  
<http://www.oed.com>

*State Papers Online: The Government of Britain, 1509-1714*. (SPO)  
<https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/state-papers-online>

## Secondary Sources:

### Books and Book Chapters

- Adams, Simon. *Leicester and the Court: Essays on Elizabethan Politics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002.
- Alford, Stephen. "Some Elizabethan Spies in the Office of Sir Francis Walsingham." In *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, edited by Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox, 46-62. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- . *The Watchers: A Secret History of the Reign of Elizabeth I*. London: Allen Lane, 2012.
- Andrews, John H. "Plantation Ireland: A Review of Settlement History." In *A History of Settlement in Ireland*, edited by Terry Barry, 140-157. 2000. Reprint, London; New York: Routledge, 2012.
- . *The Queen's Last Map-Maker: Richard Bartlett in Ireland, 1600-3*. Dublin: Geography Publications, 2008.
- . *Shapes of Ireland: Maps and Their Makers, 1564-1839*. Dublin: Geography Publications, 1997.
- Bagwell, Richard. *Ireland Under the Tudors with a Succinct Account of the Earlier History*. 2 vols. Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1885.
- Beier, A. L. *Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England, 1560-1640*. London: Methuen, 1987.
- Binasco, Matteo. *Making, Breaking and Remaking the Irish Missionary Network*. Springer International Publishing, 2020.
- Bottigheimer, Karl S. "Taking Sides? Lingering Problematics in Irish Church History." In *The Church of Ireland and Its Past: History, Interpretation and Identity*, edited by Mark Empey, Alan Ford, and Miriam Moffitt. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017.
- Bradshaw, Brendan. *'And So Began the Irish Nation': Nationality, National Consciousness and Nationalism in Pre-Modern Ireland*. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2016.
- . *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Bradshaw, Brendan and John Morrill, eds. *The British Problem, c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago*. Problems in Focus Series. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

- Bradshaw, Brendan and Peter Roberts, eds. *British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain 1533–1707*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Brady, Ciaran. "The Captain's Games: Army and Society in Elizabethan Ireland." In *A Military History of Ireland*, edited by Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery, 136-59. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- , ed. *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536-1588*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- , "Coming into the Weigh-House: Elizabeth I and the Government of Ireland." In *Elizabeth I and Ireland*, edited by Brendan Kane and Valerie McGowan-Doyle, 113-141. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- , "Conservative Subversives: The Community of the Pale and the Dublin Administration, 1556–86." In *Radicals, Rebels & Establishments: Papers Read before the Irish Conference of Historians, Maynooth, 16-19 June 198*, edited by Patrick J. Corish and Ciaran Brady, 11-32. Belfast: Appletree Press, 1985.
- , "From Policy to Power: The Evolution of Tudor Reform Strategies in Sixteenth-century Ireland." In *Reshaping Ireland, 1550-1700: Colonization and Its Consequences, Essays Presented to Nicholas Canny*, edited by Brian Mac Cuarta, 21-42. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2011.
- , ed. *Interpreting Irish History: The Debate on Historical Revisionism, 1938-1994*. Blackrock, Dublin; Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 1994.
- Brady, Ciaran and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds. *Making Good: New Perspectives on the English in Early Modern Ireland*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Brady, Ciaran and Raymond Gillespie, eds. *Natives and Newcomers: Essays on the Making of Irish Colonial Society 1534-1641*. Dublin 1986.
- Brewer, John. *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*. 1988. Reprint, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Brink, Jean R. *The Early Spenser, 1554-80: 'Minde on honour fixed'*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019.
- Burlinson, Christopher and Andrew Zurcher, eds. *Edmund Spenser: Selected Letters and Other Papers*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Caball, Marc. "Faith, Culture and Sovereignty; Irish Nationality and Its Development 1588-

- 1625." In *British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533-1707*, edited by Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts, 112-139. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- ."History and Politics: Interpretations of Early Modern Conquest and Reformation in Victorian Ireland." In *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe*. Vol. 7, edited by Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz Basingstoke, 149-169. Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Caldwell, David H. "Having the Right Kit: West Islanders fighting in Ireland." In *The World of the Galloglass: Kings, Warlords and Warriors in Ireland and Scotland, 1200-1600*, edited by Seán Duffy, 144-168. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007.
- Canning, Ruth. *The Old English in Early Modern Ireland: The Palesmen and the Nine Years' War, 1594-1603*. Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY, USA: The Boydell Press, 2019.
- Canny, Nicholas P. *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-76*. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1976.
- ."From Reformation to Restoration: Ireland, 1534-1660." Dublin: Helicon: Distributed by the Educational Company of Ireland, 1987.
- ."Irish, Scottish, Welsh Responses to Centralisation, c. 1530-c. 1640: A Comparative Perspective." In *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History*, eds. Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer, 148-157. London: Routledge, 1995.
- ."Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World, 1560-1800." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
- ."Making Ireland British, 1580-1650." Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- , ed. *Reshaping Ireland 1550-1700: Colonization and Its Consequences: Essays Presented to Nicholas Canny*. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2011.
- ."Revisiting the Past: Reflections on 'Why the Reformation failed in Ireland: une question mal posée'." In *The Church of Ireland and Its Past: History, Interpretation and Identity*, edited by Mark Empey, Alan Ford and Miriam Moffitt, 237-246. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017.
- Carey, Vincent. "Elizabeth I and State Terror in Sixteenth-Century Ireland." In *Elizabeth I and the 'Sovereign Arts': Essays in Literature and Culture*, edited by Donald Stump, Linda Shenk, and Carole Levin Tempe, 201-216. Ariz: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2011.
- Carey, Vincent, Ute Lotz-Heumann, and Karl S. Bottigheimer, eds. *Taking Sides?: Colonial and*



