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Rebuilding Haiti? Discourses of Development and Security in Post-Earthquake Haiti

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REBUILDING HAITI?
DISCOURSES OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN POST-EARTHQUAKE HAITI

by

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B.A., Ohio State University, 2008

A thesis submitted to the
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written by Amanda Kass
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Joe Bryan

Najeeb Jan

Date 19-Aug-2011

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards
Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
ABSTRACT

Kass, Amanda (M.A., Geography)
Rebuilding Haiti? Discourses of Development and Security in Post-Earthquake Haiti
Thesis directed by Assistant Professor Joe Bryan

The *Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti*, a state produced document aimed at post-earthquake reconstruction efforts in Haiti, is an ambitious proposal that aims at transforming all of Haiti—physically, institutionally, and societally. While the *Action Plan* claims to be an effort to build a new and better Haiti, this thesis will demonstrate that it largely rehashes past policies and programs, many of which helped create the very conditions that are cited as reasons for the destructiveness of the January 2010 earthquake. Further, the document serves as a powerful example of the tight, mutually constitutive relationship between humanitarianism and development. As such, this thesis understands the humanitarian disaster of the earthquake in Haiti as an event that has allowed for the implementation of particular development initiatives, manifest in the *Action Plan*. 
Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I wish to thank my graduate advisor, Professor Joe Bryan: he provided me with the freedom to carve out my own project while consistently pushing me intellectually, and without his guidance this thesis would not have been possible. I would additionally like to thank my committee members, Professor Najeeb Jan and Professor Emily Yeh, both of whom provided me with thoughtful suggestions, critiques, and support. I am also deeply indebted to the Geography Department and my fellow graduate students, most especially Abby Hickcox who gave me endless amounts of advice and read numerous drafts of my work. Finally, I wish to thank my family and friends who encouraged me every step of the way.
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<tr>
<td>FTZ</td>
<td>Free Trade Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>HOPE</td>
<td>Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity Partnership Encouragement Act</td>
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<td>HRF</td>
<td>Haiti Reconstruction Fund</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IHRC</td>
<td>Interim Haiti Recovery Commission</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>US</td>
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

We will rebuild Haiti by turning the disaster on 12 January 2010 into an opportunity to make it an emerging country by 2030.

- International Donors Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti 2010a, 8

Walking around the encampment on John’s\(^1\) property it struck me how different it was from the others I had seen in Port-au-Prince\(^2\). While other camps were chaotic and overcrowded with people living tightly packed together in badly worn tents and tarps, the encampment on John’s property stood out because, instead, there were neat rows of wooden homes organized around community facilities. This encampment further stood out from others because it had a planned layout and it appeared to be for transitional housing, a semi-permanent, rather than temporary, housing solution. Prior to the earthquake, the site had housed an amusement park, restaurant, and football field, recreational luxuries that many Haitians could not afford. While the amusement park remained, John believed it was structurally unsound and constantly worried about the safety of the children living on the encampment who, despite his efforts, continued to play on it. According to John, immediately following the earthquake displaced families moved onto his property. Shortly thereafter, Oxfam installed a series of toilets and the International

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\(^1\) For the purposes of this thesis, I have used a pseudonym. As John explained it to me, he splits his time between New York City and Haiti. Since the earthquake though, he has been spending the majority of his time in Haiti managing his property.

\(^2\) The terms tent cities, tent camps, displacement sites, and encampments all refer to the areas erected for housing in the wake of the earthquake. Materials used for housing include wood, tarpaulin, and tents. Temporary housing in Haiti, however, is not homogenous. There are formal and informal camps, which vary greatly in size, and not all Haitians displaced by the earthquake have had access or received supplies from aid organizations. Further, some sites are for transitional housing, intended to last 2-5 years, rather than temporary. The level of NGO management of camps also varies greatly, and while the International Organization of Migration (IOM) is the overall supervising institution of the camps, various NGOs actually manage them.
Organization for Migration (IOM) built wooden structures to accommodate the 380 families that had moved onto the property.

At face value, the combined efforts of the organizations seemed to have dramatically improved the lives of the displaced Haitians. Shortly after the organizations completed their projects though, an additional 40 families moved onto the property and were living in tents. John, acting as de facto camp manager, was unsure what to do with the families living in the tents and complained of IOM’s seemingly refusal to do anything about the situation. At the time I met with him, he was contemplating whether he should kick the families living in tents off his property. The additional 40 families had strained the already malfunctioning sanitary facilities, but John recognized that if he evicted the families they would have nowhere to turn. IOM further frustrated John by refusing to compensate him for his land, instead directing his concerns towards the largely non-functioning Haitian state. By using his land without first seeking his approval or providing him with compensation these organizations effectively stripped John of his property rights. Seizing private property in the wake of a natural disaster arguably falls within the purview of the Haitian state, which appeared to have abdicated authority in matters such as these to other states, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. Without further analysis, this may seem like a legitimate case of benevolence on behalf of these organizations, but such a reading ignores the historical actions of such actors in Haiti. More than a parable of post-earthquake relief, John’s camp evinces the dynamic of interventions that have historically plagued Haiti. In this manner, the actions of IOM and Oxfam constitute examples of the continuation of foreign influence in Haiti and a furthering of its trusteeship, not as a unique transition brought on by the disaster of the January 2010 earthquake.

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3 Cowen and Shenton define trusteeship as the “intent which is expressed, by one source of agency, to develop the capacities of another” (1996, x). Section IV discusses the issue of trusteeship in greater detail.
This thesis focuses on the issue of trusteeship by examining the *Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti*\(^4\), a state produced document. Following immediate rescue efforts, long-term reconstruction planning began. On March 31, 2010 over 150 countries and organizations gathered in New York City for the “International Donors’ Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti”. The purpose of the Conference, co-hosted by the United Nations and United States, was to garner international support for the long-term recovery and development of Haiti. At the Conference, participants pledged over $5 billion, and the Haitian state presented its revitalization plans for the country. On April 12, 2010 the long-term state reconstruction plans were finalized as the *Action Plan*, an ambitious proposal that aims at transforming all of Haiti—physically, institutionally, and societally.

Prior to the Conference Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive stressed that it was important for reconstruction efforts to be Haitian led, stating in February 2010 that, “We [Haiti] are willing to adapt the plan with the international community, but the basis is our vision of the future” (de Cordoba 2010a/b). Despite the Prime Minister’s proclamations, international actors largely shaped the *Action Plan*, as well as the events surrounding its creation. In order to obtain feedback on proposed long-term development plans, a series of outreach meetings took place between the Haitian state and key constituencies\(^5\) prior to the Conference. The influence of international actors into the creation of the *Action Plan* is evident by the fact that the Office of the Special Envoy, the United Nations, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of American States, as well as Brazil, Haiti, France, and the European Union all hosted the

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\(^4\) Throughout this thesis, I refer to The *Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti* as either the ‘*Action Plan*’ or ‘*Plan*’.

\(^5\) The Donors’ Conference website identifies the following as key constituents: Haitian citizens, Haitian and international private sector representatives, the Haitian Diaspora, MINUSTAH stakeholders, local government authorities, and NGOs.
outreach meetings. Further, the proposed long-term reconstruction and development plans were based off the *Haiti Earthquake PDNA*, a comprehensive assessment of the earthquake’s damage (International Donors Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti 2010c). In addition to the Haitian state, the UN, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the European Commission all helped prepare the *PDNA* (de Cordoba and Gauthier-Villars 2010). Finally, while the exact authors of the *Plan* are unknown, the preface of the document indicates that it was the product of various influences: “The plan that we\(^6\) are putting forward is based on a joint effort of reflection and consultation. In diplomatic circles, formal and constructive talks have made us aware of the expectations of our international partners and allowed us to explain to them our choices for the future” (2010a, 3). What the quoted passage evinces is that donors expect reconstruction efforts to conform to their vision of a rebuilt Haiti. Given the power imbalances between Haiti and its donors\(^7\), reflected by MINUSTAH’s role in the country and Haiti’s label as a fragile/failed state, it is highly unlikely that the Haitian state would be able to implement reconstruction efforts that were not consistent with donor wishes.

An important argument of this thesis is that development and humanitarianism exist in a tight, mutually constitutive relationship. As such, this thesis understands the humanitarian disaster of the earthquake in Haiti as an event that has allowed for the implementation of particular development initiatives, manifest in the *Action Plan*. Because the crisis of the earthquake was widely perceived as the result of inequality and poverty, addressing its effects necessitates development. However, rather than actually alleviating such issues, this thesis argues that reconstruction efforts perpetuate a cycle of crisis, humanitarianism and development.

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\(^6\) It is likely that ‘we’ means then Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and President René Préval because as a semipresidential republic, the President and Prime Minister function as co-heads of state in Haiti.

\(^7\) The US is the largest donor, pledging $100 million at the Conference.
In the case of the encampment on John’s property, the fact that the erected houses are not intended to be permanent, along with the non-function sanitation facilities, leaves the possibility for future housing crises open, in-turn necessitating further NGO involvement. While the *Action Plan* claims to be an effort to build a new and better Haiti, this thesis will demonstrate that it largely rehashes past policies and programs, many of which helped create the very conditions that are cited as reasons for the destructiveness of the earthquake.

The flux between humanitarianism and development in Haiti is in part the result of its continual trusteeship. Throughout its history, Haiti has posed a threat to the security and stability of other states, and trusteeship of the country has served as a means of mitigating and containing such threats. However, because such management is for the benefit of non-Haitians it often has negative consequences for Haiti, reflected in subsequent crises. The *Action Plan* serves as an example of both the consequences and continuation of this trusteeship. The possibility of complete implementation of the *Plan* is, at best, negligible. Implementing the *Action Plan* in its entirety requires unified reconstruction efforts implemented under the guise of a single authority, the Haitian state. Both of which are a fiction, reconstruction efforts are highly fractured and the Haitian state lacks the capacity to act as the overall reconstruction leader. The current inability of the Haitian state is part of the legacy of international interventions into the country, which has left it perpetually unstable. Despite international recognition of the inabilities of the Haitian state, the language of the *Action Plan* presents the state as being a sovereign authority. The language of the *Plan* functions as a performative aspect of sovereignty, key for the maintenance of other states’ sovereignty. However, this is a claim on a sovereignty that does not actually exist, setting the stage for the likely failure of the *Action Plan*. This impossibility works to reinforce inequality and legitimizes international trusteeship of Haiti.
SECTION II: LINKING DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIANISM

Conventional conceptions of humanitarianism see it as distinct from development and it is “usually described as denoting impartial, externally directed, short-term emergency measures geared to saving life” (Duffield 2007, 33). In contrast, development is “longer-term help to improve social resilience through strengthening community organization and self reliance” (ibid.). Despite their distinctions, this thesis argues that development and humanitarianism are in tight relation, and that the connection between the two largely hinges on the issue of security. Recently, economist Paul Collier has popularized the argument that a degree of security is a prerequisite for development to be successful. While Collier does not critically examine the connection between security, development, and humanitarianism, this section establishes that the relations between the three underpin liberalism. Further, that development and humanitarianism work to contain certain populations for the benefit of others, and that such containment occurs unevenly between regions of the world. Analyzing development and humanitarianism as two modes of power involved in the paradox of liberalism will demonstrate how they facilitate and necessitate one another.

