“Energy as Coercion, The Strategy of Bargaining”

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Abstract

The pursuit of energy security by states has become incredibly important as the international world continues to globalize. Part of this push for increased energy security has come from an increased threat of energy coercion from states that supply a large amount of another state's resources. This dependance is dangerous and not only puts an actor's energy security at risk, but also its national security. In this thesis I seek to uncover how strategic culture can further clarify the outcome of coercive scenarios involving energy. If states' maintain an understanding of target or sender state's strategic culture, potential responses to coercive threats can be better addressed or circumvented all together. This thesis analyzes the influence that strategic culture has on the success or failure in coercive bargaining scenarios involving energy. Theorized in this thesis is the idea that locus of control within a state, which influences a state's strategic culture, can determine whether a coercion scenario fails or succeeds. Conclusions were drawn from an interactive case study of three different instances of coercive bargaining with energy. These scenarios involved a sender and target state where the sender state was attempting to influence the target state with their energy access. The specific scenarios analyzed were the U.S. Japan oil embargo in 1941, the OPEC U.S. oil embargo in 1973, and the Russia Ukraine gas shut offs from 2004-2009. The evidence found in the case studies supported my theory that strategic culture influences how states respond to coercive bargaining. All else holding equal, an internal locus of control makes a target state unlikely to capitulate in a scenario involving energy, and external locus of control makes a target state more likely to capitulate in a coercive scenario involving energy.

Introduction

In a world where globalization has connected the entire globe, the pursuit of securing resource and specifically energy resources has a long history. Today many countries seek to secure their energy security in order to protect themselves and their economy from any price disruptions, supply chain issues, or other vulnerabilities. Energy security can generally be described as the "maintenance of a reliable supply at prices that are affordable to consumers, yet profitable enough for producers to justify investments in future production."[1]Because energy sources are located across different areas of the world and not every state can access them equally, some industrialized democracies are considered energy secure, and others insecure.

Energy security has the "ability to shape policies and countries behaviors whilst also determining whether or not economic and societal demands for energy are sufficiently met."[2] Therefore, energy security has its roots based in ensuring consumer demand within a country is met so that the country may continue to run smoothly. Energy encapsulates and is interwoven into almost all aspects of modern life, which means that the country, society, and the economy rely on energy in order to function properly in the capacity its citizens and its government are accustomed to. This means that when energy is put at risk by states who have the monopoly on its access for other states, a nations entire national security can be put at risk.

Energy reliance can be leveraged by ill meaning actors to achieve foreign policy goals or military goals by threatening access to natural resources. When a state has a monopoly on another state's access to energy such as oil, natural gas, or electricity, that state has the capability to coercively bargain with that energy in order to gain something from the other state that is

[1] Gavin Bridge and Philippe Le Billon, *Oil*, 2013, 96, http://site.ebrary.com/id/10763028.
[2] Abdelrahman Azzuni and Christian Breyer, "Global Energy Security Index and Its Application on National Level," *Energies* 13, no. 10 (May 15, 2020): 2502, https://doi.org/10.3390/en13102502.

reliant on access to that energy. In other words, the sender state can use the energy they provide to the target state to coercively bargain with that state. In some scenarios of coercive bargaining the sender of the threat cannot achieve what they are asking of the target if they do not acquiesce to the sender's threat and demands. In other scenarios the sender can achieve whatever their goal is by means, but they are bargaining with the state to get their demand without either nation involved losing in some capacity.

There are a multitude of ways to try to secure energy, but most efforts are enacted through foreign policy, or geopolitical and military efforts. When energy is not sufficiently secured, like in the 1973 oil crisis, natural disasters, political uprisings, or coercion in producer states, can have devastating effects on countries that rely on the flow of fuel resources like oil to keep their industry and economy running smoothly. Due to limited supply elasticity any kind of political unrest becomes "magnified through fluctuation and unpredictable prices."[3] This vulnerability is then compounded as disruption in these sectors will also affect other areas of security in countries. If access to fuel is disrupted in a state, and the economy begins to struggle, weakness in the eyes of other states could affect efforts towards nuclear deterrence, domestic security issues or international security issues. A large part of energy security today revolves around one all-important fuel, oil, but in looking back at history oil was just as, if not more important in the world than today. Efforts to secure oil make up the majority of energy security efforts as states seek to protect, preserve, and procure the resource in order to continue using it to fuel the baseline of their industry.

Some states have even been found to use coercive bargaining in energy as one of their more common strategies to influence other states or punish them for prior action. This is often

[3] Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, eds., *Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 13.

called “oil coercion” and it involves a systematic effort to win by removing the targets access to petroleum in order to influence or change that countries policy decision making. Not only is this tactic utilized by the military on the battlefield, but also to meet political goals. Russia has been well documented as utilizing this strategy in order to try to achieve political means in other states, as well as the US and some Arab states. In these coercion scenarios the majority of the time the target state is unaware or unwilling to invest time or money into lessening this vulnerability. In all realities these coercion scenarios are generally unavoidable. If a country is not resource rich and has to rely on exports from one who is there will always be a chance that political coercion from the exporting country could result. However, what is the rationale behind the outcome of these scenarios? Why do some coercive bargaining events succeed and why do others fail? Is there a way to try to predict actor behavior on either side of the target- sender relationship and if so, could this be used to analyze future coercion scenarios?

This thesis seeks to answer these questions by applying a study of state’s individual strategic culture to coercive bargaining scenario involving energy. A nation's strategic culture is generally understood as a subsection of a nation's political culture, which is created through the intersection and combination of values, societal and economic norms, and the “regional and extra regional security environments.”[4] Much of a state's security identity and culture can be observed through their prior decisions and actions regarding threats or decision making internationally. The effects of history, geography, cultural values, and a multitude of other factors all influence state strategic culture. Though one can get an idea of a nation's security culture through prior action, culture is not fixed and changes quite slowly over time. Culture and strategic culture are

[4] Pascual and Elkind, *Energy Security*.

likely to change in small increments over large spans of time, which will allow for analyzing cultures influence on state strategy.

This paper will seek to understand how a state's strategic culture influences their success or failure with coercive bargaining in the realm of energy. A full analysis of each state's entire strategic culture would require a larger breadth of study than this paper is capable of, so each state's strategic culture will be defined by only one of its many variables, locus of control. Alastair Ian Johnston, one of the first to study strategic culture defines this variable as the efficacy of force, or a state's inherent sense of ability to influence others and exert their will. This will now be further referred to as a measure of a state's locus of control, either deemed to be internal (feeling of capability to control or influence over themselves and others), or external (feeling of being controlled or unable to exert control over others).[5]

The purpose of this paper is to ask the question of how do internal or external locus's of control as a part of a state's strategic culture influence their decision making and subsequent success or failure in coercive bargaining scenarios involving energy. My theory states that due to a multitude of influential variables which culminate in locus of control, each state has an individual strategic culture that influences their strategic culture decisions. This strategic culture definition can then be sued to determine coercive success or failure in bargaining scenarios involving energy sources.

Chapters one through three will examine the prior literature on the subject as well as the theoretical foundations applicable to this study including its scope parameters for a qualitative case study analysis. Chapters four through six will examine coercion scenarios with each state's

[5] Peter B. Smith, Fons Trompenaars, and Shaun Dugan, "The Rotter Locus of Control Scale in 43 Countries: A Test of Cultural Relativity," *International Journal of Psychology* 30, no. 3 (January 1995): 377–400, https://doi.org/10.1080/00207599508246576.

strategic culture and influences evaluated, as well as how that culture influenced success or failure. In all three case studies: the United States oil embargo of 1941, the OPEC oil cut off of 1973, and the Russia gas shut off of 2004-2009, it was observed that states can only succeed in coercive bargaining with energy if the sender state has an internal locus of control and the target state has an external locus of control. If there is any other combination of strategic culture loci of control, the coercion will fail.

This study is seeking to make clear what actors can do to try to understand coercive bargaining scenarios and how to respond to demands from other actors. While the rational actor perspective cis most often referenced in interactive scenarios, sometimes it is not entirely sufficient in accounting for states decision making. This paper focuses on coercive interactions to understand the events where rational actor perspective has difficulty explaining actor behavior. Analyzing a state's strategic culture takes into account specific culture and history and how that influences strategic decisions and interactions involving energy. Without an understanding between states of who they are trying to coerce, or who is trying to coerce them, possible outcomes within the coercion scenario will not be considered and leave states vulnerable. An understanding of the strategic culture that influences state's actions can clarify for international actors how to best guard against further coercion or respond to it. An understanding of a nation's strategic culture is integral for an adversarial nation and a target nation as knowing how it differs from one's own can help to identify strategies or resources that could be used in order to defeat or control an enemy.

Chapter 1

Literature Review

Energy Security

As the world has continued to become more and more globalized countries have sought to make up for resources that they are lacking in through trade. Many of these deficits have come in the form of natural resources as they are unevenly distributed throughout the world and become more and more in demand as the world has continued to industrialize. As some states have become major exporters for resources, others have become entirely dependent on one or two states for access to the resources they need to maintain their economy and society. Energy dependance has become increasingly utilized as a weapon by resource rich actors who seek to use their power for political gain.

This threat has caused many countries to try to further diversify their energy portfolio and seek out further energy security for the future. Energy security has many definitions, and they can all be generally characterized by "sources of risk, scope of impacts, and the severity of filters in the form of the speed, size, sustentation, spread, singularity and sureness of impacts."[6] However, in a paper written by Christian Winzer, the general definition of energy security as " the continuity of energy supplies relative to demand."[7] The most broad concept of energy security references all risks that have an impact on the simply chain, but can be narrowed by identifying different sources of risk and impact measures. This further narrowing of the concept will help future scholars and researchers in addressing supply chain issues. Security risk for an energy supply is not solely linked to fossil fuels such as oil and gas, but also relates to the supply

[6] Christian Winzer, "Conceptualizing Energy Security," *Energy Policy* 46 (July 1, 2012): 36–48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.02.067.
[7] Winzer.

of electricity, where the same concepts and ideals of security can be applied. When a state is vulnerable to cut offs of vital resources such as electricity, steps must be taken to remedy the vulnerability. If a state can recognize risk in terms of the factors mentioned above, then they can reevaluate their infrastructure in order to improve the supply security of their country.

Azzuni and Breyer, the authors of a study on global energy security, create an overview and a history of energy security, when it became prevalent, and why it is essential. These authors seek to further expand upon the variables that Winzer identified as possible risk factors to a country's energy security. Taking it a step further, this paper creates the framework for an index that can be used to rate countries energy security and threat level based on trade data. Index's such as this allows for states to address and recognize possible threats to its energy security, which can affect overall national security. As energy affects all aspects of life, the security of energy within a state is integral to preserving the economy, culture, and society of all states.[8] When energy security is threatened, a state's societies entire way of life is threatened. This study creates a formula and statistical method to rank countries' energy security in an index that is globally comprehensive. Fifteen different dimensions that encompass energy security are evaluated and state performance in these dimensions ranks each states. Research like this allows countries to assess where their energy vulnerabilities lie, but when considering offensive strategies this research also reveals to possible enemy coercer states where their target states weaknesses lie.

While electricity and water have become vulnerable to supply chain disruptions in recent years, they are less often weaponized than fossil fuels like oil and gas. *Oil,* by Bridge and Le Billon addresses this vulnerability and offers insight into how oil has become intertwined in our

[8] Azzuni and Breyer, "Global Energy Security Index and Its Application on National Level."

daily lives, while also touching on the significance that that influence could have on our future. As globalization continues, Bridge and Le Billon point out how the new geopolitics of oil must change with the times and global governance of how oil is sold and bartered will be imperative to the future of state security.[9] In order to address how globalization is affecting geopolitical natural resource trade interactions, governments and actors are simultaneously charged with finding solutions to the growing challenges affecting the oil industry. Addressing price volatility, firms working to decarbonize energy, and improving how oil is governed in main oil exporting states are all vital to improving the oil industries future, and therefore further securing the energy supply. Once these other variables are addressed, Bridge and Le Billon believe that states can move on to quantifying countries energy vulnerabilities and use that information as possible leverage over others, or to address their energy security.

Coercive Bargaining

In the balance of power dynamic that we have come to know throughout the world, it is impossible for all states and actors to be fully content with their situation. As tends to befit the constant drive for more that defines human nature, states also consistently seek out change. One of the ways they do this is through coercion. Though not an uncommon technique utilized in wars or battles, more often coercion has begun to influence bargaining scenarios.

Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence*, written in the Cold War era, is one of the premier foundational academic writings on coercive bargaining and deterrence. Almost all coercive bargaining literature that has been published since Schelling's writing of this in 1966 has built off Schelling's main points first introduced in this book. Schelling puts strong emphasis

[9] Bridge and Le Billon, *Oil*.

on psychological and context driven power bases which comes in contrast to realists who stress the more material foundations of bases of power. Schelling details how diplomacy and bargaining are one and the same, though bargaining can often look on the outside as more intense and heated negotiations.[10] Schelling goes on to discuss massive retaliation, which he sees as closely interconnected with the idea of the "diplomacy of ultimate survival." "Diplomacy of violence" is also mentioned, and it explores the idea that the exploitation of a state's bargaining power to either threaten or preserve another state is a kind of diplomacy.