- Confessional Mentalités in Early Modern Ireland: Essays in Honour of Karl S. Bottigheimer*. Portland, OR; Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 2003.
- Clark, Peter, ed. *The European Crisis of the 1590s*. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1985.
- Clarke, Aidan. "Varieties of conformity: the first century of the Church of Ireland." In *The Churches, Ireland and the Irish*, edited by W. J. Shiels and Diana Woods, 105-22. Oxford, 1989.
- Collinson, Patrick. *Elizabethan Essays*. London: Hambledon Press, 1994.
- . *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Connolly, S. J. *Contested Island: Ireland 1460-1630*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Crawford, Jon G. *Anglicizing the Government of Ireland: The Irish Privy Council and the Expansion of Tudor Rule, 1556-1578*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press in Association with the Irish Legal History Society, 1993.
- . *A Star Chamber Court in Ireland: The Court of Castle Chamber, 1571-1641*. Dublin: Four Courts in association with The Irish Legal History Society, 2005.
- Crawford, Ross. "Noble Power in the West Highlands and Isles: James VI and the End of the Mercenary Trade with Ireland, 1594-96." In *James VI and Noble Power in Scotland, 1578-1603*, edited by Miles Kerr-Peterson, Steven J. Reid, 117-135. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017.
- Cunningham, Bernadette. "Zeal for God and for Souls." In *Irish Preaching, 700-1700*, edited by Alan Fletcher and Raymond Gillespie, 108-126. Portland; Dublin: Four Courts, 2001.
- Dennehy, Coleman A. "Institutional History and the Early Modern Irish State." In *Early Modern Ireland: New Sources, Methods, and Perspectives*, edited by Sarah Covington, Vincent Carey, and Valerie McGowan-Doyle, 180-195. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.
- Dickens, A. G. *The English Reformation*. London: B.T. Batsford, 1964.
- Doran, Susan and Norman L. Jones, eds. *The Elizabethan World*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Dover, Paul M., ed. *Secretaries and Statecraft in the Early Modern World*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.
- Downey, Declan M. "Seigneurialism and Strategy: The Gravitation of the Earls of Desmond and

- other Irish Nobles Towards the Early Habsburg Monarch, 1529-1604." In *Redes de Nación y Espacios de Poder: La Comunidad Irlandesa en España y la América Española, 1600-1825 (Power Strategies: Spain and Ireland, 1600-1825)*, edited by Óscar Recio Morales, 67-78. Madrid: Albatros Ediciones, 2012.
- Duffy, Eamon. *Fires of Faith: Catholic England Under Mary Tudor*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
- Edwards, David. "Ideology and Experience: Spenser's View and Martial Law in Elizabethan Ireland." In *Political Ideology in Ireland, 1541-1641*, edited Hiram Morgan, 127-57. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999.
- "Securing the Jacobean Succession: The Secret Career of James Fullerton of Trinity College, Dublin." In *The World of the Galloglass: Kings, Warlords and Warriors in Ireland and Scotland, 1200-1600*, edited by Seán Duffy, 188-219. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007.
- Edwards, David and Colin Rynne, eds. *The Colonial World of Richard Boyle, First Earl of Cork*. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2018.
- Edwards, David, Pádraig Lenihan, and Clodagh Tait, eds. *Age of Atrocity: Violence and Political Conflict in Early Modern Ireland*. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007.
- Edwards, R. Dudley. *Church and State in Tudor Ireland: A History of Penal Laws Against Irish Catholics, 1534-1603*. London; New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935.
- Edwards, R. Dudley and Mary O'Dowd. *Sources for Early Modern Irish History, 1534-1641*. New York; Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Eire, Carlos M. N. *Reformations: The Early Modern World, 1450-1650*. London; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
- Ekin, Des. *The Last Armada: Queen Elizabeth, Juan del Águila, and Hugh O'Neill: The Story of the 100-Day Spanish Invasion*. New York: Pegasus Books, 2016.
- Ellis, Steven. G. *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, 1447-1603: English Expansion and the End of Gaelic Rule*. London; New York: Longman, 1998.
- *Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power: The Making of the British State*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1995.
- Ellis, Steven. G. and Christopher Maginn, eds. *Making of the British Isles: The State of Britain and Ireland, 1450-1660*. Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007.
- Elton, G.R. *Reform and Renewal: Thomas Cromwell and the Common Weal*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

- . *Policy and Police: The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Thomas Cromwell*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- . *The Tudor Revolution in Government: Administrative Changes in the Reign of Henry VIII*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.
- Falls, Cyril. *Elizabeth's Irish Wars*. 1950. Reprint, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970.
- Ferguson, Niall. *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World*. Londres, Allen Lane, 2003.
- Farrell, Gerard. *The 'Mere Irish' and the Colonisation of Ulster, 1570-1641*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Finnegan, David. "For the Greater Glory': Irish Jesuit Letters and the Irish Counter-Reformation, 1598-1626." In *Debating the Faith: Religion and Letter Writing in Great Britain, 1550-1800*, edited by Anne Dunan-Page and Clotilde Prunier, 91-106. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012.
- Ford, Alan. *The Protestant Reformation in Ireland, 1590-1641*. Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1997.
- . "Standing One's Ground': Religion, Polemic and Irish History Since the Reformation." In *As by Law Established: The Church of Ireland Since the Reformation*, edited by Ford, James McGuire and Kenneth Milne, 1-14. Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1995.
- . "That Noble Dream': Objectivity and the Writing of Irish Church History." In *The Church of Ireland and Its Past*, edited by Ford, Mark Empey, and Miriam Moffitt, 1-18. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017.
- Games, Alison. *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Gillespie, Raymond. *Devoted People: Belief and Religion in Early Modern Ireland*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.
- . "The Louvain Franciscans and the Culture of Print." In *Irish Europe, 1600-1650: Writing and Learning*, edited by Gillespie and Ruairí Ó hUiginn, 105-120. The Irish in Europe series, 5. Dublin: Four Courts, 2013.
- . "Preaching the Reformation in Early Modern Ireland." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Early Modern Sermon*, edited by Hugh Adlington, Peter McCullough, and Emma Rhatigan, 287-302. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- . *Reading Ireland: Print, Reading, and Social Change in Early Modern Ireland*. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2005.