First, though, it is worth explaining the arguments Collier puts forth in *The Bottom Billion*, which presents his arguments as to why countries where the bottom billion people live are not experiencing development and what mechanisms can enable growth. According to

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8 Collier does not actually offer readers a clear definition how the bottom billion is calculated. Instead, he writes that out of a population of five billion, “about 80 percent live in countries that are indeed developing, often at amazing speed. The real challenge of development is that there is a group of countries that are falling behind, and often falling apart” (2007, 4). An assumption of Collier’s is that the reader will understand what he means by developing and development. The implicit understanding of what development is in Collier’s book is economic growth, which is not a “cure-all, but the lack of growth is a kill-all” (ibid., 190).
Collier, the countries that the bottom billion inhabit, what he lumps together as Africa+\textsuperscript{9}, are stuck in poverty because of various traps: conflict, natural resources, landlocked with bad neighbors, and bad governance in a small country. To take one example, conflict is a trap because

Wars and coups keep low-income countries from growing and hence keep them dependent upon exports of primary commodities. Because they stay poor, stagnant, and dependent upon primary commodities they are prone to wars and coups. Wars and coups feed on themselves in other ways that make history repeat itself. (ibid., 37)

Those not in the bottom billion should care because the problems of the bottom billion plague everyone. Collier contends that severe poverty constitutes a global threat to the “twenty-first century world of material comfort, global travel, and economic interdependence” (ibid., 3).

After explaining each poverty trap Collier explicitly explains why the trap matters for G8 policy. Addressing the conflict trap matters because, “The costs of war…spread beyond the war’s temporal and geographic boundaries. As a result, they do not only trap the countries that experience them, but make development more difficult in entire regions” (ibid., 37). Conflict in one country can not only spill over into others, but can also stifle economic growth for an entire region.

While the first part of *The Bottom Billion* is devoted to explaining the various poverty traps, the latter part lays out four instruments (aid, security, laws and charters, and trade) that those not in the bottom billion can use to un-trap countries. Collier specifically advocates for external military intervention as one such tool, and argues that it achieves security through restoring order, maintaining postconflict peace, and preventing coups (ibid., 125). Without first

\textsuperscript{9} While Collier acknowledges the pitfalls of using such a term, he nonetheless uses Africa+ as a geographic label for the countries of the bottom billion, “with the + being places such as Haiti, Bolivia, the Central Asian countries, Laos, Cambodia, Yemen, Burma, and North Korea” (ibid., 7).
achieving a degree of stability economic growth is unsustainable and largely impossible, and because of this providing security for a country is a necessary precondition for development.

While Collier’s argument is logical from a liberal perspective, Duffield (2007) problematizes this line of reasoning in order to demonstrate that development and humanitarianism are means of addressing liberalism’s inherent issue of security. In regards to liberal forms of government and the fundamental problem of security, it is worth quoting Duffield at length:

…since the beginnings of modernity a liberal rationality of government has always been based on the protection and betterment of the essential processes of life associated with population, economy and society. A liberal problematic of security is concerned with people and all the multiform processes, conditions and contingencies that either promote or retard life and well-being. It is concerned with securing these biological and social processes in the name of people, rights and freedom. (ibid., 4)

The notion of individual freedom, the hallmark of liberalism, is a knotty issue because the guaranteeing and guarding of said freedom necessitates a degree of security. Such security necessarily infringes upon personal freedom, and as such, the task of a liberal society is to balance personal freedom with societal security.

From a wider lens, liberalism is paradoxical in “its ability to speak in the name of people, freedom and rights while at the same time accepting illiberal forms of rule as sufficient or even necessary for backward or undeveloped societies and peoples” (ibid., 192). In other words, the guaranteeing of security for one particular population can oftentimes come at the expense of another. As two mechanisms of power, humanitarianism and development work to contain certain populations for the security of others. To highlight this, Duffield uses the example of the 2005 launch of the British African Commission’s development report, which argued that British
national interests were “interconnected with events and conditions in other countries and
continents” (ibid.). As such, poverty reduction in Africa was a necessary cause for British
national interest.

More than an ideology, liberalism constitutes “a technology of government involving a
specific design or means of strategizing power” (ibid., 4-5). As such, it is a broad rationality of
rule that has individual freedom as its foundation (Lemke 2001, 200)\textsuperscript{10}. Biopolitics is a
“necessary condition of liberalism” because it identifies population level dynamics that can be
productively governed in the name of freedom (Duffield 2007, 5 and 7)\textsuperscript{11}. An identified
population or population-level dynamic can then become the target of intervention, be it
development or humanitarian. Elden links biopower and liberalism more explicitly together in
writing that biopower is “the tool by which the group of living beings understood as a population
is measured in order to be governed, which is in turn closely connected to the political rationality
of liberalism” (2009a, 48). Linking the impact of the earthquake to Haiti’s status as the poorest
nation in the Western hemisphere allows for the Haitian population to be identified as in need of
development. Further, because of the country’s severe poverty and ineffectual state the
perception is that outside intervention is not just necessary, but a moral imperative.

Duffield’s analysis of development also highlights how securitizing measures draw
classifications of human life. The primary target of development is surplus life, which is a
“malleable and disposable life that capitalism constantly produces in order to devour it as a part

\textsuperscript{10} Lemke’s article is a translation and summary of Foucault’s 1979 lectures on neoliberalism.

\textsuperscript{11} Duffield defines biopolitics as a “form of politics that entails the administration of the processes of life at the
aggregate level of population” (ibid., 5). In contrast to sovereign power, which takes life, biopower is the “power to
\textit{make}, sustain or remove life” (Elden 2009a, 48 italics in original). Examples of biopolitical institutions, practices,
and knowledges include public health, the control of disease and famine, and treatment of sexual or physical
abnormalities (ibid.).
of its own unending renewal” (Duffield 2007, 12). Surplus life constitutes a security threat because it can be economically and politically charged, the latter of which threatens order (ibid., 13). Development’s purpose is to mitigate the possible consequences of surplus life, dividing “humankind into developed and underdeveloped species-life” (ibid., 16). Rather than extending the benefits of freedom to underdeveloped species-life, development constitutes “a liberal technology of security containing and managing the effects of underdevelopment” (ibid., 24).

Underdevelopment constitutes a threat to the very existence of developed life, and as a result, the necessity of security as a prerequisite for development is because it is important for controlling underdeveloped species-life (ibid., 70). From this perspective, development’s primary function is to contain certain populations so that they do not interfere, destroy, or threaten others (ibid., 24).

A perceived threat of illegal Haitian migration was one factor motivating post-earthquake humanitarian efforts in Haiti. Less than a week after the earthquake, there was speculation in the US that a possible after effect of the earthquake would be a mass exodus of Haitians seeking refuge in the US (c.f. Hsu 2010). The US even went as far as preparing tents on Guantanamo Bay in order to house any Haitians intercepted fleeing the country (Huffington Post 2010). Such patterns of containment between the US and Haiti are not unique to the earthquake though. During François Duvalier’s dictatorship, many Haitians fled the country in boats seeking refugee status elsewhere. While those fleeing Haiti declared themselves political refugees the US Immigration and Naturalization Service classified them as economic refugees, which meant they

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12 Similar to Duffield’s analysis of the divisions of human life, Reid uses the phrase logistical life to denote life which is, “Lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one’s purposes transparently in relation to others, to be positioned where one is required, to use time economically, to be able to move when and where one is told to, and crucially, to be able to extol these capacities as the values which one would willingly, if called upon, kill and die for” (2009, 13). Liberal societies, according to Reid, are pursuing logistical life with increasing intensity as a means towards “remov[ing] the problem of war from society” (ibid.).
could not gain refugee status nor gain legal immigration into the US (Farmer 1994, 118).

Similarly, in the 1980s and 1990s the US denied Haitians fleeing the military junta refugee status citing that they were economic, not political, refugees. While Bill Clinton had campaigned on a platform of reforming US policy towards Haiti, shortly after his inauguration he announced that he planned to maintain the Bush administration’s policy towards Haitian refugees (ibid., 206).

The day after Clinton’s announcement, the US Coast Guard surrounded the western part of Haiti in an effort to halt any boats of refugees (ibid.). During that time, Guantanamo Bay temporarily housed Haitians caught attempting to migrate into the US (for a detailed discussion and the role AIDS played in these detentions see Farmer 1994 and 2004).

For the Western world, “The welfare state ameliorated the problem of surplus life through social insurance and, in so doing, assisted the emergence of mass consumer society” (Duffield 2007, 23). Development today, however, emphasizes self-reliance over the welfare state. This emphasis on self-reliance can be traced back to President Truman’s 1949 inaugural address, which “signalled that the problem of surplus population was now international in scope, and in so doing, [Truman] relaunched development and its security role in its contemporary interstate form” (ibid.). Whereas former colonial powers obtained high qualities of life via welfare initiatives, “in the former protectorates and colonies…ideas of people-centered development continued to be framed in relation to self-reliance based on small-scale land and property ownership operating at the level of community” (ibid.). Self-reliance, though, is impossible to attain because “capitalist accumulation tirelessly seeks to break down and absorb areas of autonomy and self-reliance, continually creating and recreating surplus population in the process (Harvey 2003)” (ibid., 218). The impossibility of self-reliance leads to the permanence of humanitarian emergencies (ibid., 228). Humanitarianism and development exist in
constitutive relation because “when self-reliance breaks down humanitarian assistance functions as a regime of international social protection of last resort” (ibid., 18 italics in original).

