Disaster Recovery, Social Capital, and the Sri Lankan Context: A Comparative Study of Two Communities in Batticaloa

by

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Disaster Recovery, Social Capital, and the Sri Lankan Context: A Comparative Study of Two Communities in Batticaloa

Thesis directed by Dr. Kathleen Tierney and Dr. Jill Harrison

Communities do not recover from disasters in the same way, and disaster and hazard researchers have emphasized the need for research on recovery. Scholars seeking to establish a theory of community-level recovery from disasters have expressed a need for understanding how pre-existing community conditions combine with disaster impacts and post-disaster interventions to produce recovery outcomes. Further, traditional disaster research tends to focus on case studies of specific disasters, though many emphasize the need for more comparative and longitudinal research in communities preparing for, experiencing, and recovering from disasters so we may more meaningfully understand disasters as events situated within broader socio-historical contexts. This research responds to these calls and helps to fill these gaps in the literature by exploring long-term community-level recovery from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and civil war among communities in Sri Lanka.

I draw upon social capital, sustainable recovery, and sustainable development frameworks to explore multidimensional process at play in complex humanitarian emergencies that produce disparate recovery outcomes in communities. I present ethnographic data collected over the course of fourteen months between 2013 and 2018, including more than 100 in-depth interviews with community members and leaders, in two communities in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka. I show how vulnerable populations can call upon global connections and engage with religious institutions to leverage bonding, bridging, and linking social capital in different ways throughout recovery processes to produce vastly different recovery outcomes in the context of violent civil conflict. Additionally, highlighting the rapid rise of the tourism economy in Sri Lanka's eastern

province, I show how recovery projects and tourism development co-occur and highlight the implications for socio-cultural structures as communities work to integrate tourism into already-vulnerable social systems. This research builds upon the theorization of social capital by emphasizing the role of global linkages and religious institutions in the production of sustainable disaster recovery. Finally, my study highlights the need to more clearly integrate scholarship on "sustainable recovery" and "sustainable development."

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the people of Batticaloa and Galle, Sri Lanka who graciously opened their homes, communities, places of worship to, and shared and their intimate stories of pain, survival, and hope with me.

To Zaluja Murugiah, the most patient, skillful, and kind research partner. Thank you for your sisterhood and for remaining steadfast and unrelentingly thoughtful through all of the long, hot, and emotionally draining days. My gratitude and admiration for you are endless, and I look forward to many more adventures on the scooty pep with you by my side.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
MC	Municipal Council
GN	Grama Niladhari Division (community; village)
GN Person	Grama Niladhari Person (Head of the Village; community leader)

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Map 1: Administrative Province and District Map of Sri Lanka



Source: Nahallage et al. 2013; Map produced by Dr. Janet Nackoney

Photo 1: Display at the Tsunami Photo Museum in Telwatta, Sri Lanka

Introduction

> I was sweeping, and my children were playing when the water came. We do not have an upstairs, so I held my children, and we climbed up on the table. We were trapped. I could hear screaming and crying and crashing sounds. I waited to die with my children in my arms, but by the Gods' grace, I am still here… My husband was fishing and has not returned, but we still did not find him… For many days I was hearing [rumors] that the tank had broken, but the [NGO relief worker] explained to us that it was a 'tsunami'… Sometimes I still wake at night because I dream of the screaming and crying. There are no more men in my family. My husband is gone. My father and brother went in the ethnic violence. My children are growing, but I feel alone. (Shamila, a Tamil woman in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka in September 2015)

On the morning of December 26, 2004 waves reaching heights of up to 30 feet, or to the tops of mature coconut palms, inundated coastlines across the Indian Ocean basin. With little or no warning, a destructive black sludge of ocean water and debris ripped through communities. Caught by surprise, few knew what to do and where to go to escape the terrifying barrage. Shamila, a young mother in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka was trapped in her home for hours clinging to her children, terrified and praying that they would not be swept away. In the following days and weeks, she heard various rumors that the local dam had broken, causing her village to flood. Like nearly all of her neighbors, friends, and kin, before December 2004, she had no knowledge of a thing called "tsunami." A thing that stripped her of life as she had come to know it and continues to haunt her dreams more than a decade later.

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was a "megacatastrophe" that resulted in widespread destruction of both residential and commercial structures and had extensive human costs (Aldrich 2012a). The tsunami killed more than 225,000 people, damaged or destroyed an estimated 436,000 houses, and displaced more than 1.8 million people; and at the time it occurred, the devastation was considered unprecedented (Risk Management Solutions 2006). In Sri Lanka alone, more than seventy percent of the island nation's coastline was affected by the waves, and roughly 35,000 lives were lost—43% of which were among the Tamil and Muslim

populations in Batticaloa and Ampara Districts in the Eastern Province (McGilvray 2008; Gamburd and McGilvray 2013). The persistence of the Sri Lankan Civil War or Eelam War, (1983-2009) which pitted the Sri Lankan government against the Tamil separatist movement (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE) during both the onset and relief and recovery phases of the tsunami offers an opportunity for understanding the multidimensional process at play in complex humanitarian emergencies.[1,2] With questions about how these processes intersect and contribute to long-term recovery outcomes, I set out to Sri Lanka in 2013, nearly ten years after the tsunami and four years from the end of the war.

In this dissertation, I utilize ethnographic data collected between 2013 – 2018 to analyze the disparate recoveries of two distinct ethno-religious communities in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province, Batticaloa District: Thiruchendur—a majority Hindu Tamil community, and New Kattankudy East—a Muslim community. The different long-term recovery trajectories and outcomes I found in these two neighboring villages provides a unique natural experiment for understanding why and how communities recover in different ways after experiencing similarly disastrous effects of the tsunami, and to some extent the civil war. In doing so, I utilize the concept of social capital to explore four interrelated outcomes: social and economic recovery, the recovery of the built environment or infrastructure recovery, and the implementation of disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures to better understand the ethno-religious dimensions of disaster recovery in a time of violent ethnic conflict.

As I discuss in greater detail in chapter 3, scholars studying the sociological aspects of disasters frequently employ the concept of social capital, a measure of social bonds, networks

[1] Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms "civil war, "Eelam War," "ethnic conflict, and "ethnic violence" interchangeably.

[2] "Eelam" (ஈழம்) is the historical Tamil name for the island of Sri Lanka that was revived and popularized by the LTTE.

and connections, to analyze how communities prepare for, experience, respond to, and recover from disaster (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Aldrich 2012a; Meyer 2013; Aldrich and Meyer 2015; Jordan et al. 2016; Meyer 2018). Previous research has shown that social capital can contribute to disaster resilience (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004) and protect vulnerable communities from the harmful effects of disaster (Klinenberg 2002) including threats to physical (Adeola and Picou 2012) and mental health (Heid et al. 2017). Further, disasters can spur the development of altruistic norms, helping behaviors, and community solidarity, thereby creating new forms of social capital (Dynes 2006; Solnit 2009; Tierney 2019). However, some scholarship also documents the down-sides of social capital. Portes (1998) used the term "negative social capital," to described how tight-knit groups could further marginalize those on the periphery of their social networks and create undue pressures to conform for those within them (Aldrich 2012a; Tierney 2019). In this dissertation, I explore various facets of social capital along with other factors that potentially account for the disparate recovery outcomes in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East. I build upon previous scholarship emphasizing the role of social capital in long-term recovery from disasters by differentiating between the different forms of social capital (bonding, bridging, and linking), and I also discuss the negative impacts of social capital as they contributed to recovery outcomes during a time of violent armed civil conflict. Throughout my analysis, I show how religion, through religious structures and, to an extent, the norms that arise from them, operate as a vector for social capital and thus, a driver of recovery.

Foundations for Inquiry: The QCA Study

This dissertation owes its foundation to a research project directed by Dr. Amy Javernick-Will (PI) and Dr. Bernard Amadei (Co-PI) entitled "A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Community Recovery." This study was supported by a 2012 National Science Foundation (NSF)

grant[3] to engineers and social scientists based mainly at the University of Colorado Boulder (hereafter referred to as the "QCA study"). The study was premised on the notion that it is difficult to identify generalizable timelines and processes for community-level[4] recovery that can be understood cross-culturally. Communities do not recover from disasters in the same way, and disaster and hazard researchers have emphasized the need for research on recovery (Shaw 2006; Smith and Wenger 2007; Phillips 2009; Rubin 2009; Aldrich 2012a; Chang and Rose 2012; Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). The QCA study aimed to fill this knowledge gap by employing a conceptual framework based on a systematic review of factors in and pathways (combinations of pre-disaster community conditions and post-disaster recovery processes) to various community-level recovery outcomes, specifically economic, social, and infrastructure recovery.

In 2012, then graduate student in engineering, Elizabeth Jordan collected data in fifteen tsunami-affected communities in Tamil Nadu, India. A year later, as sociology graduate student supported by the project, I conducted six months of fieldwork in Sri Lanka (2013-2014) in eleven communities in Sri Lanka's Batticaloa (East coast) and Galle (Southwest coast) Districts. Through an extensive review of literature from multiple disciplines, the collection of information from a Delphi panel[5] of disaster/hazard experts, and by conducting a comparative case study of communities in India and Sri Lanka using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), researchers have identified sets of indicators and pathways related to community recovery.

[3] National Science Foundation (NSF) Award #1200422
[4] Throughout this dissertation, I use the words "community," "village," and "GN division" interchangeably to refer to the "Grama Niladhari Division" – the smallest administrative division in Sri Lanka.
[5] "The Delphi technique is a widely used and accepted method for gathering data from respondents within their domain of expertise. The Delphi technique is well suited as a method for consensus-building by using a series of questionnaires delivered using multiple iterations to collect data from a panel of selected subjects." (Hsu and Sanford 2007: 1)

Several publications from the QCA study reach important conclusions about these indicators and pathways.[6]

In an analysis of the data collected in Tamil Nadu, India, Jordan and Javernick-Will (2015) found that pre-existing community conditions were more critical than post-disaster interventions in predicting economic recovery. They cited low levels of social vulnerability as the most necessary condition for successful economic recovery. In socially vulnerable communities, economic diversity and proximity to cities were helpful. Their analysis also showed that access to government resources was the second most necessary condition (177). Here, access to government resources is measured by "the presence of elected officials and government responsiveness to infrastructural needs" (Jordan et al. 2016: 1331). The amount and source of recovery funding were neither necessary nor sufficient; indeed, the improper distribution of funds tended to worsen the possibility for economic recovery. They note, as have other studies of recovery in fishing communities in South Asia, that the sudden and excessive influx of motorized boats to replace damaged and destroyed catamarans, most often provided by way of NGO (non-governmental organization) intervention, impeded economic recovery (Alexander 2006; Salagrama 2006). My data reflect this dynamic as well. When NGOs flood traditional markets with new technology, without support for maintaining and managing the resources, this can negatively influence the community's ability to recover economically and socially by creating new divisions among community members (see chapters 3 and 4 for discussions of fishing boat provisions and the rise of a tourism economy). Finally, they found that embeddedness of constructing agencies, measured by whether or not the reconstruction

[6] See: Jordan 2012; Jordan and Javernick-Will 2012; Jordan and Javernick-Will 2013; Jordan and Javernick-Will 2014; Jordan and Javernick-Will 2015; Jordan et al. 2014; Jordan et al. 2016

agency was headquartered locally, in-country, or internationally was significant insofar as the more embedded an agency was, the more likely the interventions were to be culturally sensitive.

In a 2016 paper, Jordan and colleagues showed that when measuring the combination of social and infrastructural recovery, five conditions combine to create pathways to success in the Indian context (Jordan et al. 2016). The first two conditions, a community's access to government resources and coordination between contracting agencies conducting recovery work or projects, are necessary to all pathways to recovery. Three additional conditions were found to be significant contributors to success: low levels of social vulnerability within the community, the embeddedness of contracting agencies within the locality, and contracting agency oversight of local construction projects. The authors provided a series of propositions regarding both why communities recover in different ways from disaster and how successful social and infrastructural recovery is achieved with a particular focus on the role of organizations or agencies conducting and coordinating recovery programs. Whether an NGO or government agency conducts reconstruction is not a strong predictor of long-term success, but it is vitally important that the agency has sound knowledge of the local milieu, coordinates effectively with other agencies working in the community, and maintains regular oversight of projects. Additionally, while community participation is not necessary in the recovery process, it is critical in socially vulnerable communities and in cases where agencies are not deeply embedded within the community.

Finally, in modeling both economic recovery and the combination of social and infrastructure recovery, Jordan and colleagues made it clear that social capital is an important avenue for future study. Because each community included in the analyses exhibited similarly strong levels bonding social capital, the factor was treated as a domain condition and excluded

from potential explanatory pathways. Thus, while social does not appear as a primary condition in the pathways for these communities, the authors concluded that bonding social capital may indeed be critical for recovery and cite it as a condition worthy of further research, alongside more robust examinations of national contexts (Jordan and Javernick-Will 2015; Jordan et al. 2016).

While the QCA study took into account a variety of factors that influence recovery and did an excellent job of identifying cross-case metrics for understanding pathways to community-level recovery, my dissertation research focuses on a comparison of two communities in particular. Informed by the QCA study, my dissertation involves in-depth ethnographic comparative research in two communities that have experienced different recovery trajectories and outcomes, with the goal of identifying the broader political, social, and cultural forces, including Sri Lanka's protracted civil war, that influenced their recovery. With funding from the National Science Foundation, the American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies, and the Sociology Department at University of Colorado Boulder,[7] I was able to return to Batticaloa to conduct an additional eight months of fieldwork between 2015 and 2018. The communities I selected for study, Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East, are located in the same general geographic area in rural Eastern Sri Lanka and experienced similar tsunami impacts, but they differ socially, politically, and culturally in ways that have affected their recovery. Together they constitute an interesting setting in which to gain a deeper understanding of contextual factors and community-level processes that produce varying recovery trajectories and outcomes.

[7] National Science Foundation (NSF) Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement (DDRI) Award # 1538165; American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies Dissertation Planning Grant in 2015; the Sociology Department at University of Colorado provided multiple small grants for travel and field-work related expenses.

In a global context that is increasingly characterized by internal civil strife, it is crucial to understand better how such conditions both influence and interact with vulnerability to extreme events. Additionally, following recent scholarship in the field (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Norris et al. 2008; Aldrich 2012a), my dissertation research investigates the role of social capital in community recovery. By studying these two sites comparatively, I contribute to scholarship seeking to establish a theory of community-level recovery from disasters. Additionally, by focusing on two distinct Tamil-speaking communities in Sri Lanka, I contribute to a body of research on Tamil culture that has generally been scant regarding the situation of Tamil-speaking Muslim communities.

Research Objectives and Questions

While conducting fieldwork for the QCA study, I was required to conduct interviews that involved asking specific questions that were written to satisfy the needs of the fsQCA methodology, making it difficult to dive deeper into topics I found most sociologically compelling. Thus, I employ the data and findings from the QCA study as pilot data to inform a more in-depth analysis of two rather than eleven communities – Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East, in the Batticaloa district. As previously noted, analyses indicate that social capital has an important impact on recovery pathways. However, the social capital measure used for the QCA study was confined mainly to *bonding social capital,* or those connections between families and neighbors, and close social ties, along with demographic characteristics that bind people together. Additionally, one variable in the study was "access to government resources," or a measure of how well communities vertically linked to higher levels of government, as a proxy for *linking social capital*. What is missing is an understanding of the influence of other forms of social capital— specifically *bridging social capital,* or the horizontal ties between different

groups of people, which cross economic and political divisions, and a more robust examination of *linking social capital,* or vertical ties between community members, business leaders, and political leaders (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Aldrich 2012a).

The following primary question has guided my research: With a focus on social and economic recovery, recovery of the built environment, and the implementation of disaster risk reduction strategies—what differences in the organization of these two communities have contributed to differential trajectories and outcomes? I ask how variation in different forms of social capital—bonding, bridging, and linking—preceding and following disasters influence recovery. Throughout each of these questions, I explore how the civil war and tsunami, co-occurring as a complex humanitarian emergency, influenced these trajectories and outcomes while considering the highly politicized flow of relief and recovery aid into the country's different regions and between communities in the Eastern Province.

Conceptual Model

The conceptual model (see Figure 1) guiding my research focuses on four recovery outcomes: social recovery, economic recovery, recovery of the built environment, and the extent to which risk reduction measures have been incorporated into the recovery process. I argue that these outcomes are influenced by three sets of factors: pre-existing conditions, disaster impacts, and post-disaster conditions and recovery-related interventions.

Figure 1: Conceptual Model



While the QCA study from which this dissertation arose attempted to tease out the similar pathways to recovery across contexts in more than a dozen communities, this project focuses on why two geographically proximate communities in Sri Lanka's East coast had disparate recovery trajectories and outcomes. These communities are roughly five kilometers apart and experienced similar physical effects of the waves. However, they are socially dissimilar in ways that have influenced their recoveries. Through my work on the QCA study, I have been able to record the differential processes that took place, and by re-visiting these two communities for my dissertation research, I address the questions of why and how these disparities exist. In the sections that follow, I discuss my conceptual model in more depth.

Pre-Existing Conditions

The pre-existing conditions this study addresses are the civil war, the ethno-religious social organization of communities and space, and community social capital. These conditions are interrelated in complex ways in both communities.

The Eelam War and Ethno-Religious Community Organization

Disaster and disaster recovery do not occur within a political vacuum. Governmental responses and relationships between the community and polity are crucial indicators of recovery at the

community level. Conflict between governing structures may intensify within the disaster recovery process (Rubin 2009)—something quite evident in the case of Sri Lanka, which was mired in a decades-long civil war when the tsunami struck in 2004. The Sri Lankan Civil War (1983 – 2009) influenced differential community recovery from the tsunami along geographic boundaries and social axes of ethnicity, occupation, and religion (Kuhn 2013). The relief and recovery process in Sri Lanka was highly politicized, which in many cases led to a re-victimization of already-vulnerable populations. The exacerbated vulnerability of communities on the East Coast provides a reason to study their experiences in recovering from the 2004 tsunami (De Alwis and Hedman 2009; Hastrup 2011; Gamburd 2013; McGilvray and Gamburd 2013). Additionally, the differences between Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East raise questions about the role of religion and community institutions organized around religious faith in the recovery process. The communities differ in terms of their ethno-religious composition, which I assert is a primary factor shaping their recoveries.

Roughly three-quarters of the island's population identify as Sinhalas, speak Sinhala, and are predominantly Theravada Buddhist in religion. Tamil-speaking ethnic Tamils are the largest ethnic minority, representing roughly 18% of the island's population; and Muslims in Sri Lanka, or Sri Lankan Moors, are the third largest minority group and represent 7% of the population (McGilvray 2008).[8] Though the Sinhala-speaking regions of the island in the West and South are predominantly Buddhist, and the Tamil-speaking regions of the island, generally in the North and East, are predominantly Hindu, neither the Sinhala nor Tamil ethnic groups consist of one single religious group. In the Eastern Province, the Tamil-speaking population remains divided between interspersed Hindu and Muslim villages. As McGilvray notes, "the ethnic designation of

[8] Sri Lankan Muslims may also be referred to as "Moors," and the two terms are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation (McGilvray 2008).

'Tamil' refers to Tamil-speaking Saivite Hindus as well as to Tamil Catholics and Methodists," and though the Moors "speak Tamil (and in some cases are bilingual in Sinhala), they do not accept the designation 'Muslim Tamil'" (2008: 9). He goes on to explain that Moors are spread throughout communities across the island, though it is only in the East Coast that they "constitute a geographically concentrated ethnic group that controls a significant bloc of parliamentary constituencies and local governing councils" (10).

The two primary groups pitted in opposition to each other during the civil war were the Sinhala nationalist government and the LTTE, or the Tamil separatist movement. The LTTE, formed in 1976, sought a separate state (Eelam) in the north and east for ethnic Tamils regardless of their religious identification (Swamy 2002; Winslow and Woost 2004; Bandarage 2008; McGilvray 2008; De Alwis and Hedman 2009; Gamburd 2013; McGilvray and Gamburd 2013; Spencer et al. 2015). My description of the conflict is based on both existing literature on the war and a series of interviews I conducted between 2015 and 2017 with a Muslim peace-monitor who actively participated in a neutral third-party commission tasked with facilitating communication between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government during the final fifteen years of the conflict.

In the earliest stages of the conflict (pre-1980s), the Tamil movement consisted of several intellectually and philosophically oriented Tamil-speaking working groups that began to organize in the northern and eastern regions of the island around civil rights for Tamil speaking peoples; this included several Muslim organizers and agitators. Though some groups were focused on the designation of an independent Tamil state, the broad aims were to gain political representation of Tamil communities in the government. As the conflict progressed, the LTTE killed leaders of other prominent groups and absorbed their trained troops to emerge as the most potent and violent Tamil force and became the primary government opposition group. In doing

so, the LTTE conflated their separatist agenda with that of all Tamil-speaking communities in the north and east of Sri Lanka, superseding the more modest goals of those other Tamil-speaking ethno-religious minorities.

Because Muslims were historically able to benefit from both ends of Sri Lankan politics, Moorish leaders were not interested in being submerged in the Tamil nationalist homeland. Throughout the 1980s, Moors experienced violent persecution from the LTTE that further exacerbated the intra-ethnic tensions in the Eastern Province. The LTTE perpetrated massacres of Moorish policemen and worshippers at mosques in the east-coast and expelled the entire Muslim population from Jaffna—the site of the LTTE's headquarters in the Northern Province—in 1990 (McGilvray 2008: 11). Further, throughout the conflict, the government worked to provoke tensions through what McGilvray refers to as "calculated acts of inter-ethnic sabotage between the Muslims and the Tamils [fueling a] political chasm" (2008: 328).

Thus, while some narratives characterize the LTTE as representing the entire Tamil-speaking population, in reality, the LTTE achieved dominance over the other Tamil movements through violence and force. While Christian populations in the North and East tend to identify themselves as members of the Tamil ethnic group, the Moors do not. Once the LTTE effectively claimed control of the "Tamil cause," the Moors in the Northern and Eastern regions of the island were politically excluded from the separatist movement, although based on geography the envisioned Eelam state would have subsumed their communities. Thus, the Moors in the East occupied a unique *third space* during the advanced stages of the war, as they did not identify wholly with the cause of the LTTE nor commit full allegiance to the Sinhala nationalist government.

As a function of their liminal position during the war, the Moors in the Eastern regions of the island were in some ways left to fend for themselves. At various stages during the conflict, the Moors experienced oppression at the hands of both the LTTE and the Sinhalese government. At other times, they were able to gain favor from both sides strategically. While the Moors were not isolated from the effects of the conflict, in some senses their communities had the opportunity to turn inward and focus on building up their internal capacities. Though there are different forms of Islam practiced among Muslims in Sri Lanka, as well as internal divisions among Muslims, including considerable anti-Sufi sentiment and violence (McGilvray 2011; Klem 2011; Hasbullah and Korf 2013; McGilvray 2014), the Moors in Kattankudy were able to pull together in the post-tsunami environment.

Communities that aligned with one or the other side during the war were frequently having their allegiances tested and did not have the same ability to strengthen their social networks. I found that the inward focus of the Muslim communities in Kattankudy allowed for the development of comparatively stronger social structures within their boundaries in the years leading up to the 2004 tsunami, in comparison to the mixed-religious Tamil communities just up the road. Thus, when the waves came in December 2004, the Moorish communities were more equipped to respond to the needs of their community members than were the Tamil communities that were struggling to meet basic needs of their members while engaged actively in the conflict by virtue of their geography and ethnic identification. I expand upon this analysis of the civil war in chapter 3.

Social Capital

Social capital refers to the strength of social networks and the extent to which resources flow and travel through networks to provide benefits to individuals and groups. Social capital

includes “features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1995: 67). Social cohesion, shared norms, trust, and reciprocity are also aspects of social capital. Social capital operates to move “information and knowledge and access to members of a network,” strengthen ties within a social network, and build and maintain norms around compliance and participation among network actors (Aldrich 2012a: 46). Scholars conceptualize social capital as both an individual/private good and a collective/public good. As an individual or private good, social capital is activated by an individual actor, and the benefits of this capital accrue directly to that individual (Coleman 1988; Meyer 2018). However, when conceptualized as a collective or public good, social capital is a feature of an entire network, and the activation of this capital is for the benefit of the network.

Putnam theorized social capital as a collective good that may be activated by and for the benefit of whole communities and the facilitation of mutual benefits (Putnam 1993; Putnam 2001; Meyer 2018). Where bonding social capital focuses on intra-community social ties, bridging and linking social capital involve the ability of communities to connect with external resources. Throughout my fieldwork, it became apparent that the different forms of social organization and amounts of resources that happen to vary along ethno-religious lines played an essential role in community members’ and leaders’ ability to negotiate for effective relief and recovery aid from the government, foreign and local NGOs, and the LTTE—which played a significant role in the relief and recovery of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Disaster Impacts

Map 2 shows the number of dead and displaced by the tsunami overlaid with conflict-affected regions of the island. Batticaloa, in the Eastern Province, is clearly a geographic area in which tsunami and civil war impacts overlap. Both of the coastal villages in my study were

profoundly affected by the tsunami. There were significant losses of key infrastructure elements in both study sites, including residential dwellings, businesses, roads, medical facilities, schools, and community centers. In each community, every person interviewed for the QCA study and during my dissertation fieldwork had lost family members, friends, and/or personal property.

Map 2: Impact of tsunami and conflict in Sri Lanka

Source: Kleinfeld 2007; Data sources: Sri Lanka National Disaster Management Centre and the UNHCR GIS Unit, Sri Lanka. Cartography: Steve Bolssen.

While the physical damage to both communities is similar, the recovery of the built environment is far from equal between Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East. The latter now hosts concrete residential structures, a new hospital, new schools, and re-built business structures either within the village or within a short walking distance. In contrast, in Thiruchendur, the famous Murugan Kovil[9] still stands crookedly resting in the sand of Kallady Beach, schools have not been rebuilt, and the landscape is littered with partially-constructed homes.

Post-Disaster Interventions

The uneven distribution of relief and recovery aid following the tsunami also influenced the different recovery strategies and outcomes for these communities. Aldrich's (2012a) study of tsunami recovery in India identifies six factors that may influence the distribution of aid to communities following disasters: (1) political processes, which can create disparities in outcomes; (2) the availability of resources in a community prior to the disaster—specifically the wealth of the village; (3) community family structures, particularly multiple families living in one household, which can affect the number of replacement homes provided; (4) communities' ability to work with non-local institutions, or their linking social capital; (5) the location of the community, which can influence access to aid; and (6) discrimination in aid provision based on ethnic and racial differences. My research takes each of these factors into account.

The distribution of humanitarian aid in Sri Lanka was a politicized and, in many cases, a corrupt process (Kleinfeld 2007; Hyndman 2009; Keenan 2013; Gamburd 2013). The violence of the civil war, which left the country both geographically and socially torn, created a milieu of political jockeying for relief and recovery aid that affected the quality of assistance delivered to

[9] Kovil (கோவில்) is the Tamil term for Hindu Temple. Throughout this dissertation I use the terms "kovil" and "temple" interchangeably to refer to Hindu houses of worship.

communities and the speed in which this happened. The Post-Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS)[10] policies set in place in January 2005 in an effort to unite the government with the LTTE in the shared goals of tsunami relief and recovery failed after only five months after political groups protested the legitimacy of the LTTE as a "state actor" (Kleinfeld 2007; Keenan 2013; Gamburd 2013). While the country united for a few months after the tsunami, subsequent recovery efforts have been said to have effectively "built the conflict back better" and created a bias in terms of aid provision, against the communities outside of the Sinhala-controlled areas in the South and close to the capital in Colombo (Keenan 2013). For aid to reach Batticaloa, supplies had to travel cross-country and through multiple military (both governmental and LTTE-controlled) checkpoints, where supplies were skimmed and stolen for political and economic gain.

My dissertation project addresses the extent to which the persistence of the ethnic conflict and violence stemming from the civil war shaped the two communities' recovery strategies and outcomes. While both communities are located in the Eastern Province and thus were considered to be part of the proposed Eelam state and sites of violent clashes between warring factions, each community's ability to call upon its social capital was shaped by religious institutions more than simple geography. My research explores how a Tamil/predominantly Hindu and a Moorish community differ in their ability to call upon local and non-local institutions for assistance after the tsunami.

Recovery Outcomes

The recovery outcomes of interest in this project are social and economic recovery, recovery of infrastructure and the built environment, and risk reduction. Essential for each of

[10] I provide an extensive overview of P-TOMS and other disaster-related government initiatives in chapter 5.

these interrelated outcomes is how community members and leaders interact with one another and with entities beyond the locality during the post-disaster intervention period to negotiate these outcomes within their communities.

Chapter Overview

In the next chapter (chapter 2), I describe qualitative disaster research and give an overview of the methods employed in this study over the course of multiple trips to my field sites between 2013 and 2018. I also provide details about the ethics and methods of conducting cross-cultural research and working with an interpreter, researcher positionality, and ethical considerations and emotions associated with conducting disaster research. In chapters 3, 4, and 5, I focus on the empirical findings of this study. Chapter 3 addresses social capital theory and the use of social capital within disaster research, and I then move to a comparative analysis of infrastructure, social, and economic recovery in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East to show how social capital operated in each community to contribute to disparate recovery outcomes. In chapter 4, I extend upon my analyses of social capital in disaster recovery to analyze the rapid introduction of tourism in post-tsunami and post-war communities and discuss the implications for conceptualizing "sustainable recovery" and "sustainable development." In chapter 4, I focus on tourism development in Thiruchendur, where the implications of rapid development are more apparent than in New Kattankudy East. Chapter 5 focuses on the fourth domain of recovery central to my study: the implementation of risk reduction measures. I give an overview of disaster management policy initiatives in Sri Lanka, specifically those that have evolved between the 1980s and the early 2000s, describe and critically evaluate five interrelated disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures introduced in the two communities, assessing the and extent to which these initiatives have produced more (or less) resilient communities. In the conclusion chapter

(chapter 6), I review empirical contributions, theoretical implications, and practical recommendations that resulted from my analyses and conclude by outlining directions for future research. I argue for a more robust accounting of the role of religious institutions in the conceptualization of social capital and show how my work extends the theorization of linking social capital to account for global linkages. Additionally, I argue for the integration of scholarship on "sustainable development" and "sustainable recovery" to better account for how the two concepts are inseparable especially in among developing communities that undergo processes of modernization as they recover from disaster.

CHAPTER 2: METHODS

Introduction

For this study, I incorporate data collected between 2013 and 2018 through a mix of in-depth interviews, participant observation, and collection of some written records (e.g., from government and NGO agencies). Below, I discuss the traditions of qualitative inquiry and disaster research and comparative case study methodologies before moving on to a description of my research setting. Next, I summarize the research design and data collection methods as the project evolved through distinct phases corresponding to my trips to Sri Lanka. I then review the implications of conducting cross-cultural research using an interpreter, researcher positionality, and ethical considerations and emotionality when conducting disaster research. Finally, I conclude with notes on data management and analysis.

Qualitative Inquiry and Disaster Research

Qualitative inquiry is concerned with the meanings that people attach to things in their lives and is used to explain the *why* and *how* of peoples' decision-making and behaviors (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Stallings 2003; Taylor et al. 2015). Qualitative research methodologies allow researchers to develop insights from patterns that emerge from their data, and to remain flexible in investigating emergent questions and ideas while conducting fieldwork (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Marshall and Rossman 2011). Additionally, qualitative research empowers respondents by allowing their accounts to shape research questions and lines of inquiry (Elliott and Timulak 2005). Concerned with providing thick descriptions of social life that "present in close detail the context and meanings of events and scenes that are relevant to those involved in them" (Emerson 1983: 24), qualitative researchers engage in multiple forms of data collection including in-depth interviewing, oral histories or autobiographical interviews, focus group interviews, content

analysis, observation, and participant observation (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2010). Ethnographic research, a form of qualitative inquiry, aims for an in-depth understanding of cultures and subcultures, and usually requires researchers to live in or spend extended amounts of time in their field sites to record and analyze social structures within the setting using variety of data collection methods from survey research, to observation, and intensive interviewing (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2010).

By examining social processes, grounding inquiry in peoples' actual lived experiences, and providing thick, rich descriptions of research settings, qualitative disaster research contributes to knowledge both within and outside of disaster contexts (Fothergill and Peek 2004; Phillips 2003; Tierney 2007). Classical disaster research identified disasters as natural or physical events, overlooking that they can be "foreseeable manifestations of the broader forces that shape societies" (Tierney 2007: 509). Indeed, early disaster research understood disasters as separate from the social order and as abnormal events (Hewitt 1983; Tierney 2007). Thus, while disasters were once considered "acts of God" (Dynes and Drabek 1994; Freudenberg et al. 2009) that strike randomly, or as purely physical, it is now increasingly understood that disasters are "acts of humankind" – that is, that disasters are "produced" by human or social agents (including institutions, organizations, and states). This conceptual shift has led researchers to study the social processes that precede and produce conditions that may result in disaster (Mileti 1999; Tierney 2014). Disasters present an opportunity for social scientists to study components of society that may be otherwise difficult to uncover (Merton 1969; Fothergill and Peek 2004).

In an overview of qualitative disaster research, Brenda Phillips (2003) identifies interviewing as the most common methodological technique for qualitative disaster research. Simultaneously, because the nature of data that one can gather from interviews and observations

is different, she suggests that qualitative researchers should employ interview methods in addition to observational studies to triangulate data and make their work more robust. Again, ethnographic studies engage in a variety of methodologies to produce detailed and textured analyses of social settings (Lofland et al. 2006). Through interviews, the researcher can collect verbal data by engaging in conversation with interlocutors. These interviews illuminate perspectives of experiences beyond what the researcher may be able to directly witness and produce data rich with emotion and insight that may only be gained within the context of a conversational exchange. Through interviews, we can analyze *what people say*, and stitch together histories through comparing similar and dissimilar narratives. Participant observation, on the other hand, allows the researcher to witness and analyze *what people do* (Lofland et al. 2006). Through the direct experiences of social action, researchers can observe non-verbal actions alongside verbal exchanges, glean data from physical artifacts, and perhaps confirm inconsistencies that arise between recorded narratives. With the observation of social settings and social life, the researcher can witness the day to day activities of interlocutors to provide texture and context for the interview data.

Additionally, Phillips urges scholars studying disaster recovery to take a more longitudinal approach by immersing themselves in the field over long periods of time to correct earlier tendencies in the tradition of providing "limited-time glimpses of human behavior in disaster" (2003: 207) so that we may more meaningfully understand disasters as events situated within much broader socio-historical contexts. Phillips asks: "Why not live in a recovering community for a couple of years, observing at the neighborhood or even community level?" (206).

Comparative Case Studies in Qualitative Disaster Research

Traditionally, disaster research tends to focus on case studies of specific disasters, though comparative work is becoming more common (Peacock 2003). By focusing on events experienced by two or more entities, comparative methods allow us to draw conclusions based on "structured, focused comparison" of a particular set of events (Levy 2008: 2). By structuring inquiry around a set of events and comparing cases of communities that have experienced those events in different ways, we can better understand the variety of processes that produce certain outcomes (Ragin 1987; Hamel et al. 1993).

Broadly, the goals of comparative case study designs are to "discover contrasts, similarities or patterns across case studies" to "contribute to the development or confirmation of theory" (Mills et al. 2010: 175). My research is concerned with how pre-existing community-level conditions, disaster impacts, and post-disaster interventions influence four aspects of recovery outcomes: social recovery, economic recovery, recovery of the built environment, and the implementation of risk reduction measures. I explore these processes and outcomes through a comparative case study of two communities in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka and in doing so, I respond to Phillip's call for long-term engagement in the field. While I was not able to live in Batticaloa continuously for a couple of years straight, I was able to spend nearly fourteen months over a six-year period (2013 – 2018), living and working in the two communities to conduct interviews, participate in daily life, and observe community processes.

In comparative case-study research, units of analysis tend to be defined as "nation" or "country" (Ragin 1987; Peacock 2003). My research provides an intra-national comparison between two ethnically and culturally diverse communities within a defined geographical region. For this study, "community" is defined as the GN division or "Grama Niladhari Division" which

is the smallest unit of municipal boundaries in Sri Lanka.[11] Each GN division has an appointed "Grama Niladhari" (which roughly translates to "head of the village" or "village officer;" frequently referred to as "GN Person").

The Research Setting

Administrative units in Sri Lanka consist of 9 provinces, 25 districts, 330 divisions, and roughly 14,000 Grama Niladhari Divisions (or villages). The communities included in this study are part of the Eastern Province which includes three districts (listed from North to South): Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara.[12] Districts or District Secretariats in Sri Lanka are sub-provincial and inter-divisional offices which "function as 'outposts' of the Central Government" (Kruse 2007: 9) and are governed by a District Secretary, commonly referred to as the Government Agent (or GA). Districts are then subdivided into Divisions or Divisional Secretariats (commonly referred to as "DS" or "AGA Divisions") and from there are split into Grama Niladhari Divisions (GN Divisions or villages). Of the 14 Divisions within Batticaloa District, Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East are part of the Manmunai North and Kattankudy Divisions, respectively. (See Table 1 and Figure 2 for a diagram of relevant administrative units.)[13] Villages within the Manmunai North Division are commonly referred to as "Kallady" and the coastline "Kallady Beach." I use this terminology to refer to the beach villages surrounding Thiruchendur.

[11] "Community" is defined in this same way across phases of the project.

[12] A proclamation by President Jayewardene led to the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces for a period of time between 1988 and 2007, into one administrative unit: the North-East Province. The merger was disputed, and the proclamation declared illegal and invalid by the Supreme Court in October 2006 resulting in a formal re-separation of the Provinces in January 2007 (Sri Lanka News 2006; Asian Tribune 2007).

[13] Countrywide totals: 9 Provinces, 25 Districts, 330 Divisions, and ~14,000 Grama Niladhari Divisions; Totals for Eastern Province: 3 Districts, 45 Divisions, and ~1,085 Grama Niladhari Divisions; Totals for Batticaloa District: 14 Divisions; 346 GN Divisions (48 in Manmunai North; 18 in Kattankudy) (Batticaloa District Secretariat 2019; Ministry of Public Administration & Home Affairs 2019).

