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Afghan anti-foreign sentiment: a reality or misconception?

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Abstract

This research looks at the rhetoric of the Afghan political elite and public in order to see if there are differences in attitude toward foreigners between the two groups and also to determine whether this attitude has changed over time. This study concludes that the Afghan public has not demonstrated anti-foreign sentiment over the 20th and 21st century while the Afghan political elite tend to portray an anti-foreign view through their policies and rhetoric. Although the Afghan public has not been anti-foreign, the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 with the assumption that the Afghan public is anti-foreign. For this reason, it is important to determine if this assumption is warranted. This study exemplifies that the U.S. assumption of Afghans' anti-foreign sentiment is not warranted and, for this reason, the United States has made a significant fallacy when forming their policies for the country of Afghanistan and its people.

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Introduction

When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it shaped its policies largely on the assumption that the Afghan people are anti-foreign. In this paper, however, one can see that the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign and, therefore, it has not been warranted for the United States to form policies based on this assumption. By relying on this assumption, the United States has created several problems for both the United States and Afghanistan. For this reason, this study is significant. By seeing the problems created by relying on this assumption, one can see the problem of relying on assumptions in foreign policy.

While the Afghan public has not demonstrated an anti-foreign attitude, the Afghan government has. By comparing the rhetoric of the Afghan political elite and the Afghan people, one can see that it is the Afghan government that bears this anti-foreign sentiment and not the Afghan public. The various governments of Afghanistan in modern times have offered many clues suggesting their anti-foreign sentiment. The government's intolerance of foreigners, however, does not accurately reflect the opinion of the public.

Many argue, however, that is not only the government with these views but also the Afghan people. In his book *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, Thomas Barfield lays out the debate of when this anti-foreign view was acquired in Afghanistan—a nationalist Afghan historian view and a view abstracted from British accounts.¹ According to the nationalist Afghan historians, there was a response to the British that created an anti-foreign rebellion; however, the British accounts say that these Afghan uprisings were not a product of the British invasion, but

¹ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. pg. 122

the reason why the British lost the Anglo-Afghan wars.² Regardless of when this sentiment was acquired, both arguments agree on one thing: the Afghan people have been anti-foreign. This assumption continued to set the tone for Afghanistan's relationship with outsiders since the 19th century—by assuming that Afghans are anti-foreign, foreigners have entered Afghanistan with a certain framework shaping their interactions with the Afghan people. In 2001, this assumption helped shape the United States' framework when interacting with the Afghan people. Despite the reality this assumption was given by allowing it to shape the United States' framework, this assumption is not a reality.

It has been almost 10 years since the United States entered Afghanistan. Despite it being the longest war in U.S. history, the United States seemed prepared for many possibilities in their encounters with the Afghan people. In Seth Jones' *In the Graveyard of Empires*, he states:

Past empires that have declared to enter Afghanistan—from Alexander the Great to Great Britain and the Soviet Union—have found initial entry possible, even easy, only to find themselves mired in local resistance. Aware of this history, the United States had the resources, manpower, and strategic know-how to create a new order.³

Because past countries (i.e. the Soviet Union) met local resistance in Afghanistan, the United States prepared resources and manpower in order to cope with this anti-foreign resistance; however, if this resistance is a reality then why does the United States still struggle in their mission despite the abundant resources and manpower? The United States shaped their policies in Afghanistan according to Afghans' intolerance of outsiders. Despite the attention this sentiment received in their policies, the Afghan people are not anti-foreign. By looking at

² Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. pg. 122

³ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. xxv

different time periods and sources from the 20th and 21st century, one can see that President George W. Bush and his administration were not justified in shaping policy around the Afghan people's supposed resistance of foreigners.

It is commonly considered that Afghanistan as a nation is anti-foreign. Despite this concurrence, there are many different meanings of anti-foreign. If anti-foreign signifies ensuring that no foreigners rule their country, then Afghanistan can be considered anti-foreign; however, if anti-foreign signifies not being welcoming to outsiders, then it is false to consider Afghans anti-foreign. Because of the different interpretations of anti-foreign, this paper looks at different sources to show that this group of people is not xenophobic. The following is a study of Afghanistan and its people.

1. Methodology

In this section, I detail the variable I study and the sources I use to study it. I will also lay out the implications of this study and why I chose Afghanistan as the country to study instead of another state. It is also important to understand the organization of this paper in order to understand how the argument is presented. With an understanding of the aforementioned aspects, the significance of this study is made obvious.

Afghan sentiment as the variable

This thesis is a study of Afghan sentiment. Since the British first invaded Afghanistan in 1839, Afghanistan has been placed on the world stage. Because foreign invasions of Afghanistan put Afghanistan on the world stage, Afghan anti-foreign sentiment is important. Until Afghanistan's role on the world stage becomes nonexistent, Afghan sentiment will remain an important variable. If the Afghan people are anti-foreign then foreigners will continue to face

similar problems in Afghanistan. Because of this possibility, it makes it obligatory to find out if the Afghan people are intolerant of outsiders.

I will be looking at two variables in this study – elite rhetoric (my independent variable) and public sentiment toward foreigners (my dependent variable). My hypothesis is that popular sentiment does not accurately reflect the rhetoric of the elite classes within the country. Because the situation in Afghanistan prevents me from collecting firsthand accounts, I will be using secondary sources for both variables.

Contrast of the differences in rhetoric between the Afghan political elite and the Afghan people will exemplify that the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign. If going to Afghanistan were an option, it would improve this project significantly; however, due to dearth of time and funding of this project, research in Afghanistan is not viable. Because of this, utilizing the writings of those who have traveled to Afghanistan will be imperative to this argument—a qualitative study.

Although they disagree when anti-foreign sentiment was adopted in Afghanistan, British accounts and Afghan national historians agree that the Afghans are anti-foreign. If the Afghan national historians are correct, intolerance of foreigners can be seen since the Anglo-Afghan wars in 1839. If the British accounts are correct, anti-foreign sentiment in Afghanistan is a constant in Afghanistan's history. Regardless of the view taken, anti-foreign sentiment would be exemplified in the 20th century (because it either came about because of the Anglo-Afghan wars or has been a constant).

Another reason I will rely mostly on 20th century accounts is because of United States foreign policy. Since their invasion in 2001, they have used the experiences of other foreigners in the 20th century as a guideline. Because the Soviet Union encountered local resistance in

Afghanistan, the United States attempted to account for this possibility.⁴ By seeing if the Afghans are actually anti-foreign during this time, one can see whether United States foreign policy assumptions are justified.

Type of sources

In order to determine if the Afghan public is anti-foreign, I utilize travel logs and memoirs of those who have traveled to Afghanistan. In these memoirs, travelers (many of whom are fluent in Afghan languages) relay their encounters with Afghan natives. Not only do their stories tell us if the Afghan people have been anti-foreign but also possible reasons for this sentiment—this is the significance of this type of source. Despite memoirs and travel logs' essentiality to this project, they do not suffice as adequate research for this project.

In order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of this sentiment, other types of sources must be utilized. Looking at United States foreign policy in Afghanistan since 2001, the overarching context and significance of this research will be realized. By studying speeches and writings of President George W. Bush's administration, one can see how anti-foreign sentiment has shaped the United States' foreign policy in Afghanistan since 2001. American foreign policy stresses Afghanistan's anti-foreign attitude; however, this rhetoric is not valid. Looking at travel logs and memoirs will help refute these claims, but these memoirs only provide us possible views of society.

In addition to memoirs, I will use the speeches and writings of the Afghan political elite. By understanding the Afghan government's rhetoric, one can discern a difference between the Afghan government sentiment and that of the public. Although primary sources are ideal for this

⁴ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 131

paper, the ones that do exist are in Dari and Pashto—Afghan languages I do not speak. When possible, primary sources such as Malalai Joya’s A Woman Among Warlords are used. It is with a variety of sources that the question—if the Afghan people are actually anti-foreign—is answered.

Although this paper will utilize Western sources to understand Western perception of Afghanistan, this paper will be Afghan-centric. An Afghan-centric paper is one that attempts to understand Afghan views. These views include those of government officials and civilians. This distinction between government and the public is essential to this paper. Although both groups represent the country of Afghanistan, their sentiment toward foreigners varies. Because it varies, they must be treated as the distinct groups they are. In order to treat them as distinct groups, this paper can be considered a case study in which I compare views of the Afghan people with that of their government.

Implications

A potential challenge for this paper is determining exactly what anti-foreign attitudes entail for Afghanistan. In Malalai Joya’s book, her anti-foreign view is palpable; however, it may not be so apparent in other writings. By paying close attention to foreign encounters with Afghans, this challenge can be overcome. This requires understanding exactly what is meant by anti-foreign sentiment. Looking at United States foreign policy in Afghanistan, from 2001 to the present, will provide a context in which anti-foreign views will illuminate if existent.

As stated above, travel to Afghanistan to carry out this study is not an option. If one were to take this study further, research in Afghanistan would be the next necessary step. Although it is an important step, it is not the only step. For this reason, this study remains significant. By

comparing differences in rhetoric between the Afghan political elite and the public, one can see if anti-foreign sentiment exists.

Why Afghanistan

I chose Afghanistan for this study because it is of such intrinsic importance to the United States and the world. For this reason, it demands attention. Despite its importance, it remains a country for which the world has little understanding. Except as a base for terrorists, it has not received much attention over the last 20 years. While Afghan sentiment may seem like a minor variable, it is one with overwhelming effects if it goes without an accurate understanding. Without knowing for certain if the Afghan people are anti-foreign, misperceptions will continue to result as a consequence.

It is also important to note what this study does not try to do. This is not a study on why and when the anti-foreign view came into existence. Below is a literature review on when and why this anti-foreign view was adopted. Many scholars have written on why this sentiment exists and when it came about; however, it must first be studied if this view actually has existed and continues to exist. Because of this uncertainty, this study does not attempt to find out when this view began. Only after one can ascertain that this anti-foreign attitude exists can one begin to study when it was adopted.

A Road Map

In the next section is the significance for this paper. It is only with an understanding of the significance of this study that this study will be significant. I have combed through secondary sources arguing when and why the anti-foreign view was acquired. In chapter 3 of this paper, these sources are presented. This chapter also outlines travelers' experiences in the 20th and 21st century. In chapter 4 lie the findings. This is where American foreign policy rhetoric

with that of the Afghan people is compared. While each chapter has its role, the *Findings* chapter is the section in which an anti-foreign can be deducted if present. Chapter 5 is the conclusion. Although it is the final chapter, this study remains incomplete. Because of the United States' continued occupation in Afghanistan, one is not able to conclude permanently that the Afghan people are not anti-foreign. Despite the fact that the lack of an anti-foreign view in Afghanistan may be transient, this study remains significant.

2. Significance

This thesis stresses how a trivial assumption can have considerable consequences for various actors. By assuming that the Afghan people are anti-foreign, implications have resulted. Studying Afghan sentiment is important for many different actors. Understanding what it means to call the Afghan people anti-foreign shows how this assumption has underlying implications for not only the Afghan people but also those who invade the region. For this reason, this study is significant for the United States, which has occupied Afghanistan since 2001. By understanding the significance of this study, one can better understand the consequences of making unwarranted assumptions in foreign policy.

Significance for the Afghan people

Although the Afghan public is not anti-foreign, the misperception that they are such has significantly affected them. The United States adopted a light footprint policy in response to the Afghans' so-called history of anti-foreign sentiment. The United States' light footprint policy will be more completely explained below in chapter 4 (the findings); however, it is important to comprehend its implications in order to understand the significance that this study has for the Afghan people.

By adopting a light footprint policy, the United States has tried to inhibit anti-American backlash. Because of this attempt, the Afghan public has been left without security forces and without sufficient international help. According to a U.S. intelligence in 2009, Taliban forces have increased fourfold since 2006.⁵ Without security forces and with a light footprint policy, the Taliban will continue to grow.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1978 they experienced anti-foreign backlash. Because of the Soviet's experience with the Afghan people, the United States decided to form a policy that they thought would minimize anti-foreign backlash. Because the Soviet Union had a large footprint in Afghanistan, the United States decided for a volte-face: an opposite policy (a light footprint) would be the best means of minimizing an anti-foreign backlash. It is true that the Soviets experienced anti-foreign backlash; however, a large footprint policy was not the reason for this backlash. According to author Lester Grau, the anti-foreign backlash was in response to how the Soviet's large footprint was used, not the large footprint itself.⁶ Despite this backlash, it was an appropriate reaction for Afghans to the Soviet invasion.

