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American Jewish Republicans: What we (still) Don't Know

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American Jewish Republicans:

What we (still) Don't Know

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Abstract

What causes American Jewish conservatism and why, like Jewish liberalism, has it remained relatively unchanged for so many years? This study approaches the question by assuming that the relationship between Orthodox Jews and Republican identity is more complex than a matter of religiosity. The theory of this paper supports the idea that the religious makeup of close social structures will be indicative of which political party American Jews identify with. Using data from a comprehensive survey of American Jewish life recorded in 2013, this study examines the closest social relationships of American Jews; specifically looking at close friends, spouses, and parents. In analyzing the data for this project a clear picture of the causes of American Jewish Republicans were not found but many important indicators of party identity were uncovered through the numerous control variables and some of these findings are especially important in understanding the political identities of American Jews.

Introduction

What are the origins of American Jewish conservatism and how do we explain its persistence? This question is not the usual approach for this oft examined religious demographic in America. American Jews have been the object of inquiry for political scientists for two basic reasons. First, they have high levels of political participation compared to the average American and to other ethnic and religious groups (Wald 2014). Second, they have overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party for approximately eighty years (Uslaner 2013). This is phenomenal because while so much of the United States and the world have changed, Jews have remained steadfast Democratic supporters. Some of these transformative events are those that impact all Americans in addition to events that had a particularly profound impact on world Jewry. The most notable of these events include the Holocaust, the creation of the state of Israel, the Vietnam War, the Six-Day War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, September 11th, the financial crisis, and the election of Barack Obama.

Another reason American Jews have been identified as an important group to research is that the proposed explanations of their steadfast support of the Democratic Party is widely debated. Additionally, American Jews puzzle researchers because factors that cause other demographic groups to vote a certain way are seemingly inconsequential in explaining how American Jews vote. In this case, the prime example is income. Pundits and Politicians from both sides of the aisle are similarly interested in reaching out to American Jews. Republicans have recently felt that now is the right time to bring American Jews into their camp and have heavily invested in reaching out to them in the 2004 and 2012 Presidential Elections (Uslaner 2013).

As a student of Political Science, I am interested in the extent to which this demographic has been consistent in its voting patterns over the years, overwhelmingly supporting Democrats since President Roosevelt (Weisberg 2012). As an American Jew I have witnessed the high levels of political activity and the general preference for the Democratic Party throughout various Jewish communities. This personal experience increases my desire to unpack the intricacies involved in the determining factors of American Jewish vote choice. The minority who vote Republican are especially interesting because in a way they are ‘deviating’ against their ethnic/religious voting majority. Once the factors that cause this deviation are found, the American Jewish community can see where the opportunities for reconciliation and cooperation are, if at all. This would increase the likelihood that American Jews unite politically and as a result see greater success in creating and attaining political goals.

Throughout this paper I will look at possible causes of contemporary American Jewish conservatism. The data set I will analyze is the 2013 Pew survey entitled: “A portrait of Jewish Americans.” I will test to what extent the effects of American Jewish social structures have on American Jewish conservatism. The social relationships I narrow in on are how many of a person’s close friends are Jewish, if their spouse/partner is Jewish, and if they have Jewish parents. The reason these close social relationships are important is because they have the greatest impact on political socialization. The influence of close friends and family cannot be understated when it comes to recognizing how people make important decisions in their lives’, political or personal.

Lit Review

Political scientists and politicians alike are fascinated with American Jews' political activity which is surprising because Jews account for only two percent of the population in the United States (Wald 2014). The interest in this minority group is the result of American Jews disproportionately high political participation in a variety of capacities including number of "elected officials, campaign activists, political donors, and voters in primary and general elections" (Ibid, p. 270).

The Liberal Majority

American Jews have been researched intently not only for their high levels of political participation, but mostly for their high levels of partisanship. The majority of American Jews have been a part of the Democratic coalition that emerged with the New Deal in the 1930s (Weisberg 2012). Since 1928 only one Republican presidential candidate, Reagan in 1980, has gotten more than one-third of the Jewish vote (Uslaner 2013). Among American Jews, young and highly educated Jews are more likely to vote Democratic, which follows national patterns of non-Jews (Fisher 1979). Some scholars emphasize fluctuations of Jewish liberalism over time to point out the complexities and multiple factors at play within this group (Wald 2010), but all recognize the liberal majority of this demographic. These fluctuations are less monumental when focusing on the general voting trends of the national electorate, which correspond to the changes in Jewish support for Democratic candidates (Cohen 2008).

A big part of the puzzle around Jewish liberalism is the degree to which Jews vote against their perceived economic self-interest; that is, they reject 'pocketbook voting.' It is also true that most Americans reject pocketbook voting and instead engage in sociotropic voting (Sigelman 1991, Wald 2010). Pocketbook voting is the idea that people vote based on their economic self-interest while sociotropic voting proposes that people vote based on their assessment of the state of the economy as a whole, independent of their personal financial situation. American Jews tend to have high socio-economic status compared to other demographic groups in America, which usually corresponds to voting more conservative. However, what is observed regarding

American Jewish partisanship goes against the pocketbook voting theory and puzzles political scientists and pundits alike.

To solve this puzzle, many different hypotheses have been proposed to explain the tendency for Jews to identify as liberal. These include Jewish values, historical circumstance, minority group interests, and religious modernism (Cohen 1997). Within the category of Jewish values there are multiple factors including “argumentative individualism and universal compassion” (Ibid, p. 10). The first emphasizes a tradition of individuality and critical discussion and the latter is associated with charity and social welfare. According to surveys many Jews “regard liberalism as the essence of Judaism itself” (Wald 2014, p. 270).

Alternate explanations include the concept that minorities care about how other minorities are treated in society, especially if there is a fear that their minority group might be the target of discrimination. This theory posits that these groups will support the political party that is seen as protective of minority rights. The Democratic Party is perceived by Jews to be the party that promotes the liberal nature of the political system which allowed Jews the comforts they enjoy in America (Wald 2010, Uslander 2013). This is a more recent theory that is gaining ground and is more attractive to Political Scientists because it offers an explanation that doesn't contend that Judaic religion or culture causes their liberalism. It does, however, look at the unique historical experiences of American Jews as a cause for their longstanding Democratic tradition.

When it comes to beliefs on issues it is true that Jews tend to be more liberal. However, “once we control for socio-demographic patterns, [Jews] are not particularly liberal. Their political outlook embraces little special sympathy for the poor and the vulnerable,” one of the key causes of the Democratic Party (Cohen 1997, p. 425). Nevertheless, their issue positions may be more conservative than most people assume, but that doesn't mean they vote on the issues. American Jews still overwhelmingly identify as Democrats and vote Democratic at the polls. Other research suggests that when it comes to issues about race, Jews are more liberal than non-Jewish whites. James Glaser attributes this to Jews sharing minority status with African-Americans. In recent years and in the future, researchers anticipate this tendency to deteriorate because younger American Jews don't have the same feelings of minority status as did older generations through real and perceived discrimination (Glaser 1997, Sonenshein 2000). Another

commonality between Jews and African-Americans is that both groups are more likely to vote for candidates from their own ethnic group (Legge 1993). This may also be connected to the tendency for minority groups to engage in bloc voting as a way to maximize their political capital (Laponce 1988).

Additional findings on Jewish liberalism include the claim that Jewish elites, across all levels of religiosity, are more liberal than non-Jewish elites because Jewish liberalism is a function of socialization at the familial level (Lerner 1989). From an international perspective, some researchers suggest that the liberal tendency is specific to American Jews and that world Jewry is more centrist (Wald 2010). On the contrary, some researchers look at Canada and other destinations for Jewish immigration around the world and find that these Jewish populations indeed have liberal tendencies (Laponce 1988, Levey 1995). If the liberal tendency of Jews is in fact a worldwide phenomenon it might point to something within Judaic religion or culture as the cause of Jewish liberalism. The problem with drawing such general conclusions from global observations is that the experiences of Jews in each of these countries differs, the definitions of politically liberal or conservative differs from country to country, and the worldwide distribution of Jews is concentrated in America and Israel, notwithstanding significant Jewish communities in Europe and South America.

American Jewish Conservatives

The minority of the minority are the conservative American Jews. This side of the equation has been given much less attention from researchers simply because there are far fewer Jewish conservatives. In recent years pundits have proposed that the proportion of Jewish conservatives is growing, however these claims are largely unsubstantiated and usually espoused by hopeful Republicans (Ehrman 1999, Sonenshein 2000). This group deserves a closer look because the factors that lead to Jewish liberalism are not necessarily the same factors that lead to Jewish conservatism and are worth exploring to come to a more comprehensive understanding of American Jewish partisanship.

One of the factors that led to conservatism among Jews is a strong sense of Jewish communal identity, which includes “Jewish friendships, living in Jewish communities, opposing intermarriage, and support for Israel,” (Legge 1995). The problem with this conclusion is that

these variables are potentially proxies for high levels of Jewish religious observance, even more so than the variables that measure close interpersonal relationships. Additionally, this finding is currently twenty years old and a fresh look is required to understand the current state of American Jewish Republicans. Another study found that two types of Jews were more likely to be Republican. One is the Orthodox who observes traditional Jewish law and on the other end of the spectrum are people from households with one Jewish parent, who self-report only a nominal connection to Judaism (Windmueller 2003). The causal explanations for these findings remain unclear. Regarding the Orthodox Jews it could be that their strong attachment to tradition and a strong desire for religious rights and accommodation directs them to the Republican Party. For the other group of people that are less connected to the Jewish religious tradition in their daily life almost certainly have alternative motivating factors causing their conservatism. It could be explained by regressing to pocketbook voting and identifying with the Republican Party, because they perceive the GOP as the party that will better serve their financial self-interest. If this group of less observant Jews also rejects pocketbook voting then their motivations for identifying as Republicans remains undetermined.