Table 1: Relevant Administrative Units

National	Province	District	Division	Village
Sri Lanka	9	25	330	~14,000
	Eastern Province	3	45	~1,085
		Batticaloa District	14	346
			Manmunai North	48
			Kattankudy	18

Figure 2: Relevant Administrative Units within the Eastern Province



As I outlined in chapter 1, Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East are two GN Divisions in the Batticaloa District located roughly five kilometers apart (see Map 3). Though the tsunami caused similar physical devastation and extensive losses of life in both places, their social,

political, and cultural differences have affected their recovery trajectories and outcomes. While Tamil (தமிழ்) is the common language for both communities, the ethno-religious make-up of each community is where the vast differences can be observed. Thiruchendur is a Tamil-identifying mixed-religious community consisting of a majority Hindu population and some Christian families, and New Kattankudy East is one hundred percent Muslim. In chapter 3, I provide a detailed analysis of how the two communities differ along the lines of ethnic and religious affiliation, livelihood strategies, wealth, and other factors associated with social capital. The cross-community comparisons I undertake in my research shed light on the extent to which these social differences influenced recovery trajectories and outcomes within the context of the civil war.

Map 3: Nested maps of Sri Lanka showing Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East

Maps annotated to show field site locations (from right to left): Eastern Province, Batticaloa District, Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East



Source: maps.google.com

Research Design and Methods

Between 2013 and 2018, I spent fourteen months conducting fieldwork in Batticaloa. In this section, I provide a detailed description of my research design and methodology as the project evolved over five years. Throughout the entire duration of my fieldwork in Batticaloa, I was fortunate to work consistently with the same interpreter—Zaluja Murugiah, a trained social worker just one year older than me. Through her professional and academic activities, Zaluja had a great deal of experience working with tsunami-affected communities before my hiring her in 2013. Her intellectual curiosity, professionalism, and genuine care for both our interlocutors and me made Zaluja an integral factor in the success of my fieldwork.

2014-2014: Fieldwork for the QCA Study

As outlined in chapter 1, I first became connected to this project by participating in an NSF-funded research project I call the "QCA study." I was tasked with collecting data in Sri Lanka to supplement and add comparative potential to data collected by an engineering graduate student—Elizabeth Jordan (who received her Ph.D. in 2013)—in Tamil Nadu, India. During this phase of the project, I spent six months conducting fieldwork, between August 2013 and January 2014. Before traveling to Sri Lanka in 2013, I established connections with the director of a Sri Lankan NGO called Sewalanka. This director, an American sociologist, proved essential in helping coordinate the logistics for the first half of my trip. I also became a research fellow with the American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies (AISLS), which was instrumental as both my visa sponsor and an institutional source for networking once I was in the country.

As a research assistant on the QCA study, I was asked to replicate in Sri Lanka the case study approach and methods employed initially in India, thus broadening the investigation to include both cross-community and cross-national comparisons. During the site selection process

for this phase of the project, I selected six villages on the East coast (in Batticaloa District), and five on the Southwest coast (in Galle District), controlling for levels of damage and geographic region. During the civil war, the Northern and Eastern shores of the island were part of the proposed Eelam State for which the LTTE was fighting, whereas the Western and Southern coasts of the island remained under control of the Sinhalese government. I intentionally chose these regions for comparison to better understand the complexities of disaster recovery within the context of both social and physical shock.

I conducted eighty-six interviews in eleven different communities in both Galle and Batticaloa districts.[14] In addition to household interviews, I also met with and interviewed the planning directors, disaster management team leaders, and housing authority officials in both of the regions where the communities were located. This field visit to Sri Lanka took place nine years after the tsunami struck, and I found communities in varying degrees of recovery.

2014: Gathering Resources to Return to the Field

As I worked through preliminary data analyses in 2014, I became fascinated with the differences I had observed between communities in Batticaloa and Galle. I found that those differences were associated with which side each province fell into during the civil war. Additionally, I found that both political and tarmac biases contributed to the disparities between the two regions. Tarmac bias refers a spatial bias whereby those communities in closer proximity to urban centers, ports of entry, and highways through which relief and recovery aid travel are likely to receive those resources with greater speed and ease (Chambers 1994 and 2014; Kuhn 2013). Galle's location just south of the capital of Colombo and near the only international airport in the country meant that supplies could travel to the region efficiently, compared to the

[14] See Appendix A for details about data collection and the interview schedule used in the QCA study.

cross-country trek to Batticaloa. The political situation compounded this tarmac bias; multiple governmental and LTTE checkpoints impeded the flow of resources to regions in the Northern and Eastern regions of the island. Supplies traveling through these checkpoints were skimmed by both militaries, which meant that fewer supplies made it to the East Coast in full. I heard complaints from community members across Batticaloa that the scarcity of materials, especially those used for construction, led to poor construction and fueled corruption, as entities competed for scarce resources. For example, a mason I interviewed in Thiruchendur complained that the cost of cement bags kept rising to the point that contractors would use ten rather than thirteen bags of cement to construct home foundations to cut costs, resulting in lackluster construction of the rebuilt infrastructure.

While I understood the more apparent differences between Galle and Batticaloa, whereby communities in Galle recovered both more quickly and more completely than those in Batticaloa, I was left with questions about what I had observed in Batticaloa. Over time, I was able to refine the goals of my dissertation research as an extension of the QCA study. I determined that I could build upon the data I had already collected through conducting an in-depth comparison of Tirichendur and New Kattankudy East. I chose these two communities because, despite their geographic proximity and similar experiences with tsunami destruction, these communities experienced vastly disparate recovery trajectories and outcomes.

2015-2016: Return to the Field

With funding from a Dissertation Planning Grant from the AISLS and a National Science Foundation DDRI grant through the Infrastructure Management and Extreme Events Division, I was able to plan two more three-month trips to Sri Lanka. In 2015, I spent three months (September-November) working in Thiruchendur, and in 2016, I conducted three months

(March-May) of fieldwork in Kattankudy. While I focused my data collection efforts in one community or another on each of these trips, I frequently traveled between the communities to visit interlocutors, plan for future data collection, and meet with various government officials. With this additional six months in the field, I was able to spend enough time living and working in both communities to collect data on the various factors identified in my conceptual model and to undertake a more in-depth interpretive analysis of community recovery. Using the knowledge I had already gained through my earlier fieldwork, I conducted longer, more open-ended interviews and spent more time with the community members. I was also able to explore more sociologically-relevant topics, many of which were considered extraneous in the context of the QCA study.[15,16]

2017-2018: Following-up

During the summer months of both 2017 and 2018, I returned to Sri Lanka for short periods to conduct follow-up interviews, take photographs, and conduct sensitivity readings on my preliminary analyses. During this time, Zaluja and I rode through both communities to document differences we had noticed over time, including new construction of beach accesses, restaurants, and the rapid rise of tourist hotels in some communities. I was also able to review my preliminary data analyses with both Zaluja and a Sri Lankan academic familiar with the tsunami recovery, to confirm the soundness of my interpretations.

[15] The QCA study prioritized conditions that were similar/comparable to data collected in both India and Sri Lanka. To prioritize comparable conditions between the two countries, the inclusion of conditions specifically related to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict was difficult to achieve in the fsQCA modeling.

[16] See Appendix B for dissertation interview schedule; Appendix C for my IRB approval; and Appendix D for the Informed Consent Script (in both English and Tamil).

Sampling, Recruitment, and Interviews

From 2015 onward, I conducted more than 100 interviews with community members and leaders, local and district-level government officials; leaders of community-based organizations including those working with a prominent women's rights organization and the Mosque Federation (in Kattankudy); and the rural development societies of both villages. I also interviewed former and current employees of local and international NGOs involved with recovery projects, established religious leaders in both communities who facilitated recovery projects, local academics, and a Muslim war-time peace-monitor tasked with facilitating communication between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government during the final fifteen years of the civil war. For each community, I first interviewed the GN person to gain a perspective on the recovery process in the community and to ask permission to interview community members. Asking permission from the GN person was an entrée-gaining tactic suggested to me by Dr. Dennis McGilvray who has conducted fieldwork in Eastern Sri Lanka since the late 1960s. By asking permission, I was able to introduce myself and my project to the GN person and establish my legitimacy and that of my research assistant as researchers. Had our legitimacy come in to question, it is possible that we could have been expelled from the community. However, there was never an instance where we were denied permission to conduct interviews.

From there, I would either ask for suggestions for a key informant or ask to be introduced to one of the community leaders (for example, a leader of the local Fisheries Society, the Rural Development Society, or the Women's Rural Development Society). Once I was able to identify and interview a key informant, I moved to conducting interviews with community members in their homes. The process of identifying respondents was both purposive, to the extent that I would select households from each of the various post-tsunami housing projects within the

village (if there were more than one), and convenience-based, because fieldwork was often limited by working hours and the sheer number of religious holidays that Sri Lankans observe. I conducted fewer interviews in New Kattankudy East (N = 33) than Thiruchendur (N = 72) (see Table 2).[17,18] Though I moved between the two communities throughout the duration of my field work, I collected the majority of my data in Thiruchendur prior to moving on to New Kattankudy East. Throughout my time in Thiruchendur, I refined my interview schedule and interviewing practices, so that when I arrived to New Kattankudy East, I was able to conduct fewer interviews while still collecting similarly rich data.

Interview questions were clustered so that I could focus in on what was most appropriate to ask of each different participant whether they were a community member, a community leader, a government official holding local versus district office, or current or former employees of various NGOs. The interviews consisted of a series of questions developed to address each of my four primary research questions and lasted between two and three hours each. Depending on time and willingness of participants, I would tailor the questions to each interview so that I could glean as much information as possible from the appropriate sources.

I began each interview with a set of prompts to help establish rapport and determine how long the person had been living in or involved in working with the community. A second set of questions regarding social organization followed. Here, I would inquire about whether or not family members lived nearby, occupations, community leadership, relationships among neighbors, the problem-solving processes within the village, and the process of rebuilding with

[17] Those "key community interviews" listed in italics are not counted in the total number of community resident interviews. This is because these persons were interviewed about their participation in the community, but they are not considered residents of the community for the purposes of this study.
[18] Regarding the Samurdhi officer/Red Cross official in New Kattankudy East: At the time of the interview, the Samurdhi officer in New Kattankudy East told us about his experience working as a project coordinator for the Red Cross—work he conducted before his government appointment.

the help of the government and NGOs. Then I would ask questions related explicitly to politics and the civil war before moving on to questions about social capital.

Regarding *linking social capital*, I would ask about the role of community-based organizations and religious institutions within the village, where recovery assistance came from, whether and how GN persons and community leaders advocated for community members, and the role of local businesses and business persons in recovery efforts. For *bridging social capital*, I focused on questions related to local leadership and collaborations among various groups within the communities, and for *bonding social capital*, I would circle back to questions about family and neighbor relationships, along with participation in community-based organizations and the frequency and nature of community-wide gatherings. The next set of questions related specifically to the implementation of risk-reduction strategies and included queries about preparedness training, warning systems, village and district-level disaster management initiatives, and the relocation of community members from their pre-tsunami properties. In a concluding section, I would ask participants to compare life before and after the tsunami, including the availability of community amenities and infrastructure, the social implications of post-tsunami relocation programs, and their perceptions of and satisfaction with recovery.

In addition to using a formal interview guide, I would often meet with individuals who could provide more specific information on one or two aspects of my research interests in which case I would ask only the most relevant questions. For example, when I interviewed the local mason in Thiruchendur, we spent most of our time discussing reconstruction processes. When I met with community leaders from various organizations (Rural Development Society, Fisheries Society), I would ask specific questions about the role of the organization within the community,

and with government officials, I would ask pointed questions about policy and the role of different agencies.

Table 2: Interviews Conducted 2015-2016

Thiruchendur	**72**
Community residents	69
Key community interviews	8
New Kattankudy East	**33**
Community residents	27
Key community interviews	10
Non-community members	**9**
Total interviews:	**114**
*Categories within each site are not mutually exclusive	

Included among the key community interviews were the following individuals:

- **Thiruchendur:**
  - Local mason
  - Former President of local Fisheries Society
  - President of the Women's Rural Development Society
  - *GN Person*
  - *Samurdhi (social welfare) officer*
  - *Local hotel owner*
- **New Kattankudy East**
  - Local Human Rights watch official
  - Members of the Rural Development Society
  - Director of local pre-school
  - GN Person
  - Former GN Person
  - *Samurdhi officer*
    - *Red Cross official*
  - *Secretary of Mosque Federation*
  - *Member of Parliament representing Kattankudy at-large*
  - *Director of Women's Empowerment Organization*
- **Non-Community Interviews**
  - UN Habitat employee
  - Land Department Registrar
  - Pastor involved with coordinating relief efforts in Manmunai North
  - Caritas EHED project manager
  - District level disaster management official
  - Kattankudy/Batticaloa wartime peace-keeper
  - Female survivor turned NGO tsunami-time interpreter
  - NGO employee who oversaw a multitude of relief and recovery projects in Batticaloa
  - Local academic

Roughly seventy percent of the interviews I conducted with community members were with female respondents. This occurred for several reasons, most notably that women within the household were more likely to be home during the times that I was able to work (I was bound by Zaluja's schedule, which dictated that she work roughly 10:00 am – 5:00 pm on weekdays). Additionally, because Zaluja and I are both women, it was more culturally appropriate for us to talk with women in many cases. I believe that the data I've been able to collect captures a holistic-picture of recovery in both communities, because I triangulated data by keeping notes on informational disparities between interviews, following up with clarifications from any official data that I was able to gather (records from government entities or NGOs), and discussing these disparities in subsequent interviews with female and male community members and community leaders.

In most cases, men and women had different experiences engaging in the recovery processes. For instance, female community members tended to have a firm grasp on the relief and recovery aid related to household items and health of their family members, while male community members tended to have a stronger grip on the process of obtaining money from the government and NGOs, the home-rebuilding process, and the procurement of male-dominated livelihood materials such as fishing implements. I do not believe that my ability to analyze community-level processes was compromised by the gender imbalance in my samples.

If someone refused to be interviewed, I would take special note of his or her reason for the refusal. This happened from time to time and was due primarily to time constraints. Politics motivated some refusals; some people did not feel comfortable discussing the government or the war out of fear that their comments would not be confidential. When individuals expressed this fear, I was sure to remind them of the confidential nature of our work but would never pressure

someone to speak with us if they had the perception that doing so might compromise their safety. Other refusals were motivated purely by fatigue. Some individuals would say that they had already told their stories to academics who worked in the villages before my fieldwork, and some had spent a great deal of time following up with the NGO workers associated with housing projects. In these cases, I would take note of the reason and still make sure to gather basic information (which NGO helped to rebuild their house, the family's religious affiliation, and an estimate of the ages, genders, and relationships of those living within the household) so as to maintain a record of who was present in the communities at the time of data collection.

Field Notes and Participant Observation

In addition to interviews and the notes associated with them, I kept extensive records on the community activities I observed. For example, I made sure to attend religious ceremonies and festivals, accepted wedding and puberty-ceremony invitations, cooked and ate food with many of my respondents, and spent days exploring different livelihoods by participating in fishing-net repair and spooling thread, among other activities. By embedding myself my study communities for months at a time and becoming well-known enough to gain access to peoples' homes and businesses, I was able to keep extensive notes on the dynamics of daily life, which contributed to my ability to analyze the cultural dynamics of these communities. Additionally, I attended a village tsunami practice drill in Thiruchendur, which allowed me to meet with Sri Lankan army personnel who were conducting the drill, with whom I would not otherwise have had the opportunity to interact. Attending the drill and gaining access to government leaders through this exercise went beyond the scope of expected access to the field and allowed me to develop a deeper understanding of the disaster management systems in Batticaloa (I discuss this event in detail in chapter 5).

Conducting International Fieldwork: Working with an Interpreter

Edwards (1998) rightly notes that the process of conducting interviews with an interpreter can be fraught with difficulties ranging from issues of language competencies to power imbalances that may result from the presence of a third party. Edwards advises that there are a few ways that we can counteract these difficulties. One strategy is to choose suitable interpreters by acknowledging the correct match between interviewer and interpreter and between interpreter and interviewee. For instance, the interpreter should have a firm enough understanding of the local context that he or she can assist the interviewer in establishing credibility and gaining entrée. However, if the interpreter has ongoing relationships with the interviewee(s), this may disrupt those existing relationships. Edwards also suggests that the interpreter needs training on the nature of the research questions, confidentiality, the research process, and their role in the interview. In addition to this training, throughout research, she suggests regular debriefing sessions between interviewer and interpreter to ensure that this learning is ongoing. This training is also crucial so that the interpreter can clearly explain their role to the interviewee.

In many cases, the interpreter can also serve as a form of a key informant whose reflexivity may be valuable to the interviewer. Ultimately, Edwards advises researchers conducting this type of work to reframe our practices to "carry out interviews *with*, rather than *through* interpreters" (1998: 206). Shimpuku and Noor take this concept a step further by noting that cross-cultural qualitative studies can be "evaluated on the extent to which the researcher incorporates the interpreter into the research process and how well the researcher-interpreter working relationship influenced the study's findings" (2001: 1693). Additionally, issues of trust must be central to this working relationship, and in cases where trust is violated between interviewer and interpreter, the quality of data becomes suspect (Shimpuku and Noor 2011:

1702). Especially within the context of cross-cultural interpretation, the interpreter is not just there to translate the language, but to interpret culture—in the description of body language, emotional responses, and social interactions, and physical artifacts that may be unknown to the interviewer (Temple 2002; Temple and Edwards 2002; Borchgrevink 2003).

Zaluja's personal and professional backgrounds were an incredible asset to my fieldwork experience. That she is a Tamil Hindu woman born and raised in Batticaloa allowed for a dynamic of familiarity between her and interviewees, and her training as a social worker made her especially adept at navigating the cultural and emotional dynamics of conducting our work. Because she was so receptive to training on the research process and concerned with the well-being of our participants, I never felt as though my trust had been violated, which would have been corrosive to our relationship. She and I spent a week training each other about the research process and cultural environment before entering the field, and we engaged in daily debriefing sessions while conducting fieldwork to cut down on any inconsistencies in my perception of the data we collected. I approached our relationship as that of research-partners and frequently referred to her as my "research assistant" rather than "interpreter" for this reason. The language barriers between me and my interlocutors proved frustrating at many points throughout my fieldwork, but my strong relationship with Zaluja helped to temper my frustrations. At various points, we would re-work a question or a question pattern to more accurately reflect what she and I both agreed was more effective for gathering relevant data. Additionally, she was instrumental in helping me parse out my interpretations and analyses of what I had witnessed. Zaluja and I have maintained a working relationship beyond "the field," as she has been a constant sounding board throughout my analytical process.

I was unable to receive intensive language training before entering the field, so my Tamil language acquisition happened during my fieldwork. Additionally, with a fellowship from the American Institute for Indian Studies, I traveled to Madurai India for eight weeks in 2017 to participate in a Tamil-language intensive course. As I write this chapter in early 2019, I admit that I am still less than conversationally proficient in Tamil, though I can understand the spoken language with more proficiency than I can speak.

Social Position in the Field

Considerations of positionality and power are critical in all research, but perhaps especially in cross-cultural research, and I remained conscious of these dynamics when it came to both my position and Zaluja's in the field. Positionality is "determined by where one stands in relation to 'the other'… [and these] positions can shift" (Merriam et al. 2001: 412). "Factors such as education, gender, sexual orientation, class, race, or sheer duration of contacts may at different times outweigh the cultural identity we associate with insider or outsider status" (Narayan 1993: 671-2). Sri Lanka's colonial history[19] made issues of power central to my work (Lewis 1973; Sanjek 1993) which meant that I needed to continually acknowledge the roles that my race, nationality, age, gender, religious, and social class identities played as I moved through different contexts (Hsiung 2018).

As a young cis-gender woman (I was in my late twenties while conducting my field research), I paid particular mind to the spaces that were appropriate for me to occupy while in the field, both as a researcher and a neighbor to my interlocutors. As a foreigner, I was challenged to reckon with what it meant to be a Westerner researching in the Global South, in a language that I (for the most part) was unable to speak, read, or write. My body and appearance were a frequent

[19] Sri Lanka was colonized by the Portuguese (1505 – mid-1630's), the Dutch (1656 – late 18th century), and the British (1802 – 1948).

point of discussion while I was in the field. In many instances, my age and proximity to Western culture meant that interlocutors would assume that I was an NGO employee or otherwise affiliated with a relief agency. Zaluja and I worked to refine our informed consent script to ensure that community members and leaders were clear on the parameters of my role and data collection efforts.

I found that my outsider status frequently became an asset, because I was able to request clarification and explanation for those questions that may have seemed common-sensical to interviewees (Merriam et al. 2001). In cases where I would ask these types of questions, sometimes respondents would tell Zaluja that she knew the answer and should answer my question on her own, but she was consistently able to reiterate that I needed to hear it from them because I was the researcher, not she. Additionally, I held a certain amount of social power over my respondents by way of my Western upbringing and education, but Zaluja's presence functioned as a somewhat neutralizing effect.

Soon after I met Zaluja, she helped me to assemble an appropriate wardrobe for fieldwork. When I wore the trousers and tunic (shalwar kameez) that is customary for Tamil women, I was almost able to pass as a local. My tan complexion and dark physical features (extending from my Iraqi roots) frequently meant that as long as I dressed appropriately, my hair was braided, and I kept my mouth closed, I was generally perceived to be a Sri Lankan, or even a Tamil woman. At times, this made it easier for me to move through public spaces unobtrusively in communities where the presence of white foreigners remains relatively uncommon. One dynamic this allowed me to avoid was the preferential treatment white foreigners are frequently afforded over locals in Sri Lanka. For example, when Zaluja and I would show up for a first meeting with a government officer, and other people were waiting to meet with them, we were

not immediately moved to the front of the queue. The first time this happened, Zaluja expressed surprise because when she had worked with white women (through her NGO work) in the past, they never had to wait in line. In this way, I was able to more directly participate in daily life without unnecessarily exacerbating a power imbalance between me and my interlocutors. However, if my colorful tattoos slipped out from my sleeves, or I began to speak, I was immediately found out. I never tried to trick anyone into thinking that I was Tamil or Sri Lankan, but it did help—at times—to keep quiet and let Zaluja talk our way into interviews, especially with government agents who otherwise would have no interest in speaking with foreigners or could have been suspicious of my motives.

That Zaluja and I are both women offered us the ability to gain rapport with women research participants in ways that we would be unable to if one or both of us were a man or if there were a man present. That women's social lives in Kattankudy and Thiruchendur tend to cluster around the gendered gatherings meant that we were able to participate in group activities including cooking, childcare, and Women's Rural Development Society meetings without being too obtrusive. Especially in Kattankudy, I found that our social proximity to women allowed them the opportunity to express criticism of men in the community, or even within their households.

There were also times when Zaluja and I had a difficult time navigating the deeply gendered spaces where we were working. In these moments, we had to put extra effort into proving our legitimacy to high-status male interlocutors. The district level planning director once asked Zaluja how I could be serious about my work as a "young unmarried female," implying that my status as a single female made me a less than legitimate researcher. Frequently, as we were getting settled into our interviews, people would veer into asking personal questions about

both Zaluja and me. With Zaluja, people tended to probe her on where she was from and how she learned English, which were proxies for knowing her wealth and social status within the caste system. People tended to ask me about my father's profession, and whether or not I would be married any time soon. By locating me in relation to male figures, my legitimacy as a *good woman* was being interrogated. I frequently referenced my training under Dr. McGilvray, a well-established, white, male scholar of Tamil culture, which proved a viable solution to the problem of my legitimacy while I was in Batticaloa. I will never forget the day that Nilam Hamead, Dennis's research assistant since the late 1960s, and his wife Shukri dropped me off at my field site in Batticaloa. I had shared a ride with them from Colombo to Batticaloa, as they were on their way to Ampara (south of Batticaloa) for a family wedding. As we were driving into Kattankudy, Nilam slowed the car, pulled into a restaurant parking spot, and turned to me to say "Elizabeth, from this point forward, you must be a chaste, Tamil woman. People will respect you if they believe this." I took him seriously and even asked Zaluja if I'd interpreted his comment correctly to mean that I had to appear to be a virginal or non-sexualized figure. My interpretation was correct. If I were to be taken seriously during my fieldwork, I would need to set aside my ideas about what it meant to be an empowered female in the United States and refashion myself into the mold of a chaste Tamil woman. Insofar as I was able to perform this chastity, I was able to conduct my work without great suspicion.

There were also instances where my status as a Westerner meant that interlocutors would talk openly with me about taboo subjects. For example, in chapter 3 I describe Nirusha, a middle-aged woman in Thiruchendur who spoke candidly with me about foreigners having sex in an outdoor shower, and Suthan, who gave me an account of an alleged sexual assault at his guesthouse. I doubt that either of these conversations would have been possible had I not been a

foreigner, because these topics lie far outside conventional conversational norms within Tamil culture. While I never claimed to believe something that I did not, I did work hard to diminish the perception of me as a sexual object, or a "loose foreign woman," as Pushpakaran, a 28-year-old male Tamil counterpart and friend, once put it. Indeed, there were times when aspects of my positionality were both a detriment and a benefit to my data collection efforts. Over the years, Zaluja and I each became much more proficient in figuring out which of my many identities move to the fore in a given situation so that we could most efficiently and effectively collect the data we sought to collect without exacerbating the potential for exploitation.

Ethical Considerations and Emotions in the Field

In addition to the straightforward precautions I took to de-identify each interview respondent involved in my research (described in the following section, and evidenced in my IRB protocol), I took special care, both in the field and during preliminary analyses, to protect the identities and safety of respondents, myself, and my research assistant.

Working with survivors of disaster and war means that interviews can, and often do, become therapeutic encounters in which respondents actively process their trauma within the context of the interview (Tierney 2019: 111-112). Emotions ran high during the majority of our interviews, as respondents were often recounting what the most terrifying and devastating day of their lives, along with their experiences of a civil war that lasted nearly a lifetime for many of them. I am fortunate that my research assistant is a trained social worker, and as such has an exceptional eye and ear for dealing with emotionally-charged situations.

We took special care before, during, and after each interview to check in with ourselves and with each other about how things were going and how we should proceed with our days. Before conducting interviews or asking to interview certain families, we would do our best to

gauge where each respondent might be in relation to his or her trauma. If someone indicated to us that they were not emotionally prepared to discuss their experience of the disaster or war, we would not conduct the interview. This happened most frequently with individuals who had lost children and spouses in the war or tsunami, and those who had either been forced or chose to participate in the LTTE's campaigns, though we were able to conduct interviews with individuals who had each of these experiences.

Similarly, if we believed that the conversation might incite unnecessary secondary trauma, we would not interview with that person. For instance, we worked to find Maheshwaran, a man who I knew through the work of another anthropologist[20] who had researched fisherfolk during tsunami relief efforts. Maheshwaran lost his wife, three sons, his home, and all of his worldly possessions and also experienced physical harm as a result of being swept up into the waves and washed across the lagoon into a neighboring village. Once a prominent member of the Fisheries Society in his native village, he no longer engages in his traditional livelihood and has not been physically settled in his village since 2004. Though he could have served as a strategic key informant for our work, we decided not to ask him for an interview because we felt that it might be overwhelming for him to continue to re-live his tragic story for the benefit of an academic researcher. Instead of interviewing him, we spent an afternoon sipping tea with him and his caretaker (his deceased wife's cousin-sister) and showing them the book chapter where his photo and story appears. While our time with Maheshwaran did not result in a recorded interview focused on the topics we discussed at length with other respondents, I believe that our afternoon with him was mutually beneficial. He was able to proudly reflect on his experiences

[20] See: Lawrence, P. (2013). The Sea Goddess and the fishermen: religion and recovery in Navalady, Sri Lanka. In *Tsunami Recovery in Sri Lanka* (pp. 104-125). Routledge.

with the anthropologist and develop a stronger connection to what he had done for his community in the process.

In cases where we were conducting interviews that took an especially emotional turn, we would offer our respondents any number of options for how to proceed: we would take a break and turn off the audio recorder until the respondent felt comfortable continuing, offer to conclude the interview entirely or re-visit the individual on another day, take unrecorded breaks for tea and snacks to allow for small moments of pause, and skip over parts of the interview schedule that could have caused additional harm or conflicts. Additionally, because many interviews sometimes became heated during discussions of war, we would take extra care to make sure that in these instances our space was secure. To protect confidentiality, we worked to ensure that neighbors would not be able to overhear any parts of our conversations or walk in and begin to participate in the interview (which was a fairly typical experience). We also tried to make sure children would not be present during any discussions of violence.

If new family members or neighbors presented themselves during the interview and wanted to participate, we would first ask the original respondent if he or she would be comfortable with this. Usually, we'd do this by taking a short break so that we could ask them privately. If they consented, we would proceed with the interview only after conducting the informed consent procedure with each new participant. If the original respondent did not consent to the new person participating, we would describe the confidential nature of our work to the other person, and then offer to schedule a time for us to interview him or her one-on-one at another time.

There were a few occasions where we ended interviews of our own volition because we felt that asking our respondent about sensitive topics could contribute to some form of

vulnerability for them. In one of these cases, a male member of the Mosque Federation decided to stop by and chat with a woman we were interviewing and then decided he wanted to stay and participate. Because the woman felt as if she had to allow him to remain as a normative response to the power dynamic between herself and this man, it was our responsibility to end the interview. We did so by claiming we had finished just as he arrived, so as not to allow a conversation about her war-related sexual assault to continue in the presence of a male community leader.

There were plenty of moments where Zaluja and I were moved to tears during interviews. At times, crying with our respondents was a safe and appropriate emotional experience for everyone involved. In the three instances where one or the both of us could not proceed with an interview in a way that distanced our emotional selves from the stories we were hearing, I would cut the interview short. On some days, after an especially emotional meeting, Zaluja and I would leave the field and go elsewhere—for a cup of tea, lunch, or a ride to a temple—and then decide how to proceed with our day. If we needed a break, we would conclude our work for the day and have a conversation about how we might address a similar situation in the future. Each step of our process was iterative, and our self-evaluation was key to our success in the field. By frequently checking in with each other and engaging in the necessary self-care required when doing this type of work, Zaluja and I were able to remain productive.

Data Management and Analysis

All of the interviews were audio recorded with the participant's consent. In the few instances where I was denied permission to record, I took extensive notes during the interview and then transcribed those notes immediately afterward. In addition to the recordings and hand-written transcriptions, I took notes during and after each interview and kept daily and weekly

logs to track differences and similarities in accounts and new questions as they arose. Interview records were de-identified, and each respondent was assigned a unique identifier that allowed me to keep track of the community where the interview was conducted, the respondent's role in the after community, and the date of the interview. For example, if I interviewed a female homeowner in Thiruchendur on March 20, their identifier would read as "TCHN_20March_FemHomeowner."

Audio recordings were transcribed either by me or a paid professional transcriber. Any personal information about respondents that was recorded in the audio files was redacted from the written transcripts. Records were kept (on a password protected external hard drive) as aggregate data in a spreadsheet that identified respondents only by the community, their role in the community, their gender, and a random identifying number or pseudonym. Field notes and memos were transcribed into electronic format, and the originals were scanned and destroyed. These electronic versions of field notes and memos were kept secure in password-protected files that only Kathleen Tierney and I could access. Interview transcriptions, field notes, and memos written both during my time in the field and afterword were systematically reviewed and coded for both emergent and expected themes. I used a mixture of NVivo software and color-coding within Microsoft Word to code my transcripts, field notes, and other digitized data.

I followed Saldaña's (2009) guidance for data analysis by coding expected themes and refining and re-working codes through an iterative process. A series of expected themes and codes come directly from my interview schedule, as topics relate to my specific research questions. Examples include: which NGOs conducted work in communities and whether a project was homeowner- or donor-driven; how recovery processes were politicized and in many cases corrupted by political officials; and differences in social organization along religious lines.

Through the preliminary analyses, a secondary set of themes and codes emerged from the data. These themes included the gendered nature of community responsibilities, the religious nature of economic reciprocity between community members, and the gendered and religious nature of the tourism booms in both communities. As themes emerged, I returned to previously coded transcripts and memos to re-code them to capture the relevant data points in my analysis. Throughout my analyses, I kept memos and sketched out relationships among codes, categories, and themes.

CHAPTER 3: NEW KATTANKUDY EAST AND THE TWO THIRUCHENDURS, SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DISASTER RECOVERY

Introduction

In this chapter, I compare how social capital functioned in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East during the recovery efforts from the 2004 tsunami to produce disparate long-term outcomes. In doing so, I bring religious institutions to the fore and show how the two distinctive ethno-religious communities were differentially able to leverage the three commonly-recognized forms of social capital to negotiate access to effective disaster relief and recovery aid, with a specific focus on this ability in the context of the civil war. I argue that differences in recovery outcomes are largely attributable to the ethno-religious affiliations of each community, which effectively placed them on different sides in the thirty-year civil war in Sri Lanka. I focus on religious institutions and the particular social structures that have unfolded on account of ethno-religious strife rather than making specific claims about religious faith. I do not dismiss the importance of certain widely-shared religious principles; instead, I show how these principles are also, to some extent, artifacts of the civil war insofar as they contributed to recovery. I analyze the social structure within each community to demonstrate how and why the Moorish community in New Kattankudy East, in comparison to the Tamil village in Thiruchendur, was much more equipped to envision and execute a successful long-term recovery strategy.

As noted in Chapter 1, this study builds upon findings from the QCA study and other disaster research by analyzing how the different forms of social capital (bonding, bridging, and linking) are leveraged by communities to produce recovery outcomes (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Aldrich 2012a; Aldrich 2012b; Meyer 2013; Aldrich and Meyer 2015; Jordan and Javernick-Will 2015; Jordan et al. 2016; Meyer 2018). First, I review the core research questions

I plan to address in this chapter. Then I move through an overview of social capital theory and explain questions about disaster recovery that arise from social capital analysis, with an emphasis on trust and foreign funding within the context of the civil war. I discuss recovery in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East with a focus on three interrelated domains of recovery: recovery of the built environment; social recovery; and economic recovery and livelihoods.[21] Here, I drill down into comparisons of the different forms of social capital manifested in each community with a focus on social cohesion, demographic change, political leadership, and the role of religion and religious institutions. I show how the tsunami and subsequent aid provision affected and mobilized social capital by exploring what social capital is assumed to do in communities, how social capital was effectively or ineffectively mobilized during the recovery process, and the recovery outcomes in each community. I highlight how my dissertation contributes to the broadening of the concept of social capital by providing a focused analysis of the role of religious institutions as sites for maintaining and producing social networks critical to the success of achieving long-term recovery from disaster. In the concluding section, I discuss the implications of these findings for the theorization of social capital as a concept within the sociological study of disasters and hazards, as well as how a focus on disaster recovery projects in the Global South necessitates an analysis of the role of international development and modernization projects, which will be explored more extensively in chapter 4.

Research Questions

I address the following three questions in this chapter:

1. What are the differences in the social organization of these two communities that have led to differential recovery trajectories and outcomes?
2. In what ways did the civil war influence the recovery trajectories of the two communities?

[21] The fourth domain of recovery—the implementation of risk reduction measures—is the focus of Chapter 5.

3. How does variation in different forms of social capital (linking, bonding, and bridging social capital) preceding and following the tsunami disaster explain these differences?

My data focus on differences in the two communities I studied and specifically how these two distinctive ethno-religious communities were differentially able to leverage each of the three forms of social capital to negotiate access to effective disaster relief and recovery aid within the context of the civil war. Much of this difference has to do with the ethno-religious affiliations of the community, as well as their socio-economic development programs both preceding and following the tsunami. Importantly, a community's ability to leverage social capital following the tsunami was tightly linked to the ability to control or manage the flow of aid that was pouring into the region in unprecedented levels due to international interest in the catastrophic tsunami (Gamburd 2013; Lloyd-Jones 2006). To address the conceptualization and use of social capital in disaster research, I first begin with a brief overview of the foundations of social capital theory.

Foundations of Social Capital Theory

Political Scientist Louis Hanifan first introduced the term "social capital" to describe "good will, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit" (1916: 130). Since then, Portes notes that social capital has "become one of the most popular exports from sociological theory into everyday language" (1998: 2) as it provides a framework for describing the consequences of social connection, involvement, and participation in groups for both the individual and the collective.

Pierre Bourdieu, the first to provide a systematic contemporary analysis of social capital, defined it as:

> The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which

> provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (1986: 248).

He writes that these relationships are practical and both exist and are reinforced by both "material and symbolic exchanges which help to maintain them" which may include family names, social class affiliations, tribes, schools, political parties, and so forth making them irreducible to "objective relations of proximity in physical (geographical) space or even in economic and social space" (1986: 248). For Bourdieu, capital is a source of power that may be instrumentally leveraged to accrue profits to individuals. His emphasis on solidarity, shared identity, and intentionality shows how social capital reinforces social positions and makes groups inherently exclusionary. Bourdieu's concept of social capital involves two core elements: the social relationships that give members access to resources shared by their associates and the quantity and quality of those resources (Portes 1988). He writes that "the profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible" (Bordieu 1986: 248); thus, ongoing investment in solidarity confers continued access to the resources that these relationships provide.

James Coleman offers a definition and theory of social capital that attempts to bring together two streams of sociological thought: one that sees social actions and transactions governed by norms, rules, and obligations and describes social action as "shaped, constrained, and redirected by the social context" (1988: S95); and another, stemming from work of economists, that understands social actions as born of self-interest and rational choice. Coleman's defines social capital by its function as a "variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure" (1998:

S98). This definition leaves open the possibility that a variety of processes can function as social capital as long as they achieve a particular outcome (Portes 1988). Coleman identifies three mechanisms that generate social capital: "reciprocity (including trust), information channels and flow of information, and norms enforced by sanction" (Bhandari and Yasnobu 2009: 488). Relationships among individuals both contain and generate obligations and expectations making interactions into transactions. The expectation that actors reciprocate favors and meet obligations towards others is based on trust that becomes a resource through social interactions. Further, Coleman's idea of social capital requires an element of closure, so that the social structure can effectively impose norms and generate trust.

Robert Putnam (1993;1995; 2000) draws on Coleman's treatment of social capital and focuses on relations between civil society and democracy. He focuses on the benefits that social capital generates beyond individuals, at the community level. He defines social capital as "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (1995: 67). He builds on Coleman's conceptualization of social capital as a collective good and indicates that these networks can be leveraged towards collective action and civic engagement, what he calls "civicness" (Putnam 1993). He argues that "life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital" because networks of civic engagement foster reciprocity and trust, "facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved" and broaden the network-members' "sense of self, developing the 'I' into the 'we'" (Putnam 1995: 2-3). Actors within these social networks can engage in collective action to realize shared goals, which can be political or economic objectives (Tierney 2019).

In his early writings, Putnam considered social capital as a positive resource, though in his later work, he addresses criticism that social capital can constrain individuals' actions and choices by excluding others from access to resources (Portes and Landolt 1996), by distinguishing between two different dimensions of social capital: bonding and bridging social capital (Putnam 2001; Leonard 2004). Here, bonding social capital can be exclusive, because it occurs within homogeneous populations and tends to benefit those with "internal access" to the group, whereas bridging social capital is considered inclusive in that it can link groups across social divides. He argues that "bonding social capital is good for 'getting by' but bridging social capital is essential for 'getting ahead'" (Leonard 2004: 903). Here Putnam extends upon Bourdieu and Coleman's theorizations by showing that network ties can be significant not only within networks but by also extending reach into other networks.