- ."Traditional Religion in Sixteenth Century Gaelic Ireland." In *Christianities in the Early Modern Celtic World*, edited by Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin and Robert Armstrong, 29-41. New York; Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Gillespie, Raymond and Andrew Hadfield, eds. *The Oxford History of the Irish, Book 3: The Irish Book in English, 1550-1800*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK, 2006.
- Gordon, Andrew. "Material Fictions: Counterfeit Correspondence and the Culture of Copying in Early Modern England." In *Cultures of Correspondence in Early Modern Britain*, edited by James Daybell and Andrew Gordon, 85-109. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
- Gray, Emily Fisher. "Tradition and Invention: German Lutheran Church Architecture." In *Protestant Aesthetics and the Arts*, edited by Sarah Covington and Kathryn Reklis, 57-76. London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.
- Haigh, Christopher. *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society Under the Tudors*. New York: The Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Hammer, Paul E. J. "'Base Rogues' and 'Gentlemen of Quality': the Earl of Essex's Irish Knights and Royal Displeasure in 1599." In *Elizabeth I and Ireland*, edited by Brendan Kane and Valerie McGowan-Doyle, 184-208. New York; Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- ." *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government, and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- ." *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- , ed. *Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1450-1660*. New York; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016.
- Haynes, Alan. *Invisible Power: The Elizabethan Secret Services, 1570-1603*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- Heal, Felicity. *Of Prelates and Princes: A Study of the Economic and Social Position of the Tudor Episcopate*. New York; Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- ." *Reformation in Britain and Ireland*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Heffernan, *Debating Tudor policy in Sixteenth-Century Ireland: "Reform" Treatises and Political Discourse*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018.
- Hernán, Enrique García. *Ireland and Spain in the reign of Philip II*. Translated by Liam Liddy. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2009.

- Hinks, John. "The Book Trade in Early Modern Britain: Centres, Peripheries and Networks." In *Print Culture and Peripheries in Early Modern Europe: A Contribution to the History of Printing and the Book Trade in Small European and Spanish Cities*, edited by Benito Rial Costas, 101-126. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Hooper, Glenn. *Writing and Landscape in Early Modern Ireland*. Vol. 5. London: Sage Publications, 1996.
- Jardine, Lisa and William H. Sherman. "Pragmatic Readers: Knowledge Transactions and Scholarly Services in Late Elizabethan England." In *Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain: Essays in Honour of Patrick Collinson*, edited by Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts, 102-24. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Jefferies, Henry A. *The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations*. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010.
- Jones, Whitney R. D. *The Mid-Tudor Crisis: 1539-1563*. London: Macmillan, 1973.
- Kane, Brendan. "Popular Politics and the Legitimacy of Power in Early Modern Ireland." In *Becoming and Belonging in Ireland AD c. 1200-1600: Essays in Identity and Cultural Practice*, edited by Eve Campbell, Elizabeth Fitzpatrick, and Audrey Horning, 328-343. Cork: Cork University Press, 2018.
- Kearney, Hugh F. *Contested Ideas of Nationalism and History*. New York: New York University Press, 2007.
- Kenny, Kevin, ed. *Ireland and the British Empire*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Kilroy, Patricia. *The Fall of the Gaelic Lords: 1534-1616*. Dublin: By Éamonn De Búrca for Edmund Burke Publisher, 2008.
- Krishan Kumar. *Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.
- Lake, Peter and Michael Questier. "'The Archpriest Controversy and the Issue of the Succession.'" In *Doubtful and Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England*, edited by Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes, 71-94. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014.
- Lenihan, Pádraig, ed. *Conquest and Resistance: War in Seventeenth-Century Ireland*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2001.