Further:

As self-reliance moves into crisis it calls forth a globalizing and intrusive humanitarian urge to protect. The breakdown of self-reliance, however, is also synonymous with anomie, political extremism and the unchecked international circulation of surplus population. These threats simultaneously invoke a complementary will to consolidate and contain such life through the efforts of development to reconstitute a better mode of self-reliance. (ibid., 219)

Duffield’s argument is that humanitarian assistance does not occur simply because of a purely altruistic impulse. Instead, it is because humanitarian crises constitute a global threat—for example, in the context of post-earthquake Haiti, a perceived threat of increased illegal migration. Combined, development and humanitarian intervention work to secure the peripheral world for the benefit of the core. Simultaneously, the alleviation of a humanitarian crisis brings about new rounds of development initiatives, thus creating a seemingly perpetual rotation of development and humanitarianism. This cyclical relationship is important for understanding the successive rounds of intervention that have taken place in Haiti, and for situating the *Action Plan* within this history. Rather than constituting a break with the past as it purports to offer, the *Plan* is part of Haiti’s perpetual instability.
SECTION III: THE ACTION PLAN’S RATIONALE OF RULE

The combined humanitarian and development initiatives taking place in Haiti can be viewed as primarily an effort to calculate how to efficiently build an economy that is both integrated into the international political economy and able to sustain the local one. Rather than being merely a natural disaster, the destructiveness of the earthquake was also a result of severe poverty, overcrowding, and poor infrastructure. In an attempt to address the circumstances that magnified the effects of the earthquake, the long-term reconstruction efforts detailed in the Action Plan aim at improving livelihoods, reforming state institutions, building infrastructure, and redistributing the population. A subsection of the Plan’s introduction titled “Vision and Approach for Haiti’s Rebuilding” outlines the state’s long-term objectives, and as such, it is important to quote them in their entirety:

This restructuring will be marked by: [1.] A fair, just, united and friendly society living in harmony with its environment and culture; a modern society characterized by the rule of law, freedom of association and expression and land management. [2.] A society with a modern, diversified, strong, dynamic, competitive, open and inclusive economy based on the land. [3.] A society in which people’s basic needs are met quantitatively and qualitatively. [4.] A knowledge-based society with universal access to basic education, mastery of qualifications based on a relevant professionally training system, and the capacity for scientific and technical innovation fed by a modern and efficient university system, in order to create the new type of citizen the country needs for reconstruction. [5.] All of this, under the supervision of a responsible, unitary state guaranteeing the implementation of the laws and the interests of the people with a strong commitment to deconcentration and decentralization. (ibid., 8)
In general, the *Plan* aims at achieving long-term reconstruction objectives through stimulating macroeconomic growth, with an overall goal being that by 2030 Haiti will be an emerging country (2010a, 5 and 8).

Stating that a goal of reconstruction efforts is to make Haiti an emerging country by 2030 is a particular development discourse, which conceives of macroeconomic growth as development itself. Frequently, the term emerging economy is a positive label, denoting a country that is experiencing rapid industrialization and growth. The IMF uses the term differently in order to classify countries into one of two categories, advanced economy or emerging and developing economy, for their *World Economic Outlook*. The IMF classifies countries into these categories based on the following criteria:

1. per capita income level,
2. export diversification—so oil exporters that have high per capita GDP would not make the advanced classification because around 70% of its exports are oil, and
3. degree of integration into the global financial system. (IMF 2011b)

Presumably, becoming an emerging country by 2030 will signify Haiti’s progress towards becoming an advanced economy.

The World Bank uses a different classification scheme and categorizes countries into one of four income categories (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high) based on GNI per capita. Presently, the World Bank classifies Haiti as a low-income economy (World Bank 2011). For 2010, Haiti’s estimated GDP real growth rate was -5.1%, to put this into perspective out of 216 countries Haiti ranks 213th (CIA World Factbook 2011). Further, the overall real GDP growth rate for the Caribbean region in 2010 was 3.4% (IMF 2011a, 78). While the earthquake is a large reason for Haiti’s abysmal 2010-growth rate, its 2008-estimated GDP growth rate also reflected poor growth performance and was only 1.3% (CIA World Factbook 2009). A post-earthquake reconstruction response centered on stimulating national economic growth is logical.
since large, influential intergovernmental institutions like the IMF and World Bank measure a
country’s prosperity and development using national economic indices like the GNI and GDP.

According to Wainwright, the commonly used phrase ‘national economic development’
actually contains two distinct meanings: “something that is desirable, that requires willful
intervention, and also is a ‘natural’ thing for the nation to do” (2008, 7). For organizations and
institutions that measure development in terms of economic growth, stagnant or declining
economic growth signifies developmental failure, and outside intervention is often a necessary,
corrective measure in order to stimulate a ‘natural’ process. While development metrics that
incorporate demographic data do exist, the vast majority nonetheless incorporate at least some
economic data. In general, development indices rely on defining development in such a way that
it must be quantifiable. Reliance on quantifiable metrics conscripts an understanding of what
development is and limits what types of interventions are possible. Concerning the *Action Plan,*
the types of intervention envisioned specifically center on “a macro-economic framework based
on growth” (2010a, 5). As such, the scale of these initiatives is the nation-state. In this context,
an increase in Haiti’s GDP growth rate would signify post-earthquake recovery.

While Section II established how humanitarianism and development, broadly speaking,
are interrelated, this section narrows in on how they operate in the context of post-earthquake
Haiti, and argues that a neoliberal rationale of rule underlies the *Action Plan.* More than just an
economic doctrine, neoliberalism is the rationalization of a particular exercise of government in
which the primary task is to strengthen the economy, and as such, it scripts particular
interventions. In the case of the *Action Plan,* such interventions center on macroeconomic
growth.

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13 For a detailed discussion concerning whether development is an intentional or immanent process see Cowen and
Shenton 1995 and 1996.
Drawing on Foucault’s work on governmentality, Larner sees neoliberalism as denoting a “set of practices that facilitate the governing of individuals from a distance” (2000, 6). Foucault first introduced the concept of governmentality during his February 1, 1978 lecture at the Collège de France, in which he stated that the term was meant to denote the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. (2007, 108)

With regards specifically to neoliberalism, a theoretical strength of governmentality is that “it construes neo-liberalism…above all as a political project that endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (Lemke 2001, 203).

Foucault originally developed the concept of governmentality in order to understand the mechanisms of power particular to liberalism. Liberalism marked the transition “from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated by techniques of government” in which the principle objects are population and political economy (Foucault 2007, 106). Government, from this analytical perspective, is understood as the ‘conduct of conduct,’ the “attempt to shape human conduct by calculated means” (Li 2007, 5). Further, government designates the action of governing and the distribution of responsibility. What emerged with the transition wrought by liberalism was a “new rationality” that entailed “governing less, out of concern for maximum effectiveness, in accordance with the naturalness of the phenomena one is dealing with” (Senellart 2007, 383). The targets of this new rationality became “the well-being of populations at large,” and it “operates by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs” (Li 2007, 5). Additionally, the role of the state was reconfigured because “[t]he market became a space of autonomy that had to be carved out of the state through the conditional
right of private property,” and the market itself became “the basis for a reinterpretation and thus a critique of state power” (Read 2009, 27)\(^\text{14}\).

While closely linked, neoliberalism and liberalism are nonetheless distinct. As rationales of rule, Foucault differentiates between them on two specific points: the re-definition of the relation between the state and the economy, and the basis of government (Lemke 2000, 200). In the neoliberal conception of state-economy relations, “the state does not define and monitor market freedom, for the market is itself the organizing and regulative principle underlying the state” (ibid.). In regards to the basis of government, “neo-liberalism no longer locates the rational principle for regulating and limiting the action of government in a natural freedom that we should all respect, but instead it posits an artificially arranged liberty: in the entrepreneurial and competitive behaviour of economic-rational individuals” (ibid.). In other words, competition is the basis of social relations.

Like liberalism though, neoliberalism is an art of government that involves at face value governing less. While both liberalism and neoliberalism are associated with individual freedom, power operates at a distance through government, and because of this “people are not necessarily aware of how their conduct is being conducted or why” (Li 2007, 5). While neoliberalism is popularly associated with limiting the state in favor of market-rule, neo-Foucauldian literature on governmentality establishes that the rollback of the state does not equate to governing less (Larner 2000, 12). Instead, neoliberalism involves governing efficiently. As a political rationality, neoliberalism is one that “tries to render the social domain economic and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security systems to the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’ and ‘self-care’” (Lemke 2001, 203). This political rationality entails the

\(^{14}\) It is important to note that from a Foucauldian analytical perspective, the state and government are not interchangeable.
cultivation of a neoliberal subjectivity, in which the desire to better oneself through economic production and consumption is paramount. Further, within this subjectivity self-betterment is an individual responsibility. Lemke describes neoliberal subjectivity as one in which lives have a particularly entrepreneurial form and people are conceptualized as economically rational actors (ibid., 201-202). Individuals come to unconsciously self-regulate themselves as a means towards self-betterment. In terms of governmentality, this self-policing is a technology of the self. The neoliberal strategy of social regulation consists of “replacing (or at least supplementing) outdated rigid regulatory mechanisms by developing techniques of self regulation” (ibid., 203). An emphasis on personal responsibility is a neoliberal strategy of rule because it encourages “people to see themselves as individualized and active subjects responsible for enhancing their own well being” (Larner 2000, 13).

In order to create macroeconomic growth, the Action Plan calls for dramatic changes to Haiti and Haitian society. Such fundamental changes mean that the Action Plan is “a plan for all sectors of Haitian society where everyone is called upon to play a role in searching for the collective interest that is ultimately the best guarantee of individual interests in an inclusive society” (2010a, 5). Such rhetoric reflects a rationale of rule premised on a neoliberal subjectivity because it places responsibility on individual Haitians to behave in such a way that there is collective benefit—the overall development of Haiti, measured in terms of GDP.

Stimulating macroeconomic growth also entails ensuring a healthy, vibrant Haitian society, one that is productive, has the ability to be employed, and engages in entrepreneurial behavior. Health and education initiatives discussed in the Action Plan are clearly articulated based on this underlying rationale, “Access to basic services should no longer be seen simply as expenditure but as an investment in human capital, a critical factor for economic recovery and
growth in Haiti, in addition to being essential for the well-being of Haitians” (ibid., 34; italics mine). Further, while the “Vision and Approach for Haiti’s Rebuilding” partially focuses on education, it is for the explicit purpose of creating “the new type of citizen [Haiti] needs for reconstruction” (ibid., 8). In the context of the overall Action Plan, the type of citizen needed is one imbued with a neoliberal subjectivity who believes that it is their duty to help with post-earthquake recovery through employment and entrepreneurial activity, and desires to do so. In order to help facilitate the creation of Haiti’s new citizens, massive job creation is crucial. Job creation is particularly important in shortening the “humanitarian aid phase which, although vital, threatens to place a large part of the population in a situation of dependency” (ibid., 33). Job creation is also necessary in order to “restore both meaning and dignity for all Haitians who wish to provide for their own needs on the basis of their work” (ibid.). Linking employment with personal dignity reinforces the notion that the reconstruction of Haiti is a personal responsibility and that failure to engage in activities that generate wealth and/or jobs is a personal weakness. As such, job creation is important not just in the physical recovery of Haiti, but also in mitigating the psychological effects of the earthquake.