Nan Lin (1999; 2008), defines social capital as "resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions" (1999: 35). Lin's definition of social capital contains three ingredients:

> Resources embedded in a social structure; accessibility to such social resources by individuals; and use or mobilization of such social resources by individuals in purposive actions. Thus conceived, social capital contains three elements intersecting structure and action: the structural (embeddedness [within networks]), opportunity (accessibility) and action-oriented (use) aspects (Lin 1999: 25).

Lin's framework posits that there are three elements required in the theorization of social capital: first, the delineation of causal forces or pre-conditions and precursors that may constrain or facilitate one's investment of social capital; second, the process of linking access to and use of social capital or the process of social capital mobilization; and third, the demonstration that the three ingredients are interconnected or a "causal sequence in which embedded resources constrain and enable individual choice and actions" (1999: 41-2). In the process of linking

mobilization to outcomes, Lin argues that theory should show how social capital affects an individual's "economic, political, and social capital (resources) or her/his physical, mental and life well-being" (1999: 42). Though Lin's framework, like others, fails to give enough focus to the negative and exclusionary aspects of social capital (Aldrich 2012a), it provides more complete distinctions between cause and effect, and facilitates analysis across different scales (micro, meso, and macro), giving it more flexibility in application, and thus providing an excellent framework to apply to the study of social capital in disasters.

Social Capital and Disaster Research

Social capital is typically described as having three forms: bonding, bridging, and linking social capital, each of which has multiple, co-evolving dimensions and outcomes**.** ***Bonding social capital*** constitutes ties that exist within groups, such as kinship and friendship networks as well as the trust that develops within these relationships, the strengths of social norms within a community, the levels of participation among community members in local organizing, and the overall strength of ties within a group. While bonding social capital describes within-group ties, bridging capital describes between-group ties (Meyer 2018: 270). ***Bridging capital*** consists of interactions between different groups that hold relatively equal levels of power and the extent to which these interactions facilitate joint communication, collaboration, and resource mobilization. These bonds can traverse geographic, economic, and political boundaries, to connect stakeholder groups such as different ethnic groups and political constituencies. Bridging capital facilitates the building of coalitions by connecting groups within communities that may be focused on a common goal (Tierney 2019).

Both bridging and ***linking capital*** facilitate connections across groups, but where bridging capital widens a group's network, linking capital facilitates that group's ability to

connect with entities that have greater power and influence than they do. Thus, linking social capital is understood as the formal collaboration between a bonded or bridging group and local or national power centers. Ultimately, social capital can be interpreted as the strength of networks within communities that allow for collaboration between and among various social groups. Groups that exhibit strong levels of each of the three forms of capital are more likely to mobilize resources towards common goals effectively.

Table 3: Forms, Dimensions, and Outcomes of Social Capital

Form	Dimensions	Outcomes
Bonding	In-group or horizontal ties; network embeddedness; place attachment; civic engagement	Trust; reciprocity; norms; information
Bridging	Cross-group, or between-group ties; collaborative networks; coalitions	Community cohesiveness; influence
Linking	Ties between groups and power centers	Influence; resource mobilization

Scholars interested in the social dimensions of disasters and hazards study social capital as it manifests itself at various stages in the disaster/hazards cycle, from mitigation and preparedness activities to response and recovery (Meyer 2018). The relationship between social capital and disasters is multi-dimensional. Levels of pre-disaster social capital within a community can shape the ways a community experiences and recovers from a disaster. In post-disaster contexts, strong social capital can build a foundation of trust and information sharing among actors which may serve as "informal insurance and mutual assistance;" mobilize networks so that communities collectively organize to address recovery challenges; and decrease the probability that community members will "exit" a community following a disaster (Aldrich 2012a: 46). In their study of the Gujarat and Kobe Earthquakes, Nakagawa and Shaw (2004)

found that strong levels of trust, shared norms, and active participation by community members in the recovery process led to quicker and more successful recoveries.

A disaster may also affect a community's social capital. On the positive side, Dynes (2002) observes that emergent groups that form after disasters to address the needs of the community may create new forms of social capital. On the negative side, researchers have also found that technological disasters may damage social capital by producing corrosive communities where trust and reciprocity are diminished in the post-disaster period (Meyer 2018; Ritchie 2012; Ritchie and Gill 2007; Ritchie, Gill & Farnham 2013).

Importantly, while it is typically viewed as a positive community resource, Aldrich (2012a) makes clear that social capital is a "Janus faced" resource that may produce intended or unintended negative consequences. For instance, strong bonding social capital may provide benefits to members of tightly-linked in-groups at the cost of exclusion of and harm to marginalized populations. In his words, "the social ties that bind catastrophe survivors to each other can also be barriers that exclude lawbreakers and norm violators from recovery or punish nonconforming outsiders" (2012a: 25). For example, in his study of villages in Tamil Nadu, India after the 2004 tsunami, Aldrich found that villages with high levels of both bonding and linking social capital fared better than other communities because they engaged in collective action to overcome collective problems. However, through the process of collective action, those same villages tended to exclude minorities and low-caste disaster survivors, thus reinforcing the marginal status of those groups within the community. The Janus-faced nature of social capital is especially important to consider when analyzing the role of Sri Lanka's ongoing civil war, both during the decades before and the five years following the 2004 tsunami.

Social Capital, Trust, and Sri Lanka's Civil War

Relationships of trust among community members bolster the community's ability to prepare for and mitigate future disasters in a democratic manner (Uyangoda 2005). After disasters, co-management of the recovery process between community members and the polity requires strong "norms of trust, reciprocity, tolerance, and inclusion" to activate social networks (Pearce 2003). Most damaging to this dynamic is a perception of "recreancy," whereby community members do not believe that institutions are sharing information or that they are working in an untrustworthy manner (Freudenburg 1993; Tierney 2012). A perception of recreancy can be corrosive for a community already ravaged by disaster, leading to an arduous recovery process.

That the Sri Lankan Civil War was a straightforward Sinhala-Tamil conflict is a mostly Western construct. This dualism arises from the fact that most of the "Tamil diaspora in the West is drawn largely from the conflict-ridden [Northern] region of the island…[and] projects Tamils and Sinhalese as two homogeneous categories" and ignores the "diversities and intricacies within Tamil communities" (Bandarage 2008, 6). These diversities and intricacies within the island's Tamil population are what ultimately led me to focus my research on the disparities between Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East, where there are substantial differences between ethno-religious groups that shaped their experiences during the war.

Thiruchendur experienced tenuous governance and occupation by both the Sinhala army and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam (LTTE)—the Tamil separatist movement—throughout the 30-year conflict, but in contrast, the Moorish community in Kattankudy was able to turn inward, self-govern, and build up social capital within the borders of its neighborhoods. The Moors in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province occupied somewhat of a third space during the war,

siding with neither the government nor the LTTE, and at different times experienced both oppression and the ability to seek favor from each of the opposing factions.

Issues of trust and reciprocity were central to both inter- and intra-community networking during the recovery from the tsunami and war. Mistrust of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE within Tamil communities was fueled by the persistent violent conflict (Gamburd 2013). The ongoing challenging of authority in communities, including Thiruchendur, led to confusion and a lack of formal or accessible leadership, creating a context in which foreign and local institutions, as well as community members, were confused about with whom to communicate regarding relief and recovery projects.

Confusion and distrust were common in community residents' relationships with NGOs, and also with one another. Muriel, a mother of four living in an unfinished house in Thiruchendur, spoke with me at length about her unfinished home:

> They [the NGO that built her house] have so much money, and here is my roof [pointing to the coconut thatching she's woven to provide coverage for the home], you can see we have made it from coconut now, and it will probably be like that [forever]. When it rains again, I will fix it, and that's how it goes…

I asked whether or not she made complaints to the NGO about the house being abandoned:

> How could I speak with someone [about getting the roof fixed]? How could I? They [the NGO workers] left after the problem in Trinco. Nowhere to be found. Now I see their vans, but they don't visit us. The engineers probably speak Sinhala…

Then I asked about the GN person:

> I didn't know how to find my GN person, he left, and they sent a young boy in their place, and he remind[ed] me of [Sinhala] police. I heard that [my neighbor] got six boats. How does he have six boats and I have no roof? He worked with my cousin-brother, and we were kind to each other. I helped his mother when she got sick from the [flood] water. But he couldn't sell a boat and help me with my roof. I still feel anger. Who will help me?

I found that in the absence of effective channels of communication and collaboration among community members, the NGOs meant to serve them, and the Sri Lankan government, trust broke down, leading to rumors and competition among neighbors for scarce resources. In my interview with Muriel's neighbor, Rajendran, the following week, I asked about the "six boats," and he laughed:

> Six boats! Nonsense. People in Kattankudy were keeping all of the boats, and Sinhala fishers would buy them for a big profit. Now the Sinhalese are fishing our waters. I am still poor, and I go [fishing] on my neighbors' boat. You should talk to [another female neighbor] and see what happened to all of the sewing machines she kept.

And so it went: the cycle of denials, deflections, and complaints about hoarding resources illustrated just how much mistrust among neighbors had been generated by the misallocation or rumored misallocation of resources. Muriel and Rajendran's experiences and claims were similar to those of a number of her neighbors who live in unfinished homes near the sea in Thiruchendur—a result of a housing project that was abandoned when an NGO employee was injured during a war-related conflict north of Batticaloa in Trincomalee.

While the tsunami housing project was abandoned in 2007, the NGO still maintains a presence in the area, as evidenced by its air-conditioned vans (frequently spotted in Batticaloa traffic) plastered with logos the size of a car door. I was able to meet with the office's head engineer in 2016, who told me that the tsunami recovery projects were long-completed, the records were no longer available, and it was not possible for him to meet with families in Thiruchendur to hear their complaints. This engineer, a Sinhalese man in his early thirties, only agreed to speak with me informally because he feared the repercussions that he might face for admitting that his organization had failed to complete a project. He divulged that he had only been working in Batticaloa for a few months (as of February 2016) and that any of the relief

workers from the "tsunami days" had moved on to projects in other areas of the country. He spoke with me in hypotheticals: while he had no direct knowledge of the tsunami projects, he did recall that it *might* be true that an employee was injured in Trincomalee and agreed that the NGO would *probably* slow projects down if this happened. I asked if he could locate the files on the project and he promised to retrieve them from the central office in Colombo. I followed up five times to inquire about those records, but he eventually stopped returning my calls.

When I tried to question Savidthrii, the GN person, about how a housing project could have been abandoned and why there was no remediation available to families that still do not have roofs, I was consistently met with shrugs. She would provide evidence of other neighbors with finished homes and claim that families like Muriel's must have mismanaged their own projects. What she did not seem to know was that the finished homes she was referencing came from a separate NGO project and that the mismanagement of Muriel's rebuilding could not have been of her own doing because her housing project was donor-driven, or conducted entirely by the NGO, rather than in collaboration with families. My personal experience (in 2016) trying to coordinate with NGO personnel and government agents involved with Thiruchendur's recovery was so difficult and filled with unkept promises and denials, that I can only imagine the heartbreak and anger that Murial, Rajendran, and their neighbors felt in 2007 when they were so eager to return to Thiruchendur, and their normal lives. The confusion, lack of coordination, and inconsistent community leadership resulting in part from the ongoing war made recovery projects challenging to complete in Thiruchendur.

In New Kattankudy East, there were no such complaints from residents. The GN person, Abdul Kadhar, had been on the job for many years and worked with the Mosque Federation to coordinate projects. While sometimes I heard that a bicycle or boat might have been better suited

for one family than another, I did not hear anything about the hoarding of resources. I asked the Mosque Federation secretary, Mr. Ruzwin, about the hoarding and selling of boats to Sinhalese fishers. Seeming to be slightly offended by my inquiry, he answered with a question: “Who could believe such a thing? Any boats that came here went directly to the people.” He paused and asked the office helper to bring us tea, and while we waited, he went to another office to search for something. When he finally found what he was looking for, he returned to us in his office with a big smile, sat down, drank his piping hot tea in one confident sip and excitedly slid a document across the table at me, tapped on it, and said, “See! Here it is. These are all of the boats that came (from the NGOs), and these are the fishermen who received them.”

Mr. Ruzwin had located a hand-written ledger with records of boat allocation that seemed to be nearing disintegration but was nonetheless legible. He wouldn't let me take a photograph of the spreadsheet because it was filled with names of homeowners and their privacy needed to be respected, but because it was a valuable record and was close to falling apart, I asked if he had a back-up copy. He said, "of course," but if I wanted it, I would have to make a formal request to the Divisional Secretariat. The Divisional Secretariat told me that I should ask the District Secretariat (D.S.), who then said to me that it was the former D.S. who was working at that time, and the records traveled with him. While I was never able to locate the digital files that would tell me exactly how boats in New Kattankudy East were allocated, I trusted that Mr. Ruzwin would not falsify a ledger in the time it took for his office helper to prepare tea. Additionally, I believed him because the members of the community he serves trust him. I asked about boats in nearly every interview I conducted, but at no point during my fieldwork in New Kattankudy East did I hear anything about a mass of boats sold to Sinhalese fishers or repeated complaints about fairness in terms the distribution of boats or other livelihood resources.

Where divisional and district-level government agents were not able to recall records from the tsunami projects, Mr. Ruzwin was able to find them in short order. The power of the Mosque Federation in New Kattankudy East to coordinate recovery projects and implement them in equitable ways in their communities stood in contrast to what I found in Thiruchendur. New Kattankudy East's religious leaders worked to ensure that community members were housed and provided what they needed to rehabilitate their businesses, whether by replacement of items such as boats and sewing machines, or the provision of small business grants.

I found that trust among neighbors and between community members and leaders in Thiruchendur was violated throughout the war and the recovery process. Residents from both Hindu and Christian families spoke openly with me about mistrust because it had been such a salient part of their lives, and how it influenced recovery outcomes within the community. In Kattankudy, beyond rare complaints about issues stemming from sharing household water wells or the noise within the community, I rarely heard about complaints or mistrust among neighbors. Additionally, though Muslim women tend to be excluded from community and government leadership positions, I found that residents in Kattankudy generally expressed gratitude for and trust in their leaders. At times, women would reveal that they wished for more inclusion in community-wide decision-making processes, but they never expressed the sentiment that local leaders had violated their trust or ignored their needs during the recovery process. As I describe later in this chapter, trust among neighbors in the two villages is also likely a function of the influx of displaced peoples in the 1990s, when many Tamils were forced from their rural agricultural lands into the coastal regions during violent land-grabs at the hands of both the Army and LTTE. When families were relocated to Thiruchendur, they were often met with suspicion that they had been affiliated with either a militant gang or sympathized with the

government, and socially isolated until the time that they could gain the trust of their neighbors, whereas in Kattankudy, newcomers were met with sympathy and offered household goods to help establish their new homes.

It is possible that Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East residents differed in their willingness to express frustrations and feelings of mistrust to me as a foreigner for cultural reasons. The expressions of trust with the Muslim community could have been a face-saving technique employed to maintain a veneer of cohesion within the religious network. However, I worked hard to collect multiple perspectives in both communities and tried never to take expressions of trust or satisfaction for granted. When a resident said that they never had *any* complaints, I was sure to revisit the issue later on in the interview, with different wording, to make sure that I was documenting a consistent narrative. Additionally, my first-hand observations in each community reflected what I was told. In Thiruchendur, I watched motor-boats which no one would lay consistent claim to decay on the beach, documented the disparities in housing provision, and repeatedly witnessed and directly experienced dissembling behavior on the part of the GN person. In Kattankudy, though it was at times difficult to schedule meetings with government and community leaders, I found that they were consistently able to verify their claims with written records, or that I was able to do so in subsequent interviews with other community members. Additionally, I discussed my findings and fieldwork experience extensively with another researcher living in Kattankudy, to make sure that what I was witnessing and hearing was consistent with her experiences and knowledge of community dynamics. I found that the points where our perceptions and experiences diverged had more to do with the objectives of our work than the substance of our findings about social dynamics within the community.

The lack of bonding and bridging social capital within Thiruchendur, evidenced by mistrust and suspicion between neighbors and the breakdown of community-based organizations and cohesion across groups with different occupations (fisherfolk vs. others), was both born of and contributed to ongoing tensions among community members during the civil war. However, New Kattankudy East's high levels of bonding and bridging social capital allowed for an organized response to the catastrophic tsunami among community members and local leaders, although it was linking social capital, demonstrated by the links to foreign governments and diaspora communities, that provided the greatest post-disaster stimulus to New Kattankudy East.

Role of Diaspora and Foreign Aid

The influence of diaspora communities in both Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East is noteworthy. The Tamil diaspora, mostly hailing from the Northern region of the island, did not play an active role in the recovery of the community in Thiruchendur, though the LTTE was responsible for clearing the land for a relocation site where many community members were re-settled—the "Swiss Village." In New Kattankudy East, the lesser-known Sri Lankan Moor diaspora community played a large part in the socio-political environment of the region during the war, working effectively to link New Kattankudy East and Sri Lankan Moors to a global network of Muslim supporters and to provide fundraising capacity for the communities in New Kattankudy East. The network performed similar functions in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, when the government was considered an inconsistent ally at best. The government of Saudi Arabia in particular funneled money into Kattankudy following the tsunami—so much so that it is now known as "little Saudi Arabia," a term that Muslims in the region use with more or less ease in conversation.

Photo 2: Date palms along the A4 Highway in Kattankudy

Date palms gifted by the Government of Saudi Arabia

Often, discussions about the Golden Wave following the 2004 tsunami focus on Western actors that rushed to the island with material aid (Gamburd 2013; McGilvray and Gamburd 2013). However—especially when considering the case of New Kattankudy East, and to a significant though lesser extent, the Tamils in Thiruchendur—it is essential to consider the diaspora and foreign-sympathizer groups scattered throughout Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and North America as primary actors in the post-tsunami and post-war rebuilding. The presence of a powerful local politician and the strong ties between New Kattankudy East-linked political actors and foreign Islamic funders and supporters have played a primary role in the robust economic re-development in the region, at least in the Moorish communities. As Mr. Musthafa, the head-government leader in New Kattankudy East, and a member of parliament noted to me in an interview in 2016:

> It is with the help of my friends in Saudi that New Kattankudy East is what it is today. Do you see the palm trees? Do you see our new museum? This is because of

> the support that we have in the Arab world. My friends abroad have helped us to be what we are today.

In contrast, when asked to compare the experience of Thiruchendur to New Kattankudy East, Selvakumar, a Hindu Priest from a Pillayar (Ganesha) Temple in Thiruchendur, argued that foreign Tamils had forgotten this community:

> My people here in the village do not have a politician or a rich Islamic brother. We are only capable of tending to each other. The families who sent a brother or father away cannot facilitate the healing of our community. They will focus on their family alone. We do not have Musthafa, and we do not have ridiculous date palms lining the streets ten years later to show that we are stronger [than before the tsunami]. The Tamils in Canada and your home [in reference to the U.S.] do not care about slow-speaking Tamils. They care about Jaffna peoples, the library, the college.[22] And they should. But they also forgot about us.

Both of these men, leaders in their respective communities, recognize the power of foreign aid funneled through religious entities after the tsunami. They both mention the date palms that line the A4 highway, the main thoroughfare between coastal communities in the East, gifted to New Kattankudy East by Saudi Arabian government following the tsunami. When one is traveling along the A4 in Batticaloa, these date palms along the highway in Kattankudy are a distinct signifier of place; a display of wealth and prestige, their presence indicates that you've entered "little Saudi Arabia." Mr. Musthafa reminds me of the political power of New Kattankudy East, often misunderstood as the home of a disempowered ethnic minority on the island (Bandarage 2008), by marking the social and political proximity of New Kattankudy East to Saudi Arabia, a wealthy and devout Islamic state—an entity deserving of admiration. Where Musthafa is proud, Selvakumar reveals sadness and the feeling of being "forgotten" by overseas Tamils. He references the posture of Thiruchendur in comparison to both New Kattankudy East

[22] Jaffna is the city at the Northernmost tip of the island, the hub of Tamil life on the island. Jaffna College and the Jaffna Public library were centers of intellectual power for Tamil society and were famously targeted for destruction during the war, crippling Tamil political leader's claims to intellectual capital. The Jaffna Public Library was one of the largest libraries in Asia at the time it was burned down in 1981.

and Tamils in the Northern region of the island. He laments that families have sent brothers and fathers as migrant labor to Middle Eastern countries with little to show for their efforts in terms of community-wide financial sustenance, whereas in New Kattankudy East, the Saudi government has installed the date palms, which he understands as a frivolous, ultra-conspicuous marker of wealth and high social status. He goes on to note that in Thiruchendur, a person or household's loyalty is first to their relations (kin) and that the Tamil diaspora groups are more focused on the well-being of their kin in the North. Selvakumar feels that Thiruchendur is *doubly forgotten*, left behind in the re-development of the East coast both by near neighbors in New Kattankudy East and also by far-off compatriots elsewhere in the world.

The macro-ties to foreign funding mechanisms mirror the intra-community divisions and cohesion in each of these two communities. Where New Kattankudy East is characterized by cohesion among social sectors within the community that worked to collectively lift those affected by the tsunami, the story of Thiruchendur is one of pre-tsunami social disconnectedness intensified by the waves' watery debris and golden aid. Disparities like foreign ties and differential levels of trust and reciprocity in New Kattankudy East and Thiruchendur underpin the argument I make in this chapter that **social capital, rooted in the presence and activities of ethno-religious institutions and networks, is fundamental to the disparate recoveries of these two communities.** In the next section, I analyze recovery of the built environment, social recovery, and economic recovery in more depth.

Three Domains of Recovery

To answer my research questions, I compare and analyze outcomes in each community along three interconnected domains of disaster recovery: recovery of the built environment, which includes both household and community-level infrastructure; social recovery, with a focus

on spatial dislocation of peoples following the disaster and community cohesion across sectors; and economic recovery, by looking at both livelihoods and overall community level economic well-being.

Figure 3: Recovery Outcomes

Recovery of the Built Environment

The recovery of infrastructure in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East is one of the most visible indicators of inequality between the two communities. While walking or driving through Thiruchendur, the disparities in housing among community residents is striking. There are dozens of unfinished houses, often alongside large, multi-story homes that appear "complete." Within the boundaries of Thiruchendur, I observed at least nine distinct NGO housing projects that were implemented without coordinated efforts either between the NGOs working in the community or between community members and the NGOs.[23]

[23] The total number of housing projects in Thiruchendur and Kattankudy is based on my survey of the community. In addition to conducting formal interviews, I was deeply embedded in both communities for many months and was able to glean from observation of physical structures and via informal conversations with my neighbors, shopkeeps, and postal workers, that there were nine primary housing projects in the village. Despite my multiple attempts to request an official accounting of housing projects from government officials, and NGO project coordinators, I was never able to gather such records. This included direct pleas made to both the Director of the Planning Division and members of the Census & Statistics Division at the Batticaloa District Secretariat and various Divisional bureaucrats in both Manmunai North and Kattankudy. I was told repeatedly that the government had removed the computers from the District Kachcheri during the war making it difficult to keep records organized, and that records were not retained when government officers left (or were removed from) their posts. All NGO project coordinators and team members I interviewed claimed to have no access to official records.

As noted earlier, families in Thiruchendur received different types of homes from NGOs, which did very little to streamline the provision of services at the community level. It is important to emphasize that housing problems were not entirely the fault of NGOs. The behavior of NGOs was constrained by governmental entities that were tasked with coordinating their work. Regulations about buffer zones were instituted after some projects were begun, and those regulations varied over time. Further, the lack of stable leadership in Thiruchendur meant that NGOs frequently began their work before the rules and regulations were clearly defined and implemented. In at least two cases, NGOs began construction of new homes without an awareness of formal property boundaries and with complete disregard for the island-wide buffer zone introduced by the state following the tsunami.

In these cases, construction of many homes had begun before the new zoning rules were clearly defined, and thus when it was made clear that the houses were too close to the sea, the structures were abandoned by project managers, leaving community members with very few options for remediation. Photo #3 is from a home in Thiruchendur occupied by Tharani and Thushara, two sisters in their early twenties and their elderly mother. Their home is close to the sea (less than 150 meters), and their housing project was abandoned after the buffer zone was established. The walls and floor in this home are not finished, and according to the sisters, it is doubtful that they ever will be. When I asked if they had filed complaints with anyone about the state of the home, Thushara's response was one of disappointment and resignation:

> Even if we knew who to complain to, no one would listen to us. We do not have a father here, and he cannot advocate for our family. The NGO came and took photos of the front door and left. We've never seen them again. I think they were Japanese. We do not have the money to finish the home and have made our life here with the sand floors – this is what we are accustomed to, and it is how we live.

The experiences of these sisters are not uncommon. The story of infrastructure recovery in Thiruchendur is one of uncoordinated efforts that resulted in an unequal provision of housing aid to neighbors within the community. In addition to the patchwork of multi-actor, uncoordinated housing efforts, there have been very few post-tsunami infrastructure projects that serve the whole community such as schools and health facilities. As I will discuss in chapter 4, the introduction of beachfront amenities like gazebos and restaurants has privileged some community members over others, exacerbating inequalities among residents.

Photo 3: Unfinished home in Thiruchendur

Photo 4: Unfinished homes in Thiruchendur



In New Kattankudy East, however, the story is more straightforward: there was strong coordination between the three NGOs that operated there, resulting in no unfinished homes. Of the three projects, the Swiss-Austrian Red Cross provided the vast majority of new housing, while the other two NGOs worked to supplement the Red Cross. The three organizations coordinated their efforts and worked with both religious and government leaders to determine plans for providing housing. Additionally, there were multiple new infrastructure projects meant to serve the whole community. These projects included a new divisional hospital, primary schools, and recreation spaces near the beach replete with solar-powered lamp posts and playground equipment. In 2106, Mr. Musthafa also told me that his long-term vision for Kattankudy includes a sports complex. In Photo #5, Mujamila, a mother in New Kattankudy East, stands proudly before her new front door. She asked me to be sure that I included the plaque in the photo which shows that the Swiss/Austrian Red Cross built the home. She remarked:

> Oh, yes, I am happy with this home. My whole family lives here, and my sister is next door, and she has the same home as we do. I am able to raise my children in a home that I could not have when I was a child. Sometimes I feel guilty when I think that the tsunami showered a blessing on my family with this home. I am thankful to

the NGO workers who built our home. They let me choose the window styles, and we added the decorations.

Photo 5: Completed homes in New Kattankudy East

Photo 6: Beach in New Kattankudy East with solar lamps and playground equipment

I found that variations in the foundations of local political activity in each community were a significant factor in the processes and outcomes of recovery. As a result of the ethno-religious nature of the civil war, my two study communities were interacting with the polity in different ways – that is, calling upon their linking social capital differentially, leading to dissimilar recovery outcomes. Here, the social location of local political officials dictated the success with which they were able to negotiate for and facilitate the movement of financial assistance on behalf of their communities from the Sri Lankan government, and international communities, including governments and diaspora groups. Whereas the Muslim community of New Kattankudy East is now, for all intents and purposes, "built back better," the Hindus and Christians in Tiruchendur have been left with unfinished houses, and in some cases, families have taken on substantial debts to finish their incomplete homes.

Similar to approaches used in post-tsunami India (Aldrich 2012a), the Sri Lankan government called upon both local government leaders (GN persons) and local religious leaders to serve as intermediaries between NGOs and communities. The GN persons and religious leaders were thus given significant power to determine the flow of aid, which complicated the recovery experiences for communities where political and religious leadership was inconsistent or not focused on the well-being of the community as a whole. The political and religious leadership of the two communities is vastly different. While New Kattankudy East has essentially two trusted leadership groups—the traditional government and the leaders of the Mosque Federation—Thiruchendur has had very little consistency in leadership since 2004.

Levels of trust among residents and between the communities and the local administration also vary by community. People in Thiruchendur generally trust neither their former or current village leader (or GN person). Throughout my fieldwork in Thiruchendur, I

found it challenging to set meetings with the GN person—Savidthrii, and when I was able to interview her, she withheld information in ways that left me concerned that she was either intentionally hiding bad practices from my view or completely ignorant of the recovery projects. Either way, my perception of her elusive and inconsistent leadership was reinforced throughout my interviews with community members, who generally believe that she and the former GN persons, who were tasked with leading the community through relief and recovery from the tsunami, were either incompetent or corrupt to the point that they did very little to better the situation for the people of Thiruchendur. Families in Thiruchendur responded with consistent complaints when I asked about the GN person's ability to advocate for them:

> She is never in her office; how does she know what my family needs?" (Saraswathi; elderly woman)
>
> Have you seen her records? There are none. She does not even know which NGO built my house, so how will I ever know how to ask them for help? (Hariharan; middle-aged man)
>
> My neighbor came back and made a tin house in the sand, and she [the GN person] has not come to check on her. The government says they cannot live like this, but she [GN person] does nothing because she does not care. (Dhach'chaiyini; elderly woman)
>
> We [the community] are Hindus and Christians. Sometimes the [Christian] priests helped the Christian families but ignored the Hindus, but she [GN Person] could never do anything because she thinks we should have gratitude for everything. Well, my house is broken, and my neighbor's is not – is that fair? The kovils are not organized like a collective – each one is tended by different families, and there is no foreign money, they could not help us – we rebuilt the kovils before our homes even! (Roobaskaran; elderly man)

Here, Roobaskaran's complaint that the Hindus and Christians did not help each other shows the lack of bridging social capital within Thiruchendur. That Christian and Hindu priests and congregational leaders did not coordinate and provide assistance across religious groups within

the community served to exacerbate pre-existing fractures within the community following the disaster.

In New Kattankudy East, however, the same GN person—Abdul Kadhar, had been in office from 2002 to 2012 and only left his post to retire. During my fieldwork in 2013, he was easy to locate, and happily offered my research assistant and me an afternoon – on a busy day before a holiday – for an interview. I had the same experience with him when I visited again in 2016. Having lived and worked within the community on a long-term basis, he successfully steered the NGO projects in conjunction with members of the Mosque Federation, the officials from the local religious court, and members of the community. The houses in this community are not only finished, but the homeowners have spiral-bound books from the NGO which include the deed to the home, floor plans, maintenance instructions, and contact information for the NGO that funded their project. This holistic approach to household infrastructure recovery is far superior to the plans enacted just down the road in Thiruchendur.

During the long-running civil war, Moorish communities in the east became isolated for ethno-religious reasons and were forced to turn inward and develop a strong internal governing structure, and as a result, they were highly organized by the time the tsunami hit. This is in contrast to the Tamil communities, which were at times (both leading up to and following the tsunami) left wondering, "Who was in charge?" as sovereignty often shifted between the Sinhala government and the LTTE. In terms of linking social capital, this means that the community members either did (in New Kattankudy East) or did not (in Thiruchendur) trust their leaders to advocate for them and varied in the extent to which they were empowered to speak up for both what they needed and what they may have seen as something going wrong.

In Thiruchendur, the exclusionary nature of bonding capital is evident: though religious and kin networks were tight-knit, and resources were shared within-networks, non-group members were excluded from these benefits. These groups did not effectively achieve bridging social capital across religious and kin-networks in a way that would promote equity in the community-at-large. In Kattankudy, however, kin and religious groups are both tightly bonded and able to effectively bridge with the assistance of community leaders who worked to promote the equitable distribution of relief and recovery resources throughout the community.

Because processes of disaster recovery cannot be understood without considering the pre-disaster conditions that were present in communities, and because domains of recovery are intertwined, disparities in infrastructure recovery have both exacerbated pre-existing social inequalities and contributed to the formation of new forms of inequity within Thiruchendur and between the two communities. I turn to an analysis of social recovery in the next section of this chapter and return to an analysis of the built environment in chapter 4 to address disparities in the development of tourism in each community.

Social Recovery

I focus here on two aspects of social recovery: the spatial dislocation of families as a result of disaster-related displacements; and strength of ties, or cohesion, among groups within communities. In Thiruchendur, there are significant divisions along the lines of kinship and religious networks. These divisions existed long before 2004 and have been amplified in the years following the tsunami. While groups may not necessarily be overtly antagonistic, inter-group divisions contribute to a lack of social cohesion within the community at large. Spatial disparities in the recovery of housing have reinforced distinctions between groups in the community, in which members self-identify as a division between the "land side" and "beach

side" residents; I call this the "Two Thiruchendurs." These divisions within the community existed before the tsunami. There was a cluster of fisherfolk living near the sea and a more economically mixed population farther inland. However, pre-existing spatial disparities were exacerbated by post-tsunami relief activities, as indicated by this quote from Karunanithy, former Secretary of the Fisheries Society in Thiruchendur:

> Do you see the road? That road shows two villages. They are one, we are the other. We are the poor fishers. We live close to the sea and look at my house [unfinished]. They [the neighbor he is pointing to] work for the government – that house over there [pointing to a neighbor's home on the other side of the road] – that one is finished and has an upstairs! Do you see it? She works for the government. I do not think that is a coincidence.

Karunanithy, a resident on the "beach side" of the main road, makes a point to inform me of the more rigid distinctions between neighbors. He describes his own experience in opposition to his neighbor's, reflecting the "us versus them" ethos which has manifested itself between families living on either side of the main road after rebuilding efforts. The main road that bisects the community draws a distinct social division between those who live in closer proximity to the sea and those living in what is considered a safer and more desirable distance from the sea. On the beach side of the main road, the landscape is littered with homes that were partially built and then abandoned by NGOs that had started their work too soon, before the buffer zone rules were established and enforced. This landscape of scrap leads to a social division that reflects pre-tsunami social distinctions between occupational groups within the community: the poor fisherfolks live close to the sea, sometimes in homes without proper foundations and roofs, whereas government agents and entrepreneurs generally live a bit further from the sea in completed homes replete with "fancy" amenities, including gold-painted gates and well-landscaped yards full of fruit- and vegetable-bearing gardens.

Photo 7: Panoramic view of Thiruchendur's two sides

Photo taken from vantage point of main beach road separating the “beach side” (left) and “land side” (right) residents

In addition to the intra-community disparities among those who remained in Thiruchendur, there remains the issue of separation of families and community members as a result of the displacement and relocation of large swaths of the community to an NGO-funded settlement known as the "Swiss Village," which is many kilometers inland (see Map 4). The Swiss Village settlement project included residents relocated from Thiruchendur and at least four additional neighboring villages into one new Grama Niladhari division (McGilvray and Lawrence 2010; Turnheer 2014). This deliberate post-tsunami dislocation of fisherfolk from the sea was meant to be a risk reduction measure but has, in many cases, had the opposite effect. Between 2013 and 2018, many people left the Swiss Village and returned to Thiruchendur to reclaim to their original properties near the sea. Complaints of the distance from the sea ring constant for fisherfolk who were removed from their lands, separated from family members, and forced to attempt to rebuild their lives on a dry swath of inland desert. As of summer 2018, these returning families are now rebuilding tin and coconut thatch housing, considered "illegal settlements" by the government. While this type of housing is generally considered more comfortable and easier to manage for local families, the trade-off for building "non-permanent structures" in "illegal settlements" means that these families have no formal protection from

future ecological hazards. If these reconstituted homes are lost in another tsunami or some other type of disaster, the families will not be afforded another opportunity to rebuild with government assistance. They were left to decide between staying in the Swiss Village, in a place that is not their home and that has very few amenities, and returning to build "illegal" settlements on land that they have known for generations in order to be nearer to their families and the sea—in essence, becoming internally displaced persons within their home communities.

Map 4: Distance between Swiss Village and Kallady Beach

Driving directions shows distance of 9-10 kilometers between the two communities

Source: maps.google.com

Maalini, a primary school teacher in Thiruchendur (shown in Photo #8), allowed us to interview her on a holiday in front of her home. She decided to return to Thiruchendur from the Swiss Village to live closer to her students and the school. Returning to Thiruchendur was an

attempt to return to normalcy. She is happy living in her home here but recognizes that she is now living illegally:

> I worked for an NGO after the tsunami, because I knew the community. I was able to identify students and help them find their families, I know that the NGO workers meant the best for us, but I did not want to move to the Swiss Village. When I found out that my land [in Thiruchendur] was sitting empty, I came back. I built this home with my own hands, and I am happy here. This is how I lived before the tsunami, and this is how I will live for the rest of my life. I do not want to be away from my school and my students. I am happier here, even if I am breaking the rules. No one told me I had to stop, but the GN woman told me I could not build a permanent structure. I think even if I did, they wouldn't come break it. But I cannot afford concrete. I am fine here, and glad to be home.

Photo 8: Maalani in front of her tin and coconut thatch home

The story in New Kattankudy East is much more straightforward. First, there is community cohesion across geographic, business, and religious congregations. No new social class distinctions emerged in tandem with unequal housing provision, and residents who live near the sea or at a distance are all living in completed homes that are well outside the range of the mandated buffer zone. Additionally, families in New Kattankudy East were able to choose whether to stay in New Kattankudy East or to relocate to another village. Because the land in New Kattankudy East is considered desirable real estate and is embedded within Kattankudy Division, considered to be the economic center of Sri Lanka's East Coast, for the most part families chose to stay. Two neighbors explain their ties this way:

> Why would I want to leave New Kattankudy East? I know the other villages, people who were forced to leave their lands and their families, I feel badly for them and am thankful that I could stay here. I have my neighbor-brother [Nafiu]. He is not my brother, but now we are family. (Saliya Umma; elderly woman)

> Our community is all the same. We pray together, and we are family, even if we aren't really family. I know the children next door, they call me Uncle, and I celebrate their birthdays. I am alone here in my home and [Saliya Umma] checks on me. We are not brother and sister, but this is how we behave – but that is not because of the tsunami. We were always family, but now we share more experiences. They [other neighbors] cook for me, I know I will never be hungry, even though I am an old man. (Nafiu; elderly man)

Saliya Umma and Nafiu are not blood relations but make it clear to me that they feel as though they are. They are neighbors and have been for most of their lives, and both responded with a recognition that the tsunami brought them together in ways that seem to have separated community members in other villages. When I questioned families in New Kattankudy East about the choice of relocating, they often remarked that it was not an option for them. Of course, they could have left – but why would they? Though they were offered resettlement in a majority-Muslim inland village, they had grown accustomed to the many amenities that a coastal town like Kattankudy offered and were wary of relocating to a more rural area. Everything they

wanted and needed already existed in the community. I was able to identify fewer than five families that chose to relocate following the tsunami. The vast majority of the tsunami survivors in the community are living together in close geographic proximity to the land that residents occupied before the tsunami. The local government did not require families living within the buffer zone to leave the community after the tsunami, and very few families made that choice on their own. Instead, property was re-distributed to make room for more permanent housing within the boundaries of New Kattankudy East.

