

HOW PLACES SHAPE PARTISANSHIP

by

JEFFREY LYONS

B.S., University of Idaho, 2008

M.A., University of Colorado, 2010

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science

2014

This thesis entitled:
How Places Shape Partisanship
written by Jeffrey Lyons
has been approved for the Department of Political Science

Jennifer Wolak

Anand E. Sokhey

E. Scott Adler

Jennifer Fitzgerald

Leaf Van Boven

Date: _____

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards
Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.

IRB protocol # 11-0606

Lyons, Jeffrey (Ph.D., Political Science)

How Places Shape Partisanship

Thesis directed by Associate Professor Jennifer Wolak

Arguments that Americans are becoming increasingly polarized – ideologically and geographically – have become prevalent. The divide between red states and blue states is widening, and this is problematic for a country whose political system depends on compromise. What processes are driving this change? My dissertation explores how the places that we live and the social influences that they supply change our attitudes. Using long-term panel data with contextual identifiers as well as an original data collection from the Fall 2012 election season, I address how social pressures bring our views in line with those who surround us, and how social forces generate homogenizing pressures that can lead to more polarized places. Specifically, I address four questions: What happens when environments change? Which kinds of political contexts are most influential for the citizens who live in them? Which kinds of people are influenced and what are the individual-level mechanisms of environmental influence? And what happens when the social pressures supplied by places collide – or reinforce – other socializing agents encountered by the individual? In sum, the evidence supplied in response to these questions offers a picture of the citizen as being (in part) a product of their social surroundings and the influences supplied by place. Over all four chapters, consistent and compelling evidence emerges that individual party affiliation is formed and maintained by the environments we reside in. While it is not the case for all people, or all places, the modal condition amongst the electorate is some level of place-based partisanship. This offers a view of the citizenry as being more socially rooted than many accounts allow. It also suggests both a potential cause, and consequence, of the deepening of red and blue America. If people are a product of place and when they move to a

new location, have a tendency to adopt the views of those around them, this is likely one mechanism through which spatial polarization is proliferated. The consequence of this pattern is that increasingly homogenous partisan environments are even more likely to exert influence, furthering the pattern of place-based partisanship, and geographic polarization.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a great deal to the members of my dissertation committee for all of their work and effort, not just in the writing of this dissertation, but for the amount of time put in by all of them over the past six years of my graduate education. There is no way possible to express my level of gratitude, or the magnitude of support that I received in this acknowledgements section, but I want to very briefly recognize some of the people who I owe a great deal to. Jennifer Wolak has given an immense amount of time and energy to teaching and mentoring me – reading countless iterations of every manuscript I have written, giving very detailed feedback, helping to design experiments, offering guidance about a range of topics, coauthoring with me, giving encouragement when needed, and criticism when it was deserved. And lots of baked goods to keep me going. Anand Sokhey has also dedicated a huge amount of time to helping me with the writing of this dissertation, and with teaching and mentoring me over the course of my graduate career – giving valuable and extensive feedback, involving me as a coauthor with a number of research projects that I have learned a great deal from, offering copious amounts of guidance and support about the dissertation and much more, and for always being available no matter what I needed. Scott Adler has been a very valuable and formative influence – giving feedback on a number of projects, being a motivating force, and always making time available to try and help me with my research and anything else that would help me to be successful. Jennifer Fitzgerald has offered a great deal of comment and input in my research over the past five years – her suggestions from my Master’s thesis defense in part led to several of the chapters here, and she has always gone out of her way to support me and offer advice. Other people who have offered helpful feedback which is much appreciated and was quite important in the writing of this

dissertation are Leaf Van Boven, Kenneth Bickers, Amy Liu, Jeffrey Harden, Scott McClurg, Dan Hopkins, William Jaeger, Joshua Kennedy, Michael Burch, Joshua Ryan, Scott Minkoff, and Lauren LeBoeuf.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	The Mobile Partisan: How New Environments Socialize Citizens.....	10
III.	Which Contexts Impart Influence? Perceptions vs. Reality.....	37
IV.	Who is Influenced by Their Context? How Personality and Discussion Networks Moderate Contextual Influence.....	63
V.	What Happens When Social Pressures Collide? The Formative Role of Political Environments.....	104
VI.	Conclusion.....	134

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	142
-------------------	-----

APPENDIX

A.	Chapter 2 – Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in Models.....	155
B.	Chapter 2 – Appendix B: Improvements in Balance.....	156
C.	Chapter 2 – Appendix C: Extent to Which Sorting and Selections Appears to be Occurring.....	157
D.	Chapter 4 – Appendix A: Replication of Models and Figures Using County Context.....	159
E.	Chapter 4 – Appendix B: A Discussion of Engodeneity.....	171

TABLES

Table	
Chapter 2 – Table 1	24
Chapter 2 – Table 2.....	27
Chapter 2 – Table 3.....	30
Chapter 3 – Table 1.....	50
Chapter 3 – Table 2.....	52
Chapter 3 – Table 3.....	56
Chapter 3 – Table 4.....	58
Chapter 4 – Table 1.....	79
Chapter 4 – Table 2.....	81
Chapter 4 – Table 3.....	83
Chapter 4 – Table 4.....	89
Chapter 5 – Table 1.....	116
Chapter 5 – Table 2.....	119
Chapter 5 – Table 3.....	125
Chapter 5 – Table 4.....	129
Chapter 2 Appendix A – Table 1A.....	155
Chapter 2 Appendix B – Table 1B.....	156
Chapter 2 Appendix C – Table 1C.....	158
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Table 1A.....	159
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Table 2A.....	160
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Table 3A.....	161

Chapter 4 Appendix A – Table 4A.....	162
Chapter 4 Appendix B – Table 1B.....	172

FIGURES

Figure	
Chapter 2 – Figure 1	32
Chapter 2 – Figure 2	33
Chapter 3 – Figure 1	53
Chapter 3 – Figure 2	54
Chapter 4 – Figure 1	82
Chapter 4 – Figure 2	85
Chapter 4 – Figure 3	91
Chapter 4 – Figure 4	94
Chapter 4 – Figure 5	96
Chapter 4 – Figure 6	98
Chapter 4 – Figure 7	100
Chapter 5 – Figure 1	122
Chapter 5 – Figure 1	126
Chapter 5 – Figure 1	130
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Figure 1A	164
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Figure 2A	165
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Figure 3A	166
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Figure 4A	167
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Figure 5A	168
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Figure 6A	169
Chapter 4 Appendix A – Figure 7A	170

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Depictions of red and blue America have become commonplace in popular and academic discussions of the political landscape. Red and blue states have come to represent not just election results, but also a clash of cultures, ideas, and norms. The popular argument is that there are two Americas – red and blue – and that they are geographically distinct. Places have taken on a political meaning, and political content. While some argue that this geographically defined clash between two worldviews has been overstated (e.g. Fiorina 2005), the evidence that the electorate is clustering into like-minded locales is mounting (Bishop 2008; Myers 2012). Politics and places appear to be increasingly linked. On average, red states are becoming more Republican, and blue states more Democratic.

Communities are increasingly homogenous, and exposure to dissimilar views less frequent, meaning that tolerance and an ability to compromise are becoming more limited.

The pattern we observe is somewhat puzzling as current theories of partisanship struggle to account for these trends. On the one hand, at the individual-level, partisanship is set early in life through social processes and remains relatively unchanged over time. This understanding struggles to account for these trends because it does not leave much room for individual level change that would explain the deepening geographic divides between partisans. On the other hand, theories of macro partisanship (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989) and retrospective candidate evaluations (Fiorina 1981) allow for change in partisanship in response to performance. However, these factors act as a barometer where favor for one party and disfavor for the other should rise and fall in unison. This means that Democrats should become uniformly favorable or unfavorable across the nation, not increasingly favorable in Illinois, and increasingly unfavorable in Louisiana simultaneously. How do we understand this increasingly prevalent macro phenomenon of geographic polarization with

our understanding of the citizen, and what effect do such places with a distinct political flavor have on the people who live there?

This dissertation explores the consequences of red and blue America, and the politics of places, on the citizens who live there. The notion that individuals' political attitudes and behaviors are influenced by their surroundings has been offered for over half a decade (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Lane 1962; MacKuen and Brown 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2002, 2006; Beck 2002, Beck et al. 2002). Evidence persists that environments are consequential in shaping partisanship (Brown 1988; Campbell et al. 1960; Lyons 2011; MacDonald and Franko 2008), attitudes and political perspectives (Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; MacKuen and Brown 1987), and behaviors such as turnout (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Gimpel, Dyck, and Shaw 2004). Some environments expose the individual to more diverse views than others and can impart more influence as a result (Mutz and Mondak 2006). Citizens in the political minority are less likely to turnout (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, McClurg 2006), discuss politics less frequently (Mutz 2006), and are more likely to vote across party lines or change their partisanship altogether (Campbell et al. 1960; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Lyons 2011).

Mechanisms have been suggested for the ways in which environments influence citizens. For some micro-environments such as the family, socialization processes impart influence on the individual (Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Neimi 1968; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007) through the transmission of information, norms, and values. For macro-environments such as communities, many have suggested that direct discussion is the primary mechanism through which environments influence their residents either by acting as a conduit through which the aggregate political preferences of a locale are transmitted to the individual (e.g. Granovetter 1973; Kenny 1998; Huckfeldt et al. 1995), or by allowing the

individual to surround him or herself with like minded peers and resist environmental pressures (Finifter 1974; Huckfeldt et al. 1995). However, reception of informal cues that are observed by the individual combined with a desire to conform have also been offered as ways in which contexts shape citizens (Burt 1987; Wald, Owen and Hill 1988).

While the predominant emphasis is that people are connected to and influenced by those around them, a tension arises in light of both long-standing and more recent schools of thought in the discipline. The “Michigan School” of political behavior, pioneered by Campbell et al. (1960) with the use of large nationally represented surveys to study citizens has long emphasized the individual in relative isolation. Recent research, while not building explicitly upon the Michigan approach, have taken a similar tact and with similar implications. The notion that people are set on a political trajectory which persists relatively unchanged as a result of early socialization throughout one’s life is well established (Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Neimi 1968; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). Recently, many have added personality (Gerber et al. 2010; Schwartz, Vittorio, and Vecchione 2010; Carney et al. 2008; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010) and genetics (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Hatemi et al. 2009; Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009; Hatemi et al. 2010) as other factors which are constant within individuals over time, and act as instrumental in shaping citizens attitudes and behaviors. Yet, the degree to which these static factors are malleable and can be influenced by extra-individual forces remains to be seen.

The other dominant tradition in the study of political behavior that has gotten somewhat less attention in part due to a focus on ego-centric surveys as the primary means of inquiry, is the “Columbia School” developed from the work of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954). The central proposition of this line of thinking is that the individual is not atomized, and although characteristics within individuals are consequential, so are the

characteristics of those surrounding the individual. Many of the assertions regarding environmental effects that have been discussed employ this approach (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; MacKuen and Brown; Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Beck 2002; Beck et al. 2002; McClurg 2006). Collectively, these scholars assert that in order to understand the individual, one needs to understand the individuals around them.

These two traditions are not mutually exclusive and have operated side by side for decades. However, a relatively unexplored tension persists between the two. What happens when Michigan meets Columbia? Specifically, what happens to predisposed individuals who change environments, or are met with strong environmental pressures? Are individuals relatively static and impervious to change as the Michigan approach would suggest, or do environments shape even the most inert of attitudes and behaviors? Beyond these differing perspectives about citizens, there are also questions about the links between political people and political places. Which environments are capable of exerting an influence? What happens when environments change? If political contexts exert a causal influence on the citizen, a change in environment should produce a change in the outcome of interest. Surely, not all individuals are equally subject to contextual pressures, so who becomes a product of their surroundings and who does not? How does contextual influence interact with other socially supplied pressure – and what happens when these forces collide?

I explore these questions over the next four chapters, seeking to build a more complete picture of the effects of the places where we spend our daily lives on the political orientation of citizens – speaking to broader tensions about citizen attitude formation and maintenance along the way. In order to speak to these issues, two primary sources of data are used in this dissertation. Several of the questions pertain to environmental change and citizen mobility, as well as the maintenance of attitudes throughout the lifecycle in response to contextual pressures. These require long-term panel data which is able to assess changes over

large amounts of time within individuals, and have the ability to observe the same people in different environments. For these questions I use the Youth-Parent Socialization Study which is arguably the only such data source that is publically available to researchers focusing on the American electorate. I have received access to the contextual identifiers for this survey, which allow me to place people in their counties of residence for three of the four survey waves. This allows for the assessment of contextual effects within the same individuals over time and over different environments. Further, this data source contains a rich battery of measures pertaining to early socialized influences from adolescence, which allows for the assessment of the how these early social forces maintain or erode over time in response to environmentally supplied social pressures.

The other set of questions pertaining to individual and environmental mechanisms of influence have a different set of data requirements. What is needed here is host of measures of individual traits such as personality, potential social mechanisms such as discussion network batteries, as well as varying levels of environments. This combination of measures does not exist in any of the publically available surveys of the American electorate, so an original data collections was conducted during the Fall 2012 election season in conjunction with several researchers at the University of Colorado. The survey is nationally representative, and has two waves allowing for the assessment of changes over the course of the campaign in response to contextual pressures. Included are detailed discussion network batteries, measures of individual personality traits, as well contextual identifiers at multiple levels and individual perceptions of these environments. Collectively, this survey provides a unique opportunity to explore mechanisms of contextual influence that are limited in the extant data.

A skeptical perspective of contextual influence exists which argues that any association that we observe between places and people are likely to be either a product of

other processes than causation, or are of such a small magnitude as to be largely inconsequential. While explicitly parsing out causality is nearly impossible for questions of environmental influence since we cannot conduct an experiment with random assignment, it is still possible to leverage other data structures which can be suggestive of causal inference. In particular, time and movement across different environments offer an opportunity to use the individual as her own counterfactual and observe a given person under two environmental conditions. Using people who move and observing changes that may occur has been offered as perhaps the best way in which to evaluate the role that political environments play in forming and changing attitudes (King 1996).

In Chapter 2 I use the Youth-Parent Socialization Study to assess environmental effects across different contexts over the life cycle. The findings offer a view of the partisan as being in part contextually formed. People who move to a new environment change their partisanship in the direction of their new context over time. As we would expect with a social influence mechanism, the change that occurs is slow and does not appear at first, but after having resided in a county for roughly 9-10 years the effect emerges and the place begins to move partisanship. When places change, people adjust their partisanship in the direction of the new surroundings. While not conclusive evidence of causality, this approach offers suggestive evidence that contexts are formative in shaping party affiliation, and that social processes are responsible for this influence.

The question that is raised from these findings becomes which environments are able to influence citizens? In Chapter 3, I look at whether places appear to exert and influence on individual partisanship, and if so, what kinds of places do so. Using the original data collection from the Fall 2012 election season that is uniquely situated to address the role of different kinds of environments, I find compelling evidence that places can foster change in individual party affiliation. Specifically, those who live in the partisan minority at both the

state and county level are more likely to change their party affiliation over the course of an election season than those who live in the partisan majority. However, not all contexts exert pressures to stabilize or destabilize. To uproot party affiliations and produce instability, an environment needs to favor the out-party by roughly 20% in presidential vote share. That is, a place where Democratic candidates win by more than 20 points will result in instability for Republicans, but a Democratic margin of 10 points will not produce this effect. Further, I explore how environmental perceptions play into partisan stability, finding that perceptions are inherently biased and as a result they do not produce a destabilizing effect. This appears to be in part a product of the projection of individual extremity onto those around them.

What these two chapters demonstrate is that it appears places can shape partisanship. The questions that are raised now pertain to mechanisms and conditionality. Surely not all individuals are influenced equally by their political surroundings. A common anecdotal criticism to research on the effects of political context is that many people point to their continued residence in a partisan minority community and note that it has not influenced their attitudes. This highlights a broader problem in research on contexts which is a limited understanding of who is influenced and under what conditions. Understanding this conditionality is useful for exploring the mechanisms of influence.

In Chapter 4 I test how both individual characteristics in the form of personality traits as well as discussion network composition interact to produce a citizen who is influenced by their surroundings, or not. Beyond the descriptive question of understanding who is influenced and who is not, this speaks to a theoretical tension about whether all citizens are subject to social influence, or whether intra-individual predispositions determine openness to influence. I find that contextual influence is dependent upon both the individual's discussion network as well as their personality traits. For environments to be of consequence, discussion networks cannot be entirely agreeable with the individual. Such networks create a buffer

against the surrounding context. However, when environmentally supplied influence does reach the citizen, personality traits appear to takeover and determine who is subject to their pressures and who resists them. For some personality traits, all that is required for environmental influence is a discussion network which is not a perfect buffer. For others however, the network is largely inconsequential and no matter how much contextual influence they are exposed to, they resist influence. To understand when contexts matter and when they do not, we have to understand both individual predispositions as well as social buffers.

In exploring contextual influence, the primary mechanism that we have explored has been social in nature – interactions between individuals resulting in the exchange of information, values, and norms. However, much of the literature on socialization focuses on influences from the family and schools early in life, and the trajectory that these pressures send people on over the course of their lives. Critics have pointed out that the weakness of this socialization approach to explaining political behavior is that socialization delivered early in life forms a constant over the remainder of the life cycle, and struggles to explain changes that occur in adulthood. Chapter 5 explores what happens when contextually supplied social pressures collides with the social influences that were delivered to the citizen early in adolescence. I find that when social pressures later in life reinforce the early socializing influences that individuals received – i.e. an individual who was raised with Republican parents and resides in a Republican political environments later in life – the effect of the early pressures persist on individual party identification. However, when later social pressures challenge early social influence – the individual raised with Republican parents but resides in a Democratic community – the persistence of early socialization is negated. The results in this chapter demonstrate what happens when social influences collide, as well as offer a way in which to explain changes in behaviors or attitudes with socialization. By extending our

understanding of socialization beyond the household and formative years to broader social environments which are encountered throughout life, we gain a more complete understanding of how social forces shape political citizens.

Cumulatively, the findings presented in this dissertation paint a picture of the partisan citizen as being in part a product of place. The social influences that are geographically proximate to us – friends, co-workers, and neighbors – exert a pull on the partisanship of the individual. When we are surrounded by like-minded influences in our communities and places of residence, party affiliation is reinforced and stabilized. However, when we encounter disagreement from our surroundings, it appears that this out-group status results in a destabilized and more malleable party affiliation. While I demonstrate limits on these contextual effects, both in terms of who is influenced, under what circumstances, and in what contexts, it appears that the modal condition amongst the American electorate is a citizen who is (in part) a product of place. The suggestion which follows from these results is that places exert pressures to homogenize – especially places that already have a decided partisan leaning. Given recent discussions about the increasing levels of polarization, both ideologically and geographically, these pressures to conform are noteworthy. As counties and towns become increasingly homogenous (e.g. Myers 2012), more of the American landscape than ever before falls into the category of places which exert influences on the partisan. What the results from this dissertation suggest is that these patterns may be fueled, and likely will be perpetuated by, the ability of places to pull their citizens political attitudes in line with those around them. Millions of Americans move every year, and when these citizens arrive in their new communities, they are more likely than ever to encounter a homogenous environment. These homogenous places are the very kind that are most likely to be coercive and influence their citizens. With this in mind, it may be the case that spatial polarization – and the lack of political competitiveness that comes with it – is here to stay.

CHAPTER 2: THE MOBILE PARTISAN: HOW NEW ENVIRONMENTS SOCIALIZ CITIZENS

What is causing the increasing amount of geographic polarization amongst the electorate? Some have pointed to the mobile citizenry, arguing that people are “sorting” into increasingly homogenous environments. While this argument likely holds merit, less attention has been given to the other side of the moving equation – what happens to citizens after they move? I explore this question using long term panel data testing whether the places we live change individual partisanship upon arrival. First, I use matching to show that political environments can exert socializing influences on citizens independent of the selection issues that arise from arguments of geographic sorting. Second, when people move and arrive in a new location, they are socialized over time and change their party identification in the direction of those around them. The findings speak to both the individual-level mechanisms of geographic polarization, as well as broader questions about the degree to which citizens are a product of their social surroundings.

It is no secret to observers of American politics that places – towns, counties, states, and regions – contain their own unique politics. Residents of Maryland, Maine, and Washington passed measures allowing same-sex marriage in 2012, while residents of North Carolina voted to do the opposite. Marijuana was legalized for recreational use in Colorado and Washington, but struck down for medical use in Arkansas. This variation has received much attention from those who argue that a geographic divide is creating a “red and blue” America, where places have very distinct and increasingly homogenous partisan compositions (Bishop 2008; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2011; Myers Forthcoming; though see Abrams and Fiorina 2012). The takeaway here is that political attitudes and ideologies are geographically clustered. The average citizen of Montgomery, Alabama feels very differently about politics than the average citizen of Eugene, Oregon.

The fact that places have unique political compositions, and attitudes are geographically clustered is often taken for granted, yet we have little understanding of why this is the case. Demographics vary by region, and can explain some differences, but they struggle to account for much of this variation. In some ways this geographic pattern is

puzzling. Certainly local interests exist, but many issues are national in scope. The media is increasingly concentrated and focused on national issues where the citizen of Montgomery and Eugene receive the same information. Knowledge of national politics and issues is typically much greater than that of local or state issues, and we know that individual attitudes are responsive in great degree to national conditions and party performance. Why do we observe these unique geographic clusters of political attitudes given that many forces are national in nature and should be experienced equally by all?

One of the more promising explanations of this geographic clustering is citizen mobility. In a typical year, roughly 15% of the population moves according to the US Census Bureau. Over time, this results in a substantial reshuffling of the electorate. Some have argued that these moves may be driving such patterns as citizens “sort” into like-minded communities and environments that provide them with greater attitudinal congruence (Bishop 2008; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2011). However, the other side of the coin – the consequence of these moves for citizens’ attitudes – remains less understood. When people move their social ties and influences are disrupted and (potentially) replaced with new sets of influence. If environments are increasingly homogenous it stands to reason that they are able to supply the new arrival with a steady stream of information and influences that can serve to conform individual attitudes to their new settings. In sum, moving has two potential mechanisms through which it can foster these broader patterns of geographic clustering: sorting and socialization. I explore the second, seeking to understand what the consequences of mobility are for citizens, and the extent to which environments are able to conform and homogenize new arrivals.

I use the Youth-Parent Socialization Study to test the ways in which moving influences the partisanship of citizens. With four waves over a 32 year time period I am able to follow people as they move from one political environment to another, and assess how

their partisanship responds to these changes. I find that when environments change, citizen attitudes follow suit. This provides evidence that individuals adapt to their new surroundings upon arrival. When people move, there is gradual but persistent change that takes place over time, where individual partisanship moves in the direction of the new environment. Further, I offer suggestive evidence that these environmental effects are not simply a product of environmental selection or sorting, but they represent an independent socializing influence.

Several implications follow. First, mobility and social influence interact with one another. The argument that people are sorting into new environments has received much attention in recent years, but the question of what happens to people after these moves take place has received relatively scant consideration. When discussing geographic clustering and polarization, the changes that happen within new arrivals appear to be a fruitful avenue for explaining these patterns. Second, it speaks to the consequences of homogenous and politically uncompetitive locales for the citizenry. Lamented by many for being potentially deleterious to the health of the democracy (e.g. Mayhew 1974; Bishop 2008), decreased competition may actually be good for citizens – increasing their satisfaction with the process of elections and outcomes of democracy (Brunell 2008). The suggestion offered here is that these environments where citizens are most pleased with democracy are also the more coercive. People in the partisan majority experience little in the way of diverse viewpoints or alternative perspectives, maintaining and reinforcing their priors. However, new arrivals in the minority experience a great deal of pressure. They are surrounded by and exposed to divergent opinions daily, and in the end, they appear to succumb to these pressures on some level. Whether this is a normatively pleasing outcome depends on how one values the relative merits of citizen satisfaction vs. exposure to dissimilar perspectives.

The Atomized and (Relatively) Static Citizen

“...consider two voters. Both are conservative, poor, white men who identify with the Republican Party, prefer more defense spending and insist that the federal government

balance the budget immediately. They are each afraid that someone will take their guns away, hope to end welfare as anyone knows it, and think Rush Limbaugh should be president. The only difference is that, after being raised as twins in Utah, they were separated. One moved to Lancaster County, Pennsylvania amidst many other voters like himself. The other settled in Brookline, Massachusetts, with Michael Dukakis and many other Liberal Democrats.

Now suppose Bill Clinton runs for re-election against Phil Gramm in 1996. Both voters would obviously vote for Graham. Academics know this with a reasonable degree of certainty from extensive research in political science, political geography and related fields. Politicians know this from district surveys, studying precinct election returns and talking with constituents. This might not have been so obvious without the last hundred years of quantitative and qualitative scholarly research, but it is plainly obvious today. But how much does context matter? How long did the context of liberal Brookline, Massachusetts cause the second voter to consider voting Democrat? To be more precise, how much did the probability of voting Republican differ between the two voters? The answer is pretty clear from the scholarly literature: not much.” (King 1996: 160)

This quote highlights two things. First, it demonstrates skepticism of the extent to which political contexts are able to shape and influence the core attitudes and behaviors of the citizen given the importance of within-individual factors. Second, it shows the utility of using moving as a tool to understand the degree to which citizens are a product of their environments, or not. Unlike in traditional studies of contextual influence where we hold the environment constant and look across individuals, using movers allows the individual to be held constant and the environment to be varied. As King (1996) suggests, this provides a more stringent test of contextual influence.

The “Michigan school” of political behavior has long asserted a relatively (though certainly not entirely) atomized view of citizens which is congruent with the account provided above where attitudes are largely a product of individual characteristics such as demographics, candidate or party evaluations, and national circumstances (Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Given that these factors are relatively fixed, this perspective accounts for change largely as individual responses to changing national circumstances and changing party fortunes (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewit 1981; Erikson and MacKuen 1989).

Taken collectively, the assertion from these widely accepted views of the citizen actually suggest that the changes in social influence and pressure that occur when one environment is replaced by another should not be particularly meaningful. If people are predisposed by traits, set on a (relatively) immovable course from early in life, and only influenced by external forces when they are responding to national conditions, then the distribution of opinions and preferences that surround them on a daily basis are not likely to be compelling.

How then can we explain the aggregate clustering that we observe in the electorate with this egocentric view? The most likely mechanism from this view appears to be a sorting process whereby individuals are driven by internal desires for attitudinal congruence and purposively relocate to places that reinforce their preferences. While this perspective offers ample reason to doubt that environmental transitions impart significant influence, a different view of citizens and their attitudinal foundations suggests otherwise.

The Political Consequences of Citizen Mobility

Do individuals sort into environments using political considerations as cues? There are long standing arguments that citizens “vote with their feet” and relocate using economic considerations as a factor when deciding where to reside (e.g. Tiebout 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Hirschman 1970; Teske et al. 1993). However, evidence of selection into communities and locales based upon the aggregate partisanship of its residents or explicitly political considerations is less apparent. Although not definitively established by prior research the possibility is certainly not out of the question and has been raised by some (Bishop 2008; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui Forthcoming; McDonald 2011; though see Glaser and Ward 2006). Bishop (2008) asserts that in recent decades Americans have been sorting themselves geographically into more like minded communities creating more homogenous and polarized political environments. While this argument is compelling, counterevidence

exists (Glaeser and Ward 2006; Abrams and Fiorina 2012), and many of the claims remain untested. Others find that sorting does appear to be occurring, but note that it is likely not an explicitly political process, but rather that politics and factors that individuals do select on such as housing and neighborhood preferences are correlated (Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui Forthcoming).

What happens to the mover upon arrival in their new environment has received less attention than the sorting story, somewhat surprisingly. The evidence that has been presented is suggestive of a socialization story (Brown 1981, 1988; Gimpel 1999; MacDonald and Franko 2008), but many questions remain. The most thorough treatment of the question has been at the aggregate level, looking at what happens to aggregate outcomes in places that receive large numbers of migrants (Gimpel 1999). While very useful for understanding how places change, aggregate analyses leave unanswered questions about what happens to the people who are moving. Others have asked this question at the individual level, finding some evidence that state political environments can alter the partisanship of those who move (MacDonald and Franko 2008; Brown 1988).