More broadly, the modern development paradigm, which emerged with President Truman’s 1949 inaugural address\textsuperscript{15}, also reflects a neoliberal rationale of rule. Rather than exerting direct control over a population, as occurred during colonialism, development uses regulatory techniques. Such techniques “create the possibility of modulating the behaviour of populations or countries through controlling processes and networks rather than disciplining individuals per se” (Duffield 2007, 313). Further, they “attempt to alter the conduct of individuals within the confines of institutions and juridical relations” (ibid.). In terms of cultivating particular subjectivities, regulatory techniques are important because their aim is to

\textsuperscript{15} Previously discussed in Section II.
“modulate behaviour by encouraging or supporting those potentialities or practices that have good or desirable consequences while minimizing those that are undesirable” (ibid.). Examples of regulatory techniques include structural adjustment and financial deregulation. In Haiti, this has led to the privatization of much of the country’s social services and a reliance on NGOs. It is estimated that roughly “85 percent of primary and secondary education in Haiti, is private” (Paul Farmer, interview by Dave Davies, Fresh Air, National Public Radio, July 12, 2011). In 1999 the number of NGOs servicing Haitian households for healthcare was 744, by 2009 the number had risen to 4,995 (WHO 2011).

The language of governance used in development literature also reflects a neoliberal emphasis on self-responsibility and regulation. In terms of NGO and intergovernmental agency usage, governance is “the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)” (UNESCAP). In order to receive aid, potential recipients must adhere to certain parameters set forth by donors, and while not directly manipulated they must nevertheless conform to desired behavior. In the 1980s international financial institutions “tried to coerce governments into reform through ‘conditionality’—a government could get extra aid only if it agreed to change some of its economic policies” (Collier 2007, 67). This type of conditionality, however, was an abysmal failure because “governments discovered they only needed to promise to reform, not actually do it” (ibid. italics in original). Instead of government conditionality, Collier advocates for governance conditionality, or ex ante governance conditionality, which supposedly shifts power from “governments to their own citizens” (ibid., 110). Ex ante governance conditionality disburses aid based on the attainment of specified policy goals (ibid., 109). This approach to aid distribution is advantageous, according to Collier,

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16 Collier’s understanding of government is quite different from the Foucauldian definition that this thesis uses, and is an example of the conflation of state and government.
because it makes it much clearer to governments what they have to do, “and on what time scale, in order to be rewarded by extra aid” (ibid., 110). The conditionality of aid means that recipients “must change their conduct and attitudes if they are to be eligible” (Duffield 2001, 312).

Accountability practices and an emphasis on the transparency of aid are both hallmarks of the concept of good governance. The defining characteristics of good governance are that it is:

- participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient,
- equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.

(UNESCAP)

A focus on good governance has been common since the 1990s, with development programs heavily incorporating it into their design (c.f. IMF 2005). Initiatives that aim at achieving good governance standards commonly involve “restructuring state bureaucracies, reforming legal systems, supporting democratic decentralization and creating accountability-enhancing civil societies” (Jenkins 2002, 485). Both the World Bank and IMF “in particular have often made development assistance to poorer countries conditional on progammes of public-sector reform” (Painter 2009, 13). Development practitioners perceive incorporating good governance into aid agreements and development programs as a means towards combating corruption, believed to be a major hindrance to developmental progress. A simplification of good governance is that it means reducing the role of the state (ibid.).

Jenkins is critical of the good governance agenda and contends that it is a form of external intervention (2002, 487). However, from the perspective of donors, intervention into the domestic affairs of aid recipient states is necessary because such states often lack the capacity
to distribute aid in an ‘appropriate’ way, defined based on good governance standards. In order to ensure aid is properly spent, rather than directly giving a state money, aid agencies will often agree on a specific project with a recipient, then help design and implement it (Collier 2007, 117-118). Collier contends that in failing states, what he classifies Haiti as, for aid given in the form of projects to be successful high levels of administration from the aid agency are needed (ibid., 118). The thinking behind this is that because failing states suffer from poor governance and bad policies they cannot themselves combat such issues. The inabilities of a failing state works to naturalize its trusteeship because outside intervention and help is deemed necessary.

In Haiti, donor preference for NGOs has led to the country being nicknamed a ‘republic of NGOs’ (Oxfam 2011, 4). A 1997 report for the World Bank estimated that the total number of NGOs operating in Haiti was between 2,220 and 12,420\footnote{Morton’s estimation includes both foreign and domestic NGOs (ibid.).} (Morton 1997). In a 2009 speech former President Bill Clinton stated that there were 10,000 NGOs in Haiti, the second highest number of NGOs per capita in the world (Daniel and Charles 2009). The large number of NGOs operating in Haiti combined with donor preference for them has led to the situation in which NGOs have come to form “a parallel and mostly internationalized force undermining Haitian control of their own politics and economics” (Fatton 2011, 173). This has led to the present situation in which a strong Haitian state is non-existent and reconstruction efforts must rely on international assistance, creating the paradoxical situation in which what is necessary for alleviating the current humanitarian crisis, outside intervention, is also the very thing that contributed to it.
The Haitian state, at present, is widely acknowledged as incapable of managing the reconstruction of Haiti. The overall allocation of post-earthquake emergency aid\textsuperscript{18} is a powerful example of this. Out of $1.7 billion, the Haitian state received less than 1%; while in contrast, the UN and international organizations controlled 30% (Paul Farmer, interview by Dave Davies, \textit{Fresh Air}, National Public Radio, July 12, 2011). Cave and Thompson (2010) underscored the diminished role of the Haitian state reporting that “aid groups, fearing rampant corruption and violence, sought to limit [Haitian officials’] role” in food distribution and had pushed Haitian leadership to the sidelines. The \textit{Action Plan} also indicates the incapacity of the state in articulating that, “There has been a massive decapitalization of both households and the State, and the State’s ability to provide essential basic services to the population has been compromised” (2010a, 47). Section IV aims at situating the status of the Haitian state within Haitian history, which is important because it highlights how many of the international actors involved in current reconstruction efforts have also contributed to its decline. A central argument of this thesis is that reconstruction efforts actually work to reinscribe Haiti’s trusteeship, and an analysis of the type of state the \textit{Plan} calls for rebuilding will help establish this.

During the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century development in the form of trusteeship emerged “as a set of political procedures, enacted by capitalists and state actors, seeking to ameliorate social disorder and disruption that accompanied early industrial capitalism within Europe” (Lawson 2007, 48-49). As an international project, trusteeship was justified as a means of helping to civilize savage

\textsuperscript{18} This aid is a separate calculation from the long-term development aid.
peoples (ibid., 49). Cowen and Shenton trace the concept of trusteeship specifically to the Saint-Simonians who “conferred agency upon development and gave it constructivist purpose” (1996, 25). Within this theory of trusteeship, “Only those who had the ‘capacity’ to utilise land, labour and capital in the interests of society as a whole should be ‘entrusted’ with them” (ibid.). While intentions of trusteeship may be benevolent, Li cautiously warns that it is nevertheless a “claim to expertise in optimizing the lives of others,” which is ultimately a claim to power that “merits careful scrutiny” (2007, 5). Trusteeship functions as a technology of government because the objective of trustees is to “enhance their [meaning those being managed] capacity for action, and to direct it” (ibid.). In other words, it is an attempt to alter the behavior of others and to direct it into ways that trustees identify as advantageous and correct.

The prevailing logic of international actors is that the Haitian state is woefully incapable of providing immediate relief to its citizens, as well as being unable to handle long-term reconstruction and recovery. Outside management of Haiti’s recovery efforts is an example of trusteeship because it follows the Saint-Simonians’ logic in which supervision and guardianship are required. While outside assistance in Haiti is a genuine necessity given the incapacities of the state, it nevertheless works to preserve unequal relations because trusteeship both confirms to and depends on “a hierarchy that separates trustees from the people whose capacities need to be enhanced, or behaviors corrected” (Li 2007, 278).

In order to rebuild the state the Action Plan calls for, “Restarting democratic institutions and the apparatus of state” (2010a, 42). Such actions will allegedly provide “the opportunity to carry out a genuine fresh foundation of the State, leading to the implementation of a State providing services, including decentralized ones; a State at the service of the nation’s fundamental interests, a State capable of overseeing this new foundation” (ibid.). Such actions

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19 Section V specifically focuses on the IHRC and HRF as examples of how trusteeship is currently taking place.
are part of a process of democratization that Haiti has been on since 2006, at which time constitutional rule was restored and Haiti began its “political journey to regain full national sovereignty” (ibid., 6).

The Action Plan conceives of sovereignty as “[a] claim to final and ultimate authority over a political community” (Flint 2009, 706). Barnett (2010) describes sovereignty in more detail as being composed of both an internal and external dimension. External, or juridical, sovereignty “holds that the state is subject to no other authority and has full and exclusive power within its territory” (ibid., 47). External sovereignty is a Weberian formation in that it is largely about a state’s monopoly on a legitimate use of violence over a given territory. At the same time, it is also about states’ recognition of each other’s right to exclusive rule over particular territories. In contrast, internal, or empirical, sovereignty “asserts that the state maintains order within its borders, and ideally such order is generated not only through coercive mechanism but also with some degree of consent and legitimacy from society” (ibid.). In other words, it is not enough for states to recognize each other’s sovereign authority, but it is also necessary for the population of a given state to view it as legitimate. Concerning development, internal sovereignty is particularly important because, according to Collier, change has to come from within a society itself (2007, 12).

An understanding of the role international actors have played in Haitian affairs contradicts the narrative of democracy the Action Plan tells, and reveals that Haitian sovereignty is a provisional status that is conditional to authorization from other states and intergovernmental bodies. The US has historically had a large influence over Haiti, reflected by the fact that approximately 90.2% of all Haitian exports go to the US (CIA World Factbook 2011).20

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20 Haiti’s other key trading partners are Canada (which accounts for 4% of exports) and France (1.5% of exports) (CIA World Factbook 2011).
Additionally, the largest donor to Haiti is the United States Agency for International Development (Pierre-Louis 2011, 193). It is crucial to situate the *Action Plan* within Haitian history in order to gain greater insight into what seems to be Haiti’s permanent cycle of instability and crisis, and the ways in which the weakening and circumventing of Haitian institutions have paved the way for international trusteeship.

