

Leveraging for Peace: The Role of Mediators and International Organizations in Managing Interstate Wars



Danilo Gjukovikj

University of Colorado, Boulder
Boulder, CO, USA
danilogjuko@yahoo.com

Thesis Advisor

Dr. Jaroslav Tir, Department of Political Science

Defense Committee

Dr. Jaroslav Tir, Department of Political Science

Dr. Joseph Jupille, International Affairs Program

Dr. Doug Snyder, International Affairs Program

Abstract: Conflict management of interstate wars is commonplace in the post-World War II world, as is academic interest in the topic. Mediators and international organizations (IOs) are the most commonly identified actors in conflict management situations, but research that examines their joint effects on ending wars is rare. Most scholars study the independent impact of mediators and IOs on conflict resolution, thus failing to account for potential desirable effects when both actors manage the same conflict. This article provides a theoretical argument and an empirical analysis that address this gap. I argue that mediators and IOs have complementary roles in conflict management, and that each third-party type makes unique contributions to conflict resolution. The argument hinges on the claim that IOs expand the scope of peace incentives that mediators offer to disputants, which makes ending wars more likely. Additionally, through their leverage and institutional mechanisms IOs fill the implementation gap left by mediators after successfully negotiating peace with the disputants, which leads to more durable agreements.

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Section 1: Introduction

In recent decades third-party actors have assumed a more prominent role in resolving interstate wars (Richmond, 2018). Scholars find that at least two types of third-party actors – mediators and international organizations- are interested in resolving interstate wars (Frazier and Dixon, 2006; Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2018; Lundgren 2017). Mediation¹ is “by far the most common form of peaceful third-party intervention in international conflicts” (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009: 5). Mediators engage with disputants seeking to ameliorate their bargaining environment and to make peace preferable to war (Beardsley et al. 2006). Mediators’ motivations range from wanting to preserve peace (Mitchell, 1988), to gaining influence over disputants (Touval and Zartman, 1985), to promoting their regional interests (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006). International organizations, on the other hand, have permanent interests in promoting peace and preserving stability (Mansfield and Pollins, 2001). IOs are a common actor in conflict management situations (Lundgren, 2017), and their substantial resources give them influence with which they affect the conflict bargaining environment of warring states (Karreth, 2018). Mediators and IOs do not necessarily coordinate their actions while pursuing peace, but their participation in conflict management likely influences the conflict calculus of disputants.

The conflict management campaign launched in Bosnia illustrates this well. In the early 1990s ethnic warfare marred the former Yugoslavia. The war in Bosnia was particularly violent and attracted a host of international conflict managers, including representatives from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the IMF, OSCE and the Contact Group. Early mediation attempts failed to entice the disputing parties to end fighting, but mediation did eventually contribute to lasting peace. Richard Holbrooke and his mediation team enticed the warring sides into signing the 1995 Dayton Agreement-a compromise which required substantial use of leverage over the disputants. Despite the central

¹ Frazier and Dixon (2006: 395) discuss third-parties’ engagement in conflicts. In their analysis, mediation, ceasefire appeals and negotiation requests-common forms of third-party conflict management, account for about 55% of all modes of intervention. These third-party conflict management activities can be performed by interested mediators, while other forms third-party activity, such as election monitoring, peacekeeping, border demarcation, provision of good offices and implementation assistance are usually undertaken by international organizations or coalition of states.

role of mediation in ending the conflict, mediation did not occur in vacuum. Several international organizations, including the UN, the EU, NATO, the World Bank, and the IMF worked on reducing tensions and incentivizing peace between the disputants while mediation efforts transpired (Touval, 2002). In his reflection on the peace campaign, Holbrooke (1998: 84) himself emphasized the central role of international organizations in contributing to the Dayton Agreement, and IOs' role in assisting the disputants with agreement implementation. Alongside mediation, IO involvement was critical to resolving the conflict and to helping disputants implement the provisions from the Dayton agreement. The international response to the Bosnian war reflects an important but often overlooked dynamic in the contemporary international system, one in which both mediators and international organizations simultaneously pursue peaceful resolution of wars.

Outside of its value as a case-study, the Bosnian war shows that it is important to study mediators and IOs in tandem. Existing studies examine the independent effects of mediators in conflict management situations (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Bercovitch and Lee, 2003; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005; Beardsley, 2011) or the effects of IO involvement on conflict containment (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, 2004; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007; Shannon, 2009). However, there is less emphasis on the joined effects of mediators and IO involvement in the context of conflict management. The literature has mainly neglected to examine whether there are joint and desirable effects when both mediators and international organizations become involved in managing the same conflict. This scholarly omission potentially overlooks important dynamics of third-party conflict management of interstate wars. I attempt to fill this gap by examining the combined effects of mediation and active IO involvement on mediation success and outcome durability. I argue that each of the third-parties that engage in managing the same conflict has unique advantages and pitfalls: mediators are better at creating short-term truces, but less effective at promoting lasting peace (Beardsley, 2011). IOs are less effective at independently halting conflicts, but their institutional mechanisms provide disputants with more incentives for lasting peace (Touval, 2002; Lundgren, 2017). Despite having seemingly complementary roles in conflict management, existing studies

have mostly neglected a comprehensive examination of mediators' and IOs' joint effects in the context of the same conflict.

This article is embedded within two broader projects. First, it devises a theory of conflict management that accounts for the simultaneous involvement of mediators and IOs. It examines the accuracy of the derived predictions through a quantitative analysis of mediation attempts between 1945 and 2003, and through a qualitative study of conflict management in the Bosnian War. Second, it accounts not only for the outcome of negotiations between warring states, but also the durability of agreements. The dual focus helps distill potentially “competing short and long-term effects” of mediation, such as its propensity to lead to short-lived agreements, and its failure to uphold peace in the long-term (Beardsley, 2008: 723). My findings indicate that mediation does not necessarily produce short-lived agreements, like previous work by Beardsley (2008; 2011) has found. Instead, I find that conflicts that experience mediation and an active involvement of international organizations (1) are more easily resolvable and are associated with (2) longer-lasting peace agreements. A case-study of the American mediation of the Bosnian War depicts the dynamic at play. Mediators provide incentives for signing agreements, while active IOs further enhance the attractiveness of peace by promising rewards and threatening with punishments.

A key part of the puzzle is IOs' involvement with the disputing parties during the negotiations, which signals long-term commitment to cooperation and adds legitimacy to the peace campaign. After mediation produces an agreement, the role of IOs becomes even more prominent. Whereas the influence of mediators over the post-agreement bargaining environment is likely to decrease, IOs remain actively involved with states beyond the peace process and leverage benefits from membership and cooperation as contingent on implementing and upholding peace agreements. More broadly, this paper indicates that conflict management efforts should not be studied in vacuum, as crises oftentimes experience multiple forms of third-party involvement simultaneously.

The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 examines the existing conflict management scholarship, and focuses on motivations for states, mediators and IOs to engage in conflict management. Section 2 also

defines directive and non-directive mediation, and examines how mediation styles and IO involvement influence disputants' bargaining environments. Section 3 summarizes the theoretical predictions regarding the joint effects of mediation and IO involvement on conflict management and outcome durability. Section 4 introduces the data and lays out the research design, while Section 5 presents the statistical analysis and highlights key findings. Section 6 provides a qualitative test of the theory by discussing the conflict management efforts that produced the Dayton Agreement and ended the Bosnian War. Section 7 concludes the study and lays out further research avenues.

Section 2: Existing Conflict Management Scholarship

Why do states agree to third-party conflict management?

There are many reasons why disputants allow third-parties to manage their conflicts. Among various conflict management arrangements, disputing states most often turn to third-party conflict managers as they seek a transition to peace (Gartner, 2013). Disputants accept conflict management voluntarily, usually after they fail to bilaterally reach agreements (Wilkenfeld et al. 2005). Peaceful third-party conflict management is desirable because it provides important advantages to states that could not be obtained through bilateral or other means (Mitchell, 2014). For example, third-parties can serve as effective communication facilitators who provide complete information to disputants and help overcome information problems (Touval and Zartman, 1985; Bercovitch, 1996). Third-parties create bargaining scenarios that are more conducive to peace by providing complete information that disputants are unable to obtain themselves. Certain third-parties, such as directive mediators and IOs with leverage can extend sticks and carrots to motivate peaceful resolution of conflicts (Greig and Diehl, 2012). This conflict management style expands the bargaining environment and provides additional benefits for disputants to resolve their outstanding disputes. In sum, states can expect numerous benefits from third-party involvement in disputes, ranging from better information dissemination to tangible benefits such as aid. Disputing states can also be

subjected to punishments by mediators and IOs if negotiations fail, which increases the costs of conflict resolution failure.

Why do mediators engage in conflict management?

Like Fisher (2007: 315), I conceive of mediation as a non-coercive activity that uses “reasoning and persuasion, the suggestion of alternatives, and at times the application of leverage” in order to resolve conflicts. Mediators have individual interests that motivate them to offer or accept mediation. Sometimes, mediators are driven by a noble desire to contribute to peace (Touval and Zartman, 1985). Wars have adverse effects and can contribute to regional instability. Interested mediators engage with disputants if they fear that an ongoing conflict poses a regional security threat (Böhmelt, 2015). At other times, mediators want to build international reputation and enhance their status with the disputants. Such was the case with the Algerian mediation of the Iran hostage crisis, in which Algerian mediators looked beyond crisis resolution and hoped to improve their standing with both Iran and the United States (Touval and Zartman, 1985). Mitchell (1988) also notes that mediators seek potential rewards from mediation, such as increasing their influence over the disputants and receiving rewards for their efforts from allies.