However, much variation exists within states – i.e. Lubbock, Texas provides a fundamentally different set of social pressures than College Station, Texas. By looking at lower levels of contextual aggregation such as the county, day to day social pressures can be better isolated. From a theoretical perspective, testing at a lower level of aggregation can be informative because there are two possible mechanisms through which contexts could change individual partisanship following a move. The first is an identity story whereby the recent arrival to Texas identifies with her new state and aligns her perspectives, including her political attitudes, with her new identity. The MacDonald and Franko (2008) analysis at the state-level is well suited to test this possibility.

However, given the great degree of geographic political diversity within most states, testing of the second theoretical possibility – that attitudinal change is a product of day to day social pressures – is better done at a unit of aggregation that accounts for within-state diversity. Using the county as a unit of analysis captures the stark differences in daily social interactions that take place between Austin and Lubbock, and allows for a much more precise measurement of social influences. Since few (if any) create a salient individual identity at the county level, evidence of partisan change upon arrival in a new county is suggestive of a social influence story as opposed to the identity story that could be taking place when looking at the state. Of course, the identity and social influence stories are not mutually exclusive and it could be the case that both are at play, but testing at a lower level of contextual analysis is informative.

Other questions exist pertaining to the ways that a change in environment can shape partisanship. We know relatively little about how the socialization process influences the citizen over time. Is it an immediate effect, or does it take time for the citizen to conform to his or her environment? Given the discussion about sorting, is there an independent socializing effect of the new environment, or is selection driving the results we observe for those who move?

Political Environments and Mobile Citizens

Given atomized and individualistic view of the citizen presented earlier, why would we expect that environments and social influence matter at all? A different perspective of the citizen emerges from the ‘Columbia School’ – emphasizing extra-individual factors rather than those within citizens (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). The argument forwarded by this line of thinking is that understanding the political attitudes of individuals requires an understanding of the social influences that are imparted on them. Where the Michigan perspective placed a great deal of emphasis on the partisanship and attitudes of the

individual for understanding political behavior, the Columbia school offers the argument that two citizens' beliefs are interrelated, and the distribution of individual preferences that surrounds the citizen is quite consequential. It presents a more malleable view of the person, suggesting that the citizen is a product of those around them. When these surrounding influences change, presumably so does the individual. This presumption – largely untested – is the focus of this paper. When change occurs, which perspective of the citizen holds: atomized and stable, or malleable and socially constructed? Before discussing what happens to those who move, we need to establish that environments can socialize their residents. There is ample reason to suspect that they can.

The political contexts that surround individuals on a daily basis provide a range of influences that impart conforming pressures. First, broader contexts supply discussion partners (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). These discussion partners transmit a range of social influences. The people whom we discuss politics with can influence vote choice (Beck 2002; Beck et al. 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995) and shape attitudes about government, parties, and candidates (MacKuen and Brown 1987; Huckfeldt, Sprague, and Lavine 2000). While some individuals may be able to insulate themselves from these contextually supplied discussion partners (Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Finifter 1974), it is quite difficult for most to do (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). For many, an environment provides discussion partners who impart influence to the individual.

Consider a resident of Boston, Massachusetts. In the 2008 Presidential Election, Barack Obama took 77% of the vote in Suffolk County (Boston). A citizen of Suffolk County has roughly a 3 in 4 chance of encountering an Obama voter in their day to day lives. Whether it is a neighbor, coworker, or someone encountered at the grocery store, conversation and influence is overwhelmingly likely to come from a Democratic source. Beyond explicit conversation, norms are communicated to people through informal cues

(Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Driving around Suffolk County during an election season likely yields an overwhelming majority of pro-Democratic yard signs and bumper stickers. There is a cumulative effect of these influences. Over time, people are likely to be socialized, much as they are in youth by their parents (Jennings and Niemi 1968). This process results in citizens who come to look more like their environments. Two identical individuals, one who lives in a Democratic environment and the other who lives in a Republican environment will have different partisanship. Despite their similarities, the resident of Boston will be more Democratic than his or her counterpart in Kansas.

H₁: Comparing two similar individuals, the resident of a Democratic environment will take on a more Democratic partisanship than a similar resident of a Republican environment.

The implication for spatial polarization is that environments exert pressures to conform at the individual level and homogenize in the aggregate. But, what happens to new arrivals? Are they influenced by the surrounding environments in the same fashion that long-term residents are? Or do they resist and maintain their priors? The central issue here is what happens when change is imparted upon the individual. The Michigan School of thought, focused on individual traits and characteristics would lead us to believe that these shifts should be largely inconsequential. The Columbia School offers a different prognosis.

Moving represents potentially the most sweeping form of change in environmental influence that the individual encounters, at least for those who make moves out of their old communities or states. Such moves have the potential to disrupt and alter the foundations of all the forms of social influence that the Columbia scholars focused upon. They alter who the individual encounters at work and church, at the coffee shop or grocery store, and at community functions. They may be moving away from family, or moving to be closer to family, either way altering the kinds of interpersonal interactions that are had on a regular basis. One set of influences is abruptly replaced with another. The nature of this change can

be varied. For those who move from a Democratic community to another Democratic community, the people surrounding them will be different, but the message will be the same. However, for those moving from a Democratic community to a Republican one, both the people and the message change. Democratic influence is removed and replaced with Republican influence.

This change in social context produces more than just a (potential) change in sources of influence, it also triggers a basic human desire – the need to fit in. Arrival in new environments can be straining. Some have asserted that these moves are among the most stressful events that people engage in, ranking comparably with a breakup or affair, drug and alcohol problems, or substantial declines in income (Spurgeon, Jackson, and Beach 2001). Why such stress? In part, this is due to the dislocation of familiar ties, and the need to establish new ones. This level of anxiety underscores the importance of being accepted by peers and fitting in. One way to do this is to assimilate. Above and beyond the direct influence that comes from discussion with those in the new environment and the cues that contexts provide, this desire for acceptance and to forge relationships should lead the citizen to alter beliefs and adopt the norms of their new surroundings. Surely not all individuals experience such a desire for acceptance and need to establish new relationships, but the level of stress that moves induce for many suggests that this is the modal response.

H₂: When individuals move to a more Republican environment, their partisanship should change and become more Republican.

While the change in influence that comes with a move is likely to be quite abrupt, this does not mean that the individual response is likely to be quite as sudden. Because environmental socialization is a cumulative process which takes time to impart influence on the individual, it stands to reason that there will be a gradual adoption of norms and values upon entry into a new environment. The new arrival to an environment will likely retain many of their previous beliefs, attitudes, and sources of influences. They will maintain

contact with friends and family from their prior location, and not establish immediate relationships with neighbors and coworkers. Those who are relocated to a context which challenges their beliefs may attempt to insulate themselves with congruent networks and social ties (Finifter 1974). However, this is likely to be a difficult endeavor. Perceptions of others' opinions are skewed for those in the minority as they tend to overestimate the extent to which they are a minority, and the pervasiveness of this apparent disparity between the individual and his or her environment allows influence to be imparted despite insulating attempts (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Of course, not all will find themselves in an environment that challenges their beliefs. For these individuals we may expect a reinforcement of beliefs as they are surrounded by a homogenous and agreeable group, and may even become more extreme in their partisanship (Sunstein 2005).

As the citizen spends an increasing amount of time in the community, it should be increasingly difficult to insulate from the distribution of the opinions surrounding them, and to maintain prior attitudes and beliefs. By engaging in any number of non-political acts that people do frequently – attending a neighborhood barbeque, going to happy hour with coworkers, participating in the PTA or a neighborhood association, relationships will be forged, and influence can be conveyed. This story of gradual community socialization following arrival is very similar to what we know occurs to immigrants from foreign countries who arrive in the United States.

Environments gradually socialize new immigrants to participate in politics (Tam Cho 1999; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001), and more importantly for the theory here – influence their partisanship (Wong 2000). Whether and how immigrants from foreign countries are naturalized upon arrival has been the focus of much research (Yang 1994; Marrow 2005), and it seems that unless the immigrant is able to surround themselves to a large extent by other immigrants, many naturalize and begin to

assimilate (Jones-Correa 2001). While the degree of change experienced by an immigrant from a foreign country to the United States is likely to be more dramatic than that of someone who changes residences within the country, that does not mean that the domestic mover is not experiencing a similar “naturalization.” It is likely the case that immigrants from foreign countries face larger hurdles to socialization due to language and cultural barriers than domestic movers, but the fact that they do socialize suggests that we should expect the same in cases where the barriers are lower, such as those for domestic movers.

H₃: The effects of changing environments will be lower for those who have recently moved than for those who have resided in their environment for a longer period of time.

H₄: As the individual resides in their new community for an extended period of time, the correlation between the environment and individual partisanship becomes stronger than it is for new arrivals.

Data and Results

Because we need to observe what happens when people move, panel data is necessary. As discussed, the socialization process upon arrival in a new environment is likely one of accumulated effects which take time to impart influence on the citizen. For this reason, I use the Youth-Parent Socialization Study, which follows high school seniors who were interviewed in 1965 over three additional waves in 1973, 1982, and 1997. Because of the length of time between interviews (up to 15 years), we can assess the long term consequences of changing in environment. Chapter 2 – Appendix A provides descriptive statistics for a number of important covariates in order to illustrate distributions and give a better feel for the nature of the raw data.

Measuring political environments is done at the county level for the Youth-Parent Socialization Study.¹ Using the county as a unit of analysis has a long tradition in the study

¹ I have requested the restricted data file for the Youth-Parent Socialization Study which contains the ZIP code identifiers for the respondents at each wave of the survey. I use the ZIP codes to place

of contextual influence (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Miller 1956; Putnam 1966; Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Chinni and Gimpel 2010; Lyons 2011). The strength of using counties as a unit of contextual analysis is that they capture much of the individual's day to day social interaction. Most (though certainly not all) of us reside, work, and spend our day in one county. Using the state as a unit of analysis misses the variation that exists between San Francisco and Bakersfield, California, but county measures capture these differences. Using more micro-units such as neighborhoods are able to assess geographical nuances, but they also may miss a great deal of the social interaction that takes place as we may interact very little on a daily basis with neighbors.

This is not to suggest that counties do not have drawbacks as units of analysis. There can still be much variation within some counties such that one citizen's social reality is quite removed from the distribution of opinions in the county. Further, counties are units that often mean nothing to the citizens who reside in them. That is, few people think about or recognize the county of their residence as a meaningful unit. However, the theory presented here is not one of identity – where an individual identifying with their county is necessary – but rather a story of social influence where we are interested in capturing the distribution of social preferences that citizens encounter in daily life. To this end, the county serves as a useful, if imperfect, unit of analysis.

To create the measures, I use presidential vote share from the most recent election prior to the survey wave. I subtract the Democratic candidate's vote percentage from the Republican candidate's percentage. This is effectively a measure of the Republican

respondents in counties. Where ZIP codes cross county lines I use the primary county of residence, which is established using the percentage of the ZIP that falls within each county from Melissadata.com. The 1973 wave of the survey does not have county identifiers in the restricted data file, so this wave is dropped from the analysis.

candidate's two party vote share. Negative values represent Democratic environments, and positive values represent Republican environments.²

The dependent variable is the individual's partisanship on a seven point scale from strong Democrat to strong Republican. I include measures of the mother and father's partisanship from the respondent's youth, the expectation being that the more Republican the parents were, the more Republican the respondent is. I also include measures of education, the expectation being that the more educated will be more Democratic, a dichotomous variable for race, where I expect Whites to be more Republican than non-whites, and a measure of gender where I expect males to be more Republican than females.

Table 1 explores whether a correlation exists between the partisanship of places, and the partisan of their residents. This is a necessary – though certainly not sufficient – condition for environments to socialize the partisanship of citizens.

² For example, a county where the Republican candidate received 60% of the vote and the Democratic candidate received 35% would have a value of 25, while a county where the Democratic candidate got 60% of the vote and the Republican candidate got 35 would be -25.

Table 1: Association between County and Individual Partisanship

	Youth-Parent Socialization Study		
	1965	1982	1997
Republican Context	.002 (.002)	.020* (.004)	.018* (.003)
Mother's Partisanship (Youth)	.317* (.035)	.107* (.046)	.032 (.047)
Father's Partisanship (Youth)	.361* (.034)	.182* (.045)	.198* (.046)
Education	-----	-.062 (.064)	-.114+ (.066)
Race (White=1)	.074 (.201)	1.18* (.261)	1.56* (.281)
Gender (Male=1)	.160 (.104)	.300* (.139)	.550* (.140)
Political Knowledge	-.036 (.036)	-.008 (.056)	-.000 (.059)
Constant	.841* (.230)	.836* (.301)	1.02* (.309)
N	656	578	697
R-Squared	.55	.24	.21

Notes: $p^* < .05$, $p+ < .1$

We see that in the 1982 and 1997 waves of the Youth-Parent Socialization Study, there is a strong association between county and individual partisanship. However, this relationship is not present in the 1965 wave. This is likely explained by the fact that all of the respondents were 18 years old and still living with their parents, insulating them from the social pressures supplied by their broader context (e.g. Huckfeldt et al. 1995). The magnitude of the association between county environment and individual partisanship is fairly substantial in the 1982 and 1997 waves. Across the full range of the Republican county partisanship variable, the expected value of individual partisanship moves 2.63 points on a seven points scale in the Republican direction. Similarly, in the 1997 wave we observe a 2.37 point shift across the full range of the county partisanship variable.

The other variables across the models perform much as expected. The partisanship of the respondents' parents from youth is a strong predictor of individual partisanship, especially

early in life. When the respondent is still residing at home with the parent in the 1965 wave, across the full range of mother's partisanship we see a 2.2 point shift and for the father's party identification a 2.5 point change in respondent party identification is created. This effect diminishes over time with a .74 point shift across the full range of mother's partisanship in the 1982 wave, and no effect in the 1997 wave, and a 1.3 point effect of the father's partisanship in 1982, and a 1.4 point effect in the 1997 wave. These results conform to our understanding of the formative role of early socialization processes for the shaping individual partisanship over the life cycle (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Sears and Funk 1999).

The results for education are negative as expected in both the 1982 and 1997 waves, but only significant at the $p < .1$ level in 1997. The race measure also performs as expected in the latter waves with whites being 1.2 points more Republican in 1982, and 1.6 points more Republican than non-whites in 1997. And finally, males are roughly half a point more Republican than females in the 1997 wave of the Youth-Parent Socialization Study, and about .3 points more Republican in the 1982 wave. There was no significant effect of political knowledge. What does this tell us? It demonstrates that individuals who reside in Republican counties are more Republican than individuals who reside in Democratic counties, controlling for a set of covariates.

However, there are a host of inferential challenges that are presented with this analysis for concluding that environments have socialized these citizens. Selection effects are the first of these challenges. If sorting is taking place as many suggest (Bishop 2008; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013; McDonald 2011), then people are choosing where to live based upon the political characteristics of their new location. See Chapter 2 – Appendix C for testing of the extent to which sorting is occurring amongst respondents in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study. Sorting presents an inferential problem for asserting that environments are socializing citizens because the citizens who choose to reside in either a Democratic or

Republican environment are fundamentally different from one another. What this means is that any correlation between citizen preferences and environmental characteristics could be a function of selection, and not influence. To help address this challenge I employ a matching technique to help reduce model dependence. While not a perfect solution when we cannot be certain that we have selection on observables (see Sekhon 2009 for an illustration of this shortcoming), matching likely helps to reduce these problems and is used in similar applications to test questions of social influence when selection into congruent social environments is a strong possibility (see Sinclair 2012).

I use coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012) through the MatchIt program in R (Ho et al. 2011). Coarsened exact matching prunes the data, removing observations until balance on pre-treatment covariates is achieved. Because this process results in decreasing the number of observations, a concern is that so many observations are removed as to make inference in a regression model challenging. To address this, I use multiple imputation through the Amelia II program in R (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2012) which uses a bootstrapping algorithm to estimate missing values in the data, and reflects uncertainty about the missing data by creating multiple datasets with different values for the imputed values. By first imputing the missing values for each of the cross-sections, and then matching to achieve balance, I am able to maximize the number of observations in the final data set. Because Table 1 demonstrated an association between individual and county-level partisanship for only the 1982 and 1997 waves, I focus the following models on these two survey waves. For both the 1982 and 1997 waves, the imputation process creates 5 imputed datasets, or 10 total. I then use coarsened exact matching to create balance within all 10 of these imputed datasets.

I view environments as being treatment conditions. One can receive either a Republican treatment, or a Democratic treatment. I take the continuous measure of

environmental partisanship described above and dichotomize it so that there are Republican or Democratic environments. Achieving balance between these two conditions means that the dataset is trimmed to find respondents in each treatment condition are very similar on a number of pretreatment covariates. For the Youth-Parent Socialization Study, the covariates that I balance on are mother and father’s partisanship, education, income, political knowledge, race, and gender. This creates a dataset where respondents who are in a Democratic environment are compared to respondents who are nearly identical on all of these covariates, but are located in a Republican environment. Doing so allows for better inferences to be drawn about the socializing effects of environments, given that selection is a very real possibility. See Chapter 2 – Appendix B for L₁ balance statistics that demonstrate the improvement in balance as a result of matching.

Table 2: Association Between County and Individual Partisanship with Balanced Data

	1982	1997
Republican Context (Dichotomous)	.907* (.430)	.656+ (.394)
Mother’s Partisanship (Youth)	.591 (.390)	.108 (.551)
Father’s Partisanship (Youth)	-.157 (.351)	.102 (.551)
Education	-.138 (.303)	.207 (1.27)
Income	.072 (.073)	.005 (.168)
Race (White=1)	.489 (.984)	1.19 (1.49)
Gender (Male=1)	-.190 (.577)	.484 (.652)
Political Knowledge	.056 (.236)	.208 (.288)
Constant	-.259 (1.42)	-.085 (2.16)
N	79-98	96-110
R-Square	.29-.32	.10-.18

Notes: p* < .05, p+ < .1. Because the models are combining five imputed datasets using Zelig, there is a range in the N and R-squared across the five models. This range is reported.

Because there are 10 imputed datasets, 5 for each of the cross-sections, I use Zelig to combine the imputed datasets and produce coefficient estimates using all 5 (Imai, King, and Lau 2013). These combined results from the imputed and matched datasets are presented in Table 2. We see evidence that there is a correlation between the political environment that people reside in and their partisanship, minimizing potential selection effects in the balanced dataset. Comparing people who are nearly identical on the partisanship of their parents from youth, as well as their education, income, political knowledge, race, and gender, but reside in different contexts, we see that residing in a Republican environment moves the individual almost an entire point in a Republican direction in the 1982 wave, and over half a point on the seven point scale of party identification in the 1997 wave. This effect is likely much greater for those who are in more homogenous Republican environments and weaker in those which barely lean Republican, but we lose this variation by necessity when creating the dichotomous treatment variable. Achieving significance is impressive both because of the balance in the data, as well as the low number of observations that are present in these models due to the pruning of units. The other variables in the models are insignificant as we would expect in a dataset that has been balanced after being pre-processed by the matching procedure.

In sum, these models with the balanced datasets demonstrate that minimizing the potential selection effects (sorting) into Democratic or Republican environments, there is an effect of the environment on the partisanship of the individual. Put differently, two citizens who are nearly identical in terms of their early parental socialization, education, income, political knowledge, race, and gender, but who reside in different contexts – one in a Democratic environment and one in a Republican environment, have different party identifications. Those who are surrounded on a daily basis by Republicans are more Republican than their nearly identical counterpart in a Democratic context. Even if sorting is

occurring, there appears to be a consistent independent influence of the political environment. This provides evidence to support Hypothesis 1. With this influence in mind, the next question becomes what happens when these environments change? That is, when environments change do citizens alter their attitudes in response?

To explore this question I use change score panel models, which are ideal for two-wave panel analysis because estimates are unbiased by heterogeneity that is unobserved in variables which are constant over time between individuals (Johnson 2005). This produces the best estimates of the effects of a treatment occurring (in this case, moving) between survey waves. To estimate the change score models I subtract the wave 1 values of the time varying variables from the wave 2 values to create a change score. The dependent variable becomes the change in party identification between waves, and the primary independent variable of interest is the change in political environment between waves. Change in environment can come in two forms; an individual remaining in one place and the environment changing around them, or the citizen moving to a new environment. To account for these different kinds of change I use a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent moved out of state between the 1982 and 1997 survey waves, as well as a length of residence measure, and interact these with the differenced political environment variable.³ What these change score models offer is an exploration of whether changing environments result in changing partisanship, and if so, how quickly these influences are imparted to the mobile citizen.⁴

³ 17% of the sample moved out of state between 1982 and 1997 in the dichotomous moving variable that is interacted with the differenced political environment variable.

⁴ The change score panel models presented in Table 3 do not use the matched datasets that were used in Table 2. Because there is not one “treatment” between survey waves – i.e. there are people who stayed in the same place and their environment remained constant around them, people who stayed in the same place but the environment changed around them, people who moved but to a very similar kind of place, and people who moved to very different kinds of places, a matching approach is not suitable.

Table 3 shows the results of three change score panel models.

Table 3: Change Score Panel Model of Changing Environments and Changing Party ID
Youth-Parent Socialization Study
 1982-1997

Δ Republican Context	.009*	.014*	-.002
	(.003)	(.004)	(.006)
Moved	-----	-.225	-----
		(.166)	
Length of Time in Community	-----	-----	.031*
			(.012)
Δ Republican Context X Moved	-----	-.012*	-----
		(.006)	
Δ Republican Context X Length of Time	-----	-----	.001*
			(.001)
Δ Education	-.112	-.100	-.161
	(.124)	(.124)	(.135)
Δ Spouse's PID	.266*	.266*	.262*
	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)
Δ Marriage Status	-.828*	-.822*	-.825*
	(.154)	(.154)	(.155)
Constant	.221*	.306*	-.119
	(.072)	(.085)	(.161)
N	832	832	801
R-Squared	.11	.12	.12

Notes: p* < .05.


Because we do not have the county codes from the 1973 wave of the Youth-Parent Socialization Study and are unable to determine what kind of environmental change occurred as a result, only the 1982-1997 panel is used. The first model explores whether a change in political environment between wave 1 and wave 2 results in a change in partisanship over the same time period. We find that a change in Republican context between waves produces a positive and significant change in the partisanship of the respondent. When environments change and become Republican, individual partisanship follows suit. The largest magnitude shift in environmental change that we see in the dataset, -88, produces an expected .8 shift in the respondent's partisanship towards the Democratic party.

However, this change in environment measure applies for both those who have moved and those who have not. Everyone experiences a change in how Democratic or Republican their context is since the partisan nature of environments as measured by presidential vote share changes over time. Put differently, environmental change is experienced by those who stay in the same place and the environment changes around them, as well as those who move and have a more explicit form of change. It is likely that what is primarily being picked up here is a macropartisanship (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989) story whereby the nation becomes more liberal or conservative over time in response to national trends which is reflected in both the measures of aggregate context as well as individual partisanship.

We also see that other changes in social influence and life transitions also produces a change in partisanship. When spouses change partisanship, the respondents also appear to experience a change. A spouse that becomes more Republican is correlated with the respondent also becoming more Republican. A spouse who moves from being a strong Democrat to a strong Republican is correlated with a 1.9 point shift in a Republican direction for the respondent. We also find that life transitions, in this case a change in marital status, can produce changes in partisanship as the respondent is either detached from the spousal influences we just discussed, or becomes subject to them. The results suggest that those who become married become more Democratic by roughly .8 points.

The important finding from the first model is that when environments change, party identification changes with it. To test what kind of environmental change produces changing partisanship – people staying in one place and environments changing around them or people moving from one environment to another – I interact the changing environment measure with measures of whether the individual moved, as well as a length in time variable accounting for when they moved (if they did at all) between waves.


Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of changing environments on changing partisanship.



We see that for those who move, there is no effect of changing environments on changing partisanship. This is consistent with the argument I have made that socialization is an accumulated process, and environments do not begin to socialize citizens immediately upon entry. What this suggests is that changing environments are most influential when the individual remains in the same location, and the environment changes around them, rather than moving and experiencing a sudden change in influence. This offers suggestive evidence for Hypothesis 3. However, what the dichotomous moving variable misses is the variation in the length of residence for those who have moved. Individuals who move in 1983 and 1996 are observationally equivalent. What this misses is that there might be an effect of changing

environments for those who move after a certain length of time in the new context, consistent with the notion that environments take time to socialize new arrivals.

Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of changing environments across values of length of residence in the community.



This figure reveals the same pattern regarding environmental socialization. For people who have relocated and resided in their new community for less than nine years, there is no effect of the environmental change on their partisanship. However, those who have resided in the new location for more than nine years do have an effect as the environment begins to socialize them and impart influence which result in a change in partisanship. Those who move do change their partisanship in response to the new surroundings that they find

themselves in, but it takes time – roughly nine years in this case – for these changes to begin to take place, consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 4.

In sum, the findings presented here offer a number of suggestions about how mobile citizens and changing political environments influence the individual. First, I demonstrated that attempting to address any sorting that may be taking place, there appears to be a socializing effect of these political environments on the citizens who reside within them. If we compare two very similar individuals, both of whom had strong Republican parents, Bachelor's degrees, were white and male, moderately knowledgeable about politics and made \$55,000 per year, but one lives in Boston, MA and the other lives in Cheyenne, WY, we find that the influences exerted by living in Boston make that citizen more Democratic and the influences exerted by Cheyenne make the other more Republican. But what happens when these two individuals change places – the resident of Boston moves to Cheyenne and vice versa? The results presented here suggest that this change in environment does not result in an immediate shift in individual partisanship. Over time however, the influences supplied by both Boston and Cheyenne begin to influence the citizen. It may take nearly a decade, but eventually the new resident to Cheyenne will become more Republican, and the new resident to Boston will become more Democratic.

Discussion and Conclusion

Holding the individual constant and varying the context provides a powerful means to assess the degree to which we are constrained by our surroundings, or are unaffected by them. The results presented here stand in opposition to conclusions drawn from skeptical accounts of the degree to which “context matters.” Despite the power of internal traits, predispositions, and attitudes, a change in environment appears to foster a change in the citizen. Looking at those who change environments represents a unique opportunity to test these different views of the individual because of the sweeping nature of change that occurs,

but the conclusions can likely be extended to smaller social changes that occur, whether it is a marriage or divorce, a change in jobs, or even new friends. These more nuanced alterations warrant testing of their own, but the findings presented here suggest that we may expect these more frequent life experiences to also foster partisan dynamics.

Further, the evidence presented here provides an understanding for how individual decisions on where to live can influence aggregate patterns of geographic polarization. While many argue that these patterns are a product of a sorting process, and I do not argue otherwise, what I have shown here is what happens to people after they have made the decision on where to live is producing changes at the individual level that can also foster aggregate geographic polarization. This is a story of both choice and constraint, and how these two factors influence the partisan. Others have focused primarily on the choice side, with some evidence emerging that people prefer to live in places surrounded by their co-partisans. However, I have argued that environmentally supplied constraint is perhaps equally consequential. Upon arrival in their new environment, individuals are constrained by the social influences provided by their context, applying a cumulative influence over time that pressures the mover. Accounting for the selection effects that are likely present from sorting, there is an independent socialization effect of political contexts. And most importantly, when these contexts change, so do partisans.

The story about mobility and socialization presented here is not without shortcomings, and raises some further questions. First, I do not explicitly test geographic polarization, as it is not the goal of this paper. The focus here is on one of the hypothesized routes to this phenomenon, which is the mobile citizen. While the arguments presented here about movers certainly informs the broader discussion, it is beyond the scope of this paper to test the macro consequences of moving. Second, surely not all respond to environmental change in the same fashion. The results presented here suggest that, on average, citizens socialize and conform

to the partisanship in their surroundings over time. However, there are likely to be others who do not. Some citizens, whether due to their ability to insulate themselves from contextual influence, or due to a certain trait, may actually shift their attitudes in the opposite direction of the influences being supplied by their surroundings. Addressing these heterogeneous responses to shifts in environmental influence is instructive for understanding the conditions under which socialization occurs, or does not.