By seeing how assuming that the Afghans are anti-foreign has implications for their people, one can understand this study's value. The repercussions of the United States' light footprint policy detail the importance assumptions can have for many including the United States.

⁵ "Taliban has grown fourfold." *Aljazeera*. N.p., 9 Oct. 2009. Web. 7 Mar. 2011. <<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/10/20091091814483962.html>>.

⁶ Grau, Lester W. *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996. Print.

Significance for the United States

By answering whether the Afghan people are anti-foreign, more will be learned about the Afghan people in general. Not only will one have a better understanding of Afghans but also of what the possible differences in rhetoric mean for American foreign policy. In order to have success in Afghanistan, the United States must win the hearts of the Afghan people, not just the Afghan government. This is difficult if the rhetoric between the two groups differs drastically. Although the point of this research is not to prescribe a policy for the United States, it will show that the United States is obliged to decide what rhetoric to hear—that of the Afghan government or the public.

There are many reasons for the United States' lack of success in Afghanistan; however, the assumption that the Afghans are anti-foreign explains part of the reason the United States remains in Afghanistan today. Although U.S. forces cornered Osama bin Laden in his Tora Bora hideout in December 2001, they failed to catch him and his organization. The United States blamed this failure on the apprehension of local resistance if he were captured.⁷ Therefore, part of the reason for their continued occupation is because of the possibility that Afghans will be unwilling to cooperate with outsiders. It is significant to note that the United States' reason for not capturing Osama bin Laden is because of the *possibility* that there would be anti-foreign backlash. Because it was a mere possibility, the United States decided not to capture Osama bin Laden, which was the United States' initial reason for invading Afghanistan.

In the documentary Restrepo, U.S. military troops document their deployment in Afghanistan's Korengal Valley. This valley is said to be one of the most dangerous places in the

⁷ Kerry, Senator John F. "Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why." *111th Congress, 1st session* (2009): n. pag. Web. 8 Feb. 2011. <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf>.

world. Because the Taliban is so prevalent in this region, the U.S. soldiers emphasize the necessity to have the Afghan people on their side. Without having the people on their side, the United States cannot push forward to get the Taliban.⁸ Throughout this documentary, the U.S. military is seen attempting to secure the Afghan people on their side; however, the accidental civilian deaths create resentment toward the troops. This further increases the significance to get the people on their side—as innocents get killed, the Afghan people become more distant from siding with the United States. Because killing civilians does not help the U.S. and Afghanistan relationship, the soldiers realize how important it is to ensure as few civilian deaths as possible.

The aforementioned documentary demonstrates the significance for this study. While it shows the Afghan people resenting some of the American soldiers' actions (i.e. killing their family members and cows), it also shows how the soldiers understand the importance of the Afghan people being pro-American. This documentary, along with other sources, shows the Afghan people resenting the U.S. occupation; however, this resentment is warranted. In this documentary, the Afghan locals *only* resent the United States when the troops kill their family members or property. This does not provide evidence that the Afghan people are anti-foreign; however, it does show what the United States needs to do: respect the Afghan locals in order to win the war. Without Afghan support, the United States will continue to meet the same, common problems in their occupation.

Foreigners are often to blame for Afghanistan's suffering. The devastation gives reason for the Afghan people to be anti-foreign, yet this is often not the public's attitude when they encounter outsiders. As demonstrated during the 19th and 20th century Anglo-Afghan Wars and the United States 2001 invasion, the Afghan people resent foreign occupations because of their

⁸ Hetherington, Tim, and Sebastian Junger. Restrepo. <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1559549/>.

familiar outcomes: outsiders continue to invade the country making the residents worse off than before their occupation. They resent those that cause them hard. Despite their palpable resentment, the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign. The history of Afghanistan gives an understanding of why an anti-foreign view might be acquired; however, by comparing the rhetoric of Afghan political elite with that of Afghan public and by looking at Afghan encounters with foreigners, one can see that the Afghan public has not been anti-foreign over time.

3. Literature Review

This chapter details the debate arguing when the anti-foreign view in Afghanistan was acquired. One side of the debate argues that the anti-foreign view in Afghanistan directly resulted from the British invasion; however, another side argues that this attitude preceded the British invasion. In this section, one can see the arguments and their evidence. Looking at this debate demonstrates possible reasons why the Afghan people may have been anti-foreign; however, this debate does not allow one to conclude that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.

After a look at the aforementioned debate, the travel logs used for this thesis are explained. Although more detail with the travel logs is discussed in the *Findings* chapter, this chapter explains the significance of this type of source, which is to have a better understanding of the Afghan people. Through travel logs, this understanding will come not only by seeing the interaction between Afghans and outsiders but also by comparing the rhetoric between the Afghan political elite and Afghan public. By juxtaposing several of Afghanistan's interactions with outsiders, one can discern not only why some argue that the Afghan people are anti-foreign but also that their argument is not warranted.

3.1 The anti-foreign view: to blame the British or to precede the British?

Accounts of the Anglo-Afghan Wars provide evidence that the Afghan public resisted the British invasion; however, it remains a question whether this resentment is primarily due to the British being foreign. By looking at the debate over when the Afghan public's anti-foreign attitude was acquired, one can see that the British treatment of the Afghans gives reason for the Afghans to resent the British. Despite understanding why the Afghan public may have resented the British, others opine that the anti-foreign view preceded the British occupation. Both sides of the debate agree that the Afghan people are anti-foreign, yet they diverge on when this view was acquired. It is possible that this xenophobia was heightened as result of Great Britain, but it is also possible that it is the product of Britain's state-building experience in the country.

By laying out the arguments, one can see that both views draw on important evidence to make their claims; however, this evidence does not suffice for a comprehensive understanding of the attitudes in Afghanistan. Despite this necessity, the arguments of the various schools of thoughts are imperative to this topic. By seeing how the topic has been discussed, what needs to be done next is made clearer. Many scholars agree that the British traumatized the Afghan people during their occupation, yet it is disputed whether the supposed anti-foreign view is a direct result of this trauma.

Blame the British

Abdur Rahman came to power in Afghanistan in 1880. "He made defense of Islam and jihad a feature of Afghan national identity when dealing with the outside world."⁹ It was this Islamic character of the Afghan state that unified Afghanistan against outsiders and continues to do so in the 20th century. Abdur Rahman first used Islam to mobilize Afghans against the British

⁹ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. page 110

in the 1880s; however, his reign is seen throughout the 20th century. By uniting the country, Islam ended the Soviet occupation. Barfield contends, “By framing the [Soviet] conflict as jihad, it was possible to unite a large number of people and deprive the Kabul government of legitimacy.”¹⁰ Although Islam continues to unite Afghans, it is first seen during the Anglo-Afghan Wars. Because of this, the British are to blame. Abdur Rahman was forced to find a uniting factor among the Afghan people during the Anglo-Afghan Wars. This uniting factor at the time of the British separated Afghanistan from outsiders, which in turn made the Afghan people anti-foreign.

The British went into Afghanistan with little understanding of the country and its people. Some scholars such as B.D. Hopkins, author of The Making of Modern Afghanistan, argue that Great Britain’s flawed understandings of Afghans have affected the formulation of the Afghan state.¹¹ Great Britain’s flawed understandings include that the Afghans were violent and primitive.⁷ The conceptualization that Afghans were violent people predicated both Great Britain’s actions and expectations when dealing with the Afghan people.¹² These conceptions play an important role—in fact, they also explain attitudes toward the West.¹³ Afghanistan is a conceptual construct of Britain’s colonial image; thus, the British forced Afghans into this

¹⁰ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. page 242

¹¹ Hopkins, B.D. *The Making of Modern Afghanistan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988. Print. pg. 8, 4

¹² Hopkins, B.D. *The Making of Modern Afghanistan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988. Print. pg 8

¹³ Hopkins, B.D. *The Making of Modern Afghanistan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988. Print.

nation-state through flawed understandings. These misunderstandings and inaccurate representations led to Afghan resentment of foreigners.

In his article “Afghan Historiography,” Robert Nichols furthers Hopkin’s argument. He discusses that scholars “re-conceptualized Afghan identity to suit colonial political geographies”.¹⁴ These flawed understandings explain Afghanistan’s attitude toward the West today—by arguing that the Afghan attitude toward the West is a reaction to outside forces, Nichols argues that the British created this xenophobic attitude in the country. The arguments of Nichols and Hopkins explain that by not attempting to understand Afghans through Afghan eyes, the British generalized and assumed that Afghanistan was best explained by the British perspective and that no other perspective was necessary in dealing with the country:

Afghan foreign minister and historian Abdul Samad Ghuas argues, [The British invasion angered the Afghans and created] xenophobic sentiments that lingered for many years and proved powerful deterrents to Western style reforms and innovations undertaken by Afghan rulers decades later. The high-handed and aggressive attitude of the British had convinced the Afghan population that they would not rest until Afghanistan, the last independent Islamic country in Central Asia, was wiped off the map.¹⁵

In his aforementioned quote, Afghan foreign minister and historian Abdul Samad Ghuas argues that the Afghans feared the British. As result of this fear, he continues, was Afghan resistance to future Western style reforms. From Great Britain’s approach in Afghanistan, the Afghan people concluded that the British wanted to end Afghanistan’s existence. The argument that the British created anti-foreign sentiment in Afghanistan demonstrates the significance of unwarranted

¹⁴ Nichols, Robert. "Afghan Historiography." *Wiley* (2005): n. pag. *Wiley*. Web. 20 Nov. 2010. <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478>>.

¹⁵ Fitzgerald, Paul, and Elizabeth Gould. *Afghanistan's Untold Story*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2009. Print.

assumptions in foreign policy. In addition to the British bearing the consequences of their flawed assumption that the Afghans are violent savages (the Afghans resisted the British as result), the Afghan people were also affected. Thomas Barfield contends that the British changed the role of Islam for Afghanistan and its people. “Until 1840 religion had played a minor role in internal Afghan politics because fighting had always been Muslim on Muslim.”¹⁶ When the British invaded, Islam was used to mobilize the Afghans in order to protect against non-Muslim foreigners, specifically the British. According to Barfield, this protectionist policy created xenophobia and, thus, we can blame the Anglo-Afghan Wars for this view. Because of the myriad ethnic groups, Afghanistan is a diverse region. During the Anglo-Afghan Wars, unity was necessary; however, how was a country with so many differences supposed to unite? Islam was the panacea to this problem. Through religion, the Afghan government united its people and the British were driven back to India.

The British traumatized the Afghan people, causing the Afghan people to readjust to their new reality. This adjustment was political Islam—the fanaticism and violence that fueled the Afghani Muslims to defeat the British. In “Introduction to Political Islam,” Ana Belén Soage says that the British are the reason for the political Islam that emerged in the late 19th century. Soage defines political Islam as a means for Muslims to oppose foreigners.¹⁷ As Barfield states, fighting in Afghanistan had always been Muslim on Muslim.¹² When the British invaded, this concept changed and Islam became the perfect tool with which to oppose foreigners. And although the First Anglo-Afghan War came to an end, the Afghans did not forget that their

¹⁶ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print.

¹⁷ Soage, Ana Belén. "Introduction to Political Islam." *Wiley* (2009): n. pag. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478>>.

country was invaded without justification. Soage and other scholars argue that the way Afghans show that they have not forgotten this invasion is through the attitudes exemplified through xenophobia.

After the British invaded Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century, Afghan nationalists became concerned about the westernization of Afghanistan and the rest of the Islamic world. Because of Afghanistan's experience with the British, westernization was not an option for the Afghan people. Sheikh Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) was one scholar arguing against westernization of Afghanistan:

The sheikh had concerns that the westernization of the Islamic world was leading to moral confusion and believed religion to be necessary in determining behavior guaranteeing happiness in this life and the next. Moreover, he insisted that religion should be the underlying basis for the modernization of Muslim societies".¹⁸

Sheikh Muhammad Abduh's view was a common concern because of the British occupation in Afghanistan. Not only was it a concern that the westernization of the Islamic world would dissipate Islam's role, but also Afghans began to use Islam to fight foreigners in order to ensure this did not happen. The British attempted westernization of this country, but failed. Muslims were convinced that Great Britain's failure signified that God favored Muslims and confirmed the authenticity of their religion.¹⁵ The British created an anti-foreign, pro-Islamic view in Afghanistan when their attempt of westernization in Afghanistan failed.