Why do IOs engage in conflict management?

IOs’ interest in participating in conflict management is inherently linked to their function in the international system. Facilitating cooperation, economic interdependence, political ties and global prosperity are among the core functions of IOs in the context of international relations (Russett, Oneal and Davis, 1998; Mansfield and Pollins, 2001; Hafner-Burton, Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2015). Conflicts, and violent interstate disputes in particular, are very disruptive to the functioning of IOs, and counter their global objectives. Violent disputes create spillover effects and have destabilizing consequences in neighboring countries (Beardsley, 2011). Interstate wars also demonstratively impact economic conditions in countries involved in wars, by causing capital flight, slower growth, and lower foreign direct investment in the years following conflicts (Collier, Hoeffler & Patillo, 2004, Schneider & Troeger, 2006). Global financial

institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank often emphasize the negative effects of conflicts on “their core missions, economic development, and macroeconomic stability” (Karreth, 2018: 469). Additionally, wars create humanitarian costs in the form of mass scale suffering and refugee outflows (Dowty & Loescher, 1996). Because of wars’ disastrous effects, the mission of many important international organizations contains a clause of dedication to preventing conflict and maintaining peace (Haas, 1990). As a result, IOs have assumed a role of active conflict managers and pacifiers in the context of international relations (Anderson, Mitchell and Schilling, 2016).

Taming Interstate Wars: Mediator styles, IO involvement and Disputants’ Bargaining Environment

Regardless of their motivations for managing disputes, third-party actors like mediators and IOs affect the bargaining environment of warring states. Wars involve rational bargaining processes, which means that conflicts last until there is a change in the cost-benefit calculations for at least one actor (Shirkey, 2012; Fox, 1970). Decisions to end wars are usually endogenous, but the bargaining environment of warring states is subject to outside influence (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). As two principal conflict management actors, both mediators and IOs have significant sway over the course of conflict resolution attempts. In this section, I examine how mediation styles and IO involvement affect the bargaining environment of disputants, and I reflect on the advantages and disadvantages of both. I distinguish between three separate types of third-party conflict management: non-directive mediation, directive mediation, and active IO involvement.

Depending on the style they use, mediators can profoundly impact conflict dynamics (Wilkenfeld et al. 2005). Touval and Zartman (1985) view mediation styles on a spectrum from low to high mediator involvement, and Bercovitch and Lee (2003) dichotomize the different forms of mediation into non-directive and directive mediation.

Non-directive mediators contribute to crises resolution by helping with information problems and by improving communication lines between disputants (Beardsley et al. 2006: 63). Non-directive

mediators² restrain from using leverage and outside pressure, and instead craft and carefully examine peace proposals (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000). An example of non-directive mediation is the Algerian mediation of the Iran hostage crisis. Algerian mediators carefully coordinated the actions of American and Iranian negotiators, vetted their statements and raised potential objections before presenting proposals to each side (Touval and Zartman, 1985: 30). The absence of leverage in non-directive mediation means that disputants align their respective demands without outside inducements. An upside of non-directive mediation is its propensity to create lasting agreements that reflect the true bargaining preferences of the disputants (Beardsley, 2011). On the downside, non-directive mediators often fail to overcome negotiation impasses because they lack tangible resources to motivate disputants to agree to peace (Beardsley et al. 2006: 63). Because of its characteristics, Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) find that non-directive mediation is suitable response for lower intensity disputes but not for high intensity conflicts such as wars.

The second style of mediation is directive mediation, in which mediators use sticks and carrots to incentivize the disputants to stop fighting. In directive mediation, mediators increase opportunity costs for failure to end conflicts, and threaten disputants with punishments. Beardsley et al. (2006: 64) explain that “by adding benefits to their proposed solution, [directive] mediators are augmenting the appeal of a solution”. The use of leverage allows directive mediators to shift disputants’ “reservation points” which makes peace more likely (Bercovitch et al. 2006: 64). In order to influence the bargaining environment, directive mediators must command substantial resources that they are willing to use (Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000). An example of directive mediation is Holbrooke’s involvement in the Bosnian war in 1995, in which Holbrooke leveraged the warring sides into signing the Dayton Agreement. In return for peace, Holbrooke offered military training, peacekeepers and economic aid for the Bosnian Muslims, and relief from economic sanctions for Yugoslavia (Holbrooke, 1998). The ability of directive mediators to influence the immediate bargaining calculations of disputants makes this strategy particularly effective at

² Researchers distinguish between two subtypes of nondirective mediation: communication-facilitation and procedural mediation. In communication-facilitation, mediators use information revelation and face to face interaction as crisis resolution mechanisms (Touval and Zartman, 1985; Beardsley et al. 2006: 66). In procedural mediation, mediators control the process of negotiations and formulate proposals, although they still refrain from using leverage over the disputants (Bercovitch and Houston 2000).

halting violence in the short-term (Wilkenfeld et al. 2005). Directive mediation is the most effective strategy for managing high-intensity conflicts, such as interstate wars (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, 1991; Bercovitch and Lee, 2003; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006). Despite its relative success in taming wars, directive mediation is not without its downsides.

Agreements reached with the help of directive mediators are particularly prone to experiencing renewal of violence (Beardsley, 2011). Directive mediators often inflate the attractiveness of peace agreements and provide asymmetric incentives to the disputants. In the short-term the incentives used by mediators might be enough to produce truces, but in the long-term the influence of mediators wanes. As soon as disputants' utility for maintaining peace diminishes, they are likely to abandon their promises and renew fighting. On top of this, mediated agreements are almost always self-enforcing (Beardsley & Lo, 2014), which means that agreement implementation largely depends on the willingness of disputants to honor their commitments (Gartner, 2013).

Like mediators, international organizations are common conflict managers capable of influencing conflict bargaining environments. There are two primary ways through which IOs influence conflict dynamics. For one, IOs have institutional mechanisms that support peaceful resolution of conflicts. They supply states with good offices and avenues for negotiations (Kydd, 2010). IOs have established lines of communication and an extensive web of information which help states resolve information problems. Secondly, IOs command valuable resources and provide benefits to cooperating states, such as foreign aid, funding for projects and access to trade (Tir and Karreth, 2018: 59). The resources that IOs command serve as important sources of leverage over states, because IOs can make benefits from cooperation contingent on peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The empirical record of the effectiveness of IOs as conflict managers in interstate disputes is somewhat mixed. Some scholars find that IOs are ineffective at ending interstate disputes (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001; Oneal, Russett & Berbaum, 2003; Beardsley, 2011). Other authors find that IOs with

leverage can contribute to conflict resolution, although they caution against excessive optimism about this finding (Boehmer, Gartzke & Nordstrom, 2004).

In sum, less intrusive mediation styles like non-directive mediation produce more stable agreements and contribute to long-term tension reduction between disputants (Beardsley et al. 2006). However, non-directive mediation is ineffective at taming high-intensity disputes such as wars. Conversely, directive mediators are capable of ending violence for the moment, but their conflict management is associated with higher propensity for renewed fighting in the long-term (Beardsley 2011). IOs have various institutional mechanisms and vast resources that help them promote peace, but their conflict management record in interstate disputes is mixed.

Post-Agreement Bargaining: Mediators, IOs and Implementation Assistance

Upholding peace agreements is an equally daunting task as achieving them. Adherence to third-party negotiated settlements is voluntary (Gartner 2013), and mediators and IOs vary in their ability to assist states with implementation concerns. Beardsley & Lo (2014: 364) write that “mediators typically have neither the ability nor willingness to credibly commit to enforcement”. Although mediators are likely to remain engaged with disputants in the post-conflict period, they seldom provide disputants with implementation assistance (Werner & Yuen 2005).

Providing implementation assistance can add significant costs for mediators (Beardsley, 2011). Mediators already face financial, political and military costs when they engage in conflict management (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006). Because they incur significant costs while pursuing peace, and because they dedicate limited funds to conflict management, mediators are constrained to responding to the most pressing ongoing conflicts (Beardsley, 2011). In turn, mediators often fail “to commit to ensuring that peaceful relations continue between the adversaries” (Beardsley et al. 2006: 69). As soon as mediators achieve peace, they are likely to redirect their efforts to ongoing conflicts, leaving disputants to self-enforce their agreements. For mediators, it is less costly to come back to mediating a relapsed confrontation than to

stay involved with disputants and actively promote implementation of peace agreements (Beardsley, 2011). Whereas mediators are less equipped to enforce agreements, international organizations generally have higher stakes in maintaining peace and stability, and are more likely to leverage disputants into compliance (Simmons, 2002; Beardsley et al. 2006; Mitchel and Hansel, 2007).

IOs have permanent interest in stability and their commitment to implementing and monitoring peace is likely to outlast that of mediators. Moreover, IOs have two major advantages over mediators when it comes to peace implementation. For one, the most prominent IOs have institutional mechanisms that help states with agreement implementation. For example, the United Nations has the Department of Political Affairs, the African Union has the Peace and Security Council, and ASEAN has its own unit devoted to peaceful resolution of conflicts and implementation of agreements (Lundgren, 2017).