In a study of American Jews in the 2008 Presidential Election, researchers Steven Cohen, Sam Abrams, and Judith Veinstein unearthed interesting details about American Jewish conservatives. They had especially significant findings regarding the difference in political socialization between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews. “Among Orthodox Jews, those whose close friends are all Jewish, almost universally support McCain over Obama (90% vs. 10%), far more than those with mostly, or even fewer, Jewish close friends (60% McCain vs. 40% Obama). However, the impact of having many Jewish friends is the reverse for the non-Orthodox. Among the vast majority of Jews who are not Orthodox, having more Jewish friends is associated with greater support for Obama,” (Cohen, Abrams, and Veinstein 2008, p 21). This exemplifies an interesting dichotomy between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox American Jewish population and the potential for partisan socialization. Among non-Orthodox – about 90% of the Jewish population – having mostly Jewish friends corresponds to support for the Democratic candidate. The opposite is true for the Orthodox which has interesting implications for the motivations behind associating with certain people, and the ways that humans consciously and subconsciously choose who to spend their time with.

This study assumed that American Jewish liberalism was embedded in the political party identity of American Jews, which explains their steadfast support of Democratic candidates (Ibid 2008). One question that this assumption raises is why Orthodox Jews were left out of this political identity. If the non-Orthodox Jewish community, which itself contains huge number of diverse demographic characteristics, adopted this Democratic identity, then the Orthodox Jewish community should have shown at least some signs of Democratic political identity. Instead they show the opposite which calls into question how this political identity was established.

Interesting possibilities for case studies are the 2004 and 2012 presidential elections when Republicans specifically reached out to Jews on the basis of strong support for Israel. In both cases the evidence shows that Jews didn't respond to these attempts and remained overwhelmingly liberal in these elections. Some have suggested that the reason for the recent rejection of conservatism by American Jews are their negative attitudes towards evangelicals and the tea-party, who they perceive as the base of the Republican Party (Uslaner 2009, Uslaner 2013). Another important fact to note about the recent attempts by Republicans to capture more of the Jewish vote is their failure in convincing Jews that the Democratic Party is not sufficiently pro-Israel. The reason that these efforts are unsuccessful is because American Jews don't vote solely on the issue of Israel, both parties have a history of strong support for Israel anyway, and they understand that the Evangelicals who have the strongest pro-Israel attitudes care more about Israel than they do about Jews. American Jews are wary of Evangelicals because a lot of the comforts Jews have enjoyed in America are a result of the separation of church and state (a line Evangelicals hope to blur) and numerous attempts in the past and present to convert Jews (Uslaner 2013).

Among Jews who are perceived as more conservative there were surprising findings in the 2012 presidential election. Some information we learned from that election is that even though Orthodox Jews are more conservative, this subgroup was only more likely to vote for Romney by four-percent compared to non-Orthodox Jews. This suggests that a more complex explanation of the causal relationship between religiosity and conservatism is necessary. In that same election among the wealthiest Jews, those who earn more than \$200,000 a year, 59% voted for Obama (Uslaner 2013). This number is significantly less than the overall percentage of Jews who voted for Obama but is still an indication that even the wealthiest Jews, who we would

expect to be conservative given their economic self-interest, still supported the Democratic candidate by a sizable majority.

The Jews who vote conservative pose a complex question and their level of religiosity may not be the sole cause of their partisan leanings. The Jewish religion has multiple factors within it that point to opposite directions on the political spectrum. On the one hand there is a part of the religion that stresses “uniqueness, exclusivity, and exhibiting ethnic pride” while there is also a strong emphasis in the religion on “tolerance, obligation to society, and generosity” (Legge 1995, p. 124). Another issue is that research indicates that the social influences of a specific group have less sway over an individual’s values than the values promoted by society as a whole (Gainous 2005). This suggests that even if specific Jewish traditions or experiences would tend to promote a partisan identity the factors actually causing their tendencies may come from American society as a whole.

Ann Southworth, a professor of law, collected stories from various Jewish attorneys who identify as Republican to try to understand their politics on an individual level. This collection of testimony was certainly not representative of Jewish conservatives as a whole, as she only interviewed 16 Jewish attorneys, but some of the anecdotal evidence can provide clarity into the individual motivations of certain American Jews that could shed light onto a broader shared experience. Southworth found that the Jewish conservatives she interviewed had libertarian or pro-business leanings, rather than being motivated by social issues like gay marriage, abortion, etc (Southworth 2012).

Southworth also observed that the older Jewish conservative lawyers she interviewed had a shift in their political identity – changing from Democratic to Republican – while the younger attorneys reported a consistent conservative identity (Southworth 2012). In one account that exemplifies the former situation, an attorney explains how personally significant changing his political identity was and how he vividly remembers the event:

“I’m Jewish. The best man at my wedding was a Democratic member of Congress with 100 percent voting record with the ADA. . . . [But] in the . . . most morally courageous act of my life, I went to get the card – a registration card, checked the box called, gulp, Republican, signed the form and went to the postal box and stuck it in, and became, as I

said, at the time, the only Republican I knew, and having done it I didn't feel Jewish for six months. . . . [Later], of course, I starting associating with people who had gone through pretty much the same emotional identity experience I went through,” (Ibid, p 11).

In this person’s experience, he felt that his liberal identity was an essential part of his Jewish identity, and that abandoning it meant abandoning a part of being Jewish.

Here is different testimony from one of the younger lawyers who felt their conservative identity was consistent throughout their life, even though it differed from their parents’ partisan identity:

“Growing up in New York City in the 1970's . . . our taxes were unbearably high. There were no services It was hard to have a lot faith in ‘big’ government. My parents were both school teachers. They constantly talked about how they were being ripped off by the unions. . . How corrupt the system was, how they weren't rewarded, how awful public schools were, how many welfare cheats there were, how often the welfare families didn't have the same kinds of values as the other families – even poor families that they encountered. And all I did was just listen to them. I listened to them about the dangers of drugs, about the fact that there's right and wrong, and they wonder why I became a Republican? I wonder why they've remained Democrats. I know the reasons, two reasons. The first reason is they're from New York and everybody's a Democrat. And [second] because they're Jews. And there was this long tradition of Jews being Democrats. And I used to say that my Grandfather – everything that he said was incredibly rightwing and conservative. . . But, it's as if he would go in the ballot box intending to vote Republican, and the hand of G-d would come and move his hand to the left. And my parents – it’s not to say my parents have never voted Republican, they have... but their identity is pretty much Democratic. . . I didn't have any of that baggage,” (Ibid, p 12).

This account corroborates evidence in one of the previously discussed studies that said American Jews have much more conservative issue positions than their voting behavior indicates.

According to this view, the reason for their continued support of Democratic candidates is a function of their political party identification, which remained unchanged regardless of the policies they actually preferred.

What We Don't Know

Given the extensive research on American Jewish partisanship we know a lot about their lengthy history of being Democratic and have a good idea of the factors that lead them to that party. A much less examined part of the picture is the phenomenon of American Jewish conservatives that aren't necessarily persuaded by the same factors as their liberal counterparts. Even though there is a correlation between higher levels of Jewish observance and identifying as a Republican, there is a lack of evidence that this simplistic explanation amounts to a causal relationship. My research will focus on uncovering the factors that cause American Jewish conservatism. I will specifically look at social structures of American Jews and whether or not having many Jews in close interpersonal relationships impacts Jewish conservatism.

Theory

The typical relationship political scientists explore when explaining Jewish conservatism is that between observance of Jewish law and the likelihood of identifying as a conservative. The nationally representative Pew survey in 2013—the data source of this paper—found that among Orthodox Jews 57% self-identify as Republican. There could be a causal relationship to explain the correlation but even a causal relationship is unable to shed light on the whole picture of American Jewish conservatism because Orthodox Jews are only 10% of the total American Jewish population. This leaves approximately 70% - a sizable majority - of Jewish conservatives who aren't Orthodox unaccounted for.

There are many potential factors that can influence the likelihood of American Jews identifying as conservatives but for the narrow scope of this paper I will focus on three factors that examine the effects of Jewish social experiences on Jewish Americans' political identity. More specifically, I will look at the extent to which spending a majority of time around other Jews has an impact on conservatism. The reason this might have an effect is because it is not simply a measure of exposure to other Jews, but is rather a measure on the number of close interpersonal relationships American Jews have with other Jews. Additionally, I will define my

dependent variable as Republican political identity because “for Jews, as for other Americans, politics are a matter of identity—and political decisions are a matter of political identity,” (Cohen 2008, p 13). Even though other factors like issue positions, economic trends, and candidate likeability can influence vote choice, the factor with the largest effect is party identification.

To measure the effects of these variables I will split the relationships up into three distinct hypotheses: 1) An increase in the number of close friends a Jewish person has, who are Jewish, will correspond to a decrease in them identifying as Republicans, compared to someone with no Jewish close friends. 2) An American Jew who has a non-Jewish spouse/partner will correspond to higher levels of Republican identification, compared to Jews with Jewish spouses. 3) American Jews who have one or zero Jewish parents will correspond to higher levels of identifying as Republicans, while having two Jewish parents will lead to lower levels of Republican identity.