From its very independence in 1804, Haiti was “seen as a threat to the economic system of plantation slavery, that had facilitated economic expansion in both Europe and North America for over two hundred years” (Mullings et al. 2011, 286). An independent Haiti directly threatened the system of slavery in America, and this “generated a level of fear that resulted in processes of exclusion and sanction that significantly weakened all of the social, economic and political institutions that emerged in the post-revolutionary period in Haiti” (ibid.). Despite its declared independence, Mullings et al. contend that throughout the 19th and 20th centuries Western governments and international financial institutions used debt and aid to mold Haiti to their own interests (ibid., 287). In 1825, President Boyer essentially bankrupted the country by agreeing to pay France 150 million francs in exchange for French recognition of Haitian independence (Riddick 2008, 5). Boyer additionally agreed to halve customs charges for French trade (Framer 1994, 76). Combined, these actions “led to decades of French domination of Haitian finance, and had a catastrophic effect on the new nation’s delicate economy” (ibid.). In order to pay the French government Haiti borrowed money from foreign banks, and subsequently “[a]ll of the revenues that the Haitian government collected from taxes and trade at that time went to pay the debt. It took 80 years for the country to finish paying it” (Pierre-Louis 2011, 188).
By the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the US had gained primacy over Haiti’s markets, with Germany being its chief rival (Farmer 1994, 85). Throughout the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries the US Navy sent warships to Haiti for the stated purpose of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, a means of protecting US economic interest in the region (ibid., 89). In 1915, the US began formal occupation of Haiti through the “Convention haitiano-americaine,” which “granted the United States complete political and administrative control” (ibid., 92). According to Pierre-Louis, the US occupied Haiti specifically to prevent Germany from seizing control of the country (2011, 189), thus ensuring its continued dominance over the Haitian market. During the occupation, North American companies leased large land tracts creating large plantations that displaced portions of the Haitian peasantry (Farmer 1994, 94-95). The US finally left Haiti in 1934 following a peasant revolt. During the occupation though, the US “began a process of fiscal and commercial centralization” (ibid., 98), the result of which seems to be reflected by the singular role Port-au-Prince played in terms of Haitian politics and the economy at the time of the 2010 earthquake.

A more recent example of Western influence in Haitian affairs occurred in 1994 with the restoration of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Aristide was first elected president in December of 1990, celebrated as Haiti’s first free, democratic election following over thirty years of dictatorships and military juntas. Aristide won the election with roughly 70 percent of the vote (Buss 2008, 29), and was seen as representing the interests of Haiti’s poor, that majority of the population. His presidency though, which aimed at implementing populist reforms, was a threat to Haiti’s elite, the Duvalierists, the military, and aristocracy (ibid., 30). In September 1991, General Raoul Cèdras led a successful military coup against Aristide while he was out of
the country visiting the UN (ibid., 30-31). Aristide remained exiled in the US, and a military junta under Cédras rule sized control of Haiti.

Following the coup, the OAS declared an embargo on Haiti in an effort to weaken the Cédras regime. The embargo, however, largely had the opposite effect. The regime profited off the illegal markets and organized crime that increased and strengthened because of the embargo (ibid., 32). Further undermining the embargo’s ability to weaken the regime was President George H. W. Bush’s declaration that US firms would be exempt from it (Chomsky 2004, 3). According to Chomsky, President Clinton, who succeeded Bush in 1993, “authorized even more extreme violations of the embargo” (ibid.). A striking example of this was President Clinton’s secret authorization of the Texaco Oil Company’s right to ship oil to the Cédras regime (ibid.).

Despite the US’s embargo violations, in 1993 it also began exerting direct pressure on Cédras to cede authority back to Aristide. Initial efforts failed, but on “September 18, 1994 the United States, with authorization from the UN Security Council, occupied Haiti to restore Aristide” (Buss 2008, 32). Shortly thereafter Cédras “negotiated a peaceful departure, and went into exile in Panama” (ibid., 33). As a condition of his reinstatement Aristide “reluctantly promised the Clinton administration that he would not extend his term,” and because Haiti’s constitution prevents Presidents from serving back-to-back five-year terms this also meant he could not run for President in 1995 when his term expired (ibid.). According to Dupuy the US’s involvement in Aristide’s reinstatement was primarily motivated by its own political-economic interests, and that to not have helped restore Aristide’s presidency would have “undermine[d] Washington's post-Cold War neoliberal agenda for [the Caribbean] region” (1997, 1). Despite Aristide’s restoration to power, political instability persisted.
In 2001, Aristide became President for a second time; however, on February 28, 2004, he was once again unseated\(^\text{21}\). To this day, there are varying and contentious accounts of Aristide’s ousting. Aristide claims that he was kidnapped, forced into exile, and that domestic opposition against him was orchestrated by Western powers, primarily the US and France. Coverage of the events by major US newspapers portrayed the events much differently and, according to Potter, inaccurately (2009, 216). The dominant narrative in the US was that Aristide had been losing power and increasingly relied on violence to maintain it, and that this had led to domestically fierce opposition against him, leaving him with no choice but to resign and flee the country.

Following Aristide’s departure, the United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti (MINUSTAH) became the country’s de facto security force\(^\text{22}\), and Supreme Court Justice President Boniface Alexandre\(^\text{23}\) became Haiti’s official president, internationally recognized as such with the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1529 (Buss 2008, 40). A seven-member “Council of Wise Men,” which was operating under “the auspices of the UN Security Council,” chose interim Prime Minister Gerald Latortue for the task of forming a transitional government on March 17, 2004 (ibid.). A general election was originally scheduled for the fall of 2005, but because of logistical problems and political unrest it was delayed four times (ibid., 42).

Finally, on February 7, 2006, the first general election since Aristide’s 2004 exile took place, with René Préval winning the presidency. While the international community lauded the election as Haiti’s return to democracy, international involvement heavily shaped the election. Prior to Aristide’s ousting the EU largely suspended its aid to Haiti. However, following his

\(^\text{21}\) After seven years of living in exile in South Africa, Aristide returned to Haiti on March 18, 2011 (Archibold 2011b).

\(^\text{22}\) Aristide disbanded the military, the Armed Forces of Haiti, in 1995. While no military exists, there is a Haitian National Police force and the Haitian Coast Guard.

\(^\text{23}\) Alexandre’s ascendancy to the Presidency was per the Haitian constitution (Buss 2008, 40).
departure aid resumed to Haiti, which primarily consisted of “money to support the presidential and parliamentary elections that were scheduled for 2006. For example the European Union provided 18 million to the Electoral Council for the elections” (Pierre-Louis 2011, 197). While a widely popular candidate, controversy nonetheless marred Préval’s victory. Initial vote counts projected Préval as the winner by obtaining over 51% of the vote; however, after the initial counts his percentage dropped to roughly 49% (Dupuy 2006, 133). If the official tally showed that Préval had not won over 50% of the vote, a second, run-off election between the top two candidates would have ensued.

Evidence of voting fraud quickly began to surface, including the finding of burned ballots, accusations of discrepancies between counted ballots and the number of actual voters, and the discovery of 85,000-90,000 blank ballots (ibid., 134-135). Despite the evidence of fraud, the US, Canada, and France all “reluctantly agreed to join with their counter parts from Brazil and Chile and meet with the UN, Haiti’s interim government, and [Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council] officials to come up with an acceptable legal solution that would grant Préval a first-round victory” (ibid., 135). The solution they came up with was the Belgian Option, “which consisted of distributing the blank votes proportionally to each candidate,” putting Préval with over 50% of the vote and allowing him to be officially declared as the winner (ibid.). Préval’s opposition, which included Haiti’s business class, was heavily opposed to the Belgian Option, but eventually accepted him as President. In May 2006, nearly two months after the election, Préval was finally inaugurated President.

The flawed election left Préval in a situation in which if he did not perform to the liking of his opponents his presidency would likely be threatened (Jacobs 2006). To put it plainly, Préval was in a position in which he needed to conform to the wishes of the business class, rather
than the demographic that popularly supported him. While the 2006 election represents Haiti’s sovereignty in the *Action Plan*, an actual examination of the events surrounding it demonstrates that it serves as a powerful example of how peripheral countries’ sovereignty is a conditional status decided on by donor governments and multilateral agencies (Duffield 2001, 311).
The Haitian state’s current lack of capacity serves as justification for the international trusteeship of Haiti manifest in the two institutions involved in implementing the *Action Plan*, the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC).\(^{24}\)

The HRF and IHRC are intended to work together to distribute donor funds, ensure that reconstruction plans follow the *Action Plan*, and function as reconstruction leadership. Neither the HRF nor the IHRC, though, is directly involved in implementing projects. Instead, both have been designed to be large institutions overseeing overall reconstruction efforts in Haiti in order to avoid overlapping/duplicate projects, as well as make sure that reconstruction efforts are efficient, transparent, and in-line with the goals of the *Action Plan* (2010a, 55; Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 2010).

The stated purpose of the HRF is to “facilitate the harmonization between programmes and projects needing funding and the funds available” (2010a, 55). Further, the HRF is “ultimately a mechanism that should in principle make it easier to co-ordinate external aid and ensure sound management of the funds made available for rebuilding Haiti” (ibid.). Essentially the primary role of the HRF is to manage donations pledged at the Donors’ Conference and function as an intermediary between agencies implementing projects and the HRF’s three partners (the UN, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank). It is important to note that the HRF does not manage all earthquake recovery donations, even those pledged at the Conference. However, according to its website, the HRF “is the largest source of un-earmarked financing,” and it presently manages $335 million donated from 19 donors, the largest of which

\(^{24}\) In the *Plan*, the IHRC is the Haiti Interim Commission for the Reconstruction (HICR) and the HRF is the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). Another name for the IHRC is the Interim Commission to Reconstruct Haiti (CIRH). For simplicities sake, this thesis uses the names that these institutions currently operate under, the IHRC and HRF.
is the US. In order to obtain HRF funds purposed projects must first gain IHRC endorsement and affiliate with one of the three HRF partners (Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 2010).

The stated mission of the IHRC is to “provide effective co-ordination and deployment of resources and to respond to concerns about accountability and transparency in order to maximize support provided by international donors” (2010a, 54). According to its website the “IHRC can help facilitate funding flows by publicizing to donors all funding gaps that exist for IHRC approved projects and by connecting partially funded projects/programs to entities that can disburse funds” (Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 2010). The IHRC’s role in overall reconstruction efforts is larger than that of the HRF because the aim of the IHRC is to oversee both HRF funded and non-HRF funded projects. IHRC project approval procedures vary depending on the amount of funds requested. The executive director has sole discretion over projects seeking less than $1 million; the executive committee approves projects with budgets of $1-10 million; and a majority vote by the voting members of the IHRC board decides approval for projects exceeding $10 million (ibid.). The IHRC board is made of up of 28 voting and 4 non-voting members (ibid.)

Lastly, the two co-chairs, presently Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive, make up the executive committee.

