

Gilded Realities: The Political Art of Framing Immigrants

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Abstract

As immigration in the United States (U.S.) becomes an increasingly polarizing topic, questions concerning the legal status of immigrants are often reduced to black and white answers: they are either legal or illegal. Policymakers specifically position immigrants as deserving members of society or as unwelcomed foreigners for political profit (Tirman, 2015). This research posits that the identity of policymakers explains why some policymakers frame immigrants differently than other policymakers. Policymakers have role identities, their identity based on the positions they assume in society, and group identities, their identity based on their demographic characteristics. This research specifically analyzes the effect of a policymaker's political ideology, family immigration history, race, and immigrant constituent population on how that policymaker frames immigrants. Using a random sample from the congressional record from the 113th Congress, I conducted a qualitative analysis of these different identity memberships to demonstrate that belonging to specific identity memberships affects how policymakers organize reality. The results of this study support that as policymakers become more conservative, they are more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group. Similarly, policymakers who represent smaller immigrant populations, are also more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group. Finally, if policymakers are first-generation Americans, they are more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. This research also found political ideology to be a highly salient identity membership. In relation to the other identity memberships studied, political ideology often undermined the effects of family immigration history and constituent immigrant population.

Keywords: Immigrants, DREAMers, Framing, In-Group, Out-Group, Political Behavior

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Black or white? What about gray?

As immigration in the United States (U.S.) becomes an increasingly polarizing topic, questions concerning the legal status of immigrants are often reduced to black and white answers: they are either legal or illegal (Tirman, 2015). At the same time, policymakers appear to use terms such as “illegal,” “undocumented,” and “unauthorized” interchangeably. While each of these terms labels someone as an immigrant without legal status, they carry different connotations. For example, the term “illegal” is more closely connected to criminality than “undocumented” and “unauthorized” (Plascencia, 2009).

Many scholars have studied how policymakers frame immigrants (Egres, 2018; Chavez, 2007; Miholjcic, 2012; Santa Ana, 2007; Vertovec, 2011; Wodak, 2013). On the one hand, they have found that policymakers often label immigrants as illegal or criminal in order to justify efforts to exclude them from society (Lakoff & Fergus, 2006). On the other hand, scholars have also revealed how policymakers construct frames to characterize immigrants as legitimate members of society who are entitled to certain rights and benefits (Egres, 2018; Wodak, 2013). The scholars in this discipline focus on a question of *how* policymakers construct frames of immigrants rather than a question of *why* some policymakers use these frames differently than other policymakers. More research is needed to explain why there is variation in how policymakers frame immigrants. This research posits that the identity of policymakers explains why some policymakers frame immigrants differently than other policymakers.

Policymakers have role identities, their identity based on the positions they assume in society (e.g. occupation), and group identities, their identity based on their demographic characteristics (e.g. race). This research hypothesizes that both the role- and group identities of policymakers influence how policymakers frame immigrants. A common response to why

policymakers frame immigrants differently points to the specific characteristics of immigrant populations as the driving factor of variation (Ana, 1999; Aragon, 2017; Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Castro-Salazar & Bagley, 2012; Chavez, 2007; Chavez 2012; Chavez, 2013; De Genova, 2006; Flores, 2003; Huber, 2009; Molina, 2010; Plascencia, 2019; Van Dijk, 1984). Another response to this question also indicates the social, economic, and cultural climate of the U.S. as an explanation for why policymakers use different frames (Anderson, 2013; Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Castles & Davidson, 2000; Egres, 2018; Flores, 2003; Hajnal & Rivera, 2014; Mutz, 1998; Tirman, 2015; Vetovec, 2011). While these two responses answer part of the question, they fail to address that differences among policymakers may explain why they adopt particular frames to describe and characterize immigrants. This research questions if the differences among policymakers affect whether policymakers frame immigrants as members of their in-group (deserving members of society) or out-group (unwanted and criminal foreigners).

This research specifically analyzes the effect of a policymaker's political ideology, family immigration history, race, and immigrant constituent population on how that policymaker frames immigrants. Using a random sample of the congressional record from the 113th Congress, I conducted a qualitative analysis of these different identity memberships to demonstrate that belonging to a specific identity membership affects how policymakers organize reality. Consequently, policymakers are likely to frame immigrants differently because of these memberships. Thus, concepts assumed to be black and white, such as "legal" and "illegal," are subject to the positionality of specific policymakers.

The results of this study support that as policymakers become more conservative, they are more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group. Similarly, policymakers who represent smaller immigrant populations are also more likely to frame immigrants as members of

their out-group. Finally, if policymakers are first-generation Americans, they are more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. This research also found political ideology to be a highly salient identity membership. In relation to the other identity memberships, political ideology often undermined the influence of family immigration history and constituent immigrant population on how policymakers frame immigrants.

This paper begins by briefing the importance of language in politics and then continues to detail the relationship between immigration and whiteness in the U.S. Because the qualifications for U.S. citizenship have always been tied up with questions of race, this information is important to understanding the historical nuances and complexities of how policymakers frame immigrants in the U.S. Following this background information, this paper describes the core theory of the study: the salient identity membership model. I explain how each identity membership studied is anticipated to function using this model and elaborate on how this model reveals why policymakers frame immigrants differently. Each identity membership is hypothesized to influence how policymakers organize reality, and subsequently, how they frame immigrants. A policymaker's salient identity memberships are those identity memberships that most strongly guide how policymakers organize reality and frame immigrants. Therefore, policymakers with distinct identity memberships are likely to frame immigrants differently. Following a description of the empirical process, the analysis section of this paper substantiates the theoretical claims and details the evidence supporting the hypotheses for each identity membership. This paper ends with a discussion of the interactive relationships between and crosscutting nature of the different identity memberships studied before turning to the concluding thoughts.

The Politics of Language

Aristotle understood humans as political animals because humans alone have been endowed with the power of speech (Chilton, 2004). Human socialization triggered the formation of coalitions and signaling of group boundaries, which catalyzed the need for language (Chilton, 2004). Language allows groups of people to indicate who is useful and harmful, who is just and unjust, and who is good and evil (Chilton, 2004). As humans are political animals, policymakers are expert political animals (Chilton, 2004). Therefore, politics cannot exist without language. As a vehicle to either unify or divide groups, language is a useful tool for policymakers (Chilton, 2004). Despite being widely accepted as a key to politics, however, the link between politics and language has not been adequately explored (Chilton, 2004). Specifically, linguistic action and discourse are “strikingly absent from conventional studies of politics,” as linguist Paul Chilton (2004) notes (p.4). More research is necessary to understand how language functions in politics and why some policymakers use language differently than other policymakers. Namely, this research explores how language creates frames, and as a result, why some policymakers use language to frame immigrants differently than other policymakers.

Immigration and Whiteness in the U.S.

The cross-border movement of people shapes nations, defining their economies, policies, and culture. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, millions of people immigrated to the U.S. in search of the “American Dream,” the pervasive idea that a person could immigrate to the U.S., capitalize on economic opportunity, and make a comfortable life for themselves. The idea of the “American Dream” greatly informed the U.S.’s self-identification as a “Nation of Immigrants” and because of this, it has been widely believed that open immigration to the U.S. was accepted until the nineteenth century. It is now clear however, that immigration to the U.S.

has always been policed on lines of race and the idea of the nation. Policies have always existed that limit the immigration of specific groups of people on the basis of race and national origin. In fact, the first naturalization law enacted by Congress in 1790 dictated, “any alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided in the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States... may be admitted to become a citizen thereof” (Wong, 2017). Therefore, the roots of U.S. immigration law reveal a qualification for citizenship on the basis of whiteness, an idea that has pervaded U.S. history and continues to today.

In the nineteenth century, close to four and a half million Irish immigrants and five million German immigrants arrived in the U.S. (Oppenheimer et al, 2016). At the time, there was a strong perception that Irish and German immigrants were not “white” enough because of their different skin tone, language, and customs. As a result, their arrival produced strong nativist sentiment (Oppenheimer et al, 2016). The founding fathers of the U.S. also held anti-immigrant beliefs; Benjamin Franklin and Alexander Hamilton found both the Irish and Germans to be insufficiently white (Peters, 2015). These groups were racially labeled as “foreigners” from the Anglo-Saxon Americans who had settled in the U.S. less than a century before. This historical anecdote demonstrates how immigration policies have always been tied up with questions of race.

During the mid-nineteenth century, close to 25,000 Chinese immigrated to the U.S. (Oppenheimer et al, 2016). Like the Irish and the Germans, their addition also created anxieties among Americans and anti-immigration sentiment thrived. The belief that Chinese immigration was “in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion and was a menace to [U.S.] civilization” drove Congress to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 (Oppenheimer et al, 2016 p.22). The Chinese Exclusion Act banned the immigration of Chinese laborers to the U.S.

and was one of the first significant immigration restrictions from the federal level (Oppenheimer et al, 2016).

Like the Chinese Exclusion Act, Congress enacted numerous other policies that institutionalized the exclusion of specific groups of immigrants on the basis of race and national origin throughout the twentieth century. The Immigration Act of 1917 “barred immigration by those over the age of sixteen who cannot read the English language” (Oppenheimer et al, 2016 p. 17). This language barrier dramatically reduced the number of Italian, Russian, Polish, Hungarian, Greek, and Asian immigrants to the U.S. and strongly favored Western European immigrants (Oppenheimer et al, 2016). Similarly, the Immigration Act of 1924, or the Johnson-Reed Act, set national-origin quotas that restricted the number of immigrants to a limit proportionate to the number of foreigners residing in the U.S. based off the 1890 census (Oppenheimer et al, 2016). The flood of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe began just before 1890, therefore because this act relied on the 1890 census numbers, it dramatically reduced the number of immigrants from these countries (Oppenheimer et al, 2016). Importantly, this act also completely excluded immigrants from Asia but did not establish any quotas for immigrants from Western Europe (Oppenheimer et al, 2016). Hence, like the Immigration of 1917, the Immigration Act of 1924 limited the immigration of groups who were considered to not be “white” enough on the basis of national origin.

The Civil Rights Movement that began in the mid-1950s catalyzed a dramatic change to U.S. immigration policy. It effectively ended the Bracero program, a series of agreements that recruited labor from Mexico, because the program exploited Mexican workers. Increasing protest against racial injustice also led many Americans to view the 1924 immigration policy based on a national-origin quota system as discriminatory. As a result, the subsequent policy, the

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, shifted from a system overtly based on race and national origin to one that emphasized recruiting families and attracting labor. This new emphasis transformed the demographics of immigrants in the U.S., changing the major immigrant-sending countries from Western European countries to Latin American and Asian countries (Oppenheimer et al, 2016).

Importantly, the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 did not erase national-origin based quotas on immigration. It still restricted the number of immigrants from specific countries, such as those in Latin America. Consequently, following its implementation the number of undocumented immigrants from Latin America also increased dramatically (Chomsky, 2014). Many scholars mark the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 as the beginning of contemporary “illegal” immigration from Latin America (Chomsky, 2014). This is because the Mexican workers who were once legally in the U.S. under the Bracero program were now considered illegal, despite the fact that both they and the economic demand for migrant labor still remained in the U.S. Therefore, until 1965 Mexican migrant workers were not considered immigrants in the same capacity that they are today. In this way, illegality became politically useful in reconfiguring work from an obligation to a privilege on the basis of national origin and race (Chomsky, 2014).

One of the most monumental changes to the U.S. immigration system followed the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attack (9/11). Following the attack, the Bush Administration created three institutions housed under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In many ways, the policies in place from these institutions mirror those established in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965,

such as an emphasis on family-based immigration, employment-based immigration, and protecting refugees (American Immigration Council). Additionally, the current immigration system places caps on per-country immigration, such that immigrants from a single country cannot exceed seven percent of the total number of immigrants coming to the U.S. in a single fiscal year (American Immigration Council). Thus, like its predecessors, the current immigration system institutionalizes specific groups of immigrants as legal or illegal based on the country from which they originate.

