Between the Veil and the Vote: Exploring Incentives to Politically Incorporate Women in the Arab World

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BETWEEN THE VEIL AND THE VOTE:
EXPLORING INCENTIVES TO POLITICALLY INCORPORATE WOMEN IN
THE ARAB WORLD

by

Bozena C. Welborne

B.A., Colorado College, 2002

M.A., University of Colorado, 2006

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
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This thesis entitled:

Between the Veil and the Vote: Exploring Incentives to Politically Incorporate Women in the Arab World

written by Bozena C. Welborne

has been approved for the Department of Political Science

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Date______________

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.

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Abstract
Welborne, Bozena C. (Ph.D., Political Science, Department of Political Science)

Between the Veil and the Vote: Exploring Incentives to Politically Incorporate Women in the Arab World

Thesis directed by Associate Professor David S. Brown

The 30th anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) renewed debate on proposed mechanisms to increase women’s presence in the political sphere of the developing and developed world. Despite common perceptions that women’s political opportunities are uniformly limited across the Arab world, considerable variation exists. While women still lack the right to suffrage in Saudi Arabia, more than 20 percent of parliamentary representatives in Tunisia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates are women. My research explores the incentives behind this unexpected variation through both cross-national statistical and case study analysis, relying on data gathered during two years of fieldwork and from over 100 interviews across Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan. I posit that international economic influence plays a key role in creating incentives to politically incorporate women and partially explains the different levels of women’s political inclusion across the region. Alongside the humanitarian reasons for promoting women’s issues, there is a decidedly material interest for women’s empowerment in countries that receive significant financial inputs through development projects that increasingly conflate the status of women and democratization. Furthermore, with the passage of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their explicit focus on women’s issues, there are significant reputational benefits for improving a country’s image via women’s empowerment. Consequently, Arab policymakers hope strategic gender-related political reforms translate into greater donor and investor confidence in other indicators of development and democratization.

To evaluate my argument, I consider the impact of multiple types of foreign capital on three possible dimensions of women’s political incorporation: descriptive representation (the percentages of women in Arab legislatures), policy (gender quota adoption), and legal (women’s political, economic, and social rights) realms, with each dimension representing an empirical chapter in the dissertation. I use statistical data covering 22 Arab League member countries from the period of 1990 until 2009 for this analysis. My findings reveal robust relationships between women’s political status and variables representing international economic influence via foreign capital. Subsequent case analysis elaborates on the importance of external funding in sustaining grassroots movements pushing for more progressive political outcomes for women.
Dedication

I dedicate this project to my fiancé, Jason, for toughing out the exceptionally long slog precursing this dissertation with great aplomb, and to my good friend and colleague, Aubrey, for consistently lending her ear and wisdom to both the research and writing process undergirding this project.

“O mankind! We created you from a single soul, male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, so that you may come to know one another. Truly, the most honored of you in God’s sight is the greatest of you in piety. God is All-Knowing, All-Aware.”

(Qur’an 49:13)


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My parents in Croatia for not succumbing to despair over my career choices, everyone in office 5C who made years of dissertating bearable through constant mirth and sympathetic ears, and the Fulbright crew in Jordan whose willingness to share contacts knew no bounds.
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1. Introduction

“If you go to the protests now, you will see something you never saw before: hundreds of women. They shout and sing, they even sleep there in tents. This is not just a political revolution, it's a social revolution.”

Tawakul Karman, Yemeni Activist (2011)

Arab women have always had a reputation for docility in the Western press, meekly accepting subjugation within patriarchic Muslim societies, part and parcel of the Orientalist vision of the women behind the veil. Yet, the wave of uprisings igniting the Arab world in 2011 immediately dispelled this notion, revealing Arab women at the forefront of protest movements in Egypt and Yemen organizing events and spreading the news of dissent via new media, as well as marching next to their male brethren in the ubiquitous Tahrir (Independence) Squares across the region. Across Syria, Bahrain, and Libya women have taken singularly prominent roles in protesting autocratic leaders amid serious danger. As famed Egyptian feminist and human rights activist, Nawaal el Saadawi, proclaimed to Democracy Now: “Women and girls are, beside the boys, [sic] are in the streets. We are calling for justice, freedom, and equality, and real democracy, and a new constitution where there is no discrimination between men and women, no discrimination between Muslim and Christians, to change the system and to have real democracy.”

In reality, this is not a new role for the Arab woman as her participation in the Algerian and Moroccan revolutionary independence movements back in the 1950s and 1960s poignantly

---


2 Women had a significant role in the Tunisian demonstrations launching the so-called Arab Spring and marched side by side with their male counterparts. In Egypt, the most notorious activist of the revolution alongside dissident Google executive, Waled Ghoneim, was Asmaa Mahfous—a 26-year-old female activist whose compelling online appeal for the youth of Egypt to march in the streets next to her against Mubarak and demand popular justice quickly became a YouTube and facebook sensation and a rallying cry for the protest movement.

3 Available at http://www.democracynow.org/2011/1/31/women_protest_alongside_men_in_egyptian
attest. Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 movie, “The Battle of Algiers,” highlights the sacrifices of Algerian women for the cause of independence—in particular through a scene where a young woman partakes in a suicide mission against the French at a local café. Not only have Arab women been participating in protests against corrupt regimes and lobbying for increased rights since the beginning of the 20th century, in many Arab countries they have also been voting in elections since the early 1940s (Iraq, Syria, Djibouti, and Palestine under the British Mandate)—well in advance of select countries in Western Europe (see Table 1.1 below). With the exception of the Gulf states, most Arab nations extended full suffrage and the right to political contestation to women prior to the 1990s. However, women were not regular fixtures in the halls of power until the advent of the 1990s and the 2000s. The region exhibits significant variation in the percentages of women within elected and appointed legislatures ranging from 28 percent in Tunisia’s lower house of Parliament to zero percent in representative councils within Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar (see Table 1.1 below).

Variation in women’s general political participation exists over time, as well. During the 1940s and 1950s socialist sentiments inspired secular Arab leaders to enfranchise North African women earlier than their Middle Eastern counterparts (Brand 1998; Richards and Waterbury 2007). In the late 1990s foreign aid conditional on Arab states’ human rights record galvanized a government-sponsored renaissance of women’s non-profits in the Middle East, increasing women’s access to the public sphere. Since the advent of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 and their explicit emphasis on women’s empowerment as one of eight fundamental goals for development, the majority of the Arab world has officially embraced the formal inclusion of women into the political, economic, and social arena with varying results.
Table 1.1 Women’s Political Inclusion in 22 Arab League States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab League Member State</th>
<th>Lower House</th>
<th>Upper House</th>
<th>Year Suffrage Granted</th>
<th>Gender Quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7.71%</td>
<td>5.15%</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>3.03%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>13.85%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>12.70%</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>25.23%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>10.83%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>7.69%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>22.11%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>10.46%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>19.44%</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>YES (Under British Mandate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>6.78%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (north)</td>
<td>25.14%</td>
<td>17.86%</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>12.40%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>27.57%</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>22.50%</td>
<td>unicameral</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>NO (Limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>NO (South Yemen) 1970 (North Yemen)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database; University of Stockholm and Institute for International Development and Electoral Assistance (2011 data).

Therefore, Arab women’s recent political mobilization and participation is not unprecedented, but where does it stem from and why does it vary so much across the region? My dissertation explores the incentives informing this unexpected variation through both cross-national statistical and case study analysis relying on data gathered during two years of fieldwork and from over 100 interviews across Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and Yemen. It explores in greater detail the role of international economic influence in creating recent incentives to incorporate
women through instruments such as development assistance and conditional aid, but also considers the less transparent effects of the influx of foreign direct investment and remittances to the region. Foreign capital flows are generally understood to affect domestic policy across the fiscal and monetary spectrum (Garrett 1998), but they have also been shown to impact social policy, as well (Moghadam 2002; Ross 2008). Alongside the humanitarian reasons for promoting women’s issues, there is a decidedly material interest in promoting gender empowerment for countries that receive significant financial inputs through development projects conflating women’s issues and democratization. There are also reputational gains from incorporating women and presenting a Westernized image to the broader world. Arab policymakers are keenly aware of such incentives and hope strategic gender-related political reforms translate into greater donor and investor confidence in other indicators of development and democratization.

I evaluate these hypotheses by analyzing the impact of three types of foreign capital (development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances) on three possible dimensions of women’s political incorporation: women’s descriptive representation; the adoption of gender-related policies such as women’s quotas; and the extent of women’s rights across the political, economic, and social spectrum. Foreign capital does not operate in a vacuum and its effects at best facilitate, if not determine, the fate of Arab women. Levels of women’s civil-society activism as well as the commitment of incumbent leaders to progressive reforms certainly have an equally important effect on women-friendly legislation (Brand 1998; Jamal 2010). However, these phenomena are more difficult to quantify and will be elaborated on through the in-depth case analyses of the three countries in which I conducted fieldwork: Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco.
**Political Incorporation Revisited**

Political incorporation must be defined from the outset since it can represent the endgame of successful grass-roots political mobilization (the societal-change model) or a strategy for co-optation by political elites (the elite-led model).\(^4\) Until recently, political opposition and grassroots mobilization was still weak in many Arab countries though growing with the increasing popularity of informal Islamic networks (see Clark 1994; Denœux 1993; Esposito and Tamimi 2000).\(^5\) Consequently, I consider the problem of women’s political inclusion initially through the lens of the political elite’s incentives to incorporate women and the likely factors that would motivate them—external monies.

Clark (2004) ventures political inclusion is more of a strategic calculation on the part of in-groups (here elite males), rather than a question of the mobilization capacity of the out-group. In Arab political culture women easily compose a prominent out-group considering the restrictions on their political participation mandated by conservative and religious mores.\(^6\) The decision to incorporate such an out-group would be contingent on women framing themselves as viable coalition partners to the reigning patriarchic establishment. The growing economic or political importance of an out-group or the elite’s need for a bulwark against a threatening

---

\(^4\) Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate review these models in their contribution for “The Politics of Democratic Inclusion” edited by Christine Wolbrecht and Rodney Hero. For further reference, see examples of the societal change model in the work of Ronald Inglehart 1997 and Christine Wolbrecht 2000. The origins of the elite model lie in the work of Anthony Downs 1957 and William Riker 1965. Ellen Lust-Okar’s 2003 book entitled “Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions” applies an elite interest-based framework to the problem of political inclusion in the Middle East.


\(^6\) Most commonly this is in reference to the famous hadith recorded by Sahih al-Bukhari (5:59:709) where the prophet Mohammed stated, “Such people as ruled by a lady will never be successful.”
opposition can represent sufficient incentive to consider allying with controversial partners such as women. The Moroccan case is particularly insightful here considering King Mohammed IV openly courted women’s networks in the wake of 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks in a bid to ally against a perceived Islamist political threat with what was popularly interpreted as a secularizing feminist movement (Sadiqi 2010). In a similar vein, Ellen Lust-Okar (2005) aptly demonstrated how states shape and control incentives and relationships among the political opposition in the Middle East by pragmatically allying with divergent political interests and groups within Arab societies. There is evidence that women are increasingly representing such a veto-player in the Arab states’ bid to retain secular control over their countries, thus a consideration of women’s changing political influence in the region is in order.

Changes in structural factors can also render out-groups such as women attractive to the in-group by creating new political opportunities for the former. Most notably, the influx of foreign capital specifically targeting women, whether through conditional aid or foreign direct investment geared at employing women as cheap labor, changes the calculus of women’s economic and even political importance. Moghadam (2000) argues that women may become the sign or marker of political goals and of cultural identity not only during processes of revolution and state building, but also when power is being “contested or reproduced.” In the past, Laurie Brand (1998) described how the Tunisian state explicitly promoted women to high profile positions to sideline the Islamist al-Nahdah faction and rewarded women for supporting government crackdowns on Islamists. Recent Islamist political overtures to women in Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait—all countries with movements ideologically tied

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7 Consider the initial strategic alliance of Egypt’s Nasserist politicians with socialists and the subsequent alliance with Islamists to serve as a bulwark against rising socialist discontent.
to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, imply religious groups increasingly view women as politically important as well. Interestingly, many Islamist groups embraced female constituencies in looking to expand their followers despite significant opposition to any form of women’s political participation (Blaydes 2007; Dris-Aït-Hamadouche 2007). Islamic parties in the recent Kuwaiti and Yemeni parliamentary elections encouraged women to vote for their candidates, if not to actually run for elected office (Fattah 2006; McElhinny 2005), while some of the most successful Islamist politicians in Jordan and Morocco have been women.⁸ Such a move demonstrates the increasing salience of female constituencies politically and economically across interest groups. Furthermore, today all states in the Middle East and North Africa, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, allow female electoral participation and have appointed at least one woman to a cabinet post—some within the past five years.

Importantly, recent surveys indicate Arab populations are in fact getting more conservative on women’s issues (Telhami 2006; Zogby 2002). Thus, a puzzle emerges since political elites seem to be reaching out to female constituencies in societies that are still highly opposed to the idea of women’s political participation and at a time when the threat of Islamic radicalism is very real. Cultural and institutional explanations can only go so far in elucidating increasing women’s political opportunities vis-à-vis reigning elites. Assuming political incorporation is an elite-driven process, cultural factors may be important in the aggregate, but are very much manipulated or even ignored to serve leader’s interests. “Secular” North African leaderships in countries with devoutly Islamic populations highlight this phenomenon. Potential institutional effects are similarly constrained by the will of authoritarian leaders. Structural

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⁸ See Hayat Massimi of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front or Bassima Hakkaoui of the Justice and Development Party in Morocco.
factors, however, are not as easily manipulated nor as easily ignored.

The growing impact of increased capital flows on gender-related policy change remains under-explored (see Bush 2011; Nanes 2010; Welborne 2011). The mechanism this dissertation elaborates on represents a departure from the standard line of thought on modernization theory as well as the Gender in Development (GAD) and Women in Development (WID) paradigms by recognizing the diversity of foreign financial instruments and their divergent effects on incentives to incorporate women. Importantly, the nature of these flows changes the strategic calculus of elites in terms of possible alliance partners. These new investment dynamics potentially create novel political opportunities for women by directly empowering them through funding for women’s organizations and by providing employment opportunities allowing local women with a measure of financial autonomy.

Globalizing Women’s Issues and the Impact of Foreign Capital

A rich literature explores the effects of foreign capital or “economic globalization” on human rights and related humanitarian issues, but scholarship specifically investigating its impact on women’s political status as a subset of these agendas is scarce (Burkhart 1998; Hafner-Burton 2005; Henderson 1996; Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; McLaren 1998; Meyer, 1996, 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). Two schools of thought discuss foreign capital’s possible effects on the status of women: the Gender and Development (GAD) paradigm and the Women in Development (WID) approach (see Hafner-Burton and Pollak 2002; Rathgeber 1990; Razavi and Miller 1995). The Gender and Development’s (GAD) neo-Marxist paradigm focuses on the unequal gender relations fostered by economic development and globalization, while the Women in Development (WID) paradigm views women as an
independent interest group whose status can be improved through economic development and trade. The two approaches are a product of the shift from the gender-blind development strategies of the 1950s and 1960s (Hafner-Burton and Pollak 2002) to the adoption of “gender mainstreaming” as the cause célèbre of international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) today. Both perspectives envision foreign capital as a monolithic concept—a belief this dissertation aims to challenge in the ensuing empirical chapters.

The 1995 United Nations Fourth World Women’s Conference in Beijing was a landmark event for endorsing the notion that economic development was contingent on women’s empowerment. This idea was further entrenched through the United Nations Millennium Goals (2000), which included women’s empowerment as one of eight priorities for state development. As one of the largest sources of development project funding, the World Bank played a central role in popularizing the norms and agendas informing “appropriate” strategies for economic development and, increasingly, those strategies included gender empowerment (Finnemore 1996; Myers 1996). In fact, close to $3.1 billion dollars in aid has been earmarked for gender-sensitive programming. The Arab world has certainly responded to these international incentives with its leaders newly “re-enfranchising” their women and existing Arab women’s networks quick to respond by organizing gender-related conferences and awareness campaigns funded by willing foreign donors. My interview subjects across Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco universally agreed “gender empowerment” was an idea only recently imported from the West and had mixed feeling

---

9 Williams, M. 2007. *Gender and Trade: Impacts and Implications for Financial Resources for Gender Equality*, (Commonwealth Secretariat, Background Paper WAMM (07)).
10 The U.N.’s Arab Development Reports (2002, 2005) connected Arab countries’ flailing economic growth to the low social status of women and recommended measures to enhance women’s societal roles, which also highlighted the broader importance of women’s incorporation to Arab leaders.
as to its underlying motivation. Certainly, the legacy of September 11th is prominent in the rising popularity of the women’s agenda and its promotion by international organizations and the U.S., in particular. As Western scholarship grapples with how to heal the rift between Islam and West, a significant amount of research has focused on the gender component of their differences. Many scholars believe that resolving the “gender gap” in Arab society is integral to the international community’s efforts to democratize and moderate the region with these selfsame efforts often promoted through official development assistance and conditional aid (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003a, 2003b; Landes and Landes 2001; Lewis 2002).

Conditional aid and development assistance have an intuitive and very deliberate relationship with changes in gender-related policy, but what of the other types of foreign capital flowing into the region and their impact? Foreign Direct Investment can enhance Arab women’s status by offering women employment opportunities otherwise unavailable to them as it did in Tunisia and Morocco through the textile industry (Moghadam 1999; White 2001). Furthermore, it can directly offer them an independent source of income to fund political campaigns in countries where political parties are largely obsolete as in Jordan. However, the nature of the foreign investment and the sectors it targets are of primary importance in determining whether women can leverage their newfound economic status toward political influence (Burns, and Verba 1999; Moghadam 1999; Ross 2008; Schlozman, Sapiro 1983). Ross (2008) and Moghadam’s (2005) research demonstrates how these progressive effects exist only when foreign direct investment is geared toward low-wage export-oriented industries, which tend to hire cheap, docile labor—women. If the focus of foreign investment is the petroleum industry, as in the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), patriarchic relations tend to be reinforced.
This is partially due to the somewhat “macho” nature of the industry, but also because the source of foreign exchange bolsters household incomes sufficiently to render women working unnecessary in the eyes of their families. Ross (2008) claims remittances flowing into the region have the same effect as oil-oriented investment and effectively nullify the need for women to pursue employment and consequently gain financial independence. Overall, a deeper exploration of the effects of foreign capital on women’s political inclusion is necessary as globalization has increased the amounts and types of monies flowing into the Arab world and these may be partially, if indirectly, responsible for the changes observed in women’s political status.

**Research Design**

In this study I use both large-N quantitative methods to test my primary hypotheses and case studies to unpack and reinforce the mechanisms underlying my findings. For the statistical portion of this analysis I use data covering 22 Arab League member countries from the period of 1990 until 2009. The first stage of the analysis required reliable measures of the core concept under investigation—women’s political inclusion. Starting with Maurice Duverger’s “The Political Role of Women” in 1955, scholarship has focused on women’s political participation as measured by their presence in legislatures and the executive (also see Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lakeman 1976; Norris 1985; Paxton 1997; Rule 1981, 1987, 1994; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997). Alongside legislative and executive representation, another common measure for women’s political incorporation is their presence in political parties as well as how representative party platforms are of women’s interests (Caul 1999; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Paxton and Kunovich 2005; Wolbrecht 2000). A more nuanced approach to measuring women’s political influence may be through their aggregate
levels of government employment (see McClain and Karnig 1990) or a consideration of substantive political outcomes (see Browning, Marshall and Tabb’s 1984). In this dissertation, women’s political incorporation is modeled across three dimensions – the legislative (descriptive representation), socio-legal (political, economic, and social rights), and policy realms (gender quota adoption) with each representing an empirical chapter in the dissertation. I operationalize these three dimensions using data on women’s legislative representation from the Inter-Parliamentary Union; on women’s political, economic, and social rights from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project; and independently coded data on the adoption of gender quotas from the University of Stockholm and the International Institute for Development and Electoral Assistance’s (IDEA) Quota Project. I rely on the aforementioned three indicators of women’s incorporation to broadly capture Schmidt et al.’s (2002) benchmarks for the democratic inclusion of out-groups: “(1) full access to participation, (2) representation in important decision-making bodies, (3) influence in government decision, (4) adoption of policies that address group concerns, and (5) socioeconomic parity” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005, 4). As discussed earlier, suffrage (benchmark one) is no longer an issue for most of the region’s women with the exception of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the U.A.E. However, women’s access to governing institutions is still limited and their low levels of institutional representation attest to this.11 Consequently, I use the percentages of women within directly elected legislatures to capture Schmidt et al.’s second benchmark. The adoption of gender quota policies relates to the political influence of women’s networks within society and government, and insures there are representatives who share women’s concerns within government (benchmarks three and four).

11 Arab Parliaments averaged 10 percent female representation in 2010 according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, compared to the global average of 19 percent. Still, this is a large increase from the 3 percent average of 2000.
However, electing women does not always insure women-friendly policies in the Middle East, as we shall see chapter five. That is why I also use Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010) measures of women’s political, economic, and social rights which address women’s capacity to enjoy the political opportunities often constitutionally guaranteed unto them, but rarely enforced in many Arab countries. Cingranelli and Richards’ indicators partially channel the fifth benchmark referring to “socioeconomic parity” through their consideration of women’s social and economic rights vis-à-vis men. Certainly, this is one of the most difficult benchmarks to attain as socioeconomic disparities between the genders are still quite prominent in the West, as well. Analyzing all three of these indicators of women’s political incorporation across varying political arenas offers a clearer understanding of women’s inclusion as a function of Arab political systems.