While neighbors in Thiruchendur are generally friendly with one another, I repeatedly heard echoes of both jealousy and suspicion when residents discussed their neighbors. These echoes trace closely to traditional lines of divisions between lower-caste fisherfolk and non-fishing residents that preceded the tsunami and were exacerbated in the years following the waves. The question remains why social inequalities were exacerbated in Thiruchendur when in New Kattankudy East, neighbors seem closer to each other than before. Why and how is it the case that the social fabric in New Kattankudy East was stitched together more tightly and Thiruchendur torn apart in the years following the tsunami?

Demographic Change, Religion, and Social Cohesion

Central to my analysis of bonding social capital in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East is the question of how community members in a Tamil predominantly Hindu, mixed-religious, and mixed-caste community, in comparison to a 100% Moorish community negotiate, their familial and intra-community social ties within the context of recovery from the tsunami and civil war. Social recovery in Tirichendur is a story of strained relationships between neighbors, familial or "kudi" –based allegiances, and village leaders lacking connection to the reality of community life. In New Kattankudy East, neighbors were more eager to help one

another by sharing resources and communing regularly and were both familiar with and respect the position of their village leader, who did so much to help the community rebound. Indeed, Naifu and Saliya Umma's experience suggests that such bonds strengthened in the aftermath of the tsunami.

With respect to social capital, Aldrich (2012a; 2012b) found that bonding social capital, or the ability to negotiate familial and social ties within a community, was influential in caste-based communities in Tamil Nadu, India after the 2004 tsunami. However, the situation of Sri Lanka is less straightforward. Although the caste system still exists in Sri Lanka, it is more submerged than in India and is not a salient feature of all communities across the island. While my data do not include direct identification of caste for residents of Thiruchendur, I consider occupational categories as a rough proxy for caste. In this sense, I found that the greatest division between groups in Thiruchendur mapped closely to occupational groups whereby the fisherfolk living near the sea and those non-fishers on the land-side of the village found themselves at odds with one another. A strong caste-based identity enabled Indian communities to seek out and share the limited resources coming into their villages, whereas in Sri Lanka, bonding social capital was weakened by cleavages caused by the civil war. It was not uncommon for neighbors in Sri Lanka, including family members living near one another, to be split on issues of war, especially in the Tamil communities that the LTTE occupied (even intermittently). The caste system is not part of the culture in Moorish communities, and as such, community organization is quite different than in caste-based communities. Here, social class indicators such as wealth, education, and lifestyle are more significant axes of social identification than ascribed caste identity.

In the context of Sri Lanka, shared religion represents a foundation of most communities and maps directly on to a community's claim of ethnic identity. Thus, the ethno-religious make-up of each population represents the most fundamental difference between the two places. While Tamil is the common language in both communities, the ethno-religious character of each site makes for a sharp contrast. While Thiruchendur is predominantly Hindu, it is a mixed-caste/occupation and mixed-religious community, whereas, in New Kattankudy East, officially 100% of the population is Muslim. [24] While it is true that each of these religious communities may have different tangible manifestations in form and function, the broad grouping of individuals into religious categories is an appropriate way to perceive Sri Lankan communities, especially within the context of the civil war. In Kattankudy, though there are different forms of Islam practiced within the community, the nature of religious cohesion due to one hundred percent of community members identifying as ethnic Moors, despite a history of anti-Sufi sentiment, created bonds that enabled the provision of social welfare assistance across groups in the community. In Thiruchendur however, the mixed-caste (occupation) and the mixed-religious community was not able to bridge across social groups to produce community-wide cohesion. This dynamic is supported by the connections, or lack thereof, between religious congregations. While the mosques in Kattankudy are networked through the Mosque Federation that bridges groups across the community, the Hindu kovils and Christian churches in Thiruchendur have no similar structure and operate in a more independent fashion.

[24] For the sake of this dissertation, I label New Kattankudy East as 100% Muslim, because according to the census statistics published by the Divisional Secretariat in Kattankudy, the population of Kattankudy Division (including the New Kattankudy East Grama Niladhari) is reported to be 100% Muslim for the years 2001, 2010, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 (Kattankudy DS Division of Census and Statistics 2018). However it is worth noting that the national census statistics, which publish numbers at the Divisional level, show that according to the 2012 census, Kattankudy was 99.75% Muslim (followed by .12% Hindu and .09% Buddhist) (Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics 2012).

Before the tsunami, specifically in the 1980s and 1990s, there were re-location programs for internally displaced peoples (IDP)[25] as a result of the war. As the government and LTTE fought for valuable agricultural territory in the Eastern Province, rural Tamil and Moorish families were forced from their properties into coastal villages. Furthermore, the expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province led many to relocate to Kattankudy. Compared to Thiruchendur, New Kattankudy East experienced higher levels of IDP in-migration before the tsunami. Despite this, I found reports of stronger social cohesion in New Kattankudy East, both in the years leading up to and following the tsunami. As respondents reported:

> We were very poor when we came here, but we got rooms when we arrived. The [Mosque] Federation provided many things and neighbors came with extra food and clothes. We met them [our neighbors] at the mosque, and after that I started learning to make mats with the local ladies. (Nirosha Begam, an elderly widow who came to Kattankudy in 1991)

> We gained neighbors during the conflict, yes. And now they are our friends and family. She [next door neighbor] now sells ice cream to all of the school children, and sometimes I enjoy helping her. (Sithaara; middle-aged woman)

> Of course they fit in our place [community]! They are Muslim brothers and sisters. They are most welcome as good neighbors. (Jamaan; elderly man)

In contrast, the experience of IDP in-migration in Thiruchendur led to social divisions within the community and a tendency for social groups within the community to become narrower, focused on family groups rather than the community at large, as shown in these quotes:

> The neighbors do not speak with me because my husband was part of a group.[26] They told lies that he is a gangster. I don't have any family near to me now, they are all in separate places, and it is just me and my daughters, alone. (Poopathi, a middle-aged widow who came to Thiruchendur in 2001)

> She [a woman who moved in across the street in the late 1990s] came and I didn't see her at kovil. I think she goes to the church in Amirthakaly [village located across the lagoon], but I am not sure… I spend my days with my own sisters and we look after our children. After we got houses, now she has a big gate and we never talk to

[25] Internally displaced people are colloquially referred to as "IDP" in Sri Lanka.
[26] Tamil militant organization subsumed into the LTTE.

> her. She got one house from Pastor Abner,[27] and he did not come to help the Hindus. (Pushpa; elderly woman)

The Tamil community in Thiruchendur experienced social fragmentation before the tsunami in two crucial ways. First, the community members were more faithful to and trusting of their kin networks within the community than as a cohesive community at large, and as pointed out earlier, there had already been a fissure between the "beach side" and "land side" residents. The nature of the post-tsunami environment, including the forced relocation of many community members to the Swiss Village, led to a worsening of both of these fissures. While exclusion after the tsunami was caste-based in India (Aldrich 2012a), in Thiruchendur it was bonds forged or violated by war-oriented allegiances and the clustering of multiple generations of families into self-focused groups that truncated the flow of information, trust, and reciprocity among community members at large. Typically, familial divisions are drawn along the lines of religious affiliation, and even among Hindu families, groups cluster around specific deities and kovils rather than taking a "we are all one" approach to worship. However, in Kattankudy, the shared experience of persecution from both the LTTE and the Sinhalese government, and institutionalized religious cohesion created and fostered bonds that allowed for and encouraged social welfare assistance between community members and neighbors beyond familial ties and social class differences. Thus, in New Kattankudy East, although residents more frequently encountered new neighbors as a result of war-era relocations, the bonds between neighbors before and after the tsunami were not fractured along any obvious lines of social division. Indeed, they were fostered by shared ethno-religious cohesion and the organization of religious institutions within the community alongside the welfare norms inherent to institutionalized practices within Islam, including the redistribution of materials wealth via the Zakat tax, which I

[27] "Abner" is a pseudonym.

describe in the next section. These social inequalities map closely to lines of social-class division and the recovery of livelihoods and economic well-being in both communities.

Economic Recovery

Although both communities exhibit a range of occupations among residents, economic differences between the two communities are essential to the analysis of their different recoveries. Before the tsunami, Thiruchendur was a majority-fishing community with some residents engaged in private business and government service. In comparison, the livelihood strategies of New Kattankudy East residents were nearly opposite—while some residents participated in fishing, the majority of residents have traditionally been, and remain, engaged either in private entrepreneurial endeavors or in government service. In the years following the tsunami, the restoration of livelihoods and the sharing and redistribution of economic resources have been contentious processes in Batticaloa. In addition to the inconsistent and at times corrupt methods of allocating livelihood resources (fishing boats, sewing machines, etc.) to families, many disaster survivors have been forced to adopt new livelihood strategies. In Thiruchendur, families that were forced from their lands to the Swiss Village in the name of risk reduction no longer had easy access to the sea and could no longer fish.

The combination of incomplete rehabilitation of traditional livelihoods, the provision of new housing, and the end of the civil war have meant that families in both communities had to re-orient their livelihood strategies. As I will discuss in more detail in chapter 4, this has often led to involvement in the rapidly-expanding service economy in Batticaloa. Additionally, bridging social capital in the form of reciprocity between groups could have been a fundamental component of economic recovery but was not consistently activated. Institutionalized economic reciprocity norms in the Moorish communities tended to benefit the community at large. In

contrast, economic reciprocity in Thiruchendur was mostly confined to matrilocal familial groups, creating more intra-community variation, rather than cohesion across the community as a whole.

Livelihood Restoration

In Thiruchendur, because so many residents were forced off their properties in a government-led effort to remove them from the perils of the sea, the fishing community that once served as the most robust community-based organization was shattered. When I questioned Karunainthy about the Fisheries Society in Thiruchendur, he expressed his disappointment with the state of his community:

> We [the Fisheries Society in Thiruchendur] have not met since the tsunami – not once. At first, we just didn't have the facilities [boats and nets] to keep fishing. After the NGOs came and distributed supplies we began to argue. As the secretary [of the local Fisheries Society], I thought I could mediate, but no one listened to me. Everyone was concerned for themselves – trying to get the new engine boats, even if we didn't know how to use them [he laughs but returns quickly to a solemn disposition]. Even my neighbor who moved to Thirimadu [the Swiss Village] got a motorboat, and I did not! He can't even fish anymore without traveling an hour to the sea, so his boat sits in the sand—it is falling apart. We began to fight each other, and now, there is no Fisheries Society. There are groups of men who fish together with their family members. It wasn't this way before the tsunami. We still buy and sell fish here in the village, but the men with the engine boats get bigger fish, more fish. I fish in the lagoon now because I am too afraid of the sea, and I do not make enough money for my family, so I am glad that my children are now able to leave school and work.

The near-immediate demise of the Thiruchendur Fisheries Society and coalition following the tsunami was coupled with a lack of a coordinated long-term livelihood re-establishment plan for much of the community. While the fisherfolk who managed to remain in Thiruchendur received new boats and fishing gear as a part of the recovery process, the equity of their distribution was questionable. Traditional fishing boats are double-hull row- or sail-powered catamarans, which remain the preference for most fishers due to familiarity and

tradition. However, some NGOs provided engine-powered boats to some fishermen, leading to immediate disparities among formerly collaborative colleagues. This recovery effort resulted in a new hierarchy, with lines drawn between those who employ traditional fishing techniques and those who can use engines to travel farther out to sea. As a result of warming waters along the East Coast of Sri Lanka, over the last decade, the fishermen claim to have been forced farther and farther out to sea to catch the most desirable fish, giving those with engine-powered boats a clear advantage over their row-powered counterparts.

The demise of the Fisheries Society in Thiruchendur meant that there was no opportunity to work towards a collective solution to these new conflicts. Bonds among fishers were damaged, and the bridging work that the Fisheries Society was once able to do on behalf of the community was completely wiped away. Karunainthy assumed that as a leader of the Fisheries Society, he would be able to coordinate between NGOs and the community members, but without the framework of the society, his voice became lost in a mix of passive aid recipients.

Thus, the story of livelihood recovery for the majority of Thiruchendur is one of despair: those who were able to remain in the village are still trying to come to terms with the new antagonisms that have accompanied the introduction of engine-powered boats and tourism. The economic well-being of Thiruchendur at the community level is characterized by new forms of stratification introduced alongside aid provision, and as will be discussed in chapter 4, many families are still struggling to figure out how to make ends meet and are having varying levels of success incorporating themselves into the new tourist economy. As a result, families have reported an uptick in the frequency of transnational labor migration among both men and women who have been forced to travel to the Gulf States to take part in labor markets that are notoriously exploitative, separating families for years at a time. Additionally, many teenagers—

including Karunainthy's two children—are leaving school before their A-levels so that they can get jobs in town to help support their households.

In New Kattankudy East, there were viable long-term livelihood strategies in place before the tsunami, and during the recovery process, community members and leaders, local politicians and business leaders, the Mosque federation, NGOs, and diaspora peoples came together to support the economic recovery of the community. These stakeholders leveraged bridging and linking social capital by forming formal and informal coalitions to both restore the pre-existing livelihoods within the community and create new opportunities. A newly-established women's resource center (a non-profit group with six full-time staff at the time of 2016) organizes for women's rights and livelihoods in all of Kattankudy's villages, New Kattankudy East included. Zahira, the director of the new women's resource center reflected on the tsunami with a mix of sorrow and gratitude:

> Of course it has been difficult for us. It was horrible – the worst day of our lives for so many. I lost my sister and her children. But, I thank Allah for the opportunity I have to be here [to have survived], and to do this work [directing the women's center]. I think that we are saving lives now, we are able to empower women to be earners in their families, and we are addressing gender balance in ways that we could not speak openly about before [the tsunami]. I certainly cannot say that the tsunami was a blessing, but I must express gratitude for these new opportunities. Women in Kattankudy have never been as powerful. My daughter has just been accepted to university in Colombo for a pre-medical program—never in my dreams did I think my daughter could be a doctor! Now look at us! I only wish my sister could be here to see what we have been able to accomplish.

New pre-schools have opened, which in addition to addressing community needs have also employed several local women. There are now small textile factories set up in the village, and women have been organizing to braid floor mats, which they sell at the local market. Small businesses have been able to recover capital from tsunami-related losses with grants from local religious organizations and foreign entities. Jewelry and tea shops, restaurants, and tailors have

re-opened their doors and multiplied in the years following the tsunami and the Golden Wave, and rather than creating divisions among community members, there is an ethos of shared virtue. The economic prosperity of one's neighbors is a direct reflection of the success of the Mosque Federation in redistributing wealth among community members and ensuring that poverty rates among Moors in New Kattankudy East continue to decline.

Wealth and Economic Reciprocity

Pre-existing levels of wealth—or, more specifically, the nature of that wealth—and deeply embedded institutional and cultural norms regarding economic reciprocity, are critical to the inconsistent recovery outcomes between the two communities. While both communities were economically productive prior to the tsunami —Thiruchendur was a financially successful fishing village and New Kattankudy East was an economically successful village of locally-owned and -operated small businesses bolstered by wealthy Muslim neighbors in nearby communities—a discussion of their pre-tsunami economic conditions cannot be limited to a simple description of the types of industries they engage in and whether or not those industries recovered. While it is true that these occupational differences influenced communities' capacities to call upon material wealth in the aftermath of the tsunami, it is also the case that these communities had different mechanisms in place to allow them to draw upon that wealth in the wake of the tsunami. Community-based organizations In Thiruchendur that once indicated strong bonding social capital among neighbors and the potential for bridging capital were decimated when the tsunami hit, making economic reciprocity between fisherfolk and others ineffective in stimulating community-wide economic growth following the tsunami. The local economies in Thiruchendur, over time, have become less integrated and now, in the wake of the introduction of a new tourist economy, many households within Thiruchendur are in direct economic

competition, rather than part of a cohesive fisherfolk culture where members were more likely to share financial resources.

Private enterprise, rather than communally-oriented fishing, was a more common economic strategy for families in Kattankudy preceding the tsunami, and this has not changed in the years following the disaster. My key informants in New Kattankudy East included an elderly womana operating a booming ice-cream shop out of her home, as well as shop-owners and shop-keeps who sell tea, jewelry, and housewares. While community members were engaged in several different economic activities before the tsunami, there was still a common entrepreneurial identity among residents that served as the basis of a network of business coalitions that were mostly effective in negotiating on their behalf in the aftermath of the tsunami.

Additionally, the practice of Zakat served to both stimulate a strong ethos of economic reciprocity and provide a financial safety net that the community was able to immediately call upon following the tsunami. Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam is an obligatory alms-giving in the form of a tax on income among those who meet a minimum threshold of wealth, which is collected and redistributed to the poor in the form of financial and other material support. The Zakat tax and fund presented a savings mechanism in New Kattankudy East's economic and religio-political structure that influenced its ability to utilize existing wealth for tsunami relief and recovery-related projects that benefitted the whole community (Jayasuriya et al. 2005). In contrast, economic reciprocity in Thiruchendur was not mediated by a formal institution and was mostly confined to traditional circular loans shared within familial groups, leading to uneven recovery within the community.

Discussion and Conclusions

Disaster scholars and other social scientists agree that social capital is a core element in the story of how communities prepare for, experience, and recover from disasters. Social capital is both structural, insofar as it is embedded in organizations and institutions that play a part in determining how communities are affected by disasters, and cultural, in that the strength of social capital in the form of shared norms plays a crucial role in the flow of knowledge, information, trust, and resources among groups in society. Recovery trajectories and outcomes of Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East illustrate how pre-disaster levels of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital, embedded within both structures and cultural norms, can be activated in post-disaster environments to facilitate the coordination and implementation of recovery efforts, as well as the ways in which the experience of disaster can produce or destroy networks within communities. Social capital is an essential component of disaster recovery because it both precedes and is an outcome of disasters.

In Sri Lanka, religion and ethnicity are not entirely separate social identifiers, and the civil war happening alongside the tsunami created a milieu in which religious institutions strongly influenced the recovery processes. In Sri Lanka's East coast, religious intitutions became especially salient when looking at how houses and community infrastructure were re-built, communities kept together or separated, and livelihoods either restored or threatened. In a comprehensive overview on social capital in disaster research, Michelle Meyer (2018) observes that scholars incorporating religion into their analyses of tend to focus on religious institutions and nonprofits as sites of social capital production and engagement, rather than the ways in which religious institutions and associated cultural norms shape the experiences of disaster victims and survivors. Taking social capital as a structural resource, Bin and Edwards (2009)

show that managerial social capital may activate corporate and philanthropic giving when those managers participate in community organizations, especially religious organizations.

Additionally, Vallance and Carlton (2014) show that non-profits may expand their pre-existing missions within disaster times and become sites that can give rise to collective action that may help to bolster communities' resilience. However, as my analysis shows, the sheer presence of religious non-profits (NGOs) for instance the Catholic organization Caritas EHED and Hindu organizations based in India, does not consistently lead to improvements in recovery outcomes, including the rebuilding of social capital, because those non-profits may be more externally driven by other factors, including the demands on speedy returns on investment by funders, which leave communities out of the primary focus when projects are designed and implemented (Long and Wong 2012; McCarthy 2014).

My analyses build on these studies of religion and social capital in disasters by emphasizing that deeply-embedded religious institutions and religious norms within communities can be more effective at stimulating recovery and the growth of social capital than foreign non-profits with (or without) religious missions. Within the context of war, the recovery process becomes especially nuanced. Communities with strong leadership coalitions are better able to leverage their social capital to advocate for themselves. NGOs entering communities that have a lack of leadership or disparate leadership views ought to be very careful when carrying out projects without input from community members. When there is no clear leader, as was the case in Thiruchendur, it is essential to at least obtain a communal opinion.

Most treatments of social capital in disasters look at community-level intra-region or intra-country flows, but New Kattankudy East provides evidence that global flows may perhaps be even more critical. NGOs parachute in, do their projects, and then leave without forming

lasting bonds with stricken communities. In contrast, in Kattankudy, linking social capital in the form of strong and durable global religious ties had a positive impact on community outcomes. The effective leveraging of linking social capital through tapping into rich Muslim states afforded success to Kattankudy's recovery efforts. As this example shows, in a globalized world, there can be a global dimension to linking social capital.

Mr. Kirubarajan, a local academic in Thiruchendur whom I interviewed about his time working with Canadian NGOs in the tsunami and post-war relief efforts, was clear about the structural role that political and religious leaders played in the recovery of the two communities. He discussed how these religious leaders were differentially able to capitalize on the experience of disaster to implement long term vision and missions for their communities. Regarding Kattankudy's recovery, he had a great deal to say about Mr. Musthafa:

> Mr. Musthafa focused his efforts on restoring the lives of those in his primary voting base. It worked, and who can blame him? But his efforts left others [communities outside of Kattankudy] behind, and this is evident by the differences in the communities you are studying.

When Mr. Musthafa called upon help from the government of Saudi Arabia rather than asking the NGOs that came immediately to help or the Sri Lankan government, he was strategically leveraging linking social capital through global religious networks. Similarly, during the war, Mr. Musthafa positioned himself as an advocate for the Moorish communities in Batticaloa, and he activated that vision in the post-disaster context by leveraging social capital to incur benefits for the communities he represented.

Wartime in Tamil communities like Thiruchendur meant that many families were already in survival mode when the tsunami hit. When families are forced to concentrate on surviving the next few days and through the week, rather than planning for the long term, they became focused on immediate needs. Similarly, after the tsunami, they concentrated on gathering material

benefits through tsunami relief programs rather than on a long-term vision for the community's rehabilitation and recovery. This ethos contributed to a breakdown of trust and reciprocity among neighbors and between community members and community leaders. The shifting sovereignty and lack of strong religious and political leadership in communities like Thiruchendur meant that there was minimal capacity for developing a shared vision prior to the tsunami, and this lack of leadership and vision, in combination with the influx of foreign dollars, resulted in corruption and confusion in the process of relief and recovery work. As Mr. Kirubarajan observed:

> Immediately after the tsunami, we came together to pull bodies [from the lagoon] and to clear roads, we worked together to reunite families, and feed each other. Then came cash-for-work programs. First they gave cash to clear roads, and attitudinal changes came with the funding. We went from being focused on communal help to money…. When nobody was coordinating, and there was no plan, people became focused on getting supplies and money without regard for equity. Every family had a personal mission, they focused on their roots, their family.

The extent to which religious cultural norms dictated the flow of aid and social capital through communities is evident in the differences that Christian, Hindu, and Islamic congregations made for community members in Thiruchendur in New Kattankudy East. Again Mr. Kirubarajan, referencing the forms of worship in each faith, indicates that worship rituals may facilitate bonding within communities:

> There's a community aspect of going to the mosque, whereas in kovils, people go to their puja [prayer ritual] and are very focused on their one puja. Christians, they go to certain events, but they worship their deities similar to the Hindus – it is all ritual, and holidays. At the mosque, people go and they do their prayers, and then they talk with each other.

The normative expectations attached to isolated rituals versus communal prayer meant that bonding social capital, deeply rooted in familial and religious activities, operated in entirely different ways in the two communities. Hindu and Christian families became partial to their communities of worship and kin networks. In Kattankudy, however, the Mosque Federation

meant that the mosques within the region were interconnected to the extent that they facilitated social interaction across groups, transcending familial boundaries, and encouraged the spread of material welfare through the religious taxation system. Muslims in Kattankudy are socialized to participate in the redistribution of wealth towards poverty reduction in their communities, which is codified by the Zakat system. However, this ethos of redistribution is not limited to Zakat. There was more sharing of communal resources, visioning of community-level rehabilitation, and protection of neighbors in Kattankudy as a result of cultural bonds rooted in common ethnic-religious identification for the whole community. This ethos proved essential to the success of each domain of recovery in Kattankudy.

In cross-cultural contexts, where donors and even ground staff are foreign to the communities experiencing a disaster, initiatives and projects aimed at reducing harm from disasters must account for the sources of cohesion and conflict within communities. By examining the flow of capital through global religious networks, I have expanded the concept of social capital to account for religious institutions in global, structural social capital. Further, by examining New Kattankudy East and Thiruchendur in comparison, the primacy of cultural social capital—through institutionalized religious norms and ritual—gives more weight to religious institutions as potential sites for developing, activating, or even depleting bonding and bridging social capital within the context of disaster. The unprecedented levels of foreign aid dollars and materials resources flowing into Sri Lankan communities after the tsunami presented opportunities for both rehabilitation and corruption, and these two communities are important examples of what happens when religious institutions are taken as a center point for an analysis of social capital in disaster recovery.

In a global context that is increasingly characterized by civil strife, it is crucial to better understand how such conditions both influence and interact with vulnerability to extreme events. Within a context of insurgencies and "small wars" around the world, increasing disaster losses, and global environmental change, both nations, and the international communities are faced with the challenge of providing disaster assistance in the context of ongoing humanitarian crises. This research provides evidence that, in disaster contexts complicated by armed conflict, religion needs to be more carefully considered when recovery projects are being envisioned and implemented. In the next chapter, I dive deeper into both housing and economic recovery by focusing on how recovery projects are intertwined with "development" initiatives—specifically, the introduction of foreign tourism in Batticaloa in tandem with recovery from the tsunami and civil war.

CHAPTER 4: "AKKA, DON'T FORGET TO REVIEW US ON TRIP ADVISOR!"

Introduction

In a globalized world, small island developing nations experience obstacles to economic growth because of their small size, remoteness, and environmental vulnerability, as well as because of socio-economic factors (Pratt 2015). A focus on tourism as an economic development tactic for coastal areas, islands, and island nations is not a novel strategy, nor is it a strategy without its faults (Pelling and Uitto 2001; Fotiou et al. 2002; Ghina 2003; Adler and Adler 2004; Singh 2008; Prayag et al. 2010; Pratt 2015). Tourism and service economies which focus heavily on access to beaches are especially vulnerable to disaster and raise significant concerns about this form of natural resource exploitation in the face of ongoing climate change accompanied by increasing hazard risk (Pelling and Uitto 2001; Ghina 2003). Furthermore, the economic benefits of tourism do not always accrue to local communities, while the social and environmental consequences of this development do. Sustainable tourism policy must engage local residents in the form of participatory decision making so that locals can reap the economic benefits of the industry, including by ensuring that the financial gains of tourism remain within the locality (Prayag et al. 2010; Pratt 2015). Scholars rightly point out that for this development to be sustainable, planning must include elements of poverty alleviation and regulation structures that account for the specific needs of localities (Foitiou et al. 2002; Ghina 2003).

The decades-long civil war in Sri Lanka slowed the development of a tourism economy in some regions more than others. Despite armed conflict on the island, some regions—specifically areas in the Southern and Western provinces—experienced a nearly steady stream of tourism from European, Asian, and Russian nationals (Fernando et al. 2013a; 2013b). However, the presence of LTTE strongholds in the Central and Eastern provinces created an environment

less appealing to both international and Sri Lankan travelers and essentially stalled the development of new tourism spaces in the region until the war was officially concluded in 2009. In the two communities that I studied, opportunities for tourism development have been and continue to be introduced in tandem with tsunami recovery-oriented community projects undertaken by both foreign and national organizations.

The hastening of tourism development under the guise of recovery efforts has provided multiple shocks to social systems in communities on the East Coast. Populations with different levels of social capital are unequally equipped to absorb these shocks and move forward in sustainable ways. The practice of conflating recovery with development initiatives that narrowly focus on the development of tourism rather than restoring traditional livelihoods or the development of tourism, without political and regulatory support for local communities, has complicated the recovery experiences and exacerbated inequalities among many families in Thiruchendur. Further, as I address in chapter 6, the long-term sustainability of a tourism economy in Sri Lanka is especially sensitive to the potential for flare-ups of ethnic conflict, as evidenced by the fallout following the 2019 Easter Sunday terrorist attacks that targeted churches and tourist hotels in Colombo and Batticaloa.

In this chapter, I explore the post-disaster dynamics that have sped up the process of tourism development in Batticaloa, the City of the Singing Fish. First, I provide the example of a local restaurateur in Thiruchendur to illustrate the rapid, unregulated growth of tourism. I then argue that accounting for time compression in sustainable development and recovery better allows us to understand, and plan for, variable responses to aid provision following disasters. I also show how these provisions can produce unintended shocks to socio-economic structures, leading to disparate outcomes in long-term social, economic, and infrastructure recovery.

Focusing on the allocation of post-tsunami housing in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East, I show that the level of control that a community may be able to exercise over its own recovery experience varies according to forms of governance, including the influence of non-state actors such as religious institutions. I build on arguments made in chapter 2 by further illustrating how the presence of the Mosque Federation in New Kattankudy East is a key factor in the successful ongoing recovery efforts in this community, whereas the lack of a secondary legitimate governing force in Thiruchendur has contributed to uneven social and economic recovery among families in the village. Using illustrations from the new tourism economy, introduced as an alternative to traditional livelihood strategies, alongside "modern" western homes during recovery efforts, I provide lessons for refining the concepts of "sustainable development" and "sustainable recovery."

"Kallady Sea View Restaurants" and Batticaloa as a Tourist Destination

I interviewed Rajeesh—a 41-year-old Thiruchendur native, and father of three—in July 2017, about five months after he had officially quit fishing and opened the oceanfront "Kallady Sea View Restaurants" [sic]. He told me that although patronage was slow-going, his restaurant business was in peak condition. Frequently, his kitchen would get large orders around 6:00 or 7:00 pm from other local restaurants and guesthouses overwhelmed with orders from their own guests. In his large kitchen, he could supply dozens of noodle and curry meals on short notice to these businesses, which supplemented the slow trickle of lunchtime and early evening visitors to the beach.

Photo 9: Kallady Sea View Restaurants in July 2017

Rajeesh was considered "fortunate" by his neighbors in Thiruchendur because he had direct access to members of the area Municipal Council, who lease the space for his beach cafe. This dynamic should, in theory, parlay into a reliable and clear landlord/renter relationship and allow Rajeesh to participate in conversations with government and non-governmental organizations that are making decisions about how the tourism industry takes form in the village. The Council built four gazebos, along with a long wooden boardwalk and small playground, on the beach in late 2016 for public use. In January 2017, the Council leased the space to Rajeesh for commercial use when he was able to convince the village's GN person that building an ocean-front restaurant would be a draw for tourists, especially foreigners. He had witnessed the success of sea-front eateries when he spent some time working in ground-maintenance at a foreigners-only guesthouse south of Batticaloa in Arugam Bay the previous summer (see Map 5

below). In his opinion, the only big difference between his restaurant and those in Arugam Bay was that he could not serve alcoholic beverages. He had no idea if the laws would change any time soon to allow him to sell beer, which he didn't mind, because on the occasion that he'd allowed locals or foreigners to bring alcohol into the restaurant, it "caused too many issues" with his disapproving mother. Additionally, with the local police station being just next door, he wasn't going to take too many risks.

Only a few minutes into our conversation, his sense of excitement and optimism about his new business began to wear away when he provided this pointed response to my exploratory question of "Can you tell me about tourism in Kallady beach?":

> Kallady [beach in Batticaloa] was always going to be for the tourists. Yes, we like them to bring their money, but no one knew it would happen so fast. We have received very little support to enhance cultural awareness on both sides. The white people [foreigners] don't understand our ways of life, and we don't understand theirs. We both want something from each other, but do not know how to take with gratitude and responsibility. There is an imbalance, and the government isn't helping us... We have to figure out new ways to share our lands with foreign peoples but have had no chance to think about how to do it in a way that works for everyone.

Rajeesh and his neighbors speak in similar ways about how tourism is reshaping their community. Concerns about cultural clashes between locals and foreigners and the long-term economic viability of the service industry as a primary livelihood for community members were common themes in my interviews.

Two days after our initial interview, Zaluja and I sought refuge at the restaurant during a surprise afternoon rainstorm. The rain was pummeling the structure from all angles, water was pouring into the kitchen from the roof, through windows, and beneath doors. We talked for a long while about how Rajeesh had complained to the Municipal Council dozens of times about the rain, begging them to send or let him hire someone to make the structure safe for food preparation and running a business. The Municipal Council was happy to receive his rent

payments of 1,000 – 3,000 RP per month,[28] but complaints and questions about making improvements to the building fell on deaf ears.

In 2017, at the restaurant's peak, it flooded almost weekly with the slightest storm. He was sure that during the wet season (October through December) he would have to close his doors if improvements weren't made. In 2018, when I returned in August, the structure was shuttered, and Rajeesh had moved on to tending new guesthouses his family had built across the street. The structure now sits like a massive turquoise skeleton 50 to 65 meters from the sea, depending on the tide, collecting crows nests and sand.

Rajeesh has no idea how long the guesthouse will last, and whether or not his family will be able to turn the renting of their land to tourists into a viable long-term livelihood that they can pass on to their children. The competition in the village is steep, the work seasonal, and guesthouses come and go. Rajeesh and others in Thiruchendur have become solely dependent on short bursts of economic activity to sustain their families year-round. It remains to be seen whether Rajeesh's guesthouse will be open going forward.

[28] The Municipal Council leased the space to Rajeesh at a seasonal rate, understanding that the business was unlikely remain busy during the low season. In high season from April to August, Rajeesh paid 3,000 SL RP/month, and the rest of the year, he would pay 1,000 SL RP/month. There was never a formal leasing contract delivered to Rajeesh, though he was continuously promised one from the GN person who brokered the deal. As such, Rajeesh relied, hesitantly, on the good faith of government officials to keep his business open. 1,000 SL RP = roughly 5.50 USD; 3,000 SL RP = 16.50 USD.

Map 5: Eastern Province tourist destinations

Point markers, from north to south, show Trincomalee, Kallady, Kattankudy, and Arugam Bay



Source: maps.google.com

Kallady beach and Kattankudy are located directly between two popular tourist destinations on Sri Lanka's East coast: Trincomalee to the north, which boasts famous pilgrimage temples and "one of the finest natural deep-water harbors in the world" (Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau 2018a), making it an excellent spot for reef-seeking scuba-divers,

and Arugam Bay to the south. The Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau website boasts that Arugam Bay is a "page from a surfer's dream book where the shore is white and wide, surf is high, and the waters clear and un-spoilt beach line stretching for miles" [sic] and where you can witness the magic of fisherfolk hard at work: "Fishing boats returning after the night catch, famous jumping fishes heading towards the beach and fisherman waiting with baited lines all join hands to make the perfect picture of a daybreak" (Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau 2018b). In December 2018, Lonely Planet—a popular travel guidebook publisher headquartered in Australia—identified Sri Lanka as #1 on their list of top 10 countries to visit in 2019. The publisher's description of Sri Lanka alludes to the novelty of visiting the North and East coasts and the changing landscape of tourism on the island:

> Sri Lanka is decidedly having its moment in the equatorial sun and **change is coming swiftly.** Already notable to intrepid travelers for its mix of religions and cultures, its timeless temples, its rich and accessible wildlife, its growing surf scene and **its people who defy all odds by their welcome and friendliness after decades of civil conflict, this is a country revived**. There's now more than ever for families, adrenaline junkies, eco-tourists, wellness seekers and foodies of all budgets. **Even the North and East, including areas previously off limits, difficult to reach or lacking in services, deliver new discoveries.** (Lonely Planet 2018; emphasis added)

Though Kallady and Kattankudy, central coastal areas in the Eastern Province's Batticaloa district, are not yet overtly present on the Tourism Promotion Board or Lonely Planet's websites, locals believe that it is only a matter of time before they are more widely recognized and promoted for reasons similar to those that motivated the promotion of Trincomalee and Arugam Bay. Before the 2004 tsunami and in the years immediately following, Batticaloa had served mainly as a bus stop for visitors traveling between the two beach hotspots. Batticaloa's beaches remained a space more suited for fisher-folk to go about their traditional livelihoods uninterrupted by the presence of swimsuit-clad foreigners. Kallady beach remained a space of worship and celebration for Hindus at the famous Murugan temple, and Kattankudy's

coast served as a gathering space for families on Fridays. However, its proximity to Trincomalee and Arugam Bay has meant that Batticaloa has long been poised to be a destination rather than a mere stopping-off point, a sentiment reflected in Rajeesh's comment that "Kallady was always going to be for the tourists" and Lonely Planet's assertion that "new discoveries" await travelers in the "previously off limits" Northern and Eastern coasts.

Over the course of my many visits to Batticaloa between 2013 and 2018, I observed a marked increase in tourism. In 2013, it was common for me to go many weeks in Batticaloa without encountering another white foreigner. It was in August 2017 when I had the stark realization that the oddity of my presence in these communities (as a white person) would no longer be an aspect of my field-research experience. I will never forget sitting on the beach in awe as I watched a middle-aged white female in a bikini bathing suit walk directly from the sea to the Murugan Kovil and surrounding temple grounds in Thiruchendur. While the Western-educated feminist in me sees the virtue in women dressing as they wish and being in control of their bodies and appearance, my knowledge of the local culture in Batticaloa meant that this activity was tantamount to sacrilege. Residents of these communities have come to know me as the "tattooed sociologist," and have welcomed my research assistant and me into their homes repeatedly to collect scientific data, but I am no longer one of the few "white people" who visit the villages. The presence of white Westerners in the area has become commonplace, and residents are a mix of excited and nervous about the changes. Since my first field trip in 2013, I have returned to Batticaloa once a year. During each visit, I share milk tea, meals, and conversation my off-and-on neighbors. In 2017, farewells involving some Kallady families

shifted from the typical salutations and questions about when my next visit will be to: "Akkā, don't forget to review us on Trip Advisor!"[29,30]

Sustainable Recovery in the Context of War, Compressed Time, and a Tourism Boom

Scholars of disasters and emergency management practitioners increasingly use the language of "sustainable recovery" principles when referring to ideal scenarios for disaster recovery. The underlying assumption being that sustainably-recovered and better-built communities will have improved social, economic, and infrastructural capacity and be better equipped to plan for and mitigate against future disaster (Smith and Wenger 2006). Key elements of sustainable development practice include equality in decision making, partnership and collaboration between practitioners and beneficiaries, empowerment of communities, and acknowledgment and respect for the ecological constraints of social and environmental locales (Mary 2008; Pyles 2009).

The catastrophic nature of the tsunami, coupled with ongoing violence from the civil war, created a complex environment for recovery actors to bring their projects to fruition. The allocation of funding for recovery efforts following the tsunami was meant to be state-steered via the Post-Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS) agreement between the government and the LTTE, which designated the LTTE as a legitimate state actor capable of accepting and dispersing funds for the recovery efforts. However, the collapse of the P-TOMS

[29] "Akkā" (அக்கா) is Tamil for "elder sister." In conversational Tamil, kinship labels and terminology are often applied to friends, acquaintances, and strangers. For instance, a child might refer to me as "Akkā" as a way to acknowledge that I am a female person who is older than them, but I am not yet a middle-aged or elderly person, in which case they would more likely refer to me as "Auntie" or "Am'mā" (அம்மா; mother).

