Doxastic Voluntarism and Up-To-Me-Ness

Steup, Matthias P.

Citeable URL: https://scholar.colorado.edu/concern/articles/cf95jc504

Abstract

Rik Peels and I agree on the importance of the concept of epistemic responsibility. We disagree on whether responsibility for our beliefs requires the kind of control needed for responsibility for our actions. I say it does; he says it does not. This disagreement is based on another one: we hold different views on the issue of doxastic voluntarism: Does the kind of control we have over our actions extend to our beliefs? I say it does; he says it does not. I endorse doxastic voluntarism: the view that we have no less control over our beliefs than we have over our actions. He rejects this view. Consequently, we hold different views on how epistemic responsibility is grounded. I claim it is grounded in the same way practical responsibility is: in a kind of control that is direct. Peels claims that epistemic responsibility is grounded instead in indirect influence and in this way crucially differs from the kind of responsibility we bear for our actions.

In his paper ‘Against Doxastic Compatibilism’, Peels has offered two arguments in response to my defense of doxastic voluntarism: the Up-To-Me Argument and the Delay Argument (Peels 2014). In my recent paper ‘Believing Intentionally’, I have explained why I find these arguments unconvincing (Steup 2017). In his excellent book Responsible Belief, Peels defends these two arguments against my criticisms. I will here continue our debate and respond to his defense of the Up-To-Me Argument. I begin by summarizing why I take doxastic voluntarism to be true.

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