While data for women’s descriptive representation are accessible for the period under inspection, statistics for the number of women in political parties, the passage of relevant legislation, and the activism of feminist networks are difficult to obtain for the Middle East over time and are best dealt with anecdotally. Consequently, the case study chapter (chapter five) aims to explore these social variables, interpreting them through the lens of theories of collective action; namely, the societal change model (women’s grassroots mobilization); the elite-led model (top-down initiatives from the monarch); and the political opportunity structures model (international economic influence). The three countries chosen for this analysis represent the

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12 While there are significant obstacles to obtaining data on informal networks without conducting fieldwork in the region, aggregate numbers of political representation are available directly from large data gathering organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-Parliamentary Union. Furthermore, the passage of relevant gender policy and information regarding the ratification of relevant treaties can be coded from anecdotal evidence documented within the literature on gender and the state in the Middle East (Brand 1998, Moghadam 2005, UNIFEM 2005).
primary regions of the Arab world: North Africa (Morocco), the Middle East (Jordan), and the Persian Gulf (Bahrain). They are also illustrate a sliding scale of progress in terms of women’s status with Morocco at the top with most progressive in terms of women’s political participation and influence, and Bahrain at the bottom (see Table 5.1 showcasing Freedom House’s ratings on women’s political, social, and economic freedoms for the three countries in chapter five).

In any analysis of majority Muslim countries, the traditional subordination of women in the Islamic faith often serves as an explanation for explicit policies limiting women’s political participation (Ahmed 1992; Donno and Russett, 2004; Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Unifem 2005). Steven Fish (2002) emphasizes that the political manifestation of Islam impedes women’s access to resources and by default economic as well as political power. Importantly, Islam is not uniformly practiced across Arab nations and is certainly not the primary factor impeding women’s participation in the aforementioned Lebanese example. If the effect of Islam were constant across the Arab world, we would not see any variation in women’s political participation, legal rights, or in patterns of their political incorporation. As stated before, the percentage of women in national legislatures irrespective of gender quotas ranges from above 20 percent in the United Arab Emirates to zero in the cases of Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia in the same sub-region of the Arab world (i.e. the Persian Gulf). This lends credence to the importance of alternative explanations. While measures of religiosity collated from the World Values Survey would be ideal; the survey only contains information on five Arab countries. A potential measure for gauging broader ideological attitudes may be the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), though the decision to ratify it may be more political than ideological, and the majority of Arab
countries have ratified it with reservations (even Saudi Arabia). Therefore, I ultimately restrict my focus to a Muslim-majority region to control for the effect of Islam. This allows for an exploration of structural factors (demographics and economic development) and institutional factors (electoral systems, regime type) beyond religion or culture that contribute to the nature of gender policy in Arab countries.

**Main Findings**

The ultimate findings of this dissertation reveal a complex picture. First, the empirical analysis presented across the next three chapters reveals the intricacy of foreign capital’s effect on incentives to incorporate women. While the WID and GAD literatures posit economic globalization’s effects would be monolithic, each chapter reveals this is not the case when considering development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances as separate phenomena. Development assistance has the most consistently positive association with women’s political incorporation and is predictive of women’s greater legislative representation and the adoption of gender quotas. While not an unexpected relationship, these results directly contradict scholarship claiming foreign aid has limited impact on policy change in developing country settings (see *opus* of William Easterly). Importantly, this is a regional study and is thus impossible to generalize to the broader world. However, the research here reveals that context may be important in gauging the effectiveness of development funding. Certainly, the strategic import of the Middle East and North Africa likely renders aid less fungible when it comes to gender empowerment and thereby easier to successfully earmark for specific projects. Perhaps this is because Arab leaders themselves are increasingly co-opting women voters and politicians as bulwarks against Islamist pressure as shall be discussed in chapter five. Thus, their interests

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13 Kenworthy and Malami (1999) find a positive effect of CEDAW on women’s legislative participation, but the results are sensitive to outliers. Paxton (1997) finds no effect.
align with those of Western donors (Brand 1998; Sadiqi 2009; Salime 2007). Finally, development assistance also exhibits a positive association with progress in terms of women’s economic and social rights, again contradicting previous research showing it had no effect on women’s rights, overall (Richards and Gelleny 2007).

Foreign Direct Investment and Remittances exhibit more complicated relationships with women’s political incorporation. Their relationship to women’s political inclusion is less transparent than aid, but still compelling. Foreign direct investment exhibited the strongest positive association with Arab women’s legislative representation—a finding partially explained by the background of many of the women who successfully ran for office. Investigating the successful candidates of legislative elections in Morocco and Jordan quickly showed their ties to the foreign business community and highlighted lucrative jobs that allowed many of these candidates to independently fund their campaigns. This is especially salient in countries like Jordan where political parties are less established and cannot be relied on to fund expensive electoral campaigns. Foreign direct investment was also positively associated with women’s economic and social rights, revealing that providing women with economic opportunity through employment may yet be the most successful method for empowering them in the Middle East and North Africa.

In the third and fourth chapter, I also included remittances into the empirical analysis—initially with the intent to use them as a control for rival sources of foreign exchange to aid and investment (i.e. that could potentially dampen the effect of each). Surprisingly, remittances had their own impact, increasing the likelihood of adopting gender quotas, while deleteriously affecting women’s social and economic rights. The latter result is in line with Michael Ross’
(2008) conjecture that by bolstering household income, remittances weaken incentives for women to work, which would in turn affect the likelihood of women lobbying for improved labor laws. Yet, remittance’s positive effect on quota adoption implies there is a more complicated story at hand, which I shall delve into more deeply in the conclusion to this dissertation.

Finally, the case analysis portion of the dissertation nuances the preliminary statistical findings by exploring variation in women’s political incorporation across the countries of Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, and through the prism of a dynamic interaction between the state, women’s grassroots mobilization, and international economic influence (Jamal 2010). The comparison of the three kingdoms reveals striking, though unsurprising, insights into how substantive political reforms are achieved by Arab women (see Table 5.2 in chapter five). In all three cases, the individual monarchs exhibited a commitment to promoting gender empowerment, but the most successful—Morocco—also hosted an explicitly feminist women’s movement independent from the monarchy, though enjoying amicable relations with it. In the Jordanian and Bahraini cases, the state set up umbrella NGOs (the Jordanian National Women’s Commission and the Bahraini Supreme Council for Women) to manage women’s participation, ultimately stifling grassroots mobilization and resulting in largely cosmetic policy change. Moroccan feminists were able to successfully frame themselves as indispensable to the regime’s attempts at moderating and secularizing the nation in the wake of the Casablanca terrorist attacks in 2003 and pragmatically used their bargaining chip to push through groundbreaking legislation in the *Moudawana* reforms of 2004.\(^\text{14}\) Importantly, the diverse NGOs and organizations

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\(^{14}\) The *Moudawana* laws or Moroccan personal status code was adopted in 1957 and regulated all aspects of familial life; marriage, polygamy, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.
comprising the Moroccan women’s movement were sustained by external funding and development assistance for the past two decades, and it is not clear they would have been as successful without this foreign support (Brand 1998).

Implications
The issue of gender in the Arab world is one of paramount political and economic importance as recent rumblings in the region attest to. Exploring the roots of gender inequality is not only important in and of itself, but has implications for a variety of pressing global issues. For example, Inglehart and Norris (2003a, 2003b), as other scholars (Landes and Landes 2001, Lewis 2002, Fish 2002), claim the big divide between Islam and the West is gender, not democracy. Their research finds Muslim populations are just as likely to support democracy and economic liberalism as populations in Western states. Muslims and their Western counterparts want democracy, but disagree on issues such as divorce, abortion, gender equality, and gay rights. Inglehart and Norris maintain that precisely these issues, and specifically gender discrimination, determine whether substantive democratization can occur in the Middle East since attitudes toward gender and homosexuality reveal state and societal tolerance of politically “marginalized” groups. Alongside this, scholars and practitioners increasingly recognize gender’s role in development. The UNDP recently stated, “no society can achieve the desired state of well-being and human development, or compete in a globalizing world, if half its people remain marginalized and disempowered.” Consequently, tracking substantive progress in the political status of Arab women has implications for scholars and policymakers alike, exploring incentives for democratization and economic development in the developing world and in Muslim countries, specifically.

Furthermore, identifying the diverse impact of foreign capital on gender-related
indicators illustrates the complexity of economic globalization and highlights the necessity to disaggregate such broad concepts to their component parts. In focusing on the fiscal and monetary effects of foreign capital flows, researchers are neglecting to see how various financial instruments are changing social values and social policy in developing countries through conditional incentives and perceived reputational benefits. The WID and GAD paradigms are only capturing one side of the argument in focusing on foreign capital as a monolithic concept. Thus, my research should also inform the literature on capital controls and re-energize inquiry into the larger societal pros and cons of adopting such policies if specific types of financial capital actually have positive social effects.

Finally, the most basic contribution of this dissertation lies in its identification of significant variation in women’s political incorporation across the Middle East and North Africa, as well as introducing a plausible mechanisms explaining whether and why Arab states empower their women politically. Such knowledge allows us craft more appropriate policy across a wide range of issues.

**Overview of Chapters**

The proceeding chapters explore the different dimensions of women’s political incorporation across the Middle East in more depth. Chapter two focuses on Arab women’s legislative representation and the factors that contribute to its variation. It represents the first statistical evaluation of regional patterns in descriptive representation for the Middle East and a starting point for quantitative analyses of the region. Chapter three considers the policy arena through an examination of factors contributing to the likelihood of adopting three types of gender quotas: political party quotas, legislated candidate quotas, and reserved seats. Half of the 22 Arab
League member states have already adopted quotas (most of them in the new millennium) and these three types are equally represented across the region. Taking into account that gender quotas are the most globally widespread electoral reform in the new millennium, it is particularly instructive to disclose why they are popular in such a conservative and predominantly Muslim area. Chapter four introduces the notion of women’s political capacity examining it through Arab women’s political, economic, and social rights, and focusing on personal status laws. Chapter five considers two other factors conditioning the variation in women’s political incorporation that are not as readily quantified—state commitment to gender reform and the nature of women’s grassroots mobilization. This chapter effectively compares the interaction of top-down vs. bottom-up strategies for women’s political inclusion, while framing external finance as a political opportunity structure motivating the success of gender empowerment. The conclusion summarizes the primary findings of this research and introduces avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 2: A NEW BEGINNING. EXPLORING WOMEN’S DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

“This [women’s empowerment] is all showmanship for the international community.”
Interview with employee of Subul Assalam Center
Fes, Morocco, June 2008.

In the last 20 years scholarship exploring women’s participation in politics experienced a renaissance, partially inspired by their increasing presence in legislative and executive bodies. The Inter-Parliamentary Union reported women’s worldwide legislative representation rose from an average of 11 percent to 19 percent over the last decade. Many of these female representatives are now in positions of power due to gender quotas explicitly allowing them entry into the political sphere, as well as other less institutionalized pressures stemming from the international arena. This new legislative “presence” may also be due to the global diffusion of “neo-liberal” sentiment valorizing the rewards of gender equality across both the political and newly the economic spectrum (Bakker 2007; Braunstein 2002; Hafner-Burton and Pollock 2002). Furthermore, the widespread initiatives of the international women’s movement (Berkovitch 1999; D’Itti 1999; Rupp & Taylor 1999) contributed to publicizing women’s political under-representation and its associated vulnerabilities.

Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s Bretton Woods institutions touted the potential multiplier effect of gender equality as key for realizing the Millennium Development Goal targets in 2015. Gender-related research has rushed to capitalize on this lucrative trend generating a cottage industry centered on the relationship of women and globalization, women and development, women and democracy, culminating in women holding up “Half the Sky” according to the bestseller by Nicholas D. Kristof and Wendy WuDunn (2009). Effectively,

15 Get stats from IDEA/Gender Reader
16 Topics of interests have ranged from addressing gender parity through assessments of voting, campaigning, and execution of office to knowledge, attitudes, activism, and the substance of political influence.
women’s empowerment has become the latest *cause célèbre* of the international community, attracting global attention and now a significant amount of both private and public investment. Per a statement made by United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, on March 8th, 2009: “Supporting women is a high-yield investment, resulting in stronger economies, more vibrant civil societies, healthier communities, and greater peace and stability.” The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reflects this gender bias, openly stating on its website that 67 percent of its basic education programs focus on girl’s education, 60 percent of clients receiving loans from USAID-supported microfinance institutions are women, and a third of all clients receiving USAID-supported enterprise development services are women.

As the introductory quote from the World Bank illustrates from the 1990s onward gender empowerment started making “business sense” and attracted concomitant financing from the international community. No part of the globe is more cognizant of these changing incentives to politically and economically incorporate women than the Middle East and North Africa—a region keenly aware that much of the world primarily identifies it with the repression of women and eager to disabuse foreign investors of this “distasteful” notion. Nary a day goes by without an Arab newspaper announcing a conference on women’s empowerment sponsored by the United Nations Development Program or a new women-oriented project promoted by one of USAID’s contractor agencies (International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, International Foundation for Electoral Systems) and their European counterparts (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit*, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, French Development Agency, etc.). The focus on Arab women has extended to the global press

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17 Available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/
18 Ibid.
with pundits across the media touting a “feminist revolution” based on the role of women in 2011’s revolutionary protests (Power 2011; Varner 2011; Wolf 2011). Heady projections on the future of Arab women abound:

“…Since feminism is simply a logical extension of democracy, the Middle East’s despots are facing a situation in which it will be almost impossible to force these awakened women to stop their fight for freedom – their own and that of their communities.”

“The uprisings sweeping the Arab world have toppled not only dictatorships. Gone too are the old stereotypes of Arab women as passive, voiceless victims. Over the past few months, the world has seen them marching in Tunisia, shouting slogans in Bahrain and Yemen, braving tear gas in Egypt and blogging and strategizing in cyberspace. Egyptian activist Asmaa Mahfouz, 26, became known as the Leader of the Revolution after she posted an online video call to arms, telling young people to get out onto the streets and demand justice. In Libya, female lawyers were among the earliest anti-Gaddafi organizers in the revolutionary stronghold of Benghazi.”

“Arabs were bemused that the Western media was shocked — shocked! — to find women protesting alongside men. ‘There was this sense of surprise, that ‘Oh, my god, women are actually participating!’ says Egyptian activist Hadil El-Khouly.”

But have Arab women really been as absent from the political sphere as the Western press hints at and what role has the international promotion of women’s equality had in encouraging their formal and informal political participation and inclusion? Women’s informal participation is difficult to measure short of tracking anecdotal evidence (see Brand 1998), however data on their formal political participation and inclusion is more readily available. Taking advantage of the availability of this new data, the following chapter demonstrates that Arab women have, in fact, had formal political roles in Arab Parliaments for a substantial portion of the 20th and 21st century (see Figure 2.1 below).

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21 Ibid.
While there has been significant grass-roots lobbying from local feminists encouraging the opening of the public sphere to women and urging women to formally participate in politics (see Carapico 2003; Moghadam 2004; Moha and Sadiqi 2010; Schwedler 2002), we can safely assert that the majority of initiatives to integrate women have been top-down endeavors (Brand 1998). They are often the byproduct of strategies that political leaders use to co-opt or enfranchise segments of the population in hopes of retaining power whether by pleasing a new constituency or, as I will argue, pleasing a donor or investor, which in the long run may be one and the same since the latter can be beneficial for all. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the international economic factors that would impact political elite’s decisions to incorporate women.

* The regional typologies can be broken down into the following countries: Maghreb=Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Morocco, Egypt; Gulf=Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman; Levant=Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Iraq; Africa=Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Comoros
and galvanize the top-down strategy of gender empowerment. I statistically evaluate the effect of international economic influence on the increasing trend in Arab women’s legislative representation by operationalizing it through two iterations of global finance: foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA).

For this analysis, I use data on women’s legislative representation from the World Bank and the Inter-Parliamentary Union and explore the following questions: 1) Does the presence and growth in official development assistance and foreign direct investment have an effect on levels of women’s legislative representation across 22 Arab League member states? 2) Does the influence of one type of capital vs. another type impact the representational outcomes seen in the Persian Gulf countries vs. the rest of the Arab world? I disaggregate the countries of the Gulf due to several characteristics that render the experience of Arab women from the Arabian Peninsula unique. One is their oil-wealth, which biases capital flows towards foreign direct investment, as many of these economies hardly need development assistance. In fact, they largely serve as a source of remittances for North Africa and the Levant. Furthermore, Ross (2008) and Moghadam (2000) make the argument that oil-based economies reduce the number of economically active women by decreasing the need for them in the labor force, which in turn reduces women’s political influence. Oil wealth also renders Gulf economies unaccountable to their constituencies, further neutralizing the need for these monarchies to be sensitive to demands for equal representation (Friedman 2006). Finally, the proximity to Mecca and the susceptibility of Gulf Cooperation Council countries to Saudi influence is conducive to a more “conservative”

22 Oil and gas industries crowd out export-oriented manufacturing industries that usually hire women or result in significant financial disbursements from the state, which mitigate the need for a two-wage household. Thus, the nature of resource endowment has a tremendous effect on women’s political opportunities and status. I control for this by incorporating a Gulf dummy variable. Admittedly, this is an imperfect measure since Algeria has significant oil wealth, though most of the “resource curse” arguments in the gender context strictly apply to the Gulf.
interpretation of gender relations and women’s roles in society.

The ultimate findings reveal that foreign direct investment is positively correlated with increases in women’s legislative representation. Yet, as we shall see through the ensuing chapters, FDI does not have a similarly resonant effect on other indicators of women’s incorporation, hinting that the role of FDI in promoting gender empowerment is very much contingent on the context and institutionalized change in question.

**Arab Women’s Changing Political Roles**

Starting with Maurice Duverger’s “The Political Role of Women”, scholarship has focused on women’s political participation as measured by their presence in legislatures and the executive (also see Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lakeman 1976; Norris 1985; Paxton, 1997; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997; Rule 1981, 1987, 1994).23 Yet, why would levels of legislative representation be important in gauging women’s political incorporation in the Middle East and North Africa, specifically? Many argue this is solely a cosmetic indicator and plays into the interests of Arab leaders unwilling to substantively change the status quo for women, but needing to concede some institutions in the interest of looking progressive to the Western world. Ideally, measures of formal participation should include more sensitive indicators reflecting not only women’s formal representation, but also degrees of women’s political influence, and so capture the substance of their political integration. Yet, research has shown that seeing women in

23 Alongside legislative and executive representation, another common measure for women’s political participation is women’s presence in political parties, as well as how representative generic party platforms are of women’s interests (Lovenduski and Norris 1993, Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994, Caul 1999, Wolbrecht 2000, Paxton and Kunovich 2005). A more nuanced approach to measuring women’s political influence may be through their aggregate levels of government employment (see McClain and Karnig 1990) or a consideration of substantive political outcomes (see Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984). Finally, scholars have taken to using the United Nation’s recently developed Gender Empowerment Measures (Slusser 2009) as well as the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset’s measures for women’s political status to capture the sum of women’s experience in the political arena.
political offices increases the interest and participation of other women (Burns, Scholzman, and Verba 2001; Hansen 1997). Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007) reveal in their global cross-national analysis that female MPs serve as role models for the next generation of women—a finding that has some resonance in the Arab world. In their descriptive role female representatives bring the discussion of women into politics and the broader public realm even though the policies they promote often do not explicitly address women’s issues. Hence, the number of women serving in Arab parliaments and other political institutions is not a negligible factor. Stephanie Nanes’ (2010) research on municipal councilors in Jordan reveals the symbolic import of female representatives: “This is the big question about “impact on society” and the transformation of women’s political status. Several [Jordanian] women mentioned that a key change that had taken place was that it was no longer 3ayb, “shameful,” for an unrelated man and woman to speak to each other in public. Prior to her service on the council, one female councilor reported, such an exchange would have been extremely problematic in her small village. Now it is normal. “If they want something from the council, they have to come talk to me,” she noted. Creating cracks in invisible but powerful gender barriers is no small accomplishment in some of the more rural parts of Jordan. Another important benefit of the women’s quota on the municipal level in Jordan appears to be simply putting women in the public sphere and making her part of the give and take of politics. One council member aptly described this as women being part of qarda wa-dayn, which literally translates as “loan and debt.” This is the set of exchange relations that define local politics in Jordan. Women are increasingly seen as capable political agents, since male and female constituents come to female councilors to get help with municipal business” (Nanes 2010, 12).
Still, the Arab world trails the rest of the globe in gender parity with the average percentage of women in Arab legislative assemblies at a low 9.2 percent compared to the global average of 19 percent (see Table 2.1 below). This number has increased substantially in less than a decade rising from an average of 4 percent in 2000 to the 10 percent it is today (see Table 2.2 below). Over the last ten years data collection improved spurred by the myriad development projects cropping up in the region and the information now available finally allows for more systematic comparison and exploration of the dramatic changes transpiring in the last twenty years.

Table 2.1 Average Percentages of Women in Parliaments Worldwide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Single House/Lower House</th>
<th>Upper House/Senate</th>
<th>Both Houses Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordic countries</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe - OSCE member countries including Nordic countries</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe - OSCE member countries excluding Nordic countries</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union 2010.
Women’s Legislative Representation

Arab women’s political participation and representation has a longstanding pedigree with considerable variation across the individual Arab countries. This phenomenon is further exemplified by the disparate chronologies of each country when granting universal suffrage. Women attained the right to vote as early as 1946 in Djibouti, yet as late as 2005 in Kuwait. While women still lack the right to suffrage in Saudi Arabia, Iraq recently claimed the title to most female parliamentarians in the region through their 2010 parliamentary elections via the 25 percent quota. A few governorates (or provinces) exceeded the requirement and documented up to 32.1 percent female candidates elected (IFES 2010). In fact, 8 out of 14 governorates elected women beyond the expected quota numbers, including Kerbala, Salah Al-Din, Ninewa, and Baghdad. Tunisia has long occupied the post of the Arab country with the most female legislative representatives coming in at 28 percent—a full six percent directly elected above the national quota of 22 percent. From 2002 onward most of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries extended some form of suffrage to women: Bahrain again in 2002 after a multi-year suspension, Oman in 2003, Kuwait and Qatar in 2005, and the United Arab Emirates extended

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Table 2.2 Regional Percentages of Women in Parliaments 1955-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Countries</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Democratic</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes (2007, 266)

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24 The governorate of Wassit.
limited suffrage in 2006.\textsuperscript{25} Extending the franchise to women, as has been the case recently in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain, is also potentially telling of a sea change in state-opposition relations, alliance strategies and changing elite interest group composition, whether it is a response to internal dynamics or fueled by external pressure (or perception thereof). Adding yet another actor or interest group such as women to a system that is already in a precarious equilibrium is never a trivial decision (Lust-Okar 2006), and the choice of instituting universal suffrage or gender quotas may alter political balances in unforeseen ways (Krook and O’Brien 2010). Any change in electoral policy will impact how potential rents are disbursed and can re-combine old actors disrupting status-quo politics (Blaydes 2008; Lust-Okar 2006).