In *Into the Jaws of Death* Lieutenant Colonel Mike Snook further strengthens this argument. Many scholars agree that the Battle of Maiwand (1880) was the first time in

¹⁸ Soage, Ana Belén. "Introduction to Political Islam." *Wiley* (2009): n. pag. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478>>.

Afghanistan that Muslim fanatics were seen.¹⁹ Termed the “ghazis,” these warriors were unstoppable—the British had a myriad of guns, but the ghazis approached them without fear. The ghazis took advantage of the British fear by mass-slaughtering almost the entire British military force in the region (all but one British soldier was killed). “Only moments after the guns ceased fire the ghazis came swarming from their cover, chanting prayers, shrieking their battle cries and brandishing keen-edged Khyber knives”.²⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Snook attributes these fanatical actions strictly to the British invasion; however, is this how Afghanistan dealt with the other foreigners? By seeing Afghan interactions with other outsiders, one can see that despite the blatant resentment Lieutenant Colonel Snook notes, the Afghan public has not been anti-foreign over time.

When the British assassinated Afghan emperor Habibollah Kha in 1919, the Afghan public acquired more anti-British sentiment. This led to a new group known as “The Young Afghans,” which called for Afghanistan to defeat the British in the name of Islam. Afghan nationalist historians say that this pro-Islamic mobilization was a reaction to the British invasion and cannot be found elsewhere in history. Others consider that this sentiment is due to Afghanistan’s violent past that preceded the Anglo-Afghan wars. Although the mobilization of several fundamentalist Islamic groups came after the Anglo-Afghan Wars, it may be that this fundamentalism in which pro-Islam and anti-foreign views result was just presented in a different way than before the British invasion.

At the end of the 19th century, Mahmud-i-Tarzi became a key figure in the history of Afghanistan partially because of his *Sirajul Akhbar*, an anti-colonial newspaper that was said to

²⁰ Snook, Mike. *Into the Jaws of Death*. Annapolis: Frontline Books, 1998. Print. pg. 142

not only represent the anti-foreign views held in Afghan but also to help mobilize the Afghan people against foreigners, specifically the British. “These [writings] were the earliest stirrings of a global Islamic movement—against imperialism and strongly anti-British.”²¹ By utilizing the 19th and early 20th century interactions between the British and Afghan public, the aforementioned scholars argue that Afghanistan’s anti-foreign attitude, represented by Mahmud-i-Tarzi’s newspaper, is a reaction to the British invasion. The British placed the Afghan people in misery, which led the Afghan people to resent the British and other foreigners. Despite the aforementioned evidence, some argue that Afghanistan’s history prior to the British invasion shows that the British are not to blame for Afghanistan’s xenophobia.²²

An attitude that precedes the British

The 1880 Battle of Maiwand ended with a loss for the British. Great Britain’s plentiful and superior weapons could not withstand Afghanistan’s determination to end the British occupation. British accounts of this event describe the Afghans as crazed and brutal.²³ Although this battle demonstrates the Afghan people’s passionate resentment of the British, some scholars argue that this behavior is nothing new. The 1908 Imperial Gazetteer of India summed up views of Afghans by saying:

Their step is full of resolution, their bearing proud and apt to be rough. Inured to bloodshed from childhood they are familiar with death, audacious in attack, but easily

²¹ Loyn, David. *In Afghanistan*. N.p.: Palgrave, 2009. *Google Books*. 2009. Web. 29 Mar. 2011. <http://books.google.com/books?id=EGnuR312ANYC&pg=PA129&lpg=PA129&dq=Mahmud-i-Tarzi+Sirajul+Akhbar&source=bl&ots=K--I_pSG8_&sig=o0koEUWdg0w2PXBXJjDFo_-cq0&hl=en&ei=63SSTbSGGKyBOQHBvPjMBw&sa=X&oi=book_>>. pg. 129

²² Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. pg. 122

²³ Snook, Mike. *Into the Jaws of Death*. Annapolis: Frontline Books, 1998. Print. pg. 142

discouraged by failure. They are treacherous and passionate in revenge . . . They are much under the influence of their Mullas, especially for evil.”²⁴

Although the previous quote was written after the British invaded Afghanistan, it argues that the Afghan people have a long history of being violent and anti-foreign. This report supports that the Afghan uprisings against foreigners are not a product of the British invasion, but a view that preceded the Anglo-Afghan Wars—Afghanistan’s attitude toward foreigners is endogenous and was a part of their culture before the British invaded. In “Salafist and Wahhabist Influence in Afghanistan”, authors Noah Tucker and Sue Sypko detail how political Islam has been used: “The majority of uprisings waged in the name of Islam were in reaction to either invasion or westernizing reforms.”²⁵ This article contends that Afghan leaders have appealed to Islam to rally support for a particular cause since as early as the 11th century.²¹ While Islam mobilized the public during the British invasion, Afghans’ use of Islam to gain support and fight off outsiders was nothing new.

Although there are no specific accounts of violence in his book, Meredith Runion discusses each group that invaded Afghanistan—most of them failing to conquer. Invaders came and went, but Afghans became accustomed to their entrance. In 700 B.C.E., the Medes Empire invaded Afghanistan. This marks the first of many empires that entered Afghanistan. Following the Medes was the rise of the Persian Empire and then the rule of the Macedonians. Eventually Alexander the Great came to the region. The country was greatly divided at this time, some regions much more peaceful than others. “The [northern] region prospered but was not nearly as

²⁴ Heathcote, T.A. *The Afghan Wars*. Great Britain: Biddles Ltd, 1980. Print pg. 120

²⁵ Tucker, Noah, and Sue Sypko. "Salafist and Wahhabist Influence in Afghanistan." Human Terrain System-Research Reachback Center. *Public Intelligence*. N.p., n.d. Web. 31 Mar. 2011. <<http://publicintelligence.info/HTSAfghanExtremism.pdf>>.page 6

peaceful as the southern region.”²⁶ Afghans are xenophobic because of the myriad of forced invasions into Afghanistan. It is not the British invasion that accounts for this; it is the accumulation of incursions and the consequences that followed and led to Afghanistan’s anti-foreign attitude.

In A.D. 642, the Mongols began the Arab conquest by coming to Afghanistan. The Mongols divided Afghanistan and forced Islam on the people. Several scholars have said that it is this time in history that explains Afghanistan’s present—Great Britain’s invasion is simply evidence supporting the Mongolian invasion as cause for Afghanistan’s anti-foreign attitude. Since the beginning of time, Afghanistan’s relation with foreigners has been in the form of invasion (state-building being a form of invasion). “Genghis Khan is widely known for the destruction he brought to many countries. In Afghanistan, he is remembered as a detrimental and genocidal ruler who ransacked and pillaged the land.”²⁷ According to Runion, Genghis Khan (the Mongol leader) is the reason for the problems in Afghanistan today—looking at Afghanistan’s interactions with foreigners will provide an understanding of Afghanistan’s xenophobia.²²

Although the British realize that their occupation destabilized the country, most British accounts unsurprisingly affirm that they are not the reason for Afghan sentiment toward the West. This view also argues that it is not Afghanistan’s encounters with invaders that created xenophobia of foreigners, but it was their roots in tribal society that account for the country’s

²⁶ Runion, Meredith. *The History of Afghanistan*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2007. Print. p. 44

²⁷ Runion, Meredith. *The History of Afghanistan*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2007. Print. p. 58

current political complexities.²⁸ Several scholars consider that Afghanistan presents the same problems as it did 2,500 years ago.²⁹ These problems include their attitudes toward foreigners.

Mountstuart Elphinstone led the first British mission to Afghanistan in the early 1800s. He noticed the fragmented nature of Afghanistan and called for a united government. He told a tribal leader his opinion and the leader responded, “We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood. But we will never be content with a master.”³⁰ This quote supports a preceding anti-foreign attitude of the British. The majority of foreign states that have come into Afghanistan have played the role of a conqueror by trying to take over their land. And because the Afghani people resist conquerors, Afghanis resist foreigners. Primary sources such as Mountstuart’s encounter with a tribal leader provide insight into this argument: while some say these encounters demonstrate Afghanistan’s anti-foreign attitude, one can only conclude that they resent foreign rule of their country.

Mohammed Ali, author of A Cultural History of Afghanistan and a scholar of Afghani people, argues that Islam unified Afghanistan.³¹ The diverse tribes, for the first time, were linked together by a common faith. This cohesion led to the concept of holy wars in which Islam was used to oppose outsiders. This unification came with the introduction of Islam in the 7th century A.D.; however this does not mean that the anti-foreign view came in the 7th century A.D. with the introduction of Islam? It is argued that Afghanistan used a pro-Islamic attitude to

²⁸ Fitzgerald, Paul, and Elizabeth Gould. *Afghanistan's Untold Story*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2009. Print. pg. 144

²⁹ Tanner, Stephen. *Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2002. Print. pg. 1

³⁰ Norris, J.A. *The First Afghan War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Print.

³¹ Mohammed, Ali. *A Cultural History of Afghanistan*. N.p.: n.p., 1964. Print.

express their anti-foreign view. Despite this argument, one cannot conclude that the use of Islam to oppose outsiders entails that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.

Although the nation may have been unified through Islam, it is not certain if this unification is the cause of the views they hold today. This leads one to ask: does the pro-Islamic attitude precede or occur simultaneously with the anti-foreign attitude held in Afghanistan? This may present a problem in this study, but by looking at the schools of thought it seems as if there is one thing that both groups agree on: Islam was used to fuel the anti-foreign view and in turn, a pro-Islamic attitude was amplified because of xenophobia.

The Afghan people resented the British occupation of their country. This resentment is demonstrated through military action between the Afghan public and British (such as the Battle of Maiwand). Their actions reflect their attitude toward the British: during battles and discussions with the British, Afghans made it clear that they would not tolerate a British rule. Despite making this known, the British traumatized the Afghan people. Killing civilians and attempting to change their so-called “primitive” way of life, the British overstayed their welcome in Afghanistan. While some argue that the British are to blame for the anti-foreign view in Afghanistan, others argue that this attitude preceded the British invasion. Although historical accounts demonstrate that the Afghan public resisted the British, it cannot be concluded from these accounts that the Afghan people are anti-foreign. Because it cannot be concluded that the Afghan people are anti-foreign simply because they resented the British, other interactions between Afghans and foreigners must be looked at.

3.2 20th Century Afghanistan: When foreigners meet

Afghanistan has been a quixotic tourist destination for the last century. Despite not being a popular vacation destination, travel logs about Afghanistan are prevalent. In these travel logs,

the authors describe every aspect of their experience. Through their stories, the reader learns an outsider's perception of the Afghan people and the Afghan people's perception of the outsider. This is important because there are contrasts in Western and Afghan perception. Although many outsiders perceive Afghans as anti-foreign, many travel logs demonstrate that this is not the case. In addition, it is important to see what foreigners think an anti-foreign attitude entails. By seeing interactions between the Afghan public and outsiders, these questions are answered. Each travel log provides new insight, yet there are several similarities throughout each of them. Many of these travelers notice that there is an obvious distrust of foreigners, yet they simultaneously find hospitality and kindness throughout their travels. Despite many visitors noticing that the Afghan people are suspicious of foreigners, many of these travelers learn that this distrust is a result of the Afghan government. It is for this reason that the significance of travel logs to this study is again realized: one learns not only of the Afghan public's perception of foreigners, but also that of the Afghan government.

One of the most recognized of these travel logs is The Road to Oxiana by Robert Byron.³² In his 1933 memoir, he recounts his journey through Afghanistan. Most people remember his great descriptions of Afghan architecture, but his writings also give important descriptions of the people and his interactions with them. Although only thirty pages are devoted to his travel in Afghanistan, much is to be learned of the Afghan people and foreigners' perceptions of Afghanistan. For example, one learns that Byron's definition of anti-foreign is not warranted—he is disgusted that Afghans expect him to conform to their laws, arguing that a guest should not have to conform to a host country's rules.²⁸ From Byron's experience with

³² Byron, Robert. "Afghanistan." *The Road to Oxiana*. London: Purnell and Sons, 1937. 84-116. Print.