CHAPTER 3: WHICH CONTEXTS IMPART INFLUENCE? PERCEPTIONS VS. REALITY

Much attention has been paid to the deepening of red and blue America in recent years, with many pointing to increasing geographic polarization. What consequences does the partisan character of a place have on the citizens who reside there? I explore whether these red and blue environments have implications for the partisanship of their citizens - specifically whether living in the partisan minority has consequences for the stability of citizens' partisanship. Using data collected during the 2012 election season, I test whether environments can exert these destabilizing influences, and if so, which kinds of environments are capable of doing so. The results suggest that the places where we live do exert pressures on individual partisanship. At both the county and state level, individuals in the partisan minority exhibit significantly more partisan change over the course of the election season than those in the partisan majority. I then explore which environments are able to influence partisan stability, finding that it takes a certain degree of partisan homogeneity to be consequential. Somewhat surprisingly, it is the objective partisan composition of places that matters most for party affiliation, while perceptions of environments are not influential. I explore one possible explanation for this. This individual tendency to destabilize when challenged has the potential to be one mechanism through which geographic polarization is produced.

While much attention has been paid to polarization in Congress and (potentially) in the attitudes of the citizenry, evidence is emerging that our day to day lives may also be increasingly polarized. Specifically, the places where we live - our communities, counties, and states - are becoming more politically divergent (e.g. Bishop 2008; Myers Forthcoming). The people around us may be more similar, and exposure to heterogeneous perspectives increasingly scarce. How did this come to be? Clearly, there is some interaction between people and the places they call home that is driving such a pattern, but the nature of this interaction remains an open question.

It may be the case that one such interaction between people and places which can be a contributing factor is that our communities are coercive. That is, the social settings we reside in and are exposed to daily supply a set of influences which destabilize and change the political identities of their citizens. Moreover, these coercive effects may be felt by some, while others are unaffected or have their beliefs reinforced. If individuals in

the partisan minority (i.e. the Republican in a largely Democratic town) are pressured and more likely to change their political affiliation than those in the partisan majority, it suggests that the places we live exert continuous pressures to homogenize. Those in the majority are reinforced and stabilized, while those in the minority are challenged and destabilized.

I explore the consequences of reinforcing and challenging environments for the partisan stability of their citizens, hypothesizing that the places we live drive the degree to which we exhibit consistent or destabilized party identification. This question has the potential to shed light on one possible mechanism through which geographic polarization is produced. In doing so, I also speak to a continuing source of debate about how contexts influence citizens by testing multiple levels of context and varying degrees of environmental homogeneity, as well as whether citizen perceptions of their environments are consequential.

Using original data collected during the Fall 2012 election season which is uniquely suited to questions of social and contextual influence, I test the degree to which the places we live either stabilize or destabilize individual partisanship. The results provide support for the idea that partisan stability is in part a function of where a person lives and who they are surrounded by. Citizens in the partisan minority have significantly more instability in their party identification than those in the majority. However, not all environments exert these pressures equally. Heterogeneous locales do not appear to impart any influence at all, but as places become increasingly homogenous the amount of influence increases.

The Stability of Partisanship

Individual party identification has received much attention for its formative role in determining the vote choice of citizens (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al.

2008), and for its enduring nature over time compared to other political attitudes held by the individual. Despite this relative stability, partisanship is not entirely static. Rather, evidence that party identification is malleable under certain circumstances is increasingly prevalent (Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 1998; Gerber and Green 1998; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Keele and Wolak 2006). Over a 15 year period, roughly 33% of young adults in one survey switched from one party to another and stability on a seven point scale of partisanship is experienced by less than 10% of the sample (Rice and Hilton 1996). Many of the explanations of partisan instability center on factors such as changing candidate evaluations (Brody and Rothenberg 1988), conflicting values (Keele and Wolak 2006), and evolving issues (Layman and Carsey 2002; Carsey and Layman 2006). What is surprisingly absent from many of these accounts of partisan change and instability is a focus on what we know to be the foundation of partisan development - social forces.

Partisanship has its roots in early socialization processes. The transmission of party identification from parents to children appears to be the primary way in which partisan attitudes are formed (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Langton 1969; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009), and once established this partisan identity tends to persist into adulthood (Sears and Funk 1999). The family is not the only source of formative influence early in life. Schools become important contexts for political socialization (Campbell 2006), as are the peer groups and the friendship networks that school environments supply (Campbell 1980; Settle, Bond, and Levitt 2011). Given that partisanship is largely a product of social forces, it stands to reason that certain social influences are able to foster stability as well as instability.

Perhaps part of the reason for the focus on non-social influence for fostering partisan instability is because socialization has largely been viewed as a static pressure. That is, an individual is socialized early in life from the family and once they leave the

home, socialization has been largely completed and thus represents a constant over time. While this may be true, social influence does not end with adolescence. What changes is the source of such influence - it is shifted from parents and schools, to communities and workplaces. Could these places exert their own social pressures, potentially uprooting partisanship and causing instability?

Political Environments and Partisan Instability

One could argue that two political environments exist – the political composition of a place as it actually exists, and the political composition of a place as seen by a citizen. The first is rooted in objective reality. How many Democrats and how many Republicans live in a given place? What is the partisan balance of one’s daily social interactions? The second is rooted in how people filter and interpret this reality. Do people accurately perceive their partisan standing in the community? What role does a perception of partisan balance play?

Reason exists to suspect that neither matter. Politics appear to be increasingly national in scope. The news media is concentrated and focuses largely on national issues, diminishing awareness of local and state politics (e.g. Kaplan, Goldstein, and Hale 2005). Campaigns have become more nationalized, with national issues and mood often taking precedence over local circumstance. While all politics may have been local at some point in the recent past, the local is arguably taking a back seat to the national. With this in mind, it may be the case that local factors – political contexts included – are less formative than we may otherwise expect. So why should we expect place to matter? Why should a citizen of Seattle be different from a similar citizen of Lubbock?

Objective Contexts

The political environments where we reside stand to exert considerable pressures (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; MacKuen and Brown 1987; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) that extend over the entire life cycle. Can these

socializing agents impart instability to the partisan? There is reason to believe so. If we take the view that socialization is the “acquisition of prevailing norms” and “political learning whatsoever, whether of conformity or deviance, and at any stage in the life cycle” (Greenstein 1970: 971-972) then environments seem aptly situated to provide such influence.

The places where we spend our day to day lives have unique aggregate characteristics. In the aggregate, Seattle, Washington has a unique distribution of political views that shape the messages, influences, and norms that are presented to the resident on a daily basis. The same can be said for Wichita, Kansas, or Dayton, Ohio. Environments supply people with a host of agents through which norms are conveyed and information is communicated. Consider this individual residing in Seattle, Washington. In the 2008 presidential election, the county that Seattle is located in (King County) had 70% of its voters cast a ballot for Barack Obama. A resident of King County who is going about her daily life, whether it is chatting with co-workers at a happy hour, visiting with other parents at her child’s soccer game, or simply driving to the grocery store and observing bumper stickers and yard signs is more than twice as likely to randomly encounter Democrats than Republicans. It becomes quite clear what the norm in the environment is, and who the in and out-groups are. Democratic information and perspectives are conveyed not just in overtly political discussions where our citizen is much more likely to hear about Barack Obama’s merits, and John McCain’s shortcomings but in less explicit venues where people comment on school board or PTA decisions, converse about the behaviors of their co-workers, or talk about current events. These are socializing influences.

But how do they influence partisan stability? One way is the fashion in which they interact with the citizen’s current partisanship: either by reinforcing it or challenging it.

When individuals are confronted with disagreeable information that challenges their priors, they may become more ambivalent (Mutz 2006; Huckfeldt, Morehouse, and Osborn 2004) as they are unable to resolve the tension between their perspective and that of their counterpart, potentially inducing instability (Lavine 2001). Consider our citizen living in Seattle. If she identifies as a Democrat, the environment surrounding her on a daily basis provides largely reinforcing stimuli. When conversations regarding politics or current events arise, she is likely to hear opinions and perspectives agreeing with and fortifying her priors. There is little concern of speaking out and voicing her opinions since her beliefs conform with the surrounding norms. For this citizen, her current partisanship is buttressed on a nearly daily basis from a host of socialized sources. This should produce a more stable party identification. However, what if our hypothetical citizen was a Republican? In this case, the environment challenges her current partisanship. When those surrounding her speak about elections, politics, or current events, they typically are supplying dissonant information. Voicing a Republican identification can be socially costly, placing the citizen in the out-group resulting in uncomfortable relations. When confronted with these pressures on a daily basis, the expectation is that challenging environmentally supplied social influences will chip away at her partisanship, inducing instability.

H₁: Individuals who reside in a place that challenges their partisanship will change party identification more than those who reside in a place that reinforces their partisanship.

H₂: More homogenous environments will exert more influence on individual partisanship than more heterogeneous environments.

Perceived Contexts

What the prior discussion of environmental influence suggests is that contexts matter, but leaves the question of why and how fairly ambiguous. One question is the

extent to which these influences are a product of actual environments such as those described above, or whether they are a product of individual perceptions of their surroundings which may or may not be correct. The prior discussion raised the question of how a Republican who is surrounded by Democrats on a daily basis in a place such as Seattle would react. The question here asks, what if that Republican perceived herself to be surrounded by other Republicans, or what if a Republican in Fort Worth, Texas perceived herself to be surrounded by Democrats? Does the nature of the actual environment matter if the individual has a different perception of reality?

There is good reason to suspect that perceptions are equally important as reality. For environments to be of consequence, it would seem that the citizen needs to recognize her relative position within them. If people are experiencing disagreeable perspectives and coercive pressures to conform, this would seem likely to register with them. Some evidence exists that contextual effects are only felt for those who correctly perceive the nature of their surroundings (Baybeck and McClurg 2005). Further, measures of objective context miss the potential for homophily to create micro-environments such as discussion networks that are largely congruent with individual beliefs, regardless of what the broader aggregate environment looks like (e.g. Finifter 1974). In this case, objective broader environments are detached from the social influence that the individual experiences and perceives on a daily basis. For these reasons, it may be the case that perceptions are more important than objective reality, as they capture the political world as the citizen sees and experiences it.

However, there is also reason to suspect that perceptions should not be predictive of partisan instability. We know that citizen perceptions of environments are often relatively inaccurate. Citizens in the partisan minority tend to overstate the extent to which they are in the out-group - viewing far more people around them as holding disagreeable opinions

than actually do (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Even in an uncompetitive election such as the 1984 presidential contest, only 67% of survey respondents accurately perceived which candidate would win their neighborhood (Baybeck and McClurg 2005), and the numbers are even lower for accurate perceptions on other dimensions such as the levels of education and income of those that surround us. What this points to is a disconnect between perceptions and reality.

An extensive literature in social psychology supports this assertion, demonstrating that for most, perceptions of groups are inherently inaccurate (e.g. Tajfel 1959; Tajfel and Wilkes 1963). While the central tendency for many citizens is to project their own beliefs onto those surrounding them (Cronbach 1955; Ross, Green, and House 1977; Krueger 1998), perhaps even more important is the tendency to project the extremity of views. That is, strong partisans are more likely to perceive the views of those around them as also being polarized (Van Boven, Judd, and Sherman 2012). A strong partisan is more likely to perceive their environment around them as being extreme, while a weaker partisan may be more likely to see heterogeneity. This is meaningful for understanding whether perceived environments are formative for partisan stability because strong partisans are the least likely to change their affiliations, but are more likely to perceive themselves as being in homogeneous environments – the very places where we would expect the highest environmental influences. When looking across the range of environments from most reinforcing to most challenging, we will see less influence in extreme homogeneous places, but largely because the people who are perceiving themselves in these contexts are predisposed to be stable in their attachments, not because these places don't actually exert influence.

H₃: Strong partisans will be more likely to perceive themselves as being in homogenous environments than weak partisans will be.

In sum, it remains an open question as to whether perceptions of surrounding environments are consequential for partisan stability, or not. Despite this relative uncertainty, acknowledging the inaccuracy of perceptions, as well as the tendency to project one's views suggests that perceived environments may not be especially consequential. Citizens' ability to craft a subjective reality that does not align with the objective influences they are receiving and are exposed to offers a view where perceptions may lack in influence.

H4: Those who perceive themselves to reside in an environment which challenges their partisanship will not display more partisan change than those who perceive themselves to reside in an environment which reinforces their partisanship.

Data and Methods

To test these expectations I use an election survey conducted during the Fall 2012 election season which is uniquely situated for questions of environmental and social influence. The survey was conducted through Qualtrics and was designed to generate an approximation of a nationally representative sample. The first (pre-election) wave took place during the first week of October and had 1,753 respondents. The second (post-election) wave was conducted in late November and re-contacted 1,097 of the respondents from the first wave. What makes this survey unique is the combination of several different kinds of contextual measures - objective measures of context at both the county and state level, and respondent generated subjective measures of the political nature of their surroundings. This allows for the assessment of whether a range of contexts can destabilize individual partisanship, and if so, which ones do so. To construct the objective context measures I use the respondents' ZIP codes which were provided by Qualtrics. I match these ZIP codes to their respective county and state, and create measures of the partisan composition of both the county and state using presidential election returns from the 2012 election. I subtract the Democratic candidate's vote share in the county and state from the Republican candidate's vote share which creates a continuous contextual measure that

captures both the partisan direction (Democratic vs. Republican) as well as the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the county and state. Because I am subtracting Democratic vote share from Republican vote share, negative values represent Democratic contexts and positive values represent Republican contexts.

With this measure of the objective partisanship of the respondent's county and state, I then create a measure of the extent to which this environment either reinforces or challenges their individual party identification. I take the respondent's self-reported partisanship on a seven point scale during the first wave of the survey and match this with their environment. Since the context measure runs from very Democratic environments on the low end of the scale to very Republican environments on the high end, it is already arranged from most reinforcing environments to most challenging environments for those who identified as Democrats. For those who identified as Republicans, I reverse code the context measure such that it runs from the most reinforcing (Republican) environments to the most challenging (Democratic) environments. For those who identify as Independents I use the candidate feeling thermometers to place them as either Democrats or Republicans. Independents who have warmer feelings about Barack Obama compared to Mitt Romney are treated as Democrats, and vice versa. In sum, I have two measures of objective partisan environments - one at the county level called 'County Challenges' and one at the state level called 'State Challenges.' The measures place every respondent in an environment that either reinforces their individual partisanship (those with negative values) or challenges it (those with positive values).

Both the objective and subjective challenging context measures are distributed roughly as we would expect. The objective 'County Challenges' variable ranges from -84 (representing a respondent in a very reinforcing county) to 84 (a respondent in a very challenging county). The mean is -5.06, meaning that on average the respondents in the

survey were in slightly reinforcing counties. The objective 'State Challenges' variable ranges from -83.63 for a respondent in a state that strongly reinforces her partisanship, to 83.63 for a respondent who resides in a state that strongly challenges her partisanship. The mean of -2.03 means that on average the respondents' resided in very slightly reinforcing states. The correlation between the objective county and state measures is .59, suggesting that living in a challenging county is associated with living in a challenging state, but there are also a number of respondents who live in a challenging state but not a challenging county, and vice versa.

While these measures of context reflect the political reality of each respondent's county and state, they do not necessarily reflect how the individual views their surroundings. To measure this, a question was included on the survey which asks the respondent "Thinking about the following, how strongly Democratic or Republican leaning would you say they are? Please think of the rating as a percentage – move the slider left to signal that the group/place is more Democratic, and move it right if the group/place is more Republican." The respondents assess the partisanship of their neighborhood, city/town, and state on the 0-100 scale where 0 is labeled as "Very Democratic," 100 is "Very Republican," and 50 is "Neither Democratic nor Republican." I rescale this measure to run from -50 to 50, where -50 is a very Democratic environment and 50 is a very Republican environment - placing the measure on a similar scale as the objective context measure. I then use the same strategy to place partisans in either a reinforcing or challenging environment. For Democrats, the measure is already scaled from most reinforcing to most challenging, and I reverse code it for Republicans. Independents are coded as either Democrats or Republicans with their feeling thermometer responses. The end result is three measures of the perceived partisan nature of the respondent's political

environment at their neighborhood, city/town, and state level. Negative values represent reinforcing environments and positive values represent challenging environments.

The subjective challenging context variables are distributed in a similar fashion to the objective measures, the primary difference being that they are bounded on the low end by values of -50 and on the high end by values of 50 since the scale that they placed the partisanship of their environment had this range. 'Perceived Challenging Neighborhood' ranges from -50 to 50, with a mean value of -4.94, 'Perceived Challenging City/Town' ranges from -50 to 50 with a mean of -3.5, and 'Perceived Challenging State' ranges from -50 to 50 with a mean of -2.29. The negative mean values suggest that on average the respondents perceived their neighborhoods, cities/towns, and states to be slightly reinforcing.

What is interesting is the modest correlations between the objective and subjective context measures. The correlation between 'Objective County Challenges' and 'Perceived Challenging Neighborhood' is .24, and the correlation between 'Objective County Challenges' and 'Perceived Challenging City/Town' is .31. Of course it is possible for an individual to reside in a county that challenges their partisanship, but be in a neighborhood or city that does not, but the modest relationship between the two measures could also be a product of a disconnect between environmental perceptions and reality. The correlation between 'Objective State Challenges' and 'Perceived State Challenges' is also relatively modest at .48. Here, both the objective and perceived unit is the same, so if people are accurately perceiving the nature of their context, then there should be a strong correlation between the two. However, the .48 association suggests that there is likely somewhat of a disconnect between objective reality and perception. By measuring both, I can test the consequences of each for the partisan citizen.

Collectively, I have two measures of objective contexts - at the county and state level, and three measures of perceived context - at the neighborhood, city/town, and state level, and a measure of disagreeable discussion network composition. These comprise the independent variables used to explain contextually driven partisan instability and change.

I model partisan change by taking the absolute value of the difference in the respondent's party identification between wave 1 and 2 of the survey. This variable ranges from 0 to 6, where 0 is those who report the same partisanship at wave 1 and 2, and 6 is someone who moves 6 points on the scale of partisanship (from a strong Republican to a strong Democrat, or vice versa). 72% of the sample experiences no movement between waves and is coded as a 0, but 28% change their party identification by at least 1 point.

I control for a variety of factors that explain partisan change including strength of partisanship, age, education, political interest, the absolute value of changes in economic assessments and presidential feeling thermometer ratings, the amount of disagreement in individual discussion networks, and two measures of campaign effects: campaign spending in the state and presidential visits to the state.

I use a random-intercept multilevel modeling approach to account for potentially correlated errors within geographic units. In models exploring the effects of objective counties, perceived neighborhoods, or perceived cities, I use the county as the level-2 unit. In models where the key variable of interest is objective or perceived state contexts, the state is the level-2 unit.

Results

We begin by looking at the effects of an incongruent, or 'challenging' objective context on the individual. These effects are assessed at both the state and county level. The results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Effects of State and County Partisan Environments on Change in Partisanship

State Challenges	.003*	-----
	(.001)	
County Challenges	-----	.002*
		(001)
Strength of Partisanship	-.037	-.035
	(.024)	(.024)
Age	-.002	-.002
	(.002)	(.002)
Education	-.024	-.024
	(.026)	(.026)
Interest	.027	.028
	(.023)	(.023)
Change in Economic Assessment	.059+	.064+
	(.036)	(.036)
Change in Obama Feeling Thermometer	.017*	.018*
	(.007)	(.007)
Average Disagreement in Discussion Network	.092*	.091*
	(.038)	(.038)
Campaign Spending	-.006	-.006
	(.005)	(.005)
Campaign Visits	.002	.002
	(.001)	(.002)
Constant	.318*	.312*
	(.131)	(.131)
N	735	733
Number of Groups	50	418
AIC	1,430	1,426

Notes: p* < .05, p+ < .1.

First, we notice that both objective state and county environments can induce partisan change when the environment challenges the individual's wave 1 party affiliation. That is, the Democrat who lives in a Republican dominated state or county exhibits more partisan change than the Democrat who lives in a Democratic state or county. The objective partisan composition of a locale, either state or county, appears to influence the partisan citizen by either fostering stability in reinforcing contexts or instability in challenging ones. Across the full range of the 'State Challenges' measure we observe a .49 increase in the expected partisan change, and across the full range of the 'County Challenges' measure the expected

partisan change is .37. One standard deviation on the dependent variable is .67, so these effect sizes are somewhat modest, but not immaterial. Further, these effects are larger than any of the other statistically significant variables in the models.

The other variables in the models perform much as expected. In both the state and county models the same variables emerge as statistically significant influences on changes in party identification. The absolute value of changes in economic assessments is significant at the $p < .1$ level, with those who have larger changes in economic evaluations between survey waves also experiencing larger changes in party identification. Across the full range of the variable there is a .23-.26 increase in the expected absolute value of partisan change. Similarly, there is a statistically significant effect of the absolute value of changes in feeling thermometer evaluations of President Obama with those who reported larger changes in presidential assessments also changing party affiliations more often. Across the full range of the measure there is a .33-.35 increase in the expected absolute value of partisan change. Finally, there is a significant effect for the amount of disagreement in the individual's discussion network with those who have higher levels of average disagreement in the reported network experiencing greater change in party affiliation across waves than those with more agreeable networks. Across both models the magnitude of the effect is a .27 increase in the expected absolute value of partisan change.

If environments – both county and state – are able to influence the stability of individual partisanship, this raises the question of the limits of these effects. That is, the results are suggestive of a story in which reinforcing contexts serve to stabilize party identification, and challenging contexts destabilize. In what kinds of environments does this transition from stabilizing to destabilizing take place? Are stabilizing and destabilizing only delivered the most homogenous of contexts, or are counties and states that lean in one direction or the other also able to deliver influence to the partisan?


To explore this question I use the same dependent variable of the absolute value of change in party identification across survey waves, but instead of using the state or county challenges measures, I interact the respondent's party identification with how Republican the county or state are. Doing so allows for the assessment of the effects of context on the partisan across the full spectrum of environments. Table 2 displays these models.


Table 2: Exploring Which Environments Impart Influence

Republican State	.006*	-----
	(.003)	
Republican County	-----	.004*
		(001)
Republican State X Party Identification	-.002*	-----
	(.001)	
Republican County X Party Identification	-----	-.002*
		(.000)
Party Identification	-.009	-.004
	(.013)	(.013)
Age	-.001	-.001
	(.002)	(.002)
Education	-.018	-.021
	(.025)	(.025)
Interest	.022	.022
	(.022)	(.022)
Change in Economic Assessment	.069*	.074*
	(.035)	(.035)
Change in Obama Feeling Thermometer	.016*	.017*
	(.007)	(.007)
Average Disagreement in Discussion Network	.096*	.087*
	(.037)	(.037)
Campaign Spending	-.008	-.007
	(.004)	(.004)
Campaign Visits	.002	.002
	(.002)	(.001)
Constant	.245+	.255*
	(.127)	(.126)
N	762	760
Number of Groups	50	434
AIC	1,464	1,456

Notes: p* < .05, p+ < .1.

Of substantive interest here is the interaction between party identification and the Republican context measure. We see that the interaction term is significant in both models, as we would expect from the results in Table 1. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these interactions more clearly by showing the marginal effects of a Republican party identification across the full range of Republican context.





What we see from the figures is the range at which counties and states exert statistically significant influences for changes in party identification. On the left side of the figures is the most Democratic counties and states and on the right side is the most Republican counties and states. We see that the marginal effect of a Republican party identification in the most Democratic of counties and states is positive, which is the destabilizing effect that challenging environments exert on individual partisanship over time. What is perhaps most interesting here is that this effect becomes statistically insignificant once we reach counties and states that lean Democratic by 20 or fewer points. That is, Democratic environments destabilize Republican partisanship, but only when the environment is sufficiently homogenous. Counties and states that only lean Democratic do not appear to exert sufficient influence to foster partisan instability.

In the middle of the range where we are looking at heterogeneous environments, there is no effect either way on partisan instability. But when we assess the marginal effect of a Republican partisanship on stability as counties and states become increasingly Republican,

we see that a significant stabilizing effect emerges in counties and states at roughly a Republican +10 vote margin. We see that there is a lower threshold for significance when the environment is stabilizing rather than destabilizing. That is, a county or state needs to favor the challenging party by a margin of 20 percent to begin to induce instability, but only needs to favor the reinforcing party by 10 percent to begin to stabilize party affiliation. It appears that environments have a harder time uprooting party affiliation than stabilizing it. Consider a resident of Kern County, California, which in the 2012 election was won by the Republican candidate with a margin of 17% (a Republican +17 county). The implication from these results is that Kern County is likely to exert stabilizing influences for Republicans making them less likely to change their party affiliation over time, but Kern County is not quite homogenous to begin to destabilize the party affiliations of the Democrats who live there.

What the results have demonstrated thus far is that the partisan nature of the places where we live have the ability to influence individual party attachments. However, the measures used have been objective – i.e. what the actual partisan composition of the environment is. This raises the question of how citizens perceive the environments that surround them. Table 3 presents three models which test the effects of perceived neighborhood, city, and state partisanship using the environmental perception measures that were discussed previously. The model specification is consistent with the testing of objective environments from Table 1.

Table 3: Effects of Perceived Partisan Environments on Change in Partisanship

Perceived Neighborhood Challenges	-.000 (.001)	-----	-----
Perceived City Challenges	-----	-.000 (.001)	-----
Perceived State Challenges	-----	-----	-.001 (.000)
Strength of Partisanship	-.034 (.027)	-.039 (.025)	-.042+ (.025)
Age	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Education	-.020 (.029)	-.029 (.026)	-.033 (.026)
Interest	.027 (.025)	.026 (.024)	.027 (.023)
Change in Economic Assessment	.089* (.039)	.060+ (.036)	.056 (.036)
Change in Obama Feeling Thermometer	.021* (.008)	.015* (.007)	.016* (.007)
Average Disagreement in Discussion Network	.095* (.042)	.086* (.039)	.084* (.039)
Campaign Spending	-.007 (.005)	-.006 (.005)	-.007 (.005)
Campaign Visits	.002 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.001)
Constant	.279+ (.146)	.372* (.133)	.376* (.131)
N	644	693	703
Number of Groups	386	406	50
AIC	1,294	1,330	1,348

Notes: $p < .05$, $p < .1$.

We see from Table 3 that there are no statistically significant effects of perceived environments on change in party affiliation over the course of the campaign. This finding stands in sharp contrast to those from Tables 1 and 2, where we saw a noticeable effect of objective contexts. The suggestion from these findings is that perceptions of places do not appear to induce partisan stability or instability. They are largely inconsequential. Citizens who perceive that they reside in largely challenging environments are no more likely to change their partisanship than citizens who perceive the places around them to be largely

reinforcing communities. The other variables in the models perform much as they did in Table 1.

Why do perceptions of environments appear so inconsequential when we have seen that objective environments are so influential? As noted earlier, the correlation between the perceived environments and the objective ones is surprisingly modest (ranging from .24-.48). This suggests that there may be something about environmental perceptions that is not only inaccurate, but that eliminates the effects of partisan context on partisan change. The answer to this may (in part) lie in perceptions of extremity.

Recall from Figures 1 and 2 that it was more extreme (or homogenous) environments that exerted the largest pull on partisanship, and that these environments are largely where the effects of context are located. It may be the case that certain kinds of people are more likely to perceive environmental extremity. That is, there may be individual-level factors that predispose citizens to see places as more extreme, or more moderate. Further, if these factors that predispose perceptions of extremity are correlated with the likelihood of changing partisanship, then this could help to explain the somewhat puzzling lack of significance for perceived environments. Of particular interest here is the role of strength of partisanship in shaping perceptions of extremity.