- , *Consolidating Conquest: Ireland 1603-1727*. Harlow, England; New York: Pearson Longman, 2008.
- Lennon, Colm. "The Print Trade, 1550-1700." In *The Oxford History of the Irish, Book 3: The Irish Book in English, 1550-1800*, edited by Raymond Gillespie and Andrew Hadfield, 61-73. Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK, 2006.
- , "Protestant Reformations, 1550-1641." In *The Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 2, 1550-1730*, edited by Jane Ohlmeyer, 196-219. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- , *Sixteenth-Century Ireland: The Incomplete Conquest*. New Gill History of Ireland. 1994. Reprint, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2005.
- Levin, Carole. *The Heart and Stomach of a King: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994.
- Loades, D. M. *The Mid-Tudor Crisis, 1545-1565*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- Logue, Paul. "'Their Skill and Practice Far Exceeding Their Wonted Usage': The Irish Military Revolution, 1593-1603." In *Becoming and Belonging in Ireland AD c. 1200-1600: Essays in Identity and Cultural Practice*, edited by Eve Campbell, Elizabeth Fitzpatrick, and Audrey Horning, 293-312. Cork: Cork University Press, 2018.
- Lötz-Heumann, Ute. "Confessionalisation in Ireland: Periodisation and Character, 1534-1649." In *The Origins of Sectarianism in Early Modern Ireland*, edited by Alan Ford and John McCafferty, 24-53. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Mac Cuarta, Brian. *Catholic Revival in the North of Ireland, 1603-41*. Dublin, Ireland; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2007.
- , ed. *Reshaping Ireland 1550-1700: Colonization and its Consequences: Essays Presented to Nicholas Canny*. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2011.
- MacCarthy-Morrogh, Michael. *The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland, 1583-1641*. New York; Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- McCavitt, John. *The Flight of the Earls*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2002.
- McCoog, Thomas M. *The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland, and England, 1598-1606: Lest Our Lamp Be Entirely Extinguished*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017.
- McGurk, John. *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The 1590s Crisis*. Manchester, UK; New York: Manchester University Press; New York: Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2009.

- , "Irish Prisoners in the Tower of London: Pre-Requisites for Plantation." In *The Flight of the Earls: Imeacht na nIarlaí*, edited by David Finnegan, Marie-Claire Harrigan and Éamonn Ó Ciardha, 237-46. Derry: Guildhall Press, 2010.
- McLaughlin, Joseph. "'What Base Coin Wrought': The Effects of the Elizabethan Debasement in Ireland." In *The Battle of Kinsale*, edited by Hiram Morgan, 193-204. Bray, Co. Wicklow: Wordwell, 2004.
- McLeod, Bruce. *The Geography of Empire in English Literature, 1580-1745*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Maginn, Christopher. *William Cecil, Ireland, and the Tudor State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Maginn, Christopher and Steven G. Ellis. *The Tudor Discovery of Ireland*. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts, 2015.
- Meigs, Samantha. *The Reformations in Ireland: Tradition and Confessionalism, 1400–1690*. Early Modern History: Society and Culture. Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St Martin's Press, 1997.
- Montaño, John Patrick. *The Roots of English Colonialism in Ireland*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Moody, T. W., F. X. Martin, and F. J. Byrne, eds. *A New History of Ireland*. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press, 1976-1984.
- Morgan, Hiram, ed. *The Battle of Kinsale*. Bray: Wordwell Press, 2004.
- , "The Fall of Sir John Perrot." In *The Reign of Elizabeth: Court and Culture in the Last Decade*, edited by John Guy, 109-25. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- , ed. *Political Ideology in Ireland, 1541-1641*. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1999.
- , "The Real Red Hugh." In *Beatha Aodh Ruadh, The life of Red Hugh O'Donnell Historical and Literary Contexts*, edited by Pádraig Ó Riain, 1-35. Dublin, 2002.
- , "'Slán Dé fút go hoíche': Hugh O'Neill's Murders." In Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan and Clodagh Tait, 95-118.
- , "Tempt not God too long, O Queen': Elizabeth and the Irish Crisis of the 1590s." In *Elizabeth I and Ireland*, edited by Brendan Kane and Valerie McGowan-Doyle, 209-238. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

- "Tom Lee: The Posing Peacemaker." In *Representing Ireland: Literature and the Origins of Conflict 1534-1660*, edited by Brendan Bradshaw, Andrew Hadfield, and Willy Maley, 132-165. Cambridge, U.K; NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- *Tyrone's Rebellion: The Outbreak of the Nine Years' War in Tudor Ireland*. [London]: Royal Historical Society; Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY, USA: Boydell Press, 1993.
- Morgan, Rhys. *The Welsh and the Shaping of Early Modern Ireland, 1558-1641*. Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2014.
- Murphy, Neil. *The Tudor Occupation of Boulogne: Conquest, Colonisation and Imperial Monarchy, 1544-1550*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Murray, James. *Enforcing the English Reformation in Ireland: Clerical Resistance and Political Conflict in the Diocese of Dublin, 1534-1590*. Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- "St. Patrick's Cathedral and the University Question in Ireland c. 1547-1585." In *European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation*, edited by Helga Robinson-Hammerstein, 3-11. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1998.
- Ó Clabaigh, Colman N. "Preaching in Late Medieval Ireland: The Franciscan Contribution." In *Irish Preaching, 700-1700*, edited by Alan Fletcher and Raymond Gillespie, 81-93. Portland; Dublin: Four Courts, 2001.
- O'Day, Rosemary. *The Debate on the English Reformation*. Second edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014.
- O'Day, Rosemary and Felicity Heal. *Continuity and Change: Personnel and Administration of the Church of England, 1500-1642*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1976.
- Ohlmeyer, Jane H. *Making Ireland English: The Irish Aristocracy in the Seventeenth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
- O'Neill, James. *The Nine Years' War, 1593-1603: O'Neill, Mountjoy and the Military Revolution*. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 2017.
- Ó'Tuathail, Gearoid. *Critical Geopolitics*. 1996. Reprint, London: Routledge, 2005.
- Outhwaite, R. B. "Dearth, the English Crown and the Crisis of the 1590s." In Clark, 23-43.
- Palmer, Patricia. "'Hungry Eyes' and the Rhetoric of Dispossession: English Writing from Early Modern Ireland." In *A Companion to Irish Literature*, edited by Julia M. Wright, 92-107. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.



