Prohairesis in Aristotle and Epictetus: The Early History of the Concept of Free Will

McDonald, Ellie

Undergraduate Honors Thesis

Prohairesis in Aristotle and Epictetus: The Early History of the Concept of Free Will Public Deposited

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Citeable URL: https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/undergraduate_honors_theses/7s75df043

Abstract

Aristotle first made use of the term prohairesis (προαἱρεσις) in the Nicomachean Ethics. Though usually translated as choice or decision, prohairesis in Aristotle does not denote an early faculty of a will. Rather, prohairesis is a special type of rational desire, or boulēsis (βουλησις), perhaps best understood as a deliberative planning desire or resolution. Centuries later, prohairesis is found co-opted by Stoic philosopher Epictetus in the Discourses. Instead of denoting a rational desire, prohairesis in Epictetus is used to describe our disposition or ability to make use of our impressions in a given way. I argue that neither Aristotelian nor Epictetan prohairesis can be understood as candidates for an early notion of a will, much less a free will. For Aristotle, this is because his moral psychology allows desires from each part of the soul to be sufficient to motivate action, if not outweighed by a stronger competing desire. So, there is no need for a further willing faculty to choose which desire to act upon. Furthermore, though Aristotle believes that prohairesis pertains to what is up to us, he does not entertain the notion that prohairesis itself could be up to us, suggesting that it cannot be a notion of an agential will as developed by medieval scholars. In Epictetus, prohairesis also falls short of an agential will since Epictetus suggests there may be a more essential self that may choose whether to align our prohairesis with the divine will of God. However, some argue prohairesis in Epictetus is a very crucial steppingstone toward the later development of the agential will in medieval thought, so it may be understood as a sort of “proto-will”. Discussion of the Stoic notion of freedom further explores the extent to which Epictetan prohairesis may be considered the notion of a free “proto-will”.

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