Before unpacking the causal mechanisms that substantiate these hypotheses, a parallel exists in American politics that introduces important background to this discussion. Evangelical Christians in America have strongly supported the Republican Party since the 1970s (Rhodes 2011). That support wavers around 75% leaving a sizable Democratic minority. Rhodes claims that the lack of attention paid to Evangelical Democrats represents an “understudied minority” because they account for approximately 7% of the total U.S. voting population – which is triple the size of the entire Jewish population in America (Ibid, p 29, p 36). Rhodes’ study argues that ‘Role Conflict Theory’ is the coping mechanism that Evangelical Democrats use to combine their two potentially contradictory identities (Ibid). This doesn’t mean that there is anything within Evangelical Christianity that leads them to being Republican, but that within this religious community the vast majority identify as Republicans. The possible coping mechanisms of Role Conflict Theory include completely adopting one of the identities, compromising on various aspects of either identity, or remaining in a state of conflict. This theory was historically used to explain how women who defied the traditional role of homemaker and entered the workforce coped with their conflicting identity role. Role conflict theory will be useful in explaining the factors that lead Jewish Republicans to abandon the widespread Jewish norm of identifying as Democrats.

Rhodes' study argues that the strategy adopted by most Evangelical Democrats is to remove themselves from public or communal aspects of religious life. In practical terms, this means that they are less religious than their Republican counterparts on two key factors: lower church attendance and more liberal Bible interpretations. However, they have the same beliefs as Evangelical Republicans when it comes to the divinity of Jesus, tithing, frequency of prayer, exclusivity of their faith, and proselytizing (Ibid). The reason that Rhodes cites as an explanation for this subgroup to avoid communal religious events is that "Many Evangelical churches make politics an issue that is of primary importance, creating an environment that wards off dissenters. Environments of political activity are less likely to make religious beliefs into an issue of contention," (Ibid, p 45). Evidence that supports this is seen in Evangelical Christians using religious and social gatherings to promote political agendas, either implicitly or explicitly, and these agendas reflect that conservative bent.

Some important similarities exist between Evangelical Christians and American Jews. First, the partisan split within the religious demographic is similar, with each subgroup having a significant minority of approximately 20%. Another similarity is the correlation that exists with regard to religiosity. Within both groups higher levels of religiosity, at least using certain measures¹, correspond to higher levels of conservatism. It is important to note differences that exist in comparing these two groups as well. Demographically speaking, Jews live in rural areas at a much lower rate than Evangelicals, who make up a much larger proportion of the American population. In regard to politics Evangelicals are perceived as the base of the Republican Party. In contrast, Jews are certainly known for their activism and support but are not thought of as the base of the Democratic Party. This comparison provides perspective on how to view the Republican Jewish minority and what factors might be involved in how they cope with their 'role conflict.'

Another important piece to address is the lack of homogeneity in the Jewish community. Even though they are a relatively small group in America that exhibit certain trends, it would be a fallacy to assume that there has been one straightforward American Jewish experience. Indeed, this is true of almost all demographic groups in America that we tend to make generalizations

¹ As explained above, Evangelical Democrats have lower levels of religiosity on measures of church attendance and a conservative interpretation of the Bible, but they have comparable levels of religiosity when looking at other factors.

about. Social groups can be both cohesive and divided. Subgroups exist with their own unique characteristics including political, social, economic, and religious differences (Kotler-Berkowitz 2000). This fact is important to remember as we progress in this study, to ensure that even though we are using a simplified model of American Jewry to obtain important information it is necessary to remain mindful of the diversity that exists.

If an American Jew has high numbers of close friends who are also Jewish they will be less likely to be conservative. Admittedly this hypothesis depends on whether or not their Jewish close friends identify as Republicans or Democrats. Obviously having a group of close friends that all identifies as Republican will rarely correlate to a Democratic identity. However, because of the high numbers of Jewish Democrats this variable won't be tainted by the relatively low numbers of Orthodox Jewish Republicans. Additionally, even among Orthodox Jews, there is no guarantee that all of their close friends, who are similar religiously, identify the same way politically.

Close friends have a much greater impact on someone's political persuasions than teachers, peers, and other acquaintances (Burbank 1997). They reinforce existing political attitudes and in some cases can cause others to change their preexisting beliefs. Unfortunately for this study there is also a tendency for people to surround themselves with people who have similar ideological positions (Hackett and Hogg 2010). When looking at a nationwide sample of all Americans this issue would become a legitimate problem. However, when looking at the subgroup of American Jewry we can assume that in some places there will be a large enough Jewish community so that people who have high numbers of close Jewish friends can surround themselves with likeminded people. Because the Jewish population is so heavily concentrated in large metropolitan areas, the majority of these communities will have a diverse population of Jews with a variety of political party identities (the majority of which are liberal) and will lead to Jews having exposure to liberal political attitudes.

Consequently if someone has very low numbers of close Jewish friends they will be more likely to be conservative. Admittedly, this works well to explain conservative Jews who would like to have a high number of Jewish close friends but don't because they put a greater emphasis on having friends with affirming political attitudes. Not all American Jews desire to or are in a homogenous community where it is realistic to only have Jewish friends. Even in these cases I

contend that lower numbers of close friends who are Jewish will lead to a higher amount of conservatism. This will occur because someone who deviates from the Jewish norm of liberalism is caused to do so by a variety of factors. One of the primary factors is the ethnic/religious composition of their core group of friends and without the high likelihood of a Jewish group of friends to be liberal, they will be more likely to deviate to a conservative identity.

If an American Jew has a non-Jewish spouse, they will be more likely to be conservative. Contrary to the popular mantra ‘opposites attract’ people are more likely to engage in a romantic partnership with another person who shares a similar upbringing (Lazarus, 2001). If a Jewish person marries a non-Jew they are expressing a rejection of a Jewish social norm, as espoused by the Jewish establishment. Consequently, deviation from this one Jewish norm will make them more likely to identify as conservative which deviates from the other Jewish norm of liberalism. Because interfaith couples are less likely to attend public Jewish events, regardless of if they are religious or social, they are going to be less exposed to the political socialization that occurs through these gatherings, whether implicit or explicit.

There is already some evidence to support my third hypothesis (Windmueller 2003), but I will test it again with this most recent survey to see if it holds true. American Jews with only one Jewish parent will be more likely to identify as conservative. A person is usually politically socialized in adolescence and picks up the majority of their politics from their parents (Glass, Bengtson, and Dunham 1986). However, this doesn’t occur when parents do not agree politically, or if there is some other discord within the family. In those cases, children adopt other methods of political socialization from teachers, friends, or the media (Graber and Dunaway 2014). Regardless of the countless examples of happy and healthy interfaith families, there has been a sustained belief within the Jewish community that interfaith families are a problem for the future of American Jewish continuity (Wertheimer, Liebman, and Cohen 1996). People who are socialized in interfaith families are more likely to gain political socialization outside of the Jewish community and identify as conservative, especially if they are perceptive of the Jewish establishment’s attitude on interfaith marriages.

In addition to these hypotheses I will include controls for variables that probably also have an effect. These include denominational identity, attendance at Jewish services, belief in a higher power, membership at a synagogue or other Jewish organization, Jewish identity, support

and attachment to the State of Israel, perceptions of anti-Semitism, immigrant status, and personal histories of anti-Semitic oppression. Any of these can have an effect on conservative identity but I contend they won't have as big of an impact as the social factors I am focusing on. These controls were picked because they measure a broad range of concepts that relate to Jewish identity, communal life, and religious practice and belief. Additionally I will control for standard demographic effects like sex, education, race, country of birth, geographic region in the US, where the respondents parents are from, political ideology, American citizenship status, income and age which will give me a better idea if the conclusions I draw in my analysis revolve around something specific to Jews or if the differences can be adequately explained by these universal factors.

Research Design

As the focus on American Jews has grown in the political science field, various methods of collecting data have been promoted as the 'best' way to explain phenomena about this group of people. The primary issue is that most nationally representative surveys do not produce enough Jewish respondents to derive meaningful results. One way to get around this is to compound multiple nationally representative surveys and look at patterns that American Jews exhibit over time. Two political scientists, Cohen and Liebman did this by taking survey results from over 20 years and ended up with a Jewish population to study of 700 people (Cohen and Liebman 1997). Even though their study had a large enough sample size to draw statistically significant results, by no means did they have an abundance of respondents. One thing to be cautious of with national surveys or polls is how successfully a survey accounts for differing residential patterns. Some Jews live in heterogeneous communities while others live in homogenous communities which could skew results and lead to sampling error (Weisberg 2012). The benefit of looking at national surveys over a long time period is that it allows us to look at American Jews as a whole, but because of so many changes that occur over long periods of time it is hard to be confident that the factors affecting one generation of Jews are the same factors twenty years later.

Another way to study American Jews' political leanings is to look at local surveys and exit polls in areas with large concentrations of Jewish people. An example of this is a study that focuses on the Los Angeles Mayoral race in 1993. Even though Jews only made up six-percent of the population in Los Angeles at that time, they accounted for nineteen-percent of the total voters giving the researchers plenty of Jews to focus on (Sonenshein 2000). The benefits of this approach is that you have an accurate snapshot in time which makes it easier to control for certain factors, but the drawback is that it is unlikely that the findings of a study carried out in this manner will be transferrable to American Jewry as a whole. Both of the procedures outlined above are especially suitable for comparing Jews to non-Jews.