Afghan laws, it cannot be concluded that the Afghan people are anti-foreign. This exemplifies the significance of Western perception: one's definition of anti-foreign may not actually signify true xenophobia.

Another important memoir is Eric Newby's *A Short Walk through the Hindu Kush* (1956).³³ Through Newby's conversations with Afghans, the reader not only learns about the public but also how their government's policies reflect the government's anti-foreign attitude during this time. Despite the fact that they were written during different time periods, there are many parallels with his book, Debra Denker's *Sisters Under the Bridge of Fire*, and Rory Stewart's *The Places In Between*.^{34 35} In all three memoirs, the reader is able to contrast the Afghan people's sentiment and the political elite. This contrast is shown in conversations with the Afghan public. This is important because these conversations explain the policies and also Afghan public perception of these policies. In all three works, the authors note how government attitudes of foreigners are expressed through the Afghan public.

In *Sisters Under the Bridge of Fire*, Debra Denker records her experiences in Afghanistan during the Soviet Union invasion. There is much overlap with Denker and Newby's book. They note similar descriptions of the Afghan people and stress the differences between the political elite rhetoric and that of the public. Her story is extraordinary because not only is she a foreigner but also a woman. If the Afghans were anti-foreign they would be even less tolerant of foreign women because of their relationships with Afghan women (i.e. women are not allowed to

³³ Newby, Eric. *A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush*. New York: Penguin Books, 1958. Print.

³⁴ Denker, Debra. *Sisters on the Bridge of Fire*. Mission Hills: Burning Gate Press, 1993. Print.

³⁵ Stewart, Rory. "How to Save Afghanistan." *Time*. N.p., 17 July 2008. Web. 28 Jan. 2011. <<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1823753-1,00.html>>.

sleep in the same room as men). Despite their strict regulations on the Afghan women, the Afghan men defy their tradition when dealing with Denker. She is taken into their homes and is allowed privileges the typical Afghan woman was not. One of these privileges is the ability to sleep in the same room as men. This is not typically allowed for women, yet for this foreigner they not only allowed but also invited this act.

Her memoir demonstrates how significant the travel log genre is to this topic: differences in rhetoric between the political elite and public can be found simply by interacting with the Afghan people themselves. Although simply by looking at these interactions shows these differences, it also remains important to look at Afghan political elite sources in order to see if, at times, the Afghan government has not accurately represented the Afghan public's view of outsiders. This is very significant for the United States foreign policy in Afghanistan. As rhetoric and attitudes differ between the Afghan political elite and public, the United States government must decide which view to pay heed.

Another well-known travel book is Rory Stewart's The Places in Between. A *New York Times* review states that Stewart survived his 2002 journey through Afghanistan because of the kindness of strangers.³⁶ When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 they formed their policy on the assumption that the Afghan public is anti-foreign and, thus, will resent the United States occupation. Because of this, Stewart's travel log is essential to this paper. He comes to Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion, yet receives only the Afghan public's kindness and hospitality. Almost everyone Rory Stewart met treated him as a guest of honor—showing that the Afghan public is not anti-foreign during this time.

³⁶ Stewart, Rory. "How to Save Afghanistan." *Time*. N.p., 17 July 2008. Web. 28 Jan. 2011. <<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1823753-1,00.html>>.

Stewart's approach is also worth noting. The reader learns little about the author—it is an Afghan-centric book in which Stewart attempts not only to immerse himself into their culture but also to eliminate his bias. Although it is impossible to eliminate a bias completely, he is successful at providing a well-rounded account of the Afghan people—showing not only possible anti-foreign sentiment but also tolerance of foreigners.

Although the *Findings* chapter contains more details of the travel logs, it is important to summarize the approaches of several in order to understand how an anti-foreign sentiment could be deducted from their readings. By looking at the next chapter, one can determine that the Afghanistan's people have not been anti-foreign by seeing differences in rhetoric between the Afghan political elite and the public.

4. Findings

In this chapter, one can find certain flaws of the aforementioned argument of when Afghanistan acquired an anti-foreign attitude. By seeing these flaws, it is made obvious that the question of if the Afghan people are anti-foreign remains inconclusive by simply looking at their debate. The next section of this chapter gives American accounts of the Afghan resistance in the country. Throughout the United States foreign policy are assumptions that the Afghan people are anti-foreign. It is important to understand first what the United States government means by anti-foreign sentiment. After having an understanding of what anti-foreign views entail, I will utilize travel memoirs and other sources from the 20th and 21st century to show that the Afghan people are not anti-foreign despite several claims.

4.1 Flaws of the Afghan historians and British accounts

The literature on this subject not only lays out the schools of thought and their arguments but it also lays out the flaws of their arguments. The flaw of many studies that are consistent

with the nationalist Afghan historian view (that the British created the anti-foreign attitude in Afghanistan) is that their historical analysis is either not sufficient or is nonexistent. It is not possible to argue that the British instilled an anti-foreign sentiment in Afghans without looking at the history that preceded the Anglo-Afghan invasions.

The flaw of the argument consistent with British accounts (British accounts state that the xenophobia is not a result of the British invasion) is that they do not attempt to see if the anti-foreign, pro-Islamic view was heightened because of the British incursion. This group believes that this xenophobia was already present in the country; however, it does not see if the attitudes were heightened as a result. There were three Anglo-Afghan Wars: The first (1839-1842), the second (1878-1880), and the third (1919)—each of which should be looked at in order to see if the anti-foreign view grew in response.

Although this thesis does not devote itself entirely to the study of the aforementioned flaws, it is significant to note that the above studies remain incomplete as long as their problems go unaddressed. By looking at the United States policy in Afghanistan from 2001 to present, one can see how the debate over when and why an anti-foreign view was acquired in Afghanistan plays a role in shaping the strategies of the United States in Afghanistan.

4. 2 U.S. Foreign Policy from 2001 to present

In this section, significant aspects of United States policy in Afghanistan from 2001 to present are detailed. Although this section is devoted to U.S. policy in Afghanistan, only what is relevant to this topic is discussed. This topic is important for two reasons. The first reason is that through the United States' policies and speeches, one can see that the United States has shaped its experience in response to anti-foreign attitudes held in Afghanistan. U.S. policy has depended on the assumption that the Afghans are anti-foreign, yet the Afghans continue not to

demonstrate an anti-foreign attitude. Because of this assumption, this study is significant. The Afghan public has come to resent the United States occupation because of many of the United States policies. This is the second reason discussion of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is important. The Afghans' resentment of the U.S. occupation does not signify an anti-foreign view. The Afghan public has not been hostile to foreigners, but demonstrates resistance in response to the suffering the U.S. continues to cause Afghanistan.

It is understandable that some aspects of foreign policy may have to be based on assumptions; however, it is not surprising that there are implications from many assumptions that turn out unwarranted. For this reason, it has been a disadvantage for the United States to assume that the Afghan people are anti-foreign. For example, part of the reason the United States failed to capture Osama bin Laden in December 2001 was because the United States assumed there would be an anti-American response from the Afghan people.³⁷ In this section, one can see the United States' role in Afghanistan since 2001 and the implications of the United States assumptions.

The early days

On September 11th, 2001, Al Qaeda members murdered more than 3,000 victims when they hijacked and crashed planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. It took two months after this event for the United States to topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime. The United States mission was not complete, though, until Al Qaeda and its leaders were captured.

³⁷ Kerry, Senator John F. "Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why." *111th Congress, 1st session* (2009): n. pag. Web. 8 Feb. 2011. <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf>.

The U.S. war in Afghanistan is constantly referred to as the other war—the Iraq war receives more attention from the media and the U.S. government. The mission in Afghanistan was simple for former President George W. Bush: combat and punish Al Qaeda. Although there were different views on how to stabilize the country, most of the Bush administration agreed that nation building was not the reason for the United States' presence. With the collective help of other countries, the United States remains determined to punish Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders and their followers. By not adopting nation-building policies, the Bush administration established a light footprint policy—a policy opposite of the one the Soviets adopted in the 1980s. The Soviet policy in Afghanistan was heavy-handed and aggressive. Because of the Afghan people's reaction to this heavy-handed Soviet policy, the United States argues that a light footprint policy is the best alternative for Afghanistan.

Despite their determination to punish Al Qaeda, the United States is losing international and Afghan support. Without the Afghan people's endorsement, problems have and will continue to ensue. Because the United States continues to divert attention and resources to the Iraq war, *New York Times* reporter David S. Rohde argues, there is an increase in Afghan and Pakistan resentment.³⁸ This Afghan resentment may explain the United States' continued lack of success. It is a cycle: without progress, Afghans resent the United States occupation, and this resentment causes further lack of progress. This shows that Afghan resentment is within reason—the United States continue to make promises that go unfulfilled and the Afghan people are justly responding to these failures. Despite this resentment, it cannot be argued that the Afghans are anti-foreign. They react to situations as appropriate: this is not anti-foreign sentiment in and of itself. It is a reaction to a situation that happens to involve a foreign group.

³⁸ Rohde, David S. "Miscalculations in U.S. Afghan Offensive." *Council on Foreign Relations* (2010): n. pag. Print

In Seth Jones' *In the Graveyard of Empires*, he frequently refers to the U.S. goal of capturing al Qaeda leaders while simultaneously ensuring a light footprint in the region.³⁹ One of the main reasons for their light footprint policy was because of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan:

They wanted to prevent large-scale popular resistance similar to what the Soviet Union had encountered in the 1980s; they did not want the U.S. military engaged in peacekeeping or nation-building operations; and they ultimately believed that small numbers of ground troops and airpower, working with Afghan forces, would be sufficient to establish security.⁴⁰

The aforementioned reason (Afghan civilian resistance) for a light footprint is not a valid one because the Afghan people are not anti-foreign. Despite this uncertainty, the mere concern over possible Afghan resistance was the reason for the United States' overarching light footprint policies and their outcomes in Afghanistan. Centcom commander General John Abizaid, a scholar of Afghanistan, said that the overriding reason for the light footprint policy was to preclude or minimize local opposition.⁴¹ This shows the extent to which Afghanistan's supposed anti-foreign attitude played a role in U.S. foreign policy. This attitude was such a bona fide worry to the United States that the United States allowed it to determine the nature of their policy.

In his article, Charles Krauthammer argues that that while assuming the Afghans are anti-foreign is a reasonable postulation, it proved wrong: "Not just because the enemy proved highly

³⁹ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print.

⁴⁰ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 122

⁴¹ Krauthammer, Charles. "Obama's Bush Blame Game." *Real Clear Politics*. N.p., 30 Oct. 2009. Web. 1 Apr. 2011. <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/10/30/its_time_for_obama_to_stop_blaming_bush.html>.

resilient but because the allegiance of the population turned out to hinge far less on resentment of foreign intrusiveness than on public insecurity, which made them side with the insurgents out of sheer fear.”⁴⁰ Despite Krauthammer’s argument, the United States assumption was not reasonable. It was not the heavy aspect of the Soviet’s policy that accounts for Afghan resistance, but it was how this footprint was used. One way a heavy footprint could be used to the United States’ benefit is population protection, which entails state building and requires more troops. This demonstrates that it is not the scale of the footprint but how this footprint is used. The Afghan public resisted how the Soviet Union used their heavy occupation, but this alone does not allow the United States to conclude that a light footprint policy is their only option.

Much is to be learned by the United States when studying the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Because of this, it is within reason for the United States to refer to the Soviets’ experience when forming policy for their 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. By doing this, however, the United States relied too heavily on the Soviet Union’s experience. It is true that there was resentment of the Soviets and it is also true that the Soviets had a large presence in the region, though this resentment was not in response to the Soviets’ large footprint policies. The Afghan public resisted the Soviet Union because of their treatment of the public. The Soviets did not try to gain support from the Afghan public and the public resisted the Soviets in response.⁴² Because of this, the United States reason to adopt a light footprint policy is unwarranted.

⁴² Grau, Lester W. *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996. Print.