In the last decade, shades of women’s interests crept into politics at the highest level. In Morocco a revision of inheritance laws was recently pushed into the spotlight by a group of illiterate women dubbed the “Soulaliyate”, potentially representing a seminal achievement in terms of women’s lobbying for policy change at the national level (La Marocaine 2010). Bahrain’s family law debate is used as an arena for Sunnis and Shiites to address differences through the prism of women’s issues.\textsuperscript{26} Women’s quotas are being hijacked by smaller conservative tribes displaced by the current electoral system in Jordan to finally get a seat and access to rents in Parliament (Masri 2008). Finally, the Kuwaitis directly elected four female legislators in 2009, two of which successfully pushed the Constitutional Court to rule wearing

\textsuperscript{25} The U.A.E. does not have universal suffrage. Rather a group of 4000 electors, a third of whom are women elect representatives to the Parliament.

\textsuperscript{26} It is important to note that what many dismiss as a “trifling” issue in the West—i.e. gender empowerment, has crosscutting implications in the Arab world for religion, class, and sex. Gender equality in many respects cuts at the heart of the differences between Islamic culture and neo-liberal Western ideals as the article “The Real Clash of Civilizations” by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris deftly illustrate, as does Steve Fish in his own work (2003).
the *hijab* was optional for female parliamentarians, in direct defiance to Islamist opposition in Parliament.\textsuperscript{27} In light of the aforementioned changes and the potential risks they entail to *status quo* politics, it is worth asking what has happened over the last twenty years to promote such a shift in parliamentary demographics and why so many Arab governments are openly encouraging it through granting women suffrage, adopting legislative gender quotas, and even generously subsidizing political parties’ fielding female political candidates (Bahrain and Morocco for example).

Public sentiment, however, is certainly not responsible for galvanizing Arab government’s changing attitudes toward women. Survey data hints that most Arab public opinion sees women and women’s issues as secondary to the political process (Masri 2008, Shteiwi 2008, IFES 2010). Arab citizens of both genders see economic issues as more pressing to their day-to-day livelihood. Unsurprisingly, women also tend to vote for men rather than representatives of their own gender. An anecdote presented in a *New York Times*\textsuperscript{28} profile of the Jordanian politician, *Hayat Massimi*, a female stalwart of the Islamic Action Front and a candidate during the 2007 parliamentary elections\textsuperscript{29}, illustrates the concerns of many Arabs, in particular women, while showcasing the challenges female candidates face: “She [Hayat Massimi] faced a tough crowd. The veiled women sipped Pepsis and a syrupy sweet desert made of shredded wheat and cheese (kanafa), but they were anything but demure. What, they wanted to know, could the Islamic Action Front do in Parliament to affect the issues affecting them—rising prices for flour

\textsuperscript{27} The two Parliamentarians are *Aseel al Awadhi* and *Rola Dashti*.
\textsuperscript{28} Cambanis 2007
\textsuperscript{29} Mrs. Massimi is a mother of five and the typical Islamic Action Front politician: professional, bilingual, a Palestinian refugee who came to Jordan from Nablus in 1967, with a doctorate in chemistry—she one a seat representing the Zarqa district in the 2003 elections through the quota, though many argued she had received sufficient votes to win without it.
and diesel fuel, stagnant salaries, spiking inflation and rampant unemployment? ‘You can’t provide us any services,’ said Asmaa Said al-Assi, 38, ‘Why should I vote for you?’”

As showcased by Stephanie Nanes’ invocation of qarda wa-dayn, the ability to engage in “public service provision” is the gold standard of politics and political influence in many Arab countries. In my experience in Jordan, this talent was duly rewarded in women as well as men. Falaak Jamani, the first Jordanian woman directly elected to the Jordanian Lower House was particularly adept at taking care of her constituents, helping build a new school here, a hospital there, insuring someone’s education was paid for or unemployed status readily resolved. She won her first mandate for the district of Kerak in 2003 and was later re-elected in a landslide victory in 2007. Integral to her skill was her status as a General in the military’s health division and an ability to place people in jobs across both the military and health sector. She had the support of her tribe and was even invited to a sitting of the all-male tribal diwan as a full-fledged member and contributor. Yet, it is questionable whether Falaak would have gotten her foot in the door without King Abdullah of Jordan pushing for the adoption of a legislative quota for women in 2003. This measure was extremely unpopular at the time and was commonly seen as being foisted on the king from abroad. With this in mind, it becomes even more curious from where the incentives to politically integrate women arise since they represent a controversial issue for the restive Arab public. In an interview a female Islamist politician from Bahrain ventured, “The West is pushing this agenda [women’s empowerment], not the Arabs.”

The mechanisms through which women are integrated into political life in the Middle East are often distinct from those in much of West and hint at which factors could be important in explaining the rise in women’s legislative representation over the past two decades. As

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30 Interview with political from Al- Menbar Society, Manama, Bahrain, July 2008.
introduced in the first chapter, political incorporation can represent the result of successful grass-roots political mobilization or a strategy for co-optation by political elites. Political opposition has been weak in most Arab countries, though growing with the increasing popularity of informal Islamic networks, but also with the ubiquity of women’s organizations and non-profits operating in the region often challenging local regimes’ notoriously fickle policies vis-à-vis their female population (Moha and Sadiqi 2010).\(^{31}\) Certainly, the toppling of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes showcase the newfound power of some secular movements in posing a credible opposition, as well (Koplow 2011). Still, institutional change is largely mandated from the top down in most Arab countries. Consequently, exploring factors that influence the mindsets of Arab political leaders will likely reveal why encouraging women’s political participation has become a hallmark of Arab governments’ national strategies. One of the most important considerations and the least explored is the role of external finance in promoting change and creating credible incentives for Arab leaders.

**Foreign Capital Flows and their Impact on the Gendering of Arab Parliaments**

There has been a surprising lack of research linking foreign capital as an instrument of international pressure for conditioning gender-related outcomes (see Bush 2011; Nanes 2010 for recent work). Foreign direct investment and aid are often operationalized as indicators of interdependence and globalization, but not often conceptualized as coercive mechanisms for procuring domestic policy outcomes outside of the fiscal and monetary realms. Conditional aid has been known to have some effect on policy outcomes, specifically the amount of social expenditure in recipient countries across contexts such as security spending (Bienen and

Gersowitz 1985; Collier, Guillamont P., Guillamont S., and Gunning 1997; Marchesi and Thomas, 1999; Przeworski and Vreland, 2000; Williamson, 1983). This extensive literature chronicles the effect of external finance on promoting reforms in public expenditure and even legal code, and hints that the effectiveness of conditionality may extend to gender-related policy. 

*Development Assistance*

In more recent years, there has been a shift beyond the safeguarding of women’s rights within legal frameworks such as the Convention Against the Discrimination of Women to encouraging developing countries to factor for endemic gender discrimination within their national budgets and political institutions. The Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) which introduced the Beijing Platform for Action, the 23rd special of the General Assembly (2000), the Millennium Summit (2000) and the 2005 World Summit, highlighted government and international organization’s commitments to the financing of gender equality and empowerment to promote economic as well as political interests. From 1999 until 2003 an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) study revealed that almost $3.1 billion dollars in aid targeted gender-sensitive programming. In particular, the World Bank openly touted the importance of women’s empowerment for economic development and thus popularized gender mainstreaming as a viable national strategy. As one of the largest sources of external finance for development, the World Bank plays a central role in promoting the norms and imagery associated with progressive economic and political outcomes to the developing world (Finnemore 1996; Myers

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32 The Beijing Platform called for direct government participation in diverting resources to and creating a supportive environment for the complete inclusion of women into public society with the aid of women’s NGOs, feminist groups, and the private sector—the first clear international promotion of gender mainstreaming. *Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13), chap. 1, resolution 1, annex II.

More importantly, the World Bank’s increasing focus on building human capital benefits the promotion of women via the financial resources and professional training dedicated to this agenda (Finnemore 1996). A quick look at gender-specific projects coordinated by the World Bank shows a large majority implemented in Muslim countries—many of them in the Arab world. Even the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals explicitly highlight two gender-related issues: gender equality and maternal health; further bolstering the profile of gender initiatives worldwide. Finally, the United Nations Development Program recently stated “no society can achieve the desired state of well-being and human development, or compete in a globalizing world, if half its people remain marginalized and disempowered” (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 65).

There has been a veritable wave of development programs focused on women’s political inclusion flooding the Arab world since the 1990s. These initiatives at least partially contribute to increasing the regional average for female legislative representation through their explicit promotion of women-friendly institutional change (such as encouraging gender quotas within political parties and legislatures) and their free training of female political candidates and social organizers, thereby building a substantial technocratic elite with a vested interested in women’s issues. In fact, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) have been openly responsible for professionalizing elected female parliamentarians in both Jordan and Morocco, as well as consulting on the electoral campaigns of female candidates across the region. The United Nations Development Program purportedly dedicated 600,000 Bahraini Dinar ($1.6 million) to sponsoring women’s political campaigns in the 2003 elections.

Why is there such a push by international organizations for women’s empowerment in
majority-Muslim Arab countries specifically? The slew of recent scholarship identifying gender as the primary difference and potential point of contention between Muslim and Western societies has partially motivated this shift in policy (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003a, 2003b; Landes and Landes 2001; Lewis 2002). Preserving stability in the strategically important Middle East is increasingly framed in terms of democracy promotion in the region. Consequently, resolving the “gender gap” through women’s political inclusion has become more integral to the international community’s efforts to democratize the Arab world. Furthermore, Western donors are gambling that the political advent of women will have a “moderating” and “secularizing” influence on local politics. Therefore my first hypothesis is as follows:

H1: A rise in the amount of development assistance received by a given Arab country will increase the number of women in its legislature over time.

Foreign Direct Investment

My interviews with government officials in Jordan, Bahrain, and Morocco revealed that many Arab leaders viewed gender empowerment as a way to improve their “image” abroad and thus attract more financial investment. They also believed resolving the “cosmetic” issues of women’s legislative representation was a quick way to conciliate donors requesting concrete signs of progress in democracy and development. Importantly, the incentive structure is different in Gulf countries such as Bahrain since they receive low levels of development assistance, but attract substantial foreign investment in comparison to other Arab countries so debt conditionality will not have as pronounced of an impact in this part of the Arab world. Yet, many Gulf countries still wish to portray themselves as investment-friendly and non-threatening nations and see women’s political inclusion as a ready message to the outside world of their “progressive” environment. Consequently, there is reason to believe FDI may exert un-
intentional pressures to politically incorporate women, as well. Per my interview with an academic at the University of Bahrain: “I think most of the [gender-related] changes are galvanized by national reports. They take international ratings very seriously. They [the government] use amendments to cover things; they try to make up positions for women; but many ministries that women belong to are of secondary importance. The ministry of interior, finance, etc. these will affect government decisions.”

Photos of women cloaked in black abayas are easily the first visual most people associate with the Gulf outside of looming oil rigs nestled in a sea of sand. Certainly, movies such as Sex and the City 2 have furthered this image. The latter is an unsettling visual and one, for all attempts to romanticize it, that the Gulf actively attempts to dispel for fear of alienating investors, tourists, and white-collar foreign labor. Today that image can be supplemented with images of women within almost every legislative assembly of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia is the notable exception). It may not be an accident that much of this “New Arabia” came into being with suffrage hastily implemented from 2002 onward in the wake of the 9/11 bombings. In this respect, while conditional aid may directly mandate that Arab leaders show evidence of progress on gender and “democracy” indicators, foreign direct investment may possess an inadvertent power to create incentives for the political inclusion of women in countries where conditionality is moot by unofficially requiring that these states present themselves as politically stable and West-friendly investment environments. Women’s empowerment is increasingly part and parcel of that image. Thus my second hypothesis is as follows:

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34 Interview with female university professor at the University of Bahrain in Manama, June 2008.
H2: Rising levels of foreign direct investment will increase women’s legislative representation.

Foreign direct investment can be seen as supporting gender-related goals through gender-sensitive technological transfer and labor market access. Has this been the case in the past? Previous work exploring the link between foreign direct investment and gender empowerment found mixed results and mostly explored the impact of foreign direct investment on women’s labor market participation (Boserup 1990; Enloe 1989; Elson 1995; McMichael 2004; Mies 1986; Misra 2000; Ward an Pyle 1995; Ward 1993). Related work concludes the labor market access fostered through foreign investment can lead to political influence depending on the sector employing women (Moghadam 1999; Ross 2008; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999; Sapiro 1983). Moghadam (1999) tracked how women in low-wage manufacturing in countries such as Tunisia and Morocco formed organizations to protect their interests and lobby for women’s rights. Per Ross (2008), women’s labor force participation amplifies their political influence on three levels: the social level through an increase in the likelihood of women’s network formation by virtue of density of women in the labor market, the individual level through affecting their political views and identity, and ultimately on the economic level by highlighting their economic importance to the government giving them greater leverage over related policy. However, this labor momentum has to start somewhere and more often than not it is the byproduct of initially gender-blind foreign direct investment sweeping into these economies with a preference for cheaper female labor. Many multinational corporations seek the Middle East for location-specific advantages such as low-wages and a reliable workforce, which oftentimes happens to be female in the Arab world. This is especially important for export-oriented multi-national corporations where wages constitute a higher portion of production costs.
In fact, the majority of hires in low wage export-oriented industries such as textiles, garments and the processing of agricultural goods are Arab women—similar to the rest of the world where women compose fully 80 percent of this sector (World Bank 2001). Women are favored for these positions because they do not require great physical strength, the jobs require minimal training, and provide women an opportunity to intermittently leave and take care of their families. Finally, this type of employment is often perceived as traditional women’s work (Ross 2007). For women to have access to the formal labor market requires considerable political will to reverse cultural preconceptions of their role in Arab societies. However, many regimes may be willing to formally change attitudes toward women in the interest of guaranteeing investors the cheaper and more reliable female labor they desire.

Scholarship linking economic performance to political institutions also elaborates on another mechanism by which foreign direct investment could ultimately promote more opportunity for women largely through its effect on the policy environmental overall. The writings of Douglass North (1990; North and Weingast 1989) illustrate the Western conceit that democratic institutions (elections, parliaments and independent judiciaries) will constrain predatory politicians and foster conditions necessary for insuring the security of property and guarantee of contractual obligations—concepts linked to economic growth, credibility, and stability. Resolving tense gender relations within a given country through the co-optation of women into the political sphere can be seen as contributing toward the aforementioned goals by neutralizing yet another source of regime opposition and thus fostering stability. In a similar vein, Dani Rodrik’s (1996) research showed American foreign direct investment positively correlated with the Freedom House democracy index from 1982 and 1989, while Kucera (2001)
demonstrated that increases in foreign direct investment were associated with stronger civil liberties, political rights and democracy. The latter findings suggest a positive relationship between foreign direct investment and democratic institutions, potentially translating into promoting women’s political inclusion—a sign of a tolerant regime, as well. According to the Monterey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), “Good governance is essential for sustainable development. Sound economic policies, solid democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people and improved infrastructure are the basis for sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and employment creation. Freedom, peace and security, domestic stability, respect for human rights, including the right development, and the rule of law, gender equality, market-oriented policies, and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies are also essential and mutually reinforcing.”

In conclusion, while research exploring non-market factors affecting incentives for women’s political and economic incorporation is ubiquitous, the policy impact of market-related factors such as global finance does not generate as much inquiry. A recent United Nation’s white paper by Isabella Bakker (2007, 10) emphasized the importance of “an ongoing analysis of market and non-market factors and how these influence the gender division of labor and income distribution” and much the same can be said for the continued evaluation of the institutionalization of measures to include women in politics. The following section tracks the impact of just such an array of economic and institutional factors on women’s legislative representation in the Arab world.

A Quantitative Analysis of Arab Women’s Legislative Representation

The Model

35 Available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/.
To explore the two hypotheses introduced in the previous section, I analyze women’s political representation through a dependent variable encompassing percentages of women in legislative assemblies across 22 Arab League member states from 1990 until 2009. The data are collected from the Inter-parliamentary Union’s “Parline” and “Women in Parliaments” database, as well as supplemented with data from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. The statistical analysis in this chapter represents the first of three larger models testing the impact of global finance across three indicators of women’s political incorporation: legislative representation (chapter two), gender-related policy outcomes (chapter three), and women’s socio-political rights (chapter four). With this tri-partite testing, I hope to avoid the pitfalls of creating a list incorporating these three independent concepts as a monolithic measure of women’s political incorporation in the vein of the United Nation’s Gender Development Index (GMI) or Gender Empowerment Measures (GEM). Complete data across Arab countries is often missing for specific gender-related indicators, and analyzing the three measures above separately allows for a clearer understanding of the variation encountered across the region, while compensating for gaps in the data. Furthermore, these three indicators are structurally very different and combining them would mute that difference instead of explaining and interpreting it. The inability to insure content validity and the manipulation required to insure concept validity would pose significant specification issues, hence my decision to test these differing aspects of women’s political incorporation independently and thereby allow for more complete inference. Still, women’s descriptive representation and the adoption of gender quotas are both phenomena directly related to the institutional arena, yet the former represents an institutional

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36 I avoid using the GEM and GDI scores in this analysis because they have, in most cases, not been coded for the Middle East and North Africa or were not at the time of this research. Intriguingly, the disaggregated components of the GEM and GDI indices are available for the time period under investigation.
outcome, while the latter encapsulates a policy geared at increasing women’s representation. Since quite a few Arab countries hosted female parliamentarians before gender quotas became a trend in the 2000s (Krook 2006), considering descriptive representation separately from gender quotas allows me to examine whether women’s prior legislative representation increased the likelihood of quota adoption—effectively, testing whether incumbent women were instrumental in lobbying for gender-friendly policy change. In addition, the capacity of women to enjoy a host of civil rights transcends formal political institutions and so captures the socio-political environment Arab women operate in further outlining women’s access to power. Ultimately, the latter is a categorically different measure from the previous two concepts (legislative representation and quota adoption) and more directly reflect women’s capabilities to meaningfully participate in the public arena (see Amartya Sen 1999 for a discussion of the capabilities approach).

The dependent variable is not normally distributed since many of values are low and trend toward zero. This is unsurprising considering even single digit percentages for women’s representation in Arab parliaments are a relatively new phenomenon. Consequently, I use a poisson and negative binomial regression estimators for my analysis. The poisson and negative binomial models are both used to estimate count data or count-like data where the distribution is zero-inflated and in the case of negative binomial regression, when it is also extra-dispersed (Hoffman 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). In this case, the percentages of women in parliament would be considered as proportions of a fixed count. As stated before, both models

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While many would assume that female incumbents in Arab countries would jump at the chance to secure their seats through a quota system, most of the Jordanian female deputies I spoke to criticized the quota as being undemocratic and unfair, even though they had been elected to the through it and records show they did not explicitly support of lobby for the measure during sessions of Parliament. This further hints at a policy authored by the king and forced on the government.
are appropriate when estimating dependent variables trending toward zero—i.e. dependent variables measuring events that are rare and thus have a distribution with a mean closer to zero. Since the data range from 1990 until 2009, and quite a few Arab countries granted full suffrage to women only recently, many observations are coded as zero since there were no women present in the respective legislatures.

As a secondary robustness test, I fit a population-averaged generalized estimating equation model (GEE) to insure the robust estimation of the cross-sectional time series panel data used for this analysis (Whitford 2003; Zorn 2006, 2001) (see Table 2.4 in the Appendix). GEE models elaborate on standard generalized linear models by allowing analysts to compensate for serial autocorrelation by specifying a within-unit correlation matrix and adjusting errors accordingly (Duncan et al 1995; Horton and Lipsitz 1999; Liang and Zeger 1986; Zeger and Liang 1986; Zeger, Liang and Albert 1988). The results presented here specify exchangeable, independent, and auto-regressive correlation matrices as robustness tests of the data. Since the data form a time series cross-sectional (TCS) panel data set, there is a high likelihood of serial correlation over time and auto-correlation through repeated time points, which might inflate results. To control for this, I also estimate a limited model incorporating only the years during which a legislative change through election or appointment occurred (see Table 2.5 in the Appendix). As a final robustness check, I estimate the time series regression model using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to control for any bias in the standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) (see Table 2.6 in the Appendix). The following equation tests my assumptions:
Women’s legislative representation  = \alpha \text{ (constant)} + \beta_1 \text{Development Assistance (logged)} \\
+ \beta_2 \text{ Foreign Direct Investment} \\
+ \beta_3 \text{ Economic Development (logged)} \\
+ \beta_4 \text{ Electoral System} \\
+ \beta_5 \text{ Democracy} \\
+ \beta_6 \text{ Fertility Rates} \\
+ \beta_7 \text{ Gulf states (dummy)} \\
+ \beta_8 \text{ Women’s Labor Participation} \\
+ \beta_9 \text{ Women’s Economic Rights (CIRI)} \\
+ \beta_{10} \text{ Women’s Social Rights (CIRI)} \\
+ \beta_{11} \text{ Women’s Political Rights (CIRI)} + \epsilon

Factors Influencing Women’s Legislative Representation

The base model shown above incorporates multiple independent variables across both the institutional and structural spectrum that may affect the numbers of women present in Arab parliaments. The primary variables of interest are those reflecting the two types of external global finance: foreign direct investment and development assistance. Fertility rates and levels of economic development are included to control for structural factors that may influence the supply and demand for women in politics, while electoral systems represents the institutional rules that regulate their access to the political system. Finally, I also use a regional control for the states of the Persian Gulf due to their unique experiences as oil-wealthy nations in the proximity of Mecca and their conservative impact on attitudes vis-à-vis women.