A third way exists to examine more subtle differences between Jews by gathering more data on a large number of Jews that covers a broad array of topics (Phillips 2007). This approach doesn't bode as well for comparing Jews and gentiles but allows for a more comprehensive picture of American Jewry. This approach is the one I will utilize for my research purposes and will use the recent Pew Survey entitled "A Portrait of Jewish Americans" that has a high number of respondents in addition to a wide variety of survey questions.

I will measure my dependent variable of American Jewish Republican identity primarily by looking at two questions from the Pew survey. The first says "In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent?" If they answer independent the follow up question reads: "As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?" From these questions I will have a good idea about how they self-identify politically and be able to identify them as a Republican-identified American Jew or not. This variable will be represented on a five point scale ranging from negative two to two. There is an additional question about political ideology which conforms to the same scale that will help confirm the accuracy of the party identification variable above. More people claim they are moderate in ideology than what is shown in party identification but is nevertheless an effective way to check party identification.

To measure my independent variables I will use other questions from the survey that indicate how much social interaction the respondent has with other Jews. For H1 I will use the question: "How many of your close friends are Jewish? Would you say all of them, most of them, some of them, or hardly any of them?" Eighty-eight respondents voluntarily answered that

none of their friends were Jewish which will also be included in the variable. This will provides a range of answers that will signal how religiously diverse their group of friends are.

There are questions about the respondents' spouse's religion that I will use for H2 that is worded: "And what is your (spouse's/partner's) religion, if any?" Additionally, Pew created a variable that clearly lists whether or not the respondent has a Jewish spouse or not. The best way to measure whether or not having a Jewish spouse affects party identification is by creating three distinct 'dummy variables.' *Jsingle* measures how many of the respondents are single, *jmarriedj* measures how many of the respondents married another Jew, and *jmarriedg* measures how many of the respondents married a non-Jew. This approach allows us to look at the effects of marrying Jewish compared directly to someone who did not, with a baseline variable being the Jewish singles.

Lastly, the question in the Pew Survey that will be used to measure my third variable is: "Thinking about your parents, which if either of them were Jewish?" The answer provided will tell me if they had a Jewish mother, a Jewish father, or both. I can use this information to dissect my hypothesis even further to see if there is any difference between people who come from an interfaith family of a Jewish mother verses a Jewish father. There isn't necessarily any logic behind any potential differences in these families but it is still worth considering and if a difference occurs it could be a point of further research into what is causing this difference. Like the spouse variable, the best way to compare the effects for Jewish parents is by creating three dummy variables again. *Jmother* measures whether the respondent had a Jewish mother, *jfather* measures if they had a Jewish father, and *jparents* measures if both of their parents are Jewish.

The controls I am using are also all going to be from the Pew Survey using a multivariate regression analysis. One of the main controls that will be interesting to look at is the control which measures denominational identity. Although imperfect, denominational identity is a good measure of religiosity. An additional control included in the study that also measures religiosity is the level of attendance at Jewish religious services. Both variables are important in determining the effects of religiosity on party identification. Since many people point to the positive correlation of higher levels of religious observance with conservatism, they also think there is a causal relationship at play. Another interesting variable to look at is the specific denominational identity Orthodox Jews identify as. Pew offered three options—Hasidic,

Yeshivish, and Modern Orthodox—with many submitting a voluntary answer. This variable will provide clarity onto whether or not certain Orthodox denominations have more of a sway on political identity than others. Using denominational identity as a control is important to tell whether or not level of observance has a measureable effect on identifying as a Republican.²

Data and Analysis

The first model of interest is Model 1, which is a multivariate regression model that includes partyid measured against the three hypothesis concepts that measure the number of Jews present in the respondents' closest relationships. The concepts measuring spouse and parents are each separated into three dummy variables as explained above. The controls are naturally split up between those with Jewish characteristics and those that measure more universal characteristics. Models 2 focuses on the Jewish characteristics and Model 3 creates a regression based on the more universal control variables. Model 4 includes both the Jewish controls and the universal demographic controls and is the biggest model. If a relationship is significant in multiple models, that will help narrow down the causes of American Jews' partisan identity. Without the controls, most of these variables do not seem to have much of an effect on partyid, with the exceptions of having Jewish close friends (closefriends), the respondent being single (jsingle), and having a Jewish mother (jmother).

Table 1 (* indicates $P < .05$)

Model (n=)	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Variable Name	(n=5067)	(n=4291)	(n=3450)	(n=3026)
Closefriends	.198*	-.021	.006	-.066
Jsingle	-.209*	-.098	-.103	-.065
Jmarriedj	-----	.046	-.063	-.061
Jmarriedg	.078	-----	-----	-----
Jmother	-.216*	-.091	-.272*	-.237*

² A detailed explanation of how the various controls were measured is in the appendix.

Jfather	-.116	.08	-.162*	-.08
jparents	-.187	-.221	.058	.009

As someone moves up one interval in the measure of number of Jewish close friends, they will move up .198* points on their level of republican identity. If closefriends is measured by itself, without the controls within the other hypotheses, the results are still significant but the effect loses strength—the bivariate coefficient drops to 0.129*. This suggests that having Jewish close friends has an impact on partisan identity but not in the direction this hypothesis expected. One reason for this might be the strong positive correlation between having mostly Jewish friends and identifying with a Jewish denomination with higher levels of religiosity. Interestingly enough, all denominational identities have significant increases when measuring a regression of closefriends as the dependent variable compared to different Jewish denominations, although the Orthodox have over three times as strong of an effect of having a higher number of Jewish close friends with a coefficient of 1.5*. Ultimately the closefriends variable may be an indicator of denomination rather than an indicator of partyid even though all Jews who identify with a denomination have a statistically significant positive relationship with closefriends.

When the Jewish oriented controls are included the effect of having many Jewish close friends erodes. Not only does it become statistically insignificant, but the direction predicted in the regression coefficient becomes negative: -.021. It seems that the potential effect outlined above of having many Jewish close friends leading to greater levels of Republican identity is nullified when we control for Jewish oriented variables. Likewise, the closefriends variable does not have a statistically significant coefficient in Models 3 or 4. When closefriends is examined in multiple models, it becomes clear that the effects that seem to be occurring in the first model are nullified when controlling for Jewish specific factors, universal demographic factors, and both control variables combined.

In Model 1 jsingle has a statistically significant coefficient of -.209*. In practical terms this indicates that a Jewish person who is single moves .209 points towards identifying as a Democrat more so than a Jewish person who married another Jew (jmarriedj was the omitted baseline variable in this model). Once the other factors are controlled for, this relationship loses its significance in Models 2, 3, and 4. The initial coefficient may have been due to single people

perceiving the Republican Party as greater advocates of family life and therefore chose the Democratic Party. Unfortunately, this explanation would require the variable *jmarriedg* to indicate a Republican lean. It doesn't in Model 1 and is omitted from the other models, but we can be confident the relationship between who a Jewish person marries, or if they're married, is not indicative of partisan identification because none of the coefficients calculated in the models that account for controls indicate that a relationship exists.

Cueing stereotypes, Jewish mothers seem to be the most influential actors of the Hypothesis variables. The variable *jmother*, which measures whether or not the respondent has a Jewish mother, was statistically significant in three of the Models predicting that American Jews with Jewish mothers were more likely to identify as Democratic. The strength of the statistically significant coefficients ranged from $-.216$ to $-.272$ and are reliable predictors of partisan identity. This result refutes Hypothesis 3 because the respondents only have one Jewish parent (their mother) and are more likely to be Democratic, rather than the predicted outcome of an increased level of Republican identification. However, the variable *jmother* isn't necessarily a good variable to test this hypothesis because the variable labels all respondents who have a Jewish mother as a '1' even if they have a Jewish mother and a Jewish father. This issue is accounted for by including the variable *jparents*, which labels respondents who have two Jewish parents a '1' and all others a '0.' The problem arises because *jparents* was not statistically significant across any of the models. Something other than the causal mechanism suggested in this theory is working to push Jews with Jewish mothers towards Democratic identities.

Mothers have more impact than fathers when it comes to politically socializing their children. To see that occur within the American Jewish community isn't surprising. The question remaining is why Jewish mothers specifically lead their children to identifying as Democrats. One of the controls that might help explain this that will be discussed below is that Jewish women, like American women in general, are more likely to identify as Democrats. Ultimately, the effect of the Jewish mother would need to be examined in depth to understand why she has such an evident effect that pushes her children to identify as Democrats. Having a Jewish father only came up in one of the four models as indicating a Democratic partisan identification with a much weaker coefficient ($-.162^*$) than the *jmother* variable. Since *jfather* was only significant in

Model 3, there doesn't seem to be a strong indication that simply having a Jewish father has a substantial impact on a child's political party identification.

In creating the multiple models that account for many of the various controls that might have an effect on partisan identification, the control variables themselves proved interesting and significant in their own right. The following is a discussion of some of the most relevant controls in Models 2-4, and the full models may be viewed in the appendix.