In addition, because the terrorists responsible for 9/11 entered the U.S. through legal channels, post-9/11 immigration policies have prioritized national security. Specifically, contemporary immigration politics reflect a desperate need to track and monitor anyone entering and exiting the U.S. As a result, undocumented immigrants in the U.S. have become a much higher governmental priority and concern. In 1980, there were between two and four million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., a number which rose to eight and a half million in 2000 and to 12 million in 2007 (Chomsky, 2014). As of 2016, there are estimated to be 12.1 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (DHS, n.d.).

Mexican immigrants comprise 58 percent of the undocumented population in the U.S., and 70 percent of immigrants deported are Mexican. The high rate of Mexican immigrant deportations speaks to how as a group they are regarded as non-citizens and framed as “a race toxic to the American nation” (Aragon, 2017 p.59). As Chomsky (2014) wrote, “being Mexican makes you somehow *more* undocumented” (p.88). Often, public discourse attempts to position undocumented Mexican immigrants as “illegal” and “a problem” (López, 2015). Leo Chavez (2008) best captured this phenomenon in a phrase he coined the Latino Threat Narrative. Chavez (2008) writes that the Narrative is as follows,

...Latinos are not like previous immigrant groups, who ultimately became part of the nation... Latinos are unwilling or incapable of integrating, of becoming part of the national community. Rather, they are part of an invading force from south of the border that is bent on reconquering land that was formerly theirs (the U.S. Southwest) and destroying the American way of life. (Chavez, 2008 p. 3)

The Latino Threat Narrative can be poised historically with other antecedents in U.S. history: the Irish threat, the German threat, the Catholic threat, the Chinese threat, and the Japanese threat. Accordingly, the Latino Threat Narrative is “part of a grand tradition of alarmist discourse about immigrants and their perceived negative impacts on society” (Chavez, 2008 p. 4). However, the Latino Threat Narrative is unique in that Latinx immigrants are more closely associated with criminals than any other immigrant group (Chavez, 2008). While many believe it to be no longer permissible to overtly discriminate against someone based on their race, by assigning Latinx immigrants an illegal status and characterizing them as non-citizens, it becomes permissible to discriminate against them due to their criminality (Chomsky, 2014). Therefore, positioning Latinx immigrants in relation to the nation and other immigrant groups delineates those who are considered legitimate members of society versus those who are considered “less legitimate, marginalized, and stigmatized Others” (Chavez, 2007 p.7).

The executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have attempted to manage the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. in a number of ways. For example, Senator Durbin and Senator Hatch introduced the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act in 2001 (National Immigration Law Center, 2017). Between 2001 and today, there have been numerous iterations of the DREAM Act in various legislation. The most current version of the DREAM Act, introduced in 2017, “allows current, former, and future undocumented high-school graduates and GED recipients a three-step pathway to U.S. citizenship through college, work, or the armed services” (American Immigration Council,

2018). While this version of the DREAM Act has yet to be passed by both the House and the Senate, President Obama introduced the executive order, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in June of 2012. From the foundation of the DREAM Act, DACA ordered that anyone between the age of 15 and 31, who immigrated to the U.S. before turning the age of 16, could apply for deferred deportation if they are currently in school or serve in the military (USCIS, nd).

The DREAM Act and DACA produced a population of DREAMers, those who stand to benefit from the DREAM Act. DREAMers are the young people “who may have crossed the border (or remained in the country) “illegally,” but not through their own will or decision” (Chomsky, 2014 p.168). In 2010, the Migration Policy Institute estimated that over two million people could be potential beneficiaries of the DREAM Act (Chomsky, 2014). This has created a stark debate about the DREAM Act and who DREAMers are. Some people claim that children who play no part in deciding to immigrate to the U.S. should not be reprimanded for doing so. Others claim that illegal means illegal and undocumented immigrants should not be rewarded for breaking the law. Regardless, the construction of DREAMers legality or criminality is uncertain because, while they are without papers, the “undocumented youth who grew up in the United States do not fit the profile that many citizens hold of the “illegal immigrant”” (Chomsky, 2014 p. 169).

The DREAM Act and DACA are milestone policies that grant rights, benefits, and opportunities to undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, DACA is also important when studying how the U.S. manages undocumented immigration because its announcement coincided with a surge in undocumented children fleeing to the U.S. from Latin America. Some of the push factors driving immigration to the U.S. included economic conditions and violence in Latin American countries at this time (Chishti & Hipsman, 2014). Some also argued that a pull factor

to the U.S. was the promise of DACA (Greenblatt, 2014). While the children who were newly arriving in the U.S. at the time would not have qualified for DACA, some falsely believed that DACA provided a pathway to U.S. citizenship for incoming undocumented youth. It is difficult to know for certain how many families were motivated by this false hope, but the Republican party capitalized on the opportunity to blame DACA, a policy initiated by Democrats, as the main cause of the humanitarian crisis (Greenblatt, 2014). This is demonstrative of how some policymakers can position the same immigrant group in a positive light as legitimate members of society, while others can position them in a negative light, as a group of unwanted foreigners who cause more harm than good.

Identities that Frame Realities

Why do policymakers frame immigrants differently? A common response to this question points to the specific attributes of immigrant populations as the driving factors of variation (Ana, 1999; Aragon, 2017; Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Castro-Salazar & Bagley, 2012; Chavez, 2007; Chavez 2012; Chavez, 2013; De Genova, 2006; Flores, 2003; Huber, 2009; Molina, 2010; Plascencia, 2019; Van Dijk, 1984). Another response indicates the social, economic, and cultural climate of the U.S. as an explanation for why policymakers use different frames of immigrants (Anderson, 2013; Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Castles & Davidson, 2000; Egres, 2018; Flores, 2003; Hajnal & Rivera, 2014; Mutz, 1998; Tirman, 2015; Vetovec, 2011). Each of these arguments answers part of this question, however, still fails to address how a policymaker's identity memberships may cause them to frame immigrants differently, independent of these other factors. Policymakers construct frames by linguistically emphasizing specific elements of a phenomenon with greater apparent relevance than others (Ransan-Copper et al., 2015). This research proposes that a policymaker decides which elements of immigration to emphasize based

on that policymaker's identity memberships. Policymakers are then likely to frame immigrants differently if they hold different identity memberships. Therefore, to answer the question of why policymakers frame immigrants differently completely, it is necessary to examine how role identities and group identities of policymakers may influence their actions. This research posits that a policymaker's group identity and role identity influence how they frame immigrants.

The theoretical mechanism of this study adopts the logic of social identity theory and imagined communities to build a salient identity membership model. Social identity theory advances that a person's identity memberships inform how that person understands their own personal identity and, as a result, how that person behaves (Turner et al, 1987). Specifically, people view themselves as members of an in-group, those like them, in comparison to an out-group, those unlike them (Stets & Burke, 2000). Moreover, Benedict Anderson coined the term imagined communities to denote the socially constructed perception of belonging to specific group memberships (Anderson, 1983). Group memberships can be formed from common ideals and patterns of behavior that are expressed through ethnicity, religion, culture, and/or history (Anderson, 2013). A key method of institutionalizing an imagined community is through language, as it has the capacity to build particular solidarities within a group (Anderson, 1983). As a result, the imagined community, or their in-group, understands itself as homogeneous and acts akin to others in their in-group, assuming actions that uphold their in-group identity (Stets & Burke, 2000). Often, actions against those outside the imagined community, or those in their out-group, further ingrain the perceived solidarity within their in-group to the extent that one may hold prejudice views and discriminate against their out-group as means to enhance the status of their in-group (McLeod, 1970).

Scholars have found that before considering the specific economic or cultural costs and benefits of immigration, people first consider whether immigrants are “good Americans” (Mangum & Block Jr., 2017). In the context of this research, being a “good American” equates to being a member of the American in-group identity. Because of their in-group psychology, Americans are likely to “think more positively of Americans or those with an American identity and less favorably of individuals who are not Americans or those without an American identity” (Mangum & Block Jr., 2017 p.5). As a result, Americans assume positions on whether something supports or harms their in-group (Mangum & Block Jr., 2017). For example, Mutz and Kim (2017) studied the impact of in-group favoritism on trade preferences and found “Americans value the well-being of other Americans more than that of people outside their own country,” insofar that “rather than maximize total gains, Americans choose policies that maximize in-group well-being” (p.827). This example provides insight as to how in-group psychology may operate in the context of this research, given that policymakers will be likely to maximize their in-group well-being relative to their out-group. These findings directly support the mechanism of social identity theory and imagined communities, demonstrating how scholars can apply these theories to understand various political outcomes in the U.S.

Applying this logic to immigration, Americans also take positions on whether immigrants support or harm their in-group. Policymakers may strategically frame immigrants as members of the American in- or out-group to capitalize on potential political gains. Thus, the foundations of social identity theory and imagined communities help inform how a policymaker’s identity memberships can cause that policymaker to frame immigrants differently than other policymakers.

Figure 1. Salient Identity Membership Model




Figure 1 demonstrates the salient identity membership model underpinning this study. A policymaker's identity consists of both their group identity and role identity. Policymakers' group identities define who they are in terms of their personal demographic characteristics, whereas policymakers' role identities define who they are in terms of the roles they occupy (McLeod, 1970). This is an important duality as policymakers have multiple group identities and role identities that can either constrain or promote specific actions. This research considers the effect of a policymaker's role as a politician with a political ideology as a function of their role identity. It also considers a policymaker's family immigration history and race as functions of a policymaker's group identity. Finally, it considers the effect of a policymaker's constituents, specifically a policymaker's immigrant constituent population, and how there may be an overlap of role- and group identity when considering this membership. Each identity membership is

theorized to be a salient identity membership when considering why policymakers frame immigrants differently. The salient identity memberships are those memberships that most strongly influence how policymakers organize reality, affecting their views of immigration, and catalyzing them to frame immigrants in a specific way. A salient social identity has a high probability of being activated in a situation, meaning it will likely influence one's perceptions and behaviors (Stets & Burke, 2000). For instance, a policymaker's group identity as a person of color may become the most salient identity membership when discussing issues of race in the U.S. (Mangum & Block Jr., 2017). Each of the four identity memberships studied will be explained in further detail in the subsequent sections.

Because all policymakers hold multiple group- and role identities, this research also explores how policymakers resolve contradicting group- and role identity memberships by examining which are potentially the most salient. This research also discusses the effects of crosscutting identity memberships. Multiple identity memberships are likely to overlap and have a combined effect. For example, policymakers who are people of color are more likely to be liberal than conservative (Wong, 2017). Therefore, a crossover of identity memberships may increase the influence of both the identity memberships on a policymaker's actions and have a compounded effect (Mangum & Block Jr., 2017). Ultimately, exploring the interactive and crosscutting nature of identity memberships serves as a useful mechanism for analyzing the relationship between and the effects of a policymaker's group identities and role identities on how that policymaker frames immigrants.

Political Ideology as a Function of Role Identity

Policymakers hold multiple role identities and each poses unique constraints on their actions. Notably, a salient role identity for all policymakers is their identity as a politician with a

political ideology. Policymakers draw boundaries of their in-group and out-group to solidify their in-group identity within their political ideology and with their constituents. Political ideology is a function of a policymaker's role identity because it informs why policymakers may use frames that bolster that specific ideology for political gains. On issues of immigration, there is increasing polarization between the Republican and Democrat parties (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). In recent history, Republicans have sought political profit by exploiting anti-immigrant sentiment, whereas Democrats have sought profit by appealing to foreign-born constituents (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). For example, Republican leaders often demonize immigrants, condemn their actions, and bemoan the costs to America (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). Framing immigrants in this way permits anti-immigrant sentiment, policies, and practices as normalized ways to respond to undocumented immigration (Haas, 2008). On the other hand, Democrat leaders often support the arrival and integration of immigrants (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). Framing immigrants in this way permits the implementation of policies that grant rights and benefits to immigrants (Haas, 2008). Therefore, policymakers strategically frame immigrants for political means (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014).