As discussed previously, a growing literature in social psychology demonstrates that strong partisans tend to project the extremity of their own views onto others. All else equal, strong partisans perceive the views of others and those around them to be similarly extreme. This means that strong partisans may be more likely to perceive the environment around them as being more extreme, while the moderates and partisan leaners may be perceiving more heterogeneity. What this means for the connection between perceived environments and partisan change is that those who are the least likely to change their party identification (strong partisans) are the ones who are placing themselves on the extremes of the perceived

environment scale where we would otherwise expect to see the largest effects of context. Meanwhile, those who are most likely to change their party affiliation (moderate partisans and independent leaners) are placing themselves in more heterogeneous environments. With this in mind, it is possible to imagine a flat or nearly flat slope on a line from more reinforcing to most challenging contexts as strong partisans who are least likely to change are located at the extremes and weak partisans who are more likely to change are clustered more in the middle.

To explore this possibility, Table 4 models the perceived extremity of the neighborhood, city, and state by using the absolute value of the original perceptions variable as the dependent variable. The level 2 grouping in all of the models in Table 4 is the state.

Table 4: Explaining Perceived Extremity in Political Environments

	Neighbors	City	State
Strength of Partisanship	2.17*	1.42*	1.13*
	(.436)	(.401)	(.405)
Objective County Partisan Extremity	.074*	.098*	.017
	(.024)	(.022)	(.023)
Objective State Partisan Extremity	-.000	.090+	.209*
	(.053)	(.049)	(.066)
Age	-.067*	-.036	-.060
	(.031)	(.028)	(.028)
Education	.586	.235	-.478
	(.480)	(.436)	(.437)
Interest	1.69*	1.07*	1.67*
	(.410)	(.378)	(.377)
Average Disagreement in Discussion Network	1.27+	1.12+	1.23+
	(.689)	(.635)	(.639)
Campaign Spending	-.008	-.026	-.256*
	(.098)	(.086)	(.116)
Campaign Visits	-.021	-.029	.004
	(.027)	(.025)	(.042)
Constant	9.41*	11.61*	14.85*
	(2.58)	(2.33)	(2.57)
N	1,098	1,191	1,199
Number of Groups	49	49	49
AIC	8,988	9,632	9,722

Notes: $p^* < .05$, $p+ < .1$.

Of substantive interest here is the strength of partisanship variable. The results here demonstrate support for the notion that strong partisans are perceiving more extreme environments. Across all three models, there is a statistically significant and positive effect of strength of partisanship on perceived environmental extremity. Consistent with our expectations, strong partisans view the environment around them as being more extreme than weak partisans. Across the full range of strength of partisanship, we observe an increase in expected perceived partisanship of 6.5 points for perceived neighborhood partisanship, 4.3 points for perceived city partisanship, and 3.4 points for perceived state partisanship. A standard deviation for all three dependent variables is 14, meaning that these effect sizes are somewhat modest, but still consequential. It is important to keep in mind that these effects are controlling for the actual extremity of both the county and the state, so these coefficients represent the independent effect of partisan strength on top of the objective reality in which they are living. While it would certainly be an overstatement to claim that this alone explains the null results for perceived partisanship, it is likely a component of the puzzle.

The other variables in the models perform much as expected. The objective partisan extremity measures are also significant predictors, suggesting that as environments become more extreme, so do perceptions. Objective county partisan extremity is a significant predictor of both neighborhood and city perceptions, but not of state perceptions as we would expect given the variation within states. Similarly, objective state partisan extremity is a significant predictor of perceived state extremity, a significant predictor at the $p < .1$ level for perceived city extremity, and has no effect on perceived neighborhood extremity. Across the full range of the objective county extremity measure, from counties where there was a tie between the two candidates to the most homogenous and one-sided counties there is a 6.2 point increase in perceived extremity of the neighborhood, and an 8.2 point increase in the perceived extremity of the city. Across the full range of the objective state extremity measure

there is a 7.6 point increase in the perceived extremity of the city ($p < .1$), and a 17.5 point increase in the perceived extremity of the state. Perceptions do appear to be a function of objective reality.

The other significant variables in the model are age in the perceived neighbors extremity model, with older respondents perceiving less extremity, political interest in all three models (more interested individuals perceiving more contextual extremity), and discussion network disagreement (individuals with a higher average level of disagreement in their discussion networks perceive more extremity in their environments). Across the full range of the age variable there was a 6.7 point decrease in perceived neighborhood partisan extremity, the magnitude of the effect of political interest is 4.3-6.8 depending on the model, and the magnitude of the effect of average network disagreement is 3.4-3.8.

In comparison to the other significant variables in the model, the strength of partisanship variable which we are substantively interested in has a comparable magnitude of effect to the other significant variables in the model. Compared with the objective partisan extremity in the county and state, strength of partisanship has a larger effect on the perceived extremity of the neighborhood, and roughly half of the magnitude of objective county partisanship on the effect on perceived city partisanship. Strength of partisanship appears to have a relatively substantial effect on perceptions of environmental extremity, offering some suggestive evidence that this pattern may be helping to explain the null results from perceived context models in Table 3.

Conclusion

Many have noted the deepening of the red state, blue state divide (e.g. Bishop 2008; Myers Forthcoming; though see Abrams and Fiorina 2012), and speculated as to both its causes and consequences. While this paper does not explicitly test hypotheses pertaining to geographic polarization, the findings speak to this debate. The suggestion here is that

places are coercive. The social world that surrounds us on a day to day basis exerts a pull on the citizen that influences even the most stable and enduring of political attitudes - party identification. What this means for geographical polarization is that environments are constantly exerting homogenizing pressures. The Democratic environment is able to destabilize the partisan attachment of the Republicans who live within it, while stabilizing party affiliations for Democrats. In a place like Seattle, Washington where Barack Obama won the 2012 election contest by a margin of roughly 40 percent, Republicans are having their party affiliation destabilized while Democrats in the same place are having stabilizing pressures exerted.

However, not all environments exert these pressures. The more homogenous the environment, the stronger this pull is. Further, it appears to that it takes more partisan homogeneity to destabilize party attachments for those in the minority, than it takes to stabilize for those in the partisan minority. To destabilize those in the partisan minority, a place needs to favor a party by a margin of at least 20 percent, but to stabilize those in the partisan majority, the margin only needs to be 10 percent.

One of the other interesting findings presented here was that perceptions of environments do not appear to be consequential for shaping partisan stability over time, despite the formative influence of the objective partisan composition of places. It matters far more what the actual composition of a place is, rather than how people perceive the partisan composition. I presented some results to suggest that in part this may a function of how strong partisans perceive their environments as being more homogenous than weaker partisans due to the projection of their more extreme views onto others.

The analysis presented here raises several questions. First, much research has explored the effects of different levels of context, and this paper adds to that discussion by noting that both county and state environments appear to influence the partisan. The

question of why, and what makes one level of context influential and another less so, warrants additional research and would help to further illuminate mechanisms of influence. The focus here was on objective state and county partisanship, but more nuanced measures would be helpful to more completely understand which contexts are influential and which are not. Second, the finding that perceived environments are not consequential for partisan stability is somewhat curious. The disconnect between perception and reality, and the psychological mechanism of self-projection seem to be in part an explanation of this phenomenon, but are surely not the entire picture.

What this paper does offer an answer to is the consequences of social forces for partisan instability. Given the prominence of social pressures for shaping party identification early in life, it is a reasonable extension that similar influences could induce instability throughout the life cycle. Party identification is not just formed by social forces, it is maintained or detached by them as well. The evidence here points to the social settings which we all live and experience our lives in as a source of either enduring partisan stability, or destabilized and more volatile party identification. As noted, this environmentally derived socialization process provides one possible individual-level mechanism capable of fostering geographical polarization, and contributing to a deepening of the divide between red states and blue states.

CHAPTER 4: WHO IS INFLUENCED BY THEIR CONTEXT? HOW PERSONALITY AND DISCUSSION NETWORKS MODERATE CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCE

Much research demonstrates the role that the environments we live in can play for developing and maintaining individual political attitudes and behaviors. Yet, we know relatively little about why it is that some individuals succumb to contextual influences and become a product of their environment, while others resist and are seemingly unaffected by their surroundings. What drives these different responses to contextual pressure? I explore the way in which both discussion network characteristics and individual personality traits produce a citizen who is either influenced, or not. Using an original data collection from the Fall 2012 election season that is uniquely situated to explore the effects of political contexts, discussion networks, and personality traits, I explore the ways in which these factors influence the relationship between state political context and the stability of party identification. I find robust evidence that both discussion networks and personality traits determine who is responsive to the political environment surrounding them. That is, it matters both who you are, and who you talk to. For those with largely agreeable discussion networks that create a buffer against contextual influence, there is no effect of the political environment regardless of an individual's dispositions. However, for those with networks that are more disagreeable and do not provide such a buffer, personality traits begin to determine who responds to contextual pressure, and who does not.

Contexts influence citizens. This point has been driven home by several decades of compelling research demonstrating that the places we live and environments where we spend our time exert a host of influences on the individual, and that these influences have political consequences. From vote choice (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Sinclair 2012) to participation (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Gimpel, Dyck, and Shaw 2004) to issue attitudes (MacKuen and Brown 1987), the places where we reside shape a range of individual political outcomes. While our understanding of how places shape people is extensive, we know less about the conditions under which these places being formative. Surely we all know people who reside in contexts that *should* influence them, but do not. Why does one Republican in Boston, MA respond to contextual pressures with less stable partisanship, altered issue stances, and a decreased likelihood of participating, while another is seemingly unaffected by his or her surroundings?

I explore the ways that both individual traits and circumstances determine who is affected by their context, and under what conditions. Specifically I look at the ways in which discussion networks and personality traits moderate the effects of state context on citizens' propensity to change their party identification. Understanding the conditions under which contexts are influential (or not) speaks to the mechanisms of contextual influence which remains a source of contention (see Sokhey and Djupe 2011 for a discussion), and helps us to reconcile a broad body of research with often contradictory anecdotal experiences – i.e. why do I live in a place that challenges my beliefs yet my beliefs remain unchanged?

To address these questions I use a two-wave survey from the Fall 2012 election season that contains contextual identifiers, discussion network information, as well as measures of the Big-Five personality traits. I find, not surprisingly that state environments influence the partisan stability of their citizens. However, this contextual effect is highly conditional. Discussion networks can form buffers against contextual influence (e.g. Finifter 1974; Huckfelt et al. 1995), but these network buffers are only one component of conditional contextual pressure. When networks form perfect buffers, personality is inconsequential as the context never appears to matter. That is, it does not matter who you are as long as you have a strong buffer, the environment does not appear to matter. However, for those who do not have perfect buffers which allows more contextual pressure to reach the citizen, personality traits begin to moderate the effects of context. In these cases, some citizens are predisposed to be influenced, and are. Others are predisposed to resist outside pressure, and no matter how weak their network buffer or how strong the outside pressure, these citizens are not formed by their surroundings. In sum, it matters *both* who you are, and who you talk to.

Political Contexts and Partisan Change

Individual party identification is formed largely through social processes, with formative influence coming from the family early in life (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Campbell et al. 1960; Sears and Funk 1999; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). We know that these early identifications are relatively stable over time (Sears and Funk 1999), though changes are certainly not uncommon (Rice and Hilton 1996; Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 1998). When individuals do change their party affiliations it is often in response to the ways that issues and party stances on them shift (Layman and Carsey 2002; Carsey and Layman 2006), or when evaluations of candidates change (Brody and Rothenberg 1988).

However, given the social nature of partisan formation it should come as no surprise that social influences throughout life can serve to destabilize these attachments when they provide pressures that conflict with the citizen's current identification (e.g. Sinclair 2012). Macro-contexts in the form of both states (MacDonald and Franko 2008) and counties (Lyons 2011) appear to exert these pressures on party identification. Citizens who reside in the partisan minority – i.e. the Democrat in Kansas or the Republican in Connecticut – change their party identification more frequently in response to the contextual pressures that they encounter than the Republican in Kansas or the Democrat in Connecticut whose context supplies reinforcing and stabilizing pressures on their party affiliation.

The two general mechanisms of this influence appear to be through explicit discussion with those who live in the same area, and a more subtle absorption of values and norms that occurs with time spent in a place. While this question of exactly how environments impart influence remains open (Sokhey and Djupe 2011; Leighley 1990), we have reason to suspect that both are meaningful.

Discussion network effects impart influence for a host of political outcomes. The composition of discussion networks and type of conversation has consequences for individual

participation in politics (McClurg 2003; Mutz 2006; Klobstad 2007), policy opinions (Barabas 2004), vote choice (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Sinclair 2012) and especially important for our purposes here, partisanship (Sinclair 2012). Discussion networks are likely so influential in large part due to their ability to easily transmit information - potentially information that is persuasive or compelling relative to the individual's prior attitude or belief. For inducing partisan instability, a disagreeable network is likely to provide the individual with reasons to doubt one's candidate preferences and vote choice, call into question policy attitudes, and provide reasons to favor opposing beliefs. To the extent that networks are contextually bound and are comprised at least in part of discussants from the place where one lives (Huckfeldt 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), discussion networks are well situated to translate the aggregate distribution of opinions in a location to the individual through interpersonal communication.

On the other hand, the 'structural equivalence' theory of social influence asserts that environments provide people with influence in the form of cues and norms which are internalized by the individual (e.g. Burt 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). People adopt the norms of those who occupy similar positions in social structure - i.e. the individual residing in a liberal neighborhood in Seattle absorbs the environmental cues and adjusts her views to reflect towards what is expected of a resident of Seattle. These norms could be communicated through yard signs (Makse and Sokhey Forthcoming; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992), bumper stickers on cars, reading the opinion page of the local newspaper, or simply by observing election outcomes. Non-verbal environmental contagion such as this has been shown to spread campaign messages and influence (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992) and prompt participation in politics (Tam Cho and Rudolph 2008). Partisan influence could spread in much the same fashion.

This influence has little to do with discussion or interpersonal interaction, but rather emphasizes the adoption of norms that is produced by a desire for social acceptance and to avoid being placed in an out-group (e.g. Asch 1956, 1963). It can be socially costly for individuals to be in the minority, and desires for social acceptance likely trump political considerations given the relative importance of social acceptance and relative unimportance of politics for most individuals. In sum, there are reasons to suspect that environmental influence could be a product of supplying discussion partners and interpersonal communication, or a result of environmental contagion and subtle influence.

Regardless of how exactly it is that the places where people live shape their party identifications – inducing either stability and an adherence to priors, or instability and changing identifications – the question of conditionality is not well understood. That is, why are some individuals influenced by their surroundings, having their party affiliation become a product of their social context, while others are resistant and unaffected by the broader social milieu? Decades of research has suggested that the average tendency amongst citizens is to be (in part) a product of their environment. Yet, certainly not all individuals respond in this fashion. A greater understanding of this conditionality is the goal of this paper. When does the Democrat in Kansas change her partisanship in response to social pressures, and when does she not? Is the conditionality a function of her social setting, her individual traits and dispositions, or both?

Political Environments and the Partisan: When is Context Influential and When is it Not?

Networks as Buffers Against Contextual Influence

While the notion that our social settings are consequential for a host of individual political outcomes is well established, the conditionality of these influences is less understand. Why is one individual influenced by her environment while another is not? One of the primary explanations that has arisen is that individual discussion networks moderate

the effects of the broader environments, be they neighborhoods, counties, or states.

Discussion networks have the ability to essentially create a buffer between the individual and the larger context (Finifter 1974; Huckfeldt 1984). An individual can be in the minority, but if the people who they interact and talk to the most are of similar minority views, the macro-context is not likely to be as influential. This can occur in work settings (Finifter 1974), or as a buffer from county-level contextual influence (Huckfeldt et al 1995; Lyons 2011). In order for the context to be influential, the social pressures that they supply have to actually reach the individual.

Of course, individuals can try to assemble these agreeable discussion networks that will provide such a buffer, and some evidence suggests that they attempt to do so (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). However, our understanding of network constraint suggests that this is easier said than done. Constraint can come from a host of sources, environments being one, suggesting that even when citizens may wish to construct agreeable networks that can act as a buffer, their ability to do so is a function of the supply of agreeable discussants around them (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt 1983; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988). Certain environments such as the workplace make it especially difficult to avoid disagreement (Mutz and Mondak 2006) as people are unable to avoid potentially dissident opinions. While the exact degree to which choice and constraint drive network composition remains a topic of debate (Sokhey and Djupe 2011), what is clear is that for most individuals, their networks are neither completely a product of individual decisions to only interact with those like themselves, nor are they entirely a function of those around them. For some citizens – either through choice or circumstance – their network is largely agreeable and thus serves as a layer of social insulation from contextual influences. For others who have largely disagreeable networks and no such buffer, contextual influences are likely more powerful in shaping attitudes and behaviors.

Personality as a Moderator of Contextual Effects

People do not all engage the world around them in the same manner. Rather, internal predispositions produce heterogeneous responses to otherwise similar circumstances. Personality traits represent one such important predisposition. Specifically, the Big-Five personality traits which have been used to predict a host of outcomes from career success (Barrick and Mount 1991) to lifespan (Smith and Spiro 2002), also appear to be consequential for political behaviors and attitudes. The Big-Five personality traits appear to have an effect on political ideology and issue attitudes (Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010), presidential approval (Mondak and Halperin 2008), and political participation (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010) among other individual-level outcomes. These traits are largely a product of an individual's genetic predispositions, and are quite stable over the lifecycle. Because personality traits drive a number of social outcomes such as the frequency with which one talks and interacts to those around them, as well the degree to which their opinions and beliefs are malleable and subject to influence, it appears likely that these predispositions offer a potentially powerful explanation of the conditionality of contextual influence – particularly for asserting *who* will be influenced and who will not.

The first of the Big-Five traits to consider is extraversion. The extraverted individual is characterized as being outgoing, sociable, bold, and energetic (Mondak 2010). These individuals, because of their social disposition, discuss politics more frequently than others (Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011; Mondak 2010), and have larger discussion networks (Mondak et al. 2010), and gather more information from news sources than their introverted peers (Gerber et al 2011; Mondak 2010). Further, when exposed to socially supplied disagreement, the extraverted do not decrease their rates of discussion as the introverted do (Gerber et al. 2012). Collectively, these factors suggest that the extravert may be highly exposed to contextual influences. Because of their predispositions which lead these citizens

to more interaction with those around them, and a tendency to not shy away from socially supplied disagreement, the level of exposure to contextually supplied disagreement, discussion, and influence is likely to be much greater than for introverts. This exposure should produce a citizen who is more likely to be influenced by the political environments surrounding them compared to the introvert who engages in less discussion, interacts with those around them at lower rates, and withdraws from discussion when exposed to contrarian perspectives.

The next trait that is considered is openness to experience. A citizen who is open to experience has a tendency to be an information seeker, to enjoy learning, and is someone who has relatively weak attachments to their prior beliefs (Mondak 2010). Like the extravert, they tend to have larger discussion networks and engage in more political talk, as well as a tendency for civic engagement in the form of participating in rallies or working for a party or candidate (Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2011). With this increased exposure to social influence, combined with the open individual's propensity to be influenced (Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011) and change his or her beliefs, it seems these individuals are well situated to receive environmental pressures and have it generate influence. The closed citizen on the other hand appears to have less exposure to contextually supplied social factors due to smaller networks, less frequent discussion, and lessened engagement in political affairs. When social pressures do reach this individual, his or her penchant for resisting change and new ideas means that pressures should produce less influence.

For the emotional stability trait the expectations are quite different. The emotionally stable are generally characterized as being calm and steady, and as being generally unfazed by a range of circumstances (Mondak 2010). These individuals have smaller discussion networks, participate in politics at lower rates (Mondak et al 2010), and talk about politics less frequently (Mondak and Halperin 2008). This suggests that some of the mechanisms of

contextual influence do not supply the emotionally stable with as much contextually derived information or pressure. And even when it does reach them, what we know about the emotionally stable is that they are relatively unaffected by such things. These individuals are confident in their beliefs and rarely deviate from them as a result (Mondak 2010), often considered to be “self-assured” (Gerber et al. 2011: 696). This is not the portrait of an individual who is susceptible to external pressure and influence from the political environment. Rather, these citizens are naturally insulated, and resistant to change when social forces do reach them. For these reasons, the expectation is that the emotionally stable will be less influenced by political context.

For the trait agreeableness, the expectation are somewhat unclear. There is reason to expect either a positive or negative moderating effect on the relationship between political environments and individual attitudes. The agreeable individual is highly concerned with having social harmony and avoiding conflict with peers (Mondak 2010). Disagreement is especially costly for these citizens, as it disrupts their desire to seek positive relations with those around them. On the one hand, there is reason to suspect that these individuals are susceptible to the social environments around them. The agreeable citizen’s desire for social harmony suggests they may be prone to adapting their views to align them with those of their neighbors, coworkers, and friends. If being out of step with those around you can produce disagreement, and disagreement is avoided at all costs, it stands to reason that a solution for the agreeable to change their perspectives. The agreeable also appear to have higher levels of interpersonal trust which could produce a greater willingness to defer to others opinions, and seem to be less opinionated than those who are disagreeable (Mondak and Halpernin 2008).

On the other hand, the tendency of those with high agreeableness to experience significant discomfort when confronted with dissimilar perspectives and social out-group status, could produce a very different outcome. Rather than changing views and perspectives

to align with those surrounding them in order to produce harmony, they could shut down and turn inward in the face of disagreement or being in an out-group. If these individuals find their political identities to be a source of discomfort and consternation, they could simply hide these identities and generally withdraw from social political life. This would likely produce *less* of a contextual effect as politics become internalized and are avoided in social and public settings. In sum, there are reasons to suspect that agreeableness could produce either a positive or negative moderating effect of political environments.

The last of the Big-Five traits to consider is conscientiousness. The conscientious individual is described as traditional, dependable, and risk-averse (Mondak 2010). These individuals have smaller discussion networks, and appear to be somewhat disengaged in civic participation (Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al 2011), and may have less frequent political discussions (Gerber et al 2012). This suggests that there may be fewer avenues for contextual influences to reach the conscientious individual. Further, even when environmentally supplied pressures do find their way to the conscientious, the dispositions of being risk-averse, traditional, dependable, and steadfast suggest an individual who is going to be resistant to such pressures. Thus, the expectation is that contextual pressures will matter less for the conscientious than for the careless.

Personality and Networks: How Predispositions and Buffers Moderate Contextual Influence

Both discussion networks and individual predispositions have been discussed as moderators of contextual influence, determining under what conditions and for whom political environments influence citizens. But how do these two factors interact with one another? What happens when the emotionally stable (who have been hypothesized to be resistant to contextual influence) have no network buffer and receive a substantial environmental pressure? Conversely, what happens when the extravert (who was hypothesized to be especially prone to being influenced) has an entirely agreeable network

and thus has a strong buffer against his or her context? That is, how do predispositions interact with micro-contexts to produce a citizen that is either a product of his or her surroundings, or not? Addressing this provides a more complete picture of the conditions under which environments are of consequence as this interaction between traits and circumstances is a more accurate account of how individuals connect with their surroundings. Further, it is informative about the relative merits of both networks and predispositions as moderators of contextual influence. When the two pressures conflict – one opens the door to influence while the other closes it – which factor prevails?

When discussing the ways in which personality can moderate the effects of context, there were two primary means that were forwarded: shaping individual exposure to influence, and by the ways that different traits predispose a reaction to that influence once it reaches the citizen. By finding that personality moderates the effects of context in a two-way interaction could be evidence of either the exposure mechanism or the reaction mechanism. By looking at the moderating effects of personality across different values of network disagreement I can attempt to parse out these different mechanisms. Finding that when we look at the moderating effects of personality across values of network disagreement there are differences in how personality traits operate when contextual influence is reaching the citizen versus when it is not is suggestive of the reaction mechanism – i.e. personality matters when influence reaches the individual is inconsequential when it does not. Of course, finding this pattern does not rule out the exposure mechanism, but it does provide suggestive evidence of the differing responses mechanism. I address in Appendix B the extent to which personality drives network disagreement in a discussion of endogeneity, which is related to the exposure mechanism.

Recall the expectation for the emotionally stable. It was hypothesized that they would be less susceptible to contextual influence because they should be exposed to less of it due to

their smaller networks and tendency to be civically disengaged, and/or because they are disposed to be stable, unfazed, and difficult to persuade when influence does reach them. If we find that there is no moderating effect of personality when the network provides an effective buffer, but that when influence does reach the citizen via an incomplete or nonexistent network buffer, the emotionally stable are less influenced by their context than the neurotic, this is more suggestive of the different reactions mechanisms as the moderating effect only appears when influence is reaching the citizen.

Thus, the expectations for how personality and discussion network disagreement will interact to moderate contextual influences are driven by the argument that perfect buffers in the form of completely agreeable discussion networks form a strong impediment to contextual influence, and that personality should largely come into play when influence from the environment is able to reach the citizen. This perspective suggests that there is likely no effect of contexts when the network supplies only agreement and creates a significant barrier to contextual influence. Put differently, it will not matter if a person is emotionally stable or neurotic when the network supplies such a complete barrier to influence – contexts simply will not be of consequence. However, as the network is increasingly comprised of disagreeable discussion, providing a less effective barrier to outside pressures, contexts will start to be influential *for certain kinds of people*. This is where personality should begin to moderate contextual effects. As contextual pressures are increasingly allowed to reach the citizen through a discussion network that is not a perfect buffer, personality should start to drive the conditions under which external pressures are rejected or become meaningful. It should matter both who you talk to, and who you are.

Data and Method

To test these expectations I use an election survey conducted during the Fall 2012 election season which is uniquely situated for these questions. The survey was conducted

through Qualtrics and was designed to generate a nationally representative sample. The first (pre-election) wave took place during the first week of October and had 1,753 respondents. The second (post-election) wave was conducted in late November and re-contacted 1,097 of the respondents from the first wave. What makes this survey unique is the combination of several different kinds of contextual measures - objective measures of context at both the county and state level, ego-centric discussion network data, and the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) for measuring the Big 5 personality traits. This allows for the assessment of the ways in which macro and micro social environments interact with individual traits to produce a socially influenced citizen (or not).

To construct the objective context measures I use the respondents' ZIP codes which were provided by Qualtrics. I match these ZIP codes to their respective state, and create measures of the partisan composition of the state using presidential election returns from the 2012 election. I subtract the Democratic candidate's vote share in the county and state from the Republican candidate's vote share which creates a continuous contextual measure that captures both the partisan direction (Democratic vs. Republican) as well as the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the state. Because I am subtracting Democratic vote share from Republican vote share, negative values represent Democratic contexts and positive values represent Republican contexts.⁵

With this measure of the objective partisanship of the respondent's state I then create a measure of the extent to which this environment either reinforces or challenges their individual party identification. I take the respondent's self-reported partisanship on a seven point scale during the first wave of the survey and match this with their environment. Since

⁵ This process was also completed for the respondent's county. In the interest of space the county results are not presented in the main document but are available in Appendix A. The results are largely similar between the state and county context, though some differences do emerge for the openness to experience personality trait. However, they provide primarily consistent findings.

the context measure runs from very Democratic environments on the low end of the scale to very Republican environments on the high end, it is already arranged from most reinforcing environments to most challenging environments for those who identified as Democrats. For those who identified as Republicans, I reverse code the context measure such that it runs from the most reinforcing (Republican) environments to the most challenging (Democratic) environments. For those who identify as Independents I use the candidate feeling thermometers to place them as either Democrats or Republicans. Independents who have warmer feelings about Barack Obama compared to Mitt Romney are treated as Democrats, and vice versa.⁶ In sum, I have a measure of the objective partisan environments at the state level called 'State Challenges.' The measure places every respondent in an environment that either reinforces their individual partisanship (those with negative values) or challenges it (those with positive values). The objective 'State Challenges' variable ranges from -83.63 for a respondent in a state that strongly reinforces her partisanship, to 83.63 for a respondent who resides in a state that strongly challenges her partisanship. The mean of -2.03 means that on average the respondents resided in very slightly reinforcing states.