Table 2 (* indicates $P < .05$)

Model	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Variable	(n=4291)	(n=3450)	(n=3026)
Other Jewish	-.484*		-.227*
No Particular Denomination	-.196*		-.088
Reform	-.424*		-.258*
Conservative	-.216*		-.261*
Orthodox	.175		-.326
attend_notjewish	.095*		.042*
Belief	.332*		.101*
org_member	-.130*		-.027
culture_id	-.198*		-.044
israel_support	.751*		.344*
israel_attached	.099*		.039
Jdiscrim	-.221*		-.051
off_name	.201*		.051
Female		-.159*	-.191*
Black non-Hispanic		-.959*	-.922*
Ideo		.823*	.6798*
Reg		-.354*	-.402*
Hhchildrec		.062*	.021
Age		-.003*	-.002

In Model 2 all of the Jewish denominations correspond to a higher level of Democratic partisan identity, except for the Orthodox. The direction of the coefficient (+.175) for Orthodox Jews suggests a positive relationship exists (lean republican) but it isn't even close to being statistically significant. All of the other denominations (including answering no particular denomination) indicate at varying levels an effect toward Democratic identity. The variable 'other Jewish' looks like it presents the strongest relationship with a coefficient of -.62, but this variable really isn't a good indicator because it includes all of the voluntary responses given, ranging from Jewish Renewal to secular to traditional. This response had to be included as the alternative was losing all of these respondents' answers to the rest of the survey. For this reason, I will ignore the 'other Jewish' results moving forward even though they look strong, significant, and interesting.

The weakest coefficient in Model 2 for the statistically significant denominations is that of those who don't identify with any particular denomination. Interestingly, this is the largest (non) denominational group in the survey, representing 29.22% of the 4,658 Jewish Americans who answered the question. Many might assume that this would mean a larger disconnect from Jewish observance. That assumption may or may not be true, but the fascinating part of the relationship is that it is a weak indicator of partisan identity compared to those who identify as Reform and Conservative. In Model 4 Jews of 'no particular denomination' lose their coefficient significance. One of the reasons that this is probably the case is because of the undoubtable diversity within this group. It is the largest group of American Jews and once the universal demographic controls came into play their effect is mitigated.

The second largest group is those who identify as Reform and account for 28.4% of the survey respondents. They also have the strongest coefficient meaning that someone who is reform is going to move -.424 points on the partyid variable, the negative coefficient suggesting the respondent is more likely to identify as Democratic. This isn't surprising as the Reform movement is more in line with Democratic Party policies and ideals. It would be interesting to see if liberal Jews are more likely to join the Reform denomination or if being Reform and attending Reform services has a Democratizing effect. One way to do this would be to look at the public statements of Reform religious leaders and to see how often they explicitly or implicitly advocate for Democratic candidates and causes.

The Jews in the Conservative denomination have only slightly stronger of a coefficient (-.216*) than those who don't identify with any denomination in Model 2. This means that being a Conservative Jew indicates being more likely to be a Democrat but it is not as strong of a predictor as being Reform. This makes sense as Conservative Jewry is the moderate denomination between Orthodox and Reform. Additionally Conservative Judaism has a much broader range of beliefs within their denomination due to its commitment to balancing modernity with Jewish Law (tradition). Many Conservative rabbis interpret the law leniently, while other Conservative rabbis don't agree that the law should be amended so progressively. This causes a lot of diversity within the world of Conservative Jewry and probably also affects the relative weakness of the relationship with partyid.

The difference in strength of the relationship between denomination and partyid is mitigated when controlling for both the Jewish--specific variables and the universal demographic variables. Identifying as a Reform or Conservative Jew still suggests the respondent being more likely to identify as a Democrat and the adjusted coefficients are -.258* and -.261* respectively. In Model 4 a Jew who is a part of the Conservative denomination is actually slightly more likely than a Reform Jew to identify as Democratic. To unpack this reality further, research could be directed at whether or not the parts of Judaism that advocate more liberal policies are emphasized in either of these denominations, or if (as suggested previously) religious leaders within these denominations use the pulpit to advocate for a certain party or politician. Additionally, some of the assumptions made in the previous paragraph may prove to be inaccurate descriptions and the American Conservative Jewish Community is much less diverse in terms of religiosity than assumed.

Attending Jewish services doesn't affect partyid in a significant way but American Jews who attend non-Jewish religious services are more likely to identify as Republican. Just under 50% of the respondents answered that they never attend non-Jewish religious services, 32.82% answered they seldom do, and a combined 11% answered they do more than once or twice a month. The coefficient is relatively small (.09) but indicates that increasing attendance at non-Jewish religious services (at least for Jews) can lead to identifying as a Republican. In Model 4, the relationship retains its statistical significance but the coefficient that measures the relationship decreases to .042, which means the strength of the already weak relationship doesn't

hold when controlling for universal demographic factors as well. This might support the hypothesis that being around Jews leads to a Democratic identity. To ascertain if the opposite is true a distinction needs to be made: is the determinant factor ascribing to non-Jewish religious beliefs that this variable measures, or is it simply the social factor of being around non-Jewish individuals at these services? Another pertinent piece of information that is necessary to examine this relationship further is which religious services the respondents are attending. It would be surprising if the effect remained true regardless of the religion.

Believing in G-d or a universal spirit is also statistically significant and has a surprisingly high coefficient (.31*) in Model 2 indicating that if a person believes in G-d they are more likely to identify as a Republican. In Model 4, the coefficient drops to .101* but remains significant nevertheless. A vast majority of respondents answered this question in the affirmative with over 80% saying that they believe in G-d or a universal spirit. The belief variable measures a basic belief in G-d or a universal spirit without signifying any other levels of observance or any other religious beliefs. The next step would be to analyze to what extent politicians invoke G-d in their speeches, and see if that skews towards the Republican party which might confirm this positive relationship. Another thing to examine is whether or not believing in G-d or a universal spirit has an effect on engaging in religious rituals or adopting religious beliefs. If it does, then that would support the theory that increased religiosity is connected to identifying as a Republican.

Belonging to a Jewish organization, other than a synagogue, means someone is more likely to identify as a Democrat. The strength of the coefficient relatively weak, -.130* but this finding supports the idea that spending time around other Jews leads to a Democratic political identity. Unfortunately, the three hypotheses that measure the closest relationships of being in the presence of Jews doesn't suggest the same results. Additionally, belonging to an organization is just one variable that indicates having a higher socioeconomic status or living in an urban area where more Jewish organizations are available. Overall, based on this one variable alone and a lack of corroborating relationships this is not sufficient evidence to confidently state that this causal mechanism is at play. Additionally, `org_member` loses its significance in Model 4 and records a coefficient of -.027, clearly showing that this is not a determinant factor in determining partisan identity.

Respondents who answered that culture was a part of their Jewish identity also have a statistically significant coefficient (-.198*) which indicates that these people are more likely to identify as Democrats. The respondents for this variable answered that culture is either one of the factors or the sole factor that defines their Jewish identity. The problem with culture is that it means something different to each person. Without knowing what was meant when the respondent answered 'culture,' this variable isn't valuable in understanding party identification. Additionally, the significance of this relationship is depleted when using all of the control variables in Model 4 which affirms the vague reality of this self-reported identity.

Believing the US should be more supportive of Israel than it already is indicates identifying with the Republican Party with a coefficient of .751* in Model 2. Model 4 also shows a positive relationship between the two variables with a coefficient of .344*. Since this variable measures a policy preference that happens to be in line with the Republican Party this result is hardly surprising. Similarly, those who report higher levels of attachment to the state of Israel also have a significant coefficient that indicates an increased likelihood of identifying as a Republican (.099*). This relationship shows a much more mild change in partisan identity than the previous variable that measures an actual policy position regarding Israel. Feeling some level of attachment to Israel is common for American Jews, but there are many differing opinions on how that feeling should be manifest in support. In Model 4 the variable that measures attachment to Israel, *israel_attached*, is no longer significant which probably can be explained by the above reasoning that Jews don't agree on how being attached to Israel should influence their politics.

Many American Jews who feel attached to Israel also feel sympathy for Palestinians and support a peace deal that would include the creation of a Palestinian state, which is aligned with the Democratic Party's approach to the conflict. Israel, despite attempts to the contrary, has remained a bipartisan issue and American Jews recognize that both Democrats and Republicans consistently support Israel (Uslaner 2013). Obviously some friction has occurred between the Obama Administration and Netanyahu's government but only time will tell if this friction will lead to a lasting change in the American Israeli relationship.

There is a negative relationship between *jdiscrim* and *partyid*, meaning a respondent who answered that they do believe there is a lot of discrimination against Jews in America today moves .221* points towards identifying as a Democrat. A couple things might be occurring for

these Jews who do perceive anti-Semitic discrimination. They might feel that the Democratic Party, in general, is more supportive of minority groups who experience discrimination. Additionally, perceiving the Democratic Party as being more tolerant of diversity could also lead American Jews who believe there is discrimination against their group to identify as Democratic. Nevertheless, this variable simply measures a perception of discrimination and when the universal control variables are inserted into the equation, *jdiscrim* no longer has a significant effect on *partyid*.

When asked if they have personally experienced anti-Semitic discrimination in the last year, over 90% of respondents answered no. The questions asked by Pew were whether or not the respondent had been called an offensive name in the last year or if they had been snubbed in a social setting because they are Jewish. A slightly higher number of respondents answered that they had been called an offensive name (8.5%) than those who answered they were left out of a social setting (5.76%). Those who answered they had been called an offensive name are more likely to identify as Republican, with a coefficient of .201*. Model 4, however, does not record a significant relationship which shows that when all of the controls are accounted for, this isn't a good indicator of partisan identity for American Jews. Further research that looks at the effects of discrimination on American Jewish partisan identity should look at the differences between perceiving anti-Semitic discrimination and actually experiencing it.