Bargaining outcomes can be seen to be influenced by more than just a state's military capabilities or interests. Rather, three other factors that play a role just as important. These factors are context, skill, and willingness to suffer. Schelling's main theory on bargaining in this book revolves around how military strength is used for this means of bargaining. If this is true, it then begs the question of whether control of vital resources can have the same kind of influence and effect on bargaining as military influence does.

Building off of Schelling's ideas, Sechser, analyzes reputations and signaling within coercive bargaining. His article investigates the relationship between reputation and coercive diplomacy, as well as asks the question of when do states willingly hurt their reputation or stand by it. Sechser argues that states who do not expect future threats are more likely to put their reputation in jeopardy by caving to coercive threats. Those who try to coerce but are unable to initiate future challenges were found to have generally higher rates of coercive success.[11] Most scholars tend to agree that reputation matters to states and other states tend to take that into account when making decisions. This research on signaling identifies possible patterns in

[10] THOMAS C. SCHELLING, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vm52s.
[11] Todd S. Sechser, "Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 2 (February 2018): 318–45, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716652687.

coercive bargaining of failure and success. Determining when a state finds their reputation worth defending versus capitulating to coercive demands that would hurt their reputation would have extensive implications for understanding the rationale behind success and failure in these scenarios.

Coercion at the basest level can be generally defined as the practice of attempting to persuade someone to do something through the use of threats or some kind of force. Coercion in the space of international relations can mean many things, coercive bargaining, bombing, terrorism, economic sanctions, and nuclear threats.[12] In an unpublished manuscript on coercion, Steven Beard reconstructs the basic idea behind coercive success by referencing a series of formal models. Beard clarifies the differences between coercion by punishment and coercion in the shadow of brute force while thoroughly analyzing different models of coercion by punishment. Perceived credibility also played a large role in coercive success or failure and often depended on three factors, an "actors time horizons, the presence of commitment devices and socially constructed intersubjective beliefs."[13] Contrary to prior research, when an actor has long time horizons, they always experience multiple equilibria and coercive success ultimately can only be achieved if both sides are of the mutual belief that the coercion will work. This is due to the fact that when time horizons are longer, both actors involved are focused on their reputations and possible future benefits.

Goldmark and La Rocco take their study on coercion a step further by examining the explicit connections between North and South with specific emphasis put on to the case of energy. The two authors focus on how and where on the world stage its influence might become

[12] Steven Beard, "Explaining Coercive Success: Commitment Devices, Socially Constructed Beliefs, and Time Horizons" Unpublished Manuscript (September 8, 2022).
[13] Beard.

the most extensive and how that can relate to coercive scenarios.[14] Economic interests are generally the catalysts for global bargaining, but the pursuit of energy can also be included as a catalyst or deterrent to a bargain's success or failure. This paper describes how bargaining differs from other pursuits of economic interests, in that bargaining also pursues not only a singular interest but a planetary interest as well.[15] As energy security has come to the forefront of foreign policy in recent years, energy bargaining has been seen to come hand in hand with it at the same time.

Strategic Culture

Strategic culture, while a lesser studied concept, holds much promise in helping to clarify why some states act one way, and others act differently. An understanding of how a multitude of variables can influence actor decision making is vital to understanding states that may pose a threat in the future. Cultural factors tend to influence state decision making, which sometimes means that states don't always act in the rational way that others expect them to. Awareness of another states strategic culture is an important tool that many states can put to use.

The first generation of scholarship on strategic culture emerged in the early 1980's. Many scholars were seeking to explain why the Soviets and the Americans were thought to think differently about their nuclear strategies.[16] Gray, one of the most prominent of this first generation argued that any perceived differences between the Soviets and the Americans were caused by individual variation in "macroenvironmental variables" such as geography, political

[14] P C Goldmark and P LaRocco, "Global Energy Bargaining," *Annual Review of Energy and the Environment* 17, no. 1 (November 1992): 77–95, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.eg.17.110192.000453.
[15] Goldmark and LaRocco.
[16] Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 49–69, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097575.

culture, and historical experience[17]. Due to American and Soviet differences in these areas, each state had unique ways of thinking and taking action in terms of force that informed dominant national beliefs responsible for decision making by those in power.[18] The first generations concept of strategic culture included a large number of variables such as "technology, geography, historical practices, political culture, political psychology, national character etc."[19]

In the mid 1980's the second generation emerged in the literature on strategic culture. This generation focused heavily on defining if there was a difference between what decision makers do, versus the possible deeper and unacknowledged motives for what they do. Bradley S Klein, a prominent academic in the second generation focused on strategic culture as a byproduct of a shared historical experience, which seeing as the history would differ from state to state, would result in different state strategic cultures[20]

Edward Lock, another academic in the second generation plays off of Klein's base work but applies contemporary critical constructivist theory. Lock's new conception of strategic culture allowed for reverse analysis of how strategic behavior could be traced to the identity of those engaging in strategic behavior, as well as how strategic culture can make strategic behavior meaningful.[21] Rather than determining how a security communities strategic culture influences its behavior, Lock searches for an understanding of how strategic practices create security communities and form relationships between different communities.

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[17] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119.
[18] Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security* 6, no. 2 (1981): 21–47, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538645.
[19] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture."
[20] Bradley S. Klein, "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics," *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 2 (1988): 133–48, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097137.
[21] Edward Lock, "Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 3 (2010): 685–708, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40783291.

Alastair Johnston takes the research on culture and security a step further. A member of the third generation of scholars working on strategic culture, Johnston assesses the prior literature focused on strategic culture, beginning at the start of the cold war, and how that has shaped the area of study.[22] Johnston also focuses on finding problems within the literature and the knowledge on the subject whilst simultaneously providing solutions to these same problems. Johnston provides what he calls a more "serviceable definition" for strategic culture that can be better applied to future research as well as further defines that strategic culture may have an influence on state behavior.

Prior strategic decisions and history within the state all influence how those states' strategic cultures are defined, and this culture gives emphasis to the way it influences strategic choices in unique ways. This article by Johnston differs from many of the prior generations work as he chose to define and operationalize strategic culture through a numeric sliding scale. This scale was measured using three variables, zero sum nature, efficacy of violence and the role of war in human affairs. Johnston differs greatly from other generations in that he also does not believe that strategic culture can be assigned to a particular state which was a defining characteristic of Gray's work on Soviet and US strategic cultures.

In a paper written by Jeannie Johnson, the author defines four key factors that underpin strategic culture. These four factors are: identity, values, norms, and perceptions. Identity can be seen to indicate strategic culture through the thought that although realism tends to present state actors as acting in a rational interest, the state's view of itself and its perceptions of its destiny and future can warp some states perceptions of what rational choice is. In order to truly understand a strategic culture analysis, one must acknowledge the "assumption that states may have diverse

[22] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture."

goals based on a normative understanding of who they are, and what role they should be playing."[23] When analyzing a state's values, these can reveal strategic choices and priorities within a country. Norms, which can be defined as expected and acceptable kinds of behavior can serve to underline some choices a state might forego. The last factor, perception looks at the naturally interpretive nature of politics. A state's own perception of fact including its "own histories, image abroad, motivations of others, capabilities of [their] leadership, and of the national resources available" can all alter a state's consideration of what is rational or appropriate strategy.[24]

Chapter 2

Theoretical Foundations

Since strategic culture was first introduced in academia in 1977, strategic culture research has remained an underexplored and quite nebulous topic.[25] Strategic culture research is said to challenge previous approaches to studying strategic choices like the "non cultural neorealist" classical framework that is generally used.[26] Efforts by three generations of scholars have worked to further apply this concept to state behavior, and explore how, or if strategic culture, can be used as a determining factor for strategic behavior chosen and enacted by key individuals.

Johnston, a representative of the third generation of strategic culture theorizes that strategic culture has an observable effect on state behavior. Johnston also writes that those in the

[23] Jeannie L. Johnson, "Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct," 2006, 11.
[24] Johnson, 13.
[25] Stuart Poore, "What Is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 279–84, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210503002791.
[26] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture."

third generation share the first generations held belief that "ideational or cultural variables indeed have an effect on behavior."[27] When elites who are making decisions are socialized in different strategic cultures, it is believed that these elites will then make choices different than others even when placed in similar situations.[28] To determine how strategic culture affects behavior and strategic decisions, we must first define what strategic culture is, and how it is formed. In order to do this, we must also discern the difference between how we expect strategic culture to have been created differently in states, but also how we will use one definition and one process to explore and define a state's strategic culture.

The general definitions of culture tend to describe a certain set of assumptions and decisions that have the ability to create order within societies or an individual's own beliefs about many different kinds of environments.[29] As per Johnston, the definition of strategic culture does not stray far from the general definitions of culture. Culture is a system of symbols ingrained in the innate values of a society, "argumentation, structures, languages, analogies, and metaphors" which establishes a "pervasive and long-lasting strategic preference" that is perceived as part of a role for a key decision maker.[30] This ingraining of symbols in a role for the decision maker allows for them to perceive the strategic preferences as "uniquely realistic and effacious."[31] This means that we need to trace strategic culture from the decision making that it causes, back through the socialization process to the values, assumptions, history, and geography that influence the ideals held by key decisions makers who inform strategy decisions. In order to

[27] Johnston, 42.
[28] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture."
[29] Johnston.
[30] Johnston.
[31] Johnston.

do this, there has to be "observable indicators" for the presence of strategic culture in order to actually trace its effects on behavior.[32]

Much of the current scholarly opinion on strategic culture rests on an idea of a central paradigm which is comprised of three variables that help to rank states in order to determine strategic decision making. One has to take into account the nature of the adversary and the threat they may pose which enters into a "zero sum or variable sum game."[33] The second variable focuses on the efficacy of the use of force, which can be essentially boiled down to a perceived "ability to control outcomes and eliminate threats."[34] The third factor assumes an organization of the strategic environment and what the "role of war is in human affairs."[35] The purpose of the paradigm is to provide information that will allow academics or rival states, to reduce their uncertainty about particular strategic environment. Reducing this uncertainty will come from the three variables, which are informed based on the state from historical sources, prior strategy, or norms.[36] A strategic culture cannot be determined from this paradigm alone, one must also weigh how likely the key decision makers are to make assumptions at an operational level about which strategic option will be the most useful for handling the threat and the threat environment.[37]

[32] Johnston, 46.
[33] Johnston, 46.
[34] Johnston, 46.
[35] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture."
[36] Johnston.
[37] Johnston.

Figure 1. The Central Paradigm of Strategic Culture



[38]

One can see how the paradigm works by referencing Figure 1, which is a model created by Johnston. The frequency of conflict in human affairs, is combined with the efficacy of violence and the zero-sum nature of conflict to place states on continuum. If a state was on the high end of all three variables, a state's strategic culture might rank offensive strategies the highest as these strategies would best handle zero sum threats more positively than more accommodationist strategies. A state ranking on the low end is more likely to prefer a more accommodationist approach which utilizes diplomatic tools or tradeoffs to handle the threat.[39] Johnstons approach of beginning to define what different states strategic cultures are influenced by, and how it can inform decision making will help outline the base theory of this thesis. The level of preference that can

[38] Johnston.
[39] Johnston.

influence action creates the foundation for where strategic culture begins to apply and influence choices directly.[40]

Gray points out that for a state or certain security community, a mix of comparative advantages and disadvantages help to create dominant strategic culture. This mix also creates an idea of what kind of strategic activities the state is more likely to take part in.[41] These advantages and disadvantages could be seen as an easy access warm water port, or the absence of natural resources on the land.[42] This also can be viewed not only as what activities the state will take part in, but also what strategic activities they are most likely to succeed in.[43] This prior success or failure helps to influence strategic culture and the decision making of those in power in ways that could be perceived by enemy states. The idea of a defined strategic culture that narrows down what an enemy state thinks another might do in reaction to some kind of threat, also includes how a state believes another may respond to coercive bargaining. When security communities have to behave in a strategically culturally radical way, success is unlikely.[44]

Russia and Germany for example, have chronically had difficulties with surface naval warfare, due to a long historical emphasis on continental warfare.[45] Physically, Russia and Germany have also had immense difficulty securing access to open seaports.[46] Any security community is not likely to perform well at tasks that are wholly unfamiliar to them[47]. If an enemy state could get a grasp on a state's strategic culture, and how that culture makes them more likely to make certain decisions in certain circumstances, states would have a much better grasp on how

[40] Johnston.
[41] Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," 64.
[42] Gray, 64.
[43] Gray, 64.
[44] Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back."
[45] Gray.
[46] Gray.
[47] Gray.

to manipulate in order to get what they want. This would then influence the actions of the coercive bargaining sender state in the ways they may bargain in areas that they know the receiver state is weak. Conversely, this could also allow a target state to understand the motivations behind a sender states strategy and formulate a response to a coercive scenario.

