Conference Proceeding

 

An Argument Against Commensurate Truthmakers Public Deposited

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https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/conference_proceedings/p8418n89h
Abstract
  • The core of the truthmaker research program is that true propositions are made true by appropriate parts of the actual world. This idea seems to give realists their best shot at capturing a robust account of the dependence of truth on the world. For a part of the world to be a truthmaker for a particular it must suffice for, or necessitate, the truth of the proposition. There are two extreme and unsatisfactory truthmaker theories. At one extreme any part of the world (up to and including the whole world) that suffices for a proposition is deemed to be a truthmaker for that proposition. At the other extreme there is only one truthmaker that can do the job, and that is the entire world, the whole show. Another possibility suggests itself, that a truthmaker be any minimal sufficer for a proposition. A truthmaker is minimal if it suffices but no proper part of it suffices. A minimal sufficer would be both sufficient for the truth of the proposition and, in one sense, necessary for it as well. A minimal sufficers would be commensurate with the proposition it makes true. Unfortunately not all propositions have minimal sufficers. But it does not follow that not every proposition has a commensurate sufficer. The problem, then, is to specify a coherent notion of commensurateness on which every truth has a commensurate sufficer. I argue that this problem may not be soluble.
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  • 2014-01-01
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  • 2/20/2013-2/23/2014
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  • 2020-01-09
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