Female respondents were more likely than male respondents to identify as Democrats and the relationship actually increased when controlling for the Jewish specific factors in addition to the demographic controls. The coefficient increased from -.159* (Model 3) to -.191* (Model 4). An even stronger indicator of *partyid* than sex was race: Black American Jews are more likely to identify as Democrats than whites with coefficients of -.959* and -.922* in Models 3 and 4 respectively. Since both the Jewish community and the Black community have high levels of support for Democrats, it is no surprise to see this relationship. It would be interesting to see a member of two groups that have conflicting political patterns which would be a good way to further understand the Role Conflict Theory in regards to American politics. Both of these variables, sex and race, follow American political trends, and it is unlikely that anything specifically relating to Judaism explains why these variables affect American Jews.

The ideology variable is basically a check on the partyid variable and is a way to measure how accurate the partyid variable is. It is reassuring to the study to see a high, positive, and significant coefficient between partyid and ideo in both Models 3 (.823*) and 4 (.68*). One reason that the strength of the relationship isn't higher is that people tend to self-report being more ideologically moderate than they actually are. Nevertheless, this strong relationship is a good sign in confirming the validity of the partyid variable.

Whether or not a respondent is registered to vote or not is a basic measure of political participation. In Model 3 the statistically significant coefficient suggests that if an American Jew is registered to vote, they will move .354* points towards a Democratic political identity. With the increased number of controls in Model 4 the coefficient is actually strengthened, increasing to -.402*. This finding is extremely important because practically applied it means that Democratic Jews participate in Politics more than their Republican counterparts (as measured through the concept of voter registration). For the Republican Party to win over Jewish voters they not only have to convince American Jews to vote Republican, they also have to convince the Republican Jews to vote. Perhaps active voters who switch parties could retain their levels of participation but it is also plausible that while switching party loyalties they become disaffected from politics and exhibit lower levels of participation. This information indicates an uphill battle for Republicans hoping to court Jewish voters, an even greater challenge than was previously known.

The number of children under the age of eighteen in a household has a positive and significant coefficient in Model 3 (.062*). In Model 4 however, the significance and the relationship dwindles (.021). Model 4 takes into account all of the Jewish specific variables which probably means that this variable was simply a measure of religiosity, rather than an independent measure that would have an effect on partyid. Age is another factor that suggests a slightly negative relationship with partyid (-.003*), meaning that as age increases, a person is more likely to Identify as a democrat. The significance of this coefficient is non-existent in Model 4 which suggests that age is not a good indicator of partyid.

Conclusion

Like many previous attempts this study doesn't pin down the most important factors that cause American Jews to identify as Republicans. Nevertheless many important insights into American Jewish politics were clarified or confirmed in the course of this paper and shed light onto this important demographic. There was a lack of consistent results within the three hypotheses variables. According to the theory Jewish Americans who have a lot of Jews in their closest social circles will be more likely to identify as Democrats. The most obvious problem with this theory is that the Orthodox likely have the highest levels of each of these factors. If this critique was right, and Orthodoxy was a determining factor causing a Republican identity, we should have seen a statistically significant effect in the opposite direction. The lack of such a relationship affirms that American Jewish Republicans are influenced by more complex factors than being Orthodox or levels of religiosity. This finding is given further support by the control variables that measured denominational identification and, among the Orthodox, type of Orthodoxy.

Another interesting part of denominational identification is that there is virtually no difference in the effect on party identification among Reform and Conservative Jews. Belonging to either denominational group suggests identifying as a Democrat. Many people view Conservative Jews as being more observant than Reform Jews and would assume that Conservative Jews are more likely to be Republicans. This survey refutes that assumption and finds that although extremely close, identifying as a Conservative Jew actually suggests being slightly more likely to identify as a Democrat compared to Reform Jews.

One of the variables in the third hypothesis, having a Jewish mother, is a high indicator of identifying as a Democrat. This effect confirms what we know about moms and political socialization across the board; that children pick up party identity from their mothers more than from their fathers. The interesting part about this relationship is that Jewish mothers have a specific effect that correlates with their children identifying as Democrats. In order to understand this relationship research would have to be done to examine the common behaviors of Jewish

mothers that could cause this effect. Additionally, it could simply display a tempting correlation which doesn't necessarily mean a causal relationship is present.

An additional finding from this study is that American Jews who attend non-Jewish religious services are more likely to identify as Republicans. In a roundabout way this finding supports the theory that spending time around Jews causes a Democratic identity. Unfortunately, the Pew survey and these regression models don't provide the depth necessary to confidently ascribe attendance at these non-Jewish services as the reason for identifying as Republicans. Another issue is that the question didn't specify which religious services the respondent was attending. There is certainly a difference in the political socialization that occurs when going to a Buddhist Monastery versus an Evangelical Mega-Church. Another issue with this variable is that a relatively small number of American Jews attend non-Jewish religious services. Although this phenomenon is interesting it doesn't make sense to devote intensive resources to unpacking the mechanism behind the relationship for such a small number of American Jews. Religious leaders might be interested in why Jews are attending non-Jewish services but political scientists interested in party identification will find more promising research topics elsewhere.

The most important finding of this study is the negative relationship between voter registration and identifying as a Republican. Voter registration is a simple measure of political participation but it is an important measure because voting is one of the easiest ways to be a politically active citizen. The relationship indicates that American Jews who are registered to vote are more likely to identify as Democrats. This has broad implications for both Democrats and Republicans who want to expand their influence with American Jewish voters.

Based on this data Democrats should not be concerned about Jewish Republicans disrupting the persistent Jewish support for the Democratic Party because Jewish Republicans don't register to vote at high levels. On the other hand, Republicans who want to increase the amount of support they have within the Jewish community are discouraged by this relationship because not only do they have to work on convincing Democratic Jews to join their side, they need to focus additional efforts on getting Republican Jews to register to vote in the first place. Another issue for Republicans is that even if they are able to convince Democratic Jews to swap political allegiances there is no guarantee that Jews who 'switch teams' will stay as politically active as they were previously. In practical terms, there is no guarantee that these Jews will turn

out to vote after adopting a Republican identity. This is troubling news for Republicans who want to capture some of the American Jewish political capital that the Democratic Party has benefited from for many decades.

This study failed to capture determinant factors that cause American Jews to identify as Republicans. In the process of exploring this question many important findings were uncovered that reshape the way we think about the American Jewish demographic. There isn't an automatic relationship between denominational identity and political identity among Jewish Americans. Having a Jewish mother makes it more likely for the respondent to identify as a Democrat. A small group of Jews attend non-Jewish services on a semi-regular basis which tends to indicate a Republican identity. Democratic Jews participate in politics by simply registering to vote at a much higher level than Republican Jews, having far reaching implications for both parties. The journey to understanding the factors that influence American Jews to identify as Republicans is complex but, nevertheless, the insights gleaned are beneficial for understanding the ever important group in American Politics, American Jews.

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Appendix

Descriptions of Control Variables

Denominational_id records which Jewish denomination the respondent self-reports belonging to. The answers provided by the survey include no particular denomination, Reform, Conservative, or Orthodox. The surveyors recorded all of the voluntary responses which ranged from secular to Renewal to traditional. I added the category called 'other Jewish' which indicates they gave a voluntary answer that affirms their Jewish identity, but doesn't fall in line with the survey answers provided. Additionally, I included the category of not Jewish. Some of the respondents gave voluntary answers that indicated they practiced a religion other than Judaism, and many potential respondents were left out of the full survey altogether once they were determined to not be Jewish. Denominational_id is measured categorically on the regression models because there was no consistent interval to justify representing this variable as an ordinal variable. The baseline in the regression (what this categorical variable is compared to) is the non-Jewish respondents. This is problematic because many of these respondents weren't asked the full survey. This problem is mitigated by the myriad of other controls used but still can't be ignored when analyzing this data.

Ortho_id measures which type of orthodoxy the respondent (who answered Orthodox to the denominational_id question) practices. Ortho_id takes all of the voluntary responses and records them as 'other' which ranged from liberal to just Orthodox to Ultra-Orthodox. For the

same reasons as the denomination_id variable, the other category isn't very useful when looking at the relationship between ortho_id and partyid. Another similarity that exists between the two variables is that ortho_id is also a categorical variable on the regression because of the same interval problem as it is incorrect to say that a Hasidic Jew is more Orthodox than a Yeshivish or Modern Orthodox Jew. The baseline in the regression is the respondents who do not identify as Orthodox. This variable provides an excellent way to compare the potential effects identifying as Orthodox has on political identity.

Attend_jewish measures how often the respondent attends Jewish religious services, excluding lifecycle events like weddings, Bar and Bat Mitzvah's, and funerals. The scale ranges from 0 to five: never, seldom, a few times a year, once or twice a month, once a week, and more than once a week. Attend_notjewish asks the same question but for the respondents attendance at non-Jewish religious services.

Belief measures the respondents answer to the question of whether or not they believe in G-d or a universal spirit. A few respondents refused to answer which was recoded to missing. Additionally some volunteered an ambiguous answer which was included in the no category for the purposes of this study. The scale of this study ranges from 0-1, 0 indicates not believing in G-d or a universal spirit and 1 indicates that the respondent does believe in G-d or a universal spirit.

Shul_member records whether the respondent, or anyone in their household, is a member of a Jewish synagogue. The survey recorded the voluntary answers which included "none close by" and "member of an independent Chavurah." This study combined the answers by including the former in the 'no' category and the latter in the 'yes' category. Org_member is a two point measure on whether or not the respondent is a member of a Jewish organization that is not a synagogue.