- . *Language and Conquest in Early Modern Ireland: English Renaissance Literature and Elizabethan Imperial Expansion*. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Palmer, William. *The Problem of Ireland in Tudor Foreign Policy, 1485-1603*. Woodbridge, Suffolk; Rochester, N.Y: Boydell Press, 1994.
- Parker, Geoffrey. "History and Climate: The Crisis of the 1590s Reconsidered." In *Climate Change and Cultural Transition in Europe*, edited by Claus Leggewie and Franz Mauelshagen, 119-155. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018.
- . "The Military Revolution, 1560-1600'—A Myth?" In Rogers, 37-54.
- Parmalee, Lisa Ferraro. *Good Newes from Fraunce: French Anti-League Propaganda in Late Elizabethan England*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1996.
- Pawlish, Hans S. *Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland: A Study in Legal Imperialism*. New York; Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Pettegree, Andrew. *The Book in the Renaissance*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
- . *Brand Luther: 1517, Printing, and the Making of the Reformation*. New York: Penguin Press, 2015.
- Plowden, Alison. *The Elizabethan Secret Service*. Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf; St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Pollard, M. *Dublin's Trade in Books, 1550-1800*. New York; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
- Rapple, Rory. "Brinkmanship and Bad Luck: Ireland, the Nine Years' War and the Succession." In *Doubtful and Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England*, edited by Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes, 236-256. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2014.
- . *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558-1594*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Richings, M. G. *Espionage: The Story of the Secret Service of the English Crown*. London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd, 1934.
- Roberts, Michael. "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660." In Rogers, 13-35.
- Robinson-Hammerstein, Helga. "Archbishop Adam Loftus: The First Provost of Trinity College, Dublin." In *European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation*, edited by Robinson-Hammerstein, 34-52. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1998.

- . *European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation*. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1998.
- Rogers, Clifford, ed. *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Transformation of Early Modern Europe*. 1976. Revised and Reprinted, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.
- Ryrie, Alec. *The Age of Reformation: The Tudor and Stewart Realms, 1485-1603*. 2009. Revised. London; New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Sheehan, Anthony. "Irish Towns in a Period of Change, 1558-1625." In *Natives and Newcomers: Essays on the Making of the Irish Colonial Society, 1534-1641*, edited by Ciaran Brady and Raymond Gillespie, 93-119. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1986.
- Silke, John J. *Kinsale: The Spanish Intervention in Ireland at the End of the Elizabethan Wars*. Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts, 2000.
- Smith, Alan G. R. *Servant of the Cecils: The Life of Sir Michael Hickes, 1543-1612*. London: J. Cape, 1977.
- Smyth, William J. *Map-making, Landscapes and Memory: A Geography of Colonial and Early Modern Ireland, c.1530-1750*. Cork: Cork University Press, 2006.
- Stevenson, Kenneth. "Worship by the Book." In *The Oxford Guide to the Book of Common Prayer: A Worldwide Survey*, edited by Charles Hefling and Cynthia L. Shattuck, 44-72. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Stewart, Richard W. "The 'Irish Road': Military Supply and Arms for Elizabeth's Army During the O'Neill Rebellion in Ireland, 1598-1601." In *War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650*, edited by Mark Charles Fissel, 16-37. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Sullivan, A. M. *The Story of Ireland*. 1883. Reprint, Ireland: M. H. Gill & Son; Burns & Oates, Ltd: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1894.
- Turvey, Roger. *The Treason and Trial of Sir John Perrot*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005.
- Walsh, Micheline Kerney. *'Destruction by peace': Hugh O'Neill after Kinsale, Glancocadhain 1602-Rome 1616*. Armagh, Northern Ireland: Armagh Diocesan Historical Society, 1986.
- . *An Exile of Ireland, Hugh O'Neill, Prince of Ulster*. Blackrock, Dublin; Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1996.
- Wernham, R. B. *After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe, 1588-1595*. 1984. Reprint, Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

-----. *The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558-1603*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

-----. *The Return of the Armadas: The Last Years of the Elizabethan War Against Spain, 1595-1603*. Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Whitehead, Maurice. "'Established and Putt in Good Order': The Venerable English Colledge, Rome, under Jesuit Administration, 1579-1685." In *Jesuit Intellectual and Physical Exchange between England and Mainland Europe, c. 1580-1789*, edited by James E. Kelly, 315-336. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018.

Wright, Robert. "Early Translations." In *The Oxford Guide to the Book of Common Prayer: A Worldwide Survey*, edited by Charles Hefling and Cynthia L. Shattuck, 155-165. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

## Articles

Andrews, John H. "Sir Richard Bingham and the Mapping of Western Ireland." *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature*. 103C, no. 3 (2003): 61-95.

-----. "Where Did They Put Their Maps? The Case of Elizabethan Ireland." *Imago Mundi* 66, no. 2 (2014): 236-243.

Barnard, John. "The Financing of the Authorized Version 1610-1612: Robert Barker and 'Combining' and 'Sleeping' Stationers." *Publishing History* 57 (2005): 5-52.

Bottigheimer, Karl S. "The Failure of the Reformation in Ireland: Une Question Bien Posée." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36, no. 2 (1985): 196-207.

-----. "Ireland and the European Reformation." *History Ireland* 6, no. 4 (1998): 13-16.

-----. "The Reformation in Ireland Revisited." *The Journal of British Studies* 15, no. 2 (1976): 140-149.

-----. "Revisionism and the Irish Reformation." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 51, no. 3 (2000): 581-586.

Bottigheimer, Karl S. and Ute Lötze-Heumann. "The Irish Reformation in European Perspective." *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 89 (1998): 268-309.