In addition to measures of the macro-context, I also have ego-centric discussion network data where the respondent has identified up to four individuals who they regularly discuss politics with - allowing for the testing of micro-sources of social influence. I create network average measures of the frequency of disagreement within the network. The main respondent gives the frequency of disagreement with each named discussant on a four point scale. I sum the amount of disagreement for all named discussants and divide by the network size (number of discussants) to produce the network average of the frequency of disagreement. This variable ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 is those with no disagreement with

⁶ The results presented are robust to dropping the Independents from the variable. Coding them as being either Democrats or Republicans is done to maintain as many observations as possible.

any named discussant, and 3 is those who disagree “very often” with all of their named discussants. The mean is .90, suggesting that the levels of disagreement are relatively low on average.

Finally, I use the Ten-Item Personality Inventory which has been used relatively widely in the study of the Big 5 Personality traits in political science (e.g. Gerber et al. 2010) and produce reasonable measures of personality with a relatively limited question battery (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann Jr. 2003). The question battery consists of ten questions, two for each personality type. Each question asks the respondent the extent to which a trait pair applies to them on a seven point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strong agree. One trait pair is designed to capture the upper end of the personality trait, while the other is designed to capture the lower end. For example, to measure extraversion the respondent is asked how strongly the words “extraverted, enthusiastic” apply to them, and then how much the words “reserved, quiet” apply to them. The second trait pair is reverse coded and added to the first pair to create a measure of extraversion.⁷

Collectively, I have measures of the macro-context at the state level, measures of the micro-context at the discussion network level, and measures of individual personality traits. These three components allow me to test the ways in which macro-contextual influence is conditioned by both who someone is, and who they interact with.

I model partisan change by taking the absolute value of the difference in the respondent's party identification between wave 1 and 2 of the survey. This variable ranges from 0 to 6, where 0 is those who report the same partisanship at wave 1 and 2, and 6 is someone who moves 6 points on the scale of partisanship (from a strong Republican to a

⁷ To measure the remaining personality types the following trait pairs are used. Openness to experience: “open to new experiences, complex” and “conventional, uncreative.” Agreeableness: “sympathetic, warm” and “critical, quarrelsome.” Emotional stability: “calm, emotionally stable” and “anxious, easily upset.” Conscientiousness: “Dependable, self-disciplined” and “Disorganized, careless.”

strong Democrat, or vice versa). 72% of the sample experiences no movement between waves and is coded as a 0, but 28% change their party identification by at least 1 point. I use presidential campaign spending, strength of partisanship, age, and interest, as well as changes in candidate affect and economic evaluations between waves as additional explanatory variables.

Of interest is the way in which macro-contextual influence is conditional upon micro-social environments and individual traits. To model this question I present a series of interactions. First, I demonstrate that macro-contexts have a direct influence on partisan stability. Next, I show interactions between discussion network disagreement, and personality traits. Finally, I present three-way interactions between state context, discussion network disagreement, and personality traits to demonstrate the conditionality of contextual influence upon both who someone is, and who they talk to. The models are estimated with random intercept multilevel models to account for potential clustering at the state level.

Results

Table 1 presents the results of a multilevel model which demonstrates the effect of residence in a state where the individual is in the partisan minority on their partisan change over the course of an election season.

Table 1: Effects of State and County Environments on Partisan Change Over Election Season

	State Context	Effect Size
Partisan Minority in State	.003* (.001)	.49
Campaign Spending	-.003 (.004)	N/A
Δ in Economic Perceptions, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.057 (.036)	N/A
Δ in Obama Feeling Thermometer, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.017* (.007)	.33
Avg. Disagreement in Discussion Network	.094* (.038)	.28
Strength of Partisanship	-.038 (.024)	N/A
Age	-.002 (.002)	N/A
Education	-.023 (.026)	N/A
Interest	.028 (.023)	N/A
Constant	.331* (.130)	
<i>N</i>	735	
Level 2 Units	50	
Deviance	1,410	
AIC	1,430	

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates with random intercepts. Standard errors in parentheses. Second column shows the change in expected value of partisan change across the full range of all significant variables. * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

We see that there is a positive and significant coefficient on the ‘Partisan Minority in State’ variable, suggesting that residence in a state which challenges individual partisanship produces significantly more change in partisanship over the course of an election. The Republican in Massachusetts is significantly more likely to change her party identification than the Republican in Wyoming, while the Democrat in Wyoming is significantly more likely to change her partisanship than the Democrat in Massachusetts. Across the full range of the measure, we see a change in the expected value of partisan change of roughly .5, or half of a point on the seven point scale of party identification. While this is a relatively modest change, it is the largest magnitude amongst the significant variables in the model.

There is also a significant effect for the Change in Obama Feeling Thermometer measure, those who have a large change in their appraisal of Obama also experience a change in partisanship, moving from those with no change to the maximum amount of change in the data produces a .33 change in partisanship. Discussion network disagreement is the remaining significant variable in the model, moving from those who have no network disagreement to those whose networks are comprised of a high level of disagreement see a .28 change.

The model in Table 1 establishes that contexts – in this case, state contexts – appear to exert influences on the partisan. This finding is not particularly surprising and is consistent with decades of research on contextual influence (e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), but it is necessary establish the direct effect before exploring the conditional effects. The questions I turn to now are what explains why some people are influenced by these environments, while others are not. First, I test the expectation that the citizen's discussion network composition will moderate the influence of macro-contexts. Table 2 presents a model which tests this proposition by interacting the Partisan Minority variable with the Network Average Disagreement measure.

Table 2: Moderating Effects of Discussion Network Composition


Partisan Minority in State	-.001 (.002)
Partisan Minority in State X Avg. Dis. in Network	.005* (.002)
Campaign Spending	-.003 (.004)
Δ in Economic Perceptions, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.054 (.036)
Δ in Obama Feeling Thermometer, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.017* (.007)
Avg. Disagreement in Discussion Network	.102* (.039)
Strength of Partisanship	-.037 (.024)
Age	-.002 (.002)
Education	-.021 (.026)
Interest	.027 (.023)
Constant	.315* (.130)
<i>N</i>	735
Level 2 Units	50
Deviance	1,404
AIC	1,430

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates with random intercepts. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

We see the significant and positive coefficient on the interaction coefficient, suggesting that when discussion networks are increasing disagreeable they are unable to provide a buffer between the citizen and the broader political environment, resulting in greater influence of the state context. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship by plotting the marginal effect of the state context across the full range of the Average Network Disagreement Frequency measure.⁸

⁸ All interaction plots are generated using the margins command in Stata 11.



This figure clearly illustrates the moderating effect of network disagreement. We see that for those with no network disagreement – i.e. those individuals with a reinforcing micro-context – there is no influence of the broader macro-context. While the Democrat in Wyoming is more likely to change partisanship over the course of the election season *on average* as seen in Table 1, the Democrat in Wyoming is not going to be influenced by the broader state context when the discussion network provides an effective buffer against the broader influences by supplying political agreement. However, as the discussion network becomes increasingly disagreeable, the ability of the micro-context to provide this buffer dissolves and macro-contextual influences begin to emerge. This finding is consistent with prior work demonstrating the potential insulating effects of discussion networks against influences from broader contexts (e.g. Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Finifter 1974). However, we know that not all individuals engage their surroundings in a similar fashion, raising the possibility that whether citizens are influenced by their contexts may rest in both who they interact with as shown in Table 2, but also in their internal traits.

To test this proposition I include measures of the Big-Five personality traits in the models and interact them with the state context variable to test whether it is the case that

some people, because of their predispositions, are influenced while others resist such effects.

These results are presented in Table 3.


Table 3: Moderating Effects of Personality on State Partisan Minority Status

Partisan Minority in State	-.000	.003	.012*	.014*	.008
	(.004)	(.006)	(.005)	(.006)	(.006)
Partisan Minority in State X Extraversion	.000	-----	-----	-----	-----
	(.000)				
Partisan Minority in State X Openness	-----	.000	-----	-----	-----
		(.001)			
Partisan Minority in State X Emotional Stability	-----	-----	-.001	-----	-----
			(.001)		
Partisan Minority in State X Agreeableness	-----	-----	-----	-.001+	-----
				(.001)	
Partisan Minority in State X Conscientiousness	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.000
					(.001)
Extraversion	.008	.007	.007	.007	.007
	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)
Openness	.012	.012	.013	.013	.012
	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)
Emotional Stability	-.019+	-.019+	-.020+	-.020+	-.018
	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)
Agreeableness	-.008	-.009	-.010	-.011	-.008
	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)
Conscientiousness	.005	.005	.006	.006	.004
	(.012)	(.012)	(.012)	(.012)	(.012)
Campaign Spending	-.003	-.003	-.003	-.002	-.003
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Δ in Economic Perceptions, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.065+	.065+	.066+	.064+	.064+
	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)
Δ in Obama Feeling Thermometer, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.014*	.014*	.014*	.014*	.014*
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
Avg. Disagreement in Discussion Network	.076+	.079*	.084*	.078*	.081*
	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)	(.039)
Strength of Partisanship	-.045+	-.045+	-.043+	-.044+	-.045+
	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)
Age	-.000	-.000	-.000	-.001	-.000
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Education	-.001	-.002	-.003	-.004	-.002
	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)
Interest	.020	.019	.017	.018	.018
	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)
Constant	.293	.300	.304	.326+	.301
	(.191)	(.191)	(.191)	(.191)	(.191)
<i>N</i>	714	714	714	714	714
Level 2 Units	50	50	50	50	50
Deviance	1,322	1,322	1,320	1,320	1,322
AIC	1,354	1,354	1,352	1,352	1,354

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

While we do not see significant coefficients emerge in the interactions, plotting the marginal effects of context across the full range of all of the Big-Five traits reveals significant differences in the level of contextual influence. These plots are presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Moderating Effects of Personality for State Environments



Starting with extraversion, we see that there is a positive interaction effect as expected.

Those who are more extraverted experience a larger effect of their macro-context compared to those who are introverted. In fact, there is no effect of state political environments on changing partisanship for those who are introverted. This comports with expectations that those who are more extraverted will speak more often and engage those around them on a much more frequent basis, likely opening avenues for contextual influences to be realized, while the introverted individual engages in much less of this behavior and does not receive the same exposure to the distribution of opinions surrounding them.

For openness to experience, there is a positive interaction coefficient as expected, but the relationship is fairly weak. The slope of the marginal effects line is not large, and the 95% confidence bounds cross 0 at both the low and high ends of the distribution. There is a significant effect across a range of openness, but small slope warrants caution in confirming our expectations. This is suggestive of those who are more open to experience being more susceptible to contextual influence than those who are more conventional, but the results are too weak to make a strong confirmatory statement.

Turning to emotional stability, there is much stronger evidence to suggest that this personality trait moderates contextual influence. We see a negative interaction coefficient, and the plot reveals a fairly strong conditioning effect. As individuals become increasingly emotionally stable, they become less susceptible to contextual influence. In fact, there is no effect of the state context for those who are the most emotionally stable, as their internal traits and predispositions to be stable and steady appear to resist outside pressures. However, there is a fairly strong contextual effect for those who are neurotic and anxious.

A similar pattern emerges for agreeableness. As individuals become increasingly agreeable, the effect of state context on partisan change diminishes. For the most agreeable, there is no effect of state context, while the disagreeable appear to be influenced. Recall that

the expectations for the moderating effects of agreeableness were mixed, with reasons to suspect either a positive or negative effect. The evidence presented here suggests that when confronted with disagreement, the agreeable individual for whom this type of pressure is likely to be the most uncomfortable may be shutting down and withdrawing rather than modifying her beliefs. That is, the agreeable citizen who views socially supplied disagreement and being in an out-group as being especially distressing turns inward and in doing so, becomes impervious to external influence. Alternatively, the disagreeable individual in the same situation is not going to turn inward and will continue to engage in and be exposed to opinions and pressures around them.

Finally, we see a negative but relatively weak effect for conscientiousness. The negative relationship is in the expected direction, but with an effect different from 0 only across a relatively small range of the trait, caution is warranted in interpreting the moderating effect. This suggests that the conscientious individual who is characterized as being careful and self-disciplined, is less susceptible to external influence than the individual who is more disorganized and careless. However, these effects are not strong enough to make confident statements about the conditioning effect.

Collectively, the results from Table 3 and Figure 2 offer a picture of conditional contextual influence that is dependent upon who somebody is, and not just who they interact with. Internal factors in the form of personality traits appear to predispose citizens to being more or less susceptible to contextual effects. For some, such as the extraverted, these predispositions appear to open more avenues of influence as they interact more frequently with those in their context. For others such as the emotionally stable, these predispositions produce an individual who is largely resistant to external influence and maintains their attitudes in the face of external pressures. Given the results presented so far, the picture of contextual influence is more nuanced. Both discussion network factors, as well as personality

traits appear to moderate the effects of the macro environment. But how do these two moderating factors interact with one another? That is, what happens to the individual who is predisposed to receive contextual influence, such as the extraverted, but their discussion network provides a buffer by supplying largely agreeable discussants? How do internal traits and discussion network factors interact with one another to produce a citizen who is influenced by the outside, or resistant to change?

To explore these questions, I present a series of three-way interactions between state context, personality, and discussion network disagreement. The regression results are presented in Table 4, but the more intuitive way to interpret the results is by looking at the interaction plots.

Table 4: Moderating Effects of Personality and Network Disagreement on State Contextual Influence


Partisan Minority in State	.002 (.008)	.001 (.011)	-.001 (.009)	-.000 (.011)	-.015 (.011)
Partisan Minority X Extraversion X Avg. Network Dis.	.001 (.001)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority X Openness X Avg. Network Dis.	-----	.000 (.001)	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority X Emo. Stability X Avg. Network Dis.	-----	-----	-.001 (.001)	-----	-----
Partisan Minority X Agreeable X Avg. Network Dis.	-----	-----	-----	-.001 (.001)	-----
Partisan Minority X Conscientious X Avg. Network Dis.	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.002* (.001)
Partisan Minority in State X Extraversion	-.000 (.001)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in State X Openness	-----	-.000 (.001)	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in State X Emotional Stability	-----	-----	.000 (.001)	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in State X Agreeableness	-----	-----	-----	.000 (.001)	-----
Partisan Minority in State X Conscientiousness	-----	-----	-----	-----	.001 (.001)
Partisan Minority in State X Avg. Network Dis.	-.002 (.008)	.002 (.010)	.015+ (.009)	.016 (.011)	.028* (.010)
Extraversion X Avg. Network Disagreement	-.002 (.015)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Openness X Avg. Network Disagreement	-----	-.010 (.017)	-----	-----	-----
Emotional Stability X Avg. Network Disagreement	-----	-----	-.025 (.016)	-----	-----
Agreeableness X Avg. Network Disagreement	-----	-----	-----	-.019 (.019)	-----
Conscientiousness X Avg. Network Disagreement	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.018 (.017)
Extraversion	.008 (.016)	.005 (.009)	.006 (.009)	.005 (.009)	.005 (.009)
Openness	.014 (.011)	.023 (.019)	.015 (.011)	.016 (.011)	.015 (.011)
Emotional Stability	-.021+ (.011)	-.021+ (.011)	.001 (.018)	-.022+ (.011)	-.020 (.011)
Agreeableness	-.007 (.013)	-.007 (.013)	-.009 (.013)	.010 (.021)	-.008 (.013)
Conscientiousness	.002 (.012)	.001 (.012)	.003 (.012)	.003 (.012)	.018 (.019)
Campaign Spending	-.002 (.004)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.004)
Δ in Economic Perceptions, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.064+ (.035)	.062+ (.035)	.063+ (.035)	.057 (.035)	.059+ (.035)
Δ in Obama Feeling Thermometer, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.014* (.007)	.014* (.007)	.014* (.007)	.014* (.007)	.014* (.007)
Avg. Disagreement in Discussion Network	.107 (.123)	.180 (.169)	.322* (.153)	.272 (.189)	.264 (.180)
Strength of Partisanship	-.044+ (.044)	-.044+ (.044)	-.041+ (.041)	-.043+ (.043)	-.046+ (.046)

	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)
Age	-.000	-.000	-.000	-.001	-.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Education	.001	-.001	-.000	-.002	.002
	(.026)	(.026)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
Interest	.020	.019	.013	.018	.014
	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)
Constant	.274	.218	.099	.149	.161
	(.216)	(.242)	(.233)	(.256)	(.248)
<i>N</i>	714	714	714	714	714
Level 2 Units	50	50	50	50	50
Deviance	1,316	1,318	1,314	1,314	1,314
AIC	1,354	1,356	1,350	1,350	1,350

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

To begin, I turn to the interaction between state context, network average disagreement, and extraversion. Recall from Figure 2 that the extraverted individual is more likely to experience an effect from the state macro-context than the introverted. Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of state context across the range of extraversion when the average network disagreement frequency is 0, 1, 2, and 3 (the full range of Average Network Disagreement Frequency).

Figure 3: Moderating Effects of Extraversion and Network Disagreement




Looking at the plots in Figure 3 we see that extraversion and network disagreement appear to interact with one another to produce a citizen who is influenced by the state context, or not. Looking at the first plot where the effects of extraversion are being evaluated when there is no disagreement in the discussion network, we see that there is not a moderating effect of extraversion. That is, it does not matter who someone is – extravert, introvert, or neither – if the network does not supply the individual with disagreement there is not an effect of the broader context. This is significant because it demonstrates that even for an individual who is predisposed to receive contextual effects, i.e. the most extraverted citizen, influence is not conveyed when the network supplies only agreement and acts as a buffer against macro-contextual factors. This is a testament to the important role of discussion network composition when determining who and when people are susceptible to outside pressures.

However, when we look at the networks where there is some disagreement provided in the 2nd through 4th plot we see the same moderating pattern for extraversion emerge. When citizens receive disagreement from their networks, it is the extraverts who are influenced by their environments while the introverts resist contextual effects. Of particular note is the 4th plot where we are looking at those who have the maximum amount of disagreement in their network. These are the people whose networks provide no buffer at all and where we would expect to see the most influence from the macro-context. What stands out here is that personality still determines who is influenced and who is not. Even for those with no network buffer, the most introverted individuals are not influenced by the state political environment. This is a testament to the importance of individual personality traits in determining the conditions under which macro-influence is translated to individual effects. What these plots clearly demonstrate is that it matters *both* who you are, and who you talk to. Even the most internally predisposed citizen is not affected by the macro-context if the micro-

context provides a buffer, and even those who have no buffer whatsoever are not affected if they are not predisposed to receive influence.

Turning to openness to experience we find a similar pattern, though with less significance since the relationship with openness from Figure 2 was fairly weak. The plots for openness to experience are shown in Figure 4.


Figure 4: Moderating Effects of Openness and Network Disagreement



Similar to the pattern with extraversion, when there is no network disagreement, it clearly does not matter that personality traits one takes on, there is no effect of the macro-context. When we look at the 2nd through 4th plots where there is some level of disagreement, there is a small portion of the range of openness where there is a significant effect of the state environment, but the slope of the marginal effects line is relatively flat, suggesting that the moderating effect of openness is limited. It appears in the 4th plot that for those who are characterized as being closed, there is still no effect of the state context even when disagreement is at its maximum. While the overall strength of the results for openness are less compelling, the conclusion that it matters both who you are, and who you talk to seems to find some support again.

A very similar pattern emerges for the emotional stability trait, as shown in Figure 5.


Figure 5: Moderating Effects of Emotional Stability and Network Disagreement



When there is no network disagreement supplied to the individual and the network is able to act as a buffer, it does not matter if a person is emotionally stable, or neurotic – there is no effect of the state political environment on partisan change. However, when there is disagreement present in the network, personality traits do appear to drive who is influenced and who is not. For the most emotionally stable individuals, there is no effect of the state political environment, even when their network is comprised entirely of disagreeable discussants. Again, responses to contextual forces are highly conditional. For those whose networks supply them with only agreement and provide a buffer against macro forces, it does not matter what kinds of internal traits they possess, the macro-context is inconsequential. However, when the network supplies some level of disagreement and is not a perfect buffer, it begins to matter who someone is. Certain types of people appear to be responsive to contexts under these circumstances, while others are not. In this case, the emotionally stable citizen is not swayed by contextual influence, but the neurotic and anxious are.

Agreeableness operates in much the same way. Figure 6 shows these results.


Figure 6: Moderating Effects of Agreeableness and Network Disagreement



When the discussion network provides a complete buffer by supplying nothing but agreement to the individual, there is no effect of the macro-context, regardless of whether a person is agreeable or disagreeable. However, once disagreement is introduced into the network, the agreeableness trait appears to drive whether the state political environment is consequential for partisan change. For the most agreeable individuals, there is no effect of the macro-context, even when the discussion network is supplying only disagreement and is not able to function a buffer. However, for the disagreeable, there is a contextual effect in the 2nd through 4th plots where the discussion network does not supply a complete buffer. As with extraversion, emotional stability, and (to a lesser extent) openness to experience, both internal traits as well as social buffers determine when contextual pressures exert influence over individual party identification.

Finally, the results for conscientiousness offer an identical account of the ways in which personality traits and discussion networks interact to produce a citizen who is a product of their environment, or not. Figure 7 shows these results.

Figure 7: Moderating Effects of Conscientiousness and Network Disagreement



Again, when the micro-context in the form of the discussion network is supplies the individual with only congruent information, it appears to create an effective buffer which keeps macro-contextual influences from shaping citizen attitudes. However, as this buffer begins to break down, personality matters for who is influenced and who is not. The conscientious citizen who is characterized as being self-disciplined, is not effected by the macro-context, regardless of how strong or weak their discussion network buffer is. However, those who are characterized as being disorganized or careless have partisanship that is responsive to the state political context when their networks are not perfect buffers and supply them with some level of disagreement.

Conclusion

A common question raised about arguments of contextual influence is one derived from some of our own anecdotal experiences – why not me? That is, why are some people seemingly impervious to contextual effects, while others appear to become a product of their environments? Despite decades of compelling evidence on the ways in which context molds citizens, we all know people who are surrounded by peers and pressures that they do not conform with, and likely never will. Some of the most prominent work on conformity to group pressures (e.g. Asch 1956, 1963) notes that even when the modal response to social pressures is changing beliefs to align with those of the group (Berns et al. 2005), there is still a sizeable number of individuals who resist these pressures. The findings presented here speak to these heterogeneous responses to social pressures, looking specifically at how contextually supplied political influence either shapes the citizen, or does not.

Prior research in political science has focused on the ways that micro-contexts in the form of personal discussion networks moderate the effects of broader environments (Finifter 1974; Huckfeldt et al. 1995), offering an explanation of contextual influence that is conditional upon other contexts. The findings presented here confirm this argument but add

that these effects are also a function of individual traits in the form of personality. It matters who you are surrounded by, but it also matters who you are. There are some people (the introverted, emotionally stable, and agreeable, for example) for whom contexts appear to never be of consequence. It does not matter how coercive of an environment they are located in, or how great their exposure to out-group social pressures is. These individuals, because of their internal predispositions, are seemingly impervious to contextual influence.

This adds to our understanding of contextual influence on several fronts. One of the persisting questions has been that of mechanisms – how is it that contexts come to form citizens? By looking at the conditions under which contexts are formative (or are not), we are able to glean some insights into mechanisms. Clearly, political discussion is an important facet of influence. By demonstrating that across all personality types there is no effect of the context when individuals have entirely agreeable networks that form buffers against influence, this provides evidence of the embedded nature of social influence and of the importance of the discussion network. While this does not rule out a non-discussion based norm adoption mechanism (i.e. Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988), it does establish that discussion networks are a central component of influence. Further, exploring the conditionality of contextual influence helps to understand the anecdotal evidence that we all observe of people for whom contexts appear to play an important role in driving their political attitudes, and those whom seem to be unaffected. In debating the extent of contextual influence, many have raised the question of “why not me?” The results here offer some tentative answers to this question, though are by no means the last word on the subject.

There are several issues with the analysis presented here, and the inferences that can be drawn. First, an issue that is present in nearly all studies of contexts and discussion network effects is that of endogeneity. We know that discussion networks are in part (though not entirely) constrained by macro-context (Huckfeldt 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). It

is also possible that personality traits drive whether one has an agreeable or disagreeable network. I discuss these issues more extensively and provide some testing of the extent to which these are problems with the data I have used here in Appendix B. To summarize the discussion in Appendix B, there is some evidence of a correlation between being in the partisan minority in a state, and having a more disagreeable discussion network, consistent with our understanding of discussion network constraint. However, there is no evidence that personality traits are driving network composition, minimizing concerns of endogeneity pertaining to that aspect of the analysis.

Further, I have chosen to look at contextual effects on partisan change, and how both discussion networks and personality traits moderate the role of state political environments. It is possible that networks and personality provide different moderating effects for different dependent variables. Not all context effects are a product of social influence and in-group/out-group dynamics as state effects on partisan change are. For example, campaign environments can produce context effects on a host of dependent variables for informational reasons that have less to do with social pressures. It may be the case that networks and personality moderate in a different fashion when this is the case. While it is outside the scope of this paper to test all of these alternative dependent variables, hopefully the takeaway message that individual predispositions interact with social circumstances to produce a contextually influenced citizen (or not), can be applied to different outcomes.

CHAPTER 5: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SOCIAL PRESSURES COLLIDE? THE FORMATIVE ROLE OF POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS

How do competing social influences shape individual partisanship over the course of the life cycle? The notion that partisanship is socialized is well established, with the preponderance of evidence pointing to pre-adult socialization from the family being the most formative. However, people enter and exit a host of environments over the course of the lifespan, and these environments provide social pressures of their own. What happens when these varying social influences collide? Does the long-lasting nature of early social influence from the family trump later social forces, or do environments throughout life nullify and replace familial socialization? Using the Youth-Parent Socialization Study and constructing partisan environmental measures at the county level, I explore this question. The findings demonstrate that environments exert significant socializing influence over the lifespan, and when the pressures supplied by parents early in life and environments later in life collide, parental social influence is offset and replaced. This helps to reconcile two competing perspectives on the enduring nature of familial socialization. When environments throughout life provide reinforcing social pressures, parental influence persists over time. However, when early socialized influence is challenged over time by the political environment that citizens reside in, the influence of early parental socialization is offset and nullified. Socialization can be an agent for either opinion change, or opinion stability. Looking beyond the family to political contexts is instructive for understanding which path is taken.

Political socialization comes in many forms, and from numerous sources. These processes are undoubtedly consequential for the political attitudes and behaviors of the American citizen. But what happens when social influence is delivered to the individual from different sources, and what happens when these different socialization pressures collide? How does the individual who is predisposed to be a Democrat because of early familial socialization respond to a change in environments later in life to a context which provides Republican leaning social pressures? Our understanding of the formative power of early processes suggests a relatively static individual, for whom socialization was consequential, but primarily early in life (Campbell et al. 1960; Sears and Funk 1999) and later changes in influence are not likely to be material – often called the “persistence hypothesis” (Sears 1989; Miller and Sears 1986).

However, it is also suggested that social pressures extend beyond early years and originate from one's surroundings (Newcomb et al. 1967; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), raising the possibility that individuals are reasonably dynamic through their lives and political attitudes and behaviors respond to the changes in influences or environments that occur (Miller and Sears 1986). These two different sets of socializing pressures can be in congruence or conflict. If later environments and the social pressures they supply conflict with early influences, it may be the case that they can undo the early familial socialization process which has garnered the preponderance of attention in the formation of partisanship (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Campbell et al. 1960; Tedin 1974; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). When social forces conflict, which influences maintain and which are mitigated?

The implications are not only a more complete understanding of social influence, but also different suggestions about the socialized citizen. A problem with the socialized perspective of partisanship is that it struggles to explain the changes we observe in party identification over time. The persistence model implies a great deal of stability in partisanship as socialized influences are fixed over time once the citizen has left the household because of enduring early influences. The findings presented here help to reconcile this issue, maintaining a view of partisanship as being largely socialized, but recognizing that competing social forces over time that can either reinforce early influences fostering persistence, or challenging them and freeing the individual from his or her partisan roots.