Secondly, IOs command substantial resources with which they can sway states away from renewed fighting. By leveraging access to benefits, such as access to funds, markets, partnerships and alliances, resourceful IOs disincentivize states from re-entering conflicts. For example, the European Union (EU) is an IO that plays an active role in pursuing peace and disincentivizing renewal of fighting. Because of its vast resources and large market, the EU can add significant costs for states engaged in conflicts. EU Commission reports regularly emphasize upholding peace and security as conditionality for access to aid and its markets, both for member states and non-member states (Tocci, 2008).

Other IOs, such as the World Bank and the IMF, provide economic support for disputants in the post-conflict recovery period. Economic inducements are a common way through which IOs incentivize agreement implementation. Emmanuel (2015: 1) writes that “external economic assistance represents a potentially strong incentive for peace after conflict has ended”. States engaged in conflict may experience a reduction of benefits, termination of projects, international exclusion and loss of trading partners. Beyond the costs incurred throughout the dispute phase, states are subject to long-term IO influence, as IOs can “raise the cost of violence in the long-term” (Karreth, 2018: 470).

The vast incentives for peace offered by IOs often materialize. A recent empirical study by Karreth (2018) finds that when IOs exercise influence over states, the latter are significantly less likely to renew fighting once agreements have been reached.

The review of the literature presented above points to interesting observations about third-parties and their contributions to conflict management. Each of the actors does something well, but also leaves certain issues unresolved. Directive mediators are successful at terminating crises, but are ineffective as enforcers of agreements. IOs are less effective as negotiators, but they have better mechanisms for ensuring agreement compliance. In the next section, I theoretically consider the complementary conflict management dynamics between these two prominent conflict management actors.

Section 3: Theory

Scholars of conflict management have closely examined the independent effects of mediators and IOs as third-parties. Even though the empirical record is vast, more could be done to account for the combined effects of mediators and international organizations in the context of conflict management. In this section, I make two predictions about the effects of mediators and IOs on the prospects for signing and maintaining peace agreements. My argument follows the logic of previous studies, which postulate that both of these third-parties can make unique contributions to ending disputes and maintaining peace. I argue that the joint effects of mediators and international organizations impact both the success of negotiations and the longevity of agreements.

Mediators, IOs and Conflict Management

Disputants in a conflict evaluate the costs of continued fighting against the backdrop of peace incentives offered by conflict managers (Greig and Reagan, 2008). When conflict managers offer incentives for peace, they relax the reservation points of disputing parties, which in turn creates larger zones of agreement (Wilkenfeld et al. 2005). The larger the zone of agreement, the more likely it is that disputants

achieve peace. Because the size of the disputants' zones of agreement is increased by the incentives extended by conflict managers, I expect that disputes that experience simultaneous mediator and IO activity will have higher prosperity for peaceful resolution.

As the principal actor in conflict management, mediators assume most of the burden during negotiations. This is particularly true of directive mediators because they extend costly short-term inducements aimed at producing peace. However, interstate wars are complex and often intractable, even for resourceful mediators. Despite using tangible resources to expand the zone of agreement for disputants, mediators still fail to resolve crises more often than they succeed (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014). But as the review of existing literature indicates, mediators seldom act as the sole third-party in the context of interstate conflicts.

Conflict management campaigns launched by mediators can be uniquely supplanted by IO involvement in negotiations. From a rational bargaining perspective, IOs can "supplant mediation efforts with their tangible, credible, and conditional promises" (Tir et al. 2018: 8). Expanding the zone of agreement beyond the contributions of mediators requires that IOs extend or withdraw aid, resources and access to benefits to disputants. As a result, disputants that experience directive mediation and simultaneous active involvement of international organizations should derive higher amounts of peace incentives. This logic leads me to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The combined effect of directive mediation and active IO involvement during the peace process will enhance the likelihood for mediation success.

Mediators, IOs and Post-Agreement Environment

Even if conflict managers achieve peace, successful termination of violence by no means guarantees lasting peace. Recurrence to violence is a notable problem for mediation because compliance with agreements is voluntary (Maoz & Terris, 2006; Gartner, 2013). Mitchel and Hensel (2007: 734) write that "nonbonding management activities such as mediation or good offices do not fare as well" in producing

lasting peace. Even if disputants agree on a truce, conditions in the future may change, and disputants may become dissatisfied with the status quo. As Beardsley (2011) finds, disputing states have propensity to reengage in fighting, particularly when conflict managers extract asymmetric concessions from the disputants. Directive mediators often wrest asymmetric concessions by pressuring the stronger side in a conflict to compromise (Beardsley et al. 2006). In turn, this leads to an unstable post-agreement equilibrium.

Part of the reason for conflict recurrence is the inability of mediators to continually supply disputants with incentives to stray away from fighting. Wallenstein & Svensson (2014: 324) write that most mediators care about ending “ongoing carnage, while other [actors] may emphasize long-term stability”. Even if mediators care about successful implementation of agreements and maintenance of peace in the long-run, they often lack the capacity to ensure agreement implementation and lasting compliance (Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000; Reid, 2017). Following the conclusion of negotiations, mediators are likely to withdraw or lower the tangible resources used to entice the parties into signing agreements (Beardsley & Lo, 2014). This leaves disputants with an implementation gap in which they face limited implementation assistance by mediators and have to self-enforce their agreements.

I argue that IOs are uniquely positioned to help disputants with the implementation gap left by mediators. First, IOs are important sources of benefits for states, and access to benefits is contingent on compliance with IO demands. If states engage in renewed militarized confrontations, they can expect ramifications in the form of “suspension of benefits, direct costs such as sanctions, or exclusion.” (Karreth, 2018: 469). Second, IOs differ from mediators in that they have “institutionalized field mission capacities” that can help disputants with agreement implementation gaps (Lundgren, 2017: 614). IO involvement with disputants during the phase of negotiations is crucial because it signals a commitment for long-term cooperation. While peace negotiations are in progress, IOs often promise peace-contingent benefits to states, such as participation in war-recovery projects and access to benefits. This is precisely what the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Union (EU) and other IOs did during Dayton negotiations. These IOs extended access to monetary benefits and leveraged future membership

prospects as conditional on implementing the Dayton agreement. They signaled a willingness to cooperate with the disputants in the Bosnian war past the conflict, and developed plans and mechanisms for post-agreement cooperation (Touval, 2002).

IOs can also signal a willingness to help states with agreement implementation by sending observer forces to ensure a credible commitment to peace (Shannon, 2009). Because IOs have self-interest in maintaining peace (Haas, 1990), they are willing to supply states with credible guarantees which “can help the enforcement of contracts, diminishing the incentives to defect” (Lundgren, 2017: 204). Commanding extensive institutional mechanisms means that the influence of IOs over disputants in the post-agreement period is likely to outlast that of mediators (Walter, 2002). The logic above suggests that active IO involvement in conflicts should mitigate against the adverse long-term consequences of mediation and provide states with agreement implementation assistance which helps with compliance to agreements.

Hypothesis 2: Directive mediation, when applied in conjunction with active IO involvement, will have a higher propensity for producing lasting peace.

Section 4: Research Design

To examine the implications of the theoretical framework I conduct a series of quantitative tests using Bercovitch’s (2004) International Conflict Management (ICM) database. The ICM is the “most complete collection of data on international conflict management” (Greig and Diehl, 2012: 30), and covers conflict management efforts throughout the globe from 1945 to 2003. These data focus on conflict management instance as the unit of analysis, which allows me to test the impact of mediation styles and IO involvement on the outcome of mediation. I identify all incidents of interstate wars in the ICM that experienced mediation. In total, 71% of all interstate conflict management efforts in the database (1, 454 cases) focused on halting interstate wars. Bercovitch (2004) follows the Correlates of War classification of interstate wars, whereby disputes are coded as wars if they reach over 1000 deaths in the duration of the

conflict. I test for the significance of the key explanatory variables using logistic regression analysis, and I test for the size of their effect on the dependent variable using marginal effect analysis. Each table contains models that capture the main effects only, the main effects and the interactive term, and regression with control variables. This modeling follows the approach taken by Wilkenfeld et al. (2005), who test for both the main effects, and the combination of main effects, interactive terms and controls.

Dependent Variables

The outcomes of interest are mediation success and the durability of agreements. Hypothesis one examines the interactive effect of directive mediation and IO involvement on mediation success. Therefore, the outcome of interest *mediation success* is coded 1 for cease-fire, partial or full agreement, and 0 for otherwise. I borrow this delineation of mediation success from Bercovitch (2004: 212), who writes that mediation is successful when it produces observable difference on the dynamic between parties in a conflict dyad, and unsuccessful when it makes no “discernible difference in the behavior of parties”. Achieving a cease-fire, partial or full agreement constitute a discernible difference in the behavior of parties, as these outcomes move disputing states away from fighting and violence. Out of all interstate war conflict management attempts, 40,77% or 590 of them were successful.

Hypotheses two examines the long-term effect of the interaction between directive mediation and IO involvement on agreement durability. The dependent variable *durable agreement* captures the “length of compliance to an agreement resulting from a mediator’s intervention” (Bercovitch, 2004: 212). I use the most restrictive measure in the ICM, and code 1 for durable agreement if it survives for over two months, and 0 for otherwise. This dependent variable captures the treacherous period of peace implementation, which Walter (2002: 3) describes as “dangerous and difficult to enforce”. Previous studies (Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006; Gartner, 2011) have also used the same duration of compliance to test agreement durability. As a further robustness check for agreement durability, I code a second dependent variable to test for rate of compliance with agreements. The dependent variable *final outcome* captures the final outcome of the conflict following a successful mediation. The coding for this variable is as follows: I code

1 if the mediation effort (a) contributed to full resolution of the dispute, and (b) if no later claims are made by either of the disputing parties. This coding allows me to observe the long-term effect of directive mediation and IO involvement in wars past the two-month agreement survival threshold.