Bradshaw, Brendan. "Fr. Wolfe's Description of Limerick City, 1574." *North Munster Antiquarian Journal* 17 (1975): 47-53.

- "Revisionism and the Irish Reformation: A Rejoinder." *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 51 (2000): 587-591.
- "Sword, Word and Strategy in the Reformation in Ireland." *The Historical Journal* 21, no. 3 (1978): 475-502.
- Burlinson, Christopher and Andrew Zurcher. "Secretary to the Lord Grey Deputie here': Edmund Spenser's Irish Papers." *The Library* 6 (2005): 30-75.
- Canning, Ruth A. "James Fitzpiers Fitzgerald, Captain Thomas Lee and the Problem of 'Secret Traitors': Conflicted Loyalties During the Nine Years' War, 1594-1603." *Irish Historical Studies* 39 (2015): 573-594.
- "Profits and Patriotism: Nicholas Weston, Old English Merchants, and Ireland's Nine Years' War, 1594-1603." *Irish Economic and Social History* 43 (2016): 85-112.
- Canny, Nicholas P. "The Ideology of English Colonialization: From Ireland to America." *William and Mary Quarterly* 30 (Oct. 1973): 575-598.
- "Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland: Une Question Mal Posée." *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 30, no. 4 (1979): 423-450.
- "Writing Early-Modern History: Ireland, Britain, and the Wider World." *The Historical Journal* 46 (2003): 723-747.
- Carey, Vincent. "John Derricke's *Image of Ireland*: Sir Henry Sidney and the Massacre at Mullaghmast, 1578." *Irish Historical Studies* 31 (1999): 305-27.
- Cruikshank, Charles G. "Dead-Pays in the Elizabethan Army." *English Historical Review* 53, no. 209 (January 1938): 93-97.
- Cunningham, Bernadette. "The Composition of Connacht in the Lordships of Clanricard and Thomond, 1577-1641." *Irish Historical Studies* 24 (May 1984): 1-14.
- Dawson, Jane E. A. "William Cecil and the British Dimension of Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy." *History* 74 (1989): 196-216.
- Delle, James A. "'Good and Easy Speculation': Spatial Conflict, Collusion and Resistance in Late Sixteenth-Century Munster, Ireland." *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 3 (1999): 11-35.
- Dickins, Bruce. "The Irish Broadside of 1571 and Queen Elizabeth's Types." *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society* 1 (1949): 48-60.
- Dorrian, Mark. "On Some Spatial Aspects of the Colonial Discourse on Ireland." *The Journal of Architecture* 6, no. 1 (2001): 27-51.

- Edwards, David. "Beyond Reform: Martial Law and the Tudor Re-conquest of Ireland." *History Ireland* 5, no. 2 (1997): 16-21.
- . "'Some Days Two Heads and Some Days Four'." *History Ireland* 17 (2009): 18-21.
- Ellis, Steven G. "The Collapse of the Gaelic World, 1450-1650." *Irish Historical Studies* 31 (Nov. 1999): 449-469.
- . "Economic Problems of the Church: Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland." *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 41 (1990): 239-265.
- Elton, G.R. "Tudor Government: The Points of Contact, 1: The Parliament." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series* 24 (1974): 183-200.
- . "Tudor Government: The Points of Contact, 2: The Council." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series* 25 (1975): 195-211.
- . "Tudor Government: The Points of Contact, 3: The Court." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series* 26 (1976): 211-228.
- Falls, Cyril. "The Growth of Irish Military Strength in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century." *The Irish Sword* 2 (1956): 103-108.
- Gibney, John. "Early Modern Ireland: A British Atlantic Colony?" *History Compass* 6 (2008): 172-182.
- Green, David. "The Statute of Kilkenny (1366): Legislation and the State." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27, no. 2 (2014): 236-262.
- Gunther, Karl. "The Origins of English Puritanism." *History Compass* 4, no. 2 (2006): 235-240.
- Guy, John. "Imagining and Detecting Conspiracy, 1571-1605." Public Lecture [no longer accessible online].
- Hammer, Paul E. J. "The Earl of Essex, Fulke Greville, and the Employment of Scholars." *Studies in Philology* 91 (1994): 167-180.
- . "Essex and Europe: Evidence from Confidential Instructions by the Earl of Essex, 1595-6." *English Historical Review* 111 (1996): 357-381.
- . "How to Become an Elizabethan Statesman: Lord Henry Howard, the Earl of Essex and the Politics of Friendship." *English Manuscript Studies 1100-1700* 13 (2007): 1-34.
- . "Myth-Making: Politics, Propaganda and the Capture of Cadiz in 1596." *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 3 (1997): 621-642.