Further, this speaks to a theoretical discussion amongst scholars of social influence about what types of relationships foster social influence. Much of the literature on early socialization comes from a social cohesion perspective where strong, intimate ties – such as those with parents – generate the most influence. Others argue for structural equivalence – the idea that influence

comes from those with similar social and structural positions, regardless of the intimacy of the ties. Looking at how familial influences from early in life (social cohesion) endure in the face of less intimate influence but from contextually supplied peers (structural equivalence) joins in this conversation by demonstrating the degree to which social influence originating from the social cohesion perspective holds up in the face of pressures from sources that are structurally equivalent. Exploring this tension that can arise from conflict between the two kinds of social influence is instructive for developing a more complete understanding of the interplay that occurs between different types of influence.

I use the Youth-Parent Socialization Study, which follows a sample of Americans over 4 survey waves from 1965-1997. This survey is uniquely suited to addressing the questions presented here because it contains measures of early parental social influence, as well as observations of the same individuals over a 32 year time period. The findings paint a picture of social influence that is extended over the life cycle where the agents of socialization shift from the parents to broader environments once people leave the home. Over the course of the panel, macro-environmental socialization accounts for as much variation in individual partisanship as do the pre-adult social forces that garner the bulk of attention in the socialization literature.

Perhaps most notably, this creates an exchange between persisting parental socialization, and contemporaneous environmental social pressure. When these influences align and environments reinforce early processes, the effects of parental socialization persist over the life-cycle, conforming with our understanding of the enduring legacy of these effects. However, when environments challenge the influences learned in adolescence, they appear to terminate parental socializing effects, presumably initiating a detachment from predispositions and opening

the door to partisan change – consistent with the “revisionist hypothesis” which questions the degree to which early processes crystallize party identification (Sears 1989).

Socialized Partisanship: The Family and Surrounding Environment

The notion that partisanship is formed through social processes is well established. The preponderance of evidence pointing to these social roots focuses on the pre-adult years as being both formative and lasting over time. The family appears to be the most influential agent of pre-adult socialization for forming party affiliations (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Campbell et al. 1960; Tedin 1974; Hyman 1959; Jennings and Langton 1969; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978; Kroh and Selb 2009; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007), though less instrumental for other political attitudes and issue opinions (Tedin 1974; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Connell 1972; Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978; though see Dalton 1980; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009 for exceptions). The family is so formative in large part due to the amount of time children spend with their parents, the lack of strong prior political orientations in pre-adulthood, the intimate nature of the relationships, as well as their receptivity to the messages they are provided with from family sources (Sears and Levy 2003).

While family appears to exert the strongest pull on partisanship, pre-adult socialization does not end outside of the home. Peer and friend networks serve to shape political orientations (Beck 1977; Campbell 1980; Settle, Bond, and Levitt 2011), as do the schools that provide young people with many of their social contacts (Levin 1961; Langton 1967; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Campbell 2006). However, these micro-environments in the form of the home, friendship networks, and schools are both a product of, and constrained by the macro-environments they are embedded within such as the neighborhood, community, county, and state. These macro-environments also provide independent socializing influences in childhood and adolescence that

mold individual political persuasions (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; Campbell 2006; Pacheco 2008; Wolak 2009; Gimpel and Lay 2005).

The implication being that social pressures matter significantly early in life when the citizen's beliefs are relatively unformed and yielding, but that once early adulthood has been reached the individual's partisanship has fully formed and there is little room left for social influence. Erikson and Tedin (2011) echo this view, "Regarding persistence, two major points merit elaboration. First, political attitudes are malleable through the impressionable years. Second, after the impressionable years, political orientations harden considerably" (155). Yet, we know that the influence of early socialization, notably the transmission of partisanship from parents to children diminishes with time over the life cycle (Niemi and Jennings 1991; Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976; Achen 2002). If partisanship is not entirely stable over time and the effects of early socialization diminish through the years, what influences step in to fill the void left by the lasting parental social imprint? Is social influence largely constrained to early years and gives way to other factors in adulthood such as issues and party performance (e.g. Niemi and Jennings 1991; Kroh and Selb 2009; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989; Carmines and Stimson 1981), or is partisanship rooted in micro and macro-environments throughout life, and not just in the early formative years?

There is no reason to think that socialization is a limited phenomenon that only occurs during the "formative years" and is largely inconsequential later in life. Macro-environments such as neighborhoods, communities, and counties, are influential for a host of political outcomes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Huckfeldt et al. 1995; MacKuen and Brown 1987), and seem well positioned to fill the void left by early parental socialization

throughout life. Some evidence suggests that macro-environments can influence partisanship later in life (Brown 1988; Lyons 2011), but the degree to which these socializing influences matter over the course of the life cycle, and the extent to which they compete with or replace early social forces remains to be seen.

Further, these environments encountered later in life and the social pressures that they supply have the potential to either reinforce early processes, or challenge them, moderating the extent to which early social influence is able to persist over time. Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz (1976) note that “persistence apparently depends not only on how deeply an orientation is embedded but also how it is reinforced through life” (113). The political environment that the citizen resides in seems likely to be one such force which can moderate the persistence of early influence. Do surrounding political environments over the life cycle impart increasingly important socializing influence that can reinforce or replace early social processes? I argue that much reason exists to suspect they do, suggesting the social influence needs to be more broadly construed, and that social processes don’t necessarily suggest a relatively inert citizen. Rather, social influence occurs over the entire life cycle, providing citizens with changing pressures that people respond to. As environments change over time, so does social influence. Dynamic influence may open the door to a dynamic partisan citizen who is more moveable and tends to conform with environments over time.

Environmental Socialization Over the Life Cycle

Neighborhoods, communities, and broader environments provide the individual with many of the same social pressures that were received from parents in pre-adulthood (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). While these pressures may be more mixed in nature and less pervasive than pressures from the family home, they provide many of the same influences. In fact, surrounding

contexts appear to influence partisanship for children and adolescents independent of parental effects. Community heterogeneity (Campbell 2006) and partisan/demographic characteristics (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003), state campaign environments (Wolak 2009), and politically competitive contexts (Pacheco 2008) all socialize youths to a host of political attitudes and behaviors. Collectively, the argument is that these extra-parental environments supply children and adolescents with information which shapes opinions, stimuli that foster engagement in politics, and norms of which views and behaviors are acceptable and which are not. Why should these pressures cease when the individual matures and leaves the home?

Citizens receive information from co-workers, pressures to conform from peers and neighbors, observe partisan in-group and out-groups via bumper stickers and yard signs, and encounter the distribution of opinions in their environment at barbeques and the water cooler at work. Whether through the provision of partisan information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), a sense of norm adoption (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988), or simply not wanting to be the outcast, these daily social interactions that people have with those around them operate much the same as the influences from the family that were encountered earlier in life. Further, the social contacts that surround citizens on a daily basis are likely to occupy similar social and structural positions. People live in neighborhoods and work in professions predominately with those of similar socioeconomic characteristics. These structural similarities can be powerful conduits of social influence as individuals absorb norms and expectations of those who are like them (Burt 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).

While these later environments may lack the consistency and pervasiveness of messages that youths are exposed to, they make up for in duration. By most accounts, parents have roughly 6-8 years in which to socialize the partisanship of their children (Hess and Torney 1967).

For reasons pointed out earlier these 6-8 years are extremely formative, but consider the individual who leaves home, relocates for a job and spends a 30 year career in a different environment. The lasting imprint of the early years should begin to wane over time (Jennings and Niemi 1991), and the adult environment should begin exerting socializing influences of its own. The expectation that follows is that environmental socialization is a lifelong process. Early in life the environment that matters most is the family and the household, but once people enter adulthood and leave the home, the agent of socialization expands to the surrounding macro-environment consisting of towns, communities, and cities. These environments and the distributions of opinions within them fill the void left by ebbing parental influence and become a more formative socializing agent for the remainder of the life cycle.

H₁: Political environments will exert formative socializing influences once the individual leaves the home and will endure over the course of the life cycle.

If broader political environments shape partisanship in adulthood and throughout the life cycle, this raises the possibility that social pressures can exert influence at different points in time, from different sources, and present varying influences. One of the lingering questions pertaining to socialized influence is the degree to which early forces maintain their formative influence through life. The “persistence hypothesis” argues that parental socialization is so important because of its lingering effects over the life cycle, noting that once the citizen is set on a partisan path by their parents, that route is rarely deviated from (Sears and Funk 1999; Hess and Torney 1967; Jennings and Niemi 1968).

Others argue for a “revisionist hypothesis” (Jennings and Markus 1984; Miller and Sears 1986; Franklin 1984; Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976) whereby early forces matter, but the partisan path is deviated from more frequently, and later events continue to mold the partisan. The implication of the latter being that early socialization is not as influential as previously

argued, and that the citizen is more dynamic than had been recognized. What leads to this theoretical discrepancy? It appears that for some the persistence hypothesis applies, while others are cut loose from parental influence and have their partisanship formed by current events, policy attitudes, and candidate evaluations. I turn to the political environments which citizens reside in that continue to impart socializing pressures for an answer. These environments have the ability to moderate the effects of early influence – producing either persistence, or detachment from priors. Does the enduring imprint of early processes dominate, or can later environments nullify and replace these formative influences?

Environments can serve to either reinforce or challenge other social pressures. Reinforcing environmental social influence occurs when the citizen was socialized by a Republican mother or father, and then resides in a Republican leaning environment, or vice versa for Democrats. Conversely, challenging social pressures occur when the individual is socialized by Republican parents and reside in an environment consisting of Democratic leaning pressures, or vice versa.

When environments present social pressures reinforcing the early influence exerted by the family, the individual is receiving consistent messages, information, and influence. The attachments formed early in life are fortified. Dissonant information is relatively uncommon, and even when confronted, it is easy for the individual to avoid or reject it in the presence of an abundance of agreeable influence. On average, the formative power of early influence wanes over the life cycle (Niemi and Jennings 1991). However, when these antecedent social influences are reinforced over the life cycle by congruent social pressures provided by the environment, the expectation is that they will maintain influence. The suggestion being that the persistence of early pressures over the life cycle is dependent upon later environmentally

supplied social influence reinforcing and sustaining the early influences. When environments reinforce early influence, the persistence hypothesis should find support.

However, not all citizens reside in environments that provide these fortifying influences. Many are surrounded by political contexts that challenge the social influences from youth. When the predisposed citizen is confronted on a daily basis with pressures to conform, information, and opinions that challenge his or her early socialized beliefs, there are several possible outcomes. The first of these possibilities is that parental influence will persist in the face of social cross-pressures. After all, for adults, many views are crystallized (Sears and Funk 1999). Partisanship serves as a “perceptual screen” (Campbell et al. 1960: 133) through which the political world is viewed in fashions that continue to reinforce prior beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006; Lodge and Taber 2000). Once formed by pre-adult social forces from the family, adult partisanship is also resistant to change because citizens are unlikely to be encountering the consistent and pervasive messages from many (if any) other social sources throughout life that they encountered in the home during their childhood. If this perspective is correct, it suggests that all other forms of social influence over time are filtered through the influences provided in youth and adolescence.

On the other hand, the possibility that these environmentally supplied cross-pressures nullify early influence also exists. Cross-pressures affect partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Keele and Wolak 2006). These individuals are pulled in different directions as the influences provided by one’s parents are called into question on a daily basis by the distribution of opinions that surround the citizen. A person socialized by Republican parents but who resides in a Democratic environment faces a challenge to these early influences at work and church, in the neighborhood and in the grocery store. Views about norms and acceptable beliefs from youth

are replaced by different value sets and perspectives. While the early years clearly present an important time for beliefs to be formed, it seems quite plausible that environmentally supplied contemporaneous influences will come to supplant these beliefs. The persistence of environmental pressures to conform over time is likely to erode the lingering adolescent influence, resulting in a newly socialized citizen who has been cast free of his or her parents' influence. Put simply, when environments challenge other forms of social influence, these agents of constraint lose much of their formative power. For these citizens, the revisionist perspective may correctly characterize the persistence of early socialization.

Social influence, especially later in life, also comes from spouses. Can environments moderate these powerful socializing agents? There is reason to think they cannot. Micro-environments (such as the home) can moderate the effects of macro-environments suggesting that individuals can use their spouses to insulate themselves from the broader environment and avoid any influence (Huckfeldt et al. 1995). However, it may also be the case that these macro-environments are able to lessen the influence of spousal partisanship when they challenge and cross-pressure the individual. I argue that while it seems highly unlikely that broader environments have the ability to nullify contemporaneous spousal influence, the influences provided by the environment may lessen this influence when they create cross-pressures.

H₂: When political environments reinforce other forms of socialized influence (parents and spouses), these socializing agents will have a more persisting influence over the course of the life cycle than when political environments challenge them.

The two types of social influence discussed here are distinct. Early familial socialization originates from sources that are intimate to the individual, and readily accessible. The social cohesion perspective argues that these are the circumstances where influence is most likely to be transmitted (e.g. Dawson 1977; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Alternatively, the

view of environmental influence offers a different view. The people who surround us on a daily basis, whether they are neighbors, coworkers, or even friends, are not likely to replicate the intimate and pervasive ties that were experienced between youth and parents. From the social cohesion perspective this suggests that we should see less influence transmitted.

However, others argue that influence is primarily derived from alters who are located in similar social positions (Burt 1987; Coleman et al. 1966; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). This perspective is often called structural equivalence (Burt 1987), and represents a stark contrast to social cohesion. While these environmentally supplied sources of influence lack intimacy in the relationships between citizens, they are formative because the structurally equivalent alter shares similar social relationships, and conveys information about the expectations and norms of someone who is situated in such a position. These two theories of social influence can operate adjacently, and likely do in many cases. However, what we do not know is what happens when they do not align in a harmonious fashion? What happens when structural sources are exerting one influence and persisting cohesive influences are exerting another?

Data and Results

The Youth-Parent Socialization Study which follows respondents from their senior year in high school at age 18 in 1965, over three additional waves in 1973, 1982, and 1997 provides a unique opportunity to address these questions by combining measures of early parental social influence with long-term panel data including contextual identifiers (from the restricted data file) so that respondents can be placed in a political environment. Not only is the data longitudinal, but there are a number of years between waves allowing for a range of socializing influences from a host of sources to be tested. This enables early familial socialization to be weighed against later environmental influence that citizens encounter throughout their life.

I construct measures of the political environment at the county level. I am able to use presidential election returns for the election preceding each of the survey waves (1964, 1980, 1996 elections) to construct a measure of how Democratic or Republican the county is. I subtract the Democratic presidential vote share from the Republican presidential vote share in the county to measure the partisan composition of the county.⁹ This creates a variable where positive values indicate a Republican leaning county political environment, and negative values represent a Democratic leaning county political environment. Table 1 shows the distribution of this variable for all three survey waves.

Table 1: County Republican Context Variable for 1965, 1982, and 1997

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
1965	-90.2	70	-22.27	21.48	842
1982	-61.5	72.7	9.88	19.51	891
1997	-75.9	52.4	-5.68	20.58	898

There is a wide range in the variable over all three waves, with some respondents residing in very Republican counties (the highest values) while others reside in heavily Democratic counties (the lowest values).¹⁰

As noted earlier, one of the strongest features of the Youth-Parent Socialization Study is that we also have measures of parental political preferences from the 1965 wave to measure the kind of early political socialization that the respondent received. Both mother and father's partisanship on the seven-point partisanship scale from 1965 are included in models of

⁹ For example, if the Democratic candidate received 55% of the presidential vote in the county and the Republican received 35% of the vote, the county would be coded as a 20, indicating that it is a Democratic leaning environment, and by a magnitude of roughly 20 percentage points.

¹⁰ The means suggest that in 1965, most respondents were residing in fairly heavily Democratic leaning counties, in 1982 the mean county was Republican leaning, and in 1997 the mean county was slightly Democratic. In general, these means comport with our understanding of partisan mood in the country, suggesting that they are relatively representative of the distribution of environments nationally.

respondent partisanship as measures of this early socialization influence. We also have measures of the respondent's spouse's partisanship as another measure of micro-social influence. This variable is not available for the first wave of the survey, though presumably few respondents had a spouse during their senior year of high school.¹¹

A problem that does arise with this measure is a substantial amount of missing data since the 1965 wave is missing, and even when asked in later waves large numbers of respondents did not have a spouse. In the 1982 wave, 41% of the sample did not have a spouse (383 respondents), and in the 1997 wave 28% did not have a spouse (258 respondents). In order to maintain a reasonable number of observations in models and include the spousal partisanship measure despite this missing data issue, I use the "dummy variable adjustment" method.¹²

¹¹ There are two challenges with this survey that bear noting, both involving the contextual identifiers and placing the respondent into his or her political environment. First, the Youth-Parent Socialization Study contains only ZIP code identifiers which are an inherently messy contextual unit.¹¹ If political data were available at the ZIP code level dating back to the first wave in 1965 to allow for the creation of environmental measures at this level that would be ideal. Unfortunately they are not, requiring ZIP codes to be converted into counties where we have the relevant environmental data. ZIP codes change some over time, and ZIP codes occasionally cross meaningful boundaries such as county lines making them somewhat difficult to accurately place the individual into the correct county environment. What this means is that for some respondents where I have the ZIP code of residence, they could actually be in one of two counties. This likely creates some error in constructing the county political environment measure. However, the extent to which the respondent is placed in the wrong county is quite limited. Though some ZIP codes do cross county lines, when this occurs, it is most often very minimal.¹¹ For the 1965 wave, 67% of the ZIP codes were 100% within one county so there was no error, and roughly 92% of the ZIP codes were over 90% within one county. This means that for 92% of the sample there was either no error in county assignment, or at worst a 1 in 10 chance. In the 1982 wave, 75% of the ZIP codes were 100% within one county so there was no error, and roughly 93% of the ZIP codes were over 90% within one county. For the 1997 wave, 74% of the ZIP codes were 100% contained in one county creating no error, and 92% were over 90% in a single county. When ZIP codes cross county lines, I use the primary county as the respondent's political environment. The second challenge is that the ZIP code identifiers are not available for the 1973 wave of the survey, so for questions of environmental influence I am restricted to three waves: 1965, 1982, and 1997.

¹² This method involves assigning an arbitrary value to the missing data, I assign missing cases the value of -1, and then including a dummy variable in the regression that is coded 1=missing, 0=not missing on the spouse's partisanship measure. While this method is not acceptable when data are truly missing (i.e. if the respondent had a spouse but we were not measuring his or her partisanship), it is acceptable in cases such as this where the value truly does not exist because the respondent does not have a spouse (Allison

First, I show the results of three cross-sectional regressions, one for each of the survey waves in the analysis. These models demonstrate the ways in which various macro and micro social environments and social pressures influence the partisanship of the respondent at different stages in his or her life cycle. Highlighting the multiple sources of social influence that exist raises the potential for these sources to be in conflict or congruence. The dependent variable in these models is the respondent's partisanship on a seven point scale ranging from strong Democrat at the low end to strong Republican at the high end.

2001). In fact, Allison uses this very issue of spousal characteristics to illustrate situations in which the dummy variable adjustment method is appropriate. In footnote 5 he states "For example, married respondent's may be asked to rate the quality of their marriage, but that question has no meaning for unmarried respondents. Suppose we assume that there is one linear equation for married couples and another equation for unmarried couples. The married equation is identical to the unmarried equation except that it has (a) a term corresponding to the effect of marital quality on the dependent variable and (b) a different intercept. It's easy to show that the dummy variable adjustment method produces optimal estimates in this situation" (Allison 2001: 88).

Table 2: Cross-Sectional Effects of Socializing Influences of Direction of Partisanship

	1965	1982	1997
Republican Context	.001 (.002)	.014* (.003)	.013* (.003)
Mother's Partisanship (1965)	.321* (.035)	.097* (.039)	.015 (.040)
Father's Partisanship (1965)	.355* (.033)	.157* (.038)	.160* (.039)
Spouse's Partisanship	-----	.376* (.036)	.496* (.032)
Education	-----	-.033 (.049)	-.078 (.049)
Race (White=1)	.026 (.198)	.906* (.232)	1.01* (.239)
Gender (Male=1)	.141 (.103)	.338* (.115)	.661* (.119)
Unmarried	-----	1.27* (.174)	-1.49* (.190)
Constant	.714* (.193)	.174 (.246)	.146* (.255)
N	659	685	704
R-Square	.55	.35	.42

Notes: $p^* < .05$, two-tailed test.

What emerges from these cross-sectional regressions is a clear pattern of social influence dynamics over the life cycle. At wave 1 in 1965 when the respondent is roughly 18 years old and presumably still living at home with his or her parents, the household micro-environment exerts a tremendous influence, consistent with our understanding of parental partisan socialization (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Niemi 1968). Across the full range of mother's partisanship from the most Democratic to most Republican, we see a 2.25 point shift in the respondent's partisanship in a Republican direction, and the same range of the father's partisanship produces a similar but slightly larger movement of 2.49 points on the 7 point scale of partisanship. Further, at this stage in life, the macro environment does not appear to be


consequential. None of the other variables in the model were significant. This pattern of influence changes notably however by wave 2 in which the respondent is roughly 35 years old.

By wave 2 the lasting imprint of parental socialization is still evident, but the magnitude of the effect has diminished. There is a significant and positive effect of the county-level political environment on the partisanship of the respondent. Those residing in more Republican environments display a more Republican partisanship. The magnitude of the effect provided by these environments is not inconsequential. Moving from the minimum (the most Democratic county in the sample) to the maximum (the most Republican county in the sample) produces a shift of 1.86 points on the 7 point partisanship scale in a Republican direction. Put differently, if a respondent were to be a Democratic-leaning Independent and residing in the most Democratic county in the sample and were to relocate to the most Republican county we would expect his or her partisanship to shift roughly 2 points to becoming a Republican-leaning Independent.

Micro-environments in the form of the household are still highly influential, but the source of micro influence has shifted to the spouse. In fact, by age 35, the spouse is more influential than either parent was at age 18. Moving from the minimum value of spousal partisanship (a strong Democrat) to the maximum (a strong Republican) produces a 2.63 point shift in a Republican direction for the respondent. The lasting effect of parental partisanship is still present at age 35, though the magnitude of the effects are smaller than for both spouses and macro environments. Put differently, by this stage in an individual's life, parental socialization still matters, but environments have become more consequential. Looking across the range of parental partisanship from the most Democratic to most Republican mother produces a .68 shift in a Republican direction for the respondent, and the same shift for the father produces a 1.1

magnitude change for the respondent. The largest change that emerges is that macro environments become influential at this later stage in life.

A very similar pattern emerges at wave 3 when the respondent is roughly 50. The county macro-environment continues to exert a strong influence on the individual of a similar magnitude to the one that we observed in wave 2. Going from the most Democratic to most Republican county results in a 1.66 point shift in a Republican direction on the 7 point partisanship scale. The effect of early micro-environments from the family diminish further from their effects at age 35. Mother's partisanship is no longer a significant predictor of child partisanship, and father's partisanship remains relatively constant in influence from age 35, with a magnitude of a 1.11 point shift across the full range of values. Finally, the effects of spousal partisanship increase from age 35 to age 50, with the magnitude of the effect jumping from 2.63 at age 35 to 3.47 at age 50. Figure 1 shows the magnitude of the socialization effect sizes across all three waves demonstrating the dynamics of social influence across the life cycle.



This suggests that while social environments clearly are consequential in shaping partisanship, the sources of social influence are not static across the life-cycle. Micro-environments in the form of household influences (whether they are parental or spousal) always matter, but macro-environments matter after the teen years and their effects, though smaller than those of the micro-environment, are still sizeable. The consistent effect of micro-environments is potentially due to the intimacy of the ties between people and their parents or spouses as argued by the social cohesion perspective. However, the fact that we see correlations emerge for individuals and their political surroundings after they have left the home suggests that less intimate sources do exert pressures to conform. Social influence matters from both immediate and more distant sources, and is not a process that is complete following the early parental effects. In fact, by the time the individual is 50, the lasting imprint of these early formative years has diminished dramatically and is dwarfed by the contemporaneous influence of the spouse and

macro-environment. Though early parental social pressures do have a lasting legacy, the social pressures supplied by the environment are actually more consequential by the time the individual is 35.

These patterns and multiple sources of socializing influence point to the potential for competing social pressure. What happens when the contemporaneous environment supports the early social influence passed on from parents, and what happens when it challenges it? Do the early social influences that have dominated our understanding of partisan formation persist, or do environments throughout life have the ability to either reinforce or negate and replace early predispositions?

To explore this question, I create a measure of whether the contemporaneous environment either reinforces or challenges the early social influence provided by the mother and father, as well as the extent to which these environments reinforce or challenge contemporaneous spousal influence. This dichotomous variable is coded 1 if the contemporaneous environment is Republican in nature, and the influence from the socialization agent was Democratic or if the contemporaneous environment is Democratic in nature and the influence from the socialization agent is Republican. This creates a measure of environmentally supplied social cross-pressures. Those who are not cross pressured, the individual who resides in a Republican environment and was received early Republican social influence, and the individual who resides in a Democratic environment and received early Democratic social influence are coded 0. This variable is interacted with the direct effect of early parental social influence, as well as contemporaneous spousal influence, to determine the moderating effect that environmentally supplied cross-pressures have on these direct effects.


Table 3 shows the moderating effect of these cross-pressures in the interaction term between parental and spousal partisanship and the environmentally supplied cross-pressures measure. Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of parental and spousal influence when the environment reinforces the parental and spousal influence (no cross-pressures), and then the environment challenges these influences (environmentally supplied cross-pressures exist). The results strongly support the hypothesis that broader environments do not simply serve as a source of direct social influence as was demonstrated previously, but that these environments have the potential to create cross-pressures which serve to negate the effects of early parental socialization, and reduce the powerful effect of contemporaneous spousal influence.

Table 3: Moderating Effects of Challenging Environments on Familial and Spousal Social Influence

	Father's Influence			Mother's Influence			Spousal Influence	
	1965	1982	1997	1965	1982	1997	1982	1997
Father's Partisanship	.313*	.235*	.240*	.351*	.172*	.153*	.174*	.144*
	(.046)	(.047)	(.047)	(.034)	(.039)	(.040)	(.039)	(.041)
Mother's Partisanship	.327*	.110*	.026	.294*	.178*	.126*	.110*	.051
	(.035)	(.040)	(.041)	(.049)	(.048)	(.049)	(.041)	(.042)
Spouse's Partisanship	-----	.373*	.503*	-----	.362*	.494*	.447*	.574*
		(.036)	(.033)		(.036)	(.033)	(.041)	(.039)
Environment Challenges Father's Influence	.056	.287	.388*	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	(.057)	(.184)	(.176)					
Environment Challenges Mother's Influence	-----	-----	-----	-.217	.333+	.471*	-----	-----
				(.224)	(.194)	(.186)		
Environment Challenges Spouse's Influence	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.295*	.525*
							(.146)	(.152)
Father's PID X Environment Challenges	-.114	-.166*	-.163*	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	(.223)	(.058)	(.051)					
Mother's PID X Environment Challenges	-----	-----	-----	.066	-.176*	-.190*	-----	-----
				(.058)	(.060)	(.053)		
Spouse's PID X Environment Challenges	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.208*	-.158*
							(.058)	(.046)
Race (White=1)	-.061	.951*	1.06*	-.066	.985*	1.09*	.974*	1.08*
	(.207)	(.239)	(.244)	(.202)	(.238)	(.242)	(.239)	(.247)
Male	.174+	.266*	1.06*	.177+	.268*	.712*	.301*	.731*
	(.103)	(.118)	(.122)	(.103)	(.119)	(.123)	(.120)	(.124)
Education	-----	-.077	-.140*	-----	-.056	-.116*	-.070	-.117*
		(.050)	(.050)		(.050)	(.050)	(.051)	(.051)
Unmarried	-----	1.28*	-1.55*	-----	1.26*	-1.50*	1.14*	-1.54*
		(.176)	(.194)		(.178)	(.194)	(.183)	(.191)
Constant	.772*	.150	-.090	.777*	.060	-.188	.102	-.257
	(.201)	(.271)	(.260)	(.197)	(.273)	(.259)	(.267)	(.266)
N	697	683	692	689	674	684	659	678
R-Squared	.55	.34	.40	.55	.34	.40	.36	.42

Notes: *p<.05, +p<.1, two tailed test.