While clear partisanship polarization exists, there has never been unanimous or unwavering homogeneity within each Party. For example, 37 percent of Republican representatives crossed party lines and sided with Democrat representatives to pass the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986 (Wong, 2017). Even more striking, 93 percent of Democrat representatives joined Republican representatives in passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act in 1996 (Wong, 2017). Thus, political ideology serves as a better function of a policymaker's role identity than their partisanship would because of the variance that exists within each party.

This research theorizes political ideology on a spectrum from liberal to conservative. Liberal is understood in its contemporary form, as a political position taken by policymakers who sponsor less restrictive immigration policies. On the other hand, conservative, in its contemporary form, is conceptualized as a political position taken by policymakers who sponsor more restrictive immigration policies.

Family Immigration History and Race as Functions of Group Identity

While policymakers have multiple group identities, their family immigration history is a useful function of group identity when considering its influence on how policymaker's frame immigrants. If a policymaker is a first-generation American, then they are likely to view other immigrants as members of their in-group because of the ethnic and cultural kinship linking them to a shared history of immigration (Massey, 1993). Immigrant groups are linked through migrant networks, "sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin" (Massey, 1993 p.448). Therefore, even after settling in the U.S. and obtaining U.S. citizenship, immigrant families are still connected to immigrant groups through these networks.

Moreover, the American national identity is built largely on the idea that the U.S. is a "Nation of Immigrants" where anyone can achieve the "American Dream." As a result, many Americans strongly identify with the American national identity, regardless of whether their families recently immigrated to the U.S. or have been settled in the U.S. for centuries (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). While concerns that increased immigration may dilute the American national identity exist, first-generation Americans are least likely to share this belief (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). If someone is from an immigrant family, and still views

themselves as American, the addition of immigrants to the American in-group identity may be more natural.

In addition, race exacerbates the characterization of which immigrant groups constitute their in-group and their out-group. Because of the historical relationship between race and immigration in the U.S., “race combines with more complex ideas about group identity to inform immigration policy preferences” (Byrne & Dixon, 2016 p.21). Many Americans use nationalism as a screen to conceal their racism and validate the exclusion of specific groups of immigrants from the American in-group identity (De Genova, 2002). Thus, race can be understood as a subset of group identity as it is also used to further delineate the boundaries of in-group belonging.

Constituent Identity

Considering the makeup of a policymaker’s constituents reveals how a policymaker’s group identities and role identities may overlap. Specifically, this overlap can be understood in terms of descriptive representation versus substantive representation. Descriptive representation refers to the idea that people support policymakers who share similar characteristics to them, such as race or gender (Wallace, 2014). For example, the fact that the majority of immigrants are people of color, and people of color in Congress are more likely to be liberal than conservative may explain why immigrants often support liberal policymakers (Gimpel & Edwards, 2000; Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). Immigrants may be more likely to support liberal policymakers because they best represent the demographics of immigrant groups. Hence, descriptive representation occurs when policymakers are members of the same in-group as their constituents because of their group identity. However, while constituents may align with a specific policymaker because of their shared demographic characteristics, it is also possible that constituents support a specific

policymaker because they share a common political ideology. Substantive representation refers to the idea that people support policymakers who represent the interests of their group (Wallace, 2014). Therefore, substantive representation occurs when policymakers are members of the same in-group as their constituents because of their role identity. For example, a policymaker's constituents may support that policymaker because they align with their political ideology. Scholars argue that immigrants often support liberal policymakers because liberal policymakers generally advance policies that aid and support immigrants (Wong, 2017; Hirschman, 2005). On the other hand, white people often support conservative policymakers, specifically if they hold more anti-immigrant views (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014).

Whether immigrants often support liberal policymakers and white people tend to support conservative policymakers because of policymakers' group- or role identities, policymakers are accountable to their constituents in a democracy. In order to be re-elected or maintain a position of political power, policymakers must appease their constituents and demonstrate that they have mutual interests and objectives (Schedler, 1999). This may explain why as the foreign-born population in a political district increases, a policymaker becomes less likely to vote for restrictive immigration-related legislation (Wong 2017). Ultimately, this supports that the identity of a policymaker's constituents is also a salient identity membership for policymakers when considering why some policymakers frame immigrants differently than other policymakers.

Theoretical Assumptions

Innate in this theory are key assumptions. First, the salient identity membership model is grounded in essentialist thought, which has the potential to oversimplify complex phenomena (Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D, 2000). However, while this potential exists, the way

people self-categorize often stems from “psychological essentialism,” simple beliefs that categories of people are founded in “essences” (Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D, 2000). Scholars have found that “people automatically engage in self-categorization,” in which they place themselves in in-groups and define out-groups (Turner et al. 1987). Following the process of self-categorization, it is natural for people to have a psychological attachment to a specific identity membership based on essentialist assumptions (Mangum & Block Jr., 2017). Regardless, when engaging with the salient identity membership model one must note that social categories are not inherent or natural and much of what constitutes an in-group is *perceived* homogeneity, rather than essential similar characteristics.

Moreover, the theory of this study also assumes that the interests of specific groups do not change over time in such a way that would affect their in-group’s relationship with their out-group. The policymakers studied are assumed to frame immigrants in the same way over time as long as they hold the same identity memberships.

Hypotheses

From the standing literature and foundation of the salient identity membership model, this research hypothesizes that the role identities and the group identities of policymakers influence how policymakers frame immigrants. Because policymakers belong to a specific in-group - either through their group identity, role identity, or both - they are likely to view immigrants as either members of their in-group or as members of their out-group. Thus, policymakers are likely to frame immigrants in a deserving, humane, desirable, and innocent light to support members of their own in-group, or in a negative, dehumanized, and undesirable light to demonize and criminalize members of their out-group.

Specifically, this research hypothesizes that a policymaker will be more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group if the policymaker is conservative. Whereas, a policymaker will be more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group if the policymaker is liberal. Republicans can directly support their in-group (fellow Republicans) and hurt their out-group (Democrats) by framing immigrants in a criminal and dehumanizing way. However, because partisanship is not a strict binary (between Republican and Democrat), this hypothesis proposes that as a policymaker holds a more conservative political ideology, they will be more likely to support their in-group by framing immigrants as members of their out-group.

Moreover, a policymaker will be more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group if the policymaker is not a first-generation American. Whereas, a policymaker will be more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group if the policymaker is a first-generation American. If a policymaker is from an immigrant family or is a first-generation American, they are likely to support other immigrants, as members of their in-group.

Specifically, a policymaker will be more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group if the policymaker is Latinx. As the majority of immigrants in the U.S. are Latinx, people who are Latinx are considered the face of immigration in the U.S. (Mangum & Block Jr., 2017). Policymakers can directly support members of their in-group (other people who are Latinx) by framing immigrants as desirable and deserving.

Finally, a policymaker will be more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group if the policymaker represents a district or state with a small population of immigrants. On the other hand, a policymaker will be more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group if the policymaker represents a district or state with a large population of immigrants. If policymakers view their constituents as members of their in-group and assume actions that

support their in-group identity, then a policymaker who represents a large population of immigrants would bolster their in-group identity by framing immigrants (members of their in-group) as deserving members of society. A policymaker who represents a small population of immigrants would bolster their in-group identity by framing immigrants (members of their out-group) as criminal and undesirable.

Research Design

Data Sample

The guiding research question for this study was: why do policymakers frame immigrants differently. To answer this question, I chose to specifically analyze why policymakers frame DREAMers differently. Technically, DREAMers are undocumented, and therefore “illegal.” Therefore, the ambiguity of their legal status and the absence of a unified understanding of their belonging to the American in-group identity makes DREAMers perfect to study for this research. The ways policymakers frame them as either deserving members of society or as undeserving criminals speaks to how framing is subject to the positionality of the policymaker.

To test the hypotheses of this study, I examined a random, convenience sample from the congressional record from the 113th Congress of the U.S. government that made explicit references to the DREAM Act, DREAMers, and/or DACA. The 113th Congress was in session from 2013 to 2015. I chose this congress for this research because President Obama issued DACA as an executive order in 2012, marking a resurgence in conversation about DREAMers. Moreover, the majority of presidential candidates for the 2016 election announced their campaigns as well as their stances on key debates by the end of 2015. Hence, the 113th Congress captures a time period of increased conversation about DREAMers and more isolation from party presidential campaigning. I chose to analyze the congressional record because it highlights

discourse from both the House and Senate, across party lines, family immigration histories, racial identities, and regions of the U.S.

Empirical Process

I used a systematic process for understanding, describing, and interpreting the congressional record in order to derive data. This methodology aimed to demonstrate that policymakers frame immigrants differently because of their identity memberships, thus proving my hypotheses. To begin, I searched for any references in the congressional record from the 113th Congress about DREAMers, the DREAM Act, or DACA by using these terms as the keywords in the Library of Congress online search database. Following this, I read through the pages with the above-mentioned search terms and saved the relevant pages to capture the complete discussion regarding DREAMers. These pages were then uploaded to NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software.

Using NVivo and a convenience sampling method, I selected a random sample of the relevant pages from the congressional record. The random sample consisted of 550 references to DREAMers, the DREAM Act, or DACA. This became the data corpus. Next, I coded for instances where DREAMers were framed as members of their in-group or as members of their out-group. Then, I analyzed these coded references. As specific in-group or out-group framing techniques emerged, I classified each coded reference in thematic sub-categories. From the thematic analysis, the following six in-group framing techniques emerged: comparison (e.g. comparison to citizens or comparison to “good,” legal immigrants), economic logic, moral responsibility, deservingness, slogans (e.g. the “American Dream” or “Nation of Immigrants”), and stories. Additionally, the following four out-group framing techniques emerged: contrast (e.g. contrast to citizens or contrast to “good,” legal immigrants), slogans (e.g. “Nation of


Laws”), spin, and unintended consequences. While these themes often overlapped, I still found them to be indicative of the relationship between a policymaker’s identity memberships and how that policymaker framed immigrants.

Once I completed the coding process, I created a data matrix of each policymaker who referenced DREAMers, the DREAM Act or DACA in the sample from the congressional record that I studied. The sample consisted of 100 policymakers. I delineated their group identities and role identities in this matrix (see Appendix A). I specifically included information regarding each policymaker’s political ideology, family immigration history (e.g. if they are a first-generation American), race, and immigrant constituent population.

For each policymaker’s political ideology, I recorded each policymaker’s ideology score as listed on GovTrack’s 2014 Report Card. GovTrack, a project of Civic Impulse, LLC, is completely independent of any party politics and receives no funding from any outside organizations (About GovTrack.us., n.d.). The ideology scores listed on the report card ranks members of the House of Representatives and the Senate from most conservative with a score of one to most liberal with a score of zero. This score is derived from policymakers’ voting records, as well as their sponsored and cosponsored bills. I categorized the policymakers into quartiles: (1) policymakers with a score of zero to .24 as most liberal, (2) policymakers with a score of .25 to .49 as liberal, (3) policymakers with a score of .5 to .74 as conservative, and (4) policymakers with a score of .75 to one as most conservative. The random sample from the congressional record represented 66 liberal policymakers and 34 conservative policymakers with an average political ideology score of .42. There were 27 policymakers in the first quartile, 40 policymakers in the second quartile, 11 policymakers in the third quartile, and 22 policymakers in the fourth


quartile. There was also one policymaker who did not have a political ideology score. Figure 2 demonstrates the distribution of policymakers across political ideology quartiles.

Figure 2. Percent of Policymakers in Each Political Ideology Quartile




For each policymaker's family immigration history and race, I used their biographical information as listed on Ballotpedia, a digital encyclopedia of American politics that is firmly committed to neutrality in its content (About Ballotpedia, n.d.). Because the hypotheses only concern policymakers who are Latinx, I categorized the policymakers as either Latinx or not Latinx, rather than including the specific race of each policymaker. The sample from the congressional record represented 24 policymakers who are first-generation Americans and 76 who are not. Figure 3 demonstrates this distribution.