- . "The Uses of Scholarship: The Secretariat of Robert Devereux, Second Earl of Essex, c. 1585-1601." *English Historical Review* 109 (1994): 26-51.
- Harbin, Michael A. "Tale of Two Henries: Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland." *Fides et Historia* 50, no. 2 (2018): 100-112.
- Hayes-McCoy, G. A. "The Army in Ulster, 1593-1601." *The Irish Sword* 1 (1953): 109-117.
- . "Strategy and Tactics in Irish Warfare, 1593-1601." *Irish Historical Studies* 2 (1941): 255-279.
- Heal, Felicity. "Mediating the Word: Language and Dialects in the British and Irish Reformations." *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 56, no. 2 (2005): 261-286.
- Heffernan, David. "Political Discourse and the Nine Years' War in Late Elizabethan Ireland, c. 1593-1603." *Historical Research* 94, no. 264 (2021): 282-302.
- Hooper, "Writing and Landscape in Early Modern Ireland," *Literature & History* 5, no. 2 (1996):
- Hope, Warren. "Geoffrey Fenton." *The Oxfordian* 20 (2018): 157-158.
- Hoskins, W. G. "Harvest Fluctuations and English Economic History, 1480-1619." *The Agricultural History Review* 12, no. 1 (1964): 28-46.
- Houston, R. A. "People, Space and Law in Late Medieval Britain and Ireland." *Past & Present* 230, no. 1 (2016): 47-89.
- Hunt, Arnold. "The Early Modern Secretary and the Early Modern Archive." *Proceedings of the British Academy* 212 (2018): 105-130.
- Hutchinson, Mark. "Emergence of the State in Elizabethan Ireland and England, ca. 1575-99." *Sixteenth Century Journal* 45, no. 3 (2014): 659-682.
- Jardine, Lisa, and Anthony Grafton. "'Studied for Action': How Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy." *Past & Present*, no. 129 (1990): 30-78.
- Jefferies, Henry A. "Conversion by Coercion? The Reformation in Ireland." *History Ireland* 26 (2018): 14-17.
- . "Elizabeth's Reformation in the Irish Pale." *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 66, no. 3 (2015): 524-542.
- . "Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland." *Irish Historical Studies* 40, no. 158 (2016): 151-170.

- Jensen, De Lamar. "The Spanish Armada: The Worst-Kept Secret in Europe." *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 19, no. 4 (1988): 621-641.
- Jones, Frederick. "James Blake of Galway and the Death of Red Hugh O'Donnell." *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* 75 (1951): 30-38.
- . "James Blake and the Projected Invasion of Galway in 1602." *Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society* 24 (1950): 1-18.
- Kane, Brendan. "Ordinary Violence? Ireland as Emergency in the Tudor State." *History* 99 (2014): 444-67.
- Lennon, Colm. "Education and Religious Identity in Early Modern Ireland." *Paedagogica Historica* 35 (1999): 57-75.
- McClintock Dix, E. R. "William Kearney, the Second Earliest Known Printer in Dublin." *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy. Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* 28 (1910): 157-61.
- McCormack, Anthony M. "The Social and Economic Consequences of the Desmond Rebellion of 1579-1583." *IHS* 34 (2004): 1-15.
- McGurk, John. "The Flight of the Earls: Escape or Strategic Regrouping?" *History Ireland* 15 (2007): 16-21.
- . "Hugh Ó Neill, 2nd Earl of Tyrone, & Captain Thomas Lee, Double-Agent." *Dúiche Néill: Journal of the O'Neill Country Historical Society*, xv (2006): 11-25.
- Mooney, Canice. "The Death of Red Hugh O'Donnell." *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* lxxxix (1954): 328-345.
- Morgan, Hiram. "The Deputy's Defence: Sir William Fitzwilliam's Apology on the Outbreak of the Nine Years War in Ireland." *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature* 114C (2014): 181-214.
- . "Faith and fatherland in Sixteenth-Century Ireland." *History Ireland* 3, no. 2 (1995): 13-20.
- . "'Never Any Realm Worse Governed': Queen Elizabeth and Ireland." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 14 (2004): 295-308.
- . "Overmighty Officers." *History Ireland* 7, no. 4 (1999): 17-21.
- . "Writing Up Early Modern Ireland." *Historical Journal* 31 (1988): 701-711.
- Morrissey, John. "Contours of Colonialism: Gaelic Ireland and the Early Colonial Subject." *Irish*

- Geography* 37 (2004): 88-102.
- Murphy, Neil. "Violence, Colonization and Henry VIII's Conquest of France, 1544-1546." *Past & Present* 233 (2016): 13-51.
- Murray, James. "The Sources of Clerical Income in the Tudor Diocese of Dublin, c. 1530-1600." *Archivium Hibernicum* 46 (1991): 139-60.
- Murray, James, Alan Ford, J. I. McGuire, S. J. Connolly, Fergus O'Ferrall, and Kenneth Milne. "The Church of Ireland: A Critical Bibliography, 1536-1992." *Irish Historical Studies* 28, no. 112 (1993): 345-84.
- Myers, James P. "Murdering Heart...Murdering Hand': Captain Thomas Lee of Ireland, Elizabethan Assassin." *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 22, no. 1 (1991): 47-60.
- Nolan, John. "The Militarization of the Elizabethan State." *Journal of Military History* 58 (1994): 391-420.
- Ó Ciosáin, Niall. "Print and Irish, 1570-1900: An Exception among the Celtic Languages?" *Radharc* 5, no. 7 (2004-2006): 73-106.
- Ó hAnnracháin, Tadhg. "Catholic Reform in Ireland in a European Context." *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 106 (2017): 459-461.
- "Catholicism in Early Modern Ireland and Britain." *History Compass* 3, no. 1 (2005) BI 143: 1-17.
- "Conflicting Loyalties, Conflicted Rebels: Political and Religious Allegiance Among the Confederate Catholics of Ireland." *English Historical Review* 119, no. 483 (2004): 851-72.
- Ó Néill, Eoin. "Towards a New Interpretation of the Nine Years' War," *The Irish Sword* 26 (2009): 241-262.
- O'Neill, James. "Breaking the Heart of Tyrone's Rebellion? A Reassessment of Mountjoy's First Campaigns in Ulster, May-November 1600." *Dúiche Néill: Journal of the O'Neill Country Historical Society* xxiv (2017): 18-37.
- "Like Sheep to the Shambles? Slaughter and Surrender During Tyrone's Rebellion, 1593-1603." *For The Irish Sword* 31 (Winter 2018): 366-80.
- Palmer, Patricia. "Interpreters and the Politics of Translation and Traduction in Sixteenth-Century Ireland." *IHS* 33 (2003): 257-277.
- Palmer, William. "Early Modern Irish Exceptionalism Revisited." *The Historian (Kingston)* 79, no. 1 (2017): 9-31.