Theory Outline:

With strategic culture being measured as the independent variable, and coercive bargaining as the dependent variable my research question can be better defined. How does an internal locus of control, or an external locus of control effect a state's strategic culture in coercive bargaining with energy that makes them more or less likely to succeed?

Using Johnston's strategic culture paradigm as a baseline for the variables that define strategic culture, this paper analyzes one of his variables and its effect on decision making. For the purposes of this paper and in order to best understand and study the interaction within coercive bargaining and strategic culture, I will only be considering one of Johnston's three main variables that defines a state's strategic culture. Johnston labels this variable the "efficacy of the use of force", but within this paper we will be labeling it as locus of control, or a state's inherent sense of ability to influence others, control their fate, and exert their will.

My independent variable, strategic culture will be categorized using a multitude of geographical, historical, military, and cultural influences that determine each state's locus of control determination as internal or external. If a state maintains an internal locus of control, they will generally believe that they hold influence over the events that happen to them, and that they hold agency of their own abilities, actions, or mistakes. A state that maintains an external locus of control is more likely to feel that they do not have control over what happens to them or

influence over others, and events are rather determined by random chance, the actions of others, or environmental factors.

A state with an internal locus of control is much more likely to attempt to coercively bargain due to their increased feeling of control. Therefore, when bargaining with a state with an external locus of control who feels that others have more power than them, the target is more likely to capitulate, and the sender is then more likely to succeed in their coercion. This is due to the fact that a sender state with an internal locus of control has already understood or believes that they hold an influence and ability to assert their will onto other states. This interaction can be seen under the directionality hypothesis below as the first theoretical interaction. If they hold this kind of strong conviction in their actions, as well as if the target states know of their reputation, they will be more likely to succeed against a state with an external locus of control who will easily succumb to the bargaining demands.

Directionality Hypothesis

1. High feeling of control (IV) in the sender = Increase the likelihood of bargaining success (DV) when targeting a state with a low IV
2. Low feeling of control (IV) in the sender = Increase in likelihood of bargaining failure (DV), when target state has a high feeling of control.
3. Strong feeling of control (IV) in the sender = Increase in the likelihood of bargaining failure (DV), when the target state also shares a strong feeling of control.
4. Low feeling of control (IV) in the sender = Increase in the likelihood of bargaining failure (DV), when the target state also shares low feeling of control.

If my hypothesis holds true then in the four examples above coercive bargaining in energy should only succeed when the sender has an internal locus of control, and the target has an external locus of control. A state with an external locus of control will easily fall to these demands simply due to the fact that they have historically felt as though they hold no power or ability to control those around them and counter the demands. In example number two of the directionality hypothesis, it can be seen that in this interaction the sender of the threat will not hold strong due to a lack of reputation or feeling of control and the target will not back down leading to bargaining failure. Under my theory this kind of interaction would be extremely unlikely to occur as most states are unlikely to be willing to enter into a coercive scenario if they do not believe than can succeed in the bargaining. In example number three if both the sender and the target hold internal locus's of control neither will back down, and the bargaining will fail. In example number four, though the interaction is unlikely, if it were to happen and both have external locus's of control both will concede and bargaining success will again, fail.

Coercive bargaining success or failure will be measured through understanding the sender state's goal in coercively bargaining with the target states energy access, and whether or not they achieved this goal. Just economic harm will not be considered a full success. A sender state must have successfully negatively influenced their goal substantially and directly, not solely through economic harm in order for the coercion to be seen as successful.

Within this paper I will also be narrowing my focus of these effects to the realm of energy in order to best analyze the coercive bargaining phenomenon. Energy security has been a prevalent threat to overall national security within the world ever since the rise of globalization as many countries realized they would have to rely on others in order to secure their supply of energy. Focusing on coercion scenarios involving energy within the three case studies will help

to further understand this phenomena as well as shed light on how understanding strategic culture can further determine the outcome and likelihood of these coercion scenarios occurring.

Chapter 3

Methodology

In this thesis I conducted a qualitative case study of coercive events involving sender and target countries. I chose to focus on only one aspect of strategic culture, locus of control, in order to best formulate a comprehensive picture of how strategic culture can determine outcomes and influence interactions. In a larger breadth of study an analysis of all strategic culture variables identified by Johnston would benefit a future interactive case study analysis. However, due to the more narrowed scope of this study's capability, focusing only on one variable allowed for the cases to be better studied interactively. These case studies were evaluated interactively, with both countries involved having their strategic cultures evaluated through a defined locus of control.

The strategic cultures evaluated were the United States, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Ukraine. The first case analyzed is the 1941 oil embargo placed on Japan by the US, the second the 1973-1974 Arab OPEC embargo on the US, and the third the 2004-2009 Russia and Ukraine gas shut offs.

If my theory holds true throughout the three case studies, coercive success will only occur if a sender state has an internal locus of control, and the target has an external locus of control. The only coercive scenario that will result in success is modeled in figure one. Figures two through four will all result in coercion failure.

1. Sender – Internal Locus of Control = Target – External Locus of Control
2. Sender – Internal Locus of Control = Target – Internal Locus of Control

3. Sender – External Locus of Control – Target – External Locus of Control
4. Sender – External Locus of Control = Target – Internal Locus of Control

These specific cases were selected using six different scope conditions that all had to be satisfied in order for the interaction to be included within the study. Energy dependence was a necessary condition within this study. There needed to be a significant degree of energy dependence within the target states as without it coercion would fail regardless. For a country to be considered within the case studies, it had or has to either be a country with large energy reserves that exports to other states and is therefore relatively energy secure, or a country with small or little to no energy reserves that is highly dependent on imports and therefore relatively energy insecure. In order to simplify the study, the resource that a state must be secure or insecure in must be oil or natural gas. The last condition was that the sender state must be attempting to use their influence over the target states access to energy in order to try to coerce them into an action, or the reversing of a recent action. Coercion with the goal of political influence or political action within the target state will be considered successful if the target capitulates, as well as if the coercive event is seen to succeed in having decisive and negative impacts on the target state that were within the goals of the sender's original coercion.

In chapters four through six I utilize three different sections to organize the case study: background, strategic culture determinations, and the analysis of the bargaining events. Within the background section for each case study a brief historical overview of the lead up to the interaction, as well as the tensions between sender and target is provided. This description of the history and relevant information as to why the confrontation occurred is essential to understanding what the sender's motives are and where each stands in the world order.

Understanding a sender state's motives is essential to defining the interaction as a coercive success or failure, as stated prior.

For each state's strategic culture section, I look at the military and strategy history of each country as well as small cultural aspects that prove relevant to developing each countries locus of control. Relevant history up until the point of the coercive event is analyzed, as well as geography, cultural norms, traditions, and prior strategic decisions in order to try to find patterns that will help define their strategic culture. Determining an internal or external locus of control within each country that has developed over time provides further clarity on their overall strategic culture and how it influences bargaining outcomes and decision making.

For the case analysis section, I create an in-depth overview and understanding of the motivations behind the sender's coercion, as well as their explicit goal. The target's reaction, and recent interactions with the sender state are considered in this analysis. The opinion and feelings at the time were found through interviews, memoirs, and academic papers or books that have analyzed these interactions. Both states beliefs and statements on the bargaining event were analyzed in order to further reinforce the locus of control determination that informed the outcome of the bargaining attempt.

Chapter 4

United States Vs Japan 1941

Introduction

After WWI, even as the United States moved towards isolationism, they began to emerge as a new superpower in the world order. This emergence and their prior interactions within the world fostered a growth of strategic culture heavily influenced by an internal locus of control. In

this chapter the United States and Japan are observed in a coercive bargaining scenario involving an oil embargo implemented in 1941 on the eve of World War II. In this conflict the United States was the sender state and Japan the target state. This case will be evaluated under a strategic culture assessment of an internal locus of control for both the United States and Japan. Due to Japan's historical power and geography, their values, as well as status as a new great power, Japan is assessed to have an internal locus of control influencing their strategic culture. The American internal locus of control had begun to truly influence strategy decision making in the early 1900's. However, their internal locus of control which influences their strategy had been influenced by variables from much earlier, geography, values, and military power all played a role in defining the US locus of control.

The attempt to deter Japanese interference in Indochina with an oil embargo was one of the United States most notorious efforts of coercion. Due to both states having an internal locus of control, the bargaining action taken by the United States with the oil embargo failed. With both states holding an internal locus of control, the target state does not recognize credibility in the rationale or reasoning behind the sender state's coercion. Because of this the target state will not capitulate to demands that they do not perceive as a threat to their control or their state. If both sender and target believe that they are in control of the coercion scenario then neither has any reason to respond to the demands, and the coercion will fail. This chapter will utilize an analysis of historical hard power, geographical influence, and state ambitions to justify a locus of control label. This determination of locus of control then informs state's strategic culture, which informs decision making, and therefore influences the outcome of the coercive interaction.

The Bargaining Event: 1941

In the years prior to 1941 tensions had been rising between many of the world's nations. War had been declared by Great Britain and France on Germany as a result of its invasion of Poland. Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the yet-to-be-involved United States would make up the Allies who would be working against the Axis Powers comprised of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Amidst all the turmoil in the world at the time by 1941 the U.S. had become the world's largest producer of petroleum, putting out more than 60% of the world's volume. The United States' capability for production and exportation of petroleum made them a major supplier for many countries around the world. A reliance on the US for petroleum as well as a lack of diversification in terms of what countries they imported from left many state's energy security at risk. Japan in particular was quite vulnerable to the export advantage that the US held over them. At the time Japan was heavily dependent on the US for numerous raw materials, but overall, mainly dependent on them for oil. As Japan continued to seek great power status it began to extend its reach into territories like Indochina that other powers held a vested interest in. With this, and on the cusp of what no one yet knew would be the second World War, the United States looked to protect its interests in Indochina that were being threatened by the Japanese.

Waging military war on Japan at the time, given the world tensions, was not ideal. This meant that economic war was something that President Roosevelt could and would consider. The first few movements towards this economic war can be seen in 1940 when the US ended its 1911 commercial treaty with Japan. In January of 1941 the White House submitted a bill to congress called the Lend-Lease Bill. This act gave Roosevelt the ability to restrict or ban exports of resources that were considered necessary for national defense. It also allowed him to sell,

exchange, or lease any goods to any government that was deemed vital for United States Security.[48] Quickly following the passing of the act, aviation gas, steel, and scrap iron shipments to Japan were banned. In hopes to use the implicit threat of an oil embargo, Roosevelt refrained from truly instituting a total oil embargo and instead, after months of many failed negotiations and agreements, decided to freeze Japanese assets. A few months later a full embargo on Japan's access to US oil was enacted, Prior to these events four-fifths of Japan's available petroleum came from the United States, leaving them extremely vulnerable when the freeze occurred. Britain and Holland also quickly followed the United States' example and froze Japanese assets as well as cut off all trade.

One of the major goals of this freeze was to coerce Japan into withdrawing from Indochina. This would then appease the United States and thus the oil trade would begin to flow once again. Japan was left with three possible choices in the face of this coercion: watch their oil reserves drain away, appease the United States through withdrawal, or try to move into the Indies in order to find some kind of strategic autonomy in terms of petroleum. Seeing as relations with the US were already so strained, Japan began to look to the Netherland East Indies for an alternate supply of petroleum. Instead of capitulating to the United States' coercion, Japan chose to try to move into the Indies and on December 7th launched an attack near the oil fields of the Indies and East. To the Japanese this move allowed them to gain more autonomy over their oil security, as well as worked to further their capability to destroy some of the American fleet in the infamous Pearl Harbor attack.

[48] William R. Nester, *Power across the Pacific: a diplomatic history of American relations with Japan*, 1. publ (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1996).

Strategic Culture: Japan

For most westerners Japan's history began at the end of their policy of isolationism in 1853, but long before Western influence Japan had begun constructing an individual culture and strategy. Japan's history has been heavily influenced by its status as an island nation as well as its strong neighbors. This influence caused Japan to become increasingly insular. Until Japanese ports were forced open by the US and other European powers in the mid 19th century Japan had consistently adhered to a policy of isolation from the international system. This opening of ports and induction into the international sphere forced Japan to adopt a new strategic culture.