[30] TripAdvisor Inc. is an American company that publishes user-generated reviews of hotels, restaurants, and other travel-attractions. The company boasts, on its website that it is "the world's largest travel site" and that its mobile app is the "ultimate travel companion" (TripAdvisor.com, 2018). Managers and owners of restaurants and guesthouses have explained to me that their TripAdvisor rating (a numerical score on the scale of 0 – 5 generated by visitor reviews) can make or break their business.

agreement within five months following the tsunami and the nature of the ongoing political violence in the area created an environment whereby international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local organizations were inundating local governments and communities with cash and cash-liquid projects, commonly referred to as the "Golden Wave," with limited official oversight into how that money was being allocated and handled in both the short- and long-term (Gunawardana 2006; Silva 2009; Gamburd 2013). This meant that foreign NGOs were often working directly with communities without clear requirements for best practices set by state actors. In this environment of loose or non-existent regulation, coordination among actors conducting recovery projects was almost nonexistent. For many NGOs, the only accountability mechanism guiding their work was promises to their funders, and consequently, their work became driven by quantity rather than quality. Critical recovery actors became more focused on how many houses could be built in the shortest amount of time, rather than on the long-term structural and cultural sustainability of the new homes.

Olshansky and colleagues posit that "the key characteristic that distinguish(es) post-disaster conditions from normal times is time compression… (whereby) the post-disaster environment consists of a compression of urban development activities in time and a limited space…" (2012: 173). The normal rate of capital depletion and replacement is sped up in a post-disaster environment, and changes introduced to communities are accelerated and occur at varying rates. Furthermore, bureaucratic processes, which require checks and balances and multiple approvals, do not function well in compressed time. Governments may not be able to solve problems, provide resources, and take actions in the same ways they would in normal times, as is evidenced by the rapid breakdown of the P-TOMS agreement and the government's mismanagement of the "Golden Wave" and NGOs. This dynamic makes it even more important

for relief and recovery efforts to center on the role of citizens and empower them as decision-makers and local experts. For instance, during the rebuilding phases (2005-2008) following the 2004 tsunami, recovery efforts in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East focused primarily on restoring housing for residents or relocating them to "safer" areas and repairing critical community infrastructure. However, the rapid introduction of new infrastructure, coupled with weak governance and, at times a disregard for traditional economic and social structures, led to different recovery outcomes for the two communities. Infrastructure recovery projects have outpaced communities' ability to adapt to the new changes, both socially and economically, creating social fissures both within and among communities.

In a 2014 article, Kamble and Bouchon compare the reality of Sri Lanka's post-war tourism boom against the government's "Sri Lankan Tourism Development Strategy 2011 – 2016" which positions the boom as clearing a path towards "post-war reconstruction and reconciliation" while equalizing the "distribution of economic benefits of tourism on the island" (2014: 234). The authors show that while the "Sri Lankan hospitality sector needs to be developed even faster than it already is to meet the increasing demand[s of mostly foreign travelers]," the government's long term development strategies have not properly addressed the necessary empowerment of "minority communities that have been driven to poverty because of the war" (2014: 236). While communities in the Southern and Western regions of the island are more well-equipped to meet the rising demands of foreign tourists because their tourism industry was developed throughout the 30-year war, communities in the Northern and Eastern regions of the island are experiencing effects of the nationwide boom while simultaneously adjusting to foreign tourism for the first time. These authors caution that, while the long-term benefits of the growth of tourism in these regions remain to be seen, long-term peacebuilding between the

Sinhala majority and Tamil communities may be hampered if the needs of minority communities are not considered a priority.

By analyzing projects implemented by both international and state actors within the context of a time-compressed post-war environment, I illustrate some problematic issues with the sustainable recovery and sustainable development paradigms in developing nations like Sri Lanka, where the state emphasizes moving the country towards a tourism-based economy without the capacity for effective political leadership and policy steering in that arena. I use the example of infrastructure recovery and tourism development in the two communities to illustrate how different levels of access to governing bodies and incorporation into decision-making and project-implementation processes produced disparate recovery and development outcomes. I also question the long-term social and economic sustainability of these efforts. In particular, I show that the politicization of aid provision to survivors in Batticaloa has exacerbated pre-existing social cleavages both within and between communities and made meeting the fundamental principles of "sustainable recovery" an unviable goal in the short term, especially for Thiruchendur. The continued conceptualization and theorization of "sustainable recovery" principles must more effectively account for the possibility that *states in recovery* may also be *states in conflict*, and that ignoring this potential within the context of rapid globalization provides a dangerous precedent as global communities experience increasing climate destabilization.

Power, Governance, and the Allocation of New Housing

Variation in forms of governance and community leadership in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East directly influenced the differences in recovery and development between the two communities. In Thiruchendur, a community in the Manmunai North Division that is

majority Hindu with many Christian families, no secondary governing force oversees the activities of community members in conjunction with the government-appointed GN person. There are some social organizations present in Thiruchendur that help to regulate various aspects of community life, including local branches of the fisheries, rural development, and women's' rural development societies. Additionally, there are a few elders and religious leaders who serve as de-facto community leaders in times of need for some residents. However, none of these societies or organizational actors are agreed upon as legitimate leaders by key community constituencies. Consequently, the GN person is seen as the one single actor who is recognized as a legitimate leader by all community members in the village. This person is appointed by the district (Batticaloa) government and rarely is an individual who is a native to the village.

By comparison, governance in communities in Kattankudy is much less diffuse. New Kattankudy East is one of eighteen GN divisions in Kattankudy that are regulated by both the state-sanctioned government and a secondary legitimate governing force – the Mosque Federation. Because 100% of residents in Kattankudy are Muslim, the Mosque Federation can exert control over the residents, who identify as a homogeneous ethnic group. In Kattankudy, the Mosque Federation oversees multiple aspects of social life and works closely with those entities that have state-sanctioned power. The tight connections between leaders of the Mosque Federation, its various sub-committees, and elected and appointed government leaders made for a strong organizing force within the community and provided residents, in the context of recovery from the tsunami and war, a buffer between families and NGO actors.

The Mosque Federation in Kattankudy took on the responsibility of organizing NGOs in the aftermath of the tsunami where government actors may have fallen short. The presence of the Mosque Federation in New Kattankudy East contributed to more organized coordination

between community members and recovery agencies, resulting in more successful recovery trajectories and outcomes in comparison to Thiruchendur just up the road. Additionally, the local state-sanctioned government is more organized than in other divisions in the district. As noted earlier, the GN person in New Kattankudy East is a native to the community, held his office steadily from 2003 to 2012, and as of August 2017, still resided in the village.

The time-compressed and politically unstable context for rebuilding led to uneven recovery outcomes among households in Thiruchendur, where the community had few resources to manage the Golden Wave. NGOs would typically enter the community and try to coordinate with the GN person to estimate the needs of constituents and advance their strategies to meet those needs. However, because the GN person was largely unavailable and because there were four different GN persons designated to Thiruchendur in the period between 2005 and 2008, organizations were left to coordinate on their own. As a result, in most cases, the organizations were left to deal directly with community leaders and members to determine the next steps.

The process was further complicated because locating recognized "community leaders" in Thiruchendur is no easy task. For example, while beginning my fieldwork in 2013, nearly ten years after the tsunami, I had a difficult time determining community leaders that were defined as such by a majority of residents. When I asked community members to identify community leaders, most people would point me towards the President or Vice President of the Fisheries Society, leaders of the Women's Rural Development Society, or the Samurdhi Officer, though frequently the identities of the people holding these roles were only vaguely known. While I had the luxury of spending time living in the communities and mapping out social hierarchies during my fieldwork, NGO and other aid workers were pressured to get their projects started and completed within a short time frame, again to show donors evidence of progress. Thus, it was

difficult if not impossible, for NGOs to identify community leaders to host conversations about the communities needs in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. In the section the follows, I illustrate the many issues that arose as a result of incompetent and inconsistent governance, showing how the allocation and design of new housing after the tsunami has functioned to produce uneven incorporation into the modern tourism industry in the communities. Specifically, the way residents were required to qualify for aid and how that aid was allocated made some residents more able than others to accommodate tourists.

Qualifying for Aid and the Size of New Homes

Despite my many interviews with the current GN person and other community leaders about the issue, the process of identifying community members who qualified for aid in Thiruchendur remained somewhat murky. Most residents claimed that the GN person was expected to compile a central list of residents who qualified for government funds to assist in the rebuilding of their either fully- or partially-damaged homes. Designations of "full" or "partial" damage translated into different amounts of money that would be made available in the form of government aid. Once organizations had a list of residents, they would cluster their efforts geographically and offer to repair or build homes for residents. Some organizations promised to build as many as twenty homes, and other organizations were able to offer only a few. Some employed an owner-driven model of rebuilding whereby they released money, in multiple stages as construction progressed, directly to families who were responsible for building their own new homes. Other organizations took a donor-driven approach, which frequently meant that residents had little or no input into the rebuilding process and had no access to their new homes until the day they were given keys. None of the organizations worked collaboratively to develop a standard design model for new houses. As a consequence, organizations with more money

funded the construction of ostensibly "nicer" homes for residents, whereas lesser-funded organizations funded more basic models. Some homes were built with a second floor, which at the time was considered a viable risk reduction measure for families, because it was assumed that if another tsunami were to come, people could seek refuge from the waves by climbing to the second floor. In terms of house size, the families who received multi-story homes ended up with larger homes, while other families had smaller, one-story homes. Neighbors complained that their homes should have been built to be "as big as the ones across the street," since home size translated into material wealth. Typical of the residents' reaction to the housing strategies are statements like these:

> I still do not understand why [my neighbor] got a house with many bedrooms and I am left to sleep on the floor with all of my children. (Theepan; middle-aged man)
>
> I was never able to ask for what I wanted. No one asked me if I needed another room for my daughter and her husband, and no one offered to rebuild their marriage house. But [my neighbor] got one house here, and another house in the Swiss village. Now, I cannot pay for my daughter to be married, but [my other neighbor's] daughter has a large home for many generations of their family. (Rajhani; middle-aged woman)
>
> The houses across the road are big and strong, mine is a box with a roof. It is too hot to sleep inside, so we sleep in the sand. I have lived in this community longer than [my neighbor] and should have received more. (Buvaneshwari; elderly woman)
>
> No one came to check on the construction workers to make sure that they were using all of the materials. My foundation has more cracks now because I was not allowed to participate in the rebuilding. They didn't let me back to my property until signing day. (Yogaraja; elderly man)
>
> I do not know if I will stay in this house. It is not suitable for my family, unlike [my neighbor's] on the other side of the main road. I cannot afford the cost to hook my house up to the government water line, and no one built a well on my property. [My other neighbor] has a new well and their house had a government water line when they moved in. I tried to complain, but there was no one to complain to. Now, I do not know if I can stay here, because this place is not suitable for me and my children. I do not know what we will do, but I do not want to stay in this home. (Sarojadevi; middle-aged woman)

The variation in home size is one factor that has left community members at odds with one another over the years. Another factor in terms of home size and design that has resulted in complaints of inequality is the location and design of household toilets.

Culturally Appropriate Plumbing

Bathrooms also became a point of contention. New toilets varied in two ways: they were built either inside the main housing structure or as a separate outhouse, and they were either built as the standard squat-toilet most familiar to those in the region, or "Western toilets" or "sitting toilets." Community members felt differently about these designs.

The prestige associated with having a toilet facility in or outside of our main home structure varied between religious groups. In the Hindu cultural tradition, toilets and the bodily functions with which they are associated, are considered unclean, so understandably the introduction of an indoor toilet was something that many families grappled with during the reconstruction of their homes. Christian families tended to have fewer complaints about in-home toilets than Hindu families who frequently complained that having a toilet in the home meant that their sacred spaces were made less so. This issue was exacerbated when organizations, in an effort to cut costs and in the absence of community participation in the decision making and rebuilding processes, centralized the plumbing in the homes, making it so kitchen and toilet facilities were close together, usually separated by a wall that did not reach to the ceiling. This is a common practice in the region to facilitate air flow within structures in the absence of standard Western climate-control measures, but the presence of a partial wall between a toilet and kitchen facilities was considered unacceptable to many Hindu households. In cases where these types of structures were built, it was not uncommon for families to fill the squat toilets with sand and cover them with a piece of wood or to remove a western toilet completely. Rooms that were

intended for use as toilet facilities were thus rendered useless, along with the new septic systems to which they were connected. In cases where the families destroyed the toilet initially provided for them, some waited months or years for other NGOs to come into the community to build outhouses on their properties. Residents in homes with toilets that had been removed or covered and repurposed often raised concerns in the following ways:

> How can I cook for my family here? There is no suitable way to make clean food for my children with a toilet so close. I had no choice… I had to destroy it and wait many years for another organization to help me build a new toilet. (Kaanagi; middle-aged woman)

> My family can go [to the bathroom] outside. We filled that toilet with sand and now use the room for pooja [prayer and religious ritual]. My husband helped to ask for a new toilet, which we finally got in 2015 with the help of a church organization. (Priya; middle-aged woman)

> The toilet they built in my home is not good for my [Hindu] culture. The church organization only listened to the Christian families and did not care about how we are different…. Since I returned to this property, I do not have a toilet in my home… If I want to use a toilet I have to go to my sister's [house next door]. (Ganga; elderly woman)

The time-compressed and politically-unstable post-tsunami environment in Batticaloa contributed to the inconsistent allocation of culturally appropriate homes, which exacerbated inequalities among residents in Thiruchendur, where community and political leaders provided inconsistent oversight of NGO projects.

Governance and Duplicating Efforts

As I outlined in chapter 1, findings from the QCA study showed that community participation, consistent oversight from local government entities and the embeddedness of constructing agencies can be critical to the long-term success of disaster recovery projects (Jordan and Javernick-Will 2015; Jordan et al. 2016). In Thiruchendur, housing recovery efforts lacked community participation and strong oversight from the local government, and in most

cases, agencies were not deeply embedded within the communities. As a result, in addition to exacerbating pre-existing social inequalities and introducing new inequalities to the communities, the lack of embeddedness led to resource waste and duplication of efforts.

Families that received new homes that had toilets an acceptable distance from the kitchen or in the form out outhouses are, like those living in the larger houses I previously described, accorded a high level of prestige among community members. This prestige and the envy it caused created chasms among families who may have once identified as close friends and kin. Differences among households in these recovery outcomes were not a result of the power of individual families to advocate on their behalf, and thus cannot be interpreted as intentional power-grabs. The designation of NGOs to assist certain families by building new homes seemed to happen randomly, like a lottery. If you won the lottery, you got a big house with a Western toilet or an outhouse. If you were on the losing end, your home might not even feel habitable, and you have very few opportunities for remediation. When I asked homeowners why they did not make formal complaints about the disparities and inappropriate housing, I was met with a look of confusion or a laugh laced with irony. This question showed my ignorance of the power structure within the village, and homeowners pitied me for my ignorance because I did not understand there was no one to complain to. In the case of one housing project in particular, where residents were left with unfinished walls and ceilings, no floors except for foundations and sand, and no electric or water hook-ups, neighbors banded together to write letters to the GN persons over the years, but these letters seem to have disappeared into stacks of unacknowledged pleas for help.

After the NGOs handed the homes over to families and took photos of smiling mothers and fathers under the plaques that named the NGO's successful housing recovery project, they

disappeared from the community. There was no way for families to contact the NGOs that built the houses, and there was no money left from the government allocation to fix problematic structures or make upgrades or additions. Padmini, a mother of three, said to me:

> They [the NGO workers] took their photos and left. They wanted to make their glossy books and show their good efforts, but they never visited us after that day. My photo is somewhere in a magazine, and I look happy. I was happy! That day I got to return to my native place and bring my children home. But now I know that our lives are never going to be good here. No one asks if we are happy, no one visits, no one offers to help, and we have to pay for food and school books – we cannot afford a new floor. Have you seen my neighbor's home? They have nice floors and a beautiful garden. We have nothing…. It was not like this before. We shared with our neighbors, but how can you share a new floor? How can you share walls and doors? The companies [NGOs] left us to be angry about what we do not have instead of happy with our new homes. It is a shame. I wish it never happened.

Padmini's sentiment is shared among many members of the community when they speak of their situations in comparison to their close neighbors. Where there was once an environment of community and a measure of equality, there is now an antagonism among neighbors that came about not through the actions of families but as a result of external forces that, in a rush to build faster and bigger, failed to ask what families needed. The organizations did not work together to ensure that they were providing equitable resources to community members, and their actions have weakened once strong social ties to the point that some families wanted to leave the village because they were ashamed of their living conditions in comparison with their neighbors. In a community where tin and coconut thatch structures were once the most common housing materials for a large majority of community members, these new homes serve as tangible markers of separation and difference. There seems to be no mode of remediation to level these new separations. The NGO workers are long gone, and in cases where community members felt empowered to complain, the complaints fell on the deaf ears of government workers who felt as if "tsunami recovery" was a thing of the past, and something from which to move on.

In my own repeated attempts to query the GN person and any NGO affiliates who were still present in the district about these issues of inequality and unfinished or inappropriate homes, I was frequently told that families have become "dependency minded" (GN person, October 2014). Identifying a community member as "dependency minded" is coded language for "needy" and "lazy" persons who are fixated on the past. The GN person was not able to locate any of the paper records of rebuilding efforts, and my attempts to recover records from the district government officers were unsuccessful. In fact, throughout my fieldwork process, the disempowerment of community members was made more tangible to me because of my own inability to find concrete answers about recovery practices from both government and non-governmental organizations. When I searched for a proper accounting of the methods of recovery, or records of which NGOs worked where and how they were assigned to families, I was often left with more questions than answers – for example, being referred to a different bureaucrat who had only held office for a few months and had no knowledge of the recovery efforts. I observed these issues with record maintenance at the local, divisional, and district levels of government. Lax record keeping was both a function of the haphazard, uncoordinated nature of recovery and the civil war, in that the political environment contributed to the frequent turnover of government agents, and also the removal of computers from government offices.

The governance environment in New Kattankudy East stands in stark contrast to that of Thiruchendur. The GN person, a resident of the community, worked throughout his tenure with members of the Mosque Federation and its committees to advocate on behalf of his community. The communication and coordination between governance entities in Kattankudy resulted in a neater and more equitable housing recovery process whereby community members received nearly identical new homes and were not left wondering how or why their neighbors received

more or less than their families did. In contrast to Thiruchendur, where I counted at least nine different housing projects, I found only three in New Kattankudy East. One of the housing projects was directed toward families who received a partial-damage designation on their home, and the other two were for those with properties deemed fully damaged. These three housing projects were negotiated for by leaders of the Mosque Federation and its committees in conjunction with the GN person, who had a firm grasp on the needs of community members.

The organized manner in which the housing projects proceeded left little room for error, corruption, or exploitation. While I commonly heard complaints of the misuse and misappropriation of funds and building materials in Thiruchendur, I heard no such claims in New Kattankudy East. There are no unfinished houses, no behemoth two-story homes standing next to boxes with roofs, there are no bare sand floors, and while there are of course some conflicts between neighbors, I never heard a complaint that someone got "more" because of sheer luck or corruption. Instead, if there is real or perceived inequality, it tends to be a result of power imbalances that were present in the community before the tsunami. It is true that some community members in New Kattankudy East complained to me that they were not consulted in the design of their new homes. However, the housing projects (independent of other recovery-oriented efforts) have not created new power imbalances between "haves" and "have nots."

The power of the community leaders to advocate on behalf of community members needs and for equity among tsunami-affected families stems in part from the homogeneous nature of the community. Each family in the GN unit is Moorish, and each family recognizes the Mosque Federation as an agent of legitimate social and material control in communities in Kattankudy. While it is true that some residents may perceive the Mosque Federation as a more or less oppressive force in matters of social life, there were no complaints of being "left out" in terms of

housing recovery. The strength of governance in New Kattankudy East, at least in terms of housing recovery, has resulted in a leveling of social status among homeowners, and also allows for more empowered decision making about whether or not people choose to participate in the new tourist economy that is developing in most of Batticaloa's ocean front communities.

These differences in housing allocation and construction among residents in Thiruchendur and between residents of the two communities have produced differential access to and incorporation in the new tourism economy. In the following section, I show how these different opportunities manifest themselves and illustrate some of the social consequences of the rapidly expanding tourism industry in the region.

Improved Housing for Some Becomes Economic Opportunity for Some

Access to the sea for fishing is traditionally the primary form of environmental capital available to residents in Thiruchendur and Kattankudy. Pre-tsunami, the residents' relationship to the sea was mainly for the extraction of capital in the form of fish to be re-sold at local markets and to feed families. Now, in the post-tsunami and post-war environment, the sea is being re-framed and marketed as a space for leisure, and primarily the leisure of "others" rather than community members. Access to beaches for leisure does not merely mean that tourists will come to sunbathe and swim. There are elements of infrastructure that must be provided for this leisure to persist, including the cleaning of beaches to keep them free of rubbish and the introduction of concession stands, boardwalks, and memorials to make the beaches more comfortable and desirable for foreign visitors. Additionally, the installation of guest houses is critical so that tourists have somewhere to spend nights after long days in the sun. The production of these outputs comes at a high cost to locals who have received no formal training to help navigate the implementation of the novel industry.

Van Dam (2015) notes that the clash between fisherfolk and sunbathers in Sri Lanka is frequently an unpleasant one:

> [Fishers] need the beaches to land their boats, dry and untangle their nets, and store their equipment. They also need space to sort, clean and auction their catch. Sunbathing and blood gutters do not go well together (van Dam 2015: 45).

Nevertheless, in both Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East, new housing is frequently being transformed into tourist guesthouses so that families can capitalize on the opportunity to make money hosting tourists. The acquisition of improved housing by some families has meant that new material inequalities have tangible economic outcomes that intensify social problems in the post-tsunami and post-war environment. Unequal housing allocation among families has resulted in the exclusion of some people from incorporation in the new tourist economy. In an environment where tourism is becoming the way for community members to participate in a "modern economy," those who were left behind in the process of tsunami recovery are now finding themselves deficient compared to their luckier, "lotto winning" neighbors. Families who are hoping to flip their new homes into bed-and-breakfast-type businesses to accommodate tourists are unable to do so if the structures are not considered "comfortable" for Westerners. Smaller homes with no toilet, squat toilets, or detached toilets are less attractive to tourists, and as a result, families owning these structures are at a disadvantage compared to their neighbors.

Post-disaster time compression, coupled with the island-wide tourism boom, also meant that the benefits of incorporation into the new service economy were in some cases outweighed by cultural misunderstandings and conflict. The tourism boom also stimulated changes in local culture that were disapproved of by some residents. The discussion turns next to the nature of these tensions

Culture Clash and the New Economy

Community members in Thirchendur often relay complaints similar to Rajeesh's, that there is a lack of cultural awareness on the part of both residents and tourists. With no support for cultural awareness training or materials from the various tourism boards in the area, cultural norms in Batticaloa are violated continuously by visitors, and community members are unsure how to respond appropriately in the context of the new tourism economy.

Gendered assumptions about what is and isn't appropriate dress for men and women are central to many of these tensions. Theepan, a father of three, lamented that the women in the community are beginning to adopt Western styles of clothing that he does not see as virtuous practice:

> Do you see their swim clothing, their jeans, and tops? Now [my daughter] wants to work in town so that she can buy skirts and tops [instead of traditional tunics]. If my daughter wants to dress this way, she will never be married.

Women, especially young women, who try to emulate Western styles of dress are being ostracized socially, harassed (more than usual) by their peers, and even sexually assaulted, as the culture of violence and abuse against women is exacerbated by confusing and insensitive cultural exchanges. When I asked two women in their early twenties, Byurah and Meera, about this in 2016, they complained that their lives are now more limited because their male counterparts are becoming more disrespectful. Byurah said (with Meera's emphasis and clarifications):

> The boys [our classmates!] now think that about what we look like under our clothes. We do not go to the beach anymore without our parents. We cannot even walk home from school without the boys yelling at us. My junior [younger classmate] tried to grab me [points to her chest] when I came from the bus last week.

These changing gender norms could have long-term consequences for kinship structures in Thiruchendur. The father's complaint that his daughter will become less marriageable if she dresses like a Westerner is not untrue. In these communities, a large part of a women's virtue and

value is directly tied to the perception of how chaste she is; virginity is assumed of young brides. With increased access to the internet and interaction with foreign tourists, people in Thiruchendur are forced to make cultural adjustments rapidly to these new exposures. On Thiruchendur's new tourist beach, the locals stand by and wonder what can be done—if anything—to stop tourists from walking through kovils in their bathing suits.

Nirusha, a middle-aged woman in Thirchendur, told me about how unhappy she was with the new guesthouse her neighbor opened beside her fence:

> My children were curious and looking at the white people. I became very upset when I learned that these tourists were having relations [sex] in the outdoor shower, and I called the police.

In cases where a community member is upset about a tourist-related issue, the police are frequently called to intervene, which creates unease among community members who remain fearful of the majority-Sinhala police force and can also create bureaucratic nightmares for travelers. For instance, a speeding ticket for a tourist riding a rented motorbike can balloon quickly into a week-long series of court appearances. As our interview concluded, I asked Nirusha—as I usually do—if I could take a few photos of her property for my research. While I assured her that she and her children would not be visible in any of the pictures, she still refused, explaining that she knows that foreigners take their faces and put them onto naked bodies for internet pornography.

I visited with Suthan, the son of my former landlord, in 2017 to talk about his family's new guesthouse. He and his father created the "Blue-Green Rest"[31] —a six-room motel—from the home his mother received after the tsunami. In the process of building Blue-Green, six members of Suthan's family were forced to move into one bedroom of his young wife's new

[31] "Blue-Green Rest" is a pseudonym.

home around the corner.[32] Suthan is a fluent English speaker and knows some German, owns a smartphone with a data package, and has two scooters that he is willing to rent to tourists. This trifecta has meant success for his business, as he is able to communicate clearly with his guests, manage bookings through common online portals (Agoda.com, Booking.com, etc.) while keeping a close eye on his Trip Advisor score and providing amenities to visitors that most guesthouses in the area cannot (e.g., vehicle rental).

Suthan explained to me that earlier in the summer he had "some trouble with the police." He had purchased beer for three European female guests so that they could "party" (an evening of drinking among friends, in whatever format, tends to be labeled as a "party" in Thiruchendur). According to Suthan, that night, he and a few of his male friends joined the guests in the beer-drinking. When the guests woke up the next morning, one of the girls claimed that she had been sexually assaulted and had no memory of the event. When the woman went to the police to file a complaint, they immediately came for Suthan and threatened to shutter his business and arrest him for rape. He explained to the police, that this would be impossible because his friends would never do that to a girl, but that he went to bed earlier than the guests who may have stayed up drinking with some of his friends. The female travelers did not spend another night in Thiruchendur, and because they left the village, the police did nothing to investigate the alleged assault any further. The injustices embedded in this situation are multiple, and I was almost overflowing with questions for Suthan, but our conversation quickly veered to his top concern: his Trip Advisor score.

[32] In line with the matrilocal customs of Sri Lankan Tamil kinship, it is customary for a groom move in with his wife and/or her family immediately after they are married. However, it is not common for his extended family to join them, as happened in Suthan's case.

"Parties" and social drinking, especially including women, are entirely new to Thiruchendur and came into the community in tandem with the influx of tourism. In Batticaloa, there are no spaces, aside from the new guesthouses, for people to drink socially. There are no bars, and very few restaurants serve alcohol. Until about 2016, most of what I heard about drinking in Batticaloa was about war-related trauma and alcoholism among men. When I first visited in 2013, I was instructed by a neighbor that if I wanted "hot drink" (alcohol), I would have to ask a man to acquire it for me. The only legal sale of alcohol is through government-regulated shops, where the goods are sold from behind a counter. In many tourist hot spots on the island, guesthouses and restaurants are designated "foreigners-only" establishments.

Segregation between foreigners and Sri Lankans is a problematic approach to keeping people safe for many reasons, but it has nonetheless become standard practice for businesses catering to international guests (van Dam 2015). The opportunity for foreign women to share alcohol with Suthan and other young Sri Lankan men was quite rare. Suthan was less concerned with whether or not the police would revisit the matter (he assured me that they wouldn't because there was nothing in it for them) than what would happen if these young women wrote about the party and assault on Trip Advisor. If his Trip Advisor score tanked, or worse yet, if he were removed from the site entirely, his business would not be able to survive, his good reputation gone. While the rumor of the party and the assault spreading through the community did damage to Suthan's ego (and his marriage), it had not yet reached the internet, so for now the business—his family's sole form of income during the summer months—was still up and running.

Tensions between foreigners and locals, arising from mutual ignorance, has made the influx of tourism in Batticaloa a difficult path for many. The rapid introduction of the tourism

industry and associated infrastructures did not come with any of the necessary guidance on cultural and ethnic competence for the locals. These tensions persist because there was no long-term livelihood training available to people in Batticaloa, whose trades shifted over just a few years, away from generations of traditional fishing to small-enterprise, highly competitive, service industry work catering to foreigners. Additionally, because Batticaloa is something of a "new discovery" for foreign travelers, information about local customs and the differences among places like Batticaloa, Trincomalee, and Arugam Bay are still not well documented on sites like TripAdvisor.com and Booking.com.

In Trincomalee and Arugam Bay you can be served cocktails on the beach; in Batticaloa, if you can figure out how to buy beer, it is (as of August 2018) still taboo to consume it openly on the beach. Foreigners traveling to Batticaloa must pass through other larger ports to arrive in Batticaloa and usually spend time in other more established tourist destinations before making their way to the East Coast. Often, they wrongly assume that the necessary infrastructure exists to handle tourists and are met with difficulties when they arrive at a train station or downtown bus stand and cannot figure out how to negotiate a price with a tuk-tuk driver or other transportation provider. I've helped many backpackers who arrive to Kallady after dark and end up hiking on unlit roads that are not listed on Google Maps to find their guesthouses.

Tourism in Kattankudy: "They may be foreign, but they're also Muslim like us"

In Kattankudy, although there is a growing tourism industry, it is unheard of for visitors to seek lodging in Kattankudy if they are not Muslim, partially because these businesses are almost exclusively advertised by word-of-mouth and through kin and local connections rather than being published on the internet for tourists to book. Frequently in this community, coastal properties with post-tsunami housing on-site are being purchased by wealthy businessmen from

other parts of Kattankudy or other affluent Muslim communities on the island. Because ocean-front land parcels in Kattankudy tend to be larger than those in Thiruchendur, the new owner of the property can build a second house or a multi-unit structure (see Photo 10) that can become a motel. In some cases, new owners will make substantial additions to an original structure (see Photo 11).[33]

Photo 10: Beach side hotel in New Kattankudy East

Multi-unit hotel construction along beach road in New Kattankudy East

[33] Multi-unit housing is not uncommon in Kuttankudy, especially for families living in government or Mosque subsidized housing. However, both multi-family housing structures and government subsidized multi-unit projects are nonexistent in Thiruchendur.

Photo 11: Post-tsunami home with structural additions in New Kattankudy East

Typically, new owners of the property allow the previous owners to remain as tenants in their original homes if they commit to being the business's caretakers. This arrangement made it more difficult for me to conduct formal interviews with the people who manage these properties for two reasons: first, the owners were not local and were less available for meetings, and second, because the original families were then employees, they were less willing to speak openly with me about the business and their living conditions. However, through informal conversations and observation, I found that families generally found the terms of the arrangement favorable because they were not physically displaced from their land by the new business. Further, they were typically afforded more privacy because landlords would install large fences and gates on the property (see Photo 12), and they had somewhat steady

employment that could be supplemented by family members who worked off-site. Additionally, caretakers were comfortable because, as Zulficar, a male elder said to me: “The travelers do not offend or bother locals because they might be foreign, but they’re also Muslim like us.”

Photo 12: "Beach White House" in New Kattankduy East

Compared to Thiruchendur, the registration of new businesses is more tightly regulated by both the municipal government and the Mosque Federation in Kattankudy, and as such the process of opening a new restaurant or guesthouse is more time consuming and expensive. Booking.com screengrabs from December 2018 (see Map 6)—though they are not a comprehensive accounting for all of the guesthouses available in both communities—reflect the fundamental difference in the way that tourism has developed in the two communities. While there are most definitely new guesthouses in both communities, the guesthouses in Kattankudy are not listed on Booking.com or available to foreign tourists. Tourism development in Kattankudy has catered almost exclusively to Muslim patrons interested in visiting “Little Saudi

Arabia," serving to reinforce a cultural and religious homogeneity that preserves the historical roots of Kattankudy as an economic space both of and for the benefit of its Muslim residents.

Map 6: Available rental lodging in Batticaloa in December 2018

Top: Thiruchendur, Bottom: Kattankudy



Source: Booking.com

The trajectories of and disparities between Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East reflect larger patterns on the island that will continue to grow and as time goes on and more foreign tourists introduce money and material wealth, new technologies, and socio-cultural artifacts into the communities. I turn next to a discussion of the implications of these uneven recovery trajectories.

Discussion and Conclusions: Re-thinking Sustainable Development

The historical significance of the geographic landscapes on Sri Lanka's East coast make the region a prime location for developing "dark tourism" or "Thanatourism," a form of special interest tourism in which travelers on a search for "authenticity" are drawn to visiting communities that have undergone tragedy associated with war or disaster (Kelman and Dodds 2009; Kamble and Bouchon 2014). The rise of Thanatourism in the United States is often attributed to visitors to post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans, and researchers have found that though these tourists can help to re-stimulate post-disaster economies, they may also objectify survivors who are trying to rebuild and move on with their lives (Robbie 2008; Miller 2008). Visitors to Thiruchendur can frequently be spotted photographing the many tsunami monuments in the village, the beach-side Murugan Kovil that rests off-kilter in the sand and was never torn down or repaired, and the fenced-off sections of beach where a church-gazebo became embedded in the ground. Not surprisingly, all three show up on the first page of a Google image search of "tsunami monuments Kallady Beach" (see Figure 4). Recall the tourist described in the introduction who walked onto temple grounds in her bikini. While she may be doing her part to stimulate the local economy, there is very little guidance available to tourists to help them navigate the cultural environment in which these monuments are embedded.

Figure 4: Screen grab of Google Image search for "tsunami monuments Kallady beach"

Circled images: Murugan Kovil, Tsunami Monument located near police station and the former Kallady Sea View Restaurants, Church gazeebo on the beach (January 2019)



Source: images.google.com

In 2009, the Sri Lankan government implemented a "Sustainable Tourism Development Project" with funding from the World Bank. One of the three primary components of the project was "improving highly localized tourism-related infrastructure services in the East," to which US$8,100,000 was allocated. This component of the project included the establishment of public/private partnerships to help build capacity for effective management and regulation of tourism by the government, proposed to "support well planned and environmentally and culturally responsible tourism development" and provide "technical assistance for local planning capacity and community involvement," among other infrastructure-related projects (Gupta 2014:

2). In January 2014, the World Bank cancelled the project after having dispersed only a fraction of the $18 million loan.[34] The Bank's project report summarizes the cancellation:

> The project, as originally designed, lost its relevance because it took a long time to prepare in the midst of pressing needs in a rapidly changing environment with the end of the Civil War in May 2009. This led the government to take actions (e.g., infrastructure investments) outside the project in support of the tourism sector which grew rapidly starting in 2010. In spite of this restructuring (of the project in 2012), design shortcomings prevented the disbursement of the matching grants, ultimately leading to the cancelation of the project in January 2014… (Gupta 2014: 4)

Specifically, the World Bank pointed to the post-conflict environment and time-compression as complicating factors for pursuing sustainable tourism in the East:

> The preparation of the project took a long time. Almost two and a half years elapsed from the start of preparation until effectiveness… **The main reasons for the delays in project preparation were mostly on the side of the World Bank in the midst of a volatile post conflict environment.** The authorization to appraise the project was not given during the first Decision Meeting (October 26, 2009) because it was felt **that the project was trying to pursue too many objectives - e.g., to promote the rapid growth of the sector, to make Sri Lanka tourism more environmentally sustainable, to develop new tourism niches and/or to develop tourism in the East…. As preparation went along…the tourism sector grew rapidly. Tourism arrivals almost doubled between 2009 and 2011**… (Gupta 2014: 4-5; emphasis added)

The early failures of the Sri Lankan government to collaborate on what the World Bank defined as sustainable development initiatives in the East mirror what I have observed in communities in Batticaloa between 2013 and 2018. As time passes and tourism continues to grow in these areas, the government will need to make significant investments in the region to support the local communities. The government's current plans to encourage tourism as a means of "development" and "poverty alleviation" in the North and East coasts will continue to be in contradiction with the wishes and well-being of the local communities that continue to require

[34] "…the Sri Lanka Sustainable Tourism Development Project was cancelled on January 2014, three years after becoming effective and after having disbursed only US$110,000 out of the US$18 million original amount of the loan." (Gupta 2014: 1)

active participation in peace-building processes (Fernando et al. 2013b; Kamble and Bouchon 2014).

Western forces often exert power in the Global South during disaster recovery periods by implementing projects that are intended as development projects. Pelling defines "development" as an "economic, social, and political process, which results in a cumulative rise in the perceived standard of living for an increasing proportion of the population" (2003: 4). In the case of Sri Lanka's ongoing recovery from the tsunami, there are many ways in which "development" is taking place under the guise, or in tandem with, "recovery projects" – for instance, the introduction of new household technologies (electricity, connections to centralized water systems, and waste facilities including septic tanks for households), or the introduction of a tourism-based economic industry where it may not have previously existed.

In a discussion of the essential elements of cultural competence in cross-cultural social work, Gallegos et al. (2008) cite that organizations must understanding local attitudes, structures, and policies to achieve culturally competent community-based projects. My work in Thiruchendur and Kattankudy echo their assertions that diversity should be valued in the decision making and implementation processes of project management and that successful projects require significant culturally sensitive communication and collaboration between project management and beneficiaries (Gallegos et al. 2008).

The rapid influx of tourism bolstered by NGO and government implemented tsunami-recovery projects has caused unintended changes to socio-economic structures in both communities. A sense of "ethnic competence" (Gallegos 1982) whereby project managers acknowledge local standards of practice when working with diverse clients, was not apparent in the decision-making and implementation practices for a great many of the projects I found in

Thiruchendur. In Thiruchendur, community participation in decision-making and project-implementation in Thiruchendur has been token at best, resulting in a souring of relationships between aid providers and recipients (and among recipients) and countless cultural mishaps.