Figure 1: Outcomes of Interest




Figure 1 shows the stages of interstate conflict management contained in the ICM database. The theoretical argument and the empirical testing conducted in this paper relate to the outcome of mediation, and the durability of agreements.

Key Explanatory Variables

The independent variable *directive mediation* is a dummy variable describing the style of mediation, whereby I code 1 if the mediator used sticks and carrots over the disputants during the negotiations³. In the theory I argued that active IO involvement in conflict management will likely influence the bargaining environment, both during negotiations and after agreements are reached. IOs can signal resolve for peace to disputing states by actively engaging with disputants in the process of negotiations. Disputants are then likely to incorporate the leverage provided by IOs in their bargaining calculations (Anderson, Mitchell & Schilling, 2016). To capture the effect of IO involvement in crisis management, *IO*

³ In coding for mediator strategies, I follow the approach by Bercovitch and Lee (2003) who code strategies as directive or nondirective. Because of perfect multicollinearity, nondirective strategy is omitted and is contained in the constant term. As further robustness test, I follow the approach by Beardsley et al. (2006: 72) and code three dummy variables to describe mediation styles: directive, procedural and communication-facilitation. These regression outputs can be found in the Appendix, and the results are similar to the ones presented in Tables 1 and 3.

involvement is coded 1 for: (a) IO body involved in the process of negotiations, (b) IO sending observers to the negotiations, (c) IO providing mediators with diplomatic support. Of the 1,454 conflict management attempts in the database, only 211 saw no IO activity as specified in the criteria above, which further supports the idea that mediation does not occur in vacuum. Finally, I am interested in testing for the combined effect of mediation styles and active IO involvement in crisis management. The interactive term *directive*IO involvement* captures the combined effects of directive mediator strategy and the activity of IO during the peace process. Here, the coding for IO involvement is identical to the three criteria laid out above.

Control Variables and Robustness Checks

Russett, Oneal & Davis (1998) find a positive feedback between IOs and peace, and stress the effectiveness of IOs in contributing to avoidance of conflicts. However, scholars often caution against a lack of causal link between international organizations and peace. Most IOs are established in periods of peace, which partly drives the strong correlation between IOs and peace (Vasquez, 1993). Additionally, there is a possibility that confounding effects from IO activity in and outside of the context of conflict drives conflict behavior, and affects conflict outcomes (Karreth, 2018). To control for indirect effects of IO activity, such as promoting democracy, economic ties, and similarity in interests among disputants, I introduce several control variables. To account for other known factors that contribute to agreement durability, I include a set of control variables linked to the post-conflict environment.

Regional factors: Throughout the period under observation, regional organizations as well as large international organizations have directed efforts at promoting regional stability (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014). Additionally, both regional and large international organizations have been increasingly involved in promoting regional stability (Mitchell, 1998). Finally, due to the tendency of conflicts to cluster, some regional organizations might have increased role in managing conflicts that occur in their place of origin (Böhmelt, 2015). On the demand side of conflict management, states that come from the same region might have heightened incentives to compromise due to their geographic proximity and the challenges that come

from continuing conflict. To capture the effect of geographic origin similarity between disputants, I code *regional dyad* as 1 if both disputing states come from the same region, and 0 for otherwise.

Alignment: IOs might provide a positive feedback for disputing states that share membership. Russett, Oneal and Davis (1998: 444) write that IOs “encourage cooperation by enhancing facilities for consultation, coordination, norm creation, and initiatives by member states to make and enforce cooperative arrangements among themselves.” Further, Caporaso (1992: 602) observes that IOs provide avenues for disputing states to alter mutual beliefs and improve their communication. To capture the effect of dyadic IO membership, I code 1 if the disputing dyad share formal international affiliations and belong to the same political bloc, and 0 for otherwise.

Power Balance: Next, I include a control variable that measures the power similarity between disputants. Wilkenfeld et al. (2005) maintain that similarly powerful states are more likely to enter into mediation and to experience successful mediation compared to dyads with power disbalance. To capture the effect of power distribution, I code 1 for low power difference and 0 for otherwise.⁴

Prior Dyadic Relationship: Disputing dyads that share a history of conflict and mutual hostility have less incentives to preserve peace compared to parties with friendly history. Disputants that share a history of strong bilateral ties, trade links and an overall positive relationship are likely more willing to compromise for the sake of preserving the relationship (Bercovitch, 2004). To capture the effect of parties’ past relationship prior to the onset of their most current conflict, I code 1 if they shared a friendly history, and 0 for otherwise.

Past success: Negotiations between warring states can be daunting and agreements require compromises from both sides. Past success in negotiations between disputants can motivate parties to be constructive negotiators and can serve as a sign of willingness to cooperate. For example, Wilkenfeld et al.

⁴Bercovitch (2004) identifies a scale of absolute dyadic power difference ranging from 0 to 34. I code 1 for power difference below 10, and 0 for higher absolute power difference values, following Bercovitch’s advice on the power discrepancies and their classification.

(2005) detail the Agacher Strip War negotiations which ended the 1895 war between Mali and Burkina Faso. Even though tensions were high, the skillful Nigerian and Libyan negotiators brought the parties to an agreement, largely drawing from a mediated truce from ten years earlier. To capture the effect of past dyadic success in negotiations, I code for dyads that had a successfully mediated agreement prior to the onset of the most recent conflict.

Mediator links: Mediators that have worked on managing conflicts for conflict-ridden states have experience that can be advantageous for the conflict resolution process. For example, mediators that have professional experience working with the disputants can draw on past conflict management efforts and adapt their strategy according to the disputants' preferences (Maoz and Terris, 2006). Disputants are also more likely to agree to mediators that they view as credible, and past cooperation can be an important source of credibility (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006). To check for the effect of prior mediator links, I code for mediators that have worked with both disputants on settling a previous conflict.

Major power: Major powers often have their own agendas which are not necessarily aligned with pacifist pursuits of peace. Global powers are active conflict managers and their status and resources can significantly impact the process of negotiations (Wilkenfeld et al. 2005). To capture the effect of superpower involvement in disputes, I code for cases in which major powers are involved as active allies or active conflict managers. I follow Bercovitch's (2004) approach, which classifies the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia after 1991) as major powers.

Leadership Change: Mediated agreements can be under threat if one or both of the signees experience a change in power and a subsequent change in foreign policy outlook. What was considered a good and beneficial deal for one administration might be an act of betrayal for the next one. In order to account for the effect of leadership change in disputing states following the conclusion of agreements, I code 1 for leadership changes in the aftermath of the agreement, and 0 for otherwise.

Section 5: Results

Hypothesis 1: Nature of Mediation and Mediation Success

The statistical results largely support the predictions made earlier. To test the accuracy of the claims regarding the connection between the process of mediation and mediation outcomes, I ran logistic regression analysis. Table 1 shows the effects of the process of mediation on mediation success, with Model 1 displaying the main effects only, Model 2 displaying the main effects and the interaction term, and Model 3 and 4 displaying results with control variables. Hypothesis one predicted that the combined effect of directive mediation and the active role of IOs in conflict management will positively impact the propensity for mediation success. The statistical findings support hypothesis one. The interaction between directive mediation and active IO involvement in conflict management positively impacts the likelihood for successful mediation ($p < 0.001$). The baseline probability for mediation success when directive mediation is the only form of third-party intervention is 24.5%. However, when directive mediation is conjoined by the active involvement of IOs the baseline probability for successful mediation reaches 56.7% (95% confidence interval). For comparison, when non-directive mediation acts without the assistance of IOs the baseline probability for success is 43%, and even lower when IOs get involved. The findings about the interactive term are robust across tests, and retain their direction and significance when I add a set of control variables. These control variables are intended to isolate the impact of general IO activity in the international system from the observed effect of IO involvement in conflict management. As predicted, dyads that originate from the same region, are similarly powerful and have a friendly past relationship have higher chances of achieving mediation success, although these variables fail to reach statistical significance. Contrary to expectations, formal alignment in IOs does not improve the odds of arriving at mediated settlements. Past conflict management success between the disputants significantly enhances the prospects for successful mediation in the present. Mediator links also positively impact conflict management, although this result fails to reach statistical significance. Finally, as Wilkenfeld et al. (2005) predict, major power involvement in conflicts has negative effects on mediation success. Overall, the commonly identified


confounding variables do not detract from the impact of the key interactive term. These results are consistent with the theoretical predictions about the combined short and long-term effects of mediation and IO involvement in conflicts. Figure 2 presents the marginal analysis findings visually.