Early Japanese culture was heavily influenced by Chinese culture even though they were never fully embraced within the Chinese world. This separation between the two was likely due to geography and the distance by sea between the two.[49] Because they were never under the subjugation of Chinese dynasties and somewhat distanced, a singular unmistakable Japanese culture was able to form. Part of this culture grew around the symbolism of the cherry blossom. The Japanese cultural view of mortality, seen in the cherry blossom, has also influenced their internal locus of control. The cherry blossom has remained a cultural symbol of Japanese culture and became a symbol of Japanese honors. Seeing as the Japanese recognize the finiteness of life, the continued preservation of their national honor and noble character is a priority.[50] If ones honor is seen to have been threatened, "the loss of face and shame associated with the acts impacts the entirety of the group, not just the individual."[51] Because the Japanese concept of honor is inherently related to their idea of mortality, it is believed that actions not only influence

[49] Dr Masahiro Matsumura, "THE JAPANESE STATE IDENTITY AS A GRAND STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE," n.d.
[50] Jennifer Bradley, "Tailored Engagement: Assessing Japan's Strategic Culture and Its Impact on U.S. – China Competition," *Comparative Strategy* 41, no. 4 (July 4, 2022): 388–402, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2087434.
[51] Sam Louie, "Asian Honor and Suicide | Psychology Today," June 30, 2014, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/minority-report/201406/asian-honor-and-suicide.Louie.

one situation, but also future generations. Japanese culture also places an extremely high emphasis on success and prosperity. According to the Hofstede cultural index Japan tends to score extremely high for masculinity "which is a measure of how a country strives to be the best."[52] To the Japanese being the best means being powerful, and holding control not only over their own fate, but also over the fate of others. Japanese cultural values indicate an internal locus of control that has been developed historically as geography and cultural values promote Japanese feelings of control over their own future and autonomy over their lives.

Originally a monarchy, the Japanese emperor was considered divine. Japan also believed itself to be at the top of the world and "superior to other nations" which was further confirmed by the fact that the sun would shine on their islands first each morning.[53] Overtime Japan recognized a need to change and adapt to challenge the west and did so in a time period that became known as the Meiji Restoration. During this time Japanese envoys were sent around the world to help facilitate a modernization of the country that would "ensure that it was never again at the mercy of larger more powerful forces."[54] This mission was considered quire successful and was seen to have recast Japan as a nation no longer at the mercy of the West, but now a "member of the imperialist nations and a victimizer of its neighbors."[55] In the new pursuit of what were previously considered Western imperialist power goals, Japan began to embrace an identity that

[52] "Hofstede Insights Country Comparison," *Hofstede Insights*, accessed March 21, 2023, https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/.
[53] Forrest E. Morgan, *Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan: Implications for Coercive Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003).
[54] Bradley, "Tailored Engagement: Assessing Japan's Strategic Culture and Its Impact on U.S. – China Competition."
[55] WARREN I. COHEN, *East Asia at the Center* (Columbia University Press, 2000), 302, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cohe10108.

was more outward looking.[56] This new adoption of an identity previously reserved for more Western countries was used to try to further secure Japan's interests.

As Japan worked to absorb influence from the rest of the world, they were simultaneously pursuing a policy of imperialism that was also aimed at aiding them in displaying their control in the world and over the region. These imperialist pursuits began with Taiwan in 1895 and continued with the formal annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910. Japan's influence in helping to suppress the Boxer rebellion in 1900 renewed tensions between themselves and Russia. Frictions between both empires shifted overtime to become focused on the Korean peninsula. Conflicts began to grow more intense and Japan "struck Russian forces on land and sea, winning a stunning military and psychological victory."[57]

From there Japan came out of the Russo-Japanese War from 1904-1905 as the premier major power in East Asia, and over time Korea became a part of the kingdom of Japan in 1910. Even with Japan's new found power and control, the other great powers tended to treat the state as lesser due to "blatant racism often blocking Japan's imperialist pursuits."[58] After Korea was conquered, Japan turned its focus to obtaining a large portion of China, and the distant edges of East Asia in 1942.[59] While Japan sought to merge its interests and control in China and Southeast Asia, the state also moved to establish the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940.[60] This action and demonstration of Japan's control in the world sparked tension between Japan and the United States, as well as between Japan and Russia. Overall, the Japanese "macro historical

[56] Bradley, "Tailored Engagement: Assessing Japan's Strategic Culture and Its Impact on U.S. – China Competition."
[57] Morgan, *Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan*, 220.
[58] Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "Japan's Idenitity and What It Means," *The Japan Forum on International Relations*, 1999, 2.
[59] Andrew L. Oros, "Japan's Strategic Culture: Security Identity in a Fourth Modern Incarnation?," *Contemporary Security Policy* 35, no. 2 (May 4, 2014): 227–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.928070.
[60] Bradley, "Tailored Engagement: Assessing Japan's Strategic Culture and Its Impact on U.S. – China Competition."

experience offers Tokyo a reasonably solid base for inferential power calculations" which the Japanese put to use in their interaction with the US in 1941.[61] Success in military interactions, as well as an adoption of Western attitudes and identity increased Japanese confidence and feeling of control exponentially. On the cusp of achieving great power status, the last thing Japan would be willing to do was risk subjugation by another Western power. Japan took their own fate and influence into their own hands, utilizing their high feeling of control to influence the strategy decisions that resulted in a shocking blow to the American military.

Strategic Culture: United States

The United States has a long and extensive history tied to their history, culture, and military decisions. What began as a small British colony transformed into one of the world's greatest powers. Though the US is now a formidable power, it was not always seen to be as strong as it is today. Prior to its breakout status in World War II the US had remained primarily isolationist and removed from world affairs. This study of US strategic culture will focus on the influence of geography, history, values, and military traditions prior to 1941 to determine a locus of control determination.

Originally the Unites States began as a large mass of land that was fundamentally controlled by other imperialist countries with a vested interest in colonizing the new territory. After the Americans rebelled against their British oppressors, they proceeded to buy land from other countries like France and Spain, and they began to expand westward. A new ideal called manifest destiny, coined in 1845, underlined the cultural reasoning behind this expansion. The Americans took this expansion westward as fulfillment of the destiny of the United States

[61] Matsumura, "THE JAPANESE STATE IDENTITY AS A GRAND STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE."

ordained by God to further expand its power and spread democracy and capitalism through the North American continent. The Americans succeeded in colonizing many indigenous groups throughout the continent, and with these groups potential threat neutralized, the US looked to its neighbors.

Geographically, the North American continent was separated from the rest of Europe, after expelling most of the imperialist countries in the area the United States did not see Europe as posing a threat to them. Shielded by the Pacific and the Atlantic the US held an insular position that allowed them to form as a nation without outside influence or threat. With weak neighbors, separated by thousands of miles and large mountain ranges, the US was able to escape any other threats of colonization or war early on in its creation. In the early 1900's the US had moved on from expanding their territory to expanding their economy. Overtime the US had become an urban and industrialized country that had also participated in a major world war. Due to increased economic expansion largely credited to steel and oil exports, the US was able to build a large military. This military was put to use in World War I and aided the US in solidifying their place in the world order.

Because of the benefits afforded by its geography US insularity allowed Americans to identify with the idea that war is a deviation from peace, which was considered a norm. Furthering that idea American strategic culture was able to be shaped by long period defined by peace and interrupted by generational conflicts – " the War of 1812, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II."[62] All of these conflicts were further defined as "crusades of good vs evil" and continued to grow American ideals of exceptionalism.[63] From incredibly early on the

[62] Thomas G. Mahnken, "United States Strategic Culture" (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advances Systems and Concepts Office, 2006), https://irp.fas.org/agency/dod/dtra/us.pdf.
[63] Mahnken.

geography of the North American continent leant itself towards the United States development of an internal locus of control. Success in wars, and the growth of their country that was able to proceed unhampered by the rest of the world, fostered a belief with American strategy that they were in control of their power and were capable of exerting that control over others if the need were to arise.

American strategic culture tends to be defined by senses of idealism and exceptionalism that have both defined cultural norms. The free security that the US was afforded due to its geography played a role in affecting the American view of the world and making optimism a national philosophy in the US.[64] From its founding Americans have always seen themselves as exceptional.[65] This sense of exceptionalism has influenced how the United States tend to interact with others. The United States sees "an aggression is an armed rebellion against the universal and eternal principles of the world society" which means further that "no war can end rightly … except for by the unconditional surrender of the aggressor nation and by the overthrow of its political regime."[66] American strategic culture defined by this sense of exceptionalism reveals an increasing internal locus of control as the US sees itself as capable of not only controlling its own sphere, but also being capable of controlling those around them. Aggression and conflict does not appear solely as aggression and conflict in the American perspective. Aggression is seen more so as an affront to American ideals and values of control that must be addressed through nothing but unconditional surrender.

In terms of military power American strategic culture has been fundamentally defensive throughout history at the level of strategy, while simultaneously being offensive at the level of

[64] Mahnken.
[65] Mahnken.
[66] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the United States* (London, 1952), 25.

operations.[67] Aspirationally the United States seeks to wage war which "includes aggressiveness at all levels of warfare, a quest for decisive battles, and a desire to employ maximum effort."[68] American strategy also tends to rely on technological capabilities which, given US production capabilities, is generally able to provide the support the US relies on in its battles. This preference towards aggression in strategy rather than defense shows an American awareness of their capability and further reinforces the sense of exceptionalism that builds up their internal locus of control.

Continued decisive wins, control over the world order, and their own country has facilitated the growth of an American internal locus of control. Not only had the US been winning wars, but they had also amassed a large military in the 1900's that they were willing to put to use and expand in the coming conflicts. This historical precedent, as well as US military might at the time of 1941 also gave American strategic culture an increased internal locus of control. When the European war started in 1939 the US army ranked seventeenth in the world in terms of the six of their army and combat power.[69] Though, by 1945 the US army had experienced a 44-fold increase.

Case Analysis

After World War I, it can be expected that many countries' strategic cultures would have experienced shifts whether large or small. Japan and the US were no exception to this. Prior strategic decisions made by Japan were no longer as wholly representative of their strategic

[67] Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 5, no. 3 (January 1, 1985): 269–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495938508402693.
[68] Mahnken, "United States Strategic Culture."
[69] Rick Atkinson, "Ten Things Every American Student Should Know About Our Army in World War II - Foreign Policy Research Institute," 2009, https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/05/ten-things-every-american-student-should-know-about-our-army-in-world-war-ii/.

culture and locus of control as they had been prior. In 1941 the United States allowed their internal locus of control to influence their strategic culture and ensuing decision making. This resulted in a coercion scenario involving oil and Japan. The position the US held over Japan with its reliance on US oil imports put the US in to what they perceived to be a strong power position that would help them to force Japan out of Indochina. The US acted on an internal locus of control while objectively well aware that they had ten times the military potential of Japan. The US government felt that Japan had an external locus of control and would have no choice but to capitulate and pull out of China. This is not what happened. The Japanese response that ensued shook the US as a nation and pulled them away from the trademark isolationist policy that had prevailed since World War I. Because a country with an internal locus of control attempted to coerce another internal locus country, the coercion did not succeed, therefore outlining the proposed theory within this paper. Coercion will only succeed if an internal locus of control country is coercing a true external locus of control country.

Henry L Stimson, Secretary of War under the Roosevelt administration, was a strong supporter of the embargo against Japan years prior to when it was actually enacted. He believed that the best course of action that would lead to diplomatic adjustment with Japan would come from a "policy of the utmost firmness."[70] Following the October expansion on the embargo Stimson pointed out in a memorandum that Japan had yielded previously to American coercion, in Japan's withdrawal from Shantung and Siberia in 1919, and in Japanese acquiescence of naval inferiority in 1921. What Stimson took away from this was that "Japan has historically shown that when the United States indicates by clear language and bold actions that she intends to carry

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Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 384.

out a clear and affirmative policy in the Far East, Japan will yield to that policy even though it conflicts with Japan's own Asiatic policy and conceived Interests."[71] This quote demonstrates the US's reliance on a rational actor perspective as well as the effect their internal locus of control had on perceiving other states and influencing their decision making. Had the US studied changes in Japanese strategic culture and understood how culture influences their decision making, the US may have understood the changes that Japanese strategic culture had undergone which made past acquiescence's no longer representative of future Japanese action.

As seen in Stimson's statement, Roosevelt and other powerful state actors held an internal locus of control overall and applied this feeling to the situation with Japan. This directly explains why they would have attempted to coerce Japan with an oil embargo. In this coercion scenario their internal locus of control influenced their perception of the strategic culture of Japan. Their internal locus of control within the coercion scenario was strongly influenced by an understanding of Japan's prior concessions, but was also due to the strategic advantage they held over Japan in terms of resources. The US also held a much larger military force that Japan could not hope to match. Culturally, the United States is incredibly individualistic, and values change and progress. Countries that are culturally or idealistically different, like Japan, tend to be looked down upon by Americans for their different ways of life. Stereotypes in the United States of "Japanese near sightedness, inability to fly well, dearth of fighting, production, and innovation skills, and mental and physical weaknesses" furthered the Americans internal locus of control over what was assumed to be an enemy with an external locus of control.[72] The US perception of the Japanese informed their policy and urged them to enact an embargo that they believed they could use to control the Japanese as well as the situation in Indochina. After World War I the

[71] Stimson and Bundy, 385.
[72] Nester, *Power across the Pacific*, 158.

U.S. had started to become more isolationist, but that did not influence the capability and control they felt they held over the world order at the time. This was likely due to their military and production capabilities which were strong indicators for why their strategic culture was so positive in terms of a feeling of control at the time of the embargo.

