Article

 

Destructive Defeat and Justificational Force: The Dialectic of Dogmatism, Conservatism, and Meta-Evidentialism Público Deposited

https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/articles/g732d989w
Abstract
  • Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If the answer is ‘yes’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification by destroying propositional justification. You have neither all-things-considered nor some-things-considered justification for believing that the table is red. According to dogmatism, the justificational force of perceptual experiences is indestructible. According to conservatism about sense experience, a perceptual experience ceases to have justificational force if there is evidence against its reliability. Finally, according to meta-evidentialism, a perceptual experience is blocked from being a source of justification is there is no evidence of its reliability. I argue that, of these three theories, meta-evidentialism is the most plausible.

Creator
Date Issued
  • 2018-07
Academic Affiliation
Journal Title
Journal Issue/Number
  • 7
Journal Volume
  • 195
Subject
Publisher
Última modificação
  • 2020-01-22
Resource Type
Declaração de direitos
DOI
Peer Reviewed
ISSN
  • 1573-0964
Language

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