To speak of ethnic competence and the issues of working with minority populations in the process of aid provision, both in general and following disasters requires a conceptual account for "vulnerability" in the disaster context. It is well known within the disaster research field that disasters do not affect all members of society equally. "Vulnerability (to a disaster) is a function of exposure (who is at risk) and sensitivity of system (the degree to which people and places can be harmed)" (Cutter et al. 2008, 559). Vulnerability is a function of social class, gender, race/ethnicity, social capital, and political dis/enfranchisement among other axes of social inequity (Tierney 2019). Not all communities experience or recover from disasters in the same way.

At the same time, Blaikie (2009: 6) observes that "one criticism of the concept of vulnerability is that it 'has also brought with it assumptions concerning the victims of disasters and their powerlessness,' which encourage humanitarian workers to 'underestimate the agency of the people they set out to help and fail to understand (or even attempt to fund out) what the affected people can do themselves.'" Displaced people's passive response in the wake of a disaster may stem from the "centralized, bureaucratized, top-down approach taken by those who administer aid" (Gamburd 2013: 7). The combination of development-oriented aid provision with the language of "community empowerment" contributes to a problematic environment whereby aid recipients are assumed to be powerless and are thus stripped of their agency in recovery processes. (De Alwis and Hedeman 2009). Labeling families who say that they have not recovered in ways that are equitable as "dependency minded" serves to disempower these

families further, while they simultaneously experience economic disempowerment by being excluded from new economic activities now available to their more fortunate neighbors. The shift in economic activities from traditional livelihoods—fishing, shop-owning, small scale catering—to new tourism-centric activities is happening in Batticaloa without consideration for the cultural realities of place in both communities, in different ways.

De Alwis and Hedeman (2009) speak clearly to the ways in which communities do not govern themselves or determine what their own recovery and/or development looks like and are thus re-victimized in the post-disaster recovery phase:

> 'Sustainable recovery projects' transform into new forms of oppression for communities of survivors through the process of participation in their own development… 'empowerment' through 'participation' becomes 'not just a matter of giving power to formerly disempowered people, but also of incorporating them in the great project of the modern' – as responsible citizens, as diligent consumers, as rational farmers etc. This attempt to 'reshape the personhood of participants [or community members]…is tantamount to subjection. Participation, however counter-intuitive it may seem, thus transforms into a form of governance. (De Alwis and Hedeman 2009: 127)

This dynamic is evident especially in the complaints of Thiruchendur residents that there is no foundation from which they can work across sectors to achieve a culturally beneficial tourism industry. Residents have few options for remediation because the government and NGO entities that kickstarted the projects tended to abandon them prior to completion or have not provided the financial and social supports necessary to produce tangible benefits to the community members engaged in these new forms of service-oriented labor. In contrast, in Kattankudy, the relative strength of governance and resulting housing equity has created an environment where community members feel a stronger sense of agency in terms of choosing to opt in or out of the new economy.

My work in Batticaloa illustrates the difficulties in the viability of "participatory-engagement" and "capacity-building," both assumed to be critical to "sustainable recovery" (Pyles 2009) and "sustainable development" of tourism (Pelling and Uitto 2001; Pratt 2015) and troubles the assumption that these goals are viable in the time-compressed post-catastrophe and post-war environments. The coupling of "recovery" projects with Sri Lanka's rising star on the stage of the global leisure industry has contributed to uneven economic development, disempowerment of minority communities, and harmful cultural misunderstandings, all of which combined have outweighed the benefits of the new tourist economy in Thiruchendur. The cases of both Thiruchendur and Kattankudy illustrate that time-compression and community social capital rooted in religious organizations must be better accounted for in the theorization and conceptualization of "sustainable disaster recovery" and "sustainable development" to more holistically implement and evaluate disaster recovery in post-war societies.

In the next chapter, I analyze the fourth domain of disaster recovery critical to my analyses: the implementation of risk reduction measures in post-disaster communities. This analysis further problematizes the introduction of tourism in Batticaloa when we consider the rising threats to coastal regions in light of increasing climate destabilization.

CHAPTER 5: RISK REDUCTION AND RESILIENCE IN BATTICALOA

Introduction: Risk Reduction and Resilience

In addition to social, economic, and infrastructure recovery, I investigated the adoption and implementation of risk reduction strategies as a fourth domain of recovery. In the previous chapters, I showed how Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East were differentially vulnerable to the tsunami when it struck in 2004, which contributed in part to disparate recovery trajectories and outcomes. I also showed how the two communities are implementing and coping with the rise of tourism in different ways and warned that the unregulated, rapid increase in tourism in Thiruchendur contributes to increased inequality among families. In keeping with cautions associated with the rise of tourism in coastal areas that are becoming increasingly vulnerable to climate-related hazards (Pelling and Uitto 2001; Ghina 2003), I now turn to the implementation of risk reduction strategies to analyze the extent to which disaster risk reduction initiatives have alleviated or exacerbated vulnerabilities and inequalities within and between the two communities. The central question of this chapter involves whether or not the risk reduction measures introduced by the government in the years following the tsunami and the end of the civil war have resulted in increased resilience in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East.

As discussed briefly in the preceding chapter, sustainable development is a common theme in approaches to and analyses of disaster recovery, and within this umbrella, there exists the expectation that communities recover not by returning to the status quo, but by *building back better* so that they can be better prepared to resist or handle hazards in the future. To be better prepared, communities must incorporate disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures into their recovery projects. Birkmann and von Teichman remark that the "optimal window of opportunity for the implementation of long-term DRR measures" (2010: 175) is immediately after the

disaster has occurred. In the context of compressed time that follows disasters, governments and humanitarian organizations tasked with response and reconstruction efforts often neglect DRR in favor of providing immediate assistance, making for a missed opportunity to bolster resilience. Scholars from various disciplines agree that resilience:

> [I]nvolves both absorptive capacities, or the ability to resist disruption and remain relatively stable, and the ability to bounce back, regroup, and restore activities of disrupted systems [and] involves not merely a return to or replacement of some prior state, but reorganization, change, and under certain conditions major system transformations (Tierney 2014; 164).

Thus, the analysis of resilience in Sri Lanka must account for how disaster management and risk-reduction initiatives, both at the local and national levels, have incorporated lessons learned from the tsunami and subsequent relief and recovery efforts into policy and actions.

For Sri Lanka, the 2004 tsunami was an unprecedented and ill-understood event, so the ability to apply prior knowledge and experience to reduce the impacts of the tsunami was absent, contributing to loss and devastation (Birkmann and Fernando 2008). National and localized disaster management entities have taken form in the years following the tsunami, though their effects at the local community level remain inconsistent. Here I explore how the disparate processes of rebuilding and development of coastal areas for tourism in Batticaloa have taken place in tandem with the introduction of risk reduction and resilience-related measures. In my analysis of Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East, I problematize the efficacy of various risk-reduction measures introduced by the government and affiliated entities over time. I ask whether or not the two communities have become more resilient and find that the rushed development and implementation of DRR policies and projects in the post-tsunami, post-war environment have not achieved the goal of reducing risk.

I first provide a historical overview of disaster management policy in Sri Lanka to illustrate the highly politicized nature of these efforts as they were developed within the context of the civil war. I then turn to a discussion of five interconnected strategies for risk reduction that have been incorporated into these communities' recovery processes: the establishment of coastal no-build zones (buffer zone); the forced relocation of some residents from their pre-tsunami homes; the rebuilding of other households in-place; the introduction of early warning systems; and efforts to educate and engage the public regarding tsunamis and other hazards. Throughout the chapter, I compare Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East to show how these efforts have contributed to the growth of vulnerability or increased resilience within the two communities. In a concluding section, I show how community leaders and styles of leadership affect the development of resilient communities.

Disaster Management Policy and Initiatives in Sri Lanka

In this section, I give a brief historical summary of disaster management policy and initiatives in Sri Lanka from the 1980s onward to show how the politicized nature with which these efforts have been developed and implemented during and following the 30-year civil war has contributed to tsunami-related losses and given way to inconsistent implementation of DRR initiatives. I show that efforts in the 1980s and 1990s failed to promote resilience in coastal regions, and that post-tsunami disaster management policies have failed to meet the unique needs of communities in the Eastern Province.

The Coast Conservation Act No. 57 of 1981 [amended by Act No. 64 in 1988] set standardized coastal zones around the island and required that any development activity within 300m from the sea be approved and permitted by the Director of Coastal Conservation. Under this regulation, any coastal development must be deemed to maintain "stability, productivity and

environment quality of the coastal zone" (Jayawardene 2006a: 3). However, inconsistent law enforcement and competing government initiatives made it difficult to achieve conservation of Sri Lanka's coast, which undoubtedly contributed to the damage and losses caused by the 2004 tsunami (Jayawardene 2006b). In the 1990s, Sri Lanka established the National Disaster Management Center (NDMC) under the Ministry of Social Services. However, the NDMC was ineffective at incorporating disaster mitigation and planning approaches into national policy and thus failed to promote an environment that could have been more resilient to the tsunami in 2004.

In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the government and the LTTE, each with a massive financial and political interest in how the relief and recovery efforts would proceed, insisted on the right to manage efforts in the regions where they claimed authority. With a total of 4.5 billion USD pledged by the international community, the government and LTTE came together in January 2005 to propose the Post-Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS). Under P-TOMS, both the Government and LTTE would be deemed legitimate actors for both the receipt and distribution of funding and material goods that were flooding the island. In the coming months, the massive influx of donations was allowed to proceed, but the political animosity between the two entities flared (Keenan 2013). Fears among government supporters that the P-TOMS agreement lent legitimacy to the LTTE as a state actor and violated the country's constitution led to protests from nationalist political and religious groups.

Furthermore, Moorish groups on the island were not satisfied with the prospect that the agreement would expand the LTTE's power in the Eastern Province (McGilvray and Raheem 2007; Keenan 2013). Despite considerable opposition, the P-TOMS agreement was signed in June 2005 and was immediately challenged by a formal complaint to the Supreme Court. One

month later, in July 2005, the Supreme Court, mostly agreeing with Sinhala-nationalist claims, rejected the P-TOMS proposal, ensuring that it would be unlikely to revive such an agreement in the future (Kleinfeld 2007; 179). This insistence on control intensified the territorial stalemates central to the ongoing civil war, and other organizations replaced the agreement, including the Taskforce to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN) and the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) (Kleinfeld 2007; Hyndman 2009; Blaikie 2009; Keenan 2013; Gamburd 2013).

Under TAFREN, in February and March 2005, the Government introduced the concept of the "buffer zone" to establish no-build areas along the island's coastline. The island was split into two zones: In Zone 1, which included the coastal belt within Killinochchi, Mannar, Puttlam, Gampaha, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, and Hambantota districts (Sri Lanka's Western and Southern coasts), there would be no building allowed within 100 meters of the sea (measured from the mean high-water line). In Zone 2, which included the coastal belt within Jaffna, Mullatitive, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara Districts (the island's Northern- and Eastern-coasts), there would be no building allowed within 200 meters of the sea. The scientific underpinnings of the buffer zone policy and justification for the disparate distances from the sea (100m in the West and South; 200m in the North and East) were never clearly specified, and the regulations around the policy seemed to shift continuously. Confusion over the inconsistent establishment and implementation of the buffer zones further complicated the efforts of humanitarian agencies doing relief and recovery work across the island, especially those involved in the reconstruction of homes for survivors. Furthermore, local government leaders had limited knowledge of the contours of the policy and did little to ensure that new construction projects fell within the guidelines (Brun and Lund 2008; Ekanayake 2008; Blaikie 2009;

Hyndman 2009). I return to the buffer zone policy in the next section of this chapter and provide a more in-depth analysis of the policy and its outcomes in relation to my field sites.

In May 2005, the Government formed the Parliamentary Committee on Natural Disasters and established Disaster Management Act No. 13. This Act established the National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) and the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) on the island (Government 2005). The NCDM and DMC were meant to provide a framework for and legislative and institutional support towards disaster risk management on the island. Additionally, the NDMC was subsumed into the efforts of the DMC at this time. The creation of the NCDM represented a shift in the country's approach to disasters, from response-oriented approaches to proactively addressing disaster risk management (Choi 2013). The many directives of the Act were meant to be carried out by the DMC (established in July 2005), and by November of that year, the Ministry of Disaster Management was established to take the lead role in directing the initiatives. In December 2005, the Ministry of Disaster Management outlined the "Roadmap for a Safer Sri Lanka," which called for a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder effort that over ten years proposed to address seven primary components:

1. Policy, Institutional Mandates, and Institutional Development,
2. Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment,
3. Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems,
4. Preparedness and Response Plans,
5. Mitigation and Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction into the Development Process,
6. Community-based Risk Management, and
7. Public Awareness, Education and Training (Government 2005; Jayawardene 2006a).

Amid profound political instability and in the fragile post-tsunami environment, Sri Lanka had presidential elections to contend with. Chandrika Kumaratunga, who served as Sri

Lanka's president from 1994 to 2005, was a strong advocate of the unpopular P-TOMS agreement. The country's Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was selected to be her successor in the November elections. In a shift from his original position, Rajapaksa threw his political support toward ultranationalist parties and ran for president on a platform that rejected any form of power-sharing with the LTTE, including P-TOMS, which he invalidated in his inaugural address to Parliament after narrowly winning the presidential election in November 2005 (Kleinfeld 2007). Rajapaksa's plans for the country, articulated through "Mahinda Chinthana" or "Mahinda's vision," clarified his rejection of international influence in national politics, and he promised to bring an end to Sri Lanka's protracted civil war. His nationalist political agenda aligned tightly with the government's 2005 disaster management and risk reductions logic that focused largely on "national preparedness" (Choi 2013; Choi 2015).

Tensions between the government and LTTE had been tempered in the years leading to the tsunami, with an internationally-mediated ceasefire agreement that was officially signed in 2002. However, the tsunami and subsequent sparring over political legitimacy and rights to accept and distribute relief and recovery aid helped to reignite tensions. By the end of 2005, the ceasefire agreement was beginning to fall apart, and by mid-2006, the government was engaged in an intense campaign to regain control of the East Coast, which it achieved in 2007. Claiming that the LTTE had violated the ceasefire agreement, the Government officially pulled out of the agreement in January 2008, proclaiming that 2008 would be “the year for war in Sri Lanka” (Choi 2015: 292). Ironically, the war raged on alongside active humanitarian efforts to assist disaster victims in their recovery under the “Roadmap towards a Safer Sri Lanka.”

Vivian Choi rightly identifies the Government's disaster management initiatives and technologies as "disaster nationalism (that were) not only aimed at protecting and maintaining

existing infrastructures but also sought to build new ones" (2015: 289). The war-affected regions in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka make for an important case study in DRR not only because they experienced the tsunami, but also because there was no state of normalcy to return to after the disaster (Choi 2015). The opportunities for building capacity in these communities were great, but the political landscape of Sri Lanka made for an especially difficult and confusing environment for humanitarian organizations to conduct relief and recovery work. These organizations were forced to innovate rapidly and find creative strategies to operate within the country's insecure political environment, where they were often confronted with the competing goals of political and military entities on the island (Blaikie 2009; Lang and Knudsen 2009).

The distribution of humanitarian aid in Sri Lanka was a politically fraught and, in many cases, a corrupt process (Kleinfeld 2007; Hyndman 2009; Keenan 2013; Gamburd 2013). The violence of the civil war, which left the country both geographically and socially torn, created a climate of political jockeying for relief and recovery aid that affected the quality of aid delivered to communities and the speed with which this happened. While the country united for a few months after the tsunami, subsequent recovery efforts have been said to have effectively "built the conflict back better" and created a bias against communities outside of the Sinhala-controlled areas in the South and close to the capital in Colombo (Keenan 2013). For aid to reach Batticaloa, supplies had to travel cross- country and through multiple military (both governmental and LTTE-controlled) checkpoints, where supplies were frequently skimmed and stolen for political gain. In the next sections of the chapter, I return to the specifics of how disaster management policies and initiatives have affected communities in the Eastern Province.

Post-Tsunami Risk Reduction Strategies: Description and Critical Evaluation

In this section, I consider how national policy functioned to exclude communities in the Eastern Province from the benefits of DRR measures by examining the re-development of Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East with consideration for the no-build buffer zones, forced relocation of some residents, rebuilding in place for others, and the implementation and use of early warning systems and efforts to engage communities in the DRR.

No-Build Buffer Zones

The Taskforce to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN), established the "Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone" as no-build regions of coastal land to "better safeguard the lives of the coastal population and to protect the coastal environment from any future natural disaster" (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2005: 32; Brun and Lund 2008). Under the policy, the island was split into two zones that mapped neatly with land-authority claimed by the Government and LTTE. The Western and Southern regions of the island were lumped into Zone 1, and the Northern and Eastern regions—to which the LTTE claimed authority—was designated Zone 2. The buffer zone policy and area designations were (and remain) problematic because the Government offered scant justification for the initial policy and continues to provide little explanation for why and how the area designations continue to shift (Ratnasooriya et al. 2007; Blaikie 2009; Hyndman 2009). Some accounts of the policy claim that the buffer zones were initially designated at 200m, except in LTTE controlled territory, where it was initially 400m and after time was reduced to 65m (Brun and Lund 2008, 280). Others note that there was initially a uniform 200m buffer zone along the entire island that was reduced to 100m and has now been reduced to 65m and even 45m in some places (Choi 2013). What does remain consistent across accounts is that the original buffer zone declaration and continual shifts in policy happened with

very little explanation and justification from the government. Additionally, the initial relaxation of the buffer zones was a politically charged decision made in the run-up to the November 2005 presidential election and likely was a result of complaints from Rajapaksa's constituents in the tourism-heavy Southern and Western districts (Choi 2013; Choi 2015). Finally, the buffer zones differentially affect those in Zone 1 and 2 because regardless of shifts in policy, the no-build area remains comparatively much larger in Zone 2.

Under the new policy, those engaged in fishing, tourism, and commercial-economic sectors dependent on access to the sea, were forced to leave their traditional lands and rebuild their homes and livelihoods great distances away from the beach. Many view the buffer zone policy as a land grab attempt by the government in the interest of seizing the coastal land for privatization, commercialization, or military occupation. Cohen distinguishes between two forms of post-disaster land grab: predatory and strategic. Predatory land grabs involve "private persons or companies [that] seek to exploit a disaster to avail themselves of the victims' land either by eviction or purchase under duress," whereas strategic land grabs are "the forced removal of whole communities from their land by national or local authorities, by means of official ordinances and rehabilitation plans, with a view of future development of the vacated land, primarily for tourism projects" (2011: 266). In her ethnography of communities in the Sri Lanka's Southwest, "The Golden Wave," Michelle Gamburd identifies these land grabs as part of the framework of "disaster capitalism" whereby "major reorganization of the economic system (is) prompted by, excused by, or done under cover of disasters" (2013: 120). This type of reorganization may be introduced under a benign motive such as risk reduction and safety, but it often produces detrimental results for marginalized people while the rich and powerful profit. For example, when she asked a young man in her field site what would happen to the ocean-front

property he and his family had been pushed away from, he responded with "this land is going to become a hotel" (2013: 125).

In chapter 4, I wrote extensively about Arugam Bay – the surfer's paradise in Ampara district just South of Batticaloa. Cohen (2011) cites Arugam Bay as "the principal example of strategic land grab in Sri Lanka," because after the buffer zone declaration, the local government made simultaneous proposals for massive relocation of residents and commercial reconstruction in the area. The government's proposed blueprints for Arugam Bay included upscale resorts, marinas, a seaplane pier, and a helipad in a village that had only a few guesthouses for surfers before the tsunami. The relocation plan for nearly 5,000 residents was justified as "necessary to protect the environment, curb unregulated and often illegal development and attract investment" (Cohen 2011, 233). With organized pushback from residents and land-holders, the government canceled these plans. However, in the years following the end of the war, Arugam Bay is again being prospected by wealthy real-estate investors eager to get in on the promise of the surfer's paradise.

While I agree with Cohen (2011) and Leonard (2007) that Sri Lanka's case generally represents a strategic land grab on behalf of the government, what I have found in the long-term is that these two categories (strategic vs. predatory) cannot be neatly disentangled in the time-compressed context of the post-tsunami, post-war, rapidly-developing East coast. The government strategically grabbed the land from residents with various plans for the space, but predation by wealthy private investors is still happening, to the detriment of families who have been disenfranchised in the longer-term by the tsunami and buffer zone policies. The land in Arugam Bay was returned to locals after a well-organized effort to fight the government initiative, but in Batticaloa, a great deal of confusion among residents and local government

officials remains about *who owns the beach* and what that land can and should be used for under the buffer zone regulations. In Thiruchendur in particular, questions about land ownership within the buffer zone are only recently (post-2015) beginning to bubble up in discussions about the potential for massive tourism-related developments like resorts. Speculators will likely take advantage of the atmosphere of confusion to push for more intensive development.

Photo 13: "Illegal settlement" within buffer zone

Newly built thatch homes in Navalady, just north of Thiruchendur in July 2018

Recall that in Thiruchendur, many residents who were forcibly relocated after the tsunami are now returning to the village to rebuild in what the government considers "illegal settlements." Maalani, the primary school teacher, returned to Thiruchendur from the Swiss Village relocation settlement to rebuild a home near the school where she teaches. She is now living on her former land illegally and without protection from the government because her

property is within the buffer zone, though she insists that she is "glad to be home." Some households, like the sisters I wrote about in Chapter 3, are living in unfinished houses that NGOs began constructing before buffer zone policies were established and then subsequently abandoned in light of the new rules. Karuanithy, the former secretary of the Fisheries Society in Thiruchendur, pointed out that the buffer zone rules reinforced the separation of Thiruchendur into two villages – one for the land side and one for the beach side peoples. He and his family live close to Maalani and the sisters; they have all grown accustomed to the sight of unfinished homes and blame the buffer zone ruling for leaving their beach side homes incomplete and making them feel like second-class citizens compared to those living on the land side. I asked Karuanithy if he or his wife own the land where their home is, and he argued that though he had misplaced his land title documents, he is sure that the GN woman still has a record of his wife's property ownership. This property has belonged to his wife's family for generations, and it was gifted to her when they married. It seemed utterly impossible to him that the land might not be his wife's legal estate anymore. In 2015, when I then asked the Savidthrii, the GN in Thiruchendur, about Karuanithy's property and that of others' living on the beach-side, she remarked:

> Technically I do not know because, you see, he is living in the coastal [buffer] zone. Sometimes the DS [District Secretariat] informs us that the government now owns this land and tells us to remove people from the beach, but I have no time for this, and I never get trouble [from the DS], so I let them stay.

I probed further and asked her if someone could come to Thiruchendur and purchase that land to build something other than homes for residents, perhaps a resort or tourist hotel, to which she responded:

> I do not think this will be an issue. Thiruchendur is a small village. Why would someone come buy this land to build hotels when Arugam Bay and Passikudah are

> so nearby? The people in this village are traditional, can you imagine if tourists come here and want to be served alcohol [she laughed]?

She said all of this in 2015, before the majority of the new guesthouses that have cropped up in Thiruchendur were established. When I asked her again about property ownership on Thiruchendur's beach side in 2017, she changed her tune:

> See now, you have been coming here many years, since 2013 you know us. You have watched the changes. Now we have many guesthouses and small hotels, and many foreigners like you come to see Thiruchendur and the Murugan Kovil.

Overt efforts to capitalize on the disaster by building seaside (within the buffer zone) resorts and guesthouses have not yet been as straightforward in Batticaloa as they have been elsewhere on the island. Gamburd's 2013 study involved working with communities in the Southwest that had already seen the possibility of resorts rising from the sand, and in Arugam Bay residents had long been engaged in small-scale tourism. But in Batticaloa, the concept of a resort hotel, or "five-star resort" as locals have taken to calling them, is still an unknown to many. Among those who are able to envision the "five-star resort," there is a mix of denial and anger about the potential effects it could have on their lives.

I asked Loajini, a middle-aged mother of two teenagers who works in the Road Authority at the District Secretariat, what she envisioned Thiruchendur would look like 15 years from now, and she responded:

> I am sure we will have five-star resorts. You have seen the Riviera [local hotel], yes? [I nodded "Yes."] There will be so many more like the Riviera. They will have swimming pools near the sea!

She seemed excited by the prospect of resorts within the village, so I moved on to ask whether she would approve of her children working at a five-star resort in Thiruchendur after they finished school, to which she responded, emphatically:

> Absolutely not. What they would be exposed to is terror. They would be kept like slaves and not allowed to return home to me. Maybe foreigners will try to use them [she hushed her voice] for sex, and anyways they don't speak English, so how could they?

Loajini, having never traveled beyond the borders of the Batticaloa District, lacks a clear understanding of what a five-star resort might actually look like and what would take place there. She expressed fears and skepticism and repeated stereotypical tropes about sex, similar to Nirusha (described in chapter 4), who was upset about tourists' sexual activity and assumed that photos of her and her family would end up in pornography. Loajini had a relatively limited vision of what effects a resort moving into Thiruchendur might have on her family. When I asked her if she thought her neighbors might sell their properties to investors who could build these hypothetical hotels, she seemed to grow concerned and asked me if I knew what was happening in the Dutch Bar, the village just North of Thiruchendur.

I spent some time working with families dislocated from the Dutch Bar to the Swiss Village during my fieldwork in 2013. I knew that residents of the Dutch Bar had been relocated en masse, leaving very few families behind in the original village, unlike the efforts to relocate people from Thiruchendur, which resulted in the community being split up in a piecemeal fashion. The Dutch Bar is a small swath of land sandwiched between the ocean and the lagoon, and the property still sits nearly empty, which I assume has something to do with residents having been relocated as a nearly-whole community. However, in 2017, I noticed that a large plot (about an acre) along the lagoon had been fenced off and tractors had begun leveling the land. I asked Loajini what was happening with that land and she said:

> Four families. I know them, and I know they did this. They got together, and they sold that large piece of land to a foreign businessman. They made a lot of money, and now they are bringing their sons back from the Middle East. In two years, there will be a five-star resort there.

I grew confused, as I had not heard about any potential big-business interests in the area. Until that point, I had only known of families transforming their rebuilt homes into guesthouses, but this was the first I heard of a multi-plot land transfer in the area. I asked Loajini again if she thought her neighbors in Thiruchendur could sell their land to an investor, similar to what happened in the Dutch Bar, to which she shrugged, and said:

> Where will they build? The [Murugan] Kovil is just on the beach. They cannot move it. The Dutch Bar is on the lagoon, and the land is empty. Why would anyone come to Thiruchendur and buy land from people living here? These people (her neighbors) have been displaced enough. They will let us be.

She echoed what other scholars studying post-tsunami and post-war Sri Lanka have labeled the double dispossession that so many Tamils and Muslims in the Eastern Province experienced after the tsunami and the implementation of the buffer zone. Many residents in Thiruchendur had been forced into the coastal village from their inland rural communities during the war. Then, in an unfortunate twist of fate, it was these same people who experienced the worst of the tsunami and were forced into relocation settlements after the buffer zone was established (Hyndman 2007; Brun and Lund 2008; Turnheer 2014). Loajini simultaneously holds the contradictory beliefs that resorts are indeed coming to Thiruchendur, but that there will be no land available for investors to build on. Additionally, she cannot envision an instance where Thiruchendur families would be asked to sell their land to bidders seeking waterfront property on the untouched coasts in Batticaloa.

My conversations with residents and the GN person in Thiruchendur suggested that the magnitude of the effects of disaster capitalism are yet to be understood in Thiruchendur and villages like it. Both Savidthrii and Loajini seem to know the resorts are coming but are unclear about both the timeline and the implications for local culture. Loajini denies that families in Thiruchendur would be willing to sell their land, and Savidthrii, though she is the village leader,

seems unable to tell me if the purchase of that land is even possible, though she never denied it. The buffer zone policy meant that many families in Thiruchendur lost their property in the village and were forced to relocate to the Swiss Village following the tsunami. In this process, tenuous pre-tsunami social cohesion in Thiruchendur was exacerbated by the forced separation of families and neighbors, both from their lands and from one another. Furthermore, the now empty beach side land leaves open the possibility that government or private entities may seize the property to build tourist-attractions, the long-term implications of which remain to be seen in Thiruchendur. In the following sections, I focus on the uneven enforcement of the buffer zone, and different accommodations provided to families living within it, that has resulted in the relocation of some and the rebuilding in-place for others.

Forced Relocation

As the foregoing discussions show, the buffer zone designation complicated the lives of residents and aid workers conducting projects in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East. The designations meant that there were two options for families in the tsunami-ravaged communities: relocation or rebuilding in place. However, this option was not usually represented as a choice for families in Thiruchendur, though it was in New Kattankudy East.

For families in Thiruchendur, the choice to relocate or rebuild was only offered to those living outside of the buffer zone. Those living near the sea before the tsunami, or within the beach side of the village, were only offered new homes in the Swiss Village. The partial relocation of community members from Thiruchendur exacerbated pre-tsunami social fissures and produced new ones. Relocation presented the potential for exposure to new risks, and indeed the Swiss Village was built in a floodplain that extensively flooded in 2011. Transportation in and out of the Swiss Village is limited to infrequent bus routes and expensive rides to town in

taxis. Living far from the sea and having little access to viable transportation between their new homes and the sea also meant that families removed from the village experienced a decrease in their capacity to engage in their traditional livelihoods, and many are now choosing to return to Thiruchendur to live in vulnerable structures now considered "illegal" settlements by the government. As I have illustrated in previous chapters, many families live in unfinished homes in Thiruchendur and have returned to build "illegal" settlements despite the buffer zone because they are more interested in remaining within the geographical bounds of their native village and nearer to their old neighbors, who are frequently their close kin-relations.

For those families in Thiruchendur that were not immediately forced to relocate, at least two NGOs began building new homes before the buffer zone was designated, and once the policy was in place, these structures were merely abandoned unfinished. Further, questions remain about the implementation of building codes and restrictions aimed at risk reduction in the new home structures. When queried about this issue during an interview, Iqbal, the Batticaloa district disaster manager, commented that the process of rebuilding started happening before new codes could even be defined. In some cases, homes were built with second stories under the assumption that if individuals could get to the second floor, they wouldn't be swept away in tsunami waves. However, the implementation of this second-story home strategy was employed inconsistently across households in the community, and as I have already illustrated, the disparities in forms of housing allocation have contributed to envy among families within the village and produced differences in the potential for incorporation in the new tourist economy. Where many in Thiruchendur were given no choice but to relocate, community members in New Kattankudy East were given a choice.

Rebuilding in Place

Tsunami survivors in New Kattankudy East were given a choice to relocate or remain within the village following the designation of the buffer zone. Strong coordination between NGOs and local leaders in New Kattankudy East meant that no construction began before plans were negotiated, and thus, no houses were built close to the sea before the buffer zone policy was enacted (at least in its first iteration). It was the general preference for residents to remain within the geographical bounds of their pre-existing community, and in New Kattankudy East special care was taken to find space for these new households within the community proper. I never met a family or heard of a family member that chose to relocate, though the GN Person told me that fewer than a dozen families decided to leave, which he attributed mostly to their desire to return to their more rural agricultural homes, which the end of the violent conflict enabled them to do.

That all tsunami survivors in New Kattankudy East were given the option to relocate, and so few did so meant that property lines in New Kattankudy East had to be re-drawn after the tsunami to make room for more community members in a smaller area. Many families allowed their property lines to be redrawn as smaller plots to make space for new housing, and all neighbors had to agree to live in closer proximity to one another. Though I fielded the occasional complaint about the noisy neighborhood or the difficulties in sharing water-wells with neighbors, I found that community members in New Kattankudy East were willing to live in closer proximity and on smaller pieces of land because it meant that their neighbors stayed close by. Additionally, families were relieved to stay in New Kattankudy East because of access to medical care, childcare and schools, and economic amenities. Kattankudy (Division) was already the commercial center of the East Coast before the tsunami, and the post-tsunami rebuilding

efforts that facilitated new infrastructure projects that benefitted the community-at-large made the region even more desirable to its Moorish residents.

However, because nearly all community members chose to stay in New Kattankudy East, this also meant that community members were choosing to remain in the risk-laden coastal area. Though they are now living beyond the buffer zone, that they are not without risk of future disaster. With this in mind, the local disaster management entities have worked to ensure that families living in New Kattankudy East will be clearly warned of imminent disaster and will know what to do and where to go to avoid the potentially disastrous consequences. This is in contrast to those residents remaining in Thiruchendur, whose community leaders have done very little to ensure that they are prepared to withstand or respond to potential hazards. In the next section, I discuss the introduction of early warning systems and environmental and disaster-oriented education initiatives that have been introduced in each community, to assess the extent to which community members have been incorporated into local DRR initiatives.

Building Local Capacity: Community-Based Disaster Management Initiatives and Early Warning Systems

Combined with the ignorance of *a thing called "tsunami,"* the failure to warn communities in advance of the waves contributed to the catastrophic loss of life and property in the tsunami (Lee and Espinosa-Aranda 2003; Basher 2006; Peguero 2006; Thomalla and Larsen 2010). The international community subsequently rushed to support local governments in the implementation of a national early warning system. A total of 50 multi-hazard warning towers were erected across the island that were meant to be able to communicate via satellite to share warnings with villages, districts, and to Colombo, the capital (Choi 2013; Choi 2015). In addition to the early warning towers, some efforts were also made to educate the public about disaster

risk, train local officials to be village-level disaster and risk managers, mark evacuation routes in villages, and plan practice evacuation drills (McEntire 2004).

Access to these systems and trainings was limited in the Eastern Province because the government resources were funneled most efficiently into the regions under stable control of the Sinhalese government. For instance, the district-level disaster managers in Galle are mostly retired Army personnel who have intricate knowledge of state bureaucratic structures and procedures associated with disaster policy and practice, whereas the disaster managers in Batticaloa District are civilians with varying amounts of training in disaster-oriented policy and practice. I learned this while I was conducting research for the QCA study in 2013 and had the opportunity to interview the district level disaster manager in Galle, an active member of the Army, who gave me insight into the different disaster-management structures across the island. Additionally, my frequent interactions with disaster managers in Batticaloa District provided information on the training, or lack thereof, required of bureaucrats in the Eastern Province.

In 2013, when I interviewed Iqbal, a Muslim man in his early thirties serving as the district level Disaster Manager for Batticaloa, he told me that each GN division has a five-member team of local leaders tasked with communicating disaster information to the community. I asked nearly every community member and government official I interviewed about local disaster management initiatives, programs, evacuation routes, and drills, and the differences between Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East were stark. When I queried Savidthrii, the GN person in Thiruchendur, about where I could find these team members in the community, she sent me to speak with Karunaithy. He then denied that he had ever been involved with any formal disaster management work, but quickly admitted that because he is a community leader, he looked out for the elders and children during evacuation drills. No one I interviewed in

Thiruchendur knew of a local disaster manager, though many turned the question back to me to ask if I could tell them who the team members were.

In 2011, a tsunami false alarm was disseminated across the Eastern Province, which residents in both Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East cited to me as a terrifying practice drill. Typical of responses I heard in Thiruchendur when I asked about this warning in 2011 include:

> We panicked. Me and [my wife] took our children ran. We did not know where to go but went as fast [as] we could to the main road [the A4 highway which is about a 20-minute walk from their home]. My girl [daughter] can follow but she is slower and almost got run over by a motorbike and then an auto [three-wheeler taxi/tuk-tuk]. The three-wheeler was empty, but he did not stop to help me and my family. (Jude; middle-aged father of three)

> We didn't know what to take from our home, so I took my chains [gold necklaces] and ran. I think I was supposed to take my family's papers [ID card, health records, etc.] but I had so much fear, so I just went. (Januhashini; young woman)

> We didn't practice before, so I followed my neighbor. I hurt my foot and fell when I was running, and a boy stepped on me. (Kamalahasan; elderly man)

Community members in Thiruchendur consistently stated that the warning instigated a sense of panic among neighbors who did not know what they were supposed to do when they heard the sirens, which incited them to "run for their lives" with disregard for other evacuees. Fewer than twenty community members could recall having participated in any practice drill prior or training session prior to 2011, and even fewer knew that there was a designated safety zone on the second level of the local school grounds to which they could have evacuated to much more quickly than trying to run through narrow streets to the main road. Of those who did know that they could go to the school, most admitted that they'd learned this from their school children, who had received some training from the Red Cross many years prior. When I asked how residents had received the warning, I got mixed reactions. No one claimed to have heard a siren,

though they said that people in other communities heard sirens and called them or sent them text messages. Some, but not all, received text messages through their cell phone provider.

In contrast, in New Kattankudy East, residents tended to respond with fear, but I rarely heard of panic:

> I know that if a warning comes, I have some time to go, so I took my papers and my house book [the laminated blueprints and deed provided to her by the Swiss/Austrian Red Cross], went for my neighbor [an elderly woman] and took her to the mosque. (Mihar; middle-aged man)

> I got an SMS [text message] from the [disaster management] center, so me and my children went to the mosque. We were so scared, but I knew where to go for safety. (Jumaana; young woman)

> I heard the prayer call, but it wasn't the prayer call, so I looked at my phone, and the SMS [text message] from the government told me to get shelter. I found my wife, and we took our documents and went to the mosque. (Haithar; elderly man)

Residents in New Kattankudy East both heard sirens projected through the mosques' integrated loud-speaker systems, which usually serve only to announce daily calls to prayer and received text messages from the divisional government office that sent out a warning through the local cell phone providers. Residents told me that they had received directions from training at the GN person's office or heard directly from their GN person and his team of local disaster managers, that in the event of a warning they should have enough time to gather their necessities and get to safer ground. They had been instructed that "necessities" meant their identification paperwork and other irreplaceable personal records which they should always keep in a designated place in their home for easy access, and that "safer ground" was one of two mosques at the edge of the village that had multiple levels that they could climb to be safe from any flooding.

Variations in community leadership between New Kattankudy East and Thiruchendur accounted for the stark differences in the adoption of DRR-related practices among community members. The recently retired GN person—Abdul Kadhar—had been presented with an award

for his efforts towards local risk reduction, and he quickly introduced me to a number of contacts in the village who were on his local disaster management team, all of whom had been involved in some way with local disaster and risk-reduction measures in the community. He had convened a group of community leaders, who were tapped into activities by way of leadership within the mosques, or by having served in various government posts, such as the Samurdhi office and other local initiatives, including poverty-reduction and human-rights campaigns.

Residents of New Kattankudy East talked proudly about their training, and responded with pride about the ways that the Mosque Federation contributed to the warning systems by lending the mosques' prayer-amplification towers to the disaster management officials when warnings needed to be transmitted.