Figure 3. Percent of First-Generation American and Non-First Generation American Policymakers



Additionally, there were 17 policymakers who are Latinx in the sample and 83 policymakers who are not and figure 4 illustrates this division.


Figure 4. Percent of Latinx and Non-Latinx Policymakers



Finally, to calculate the size of each policymaker's immigrant constituent population, I used the number of foreign-born constituents in each Senator's state and in each House

Representative's district as provided by the Migration Policy Institute and the Government Census. I used this number to calculate the percent of foreign-born constituents out of a policymaker's total number of constituents. Then, I grouped the policymakers in the following categories: less than five percent of constituents are foreign-born, five to 10 percent of constituents are foreign-born, 10 to 20 percent of constituents are foreign-born, 20 to 30 percent of constituents are foreign-born, 30 to 40 percent of constituents are foreign-born, or more than 40 percent of constituents are foreign-born. There were nine policymakers with less than five percent, 20 with five to 10 percent, 31 with 10 to 20 percent, 20 with 20 to 30 percent, 15 with 30 to 40 percent, and five with more than 40 percent. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of policymakers across these categories.

Figure 5. Percent of Policymakers in Each Political Ideology Quartile



I uploaded this demographic information to NVivo as attribute data for each of the policymaker's cases and used crosstab queries to search for correlations between the group- and role identities of a policymaker and their usage of the various frames. Then, I tested the hypotheses. If the identity of policymakers influences the ways they frame immigrants, the results would indicate that policymakers who are more conservative, who are not from

immigrant families, who are not Latinx, or who represent a state or district with smaller percentages of immigrants are more likely to frame DREAMers as members of their out-group. On the other hand, policymakers who are more liberal, who are from immigrant families, who are Latinx, or who represent a state or district with larger percentages of immigrants are more likely to frame DREAMers as members of their in-group. The results would then explain why there is variation in the ways policymakers frame immigrants and indicate that policymakers with different identity memberships are likely to frame immigrants in varying ways.

Driving Difference: The Influence of Role Identity and Group Identity

The general findings of this study support the hypotheses that the role- and group identities of policymakers influence how policymakers frame immigrants. The subsequent sections provide an in-depth analysis of each identity membership that studied: political ideology, family immigration history, race, and constituent immigrant population.

Political Ideology as a Function of Role Identity

Figure 6. In-Group v. Out-Group Frames by Political Ideology





Figure 6 illustrates how as policymakers became more conservative, there was an exponential increase in the average number of frames used per policymaker. The policymakers in

the fourth quartile who classified as most conservative framed DREAMers as members of their out-group 197 percent more than the most liberal policymakers in the first quartile who classified as most liberal. Similarly, policymakers in the first quartile framed DREAMers as members of their in-group 170 percent more than policymakers in the fourth quartile. This indicates the significant impact that a policymaker's political ideology has on how that policymaker frames immigrants and supports that political ideology is a salient identity membership.

Policymakers with different degrees of liberal or conservative political ideology also employed different framing techniques when positioning DREAMers as members of their in-group or their out-group. Liberal policymakers used the deservingness and moral responsibility frames as in-group framing techniques most often, and conservative policymakers used spin and consequences as out-group framing techniques most often.

Figure 7. In-Group Framing Techniques by Political Ideology Quartile 1 (Most Liberal)



The most liberal policymakers studied, those in the first quartile with a political ideology score between zero and .24, employed in-group frames of DREAMers most often. Twenty-six policymakers categorized in the first quartile, and figure 7 illustrates the distribution of in-group framing techniques used by these policymakers. According to the dataset, policymakers in this

quartile used deservingness as an in-group framing technique most frequently. The deservingness frame is also the most demonstrative of the hypotheses for policymakers in the first quartile because it exemplifies how they could engage their role identity to bolster liberal policies (the DREAM Act and DACA). Framing DREAMers as deserving of the rights and benefits of a pathway to citizenship equates the DREAM Act and DACA with rewarding DREAMers with what they have justly earned. The excerpt from Senator Durbin below demonstrates how this technique functioned for a policymaker in the first quartile:


[DREAMers] are nothing short of amazing. These young people have done things with their lives that are just incredible. They are the valedictorians of their classes in many cases. They have gone on to college and paid for it out of their pocket in many cases... Every time I have told that story about that DREAMer, someone has stopped me in the hall and said: That is an amazing story about this young person who just wants to be part of the United States and its future... I do believe the vast majority of Americans are fair people. They are people who believe in justice. They do not believe that a child—that a child—should be held responsible for any wrongdoing by their parent. If their parent brought them to the United States as a baby, they had no voice in that decision. Why should they be penalized for that decision? They should be given their own chance to become part of this Nation's future. (S5952)

There are three key aspects of this example that exhibit major elements of their in-group frames employed by policymakers in the first quartile. First, Senator Durbin described the quality of DREAMers' character, stating they are "nothing short of amazing," "have done things with their lives that are just incredible," and listing some of these things, such as becoming valedictorians. By describing DREAMers this way, Senator Durbin framed them as deserving of U.S. citizenship because of their upstanding character and inspiring work ethic. Second, Senator Durbin emphasized that DREAMers "just want to be part of the United States and its future" on several accounts. This rhetoric combined with the description of DREAMers as hard-working people furthers the notion that they deserve a pathway to citizenship because they want to better the future of the U.S. Finally, Senator Durbin explained that because DREAMers were brought

to the U.S. as young children unbeknownst to them, they should not be penalized for the offenses of their parents. The deservingness frame is grounded in rhetoric, such as “through no fault of their own,” which absolves DREAMers of any guilt attached to their undocumented status. Ultimately, this example illustrates how the deservingness frame positions DREAMers as innocent children who deserve a chance to better U.S. society.

Policymakers in the most liberal quartile may have been particularly inclined to use the deservingness frame because, as the example from Senator Durbin illustrates, the frame allows liberal policymakers to invoke both emotion and logic when evaluating liberal policies. Essentially, policymakers use the deservingness frame to position DREAMers as worthy people who deserve an inculpable policy that protects their livelihoods and allows them to be assets to the U.S. Therefore, the most liberal policymakers support their fellow liberal policymakers by framing DREAMers as members of their in-group.

Figure 8. In-Group Framing Techniques by Political Ideology Quartile 2 (Liberal)



The policymakers in the second quartile who qualified as liberal with a political ideology score between .25 and .49 employed in-group frames of DREAMers more often than policymakers in the third and fourth quartiles. There were 40 policymakers who classified in the second quartile and figure 8 demonstrates their in-group framing techniques these policymakers

used. From the data sample, policymakers in this quartile used their in-group framing techniques of slogans and comparison most often. In addition, many liberal policymakers also employed the moral responsibility frame and this technique was found to be demonstrative of the hypotheses.


The moral responsibility frame allows more moderate liberal policymakers to position the livelihood of DREAMers as something all policymakers are responsible for, regardless of whether their political party supports the DREAM Act or DACA. The citation from

Representative Hinojosa below demonstrates this technique in action:

Since its inception in 2012, the DACA program has protected DREAMers who meet certain requirements from deportation, allowing hundreds of thousands of young undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children to remain and work in the United States. In my view, closing the door on undocumented youth is un-American. We in the Congress of the United States have a moral responsibility to protect the welfare and rights of vulnerable children and youth. (H7232)

There are two notable elements to this example of the moral responsibility frame. First, Representative Hinojosa described not allowing undocumented youth a pathway to citizenship as “un-American.” This consequently positions the livelihood of DREAMers as an American responsibility. Second, Representative Hinojosa stated that Congress has a moral responsibility to protect the rights and welfare of youth, including DREAMers. These elements illustrate how Representative Hinojosa’s role-identity as a policymaker actively produced the moral responsibility frame. The combination of these two elements positions DREAMers as members of their in-group and, because of their in-group’s responsibility to its own members, solidifies that it is the job of policymakers to protect DREAMers. Ultimately, the moral responsibility in-group framing technique allows policymakers in the second quartile to strategically appeal to *all* policymakers’ responsibilities in Congress, not just to policymakers who are liberal.

Figure 9. Out-Group Framing Techniques by Political Ideology Quartile 3 (Conservative)



The policymakers in the third quartile who categorized as conservative with a political ideology score between .50 and .74 employed out-group frames of DREAMers more often than policymakers in the first and second quartiles. In this sample, 11 policymakers categorized in the third quartile and the majority of them used contrast as an out-group framing technique. Figure 9 exhibits the distribution of out-group framing techniques policymakers with a conservative political ideology used. The framing technique spin exemplified the mechanism of the hypotheses for policymakers in this quartile. The spin out-group framing technique permits moderate conservative policymakers to appeal to policymakers who are both liberal and conservative. Using spin, policymakers initially appear to frame immigrants positively, but inadvertently still position them as members of their out-group. Representative Rohrabacher exemplified how this technique functioned for a policymaker in the third quartile. Representative Rohrabacher began by describing how America is diverse and inclusive, stating:


... One of the things that makes America great is that our country is a country that—regardless of one’s race, one’s religion, or one’s ethnicity—we, as citizens of the United States, make up a collective family, the American family; yes, a diverse family, but a family, in and of itself, composed of all the people, the great variety of people we have here from every part of the world who have come here to live in freedom and enjoy the opportunity and the liberty and the justice that America represents. Here, despite where one was born or whose one’s parents are or when even one became a citizen, we are all equally part of that family. (H3400)

Using this rhetoric, Representative Rohrabacher implied he is caring and compassionate towards everyone in America, regardless of race, religion, or ethnicity. He even goes as far to recognize naturalized immigrants as members of the American in-group. Representative Rohrabacher also reaffirmed his role as a policymaker and a member of the American “family” to care for his family (or in-group). However, following this, he paradoxically contrasted those in the American family to foreigners who seek to be members of the American family:

Just as many families across our Nation have come to discover, at one point or another, in a time when there are scarce resources, when you are going through perhaps an economic crisis or trying to avert an economic crisis, it is not unreasonable to provide for one’s family before helping others. It is not selfish to watch out, thus, for our fellow Americans. It is not selfish to watch out for our fellow Americans above the well-being of foreigners, even foreigners who wish us well and, yes, foreigners who would like to become part of the American family; but, first and foremost, those Americans from every part of the world who are citizens of this country or, yes, who have come here legally in the attempt to become a U.S. citizen, their interest must be our first priority. (H3400)

Through this contrast, he emphasized that the American family must be the first priority and prioritized over foreigners. This example classified as spin because Representative Rohrabacher directly stated that immigrants are members of the American family, however, only those who have already been formally and legally accepted. As a result, Representative Rohrabacher framed undocumented immigrants, including DREAMers, as members of the American out-group. Representative Rohrabacher appealed to his role identity and emphasized how he, as well as the other members of Congress, must prioritize the American family first in order to fulfill their responsibility as policymakers. Representative Rohrabacher explained that this is the only viable way to do a policymaker’s job of protecting and serving Americans (members of their in-group). Similar to how Representative Hinojosa employed a moral responsibility frame to appeal to all policymakers’ responsibilities in Congress, Representative Rohrabacher employed spin to appeal to all policymakers but also subliminally framed DREAMers as members of their out-group.

