Dutifully Oppressed: Essays on Duties To, and Duties Of, the Oppressed

Kianpour, Connor K.

Graduate Thesis Or Dissertation

Dutifully Oppressed: Essays on Duties To, and Duties Of, the Oppressed Public Deposited

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Citeable URL: https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/graduate_thesis_or_dissertations/3f462709h

Abstract

After a brief introductory chapter (Chapter I), I investigate the general question of whether our membership in social groups, as such, makes a difference for what we owe others and what others owe us, morally speaking in Chapter II. Those who answer this question in the affirmative are proponents of color consciousness whereas those who answer this question in the negative are proponents of colorblindness. In this chapter, I argue that we should presume the truth of colorblindness rather than the truth of color consciousness. This is because the moral costs of presuming the truth of colorblindness when, in fact, color consciousness is true are lower than the moral costs of presuming the truth of color consciousness when, in fact, colorblindness is true.

In Chapter III (“Reciprocity of the Oppressed”), I consider whether the value of reciprocity could help to explain why members of an oppressed group are specially obligated to one another. The value of reciprocity is often invoked to explain why citizens of a nation are obligated to one another to obey the laws of their nation. So it is worth asking if the value of reciprocity can explain why members of an oppressed group are obligated to one another to conform to particular norms. In this chapter, I conclude that the value of reciprocity cannot explain why members of an oppressed group have an imperfect duty to engage in certain kinds of sociopolitical activism for the sake of their other group members. In doing so, I hope to offer resistance to the increasingly popular notion that in order to be a “good gay” or a “good Black,” one must be progressive in their politics.

In Chapter IV (“Solidarity and the Duties of the Oppressed”), I consider whether the value of solidarity could help to explain why members of an oppressed group are specially obligated to one another. There are many contexts in which people reasonably believe that members of a group are specially obligated to one another so as to promote a valuable sort of group cohesion. For example, it is commonly thought that members of the same family or members of the same polity are specially obligated to one another so as to promote the valuable sort of group cohesion that is characteristic of these groups. So it is worth asking whether members of oppressed groups are specially obligated to one another so as to promote a valuable sort of group cohesion characteristic of their groups. I conclude, however, that the analogies between oppressed groups and families, and oppressed groups and polities, both fail.

After, in Chapter V (“‘You Should Have Known Better’: Epistemic Privilege and the Duties of the Oppressed”), I consider whether the value of epistemic privilege could help to explain why members of an oppressed group are specially obligated to one another. It seems that members of oppressed groups have intimate knowledge about the ways in which they are oppressed in society––knowledge that might position them well to help others in their groups overcome their respective oppressions. And it is worth asking whether those in oppressed groups who possess such knowledge have obligations to their other group members that flows from this knowledge. I conclude, however, that if such an argument succeeds, it would not generate obligations for members of oppressed groups to engage in specific activism and it might generate obligations for members of oppressed groups to be less antagonistic toward their other group members who flout widespread ideological commitments in the group.

And finally, I conclude in Chapter VI.

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