Fatton contests the notion that Haitian officials are actually playing a meaningful role in the IHRC, stating that the organization merely “preserves a legal façade of ultimate Haitian authority, but in reality it clearly places Haiti under de facto trusteeship” (2011, 165). IHRC documents indeed seem to bolster Fatton’s statement. For example, its website states that, “The IHRC’s mandate is to oversee the submission process and review for approval all projects/programs proposed by the Haitian government ministries, donors or implementing

25The Action Plan specifies 24 voting members for the IHRC (2010a, 54); however, this thesis uses the figure from the IHRC’s website since it was created after the Plan was published.
The IHRC mandate suggests that the Haitian state cannot implement its own projects without first obtaining IHRC approval. Moreover, the website also states that the purpose of the IHRC’s creation was, in part, to overcome the following obstacles: “Significant lack of monitoring mechanisms to measure outcomes” and a “lack of transparency” (Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 2010). The implication of these obstacles is that the Haitian state, at present, lacks the ability to monitor reconstruction efforts in a way that is acceptable to donors. Additionally, the stated obstacles harkens back to the principles of good governance, discussed in Section III, which can actually undermine state sovereignty. Recently, Oxfam has sharply criticized the IHRC for failing to improve coordination, build state capacity, or bring donors and Haitian political leadership together (2011, 3).

The IHRC’s mandate also specifies that it be “carried out in the context of the state of emergency” (2010a, 54). On April 20, 2010 then President Préval (2010) issued a presidential order to maintain a state of emergency throughout Haiti for 18 months. By voting to approve the presidential order, the Haitian parliament effectively ceded authority to the IHRC (Fatton 2011, 165). Further, the IHRC is an entity that exists outside of Haitian law; according to its bylaws “the IHRC is a separate legal entity under the laws of the Republic of Haiti that has a special purpose and is considered sui generis there under” (Bylaws of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 2010, italics in original). A stark example of IHRC’s power is that, “IHRC approval indicates endorsement of the Government of Haiti” (Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 2011). The statement indicates that the IHRC is acting as a substitute for the Haitian state.
The fact that the World Bank is in charge of managing the HRF also demonstrates the
trusteeship of Haiti. While the Action Plan states that the World Bank’s management of the
HRF was per the request of the Haitian state (2010a, 55), this account is contradicted by Lindsay
who writes that, “Canada [had] reportedly proposed that the World Bank run a trust fund” for
Haiti (2011, 20). Mullings et al. view this bypassing of the Haitian state in favor of the World
Bank as an example of financial colonialism (2010, 294). The concept of financial colonialism
is from Klein’s The Shock Doctrine (2007), which argues that Milton Friedman’s Chicago
School style of economics is a modern form of colonialism. Whereas previous forms of
colonialism sought to conquer new territories, in the Chicago School style of economics the state
itself became the “new frontier” for financial markets (ibid., 70). Friedman’s model of
economics sees the role of the state as creating and preserving an institutional framework
“characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade” (Harvey
2006, 145). Further, the framework is one in which the well-being of humans is thought to “best
be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms” (ibid.). Within this framework,
the creation of markets necessitates a state, but once created state intervention “must be kept to a
bare minimum” (ibid.).

Klein (2007) argues that the already rich and wealthy classes exclusively benefit from the
processes of neoliberalization that have sprung from Friedman’s model of economics. Harvey
similarly argues that the free-market turn that took place in the 1980s was “in some way and to
some degree associated with a project to restore or reconstruct upper-class power” (2006, 149).
In rolling back the state, new terrains for capitalism to consume emerged, a process known as
accumulation by dispossession.\textsuperscript{26} Crudely, accumulation by dispossession is a means of accumulating

\textsuperscript{26} Accumulation by dispossession is a reworking of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation (Glassman 2006,
608). Marx developed the idea of primitive accumulation to signify the commodification of land that took place in
capital through the practices of privatization, financialization, the management and manipulation of crises, and state redistributions (Harvey 2006). As an ongoing process, accumulation by dispossession works to restore class power to capitalist elites (ibid., 153). As clear examples of trusteeship, the IHRC and HRF demonstrate the reinforcement of uneven power dynamics between Haiti and the international community.

The erosion of the Haitian state by international actors has led to the current situation in which it is largely non-functional. Ironically, NGOs commonly complain about other NGOs unwillingness to work with the Haitian state and cite this as a reason for the slow reconstruction progress. For example, the Country Director for Oxfam stated that, “Too many donors from rich countries have pursued their own aid priorities and have not effectively coordinated amongst themselves or worked with the Haitian government,” and that, “This seriously weakens the government's ability to plan and deliver on its sovereign responsibility to lead reconstruction” (Gronewold 2011). Paradoxically, even if NGOs were to abdicate authority to the Haitian state, it still would not be able to function as reconstruction leader, and recent political events evince the status of the Haitian state. On April 4, 2011, the Haitian population elected Michel Martelly as president in a second round of presidential elections. While Martelly obtained two-thirds of the vote in the runoff election, three-quarters of Haiti’s registered voters did not vote (Grandin 2011). According to Grandin (ibid.), the small voter turnout symbolizes the lack of faith the Haitian populous has in its politicians and political system. In a recent public appearance, protestors displayed their unhappiness with the current political situation by pelting Martelly’s entourage with plastic bottles and rocks (Daniel 2011a). Perhaps more telling of the current situation is the difficulty Martelly has had in securing a Prime Minister and the fact that he has
little support in parliament (Charles 2011b, Daniel 2011a). Shortly after his inauguration, Martelly nominated Daniel-Gerard Rouzier as his Prime Minister. However, questions over both Rouzier’s taxes and citizenship led the Haitian Chamber of Deputies to reject the nomination on June 21, 2011 (Daniel 2011b). Martelly’s second nomination, Bernard Gousse, was an even more controversial candidate than Rouzier. Gousse’s record as justice minister includes accusations of falsely imprisoning people and being an accomplice to murder (ibid.). Haiti’s Senate rejected Gousse’s nomination on August 3, 2011 (ibid). The Haitian Senate approved Martelly’s third nomination, Garry Conille, on October 5, 2011. Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Conille worked for President Clinton in Clinton’s capacity as a UN Special Envoy to Haiti and “has had a long career with the United Nations” (BBC News 2011). The weakness of the Haitian state legitimizes donor preference for NGOs, as described previously in this section. Even without donor preference for NGOs, the state’s inability to function requires international actors to play a strong role in post-earthquake reconstruction, thus perpetuating Haiti’s trusteeship.
SECTION VI: REFORMULATING PAST POLICIES

Neoliberalism, like liberalism, perpetuates a cycle of crisis, humanitarianism, and development. “[P]olicy failure” according to Brenner et al., “is central to the exploratory and experimental modus operandi of neoliberalization processes—it is an important impetus for their continual reinvention and every-widening interspatial circulation” (2010, 209 italics in original). The uneven development of neoliberalization entails “successive rounds of distinctively patterned, market-oriented regulatory restructuring, each of which is predicated upon, but also partially transformative of, inherited institutional landscapes at various spatial scales” (ibid. italics in original). In Haiti, the humanitarian crisis of the earthquake was in part the result of past policies and initiatives that aimed at stimulating macroeconomic growth. Despite this, the long-term post-earthquake reconstruction plans are precisely a re-working and expansion of previous policies.

In Haiti free-trade zones (FTZs) have had the negative consequences of contributing to the collapse of Haiti’s agricultural industry, the country’s reliance on food imports, and the overpopulation of Port-au-Prince (Lindsay 2010), all of which magnified the impact of the earthquake. Nonetheless, the Action Pan focuses on industrial parks and free zones as important development strategies (2010a, 17). Lindsay reported that prior to the March 31st conference the recovery plan supported by the UN had been “set in motion before the earthquake, [and] centered in large part on bolstering the maquiladora industry” (2010, 20). The inclusion of FTZs as a

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27 Brenner et al.’s word choice of neoliberalization, rather than neoliberalism, is intentional and signifies it as a process rather than entity or end-state (Peck and Tickell 2002, 383).

28 FTZs are areas free of customs intervention in which goods are imported, manufactured or altered in some way, and then re-exported.

29 Maquiladoras are free-trade zones.
post-earthquake recovery strategy (see 2010a, 17 and 26) highlights how the *Action Plan* rather than rebuilding a new Haiti is a reinscription of the past.

One element key to Haiti’s developmental success is culture, which is particularly important because of the “globalized environment” Haiti presently finds itself in (2010a, 32). The globalized environment makes it “necessary to create conditions that allow the effective development of a market for cultural goods and services” (ibid.). More specifically culture is important for development because

the marginalization of culture has led to the failure of developmental support programs in practically every country for many years. Thus, if a country is to be restructured, it is essential that culture be a driving force that contributes as significantly to economic growth as do other key sectors of national life. (ibid., 34)

This emphasis on culture is in-line with Radcliffe and Laurie’s observation that, “In recent years development has undergone a cultural turn in which culture is given due significance as a factor in development projects and programs” (2006, 231).

Culture, as presented in the *Action Plan*, is a product, “a set of material objects and distinctive behaviors” (ibid., 242). The idea of culture as a commodity in and of itself is clearly articulated within the *Plan*:

*The integration of culture into economic life, apart from the promotion of cultural products,*

stems not only from a desire to develop creativity, imagination and the investments of cultural entrepreneurs but also to prepare *the introduction in full force of Haitian society to the economy of the intangible.* (2010a, 34 italics mine)

Commodifying Haitian culture entails creating the infrastructure necessary to meet consumer demand through physically restructuring the country. As an economic growth strategy, the first targets for the promotion of Haiti’s cultural economy are pre-existing heritage sites, which can
be marketed as tourist destinations, and many of the sites are also within the proposed regional
development center locations (ibid., 35). Subsequently, “cultural property, particularly that
protected by intellectual property law, will be taken into account,” and “other sectors of culture
will gradually be opened up to the economy (ibid.). In general, one task of post-earthquake
reconstruction is to develop markets in which Haitian culture will be a desirable commodity.

However, the Plan leaves undefined what exactly qualifies as Haitian culture, it seems
that defining Haitian culture is also a reconstruction task. One strategy proposed is the
implementation of a cultural educational syllabus into Haitian schools, which will foster a shared
sense of culture (2010a, 25). From this perspective, the inclusion of Haitian culture in the Plan is,
perhaps, also a strategy aimed at creating social cohesion. A focus on culture may also be an
attempt to pacify long-standing social conflicts that have existed in Haiti since its independence.
The idea that culture is important to developmental success connects to the work of Samuel
Huntington, who “sees culture…as a ‘key variable’ in the determination of democratization and
economic growth” (Watts 2003, 12). According to Huntington’s line of reasoning culture
matters because, “A bad attitude…is growth-inhibiting” (ibid.).