December 2001

Two important events happened in Afghanistan in December 2001: the signing of the Bonn Agreement and the mission at Tora Bora. The Bonn Agreement was created in order to re-establish government institutions for Afghanistan. In this agreement, an interim authority was established in which government duties would be fulfilled until Afghanistan's presidential elections.⁴³ The interim government's functions include dealing with the affairs of the state, regulating of currency, human rights monitoring, and abiding by international standards.⁴⁴ This agreement established Hamid Karzai as the head of the thirty-member administration.⁴⁵ The agreement was essential to Afghanistan's transition—it demanded the establishment of security forces along with equal representation of all Afghan ethnicities. The Bonn Agreement is significant because its promises have gone unfulfilled. Because of this, many Afghan people demonstrate resentment.⁴²

The Bonn Agreement also established the peacekeeping role of the international community. This is significant because, while it established this role, the international community did not follow through with their responsibilities. Although the Bonn Agreement states otherwise, the United States stressed that peacekeeping should be minimal (some speeches indicate that it should only be in the city of Kabul). The Afghans noticed the United States' failed promises. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said, "this has led to increasingly vocal

⁴³ Afghan Bonn Agreement. <http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm>.

⁴⁴ Afghan Bonn Agreement. <http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm>.

⁴⁵ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print.

⁴⁶ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print.

demands by ordinary Afghans.”⁴⁷ Despite the United States’ concern that resistance would result from a large presence, their small presence policies created problems for the Afghan people. This stresses the United States policy in Afghanistan—a light footprint in which Al Qaeda may be tackled, but security and peace issues are not.

Another important aspect of the Bonn Agreement was the establishment of a constitutional Loya Jirga. A Loya Jirga is a typical meeting held in Afghanistan when the country faces important reform.²⁶ The Loya Jirga, which was held between June 12 and June 19, 2002, was in charge of drafting a constitution; however, Malalai Joya (a member of Afghanistan’s parliament) says it had already been drafted behind the scenes. “As delegates, many of us felt we were being sued to legitimize a document that we were not able to influence.”²⁶ If the constitution had already been drafted, what was the purpose of the Loya Jirga? Malalai Joya says that its purpose was in order to be perceived as a democracy.

Another issue with the Loya Jirga dealt with propositions. In order even to propose an amendment, at least fifty delegates had to agree.²⁶ The Loya Jirga’s sole purpose was to reform the country; by setting hurdles such as the aforementioned one, it made reform less likely. As President George W. Bush said in his April 17, 2002 address, peace will be achieved in Afghanistan by helping the country build a stable government.⁴⁸ In order to achieve this stable government, many hurdles must first be dismantled. The purpose of the Bonn Agreement was created to recreate the state of Afghanistan. Despite its purpose, the United States government

²⁶ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print. pg. 81

⁴⁸ Bush, President George W. April 17, 2002 Address.
<http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=915>.

constantly said that their purpose was not state building. Sending these mixed messages, the Afghan people continue to show more resentment toward the United States. This resentment, however, comes with some justification: the United States has made Afghanistan suffer and the Afghan people respond to this suffering. Although they show resentment, the Afghan people are not anti-foreign. Many resent the United States occupation, but this does not reflect on their attitude toward foreigners.

The second event in December 2001 occurred in the mountains of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan. This event is an important reflection of the United States using the mere possibility of Afghan resentment to justify their actions or in this case, their lack of action. The United States' initial and central reason for being in Afghanistan was to capture Osama bin Laden and his followers; however, at Tora Bora, the threat of Afghan resentment as part of the reason for their failure to capture him.

In November 2009, Senator John F. Kerry addressed the Senate with his *Tora Bora Revisited*. In this report, he discusses the 2001 failed military engagement at Tora Bora. This eastern Afghanistan region is well-known as Osama bin Laden's hideout and the United States' failure to capture him at this location. In December of 2001, American and Afghan forces surrounded Tora Bora. The U.S. government was certain that Osama bin Laden was present at Tora Bora; however, despite this certainty, they still failed to capture him.

In this article, Senator Kerry says that it was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's decision not to deploy American forces. "Rumsfeld said at the time that he was concerned that too many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would create an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread

insurgency.”⁴⁹ The assumption that the Afghan people are anti-foreign was one of the main reasons Osama bin Laden was not captured in December 2001. This assumption is not warranted, yet remained a real threat to the United States as it deterred the U.S. troops from completing their mission. The Bush administration said from the onset that they had the goal of catching Osama bin Laden and his followers. By not deploying more troops, the Bush administration went against their mission.

Many politicians, such as former Vice President Dick Cheney, defended Rumsfeld’s decision because they said they were uncertain of Osama bin Laden’s exact location; however, the majority of sources were certain that Tora Bora was Osama bin Laden’s location.⁵⁰ Many sources (i.e. the Pentagon and CIA operatives) state that the Bush administration’s focus on the Iraq war was part of the reason Osama bin Laden was not captured in December 2001. During this time, President George W. Bush’s attention had already begun to shift. “From day one it was Iraq, Iraq, Iraq,” remarked Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.⁵¹ Because of this, many argue, Osama bin Laden was not captured at Tora Bora and was able to escape to Pakistan, where many think he remains today.

Although Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and many others argue that it was the Bush administration’s focus on Iraq that led to Osama bin Laden’s escape, Secretary of Defense Ronald Rumsfeld said that it was because too many U.S. troops in the region would create an anti-

⁴⁹ Kerry, Senator John F. "Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why." *111th Congress, 1st session* (2009): n. pag. Web. 8 Feb. 2011. <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf>.

⁵⁰ Kerry, Senator John F. "Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why." *111th Congress, 1st session* (2009): n. pag. Web. 8 Feb. 2011. <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf>.

⁵⁰ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 145

⁵⁰ Kerry, Senator John F. "Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why." *111th Congress, 1st session* (2009): n. pag. Web. 8 Feb. 2011. <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf>.

American backlash.⁵² It remains a question whether he was using the possibility of anti-foreign backlash to justify his lack of action at Tora Bora or if that was truly the reason for Osama bin Laden's escape. It is precarious that Rumsfeld's worry about anti-foreign backlash was the real reason for his lack of action because, at this time, the Bush administration's attention had fully turned to Iraq.

In addition to the overarching focus on Iraq, the reliance on Afghan forces also led to Osama bin Laden's escape. Because the local Afghan troops would not suffice to fight Al Qaeda at Tora Bora, the CIA requested additional U.S. troops.⁵³ This request went unanswered and the U.S. mission at Tora Bora was forced to rely almost completely on local Afghan troops. This led to Osama bin Laden's escape to Pakistan. It remains a question why the CIA's request for more troops went unanswered: was it because more troops would lead to anti-American backlash or was it because these resources were being allotted for Iraq? Although the answer to this question remains unknown, the Bush administration used anti-foreign backlash to justify their actions in Afghanistan.

Partially due to the failure at Tora Bora, the United States remains in Afghanistan today. Despite their continued presence and promises to increase aid, the war in Afghanistan remains lightly funded relative to other wars. For example, by 2010 cumulative spending on Iraq reached \$751 billion while Afghanistan had received \$336 billion.⁵⁴ Although it is not certain that more funding would ameliorate the rebuilding of Afghanistan, it is certain that the administration's inadequate funding policies have not been successful thus far. One can measure their lack of success simply by looking at the amount of corruption and lack of freedom that are ever-

⁵³ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print.

⁵⁴ Belasco, Amy. Congressional Research Service: The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>.

increasing in the country. The Afghan public resents the United States occupation as result of these problems.

The warlords and their return to power

The United States strategy of combating Al Qaeda is also worth noting. Many warlords have returned to power because the United States continues to fund them in order to capture Al Qaeda members. These warlords are largely responsible for Afghanistan's devastation in the 1990s.⁵⁵ In the 1990s, Hekmatyar was known for being "the most brutal of a generally brutal group" and in 1994 he bombed Kabul destroying half the city and killing 25,000 people.⁵⁶ Today, Hekmatyar has a position in the Afghanistan parliament. Despite their history of violence, many warlords have important roles in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. According to a Human Rights Watch report, these warlords make up 60 percent of the new parliament.⁵⁷ This further questions the United States' purpose in Afghanistan. Although rhetoric says that the United States is in Afghanistan to help build a stable government, they are allowing the promotion of notorious warlords. In Kathy Gannon's 2004 "Afghanistan Unbound", she discusses how the international community has abandoned Afghans by promoting these warlords.⁵⁸ Not only has the international community abandoned these Afghans by allowing the

⁵⁵ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print.

⁵⁵ Perlez, Jane. "A Nation Challenged: The Warlords; The Corrupt and Brutal Reclaim Afghan Thrones." *The New York Times*. N.p., 19 Nov. 2001. Web. 1 Apr. 2011. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/19/world/nation-challenged-warlords-corrupt-brutal-reclaim-afghan-thrones-evoking-chaos.html?src=pm>>.

⁵⁷ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print.

⁵⁷ Gannon, Kathy. "Afghanistan Unbound." *Foreign Affairs* (2004): n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/afghanistan-unbound>>.

⁵⁷ Baker, Aryn. "The Warlords of Afghanistan." *Time*. N.p., 12 Feb. 2009. Web. 1 Apr. 2011. <<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1879167,00.html>>.

promotion of these warlords but it has also endorsed these warlords by allowing their promotion. With warlords in power, Afghanistan's ability to reform is inhibited.

In *Time's* "The Warlords of Afghanistan" Aryn Baker interviews Maghferat Samimi, an Afghan civilian. Samimi says that the problem is that the warlords are not only continuing to commit the same crimes they did in the 1990s but the United States government now also protects them.⁵⁹ "[The warlords not being held accountable for their crimes and also being granted government positions has] fueled public discontent with the U.S.-backed Afghan government."⁵⁷ The warlords caused much harm for the Afghan people and the United States has allowed and even promoted their come to power. Because of this, Afghans resent the United States occupation and this seems like an appropriate reaction. Despite this being a justified reaction, one cannot conclude that the Afghans are anti-foreign because of this. This reaction does not signify intolerance of foreigners, but an intolerance of those who allow Afghanistan's enemies to come to power.

The author of *In the Graveyard of Empires*, Seth Jones, says that one of the many repercussions of the United States' lack of funding is the return of Afghanistan's most infamous warlords. Due to the dearth of foreign aid, the United States military has recruited local-warlord militia forces.⁶⁰ Lieutenant General John R. Vines stated that local warlords "led every mounted patrol and most operations because they knew the ground better and could more easily spot something that was out of place."⁶¹ Though it is most likely true that Afghanistan's warlords

⁶⁰ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print.

⁶⁰ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print. pg. 130

⁶⁰ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print. pg. 107

⁶¹ Gannon, Kathy. "Afghanistan Unbound." *Foreign Affairs* (2004): n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/afghanistan-unbound>>.

know the terrain better than American forces, the Afghan public does not support their government positions, yet these warlords are still permitted to represent the Afghan people in government and war.⁶² How is this being allowed? These warlords devastated the current generation in Afghanistan, but are still being given revered spots in government. Their policies in the 1990s regressed Afghanistan and its economy, yet today they are still in charge of Afghanistan's economic and political progress.

In 2004, Hamid Karzai became president of Afghanistan. "President Karzai has praised the mujahideen as heroes for their part in the war against the Soviets in the 1980s. But that is not how ordinary Afghans view them."⁶⁰ On many issues, the locals do not see eye to eye with their president. Because of this and his relationship with several warlords, many Afghans question President Hamid Karzai's intentions for their country. The United States' intentions in Afghanistan are also questioned because many believe Karzai is a "puppet" for the United States.⁶³ Many individuals criticize President Karzai and his weakness. Malalai Joya was first elected to the interim authority and then as a member of Parliament. Many refer to her as the bravest woman in Afghanistan because of her condemnation of United States foreign policy and the resultant lack of reform in her country.⁵³ In her book A Woman Among Warlords, she describes President Karzai as a "puppet ruler of the United States."⁶⁴ She also mentions repeatedly that it is the White House's requests to which Karzai responds, despite his obligation to respond to those of the Afghan people.⁵³ For this reason, many refer to Karzai as a puppet

⁶⁴ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print. pg. 107

ruler of the United States. Although President Karzai knows the warlords' backgrounds, he has yet to punish or expel them from parliament. This is where frustration lies: these people should not be able to represent the population and they should also be prosecuted for their actions.