Photo 14: Drainage canal in New Kattankudy East

In early 2016, I met Rias and Naleefa in New Kattankudy East when Zaluja and I were tracing a drainage system that wove through some of the streets closest to the sea. Naleefa came outside and asked what we were doing, and when we began to talk, she invited Zaluja and me

inside to talk with her and Rias, who is the well-known village butcher. We spoke with Rias and Naleefa all afternoon about the drainage system, which they claimed was introduced in the years following the tsunami to help with the flooding that tends to happen every year during the rainy season (December to February). Rias said:

> I am in a good [social] position as the butcher. I can talk with the big men because I feed their families. Even before the tsunami, I was talking with the GN about the flooding problems in Kattankudy, and they came to look at my home just before the tsunami. There was not so much water at the time, but after the tsunami, we had water for a long time. It was a mess, but after that [the tsunami], the government and the Mosque men [members of the Federation] became very active in rebuilding our homes so that they can stay dry in the monsoons. [He paused, looked to Naleefa with a smile, then returned to my gaze and asked,] Have you met Mr. Abdul Kadhar? He is so wonderful.

I said that I had met with Abdul Kadhar on a holiday, and that he generously offered his time to talk with us about the recovery efforts, and that I knew he had won an award for his work. Naleefa interjected: "I helped with this!" She proudly went on to explain that she and a number of her neighbors from the village worked to lobby for him to be awarded for his "good service" when they knew he was coming close to retirement. They wanted him to be recognized for the care he put into knowing each member of the community, listening to them and identifying their needs, and then following up once they were placed in their new homes to make sure that everything was working well. Naleefa pulled out the dusty handbook that she and Rias had received from the Swiss/Austrian Red Cross after their house was handed over. It included blueprints for the home, detailed descriptions in Tamil and English about the design of the structure, and a few simple maintenance instructions. She showed me the inside cover where she had Abdul Kadhar sign his name and the date in early 2009 when he visited their home to do an impromptu inspection of the NGO's work. I asked Rais and Naleefa if they had received any training or participated in evacuation drills, and they both admitted that though the trainings had

been offered, they had not attended, but they did evacuate with the warning in 2011, and knew which route to take because the signs were posted just at the end of their street.

Photo 15: Evacuation sign in New Kattankudy East

Text in Sinhala, Tamil, and English

In Thiruchendur, I frequently fielded complaints that "we never received any training" or that "only school children get training for these drills." Residents in Thiruchendur often complained that their GN person did not care about them and did not do her job correctly. Many were also unimpressed with a practice evacuation drill that I was able to witness in November 2015. On an otherwise unremarkable, sunny afternoon in November 2015, Zaluja and I were wrapping up our work for the day, and just as we were about to depart the village, we heard a strange wailing sound. The sound was repetitive and unsettling. We decided to drive my scooter towards the GN office to see if people were gathering, but as we set out, we noticed that mothers and their children were all filing towards the Vipulanda Vidyalayam primary school at the edge of the village. We followed them to the school grounds and saw military personnel gathered with

Savidthrii, Iqbal and other district personnel I recognized from my many trips to the Kachcheri. It was at this moment that we realized we were participating in a disaster drill.

Photo 16: Thiruchendur residents gathering during tsunami drill

I was curious if residents had received advanced notice of a practice drill, so we began to ask questions as we waited in line with the others to enter the school. The consensus was that school children had been notified to inform their parents, and the expectation was for parents to tell their neighbors. The wailing sound grew louder as a three-wheeler equipped with a hand-crank siren rode onto the school grounds. Children rushed towards the tuk-tuk trying to get a look at the siren device, which was promptly removed from the vehicle, set on the ground, and then played for the community members to see it up close.

Photo 17: Hand-crank warning siren

Zaluja and I made our way towards Savidthrii and asked her if this was the only warning system in Thiruchendur. I asked about text messages and the towers that were supposed to alert us of danger, to which she responded that the tower warnings did not reach Thiruchendur:

> You can hear the warnings in the Muslim areas because they play them from the Mosques. But people here cannot hear from the Mosques, and the tower in [Batticaloa] town is not functioning, so we use this [pointing to the hand-cranked siren]. I think this [the drill exercise] is going well. So many women have come, don't you agree?

She was concerned that she would be judged critically by the army personnel and Iqbal if the community members didn't participate in the drill and was pleased that so many women had come with their children. Another hour passed with no coordinated action, and as soon as the Army jeep drove away with the siren, Savidthrii emerged from inside the school with three coolers full of chilled Milo and milk drinks. She was crowded by the children and mothers who had been waiting in the hot sun for some reward for showing up for the drill and were happy to

receive cold drinks from the GN person. There had been no training, no pamphlets or brochures shared with attendees, and little if no direct acknowledgment for their participation from Savidthrii beyond a chance to get a cool drink. No one reported that they had learned anything about disaster management, or best practices for evacuation during the event.

Illustrating strong bonding, bridging, and linking social capital, the tight-knit networks among New Kattankudy East residents meant that they looked out for one another during warnings and could turn to their neighbors or community leaders for information and assistance, and trusted district officials to provide notices through their local mosques. Where I heard accounts of streamlined and effective training initiatives, evacuation practices, and warning systems in New Kattankudy East, I heard reports of and witnessed no such coordination among community members or between community members and leaders in Thiruchendur. Residents in New Kattankudy East expressed pride in their community leadership and ownership of their knowledge of local DRR initiatives, while in Thiruchendur I received complaints or ambivalence from community members who knew very little about the proper actions to take to evacuate their village in the face of warnings or threats. I found that DRR initiatives in Thiruchendur served to reinforce boundaries and separations among residents who had varying levels of access to information and training regarding how to manage threats and risks.

Conclusions

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami is considered a "low-frequency, high impact event," and the probability of another tsunami of this magnitude reaching the shores of Sri Lanka within our lifetimes is low (Jayawardane 2006). In their study of tsunami recurrence in the Indian Ocean Basin in the 7,400 years prior to the 2004 tsunami, Rubin and colleagues found that the "average time period between tsunamis is about 450 years with intervals ranging from a long, dormant

period of over 2,000 years, to multiple tsunamis within the span of a century" (2017: 1). However, Sri Lanka is prone to several other environmental hazards that may have disastrous consequences, including floods, landslides, droughts, coastal erosion, and cyclones (DMC 2019). Thus, while it is unlikely that another tsunami will affect the same people who experienced the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004, there are plenty of reasons to implement strong disaster management and risk reduction measures in the country.

The central question of this chapter revolves around whether or not the risk reduction measures introduced by the government have resulted in increased resilience for the two communities. I explored five interconnected measures that were meant to bolster community resilience: coastal no-build buffer zones, forced relocation, rebuilding homes in-place with built-in DRR features, the introduction of early warning systems and efforts to engage and educate the public about hazards and disasters. I also showed how different types of community leaders can have a positive or negative effect on resilience within their communities. I found that undemocratic policies and projects that were quickly introduced in the wake of the 2004 tsunami and developed within the context of intense political instability on the island have not consistently achieved the goal of reducing risk in some areas – especially those that were marginalized over the course of the 30-year civil war (Uyangoda 2005).

The vision and mission of Sri Lanka's Ministry of Disaster Management of creating a "safer Sri Lanka" and working to "facilitate harmony and prosperity and dignity of human life through effective prevention and mitigation of natural and man-made disasters in Sri Lanka" (Ministry of Disaster Management 2019), was left incomplete in those communities that were under the occupation of the LTTE during the civil war. The central government's response to the tsunami did little to resolve conflict and ensure the long-term sustainability of infrastructure and

livelihoods for communities on the East coast (Zhang 2016). Thiruchendur illustrates the problematic nature of the government's top-down, undemocratic response to the tsunami for communities that already had depleted capacity when the tsunami struck, but in New Kattankudy East I found that the strength of the community's leaders and willingness to engage community members in the recovery process has contributed to their resilience (Uyangoda 2005).

The failure of the P-TOMS agreement and subsequent inconsistencies in policy planning and implementation in Sri Lanka's disaster management sector contributed to the exodus of humanitarian agencies before they completed their missions (Silva 2009), leaving many families with unfinished houses in Thiruchendur. The rushed and politicized declaration of the coastal no-build buffer zone policy had the effect of decreasing community capacity in Thiruchendur. Indeed, the buffer zone has exacerbated potential risks for residents of Thiruchendur who are now living in "illegal" settlements on their traditional lands and made traditional livelihoods difficult if not impossible to restore for many families. Additionally, the capacity for local government agents to truly understand, implement, and enforce the necessary regulations has been compromised because the national policy, and its rationale, have still never been elucidated by federal policymakers (Shanmugaratnam 2005; Hyndman 2007; Ekanayake 2008; Ruwanpura 2009).

This decreased resilience is both exacerbated and made especially problematic by the rapid development of tourism in the region. Scholars of development agree that development should translate into a general reduction of vulnerability, but I have found that incomplete efforts to reduce risk have contributed to new vulnerabilities and decreased the capacity for resilience in parts of Batticaloa (McEntire 2004; Birkmann and Fernando 2008). In coastal disaster-prone areas like Sri Lanka's East Coast, linking the tourism sector directly to DRR efforts is necessary

to protect both the local communities and visitors (Becken and Hughey 2013). In New Kattankudy East, community leaders, empowered by their connections through the mosques which link them directly to district-level officials, have worked to effectively train community members to prepare them for potential risks and hazards. However, the post-tsunami and post-war development has not increased community resilience in Thiruchendur, where families feel unprepared to handle the next disaster and are still attempting to decipher the true meaning of shifting the village economy toward a service industry that caters to mostly foreign travelers. Though physical structures may appear to be sturdier in some parts of the community, very little has been done to reduce historical structural vulnerabilities that these marginalized communities face. Little attention was given to the social, economic, and political realities of Tamil lives in the wake of the tsunami, and as a result, the rebuilding of homes and community infrastructures and the restoration of livelihoods happened in a vacuum without considering historical social relations which have decreased social capital and resilience in Thiruchendur (Ruwanpura 2009; De Silva 2010; Aldrich 2012a).

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Introduction

Throughout this dissertation, I provided new insights into why communities both experience and recover from disasters differently. I did so through a comparative analysis of two different ethno-religious communities—Thiruchendur, a mixed-religious Tamil community, and Kattankudy, a Muslim community—as they recovered from a disaster during the 30-year civil war in Sri Lanka. Using a social capital framework, I demonstrated the ways that pre-existing community-level conditions combine with disaster impacts and post-disaster interventions to produce different long-term recovery outcomes in these two communities in rural Eastern Sri Lanka.

I focused my analyses on four forms of recovery: social recovery as measured by social cohesion across sectors in society; economic recovery, or the restoration of livelihoods and earning capacity; recovery of infrastructure or the built environment both at the household and community levels; and the implementation of disaster risk reduction measures (DRR). I showed how the communities' ethno-religious identities and affiliations contributed to different recovery trajectories and outcomes within the context of the 30-year Sri Lankan Civil War. My work provides lessons in the theorization of social capital in disaster recovery and emphasizes the need to bridge gaps between scholarship on sustainable recovery and sustainable development.

Social Capital in Disaster Research

Aldrich refers to social capital as the "engine for recovery" because it provides a multitude of benefits to communities as they both prepare for and recover from disasters (2010: 1). Using a social capital framework, I have provided explanations for the differences between Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East (summarized in Table 4). Regarding bonding social

capital, I found that strong in-group ties between families and religious groups became even stronger in the aftermath of the tsunami at the exclusion of non-group members, and that economic reciprocity was limited to tightly bonded familial groups rather than the community at large. Additionally, trust was violated throughout the civil war accompanied by the influx of displaced persons into the village. In New Kattankudy East, strong bonds among community members existed prior to the tsunami and were bolstered in the post-tsunami environment. Further, in direct contrast to Thiruchendur, trust among community members was strong throughout the civil war. In terms of bridging social capital, Thiruchendur was inadvertently fractured into "Two Thiruchendurs," and spatial dislocation as a result of the forced relocation of only some residents to the Swiss Village exacerbated pre-tsunami social disparities and created new ones. The breakdown of community-based organizations (like the Fisheries Society) contributed to a lack of cohesion across groups in the community, and the lack of coordination across religious congregations has fueled tensions between neighbors who claim that the allocation of post-tsunami aid was corrupt. In New Kattankudy East, strong ties across mosque congregations, facilitated by the Mosque Federation, meant that social bonds and the flow of resources traversed kin networks, to the benefit of the community at-large. Here, the Zakat taxation system was especially important for facilitating economic reciprocity throughout the whole community. Strong pre-tsunami networks between entrepreneurial leaders was bolstered in the post-tsunami environment, and new community-based networks emerged to support the whole community.

Finally, in terms of linking social capital, a lack of trust in Sri Lankan governmental leadership and local leadership, combined with unstable and inaccessible leadership, contributed to ineffective coordination and a lack of oversight of NGO projects in Thiruchendur. Here, the

Tamil population also felt left behind by the Tamil diaspora. However, in New Kattankudy East, despite a lack of trust in the Sri Lankan government, local leadership proved to be especially trustworthy and successful in negotiating on behalf of the real needs of community members. The stable, accessible, and powerful community-level leadership (both by the GN person and the Mosque Federation) created an effective coordination and oversight environment for NGO projects in New Kattankudy East. Finally, the links between powerful government agents in Kattankudy and foreign benefactors in Saudi Arabia became an especially important factor in the robust revival of communities in Kattanakudy.

Table 4: Summary of Forms of Social Capital in Two Communities

Form of Social Capital	Thiruchendur	New Kattankudy East
Bonding	• Strong in-group ties between families and religious groups and the exclusion of non-group members • Economic reciprocity within kin-networks • Bonds of trust violated throughout civil war with influx of IDPs	• Strong bonds among community members despite social differences • Bonds of trust bolstered throughout civil war with influx of IDPs
Bridging	• Fracturing of community into "Two Thiruchendurs" exacerbated pre-tsunami disparities • Spatial dislocation through forced partial relocation of community to Swiss Village • Breakdown of community-based organizations contributed to lack of cohesion across groups in community • Little to no coordination across religious congregations • Mistrust of neighbors regarding corruption of post-tsunami aid allocation	• Strong ties across religious congregations despite anti-Sufi sentiment in Eastern Province • Economic reciprocity across social groupings, bolstered by Zakat tax system • Emergent community groups provide new forms of bridging (and bonding) social capital • Strong networks among business leaders
Linking	• Strong mistrust of Sri Lankan government and local leadership • Unstable and inaccessible community-level leadership contributed to ineffective coordination and non-oversight of NGO projects • Complaints of feeling left behind by Tamil diaspora	• Despite mistrust of Sri Lankan government, local leadership a trusted entity • Stable, accessible, and powerful community-level leadership (GN Person + Mosque Federation) allowed for effective coordination and oversight of NGO projects • Community and local leadership fostered lucrative and productive links to foreign government

In addition to the differing forms of governance in each community, a common thread through all of these axes of difference is the way in which religious institutions, and to an extent the norms which arise from them, contributed to the strengthening or depletion of inter- and intra- community social bonds. In Thiruchendur, the lack of coordination across religious congregations, accompanied by a focus on more individualized worship rituals, contributed to the lack successful of community-wide efforts towards recovery. There is no network of Hindu kovils or Christian churches in Sri Lanka that is comparable to the Mosque Federation in Kattankudy. Though Christian and Hindu organizations contributed to the relief and recovery efforts in Tamil communities, their efforts were frequently limited to immediate relief efforts or focused on the families associated with their congregations. However, despite significant differences in the practice and form of Islam in New Kattankudy East, the Mosque Federation worked to facilitate the relief and recovery efforts for the whole community rather than separate groups within the community. Local leaders were able to leverage their connections to a sympathetic religious community abroad in Saudi Arabia to move toward a robust recovery.

My research contributes to the ongoing project of theorizing the role of social capital in disaster recovery in two ways. First, I expand upon the concept of linking social capital by accounting for the importance of global linkages directly between communities and foreign entities, including government and diaspora groups. Second, in my accounting of global linking social capital, along with bonding and bridging capital, I demonstrate the importance of religious institutions and accompanying socio-cultural norms in activating social capital in communities as they recover from disasters.

Global Linking Social Capital

Daniel Aldrich and Michelle Meyer are two of the foremost scholars of social capital in disasters, having published extensively both individually and collaboratively on the topic (Aldrich 2010; Aldrich 2011a; Aldrich 2011b; Aldrich 2012a; Aldrich 2012b; Aldrich and Crook 2008; Meyer 2013; Aldrich and Meyer 2015; Aldrich and Sawada 2015; Meyer 2018). Meyer recently authored an extensive review of social capital in disaster research in which she writes that scholars of disaster, building on research from non-disaster settings, have tended to assume that marginalized populations rely more heavily on bonding social capital rather than bridging or linking social capital compared to less marginal groups (2018). She calls for more research to better understand how "social capital mediates or multiplies the effects of social vulnerability" (Meyer 2018: 280). My dissertation research begins to address this need by showing how minoritized communities in Sri Lanka differentially leveraged social capital, specifically how the Moors, the smallest ethno-religious minority in Sri Lanka, successfully leveraged global links to achieve recovery much more effectively than in other areas.

Meyer also calls for more longitudinal or comparative research studies to explore pre- and post-disaster social capital in order to explain causal mechanisms. She writes:

> Questions about the role of social capital in recovery need further specification as to how emergent social capital compares to existing social capital in quantity, quality, and effects on disaster outcomes. This clarification is important for disaster practice as fostering emergent social capital may be different than activities that strengthen pre-event social capital that would transition into post-event collective action (2018: 280).

Both the QCA study and my dissertation consider the pre- and post-disaster contexts to explain recovery outcomes. My dissertation provides a nuanced accounting of social capital by examining communities with different levels of pre- and post-disaster bonding, bridging, and linking capital. By examining the nexus between the tsunami disaster and the civil war, I show

how violent conflict, and matters of security and sovereignty—components of governance—affect social capital both preceding and following disaster and explore how socially vulnerable communities effectively engage linking social capital to achieve long-term recovery. Additionally, by conducting long-term ethnographic research in recovering communities, I satisfy Brenda Phillips's (2003) request for more immersed, longitudinal research on disaster recovery to more meaningfully account for the broader socio-historical contexts surrounding disaster.

Aldrich's (2012a) work examining the role of social capital in disaster recovery in communities following the 1923 Tokyo Earthquake, the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the Indian Ocean Tsunami in communities in India, and Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. served as a critical foundational text as I was designing and implementing my study and conducting analyses. Aldrich focuses his analysis of social capital as it varies at regional and city levels, and from neighborhood to neighborhood (2012a: 34). In terms of linking social capital, which "connects regular citizens to those in power" (Aldrich and Meyer 2015: 259) he shows that vertical links between communities and government representatives and NGOs are critical to connecting the community to resources and information. Among rural communities in Tamil Nadu, India recovering from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami he found that new connections to a low-level bureaucrat facilitated residents' access to external resources and information despite never having met a representative of their government. Further, he found that rural women in India who connected to local NGOs and the National Council of YMCAs of India received livelihood training that simultaneously increased their economic capacities, thus decreasing their vulnerability to disasters. Among communities recovering from Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, high levels of bonding and bridging social capital were not enough to help residents in

marginalized communities recover. Residents complained that while local leaders were able to unify and coordinate their own communities, they lacked links to extra-local resources that could have had a positive influence on recovery. This example, according to Aldrich, underscores the need for a combination of bonding, bridging, and linking connections, which my own work also highlights. In my research in Sri Lanka, I found that the more tightly bonded community in New Kattankudy East effectively bridged across religious congregations and familial ties, fostering greater trust in local leaders who were able to then link the communities to a foreign government that provided critical financial and material resources directly to the community.

In their seminal paper on the importance of social capital in disaster recovery, Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) compare the cases of the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan and the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake in India and show that communities with social capital are efficient in rescue and relief, but the most challenging issue is post-disaster reconstruction, where matters of planning and zoning require collective decision making. They show that without social capital, construction can take a long time and that strong community leadership is essential for any collective action. What they call for is policymakers to recognize social capital as an asset for communities, and a reframing of recovery efforts towards a grass-roots perspective. Indeed, my research shows that low levels of social capital and ineffective local and political leadership contributed to a decreased capacity for collective action thus slowing the recovery in Thiruchendur whereas the opposite was true in New Kattankudy East.

Throughout Meyer's (2018) extensive review of the literature on social capital in disaster and Aldrich's (2012a) and Nakagawa and Shaw's (2004) explanations of the role of social capital in disaster recovery, there is little or no attention given to the role of global linkages. While these scholars do reference the role of international NGO's in response and recovery, none speak

directly to the critical linkages I found between communities and foreign governments. In New Kattankudy East, community leaders directly called upon the government of Saudi Arabia, which helped to fund the recovery efforts. This global link proved critical to the recovery of community amenities, including the rebuilding of homes and new schools and medical facilities, which have arguably made New Kattankudy East an even more desirable place to live in the post-tsunami and post-war environment than before 2004.

Social Capital and Religion

Furthermore, related to global linking social capital, my work highlights the specific role of religious institutions in building and maintaining social capital that can contribute to successful disaster recovery. Again, religious and political leaders in Kattankudy were able to effectively leverage ethno-religious international networks to facilitate financial support directly from a foreign government that identified strongly with their shared religious missions. As I mentioned in the conclusion of chapter 2, existing research on the role of religion and religious institutions as sites of social capital production and engagement tend to focus on the role of nonprofits that may be guided by religious missions (Vallance and Carlton 2014). Or, as Bin and Edwards (2009) explain, managerial social capital can activate corporate and philanthropic giving when managers are engaged in religious organizations. What this ignores, I argue, is that religious institutions and associated cultural norms within communities can work to shape the experiences of disaster survivors. I have shown that the sheer presence of NGOs, including those with religious missions, does not consistently improve recovery outcomes in communities.

Strong social networks contribute to residents' abilities to help mobilize and overcome barriers to collective action and help communities more effectively attract and control relief and recovery assistance. The civil war in Sri Lanka, which contributed to a breakdown of trust

among neighbors in Thiruchendur and facilitated bonds within New Kattankudy East, shaped the extent to which each community could efficiently and equitably allocate the material resources provided during the "Golden Wave" (Gamburd 2013). Strong bonding and bridging social capital allowed residents in New Kattankudy East to share information and resources more equitably throughout the whole community, rather than through smaller intra-community networks like those in Thiruchendur. Specifically, I found that trust and resources flowed more easily through bridging ties among religious congregations in New Kattankudy East than in the more fragmented Christian and Hindu congregations in Thiruchendur. This dynamic reflects what Aldrich (2010) and Chamlee-Wright (2010) found in their studies of communities in post-Katrina New Orleans: communities that were tightly bonded and well-coordinated recovered more quickly than their less networked counterparts. My research builds upon their findings by showing the importance of religious congregations in this process.

In terms of bridging social capital, community-wide norms of economic reciprocity rooted in religious institutions and the structure of religious congregations also facilitated the comparatively successful recovery in New Kattankudy East, as residents were primed to re-distribute wealth and resources through congregations and with the support of the Zakat tax. The complaint among residents in Thiruchendur that Christian organizations tended to exclude Hindu families from benefits underscores the importance of bridging social capital. Indeed, Hindu and Christian congregations in Thiruchendur did not effectively bridge groups in the community to provide equitable resources, which in turn exacerbated existing inequalities and contributed to new tensions among residents. This is in contrast to the effective bridging of mosque congregations in New Kattankudy East, which helped to ensure that resource allocation was equitable and which was bolstered by a shared ethno-religious identification among residents and

their leaders. Finally, my research has shown that religious norms and institutions in both communities can facilitate the more and less successful integration into the new tourism economy.

As scholars continue to theorize the role of social capital in disaster recovery, my work indicates the need for increased attention to the potential for global linkages that may circumvent the traditional flows of aid through international humanitarian networks, which tend to flow through national and local governments. My findings also underscore the importance of religious institutions, which have not typically been of primary focus previous scholarship on social capital in disasters. In the concluding section of this chapter, I revisit the global and religious nature of social capital, in particular the potential Janus-faced nature of linking social capital, in a discussion of the connections between Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia in light of the 2019 Easter Day terrorist attacks.

Sustainable Recovery and Development in the Context of War

"Violent civil conflict is disturbingly widespread in today's world and has rightly been referred to as 'development in reverse'" (Nel and Righarts 2008: 161). Though humanitarian aid and development assistance have increased in recent years, contributing in a reduction of global poverty, and the number of armed conflicts have declined since 1990, this trend has slowed and is potentially being reversed as the growth of democratic states has paralleled the increase in the number of fragile states with weak institutions (Bellman 1969; Dresher 2007; U.S. Department of Defense 2010; Scheffran et al. 2012). Questions about the interplay between violent civil conflict, sustainable disaster recovery, and sustainable development are central to my research. My study attempts to bridge bodies of literature on violent conflict, disaster recovery, and sustainable development.

In a study of 187 political units during the second half of the twentieth century, Nel and Righarts found that especially in autocratic or consolidated democratic regimes, areas with low economic growth, and high levels of income inequality, rapid-onset "natural disasters" pose a significantly greater risk than slow-onset disasters in instigating violent civil conflict. In the case of rapid-onset disasters, like the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the social impacts of disasters can act to destabilize society by "increasing the motive, incentive, and opportunity for conflict" (2008: 179). Concerning motives, they show that widespread suffering, the destruction of homes and means for survival (livelihoods and economic capacity, and other lifelines), and the displacement of people intensify grievances. Incentives, including the competition for scarce resources and the potential for resource grabs by elites, lead to calculations of potential gain from violent civil conflict. Regarding opportunities, decreased state capacity creates space for resistance, states' inadequate responses to disaster can lead survivors to blame the state for losses thus decreasing the state's legitimacy, and that opportunities for resource capture is great, which contributes to the inequitable distribution of collective action resources (Nel and Righarts 2008).

However, when accounting narrowly for the mediating effects of economic income and economic capacity, Bergholt and Lujala (2012) found no significant connection between disasters and the risk for violent civil conflict. In an analysis of ethnically fractionalized countries, Schleussner and colleagues (2016) found that though there is no direct indication that environmental disasters trigger armed conflicts, disasters can act as "threat multipliers" in the conflict-prone regions.

My research adds empirical evidence to the complicated ways in which disasters and civil conflict intersect and provides further evidence of the potential for corruption and increased conflict as communities work to recover from disaster in politically unstable environments.

Especially interesting in the case of Sri Lanka is that the civil war, which preceded the tsunami, was reinvigorated in the years following the disaster, as both the Government and LTTE jockeyed for control of the relief and recovery efforts. The tsunami disaster, rather than having the effect of instigating cohesion and sharing of resources across the island, further split the island along ethno-religious lines and led to an environment of renewed violence.

Sustainable development scholars emphasize the need for collaboration between communities and practitioners and an acknowledgement of the ecological constraints of social and environmental locales when designing development projects (Mary 2008; Pyles 2009). In terms of sustainable disaster recovery, Smith and Wenger (2006) argue that sustainable recovery from disasters must go beyond the restoration of pre-disaster conditions by incorporating improved social, economic, and infrastructural capacity and equipping communities to plan for and mitigate against future disasters. Increased resilience to disasters, an indicator of sustainable recovery, thus requires collaboration and recognition of constraints.

The linkages between increasing environmental risk and violent conflict are especially important to consider in states where disaster, disaster recovery, and civil conflict co-occur. My research highlights the complicated nature of "sustainable recovery" when conflicts makes it difficult to develop a solid baseline for communities to return to and then surpass. In Thiruchendur, residents were left unsure of whether they had actually recovered, because they were forced to shift their attention to tourism rather that returning to traditional livelihoods. Among many families, this forced shift has left them frustrated with the continued instability that the new tourism economy has produced in the post-war environment. The risks associated with this new industry remain unaddressed as community disaster risk reduction efforts have so far proven untenable in Thiruchendur.

The integration of disaster risk reduction (DRR) initiatives in communities is an important indicator of successful disaster recovery. In the face of ongoing climate change, islands states are increasingly vulnerable to natural hazards, including hurricanes and typhoons, storm surges, coastal erosion, flooding, and potable water shortages (Becken 2005; Le Masson and Kelman 2011; Méheux et al. 2007; Becken et al. 2014). That these island states tend to rely heavily on tourism for economic stimulus exacerbates the risk that these nations face (Lewesy et al. 2004; IPCC 2012; Becken et al. 2014). From the perspective of tourism:

> On-going growth in demand for coastal tourism and investment in hazardous coastal locations, alongside ownership models that increase local exposure (e.g. where local operators operate a franchise of a global brand but are responsible for the risk management of all assets, are likely to exacerbate hazards. (Becken et al. 2-14: 957)

In their study of tourism disaster vulnerability in communities in the Caribbean, the South Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, Becken and colleagues (2004) found that substantial barriers exist to the incorporation of DRR into tourism industry. For example, in the Maldives and Fiji, they found that government officials were more concerned with attending policy conferences and talking about DRR policy than actually implementing the initiatives. In the Caribbean, they found that business managers place economic concerns over safety—keeping rooms filled was more important than anticipating disaster risk, which was a problem for the future. In the Maldives, they found that some managers actually downplayed disaster risks in order to "safeguard the positive image of the destination, rather than one that inspires fear amongst tourists" (2014: 955). Furthermore, they found that the primary DRR initiative in the public sector involves the provision of early warning systems, which may or may not be effective in translating to actual preparedness. This underscores the problem that technological systems of warning are not inherently techno-social—the transmission of warnings does not translate into

functional disaster preparedness, as evidenced by inconsistent reactions to disaster drills and warnings in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East.

Tierney points out that efforts to enhance community disaster resilience are increasingly shaped by neoliberal forms of governance, including the emphasis on economic growth and capital accumulation sans government regulation. In a critique of neoliberal sustainable development and resilience narratives, she writes that:

> In a global context of continual risk and uncertainty, individuals are challenged to achieve resilience by becoming adaptive and seeking out opportunities for betterment in an entrepreneurial fashion. Rather than resisting and demanding an end to suffering through political action, the resilient individual changes in ways that make it possible to bear that suffering. (2015: 1333)

The undemocratic, top-down recovery efforts in Thiruchendur, excluded residents from participating in their own recoveries and has resulted in the rapid incorporation of war-torn parts of the country into a global tourist industry with complete ignorance of its consequences.

As the tourism industry grows, policymakers and entities tasked with regulating the growth of the new sector must work to account for the specific needs of localities to ensure that this growth is sustainable (Foitiou et al. 2002; Ghina 2003) and that the economic benefits of the industry accrue directly to the communities in which it is embedded (Prayag et al. 2010; Pratt 2015). The complex political environment of post-tsunami Sri Lanka contributed to the inability of residents in Thiruchendur to self-govern their recovery. Participatory engagement and capacity-building, both cornerstones of sustainable recovery and sustainable development (Pelling and Uitto 2001; Pratt 2015), were not achieved in the recovery process in Thiruchendur, which has contributed to the uneven recovery outcomes in the community. The provision of new housing to residents of Thiruchendur—some of which was left incomplete within the village, and some of which forced residents to relocate to the Swiss Village—has produced inequalities

within the community and exacerbated a sense of powerlessness, as residents were not able to advocate for their wants and needs, and instead became relatively passive recipients of the relief and recovery aid. Here, aid recipients were forced into passivity, and are now left with few options for economic power if they do not participate in the new economy.

The context of civil war in Sri Lanka meant that lax regulation and ineffective government assistance left communities to fend for themselves by incorporating into the tourist economy, which has contributed to their vulnerability in the post-tsunami and post-war era. This is especially evident in the rapid rise of tourism in Thiruchendur, where the lack of appropriate regulation or training for community members has contributed to the disempowerment of residents, who feel forced to participate in the new economy because their traditional livelihoods were never effectively restored. Furthermore, community-level disaster risk reduction efforts have done little to promote resilience in Thiruchendur. In a community where residents say that they are unprepared to face the next crisis, this raises further concerns about the viability of the tourism industry, as the residents will be faced with protecting tourists from harm as well.

Though it is beyond the scope of this study to say whether or not the rapid growth of tourism in Thiruchendur will ultimately improve the village's overall economic capacity, the coupling of recovery and development projects has exacerbated inequality and produced new vulnerabilities in the roughly ten years between the end of the civil war and now. As Sri Lanka's Eastern Province becomes more accessible and attractive to foreigners in the post-war environment and tourism comes into focus a viable avenue for economic growth in the region, communities will need to work together and with political and religious leaders to ensure the sustainability of this project. As I remarked in chapter 2, my research highlights the ways in which the ongoing project of theorizing sustainable recovery must clearly account for the

possibility that *states in recovery* may also be *states in conflict*, and that ignoring this potential within the context of rapid globalization provides a dangerous precedent as global communities experience increasing climate destabilization.

Directions for Future Research

As I was finishing my dissertation, the 2019 Easter Sunday terrorist attacks targeted churches and tourist hotels in and near the capital city of Colombo, as well as the Zion church in Batticaloa, killing more than 250 people and injuring hundreds. The attacks underscored the potential for continued political instability and ethnic tension in the country. Among the dead were three residents from Thiruchendur, a middle-aged married couple and a baby (Divisional Secretariat - Manmunai North Batticaloa 2019).

Perpetrated by a group led by a Muslim man from Kattankudy, Mohammed Zahran Hashim, who preached hatred, violence, and slaughter against idolaters and non-Muslims (Beech 25 April 2019), the attacks have re-invigorated ethnic tension in communities across the island. Hashim is a former member of the National Thowheeth Jamaath (NTJ) Mosque congregation who was expelled for his efforts to instigate violence. The congregation is located about two hundred meters beyond the border of New Kattankudy East, in the next village on the beach. Hashim led the attacks with support from the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) (Greenfield 23 April 2019; BBC News 28 April 2019; The New York Times 22 April 2019). Relevant to my research, it has been reported that the NTJ is an ideological offspring of the Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath (TNTJ), a Saudi-funded, Wahhabi-based organization with headquarters in Southern India (Chellaney 26 April 2019; Sellin 5 May 2019). Saudi Arabia's aid to Kattankudy in the wake of the tsunami facilitated recovery, but the attacks have also called attention to the country's long-term strategy of introducing Wahhabism (conservative Islam) to Sri Lanka. The

connection between Saudi Arabia's disaster recovery assistance and its efforts to export conservative Islam show how the positive aspects of linking social capital can have unanticipated negative effects. Indeed, the terrorist attacks have instigated violence against Muslims across the island, including an attack less than a month later in the North Western province on Muslim-owned shops and mosques that led to the violent stabbing death of a 45-year old Muslim business-owner (Srinivasan 14 May 2019).

Along with my own research findings, these developments suggest that future research should pay more attention to both the positive and the negative dimensions of social capital. This is especially true in the field of disaster research, where (with some exceptions) scholars have framed social capital and its role in recovery in highly positive ways. In the Sri Lanka case, it appears that there have been very significant negative consequences of ties with Saudi Arabia that go far beyond disaster recovery.

Further, in a state that is increasingly reliant on the global tourism industry for economic stimulus, fears about safety and the potential resurgence of ethnic conflict have again come to the fore, underscored by the deaths of at least 35 foreigners in the attacks. Reuters (4 May 2019) reported that in the aftermath of the attacks, hotel bookings were down by 70 – 85% across the island. This precipitous decline is creating uncertainty among those whose livelihoods involve catering to foreign tourists. In an effort to tamp down the spread of rumors following the attacks, the government shut down social media and messaging services, making it difficult for those on the island to communicate with one another and with those abroad. Communication problems also followed the anti-Muslim violence in North West Sri Lanka. These were not the only times the government has shut down social media to combat the spread of rumor out of fear for increased ethnic tensions.

In March 2018, a Facebook status written in Sinhalese text stating "Kill all Muslims, do not spare even an infant, they are dogs," accompanied by posts spreading misinformation and inciting anti-Muslim hate and violence, spread like wildfire across the island. This misinformation spread unmitigated across popular social media and messaging platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp, and within a week's time mobs of Buddhists stormed Muslims' homes and businesses and burned down a mosque, injuring many and killing at least one man. Photos and videos of the mobs were uploaded and shared on these platforms, fueling intensified violence. Facebook's and WhatsApp's inability to remove or temper the spread of this violence-inciting content led government to shut the social media platform down for some time (De Sayrah 2018; Morris 2018). This episode and the Easter Sunday attacks illuminate the ethnic tensions that still simmer among communities. The spread of hate speech through social media and subsequent outbreaks of violence only add to the instability of the global tourism industry in Sri Lanka.

Other topics emerged over the course of this study that I was not able to investigate but that merit further study. Throughout the study, as I witnessed the rapid introduction of internet use alongside foreign tourism in communities in Batticaloa, I grew more interested in the socio-cultural implications of technology and tourism. The recent episodes of technology-enabled ethnic violence on the island highlight the potential for the resurgence of armed conflict in a political unstable environment. In keeping with themes of sustainable recovery and sustainable development, concerns for the safety of both residents and tourists alike must remain in constant focus as the country's politicians work to develop and refine tourism-related policy and initiatives and alleviate ongoing tensions between ethno-religious groups. Not only are communities in Batticaloa, including Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East, now grappling

with a return to war-era tensions and the renewed militarization of the Eastern Province, but many are left without the economic benefits of the tourist industry which they have, for better or worse, come to rely on in the post-tsunami and post-war era. As my work in Sri Lanka continues over time, I expect to continue to investigate the socio-cultural and environmental implications of new technologies and tourism on the island, which open the state to novel forms of foreign influence.

Another avenue that I hope to investigate further is the gendered consequences of the rise of tourism in Thiruchendur and New Kattankudy East. The exposure to foreigners and the increase in internet accessibility has already begun to disrupt traditional gender norms, and women are now increasingly scrutinized as sexual objects. Relatedly, I plan to investigate how matrilineal and matrilocal kinship patterns will be altered or disrupted in the coming years, as youth begin to explore the economic and social options available to them beyond the bounds of their villages and even their country. I will also be interested to know how arguments I have made about the importance of religious institutions and norms in shaping recovery efforts will stand the test of time in an increasingly globalized Sri Lanka. As foreign interests and access to Sri Lanka expand, it will be essential to understand how residents adapt and respond to or resist the implications of their global exposure.

Conclusion

The case of Sri Lanka provides a unique opportunity to study the multidimensional processes at play as communities work to recover from disaster amid violent civil conflict. By conducting this comparative case study of two distinct ethno-religious communities in Sri Lanka, I have shown the importance of considering the various ways that religious institutions and norms can shape the recovery experiences of communities. I have also shown how social capital

operates in religious networks and through global linkages. My findings raise concerns about the influx of foreign tourists as Sri Lanka and their impacts on communities in the Eastern Province, which will grow as the area increasingly gains recognition on the world stage as a tourist destination. I hope that the conclusions of this study encourage researchers and practitioners to continue to refine the conceptualization and theorization of "sustainable recovery" principles to more effectively account for the possibility that states in recovery may also be states in conflict.