Long-term reconstruction efforts also aim at deconcentrating the population of Port-au-
Price and dispersing the population throughout the country. A particular way of decreasing the
population envisioned in the Action Plan is the creation of regional development centers. The
idea is that the development centers will be regional hubs of various forms of economic activity
throughout Haiti. The rationalization behind creating such areas is that they will entice Haitians
to move away from the capital, thus, naturally decreasing the population. The purposed
development centers combine different types of businesses with particular regions of Haiti.
More specifically the development centers identified in the Plan are the following: “in the North,
the axis between Cap Haïtien and Ouanaminthe for tourism, textile and agriculture; the region
around Gonaïves for agriculture and tourism; the South for agriculture, textiles and tourism”
(2010a, 27). The specific towns slated to become development centers are Cap Haïtien, Les
Gonaïves, St-Marc, Hinche, and Les Cayes (ibid., 17). Additionally, for the metropolitan area of
Port-au-Prince “a new regional development and growth centre would be located in the Cabaret
sector in the Fond Mombin zone” (ibid.).

As part of creating the regional development centers, and to help foster trade, the *Action
Plan* aims at physically restructuring the country. An important aspect of the *Action Plans’*
territorial rebuilding section is the call for an urban plan. Establishing a complete urban plan is
vital in preventing Port-au-Prince’s return to the condition it was in prior to the earthquake
(2010a, 12). Part of the urban plan involves allocating land between that “which will be used by
the State and that which will be transferred to private landowners at current value of land”
(ibid.). Part of the transformation of Haiti entails the creation of a national transportation system,
as well as the redesigning of airports and ports in order to open the country to the region and the
world (ibid., 14). Strengthening Haiti’s transportation system includes building two additional
international airports, in Cap Haïtien and Les Cayes, as well as the rehabilitation and extension
of Port-au-Prince’s airport. Combined the “three airports will be in a position to meet economic
development and tourism needs” (ibid.). The placement of two additional airports in Cap Haïtien
and Les Cayes is also part of transforming these areas into regional development centers. The
*Plan* advocates for redesigning the current airport in Port-au-Prince because it “did not address
the real needs of the country’s economic activities,” and its current location in the center of the
city is a problem (ibid.). Finally, the *Action Plan* calls for building two deep-water ports, which
will “enable the facilitation of imports and exports and encourage the emergence of industrial
and commercial activity in other regions of the country [meaning besides Port-au-Prince]” (ibid., 15). These reconstruction efforts are all for the specific purpose of providing the physical restructuring necessary for the economic success of Haiti.

At the time of the earthquake, the population of Port-au-Prince’s metropolitan area was over 2 million (CIA World Factbook 2011), with some estimates putting the population as high as 3 million, roughly one-third of Haiti’s entire population (Allen and Leonard 2010, CNN 2010). The size of the capital’s population is noteworthy because the area was originally planned for just 250,000 people (Jordan and de Cordoba 2010). The creation of the regional centers is a key part of deconcentrating the capital, which is critical because otherwise “the overdevelopment of Port-au-Prince is likely to not only continue but its rate will increase” (2010a, 27). The overdevelopment of Port-au-Prince is the result of rapid urbanization. In 2009, 53% of the population was living in rural areas (CIA World Factbook 2009), but by 2010 the majority of Haitians, 52%, were living in urban areas (CIA World Factbook 2011). Currently, Haiti’s annual rate of urbanization is 3.9%, while its overall population growth is approximately 0.787% (ibid.).

The massive rural to urban migration that has taken place in Haiti is not unique to the country though. Davis contends that many peripheral countries contain examples of “capital-intensive countrysides and labor-intensive deindustrialized cities,” and that this phenomenon is in stark contrast to the “classical stereotype of labor-intensive countryside and the capital-intensive industrial metropolis” (2006, 16). Further, this trend is the result of structural reforms. In Haiti, state-led measures aimed at decreasing subsistence farming and increasing the factory labor force were major catalysts fueling rural to urban migration.

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30 Port-au-Prince’s metropolitan area includes the city of Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Pétionville, Delmas, Tabarre, Cité-Soleil and Kenscoff.
However, the *Plan* discusses the overpopulation of Port-au-Prince without linking it to Haitian history. Mullings et al. argue that, “The adoption of the neoliberal export-oriented model…created the context for the mass rural-urban migration that resulted in so many people being concentrated in the capital of Port-au-Prince on the day of the earthquake” (2011, 288). In the particular case of Haiti, the increased use of offshore assembly factories by multinational corporations helped fuel internal migration. During François Duvalier’s dictatorship offshore assembly, specifically for US corporations and markets, began being integrated into the Haitian economy, and was touted by both the US and Haiti as aid (Farmer 1994, 115). Duvalier attracted outside investment into Haiti by offering foreign investors “generous incentives, including tax exemptions on income, profits, and raw materials” (Perito 2007, 7).

Following François Duvalier’s death in 1971, his son Jean Claude took over as the country’s ruler. In agreement with NGOs, he and his administration encouraged “Haitian peasants to migrate to Port-au-Prince to seek employment in the assembly industries that were being built” (Pierre-Louis 2011, 196). The focus on assembly industries was part of “the international community’s strategy to decrease Haiti’s dependence on subsistence agriculture and cash crops” (ibid.). In 1980, 200 assembly plants were in Haiti, employing 60,000 people (Farmer 1994, 117). By the mid-1980s, “Haiti was the world’s ninth largest assembler of goods for U.S. consumption” (ibid.).

Despite its touted benefits as early as 1984, it was evident that “the Haitian assembly industry…provided no long-term benefits to the country” (Perito 2007, 7). The embargo against Haiti during the 1990s largely decimated the industry, with some estimates figuring that “nearly 90 percent of Haiti’s industrial sector was destroyed” (ibid.). Even after Aristide was restored to power in 1994 the Haitian economy continued to decline, and by 2002 “the richest 4 percent of
the population controlled 66 percent of the country’s assets” (ibid.). Employment in the sector did not improve livelihoods for the majority of Haitians who had migrated to the urban areas, and this helped create Port-au-Prince’s massive overcrowding, with much of the population living in abject poverty.

Further, a focus on development via an assembly-export industry perpetuates inequality between Haitians, as well as sustaining Haiti’s status as a peripheral country. Recently leaked US State Department cables have revealed that in 2009 the US opposed a purposed increase in Haitian assembly zone workers’ minimum wage (Coughlin and Ives 2011). While Haiti’s private sector largely supported the wage increase, it “engendered fierce opposition from Haiti’s tiny assembly zone elite, which Washington had long been supporting with direct financial aid and free trade deals” (ibid.). The US opposed the wage increase because posed a threat to the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) II Act, and urged President Préval to take action (ibid.). Préval eventually negotiated a deal, raising the minimum wage for the textile industry to approximately $3/day and the minimum wage for other industries and commercial sectors to $5/day (ibid.).

The HOPE Act, which is a trade agreement between the US and Haiti, was first enacted by the US Congress in 2006 and implemented in March 2007 (United States Agency for International Development). The stated purposed of the HOPE Act was to provide “duty-free entry to the United State [of] garments manufactured in Haiti” (ibid.). More specifically, the HOPE Act targeted Haiti’s textile industry, which in 2006 was “Haiti’s last remaining industry and source of 90 percent ($450 million) of its exports to the United States” (Perito 2007, 10). In 2008, the US Congress extended the Act as part of the US Farm Bill, and it became HOPE II
An assumption of the Plus One for Haiti initiative is that consumers will be inclined to purchase items with a Made in Haiti logo because they will associate such actions with helping post-earthquake recovery efforts. Companies with products that have a Made in Haiti logo stand to benefit not only from duty-free imports, but also from potentially increased sales. In the *Action Plan* the merits of HOPE II are explained as providing “the initial framework for using Haiti’s comparative advantages, to benefit from its workforce, the proximity of the North American market and the know-how of its private sector” (2010a, 17). HOPE II is particularly important for the viability of the regional development centers because their success is largely dependent “on incentives for industrial, commercial and tourist development” (ibid.). However, given the legacy of assembly factories in Haiti it seems highly unlikely that the initiatives put forth in the *Plan* will actually yield meaningful benefits for the majority of Haitians. By focusing on creating development centers that largely relay on economic activity tied to free trade, post-earthquake recovery efforts may fall short.

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31 In May 2010 Congress passed the Haitian Economic Lift Act (HELP) which extended the HOPE Act, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTA) to 2020 (*Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010*).
zones and assembly factories the *Action Plan* seems to merely displace the very issues that allowed for the devastation of the earthquake, rather than actually mitigating them.
In post-earthquake Haiti, a key issue has been securing the displaced population into permanent housing solutions. Many Haitians living in tent camps find themselves in a state of limbo in which landowners are threatening to evict them, they cannot return to their previous residences, and they are facing stalled state and NGO-led resettlement plans. While determining permanent housing solutions and the closing of tent camps have been major priorities, a number of issues complicate such efforts. Journalist Deborah Sontag (2010b) describes the apparent permanence of one particular camp as having a “quasi-mayor, a ragtag security force, a marketplace, two movie theaters, three nightly prayer services, rival barber shops and even a plastic-sheeted salon.” A widely held perception is that the tent camps provide access to services that Haitians otherwise would not have, and many NGOs and intergovernmental agencies “argue that people only stay in camps in order to receive services” (Schuller 2010). Thus, the closure of tent camps is a long-term process that must involve providing displaced Haitians with better livelihood alternatives.

While the earthquake had the greatest impact on Haiti’s urban areas, it nevertheless affected the countryside. In the wake of the earthquake an estimated 600,000 people migrated to Haiti’s countryside, many of whom had originally migrated from these areas to Port-au-Prince in search of schools, jobs, and social services (Sontag 2010c). The influx of Haitians into the countryside created extra stress on areas in which food and social services were already, and have historically been, scarce (ibid.). Reviving Haiti’s rural areas and economy, as well as

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32 The migration of people to the countryside was in addition to the thousands of tent camps that sprung up in the areas in which the earthquake directly struck.
moving displaced Haitians there are important long-term strategies in creating a new Haiti (c.f. 2010a 22-24). One reason for this is that relief agencies cannot “build on most plots where the homeless previously resided,” which is “because about 80 percent of them were renters, and the agencies fear the intended recipients would only be evicted by landowners” (Bajak 2010).

However, at present the rural areas cannot support a rapid population increase.