Figure 10. Out-Group Framing Techniques by Political Ideology Quartile 4 (Most Conservative)



Finally, the policymakers in the fourth quartile who classified as most conservative with a political ideology score between .74 and one employed out-group frames of DREAMers the most. From the data sample, there were 22 policymakers in the fourth quartile. Figure 10 illustrates the distribution of out-group frames policymakers in this quartile used. The most conservative policymakers frequently employed the consequences frame as an out-group framing technique. The consequences framing technique effectively demonstrates the mechanism of the hypotheses because it allows the most conservative policymakers to frame DREAMers as members of their out-group by emphasizing the adverse effects of the DREAM Act and DACA, thereby discrediting liberal policies. The quotation from Representative King below exhibits how policymaker in the fourth quartile framed DREAMers as members of their out-group using the consequences framing technique:

What kind of compassion is it, Mr. Speaker, that supports a policy, that is attracted by DACA, that would cause a family member—whether it is a mother and a father in, say, Guatemala, El Salvador, or Honduras, or an aunt and uncle, a grandparent, to go down to the pharmacy and buy birth control pills and bring them back and start the prescription of the birth control pills to your 12-year-old daughter, your 12 year-old granddaughter, your 12-year old niece—13, 14, 15—and then hand her over to a coyote who is, by definition, a human trafficker and put her out there in the custody of the coyote. And she ends up on a bus. She ends up on a truck. She ends up on a train. She ends up raped.

Representative King directly connected DACA to the plight of young children. Specifically, he paralleled the atrocious circumstances of these children to another pressing, but seemingly unrelated, opinion held by conservatives – opposition to planned parenthood (e.g. birth control). This excerpt demonstrates how Representative King manipulated the perceived consequences of DACA by also referencing other controversial topics in order to rally even more opposition against it. Following this, Representative King continued to explain the alarming situation of young women immigrating to the U.S. from Latin America, stating:

And if she gets to the United States alive, traumatized, she has still got to get across the river. She still has to get into the United States. And maybe she goes across on a boat. Maybe she goes across on a jet ski. Maybe the water is low, and she is able to get across. Right now, it is too deep in that area for that to happen. Swimming is a chance, but sometimes they drown. Sometimes they pick up sexually transmitted diseases. Sometimes they are killed along the way. Many, many, many times they are raped. This is the product of DACA. This is the product of a feckless policy that is also a lawless policy, a policy that violates the existing law that says, you shall place them into removal proceedings. (H6951)

Here, Representative King further detailed how horrific the current undocumented youth crisis was at this time. He concluded by explicitly framing the situation of the undocumented youth as a direct product of DACA. From Representative King's perspective, DREAMers constitute members of their out-group because supporting DREAMers catalyzes the abuse and mistreatment of other undocumented children who hope to benefit from the false promise of DACA.


Essentially, Representative King used DREAMers as a pawn to oppose and disrepute a liberal policy (DACA) by invoking strong emotions attached to longstanding conservative viewpoints. As demonstrated by this example, the most conservative policymakers, including Representative King, often did not directly reference DREAMers but rather negatively framed liberal policies that help DREAMers obtain benefits and a pathway to citizenship. Ultimately, in

doing so, the most conservative policymakers support their fellow conservative policymakers by framing DREAMers as members of their out-group.

Ultimately, the most liberal and the most conservative policymakers framed DREAMers as members of their in-group or as members of their out-group in order to support their fellow policymakers on the same side of the aisle. The more moderate liberal and conservative policymakers, on the other hand, used frames to position DREAMers as members of their in-group or out-group in such a way that implied all policymakers, regardless of their ideology, should frame them in the according way. Irrespective of the framing techniques used, as policymakers became more conservative they were more likely to frame DREAMers as members of their out-group.

Family Immigration History as a Function of Group Identity


Figure 11. In-Group v. Out-Group Frames by Family Immigration History



The data supports that a policymaker is more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group if the policymaker is a first-generation American. There is a 168 percent difference between the first-generation American policymakers who framed DREAMers as members of their in-group and those who framed DREAMers as members of their out-group. Interestingly, the converse does not hold as true. The data does not support that a policymaker is

more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group if that policymaker is not a first-generation American. There is only a three and a half percent difference between non-first-generation American policymakers who framed immigrants as members of their in-group and out-group. Furthermore, this percent difference is not significant because of the crosscutting nature of the identity memberships in the sample collected. Therefore, based on the findings of this study, not being a first-generation American likely has little effect on how policymakers frame immigrants and is not considered a salient identity membership. Because of this, how policymakers who are not first-generation Americans framed immigrants will not be explored further. Overall, the results did indicate that being a first-generation American is likely a salient aspect of a policymaker's identity and is likely activated when policymakers construct frames about immigrants.

Figure 12. In-Group Framing Techniques by First-Generation American Policymakers



First-generation American policymakers almost exclusively framed DREAMers as members of their in-group. There were 24 first-generation American policymakers in the data sample. Figure 12 demonstrates how first-generation American policymakers used the moral responsibility frame and the stories frame most often to position DREAMers as members of their in-group. Moreover, analyzing how first-generation American policymakers used stories and

slogans as framing techniques exemplifies how they activated their group identity when framing DREAMers as members of their in-group.

For example, Senator Rubio told his own family's immigration history when discussing immigration policies. He described how both his parents were undocumented immigrants. They immigrated from Cuba to Miami because they had done "everything they could to make a better life [in Cuba], but living in an increasingly unstable country, with limited education and no connections, they just couldn't" (S5344). Senator Rubio described how the first words his father learned to speak in English upon his arrival to the U.S. were, "I am looking for work" (S5344). Senator Rubio anecdotally detailed his parent's trials and tribulations working in cities all over the U.S. until they finally saved enough money to buy a house and support their growing family. Senator Rubio explained how as his parents worked hard in America, the "country became their own" (S5344):

My mother recalls how on that terrible November day in 1963 she wept at the news that her President had been slain. She remembers that magical night in 1969 when an American walked on the Moon and she realized that now nothing was impossible, because, you see, well before they ever became citizens, in their hearts they had already become Americans. (S5344)

Using several examples, Senator Rubio defended that his parents were truly Americans before becoming naturalized. By positioning his parents, undocumented immigrants at the time, as members of their in-group, he framed other undocumented immigrants, including DREAMers, as members of their in-group as well.

Like Senator Rubio, other first-generation American policymakers referred to their own family immigration histories when discussing immigration. Many of them told their stories in conjunction with well-known slogans, such as "Nation of Immigrants" and the "American Dream." For example, Representative Hoyer explained,


I am the son of an immigrant, an immigrant from Denmark. Serving with me in this Chamber are the sons and daughters, grandsons and granddaughters, great-grandsons and great-granddaughters, and yes, even more generations before. Grandsons of immigrants from Mexico, from Italy, from China, from Africa, from Eastern Europe, from the Caribbean, from Asia—indeed, from every land in this world. (H5642)

By stating he is the son of an immigrant, Representative Hoyer positioned immigrants as members of his in-group similar to how Senator Rubio did. Representative Hoyer continued by explaining many of the policymakers in Congress are descendants of immigrants as well. Thus, he implied all of the policymakers in the Chamber should also view immigrants as members of their in-group because the U.S. is a “Nation of Immigrants.” Ultimately, combining his own personal story with a well-known slogan framed immigrants as the essence of the American in-group identity.

Representative Hoyer was not the only first-generation American policymaker who explained his family’s immigration story through the framework of slogans. Representative Garcia stated, “None of this—none of this—would be possible without the hard work of immigrants who came to my community searching for the American Dream, just like my parents did” (H7505). Senator Durbin also did this clearly, stating, “we may have to go back several generations—in my case, not very far. My mother was an immigrant to this country... That is my story. That is my family’s story. That is America’s story. That is who we all are” (S3585). Both Representative Garcia and Senator Durbin explained that America’s story and its foundation comes from a shared history of immigration. Senator Durbin even went as far as to say, “That is who we all are.” Using the pronoun “we” explicitly framed immigrants as members of the American in-group. Ultimately, the first-generation American policymakers studied were highly likely to use their own personal family immigration stories to frame other immigrants as part of the America’s “Nation of Immigrants” hoping to achieve the “American Dream.” These

examples clearly demonstrate how first-generation American policymakers emphasize the connection between America's self-proclaimed identity as a "Nation of Immigrants" and their own immigration history to solidify immigrants as members of the American in-group.

Figure 13. Out-Group Framing Techniques by First-Generation American Policymakers



While the majority of first-generation American policymakers framed DREAMers as members of their in-group, there were a select few who did not. For example, Senator Cruz and Representative Labrador are both first-generation Americans, but framed DREAMers as members of their out-group. These two, however, are also both conservative. The conflicting nature of these policymakers' identity memberships was not hypothesized, therefore the discussion section of this research will elaborate further on how policymakers with competing identity memberships, such as Senator Cruz and Representative Labrador, navigate them.

Interestingly, the first-generation American policymakers who framed DREAMers as members of their out-group used consequences and spin as framing techniques. The excerpt below from Senator Cruz sheds light on why a first-generation American policymaker may still frame immigrants as members of their out-group. Using the consequences frame, Senator Cruz made the following comment about the DREAM Act and DACA:

I would suggest to my friends this is what amnesty looks like. Amnesty looks like dangerous drug cartels entering this country wantonly. Amnesty looks like thousands of young children being housed in military bases. Amnesty looks like hundreds of

immigrants who came here illegally being transported to cities and towns amid opposition from the citizens who lived there. Amnesty looks like a complete and utter disregard of our rule of law. Amnesty is unfolding before our very eyes.

Here, Senator Cruz emphasized the perceived negative consequences of the DREAM Act and DACA. He equated DACA to amnesty because it provides a pathway to citizenship for undocumented youth and emphasized how amnesty benefits drug cartels and hurts young children and U.S. citizens. Senator Cruz based this statement on the false pretext that DACA catalyzed the surge in undocumented youth immigrating to the U.S. in 2013 and 2014.


When Senator Cruz stressed the perceived negative effects of amnesty, he specifically targeted undocumented immigrants. As a first-generation American policymaker, Senator Cruz may have felt more comfortable using the consequences framing technique rather than other out-group framing techniques because his family immigrated to the U.S. through formal, legal channels. When speaking of his family immigration history, Senator Cruz often emphasized how his family immigrated “legally.” Thus, Senator Cruz may only understand documented immigrants to be members of his in-group, not undocumented immigrants.

Of the first-generation American policymakers studied, some of the policymakers’ families may have immigrated to the U.S. through formal, legal channels or as undocumented immigrants. While the influence of this was not hypothesized, it may affect how first-generation American policymakers frame undocumented immigrants, including DREAMers. It is possible that some first-generation Americans whose parents immigrated to the U.S. through formal and legal channels may only view other documented immigrants as members of their in-group. As only two first-generation American policymakers from the sample studied framed DREAMers as members of their out-group, the limited data leaves some aspects of this conclusion up for debate for future research.

Overall, these findings support that being first-generation American is a salient identity membership for policymakers, and thereby strongly influences how policymakers frame immigrants. While the majority of first-generation American policymakers framed DREAMers as members of their in-group, select few did not. The reason for this may root in the specific nature of a policymaker's family immigration history. Ultimately, however, the findings from this study supported the hypothesis that policymakers who are first-generation Americans are more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. On the other hand, the findings did not support that policymakers who are not first-generation Americans are more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group.

Race as a Function of Group Identity

Figure 14. In-Group v. Out-Group Frames by Race



Furthermore, the results of this study support that a policymaker is more likely to frame DREAMers as members of their in-group than as members of their out-group if the policymaker is Latinx. Figure 14 demonstrates how the Latinx policymakers studied framed DREAMers as members of their in-group 139 percent more than as members of their out-group. This indicates that being Latinx is likely a salient identity membership. Because of the relationship between race and immigration in the U.S., by framing immigrants as members of their in-group, Latinx policymakers combat the systematic racism embedded in U.S. immigration politics.

Moreover, these findings also inform why first-generation American policymakers are likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. While some Latinx policymakers have long family histories in the U.S., many are first-generation Americans. As a result, Latinx policymakers likely have ties to immigrant communities. Regardless, Latinx people are considered the face of immigration in the U.S. Therefore, they are likely to view other immigrants, including DREAMers, as members of their in-group.

The remainder of section details how Latinx policymakers activated their group-identity to frame DREAMers as members of their in-group. Specific focus is paid to how Latinx policymakers employed comparison and slogan in-group framing techniques, as well as how these policymakers often underscored other in-group framing techniques with a discussion of race.