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Parental and Spousal Influence When Environments Either Support or Challenge



We see no significant moderating effect of environmental cross-pressures in the 1965 wave for either mother or father's partisanship. This is not surprising since there was no direct effect of the environment at these early stages in the previous models that were discussed. However, in both 1982 and 1997, there is a significant moderating effect. In both of these waves, when the environment that the individual resides in challenges the social influences supplied by the mother and father early in life creating environmentally supplied cross-pressures, there is no effect of the early socialization processes. Conversely, when the environment supplies reinforcing socializing pressure, there is a lasting effect across the duration of the panel for both mother and father's influence. Recall from Table 3 that the effect of the mother's partisanship waned significantly over the panel to the point where it was not a significant predictor of partisanship in the 1997 wave, but we see here that when the environment reinforces the early influences there is a significant effect of mother's partisanship across the duration of the panel.

A similar pattern emerges for the effect of contemporaneous spousal influences. When the environment challenges the spouse's partisanship creating social cross-pressures, the spousal effect is significantly lower than when the environment reinforces it. However, in the case of spousal partisanship, even though the effect is lessened by the challenging environment, there is still a significant effect remaining. Environments can mitigate, but not eliminate contemporaneous spousal influence.

The cross-sectional regressions are instructive for seeing how sources and magnitudes of influence change over the lifecycle, and help to establish the ways in which environmental influence becomes more prevalent over time. However, they do not allow for inferences to be drawn about which sources of influence matter the most over the life cycles, or for the


contributions of different sources of influences over time to be weighed against one another. I turn to a random-intercept panel model which utilizes all three waves of the survey to address these questions.

These effects show a distinct pattern of how colliding social influences affect the citizen over the life cycle, but leave unclear what the collective effects are over the course of the life cycle. I estimate three random-effects panel models to assess how these conflicting social pressures influence the citizen over the course of the life cycle. The first two models are focused on the effects of cross-pressures between the environment and parental social influence, and the third is focused on environmental and spousal cross-pressures. In a similar fashion to the panel models presented earlier, I exclude spousal partisanship and education from the first two models as they are missing for the 1965 wave and keeping them in the model would drop this year. Table 4 and Figure 3 show the marginal effects of each form of social influence when the environment either supports and reinforces the influence, or challenges it creating cross-pressures.

Table 4: Effects of Environmental Socializing Influences Over the Full Panel, 1965-1997

Father's Partisanship (1965)	.294*	.242*	.185*
	(.034)	(.030)	(.036)
Mother's Partisanship (1965)	.171*	.233*	.073+
	(.031)	(.036)	(.037)
Spouse's Partisanship	-----	-----	.328*
			(.024)
Environment Challenges Father's Influence	.580*	-----	-----
	(.117)		
Environment Challenges Mother's Influence	-----	.673*	-----
		(.122)	
Environment Challenges Spouse's Influence	-----	-----	.444*
			(.104)
Father's PID X Environment Challenges	-.108*	-----	-----
	(.034)		
Mother's PID X Environment Challenges	-----	-.134*	-----
		(.035)	
Spouse's PID X Environment Challenges	-----	-----	-.156*
			(.035)
Political Knowledge	-.050	-.048	-.082*
	(.030)	(.030)	(.037)
Race (White=1)	.966*	.957*	1.18*
	(.183)	(.181)	(.217)
Gender (Male=1)	.315*	.341*	.508*
	(.094)	(.094)	(.111)
1982	.186*	.159+	-----
	(.094)	(.094)	
1997	.343*	.340*	.056
	(.083)	(.084)	(.079)
Constant	.463*	.411*	.545*
	(.209)	(.207)	(.255)
Number of Observations	1,954	1,932	1,216
Number of Groups	702	694	707
Wald Chi-Square	575.72	592.58	480.40
R-Square Within	.05	.05	.07
R-Square Between	.43	.44	.40
R-Square Overall	.29	.30	.35

Notes: *p<.05, +p<.1



When environments challenge the father’s partisanship, we see that the marginal effect of the father’s partisanship is lessened, though the two effects are not statistically different from one another at the 95% confidence level. For the mother’s and spouse’s partisanship however, the marginal effect of the influence is significantly lower when environmentally supplied cross-pressures are present than when they are not. Over the course of the life cycle, these reinforcing and conflicting influences appear to be quite formative. When reinforced, early socialized influences persists, likely producing the stable partisan that much research has noted. However, when challenged, it appears that the partisan is cut loose of his or her predispositions, potentially becoming an unstable or unreliable partisan.

In sum, I have shown consistent evidence regarding the nature of social pressures and influence that extend beyond an individual's formative years, and how these varying influences either compete with or reinforce one another. Specifically, I have focused on how the political environments that citizens reside in shape their partisanship over the life cycle providing direct influence, as well as interacting with other social pressures either reinforcing or nullifying those effects. The results demonstrate that over the life cycle, the lasting imprint of parental socialization ebb while the effects of the broader political environment increase once the citizen leaves the home. Not only do these environments become more important than early parental socialization over the life cycle, but they also interact with both parental and spousal social pressures. When environments reinforce these influences, we see a significant and enduring effect of parental and spousal partisanship on the individual across the lifecycle. However, when environments challenge the influences supplied by parents and spouse's creating cross-pressures we see that these other forces are weakened (in the case of spousal socialization) or eliminated (in the case of parental socialization). Environments emerge as an important source of direct social influence, as well as a force that moderates the effectiveness of other social processes.

Discussion and Conclusion

The environments that surround individuals on a day to day basis appear to be a powerful source of social influence. Over the course of the life-cycle, these environments exert just as much pressure on the individual's partisanship as does early familial socialization which has received much of the attention for shaping party identification. Once the individual leaves the home following adolescence, we do see a persisting legacy of early influence, but contemporaneous environments actually exert a more significant effect on partisanship. Two suggestions follow: First, socialization is a lifelong process whereby partisanship is continuously

updated and shaped by the distribution of opinions and influences around the individual. Second, the sources of social influence shift over time from parents and family, to environments and spouses.

Beyond the direct socializing effects that environments have, people's surroundings moderate the effects of other forms of social influence, including those from the family. Social influence is layered. Considering the effects of various socializing agents in isolation misses much of the story regarding how these various influences interact over time, producing a socialized partisan, or not. There is no doubt that early processes have the potential to endure over time, but whether they actually do so or not, appears to be largely dependent upon whether the environments that people encounter throughout the lifespan reinforce these early influences.

This point speaks to a debate within the socialization literature. Two perspectives have emerged regarding the degree to which early processes persist over time – the persistence and revisionist hypotheses (Sears 1989). I find support for both, with contemporaneous socializing influences from the political environment moderating which explanation holds. When socialized reinforcement occurs, parental influence persists over the course of the panel, supporting the persistence model. However, when environments challenge early influence, parental pressures are negated once the citizen has left the home, presumably opening the door for other influence and instability, supporting the revisionist model. To understand the effects of early socialization, we need to understand the effects of contemporaneous socialization.

What makes environments unique and important as a form of social influence is that they typically vary significantly within individuals over time. Other forms of social influence, primarily parental social pressure, suggest stasis as the individual is set on a trajectory early in life that is rarely to be deviated from. Environments on the other hand vary dramatically across

both space and time, and suggest a more malleable picture of the partisan citizen where socialization can foster change rather than stability. The evidence presented here points to a picture of social influence fostering changing political preferences. The suggestion is that socialization should be thought of a continuous process throughout life, and one that involves the interaction of multiple sources of influence.

The other insight that follows pertains to the two prominent theories of social influence – social cohesion and structural equivalence. The early socialization literature, couched in the social cohesion argument that intimate ties transmit social influence clearly holds weight here. We observe the lasting legacy of early familial socialization over much of the lifecycle, as has been noted by many. However, the rising influence of political environments as individuals age and leave the household also provides strong support for the structural equivalence argument that those who hold similar structural positions exert the most influence. I have shown here that when these two theories collide, structurally derived influence can mitigate early influence from intimate sources. Put differently, understanding the extent to which cohesion and equivalence shape citizen preferences depends in part upon the extent to which these independent sources of pressure either reinforce or challenge one another.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The argument of this dissertation is straightforward – people are, in part, a product of place. While we all possess the ability to act, think, and behave independent of our surroundings, the past four chapters have demonstrated the coercive nature of social environments on the political citizen. Politics and places have become increasingly intertwined. States and cities have political meaning, and an increasingly distinct political orientation. These distributions of political preferences are consequential for the people who live in red and blue America. As we observe an increasing number of these homogenous places across the country (Myers 2012; Bishop 2008; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008), the suggestion which arises is that more Americans than ever before may have attitudes that are subject to the social pressures which surround them.

The findings presented here advance our understanding of political contexts and their role in shaping citizens in the following ways: 1) What happens when environments change? If places are causal agents, then a change in location should result in a change in partisanship. We have seen using long-term panel data that when people move and experience a change in contextual influence, their party affiliations change as well, and they change in the direction of those around them. This process takes time, suggesting a social mechanism that requires an accumulation of pressures and an embeddedness within one's community. When we view environmental influence dynamically using panel data and observations of the same individual in multiple places, a more compelling picture of contextual influence emerges than the largely cross-sectional analyses that have drawn skepticism to the link between people and places. 2) Which places exert an influence on the partisan? We have seen that not all states, cities, and

communities are likely to shape individual party affiliations. A certain degree of homogeneity is required, although the level depends on whether a citizen is in the partisan minority or majority. For places to *destabilize* the party associations of those who are in the partisan minority, the state and county need to favor the majority party by a margin of roughly 20%. For places to *stabilize* the party associations of those who are in the partisan majority, the state and county need to favor the majority party by a margin of 10%. Those who reside in the middle – in largely competitive contexts – do not seem to experience a party association that is subject to broader distributions of opinion. 3) Which citizens are subject to being influenced by their surroundings? One problem with our understanding of contextual forces has been a lack of explanation for when people are influenced and when they are not. In part, this stems from somewhat ambiguous testing of the mechanisms of contextual influence. The results presented here merge our understanding of discussion networks as moderators of influence, as well as personality traits as individual-level factors which predispose the way in which citizens engage their surroundings. By viewing networks as potential buffers which can insulate or expose the individual to macro-contextual pressures (e.g. Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Finifter 1974), but recognizing that when such pressures reach the citizen, individual personality traits may take over and drive who is affected and who resists, the results presented here offer a more complete understanding of the conditionality of contextual forces. When networks offer a complete buffer with entirely agreeable discussions, it does not matter what the individual's predispositions are, contexts will not be formative. However, when networks do not offer a complete buffer and allow contextual pressures to reach the citizen, personality traits take over and determine who becomes a product of place, and who does not. By combining both individual traits and social circumstances, we can come to understand why some people respond to contexts, while others do not. 4) What

happens when different social pressures collide? Much of the research on socialization focuses early in life and takes the position that social pressures have largely left their imprint on the citizen by the end of adolescence, and that these pressures will endure over time resulting in a socialized citizen. What we do not have an answer to is how environmental socialization throughout the lifecycle interacts with early social pressures to produce a stable or unstable partisan. The results shown here demonstrate that contextually supplied social pressures from later in life do interact with early socialized influence from the family. When environments provide congruent social influences to those from the family in adolescence, the effects of early forces persist throughout the lifecycle. However, when environments later in life provide a set of pressures that challenge the early influences from the family, the persisting effects of early social pressures are negated. Socialization appears to be a lifelong process, and environments may be just as consequential for understanding attitude formation and persistence as are early familial forces.

A picture of three types of context-citizen profiles emerge from the findings in this dissertation. The first is the individual who resides in a homogenous, out-party environment. The Democrat who lives in Lubbock, TX represents one such individual. She is surrounded on a day to day basis by a host of social influences that challenge her existing party affiliation. Because Lubbock is a homogenous context where Republicans outnumber Democrats by a roughly 40 percent margin, it is the kind of place that possesses the consistency of pressures to induce instability in her party affiliation. Over the course of a presidential campaign, she is more likely to change her party affiliation than her Republican peers in Lubbock. In part, this change may be induced as her contemporaneous set of social pressures come into conflict with early socialized influences from the family. Assuming she was socialized in a Democratic household

through adolescence, the influences that she is subject to Lubbock are likely to negate these early social forces, potentially setting her up for change and detachment from priors. However, observing these changes is contingent upon personality traits and discussion network composition. If she is able to insulate herself by composing a core discussion network that is entirely comprised of like-minded Democrats, or if she is characterized by traits such as emotional stability and agreeableness, then we do not expect her location in a homogenous, out-party context to alter her partisanship.

The second is the citizen who resides in a homogenous, in-party environment. The Republican who lives in Lubbock, TX experiences the same social environment and same distribution of preferences as the Democrat in Lubbock, TX, but to a much different outcome. In this case the citizen has her beliefs reinforced from social sources, and receives pressures to maintain harden her beliefs. Over the course of a presidential campaign, she is much less likely to deviate from her priors than the Democrat who lives down the street. For these citizens, places exert influence, and that influence fosters stability. Assuming that this Republican citizen was socialized in a Republican household early in life, residence in Lubbock will provide reinforcing social stimuli which will help to maintain the persistence of prior attitudes, fostering a static and resilient party affiliation.

The third is the citizen who resides in a politically competitive environment. While these locations can be characterized by intense campaign activity that have a host of consequences for the individual, the distribution of partisan leanings do not appear to be one-sided enough to socialize and coerce partisanship. The point at which a competitive place becomes homogenous enough to begin exerting a pull on partisanship depends on whether the individual resides in an out-party or in-party locale. For those who live in an out-party context, but one that is relatively

heterogeneous, the partisan balance has to reach a 20 percent difference before their party affiliation will begin to be destabilized. However, for those in an in-party but heterogeneous context, the margin only has to be 10 percent before the reinforcing social pressures exert a stabilizing pressure on party affiliation. These appear to be the bounds at which the consistency of social pressures amass enough to begin to shape the partisan. Truly competitive places where there is less than a 10 percent margin between the two parties fail to deliver the socializing pressures of more homogenous places.

Perhaps most interesting is that these three types of context-citizen profiles are not constant over the lifetime – environmental social influence for many is dynamic. People move, contextual social influences change, and when they change people appear to change as well. An individual who fits the homogenous, in-party profile as a Republican in Lubbock is likely to move at some point in her life and she may relocate to Seattle, WA where she will now be in a homogenous, out-party context. Our expectation of environmentally driven partisan stability from Lubbock changes to an expectation of instability, and a party affiliation that should move in a Democratic direction over time. People are, in part, a product of place. And when places change, so do people.

What does this tell us about people, and about places? Former Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill famously stated “all politics is local.” While the argument presented here certainly does not suggest that *all* politics are local, when trying to understand citizen attitude formation and maintenance, perhaps more attention of local pressures is warranted. Explanations of citizen attitudes frequently focus on reactions to national-level phenomenon – economic conditions, presidential approval, and party fortunes – and on individual traits and characteristics. In the aggregate we have observed a rather dramatic increase in the correlation between state-level

presidential vote and more localized elections such as gubernatorial contests, further suggesting the nationalization of politics (Hopkins 2014). The findings presented here about place and people offer a different focus: local is scope, and social in nature.

While many forces in American politics are undoubtedly increasingly nationalized, the argument and findings here advise that the local should not be ignored. The composition of communities, the people whom we interact with, and the distribution of influences we are surrounded by are quite formative. Despite changes that favor national circumstances, to think that these patterns negate the social foundations of much human behavior is likely misguided. As long as people as people are rooted in social processes – and the evidence suggests this has not changed over time (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009) – communities, places, and the people around us will continue to be formative. The evidence here demonstrates that this social foundation is consequential for political outcomes in a host of ways.

While this dissertation offers answers to a number of questions about contextual influence, there are inherently some notable limitations, as well as additional questions that are raised. Perhaps one of the most troubling limitations is that of measurement. Contexts are the sum total of socially supplied influences that a citizen is exposed to on a day-to-day basis. Capturing these sets of pressures with a measure is inherently difficult. One challenge is the level of context. In the analyses here I have explored contexts at both the county and state level. A criticism of these measures is that they are not at a level which is sufficiently nuanced. There is undoubtedly heterogeneity that exists at the county, and certainly the state levels, which raises questions about how effectively these measures capture the social experiences of citizens. While the measures used here certainly lack a degree of nuance, there are advantages to them as well. A neighborhood measure would more accurately capture the distribution of opinions that one is

surrounded by at their home, however, it would not necessarily capture the total daily social interactions that are experienced at the workplace, the grocery store, or visiting a friend across town. Counties are much more likely to encompass these influences. Despite the strengths associated with the levels of analysis used here further research exploring how the findings presented here hold at more micro-levels of contextual analysis would be useful.

Another issue that is pervasive with any research on environments and social influence – including the results presented here – is selection effects. As discussed at several points in the preceding chapters, arguments that people select into social groups and broader contexts which reinforce their existing beliefs are prevalent. These tendencies raises an inferential challenge as correlations between places and people could be a function of other processes than influence. Unfortunately, to completely resolve this problem would require a randomized experiment in which people are assigned to live in places and be embedded in discussion networks that they have no choice over, which is not a practical or likely scenario. Against this reality, we have to be cautious with how the causal effects of environments are discussed. The reasons to suspect that places are causal agents are numerous, and widely discussed here, but producing empirical results to confirm these theoretical expectations is a tall order.

An additional question that is raised pertains to outcomes of environmental influence. The focus here has been almost exclusively on partisanship, and for good reason. Party affiliation is arguably the most important attitude held by the American electorate – structuring vote choices, evaluations of government and candidates, and issue stances. Understanding how places shape partisanship is understanding how places shape may facets of being a citizen. Further, party identification is the most enduring and stable of attitudes held by the individual. This is meaningful because observing changes in a relatively immovable object speaks to the

strength of environmental influence. Exploring partisanship arguably sets the highest bar possible when assessing what attitudes a place can change. It may be the case that the results presented here understate the level of environmental influence for a range of other, less static, factors. As such, understanding how places shape other attitudes is instructive for gaining a more complete picture of contextual influence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrams, Samuel J., and Morris P. Fiorina. 2012. "The Big Sort That Wasn't: A Skeptical Reexamination." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 45: 203-210.
- Achen, Christopher H. 2002. "Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification." *Political Behavior* 24(2): 151-170.
- Alford, John R., Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?" *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 152-167.
- Alford, John R., Peter K. Hatemi, John R. Hibbing, Nicholas G. Martin, and Lindon J. Eaves. 2011. "The Politics of Mate Choice." *The Journal of Politics* 73(2): 362-379.
- Allison, Paul D. 2009. *Fixed Effects Regression Models*. Sage Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Science, 07-160. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Allison, Paul D. 2001. *Missing Data*. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-136. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Alvarez, R. Michael, and John Brehm. 1995. "American Ambivalence Towards Abortion Policy: Development of a Heteroskedastic Probit Model of Competing Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 1055-1082.
- Asch, Solomon. E. 1956. "Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority." *Psychological Monographs* 70 (9): 416.
- Asch, Solomon E. 1963. "Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments." In Harold Guetzkow, ed. *Groups, Leadership and Men: Research in Human Relations*. New York: Russell and Russell: 177-90.
- Bartels, Larry M. 1985. "Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating Campaigns." *The American Political Science Review* 79(3): 804-815.
- Barrick, Murray R., and Michael K. Mount. 1991. "The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job Performance: A Meta- Analysis." *Personnel Psychology* 44(1): 1-26.
- Basinger, Scott J., and Howard Lavine. 2005. "Ambivalence, Information, and Electoral Choice." *The American Political Science Review* 99(2): 169-184.
- Baybeck, Brady, and Robert Huckfeldt. 2002. "Urban Contexts, Spatially Dispersed Networks, and the Diffusion of Political Information." *Political Geography* 21: 195-220.
- Baybeck, Brady, and McClurg, Scott. D. 2005. "What Do They Know and How Do

- They Know It? An Examination of Citizen Awareness of Context.” *American Politics Research* 33: 492-520.
- Beck, Paul A. 2002. “Encouraging Political Defection: The Role of Personal Discussion Networks in Partisan Desertions to the Opposition Party and Perot Votes in 1992.” *Political Behavior* 24: 309-337.
- Beck, Paul Allen, Russell J. Dalton, Steven Greene, and Robert Huckfeldt. 2002. “The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices.” *American Political Science Review* 96:57-73.
- Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Berns, Gregory S., Jonathan Chappelow, Caroline F. Zink, Giuseppe Pagnoni, Megan E. Martin-Skurski, Jim Richards. 2005. “Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation.” *Biological Psychiatry* 58(3): 245-253.
- Bishop, Bill. 2008. *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Brunell, Thomas. 2008. *Redistricting and Representation: Why Competitive Elections Are Bad for America*. New York: Routledge.
- Brown, Thad A. 1988. *Migration and Politics: The Impact of Population Mobility on American Voting Behavior*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Brown, Thad A. 1981. “On Contextual Change and Partisan Attributes.” *British Journal of Political Science* 11(4): 427-447.
- Burt, Ronald S. 1987. “Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion versus Structural Equivalence.” *American Journal of Sociology* 92: 1287-1335.
- Campbell, Bruce A. 1980. “A Theoretical Approach to Peer Influence in Adolescent Socialization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 24(2): 324-344.
- Campbell, David E. 2006. *Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape Our Civic Lives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1981. “Issue Evolution, Population

- Replacement, and Normal Partisan Change.” *American Political Science Review* 75(1): 107-118.
- Carney, Dana R., John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling, and Jeff Potter. 2008. “The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Traits, and Political Choice.” *Political Psychology* 27: 807-840.
- Carsey, Thomas M., Geoffrey C. Layman. 2006. “Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate.” *American Journal of Political Science*. 50: 464-477.
- Chinni, Dante, and James G. Gimpel. 2010. *Our Patchwork Nation: The Surprising Truth About the Real America*. New York, NY: Gotham Books.
- Coleman, James E., Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel. 1966. *Medical Innovation: A Diffusion Study*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Connell, R. W. 1972. “Political socialization in the American family: The Evidence Re-examined.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36(3):323-333.
- Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. “Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?” *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (2): 478–97.
- Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan N. Katz. 2002. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Michael C. Munger. 1989. “Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections.” *American Political Science Review* 83 (1): 217–31.
- Cronbach, L. J. 1955. “Processes Affecting Scores on Understanding Others and Assumed Similarity.” *Psychological Bulletin* 52: 177-193.
- Dawson, Richard E., Kenneth Prewitt, and Karen S. Dawson. 1977. *Political Socialization*. 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Diamond, Alexis, and Jasjeet S. Sekhon. Forthcoming. “Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal Effects: A General Multivariate Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Observational Studies.” *Review of Economics and Statistics*.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1980. “Reassessing Parental Socialization: Indicator Unreliability Versus Generational Transfer.” *The American Political Science Review* 74(2): 421-431.
- Erikson, Robert S., and Kent L. Tedin. 2011. *American Public Opinion* Ed. 8. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Finifter, Ada W. 1974. “The Friendship Group As a Protective Group For Political

- Deviants.” *American Political Science Review* 68 (2): 607-625.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 2005. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. New York, NY: Longman.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Florida, Richard. 2008. *Who’s Your City: How the Creative Economy is Making Where to Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life*. New York: Basic Books.
- Florida, Richard. 2002. *The Rise of the Creative Class*. New York. Basic Books.
- Franklin, Charles E., and John H. Jackson. 1983. “The Dynamics of Party Identification.” *American Political Science Review* 77: 957-973.
- Gerber, Alan, and Donald P. Green. 1998. “Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes.” *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 794-818.
- Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, and Conor M. Dowling. 2012. “Disagreement and the Avoidance of Political Discussion.” *American Journal of Political Science* 56(4): 849-874.
- Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, and Conor M. Dowling. 2010. “Personality Traits and the Consumer of Political Information.” *American Politics Research* 39(1): 32-84.
- Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, and Shang Ha. 2010. “Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships Across Issue Domains and Political Contexts.” *American Political Science Review* 104: 111-133.
- Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, Connor Raso, and Shang E. Ha. 2011. “Personality Traits and Participation in Political Processes.” *The Journal of Politics* 73(3): 692-706.
- Gimpel, James G. 1999. *Separate Destinations: Migration, Immigration and the Politics of Place*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Gimpel, James G., J. Celeste Lay, and Jason E. Schuknecht. 2003. *Cultivating Democracy: Civic Environments and Political Socialization in America*. Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Gimpel, James G., and Celeste Lay. 2005. “Party Identification, Local Partisan Contexts, and the Acquisition of Participatory Attitudes.” Pp. 209-227 in *The Social Logic of Politics*, ed. Alan S. Zuckerman. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Glaeser, Edward L., and Bryce A. Ward. 2006. "Myths and Realities of American Political Geography." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20(2): 119-144.
- Granberg, Donald. 1993. "Political Perception." In *Explorations in Political Psychology* Eds. Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Granovetter, Mark. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." *American Journal of Sociology* 78(6): 1360-1380.
- Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 1998. "Macropartisanship: A Replication and Critique." *American Political Science Review* 92: 883-899.
- Greenstein, Fred I. 1970. "A Note on the Ambiguity of "Political Socialization": Definitions, Criticisms, and Strategies of Inquiry." *The Journal of Politics* 32(4): 969-978.
- Gosling, Samuel D., Peter J. Rentfrow, and William B. Swann Jr. 2003. "A Very Brief Measure of the Big-Five Personality Domains." *Journal of Research in Personality* 37: 504-528.
- Hatemi, Peter K., John R. Alford, John R. Hibbing, Nicholas G. Martin, and Lindon J. Eaves. 2009. "Is There a "Party" in Your Genes?" *Political Research Quarterly* 62 (3): 584-600.
- Hatemi, Peter K., John R. Hibbing, Sarah E. Medland, Matthew C. Keller, John R. Alford, Kevin B. Smith, Nicholas G. Martin, and Lindon J. Eaves. 2010. "Not by Twins Alone: Using the Extended Family Design to Investigate Genetic Influence on Political Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (3): 798-814.
- Hess, Robert D., and Judith V. Torney. 1967. *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*. Chicago, IL: Aldean.
- Hibbing, Matthew V., Melinda Ritchie, and Mary R. Anderson. 2011. "Personality and Political Discussion." *Political Behavior* 33: 601-624.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ho, Daniel E., Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Elizabeth A. Stuart. 2011. "MatchIt: Nonparametric Preprocessing for Parametric Causal Inference." Accessed: 16 July, 2012. http://gking.harvard.edu/node/4355/rbuild_documentation.
- Honaker, James, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell. 2012. "Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data." Accessed 2 April, 2013. <http://r.iq.harvard.edu/docs/amelia/amelia.pdf>.
- Hopkins, Daniel. 2014. "All Politics is Presidential." *FiveThirtyEightPolitics*. 17 March.

- <http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/all-politics-is-presidential/> (25 March, 2014).
- Huckfelt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1987. "Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information." *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1197-1216.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1995. *Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, J. Morehouse, and T. Osborn. 2004. "Disagreement, Ambivalence, and Engagement: The Political Consequences of Heterogeneous Networks." *Political Psychology* 26: 65-96.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, Eric Plutzer, and John Sprague. 1993. "Alternative Contexts of Political Behavior: Churches, Neighborhoods, and Individuals." *The Journal of Politics*. 55: 365-381.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1992. "Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass." *American Political Science Review* 86: 70-86.
- Huckfeldt, Robert R. 1983. "Social Contexts, Social Networks, and Urban Neighborhoods: Environmental Constraints on Friendship Choice." *American Journal of Sociology* 89(3): 651-669.
- Huckfelt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1988. "Choice, Social Structure, and Political Information: The Informational Coercion of Minorities." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(2): 467-482.
- Huckfeldt, Robert. 1984. "Political Loyalties and Social Class Ties: The Mechanisms of Contextual Influence." *American Journal of Political Science* 28(2): 399-417.
- Huckfeldt, Robert. 1986. *Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflict in Urban Neighborhoods*. New York: Agathon Press.
- Hyman, Herbert H. 1959. *Political Socialization*. New York: Free Press.
- Iacus, Stefano M., Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. 2012. "Causal Inference without Balance Checking: Coarsened Exact Matching." *Political Analysis* 20(1): 1-24.
- Imai, Kosuke, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. 2013. "ls: Least Squares Regression for Continuous Dependent Variables." In Kosuke Imai, Gary King, Olivia Lau, "Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software," <http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig>.
- Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1968. "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child." *American Political Science Review* 62(1): 169-184.

- Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1974. *The Political Character of Adolescence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1978. "The Persistence of Political Orientation: An Overtime Analysis of Two Generations." *British Journal of Political Science* 8(3): 333-363.
- Jennings, M. Kent, and Kenneth Langton. 1969. "Mothers Versus Fathers: The Formation of Political Orientations Among Young Americans." *The Journal of Politics* 31(2): 329-358.
- Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker, and Jake Bowers. 2009. "Politics Across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined." *Journal of Politics* 71: 782-799.
- Johnson, David. 2005. "Two-Wave Panel Analysis: Comparing Statistical Methods for Studying the Effects of Transitions." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 67: 1061-1075.
- Jones-Correa, Michael. 2001. "Institutional and Contextual Factors in Immigrant Naturalization and Voting." *Citizenship Studies* 5(1): 41-56.
- Kaplan, Martin, Ken Goldstein, and Matthew Hale. 2005. "Local News Coverage of the 2004 Campaigns: An Analysis of Nightly Broadcasts in 11 Markets." Report of the Lear Center Local News Archive, USC Annenberg School, Los Angeles and University of Wisconsin, Madison.
- Keele, Luke, and Jennifer Wolak. 2006. "Value Conflict and Volatility in Party Identification." *British Journal of Political Science* 36: 671-690.
- Kenny, Christopher B. 1998. "The Behavioral Consequences of Political Discussion: Another Look at Discussant Effects on Vote Choice." *Journal of Politics* 60: 231-244.
- Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case." *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (02):129-61.
- King, Gary. 1996. "Why Context Should Not Count." *Political Geography* 15(2): 159-164.
- Kriner, Douglas L. 2006. "Examining Variance in Presidential Approval: The Case of FDR in World War II" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76(1): 23-47.
- Kriner, Douglas, and Liam Schwartz. 2009. "Partisan Dynamics and the Volatility of Presidential Approval." *British Journal of Political Science* 39: 609-631.
- Krueger, J. 1998. "On the Perception of Social Consensus." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 30: 163-240. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

- Kroh, Martin, and Peter Selb. 2009. "Inheritance and the Dynamics of Party Identification." *Political Behavior* 31: 559-574.
- Lane, Robert. 1962. *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does*. New York: Free Press.
- Langton, Kenneth P. 1967. "Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process." *American Political Science Review* 61(3):751-758.
- Lavine, Howard. 2001. "The Electoral Consequences of Ambivalence Toward Presidential Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 915-929.
- Layman, Geoffrey C., and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. "Party Polarization and Party Structuring of Policy Attitudes: A Comparison of Three NES Panel Studies." *Political Behavior* 24: 199-236.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet. 1944. *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Levin, Martin L. 1961. "Social Climates and Political Socialization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25(4): 596-606.
- Lodge, Milton, and Charles Taber. 2000. "Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Reasoning." In A. Lupia, M. McCubbins, and S. Popkin [Eds.] *Elements of Political Reason: Understanding and Expanding the Limits of Rationality*. Cambridge University Press.
- Louis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. *The American Voter Revisited*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Lyons, Jeffrey. 2011. "Where You Live and Who You Know: Political Environments, Social Pressures, and Partisan Stability." *American Politics Research* 39(6): 963-992.
- MacDonald, Jason A., and William F. Franko, Jr. 2008. "What Moves Partisanship?: Migration, State Partisan Environment Change, and Party Identification." *American Politics Research* 36: 880-902.
- MacKuen, Michael, and Courtney Brown. 1987. "Political Context and Attitude Change." *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 471-490.
- MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1989. "Macropartisanship." *The American Political Science Review* 83(4): 1125-1142).
- Makse, Todd, and Anand E. Sokhey. Forthcoming. "The Displaying of Yardsigns as a

- Form of Political Participation.” *Political Behavior*.
- Marrow, Helen B. 2005. “New Destinations and Immigrant Incorporation.” *Perspectives on Politics* 3(4): 781-799.
- Marsden, Peter V. 1987. “Core Discussion Networks of Americans.” *American Sociological Review* 52: 122-131.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. “Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals.” *Polity* 6 (3): 295–317.
- MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1989. "Macropartisanship." *The American Political Science Review* 83 (4):1125-42.
- McClurg, Scott D. 2003. “Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Interaction in Explaining Political Participation.” *Political Research Quarterly* 56: 449-464.
- McDonald, Ian. 2011. “Migration and Sorting in the American Electorate: Evidence From the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.” *American Politics Research* 39(3): 512-533.
- McKee, Seth C., and Jeremy M. Teigen. 2009. “Probing the Reds and Blues: Sectionalism and Voter Location in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections.” *Political Geography* 28: 484-495.
- McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin and James M. Cook. 2001. “Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 415-444.
- Miller, Warren E. 1956. “One Party Politics and the Voter.” *American Political Science Review* 50(3): 707-725.
- Miller, Steven S., and David O. Sears. 1986. “Stability and Change in Social Tolerance: A Test of the Persistence Hypothesis.” *American Journal of Political Science* 30(1): 214-236.
- Mondak, Jeffrey J. 2010. *Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Mondak, Jeffrey J. and Karen D. Halperin. 2008. “A Framework for the Study of Personality and Political Behaviour.” *British Journal of Political Science* 38(2): 335-362.
- Mondak, Jeffrey J., Matthew V. Hibbing, Damarys Canache, Mitchell A. Seligson, and Mary R. Anderson. 2010. “Personality and Civic Engagement: An Integrative Framework for the Study of Trait Effects on Political Behavior.” *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 85-110.

- Mutz, Diana C. 2002. "The Consequences for Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 838-855.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2006. *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Mutz, Diana C., and Jeffrey J. Mondak. 2006. "The Workplace as a Context for Cross-Cutting Political Discourse." *The Journal of Politics* 68(1): 140-155.
- Myers, Adam S. Forthcoming. "Secular Geographic Polarization in the American South: The Case of Texas, 1996-2010." *Electoral Studies*.
- Newcomb, Theodore M., Kathryn E. Koenig, Richard Flacks, and Donald P. Warwick. 1967. *Persistence and Change: Bennington College and its Students After 25 Years*. New York: Wiley.
- Niemi, Richard G., R. Danforth Ross, and Joseph Alexander. 1978. "The Similarity of Political Values of Parents and College-age Youths." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 42: 503-520.
- Niemi, Richard G., and M. Kent Jennings. 1991. "Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 970-988.
- Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert M. Warren. 1961. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas." *American Political Science Review* 55(4): 831-842.
- Pacheco, Julianna Sandell. 2008. "Political Socialization in Context: The Effect of Political Competition on Youth Voter Turnout." *Political Behavior* 30: 415-436.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1966. "Political Attitudes and the Local Community." *American Political Science Review* 60(3): 640-654.
- Ramakrishnan, Karthick, and Thomas J. Espenshade. 2001. "Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States." *International Migration Review* 35(3): 870-909.
- Rice, Tom W., and Tracey A. Hilton. 1996. "Partisanship Over Time: A Comparison of United States Panel Data." *Political Research Quarterly* 49(1): 191-201.
- Robbins, Jordan M., and Joachim I. Krueger. 2005. "Social Projection to In-groups and Out-groups: A Review and Meta-Analysis." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 9(1): 32-47.
- Ross, Lee, David Greene, and Pamela House. 1977. "The "false consensus effect": An

- Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes.” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*. 13(3): 279-301.
- Sapiro, Virginia. 2004. “Not Your Parents’ Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 1-23.
- Schwartz, Shalom H., Gian Vittorio Caprara, and Michele Vecchione. 2010. “Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis.” *Political Psychology* 31 (3): 421-452.
- Sears, David O. 1989. “Whither political socialization research? The question of persistence.” In *Political Socialization, Citizenship Education, and Democracy*, ed O Ichilov, pp. 69–97. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Sears, David O. 1983. “The persistence of early political predispositions: The roles of attitude object and life stage.” In Ladd Wheeler and P. Shaver, eds., *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 4: pp. 79-116.
- Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. 1999. “Evidence of the Long-Term Persistence of Adults’ Political Predispositions.” *Journal of Politics* 61(1): 1-28.
- Sears, David O., and Sheri Levy. 2003. “Childhood and Adult Political Development.” In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Searing, Donald, Gerald Wright, and George Rabinowitz. 1976. “The Primacy Principle: Attitude Change and Political Socialization.” *British Journal of Political Science* 6: 83-113.
- Settle, Jaime, E., Robert Bond, and Justin Levitt. 2011. “The Social Origins of Adult Political Behavior.” *American Politics Research* 39(2): 239-263.
- Sekhon, Jasjeet S. 2009. “Opiates for the Matches: Matching Methods for Causal Inference.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 487-508.
- Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. *The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Smith, Timothy W., and Avron Spiro III. 2002. “Personality, Health, and Aging: Prolegomenon for the Next Generation.” *Journal of Research in Personality* 36: 363–394.
- Sokhey, Anand E., and Paul A. Djupe. 2011. “Interpersonal Networks and Democratic Politics.” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44:55-59.
- Sunstein, Cass R. 2005. *Why Societies Need Dissent*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Spurgeon, A., C.A. Jackson, and J.R. Beach. 2001. "The Life Events Inventory: Re-scaling Based on an Occupational Scale." *Occupational Medicine* 51(4): 287-293.
- Taber, Charles, and Milton Lodge. 2006. "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 755-769.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1959. "Quantitative Judgment in Social Perception." *British Journal of Psychology* 54: 259-272.
- Tajfel, Henri, and A.L. Wilkes. 1963. "Classification and Quantitative Judgement." *British Journal of Psychology* 54: 101-114.
- Tam Cho, Wendy K. 1999. "Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and (Non-)Voting." *Journal of Politics* 61(4): 1140-1155.
- Tam Cho, Wendy K., James G. Gimpel, and Iris Hui. 2013. "Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*.
- Tam Cho, Wendy K., and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2008. "Emanating Political Participation: Untangling the Spatial Structure Behind Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 38(2): 273-289.
- Tedin, Kent L. 1974. "The Influence of Parents on the Political Attitudes of Adolescents." *The American Political Science Review* 68(4): 1579-1592.
- Teske, Paul, Mark Schneider, Michael Mintrom, and Samuel Best. 1993. "Establishing the Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory: Information, Movers, and the Competitive Local Market for Public Goods." *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 702-713.
- Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." *The Journal of Political Economy* 64(5): 416-424.
- Uhlener, Carole J., Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. "Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s." *Political Behavior* 11 (3): 195-231.
- Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill, Jr. 1988. "Churches as Political Communities." *American Political Science Review* 82 (2): 531-548.
- Williamson, Thad. 2008. "Sprawl, Spatial Location and Politics: How Ideological Identification Tracks the Built Environment." *American Politics Research* 36: 6: 903-933.
- Wolak, Jennifer. 2009. "Explaining Change in Party Identification in Adolescence." *Electoral Studies* 28(4): 573-583.

- Wong, Janelle. 2000. "The Effects of Age and Political Exposure on the Development of Party Identification Among Asian American and Latino Immigrants in the United States." *Political Behavior* 22(4): 341-371.
- Yang, Philip Q. 1994. "Explaining Immigrant Naturalization." *International Migration Review* 28 (3): 449-77.
- Zuckerman, Alan S., Josip Dasovic, and Jennifer Fitzgerald. 2007. *Partisan Families: The Social Logic of Bounded Partisanship in Germany and Britain*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX

Chapter 2 – Appendix A: Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables included in Models

	Mean	Range	N
<u>1965 Wave</u>			
Republican Context	-22.27	-90.2-70	842
Party Identification	2.48	0-6	925
Mother's Partisanship (Youth)	2.65	0-6	823
Father's Partisanship (Youth)	2.48	0-6	770
Education	N/A		
Income	N/A		
Political Knowledge	4.71	1-7	928
Race (White=1)	.918	0-1	935
Gender (Male=1)	.491	0-1	935
<u>1982 Wave</u>			
Republican Context	9.88	-61.5-72.7	891
Party Identification	2.81	0-6	907
Mother's Partisanship (Youth)	Constant – See 1965 wave.		
Father's Partisanship (Youth)	Constant – See 1965 wave.		
Education	1.95	1-4	934
Income	14.69	1-22	628
Political Knowledge	4.78	1-7	796
Race (White=1)	Constant – See 1965 wave.		
Gender (Male=1)	Constant – See 1965 wave.		
<u>1997 Wave</u>			
Republican Context	-5.68	-75.90-52.4	898
Party Identification	2.96	0-6	922
Mother's Partisanship (Youth)	Constant – See 1965 wave.		
Father's Partisanship (Youth)	Constant – See 1965 wave.		
Education	2.06	1-4	934
Income	15.07	3-23	751
Political Knowledge	3.98	1-6	920
Race (White=1)	Constant – See 1965 wave.		
Gender (Male=1)	Constant – See 1965 wave.		

Notes: The descriptive statistics here are from the raw data and presented to provide a picture of the distributions of important variables in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study. These are not the distributions after matching to produce the balanced datasets that are presented in Table 1. See Appendix B for the percent improvement in covariate means after matching.

Chapter 2 – Appendix B: Table 1B: Improvements in Balance: L₁ Statistics and Percent of Common Support for Unmatched and Matched Data

	Unmatched		Matched	
	L ₁	Common Support	L ₁	Common Support
<u>1982 Imputed Datasets</u>				
1982.1	.92	5.3%	.63	23.4%
1982.2	.91	5.4%	.62	29.5%
1982.3	.92	4.9%	.67	22.1%
1982.4	.93	4.5%	.54	33.3%
1982.5	.93	4.6%	.66	24.6%
<u>1997 Imputed Datasets</u>				
1997.1	.84	8.8%	.73	20.0%
1997.2	.85	7.8%	.60	30.2%
1997.3	.83	8.9%	.69	22.9%
1997.4	.86	7.2%	.68	23.7%
1997.5	.86	7.5%	.79	15.1%

Chapter 2 – Appendix C: Extent to Which Sorting and Selection Appear to be Occurring

As noted, many arguments have surfaced regarding the “sorting” of the American electorate into like-minded communities (Bishop 2008; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013; McDonald 2011). While this question is not the central focus of this paper, it presents an inferential challenge for understanding the extent to which environments socialize and change citizens after a move. To assess the extent to which partisan motivated sorting is taking place in the Youth-Parent Socialization Study I focus on the 1973 to 1982 waves, and the 1982 to 1997 waves. I restrict the analysis to those who moved out of state between these waves as those who do not move cannot inform us of how partisanship plays into moving decisions. I estimate two models, one looking at movers between 1973 and 1982, and the other looking at movers between 1982 and 1997. The dependent variable is the partisanship of the destination county that the individual arrived at following his or her move. It is constructed using the same measurement strategy as the county context variables that were used in the main results. Low values of the dependent variable are very Democratic counties, and high values are very Republican counties.

The primary independent variable of interest is the respondent’s party identification at the first wave. This will tell us whether individual partisanship at wave 1 predicts county partisanship at wave 2 for those who move. Since both individual and county partisanship are coded such that low values are Democratic and high values are Republican, a positive and significant coefficient on the variable measuring individual partisanship from wave 1 would suggest that as individuals become more Republican, they are more likely to relocate to Republican counties – evidence of the sorting story. I include controls for income and education at wave 1 in both models. The results are shown in Supplementary Table 1.

Table 1C: Effect of Wave 1 Individual Party ID on Wave 2 Contextual Party ID

	1973-1982	1982-1997
Individual Party ID, wave 1	2.44* (1.08)	.749 (1.25)
Income, wave 1	-.064 (.435)	-.352 (.670)
Education, wave 1	-2.54 (1.68)	-1.03 (2.05)
N	138	84
R-Square	.06	.01

Notes: P* < .05, P+ < .1. Analysis is restricted to those who moved between waves.

These two models demonstrate that there is some suggestive evidence that sorting was taking place in the electorate for those who moved, though there is only a significant effect in the 1973-1982 wave, and not in the 1982-1997 wave where the main analysis presented in the paper focuses. The results from the 1973-1982 wave suggest that a strong Republican in 1973 who moved was likely to have a destination county that was 14.5 points more Republican than a strong Democrat from 1973 who also moved. While the coefficient is still positive for the 1973-1982 wave, it is not significant, offering little evidence of sorting in that time. Neither income nor education emerged as significant predictors of destination county partisanship.

While drawing inferences here is somewhat challenging with the low number of observations, it appears that there is some reason to suspect that sorting may be taking place. Attempting to address this selection issue is important for understanding how decisions on where to live, and the (potential) socialization that takes place after a move influence the citizen.

Chapter 4 – Appendix A: Replication of Models and Figures with County Context

Table 1A: Effects of State and County Environments on Partisan Change Over Election Season

	County Effect	Effect Size
Partisan Minority in County	.002* (.001)	.31
Campaign Spending	-.003 (.004)	N/A
Δ in Economic Perceptions, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.062+ (.036)	.25
Δ in Obama Feeling Thermometer, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.018* (.007)	.33
Avg. Disagreement in Discussion Network	.093* (.038)	.28
Strength of Partisanship	-.036 (.024)	N/A
Age	-.001 (.002)	N/A
Education	-.023 (.026)	N/A
Interest	.029 (.023)	N/A
Constant	.325* (.130)	
<i>N</i>	733	
Level 2 Units	418	
Deviance	1,404	
AIC	1,424	

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates with random intercepts. Standard errors in parentheses. Third column shows the change in expected value of partisan change across the full range of all significant variables. * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

Table 2A: Moderating Effects of Discussion Network Composition

Partisan Minority in County	-0.002 (.001)
Partisan Minority in County X Avg. Dis. in Network	.005* (.001)
Campaign Spending	-.002 (.004)
Δ in Economic Perceptions, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.067+ (.035)
Δ in Obama Feeling Thermometer, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.019* (.007)
Avg. Disagreement in Discussion Network	.123* (.039)
Strength of Partisanship	-.038 (.024)
Age	-.001 (.002)
Education	-.024 (.026)
Interest	.024 (.023)
Constant	.305* (.129)
<i>N</i>	733
Level 2 Units	418
Deviance	1,368
AIC	1,392

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates with random intercepts. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

Table 3A: Moderating Effects of Personality on County Partisan Minority Status

Partisan Minority in County	.001 (.003)	.009* (.004)	.006+ (.003)	.008* (.004)	.007+ (.004)
Partisan Minority in County X Extraversion	.000 (.000)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in County X Openness	-----	-.001+ (.000)	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in County X Emotional Stability	-----	-----	-.000 (.000)	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in County X Agreeableness	-----	-----	-----	-.001 (.000)	-----
Partisan Minority in County X Conscientiousness	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.000 (.000)
Extraversion	.008 (.009)	.008 (.009)	.007 (.009)	.006 (.009)	.007 (.009)
Openness	.011 (.011)	.008 (.011)	.012 (.011)	.014 (.011)	.013 (.011)
Emotional Stability	-.017 (.011)	-.019 (.011)	-.020 (.012)	-.018 (.011)	-.017 (.011)
Agreeableness	-.010 (.013)	-.008 (.013)	-.011 (.013)	-.014 (.013)	-.010 (.013)
Conscientiousness	.004 (.012)	.006 (.012)	.004 (.012)	.004 (.012)	.001 (.012)
Campaign Spending	-.003 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	-.003 (.004)
Δ in Economic Perceptions, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.071* (.035)	.069* (.035)	.071* (.035)	.072* (.035)	.068+ (.035)
Δ in Obama Feeling Thermometer, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.015* (.007)	.015* (.007)	.015* (.007)	.014* (.007)	.015* (.007)
Avg. Disagreement in Discussion Network	.077* (.039)	.081* (.038)	.082* (.038)	.079* (.038)	.082* (.038)
Strength of Partisanship	-.043+ (.024)	-.046+ (.024)	-.044+ (.024)	-.043+ (.024)	-.044+ (.024)
Age	-.000 (.002)	-.000 (.002)	-.000 (.002)	-.000 (.002)	-.000 (.002)
Education	-.004 (.026)	-.004 (.026)	-.004 (.026)	-.004 (.026)	.000 (.026)
Interest	.022 (.023)	.023 (.023)	.020 (.023)	.022 (.023)	.020 (.023)
Constant	.295 (.192)	.315+ (.192)	.330+ (.193)	.342+ (.194)	.314 (.192)
<i>N</i>	712	712	712	712	712
Level 2 Units	410	410	410	410	410
Deviance	1,320	1,318	1,318	1,318	1,318
AIC	1,352	1,350	1,350	1,350	1,350

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

Table 4A: Moderating Effects of Personality and Network Disagreement on County Contextual Influence

Partisan Minority in County	-.006 (.005)	-.003 (.006)	-.002 (.006)	-.009 (.007)	-.009 (.006)
Partisan Minority X Extraversion X Avg. Net. Dis.	-.000 (.000)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority X Openness X Avg. Net. Dis.	-----	-.001 (.001)	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority X Emo. Stability X Avg. Net. Dis.	-----	-----	-.000 (.001)	-----	-----
Partisan Minority X Agreeableness X Avg. Net. Dis.	-----	-----	-----	-.001* (.001)	-----
Partisan Minority X Conscientiousness X Avg. Net. Dis.	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.001* (.000)
Partisan Minority in County X Extraversion	.000 (.001)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in County X Openness	-----	.000 (.001)	-----	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in County X Emotional Stability	-----	-----	.000 (.001)	-----	-----
Partisan Minority in County X Agreeableness	-----	-----	-----	.001 (.001)	-----
Partisan Minority in County X Conscientiousness	-----	-----	-----	-----	.001 (.001)
Partisan Minority in County X Avg. Network Dis.	.007+ (.004)	.012* (.006)	.008 (.005)	.016* (.006)	.016* (.005)
Extraversion X Avg. Network Disagreement	-.006 (.015)	-----	-----	-----	-----
Openness X Avg. Network Disagreement	-----	-.015 (.018)	-----	-----	-----
Emotional Stability X Avg. Network Disagreement	-----	-----	-.023 (.016)	-----	-----
Agreeableness X Avg. Network Disagreement	-----	-----	-----	-.023 (.019)	-----
Conscientiousness X Avg. Network Disagreement	-----	-----	-----	-----	-.023 (.017)
Extraversion	.012 (.017)	.007 (.009)	.005 (.009)	.005 (.009)	.005 (.009)
Openness	.012 (.011)	.022 (.020)	.013 (.011)	.013 (.011)	.014 (.011)
Emotional Stability	-.018 (.011)	-.019+ (.011)	.001 (.019)	-.019+ (.011)	-.019+ (.011)
Agreeableness	-.008 (.013)	-.008 (.013)	-.010 (.013)	.012 (.022)	-.010 (.013)
Conscientiousness	.001 (.012)	.004 (.012)	.002 (.012)	.002 (.012)	.022 (.020)
Campaign Spending	-.002 (.004)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	-.002 (.004)	-.003 (.004)
Δ in Economic Perceptions, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.074* (.004)	.073* (.004)	.074* (.004)	.072* (.004)	.073* (.004)

	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)
Δ in Obama Feeling Thermometer, Wave 1 to Wave 2	.017*	.016*	.016*	.015*	.016*
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
Avg. Disagreement in Discussion Network	.150	.238	.324*	.325+	.337+
	(.125)	(.171)	(.157)	(.190)	(.182)
Strength of Partisanship	-.044+	-.045+	-.043+	-.044+	-.044+
	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)
Age	-.000	-.000	-.000	-.000	-.000
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Education	-.005	-.005	-.004	-.003	-.000
	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
Interest	.019	.017	.015	.017	.015
	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)
Constant	.261	.185	.135	.114	.101
	(.219)	(.245)	(.238)	(.260)	(.250)
<i>N</i>	714	714	714	714	714
Level 2 Units	50	50	50	50	50
Deviance	1,310	1,304	1,306	1,302	1,302
AIC	1,348	1,342	1,344	1,340	1,340

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, + $p < .1$.

Figure 1A: Moderating Effect of Network Disagreement




Figure 2A: Moderating Effects of Personality for County Environments




Figure 3A: Moderating Effects of Extraversion and Network Disagreement




Figure 4A: Moderating Effects of Openness and Network Disagreement




Figure 5A: Moderating Effect of Emotional Stability and Network Disagreement




Figure 6A: Moderating Effect of Agreeableness and Network Disagreement





Figure 7A: Moderating Effect of Conscientiousness and Network Disagreement



One significant concern with the analysis presented here is that contexts, networks, and personality could all be endogenous. The story presented is one where personality and network disagreement moderate contextual effects determining when and whom is influenced by their surrounding environment. While personality is likely an exogenous variable given its foundation in one's genes and relative stability over the life cycle (Mondak 2010), there is room for concern that our other moderating variable, network disagreement is a function of context and personality. That is, certain personality types may be more likely to have disagreeable networks, and residing in a state where one is in the partisan minority may also produce more disagreeable networks. To test this possibility I estimate a multilevel model where the Network Average Disagreement Frequency variable that was used in the prior analyses is the dependent variable, and include both the state context measure as well as the personality measures in the model to test whether these factors significantly predict network disagreement. I also include strength of partisanship, political interest, education, age, and frequency of political discussion in the model. These results are presented in Table 1B.

Table 1B: Effects of State Context and Personality on Network Average Disagreement Frequency

Partisan Minority in State	.002*
	(.001)
Extraversion	.001
	(.007)
Openness	-.003
	(.009)
Emotional Stability	-.008
	(.009)
Conscientiousness	-.015
	(.009)
Agreeableness	-.009
	(.010)
Strength of Partisanship	-.088*
	(.018)
Interest	.021
	(.018)
Education	.071*
	(.019)
Age	-.002
	(.001)
Network Average Frequency of Discussion	.271*
	(.033)
Constant	.808*
	(.138)
<i>N</i>	1,186
Level 2 Units	50
Deviance	2,158
AIC	2,182

Notes: Multilevel regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$.

There are several important takeaways from Table 1B. First, there does appear to be an effect of residing in a partisan minority state on the amount of disagreement in one's discussion network. The Democrat in Kansas appears to have more disagreement in her network than the Democrat in Massachusetts. Across the full range of the Partisan Minority in State variable, there is a .40 increase in the Network Average Frequency of Disagreement (the measure has a range of 0-3 and a standard deviation of .65). This suggests that there is some concern of endogeneity between the primary independent variable of interest and one of the moderators. However, turning to the personality measures we see that none reach significance. In fact, only one of

them – conscientiousness, is even approaching significance. What this suggests is that there is much less concern that personality traits are influencing the other moderating variable of network disagreement.

What does this mean? It means that concerns of endogeneity are warranted, but the evidence of endogeneity is largely restricted to the role that contexts play in constraining networks, not in the role that personality plays in shaping network composition. The finding that contexts can influence networks is far from surprising as much research has demonstrated that despite individual choice, contextual constraints on network composition are very real (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt 1986). The challenge of endogeneity presented in this analysis is the same one that faces all research of contexts and networks. The two layers of social influence are inherently interdependent. This point bears discussion and needs to be acknowledged, but the magnitude of the relationship between the moderating variable (Network Average Disagreement Frequency) and the independent variable of interest (Partisan Minority in State) is modest at less than a one standard deviation change in Network Average Disagreement Frequency across the full range of Partisan Minority in State suggesting that perhaps this is not going to seriously affect the inferences.