- Parrott, David. "Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The 'Military Revolution'." *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 2 (1985): 7-25.
- Pawlich, Hans. "Sir John Davies, the Ancient Constitution, and Civil Law." *The Historical Journal* 23, no. 3 (1980): 689-702.
- Pettegree, Andrew and Matthew Hall. "The Reformation and the Book: A Reconsideration." *The Historical Journal* 47 (2004): 785–808.
- Quinn, David B. "Government Printing and the Publication of the Irish Statutes in the Sixteenth Century." *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* 49 (1943): 45–129.
- Rapple, Rory. "Taking up Office in Elizabethan Connacht: The Case of Sir Richard Bingham." *English Historical Review* 123, no. 501 (2008): 277-299.
- "Writing About Violence in the Tudor Kingdoms." *The Historical Journal* 54 (2011): 829-854.
- Robinson-Hammerstein, Helga. "Aspects of the Continental Education of Irish Students in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I." *Historical Studies* 8 (1971): 137-153.
- Rogers, Clifford. "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War." *Journal of Military History* 57 (April 1993): 241-277.
- Sheehan, Anthony. "Irish Revenues and English Subventions, 1559-1622." *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature* 90C (1990): 35-65.
- "The Overthrow of the Plantation of Munster in October 1598." *The Irish Sword: The Journal of the Military History Society of Ireland* 15 (1982): 11-22.
- Smuts, Malcolm. "Organized Violence in the Elizabethan Monarchical Republic." *History* 99 (2014): 418-443.
- Spooner, Aaron. "Shakespeare's Itinerant Soldiers and Foreign Wars: The Elizabethan Crisis of Debt in the Economy of Hal's England." *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 12 (2012): 49-84.
- Stone, Lawrence. "Prosopography." *Daedalus* 100 (1971): 46-79.
- Treadwell, Victor. "The Establishment of the Farm of the Irish Customs 1603-13." *English Historical Review* 93, no. 368 (1978): 580-602.

----- "Sir John Perrot and the Irish Parliament of 1585-6." *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, Section C, Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* 85 (1985): 259-308.

Turvey, Roger. "Sir John Perrot (1528–92): A Fourth Centenary Retrospective." *Journal of the Pembroke Historical Society* 5 (1992–3): 15-30.

----- "Sir John Perrot, Henry VIII's Bastard? The Destruction of a Myth." *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1992): 79-94.

Walsh, Paul. "James Blake of Galway." *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* 50 (1937): 382-397.

Walshe, Helen Coburn. "Enforcing the Elizabethan Settlement: The Vicissitudes of Hugh Brady, Bishop of Meath, 1563-1584." *IHS* 26 (1989): 352-376.

Walter, John. "A 'Rising of the People'? The Oxfordshire Rising of 1596." *Past & Present* 107 (1985): 90-143.

Walter, John and Keith Wrightson. "Dearth and the Social Order in Early Modern England." *Past & Present* 71 (1976): 22-42.

Wong, Jane Yeang Chui. "The (Mis)Fortunes of the Nine Years' War: Accountability and War Profiteering in Shakespeare's *Richard II* and *1 Henry IV*." *ELH* 88 (2021): 27-53.

### **Unpublished Dissertations**

Acres, William Dixon. "The Early Political Career of Sir Robert Cecil, c. 1582-1597: Some Aspects of Late Elizabethan Secretarial Administration." PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 1992.

Bleiweis, Susan. "The Elizabethan Intelligence Service, 1572-1585." PhD diss., Rutgers University, 1976.

Brady, Ciaran. "The Government of Ireland, c. 1540-1583." PhD diss., Trinity College, 1980.

Ellis, Steven G. "The Administration of the Lordship of Ireland Under the Early Tudors." PhD diss., Queen's University, Belfast, 1979.

Fellheimer, Jeannette. "Geoffrey Fenton: A Study in Elizabethan Translation." PhD diss., Yale University, 1941.

Heffernan, David. "Tudor 'Reform' Treatises and Government Policy in Sixteenth-Century Ireland." PhD diss., University College Cork, 2012.

- Mains, Christopher. "Sir Robert Cecil and Elizabethan Intelligencing, 1590-1603." PhD diss., The Open University, 2020.
- Murray, James. "The Tudor Diocese of Dublin: Episcopal Government, Ecclesiastical Politics and the Enforcement of the Reformation, c. 1534-1590." PhD diss., University of Dublin, 1997.
- Peters, Jason. "The King James Bible and Its Readers: Constructing Readable Space in Post-Reformation England." PhD diss., University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 2009.
- Pluymers, Keith. "Colonizing Lands and Landscapes in the English Atlantic, c. 1580-c.1640." PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2015.
- Tu, Hsuan-Ying. "The Pursuit of God's Glory: Francis Walsingham's Espionage in Elizabethan Politics, 1568-1588," PhD diss., University of York, 2012.
- Turvey, Roger. "The Perrot Family and Their Circle in Southwest Wales during the Later Middle Ages." PhD diss., University of Wales, Swansea, 1988.
- Vaughn, Jacqueline D. "Secretaries, Statesmen and Spies: The Clerks of the Tudor Privy Council, c.1540-c.1603." PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 2007.