Table 1: Effects of the process of mediation on mediation success

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Directive*IO		1.537** (0.484)		1.274** (0.520)
Directive Mediation	-0.010 (0.229)	-0.845** (0.363)	0.109 (0.252)	-0.587 (0.390)
IO involvement	0.352 (0.217)	-0.143 (0.267)	0.410* (0.249)	-0.015 (0.303)
Regional dyad			0.633 (0.598)	0.575 (0.598)
Similar powers			0.102 (0.243)	0.110 (0.245)
Aligned			-0.540* (0.296)	-0.560* (0.298)
Friendly			-0.193 (1.153)	0.005 (1.190)
Past success			1.208*** (0.239)	1.159*** (0.241)
Mediator links			0.433 (0.351)	0.422 (0.355)
Major power			-0.910** (0.391)	-0.880** (0.396)
cons	-0.491** (0.163)	-0.279 (0.173)	-0.623 (0.600)	-0.373 (0.614)
No. of Obs.	358	358	343	343
R-Squared	0.0055	0.027	0.1286	0.1439

Robust standard error in parenthesis. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .00$

Figure 2: Estimated probability of mediation success



Adjusted predictions for the impact of directive mediation, IO involvement, and their combined effect on the propensity for mediation success. The adjusted predictions show the impact of the two independent variables and the interactive term going from value of 0 to value 1, and whiskers indicate 95% confidence level. Results are based on Model 2 in Table 1.

For further robustness check, I recoded the dependent variable using more restrictive parameters. In Model 5 in Table 2 the dependent variable mediation success is coded only for partial and full agreements. Model 6 has the most restrictive dependent variable and is coded only for mediation attempts that resulted in full agreements. The results exhibit a very similar pattern to those in Table 1, and the interactive term of interest maintains its positive effect and statistical significance in spite of the more restrictive coding of the dependent variable mediation success.

Table 2: Robustness check for Mediation Success

	<i>Model 5: Full/Partial</i>	<i>Model 6: Full Agreement Only</i>
	b/se	b/se
Directive* IO involvement	1.735** (0.551)	0.103* (0.059)
Directive mediation	-1.422** (0.442)	-0.073* (0.043)
IO involvement	-0.308 (0.277)	0.016 (0.035)
cons	-0.461** (0.175)	0.073** (0.022)
No. of Obs.	358	358
R-Squared	0.0349	0.0181

Robust standard error in parenthesis. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .00$

Hypothesis 2: Nature of Mediation and Durable Agreements

Hypotheses two is related to the durability of mediated settlements, and predicts that outcomes achieved through directive mediation used in conjunction with active involvement of IOs will be long-lasting. Indeed, when IO activity coincides with the efforts of directive mediators, the effect on agreement durability (measured by agreement survival rate of two months or more) is positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.003$). The marginal effects analysis gives further insight into the findings. The use of directive mediation as the only form of conflict management is associated with only 27.2% likelihood that agreements are durable past the two-month period. When the activities of directive mediators coincide with active IOs, the probability that those agreements surpass the two-month hurdle increases to 70.5% (95% confidence interval). This constitutes around 43% increase in the probability that an agreement survives the initial post-agreement period compared to the fragile settlements reached by directive mediators alone. Results from the marginal means tests are visualized in Figure 3 below. The results surrounding the interactive term directive mediation*IO involvement are robust across different specifications. It maintains positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood that an agreement survives for over two months even when I include a set of control variables. The control variables in Model 9 isolate potential confounding effects of IO activity from the observed effect of IOs in relation to


outcome durability. As an additional check, I include decade-fixed effects in Model 10. With the exception of antagonistic, which describes the nature of disputants' relationship prior to the onset of the disputants' current disagreement, the control variables exhibit a predictable pattern. Antagonistic past positively contributes to lasting peace, but this finding reaches significance only in Model 9. Leadership change in the disputing states following an agreement has a negative impact on outcome durability, while belonging to the same international bloc is positively correlated with outcome durability. Both of these controls fail to reach statistical significance.

Table 3: Effects of the Process of Mediation on Outcome Durability

	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>	<i>Model 9</i>	<i>Model 10</i>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Directive*IO		2.955** (0.902)	3.372*** (0.969)	2.966** (1.035)
Directive mediation	-0.145 (0.403)	-2.079** (0.744)	-2.637** (0.805)	-2.384** (0.856)
IO involvement	-0.249 (0.384)	-1.099** (0.461)	-1.442** (0.527)	-1.061* (0.570)
Antagonistic			0.923** (0.441)	0.350 (0.536)
Leadership change			-0.399 (0.534)	-0.297 (0.583)
Aligned			0.438 (0.493)	0.937 (0.582)
1956-65				-0.898 (0.972)
1966-75				-1.952** (0.870)
1976-85				-1.676* (0.962)
1986-95				-1.435 (0.975)
cons	0.740** (0.269)	1.099*** (0.309)	0.791 (0.508)	1.876** (0.813)
No. of Obs.	135	135	127	127
R-Squared	0.006	0.095	0.161	0.204

Robust standard error in parenthesis. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .00$

Figure 3: Estimated probability of durable agreements



Adjusted predictions for the impact of directive mediation, IO involvement, and their combined effect on the propensity for reaching durable agreements (>2 months). The adjusted predictions show the impact of the two independent variables and the interactive term going from value of 0 to value 1, and whiskers indicate 95% confidence level. The results are based on Model 8 in Table 3.

Toward Lasting Peace: Nature of Mediation and Final Outcome

Table 4 shows the regression results that test for the effect of the nature of mediation on the final outcome of disputes. To recap, I consider final outcomes of disputes to be successful if the mediation effort that produced peace was not followed by renewed violence or new claims by the disputants. To control for possible confounding effects and omitted variables, I include a set of variables and decade-fixed effects. The results are in line with the theoretical expectations, and lend further credence to the predictions regarding the bargaining environment in the post-agreement period. Directive mediation has negative impact on final resolution of conflicts, but neither Model 11 nor Model 12 shows a statistical significance. The independent effect of IO involvement is small and insignificant in both Models 11 and 12. On the other hand, the interactive effect of directive mediation and IO involvement has a positive and significant impact on the likelihood that successful mediation produces lasting peace. The estimated probabilities displayed in figure 4 indicate that directive mediation has 22.6% probability of resulting in lasting peace when used

as the only conflict management form. When combined with the active involvement of IOs, however, the probability that directive mediation results in lasting peace increases all the way up to 89% (95% confidence interval). This constitutes a 66.4% increase in the likelihood for lasting agreement.


The control variables also exhibit a predictable pattern. Having a history of antagonism decreases the possibility that a dyad maintains the peace concluded through mediation. Leadership change in disputing parties following the conclusion of peace agreements is negatively and significantly correlated with the likelihood that lasting peace is maintained. Finally, formal alignment in international organizations increases the likelihood that a dyad keeps to the terms of peace treaties, and this finding is also statistically significant.

Table 4: Peace as Final Outcome of Conflict Management

	<i>Model 11</i>	<i>Model 12</i>
	b/se	b/se
Directive * IO involvement	1.719** (0.860)	3.097** (1.350)
Directive mediation	-0.672 (0.586)	-0.895 (0.672)
IO involvement	-0.212 (0.500)	0.224 (0.737)
Antagonistic	-0.532 (0.451)	-1.620** (0.573)
Leadership change	-5.216*** (0.530)	-5.772*** (0.807)
Aligned	1.196** (0.527)	1.576** (0.696)
1956-65		2.460** (0.990)
1966-75		2.690*** (0.888)
1976-85		0.849 (0.813)
Cons	2.334*** (0.519)	0.267 (0.962)
No. of Obs.	341	277
R-Squared	0.675	0.754

Robust standard error in parenthesis. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .00$

Figure 4: Estimated probability for peace as final dispute outcome



Adjusted predictions for the impact of directive mediation, IO involvement, and their combined effect on the propensity for mediation to produce lasting peace. The adjusted predictions show the impact of the two independent variables and the interactive term going from value of 0 to value 1, while holding all else at the mean. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence level. The results are based on Model 12 in Table 4.

Robustness of Results

The findings presented above are robust across several tests. Primarily, using model specifications in the regression analysis I include previously identified independent variables that might have confounding effects on mediation success and agreement durability. Next, wanting to nullify potential omitted variable bias in the results, I specify models which include the key explanatory variables, decade fixed effects, and models which include the key explanatory variables and a host of independent variables (Table 1-Model 3, 4; Table 4-Model 12). Research on the effects of IOs on states' bargaining environment often suffers from exclusion of variables that might drive disputants' behavior, independently from the influence of IOs. To control for these potential effects, I include previously identified confounding variables such as disputants' alignment, their past relationship and their region of origin. The significance of the results does not change between the models with different specifications, which reduces the likelihood that estimated coefficients

for the key explanatory variables are impacted by the inclusion or exclusion of potentially confounding variables. The key explanatory interaction retains its directionality and statistical significance across model specifications, both to the inclusion and exclusion of missing variables. The adjusted prediction tests for the interactive term are robust and within the 95% confidence interval, for all dependent variables specified in the research design. Finally, the findings for mediation success and outcome durability are robust even when I use alternative coding for the dependent variables. For mediation success, I check the robustness by fitting models with more restrictive dependent variables, one coded as partial and full agreements, and one coded as full agreements only. For outcome durability, I go beyond the standard two-month agreement survival measure, and code for the final outcome of the dispute. In all cases, the interactive term directive mediation*IO involvement retains its significance and directionality. In the appendix I attach regression outputs with alternative coding for mediator strategies, and a two-stage Heckman test for selection effects.