Kathy Gannon, an Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Gannon says, "Although President Hamid Karzai is strong on paper, he is weak in fact. The drug trade is surging, the Taliban are creeping back, and real power rests in the hands of the country's many warlords."⁶⁵ It seems as if the United States' foreign policy has yet to address these concerns with President Karzai. This again questions the United States' purpose in Afghanistan. With the sole goal of finding Al Qaeda, they are simultaneously promoting a safe haven for Al Qaeda and Taliban members by allowing warlords with similar views as the Taliban to rule the country.

According to the Afghanistan National Security Council's *National Threat Assessment of Afghanistan to the United States*: these warlords were the "principle obstacle to the expansion of the rule of law into the provinces and thus the achievement of the social and economic goals that the people of Afghanistan expect their Government, supported by the International Community, to deliver."⁶⁶ Because of the warlords' presence in the government and a lack of security forces, the Bonn agreement failed to live up to its expectations. What has not failed to live up to its expectations was the United States' attempt to have a minimal peacekeeping role in the region. By looking at the United States' light footprint policy, one can see how minimal the United States' peacekeeping role remains.

⁶⁵ Gannon, Kathy. "Afghanistan Unbound." *Foreign Affairs* (2004): n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/afghanistan-unbound>>.

⁶⁶ Gannon, Kathy. "Afghanistan Unbound." *Foreign Affairs* (2004): n. pag. Web. 25 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/afghanistan-unbound>>.

The United States' light footprint policies and their repercussions

As author Seth Jones states, the small footprint policy was based on the past—the heavy presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan led to a large-scale popular resistance.⁶⁷ Because of this, a small presence was the logical alternative for the United States; however, many argue that it was not the Soviet's large presence that led to Afghan resistance, but how they threatened the population instead of trying to win support.⁶⁸ “Despite all the press photos showing Soviet soldiers with Afghan adults and children, genuine fraternization between Soviets and Afghans was discouraged. During field operations, the Soviets called in artillery and air strikes on villages without warning the inhabitants.”⁶⁹ The Afghans did not resist the pervasiveness of the Soviet occupation, but how it was used. This shows the U.S. foreign policy's lack of understanding not only of history but also of the Afghan people—they were not against a large presence but how it was used and how it exacerbated the situation. It is worth noting how instead of asking the Afghan people whether they would have preferred a large-scale or small-scale occupation, U.S. foreign policy based itself on unwarranted assumptions such as the aforementioned.

Although President George W. Bush and his administration decided that their purpose in Afghanistan was not for peacekeeping, some of their rhetoric indicates otherwise. In his April 17, 2002 address to the nation, President George W. Bush said that America's purpose in Afghanistan goes beyond eliminating terrorism and resentment. America's purpose is also to

⁶⁷ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 133

⁶⁸ Grau, Lester W. *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996. Print.

⁶⁹ Grau, Lester W. *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996. Print.

ensure opportunity for all Afghans by helping to rebuild their country.⁷⁰ By utilizing contradictory rhetoric, the Bush administration caused frustration not only for Americans but also for Afghan citizens.⁷¹ Not only do President George W. Bush's words contradict themselves but they also confuse how his administration defines success in Afghanistan. A peacekeeping role requires a large foreign presence, yet the United States' presence remains small. Because of this, it seems as if the United States does not truly intend to have a significant peacekeeping role.

Beginning in 2005, the Taliban's presence became more palpable. Afghan forces were unable to protect the Afghan people from the Taliban's large forces.⁷² The fact that the Taliban took control over large areas demonstrated the need for increased security and police forces. The United States' allowance for the Taliban to take control shows the United States' lack of practical concern for the people of Afghanistan, which contributes to Afghan resentment of U.S. troops.

A need for security forces

New York Times reporter David S. Rhode, who spent years in Afghanistan, says security improvements would solve Afghanistan's problems.⁷³ By looking at southern Afghanistan, he says, one can see how Karzai and the United States' mistakes are due to lack of security forces: "The Karzai government has made major mistakes in southern Afghanistan that have really alienated the population and created an opening for the Taliban to move into southern

⁷⁰ Bush, President George W. April 17, 2002 Address.

<http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=915>.

⁷¹ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print. pg. 111

⁷² Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 163

⁷³ Rhode, David S. "Miscalculations in U.S. Afghan Offensive." *Council on Foreign Relations* (2010): n. pag. Print.

Afghanistan with a lot of popular support.”⁷⁴ The Afghan people resist the United States occupation because of U.S. decisions. Because of the lack of security southern Afghans receive, the Taliban is more accepted as a political leader in their region. From the beginning, President Bush said the United States would help Afghanistan set up an Afghan military. By seeing how southern Afghanistan’s situation has worsened because of a lack of security, one can see that President Bush’s promise is without backing or realization. The Afghan public has not resented the U.S. occupation since 2001. The Afghans’ resentment is correlated with the United States continued failed promises. For this reason, one cannot conclude that the Afghan public is anti-foreign.

In January 2006, Major General Robert Durbin was appointed to head the training of Afghan police and army. Although he thought he could positively modify the police force within a few months, Durbin soon realized that it would take over ten years.⁷⁵ Despite this realization, Major General Durbin was determined to continue efforts to reform the police force and his determination prodded the United States to increase attention and funding for the training Afghan police forces. As this attention increased, the United States realized how corrupt and inexperienced the Afghan security force was. “Afghan, U.S., and European officials involved in police training reported pervasive corruption throughout the force.”⁷⁶ This pervasive corruption supported the need to rebuild Afghanistan’s domestic security forces.

⁷⁴ Rohde, David S. "Miscalculations in U.S. Afghan Offensive." *Council on Foreign Relations* (2010): n. pag. Print.

⁷⁵ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 163, 167

⁷⁶ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 163, 167

In a 2008 report, the Pentagon acknowledged that corruption and insufficient U.S. military trainers have inhibited Afghanistan's police force.⁷⁷ In response to violence being at an all-time high in March 2009, President Barack Obama deployed an additional four thousand U.S. troops with the sole purpose of training Afghan soldiers. President Obama noted, "These additional troops will fully resource our effort to train and support the Afghan army and police."⁷⁸ Although this increase in troops is a prima facie accomplishment, the United States' policy from September 2001 has been to build an Afghan military force. Thus, one can question what the United States has been doing in the past 10 years to ameliorate security and end corruption, the promises the United States made to Afghanistan.

Despite the increase in troop numbers, some argue that sending more troops is not the answer to assisting Afghan forces. Max Boot, a Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, considered that money is the answer. In a 2006 *Council on Foreign Relations* article, contributor Max Boot contends, "U.S. financial assistance to Afghanistan has never been adequate."⁷⁹ Without this funding, continued problems with security forces will result. This speaks to a potential issue of aid for the people of Afghanistan. If security forces require more funding than received, how is Afghanistan supposed to improve its condition? Not only is the lack of problem not fixing Afghanistan's problems but some may argue that the problems are worse (by looking at the amount of corruption ever increasing in the country).

⁷⁷ Pentagon. Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2008. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan>. pg. 4

⁷⁸ Bruno, Greg. "Afghanistan's National Security Forces." *Council on Foreign Relations* (2010): n. pag. Web. 2 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistans-national-security-forces/p19122>>.

⁷⁹ Boot, Max. "Get Serious About Afghanistan." *Council on Foreign Relations* (2006): n. pag. Web. 4 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/get-serious-afghanistan/p11598>>.

Although President Obama increased troop numbers to assist Afghanistan's security, some Afghan leaders are against this surge. In November 2010, President Hamid Karzai told *The Washington Post*, "The time has come to reduce military operations. The time has come to reduce the presence of, you know, boots in Afghanistan . . . to reduce the intrusiveness into the daily Afghan life."⁸⁰ Without the complete support of President Karzai and his government, the United States' increase in aid may be futile. Because of this vacillation in support, U.S. success in Afghanistan remains difficult.

The United States is not the only one concerned about the corruption and incompetence of Karzai's government. The Afghan public's faith has decreased as corruption has increased.⁸¹ According to *The New York Times* article "Bribes Corrode Afghans' Trust in Government," corruption is contributing to a lack of public confidence in Karzai's government.⁸² It is agreed that corruption must be ended in order to improve the country but it remains debated how it should be handled. Although the Afghan people's faith in President Karzai has waned, Karzai and his people seem to agree on one thing: the international presence is not facilitating growth.

As the situation continues to appear futile, individuals conclude that it is because Afghans are ungovernable. Because they are ungovernable, success in Afghanistan is unlikely. "Because of the laziness and complicity within the mainstream media, the United States and its allies have been able to perpetuate the myth that Afghanistan has always been an ungovernable state."⁸³

⁸⁰ Blackwill, Robert D. "Plan B in Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs* (2011): n. pag. Web. 1 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan>>.

⁸¹ Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 183

⁸² Filkins, Dexter. "Bribes Corrode Afghans' Trust in Government." *The New York Times*. N.p., 1 Jan. 2009. Web. 2 Apr. 2011. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/world/asia/02kabul.html?pagewanted=1>>.

⁸³ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print. pg. 169

Although it may be true that Afghans are ungovernable, this conclusion can only be reached after all other problems have been solved. Until then, it remains uncertain if the lack of success is a result of Afghans being ungovernable or the United States' policies.

The war in Afghanistan is complicated and the United States' policies seem to further this complication. President George W. Bush's conflicting rhetoric and with his conflicting policies have inhibited growth in Afghanistan. By relying on the assumption that Afghans are anti-foreign if aggravated, the United States has made their role more difficult and less obvious. For this reason, it is important to understand that the Afghan public is not anti-foreign. By comparing the rhetoric of the Afghan political elite and the Afghan public, it can be determined if that the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign. Despite this, it remains a question to whom the United States should respond if one group is anti-foreign and the other is not.

4.3 Comparing rhetoric of the Afghan political elite and Afghan public over time

By contrasting different time periods of the 20th and 21st century, one can conclude that the Afghan people's tolerance of foreigners has been relatively consistent through the years. In this section, both the Afghan public and the Afghan political elite are the variables of study. Because of the language barrier, studying the changing sentiment of modern Afghans is a challenge. Despite this challenge, there have been several foreigners (who speak Afghan languages such as Pashto) to Afghanistan. In their memoirs, the Afghan public and political elite are also their variable of study.

Through their encounters, the reader has much to learn about the Afghan people, the Afghan government, and their different opinions of outsiders. For this reason, I utilize the encounters of foreign travelers and the Afghan people to determine if the Afghan public is anti-foreign. For example, if Afghans were anti-foreign, would they repeatedly invite foreigners into

their home or conduct a conversation with them? Throughout this section, I will show that encounters such as the aforementioned demonstrate that the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign over time. Although the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign over time, the Afghan government does show xenophobia through out the 20th and 21st century. Although their opinion has differed with time, one can see that this anti-foreign view has really been that of Afghanistan's government and not the public. There are two significant reasons to utilize travel memoirs. First, this source shows how foreigners portray the Afghan public. This is important because many foreigners perceive Afghans are anti-foreign. By seeing how outsiders think the Afghans portray anti-foreign views, one can see if their definitions of anti-foreign are valid. The second reason to utilize travel memoirs is to see differences between in rhetoric between the Afghan public and Afghan political elite. Because anti-foreign rhetoric differs between the public and government over time, the United States must decide to which sentiment to pay heed. For this reason, one must understand these differences. By studying the Afghan public and political elite's rhetoric over time, one can determine that it is the Afghan government and not the public that has mostly held an anti-foreign view.

The 1930s in Afghanistan

In 1933, Robert Byron began a journey through the Middle East. Although his writings on Afghanistan are short, he quickly concludes how the Afghans expect Europeans to conform to their standards.⁸⁴ This expectation, according to Byron, demonstrates the anti-foreign attitude held by the Afghans, but his description does not actually indicate xenophobia. Byron later states the standard to which the Afghan people expect him to conform is the inability to buy

⁸⁴ Byron, Robert. "Afghanistan." *The Road to Oxiana*. London: Purnell and Sons, 1937. 84-116. Print.

alcohol in the country. He notes that there is not a drop of alcohol in the whole country.⁷¹

Although Byron traveled to Afghanistan in the 1930s, today it is expected that the traveler conforms to the host country's standards—not the converse. Because of this, this expectation is not only conventional but it also cannot be considered anti-foreign. Although Byron is inconvenienced by this law, the Afghan people cannot be considered anti-foreign simply because they do not change it to accommodate a traveler.