The paucity of independent variables is partially in the interest of preserving degrees of freedom, but also a by-product of the limited information available for all of the time periods. The expanded models incorporate the independent variables in cursive in an attempt to control for grassroots factors affecting women’s legislative representation. Religiosity is not formally controlled for in the model since all the Arab League member states are majority Muslim countries and measures sensitive to variations in Islamic religious intensity have yet to be developed.
Variables of Interest: International Financial Incentives

Billions of dollars flow annually into the Middle East affecting both the policy and ultimately the social environment of these countries. With the end of the Cold War donors have increasingly linked funding with improvements in social conditions, particularly for women in the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 1998; Carapico 2002; Coleman 2004; Moghadam 2003). In some cases, the inadvertent pressure exerted by the international multi-national community through its demands for stable, liberal, and ultimately “familiar” environments for investment may also play an integral role in pushing women into the public sphere as norms shift (Campa 1994; Miller 1992). Consequently, there may be a direct connection between foreign interests and increases in women’s political representation by virtue of conditionality agreements and pressures to create “investment-friendly” environments. I use official development assistance and foreign direct investment as percentages of Gross Domestic Product as my measures for the effects of foreign capital. These ratios allow for an exploration of how much influence foreign direct investment or development assistance have in the overall national economy in terms of magnitude, thus giving more insight into how much is at stake if governments refuse to comply with formal and informal conditions introduced by the disbursers of the respective monies. These numbers are derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and I posit both types of external finance will positively correlate with women’s legislative representation.

Control Variables: Supply and Demand-side Factors

factors represent the pool of women available for candidacy and most closely approximate structural considerations such as women’s labor-force participation and access to income, which are conditioned by levels of economic development. The demand-side elements comprise electoral mechanisms, which control women’s access to the political arena, as well as the density of grassroots networks lobbying for and against women’s political representation.

A. Demand-side or Institutional Factors

Electoral System

Institutional explanations suggest that political rules explain systematic differences in women’s representation among relatively similar societies. Unfavorable contextual conditions can be manipulated by alternate electoral systems to change women’s political situation. Wilma Rule (1981, 1987, 1994) and Pippa Norris (1985, 1997, 2001) demonstrate electoral arrangements for choosing legislatures (proportional versus majoritarian party lists) have an impact on the gender make-up of legislatures. Reynolds (1999) seconds this analysis showing women are more likely to be elected in systems with proportional representation and closed lists. I control for electoral systems’ influence by incorporating a dummy variable capturing whether a country uses a majoritarian electoral system. The data is derived from Pippa Norris’ Democracy Dataset and I expect the presence of majoritarian electoral system to be associated with a lower number of female representatives.

Political Regime

The substance of women’s representation in non-democratic contexts is questionable at best (Goetz & Hassim 2003). Yet some researchers argue that the position of the parliamentarian is visible and carries prestige in all contexts, providing women with symbolic power in
democracies and non-democracies alike (e.g. Paxton & Kunovich 2003). Ultimately, the nature of the regime will determine whether it’s institutions will be representative of the popular will or even the population itself. Democracies have more of an imperative to be representative, hence why gender quotas and initiatives to recognize a silent female majority may be more prevalent (and usually are) in countries with democratic regimes. I control for level of democracy through Ted Gurr’s POLITY IV democracy scores. I expect the more democratic a state, the more female representation there will be in the respective Parliament.

B. Socio-economic factors

Economic Development and Fertility Rates

Economic development and the expected drop in fertility rates can be considered a proxy for the kind of ideological change that would allow the acceptance of women in politics within conservative Muslim societies. Modernization is seen as leading to a weakening of traditional values, decreasing fertility rates, and increased urbanization with greater educational and labor force participation by women, alongside attitudinal changes in perceptions of women’s roles within society (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Matland 1998). Decreasing fertility rates can also hint at women successfully wrestling control of their private and public selves by establishing control over their reproductive rights. This is yet another harbinger of more progressive and women-friendly values within a society, further allowing for the successful political advancement of women. I use standard indicators such as GDP per capita and fertility (total births per woman) from the World Bank’s Development Indicators as proxies for these concepts. I expect economic development as proxied through income to be positively associated with women’s...
legislative representation, while a rise in fertility rates should have a dampening effect.

Women’s Labor Participation

Globally, it seems there is little evidence that education or even labor participation drives female political incorporation (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2003, 2005; Paxton 1997). Yet, increased female labor force participation, especially in professional sectors, should also result in a larger pool of potential applicants for political positions since it can often be an indicator of women’s access to funds (Norris 1996a). Importantly, even where women do participate in the labor force, there is no guarantee that this gives them direct power over the money generated from their labor. I still expect this control to be positively associated with women’s legislative representation (Blumberg 1984; Chafetz 1984; Karam 1999; Staudt 1986). While the Middle East has made incredible strides in closing the gender gap across basic income and education over the last thirty years (Moghadam 1998)\(^3\), it hasn’t translated into levels of political engagement or even predicted levels of labor participation, a “development deficit” highlighted in the seminal Arab Human Development Report of 2002 (World Bank 2004b; UNDP 2002). Hence, why there is also the likelihood of non-significant findings. I include the percentage of the economically active population who are women effectively measuring the “supply” eligible for office and derive this information from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. Regrettably, there is a dearth of data over the time period under investigation for women’s education levels in the Arab world.

Women’s Social, Political, Economic Rights (Cingranelli-Richards)

Finally, in the expanded model I also incorporate Cingranelli and Richard’s (2004) or

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\(^3\) The ratio of male-to-female years of schooling fell from 2.5 in 1960 to 1.4 in 2000 (UNDP 2002). Female participation in the labor force has rise from 25 percent between 1960 and 1980, to 35 percent in the present.
CIRI measures capturing women’s social, political, and economic rights in a bid to channel the socio-political environment women face in the Arab world and the potential for grassroots mobilization. The CIRI Human Rights dataset is coded using US State Department Reports on Human Rights Practices and from Amnesty International’s Annual Reports. The three control variables are on a scale from zero to three, with zero representing minimal evidence of the rights in question, while three represents the maximum standard. The women’s political rights variable includes the right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political parties, and the right to petition government officials.\(^{40}\) The women’s economic rights also includes several rights such as equal pay for equal work, free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent, equality in hiring and promotion practices, job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs), nondiscrimination by employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, and the right to work in the military and the police force.\(^{41}\) The women’s social rights variable incorporates the right to equal inheritance, the right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men, the right to travel

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\(^{40}\) Women’s rights are coded on a scale of 0 to 3: 0 = women’s rights are not guaranteed by law or the legal system restricts women’s political participation; 1 = political participation is guaranteed by law, but women hold less than 5 percent of high ranking government positions; 2 = political participation is guaranteed by law, but women hold more than 5 percent but less than 30 percent of high ranking government positions; 3 = political participation is guaranteed by law and in practice, and women hold more than 30 percent of high ranking government positions. There is no country in the Middle East that received a “3”.

\(^{41}\) This variable is also coded from 0 to 3: 0 = economic rights are not guaranteed by law and the law reinforces sex discrimination and there is high tolerance by the government for discrimination; 1 = some economic rights for women are guaranteed by law, but the law enforcement is weak and the government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination; 2 = some economic rights for women are guaranteed by law, but the government does not enforce the laws effectively and the government tolerates a low level of discrimination and; 3 = all or almost all of women’s economic rights are guaranteed by law, and the government enforces the law and tolerates no discrimination.
abroad, the right to obtain a passport, the right to confer citizenship to children or a husband, the
right to initiate a divorce, the right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into
marriage, the right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities, the right to an
education, the freedom to choose a residence/domicile, freedom from non-consensual female
genital mutilation (FGM), and freedom from forced sterilization. I expect all of these measures to
be positively correlated with women’s legislative representation.

Findings
The three hypotheses are tested through the estimation of a base model and an expanded
model incorporating additional demand-side factors using poisson regression and negative
binomial regression over a 19 year time period and across 22 cases (see Table 2.3). As an
additional robustness check, I also run a poisson regression featuring only the years a legislative
election took place, thus reducing the likelihood of inflated results due to repeated time samples.
Finally, I use poisson regression to explore whether the results for the Gulf countries differ
substantially from the rest of the Arab world, thereby testing for sub-regional specificities. The
Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) location within Saudi Arabia’s conservative sphere of
influence, proximity to Mecca, and reliance on oil production all conspire to create an
environment less than conducive for the election of women (Gause 1994; Richards and
Waterbury 2007; Ross 2008). The Appendix contains additional robustness tests using a
generalized estimating equation (GEE) model (see Table 2.4 and 2.5) and prais-winston time-
series regression model (see Table 2.6) with panel-corrected standard errors. The latter results
are suggestive of the findings gleaned from the poisson and negative binomial regression
estimators.
Of the global finance indicators, foreign direct investment seems to be the only one with a consistent and positive impact, confirming the second hypothesis and disproving the first hypothesis (see Table 2.3 below). In both the poisson and negative binomial regressions, a standard deviation increase in foreign direct investment is associated with a one percent increase in the percentage of parliamentary seats occupied by women. This translates into a roughly five percent increase in foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP being equal to a one percent increase in the percentage of women in the legislative. In the model controlling for the election cycle a one-unit increase in foreign direct investment is associated with an eight percent increase in the percentage parliamentary seats occupied by women. Interestingly, in both the Gulf countries and the non-Gulf Arab world, foreign direct investment had a significant and positive effect on women’s legislative representation. In the Gulf, its presence increased women’s legislative representation by 15 percent, while in the rest of the Arab world it increased the expected percentage of women in Arab parliaments by five percent.

Of the control variables, only fertility rates, levels of economic development and the Gulf region (dummy) had a consistently significant and negative impact on women’s legislative representation across all of the models utilized. While the negative correlation between economic development and women’s legislative representation may be surprising, it is likely an artifact of the specific characteristics of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council technically have the highest GDP per capita in the Arab world with the kingdom of Qatar holding the title of the country with the highest per capita income in the world ($101,827 adjusting for purchasing power parity in 2011 according to the IMF). Its Gulf neighbors all rank among the world’s most economically developed countries according to
this metric, yet their performance when it comes to women’s rights is notoriously bad as exemplified by their consistently significant negative association with women’s legislative representation. The countries of the Arab League with the most substantial female presence within their Parliaments have been in North Africa—essentially states with mid to low-level annual incomes, which range from $600 in Somalia to $9,488 in Tunisia (IMF 2010 estimates). In some respects, this relationship should not be surprising considering Sub-Saharan Africa has seen the single largest jump of any world region in the average number of female parliamentarians over the last two decades, yet it is also hosts the poorest populations of the globe (see Table 2.2 in this chapter). If anything, these findings showcase that income as a measure of economic development is too crude to encompass the ideological change associated with economic progress. It also implies that policy attitudes towards women can improve without a commensurate shift in national income.

Incorporating a lagged version of the dependent variable—women’s legislative representation, does not erase the significance of the aforementioned indicators. Adding demand-side controls for women’s social, political, and economic rights to an expanded version of the model reveals a significant positive association between the presence of political and economic rights and women’s legislative representation, yet the latter has a negative association with women’s social rights. The social rights variable with its focus on the right to inheritance and freedom of movement channels the effective cultural challenges faced by Arab women, which are difficult enforce even when enacted as policy, much less quantify. Political and economic rights as coded in the Cingranelli and Richards are more readily institutionalized. Thus, the negative association between social rights and a potentially cosmetic sign of women’s political
inclusion such as legislative representation may effectively channel the gap between institutionalizing women’s progress on paper and the realities of women’s status in the social arena.

Finally, in comparing the Gulf countries to the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, we find the same patterns emerging in terms of which factors affect women’s legislative representation. However, the magnitude of the effect is more pronounced in the Gulf than in the rest of the Arab world and development assistance, when present, actually decreases the percentage of women in the respective legislatures by 66 percent. Perhaps this is a byproduct of the “aid” sent to the Gulf largely being of military nature and not as focused on fostering economic development. The enhanced magnitude likely reflects the sudden changes in the region since many Gulf countries have only recently, but very adamantly jumped on the gender empowerment bandwagon.
Table 2.3 Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Legislative Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Poisson Regression</th>
<th>Negative Binomial Regression</th>
<th>During Election Cycle (poisson)</th>
<th>Gulf Countries (poisson)</th>
<th>Non-Gulf Countries (poisson)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official Development Assistance (log)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-1.10**</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System (Majoritarian)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>3.81***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>-0.81***</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.33***</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
<td>-0.39***</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation (lagged)</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Labor Participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Economic Rights (CIRI)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Political Rights (CIRI)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.57***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Social Rights (CIRI)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudo likelihood</td>
<td>-244.63</td>
<td>-214.53</td>
<td>-245.72</td>
<td>-183.79</td>
<td>-56.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ODA and FDI are coded as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors in parentheses.

*Significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%.
Conclusion

“At international pressure matters a lot in promoting change…”42

At the beginning of this chapter Secretary Clinton called women’s empowerment a “high-yield investment resulting in stronger economies…and greater…stability.” Interestingly, foreign investment seems to have the greatest impact on levels of women’s legislative representation in the Arab world, though the mechanism behind it is still unclear. Is it the pressure from multinational corporations for these countries to provide stable, familiar environments that are gender-friendly as in the West? Is it through ratings systems that inadvertently include gender measures in their assessment of level of democracy and political risk? Could it be the pressure to enfranchise and free up a cheap source of labor via political lobbying? It could be all and none of these factors, but in any case international economic pressure seems to matter a great deal in the Arab world when it comes to women’s legislative representation.

Most of the policymakers I interviewed across Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco emphasized the pressure to promote women’s representation was exerted by international organizations and Western donors. Yet, this research reveals its influence may increasingly become muted as many of these countries take aid for granted, especially when it is administered with ex-ante conditionality (Collier 2007). While development assistance may have a substantial effect on gender-related policy, it may not be as successful in creating the supply and interest necessary to galvanize women to go out and run for office. Aid certainly does not provide the funds for campaigns except in rare cases, and many of the Arab women who campaign for political office are privately funded due to the lack of strong political parties in their respective countries. In states where political parties do exist and can fund candidates, many parties consider fielding

42 Interview with female professor at University of Bahrain, Manama, June 2008.
women risky—especially if there is no gender quota in place to guarantee their election. Much as Ross (2008) predicts, Arab women may be rising to the occasion with their pockets lined with monies earned from working for foreign companies. With women finally having access to formal jobs in the private sector (often through international companies), they may matter more as sources of state revenue. Thus economically enfranchised, women may also have more concerns regarding the services the state provides and whether the state can continue to attract foreign employers with current policies (Ross 2008). The power of foreign direct investment could ultimately lie in it directly placing money into the hands of women in the private sector. It thus allows females to mount formidable political campaigns in minimally open political regimes, akin to Reem Badran’s direct parliamentary win in the 2010 Jordanian elections. Badran’s background hints at her impressive ability to fundraise and organize, largely honed working for local and international banks. She was the second deputy to the president of the Amman Chamber of Commerce and previously held the position of Executive Director of the Jordan Investment Board (Malkawi 2010). Her connections to the Jordanian political establishment via her father, an ex-Prime Minister, certainly helped her bid for a seat in Amman’s rich third district, but the ability to bankroll her own campaign was also essential. In fact, a quick survey of Jordan’s female political glitterati at the online directory “Who-is-she-Jordan” demonstrates how many of the country’s politically prominent women have connections with the foreign community both in the business and policy arena.43 Furthermore, this is not solely the province of Jordan—other countries exhibit similar patterns. One of Kuwait’s four female parliamentarians, Rola Dashti, had extensive ties with the international business community through work as an economist for both local and international banks as well as the international development

community by virtue of working as a consultant to the World Bank. A quick look at Bahrain’s Shura Council (Upper House of Parliament) quickly demonstrates a majority of its eleven women have connections to international business networks, most prominently deputies Hala Ramzi Fayiz Qurisa and Dr. Aysha Salem Saif Mubarak. In conclusion, foreign direct investment may play a yet underexplored role in empowering women for political office by providing interested parties with the means and skills to fund and organize successful campaigns in political environments where formal financial support for women is lacking.
CHAPTER 3: EXPLORING THE ADOPTION OF GENDER QUOTAS IN THE ARAB WORLD

Why is there more female political representation and gender-related policy reform in Morocco than in Lebanon? Lebanon has long boasted a cosmopolitan, educated culture and was hailed the “Paris of the Middle East” up until the civil war. Richards and Waterbury (2007) proclaimed it one of the few quasi-democracies in the Middle East and North Africa, alongside Israel and Turkey. Lebanese women won the right to vote and participated in national elections in 1952, two decades before that same right would be extended in Switzerland. Even public awareness of gender-related issues is substantially higher in Lebanon than in Morocco, however, only 17 women have ever served in Lebanon’s parliament.\(^4\) Morocco, conversely, is a constitutional monarchy with some of the world’s highest rates of illiteracy across both genders yet it has arguably experienced greater levels of women’s political representation. Currently, there are 34 female parliamentarians out of a total of 325 representatives; 30 of whom have been elected via a voluntary party gender quota adopted in 2002.\(^1\) Furthermore, Morocco’s Moudawana reforms have been hailed as a landmark example of gender policy reform because of their progressive content and the truly grassroots nature of the movement that successfully put the proposal on the government’s agenda.\(^4\)

Modernization theorists from Lipset (1959) to Inglehart and Norris (2003) would lead us to expect more “progressive” gender outcomes and policies in “cosmopolitan” Lebanon rather

\(^{44}\) Abdul-Latif and Serpe, 2010.
\(^{45}\) The Moudawana law is a revision of Morocco’s family code passed by the Moroccan Parliament in 2004 granting women substantial rights vis-à-vis their spouses. Women are now allowed to obtain and dispute a divorce on equal terms in civil courts, polygamy has been circumscribed, the legal age of marriage was raised to 18 from 15, sexual harassment is now an offense punishable by law, etc. More details are available a the Moroccan Ministry of Justice’s website: http://www.justice.gov.ma/MOUDAWANA/Codefamille.pdf
than Morocco, so what explains this discrepancy?46 One possible explanation may lie in the international pressure for “reform” exerted through the higher levels of conditional aid present in Morocco relative to Lebanon.47 Morocco received much greater levels of targeted development assistance from the multi-lateral community than Lebanon over the past 19 years (see Figure 3.1 below). These aid disbursement patterns remained steady until 2004 when the allocation of foreign aid to both countries rises. Shortly thereafter, the idea of implementing a gender quota emerged as a central topic of Lebanese parliamentary and cabinet debate in 2005. That year a national commission drafted a new electoral law recommending a 20 percent gender quota for the legislative assembly, subsequently rejected by the legislative and executive offices. This chapter postulates that the renewed discussion of gender quota adoption in Lebanon and the decision to adopt a political party quota in Morocco were not accidental developments, but rather an indication of a broader pattern in the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, these constitutional shifts in election policy are motivated by the increasing financial pressures from abroad requiring credible commitments to democratization via gender empowerment (see Figure 3.1 below).48

46 Samuel Martin Lipset (1959) maintained that education specifically moderated men and women by broadening their social outlook and thus rendering them more tolerant of disenfranchised groups such as women, leading to the liberalization of the political system overall. Recently, Inglehart and Norris (2003) ventured modernization blurred gender roles, increasing equality across the workforce, the hearth, education, and representative government.

47 These adopted strategies can also be seen as a by-product of Arab governments’ attempts to attain “democracy” benchmarks set by the World Bank, the United Nations, and other high-profile international organizations as well as donor governments rather than a bid to truly enfranchise women.

48 Importantly, when considering official development assistance on a per capita basis these relationships reverse with Lebanon receiving substantially more aid per person than Morocco due to its smaller population. However, the aid that is disbursed in Morocco goes a lot further when taking into account the relative per capita incomes adjusted for PPP in each country (Morocco’s ranges from an average of $3000-$5000, while Lebanon’s from $11,000-$15,000 according to the most recent data from the International Monetary Fund). Importantly, Still, the overall rising patterns strategically convening around the 2000s when the global gender agenda comes into its own hints that these results are not accidental.
In this chapter, I examine whether official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI), and remittances have a significant impact on the types of gender-related institutional reforms chosen by Arab nations. I explore two questions: 1) Does the presence and growth in ODA, FDI, and remittances increase the likelihood of adopting a gender quota? 2) And if so, do these types of monies have an impact on the likelihood of adopting a particular type of gender quota? There are currently three types of gender quotas present in the region: (1) reserved seats, (2) legal candidate quotas, and (3) political party quotas. Reserved seats regulate the number of women elected to the legislative, while political party quotas and legal candidate
quotas set a minimum number for women on candidate lists. The three iterations represent different levels of formalized commitment to incorporating women into Arab legislatures. Forthcoming research has shown that international influence exerts a substantial impact on the likelihood of adopting quotas globally via foreign aid and specifically USAID operations (Bush 2011). Stephanie Nanes (2010) outlined in detail how the multi-lateral community encouraged municipal level gender quota adoption in the case of Jordan, unpacking the *quid pro quo* bargaining between the Jordanian government and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. She claims a governance advisor at USAID confirmed that a municipal women’s quota was a “conditioned precedent” for Jordan to qualify for the Millennium Challenge Corporations Threshold program.