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APPENDIX A: Interview Schedule and Details of Data Collection for the QCA Study

IRB Protocol #: 11-0264

Between July 2013 and January 2014, I collected interviews about recovery in the following eleven communities:

District	GN Division	Majority Ethno-Religious Group in Community	# of Interviews Conducted
Batticaloa	Navalady	Tamil/Hindu	8
	Amirthikaly	Tamil/Hindu	7
	Thirimadu/Swiss Village	Tamil/Hindu	8
	Thiruchendur	Tamil/Hindu	7
	Kattankudy 167A	Moor (Tamil speaking)	6
	Kattankudy 167B (New Kattankudy East)	Moor (Tamil speaking)	6
Galle	Maha Mordua	Sinhala/Buddhist	6
	Akurula	Sinhala/Buddhist	7
	Thalipitiya	Moor (Sinhala and Tamil speaking)	6
	Pereliya	Sinhala/Buddhist	9
	Telwatta	Sinhala/Buddhist	8
Total # of community level interviews			**78**
Total # of key interviews (see below)			**8**
Total # of interviews conducted in SL for the J-W study			**86**

Key non-community interviews:

- GIS scientist and data manager for UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) in Batticaloa
- Batticaloa District Disaster Manager
- Batticaloa Housing Director
- Batticaloa District Planning Director
- Director of Tsunami Photo Museum in Telwatta (Galle)
- Galle District Planning Director
- Divisional Secretary in Hikkaduwa (Galle)
- Galle District Disaster Manager

Interview Schedule:

OVERVIEW QUESTIONS (some of these questions are only for the GN person; some are for rapport building – this is also the time when some respondents will share their experience from the day of the tsunami.)

- Can you describe the types of damage in this community after the tsunami?
- **How long have you been working, as the GN person, in this community?**

    - **Can you tell me the exact years of your service?**
- **How many households are there in this community?**
- **How many houses were built here after the tsunami?**
    - **When were they completed?**
- **What NGOs worked here after the tsunami?**
    - **What did they do?**
    - **Did they work in the community before the tsunami?**
- What is the occupation of this community (caste)?
- If the community members are living in apartment complexes (rather than single family homes):
    - Did the community members live in apartment complexes before the tsunami?
        - If so, who built them?

INTRODUCTION QUESTIONS

- Were you living in this village before the tsunami?
    - *How long did you/your family live here before the tsunami?*
- *Make note of: gender, age, religion and caste (*What is the occupation of your community?).*

CONDITION: *Economic Diversity*

- What industries do people in this village work in?
    - Do most people in this village work in a particular industry (e.g. fishing, tourism, farming...)
- What was the livelihood for your household before the tsunami?

OUTCOME: *Economy*

- What percentage of families in this community are currently receiving welfare?
- What is your family's livelihood?
- Are you doing the same work now as you did before the tsunami?
    - On average, how many days in a month do you work?
- What kind of work do most people here do?
    - Has this changed since the tsunami?
- How does you income now compare to what you earned before the tsunami?
    - What are your daily earnings now/before the tsunami?
    - Is there a reason that your income changed?
- Have businesses re-opened in the village?
    - How does number of businesses compare to pre-tsunami?

CONDITION: *Recovery Funds*

- Did you receive any funds after the tsunami?
    - Where did these come from? Were these enough?

CONDITION: *Infrastructure*

- Is this the same property that you were living on before the tsunami?
- What kind of house were you living in before the tsunami?
    - What kind of roof?
    - What kind of walls?
    - What was the floorplan/rooms?
        - How does this compare to your current house?
    - In general, what types of houses did most people here have before the tsunami?
- How many households are there in this community?
    - How many new houses were built in this village after the tsunami?

- In general, who builds structures in the community? (schools, temples, shops)
    - Who built your pre-tsunami house?
    - Was [that person] trained? Did he/she have experience building?
- How did you access water before the tsunami?
    - Who built your well?
    - Was there a sufficient supply?
    - How often and how much water were you able to get each day?
    - Did you share a well with your neighbors, or did your family have their own?
    - How did you treat the water before you consumed it?
        - Why do you choose (not) to treat your water before drinking it?
        - Was there any education about water sanitation and drinking directly from wells? Were people here instructed either way?
- Did your pre-tsunami house have a toilet?
- Did you have electricity before the tsunami? Was it metered?
    - Do most people in this village currently have a difficult time paying water and/or electric bills?
        - Is the cost to keep these utilities running affordable?
- What kind of roads were here before the tsunami?

OUTCOME: ***Infrastructure***

- When was your current house completed?
    - How long did the construction take?
- What type of house do you live in? For example, what is your roof made from? Are your walls and floor made of concrete or some other material?
    - When was your current house completed?
    - Did you have to pay anything for your new home? Was that money from your savings or from the government post-tsunami funds allotted to each family?
    - Did you need to help construct your new home?
- Do you know where the material for your house come from?
    - Are the materials manufactured locally?
    - How was it transported here?
- How is the quality of your house?
    - Do you have any problems?
    - Does this house have a toilet?
        - Is it functioning?
        - Are you using it?
        - Did you receive any training on how to maintain your septic tank? OR – did you receive any maintenance instructions for your new home?
            - What do you do if your toilet or your septic tank malfunctions?
- Where do you get drinking water from?
    - Do you filter or boil this water before you drink it?
    - Is there an adequate supply?
    - How much is available each day?
    - Is it available all day?
    - Does your access to water change between the dry and rainy seasons?
- During the rainy season, do you have any problems with water stagnation?
    - How quickly does the water drain after it rains?
    - Does your property/village flood every single year, or just some years?
- Do you have reliable electricity?
- If you need to get to town, or to run errands, what kind of transportation do you use?

    - Do buses come into this village?
    - How far do you have to walk to get to the nearest bus stand?
- What kind of roads do you have now?
- How long did it take until the roads were repaired? Where is the nearest hospital? (Add healthcare questions)
    - Before the tsunami, how did you receive healthcare?
    - After the tsunami, how do you receive healthcare?
    - In general, do you use the public healthcare system, or private practitioners? Has this changed pre/post-tsunami?

CONDITION: *Social Capital*

- How long have you been living in this community? How many generations of your family have lived in this community?
    - Have most people lived here a long time or are there many newcomers?
    - Before the tsunami, did anyone in this community rent their house?
- What are your thoughts on the relocation of your neighbors post-tsunami?
    - How has the relocation of people affected your family and community?
    - Do you still have contact with the members of your village who were relocated? Do you believe that they still feel like members of this community?
    - Did the tsunami ease or create any conflict between neighbors?
- Do you have many friends and family members in the community?
    - Does most of your family live in the community?
    - Do you know everyone in your community?
- Did you have any community-based organizations (CBOs) before the tsunami such as a youth club, sports clubs, or the fishers society?
    - Were you a part of any of these?
    - Does everyone in your village belong to one of these organizations?
- Before the tsunami, were there many occasions when the entire community would gather together? (promt: for a meeting, or celebration)

CONDITION: *Social Vulnerability*

- What caste are the community members here?
- What income did you have before the tsunami?
    - Was that enough for your needs?
- What level of education do the people in your household have?
    - *Literacy?*
- In general, what level of education do most people in this community have?

CONDITION: *Access to government resources (& function of local government)*

- If there is a problem here such as a conflict with your neighbors, a theft, or your well malfunctions, who would you report it to?
    - Is this the same as before the tsunami?
    - When something in the village breaks (e.g. a water tap) how long does it take to get repaired? Is this the same now as before the tsunami?
- Do you have a group made of local community leaders that works to resolve problems in the community, such as a civil defense group or a mediation board?
    - What is the purpose or function of this group?
    - Who is on the mediation board?
        - When was it formed?
        - How do you elect the members of the mediation board?

        - How often?
    - How often does the mediation board meet?
    - Do you have a mediation board member living in this community? Did you have a mediation board member here before the tsunami?
- Do you receive any resources from the government on a weekly or monthly/regular basis such as samurdhi (food stamps) assistance?
- **How do you communicate with higher levels of government?**
    - **Did your role as the community leader change pre/post-tsunami?**

CONDITION: ***Community Participation***

- Can you describe the recovery process?
    - How long were you displaced from your home and where were you during this time?
- How did you receive information about resources that were available during the recovery process?
- Were community meetings held?
    - How often?
    - Who attended?
    - During these meetings, were you able to request specific resources, or were you simply told what was available to you?
- Were you involved in rebuilding your house?
    - How?
    - How much monetary compensation did you receive for your damaged home?
        - Where did this money come from?
        - How was it handled?
- Did you see a design of what the house would look like before construction started?
    - Were you able to give any feedback on that design?
    - Did they take your suggestions?
- Did you receive any kind of training about construction?
    - Did you check the contractor's work during construction?
        - Do you know who the contractor was?
            - **EMBEDDEDNESS: Where is this contractor from? Did they work in this community before the tsunami reconstruction projects?**
    - Were you instructed about what to look for during the construction process? How did you know if something was going wrong with the construction?
    - If you had a complaint, what happened?

CONDITION: ***NGO Presence***

- Did an NGO work in this village?
    - What NGO was that?
    - Do they have a local office**?**
    - What kind of projects did they do?
    - Did they work in Sri Lanka before the tsunami?
        - How about this community?
- What types of things did you need after the tsunami that you didn't receive?
- If more than one NGO was here, what did each do? Did they coordinate?
- Did any NGOs work here before the tsunami?
- How often was a representative of that NGO here during the construction?
    - Did NGOs check the contractors' work?
- Are NGOs still working here now?
- Has anyone from that NGO returned here after handing over the houses?
    - How many times?

- What did they do when they came?

CONDITION: ***Recovery Funds contd.***

- Did you receive any other items after the tsunami (prompt: livelihood supplies, kitchen equipment, clothing, food)?
  - How many people here received those?
  - Do you believe that there was an equitable distribution of these resources?

CONDITION: ***Emergency Preparedness***

- Before the tsunami, what emergency preparedness measures were in place?
  - For example, did you have a warning system, shelters or evacuation procedures?
  - Before 2004, were you aware of tsunami? Did you know it could happen here?

OUTCOME: ***Risk Reduction***

- Did you receive the tsunami warning in April, 2012?
  - How did you receive this warning?
  - What did you do?
  - What did most people in the community do?
- Did you receive any disaster preparedness training after the tsunami?
- When you receive a warning, how do you know if it is a drill versus a legitimate disaster warning?
  - Are you informed, ahead or time, when there will be a drill?
- Do you have a local community group in charge of diaster management (@ the village level)?
  - What is the function of this group?
  - How does someone become a part of this group?
- Is this house in the same location as your house before the tsunami?
  - If not, how far did you relocate?
  - Did you have the option to relocate?
    - If so, why did you make the decision to either stay or leave?

OUTCOME: ***Social***

- How would you rate life in this village compared to pre-tsunami?
  - Have there been any major changes within this community, since the tsunami?
  - Have any of your community amenities changed since the tsunami?
  - How satisfied are you with the recovery process?
    - Do you believe that your family has recovered? How about your village/community?
      - Why or why not?
    - Do you believe that the people who were relocated from this village (post-tsunami) have recovered?
- Do have a community center? Temple? School? Grocery shop?
  - Are these the same as you had before the tsunami, or have the amenities changed?
- Has everyone returned to the village?
- Are any of the new houses here vacant?
- Do you have the same neighbors as you had before the tsunami?
- Are there any new groups here now?

APPENDIX B: Interview Schedule for Dissertation

OVERVIEW QUESTIONS (*some of these questions are only for the GN person; some are for rapport building – this is also the time when some respondents will share their experience from the day of the tsunami.)

- How long have you lived or worked (if the GN person and not a community member) in this community?
- How long as your family lived in this community?
- Can you describe the types of damage in this community after the tsunami?
- **How long have you been working, as the GN person, in this community?**
    - **Can you tell me the exact years of your service?**
- **How many households are there in this community?**
- **How many houses were built here after the tsunami?**
    - **When were they completed?**
- **What NGOs worked here after the tsunami?**
    - **What did they do?**
    - **Did they work in the community before the tsunami?**
- If the community members are living in apartment complexes (rather than single family homes):
    - Did the community members live in apartment complexes before the tsunami?
        - If so, who built them?

(RQ1) Why have the two communities experienced different recovery trajectories and outcomes? What are the differences in the organization of these two community groups that have led to differential recovery outcomes?

- Does most of your family live nearby or within this community?
    - Has this changed pre-/post-tsunami?
    - How has the relocation of your family been influenced by the war?
- What is your clan/kudi/maternal family name?
- What is the occupation of most people in your community? OR What is your family's livelihood?
- Tell me about the leaders of this community. Are they part of organizations or are they elders?
    - What organizations host the majority of leaders in this community (Rural Development Society (RDS), Samurdhi committee, womens' RDS, fisheries commission, municipal council)?
- What is the role of the GN person in this community?
    - Has this role changed since before the tsunami?
    - During the civil war, was the role of the GN person always the same?
- Were there ever times leading up to the tsunami, and following the tsunami, when you didn't know where to turn for help?
- How are problems solved in this community?
    - Disputes with neighbors
    - Disputes with utilities entities (Ceylon electric board, local plumbers, infrastructure relevant entities)
    - How long does it take to solve these problems?
        - Is this a shorter or longer period of time (problem solving) than before the tsunami?
        - How, during the recovery from the tsunami, did you voice concerns or ask for help on behalf of your household? Your community?
- Which NGO's worked in this community to rebuild homes?
    - What NGO was that?
    - Do they have a local office**?**

    - What kind of projects did they do?
    - Did they work in Sri Lanka before the tsunami?
        - How about this community?
- What types of things did you need after the tsunami that you didn't receive?
- If more than one NGO was here, what did each do? Did they coordinate?
- Did any NGOs work here before the tsunami?
- How often was a representative of that NGO here during the construction?
    - Did NGOs check the contractors' work?
- Are NGOs still working here now?
- Has anyone from that NGO returned here after handing over the houses?
    - How many times?
    - What did they do when they came?
- Was there duplication of recovery efforts?

(RQ2) In what ways did the civil war, as a complex humanitarian emergency, influence the recovery trajectories of the two communities? In what ways did the highly politicized flow of tsunami aid, which was related to the civil war, create differential long-term recoveries within region?

- Do you believe that your community has recovered from the tsunami?
- Do you still feel the effects of the tsunami?
    - Tell me about those feelings
- What was the experience of the war like for this community?
- Do you still feel the effects of the civil war?
    - Tell me about those feelings
- Do you believe that there was differential recovery from the tsunami, between communities in the east and the south, due to the civil war?
    - If so, why?
    - If not, why?
- Do you believe that there was differential recovery from the tsunami, between communities in the east, due to the civil war?
    - If so, why?
    - If not, why?
- Do you believe that the Sri Lankan government was an advocate for communities on the East Coast following the tsunami?
- At what point do you feel like your community recovered from the tsunami?
    - If your community hasn't recovered from the tsunami – why not?
- How did leadership in your community change pre-/post-tsunami?
    - Do you believe that the war had any influence on this change?

(RQ3): To what extent does variation in different forms of social capital (linking, bonding, and bridging social capital) preceding and following natural disasters influence recovery in the context of complex humanitarian emergencies? Three forms of social capital will be considered: *Linking* – How do community members negotiate relations with business and political leaders in order to recover in the context of a complex humanitarian emergency? ***Bonding*** – How do community members in Hindu versus Muslim communities negotiate their familial and neighborly social ties within the context of recovery from a natural disaster and civil war? ***Bridging*** – In what ways do local groups negotiate economic and political boundaries and coalitions as they recover in the context of a civil war?

LINKING SOCIAL CAPITAL

- Did you have any community-based organizations (CBOs) before the tsunami such as a youth club, sports clubs, or the fishers society?

    - Were you a part of any of these?
    - Does everyone in your village belong to one of these organizations?
- Who did you ask for recovery assistance following the tsunami?
- Did you feel safe asking your GN person for help? Do you believe that your GN person was your advocate?
- If you didn't rely on your GN person for help, who did you turn to?
- Are you doing the same work now as you did before the tsunami?
    - On average, how many days in a month do you work?
- What kind of work do most people here do?
    - Has this changed since the tsunami?
- How does you income now compare to what you earned before the tsunami?
    - What are your daily earnings now/before the tsunami?
    - Is there a reason that your income changed?
- Have businesses re-opened in the village?
    - How does number of businesses compare to pre-tsunami?
- Who are the business leaders in your community?
    - Has this changed pre-/post-tsunami?

BONDING SOCIAL CAPITAL

- How long have you been living in this community? How many generations of your family have lived in this community?
    - Have most people lived here a long time or are there many newcomers?
    - Before the tsunami, did anyone in this community rent their house?
- What are your thoughts on the relocation of your neighbors post-tsunami?
    - How has the relocation of people affected your family and community?
    - Do you still have contact with the members of your village who were relocated? Do you believe that they still feel like members of this community?
    - Did the tsunami ease or create any conflict between neighbors?
- Do you have many friends and family members in the community?
    - Does most of your family live in the community?
    - Do you know everyone in your community?
- Did you have any community-based organizations (CBOs) before the tsunami such as a youth club, sports clubs, or the fishers society?
    - Were you a part of any of these?
    - Does everyone in your village belong to one of these organizations?
- Before the tsunami, were there many occasions when the entire community would gather together? (promt: for a meeting, or celebration)

BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL

- Did your community become divided on issues related to the civil war?
- Did issues relating to the civil war influence the effectiveness of community leaders to make positive change in the community?
- Who was empowered during the war?
- Who was disempowered during the war?
- Were there any community groups which formed specifically to address issues related to the war and your community?

(RQ 4) What are the community-level conditions that lead to the differential implementation of risk reduction strategies during recovery?

- Did you receive any disaster preparedness training after the tsunami?
    - If so, what form did it take?
    - If not, why not? Did you ask for preparedness training?
        - If not, why not?
- When you receive a warning, how do you know if it is a drill versus a legitimate disaster warning?
    - Are you informed, ahead or time, when there will be a drill?
- Do you have a local community group in charge of disaster management (@ the village level)?
    - What is the function of this group?
    - How does someone become a part of this group?
- In what ways does the District Level Disaster Management team focus on issues specific to your community?
    - Have they visited your community since the tsunami?
- Is this house in the same location as your house before the tsunami?
    - If not, how far did you relocate?
    - Did you have the option to relocate?
        - If so, why did you make the decision to either stay or leave?

Conclusion

- How would you rate life in this village compared to pre-tsunami?
    - Have there been any major changes within this community, since the tsunami?
    - Have any of your community amenities changed since the tsunami?
    - How satisfied are you with the recovery process?
        - Do you believe that your family has recovered? How about your village/community?
            - Why or why not?
        - Do you believe that the people who were relocated from this village (post-tsunami) have recovered?
- How do you think the war changed your experience of your own village?
- Do have a community center? Temple? School? Grocery shop?
    - Are these the same as you had before the tsunami, or have the amenities changed?
- Has everyone returned to the village?
- Are any of the new houses here vacant?
- Do you have the same neighbors as you had before the tsunami?
- Are there any new groups here now?

APPENDIX C: IRB protocol and approval

Institutional Review Board
563 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309
Phone: 303.735.3702
Fax: 303.735.5185
FWA: 00003492
31-Aug-2015
Dear Elizabeth Bittel,
On **31-Aug-2015** the IRB reviewed the following protocol:

APPROVAL

Type of Submission:	Initial Application
Review Category:	Exempt - Category 2
Title:	Disaster Recovery, Social Capital, and the Sri Lankan Context: A Comparative Study of Two Communities in Batticaloa
Investigator:	Bittel, Elizabeth
Protocol #:	15-0370
Funding:	Federal; Non-Federal
Documents Approved:	15-0370 Consent Form (31Aug15); Interview Schedule; 15-0370 Protocol (31Aug15);
Documents Reviewed:	Foreign Local Review Letter; K Tierney Citi Certificate; HRP-211: FORM - Initial Application;

The IRB approved the protocol on **31-Aug-2015**.
Click the link to find the approved documents for this protocol: Approved Documents. Use copies of these documents to conduct your research. In conducting this protocol you must follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).
Sincerely,
Douglas Grafel
IRB Admin Review Coordinator Institutional Review Board

APPENDIX D: Informed Consent Script (English and Tamil)

Title of research study: Disaster Recovery, Social Capital, and the Sri Lankan Context: A Comparative Study of Two communities in Batticaloa

Investigator: Elizabeth Bittel

Why am I being invited to take part in a research study?
We invite you to take part in a research study because you participated in the community recovery efforts from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in either Tirichendur or Kattankudy 167B, Batticaloa, Sri Lanka.

What should I know about a research study?

- Someone will explain this research study to you.
- Whether or not you take part is up to you.
- You can choose not to take part.
- You can agree to take part and later change your mind.
- Your decision will not be held against you.
- You can ask all the questions you want before you decide.

Who can I talk to?
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or think the research has hurt you, talk to the Principle Investigator, Elizabeth Bittel. She may be reached via telephone at XXX[35] or email at elizahetb.bittel@colorado.edu. Alternately, you may contact Elizabeth's academic advisor, Kathleen Tierney, Director of the Natural Hazards Center. Dr. Tierney may be contacted via telephone at XXX or via email TierneyK@Colorado.edu.
This research has been reviewed and approved by an Institutional Review Board ("IRB"). You may talk to them at XXX or irbadmin@colorado.edu if:

- Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
- You cannot reach the research team.
- You want to talk to someone besides the research team.
- You have questions about your rights as a research subject.
- You want to get information or provide input about this research.

Why is this research being done?
This research is intended to gather the experiences of folks recovering in two communities in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami with in the context of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Those who were present during the tsunami recovery efforts are eligible to participate in this study. We expect that the data gathered from this study will help contribute to a theory of community level recovery from disasters. Further, practical suggestions will be made to Batticaloa Disaster Management Officials regarding their work around community recovery in Batticaloa.

How long will the research last?
Research is being done for this project via interviews, and we expect that the interviews should last from roughly 1-2 hours each. This data will be retained and analyzed over the next 2-3 years by Elizabeth Bittel and written up in a dissertation for her PhD at the University of Colorado at Boulder, USA.

How many people will be studied?
We expect about 140 people will be in this research study in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka.

[35] Phone numbers redacted.

What happens if I say yes, I want to be in this research?

- This study will include at least 1 initial interview at the place and time of your choosing. We anticipate that this interview will last between 1 and 2 hours.
- During this interview, you will be asked about your experience recovering from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami within the context of the Sri Lankan Civil War.
- This interview will be conducted by the Principle Investigator, Elizabeth Bittel. Elizabeth will be assisted by a Tamil translator, Zaluja Murugiah.
- You may be conteacted again within the next 10 months with additional questions form the researcher.
- Your interview will be audio recorded unless you prefer otherwise.

Please select one of the following options to decline or consent to being audio recorded during this interview.
___ Yes, I would like to be taped during my participation in this research.
___ No, I would not like to be taped during my participation in this research.

What happens if I do not want to be in this research?
You can leave the research at any time and it will not be held against you.

What happens if I say yes, but I change my mind later?
You can leave the research at any time it will not be held against you. Your information will be removed from the study of you decide to leave the research.

Is there any way being in this study could be bad for me?
The risks to you as a participant are minimal. However, the questions that will be asked as part of this research will include topics relating to the 2004 Tsunami and the Civil war and how it has affected your life and those of your community members. Recalling some of this information may cause discomfort or psychological stress.

Will being in this study help me any way?
I cannot promise any benefits to you or others from your taking part in this research. However, possible benefits include an opportunity to voice your opinions and attitudes regarding the disaster, which participants in other studies have described as a "cathartic" experience. Additionally, individual participants have stated that it was encouraging to contribute to knowledge that was being gained from attention given to a disaster's impact on people's lives and their community.

What happens to the information collected for the research?
Efforts will be made to limit the use and disclosure of your personal information, including research study records, to people who have a need to review this information. I cannot promise complete secrecy. Organizations that may inspect and copy your information include the IRB and other representatives of this organization.
The results of this study may be published in scientific research journals, or presented at professional conferences and community meetings. However, your name and identity will not be revealed, and your record will remain confidential. Any narratives used will be designed to accurately present the essence of your comments while removing any personally identifiable information.

Can I be removed from the research without my OK?
The person in charge of the research study can remove you from the research study without your approval. Possible reasons for removal include: distress that you are experiencing as a result of sharing

your narrative or a determination that your cognitive functioning is hindered in such a way that would make your inclusion in this research unethical.

Verbal confirmation of informed consent:

Do you agree to participate in this study? Yes or No

University of Colorado Boulder

Permission to Take Part in a Human Research Study

மனித ஆய்வுக் கற்கையில் ஈடுபடுவதற்கான அனுமதி

ஆய்வுக் கற்கையின் தலைப்பு: அனர்த்த மீட்சி, சமூக முதலீடு, மற்றும் இலங்கைச் சூழ்நிலை: மட்டக்களப்பின் இரு சமூகங்கள் குறித்த ஓர் ஒப்பீட்டாய்வு

ஆய்வாளர்: *எலிஸபெத் பிட்டெல்* **(Elizabeth Bittel)**

இவ் ஆய்வில் நான் ஈடுபட ஏன் அழைக்கப்படுகிறேன்?

2004 இல் இலங்கையின் மட்டக்களப்பு மாவட்டத்தின் திருச்செந்தூர் அல்லது காத்தான்குடி 167B பகுதியை தாக்கிய இந்து சமுத்திர சுனாமியின் விளைவான சமுதாய மீட்பில் நீங்கள் பங்குபற்றியுள்ளமையே நாம் உங்களை இவ்வாய்வில் பங்குபற்ற அழைப்பதன் காரணமாகும்.

ஆய்வில் நான் எவற்றைப் பற்றி தெரிந்து கொள்ளவேண்டும்?

- யாராயினும் இவ்வாய்வினைப் பற்றி உங்களுக்கு விளக்குவார்கள்.
- இதில் பங்குபற்றுவதோ மறுப்பதோ உங்களைச் சார்ந்தது.
- நீங்கள் இதில் பங்குபற்ற விரும்பாமல் போவதும் உங்கள் விருப்பமாகலாம்.
- இதில் பங்குபற்ற ஏற்றுக்கொண்டு அதன் பின்னர் உங்கள் மனதை மாற்றிக் கொள்ளலாம்.
- பங்குபற்றும் உங்கள் முடிவு உங்களுக்கெதிராக பயன்படுத்தப்படாது.
- பங்குபற்ற முடிவெடுக்க முன்னர் நீங்கள் விரும்பிய சகல கேள்விகளையும் கேட்கலாம்.

யாரிடம் நான் கதைக்கலாம்?

ஆய்வு குறித்து உங்களுக்கு கேள்விகள், கரிசனைகள், முறைப்பாடுகள் இருப்பின் அல்லது ஆய்வு உங்களை காயப்படுத்தி விட்டது என நினைக்கலால் பிரதான ஆய்வாளரான **எலிஸபெத் பிட்டெல்** ஐ பின்வரும் தொலைபேசியில் [redacted] அல்லது elizahetb.bittel@colorado.edu மின்னஞ்சலில் தொடர்பு கொள்ளலாம். இல்லையேல், எலிஸபெத் பிட்டெலின் ஆய்வின் ஆலோசகரும் இயற்கை அனர்த்த மையத்தின் பணிப்பாளருமான **கத்லீன் டீர்னி** (Kathleen Tierney) ஐ தொ.பேசி [redacted] அல்லது மின்னஞ்சல் TierneyK@Colorado.edu மூலம் தொடர்பு கொள்ளலாம்.

இவ்வாய்வு நிறுவனத் திறனாய்வுச் சபையால் (Institutional Review Board - IRB) திறனாய்வு செய்யப்பட்டு ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டுள்ளது. பின்வரும் விடயங்களுக்காக அந்நிறுவனத்தைத் தொடர்பு கொள்ள வேண்டி இருந்த[redacted]து irbadmin@colorado.edu ஐ பயன்படுத்துங்கள்:

- ஆய்வுக் குழு உங்கள் கேள்விகள், கரிசனைகள், முறைப்பாடுகளுக்கு விடையளிக்காத பட்சத்தில்,
- ஆய்வுக் குழுவினை நெருங்க முடியாத சந்தர்ப்பத்தில்,
- ஆய்வுக் குழுவினைத் தவிர வேறு நபரைத் தொடர்பு கொள்ள விரும்பின்,
- ஆய்வுக்கு உட்படுபவர் எனும் ரீதியில் உங்களின் உரிமை பற்றி கேட்க விரும்பினால்,
- ஆய்வுபற்றி தகவல் ஏதும் தேவைப்படின் அல்லது உங்கள் தரவுகளை சேர்க்க விரும்பினால்.

IRB Approval Date

ஏன் இவ் ஆய்வு நடத்தப்படுகிறது?

இவ்வாய்வு இலங்கையின் உள்நாட்டு மோதல் சூழ்நிலையில் 2004 இந்து சமுத்திர சுனாமியின் அனர்த்தத்தில் இருந்து மீளும் மட்டக்களப்பிலுள்ள இரு சமுதாயங்களைச் சேர்ந்த மக்களின் அனுபவங்களை சேகரிப்பதை நோக்காக கொண்டுள்ளது. இங்கு சேகரிக்கப்படும் தரவுகள் சமுதாய மட்டத்தில் அனர்த்தங்களிலிருந்து மீளுவதற்கான கொள்கைகளுக்குப் பங்களிப்புச் செய்யுமென எதிர்பார்க்கப் படுகிறது. மேலும், மட்டக்களப்பின் அனர்த்த முகாமைத்துவ அதிகாரிகளின் சமுதாய மீட்சிச் செயற்பாடுகளுக்கும் நடைமுறை ஆலோசனைகளை வழங்கும்.

இவ் ஆய்வு எத்தனை காலம் நீடிக்கும்?

இத்திட்டத்திற்கான ஆராய்ச்சி நேர்காணல் மூலம் நிகழ்த்தப்படுவதோடு, ஒவ்வொரு நேர்காணலும் அண்ணளவாக 1 – 2 மணித்தியாலங்கள் கொள்ளுமென எதிர்பார்க்கப்படுகிறது. பெறப்படும் தரவுகள் ஆய்வாளரினால் பேணப்பட்டுப் பின்னர் 2 – 3 வருடங்களுக்குப் பகுத்தாய்வுக்குட்படுத்தப்படும். அதன் பின்னர் பெறுபேறுகள் வியாஸமாக்கப்பட்டு எலிஸபெத் பிட்டெலின் கலாநிதி பட்டத்திற்காக ஐக்கிய அமரிக்காவிலுள்ள கொலராடோ போல்டர் பல்கலைக்கழகத்தில் சமர்ப்பிக்கப் படும்.

எத்தனை மனிதர்கள் ஆய்வுக்குட்படுத்தப்படுவர்?

இலங்கையின் மட்டக்களப்பில் **150** நபர்களை இவ்வாய்வில் பயன்படுத்த எதிர்பார்க்கப்படுகிறது.

நான் இவ்வாய்வில் பங்குபற்ற சம்மதித்தால் என்ன நிகழும்?

- இக்கற்கையானது உங்கள் விருப்பத்திற்குரிய நேரம் மற்றும் இடத்தில் நிகழ்த்தப்படும் குறைந்தது ஒரு நேர்காணலையாவது கொண்டிருக்கும். இந்நேர்காணல் 1 – 2 மணித்தியாலங்கள் நீடிக்கும் என எதிர்பார்க்கப்படுகிறது.
- நேர்காணலின் போது, கடந்த யுத்த காலப்பகுதியில் 2004 இல் நிகழ்ந்த இந்து சமுத்திர சுனாமியின் அனர்த்தத்தில் இருந்து மீளுகையில் கிடைத்த அனுபவத்தைப் பற்றி உங்களிடம் கேட்கலாம்.
- இந்நேர்காணல் பிரதான ஆய்வாளரான எலிஸபெத் பிட்டெலினால் நிகழ்த்தப்படும் போது ஸலுஜா முருகையா எனும் தமிழ் பெயர்ப்பாளர் உதவியாக இருப்பார்.
- அடுத்து வரும் 10 மாதங்களுக்கு ஆய்வாளர் மேலதிக வினாக்களுடன் உங்களை மீணடும் தொடர்பு கொள்ளலாம்.
- வேறுவிதமாக நீங்கள் வேண்டாத பட்சத்தில், இந்நேர்காணல் ஒலிப்பதிவு செய்யப்படும்.

இந்நேர்காணல் ஒலிப்பதிவு செய்யப்படுவதற்கு உங்களின் இணக்கத்தை அல்லது விருப்பமின்மையை பின்வரும் ஏதாவதொரு தெரிவினூடாக தயவு செய்து அறியத்தரவும்:

___ ஆம், இவ் ஆய்வில் பங்குபற்றும் போது ஒலிப்பதிவு செய்யப்படுவதை ஆமோதிக்கிறேன்.
___ இல்லை, இவ் ஆய்வில் பங்குபற்றும் போது ஒலிப்பதிவு செய்யப்படுவதை நிராகரிக்கின்றேன்.

நான் இவ் ஆய்வில் பங்குபற்ற விரும்பாவிடில் என்ன நிகழும்?

நீங்கள் எந்நேரத்திலும் இவ்வாய்விலிருந்து வெளியேறலாம் என்பதுடன் அம்முடிவு உங்களுக்கெதிராக பயன்படுத்தப்படாது.

பங்குபற்ற ஏற்றுக்கொண்டு அதன் பின்னர் என் மனதை மாற்றிக் கொண்டால் என்ன நிகழும்?

நீங்கள் எந்நேரத்திலும் இவ்வாய்விலிருந்து வெளியேறலாம். அம்முடிவு உங்களுக்கெதிராக பயன்படுத்தப்படாது என்பதுடன் உங்கள் தரவுகள் அனைத்தும் கற்கையிலிருந்து அழிக்கப்படும். எனவே, உங்களை நேர்கண்ட நேரம், தேதி என்பற்றைக் குறித்துக் கொண்டால் நேர்காணலின் பின்னர் உங்கள் மனதை மாற்றிக் கொள்ளும் போது தரவுகள் மீட்டெடுக்கப்பட்டு அழிக்கப்படும்.

இவ் ஆய்வில் பங்குபற்றுவதால் எவ்விதத்திலும் எனக்குத் தீங்கு நிகழுமா?

பங்குபற்றுனர் எனும் அடிப்படையில் உங்களுக்கு எவ்வித தீங்குகளும் பாரியளவில் ஏற்படாது. எனினும், இவ்வாய்வின் பகுதியாகக் கேட்கப்படும் கேள்விகள் 2004 சுனாமியையும் சிவில் யுத்தத்தையும், அவை எவ்வாறு உங்களினதும் உங்கள் சமூகத்தைச் சார்ந்தவர்களினதும் வாழ்வுகளை பாதித்தது என்பவற்றைத் தொடர்புபடுத்தும் விடயங்களைக் கொண்டிருக்கும். அவ்வாறான நிகழ்வுகளை ஞாபகப்படுத்தல் உங்களுக்கு அசௌகரியத்தை அல்லது மனவழுத்தத்தை ஏற்படுத்தக்கூடும்.

இவ் ஆய்வில் பங்குபற்றுவதால் எவ்விதத்திலும் எனக்குப் பயனைத் தருமா?

இதில் பங்குபற்றுவதால் உங்களுக்கோ ஏனையோருக்கோ அவ்வாறான நன்மைகள் எதனையும் என்னால் உத்தரவாதமளிக்க முடியாதுள்ளது. ஏவ்வாறாயினும், அனர்த்தம் பற்றிய உங்களின் கருத்துகளையும் மனோநிலையையும் வெளிப்படுத்த ஏதுவான வாய்ப்பும், அதன் மூலம் ஓர் தூய்மைப்படுத்தும், விடுதலை உணர்வினை சாத்தியமான அனுகூலங்களாக கூறமுடியும். மேலும், மக்களின் வாழ்விலும் அவர்களின் சமூகத்திலும் அனர்த்தம் செலுத்திய தாக்கத்திலிருந்து பெறும் அறிவுக்கு பங்களிப்பு வழங்குவது உற்சாகமளிக்கிறது என தனியான பங்குபற்றுனர்கள் கூறியுள்ளார்கள்.

இவ் ஆய்வுக்கென சேகரிக்கப்படும் தகவல்களுக்கு என்ன நிகழும்?

ஆய்வுத் தரவுகளை பரிசோதிக்க விரும்புவர்களுக்குத் தங்களின் தனிப்பட்ட தகவல்களை பயன்படுத்துவதையும் வெளிப்படுத்துவதையும் மட்டுப்படுத்த முயற்சிகள் எடுக்கப்படும். என்னால் முழுமையான இரகசியத்தன்மையை உத்திரவாதமளிக்க முடியாது. தங்களின் தரவுகளை IRB யும் அதனுடன் தொடர்புபட்ட பிரதிநிதிகளும் பார்வையிடுவர்.

இவ்வாய்வின் பெறுபேறுகள் விஞ்ஞான ஆய்வுச் சஞ்சிகைகளில் அல்லது தொழில்சார் மாநாடுகளிலோ, சமுதாயக் கூட்டங்களிலோ வெளியிடப்படும். ஆயினும், உங்களின் பெயர், அடையாளங்கள் வெளிப்படுத்தப்படாது அத்துடன் உங்களின் விபரங்கள் இரகசியமாக வைக்கப்படும். ஆய்வு விபரணங்கள் தங்களின் தகவல் குறிப்புகளின் சாரத்தைக் கொண்டிருப்பதோடு உங்களை அடையாளப் படுத்தும் தரவுகள் நீக்கப்படும்.

என்னுடைய ஒப்புதல் இல்லாமலே இவ் ஆய்விலிருந்து நீக்கப்படுவேனா?

உங்களின் ஒப்புதல் இல்லாமலே இவ்வாய்வின் பொறுப்பாளரினால் ஆய்விலிருந்து நீங்கள் நீக்கப்படலாம். உங்களின் அனுபவங்களைப் பகிர்வதால் தங்களுக்கு ஏற்படும் மனவழுத்தம், அல்லது இதனால் உங்களின் சிந்தனைச் செயற்பாடுகள் பாதிப்படையும் நிலையில் அது ஆய்வு நெறிக்கு விரோதம் என ஆய்வாளர் தீர்மானித்தல் என்பன இதற்கான காரணங்கள்.

அறிவிக்கப்பட்ட சம்மதத்தின் வாய்மூலமான உறுதிப்பாடு: இவ் ஆய்வில் கலந்துகொள்ளச் சம்மதமா? ஆம் அல்லது இல்லை

சம்மதத்தை ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளும் பிரதான ஆய்வாளரின் கையொப்பம்:

திகதி: _____

நேரம்: _____

சமுதாயம் மற்றும் அதன் வகிபங்கு: _____

பிரதான ஆய்வாளரின் கையொப்பம்: _____