Figure 15. In-Group Framing Techniques by Latinx Policymakers




Figure 15 demonstrates how the Latinx policymakers studied employed the comparison frame most frequently, and this framing technique exemplifies why the majority of Latinx policymakers framed immigrants as members of their in-group. Because many Latinx communities are connected to immigrant communities in the U.S. through migrant networks, Latinx policymakers likely understand Latinx immigrants to be members of their in-group. By

comparing DREAMers to citizens, Latinx policymakers' group identities actively influence how they frame DREAMers as members of their in-group. The excerpt below from Representative Cardenas demonstrates how policymakers who are Latinx used the comparison frame to situate immigrants as members of their in-group.

...Comprehensive immigration reform is not about "those people." Comprehensive immigration reform is about us, Americans. It is about us improving our economy. It is about us doing the right thing. It is about us welcoming the men, women, and children who come to this country and work as hard as any human being will dare to do, and that makes our economy stronger. That makes America great.... And that is what immigrants do for our United States of America. They make our country stronger. This country was built on immigrants. Why in the world would we, as Americans, want to support the idea that they are "those people" and they are not part of who we are? (H7684)

In this example, Representative Cardenas explained how immigrants are not "those people," because immigrants are embedded in the fabric of the U.S. and are essential to its functions. By combating the dichotomy of "us" versus "them," Representative Cardenas drew attention to the fact that immigrants are, and have always been, members of the American in-group.

Moreover, similar to the framing techniques commonly used by first-generation American policymakers, Latinx policymakers also frequently employed slogans such as "Nation of Immigrants." This coincided with how Latinx policymakers used the comparison frame to solidify immigrants' positions as members of their in-group because of their similarities to U.S. citizens. Slogans connect all Americans to a shared history of immigration. For example, Senator Menendez stated that supporting policies that aid DREAMers is:

...a vote for the long history of immigrants in America, for the millions of immigrant families: Irish, German, French, Italian, Scandinavian, Jewish, Greek, Polish, Portuguese, and many others whose blood, sweat, and tears ushered in America's industrial age; a vote for the immigrants of the "greatest generation" who brought this Nation through the Depression, fought a World War, and ended the Cold War. (S5342)

Senator Menendez emphasized that throughout American history, immigrants of all races have come and aided the U.S. on various accounts. In this way, they have been essential in sculpting

the U.S. into what it is today. Senator Menendez also explicitly listed the racial background of the various immigrant groups who have come to the U.S, emphasizing how the U.S. is a “Nation of Immigrants.” Like Senator Menendez, many of the Latinx policymakers who framed DREAMers as members of their in-group often highlighted race while employing other in-group framing techniques. For example, Representative Hinojosa discussed race in conjunction with the economic logic framing technique to underscore how race is wrongfully used to position DREAMers as members of their out-group:


Generalizations about children, about entire races of people are intolerant, disrespectful, and not very intelligent. Our country expects better from us. Recent comments made by one colleague across the aisle are far below those expectations. Forget for a moment that the DREAM Act is the right thing to do and will help grow our economy. Forget that most DREAMers are the best and the brightest of our country, and that passing the DREAM Act will increase DREAMers’ earnings by an aggregate of 19 percent, totaling \$148 billion in wages by 2030, triggering more spending on goods and services throughout our economy and generating \$181 billion in increased economic growth by 2030, creating millions of jobs for Americans. Forget that providing a strong incentive for DREAMers to further their education will add 223,000 college diplomas to the workforce and open doors to better paying jobs. Forget all that and remember that these are children and young adults. These are human beings. (H4991)

Representative Hinojosa defended that race should not be a factor when considering immigration to the U.S. She expressed how the DREAM Act makes economic sense, and that regardless, DREAMers are human beings who do not deserve to be negatively racialized. In this excerpt, Representative Hinojosa referenced the following comment made by Representative King: “For everyone who’s a valedictorian, there’s another 100 out there who weigh 130 pounds, and they’ve got calves the size of cantaloupes because they are hauling 75 pounds of marijuana across the desert” (H4990). This rhetoric excludes immigrants from the American in-group identity on the basis of race. As a Latinx policymaker, Representative Hinojosa combatted this racist narrative and repositioned DREAMers as members of their in-group.

Race plays an important function when considering why policymakers frame immigrants differently because it works to systematically exclude specific groups of immigrants in the context of U.S. immigration politics. As previously stated, Latinx immigrants are significantly more likely to be deported than other immigrants groups. Therefore, Latinx policymakers can combat the systematic racism embedded in the immigration system by framing immigrants as members of their in-group.

Constituent Immigrant Population


Figure 16. In-Group v. Out-Group Frames by Constituent Immigrant Population



The data generally supports that a policymaker is more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group if the policymaker represents a state or district with a small population of immigrants. It also supports that a policymaker is more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group if the policymaker represents a state or district with a large population of immigrants. Figure 16 demonstrates how policymakers who represented constituent populations of more than 10 percent of immigrants used in-group frames more than out-group frames. Policymakers representing different sized immigrant constituent populations also employed different in-group and out-group framing techniques. The policymakers studied

who represent larger immigrant constituent populations often used slogans and comparison as in-group framing techniques. On the other hand, the policymakers studied who represent smaller immigrant constituent populations often used spin and slogans as out-group framing techniques.

Figure 17. Out-Group Framing Techniques by Constituent Immigrant Population <5%




Policymakers who represent less than five percent of immigrants in their constituent population were the most likely to frame DREAMers as members of their out-group. In the data sample, nine policymakers fell into this category and they used contrast as an out-group framing technique most often. This technique allows policymakers who represent the smallest populations of immigrants to position immigrants antithetically to American citizens. By doing so, policymakers solidify their in-group identity by describing who does not constitute members. The excerpt below from Senator Sessions illustrates how policymakers in this category used the contrast frame to position DREAMers as members of their out-group:

To whom do we owe our allegiance? To these groups who want more people in the high-tech world, agriculture world, meatpacking, or other businesses, or to the American citizens, who work hard, pay their taxes, fight our wars, and obey our laws? (S5246)

This discourse paints immigrants as people who do not work hard, pay taxes, fight in the armed services, and obey the laws. While these statements are not universally true, this rhetoric augments an image of immigrants as antithetical to “good” Americans. Because the majority of Senator Session’s constituents are U.S.-born, Senator Sessions may be more inclined to frame

DREAMers as members of their out-group to demonstrate his allegiance to his in-group (his constituents).

Figure 18. Out-Group Framing Techniques by Constituent Immigrant Population 5-10%



Policymakers who represent between five and 10 percent of immigrants in their constituent population were more likely to frame DREAMers as members of their out-group than policymakers who represent constituent populations of more than 10 percent of immigrants. There were 20 policymakers in this category, and they used slogans as an out-group framing technique most often. Many policymakers explicitly used the phrase “Nation of Laws” to exclude anyone who violates the laws (i.e. undocumented immigrants) from the nation. Often, policymakers would also juxtapose two commonly used slogans: “Nation of Immigrants” and “Nation of Laws,” as means to frame undocumented immigrants antithetical to the generations of immigrants who have come before and abided by the laws. Policymakers employ this technique to emphasize their responsibility to prioritize the enforcement of immigration laws over the welfare of those who violate said laws. Therefore, policymakers in this category affirm their responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the U.S. and enforce laws that disadvantage DREAMers, which consequently positions DREAMers as members of their out-group.


Similar to how policymakers often used their out-group slogan, “Nation of Laws,” to disrepute their in-group slogan, “Nation of Immigrants,” policymakers in this category also invalidated the deservingness frame. The excerpt from Senator King below demonstrates how policymakers in this category attacked commonly used in-group framing techniques in order to position DREAMers as members of their out-group:

We know that young people can form intent. That’s why we discipline them at a young age; 2-year-olds get a little discipline because they have intent; 3year-olds have a little more intent, and they get a little more discipline. By the time they get to be 7 or 8, they are actually disciplined. So, I think that’s an argument that moves us off the target. Regardless of whether they have intent when they’re 1 day old, 1 week old, 1 month old, 1 year old, or 10 years old, whenever that time comes, when they become of age and they realize that they’re unlawfully present in the United States, the law requires that they remove themselves. It’s just the law. So, we expect them to accept this responsibility, whether it was the intent that they had when they came in or the intent that they have to stay tomorrow. If we don’t do that, then we’ve absolved a whole class of people from a responsibility and rewarded them with the objective of their crime. These are the things that trouble me. If we destroy the rule of law, an essential pillar of American exceptionalism—we could not be a great Nation without the rule of law. If we destroy that even in the narrower version of immigration or the even narrower version of the DREAM kids, if we do that, then it expands into all people that are here illegally because age is the only difference, and you cannot draw a bright line. Furthermore, then you have expanded the amnesty throughout all immigration, and you’ve destroyed the rule of law. (H5046)

Representative King openly refuted a key element of the deservingness frame, “through no fault of their own,” explaining how young people actually can form intent. Because of this, DREAMers are responsible for their undocumented status and have the obligation of removing themselves from the U.S. In addition to combatting the foundation of the deservingness in-group framing technique, Representative King also employed the logic of their out-group slogan, “Nation of Laws”. Representative King defended that if Congress does not enforce the deportation of undocumented youth, there will be serious consequences for the rule of law. While Representative King did not explicitly use the phrase, “Nation of Laws,” he used its framework to exclude DREAMers from in-group membership. Conclusively, Representative

King pushed back against common in-group framing techniques to situate DREAMers as members of their out-group. Representative King likely does not rely heavily on support from his foreign-born constituents because they make up a small percentage of his constituent population. Therefore, as a policymaker representing many U.S. born constituents, he was likely inclined to frame DREAMers as members of their out-group as means to rally support from his in-group (his constituents).

Figure 19. In-Group Framing Techniques by Constituent Immigrant Population 10-20%



Policymakers who represent constituent populations of 10 to 20 percent of immigrants were more likely frame DREAMers as members of their in-group than policymakers who represent constituent populations of less than 10 percent of immigrants. In the data sample, there were 31 policymakers in this category. Figure 19 demonstrates how policymakers in this category often used stories and moral responsibility as in-group framing techniques. These framing techniques allow policymakers who represent larger immigrant constituent populations to demonstrate to the immigrants among their constituent that they represent their interests by listening to their stories and acknowledging their responsibility as a policymaker to aid them.

The excerpt below from Senator Durbin exhibits how policymakers in this category employed the moral responsibility frame:

For most of their lives, these young people have been trapped in the shadows, fearing they could be deported at any moment and facing obstacles to developing their talents in this country. Isn't it ironic that we have invested so much already in their lives—educating them, giving them an opportunity to thrive in this Nation—and then, right at that moment when they are ready to go to college or go into a job—we tell them: Leave. We do not want you. That is not right. It is not fair. It does not make any sense. (S9012)

By explaining that it “does not make sense” to exclude DREAMers from their in-group because Americans have already invested so much in their lives, Senator Durbin indicated that Americans and policymakers have a responsibility to do what is right and what is fair for DREAMers. Because of this investment and its significant expected return, Senator Durbin implied that Congress and the U.S. should “want” DREAMers.