Roosevelt felt that the control he could exert over Japan with the oil embargo would be sufficient enough to deter Japan from its aims in Indochina without having to engage in any overt military action. Roosevelt told the Secretary of the Interior at the time, Harold Ickes, that he planned to use the embargo and the asset freeze as a "noose around Japan's neck" that he would "give a jerk now and then."[73] The state department hawks at the time, Acheson, and Stanley Hornbeck believed that Japan was a "paper tiger that would collapse in response to strong US pressure."[74] The purpose of the embargo was to further reinforce the asset freeze and be capable of making access for Japan's importers impossible. With the institution of the embargo the US deprived Japan of almost 80 percent of the oil needed to keep the country and the economy running smoothly.[75] A result of the denial of exchange permits and licenses, combined with the seizure of Japanese assets maintained by Great Britain and the Netherlands, resulted in the destruction of 50-75 percent of Japan's foreign trade.[76] Here the US internal locus of control is evident. The US saw Japan as a state that they could coerce and control with little to no difficulty and without any capability to push back on their coercion. To the US Japan was not solely vulnerable due to their oil reliance, it was in majority vulnerable because the US saw it as having no power or control compared to their influence.

[73] Jeffrey Record, *Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 14.
[74] Record, 17.
[75] Irvine H. Anderson, "The 1941 De Facto Embargo on Oil to Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex," *Pacific Historical Review* 44, no. 2 (May 1, 1975): 8, https://doi.org/10.2307/3638003.
[76] Record, *Japan's Decision for War in 1941*, 19.

In order to lift the oil embargo the Roosevelt administration was marked as demanding multiple concessions that Japan was unwilling or not capable of fulfilling. They asked that Japan remove itself from the tripartite alliance, as well as remove its presence from China and Indochina. The demands regarding China and Indochina provoked fear in the Japanese that the US would also ask them to remove themselves from Manchuria as well. Japan had been working to gain ground in the Asian mainland since 1937, and having to give up this advantage would ensure the loss of any chance to become the dominant power in East Asia. A large part of this push to gain ground in the Asian mainland stemmed from a desire in Japan to free itself from the economic dependency that characterized its economy at the time, which was eerily reminiscent of similar historical claims protesting Western dependency. The embargo that was then instituted on Japan by the US represented the exact danger of dependency that Japan had been hoping to diminish.

The demands made by the Roosevelt administration further exaggerated these concerns and led the Japanese to believe that acquiescence would open the door to more coercion in the future involving territorial concessions. Any further "continued reliance on the whims of Washington" was unacceptable to Japan.[77] Japan felt that the U.S. was essentially demanding that it "renounce its status as an aspiring great power, and consign itself to dependency on a hostile Washington."[78] The embargo, and the asks made of the Japanese by the Roosevelt administration were directly contrary to the historically dominant cultural idea of the "master race(shido minzoku)."[79] This idea underlined much of Japanese territory and military ambition

[77] Record, 20.
[78] Record, 21.
[79] Nester, *Power across the Pacific*.

early in their history just as much as it did in 1941.[80] Any obstacles to Japanese goals would be surmounted by "Japanese spirit (Yamato damashii)."[81]

A Japanese historian Akira Iriye wrote that the oil embargo had a huge psychological impact on the Japanese.[82] Another historian further elaborated on the Japanese reaction to the embargo by stating that "for no faction of the Japanese elites could there be a retreat from the goals of a victorious settlement in China and successful expansion to establish … Japanese dominance in the Far East."[83] The Japanese objectives on the Asian mainland were no longer just of economic importance, but now reflected the cultural values and intrinsic identity formed around national pride, honor, and prestige of the nation.[84] Not only were these aims now intrinsic to Japanese policy and military goals, but also became ingrained into the strategic culture framework of the country. Japan had proved to itself that it could succeed in these endeavors and had control at the time over the situation in the East. The available alternatives provided by the US not involving military engagement were perceived as humiliating, ignominious, and permanent defeat under the thumb of the United States. It was thought that it was "better to die fighting than capitulate."[85] Admiral Osami Nagano, the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Navy, said in September of 1941 that "Japan would rather go down fighting than ignobly surrender without a struggle because surrender would spell spiritual as well as physical ruin for the nation and its destiny."[86] No one on the Japanese side believed that they could defeat the US militarily, but they did believe they might be able to achieve a limited victory through a surprise

[80] Nester, 153.
[81] Nester, 153.
[82] Record, *Japan's Decision for War in 1941*.
[83] Record, 22.
[84] Record, 22.
[85] Record, 23.
[86] Record, 23.

attack.[87] Their national culture and internal locus of control influenced the elite's decision to not concede to American's coercive demands.

Japan had grown a stronger internal locus of control in the world after making territorial gains that would work to further their ambitions to achieve superpower status in the years prior to 1941. This stronger internal locus of control combined with a national culture of pride and meant that in the face of being controlled by the US indefinitely, Japan felt in in control enough of the situation to not concede. Due to these territorial gains and new status as a rising superpower, Japan had grown in its internal locus of control, shifting from a strategic culture of an external locus of control in the early 1900s to an internal locus of control in 1940 and 1941. Their new rising status as a superpower gave them a feeling of power and control in the world order that was markedly different from years before when they had capitulated to U.S. demands. State actor perceptions of greater power than previously, as well as cultural values centered around pride and honor made conceding to US demands unreasonable and impossible in the eyes of the Japanese.

The gradual buildup of sanctions on the part of the US was an effort at gradually increasing the punishment meant to be put on Japan in the coercive scenario. However, it is possible that the gradual attempt at punishment may have weakened the US control capability in the eyes of Japan, and grown Japan's own feeling of control. An incredibly crucial factor of compellence strategy is a sender states ability to convey a credible and believable commitment to achieving the coercion objective.[88] Because the US government chose to gradually escalate their sanctions on Japan, this may have looked to Japan as though the US threat was not credible, and

[87] Morgan, *Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan*, 293.
[88] SCHELLING, *Arms and Influence*.

that they did not have the control capability to follow through on their threats.[89] Further reinforcing this ideal of US external control and Japanese internal control, Cordell Hull also repeatedly denied that the prior export restrictions were focused on Japan in 1939 and 1940. A perception by the Japanese of a US lack of commitment to their strategy would have further influenced their internal locus of control and dampened the measure of credible threat that the Japanese felt was coming from the Americans.

The United States did not take into consideration how the new strength felt within the state, combined with the national dominant cultural trait of pride heavily influenced policy and strategy decisions. The U.S. was functioning under the assumption of a realist theory where Japan was expected to act as a rational actor and focus on calculations of power and interest to drive their behavior. This perspective can overlook cultural and historical factors like pride or ideology that can warp any kind of rational analysis of strategy, risk, or reward. There was a strongly held belief in the Roosevelt administration in 1941 that "no sensible Japanese leader could rationally contemplate war with the United States."[90] This assumption disregarded cultural, and historical influences on Japanese perceptions of control in favor of relying on personal and state feelings of control in the US over the world order and the situation. Prior capitulations and dependence on U.S. oil imports were not capable of coercing Japan into what they deemed a hopeless and weak fate dictated by the United States.

In terms of Japan's beliefs on the outcome of what was to be an inevitable war after being provoked by the oil embargo, it can be seen that the Japanese thought that they could try to force the U.S. into an "island by island slog that would eventually exhaust their political will to fight

[89] Morgan, *Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan*, 289.
[90] Record, *Japan's Decision for War in 1941*, 7.

on to total victory."[91] The overall goal of this strategy was to exhaust the U.S. will, and to end the inevitable fight on more favorable and acceptable terms than what was being offered. As can be seen in this case, when two internal control countries are entered in a coercion scenario with energy such as this one, the outcome is not capitulation. The very fact that the target is an internal control country means that the coercion has a low likelihood of working in the way that the sender state intends it to. Internal loci of control can also make states and actors arrogant or presumptuous in their interactions. Assuming control also assumes a lack of control within the target state. If this assumption is incorrect and does not take into account cultural influence the sender will miss strategy possibilities that should have been considered. A lack of understanding on the United States' part of similarities between themselves and Japan set the US up for failure within the coercion scenario.

Roland Worth demonstrates the similarities between both states that defined their internal loci of control in his statement that "If the United States had been faced with a similar boycott which equally endangered its future, few Americans would have questioned the propriety of waging a major war to restore the prerequisites of American survival. . . . a body blow of this caliber could have driven multitudes beyond even caring about "winnability." National self-respect and even the quest for naked vengeance . . . would have reinforced necessity and swept aside any objections. If the United States would have launched a preemptive war under such circumstances, why is it so surprising that the Japanese did so?"[92]

[91] Record, 27.

[92] Worth, *No Choice But War*, p. 129.

Had the U.S. considered Japan similarly to themselves and understood their shared internal loci of control, the approach to the oil embargo, and the approach to war considered by Japan may have been different. The rational actor assumption and internal locus of control on the part of the sender state blinded them to the reality of the target state's strategic culture. An American perspective which understood the Japanese strategic culture would have been able to comprehend the strategic similarities between the two states and account for a possible offensive strategic decision like the one that resulted in Pearl Harbor.

Chapter 5

Saudi Arabia (OPEC) Vs United States 1973-1974

Introduction

This chapter will focus on assessing the interaction between the United States and OPEC in 1973 with special emphasis put on assessing Saudi Arabia's strategic culture as the perceived driving force behind the coercive action. This scenario involved Saudi Arabia and OPEC as the sender, and the United States as the target. At the time of the coercion, the U.S. Reliance on Middle Eastern oil, as well as much of Western Europe, gave Saudi Arabia an internal locus of control that they and the rest of OPEC would use to try to influence the United States' support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war.

Overall, throughout historical power dynamics and through the pursuit of geographical and state ambitions, Saudi Arabia has had an external locus of control, but within this case I observed that an external control country can take on internal control traits within its strategic culture when certain factors are introduced. Within this case study, Saudi Arabia was observed to act with an internal locus of control when acting in tandem with the support of the other Arab

OPEC members and under the understanding of their newfound oil weapon. In what I observe to be a time of transition in Saudi Arabia's strategic culture, Saudi Arabia acted with an internal locus of control. I posit that this is due to the influence that oil had on their strategic culture. In the same way that other states strategic culture and locus of control may change or be influenced by the introduction of a new powerful military weapon, such as a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia acted in a new way that was in accordance with a transitioning strategic culture and locus of control based on their OPEC membership and control over world oil.

Saudi Arabia's relationship with Egypt, as well as its relationship with the United States placed them in the ideal position to instigate the oil crisis that began with OPEC's shut offs and price hikes in 1973. In regard to Saudi Arabia's strategic culture, it is influenced strongly by an internal locus of control which originates from the state's recent history. The United States maintains an internal locus of control in this scenario as well. Due to this the coercion will not succeed as neither state will feel a need to capitulate. In justifying a decision of an internal locus of control for both countries, their military power, world power status, as well as geographical influence will be analyzed in order to determine the extent of influence on the outcome of the bargaining scenario.

In terms of the bargaining event this coercive action is seen to be a failure. Saudi Arabia stated at the time that they instituted the embargo that their goal was to coerce the US into withdrawing support from Israel. Saudi Arabia did not succeed in this goal, even though they did succeed in causing economic damage and inciting societal panic in the US. Due to the fact that they were unable to influence the US in terms of their stated political goal for the coercion, this bargaining event cannot be considered successful.

The Bargaining Event: 1973-74

In 1973 about thirty six percent of the world's oil supply came from countries in the Middle East. In early October of that same year Syria and Egypt coordinated to launch a surprise attack on Israel which later became known as the Yom Kippur War. Six days later President Nixon approved supplies and weapons to be delivered to Israel. Quickly following that decision, the Arab members of OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, announced their decision to increase the price of oil by 70 percent at over five dollars per barrel. A day later a production cut of five percent was also announced with added five percent cutbacks on shipments to continue monthly if Israel continued to not withdraw to its boundaries that existed before 1967.[93]

Nixon then asked Congress for 2.2 billion to be used as emergency aid for Israel. This support for Israel alienated the Arab members of OPEC and triggered a collective response from them as well as Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia. Quickly following the beginning of the Yom Kippur war, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all of whom were authoritarian resource rich states, announced their intention to increase oil prices and institute production cuts. The OPEC states then mutually agreed to use their energy exports as a foreign policy tool against states they saw as "unfriendly", or rather those that supported Israel. Overtime oil supply was then curbed or fully cut off for countries like the Netherlands, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.[94] Due to these cut offs and OPEC's oligopoly, the price of oil globally quadrupled.

[93] William P. Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency*, 1st ed (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 437.
[94] Pascal Ditté and Peter Roell, "Past Oil Price Shocks: Political Background and Economic Impact Evidence from Three Cases," *Institut Für Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-Und Wirtschaftsberatung*, 2006, 1–13.

The goal of these cuts offs was unmistakably for the purpose of "pushing Israel and the United States strongly for a compromise outcome."[95] The maneuver did not ultimately succeed in pushing the U.S. to cease their support of Israel, and in fact actually backfired as the U.S. held true to their high feeling of control and negotiated a peace with the Soviet Union without contacting Israel. This move came very soon after the oil embargo was officially placed on the United States. Brezhnev and Kissinger were able to reach terms for a ceasefire within four hours, but these terms were reached without Israel being consulted. The oil embargo did not succeed in coercing the US to end their support for Israel. The United States feeling of control was too high for that, but the attempt at coercion did serve to stress to the United States that the security of their energy supply needed to be reevaluated.