This scholarship is a welcome addition to gender quota research, which tends to ignore the international economic factors facilitating quota adoption in favor of a focus on legalistic explanations. Few researchers have, however, explored whether foreign aid results in the adoption of specific types of gender quotas, much less explored this question in the challenging setting of the Middle East. Furthermore, alternative sources of external finance exist that may concurrently impact the social environment in Arab countries and either render it conducive to gender quota adoption (such as foreign direct investment) or potentially mute the effect of conditional foreign aid (such as remittances). I hypothesize international aid represents the most important financial incentives for gender quota adoption, especially in the case of reserved seats which represent the most formalized and explicitly guaranteed commitment to incorporating women into legislatures.

In this analysis, I use data on gender quotas from the World Database on Women from the
University of Stockholm, supplemented with data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the work of Mona Lena Krook (2010). The chapter proceeds as follows. Initially, I review the background on the spread of gender quotas as an electoral policy worldwide, later focusing on patterns of adoption in the Arab world. I explore why financial incentives play a central role in determining the choice of quotas, highlighting the importance of the World Bank and the United Nation’s co-optation and re-framing of gender empowerment as an “economic good” as crucial to gender quotas widespread popularity in developing countries. This creates incentives for Arab countries dependent on foreign aid, as well as those concerned with their image abroad, to consider institutional affirmative action policies for women in a bid to enhance women’s political visibility, but not necessarily change the status quo.49 Finally, I present the data and model used to empirically test my hypotheses then discuss the results and findings in the conclusion.

Gender Quota Adoption in the Arab World and Beyond

Over the last two decades, there has been a significant diffusion of gender norms globally; first via the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979), then the Beijing Platform for Action (1995),50 and newly the Millennium Development Goals (Krook 2006). In the last decade, gender quotas emerged as the most widespread gender policy and electoral reform with over 100 countries implementing some type of gender quota (Krook 2009). The following section traces the diffusion of this particular policy trend across the world, while...

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49 As will be argued in chapter four’s discussion of women’s rights and chapter five’s case analysis, the most hard-hitting gender-related reforms that can be legislated would be revisions of Arab personal status laws, which restrict Muslim women’s public and private activity.

50 The Beijing Platform called for direct government participation in diverting resources to and creating a supportive environment for the complete inclusion of women into public society with the aid of women’s NGOs, feminist groups, and the private sector—the first clear international promotion of gender mainstreaming. Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annex II.
discussing the possible dynamics underlying the choice to adopt gender quotas in the Middle East and North Africa.

Krook and O’Brien (2010) venture that more than three quarters of proposals to adopt gender quotas have been introduced in the last 15 years, which directly follows the rise of *gender mainstreaming* from the U.N.’s 4th World Conference for Women in 1995 through to the Millennium Summit in 2000 (Hafner-Burtin and Pollack 2002; Krook and True 2008,). Dahlerup (2003) believes that a country’s international image has become more and more important across the international and national context, pushing countries to effectively market themselves as modern and innovative with women’s empowerment quickly becoming a popular and timely way to promote just such an image to the world. Furthermore, the goals of the Beijing Conference (1995) and the Millennium Development Goals (2000) explicitly promoted the idea of women’s importance for economic development. This new rhetoric rapidly created an economic incentive to institutionally incorporate women into the political systems of countries with oftentimes less-than-stellar reputations for upholding women’s rights. The *Economist* pointed this out in 2008 with the following tongue-in-cheek observation, “Around 110 countries have rules helping women get elected, joined in recent years by such feminist-friendly places as Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan.”

In recent years, there has been an important shift within the multilateral community to go beyond the safeguarding of women’s rights within legal frameworks and strive to factor for endemic gender discrimination within national budgets, as well—what Kantola and Squires (2008) term *market feminism*. While earlier scholarship expected gender empowerment to be the by-product of development, a reverse view now contends that empowering women leads to

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development—a shift that happily coincides with the global promotion of gender quotas. The Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) which introduced the Beijing Platform for Action, the 23rd special of the General Assembly (2000), the Millennium Summit (2000) and the 2005 World Summit, highlighted government and international organizations’ commitments to financing gender equality and empowerment to promote economic (via the term “development”), as well as political interests. The Beijing Platform for Action, in particular, served as a template for the allocation of resources across all sectors to help achieve this goal. In 2002 the parties to the International Conference on Financing for Development adopted the Monterrey Consensus, which included gender-sensitive development and gender mainstreaming across all sectors as part of its prescriptions. Furthermore, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) incorporated consideration of gender equality into its suggestions for the harmonization of efficient and substantive funding practices across donor countries (Bakker 2007). Finally, even the Bretton Woods institutions recognized “the potential multiplier effect of gender equality…as key for realizing the Millennium Development Goal targets in 2015” and has openly claimed that, “investing in gender equality and empowerment of women is smart economics” (Bakker 2007, 7). Thus, the possibility of funding opportunities via gender-related development assistance in exchange for appropriate institutional reforms gained import in the developing world.

Overall the new framing of gender empowerment as important for economic development

52 The Monterrey consensus specifically references the issue of gender in the following paragraphs: “These refer to a holistic and interconnected approach to financing for development that is gender sensitive (para. 8); good governance, sound economic policies and the importance of gender equality for realizing such goals (para. 11); empowering women in the context of appropriate national policy and regulatory frameworks (para. 12); investments in basic social and economic infrastructure that is gender-sensitive (para. 16); microfinance, particularly for women (para. 18); capacity building that includes gender budget policies (para. 19); business frameworks that are sensitive to the gender implications of their undertakings (para. 23); and, calls for governments to “Mainstream the gender perspective into development policies at all levels and in all sectors” (para. 64) (Bakker 2007, 7)
and the funds associated with it have received scant attention in the literature on gender quotas; yet this may, in fact, represent a powerful incentive for governments to adopt them. It may be the most powerful incentive for conservative Muslim Arab governments when considering such a controversial policy, since increases in women’s political representation are seen as a much-lauded and oft rewarded sign of democratization and stability by donors and investors from the West (Bakker 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Eleven of the 22 Arab League member states have adopted gender quotas since 2000 despite the region’s abysmal track record in women’s political representation overall (see Table 3.1 below). In fact, the quota trend is largely responsible for the increase in the world average for women’s legislative representation from approximately 12 percent in 2000 to close to 20 percent today (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2010). The Arab world itself has seen an astonishing rise from a regional average of four to nine percent in women’s legislative representation since the turn of the millennium; a shift that coincided with the spread of gender quotas in the region as discussed in chapter two (see Figure 2.1).

53 The Middle East ranked the lowest on the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s regional averages for women’s legislative representation with an average of 9.1 percent in 2010.
Civil society, the state, and international as well as transnational organizations, usually working in tandem, tend to be the primary actors conditioning gender quota adoption (Krook 2009). Often grassroots women’s organizations see quotas as a mechanism to increase and institutionalize gender representation. Certainly, political elites recognize the strategic value of quotas usually for inter-party or coalition advantage (Tripp 2003). Quotas are also promulgated through international norms and through transnational sharing of ideas and information (True and Mintrom 2001). Similar factors influence quota adoption in the Arab world, yet with some important nuances. Islam, as well as conservative tribal culture has a role in conditioning the acceptance of women in the political arena and any associated institutional changes (Donno and Russett 2004; Fish 2002; Lewis 2002). Yet opposition to gender quotas comes from both secular feminists and Islamists alike; the first criticizing the cosmetic nature of the policy, while the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Adoption Timeline</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Latest Parliamentary Results</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Political party quotas</td>
<td>2002-</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>2002-</td>
<td>PBV</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>(1979-1986) 2009-</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Legal Candidate quotas</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>2003-</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Legal Candidate quotas</td>
<td>2006-</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Political Party quotas</td>
<td>2002-</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Legal Candidate quotas</td>
<td>2005-</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Political Party quotas</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Both Sudan and Egypt have previously implemented quotas for the time periods indicated in parentheses. Source: Global Database for Women (2010)
latter tend to attack the injustice of quotas privileging a specific group, especially when that
group represents women. Finally, Gender quotas have often been inspired or at least sanctioned
by “progressively-minded” Arab monarchs (such as King Abdullah of Jordan or King
Mohammad VI of Morocco) or dictators (President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia)
interested in currying favor with international donors and investors by showcasing their
“progressive” values (Tamale 2003, Reyes 2002). Consequently, this policy usually represents a
top-down decision brokered by the state (i.e. state feminism) rather than a response to legitimate
social pressures (Brand 2002; Sabbagh 2007).

Still, grass-roots promotion of gender quotas does exist. Local women’s organizations
partnering with transnational women’s networks promoted legislative gender quotas in several
countries, including: Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan, and even Yemen.
Unsurprisingly, the aforementioned countries all receive significant levels of development
assistance (Carapico 2003; Moghadam 2004; Schwedler 2002), but also remittances (Singer
2010; World Bank 2011). Quotas are often promoted by party elites to expand voter share in a
bid for earmarked funding from international non-governmental organizations and national
governments, to band-wagon with other parties once such reforms are implemented, or to
revamp a stale image, as was the case in Morocco and Algeria. Where prominent left-wing
parties exist (Algeria, Yemen, Morocco), they have promoted gender quotas as measures to
attain social equality both within the party apparatus and beyond as in the West (Opello 2006).54

In fact, women’s quotas are often used by regimes to sideline Islamist interests (Tripp and Kang

54 The Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires of Morocco has five women on its 21-member central board via an
internal quota; the Yemeni Socialist Party has an internal quota mandating 30 percent of candidates must be women.
Front de Libération Nationale of Algeria mandates two out of the first five names on a candidate list must be
women.
Despite initial opposition, once gender quotas are adopted, Islamic parties tend to be some of the most successful actors in parlaying them toward greater Islamist representation in legislative assemblies, as in the case of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front with their MP Hayat Massimi and the Moroccan Parti de la Justice et du Développement and their most notorious MP, Bassima Hakaoui. In the case of Iraq we see gender quotas institutionally imposed by international actors, however women rose to the occasion and actively campaigned and one seats even beyond the quota in some districts during the 2010 parliamentary elections (IFES 2010; Norris 2007).

A significant amount of scholarship delved into the nature and rapid diffusion of gender quotas, as well as the substance of their outcomes across Europe (Bergqvist et al 1999; Caul 2001; Dahlerup & Friedenvall 2005; Kittilson 2006, Kunovich 2003) and Latin America (Araujo 2003; Baldez 2004, Jones 2009, 2004). However, the regional experiences of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia remain under-explored especially in empirical terms. As mentioned previously, while many Arab governments actively discuss adopting gender quotas, only 11 Arab nations currently observe the policy: Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, and newly Egypt. Still, these countries represent half of the Arab league country member states demonstrating the quota diffusion is a phenomenon worthy of further inspection. In the following section, I consider which factors contribute to the likelihood of adopting gender quotas across the 22 Arab League member states.

A Quantitative Analysis of Gender Quota Adoption in the Arab World

The Model

I analyze the diffusion of gender quotas using standard event history analysis (see Bush
competing-risks survival regression (see Fine and Gray 1999, Lunn and McNeill 1995). Survival regression has previously been used to model the diffusion of gender quotas (Caul 2001) and gender mainstreaming (True and Mintrom 2001) in advanced industrial economies. Utilizing event history analysis represents a more efficient method to model quota adoption over time since once the event happens, the subsequent observations are taken out of the model and reduce the risk of inflating results. Here, I expand the application of event history analysis to modeling the likelihood of adopting competing types of gender quotas in a developing country setting. I choose competing-risks regression since it is the more appropriate method of modeling the exclusive choice between reserved seats, political party quotas, legal candidate quotas, and, of course, no quotas—all effectively competing events. The focus in this type of survival analysis is on “the cumulative incidence function, which indicates the probability of the event of interests happening before a given time.” Gender quota adoption is interpreted as the failure event, consequently sample countries drop out once they adopt a particular quota and thus mitigate the risk of inflating the significance of results. The data’s temporal scope ranges from 1990 until 2009 to increase reliability; therefore, the models utilized incorporate time varying covariates (year dummies) where possible to control for potential correlation over time.

As an additional robustness test, I also use two discrete-time event history models to estimate a binary dependent variable reflecting whether quotas, in general, were adopted:

---

55 “Competing-risks regression is semi-parametric in that the baseline sub-hazard of the event of interest is left unspecified, and the effects of covariates are assumed to be proportional. Time-varying covariates and coefficients are allowed.” Accessed at http://www.stata.com/stata11/stcrreg.html.

56 Importantly, if a country switched to a different type of gender quota at some point after initial quota adoption, this information would be lost in a discrete time event history analysis, thus necessitating the choice of the MLN estimator. Table 3.5 in the Appendix features a multi-nominal regression model estimating the likelihood of adopting one of the three quota options. The results mostly reflect the same findings as the subsequent survival regressions.
namely, a logistic regression incorporating time-varying covariates to control for potential correlation over time and a Cox proportional hazards model. The coefficients in both models are interpreted as hazard ratios reflecting the likelihood or “risk” of gender quota adoption. Effectively, these two models also focus on the survival time to quota adoption and which factors precipitate this event.

57 Discrete-time models are more appropriate for modeling quota adoption as opposed to continuous-time models (such as parametric event-history models) since we have the expectation of the chosen event happening within a specific time period—from 1990 until 2009. The data set-up for a discrete-time event history model treats each year as a separate observation for each individual case, thus allowing us to more accurately and rigorously model the respective event in a panel data environment (see Hoffman 2004, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).

58 This version of the dependent variable is formulated as a binary (dummy) indicator representing time to quota adoption (the three different types of gender quotas are coded as “1”) with quota adoption interpreted as the failure or right-censoring event (Caul 2001). Sample members drop out once they experience the event (failure): quota adoption. I use two discrete-time event history models to estimate this iteration of the dependent variable: logistic regression incorporating time-varying covariates and the Cox proportional hazards model. Discrete-time models are more appropriate for modeling quota adoption as an event as opposed to continuous-time models (such as parametric event-history models) since we have the expectation of the chosen event happening within a discrete time periods—in this case, years. The data set-up for a discrete-time event history model treats each year as a separate observation for each individual case, thus allowing us to more accurately and rigorously model the respective event in a panel data environment.

59 No quota=82 percent of observations; political party quotas =5 percent of observations; legal candidate quotas =3 percent of observations; reserved seats=9 percent of observations. Mean: 0.38; Standard deviation: 0.91.

60 Reserved seats guarantee women a certain number of seats in the parliament, independent of the electoral result, whereas legal candidate quotas mandate a certain percentage of women on the candidate lists. In both cases, the
commitment to women’s representation, followed by legal candidate quotas, and finally reserved seats. For example, political parties implementing quotas that neglect to implement “placement mandates” tend to place women at the bottom of their party lists deliberately jeopardizing their election (Jones 2004)—a common issue in Morocco. Furthermore, the penalties for non-compliance across the different quotas vary significantly (Dahlerup 2003). In a party quota system, while the participants will receive the opprobrium of the international community and local women’s organizations, there are really no other mechanisms to enforce compliance. Consequently, legal candidate quotas and reserved seats tend to have more binding provisions to insure compliance and that the quota has teeth (Bush 2011; Dahlerup 2003). Interestingly, Krook (2009) ventures these two quotas are most common in countries that are less powerful within the world system. Effectively, such countries are more vulnerable to international and transnational pressures to adopt quotas that force greater commitment (albeit cosmetic) to formalizing gender equality. Conversely, most of the “powerful” Western countries within the world system actually use the more lax political party quotas (see Towns 2004).

The majority of observations for quota adoption in the period between 1990 and 2000 are coded zero, since most quotas were implemented in the new millennium with the exception of Sudan. Regionally, political party quotas tend to be favored in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), possibly an artifact of French colonization since France and most of Europe utilized this type of quota (Krook 2009). Reserved seats are most common in the Levant and East Africa (Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan), mimicking trends for developing countries with initially low numbers of women in politics (Krook 2009). Finally, we find voters decide which of the women candidates are elected, but under the reserved seats system, women are guaranteed a certain number of seats.
legislative candidate quotas in Iraq and Mauritania.

The data for the dependent variable are gathered from the University of Stockholm’s Global Database for Women with the model below illustrating the hypothesized factors affecting the likelihood of gender quota adoption. The independent variables in regular script represent the base model; supply-side variables (see Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007) in cursive are incorporated into an expansion of the original model. The conceptual dependent variable is the probability that country \( i \) will adopt a type of gender quota in year \( t \) assuming the country has not adopted a gender quota prior to this point. Observations up until the year of quota adoption are coded zero.

\[
\text{ADOPT}_{i,t} = \Phi \text{ (constant)} + \beta_1 \text{ Development assistance}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{ Foreign direct investment}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \text{ Economic development}_{i,t} + \beta_4 \text{ Electoral system}_{i,t} + \beta_5 \text{ Democracy}_{i,t} + \beta_6 \text{ Fertility rates}_{i,t} + \beta_7 \text{ Remittances}_{i,t} + \beta_8 \text{ Women's labor participation rates}_{i,t} + \beta_9 \text{ Women's secondary education rates}_{i,t} + \beta_{10} \text{ Women's legislative representation}_{i,t} + e
\]

**Factors Influencing the Adoption of Gender Quotas**

**Variables of Interest: International Financial Incentives**

The literature on women’s global political participation often cites international influence and norms diffusion as salient alongside domestic factors to the rapid spread of gender quotas.

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61 I use additional data from Pippa Norris’ 2010 Democracy Dataset’s Fast-track policy variable, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and Krook and O’Brian (2010). In cases, where the descriptions of the quota type diverge between these sources, I opt for the Quota Project’s coding. In the case of Palestine, Krook and O’Brian claim there are legal candidate quotas in place, while Dahlerup claims they are reserved seats. There is also a discrepancy in the case of Djibouti where Krook and O’Brian claim the country uses reserved seats, while Dahlerup maintains legal candidate quotas are in place. Please refer to Table 1 in the Appendix for more details on the discrepancies in coding. Most of these authors are actually party to and moderate the QuotaProject, which renders the discrepancy in coding interesting. See [http://www.quotaproject.org/](http://www.quotaproject.org/) for more details and Table 1 in the Appendix for an overview of quotas implemented in the Middle East and North Africa.
worldwide (Dahlerup & Nordlund 2004; Krook 2006, 2004; Paxton et al 2006; Paxton & Hughes 2007; Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007; True and Mintrom 2001). Krook (2006) highlights international organizations and the transnational connections they foster as one of the vehicles for the spread of quotas. She ventures a multiplicity of organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the Organization of American States encourage members to strive for at least 30 percent female representation within their political institutions, which further contributes to the global acceptance of gender norms. Keck and Sikkink (1998) demonstrate international non-governmental organizations have occasionally been successful at holding nations accountable to such contracts. Most quota literature recognizes the roles played by international organizations via legal or reputational mechanisms; however, much of it ignores the importance of economic incentives wielded by multilateral organizations and bilateral donors.

*Official Development Assistance*

Since the end of the Cold War, many donors linked funding with improvements in social conditions, particularly women’s issues in the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 1998; Carapico 2002; Coleman 2004; Moghadam 2003). Even a cursory look at the development projects funded by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Arab region reveals a heavy focus on gender (Arab Human Development Report 2005). One of the least politically costly and most cosmetic ways to show a commitment to “democratic development” is by implementing a gender quota. The artificial increase in gender representation also happens to translate well into development and governance indicators and most Arab governments figure conservative norms will ensure no real change of the *status quo*. As Stephanie Nanes (2010)
states, aid marked for democracy promotion tends to concentrate on overhauling the legislative, judiciary, and civil society while executive power remains intact despite representing the source of authoritarian dysfunction. “External democratization efforts allowed, if not encouraged, states to pass reforms elevating women’s status in place of more hard-hitting reforms” (Nanes 2010, 3). During my interviews with public officials as well as leaders of state-sponsored non-profits and international organizations across Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, and Bahrain (from 2007-2009), my interlocutors universally hinted that the primary reason for gender reform lay in satisfying donor objections to current policies with the hope of attracting more funds. Consequently, my primary hypothesis is as follows:

\[ H1: \text{An upsurge in development assistance will increase the likelihood of adopting a gender quota in a given Arab state.} \]

Importantly, foreign economic influence may also be manifested in the level of formalized institutional commitment to gender empowerment. The three different types of gender quotas used in the region can intuitively be ranked relative to their level of formalized commitment to gender representation.\(^{62}\) Both legal candidate quotas and reserved seats represent legally binding reforms mandating women’s presence at distinct stages in the election process. Thus, voluntary political party quotas represent minimally institutionalized guarantees for women in politics, while reserved seats encapsulate the most binding commitment to formalizing gender participation within legislative assemblies (Bush 2011; Dahlerup 2003). Krook’s (2009)

\(^{62}\) Reserved seats guarantee women a certain number of seats in the parliament, independent of the electoral result, whereas legal candidate quotas mandate a certain percentage of women on the candidate lists. In both cases, the voters decide which of the women candidates are elected, but under the reserved seats system, women are guaranteed a certain number of seats. The political parties themselves enforce party quotas internally, while legal candidate quotas and reserved seats are usually enforced through a formal legal requirement (the constitution or electoral law).
analysis affirmed that reserved seats and legal candidate quotas tend to be utilized in developing countries particularly vulnerable to international pressures for policy reform on gender. The Western nations that “tie” their hands by implementing gender quotas, most prefer to limit their gender commitment to the less formally binding voluntary political party quota. In fact, countries implementing reserved seats tend to have a limited number of females in the legislative assembly prior to quota adoption (Krook 2009). The question arises why such countries would introduce policies that explicitly and controversially forced them to integrate women into their politics. Pressure from foreign donors arises as a plausible explanation for the adoption of such an unpopular measure. Therefore, I also posit the following hypothesis:

\[ H2: \text{Rising levels of development assistance increase the likelihood of adopting more “binding” quotas such reserved seats.} \]

**Foreign Direct Investment**

Importantly, development assistance does not have as much sway in the petroleum-rich Arab countries, but the last decade has seen a multitude of gender policy reforms—specifically the extension of universal suffrage rights in Kuwait (2000), Qatar (1997), Bahrain (re-instated in 2002), Oman (2003), and the United Arab Emirates (limited 2006). The case of Bahrain was particularly interesting since my Bahraini interview subjects openly stated the government was not as concerned with development assistance as it was with foreign direct investment and broadcasting an image of a progressive, stable, and ultimately investment-worthy nation. Empowering women was deemed an integral part of the struggle to revamp the country’s image. Previous work exploring the link between foreign direct investment and gender empowerment

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63 The Western nations that “tie” their hands by implementing gender quota prefer to limit their own gender commitment to the less formally binding voluntary political party quota.
found mixed results (Bakker 2007; Braunstein 2006). However, in the context of the region foreign direct investment should not be ignored since it may significantly increase the likelihood of adopting gender quotas as Arab governments struggle to rehabilitate their image in the wake of September 11th. Thus, my third hypothesis is as follows:

**H3:** *Rising levels of foreign direct investment increase the likelihood of adopting a gender quota.*

What about the effects of foreign direct investment on more committed forms of gender integration? There is a subtle difference in the impact of the two types of foreign capital. Development assistance tends to have conditions associated with its disbursement and often requires metrics for assessing progress in attaining pre-specified goals. Consequently, devising ways of signaling credibility to the donor becomes an important skill for the recipient country since a *de facto* bargaining process underlies the allocation of aid. Foreign direct investment has no such strings attached. In fact, the importance of investment lies in Arab policymakers’ beliefs regarding what investor-friendly traits entail, rather than specific mandates from corporations. Certainly property rights and contract enforcement would rank highly on any list of desirable traits, but increasingly institutional reforms relating to democracy have become popular and within that framework women’s rights become increasingly important as an indicator of tolerance and the consistent enforcement of legal rights, overall. This is especially the case for Muslim countries where the gender gap is perceived as a sign of “backwardness” and even repression. I expect levels of foreign direct investment to correlate with the likelihood of adopting a gender quota, however, I do not expect investment to be associated with any particular level of commitment to women (or any specific gender quota) since there is no
underlying bargaining process that would necessitate such a guarantee.