Furthermore, on several occasions, Senator Durbin verbalized how he is accountable to the DREAMers in his state. For example, he explained how the initial DREAM Act was a response to one of his constituent cases. This particular constituent was a Korean woman who brought her daughter from Korea to the U.S. at the age of two. She and her husband planned on finding stable work in the U.S. While they eventually did, they did not make much money and their children grew up in poverty. Senator Durbin described how against all odds, the family was able to enroll their daughter in the MERIT Music program, a program that teaches poor children the gift of music. One hundred percent of the students enrolled in the program attend college. The daughter became such an accomplished pianist through this program that she was accepted into the Juilliard School of Music and the Manhattan Conservatory of Music. Senator Durbin remarked that this accomplishment was “amazing for this poor Korean girl,” however,

When she applied and went through filling out the application, she came to the line that said “nationally and citizenship,” and she turned to her mother and said: What do I put here? Her mom said: I don't know. We brought you here at the age of 2, and we never filed any papers. The girl said: What are we going to do? The mom said: Let's call Senator DURBIN. So, they called our office, and we checked on the law. The law in the United States is very clear and very cruel. The law in the United States said that little girl

had to leave this country for 10 years and apply to come back—10 years. She had been brought here at the age of 2. She was only 17 or 18 at the time. (S5951)

Foundational individual stories such as this embody why Senator Durbin may have framed DREAMers as members of their in-group. It also informs why policymakers who represent more than 10 percent of immigrants in their constituent populations are likely to frame DREAMers as members of their in-groups: if their constituents call them and ask for help, it is their role as a Senator or House Representative to do so. Therefore, if a policymaker has more immigrant constituents, that policymaker is held more accountable to their needs.


Figure 20. In-Group Framing Techniques by Constituent Immigrant Population 20-30%



Policymakers who represent constituent populations of 20 to 30 percent of immigrants were more likely to frame DREAMers as members of their in-group than as members of their out-group. Interestingly, policymakers in this category were not as likely as policymakers in the previous category to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. The spike in in-group frames used per policymaker for policymakers who represent constituent populations with 10 to 20 percent of immigrants was not hypothesized. In the data sample, there were 20 policymakers in this category. Figure 20 demonstrates how policymakers in this category used their in-group framing techniques of moral responsibility and slogans most often. Aside from being slightly less likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group as the policymakers in the previous


category, the general trends of the data for the policymakers in this category and the framing techniques used support the hypotheses.

Figure 21. In-Group Framing Techniques by Constituent Immigrant Population 30-40%



Policymakers who represent immigrant constituent populations of 30 to 40 percent were also more likely to frame DREAMers as members of their in-group than as members of their out-group. In the data sample, there were 15 policymakers in this category, and figure 21 illustrates how the most common in-group framing technique used was comparison. Similar to the previous category, policymakers in this category were not as likely to frame DREAMers as members of their in-group as the policymakers who represent constituent populations of 10 to 20 percent of immigrants. However, these findings still support the hypotheses.

Figure 22. In-Group Framing Techniques by Constituent Immigrant Population >40%



Policymakers who represent constituent populations with more than 40 percent of immigrants were the most likely to frame DREAMers as members of their in-group. In the data sample, the five policymakers in this category used their in-group framing technique of stories most often. Figure 22 illustrates these findings. A policymaker in this category may have told stories about immigrants in their constituent populations to highlight how that policymaker represents the needs and interests of their constituents. For example, Representative Garcia stated,

I want to talk about someone who is sitting in the gallery, Secia Soza. Until the age of 8, she had always assumed that she had been born in the United States, like her brother. While she eventually was granted deferred action, both of her parents have been deported. Neither were criminals. In fact, her father owned a small business. There are millions of Joses and Lourdeses and Secias. They grow our food, they build our homes, and they care for our families. They often work at jobs that no one wants and start businesses that create jobs when there were none before and in areas where they are needed most. (H7505)

Representative Garcia also underscored themes of the deservingness frame when depicting this undocumented family's story. He explained how the family benefited his constituent's community and did not pose a threat because they did not have a criminal record. Nonetheless, while Secia was allowed to remain in the U.S. as a DACA recipient, her family was not. In spite of their deportation, Representative Garcia still extended the deservingness frame to the entire family, and consequently to all undocumented immigrants. He explained:

Our Nation would not be the society it is today without the generations of immigrants who came to our shores searching for a better life. The 11 million undocumented individuals living here today are no different. They are American in every way but on paper. (H7505)

In addition to the deservingness frame, Representative Garcia also used slogans and comparison at the end of this story to frame undocumented immigrants as members of their in-group. He explicitly stated that the undocumented immigrants in the U.S. today are no different from the

immigrants who founded the American nation and that “they are American in every way but on paper.”

Relatedly, the following excerpt from Representative Chu also reveals how policymakers in this category use comparison frames to position DREAMers as members of their in-group:

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program is legally sound, makes sense, and is the right thing to do. These kids study in our schools. They play in our neighborhoods. They pledge allegiance to our flag. All they want to do is to continue calling their home “home.” (H2325)

Similar to how Representative Garcia stated the lives of DREAMers are no different than the lives of Americans, Representative Chu explained how DREAMers already function as members of the American in-group in day-to-day life. Because Representative Garcia and Representative Chu both represent a large population of immigrants, immigrants are likely embedded in their constituents’ societies. Therefore, it is evident why policymakers in this category are likely to frame DREAMers as members of their in-group.

Ultimately, the findings of this study indicate that policymakers who represent larger populations of immigrants are likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. On the other hand, policymakers who represent smaller populations of immigrants are likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group. Interestingly, the data from this sample also supports that representing 10 percent or more immigrants in a constituent population is a critical turning point for how policymakers frame immigrants.

Discussion and Recommendations for Future Research

Interactive Relationship between Role Identity and Group Identity

The findings of this research support that some policymakers frame immigrants differently than other policymakers because they hold different identity memberships. This

discussion section explores the interactive relationship between role identity and group identity. While the findings of this study support the hypotheses, it is important to consider how individual policymakers navigate competing role- and group identity memberships. What is the likelihood that policymakers with conflicting identity memberships frames immigrants as members of their in-group or out-group? One hundred percent of the liberal policymakers studied framed immigrants as members of their in-group, regardless of whether they are not first-generation Americans or represent small immigrant populations. In addition, the majority of conservative policymakers studied framed DREAMers as members of their out-group, regardless of whether they are first-generation Americans or represent large immigrant populations. Therefore, of the four salient identity memberships studied, political ideology is likely the most salient.

Salience of Political Ideology over Family Immigration History

This study found that if a policymaker is more conservative, that policymaker is more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group. However, this study also found that if a policymaker is a first-generation American, that policymaker is likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. Because these identity memberships are not mutually exclusive, the findings of this study raise the question of how a conservative, first-generation American policymaker is likely to frame immigrants.

Interestingly, the majority of policymakers who are both conservative and first-generation Americans still framed immigrants as members of their out-group. While being a first-generation American was also found to be a salient identity membership, a policymaker's political ideology may undermine its influence. This conjecture may be due to the specific nature

of a policymaker's family immigration history. However, future research is needed to explore these findings further.

Salience of Political Ideology over Immigrant Constituent Population

This study also found that if a policymaker represents a large population of immigrants, that policymaker is more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. In addition, if a policymaker is conservative, that policymaker is more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group. As previously stated, the findings of this research suggest political ideology is a highly salient identity membership. Therefore, it is not surprising that all of the conservative policymakers who represent a large immigrant population still framed immigrants as members of their out-group. Similarly, all of the liberal policymakers who represent small immigrant populations still framed immigrants as members of their in-group.


To explain the competing nature of a policymaker's political ideology and their constituent demographics, it is helpful to recall the theory of substantive representation. This is the idea that people support policymakers who represent the interests of their group (Wallace, 2014). Interestingly, it seems that the degree to which policymakers represent their immigrant population's interests may be irrelevant. To test this, it would also be helpful to study the political ideology of a policymaker's constituents. Perhaps if policymakers and the majority of their constituents share the same political ideology, the findings would then reaffirm the theory of substantive if policymakers and the majority of their constituents share the same political ideology. Further research is needed to explain the nuances of this identity membership; however, the findings of this study ultimately suggest that political ideology is the most salient identity membership of the four studied because it undermines the influence of the other identity memberships.

Crosscutting Identity Memberships

Political ideology, family immigration history, race, and constituent immigrant population all influence how policymakers frame immigrants. This study also found political ideology to be the most salient of the identity memberships studied. In order to substantiate these claims, it is important to also analyze the likelihood that policymakers have crosscutting identity memberships.


Of the policymakers studied, clear patterns exist regarding the policymakers belonging to more than one identity membership. For example, of the 24 first-generation American policymakers studied, 88 percent were liberal, whereas only 12 percent were conservative. Figure 23 illustrates this distribution.

Figure 23. Political Ideology of First-Generation American Policymakers




Similarly, of the 17 Latinx policymakers studied, 82 percent were liberal, whereas only 18 percent were conservative and figure 24 illustrates this division.

Figure 24. Political Ideology of Latinx Policymakers



Finally, of the 41 policymakers who represent constituent populations with more than 20 percent of immigrants, 93 percent were liberal, whereas only 7 percent were conservative. Figure 25 demonstrates how the majority of policymakers who represent larger immigrant constituent populations were also liberal.

Figure 25. Political Ideology of Policymakers with >20% Immigrant Constituent Populations



Because political ideology is the most salient identity membership when it is competing with other identity memberships, if it is conversely supporting other memberships, it likely has a compounding effect. Policymakers may feel more secure framing immigrants as members of their in-group or as members of their out-group if they hold multiple identities that affirm such frames. For example, if a policymaker is a first-generation American, that policymaker would be likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group. If that same policymaker was also liberal, then they may be even more likely to frame immigrants as members of their in-group to support both their group identity members (immigrants) and role identity members (liberals) simultaneously.

This is meaningful when considering policymakers who are likely to be elected because of their group- or role identities. If policymakers have crosscutting identity memberships, then they can reach a broader range of their constituents. For instance, because most of the first-generation American policymakers studied were also liberal, they can appeal to both their foreign-born and liberal constituents by framing immigrants as members of their in-group. In this way, they can activate multiple identity memberships to reaffirm their allegiance to their constituents. By doing so, policymakers can also increase their chances for re-election or to stay in political power. While the actual effect of crosscutting identity memberships should be explored further, the results of this study provide a strong foundation and insight to develop future theory.

Other Avenues for Future Research

In addition, this study could also be expanded in future research in several other ways. For example, a researcher could examine other aspects of a policymaker's identity, such as their outside occupation, their age, or their gender. This research chose the four identity memberships

studied to analyze because they were theorized to be salient when considering why policymakers frame immigrants differently. It is possible, however, that other identity memberships may also be salient when answering this question.

This research also specifically analyzed Latinx policymakers. Future research could explore how other policymakers who are racial minorities frame immigrants. It is possible that some policymakers of color may frame immigrants as members of their out-group. Specifically, African American policymakers may be more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group than Latinx policymakers because African Americans in the U.S. face some of the most extreme racial discrimination from the white majority. Therefore, to appease their white constituents, an African American policymaker may feel pressure to frame immigrants as members of their out-group to solidify the perception that that policymaker belongs in their in-group.

It could also be interesting to explore any differences in how House Representatives and Senators frame immigrants. Because they serve different lengths of time in office, the effect of their constituent populations may differ from one another. As the House holds elections more often, House Representatives may be more accountable to their immigrant constituent populations than Senators are.

In addition, this research specifically analyzed how policymakers frame DREAMers because DREAMers best represent how an immigrant's legal status can vary based on the position of a policymaker. However, in conducting this research, I found that liberal policymakers were significantly more likely to explicitly reference the DREAM Act, DREAMers, and DACA. Therefore, the data sample collected was skewed slightly liberal, and the majority of conservative policymaker discourse analyzed was in response to comments made

by liberal policymakers. To collect a sample with more conservative policymaker discourse, future research could search for any references policymakers make to immigrants or immigration, rather than those they make specifically to the DREAM Act, DREAMers, and DACA.

Finally, future research could also explore this same study on different Congresses. For example, would this study look different if it were conducted on the first Congress or on today's Congress? This may reveal how the changing public opinion toward immigrants overtime affects how policymakers frame immigrants. This research affirmed policymakers' identity memberships as factors driving variation in how policymakers frame immigrants, independent of the attributes of specific immigrant groups and the social, political, and economic climate of the U.S. Analyzing the potential variation between House Representatives and Senators may serve to incorporate some of the findings from the standing literature in the discipline back into this research.