Section 6: Case-study of the 1995 American mediation of the Bosnian War

The 1995 U.S. mediation of the Bosnian war which produced the Dayton Agreement is a good illustration of the dynamic of combined effects of directive mediation and active IO involvement in the same conflict. Per my theory, I should observe two mechanisms of crisis resolution. First, I should see aggressive mediation which changes the disputants' short-term bargaining environments and drives them to an agreement. Second, I should see active IO involvement during the peace process, and a subsequent use of leverage that affects the disputants' long-term bargaining calculations and discourages them from renewal of violence. Historical evidence from the Bosnian war shows this to be the case. To entice the disputants into an agreement, US mediators used leverage to ameliorate the conflict bargaining environment. Alongside mediators, the supplementary weight of IO involvement in the negotiations further increased disputants' costs of fighting. After an agreement was reached in Dayton, IOs assumed a leading role in implementing the agreement. IOs post-negotiation leverage over the disputants was key in supplying long-term incentives and credibly committing the disputants to peace.

Context

A sudden upsurge in nationalist divisions among the constituent republics contributed to the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The fighting resulted in violent ethnic clashes, hundreds of thousands of victims, and millions of displaced persons. The war in Bosnia was particularly violent and received a great deal of international attention. It also prompted numerous third-parties to get involved in managing the dispute. Although the conflict initially began as a civil war, the dispute was soon “externalized through declarations and subsequent recognition of independence” (Melin and Svensson 2009: 251). In March 1992 Bosnian authorities declared independence from Yugoslavia and the following month the new country received international recognition. By May 1992, Bosnia had become a United Nations member state. Initially, three major actors fought against one another – the Bosnian Muslims, the Croats and the Serbs. Upon U.S. and EU insistence, the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats united under the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994, thus transforming the conflicting triad into a dyad. The Serb forces supported by the Yugoslav army were initially superior, but their dominance was diminished by a combination of a Bosnian Muslim-Croat unification and their subsequent military campaigns, and by the NATO bombing campaign in Operation Deliberate Force (Holbrooke, 1998).

The U.S. mediation in 1995 was preceded by several mediation campaigns launched by conflict managers. From 1992 until 1994, conflict managers had produced the Cutileiro Plan, the EU plan, the Invincible Plan, and the Contact Group Plan, which sought to bridge the warring sides and end the war. Outside of a temporary halt on violence, however, these plans failed to create long-term peace in Bosnia. The 1995 Dayton Agreement which succeeded borrowed certain elements from the previous mediation plans (especially from the 1994 Washington Agreement), such as aspects of territorial division, constitutional arrangement and power sharing. The most important difference between Holbrooke’s and earlier mediation efforts was not so much the content of the proposals, but rather the style of mediation. Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) note that effective mediators learn from previous failures and adjust their strategies accordingly. The ineffectiveness of the non-directive approach pursued by the European

peacemakers was one of the motivations for changing the style of third-party mediation in Bosnia to directive, leverage-based mediation (Holbrooke 1998: 318).

Mediation

The process of mediation that ultimately produced the Dayton Agreement was substantially different compared to previous mediation efforts in the Bosnian war. For one, the US mediation led by Holbrooke was highly coercive and directive, and followed a short NATO military campaign against the Serbs that contributed to balancing the power between the disputants (Curran, Sebenius & Watkins, 2004). Whereas previous mediation efforts led by the EU, the United Nations, the Contact Group and OSCE were multinational mediation attempts, the later U.S. initiative was largely a unilateral approach. U.S. mediators followed a centralized approach to mediating the war by receiving instructions and guidance from Holbrooke himself. Although Holbrooke consulted with IOs, Russian and German observers, he and his team had the ultimate say on the course of negotiations.

Touval (2002: 173) describes the directive role played by the U.S. mediators in the following way: “to influence disputants, mediators often need to bargain with them: to promise them rewards for following the mediator’s suggestions and to threaten them with punishments if they refuse.” The American mediation in the Bosnian War relied on the mediators’ willingness to use leverage and coerce the parties into an agreement. The decision to use heavy handed mediation followed two public fiascos, one linked to the Serbian seizure of UNPROFOR soldiers, and another linked to the Serbian atrocities in Srebrenica and Zepa. After these high-profile incidents and the numerous failed mediation attempt, international concerns over the Bosnian war surged. By the mid-summer of 1995, the US mediating team had recognized the moment to intervene, and Holbrooke’s team established direct line of communication with the warring parties. From the onset the U.S. mediating team took a directive approach by leveraging both sticks (in the form of possible troop and air operations) and carrots (in the form of lifting economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, and providing military and economic aid to Bosnia).

In return for peace U.S. mediators promised access to peacekeepers, military equipment and economic aid (Beardsley, 2011). Having first achieved a more balanced power distribution and a more favorable bargaining environment, the U.S. mediators then worked on implementing an agreement that made peace attainable. This meant negotiating the merits of a constituent state composed of the three nationalities and two separate entities (Republika Srpska and a Muslim-Croat Federation), and a division of territories as a potential compromise between the warring sides. Additionally, Holbrooke outlined constitutional provisions which mandated the federal character of Bosnia.

The final conference at Dayton where disputants signed the peace agreement was preceded by detailed negotiations led by Holbrooke in Geneva and New York. Touval (2002: 152) notes that the process of negotiations that led to the Dayton agreement was rocky, and hinged on Holbrooke's ability to manipulate the sides into an agreement. This meant exerting strong pressure over the negotiators, and constantly leveraging sticks and carrots to push the peace process forward. At one point during the New York negotiations, for example, Holbrooke had to pressure the Bosnian Muslim representative Muhamed Sacirbey to agree to the propositions put forth by the US mediator team, thus saving the entire process from failure. When the initial terms of the agreement were specified, the leader of Yugoslavia-Milosevic, the leader of Bosnia-Izetbegovic and the leader of Croatia-Tudjman met in Dayton to conclude the war.

Despite the leaders' triumphalism upon arrival in Dayton, peace was by no means a guaranteed outcome. Instead, Holbrooke and the US team relied on sticks and carrots even in the final stages of the peace process. With regards to Tudjman, who was widely regarded as the most flexible negotiator, the US team proposed territorial division that satisfied core Croatian demands (Touval, 2002: 162). Milosevic, on the other hand, was eager to see lifting of the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia, and Holbrooke carefully leveraged the sanction removal upon signing peace (Holbrooke, 1998). The Bosnian Muslim negotiators were the least flexible, and the US mediation team used a number of incentives to entice the Bosnian Muslim negotiators to sign onto peace. The Muslims entered the negotiations in Dayton on the back of several military victories which improved their standing in the battlefield and their bargaining position.

Touval (2002: 163-164) details how the US mediation team had to threaten with revoking political and economic support for the Bosnian Muslims, and revoking support for the Bosnian army. On top of this, Holbrooke (1998: 309) threatened that in the case of an eventual failure of the peace process, he would accuse the Bosnian Muslims for failing to end the war. Under heavy pressure from U.S. mediators, the disputing parties signed the Dayton Agreement, which officially ended the Bosnian war.

This brief summary of the US mediation in Bosnia in 1995 demonstrates the ability of directive mediators to affect the short-term bargaining environment of disputing parties. The United States had considerable leverage over the warring sides, and U.S. mediators manipulated the disputants' bargaining environment to make it more conducive to peace. Peace in Bosnia was possible due to a combination of factors. First, the NATO military intervention and the Bosnian-Croat military advancements weakened the position of the Yugoslav army in the battlefield. Then, skillful mediation by the U.S. mediators changed the bargaining positions of the warring parties so that peace became preferable to conflict. Finally, Holbrooke's mediation activities coincided with the active involvement of several influential IOs, whose participation in the conflict helped orient the disputants toward peace. The following section details the contribution of IOs during the negotiation process.

IO involvement in negotiating the Dispute

IOs leveraged various sticks and carrots in order to bring the warring sides to peaceful conflict resolution. IOs explicitly stated to disputants that any benefits that stem from cooperating with IOs were contingent on halting violence. The European Union leveraged economic aid and opened the prospects for eventual integration of the warring parties into the union (Beardsley, 2011). The World Bank and IMF sent representatives to observe and help manage the dispute. They promised access to reconstruction and development funds once agreement has been reached. The World Bank withheld reconstruction aid to Bosnia, and promised access to funds immediately following the conclusion of the war. During the time of negotiations, the EU leveraged reconstruction funds, and the World Bank promised post-conflict assistance of five billion dollars contingent on peace (Touval, 2002: 164). Similarly, the IMF urged an end of violence

before engaging in an extensive campaign to help Bosnian authorities in their quest for post-war consolidation (Pugh, 2002). Yet another international organization that was heavily involved in the diplomatic initiative was the Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC). Although the IOC stood firmly in support of Bosnian Muslims, the organization's activities did contribute to conflict reduction. Karčić (2013), for example, notes that the OIC was involved in both shaping the diplomatic process, and providing financial assistance to Bosnia. On top of rewards, the OIC used punishment tactics by pressuring United Nations member states to halt their economic cooperation with Yugoslavia, with the purpose of ending the military confrontations over Bosnia's sovereignty (Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1994: 10-12)⁵. The involvement of IOs significantly improved the odds for success, and added legitimacy to Holbrooke's mediating mission by constantly expressing support for the ongoing mediation campaign.