Strategic Culture: Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has a long history of a powerful culture and strong sense of identity. Saudi strategic culture has experienced a multitude of changes throughout history and been influenced by many different domestic ideals and external affects. This strategic culture has been particularly in flux since Saudi Arabia became increasingly involved in the world order and within interactions between itself and its neighbors. Saudi strategic culture has been influenced by many domestic factors, but the main ones I will explore in this paper are cultural, religious, military strategy, and oil. The external influence of alliances and threat perceptions on its internal strategic culture will also be investigated.

Over time government changes and cultural evolutions throughout the Saudi states has cemented their perception of their national identity as a sense of exceptionalism and

[95] Bundy, *A Tangled Web*, 430.

exclusiveness for Saudi citizens.[96] This ideal stems from the historical declaration that "traditional Salafism is the purest version of Sunni Islam for the Muslim Ummah, and that the descendants of Al Saud stand at the apex of a tribal coalition hierarchy on the Arabian Peninsula."[97] The shaping of Saudi national character defined by through the historical legacy of Salafism and Al Saud has suprastate implications for strategic culture. Many in the region also see Saudi Arabia's legitimacy as a state and a culture as connected to its custodianship of two holy mosques, as well as carrying the "standard barrier of Sunni Islam."[98] The Saudi character of exceptionalism has informed their strategic culture with a sense of "mission and direction" which became a further part of a purposeful religiously influenced "regional strategy of social power projection: a classic intersection of religion and realpolitik."[99]

It is perceived by historians today that the "modern Saudi military was conceived in war."[100] In 1902 an expansive military campaign was started that focused on trying to unify the four separate regions in the Arabian Peninsula. The culmination of this military campaign began in the same year when Saudi Arabia established its first army which was called "Ikhwan" or Brethren. This army was charged with converting nomadic tribes to the "literal interpretation of the Islam of Ibn Saud/ Shaikh Mohammed bin Abdul al – Wahhab's Salafism."[101] This venture succeeded and in 1932 the third Saudi state was established.

The Ikhwan facilitated the rise of an overall religious mission that has defined much of Saudi strategic decision making and strategic culture. Overtime there has been a consistent

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[96] Ghaidaa Hetou, "Saudi Arabia," in *Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases*, ed. Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski, and Simon Reich (Oxford University Press, 2019), 0, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0011.
[97] Hetou.
[98] Hetou.
[99] Hetou.
[100] Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991*, Studies in War, Society, and the Military (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).
[101] Hetou, "Saudi Arabia."

religious reasoning behind Saudi battles in terms of Saudi policy and execution of their strategy. For a long time after this period the Saudi state did not have a standing army and did not see a need for one. However, the impact of World War II as well as witnessing the power of the modern European armies convinced the Saudi King at the time to create the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF).[102] From there the Saudis began to purchase more modern military equipment particularly in the 40's and 50's as their oil exports and revenue both increased exponentially. Unrest in the Middle East in the 1950's and 1960's prompted further military expansion as the Saudi's feared external influences, revolutions, or expansions that would threaten their sovereignty. The British exit out of the region in 1971 furthered cemented for the state a need to expand their military as their "longtime European protector" would no longer be established in the area.[103]

Oil has also had a defining effect on Saudi Arabia's strategic culture in a more recent sense. After the discovery of oil in the 1940's and 1950's resulted in rapid urban development, Saudi national identity began to become intrinsically tied to oil and the wealth it provided. The money provided by the discovery influenced an increased amount of development focused on modern infrastructure such as housing, Western commercial centers, the expansion of international commerce, and the building of educational institutions. Saudi Arabia's massive oil exports, as well as their joining of OPEC strongly influenced an increased internal locus of control that began to grow as soon as they joined the agreement in 1960.[104]

All of these domestic factors; culture, grand strategy, and oil, are not the only factors that influence Saudi Arabian strategic culture. There are other external factors, such as regional

[102] Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 426.
[103] Pollack, 427.
[104] OPEC, "OPEC : Member Countries," accessed April 1, 2023, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm.

alliance formations, threat perception, and potential forms of conflict that have also had effects on Saudi Arabian strategic culture and locus of control. Middle Eastern states tend to be more likely to try to balance against a threat, and therefore "threat perception and ideological solidarity play a role in these states alignment choices."[105] The expansion that Israel attempted that started the Yom Kippur War motivated Saudi Arabia to utilize the alliance they had already secured in the form of OPEC. This allowed them to weaponize their oil exports and is the event that coined the term "the oil weapon". To Saudi Arabia, their mass oil exports were an avenue that could allow them to try to influence other states. Without a large or powerful military, Saudi Arabia looked to oil as the weapon it needed. Much the same as states who gain new weapons, Saudi Arabia's locus of control expanded and became more internal as they recognized the effect an oil weapon could have on other states. Added to this feeling was Saudi Arabia's role as a kind of ringleader for the Arab states in OPEC. Just the same as alliances make states more powerful and able to build a greater internal locus of control, OPEC provided this for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's oil weapon was not complete without the other Arab states in OPEC also participating in the price hikes and shut offs. Able to influence and persuade its fellow Arab member states, Saudi Arabia exercised an internal locus of control with the addition of a new weapon in their arsenal.

Strategic Culture: United States

As was seen in the prior chapter, United States strategic culture has been heavily influenced by its geography, history, cultural norms, and military power. Due to strategic culture's slow-moving shifts and changes, much of this analysis of American strategic culture

[105] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliance* (Cornell University Press, 1987), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b5fc.

will be the same as that defined and analyzed in chapter four of this paper under the United States strategic culture assessment section. This section on United States strategic culture in 1973 will give a brief overview of the same ideals mentioned in chapter four, with a specific focus on how US involvement in World War II, Vietnam, and the Cold War influenced an increased internal locus of control in the years between 1941 and 1973.

As the US began developing as a country on the North American continent, the early days of the nation were unburdened by the threat of powerful neighbors, or interference from Europe. The Pacific and the Atlantic protected the US from European interference in the state, and the nation was able to build and grow without oppression or colonization. Insularity provided by its geography allowed the US to develop a sense of peace as a norm, with war being a deviation from this. As the US continued to grow and industrialize ideals like manifest destiny, idealism, and exceptionalism shaped the American strategic culture and worldview. An internal locus of control has resulted from these ideals, and further influenced how American strategic culture influences their decision making.

These ideals, shaping strategic culture, also shape how the US interacts with others. A general belief of power over others and exceptionalism compared to others further demonstrates this determination of an internal locus of control. The US has experienced long periods of peace intermittently disrupted by generational conflicts like World War I and World War II. American strategy has revealed a preference towards general defense, until aggression becomes the best course of option. The United States military has grown 44-fold since the US entered into the war. This increase in mobilization and demand for jobs helped their economy to expand exponentially and the United States became a global economic leader.

The main change in US strategic culture between 1941 and 1973 came in the form of the United States nuclear capability. Not only had the United States mobilized one of the largest armies in the world, but they had also succeeded in creating one of the most dangerous and powerful weapons of the time. Possession of the nuclear weapon would have been enough for the US to grow in their internal locus of control. However, their use of the bomb in August of 1945 further cemented the idea for other states that the US would not hesitate to use their new weapon. States possessing nuclear capabilities with massive fallout implications influenced the way that much of the world looked at strategy decisions. In 1949 the Soviets conducted their first nuclear weapons test, and the arm race between the Soviets and the United States began.[106] This arms race allowed for both states to amass huge weapons stockpiles. Even at the end of the Cold War the United States had amassed 31,000 weapons in just ten years compared to the Soviet 6,000.[107] This increase in hard power further solidified and increased what was already an incredibly strong feeling of control within the state.

The introduction of nuclear weapons into their arsenal, as well as general expansion of their military had additionally grown and influenced their internal locus of control. Even losses in confrontations like Vietnam were not enough to sway the US internal locus of control. A mass increase in general power capability, an economic boom, and an emergence as one of the world's foremost powers had the US strategic culture increasing exponentially in terms of its internal locus of control. Influence over the world, increased power within their own state and an ability to exert their will over others all further facilitated this increase in the US feeling of control.

[106] "U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control.
[107] United Nations, "End Nuclear Tests Day - History," United Nations (United Nations), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.un.org/en/observances/end-nuclear-tests-day/history.

Case Analysis

After Britain began removing its presence from the Gulf region in the early 1970's Saudi Arabia and Iran took on incredible importance in becoming "twin pillars" of current and future security in the region.[108] Despite the two countries cultural and religious differences, both could agree in their opinion on the conflict over Israel. In early 1972 the dominant position that the Arab oil rich countries, and particularly Saudi Arabia, held over their importers was made clear through thinly veiled threats that the states were not against using the oil as a political weapon.[109] However, many Americans were of the belief that the new power held by the OPEC countries as a whole was an illusion.

In late august if 1973 Anwar al Sadat came to the Saudi king, Faisal, and asked for Saudi Arabia's support in the coming war with Israel. Faisal, promised to use Saudi Arabia's oil weapon to further Sadat's cause. Faisal is noted in asking Sadat to "Give us time. We do not want to use our oil as a weapon in a battle that goes on for two or three days, and then stops. We want to see a battle which goes on for a long enough time for world opinion to be mobilized."[110] Here it can be seen that Faisal had full confidence in his control of the oil sphere in the global world, further demonstrating his internal locus of control. With the US as dependent on oil coming from the Middle East as Japan and Western Europe, Faisal had full confidence that he could use the oil weapon to influence not only US support of Israel, but Western Europe and Japan as well. He knew that unless the consuming countries acted in coordination, which was unlikely, that they were all so heavily dependent on Middle East oil that they would have no choice but to capitulate to coercion. He furthered this plan by not only organizing a Saudi

[108] Bundy, *A Tangled Web*, 430.
[109] Bundy, 431.
[110] Anatolij F. Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents*, 1. publ (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2001), 292.

Arabian oil weapon, but one that came from all of the Arab member states in OPEC. Faisal was able to organize OPEC's oligopoly to pledge their collective oil weapon to influence the outcome and support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war. Saudi Arabia itself felt a high feeling of control influencing their strategic culture with their new oil power, but with the combined backing of the other OPEC states, that feeling of control skyrocketed in this specific coercion scenario.

Many Americans were of the belief that the new power held by the OPEC countries as a whole was an illusion. If consumer states would hold firm and work together, the OPEC countries would be unable to increase prices or cut production without suffering themselves so grievously that they would no longer be able to sustain any coercive action. [111] Many who were of this opinion also found it ridiculous that the OPEC countries would expect that US policy could be dictated by the coercion of repressive foreign governments at the overall expense of Israel, the US's ally.[112] Following the signing of SALT I in 1972, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, despite backing separate sides in the Yom Kippur War, were more willing to work together than they had been prior. Nixon sent a message to Kissinger while we were in talks with Brezhnev over the ceasefire and declared that he was now of the same belief that Brezhnev had expressed months prior at San Clemente:

> "The Israelis and Arabs will never be able to approach this subject by themselves in a rational manner. That is why Nixon and Brezhnev, looking at the problem more dispassionately, must step in to determine the proper course of action to a just settlement and then bring the necessary pressure to our respective friends."[113]

[111] Bundy, *A Tangled Web*, 431.
[112] M. A. Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies As OPEC Tax-Collectors," *Foreign Policy*, no. 9 (1972): 69, https://doi.org/10.2307/1148086.
[113] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1st ed (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 550.

Kissinger, in the midst of negotiations with Brezhnev, claimed that he was "convinced that we were in a strong position to conclude the negotiations on … the terms we sought: a ceasefire … and the breakthrough to direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors."[114] Kissinger also claimed during the time of this meeting "we held the cards now. Our next challenge was to play our hand."[115] In these negotiations and in its reaction, it seemed that the US was unphased by the oil embargo. They not only did not feel the need to cease their support of Israel in order to appease Saudi Arabia and OAPEC, and even went so far as to take it upon themselves to negotiate the end of the war with Russia on behalf of both sides without consulting Israel. The U.S. felt such a strong feeling of control and superiority that they did not deign to bargain with, or acknowledge, the states who were attempting the coercion and instead only deigned to bargain with another renowned world power like Russia.

In this coercion scenario Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries in OPEC mistakenly overestimated the influence that their oil supply cut off would have on the US. They also underestimated the US's overall cultural values and sense of place in the world hierarchy. As Kissinger dictated, the US felt throughout the entire scenario that they held the power even in the face of the massive oil shortage resulting from the embargo. Saudi Arabia and the other OPEC countries felt the same. Given the massive volume of oil that they were exporting to consumer counties like the United States and Western Europe, they made a calculated decision that they could coerce the U.S. into ending their support of the Israeli side of the war. If they had been trying to coerce a low control country with an external locus of control, they likely would have succeeded given the magnitude of their cut off.