**H4: Levels of foreign direct investment will be predictive of gender quota adoption.**

I use official development assistance and foreign direct investment as percentages of Gross Domestic Product to evince the aggregate impact of these capital flows on the overall economy. Both of these measures are derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

**Remittances**

The third type of global finance potentially affecting incentives to change gender policy at the national level are remittances. Remittances already overshadowed levels of both foreign direct investment (approximately $3 billion) and official development assistance (approximately $6 billion) flowing into the Arab world in 2001, and were estimated to be $15 billion (Kapur 2003). Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco represent countries with the world’s largest influx of remittances from their citizens working abroad—usually in Western Europe or the Gulf States (World Bank 2011). These nations receive in excess of two billion dollars a year to supplement the government’s coffers—a number which significantly rivals most Arab countries receipt of foreign direct investment and development assistance (Singer 2010). Much as foreign direct investment from China was substituted for conditional aid in Sudan, there is reason to believe the sheer level of remittances flowing into the region might have a similar effect in the Arab world and allow governments to be less reliant on foreign aid and consequently less vulnerable to pressure for gender reform from the international community. The converse would show remittances as a bolster for development at the local level through its direct economic empowerment of individuals (an injection of monies that is not entangled in bureaucracy), which could potentially have a positive effect on the status of both men and women by affording them a

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64 Accessed from [http://go.worldbank.org/9PTEM0P410](http://go.worldbank.org/9PTEM0P410)
measure of economic independence from the government dole (Brown 2006; Kapur 2005).

\[ H5: \text{An increase in the flow of remittances will significantly impact the likelihood of quota adoption, but the direction of their effect in uncertain. Remittances can either serve as substitutes for development assistance, dampening its effect or they may work concomitantly with development assistance, empowering women at the local level to appeal for gender policy change at the national level.}^{65} \]

I operationalize remittances as percentages of Gross Domestic Product deriving the data from the World Bank Development Indicators.

**Control Variables**

The independent variables used reflect the same set of indicators presented in chapter two, serving as controls to the variables of interest, and reflecting alternative hypotheses. As with the previous chapter, the control variables encapsulate supply and demand side factors affecting the likelihood of gender-related reform. Demand-side or institutional factors play a particular role in conditioning the likelihood of quota adoption. Here, the type of electoral system and regime, as well as prior presence of women within governing bodies is of import and will be dealt with more extensively that the other controls featured in the model. Most distinctly, quota adoption is often determined by the electoral system in place—whether a country has a proportional system or a plurality-majority system. The system regulates how votes cast in elections translate into party or individual candidate seats. It also controls whether quotas can be seamlessly integrated into the political substructure. Abundant research has found that proportional systems tend to be more conducive to the election or appointment of women, as well as to gender quota adoption (Caul 1999; Matland and Studlar 1996). The conduciveness of proportional regimes to the election of women was theoretically established as far back as

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65 In any case, the sheer volume of remittances flowing into the region should have an effect on gender policy at the national level if other types of global finance have an effect.
Maurice Duverger (1955) and further corroborated by the research of Wilma Rule (1981) and Pippa Norris (1985), as well as a slew of other scholars (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Paxton 1997; Paxton et al. 2006; Reynolds 1999). Certainly, the presence of quotas in conjunction with a particular electoral system can prove beneficial or impede women’s participation. Dahlerup (2006a) furthers this contention claiming quota systems that do not match the electoral system in place tend to be only symbolic (Dahlerup 2006a). I expect countries with majoritarian systems to decrease the likelihood of adopting a gender quota and use a binary variable reflecting this electoral system is in place from Pippa Norris’ Democracy Dataset.

It may be safe to assume that democracies have more of an imperative to be representative, hence why gender quotas are often more prevalent in countries with democratic or even “democratizing” regimes (Bauer and Britton 2006; Krook 2009). That said, many transitioning nations are using “gender quotas” to reify a progressive image so the association of quota adoption with particular regime type may be an unclear one. I use Ted Gurr’s POLITY IV scores to operationalize level of democracy. I formally expect higher democracy scores to increase the likelihood of adopting a gender quota.

Women’s prior presence within the legislature likely bodes well for gender quotas since there are female incumbents who have a direct interest in lobbying for quotas to secure their seats. However, in my interviews with female parliamentarians in Jordan, Bahrain, and Morocco this was not always the case. A substantial number of these women criticized gender quotas for being anti-democratic, unfair to their male counterparts, and unnecessary to combat cultural obstacles preventing female political participation. Consequently, prior legislative representation
can either be a boon or detrimental to the adoption of quotas and the passage of other gender-related reforms. This is particularly the case in Parliaments where Islamist parties have the largest number of female deputies and can impede the passage of women-friendly legislation as in Morocco. I use a lagged variable encompassing the percentages of women in legislative assemblies to measure this concept, collecting the data from the Inter-parliamentary Union, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the World Bank’s Development Indicators. I expect higher numbers of women’s legislative representation prior to the onset of the quota to be predictive of the likelihood of gender quota adoption.

Finally, a lagged variable for GDP per capita is included in the model to gauge whether improved levels of economic development and income, translate into more progressive policy for women. Fertility rates reflect whether women have the time or capacity to engage in activities within the public domain and can thus lobby for meaningful gender reform such as the adoption of quotas. Women’s labor force participation and education levels are incorporated to capture the “supply” of women likely to lobby for quota adoption. All of these data are derived from the World Bank’s 2010 World Development Indicators dataset. There is no control for the Gulf countries in this model since none of them have ever adopted a gender quota and consequently are dropped automatically from the analysis by the estimator.

**Findings**

The first results presented in Table 3.2 are generated with discrete-time event history analysis to estimate the likelihood of adopting *any* type of gender quota using a binary dependent

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66 Ironically, in Morocco the Islamist party’s candidates were elected to the Parliament via a very deliberate manipulation of the gender quota only to attempt to stall the passage of crucial reforms to the personal status laws.
variable through logistic regression (MNL) and a Cox proportional hazards model.\textsuperscript{67} The coefficients in both models can be interpreted as hazard ratios reflecting the likelihood or risk of a quota adoption.\textsuperscript{68} These broad results give the reader initial insight into the salient variables predicting the probability of adopting gender quotas overall. The subsequent competing risk models (Table 3.3 and 3.4 respectively) disaggregate the dependent variable and estimate the likelihood of adopting a particular type of gender quota (i.e. a political party quota, a legal candidate quota, or reserved seats), revealing the variation in incentives informing the choice of gender empowerment strategies across the Middle East and North Africa.

\textit{The Likelihood of Adopting Gender Quotas Overall}

The first observation is that development assistance alongside the presence of a majoritarian electoral regime is consistently predictive of quota adoption. In the base model in Table 3.2, each one unit increase in development assistance is associated with a 182 percent increase in the likelihood of adopting a gender quota in the MNL model and with a 33 percent increase in the Cox model. Foreign direct investment is insignificant in both iterations of the base model. The existence of a majoritarian electoral system reduces the likelihood of adopting a gender quota by 99 percent in the MNL model and by 85 percent in the Cox model. Finally, the level of economic development unexpectedly reduces the likelihood of gender quota adoption by 89 percent in the MNL model and by 55 percent in the Cox model.

\textsuperscript{67} Table 3.6 in the Appendix shows that the hazards were proportional for the independent variables, thus allowing the use of the Cox proportional hazards model. Here, the word “quota” represents all three iterations of this policy from political party quotas to reserved seats and is coded as a binary variable.

\textsuperscript{68} Hazard ratios less than one decrease the likelihood of gender quota adoption, while ratios greater than one increase the likelihood of quota adoption. The hazard ratios in the Cox proportional hazards model are already exponentiated.
There are two additional “expanded” models in Table 3.2. The first incorporates remittances as a competing financial incentive vis-à-vis foreign direct investment and development assistance, while the second model includes supply-side variables such as prior women’s legislative participation, women’s secondary education enrollment levels and women’s labor participation. Overall, these expanded models generate similar results to the base model, although at the expense of a reduced number of observations.

The first expanded model tests whether remittances compete with foreign direct investment and development assistance as an unconditional source of funding and consequently mute the possible impact of either on gender policy. Official development assistance and remittances have a positive effect on the likelihood of gender quota adoption with electoral regimes still exhibiting the expected dampening effect. Official development assistance increases the likelihood of adopting a gender quota in the MNL model by 285 percent, while remittances increase it 69 percent. Conversely, level of economic development decreases the likelihood by 82 percent, while having a majoritarian electoral system decreases it by 99 percent. In the Cox proportional hazards model, official development assistance loses its significance, while majoritarian electoral system again decreases the likelihood of adopting a gender quota by 88 percent, with fertility rates increasing it by 64 percent and remittances by 35 percent. In conclusion, remittances act in congruence with development assistance when it comes to quota adoption.

In the second expanded model, we encounter slightly different results while testing for the impact of more social factors. Yet again, official development assistance and the type of electoral system in place remain significant predictors of quota adoption. For each unit increase in official development assistance, the likelihood of adopting a gender quota increases 259
percent in the MLN model and 47 percent in the Cox model. The presence of a majoritarian electoral system again decreases the likelihood of gender quota adoption by 98 percent in the MLN model and by 71 percent in the Cox model. In the expanded models, level of economic development loses its significance with women’s prior legislative representation gaining significance in the MLN model and increasing the likelihood of adopting a gender quota by 36 percent.

Overall, these results showcase the importance of structural (levels of development assistance, remittances, and economic development) and institutional factors (electoral systems) in conditioning gender quota adoption and commitment to more formalized iterations of gender representation in the legislature. Both estimation techniques and the expanded models confirm the first hypothesis positing that aid is predictive of gender quota adoption. The third and fourth hypotheses are however disconfirmed with foreign direct investment never appearing to have significant impact on the dependent variable. The results also confirm the fifth hypothesis demonstrating that remittances have a significant and in this case positive effect on the likelihood of quota adoption. However, are these same factors equally predictive across the individual quotas? The analysis in the following section demonstrates this is not entirely the case.

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69 Future research will incorporate more social indicators in the hope of capturing the effect of local women’s lobbying capacity and grassroots pressure.

70 This article is part of a broader dissertation project in which a corollary chapter discussed the effects of foreign direct investment on women’s legislative representation and statistical analysis had significant positive results for FDI influence on gender representation over time. It seems the type of political incorporation is particularly salient for whether FDI is a significant predictor or not. Consequently, this comparison of the effects of aid vs. FDI across particular contexts and measures for promoting gender is a cornerstone of the dissertation analysis.
Table 3.2 Discrete-Time Event History Analysis in Two Iterations: Multi-Nomial Logistic Regression (MNL) /Cox Proportional Hazards Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard Ratios</th>
<th>Base Models</th>
<th>Expanded Models (1)</th>
<th>Expanded Models (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
<td>1.35***</td>
<td>1.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox</td>
<td>1.33*</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>-2.24***</td>
<td>-1.75***</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.64***</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System (Majoritarian)</td>
<td>-5.14***</td>
<td>-6.79***</td>
<td>-4.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(2.06)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Secondary Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Labor Participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>256</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-57.74</td>
<td>-168.03</td>
<td>-50.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-164.86</td>
<td>-32.26</td>
<td>-108.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Women’s legislative representation is lagged in the MLE model, but not in the Cox regression since the latter does not allow time series operators. Ratios significantly less (greater) than one indicate that a variable is estimated to reduce (increase) the likelihood of adopting a gender quota. ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP. Incorporates time-varying covariates.

Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The previous analysis reflected a combination of development assistance and electoral regimes most consistently impacted the likelihood of adopting a gender quota in the Arab world. Yet, these same factors may have different effects when predicting the adoption of the three distinct types of gender quotas. The previous discussion noted that the level of formalized commitment to guaranteeing the presence of women in the legislature varied across each type of quota. I maintain this same variation stems from the level of pressure exerted by the dominant type of international financial flows coming into the country—specifically whether there is a conditional element associated with these monies both formally (development assistance) and informally (as foreign direct investment). Exploring the effects of foreign direct investment, development assistance, and remittances represents a unique way to proxy for such effects. As stated in hypothesis three and hypothesis four, my expectation is that the more “institutionalized” the choice of gender quota (i.e. whether it is mandated via constitutional or legal reforms as in the case of legal candidate quotas and reserved seats), the more likely conditional aid is to have a significant impact on this choice since adopting such a policy requires more drastic and potentially controversial institutional change. The results of the competing-risks regressions in Table 3.3 and 3.4, confirm these hypotheses in the case of reserved seats, but the story is nuanced when analyzing political party quotas.
Table 3.3: Competing-Risks Survival Regression of Quota Adoption I (1990-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Hazard Ratios</th>
<th>Political Party Quotas</th>
<th>Reserved Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong></td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.73**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong></td>
<td>0.76***(-)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System (Majoritarian)</td>
<td>0.00*** (-)</td>
<td>(0.12)**(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>1.11**</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>0.45 ** (-)</td>
<td>(0.53)**(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>0.20***(-)</td>
<td>3.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP. Incorporates time-varying covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sub-hazard ratios have already been exponentiated.  

71 Ratios lower than one reflect a decreasing likelihood of gender quota adoption, while ratios above on reflect an increasing likelihood of gender quota adoption.
Table 3.4: Competing Risks Survival Regression of Quota Adoption II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Hazard Ratios</th>
<th>Political Party Quotas</th>
<th>Reserved Seats</th>
<th>Political Party Quotas</th>
<th>Reserved Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong></td>
<td>0.22**(-)</td>
<td>1.80**</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>5.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(3.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong></td>
<td>0.83* (-)</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.80** (-)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong></td>
<td>5.97**</td>
<td>1.37**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.33)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>1.16***</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.73)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>3.48***</td>
<td>0.25*** (-)</td>
<td>3.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System (Majoritarian)</td>
<td>0.00*** (-)</td>
<td>0.02 (-)</td>
<td>0.00*** (-)</td>
<td>0.09*** (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.95*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Secondary Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Labor Participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.89** (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP. Incorporates time-varying covariates.
Robust Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sub-hazard ratios have already been exponentiated. 72

72 Ratios lower than one reflect a decreasing likelihood of gender quota adoption, while ratios above on reflect an increasing likelihood of gender quota adoption.
Legal candidate quotas are not included in the results presented in Table 3.3 or 3.4 due to insufficient observations for substantive and accurate interpretation. Of the three different types of gender quotas in the Arab world, these quotas are the least represented time-wise and log only fifteen observations across the Palestinian Authority, Mauritania, and Iraq, hence the lack of results. Event history operators are particularly sensitive to the number of observations and were not able to converge to generate results. Table 3.5 in the Appendix, however, gives a taste of what those results might be, albeit inflated through the use of multi-nominal logit estimator. In Sarah Bush’s (2011) research on gender quotas worldwide, she chooses to combine legal candidate quotas and reserved seats maintaining they both represent similar instances of legally institutionalized gender quotas as averse to voluntary policies. Perhaps the results for reserved seats can serve as an adequate proxy for possible outcomes in the case of legal candidate quotas.

The most striking findings in Table 3.3 and 3.4 reveal that development assistance continues to be predictive of the adoption of reserved seats without any effect on political party quotas. However, foreign direct investment significantly decreases the likelihood of adopting political party quotas. Interestingly, an increase in the inflow of remittances raises the likelihood of adopting both types of gender quotas. As expected, the predominant type of the financial incentive flowing into the region has a distinct impact on the nature of adopted gender policies. In both reserved seats and political party quotas, the level of economic development reduced the likelihood of adoption, as did the presence of a majoritarian electoral system. Unusually, a rise in fertility rates increased the likelihood of adopting reserved seats, but decreased the likelihood of adopting political party quotas, which I will touch upon in the discussion section.

73 Official development assistance, economic development, a majoritarian electoral regime, and fertility rates are all predictive of quota adoption, while foreign direct investment has a negative effect. The supply side indicators in the expanded model are positively predictive of quota adoption.
A. Reserved Seats

Reserved seats are found in a truly diverse array of countries: Djibouti, Jordan, Somalia, and Sudan with an equal array of differing electoral systems ranging from a proportional single transferable vote system in Jordan to majoritarian systems in Djibouti and Sudan. Reserved seats represent the most formalized iteration of gender quota adoption and usually require significant legislation and institutional change for implementation—a primary reason why they are often associated with pressure from abroad (see Bush 2011, Krook 2009). Most countries adopting reserved seats also tend to have conservative reputations vis-à-vis women’s rights and the Arab countries choosing this measure are no exception (Krook 2009). Unsurprisingly, official development assistance has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of adopting reserved seats, increasing it by 73 percent in the base model. Fertility rates also have a significant impact increasing the likelihood of adoption by 212 percent. This result is likely conflated with official development assistance, which is oftentimes extended to countries with demographic problems since intergovernmental organizations will prescribe gender-related policy reforms to curb such issues. The presence of a majoritarian electoral system decreases the likelihood of adopting reserved seats by 88 percent while level of economic development decreases by 47 percent. In the first expanded model, we see the same relationships re-appear with remittances increasing the likelihood of adopting a gender quota by 37 percent.

The final expanded model incorporating supply side factors reveals significant results in terms of the role of the prior legislative presence of women, levels of women’s secondary education, and women’s labor participation rates. The latter results are somewhat counter-intuitive as prior women’s presence in the legislature unexpectedly reduces the likelihood of
adopting reserved seats by 5 percent, while increasing levels of women’s labor participation decrease the likelihood of quota adoption by 15 percent, and a rise in women’s secondary education levels dampen the likelihood of adoption by 11 percent. The case of Jordan gives some insight into the negative findings. Most of the women within the Jordanian lower house of Parliament obtained their seats either through reserved seats adopted in 2003 or through the quota for the Circassian and Christian minorities as with the Circassian female candidate, Toujan Faysal – the first women elected to the Jordanian Parliament. Most of these women were adamantly against expanding the very-same quota that allowed them to become MPs in the first place, explicitly lobbying against proposals to raise the number of reserved seats from 6% to 12% in the lower house (Azzi 2007; Husseini 2010,). Per Toujan Faysal: “I am totally against all forms of quotas, which is in itself against the law, because the law states clearly: A member of the lower house is a person who gains the highest points of votes. Hence it is against the law to include any member who has not secured a seat through the democratic process of election. How can one justify a person getting into the Lower House without being elected, while a candidate who might have secured a sizable backing by the electorate is deprived of the right to sit under the dome? I had tried my best as a legislature to affect change. I presented an interrelated election law with no quotas; 27 MPs signed the petition, but it did not get past the legal committee” (The Star 2004).

In fact, the most strident supporters of the quota were local women’s non-governmental organizations, which consistently lamented the corruption of these self-same women in power and the fact that the quota attracted unqualified female candidates or “puppet parliamentarians” (Abou Zeid 2006; Husseini 2010, 2007). Despite significant increases in educational attainment
on the part of women and slight increases in their presence within the formal labor sector, this progress has largely been confined to elites, whose members both male and female had a concerted interest in conserving the status quo (Moghadam 2003; Sabbagh 2007,). Hence, why the results counter the expectations of modernization theory. Finally, in the full model official development assistance increases the likelihood of adopting reserved seats a substantial 462 percent, clearly outpacing the influence of other factors and highlighting the connection between this “binding” method of gender empowerment and external pressure for reform.

B. Political Party Quotas

Political party quotas are largely present in North African countries with a French colonial legacy—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. France also implements a political party quota to redress gender disparity within its own legislature and has served as a ready template for its former colonies. This quota is theoretically the most lax and least legally formalized since its adoption is contingent on each party independently deciding to incorporate it into its party statutes. In Morocco, this choice was made by collective decision in 2002 where all of the parties came to a consensus that 10% of their candidate lists should composed of women, adding this provision to their party statutes. In Algeria, conversely, only two parties mandate female electoral candidates: the National Liberation Front (FNL-Front de Libération Nationale) requires that in every province two out of the first five candidates have to be women, while the Movement of Society for Peace (HMS-Harakat Moudjtamaa As-Silm / Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix) requires that one-fifth of all candidates at the regional level be women. In effect, the statistical analysis in this case is de facto exploring why political parties individually choose to amend their statutes to reform candidate selection vs. why national governments choose to
entertain institutional reforms geared at increasing representation. While reserved seats reflect national interest and are the by-product of top-down agency, political party quotas echo local interests at the electoral recruitment stage since they are adopted often within limited and specific group of political parties representing discrete issues and demographics.