The respondents were asked "Thinking about the relationship between Israel and the United States, is the US too supportive of Israel, not supportive enough, or is the level of support about right?" I reordered the answers given to create a variable, israel_support, which measures the respondents' opinions on how much support they believe the US should provide Israel, a higher number indicating they believe they should support Israel more. To understand the subtle differences that might occur, israel_attached measures the level of emotional attachment the

respondents feel towards Israel (a four point scale ranging from not at all attached to very attached).

Pew asked the respondents: “To you personally, is being Jewish mainly a matter of religion, mainly a matter of ancestry, or mainly a matter of culture.” From this initial question (and the follow up question if the respondent answered with more than one of these measures) I created three dummy variables. Ancestry_id measures if ancestry is part of the respondent’s Jewish identity, religion_id measures if religion is a part of their Jewish identity, and culture_id measures if culture is a part of their Jewish identity.

Jdiscrim measures if the respondent feels that there is a lot of anti-Semitic discrimination in the United States today. It is a variable that measures the respondent’s perception of the country as opposed to their personal experiences. Off_name and snub_social are two variables that measure the respondent’s personal experiences of anti-Semitism within the last year. Respectively, they measure whether the respondent has been called an offensive name because they were Jewish or whether they have been snubbed from attending a social setting because of being Jewish.

Regression Models:

Model Contents:

Model 1: Partyid and the 3 Hypothesis Variables

Model 2: Partyid, the 3 Hypothesis Variables, and Jewish Control Variables

Model 3: Partyid, the 3 Hypothesis Variables, and Universal Demographic Controls

Model 4: Partyid, the 3 Hypothesis Variables, Jewish Control Variables, and Universal Demographic Controls

Model 5: Partyid and Close Friends Hypothesis Variable

Model 6: Partyid and Spouse Hypothesis Variables

Model 7: Partyid and Parents Hypothesis Variables

Model 8: Partyid and Denominational Variables

Model 9: Partyid and Voter Registration Variable

Model 1:

Source	SS	df	MS	
Model	267.119339	6	44.5198898	Number of obs = 5067
Residual	12448.0036	5060	2.46007977	F(6, 5060) = 18.10
				Prob > F = 0.0000
				R-squared = 0.0210
				Adj R-squared = 0.0198
Total	12715.123	5066	2.50989399	Root MSE = 1.5685

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
closefriends	.198372	.0296231	6.70	0.000	.1402978	.2564461
jsingle	-.2085765	.0564637	-3.69	0.000	-.3192697	-.0978832
jmarriedj	0	(omitted)				
jmarriedg	-.0784508	.0633685	-1.24	0.216	-.2026806	.045779
jmother	-.2164655	.0882775	-2.45	0.014	-.3895277	-.0434033
jfather	-.1164933	.0866115	-1.35	0.179	-.2862894	.0533027
jparents	-.1875946	.1154317	-1.63	0.104	-.4138907	.0387015
_cons	-.6141575	.0992122	-6.19	0.000	-.8086564	-.4196585

Model 2:

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	2440.53528	28	87.1619743	Number of obs =	4291	
Residual	8495.77747	4262	1.9933781	F(28, 4262) =	43.73	
				Prob > F =	0.0000	
				R-squared =	0.2232	
				Adj R-squared =	0.2181	
Total	10936.3127	4290	2.54925705	Root MSE =	1.4119	

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
closefriends	-.0214918	.0324374	-0.66	0.508	-.085086	.0421023
jsingle	-.0989801	.0547656	-1.81	0.071	-.2063492	.008389
jmarriedj	.0456043	.0665027	0.69	0.493	-.0847757	.1759843
jmarriedg	0	(omitted)				
jmother	-.0907576	.0879509	-1.03	0.302	-.2631872	.081672
jfather	.0796147	.0875392	0.91	0.363	-.0920077	.2512371
jparents	-.2209992	.1170252	-1.89	0.059	-.4504295	.0084312
denominational_id						
Other Jewish	-.4842376	.107694	-4.50	0.000	-.695374	-.2731012
no particular denomination	-.1955577	.0782087	-2.50	0.012	-.3488875	-.0422279
reform	-.4238033	.0840397	-5.04	0.000	-.5885648	-.2590417
conservative	-.2157311	.0912939	-2.36	0.018	-.3947147	-.0367476
orthodox	.1754071	.6152907	0.29	0.776	-1.030883	1.381697
ortho_id						
modern orthdodox	.2137087	.6203987	0.34	0.731	-1.002596	1.430013
hasidic	.5117585	.6244597	0.82	0.413	-.7125078	1.736025
yeshivish	1.002247	.6272384	1.60	0.110	-.2274666	2.231961
other	.6233244	.5869785	1.06	0.288	-.5274592	1.774108
attend_jewish	-.0205949	.0230868	-0.89	0.372	-.0658571	.0246673
attend_notjewish	.0954238	.0189585	5.03	0.000	.0582553	.1325924
belief	.331953	.0613524	5.41	0.000	.2116703	.4522357
shul_member	-.086942	.0653104	-1.33	0.183	-.2149844	.0411003
org_member	-.1301503	.0580362	-2.24	0.025	-.2439315	-.0163692
relig_id	.0403405	.0502698	0.80	0.422	-.0582145	.1388955
ancestry_id	.0773378	.045059	1.72	0.086	-.0110014	.165677
culture_id	-.1982981	.0451379	-4.39	0.000	-.286792	-.1098042
israel_support	.7505342	.0376929	19.91	0.000	.6766366	.8244319
israel_attached	.0988544	.0265605	3.72	0.000	.0467819	.1509269
jdiscrim	-.220634	.0449475	-4.91	0.000	-.3087546	-.1325135
off_name	.2010387	.0808535	2.49	0.013	.0425237	.3595536
snub_social	-.0319086	.098175	-0.33	0.745	-.2243827	.1605654
_cons	-1.530955	.1260264	-12.15	0.000	-1.778032	-1.283877

Model 3:

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	3450
Model	3315.98639	34	97.5290114	F(34, 3415) =	64.29
Residual	5180.61767	3415	1.51701835	Prob > F =	0.0000
				R-squared =	0.3903
				Adj R-squared =	0.3842
Total	8496.60406	3449	2.46349784	Root MSE =	1.2317

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
closefriends	.0067128	.0303464	0.22	0.825	-.0527861	.0662117
jsingle	-.1026839	.05574	-1.84	0.066	-.211971	.0066033
jmarriedj	-.063272	.0602711	-1.05	0.294	-.1814431	.0548991
jmarriedg	0	(omitted)				
jmother	-.2716923	.0839385	-3.24	0.001	-.436267	-.1071176
jfather	-.1624996	.0823997	-1.97	0.049	-.3240574	-.0009418
jparents	.0579539	.1107331	0.52	0.601	-.159156	.2750637
sex						
Female	-.1586739	.0431078	-3.68	0.000	-.2431937	-.0741542
educ	-.0422595	.0231421	-1.83	0.068	-.0876333	.0031143
racethn						
Black non-Hispanic	-.949129	.1129024	-8.41	0.000	-1.170492	-.7277659
Hispanic	.1032157	.1217847	0.85	0.397	-.1355624	.3419939
Other	-.121722	.1376898	-0.88	0.377	-.3916847	.1482408
respondent_birthregion						
U.S. (native born)	0	(omitted)				
cregion						
Midwest	-.0059277	.0756473	-0.08	0.938	-.1542461	.1423908
South	-.0582298	.0550247	-1.06	0.290	-.1661144	.0496549
West	-.1161377	.0599264	-1.94	0.053	-.2336329	.0013576

Model 3 Continued:

father_birthregion						
Americas (excluding U.S.)	-.1120678	.1508081	-0.74	0.457	-.4077511	.1836154
Asia/Pacific (except FSU)	.1039755	.2780665	0.37	0.708	-.4412182	.6491691
Europe (except FSU)	-.0059743	.0805036	-0.07	0.941	-.1638144	.1518658
Middle East/N. Africa (e..)	.7694853	.3526442	2.18	0.029	.0780703	1.4609
Sub-Saharan Africa	.2374294	.4922454	0.48	0.630	-.7276959	1.202555
Former Soviet Union (FSU)	.1047396	.1115479	0.94	0.348	-.1139679	.323447
Israel/Palestine	-.0952632	.1772535	-0.54	0.591	-.4427968	.2522705
mother_birthregion						
Americas (excluding U.S.)	-.1625372	.1492711	-1.09	0.276	-.455207	.1301325
Asia/Pacific (except FSU)	-.2958785	.2870366	-1.03	0.303	-.8586592	.2669023
Europe (except FSU)	.1173035	.0858927	1.37	0.172	-.0511027	.2857097
Middle East/N. Africa (e..)	-.1186452	.4343273	-0.27	0.785	-.970213	.7329226
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.129123	.5315092	-2.12	0.034	-2.171231	-.0870144
Former Soviet Union (FSU)	-.0969875	.1334315	-0.73	0.467	-.3586011	.1646262
Israel/Palestine	.2663826	.2170331	1.23	0.220	-.1591452	.6919104
ideo	.8227975	.0200409	41.06	0.000	.7835041	.8620908
citizen	0	(omitted)				
income	.0079957	.0163037	0.49	0.624	-.0239704	.0399617
income2	.0050064	.0224101	0.22	0.823	-.0389321	.048945
reg	-.3537015	.0791149	-4.47	0.000	-.5088188	-.1985843
hhchildrec	.0617147	.0280309	2.20	0.028	.0067558	.1166737
age	-.0031357	.0015042	-2.08	0.037	-.006085	-.0001865
_cons	.5556749	.1458767	3.81	0.000	.2696605	.8416893