Post-Agreement Bargaining: Long-Term Incentives for Peace after Dayton

Even at the time of negotiations the U.S. mediators recognized the significance of preserving a stable post-conflict equilibrium. The peace reached in Dayton was in large measure the product of strong U.S. leverage that affected the parties' short-term bargaining environments. Any hope at lasting peace, however, would rely on strong outside inducements that reduce the disputants' appeal to renew violence. Here, the role of international organizations was key to maintaining the fragile peace achieved at Dayton. Stressing the need for post-conflict engagement in Bosnia with the purpose of preserving peace, Holbrook (1998: 84) wrote:

...“We must never forget that we will need them [IOs] all if there is ever a settlement – the E.U. for economic assistance, our NATO allies for the new post-U.N. peacekeeping force, the U.N. for legitimizing resolutions, the Islamic Conference for additional aid, and the Russians and Greeks for their influence (however limited) on Belgrade.”

⁵ The entire document is available at: <http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/All%20Download/7Ext/7Ext-FC-En.pdf>

Although implementation efforts were marred by numerous hurdles, the overall consensus among scholars is that the Dayton Agreement contributed to lasting in Bosnia.⁶ The section below outlines some of the major contributions by IOs in implementing the agreement and upholding peace.

Economic reconstruction was a key requirement for peaceful and timely implementation of the Dayton Agreement. International organizations played a leading role in providing peace-contingent financial aid to Bosnia in the post-Dayton period. United Nations progress report from 1996 details the post-conflict contribution of economic implementation agencies, such as the World Bank, the European Commission, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the IMF and the International Management Group (United Nations, 1996). The same report notes that in the first half of 1996 alone IOs provided over U.S.\$ 1 billion for implementation assistance. Aside from providing the funds, the IMF and the World Bank negotiated revenue assignments with the Bosnian authorities, and helped craft budget allocations (Fox & Wallich, 1999: 15).

Some IOs focused specifically on helping disputants with their implementation efforts⁷. For example, article II of the agreement established the dual chamber Human Rights Commission, which to this day is supported by the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission. The Council of Europe has provided Bosnian authorities with implementation funds, legal and institutional support, and reform suggestions that motivate the continual functioning of the Human Rights Commission (Council of Europe, 2016). Disarmament and lowering of the fighting capabilities of the disputing parties was another key provision on the path to long-term peace in Bosnia. One of the very first internationally organized efforts in post-Dayton Bosnia was to downsize the various armies that participated in the conflict. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) led this effort with significant help from the World Bank and the IMF (Hadžović, 2009: 36).

⁶ The Peace Accords Matrix, for example, estimates that 93% of the provisions in the Dayton Agreement have been successfully implemented. See Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: (02/09/2019), <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-framework-agreement-peace-bosnia-and-herzegovina>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.

⁷ The Dayton Agreement is available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf

At other times the international community acted in unison and threatened punishments if the disputants did not follow through with implementation of the agreement. For example, article IX of the Dayton Agreement mandated that prisoners held by the three sides to the conflict be released after the transfer of authority between the cantons. Mutual accusations between the formerly warring sides led to delays in prisoner exchanges, and the January 1996 date set for release was not met. It was only after threats of sanctions and retaliatory action by the international community that most prisoners were released (United Nations, 1996). Threats of sanctions were used against one of the disputants when the international community and the organizations involved in the implementation effort were dissatisfied with progress in implementing the peace accords. The following passage from a United Nations document assessing the implementation of the Dayton Agreement demonstrates the willingness and ability of IOs to impose credible costs on disputants for failing to commit to peace implementation:

“For almost two years, the authorities in the Republika Srpska have followed a policy of minimum implementation of the peace agreement. They have done little or nothing to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing and to return refugees to their homes, they have obstructed the apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity, they do not cooperate adequately with the joint institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and they have not concluded a police restructuring agreement. They have paid a price for this policy, especially in terms of access to the capital resources needed to finance the reconstruction effort. Now, for the first time, there are voices within the Republika Srpska urging implementation of at least some parts of the Dayton Agreement. It is essential for the international community that the present crisis be resolved in a way that will give greater voice to those forces wishing to move ahead with the peace agreement.” (United Nations, 1997: 10-11).

Furthermore, the peace agreement outlined political and citizenship reform as post-conflict priorities, and various international organizations sought to aid the effort of attaining a balanced power

sharing arrangement between the constituent parts of Bosnia. As one of the most politically intricate parts of the agreement, these provisions required extensive consultation and incentivization on the part of the international community. By leveraging access to EU funds and prospects for future membership, the European Commission has managed to speed up the implementation of more inclusive power sharing arrangements in Bosnia. Some of these programs and provisions have resulted in increased political awareness, while others have had limited effects on federal power-arrangements (Hodžić and Mraović, 2015:430). Even as issues pertaining to equitable minority representation remain, the ability of the EU to leverage reconstruction funds and access to membership helped maintain the post-Dayton peace (Bell, 2018).

The costs and benefits provided by active IOs, as well as the prospects for future integration into the European Union were incentives that well-surpassed the short-term benefits promised by the US mediators. For Yugoslavia, the potential benefit of eventual EU membership, as well as the relief from continued costs incurred by military action and economic sanctions were strong motivating factors in ending violence and maintaining peace (Greenberg, Barton & McGuinness, 1999). For Bosnian Muslims and Croats long-term peace meant securing a partnership with the United States, enhancing their prospects for EU and NATO membership, and maintaining access to financial resources through the IMF and the World Bank. Active IO representatives were in continual communication with officials from all sides to the conflict, both during the negotiations and once peace was reached. IOs carefully crafted plans for post-agreement cooperation while negotiations were in progress, which gave them significant influence over the disputants in the post-agreement environment.

Summary

The Bosnian conflict was uniquely challenging for mediators and international organizations alike. Burg and Shoup (1999: 191) note that “the war in Bosnia was being waged by actors who for the most part had neither the inclination nor the experience to make concessions for the sake of peace”. In turn, this meant that mediators and IOs had to use leverage to expand the bargaining environment of disputants in order to

make peace a possibility. Holbrooke's directive mediation proved useful in bringing the warring sides to the negotiating table. As detailed above, Holbrooke's team used a variety of sticks and carrots to impose a settlement. Mediation also coincided with the activities of peace-seeking IOs which added pressure on the disputants to end fighting and sign a peace deal. Like in many other instances of mediation, the successful conclusion of negotiations at Dayton was by no means the end of conflict anxieties. Various IOs continued their close involvement with the warring sides and introduced important incentives for maintaining peace. Ultimately, it was the synergy between the directive American mediation and the active IO involvement that produced the Dayton Agreement and the peace that ensued (Touval, 2002).

Section 7: Conclusion

This study seeks to examine the joint effects of two prevalent conflict management actors- mediators and international organizations - on mediation success and outcome durability. Independently, both third-parties are extensively studied in the literature, but limited research is dedicated to studying their joint impact. I propose that mediators and international organizations make complementary contributions to conflict management, the former through manipulating disputants into making concessions, and the latter through providing supplemental weight to the negotiations and ensuring implementation of agreements. Evidence from interstate wars between 1945 and 2003 and the Bosnian war suggests that conflict management efforts rarely occur in vacuum. Failing to account for the joint effects of mediators and IOs on conflict resolution could potentially create large gaps in our understanding of conflict management dynamics.

My results indicate that leverage plays an important role in managing interstate wars. Mediators with leverage promote the conclusion of wars by extending sticks and carrots to disputing parties. These inducements transform the disputants' bargaining environments and makes them more likely to sign peace agreements. IOs that engage with disputants while negotiations are in progress are likely to support peace efforts by extending their own resources toward peace-pursuing missions. In effect, disputants are likely to

receive an expanded pool of peace incentives compared to situations when only one type of actor gets involved in managing the conflict. Following the logic of Wilkenfeld et al. (2005), this means that when mediators and IOs participate in resolving the same conflict, they create a broader zone of agreement within which peace is possible. Through statistical examination of ICM data I find that conflicts that experience both mediation and active IO involvement are significantly more likely to be successfully mediated.

Signing an agreement, however, is no guarantee that lasting peace will ensue, especially because mediated truces are self-enforcing. Due to the costliness of mediation and a lack of institutionalized mechanisms, mediators often fail to provide disputants with implementation assistance. Here, the role of IOs is of further importance for the peace process, because IOs possess significant resources and institutional mechanisms that can aid the disputants' implementation efforts. IOs generally stay engaged with disputants longer compared to mediators, and their involvement is likely to keep disputing states on the path to peace. IO leverage can undermine some of the adverse effects of directive mediators, such as its propensity for short-lived agreements, by expanding the incentives for disputants to credibly commit to peace in the long-term. Here, a statistical analysis of IMC data supports the prediction that directive mediation applied simultaneously with IO involvement in conflict resolution processes will contribute to lasting peace. The empirical findings are robust across tests, to the inclusion of various control variables, and to more restrictive coding of the dependent variables.

For conflict resolution research, this study emphasizes the importance of studying the activities of active third-parties jointly. Examining the main conflict management actors in the context of the same dispute is of great importance, considering the propensity of various actors to engage in managing conflicts simultaneously. This study adds to recent research (see Lundgren, 2017; Tir and Karreth, 2018; Karreth, 2018) which points to the ability of IOs to serve as effective peace promoters. In addition, my results address a concern raised by Beardsley (2011) about the propensity of directive mediation to create unstable peace. The findings in my paper suggest that directive mediation does not necessarily lead to short-term agreements, but that it can contribute to lasting peace when used in conjunction with active IO involvement.