Many of the countries adopting political party quotas have exhibited some of the greatest gains for women within their legislatures and beyond despite their “voluntary” nature (28% of Tunisia’s legislature is female), hinting that gender quotas and foreign pressure slightly contributes to ensuring women’s substantive political participation. Considering all of these countries have flirted with “socialism” in their respective pasts with Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria hosting strong socialist parties, this ethos and its usual mandate of gender equality likely contributed to women’s mobilization in these societies (Richards and Waterbury 2007).

In the case of political party quotas four factors have the most consistent statistical impact: foreign direct investment, type of electoral system, level of economic development, and fertility rates. Official development assistance is not consistently significant. In the base model, foreign direct investment reduces the likelihood of adopting political party quotas by 24 percent. The level of economic development also decreases the likelihood of adopting these quotas by 55 percent, while rising fertility rates reduce the likelihood of quota adoption by 80 percent. The presence of a majoritarian electoral system decreases the likelihood of political parties adopting quotas by 100 percent. The latter is unsurprising since all three countries have proportional electoral systems mimicking their French colonial master. Level of democracy has the lone positive effect, increasing the likelihood of political parties adopting a gender quota by 11 percent. In the first expanded model controlling for the competing influence of other financial
sources, we see the same relationships re-appear except now remittances arise as the largest predictor for political party quotas, increasing the likelihood of their adoption by 497 percent! Unsurprisingly, in the four listed countries the level of remittances significantly outpaces development assistance and levels of foreign direct investment. The final expanded model incorporates supply side factors as controls and shows the same relationships as before with none of the supply-side variables appearing to be significant.

**Discussion**

The significant results for development assistance in the case of reserved seats hint at the bargaining mechanism underlying the incentives behind gender quota adoption. Broadly, international pressures can sway countries to modify their legal infrastructure to promote gender outcomes espoused by the West when financial rewards are dolled out. Foreign direct investment seems to have limited impact across countries adopting reserved seats, though this may be unsurprising considering the countries implementing this measure (Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and Jordan) do not attract as much as investment as they receive foreign aid and remittances, with the exception of Sudan. Furthermore, in Sudan foreign investment is largely geared at the oil industry with heaviest investors (China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Gulf states), preferring the status quo of Omar Bashar’s Islamic government. The majority adopts a “strictly business” policy of noninterference in domestic affairs, which would not favor institutional change at the national level (Council on Foreign Relations 2007; Goodman 2004). Political party quotas reflect a different array of interests, partially because the decision to adopt a gender quota is made at a more discrete, party-based level rather than imposed on a larger, national scale. In fact, foreign direct investment dampens incentives for political parties to adopt quotas. Perhaps, this
relationship reflects the *status quo* bias of the sources of foreign direct investment in North Africa since many of the European and Gulf states (The North Africa Journal 2009; World Bank 2010a,) that typically invest in the region are critical of even marginal political changes. Nor are investors from these countries as prone to associating “stability” and “security of investments” with democratization (see Nesbit 1998). Finally, remittances are associated with gender quota adoption across both political party quotas and reserved seats—a fascinating outcome that hints at the power of the *Diaspora* in potentially providing “grassroots” funding for politically and socially controversial gender reforms when international aid and political will are lacking (Brown 2006; Kapur 2005; Kapur and McHale 2003). This finding is especially interesting since remittances represent a pure injection of foreign exchange into the receiving economies—void of the bureaucratic entanglements of development assistance and insulated from the vicissitudes of private investors and money managers that characterize foreign direct investment.

In the case of fertility, the persistent yet counter-intuitive relationship where increases in fertility are associated with the greater likelihood of adopting a gender quota are likely an artifact of the chronically high rates of population growth in the Middle East, only exceeded by sub-Saharan Africa (Richards and Waterbury 2007, 71). Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Somalia are all countries with population growth rates above two percent (United Nations 2005). High fertility rates attract development assistance aimed at curbing problematic demographic outcomes—an issue squarely within the realm of gender-related policy. According to this logic, gender quotas arise as a salient policy response to pressure from the outside world to find coping strategies for women-specific
demographic issues such as infant or maternal mortality that are contingent on women gaining more control over their fertility and overall livelihood.

The question remains whether the significant and positive relationship between development assistance and the adoption of reserved seats is endogenous—i.e. did the adoption of progressive gender policies attract development assistance as a reward for undertaking suggested reforms and not vice versa. Anecdotal historical data illustrates that most Arab countries adopted gender quotas in the new millennium (see Table 3.1), yet foreign aid has been flowing into the region for the entirety of the past two decades (see Figure 3.2). Furthermore, the important shift in framing development as a gendered economic process spearheaded by the Beijing Conference and later the Millennium Development Goals, explains why previous financial inputs did not result in similar levels of gender quota diffusion across the Middle East and North Africa. Implementing gender policies has become a lucrative endeavor in the new millennium due to the Bretton Woods' institutions, as well as bilateral donors, increasingly conflating progress on gender issues with “development” and rewarding countries that do the same. Broadly, these findings also hint that development assistance is less fungible in the context of gender programming efforts, although it is likely extended under a broad “democratization” rubric where gender empowerment appears among the most “innocuous” reforms Arab policymakers envision. Ultimately, all of these empirical results reflect the increasing impact global finances have on shifts in Arab national policy, specifically in the case of gender-related political reforms.

Consider how loathe Arab “reformers” are to touch media laws or even religious freedom, yet gender is quite often used as a tool to “democratize”, as well as a vessel through which governments address other controversial topics such as religion (as in the case of family laws).
Conclusion

The previous analysis explored factors influencing the adoption of gender quotas across the Arab world, focusing on a neglected element—external financing in the guise of foreign direct investment, development assistance, and remittances. A majority of scholarship concentrates on the influence exerted through international legal frameworks promoting gender empowerment, consequently research exploring the economic incentives informing such controversial policy choices for Muslim and Arab majority countries is severely lacking. The

*This chart excludes Iraq and Egypt in the interest of showcasing regional averages in more detail. The substantial level of development assistance allocated to these two countries disallows a closer examination of regional trends when grouped with the rest of the Middle East. The four regional subgroups contain the following countries:

- Maghreb=Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Morocco;
- Gulf=Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman;
- the Levant=Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority;
- Africa=Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and the Comoros.
strategic calculus behind quota adoption becomes especially important when considering the shift in framing gender empowerment from a political to an economic good by many international and transnational organizations. This change in rhetoric turns women into a valuable commodity for countries pursuing economic development and seeking financial validation from the West for their chosen development strategies. Foreign aid, in particular, is consistently predictive of gender quota adoption overall, but reserved seats in particular. To reiterate, it is no accident that foreign donors influence the adoption of an often constitutionally mandated policy reform, which can have unpredictable, substantive, and long-lasting impacts on existing institutions. The fact that women in Djibouti, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Iraq still win legislative seats outright even with the existence of gender quotas implies there may yet be unintended substance to this policy.\textsuperscript{75} Chapter five illustrates this in more detail by describing the precipitous increase in women running for office since the adoption of quotas in Jordan and Morocco. Remittances also appear as a potentially homegrown source for women’s campaign finance at the local level, hinting at their possible role in the grassroots mobilization of disempowered groups for policy change.

Evidence from other transitioning countries may prove prescient in the Arab case—especially as the world looks to the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the current proto-revolutionary events in Egypt as potentially harkening the Arab world’s 1989 or, at least, a new round of institutional reform. Olga Shvetsova’s (2003) article on the consequences of the strategic choice of electoral rules in transitioning post-Communist Eastern Europe illustrates how new institutions once in place can become embedded within the political system in ways

\textsuperscript{75} Figures published by the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior show that percentage of female candidates on supplemental lists had risen from 4.8\% in 2003 to 15.7\% in 2009. In Jordan, the number of women campaigning for the six reserved seats within parliament rose from 54 in 2003 to 199 in 2007.
unanticipated by their original progenitors. She describes how the electoral reforms promulgated by the formerly Communist “brokers” of democratic transition in Poland, Russia, and Hungary often resulted in those selfsame individuals voted out of power. Yet, their original intent was to conserve incumbency through revised threshold requirements for national parliamentary elections or manipulating the size of electoral districts.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, a degree of institutional inertia and incomplete information resulted in “unintended consequences”. Per Shvetsova, “the connection between the strategic choice of institutions and the consequences of these institutions is anything but direct when information is incomplete.”\textsuperscript{77}

An Arab parallel for these “unintended” consequences of institutional choice played out in Jordan during the 2003 parliamentary elections. The 2003 election laws reserved six seats for women across the nation who received the highest percentage of votes in their districts regardless of their ranking \textit{vis-à-vis} other candidates. Since districts are drawn according to geographic criteria instead of population, women who run in less populated, rural areas improve their chances of securing a higher percentage of votes relative to their urban counterparts. Many tribes decided to nominate women because it increases their chances of representation in the government (Azzi 2007). A case in point: a small local tribe in the conservative second district of Tafilah overwhelmed the dominant district tribe’s male candidates by unexpectedly and pragmatically using the gender quota to elect the female parliamentarian, \textit{Insaf Khawalde}, thereby guaranteeing the community access to parliamentary rents through a \textit{woman’s} legislative mandate. Such a development may not seem controversial on the surface, but knowing the rigid tribal hierarchies of Jordan (see the work of Linda Layne or Andrew Shryock), much less how

\textsuperscript{76} See Shvetsova’s(2003) descriptions of parliamentary elections in Poland, Russian, and Hungary in the 1990s for more information (pp. 201-203).

\textsuperscript{77} Shvetsova 2003, 201.
staunchly conservative the Tafilah district is, highlights the novelty of such an event. A woman elected to represent the primary source of income for a small, conservative town in the Jordanian desert is not a trivial development. It was certainly not an intended consequence of the gender quota “sanctioned” by a Jordanian parliament dominated by larger tribes who had no expectation of smaller tribes using it to become more electorally competitive. The countries of the Gulf are wary enough of the transformative power of gender quotas in that they refuse to consider implementing such a measure. The continuing diffusion of such “hazardous policies” may yet bode well for Arab women—as the proverbial saying goes, “where there is smoke, there is fire”—and we can only hope quotas are the hint of broader gender empowerment measures to come.
Chapter 4: Can Public Space Be Democratized? Exploring Women’s Political, Economic, and Social Rights

“The problem was before that the law did not allow it [women’s political participation], now it’s the society itself that does not allow it.”

Interview with female member of the Shura Council, Manama, Bahrain, July 2009.

This chapter attempts to empirically explore women’s capacity to fully participate in Arab political life through an examination of existing women’s rights and their legal enforcement within Arab society. The analysis here transcends the legislative and institutional focus of the previous two chapters and considers the impact of global finance on women’s political, economic, and social rights, which more directly channel the overall socio-political environment. Furthermore, examining women’s rights nuances the measurement political inclusion and accesses a rich literature investigating the effects of foreign capital on human rights (Burkhart 1998; Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; Hafner-Burton 2005; Henderson 1996; McLaren 1998; Meyer, 1996, 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). Scholarship exploring the impact of foreign capital (or “economic globalization”) on human rights is often grouped into two camps: those reflecting the “liberal neoclassical” school and the “dependency” school. Women’s rights are similarly bifurcated into the Gender and Development (GAD) and Women in Development (WID) paradigms (see Akhter 2006; Richards and Gelleny 2007; Ward 1984). GAD theorists posit a Wallerstein-ian view of this relationship, maintaining economic globalization exacerbates women’s vulnerabilities in an already unequal gender playing field (Clark et al 1991; Pyle and Ward 2003; Ward 1984). Conversely, the WID perspective promotes a heady vision of women’s status improving alongside rising levels of economic development in line with the expectations of classical modernization theory (Braunstein 2006; Ingelhart and
Norris 2003b; Lerner 1958). In this chapter, I hope to illustrate the complexity underlying the question of women’s rights vs. capabilities in the Middle East as well as demonstrate that treating the effects of foreign capital as a unitary concept in the vein of the GAD and WID paradigms represents a disservice to both the globalization and gender literatures. This approach essentially trivializes the important differences between assorted types of foreign capital and impedes scholars’ ability to penetrate their varying effects as well as practitioners’ ability to craft informed policy relative to capital flows and their potential effects on societal change.

I posit the following question: How do different types of global capital affect progress on three forms of women’s rights in the Arab world from 1990 until 2009? Disaggregating these rights is an important step since political, economic, and social rights enjoy differing levels of institutionalization and enforcement in the Arab world. Surprisingly, women’s political rights are the most commonly institutionalized and standardized in the region, usually through constitutional provisions guaranteeing women’s’ right to vote, stand as political candidates, and be members of political parties. Women’s economic rights are also more readily formalized through legal guarantees of women’s right to work, to rightful compensation, to private property, and various provisions for maternity leave and childcare. Social rights, however, represent more complex phenomena, as they tend to be more diffuse and often fall under the purview of both civil and Islamic courts. In particular “personal status codes,” or Islamic laws regulating women’s personhood in the private and public realm, often contradict women’s constitutional rights to equality—especially when it comes to personal autonomy—thereby impeding women’s enjoyment of their often constitutionally guaranteed political and economic rights. Therefore, a disaggregated conceptualization of women’s rights allows for a more complete picture of the
realm in which gender disparity may be institutionalized, as well as its level of institutionalization (see Bradley and Khor 1993). I use measures for women’s rights gleaned from the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights dataset (2010). These indicators operationalize women’s capacity for political inclusion by encompassing (a) whether laws guarantee women an array of important economic, social, or political rights and (b) the level of their enforcement. Conceptualizing rights as a means to inclusion gives more insight into Arab women’s access to the public sphere and, ultimately, their capacity to function in the political arena. This is an important consideration for the Arab world when accounting for Muslim women’s traditionally circumspect roles in public life and the discriminatory informal and formal rules that govern their personhood.

**The Spectrum of Women’s Rights in the Arab World**

The introductory quote emphasized the rift between granting women the right to equality in the political arena versus allowing them the opportunity to meaningfully participate and legislate—in a broader sense, the right to full citizenship. Marshall (1965, 92) defines citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community,” implying the concept of citizenship encompassed the ability to fully participate in public life, as well as “the notion of autonomous personhood in a legal and bureaucratic sense” (Berkowitz 1999; Steenbergen 1994; Volde and Moran 1991). However, the majority of Arab women fall under the jurisdiction of “personal status laws” which specifically regulate the boundaries of female personhood within Arab society allowing men to treat women as only partially autonomous persons. Per the Arab Human Development Report (2005, 184), “Arab personal status laws, with regard to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, are witness to legally sanctioned gender bias.” These laws are often not
codified, but arbitrarily enforced by local *shari’ah* courts institutionalizing male privilege via *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and in some cases countermanding women’s constitutional rights to equality across the political, economic, and social spheres. Furthermore, *shari’ah* courts tend to wield more respect in their communities than Arab governments, which weakens existing legal guarantees protecting women’s rights. The following section elaborates on these concepts further detailing the specificities of the individual types of rights and how they interact with one another to foster or impede women’s mobility in and access to the public sphere.

**Political Rights: Voting and Representation**

While the Middle East has made incredible strides in closing the gender gap across basic income and education over the last thirty years, it hasn’t translated into levels of political engagement or even predicted levels of labor participation—a “development deficit” highlighted in the Arab Human Development Report of 2002. The previous chapters focused women’s representation within political institutions, but what role do basic legal rights play in facilitating women’s capacity in entering and functioning in the Arab public sphere? The Beijing Platform for Action called for women’s human rights to be recognized and for women to be empowered across the economic, political and cultural domains (United Nations 1996). Mandating institutional mechanisms for the political incorporation of women represented one of the 12 critical areas of concern within the Platform. Yet, in many respects, the majority of Arab nations have already made significant progress in these particular provisions for increasing women’s political inclusion. National legislation in most Arab states guarantees the equality of men and women before the law, and women’s basic political rights such as the right to participate in the electoral process and to stand for public office. In most Arab states these rights are
constitutionally mandated, while the countries that officially limit women’s political participation tend to limit suffrage overall (namely, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). While allowing women access to political institutions guarantees some legal rights in terms of political opportunity, the limited nature of these reforms hints that these rights are largely extended so long as the “participating” women reinforce the regime in power (Brand 1998). Thus, exploring a broader set of rights might be more reflective of how much opportunity and capacity women have to actually partake in and have credible access to politics. As Moghadam and Sentova (2005) state, women’s empowerment is a multi-dimensional process reflecting women’s enjoyment of their rights and the capacity for participation, a notion reminiscent of Amartya Sen’s (1999) thesis on enhancing citizens’ “capabilities,” which can in turn foster democratic development. Such capabilities are facilitated by factors within the economic and social arena, not solely those formalized in the political realm.

Importantly, many Arab women do not even view formal participation in the legislative process as a viable strategy for their own empowerment vis-à-vis men. In fact, 80 percent of Arab women active in the public domain maintained having a female presence within the formal state apparatus made no contribution to achieving gender-related goals. This may partially be a byproduct of the disingenuous reasons for including women in the political process as evidenced by the comments of an employee in the Bahraini Supreme Council for Women, “There is no true belief within party [in women]; there is a belief women’s participation stops at membership.”

78 From the Arab Human Development Report 2005: “See, for example, Article 21 of the Lebanese constitution, Article 8 of the Moroccan constitution, Articles 34,35,42 of the Qatari constitution, Article 1 of the Egyptian Law for the Exercise of Political Rights, Article 2 of the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies Law, Article 2 of the Tunisian Electoral Code, and Article 1 of the Bahraini Law for the Exercise of Political Rights.

79 IDEA: http://www.idea.int/women/parl/studies1a.htm
In terms of cultural barriers to women’s entry into the political sphere, Arab women face the most discriminatory public opinion attitudes on gender equality in the world with both men and women preferring male political leaders and entitling men to jobs when employment is scarce (Jamal and Tessler 2008). Amaney Jamal’s (2010a) research further demonstrated that these attitudes directly harm objective indicators of women’s status. Furthermore, the authoritarian nature of the political environments Arab women operate in serves as an additional barrier for their participation, as well as the credible participation of their male counterparts. Elections are not about representation, but rather tools for elite management—a method for Arab regimes to distribute favors and rents (Blaydes 2010; Lust-Okar 2006). Per Amaney Jamal (2010b, 12), “even women who do access political power must participate in this system of patrimony, which privileges existing patriarchal networks.” Therefore, only referring to legal guarantees of political rights may be insufficient to actually gage women’s substantive ability to politically participate in Arab society. Importantly, including women in the political life of even an authoritarian nation at least opens up the system to the chance of women’s equal participation in public life, if not exactly transformative of the regime. Even such a small political opening may set precedents for other disenfranchised groups to lobby for representation (Krook O’Brien 2010).

**Economic Rights: Labor Participation and Mobility**

If the political inclusion of Arab women is low relative to global counterparts, their levels of labor participation are abysmal (see Table 4.1 below). Yet, within Islamic history there are precedents for supporting women’s economic rights—especially when considering the wives of the Prophet Mohammed. Most notably, his first wife Sayeda Khadija was a successful...
independent businesswoman (Freedom House 2009). Female labor participation has historically been deemed an important component of women’s political empowerment with theories to this effect dating back to the work of Friedrich Engels (1884). Pippa Norris’ (1996a) research showed increased female labor force participation, especially in professional sectors, created a larger pool of potential applicants for political positions. Further research revealed the more access women had to outside income, the more influence they wielded within their families (Iverson and Rosenbluth 2006) and the more politically active they became (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999).

**Table 4.1 A Comparison of Male and Female Employment and Unemployment Rates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Female Employment-to-population ratio (%)</th>
<th>Male Employment-to-population ratio (%)</th>
<th>Female Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Male Unemployment rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed Economies and European Union</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td><strong>20.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Levels of women’s economic participation are partially related to their direct access to the labor market and the legal infrastructure facilitating this access. Interestingly, many Arab states have passed labor legislation explicitly protecting the rights of working women. Article 69 of the Jordanian constitution and Article 11 of the Egyptian constitution explicitly guarantee a women’s right to work. Article 5 of the Tunisian Labor Law goes as far as prohibiting gender discrimination in the workplace (Arab Human Development Report 2005). The Moudawana reforms of Morocco have also brought the issue of sex discrimination in the workplace to the forefront. A number of Arab states have laws guaranteeing rights to maternity leave (see Article 91 of the Egyptian Labor Law, Article 61 of the Bahraini Labor Law, Article 25 of the Kuwaiti Labor Law, Article 37 of the Moroccan Labor Law and Article 64 of the Tunisian Labor Law) (Arab Human Development Report 2005). Even with these progressive provisions, many opportunities for women are curtailed through personal status laws that penalize women for leaving their matrimonial homes or curtail their opportunity to work without a husband or other male guardian’s (muhram’s) consent. Many countries legally forbid women working in unsuitable professions: “Libyan labor law prohibits the employment of women in work that does not suit their nature” (Arab Human Development Report 2005, 185). Egypt, Tunisia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all explicitly outlaw women working at night (Arab Human Development Report 2005, 185).

Outside of the legal arena, there are considerable informal barriers to women’s ability to work. According to Amaney Jamal (2010b), low levels of economic participation are largely due

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80 The Moudawana laws refer to the personal status code or family law for Morocco.
81 Among other laws, Egypt prohibits the dismissal of working women during maternity leave (Article 92 of Egyptian Labor Law) or pregnancy and guarantees women the right to child care leave (Article 94 of the Egyptian Law of the Child), as well as a period for nursing infants (Article 71 of the Egyptian Law of the Child).
to three inter-related factors: the patriarchal order privileging domestic labor and child rearing as the only appropriate venues for women’s labor and in many countries even requiring a husband or father’s consent to allow women to work. Secondly, the high rates of unemployment coupled with a very conservative culture disadvantage women’s entry into the labor force. Finally, some of the highest rates of fertility (an average of 3.8 live births for each women between 2000-2005 according to the World Health Organization) in the world keep women away from the workforce, occupying them with child rearing (Arab Human Development Report 2005). Furthermore, the gap between women and men’s labor participation persists because the laws governing women’s economic rights are either not enforced or discriminatory behavior carries no legal ramifications.