Concluding Thoughts

This research explored why policymakers frame immigrants differently. Using the salient identity membership model, it hypothesized that a policymaker's group- and role identities influenced how that policymaker framed immigrants. To test this hypothesis, I specifically analyzed four identity memberships deemed salient for policymakers: their political ideology as a function of their role identity, their family immigration history and race as functions of their group identity, and their constituent immigrant population as the overlap between group- and role identity. I used these identity memberships to look for patterns of in-group and out-group frames used by policymakers in the coded sample from the congressional record of the 113th Congress. The results supported that as policymakers became more conservative, or if

policymakers represented smaller immigrant populations, they were more likely to frame immigrants as members of their out-group. This research also found political ideology to potentially be the most salient identity membership because it often undermined the influence of family immigration history and constituent immigrant population on how policymakers framed immigrants. These results reveal that the identity memberships of a policymaker influence their actions. Understanding that policymakers' different identity memberships drive variation in their actions adds to the study of political behavior and the limited literature that exists which examine the relationship between politics and language.

As expert political animals, policymakers strategically use language for political profit. As a result, there are far-reaching consequences of how policymakers frame immigrants. On the one hand, whether policymakers position immigrants as members of their in-group or as members of their out-group has consequences for immigrants themselves. Donnelly (2017) explains that language "plays an extremely powerful role in separating those who are worthy of protection and those who are not, those who are like "us" and those who are not, those who threaten "us" and those who do not, those lives that matter and those that do not" (p. 244). Therefore, policymakers who frame immigrants as members of their out-group position them as people whose lives do not matter as much as American lives. This legitimizes harmful policies that discriminate against immigrants and strip them from basic rights and dignity. Policymakers who frame immigrants as members of their in-group combat such policies and often work towards solutions that allow immigrants to both figuratively and literally become legitimate members of American society.

On the other hand, how policymakers frame immigrants also has consequences for policymakers. By framing immigrants as members of their out-group, policymakers can rally

their in-group against their out-group to gain more support from their constituents. On the other hand, by framing immigrants as members of their in-group, policymakers can appeal to their foreign-born constituents and solidify their in-group identity. Policymakers own personal identity memberships and those of their constituents dictate how policymakers can use in- or out-group frames to achieve their political objectives. Most policymakers aim to be re-elected and maintain positions of political power. Therefore, by positioning immigrants as deserving members of society or as unwanted criminals, their own identity memberships can be useful tools to bolstering their in-group identity and win more support from their identity group members.

It is also imperative that American voters recognize that policymakers' identity memberships influence how they frame immigrants. Because immigration politics frequently circulate the news, it is important to understand that what a policymaker says is not always factual, but rather is likely a product of who that policymaker is (i.e. their identity memberships). Therefore, Americans must be aware of the biases that result from the positionality of policymakers. If Americans are not aware, the potential exists to fall into a polarizing trap in which Americans assume the contradictory and inaccurate information provided by policymakers is factual and proceed to form their own political opinions based on such variable truths. The ultimate implications of this study conclude with the reality that identity matters to immigrants, to policymakers, and to voters.

Appendix A: Demographics of Policymakers Data Matrix

Policymaker	1 = House 0 = Senate	1 = Most Conservative 0 = Most Liberal	Political Ideology Quartile	Race	Immigrant Parents? (1 = yes; 0 = no)	State/District	Immigrant Population (% of constituents)
Ayotte	0	0.67	3	Not Latinx	0	New Hampshire	5-10%
Bachmann	1	0.85	4	Not Latinx	0	Minnesota, district 6	5-10%
Becerra	1	0.41	2	Latinx	1	California, district 34	>40%
Bennet	0	0.26	2	Not Latinx	1	Colorado	10-20%
Blackburn	0	0.95	4	Not Latinx	0	Tennessee	5-10%
Blumenthal	0	0.03	1	Not Latinx	0	Connecticut	10-20%
Boxer	0	0.02	1	Not Latinx	1	California	20-30%
Cantor	1	N/A	N/A	Not Latinx	0	Virginia, district 7	5-10%
Capps	1	0.29	2	Not Latinx	0	California, district 24	10-20%
Cardenas	1	0.3	2	Latinx	1	California, district 29	>40%
Carter	1	0.78	4	Not Latinx	0	Texas, district 31	10-20%
Castor	1	0.32	2	Not Latinx	0	Florida, district 14	20-30%
Castro	1	0.39	2	Latinx	0	Texas, district 20	10-20%
Chu	1	0.16	1	Not Latinx	1	California, district 27	>40%
Cole	1	0.76	4	Not Latinx	0	Oklahoma, district 4	<5%
Conyers	1	0.1	1	Not Latinx	0	Michigan, district 13	5-10%
Cornyn	0	0.9	4	Not Latinx	0	Texas	10-20%
Crowley	1	0.34	2	Not Latinx	1	New York, district 14	>40%
Cruz	0	0.81	4	Latinx	1	Texas	10-20%
Culberson	1	0.78	4	Not Latinx	0	Texas, district 7	30-40%
Davis	1	0.27	2	Not Latinx	0	California, district 53	20-30%
Delbene	1	0.37	2	Not Latinx	0	Washington, district 1	10-20%
Doggett	1	0.33	2	Not Latinx	0	Texas, district 35	10-20%
Duffy	1	0.73	3	Not Latinx	0	Wisconsin, district 7	<5%
Durbin	0	0.12	1	Not Latinx	1	Illinois	10-20%
Esty	1	0.32	2	Not Latinx	0	Connecticut, district 5	10-20%
Feinstein	0	0.14	1	Not Latinx	0	California	20-30%
Flake	0	0.81	4	Not Latinx	0	Arizona	10-20%
Foster	1	0.4	2	Not Latinx	0	Illinois, district 11	20-30%
Foxx	1	0.65	3	Not Latinx	0	North Carolina, district 5	5-10%
Gallego	1	0.47	2	Latinx	1	Texas, district 23	10-20%
Garamendi	1	0.3	2	Not Latinx	0	California, district 3	10-20%
Garcia	1	0.46	2	Latinx	1	Florida, district 26	>40%
Gardner	0	0.78	4	Not Latinx	0	Colorado	10-20%
Gohmert	1	0.84	4	Not Latinx	0	Texas, district 1	5-10%
Goodlatte	1	0.77	4	Not Latinx	0	Virginia, district 6	5-10%
Graham	0	0.75	4	Not Latinx	0	South Carolina	5-10%
Grassley	0	0.7	3	Not Latinx	0	Iowa	<5%

Policymaker	1 = House 0 = Senate	1 = Most Conservative 0 = Most Liberal	Political Ideology Quartile	Race	Immigrant Parents? (1 = yes; 0 = no)	State/District	Immigrant Population (% of constituents)
Green	1	0.29	2	Not Latinx	0	Texas, district 9	30-40%
Grijalva	1	0	1	Latinx	1	Arizona, district 3	20-30%
Gutierrez	1	0.27	2	Latinx	1	Illinois, district 4	30-40%
Hahn	1	0.21	1	Not Latinx	0	California, district 4	10-20%
Hanabusa	1	0.38	2	Not Latinx	0	Hawaii, district 1	20-30%
Heinrich	0	0.16	1	Not Latinx	1	New Mexico	10-20%
Hinojosa	1	0.3	2	Latinx	1	Texas, district 15	20-30%
Hirono	0	0.1	1	Not Latinx	1	Hawaii	10-20%
Holt	0	0.16	1	Not Latinx	0	New Jersey, district 12	20-30%
Horsford	1	0.35	2	Not Latinx	1	Nevada	10-20%
Hoyer	1	0.39	2	Not Latinx	1	Maryland, district 5	10-20%
Hudson	1	0.8	4	Not Latinx	0	North Carolina, district 8	5-10%
Hultgren	1	0.78	4	Not Latinx	0	Illinois, district 14	10-20%
Jackson Lee	1	0.17	1	Not Latinx	1	Texas, district 18	20-30%
Jeffries	1	0.32	2	Not Latinx	0	New York, district 8	30-40%
King	1	0.8	4	Not Latinx	0	Iowa, district 4	5-10%
Kinzinger	1	0.74	3	Not Latinx	0	Illinois, district 16	5-10%
Labrador	1	0.73	3	Latinx	1	Idaho, district 1	5-10%
Leahy	1	0.11	1	Not Latinx	0	Vermont	<5%
Lewis	1	0.19	1	Not Latinx	0	Georgia, district 5	5-10%
Lofgren	1	0.22	1	Not Latinx	0	California, district 19	30-40%
Lowenthal	1	0.18	1	Not Latinx	0	California, district 47	30-40%
Lowey	1	0.3	2	Not Latinx	0	New York, district 17	20-30%
Luján	1	0.38	2	Latinx	0	New Mexico, district 3	5-10%
McCain	0	0.64	3	Not Latinx	0	Arizona	10-20%
McConnell	0	0.77	4	Not Latinx	0	Kentucky	<5%
McGovern	1	0.1	1	Not Latinx	0	Massachusetts, district 2	10-20%
Menendez	0	0.09	1	Latinx	1	New Jersey	20-30%
Murray	0	0.09	1	Not Latinx	0	Washington	10-20%
Nadler	1	0.19	1	Not Latinx	0	New York, district 10	30-40%
O'Rourke	1	0.3	2	Not Latinx	0	Texas, district 16	20-30%
Pelosi	1	0.42	2	Not Latinx	1	California, district 12	30-40%
Poe	1	0.82	4	Not Latinx	0	Texas, district 2	20-30%
Polis	1	0.26	2	Not Latinx	0	Colorado, district 2	5-10%
Quigley	1	0.31	2	Not Latinx	0	Illinois, district 5	20-30%
Reid	0	0.29	2	Not Latinx	0	Nevada	10-20%
Rogers	1	0.64	3	Not Latinx	0	Kentucky, district 5	<5%
Rohrabacher	1	0.65	3	Not Latinx	0	California, district 48	20-30%
Roybal-Allard	1	0.22	1	Latinx	0	California, district 40	30-40%
Rubio	0	0.78	4	Latinx	1	Florida	10-20%

Policymaker	1 = House 0 = Senate	1 = Most Conservative 0 = Most Liberal	Political Ideology Quartile	Race	Immigrant Parents? (1 = yes; 0 = no)	State/District	Immigrant Population (% of constituents)
Ruiz	1	0.37	2	Latinx	0	California	20-30%
Sanchez	1	0.39	2	Latinx	1	California, district 46	30-40%
Scalise	1	0.8	4	Not Latinx	0	Louisiana, district 1	5-10%
Schiff	1	0.24	1	Not Latinx	0	California, district 28	30-40%
Schneider	1	0.44	2	Not Latinx	0	Illinois, district 10	20-30%
Schumer	0	0.09	1	Not Latinx	0	New York	20-30%
Sessions	0	0.82	4	Not Latinx	0	Alabama	<5%
Shelby	0	0.58	3	Not Latinx	0	Alabama	<5%
Sinema	0	0.43	2	Not Latinx	0	Arizona	10-20%
Slaughter	1	0.17	1	Not Latinx	0	New York, district 25	5-10%
Smith	1	0.7	3	Not Latinx	0	Nebraska, district 3	5-10%
Stutzman	1	0.79	4	Not Latinx	0	Indiana, district 3	5-10%
Swalwell	1	0.29	2	Not Latinx	0	California, district 15	30-40%
Takano	1	0.16	1	Not Latinx	0	California, district 41	20-30%
Thune	0	0.83	4	Not Latinx	0	South Dakota	<5%
Titus	1	0.3	2	Not Latinx	0	Nevada, district 1	30-40%
Tonko	1	0.25	2	Not Latinx	0	New York, district 20	10-20%
Vargas	1	0.31	2	Latinx	1	California, district 51	30-40%
Veasey	1	0.34	2	Not Latinx	0	Texas, district 33	30-40%
Warner	0	0.32	2	Not Latinx	0	Virginia	10-20%

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