Additionally, this paper made an initial effort to address Frazier and Dixon (2009: 401), who write that one untested proposition is that conflict managers “sanctioned by IGOs may be more likely to foster an environment leading to a negotiated settlement more so than ad hoc coalitions without IGO support”.

Further empirical testing is in order, especially to better address potential selection effects. In this paper⁸ I made an initial effort to address selection issues by including a two-stage Heckman test which showed no evidence that selection effects are at play. However, other issues remain. For one, IOs do not engage in conflicts randomly, and a multitude of factors contribute to whether IOs get involved in conflict management or not (Gartner 2011). Lundgren (2017: 615) talks of a lack of convincing variables to support exclusion restriction, and his findings indicate that IOs have a slight tendency to select more challenging cases. Mediation research suffers from the similar issues, as mediators tend to be highly selective about the cases they engage with. Bercovitch and Diehl (1997) and Bercovitch and Jackson (1997) find that mediators are ten times more likely to mediate complex international military confrontations compared with less violent disputes. Terris and Maoz (2005) describe how mediators’ willingness to engage in conflict management is highly dependent on the integrity and strategic interests of the mediators. It is essential for further testing to reveal if conflict managers follow a “pattern of mediation in the thorniest conflict situations” (Melin and Svensson 2009: 252-53). Testing for selection effects should reveal a more randomized sample of conflicts for researchers to look at. One potential way to address selection effects related to mediation onset would be to follow Crescenzi et al. (2011) and Melin et al. (2013). These studies expand the pool of potential mediators by adding prospective regional and major power mediators in order to address selection concerns. Chen (2019: 156) explains that adding states in the same region of the dispute and major powers as potential mediators eliminates selection effects “associated with not including the unobservable cases”. Although the statistical challenges associated with disentangling selection effects are formidable, this worthy undertaking can add additional credence to the findings about mediators and IOs in this paper.

⁸ See Table A3 in the Appendix for the Heckman output

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Appendix

Table A1⁹: Mediation Success and The Process of Mediation

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Directive*IO involvement		1.320** (0.529)		1.007* (0.568)
Procedural*IO involvement		-1.137* (0.596)		-1.226* (0.658)
Directive mediation	0.314 (0.252)	-0.431 (0.382)	0.334 (0.275)	-0.243 (0.409)
IO involvement	0.266 (0.222)	0.074 (0.343)	0.324 (0.252)	0.235 (0.377)
Procedural mediation	0.943** (0.288)	1.609*** (0.429)	0.665** (0.322)	1.424** (0.487)
Regional dyad			0.623 (0.600)	0.533 (0.595)
Similar powers			0.122 (0.244)	0.174 (0.249)
Aligned			-0.539* (0.299)	-0.534* (0.305)
Friendly			-0.296 (1.170)	-0.027 (1.182)
Past success			1.089*** (0.246)	1.005*** (0.252)
Mediator links			0.374 (0.357)	0.239 (0.376)
Major power			-0.977** (0.394)	-1.011** (0.401)
cons	-0.767*** (0.187)	-0.693*** (0.210)	-0.696 (0.602)	-0.524 (0.614)
No. of Obs.	358	358	343	344
R-Squared	0.0380	0.0830	0.1399	0.1709

Robust standard error in parenthesis. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .00$

⁹ The coding of mediator strategies follows Beardsley et al. (2006: 72), where dummy variables directive, procedural and communication-facilitation capture mediation styles.

Table A2¹⁰: Effects of the Process of Mediation on Outcome Durability

	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>	<i>Model 9</i>	<i>Model 10</i>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Directive*IO involvement		3.097** (0.990)	3.188** (1.081)	2.849** (1.179)
Procedural*IO involvement		0.142 (0.973)	-0.786 (1.163)	-0.933 (1.294)
Directive	0.193 (0.447)	-1.769** (0.777)	-2.051** (0.841)	-1.836** (0.892)
Procedural	0.790* (0.466)	0.821 (0.667)	1.772** (0.884)	2.106** (0.985)
IO involvement	-0.279 (0.390)	-1.240** (0.616)	-1.241* (0.697)	-0.904 (0.745)
Antagonistic			1.082** (0.455)	0.638 (0.577)
Leadership change			-0.328 (0.545)	0.004 (0.660)
Aligned			0.527 (0.517)	1.114* (0.617)
1956-65				-0.814 (1.009)
1966-75				-2.010** (0.891)
1976-85				-1.651* (1.002)
1986-95				-2.051** (1.043)
cons	0.424 (0.321)	0.788** (0.381)	0.002 (0.621)	0.972 (0.915)
No. of Obs.	135	135	127	127
R-Squared	0.0272	0.1198	0.2033	0.2515

¹⁰ The coding of mediator strategies follows Beardsley et al. (2006: 72), where dummy variables directive, procedural and communication-facilitation capture mediation styles.

Table A3¹¹: Heckman two-stage test

<i>Stage 1: Mediation onset</i>	
Mediator links	0.168 (0.209)
Previous success	0.723*** (0.176)
Democratic mediator	-0.564*** (0.131)
Superpower	0.453** (0.210)
Regional dyad	0.517* (0.271)
Similar powers	0.247 (0.151)
cons	-0.211 (0.278)
<i>Stage 2: Mediation success</i>	
Directive mediation	-0.102 (0.076)
IO involvement	0.016 (0.064)
Directive * IO involvement	0.246** (0.106)
Similar powers	0.048 (0.054)
Regional dyad	0.042 (0.129)
Mediator links	0.122 (0.075)
Previous success	0.322*** (0.066)
cons	0.109 (0.178)
mills	
lambda	0.251 (0.177)
No. of Obs.	434
No. of Obs. without mediation onset	1.111

¹¹ Outside of mediation, Bercovitch (2004) also identifies bilateral negotiation, arbitration, adjudication, referral to IOs and multilateral conferences as potential conflict management approaches. In turn, this allows me to test for selection cases by examining the effects that influence selection into mediation (stage 1), and drawing a sample from stage 1 to examine the effects on mediation success (Stage 2).

Table A4: correlation matrix for Table 1 variables

	directive	ioinvolve	regional	similar	aligned	friendly	previous
directive	1.0000						
ioinvolve	0.1267	1.0000					
regional	0.0543	-0.0132	1.0000				
similar	-0.0787	0.2219	0.1278	1.0000			
aligned	0.0657	0.0332	0.4161	-0.0107	1.0000		
friendly	-0.0343	-0.0458	0.0231	0.0545	0.0895	1.0000	
previous	0.0205	0.1135	0.0256	0.0459	0.0624	-0.0089	1.0000
mediator	-0.0511	-0.2371	0.0108	0.0091	-0.0594	-0.0446	0.0377
superpower	-0.0056	0.0431	0.2140	0.0441	0.3446	-0.1002	-0.0552
		mediator	superpower				
mediator	1.0000						
superpower	0.0297	1.0000					

Table A5: correlation matrix for Table 3 & 4 variables

	directive	ioinvolvement	antagonistic	leadership	aligned
directive	1.0000				
ioinvolvement	0.1267	1.0000			
antagonistic	0.0329	0.1561	1.0000		
leadership	-0.0069	0.0698	0.2276	1.0000	
aligned	0.0657	0.0332	-0.2481	0.1640	1.0000

Table A6: International Organizations involved in Conflict Management

Organisation	Name and Origin
UN	<i>United Nations</i> - global
AL	<i>Arab League</i> - regional, Middle East, North Africa
EU	<i>European Union</i> - regional, Europe
OAS	<i>Organisation of American States</i> - regional, Central and South America
OAU	<i>Organisation of African Unity</i> - regional, Pan African
OSCE/CSCE	<i>Organisation/Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe</i> - regional, Pan European (from Vancouver to Vladisvostok), Northern Hemisphere
ASEAN	<i>Association of South East Asian Nations</i> - regional, Southeast Asia
NATO	<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</i> - regional, linking security of North America to Europe
OIC	<i>Organisation of the Islamic Conference</i> - global, linking Muslim peoples and states globally
Commonwealth	<i>The Commonwealth (British)</i> - global, linking former colonies of the British Empire
ECOWAS (ECOMOG)	<i>Economic Community of West African States</i> -
IAC	<i>International Arbitration Commission</i> -
IGAD	<i>Intergovernmental Agreement on Development</i> -
Carter Centre	<i>Carter Centre</i> -
Amnesty International	<i>Amnesty International</i> -
IMF	<i>International Monetary Fund</i> -
World Bank	<i>World Bank</i> -
SADC	
CIS	<i>Commonwealth of Independent States</i>
ICRC/IFRCs	<i>The Red Cross</i> - global, independent of governments and international and regional organisations: The international committee of the red cross and The federation of red cross and red crescent societies.
The Church	global - <i>The Vatican</i> - government of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope, Papal nuncios, envoys, emissaries, Cardinals etc. - <i>WCC - The World Council of Churches</i> : global, linking diverse Christian churches, groups, and missions - Other Church organisations/officials, Archbishops, Bishops, etc.

Table A5 is taken from Bercovitch 2004: 194-195), and shows all IOs contained in the ICM.

Table A7: Number of IOs per observed mediation instance

Total IO count per mediation attempt	Freq.	%
0	211	14.51
1	695	47.81
2	342	23.52
3	184	12.65
4	22	1.51

Figure A1: Predicted Probability for Mediation Success by number of IOs




Figure A1 shows the predicted probability for mediation success corresponding to the number of IOs involved in the management process.