Model 4:

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	3026
Model	3280.17639	56	58.5745783	F(56, 2969) =	40.53
Residual	4290.39367	2969	1.44506355	Prob > F =	0.0000
				R-squared =	0.4333
				Adj R-squared =	0.4226
Total	7570.57006	3025	2.50266779	Root MSE =	1.2021

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
closefriends	-.0664645	.0346272	-1.92	0.055	-.1343602	.0014312
jsingle	-.0653585	.0596518	-1.10	0.273	-.1823216	.0516046
jmarriedj	-.0615472	.0678797	-0.91	0.365	-.1946433	.0715488
jmarriedg	0	(omitted)				
jmother	-.2367489	.0882696	-2.68	0.007	-.4098247	-.0636732
jfather	-.0803797	.0879864	-0.91	0.361	-.2529002	.0921408
jparents	.0088679	.1192282	0.07	0.941	-.2249103	.2426461
denominational_id						
Other Jewish	-.2267518	.1082247	-2.10	0.036	-.4389548	-.0145487
no particular denomination	-.0879316	.0782138	-1.12	0.261	-.2412903	.0654271
reform	-.2583693	.0843564	-3.06	0.002	-.4237723	-.0929663
conservative	-.2614018	.0924658	-2.83	0.005	-.4427054	-.0800981
orthodox	-.3259787	.8932029	-0.36	0.715	-2.077338	1.425381
ortho_id						
modern orthodox	.574426	.9020537	0.64	0.524	-1.194288	2.34314
hasidic	.5301922	.9028949	0.59	0.557	-1.240171	2.300555
yeshivish	1.167787	.9042605	1.29	0.197	-.6052533	2.940828
other	.6752774	.85901	0.79	0.432	-1.009038	2.359593

Model 4 Continued:

attend_jewish	.0076464	.0243054	0.31	0.753	-.0400107	.0553035
attend_notjewish	.042094	.0193204	2.18	0.029	.0042113	.0799767
belief	.1006926	.0645193	1.56	0.119	-.0258146	.2271998
shul_member	-.1030657	.069204	-1.49	0.137	-.2387583	.0326269
org_member	-.0268516	.0605353	-0.44	0.657	-.145547	.0918438
relig_id	.0502435	.0523651	0.96	0.337	-.0524322	.1529192
ancestry_id	.07456	.0460494	1.62	0.106	-.015732	.164852
culture_id	-.0444322	.0469264	-0.95	0.344	-.1364436	.0475793
israel_support	.3441294	.0408331	8.43	0.000	.2640653	.4241935
israel_attached	.0390128	.02773	1.41	0.160	-.0153592	.0933848
jdiscrim	-.0509811	.0463527	-1.10	0.271	-.1418678	.0399057
off_name	.0505271	.0811631	0.62	0.534	-.1086146	.2096688
snub_social	-.0205171	.1003819	-0.20	0.838	-.2173422	.176308
sex						
Female	-.1906932	.0463187	-4.12	0.000	-.2815131	-.0998733
educ	-.0360758	.0247065	-1.46	0.144	-.0845194	.0123677
racethn						
Black non-Hispanic	-.9217275	.1198079	-7.69	0.000	-1.156643	-.6868125
Hispanic	.0781575	.1267136	0.62	0.537	-.1702979	.3266129
Other	-.1521045	.1452561	-1.05	0.295	-.4369173	.1327083
respondent_birthregion						
U.S. (native born)		0	(omitted)			
cregion						
Midwest	-.0008722	.0785119	-0.01	0.991	-.1548154	.153071
South	-.0094613	.0582364	-0.16	0.871	-.1236492	.1047265
West	-.1138525	.0631716	-1.80	0.072	-.237717	.0100121

Model 4 Continued:

father_birthregion						
Americas (excluding U.S.)	-.2702546	.1530241	-1.77	0.077	-.5702986	.0297894
Asia/Pacific (except FSU)	.0781102	.2732263	0.29	0.775	-.457622	.6138423
Europe (except FSU)	-.0904046	.084462	-1.07	0.285	-.2560147	.0752054
Middle East/N. Africa (e..)	.7631747	.3643615	2.09	0.036	.048748	1.477601
Sub-Saharan Africa	-.1944932	.5035802	-0.39	0.699	-1.181895	.7929083
Former Soviet Union (FSU)	.108781	.1208113	0.90	0.368	-.1281014	.3456635
Israel/Palestine	-.2662874	.1864669	-1.43	0.153	-.6319049	.09933
mother_birthregion						
Americas (excluding U.S.)	-.1409972	.1552044	-0.91	0.364	-.4453164	.163322
Asia/Pacific (except FSU)	-.1235763	.2889987	-0.43	0.669	-.6902344	.4430818
Europe (except FSU)	.0787045	.0904093	0.87	0.384	-.0985668	.2559758
Middle East/N. Africa (e..)	-.0350834	.4505699	-0.08	0.938	-.9185444	.8483775
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.106755	.5525135	-2.00	0.045	-2.190103	-.0234066
Former Soviet Union (FSU)	-.0963792	.1431613	-0.67	0.501	-.3770846	.1843263
Israel/Palestine	.2387838	.2281673	1.05	0.295	-.2085983	.6861659
ideo	.6798	.0242011	28.09	0.000	.6323474	.7272525
citizen	0	(omitted)				
income	.0198622	.0173868	1.14	0.253	-.0142291	.0539536
income2	.0275379	.0235265	1.17	0.242	-.0185919	.0736678
reg	-.4015883	.084112	-4.77	0.000	-.5665121	-.2366646
hhchildrec	.0208026	.0298651	0.70	0.486	-.0377559	.0793611
age	-.0022188	.0016625	-1.33	0.182	-.0054787	.001041
_cons	.0845217	.183652	0.46	0.645	-.2755764	.4446198

Model 5:

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	5090
Model	62.7285884	1	62.7285884	F(1, 5088) =	25.12
Residual	12704.9533	5088	2.49704272	Prob > F =	0.0000
				R-squared =	0.0049
				Adj R-squared =	0.0047
Total	12767.6819	5089	2.50887835	Root MSE =	1.5802

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
closefriends	.1294931	.0258361	5.01	0.000	.0788433 .180143
_cons	-.9245578	.0613289	-15.08	0.000	-1.044789 -.8043267

Model 6:

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	32.9804055	2	16.4902028	Number of obs =	5120	
Residual	12811.5897	5117	2.50373065	F(2, 5117) =	6.59	
				Prob > F =	0.0014	
				R-squared =	0.0026	
				Adj R-squared =	0.0022	
Total	12844.5701	5119	2.50919518	Root MSE =	1.5823	

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
jsingle	-.108086	.054414	-1.99	0.047	-.2147607	-.0014114
jmarriedj	.0824366	.0560028	1.47	0.141	-.0273527	.192226
jmarriedg	0	(omitted)				
_cons	-.623265	.0406794	-15.32	0.000	-.703014	-.5435161

Model 7:

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	88.8434235	3	29.6144745	Number of obs =	5116	
Residual	12735.2809	5112	2.49125213	F(3, 5112) =	11.89	
				Prob > F =	0.0000	
				R-squared =	0.0069	
				Adj R-squared =	0.0063	
Total	12824.1243	5115	2.50716018	Root MSE =	1.5784	

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
jmother	-.2288222	.0880771	-2.60	0.009	-.401491	-.0561533
jfather	-.1354035	.0865699	-1.56	0.118	-.3051176	.0343106
jparents	.0068862	.1120769	0.06	0.951	-.2128324	.2266048
_cons	-.3718663	.0589042	-6.31	0.000	-.4873438	-.2563887

Model 8:

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	5082
Model	1010.84758	9	112.316398	F(9, 5072) =	48.65
Residual	11708.7384	5072	2.30850521	Prob > F =	0.0000
				R-squared =	0.0795
				Adj R-squared =	0.0778
Total	12719.586	5081	2.50336272	Root MSE =	1.5194

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
denominational_id					
Other Jewish	-.7913492	.1015074	-7.80	0.000	-.9903475 - .5923508
no particular denomination	-.39405	.0732551	-5.38	0.000	-.5376615 - .2504385
reform	-.6670236	.0735868	-9.06	0.000	-.8112855 - .5227616
conservative	-.2368474	.0795401	-2.98	0.003	-.3927803 - .0809144
orthodox	-.1350853	.651311	-0.21	0.836	-1.411936 1.141765
ortho_id					
modern orthdodox	.5624735	.655219	0.86	0.391	-.7220387 1.846986
hasidic	.7020973	.6579873	1.07	0.286	-.5878418 1.992036
yeshivish	1.467069	.6613519	2.22	0.027	.1705334 2.763604
other	1.053023	.6268186	1.68	0.093	-.1758127 2.281858
_cons	-.3465819	.0605815	-5.72	0.000	-.4653478 - .227816

Model 9:

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	4978
Model	74.8857217	1	74.8857217	F(1, 4976) =	29.68
Residual	12554.9986	4976	2.52311064	Prob > F =	0.0000
				R-squared =	0.0059
				Adj R-squared =	0.0057
Total	12629.8843	4977	2.53765005	Root MSE =	1.5884

partyid	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
reg	-.4243508	.0778921	-5.45	0.000	-.5770537 - .2716478
_cons	-.2510917	.0742225	-3.38	0.001	-.3966005 - .1055829