When Byron tells a Punjabi traveler he meets that it is nice to be in a freer environment than Persia, the friend says, “You make a large mistake, sir, when you think there are no suspicions here. It is all suspicions . . . At the present time, twenty foreigners reside in this town, Indians and Russians. About one hundred and twenty government agents are employed to watch them.”⁷¹ This traveler goes on to state that the government is currently watching Byron and that it is the wrong time to be in Afghanistan. This traveler's remarks reflect more poorly on the Afghan government than the Afghan people—the government is hiring these agents in response to their own suspicions of foreigners. Byron later relays a first-hand account with one of these agents.⁷¹

The 1950s in Afghanistan

In 1953, Eric Newby traveled through Afghanistan. In *A Short Walk through the Hindu Kush*, he relays his encounters with the Afghans. During his travels, Newby notes that the Afghans say hurtful things about non-Muslims and there is an obvious distrust of foreigners.⁸⁵ However, as he continues to travel and observe this distrust, he is told that the Afghan

⁷¹ Byron, Robert. "Afghanistan." *The Road to Oxiana*. London: Purnell and Sons, 1937. 84-116. Print.

⁸⁵ Newby, Eric. *A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush*. New York: Penguin Books, 1958. Print. pg.134, 84

government is reluctant to allow travelers because not only are the inhabitants unpredictable in their reception of foreigners but also partly because potential visitors are suspected of being agents who would stir up trouble.⁸⁶ Although Newby begins his memoir noting the Afghan public's distrust of foreigners, it seems as if this distrust is strictly in response to the Afghan government's anti-foreign attitude. Because the political elite do not trust foreigners, they create restrictions on the interactions between the public and foreigners in order to suppress their own anxiety.

By creating restrictions on travelers, it is possible that the Afghan people think they have reason to fear these outsiders. If they should not fear them, then their government would not install restrictions on their relationships with travelers. Therefore it seems that by installing these regulations, the Afghan government is also installing an anti-foreign sentiment in the Afghan people. Despite this possibility, Eric Newby seems to describe more friendly encounters than negative.

The restrictions which Newby discusses show that the Afghan government is anti-foreign; however, one cannot conclude that the Afghan people are anti-foreign because of these restrictions. These restrictions were created partially because the government was unsure how the public would respond to outsiders. They were also instituted because of the government's distrust of outsiders. This demonstrates that the Afghan government did not represent their public's views but also did not attempt to understand how their view toward foreigners. It is possible that the government's restrictions created a suspicion of outsiders in the Afghans. Afghans cannot be considered anti-foreign if their "obvious distrust of foreigners" is result of the Afghan government's own fears.

⁸⁶ Newby, Eric. *A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush*. New York: Penguin Books, 1958. Print. pg.134, 84

Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan (1979-1988)

In Debra Denker's Sisters on the Bridge of Fire, a travel log written approximately 20 years after Eric Newby's memoir, it remains as if it is the Afghan political elite creating these anti-foreign views. Denker quotes several encounters she has with Afghans showing how they would love to invite her into their home, but the government restricts the public from hosting foreigners.⁸⁷ This demonstrates that the Afghans' reason for not inviting Denker into their home is not because they hold an anti-foreign attitude, but because of their government's restrictions. Because the government fears outsiders, they install restrictions on the public's interaction with them.

Although many of her new Afghan friends are nervous to be seen in public with a foreigner, many Afghans still invite Denker into their home. This reinforces the belief that the Afghan people are not anti-foreign but are simply scared of the possible repercussions from inviting foreigners into their home. While their government prevents them from demonstrating their tolerance of foreigners in public, the Afghan people acknowledge behind closed doors their acceptance of foreigners. In fact, Denker does not only show the Afghans being accepting of foreigners but she also shows them going out of their way for her. "Hospitality is a matter of sacred honor to all Afghans. Traditionally in a village, women would eat separately, but because I am a foreign journalist who wants to tell their story, my companions break many traditions for me."⁷³ Because Denker is a foreigner, Afghans invite her into their home. This not only demonstrates a lack of an anti-foreign view but also an almost pro-foreign attitude. By inviting

⁸⁷ Denker, Debra. *Sisters on the Bridge of Fire*. Mission Hills: Burning Gate Press, 1993. Print. pg. 46, 27, 46

Denker into their home because she is a foreigner, the Afghan people prove their acceptance of foreigners.

Not only does Denker show how Afghans rid tradition in order to accommodate a foreigner but she also continues to show how the government's curfew and restrictions have detrimental effects on the people. "Everyone is afraid to admit friendship with a foreigner."⁷³ This shows xenophobia being created by the Afghan government—by restricting Afghans from interacting with outsiders, a fear of being seen with foreigners is instilled in the Afghan people. It is important to note that it is not a fear of foreigners the government instills, but the fear of being seen with them.

Although they are afraid to admit friendship, they are still friends with foreigners. Throughout Denker's travels, she continues to meet caring Afghans who invite her into their home. Not only is Denker a foreigner but she is also a woman. This makes her encounters with Afghan men even more surprising. By sleeping in the same room as these men, one sees devote Muslims contradicting their traditions in order to accommodate not only a complete stranger woman, and outsider.

Despite her friendly encounters with the Afghan people, she notes that while "they will accept war, suffering, loss of home and family, and personal death, which they see as martyrdom guaranteeing paradise, they won't accept foreign domination of their country."⁸⁸ This does not mean that the Afghan people are anti-foreign. This instead signifies that the Afghan public has been against domination. This is a key point because it relates back to the 2001 United States invasion. Many Afghans originally welcomed United States involvement because they did not

⁸⁸ Denker, Debra. *Sisters on the Bridge of Fire*. Mission Hills: Burning Gate Press, 1993. Print.

perceive it as the U.S. trying to take over. This is understandable. Although the United States and Great Britain are allies, Great Britain would not allow the United States to rule their country—this does not make the United States xenophobic of Great Britain. The Afghan people’s resistance to foreign domination is not in itself an anti-foreign act.

It is important to note that Denker’s travels in Afghanistan were taking place from the start of the Soviet occupation in 1979 to 1984. It may be that after the Soviets had been in Afghanistan for some time that a fear of foreigners developed, not out of fear of the government restrictions, but because of the Soviets. In Thomas Barfield’s *A Cultural and Political History* he argues that Russian intervention mobilized more opposition to foreigners⁸⁹; however, Debra Denker’s interactions take place during this intervention. It is hard to imagine the Afghan people being more accepting of Denker; according to Barfield, however, the Afghan people were more anti-foreign at the time of her travels than in the past. Although Barfield argues that the Russian intervention mobilized more opposition to foreigners, did this intervention mobilize more opposition to all foreigners or just the Soviets? By looking at Debra Denker’s memoir, one can argue that the Soviet intervention mobilized opposition to Soviets, not of foreigners (Denker is from the United States) in general.

The Soviet invasion is a crucial time period for understanding Afghans and their possible reasons for supposed xenophobia. The nine-year occupation left Afghans worse off than before the invasion—they were devastated and exhausted from resisting the Soviets. Thomas Barfield says that the Soviet invasion mobilized opposition to foreigners. In contrast, in his memoir,

⁸⁹ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print.

Guibert Lefevre notes only positive encounters with the Afghan people.⁹⁰ In The Photographer: Into War-Torn Afghanistan with Doctors Without Borders, Guibert Lefevre tells many stories exemplifying Afghani generosity. During his travels, Lefevre met a man named Robert who started out as a traveler in Afghanistan, but after constantly witnessing Afghan generosity, moved to the country. The experience that made Robert stay in Afghanistan was when the village he was staying in ran out of bread supplies, yet continued to give him bread.⁷⁶ It seems that the Afghans would not give a foreigner the last of their bread if they were anti-foreign.

During the Soviet occupation, Guibert Lefevre (a French doctor) traveled to Afghanistan. Because the Soviet invasion has left many of them injured and unable to rehabilitate themselves, the Afghans need outside assistance. In his writings, it seems as if the Afghans do not care who helps them—they simply want help. This further supports the anti-domination theory. The Afghans want help. This is made clear through Lefevre's The Photographer and is made clearer today.

The 1990s

Throughout Malalai Joya's book Woman Among the Warlords, she says that she is speaking on behalf of the Afghan people—she is their representative. Despite her claim, there is a disconnect for the reader: we are not sure if she is really representing the Afghan people. Joya makes her anti-American attitude known throughout her writings. While it is true that a representative may have some views that her people do not share, by continuously saying she represents the people and is also anti-foreign, it seems as if she wants to argue that this is a view

⁹⁰ Guibert, Emmanuel, Didier Lefèvre, and Frédéric Lemerrier. *The Photographer*. New York: First Second, 1986. Print. pg. 147

from the people. It remains a question if Joya really does represent the Afghan public's sentiment.

While she is anti-American, Joya also recognizes her country's dependency on foreign help. So while she considers that foreigners are the root of her problems, they seem to also be the solution. Although Joya attempts to represent the Afghan public in her book, the reader must consider her as the political elite she is. Because of this, her anti-foreign view is considered a view of the Afghan political elite.

In the 1990s, the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. Many, including Thomas Barfield, document the Taliban movement and their dearth of popularity in the region. In a sense, the Afghan people were anti-foreign by rejecting the Taliban. The Taliban is a product of Pakistan and the Taliban's leader had little understanding of Afghanistan and its history. There is reason to suspect that an anti-foreign view came from this; however, although the Afghan people rejected a foreign group (the Taliban), this rejection does not reflect on foreigners in general. Because the Taliban caused and continues to cause the Afghan people much harm, the Afghan people resent them. When the Afghan people resent foreigners, it seems as if it is not necessarily because they are foreigners but it is because it is a justified response to the actual harm the foreigner has caused them.

The Afghan people resisted the Taliban regime (1996-2001) of their country. While it is important to realize that the Taliban's opinion of outsiders differed from that of the public, it is also important to realize that, to outsiders, the Taliban opinion was *the* opinion of Afghanistan. The Afghan public's opinion was hardly discussed or known to the outside world and, therefore, foreign perception of the Taliban is important. The reason it is important is because what the West perceived of the Taliban, they most likely perceived of the public. During the Taliban rule,

the Afghan public did not have a voice. Because of this, the Taliban, the Afghan political elite's opinion was accepted as the opinion of the nation. Although the Taliban requested aid from the United Nations, they also demonstrated "hostile rhetoric and regular threats to throw the international agencies out of the country."⁹¹ The Taliban demonstrated hostility toward the international community through their rhetoric and actions. This hostility was taken as the opinion of the nation as only one voice was portrayed throughout their rule.

2001-present

In 2002 Rory Stewart walks across Afghanistan. In *The Places in Between*, he documents his travels. Although he states no particular reason for this journey, much is learned about Afghanistan and its people. Throughout his travels he is dependent on the hospitality of Afghans. "Tell them I am a guest, a traveler. Muslims cannot refuse hospitality."⁹² This is his attitude throughout his memoir. He is demanding when it comes to ensuring that he receives this hospitality. Despite his demands, he is almost always accepted as a guest. If it is required by Islam to be hospitable and because Islam is an all-encompassing way of life for them, it would seem that Afghans would not be anti-foreign.⁹³ Regardless of this possibility, it still remains unresolved whether Afghans are anti-foreign.

When denied a place to stay, Stewart's Afghan guide was ashamed. He told the host: "Look at this man. This man is a foreigner. Look how disgustingly you have behaved toward

⁹¹ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print.

⁹² Stewart, Rory. *The Places in Between*. London: A Harvest Original, 2006. Print. pg. 58

⁹³ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print.

him.”⁹⁴ Stewart shows how the Afghans are expected to accommodate foreigners because they are foreign. Although Stewart’s memoir was written more than twenty years after Debra Denker’s memoir was written, there are parallels. In Denker’s book she writes that the Afghans invite her in because she is foreign. In Stewart’s book, he shows Afghans being expected to invite foreigners into their home simply because they are foreigners. Because of this, one can see that there are similarities in the way Afghans treat foreigners despite the difference in time.