[114] Kissinger, 550.
[115] Kissinger, 544.

After World War II the United Sates internal locus of control was further bolstered by their new status as a superpower. Due to this the US felt that they were in too strong of a power position in the world order, as well as too prideful to even consider bowing to the demands of states that they deemed to be so much lesser than them. This opinion is easily demonstrated through the claim made by Charles Issawai "a group of small, economically underdeveloped, socially less advanced, and militarily weak nations imposed their will on the industrialized world."[116] This quotes demonstrates the overall American opinion that was held on the Arab states. They considered the OAEPC states as inferior to American power in every way. The states were small, not economically strong, culturally different, and lacking in military power. These claims about the Arab OPEC members are made quite obviously in terms of a comparison to the "superior" qualities of the United States. The level of arrogance and assumption of control and power that the US believed they had over the world at the time can be understood directly from this quote. In comparison to the US these states were lesser in every way that mattered to those in power and therefore their threat was not truly taken seriously.

In the ideas set forth by Brezhnev and later Nixon as well, both world powers agreed that the Arab states were not "rational" enough to resolve this conflict on their own and would need the Western powers to step in and negotiate a ceasefire for them.[117] Neither state had a low feeling of control, and therefore each states strategic culture was defined by an emphasis on a feeling of a capability to maneuver out of any situation either side could be coerced into. As the protector power of the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia had the ability with their oil weapon and influence on the other Arab OPEC members to force coercive action on the United States.

[116] Charles Issawi, "The 1973 Oil Crisis and After," *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics* 1, no. 2 (1978): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4537467.
[117] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*.

Similarly, as the United States had recently established itself as an industrial and military powerhouse at the top of the global world order. Saudi Arabia attacked the one area where US security was at risk, but it was not enough. Had the United States been another country the coercion may have succeeded, but the power moves made on both sides because of their strategic culture meant that the coercion inevitably failed. An understanding on either side of the others strategic culture might have allowed decision makers to entertain different strategy options than those that were observed.

Chapter 6:

Russia Vs Ukraine 2004 - 2009

Introduction

Within this case study Russia and Ukraine are observed through multiple escalating coercive bargaining scenarios concerning gas that involved Russia as the Sender and Ukraine as the target. Evaluated under a strategic culture assessment in which Russia has a high level of control and Ukraine has a low level of control, Russia had partial success in their bargaining attempts. Russia's historic position of power and influence over periphery states, such as Ukraine, as well as a strategic culture marked by suspicion of Western influence all worked to shape their decision to try to coerce Ukraine into moving away from pro-Western turning political ideals and candidates. Assessing Ukraine through the lens of an internal or external locus of control, Ukraine can be seen to have an external locus of control. In justifying this decision, this paper will analyze each states historical military power, geographical influence, and values to determine an assessment of locus of control that influences strategic culture and therefore decision making. Locus of control's influence on strategic culture and elite decision

making, will outline the influence that strategic culture has on predicting the success or failure of this bargaining interaction.

The Bargaining Event: 2004 - 2009

In 2004 an intense race between two presidential candidates, Yanukovich and Yuschenko, took place in Ukraine. Yanukovich was considered to be on friendly terms with Moscow and had the backing of the Kremlin as a candidate.[118] After Yanukovich was declared the winner in the midst of a fraudulent vote, the Orange Revolution took place. It was spearheaded by supporters of Yuschenko who was considered pro-West. This revolution culminated in forcing a new election which was not supported by the Kremlin. In the second election, Yuschenko came out the victor. His pro-West stance, as well as rise to power through a revolution that was Western backed, soundly placed Ukraine out of the Russian orbit. Since this "color revolution" was reminiscent of those having taken place in Georgia, Serbia, and Kirghizstan the election was deemed a threat to Moscow and Putin himself, neither of which could be tolerated.[119]

Accordingly, the Kremlin began to utilize gas access as a weapon. One person was cited as claiming "what else but gas could convince the people of Ukraine that it is better to be a friend of Russia than the EU and NATO."[120] To all Ukrainian people it was made clear that a vote for

[118] Randall Newnham, "Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2, no. 2 (July 2011): 134–43, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.004.
[119] Newnham.
[120] Victor Yasmann, "Russia: Moscow Uses Different Lever of Influence, Same Message," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (Www. Rferl. Org)*, 2006.

Yuschenko was a vote for a winter without heat, for the closing of factories, and possible economic collapse. Given Yuschenko's win at the end of 2004, Russia followed through on its threats. Though Ukraine's 2005 gas contract with Gazaprom, one of the most prominent state influenced gas companies in Russia, had already been signed the country was informed that there would be a harsh price increase. It was said that this was due to a natural increase in the world market price, but under the prior president of Ukraine who was backed by Moscow the price had held steady for years.[121]

This price increase, as well as Gazaprom calling in Ukraine's debt, would have succeeded in bankrupting Ukraine. In the beginning of 2006 when a new contract could not be negotiated, Gazaprom began to shut off gas flow to Ukraine. Commentators on Russian state-owned television openly stated that "the gas shut off is retribution for the Orange Revolution."[122] The gas shut off was not entirely successful. Russia was able to force Ukraine to agree to pay double the previous price for gas. This action enacted a huge economic drain on the Yuschenko administration, and due to the new price still being well below the world market price, allowed Russia to hold future price increases over Ukraine's head. The price increase then had an ensuing political effect as citizens began protesting the falling economy and attributed it to Yuschenko's party. Accordingly, Yuschenko's party did not do well in the 2005 elections, allowing more individuals supported by the Kremlin to try to take back power. After the 2006 cut off Russia continued to use the gas weapon on Ukraine as a reaction or threat to any action of President Yuschenko, or the greater Ukraine, that seemed to indicate a Western leaning.

[121] Newnham, "Oil, Carrots, and Sticks."
[122] Yasmann, "Russia: Moscow Uses Different Lever of Influence, Same Message."

Another gas shut off in 2008 was widely seen as punishment for the election of Timoshenko, the second pro-Western leaning president to be elected in the early 2000's.[123] Following later there was a shut off in 2009 that greatly affected Western Europe and was, like all the others, used by Russia to try to coerce Ukraine back into the Russian sphere and away from Western influence. Given the victories of Yuschenko, and later on Timoshenko, both of which Moscow used energy to try to oppose, the Kremlin's coercive bargaining tactics with gas did not always appear to garner immediate success. This, however, does not mean that Russia was not successful in its goals.

Strategic Culture: Russia

At the beginning of the Cold War Russia became one of the first states to have its strategic culture studied and analyzed. Though it has been many years since those first studies, Russian strategic culture influences such as geography, military power, and culture have not changed much in the years since. Russian strategic culture has stayed relatively stable throughout its history with emphasis on power shifts moving from military influence to more economic tools.

Since the beginning of its history Russia has had a tendency to consistently utilize force in order to achieve their strategic goals.[124] Ever since the 1600's military power has been the primary foundation for justifying the Russian state. Due to how difficult their geographic boundaries are to defend Russia had to rely on its military power to lessen its vulnerability to external attack.[125] Accordingly, over time Russia developed a militaristic and highly centralized

[123] Luke Harding, "Russia Issues Gas Ultimatum to Ukraine," *The Guardian*, October 3, 2007, sec. Business, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/oct/03/russia.ukraine.
[124] Norbert Eitelhuber, "The Russian Bear," *Connections* 9, no. 1 (2009): 1–28, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326192.
[125] Eitelhuber.

government which "relied on the idea of mass forces [that] could be sacrificed knowingly."[126] Russian strategic culture is heavily influenced by Russia's military history and geography, which worked to further shape its political culture and elite psychology.[127] Overtime after the Cold War Russian strategic culture emphasis moved from military strength to economic power, including Russia's use of its oil and gas weapon. From then on after the fall of the Soviet Union Russia has been focused on "restoring its status as a great power" and its prevailing history, ideals, and values simultaneously marked their strategic culture as sensitive to actions concerning the West. Part of this sensitivity has played a role in Russia's interactions with its former Soviet republics as they see them as under their control and vulnerable to uninvited Western interference. Many of these Soviet republics Russia does not see as separate from itself, but rather an extension of their own state, and therefore fully within their realm of control.[128]

Russia has been seen to have a long history of expansion, invasion, and goal of the completion of a pan-Slav mission. The Soviet Union's actions that have reflected these goals are similarly reminiscent of the same goals that were at the forefront of Russian foreign policy in the era of Imperial Russia.[129] Russia tends to see itself as a protector of its own values and is meticulous about ensuring that enemies do not get a foothold in "ethnic Russian core territory."[130] These intrinsic values and perceived self-identity have cultivated a strategic culture that is defined by an internal locus of control, especially when it comes to their influence over the former Soviet republics. This mission and its prominent goals have become a part of the Russian identity that works to define their perception of their eventual destiny and global role.

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[126] I. M. Koval′, O. B͡rusylovs′ka, and Volodymyr Dubovyk, eds., *Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine* (Odesa: Odes′kyĭ nat͡sional′nyĭ universytet imeni I.I. Mechnykova, 2017).
[127] F. W. Ermarth, "Russian Strategic Culture: Past, Present, and ... in Transition?," 2006, www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/russia.pdf.
[128] Eitelhuber, "The Russian Bear."
[129] Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War* (London: Routledge, 2006), 28.
[130] Sondhaus, 28.

These perceptions and views of a state's identity by its rational, but also self-interested actors, are direct influencers of strategy and decision making that occurs within that state. With a self-perceived identity of preserving their culture, and a main value of security, Russia's strategic culture has held steadily at an internal locus of control for quite a while. Much of their feeling of the control stems from the political and historical influence that they have had on prior Soviet republics.

In terms of Russian values, in a study done using Schwartz's theory of basic human values, it was found that the main value of the highest priority for Russia is security.[131] In the same study it was also found that achievement, tradition, and power are also high ranking amongst Russian citizens. Russian values play just as strong of a role in defining their strategic culture as their history does. An emphasis on security likely stems from concerns left over from the time of the Soviet Union involving Western interference and influence in Eastern Europe. Russia's specific feeling that they have a right to interfere with and influence countries like Ukraine that are within the near abroad has defined some of their willingness to threaten Ukraine's energy supply. Their intrinsic drive for security and identity as a great power who holds control over energy supply has further led their strategic culture to be formed with an internal locus of control. An almost full monopoly on European energy supply leaves them with an internal locus of control in bargaining scenarios or interactions as European states have been reluctant to support strong sanctions aimed at the energy sector given their reliance.[132] This continued reluctance by European states to punish Russia for its coercion or interference in other

[131] Nadezhda M. Lebedeva and Alexander N. Tatarko, "Basic Values in Russia: Their Dynamics, Ethnocultural Differences, and Relation to Economic Attitudes," *Psychology in Russia: State of the Art* 11, no. 3 (2018): 36–52, https://doi.org/10.11621/pir.2018.0303.
[132] European Parliament. Directorate General for External Policies of the Union., *Energy as a Tool of Foreign Policy of Authoritarian States, in Particular Russia.* (LU: Publications Office, 2018), 11, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/951739.

states has further allowed Russia to grow in its feeling of control over global interactions and events. The consequences of this can be seen in the 2004-2009 interaction between Russia and Ukraine.

Strategic Culture: Ukraine

As a country previously and recently suppressed under the rule of Soviet Russia, Ukrainian strategic culture is still forming. However, this does not mean that Ukrainian strategic culture's stable factors as they stand after the fall of the Soviet Union cannot be examined. Ukrainian strategic culture is generally defined by geographical, historical, and geopolitical factors.

Geographically, Ukraine is generally flat with borders and topography that lend themselves to easy penetration from its neighbors from all sides. These vulnerabilities were further increased for centuries as Ukraine was located directly at the "crossroads of most of the trade routes connecting the East to the West and the South to the North."[133] This meant that not only was Ukraine easily accessible to other actors, but that it also posed a certain strategic position that other states found compelling. Historically, this tended to lead to Ukraine falling victim to neighboring countries goals for the territory, which further hampered Ukraine's ability to create an independent and strong state. After a long period of the territory becoming part of other countries or empires, Ukrainian leaders began to look to diplomacy in order to secure alliances with other countries and to fend off enemies from all directions. This developed an early policy of receiving security in return for diplomacy and further allowed diplomacy to become one of Ukraine's principal tools for their policy on building their nation.[134]

[133] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, *Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine*, 12.
[134] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, *Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine*.

The use of diplomacy for security historically has allowed diplomacy to become a fundamental part of Ukrainian strategic culture in the form of the search for a strong partner. The relationship between Ukraine and its chosen partner generally manifests into asymmetrical relationships that form a kind of "protector(patron) – vassal relationship."[135] After a number of successful Ukrainian rebellions against enemy empires that were supported by various partner states, Ukraine made it a "political tradition to build its own sovereignty through alliances with a more powerful state."[136] The Kingdom of Moscow, which was linguistically, culturally, and religiously similar to Ukraine became an early ally and partner that Ukraine remains interconnected with today. The reliance on a stronger partner throughout much of Ukraine's history for security and alliances has led Ukraine to maintain an external locus of control as they have tried to grow as a country. Permanently under the watchful eye of another more powerful state that they become beholden to has forced Ukraine into a system of beliefs in regard to their ability to control the world around them and their state.