The Action Plan calls for increasing homeownership for Haitians through “the creation of 0 percent interest-rate loans guaranteed by the state, which could be provided via the Haitian bank system and in turn paid at a normal rate that has been negotiated by the state and the banks” (2010a, 25). However, prior to the earthquake many Haitians could not afford to purchase a home and since the earthquake the cost of housing has only soared (Katz 2010). One estimate put the current price of renting a house at 5 to 10 times higher than it was before the quake (Sasser 2011). The increased demand for housing by both displaced Haitians and foreign workers, combined with the fact that the earthquake decreased the available housing supply have all contributed to the dramatic increases in housing prices (Katz 2010). While relief workers rushed to Haiti to provide assistance, their presence has, ironically, made housing more unaffordable.

More generally, the “lack of clarity of land titles” (2010a, 27) in Haiti is impeding homeownership and land development. Pre-earthquake property ownership in Port-au-Prince was a situation in which “squatter settlements were strewn across the capital…and the fragile legal system was burdened by multiple claims for the same parcels of land” (Bajak 2010). Land ownership is a complicated issue tracing back to the deep racial and class divisions that emerged alongside Haiti’s independence (cf. Trouillot 1990, James 1989). Fatton traces class division in Haiti back to the Haitian revolution and writes that “Haiti’s founding fathers had no
choice but to embark on a program of militarization to confront the armed threats of White supremacist forces” (2011, 160). Within the country’s internal politics, the militarization of Haiti had the negative consequences of subordinating civilian politics and contributing to the “development of a predatory system in which those not born into wealth and lacking weapons were systematically repressed into marginalization” (ibid., 160-161). In addition to economic stratification, there was also a large rift between the peasantry and urban population. According to Trouillot, “Peasants were the economic backbone of the nation; yet peasants had no claim whatsoever to the state” (1990, 16). The US occupation of Haiti, lasting from 1915-1934, further exacerbated the disjuncture between the state and nation33, and ultimately paved the way for the Duvalier dictatorships, with François Duvalier first seizing power in 1957 (ibid.). The economic restructuring that took place during the 1970s at the discretion of Jean-Claude Duvalier, François’ son and successor, “simply reinforced the urban-rural polarization” in that the peasantry was ignored in favor of cheap, urban labor (ibid., 17).

Riddick traces the split between Haiti’s urban and rural populations to the Civil Code of 1825 and Rural Code of 1836, and argues that they created a legal apartheid between rural and urban Haitians (2008, 5). The Rural Code essentially barred the rural Haitian population from having property rights, and as such, led to a situation in which private parties through occupation and agricultural cultivation informally controlled legally public-held land (ibid.). In 2006 President Préval announced “the transfer of land to the farmers who were in possession of these agricultural lands;” however, the “Haitian Constitution of 1987 prohibit[ed] such practices” (ibid., 6).

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33 For Trouillot (1990) the Haitian peasantry is largely synonymous with the nation, while the state is composed of Haitian urbanites. The pitting of nation against state is also discussed in terms of the relationship between civil and political society, which were “never as close in Haiti as most of the urbanites and even some of the peasants would like to think” (ibid., 31).
While the *Action Plan* aims at reviving the countryside and utilizing the space to depopulate the urban areas, ambiguities over land ownership, as well as social tensions, remain contentious issues, and initiatives directed at these areas could possibly affect the rural population in negative ways. A July *Democracy Now!* interview with Kim Ives\(^{34}\) indicated that in parts of Haiti’s countryside, state-held land used as commons was being illegally appropriated for private ownership to develop luxury apartments, assembly factories, and office buildings (Kim Ives, interview by Amy Goodman and Sharif Abdel Kouddous, Democracy Now, July 14, 2010). However, it is unclear whether such actions are in fact part of the reconstruction plans detailed in the *Action Plan* because the land appropriation discussed in the document is not solely for housing purposes (c.f. 2010a, 12).

Presently, 634,000 Haitians remain living in 1,001 displacement sites (Doyle 2011a)\(^{35}\), and many are facing eviction. Following the emergency relief phase, the closure and relocation of camps became a focal point of reconstruction efforts because they pose a public health risk and many are on land that is susceptible to flooding. In February 2010 President Préval announced that his administration planned on moving Haitians living on public land by providing them with “incentives to guide them to other places,” but also stated that if the incentives did not work they would be “moved by legal means” (Cave 2010). Continuing with his predecessor’s efforts, President Martelly announced plans to close six camps within the first 100 days of his presidency (Charles 2011a)\(^{36}\). The resettlement of displaced Haitians has been

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34 Ives is an editor for *Haiti Liberté*, filmmaker, and host of a weekly radio program that focuses on Haiti. Recently, he has been writing extensively on the WikiLeaks’ Haiti files, and has had his articles about the cables published in *The Guardian* and *The Nation*.

35 In a recent *Fresh Air* interview Paul Framer, co-founder of Partners in Health and a UN Special Deputy Envoy to Haiti, put the number of Haitians still homeless much higher at 800,000 (Paul Farmer, interview by Dave Davies, *Fresh Air*, National Public Radio, July 12, 2010).

36 He has yet to achieve this.
slow, at best, and private landowners have increasingly been evicting people as a result. Private landowners fear that the camps will become permanent slums, and view the evictions as a means of protecting their private property (Sontag 2010a). From January 2010 to April 2011, the number of displaced Haitians dropped by roughly 45%; however, the reduction seems largely to be the result of evictions. In a press release, the Chief of IOM’s Mission to Haiti states that, “It is apparent that many people are leaving the camps under duress” (Doyle 2011b). A New York Times article stated that out of the total number of Haitians who have left the tent camps, only 4.7% did so because they had had their homes either repaired or rebuilt (Archibold 2011a). As of June 2011, over 200,000 Haitians, roughly 1/4 of all remaining displaced Haitians, were facing camp expulsions (Doyle 2011b). The evictions are a difficult issue, and humanitarian officials worry that they could further destabilize the country by increasing conflict, forcing people to relocate to unsafe locations, and create sites that lack basic services (Sontag 2010a).

The continuing housing crisis in Haiti evinces both the impossibility of the Action Plan and the ways in which humanitarianism and development feed back on one another. In order to manage the crisis of the earthquake aid agencies provided Haitians with much needed services like medical attention and food. However, because these services largely did not exist prior to the earthquake, Haitians are, allegedly, reluctant to leave camps. In order for the closure of camps to take place, organizations involved in their management must provide better alternatives to Haitians. The creation of such alternatives necessitates long-term development, specifically envisioned in the Plan as the stimulation of economic growth. By growing the economy, Haitians will eventually be able to provide for themselves. This line of reasoning, however, skirts the issue of land ownership. Issues of private property are state matters, and addressing

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37 Out of the total number of threatened evictions 67% are on private land, 8% on public land, and 25% is located on lands with unclear ownership (Doyle 2011b).
such issues autonomously would mean that NGOs and intergovernmental agencies would violate the sovereignty of the Haitian state. While these same actors certainly are circumventing the Haitian state in other ways, as previously discussed, they are also working to preserve a fictional Haitian sovereignty. In the case of housing, this means that many organizations are unwilling to rebuild houses. Continuing ambiguities over land ownership leaves the housing situation largely unresolved, allowing the possibility of future crises to remain open.
SECTION VIII: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Despite proclamations that the 2010 earthquake provided an opportunity to reinvent Haiti, an analysis of the Action Plan demonstrates how reconstruction efforts are largely an extension of past policies. The long-term reconstruction goals outlined in the Plan all center on strengthening the Haitian economy, and a key assumption structuring the document is that national economic growth will yield meaningful benefits for individual Haitians. This thesis has demonstrated how many of the policies and proposals reworked in the Action Plan helped create the very conditions that allowed the earthquake to be so destructive. Rather than building a new Haiti, it is possible that the Action Plan would simply recreate the problems that plagued Port-au-Prince prior to the earthquake. As previously argued though, complete execution of the Plan seems dubious at best.

Nearly two years after the earthquake much of the capital remains in ruins and by some estimates only 25% of the rubble has been cleared (Paul Farmer, interview by Dave Davies, Fresh Air, National Public Radio, July 12, 2011). Despite the existence of a national, state-led plan for post-earthquake recovery, reconstruction efforts remain highly fractured. Achieving large-scale reconstruction projects, like the regional development centers, appears to be impossible because there is a lack of cohesion, coordination, and organization among NGOs, intergovernmental institutions, for-profit development companies, and the Haitian state. While actually implementing the Action Plan in its entirety seems unattainable, Goldman cautiously warns that denoting a development program or policy as a failure only works to “legitimate and expand the project of development, writ large, justifying it as a necessary if flawed uniform project of modernity and progress for the South” (2005, 13). Writing the Action Plan off as a
failure only provides space for ushering in new rounds of development initiatives. As Brenner et al. explain, “neoliberal strategies frequently postpone or displace crisis pressures, instilling an insatiable need for ‘next stage’ reforms” (2010, 210). The outcomes of such strategies are “spiraling—crisis-induced, crisis-managing and crisis-inducing—processes of regulatory transformation” (ibid. emphasis in original). Haiti’s history of international interventions and involvement has led to the present moment in which Haiti holds the title of poorest nation in the Western hemisphere. Its status as a country plagued by abject poverty, inequality, and political instability all contributed to the necessity of international assistance for immediate emergency aid and post-earthquake recovery. However, this international assistance, combined with an impossible Action Plan and non-functioning Haitian state reinforces inequality and further legitimizes international trusteeship of Haiti.

An important question is why did those involved in writing the Action Plan design it in such an unfeasible way. Broadly, there are two answers to this question: either the parties involved misunderstand the cycle of development or they stand to gain from perpetuating it. From my research for this thesis, I believe it is a combination of the two factors. On the one hand, those on the ground working as development or humanitarian practitioners oftentimes are genuinely interested in helping Haitians. In the wake of the earthquake, people compelled by images and stories of enormous amounts of destruction and suffering rushed into Haiti. However, many foreign workers lack knowledge of the country and/or Creole language skills. My impression from being in Haiti was that beyond language barriers, the majority of organizations involved in reconstruction efforts do not actually spend much time with non-state affiliated or elite Haitians, and as such do not have a pulse for much of the society. This lack of interaction with the majority of the Haitian populous is largely because of security risks, in terms
of both crime and the threat of disease. Perhaps more importantly, it seems that many fail to recognize their own role in perpetuating a problematic cycle of development. Those who do recognize the problems of development nonetheless rationalize their work on the basis that there is no other option. From my observations, NGOs largely work to achieve two goals. The first being expansion, and the second being the organizations stated humanitarian or developmental goals. This disjuncture between goals may contribute to the ineffectiveness in actually combating the problems that NGOs purport to deal with. In addition to their stated mandates, NGOs are also in pursuit of grants and donor money to survive in a ‘shark tank’ environment, as one aid worker in Haiti described the situation to me. A productive area for future research would be to investigate inter-NGO competition and the impacts that this has on reconstruction efforts in Haiti.