As Rory Stewart travels through Afghanistan, he interacts with the members from several different ethnic tribes of Afghanistan. One of these Afghans is a member of the Tajik who told him “foreigners should stay out [of our country].”⁷⁹ Stewart replied by saying that he has been treated very well in other Muslim countries because Muslims treat guests well. After he says this, the Tajiks change their behavior by saying, “of course we treat guests well. We are Muslims.”⁷⁹ This was one of the few anti-foreign encounters Rory Stewart had in his walk across Afghanistan. Although he did not have many anti-foreign encounters, he did encounter some people who were not welcoming.⁷⁹

Throughout his book, he compares his experience in Afghanistan with those in other Muslim countries—while residents of Iran and Pakistan would not let him travel alone, not many offered to escort Rory to other villages in Afghanistan. Despite this aforementioned statement, it seems as if he is seldom alone throughout his travels.

⁹⁴ Stewart, Rory. *The Places in Between*. London: A Harvest Original, 2006. Print. pg. 58, 83,

Haji Mohsin, a feudal commander and a man of the utmost importance in his village, offered Rory a place to stay for the night. Despite this hospitality, Rory was forced to deal with anti-foreign sentiment. "Twenty-five years getting rid of the foreigners and here they are again," said Haji Mohsin's younger brother.⁹⁵ No one would argue against this statement being anti-foreign but the way in which Rory shows how it was said makes it seem as if it were just a bad joke. This makes for confusion because while these Afghans are making xenophobic statements, they are simultaneously offering a foreigner a place to sleep.

In a 2009 article, *The Washington Post* stated, "The planned U.S. military and counterinsurgency drive in Afghanistan is meeting public and official resistance that could delay and possibly undermine a costly, belated effort that American officials here acknowledge has a limited window of time to succeed."⁹⁶ It is important to note that the aforementioned quote divides Afghans into two groups: the public and officials. Although this article argues that both groups are resenting the United States counterinsurgency, it remains a question if either group is anti-foreign. It would be much easier for the United States to respond if both the Afghan political elite and public held the same opinion of foreigners; however, the Afghan public and government's opinions have differed about foreigners over time. Because of this, it remains a question to which rhetoric the United States should respond.

⁹⁵ Stewart, Rory. *The Places in Between*. London: A Harvest Original, 2006. Print.

⁹⁶ Constable, Pamela. "Resistance to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan." *The Washington Post*. N.p., 16 Jan. 2009. Web. 5 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/15/AR2009011504198.html>>.

President Hamid Karzai's April 3, 2010 Speech

In Thomas Barfield's *Afghanistan*, he quotes a veteran Western diplomat saying, "Karzai was seen by many Afghans as a puppet of the Americans. It delegitimized him."⁹⁷ By not wanting Karzai to be a puppet of the Americans, one may argue that the Afghan public demonstrates their anti-Americanism; however, if someone does not want their government to be a puppet of another country, one cannot conclude that they are anti-foreign. Calling President Karzai a puppet of the Americans, the Afghan people argue that he not only is dependent on the United States but he also responds to U.S. requests instead of Afghan desires (Joya 107). If it is true that President Karzai is a "puppet of the Americans," one may argue that he is pro-American, yet his April 2010 speech tells us differently on his thoughts of Americans and the international community.

On April 3, 2010, it is reported that President Hamid Karzai told a meeting of parliamentary deputies, "if the international community pressures me more, I swear that I am going to join the Taliban."⁹⁸ Although many argue that President Karzai needs the United States and the rest of the international community, his April 2010 speech is referred to as a "harsh anti-Western speech in which he accused foreigners of manipulating last year's election and warned that America and NATO troops risked being seen as invaders."⁹⁸ This accusation was troubling for the United States. Although the President Barack Obama's administration was seeking clarification from President Karzai in regard to his remarks, President Karzai's message is clear:

⁹⁷ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. pg. 310

⁹⁸ Baker, Peter. "White House Calls Karzai Speech 'Troubling.'" *The Washington Post*. N.p., 2 Apr. 2010. Web. 6 Mar. 2011. <<http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/white-house-calls-karzai-speech-troubling/>>.

he wants foreigners to leave Afghanistan.⁹⁹ There are reasons for President Karzai to criticize the United States. For example, the Afghan public thinks he depends too heavily on the United States. It may be that he criticizes the United States in order to prove otherwise to the Afghan people.

In his speech, Karzai warns foreigners that they will soon be seen as invaders.¹⁰⁰ This is important: because he believes the international community has overstayed its welcome, they will be considered invaders if they stay. When Secretary of State Hilary Clinton asked for an explanation, President Karzai said that he was criticizing western news coverage and not the United States⁶⁸; however, he addresses more than the western media in his speech. "Foreigners will make excuses, they do not want us to have a parliamentary election. They want parliament to be weakened and battered, and for me to be an ineffective president and for parliament to be ineffective."⁶⁰ Although some of President Karzai's actions (i.e. responding to U.S. requests and not those of the Afghans) tell us differently about his tolerance of foreigners, his speech's message is clearly anti-foreign. The aforementioned quotes are all taken from one of Karzai's speech. Despite it being a singular event, his rhetoric is reflected in Afghanistan's parliament.

The parliament of Afghanistan

Malalai Joya is one of these parliament members in which the rhetoric from Karzai's April 2010 speech is reflected. In Woman Among Warlords the United States offers Joya

⁹⁹ "U.S. irked by Karzai's anti-Western remarks." *Breitbart*. N.p., 3 Apr. 2010. Web. 6 Mar. 2011. <http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9ER4V6G2&show_article=1>.

¹⁰⁰ Yang, John. "Karzai's speech befuddles Afghan officials." *MSNBC*. N.p., 3 Apr. 2010. Web. 6 Mar. 2011. <http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/04/03/4376139-karzais-speech-befuddles-afghan-officials>.

assistance and she turns it down saying that the help should be from Afghans.¹⁰¹ This is just one of the many instances in which Joya shows her anti-American sentiment. Despite her constant anti-foreign rhetoric, she also argues, “If Afghanistan is to stand on its own feet as a democratic and independent country, it will require the participation of many who today live in the West.”¹⁰² This leads to confusion: Joya continuously portrays her anti-foreign attitude yet simultaneously says the Afghans need their help. Despite her contradictory rhetoric, it seems as if her intolerance of foreigners may be warranted. She states that the CIA paid many warlords for their support of the U.S. war. Because of this funding, warlords are able to buy their parliament seats.⁷⁰ Allowing warlords to be involved in Afghanistan’s reform, the United States has created enemies such as Joya. “The people of Afghanistan would never forgive the United States for backing such brutal men.”⁷⁰ Although Joya speaks on behalf of the Afghan people, the reader cannot be certain that her rhetoric accurately reflects their thoughts. Despite this, the reader easily ascertains that Malalai Joya, an Afghan political elite, is anti-foreign.

“The Afghan political class is proving loath to follow the West’s script.”¹⁰³ One example of this is that parliament has turned down 17 of President Karzai’s ministerial nominees. The United States had certain specific nominees in mind for the aforementioned positions; however, the parliament has refused their wishes by not electing them.

It is difficult to determine what entails an anti-foreign view and what does not; however, it seems as if the government portrays an anti-foreign view often through out the 20th and 21st

¹⁰¹ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print.

¹⁰² Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print. pg. 111

¹⁰³ "Parliamentary pitfalls." *The Economist* (2010): n. pag. Web. 6 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.economist.com/node/15213200>>.

century. While both the Afghan government and public resent the American occupation at times, the Afghan public remains tolerant of foreigners (as demonstrated in Rory Stewart's The Places in Between). The anti-American backlash is due to the United States' failed promises and the suffering Afghanistan experiences because of these failures. Despite this resentment and anti-domination attitude expressed among the Afghan people, the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign.

5. Some Conclusions

The aforementioned writings demonstrate that the Afghan public has not been anti-foreign. Throughout each memoir, Afghan individuals are inviting and kind to outsiders. When the public at first seems suspicious of outsiders, the reader learns that it is usually a result of the Afghan government's anti-foreign view. The government creates restrictions on the Afghan public's interactions with outsiders and makes the public hesitant to interact with foreigners. Despite this hesitancy, the Afghan public continues to invite outsiders into their homes.

In 2001, the Afghan public invited the United States into their home country. In Thomas Barfield's Afghanistan he states, "there was a surprising level of popular support within Afghanistan for the U.S. intervention."¹⁰⁴ Although the U.S. already had the public's support, the U.S. focused their policy on gaining the Afghan public's support. The United States will only defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda by first winning the Afghan people's hearts and minds.¹⁰⁵ In the documentary Restrepo the significance of having the Afghan public on their side is obvious. When U.S. troops accidentally kill local civilians, the soldiers appear frustrated and

¹⁰⁴ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. pg. 276

¹⁰⁵ PBS Frontline. Obama's War. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/>.

angry. These accidental deaths do not help the U.S. mission to capture the Taliban.¹⁰⁶ In fact, these deaths hinder and impede the United States' ability to capture Taliban forces. When interviewed in this documentary, the soldiers stress that in order to push forward to capture the Taliban, the Afghan people must be on their side. If the Afghan public is anti-foreign, the United States' mission would be futile in the region; however, the public is not xenophobic. Because of this, the United States has reason to gain the Afghan public's support.

On March 27, 2011 *Rolling Stone* released an article detailing how U.S. soldiers, for their own recreational purposes, have murdered innocent Afghan civilians. Although the soldiers' officers failed to stop them, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen stresses how these actions go against the United States' mission in Afghanistan: "If we're killing local civilians, we're going to strategically lose."¹⁰⁷ Despite military officials recognizing the need to have the Afghan civilians on the U.S. side, some soldiers did not. Soldiers Jeremy Morlock and Andrew Holmes constantly had conversations of killing one of these innocent "savages" for fun.¹⁰⁸ Finally these soldiers decided to act on these countless imaginings. United States soldiers Morlock and Holmes fired repeatedly at short range on an innocent, 15-year-old Afghan boy. They celebrated their kill by taking photographs with the dead youth and cutting off his little finger to serve as a trophy.¹⁰⁹ Although these actions do not represent most U.S. soldiers, they reflect poorly on the United States occupation. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan recognizes that these incidents were exceptional cases; however, these tragedies explain why the

¹⁰⁶ Hetherington, Tim, and Sebastian Junger. Restrepo. <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1559549/>.

¹⁰⁷ Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. pg. 276

¹⁰⁸ Boal, Mark. "The Kill Team." *Rollingstone*. N.p., n.d. Web. 29 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team-20110327?page=1>>.

¹⁰⁹ Boal, Mark. "The Kill Team." *Rollingstone*. N.p., n.d. Web. 29 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team-20110327?page=1>>.

United States meets resistance with local civilians.¹¹⁰ By committing these crimes, the United States continues to give reason for the Afghan public to resist the U.S. occupation.

In Malalai Joya's *A Woman Among Warlords* she recognizes that Afghanistan needs international help in order to ameliorate their situation.¹¹¹ The Afghan people also recognize that the United States is not helping their country. As more innocent civilians are murdered (whether by accident or not), U.S. troops will continue to meet resistance. One cannot generalize from this resistance that the Afghan people are being anti-foreign. In fact, this heavy assumption has short-changed Afghans in the process. They are suffering largely because of the false assumptions the United States makes. In Thomas Barfield's book he states how the Afghan people noticed a difference between the U.S. invasion and that of the Soviets and British: "there were practically no Americans to be seen during the war against the Taliban."¹¹² The Afghan people allowed the U.S. into their home. Despite this allowance, the United States formed a light footprint policy in order to preclude an anti-foreign backlash. By doing this, the United States ignored the obvious evidence of the Afghan people not being anti-foreign.

To win the end game in this lengthy and important chess match, the current strategy must be reconsidered, and remaining assets redeployed in an effort to secure the hearts and minds of the Afghan populace. Only then will the war end in checkmate with a win for the United States and the Afghan people. The Afghan people have not been anti-foreign and the United States must drastically alter their policies to this finding.

¹¹⁰ Moore, Solomon. "Karzai blasts US troops for gruesome Afghan deaths." *Yahoo News*. N.p., 30 Mar. 2011. Web. 31 Mar. 2011. <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110330/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan>.

¹¹¹ Joya, Malalai. *A Woman Among Warlords*. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print.

¹¹² Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. pg 276

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