Ukraine has also generally held a more open world view than their partners. In terms of comparison between Ukraine and Russia, its partner for the last few decades, Ukraine's strategic culture is much more open to influence from "others". One example of this tolerance is through Ukraine's stance on religion compared to Russia's. While Ukraine has accepted the same religions as most of Russia in the form of Greek Christian Orthodoxy, they have not accepted the same repulsion felt towards the Western Church that Russia holds.[137] This openness to Western influence has also led Ukraine to seek out connections with NATO, and other Western alliances. This rapport has placed a strain on Ukrainian- Russian relations since the mid 1990's and

[135] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, 12.
[136] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, *Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine*.
[137] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk.

affected Ukraine's overall strategic culture in regard to openness to the West. As generally being more accepting of Western influence, and Russia being its exact opposite, strife between the two countries opposing strategic cultures often results.

The Ukrainian worldview has been described as "generally indefinite and spineless" with a strong emphasis and leaning towards the "feminine style" which is defined by Ukraine identifying its interests with the interests of another state, generally its strongest partner.[138] This idea is further reinforced through historical experiences which show that Ukraine is willing to give up parts of its sovereignty and play a more minor role so long as its interests and rights are respected by its stronger partner. If Ukraine feels that its partner is not respecting its rights, the state is likely to attempt to rebel, but with little to no control over the relationship, success is unlikely.

Ukraine's history, geography, and geopolitics influences all define Ukraine's strategic culture and facilitate determination of an external locus of control for Ukraine. With a history of colonization and suppression under more powerful actors that morphed into asymmetrical relationships, Ukraine is still, up to the beginning of 2004, acting with a strategic culture that is defined by an external locus of control. While there is a pretense of respect and civility in its partnerships, Ukraine generally has grown as country with an external locus of control due to its lack of autonomy over its own fate and decisions.

Case Analysis

[138] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, 16.

On the 27th of September in 1994 Boris Yeltsin spoke to the United Nations and said that "Russia's priority interests lie in the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union."[139] Both Russian and Ukrainian strategic cultures are rooted within similar values, military culture, and history. For the same reason that Russia has a high feeling of control, Ukraine has a low feeling. The partnership between the two has always been distinct with Russia setting the tone and polices, and Ukraine generally being willing to go along with it. Russia had the capability to capitalize on Ukraine's gas dependencies because it had lulled Ukraine into a state of complacency. Ukraine was expecting to keep working within the partnership that the two had established where Ukraine received respect and all the other benefits of a protector state. Russia felt that they had control over the state through Ukraine's gas dependency as well as their prior strong influence and "right" to interference.

A marked difference in Russian and Ukrainian strategic culture has been their feeling of control regarding their states. Russia has consistently declared the primacy of their state over others, and always felt highly vulnerable when faced with any expansion of Western civilization near their borders. This vulnerability has always prompted them to set their sights on states like Ukraine that they can try to use as a physical border against Western influence. Ukraine has moved in the opposite direction and has been consistently open to engagement and integration with westerners or "others."[140] After the dissolution of the Soviet Union it was found through public opinion statistics that only 25 percent of the Ukrainian population viewed Russia as a threat.[141] Viewing Russia as non-threatening and more of a big brother than anything else

[139] John M. Goshko, "YELTSIN CLAIMS RUSSIAN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE - The Washington Post," September 27, 1994, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/09/27/yeltsin-claims-russian-sphere-of-influence/fe3fe83b-bef3-4c10-b9bf-4784b4ec39c6/.
[140] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, *Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine*, 14.
[141] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, 15.

because of their cultural similarities lead Ukraine to become complacent in their energy security and to underestimate Russia's willingness and capability to use the gas weapon.

In a study of polls on cultural traditions, Ukraine showed that one main factor that defines their national identity is their language. This helps Ukrainians distinguish their identity from that of the assimilated Soviet and foreign Russian identity. However, Ukrainians very much so also see themselves as interconnected within the Russian sphere and as they are hugely defined by their tradition, history, and language they are willing to push for political reform but will not try to disrupt the social order.[142] A kind of protector patron state relationship has consistently existed between Russia and Ukraine. A similar culture, linguistic tradition, and religion allowed for an easy allyship to grow at the time which has then continued throughout the years to become a lasting feature of Ukrainian strategic culture.[143] This is in large part due to its geography and the role of neighboring states trying to take advantage.

The control that the Kremlin holds over the Ukrainian government as well as the historical right that they feel towards the territory and the country further defines Ukraine's position within the dynamic as firmly out of control. Ukrainians have historically felt very comfortable with their ever present "older brother" who despite divisions they never defined fully as their enemy. Even with that being said, when Russia began to oppress their rights or intervene too heavily in the country, Ukraine has been historically likely to "initiate spontaneous protest", but not the complete dissolution of the relationship, or disruption of the social order.[144] Though, it is not to be said that the Ukrainians may not be seeking to achieve that outcome. At

[142] Oleksander Hrytsenko, "Culture as a Nation Building Tool in Contemporary Ukraine," in *Journal of Ukrainian Studies 26,* 2001.
[143] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, *Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine,* 14.
[144] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk, *Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine*.

the time and within the partnership they simply did not have the means or feeling of control in the relationship to achieve goals of separation from Russia.[145,146] In regard to the value scale of Ukraine, and in researching polls referencing religion and cultural traditions, overall it was found that Ukrainians presented as generally open minded in regard to political reform but were still mostly socially conservative. Ukrainians tend to place a high value on family, religion, and tradition.[147] This means that Ukrainian strategy is unlikely to be deterred by decisions that would push forward political reform, but they would be hesitant to disrupt their current social order.

Ukraine's dominant norms and identity traits reveal a perceived lack of control and preference towards strategic choices that will not disrupt the current social order. A focus on tradition emphasizes the historical tradition of Russia holding influence and power over Ukraine. The Ukrainian people are willing to move towards changing political reform, but overthrowing the Russian yoke is not within their value and identity ideals. These ideals then form their view on their strategy and security when entering into coercion scenarios or considering foreign policy decisions.

Seeing as Ukraine was always more open to Western influence and interaction with those seen as other by Russia, Ukrainian elites miscalculated the tolerance of the Kremlin in regard to their election in 2004. Throughout history it can be seen that within the framework of the partnership between Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine has been willing to forego some parts of its sovereignty in order to play a more minor role. However, within this partnership Ukraine has always expressed an inherent desire to be respected in the partnership. With the gas shut offs

[145] Koval′, Brusylovs′ka, and Dubovyk.
[146] While this has been true historically and remained true within the timeline of 2004-2009, it is this authors belief thar Ukrainian strategic culture has drastically shifted since this time frame. Further study would benefit from a close look at the shift in the relationship dynamic between Russia and Ukraine, with particular attention paid to how it has been influenced by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as the Russian Ukrainian war beginning in 2022.
[147] Hrytsenko, "Culture as a Nation Building Tool in Contemporary Ukraine."

from 2004-2009 Russia used the price hikes and cut off threats to try to influence Ukraine to follow the guiding hand of their "big brother." The threats and price hikes toed the line of respectful and were easily brushed off by Russia as price disputes instead of the political coercion that they were. Due to Russia's high feeling of control and its traditional influence in having a hand in Ukrainian politics, it was a foregone conclusion that they could try to influence the election of Western leaning candidates through gas shut offs. Russia had placed Ukraine in a position to be punished if it did anything that indicated interest in Western influences or moving away from its Russian partner.

Due to the Gazaprom gas shut offs Ukraine's economy suffered a heavy drain and the Kremlin profited directly from the price increases seeing as Gazaprom is state owned. The success of coercive bargaining cannot simply be measured through whether or not it brings immediate resolution to the sender states demands. Rather, an assessment should also measure the level of damage caused by actions carried out against the target states and whether that damage had a lasting and strong effect politically, economically, or militarily. Per David Baldwin, when considering the success of sanctions, "one must always count the costs imposed as a success since they weaken the opponent."[148]

The gas shut offs and price hikes did not only succeed in cause economic damage. They also served to weaken the stance and political support of Yuschenko which also led to his inability to provide on his campaign promises. Russia has shown with Ukraine and with many other "near abroad" states that it is willing to use its petro power to achieve its political interests. Enemies of the state are punished with tactics that can escalate from threats, to price hikes, and sometimes to outright embargos. While Russia's efforts with Ukraine may not have seemed to

[148] David A Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft: New Edition* (Princeton University Press, 2020), 132.

have shown immediate results in the sense of political compliance or capitulation to the coercive demands, all of Russia's efforts from 2004 to 2009 served to impose extensive costs on Ukraine. These costs were not only economic, but also served to increase political instability and undermine the base of power for political candidates that the Kremlin did not support. When an internal control country coerces and external control country this interaction will almost always result in coercive success. External control countries do not have the capability in interactions or coercion to mount the defensive or offensive position needed to circumvent the coercion. Generally lacking in historical capabilities, military power and values that support a feeling of control, external control countries are unlikely to be able to fully evade coercion. In the case of Ukraine, the pro West political party that Russia was targeting was so economically damaged that they were unable to mount a protest against the Kremlin backed candidates. While outright coercive success may not have occurred, Moscow was unable to unseat the two Western candidates who had already been elected, they were able to ensure the pro West groups failing in the next elections.

Conclusion

This study aimed to understand how strategic culture can influence coercive bargaining outcomes in energy. Using strategic culture theory, energy security, and coercive bargaining, I hypothesized that a high feeling of control, or an internal locus of control, defining strategic culture in a sender state will result in bargaining success only when the target state has an external locus of control. To test this hypothesis, I conducted a qualitative case study analysis of three coercive energy bargaining scenarios where each state's strategic culture was analyzed and defined using a series of variables relating to culture and control.

I asked the question of how does an internal locus of control, or an external locus of control effect a state's strategic culture in coercive bargaining with energy that makes them more or less likely to succeed? By analyzing locus of control's influence on decision making in coercive scenarios involving energy, this thesis, holding all else equal, found support that locus of control determinations can directly and indirectly shape strategic decision making that defines coercive success or failure. Only coercive scenarios involving a sender with an internal locus of control, and a target with an external locus of control resulted in success in the case studies analyzed. The results indicated that sender states who do not understand or take into account target sates locus of control and strategic culture leave themselves vulnerable to possible retaliation or a diminishment of their credibility in the ensuing coercion failure. An unawareness of a target or sender state's locus of control resulted in failed coercion. If sender and target both hold an internal locus of control, the target state may handle the threat more intensely than the sender state anticipated and retaliate in harmful ways as was the case with Japan and the United States. Awareness of state locus of control can prepare states to consider further strategic decisions and understand an opponent in a more comprehensive way than other theories have allowed for before. I also found that rarely, if ever, do states with external locus's of control act as senders in bargaining scenarios. In each case study I found that each sender had an internal locus of control, and it was the target's locus of control that determined success or failure. Two internal control countries involved results in neither state deeming the threat as credible, and therefore the coercion fails.

While the focus on bargaining scenarios with energy limits the generalizability of the results, this approach provides new insights into strategic culture variables and how they can affect decision making. Maintaining a narrow focus on coercive scenarios in energy allowed this

paper to observe countries' decision making in similar scenarios. Observing each state in similar coercive scenarios allowed me to further explore how strategic culture and locus of control could influence decision making and the outcome of the coercive event. While strategic culture is becoming more commonly studied, many scholars still remain reluctant to analyze individual states' strategic cultures. This paper adds an in-depth analysis of how locus of control can influence strategic decision making to the discussion on the topic, while also focalizing on how this effects energy. Oil and gas were also noted in this paper to, on occasion, act as weapons that states had in their arsenals. The influence of these resource weapons tended to increase internal locus's of control. Just as the production of new weapons and an increase in hard power increases a states feeling of control, holding power and influence over another state's energy supply seems to have the same effect. This paper was able to account for variables that influence decision making that had previously rarely been studied. The influence of history, geography, and military power on locus of control as well as locus of control's influence on coercive outcomes, reveal how important strategic culture research is to fill in the gaps of how and why states make the strategy decisions that they do. While this research illustrates how locus of control affects decision making and strategic culture, it also raises the question of the influence of Johnston's variables on the results if all of them were to be analyzed.

By examining the findings from each case study, I was able to explore the relationship between strategic culture and success in bargaining while also understanding energy dependencies. Future research could study strategic culture more broadly using all of Johnstons variables, and in other cases of coercive bargaining that do not involve energy. Examining the strategic culture of a state is an incredibly extensive process that involves examining numerous different variables and factors. Multitudes of books on strategic culture could be written on each

and every state that was analyzed in this paper. Future projects should include in depth and fully comprehensive analyses of each states' strategic culture so that it can be understood in how it influences coercive interactions in broader spheres beyond energy coercion exclusively. A study such as this would allow for a full and comprehensive overview of strategic culture in states regarding coercion that has yet to be written.

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