Close Call: Electoral Vulnerability and Legislative Effectiveness

Undergraduate Honors Thesis

Citations

Citeable URL: https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/undergraduate_honors_theses/6969z2679

Abstract

To what extent do election results change legislative behavior? To answer this question, this paper examines the influence of electoral dynamics on legislative productivity. Previous research has mainly looked in the opposite direction: how legislative productivity affects electoral outcomes. Using twenty years of data from the United States Congress, I hypothesize that legislators who perceive themselves to be vulnerable due to previous election results will become more effective lawmakers in response. An analysis of three different measures of electoral vulnerability provides evidence for my hypothesis, demonstrating that vulnerable members of Congress are more effective than others on average, but not in all cases. The effect of vulnerability on productivity appears to have strengthened in recent years. Contrary to my hypothesis, primary election vulnerability does not increase legislative effectiveness. This research contributes to our understanding of how electoral competition can shape representation.

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