However, an exploration of political and economic rights will not give a complete illustration of the conditions for women in the region. The enforcement of legal provisions in Arab countries is highly contingent on cultural mores—an arena where personal status codes and shari’ah laws encapsulated under the broader rubric of “social rights” fall. A more thorough consideration of social rights might give further insight into which cultural institutions beyond the legal purview bar women’s access to the public sphere. The existence of strict personal status laws can limit women’s political and economic participation by circumscribing their overall mobility.

**Social Rights: Personal Status Laws and the Public/Private Space Dichotomy**

For Arab women, especially those who are Muslim, personal status laws govern important aspects of their lives within the private and public realm pertaining to domestic relations and partnerships. This system of laws arose in the Arab Ottoman past and is often
adjudicated by the national judiciary or local shari‘ah courts heavily relying on classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Personal status laws govern all aspects of marriage (from inheritance to spousal abuse, adoption, and surrogacy), as well as its termination (divorce, annulment, property settlements, alimony and parental responsibility). In many Arab countries they also determine whether women have a right to private property and citizenship, as well as the granting of nationality to children—usually, the sole purview of the father. The latter two legal provisions can effectively curtail women’s economic and political capacity challenging their personal autonomy and social value. Generally, the nature in which personal status laws are codified preserves the primacy of men as legal caretakers of the family, while simultaneously relegating women to the hearth and often to the status of a permanent minor (Jamal and Nooruddin 2010; Joseph 1999; Moghadam 2007; UNDP 2005).

In terms of personal mobility, Moroccan scholar Fatima Sadiqi (1997) connects personal status laws to the gendering of space that arises from Arab custom. She describes how public space (“the state and the market”) was traditionally considered the masculine domain, while private space was the domain of women and children (“the powerless”). She maintains, “The two spaces are strictly dichotomized and interact in a dynamic way in the sense that one does not exist without the other. It is true that women can be in some public spaces--for example, on the street--but cannot stay there as men are encouraged to. Rather, women must do their business and move on. Also, men generally do not spend any time in the kitchen, for example, so the taboo applies to them, too, though with very different consequences.”

Personal status laws formalize this spatial dichotomy, hence they can have such a crippling effect on women’s ability to access and navigate the public sphere. Sadiqi claims this

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pattern of behavior was disrupted when women began to seek employment outside of the home in the Morocco of the 1960s. Moroccan women entered the workforce as a byproduct of the increasing poverty facing the kingdom at the time, with poorer women seeking work as domestics and in low-wage industries. Simultaneously, rising education levels among females allowed literate women openly pursuing jobs available to skilled labor for the first time. Sadiqi cites Fatima Mernissi’s (1994) observation of the time of workingwomen being unanimously vilified as the wives of low-income, ill-bred men who allowed their spouses to sully family reputations. Yet these initial forays into the labor market ultimately resulted in pressures to reform personal status laws in a bid to give women sufficient freedom to work (Charrad 2001; Moghadam 2003; Ross 2008). It is no accident that the countries that have seen the largest entrance of women into the labor market over time—namely, the Arab countries of North and East Africa, also have some of the most progressive personal status laws (see Table 4.2 below). According to the Arab Human Development Report (2005), personal status law in North Africa tend to be much more progressive than those of their counterparts in the Arab East precisely because of the necessity for women’s work to shore up household income in this impoverished region. Furthermore, the Report maintains Islamic religiosity is often not the primary reason for the imposition of restrictive personal status codes or family laws. It claims, “Family laws in the Maghreb show that it is possible for shari’ah to coexist harmoniously with the principle of equality between husbands and wives. Thus, gender equality in Arab legal systems is more the product of history, customs, and conventions than of authentic religious precepts” (Arab Human Development Report 2005, 195).”

83 An acute labor shortage allowed for this to be possible in the first part of the 20th century when Morocco actually hosted migrant labor from Spain.
Table 4.2 Mean of Women’s Labor Participation as % of Total Labor Force (1990-2009)

The Moroccan case is illustrative of how shari‘ah based personal status laws and the principle of equality can co-exist in an Arab setting. Recent Moudawana reforms are now a model for the rest of the Arab world. Prior to the passage of these reforms, the notion of guardianship regulated all aspects of women’s public mobility. Women required approval from male guardians to legally work, travel, or attend university. Yet, with the passage of the Moudawana laws most of these restrictions were formally lifted, even though enforcement still leaves much to be desired. Still, codification itself allows the laws to be standardized and
therefore more easily accessible and contested by women.

Tunisian women have long-enjoyed the most political and economic opportunity in the Middle East owing to codified family laws that were reformed shortly after independence in 1956, but more importantly enforced as former president Bourgiba looked to women as a bulwark against rising Islamism (Brand 1998). His government drafted a personal status code that gave women almost full equality in marriage, which allowed for their advancement in terms of employment and education (Charrad 2001; White 2001). It is likely no accident that the far-reaching Moudawana reforms of Morocco were passed in the wake of the Casablanca terrorist bombing of 2003. Many scholars have openly argued the young King hoped that by empowering women he could moderate Islamist factions within his society and secularize Morocco (Sadiqi 2010).

Importantly, not all legal reforms are equally empowering for women in the Arab world. In fact, many Arab regimes gamble that extending political rights to women is moot and usually results in the maintenance of the status quo than an evolution in politics—often because women vote according to what their tribes and families dictate (Freedom House 2009, Arabarrometer 2006). Furthermore, women much less men often do not bother to exercise their political rights in authoritarian regimes fearing government retribution or public acrimony. However, economic and social rights directly affect women’s welfare, independence, and mobility in ways that are tangible to Arab women. Revisions in personal status laws can afford women significantly greater mobility and autonomy outside the hearth, as well as opportunity in the case of divorce or death of a spouse. Changes to labor policy incorporating mandatory maternal leave or the sanctioning sexual harassment create incentives for women to work and provide safe
environments therein. In fact, the ultimate importance of political rights lies in their ability to give women the opportunity to meaningfully legislate for improved economic and social rights—no more, no less.

Amaney Jamal (2010) credits the successful push for the Moudawana laws in Morocco to three inter-related dynamics: women’s grassroots activism, international influence, and the commitment of the monarchy. The success of grassroots activism and the effect of benevolent leadership on the promotion of progressive women’s rights policy are difficult to gage statistically due to limited data and questions of content and concept validity in coding the data that is available. Furthermore, they lend themselves more to an in-depth case analysis, which I will provide in chapter five. However, the impact of international influence on women’s rights can be statistically evaluated and will be in the methodology section. The following section describes the relationship between international economic influence and women’s rights.

**International Economic Influence**

The previous two chapters discussed the impact of international economic factors on women’s legislative representation and related policy change (gender quotas), but did not attempt to encapsulate a more holistic measure of women’s political capacity through a human rights approach (Burkhart 1998; Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; Hafner-Burton 2005; Henderson 1996; Meyer, 1996, 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; McLaren 1998). As stated previously, the study of the effects of the flow of foreign capital on women’s status in developing countries can be viewed through two paradigms: GAD and WID. Gender and Development (GAD) theorists adopt a Wallerstein-ian world-system view of the role of foreign capital in disempowering women (Clark et al 1991; Pyle and Ward 2003; Ward 1984). Investment friendly environments are deemed to limit budgetary spending, shrink taxes, and
privatize government services (Maxfield 1998), while the conditionality associated with foreign aid (especially of the multilateral variety) often promotes neoliberal economic policies curtailing social programs that benefit and employ women (Acker 2004; Bergeron 2001). Women tend to be among the most vulnerable populations in developing societies and when public spending is cut, evidence shows they suffer disproportionately (Bergeron 2001; Hemmati and Gardiner 2002; Rao and Kelleher 2005).

Conversely, the Women in Development perspective (WID) theorists visualize an outcome akin to the predictions of conventional modernization theory in line with liberal neoclassical beliefs in the power of foreign capital and economic growth to promote development (Bakker 2007; Braunstein 2006; Ingelhart and Norris 2003b; Lerner 1958; World Bank 2001.). Foreign investment accelerates economic development benefitting women through its spillover effects on education, local incomes, and in some cases norms-diffusion (Acker 2004; Bhagwati 2004; Deo 2006; Gray et al. 2006; Hafner-Burton 2004). It shifts women’s economic and labor rights from a national to an international jurisdiction, a transition that tends to view women’s participation in the public sphere more favorably (Deo 2006). The United Nations’ (1999) furthers this view stating, “Economic development is closely related to the advancement of women. Where women have advanced, economic growth has usually been steady; where women have been restricted, there has been stagnation.”

Certainly, foreign companies have an interest in lobbying for labor laws that give workers regardless of gender more mobility, thus we can expect to see a positive impact on women’s economic rights. In fact, Morocco and Tunisia enjoy the highest rates of female labor force participation due to both foreign and local export-oriented industries preferring unmarried,
mobile who could be paid lower wages in the interest of keeping labor costs low and competing on the global market. According to Joekes (1982), by 1980 Morocco’s textile workforce in foreign-owned, export-oriented companies was 75 percent female and accounted for 75 percent of growth in female employment in the 1990s (Assaad 2004). Development assistance is allocated with the expectation of seeing progressive social reforms enforced and would thereby improve the spectrum of women’s rights. Finally, remittances could either financially empower women to agitate for their rights through cash inputs or are perhaps filtered into a country with the express purpose for funding similarly disempowered groups with political agendas that favor women.

In both of the GAD and WID scholarly agendas, foreign capital is treated as a mechanism for economic globalization or “international economic penetration”, yet the many iterations of external finance might have a decidedly different effect when disaggregated and decoupled from these concepts. Increasingly, multi-dimensional models of foreign capital incorporating foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, foreign debt, and development assistance are used to evaluate whether foreign economic penetration improves or deteriorates a developing countries’ human right record (Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). I further expand on this line of research by incorporating a new iteration of foreign capital—remittances—into my analysis.⁸⁴ This

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⁸⁴ Remittances nuance the examination of the sway global finance in developing countries, as they increasingly represent one of the largest sources of external money, but elicit very different socio-economic outcomes from foreign direct investment or official development assistance. Remittances have no associated conditionality as with foreign aid and they do not engender income volatility as with FDI or portfolio investment due to their being “unrequited” (Singer 2010, Ahlquist 2006, Scheve and Slaughter 2004). Finally, remittances tend to be counter-cyclical, serving as de facto insurance policies for developing countries in times of economic crisis (Kapur 2005). They can effectively serve as injections of cash into desperate communities and shore up defunct attempts at economic development (Kapur and McHale 2003). However, they may also be used to fund controversial social causes such as women’s or minority rights. In my discussions with a Moroccan women activist, she and other Amazigh interlocutors mentioned how the Amazigh movement had been funded from remittances coming from Europe and had successfully managed to overturn legislation mandating all Moroccan names be arabized. It is
research uses foreign direct investment, development assistance, and remittances as percentages of Gross Domestic Product to operationalize a more multi-dimensional view of foreign capital and its specific effects on an array of women’s rights. My expectations are formalized in the following hypotheses based on results from previous chapters showcasing the positive impact of foreign capital on women’s legislative presence:

\[ H1: \text{Rising levels of development assistance and foreign direct investment will have a positive effect on women’s political rights. The effect of remittances will be negligible.} \]

\[ H2: \text{Rising levels of development assistance and foreign direct investment will have a positive effect on women’s economic rights. The effect of remittances will be negligible.} \]

\[ H3: \text{Rising levels of development assistance will have a positive effect on women’s social rights, while the effects of foreign direct investment and remittances will be negligible.} \]

In chapters two and three, development assistance was shown to positively affect the number of women representatives in Arab legislatures over time, as well as increase the likelihood of adopting a gender quota. Thus, I expect it to have the most significant impact on women’s political rights. Foreign direct investment also had a similarly positive impact on women’s legislative presence, often by funding the campaigns of prominent Arab women connected to foreign investors, hence my expectation of its positive effect on political rights. In terms of economic rights, all three types of foreign capital represent opportunities for women to independently obtain funds, which could increase their autonomy within the household—whether through micro-financing sponsored by international aid organizations or through multi-national corporations willing to hire women. Finally, development assistance will be the sole financial indicator with an effect on Arab women’s social rights since it explicitly targets the possible that these monies are being used to fund other attempts at policy change and avoiding detection from the central government.
controversial reform of restrictive personal status laws and family codes in the region. Since remittances can serve as rival source of foreign exchange in the Middle East, they may dampen the effects of conditional aid and should be controlled for in this analysis (Kapur 2003; Richards and Waterbury 2007). Much as with foreign direct investment, remittances can also bolster household incomes to the point where dis-incentivize women from entering the workforce—especially in conservative tribal cultures (Ross 2008). Without opportunity or pressure to work, women face little prospect of gaining financial autonomy and have limited incentives to lobby for greater rights.

A Quantitative Analysis of Women’s Rights

The Model

In previous chapters, I demonstrated that international financial incentives impacted the likelihood of Arab women’s political inclusion into the legislative arena in the Middle East and North Africa. Could official development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances exert similar power across a broader array of women’s rights? I test this assumption using data from the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights (CIRI) dataset to code three dependent variables encapsulating women’s political, economic, and social rights. Cingranelli and Richards’ coding draws on the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and on Amnesty International’s Amnesty International Report, with both reports extensively surveying human rights practices and conditions among 195 world countries annually. The women’s rights variables are coded on an ordinal scale ranging from 0-3. CIRI represents one of the few databases incorporating gender indicators that have no missing data for the Middle East and North Africa. The United Nation’s Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM) have limited observations for the Arab world and are therefore not utilized in this analysis. The three dependent variables are described in detail below.

*Women’s Political Rights*

This dependent variable includes the following rights: the right to vote and run for office, the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political parties, and the right to petition government officials. It is coded from 0 to 3 on the following scale:

0=Women’s rights are not guaranteed by law and laws completely restrict the political participation of women (ex: Saudi Arabia)
1=Women’s political participation is guaranteed by law, but women hold less than 5 percent of high ranking government positions (ex: Libya)
2=Women’s political participation is guaranteed by law, and women hold more than 5 percent but less than 30 percent of high ranking government positions (ex: Tunisia)
3=Women’s political participation is guaranteed by law, and women hold more than 30 percent of high ranking government positions (Ex: Iraq during the 2005 election cycle)

*Women’s Economic Rights*

This dependent variable includes the following rights: the right to equal pay for work, the free choice of profession or employment (no requirement for male chaperone’s consent), the right to gainful employment without obtaining male chaperone’s consent, equality in hiring and promotion, job security (guaranteed maternity leave, unemployment benefits, etc.), nondiscrimination by employers, the right to be free of sexual harassment in the workplace, the right to work at night, in occupations classified as dangerous and to work in the military or police force. This variable ranges from 0 to 3 (Tunisia) on the following scale:

0=Women’s economic rights are not guaranteed by law, the law reinforces sex discrimination, and there is a high tolerance for gender discrimination in the workplace exhibited by the government (ex: Saudi Arabia)

---

85 Observations 308; Mean 1.11; Standard Deviation: 0.75.
86 Observation 311; Mean 0.98; Standard Deviation 0.55.
1=A portion of women’s economic rights are guaranteed by the law, but enforcement is weak with the government tolerating moderate levels of gender discrimination in the workplace (ex: Algeria)

2=A portion of women’s economic rights is guaranteed by law, but enforcement is weak with the government tolerating low levels of gender discrimination in the workplace (ex: Mauritania)

3=All women’s economic rights are guaranteed by law with the government enforcing labor laws and has a no-tolerance policy vis-à-vis gender discrimination in the workplace (ex: Tunisia in 2003)

**Women’s Social Rights**

This dependent variable includes the following rights: the right to equal inheritance, the right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men, the right to travel abroad, the right to obtain a passport, the right to confer citizenship to children or a husband, the right to initiate a divorce, the right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage, the right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities, the right to an education, the freedom to choose a residence/domicile, and freedom from forced sterilization. It is coded from 0 to 3 on the following scale:\[87\]:

0= Women’s social rights are not guaranteed by law and the law reinforces gender discrimination with the government having a high tolerance for discrimination in the social realm (ex: Saudi Arabia)

1= Women’s social rights are partially guaranteed by law, but the government does not enforce the laws effectively and tolerates a moderate level of gender discrimination (ex: Syria)

2= Women’s social rights are partially guaranteed by law, but the government does not enforce the laws effectively and tolerates a low level of gender discrimination (ex: Tunisia)

3= All of women’s social rights are guaranteed by law, and the government enforces the law and tolerates no gender discrimination.  
*(None of the Arab countries scored “3” on this indicator)*

The independent variables reflect the same set of indicators presented in chapters two and three. Development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances are channeling

---

87 Observations 269; Mean 0.44; Standard Deviation 0.58
Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko’s (2001) multi-dimensional notion of “foreign economic penetration,” but here they each have an independent importance (all three are derived from the World Bank). The remaining indicators channel alternative hypotheses. Prior research demonstrated democracy was related to enhanced government respect for women’s rights, hence the inclusion of the Polity IV scores as a measure for level of democratization. GDP per capita is also included in this model since levels of economic development can improve citizen’s income and possibly empower women by putting more funds directly under their control. Fertility rates reflect whether women have the time or capacity to engage in activities within the public domain (Amaney Jamal 2010), while labor participation and education showcase women’s ability to exercise and benefit from mobility. All of these data are derived from the World Bank’s 2010 World Development Indicators dataset. A lagged variable reflecting women’s prior legislative representation hopes to capture if female politicians are lobbying for improvements in women’s rights. The electoral system is only utilized as a control in the case of women’s political rights since it can plausibly affect the likelihood of their political recruitment and therefore creating a female presence within governing institutions with a potential interest in conserving incumbency. Ultimately, the type of electoral system would most likely only have an indirect effect on women’s economic rights or social rights, and is not featured in those models as a control. Finally, I control for the unique situation of the Gulf countries using a Gulf dummy variable.

Women’s social/economic/political rights= α (constant) + β1 Development Assistance (logged) + β2 Foreign Direct Investment (logged) + β3 Remittances (logged) + β4 Economic Development (logged) + β5 Electoral System + β6 Democracy + β7 Fertility Rates + β8 Gulf states (dummy) + β9 Women’s Legislative Representation
Linear regression is inappropriate for the prediction of ordinal outcomes when the distribution of the dependent variable is not normal as in the case of the three dependent variables capturing women’s rights (Hoffman 2004). Ordinal data is usually estimated using an ordered logistic or an ordered probit model. However, both of these estimators are highly sensitive to violations of the proportional odds assumption—the supposition that the relationship between each pair of outcome groups (categories) is the same. Violations of the proportional odds assumption are more likely as datasets become more complex, yet have fewer observations as in the case of data on the Middle East and North Africa. An alternative to these estimators is generalized ordinal logistic regression (gologit), an unconstrained model yielding the same goodness of fit as running a multinomial logistic regression, while being less restrictive in its assumptions (Long and Freese 2006; Williams 2006). Yet, Clogg and Shihadeh (1994) argue that the generalized ordinal logistic regression model does not represent an ordinal model since it is completely unconstrained and thus equal to the results of a multinomial regression model.

Ultimately, I use ordinal generalized linear regression (oglm) since it retains the ordinal structure of the data without being too restrictive in its assumptions and still has the ability to estimate partial proportional odds (Williams 2009, 2010). Heterogenous choice models such as generalized ordinal logistic regression are more apt for correcting for the variance in the error

---

88 Ordinal logistic regression assumes the relationship between the independent variables and the logits (outcome groups) are the same for all of the logits, as well as assuming the error variance is the same across groups/categories and across cases.

89 The “gologit” estimator is also capable of producing negative probabilities and is especially susceptible when the sample size is small as with my data. This is usually a more trivial occurrence unless a substantial proportion of the independent variables yield negative probabilities, in which case the model may be mis-specified.

90 In fact, Keel and Park (2006) venture it is effectively an example of a class of generalized nonlinear models and that the oglm moniker is a misnomer.
terms across individual cases and may therefore be more reliable at controlling for heteroskedasticity (Keele and Park 2006; Williams 2009). Importantly, Keele and Park (2006) maintain these models may contain unusual nonlinearities (due to their unconstrained form), which could be sensitive to variance misspecification and generate biased estimates. An additional problem with using discrete-choice models is that country-fixed effects lead to biased coefficients and standard errors (Stata 2003). Since the dependent variables approximate normal distributions despite their ordinal nature, I conduct an additional robustness test in OLS using fixed-effects (see Table 4.10 in the Appendix). Finally, I incorporate time varying covariates since the data reflects women’s rights from 1990 until 2009 across the 22 Arab League member states.

Findings

Table 4.3 below reveals the diverse effects of three indicators of global capital across the indicators of women’s political, economic, and social rights. The subsequent tables (4.5, 4.6, 4.7) highlight the statistical results with the ensuing commentary explaining their importance and their relationship to the hypotheses.

Table 4.3 The Effects of Global Finance on Three Forms of Women’s Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Official Development Assistance</th>
<th>Foreign Direct Investment</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Political Rights</td>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>Negative effect (-)</td>
<td>No effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Economic Rights</td>
<td>Positive effect (+)</td>
<td>Positive effect (+)</td>
<td>Negative effect (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Social Rights</td>
<td>Positive effect (+)</td>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>Negative effect (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political Rights

Previous analysis by Richards and Gelleny (2007) found only a weak positive relationship between debt conditionality and women’s global political rights in the pre-globalization era (i.e. prior to the 1990s) with all other foreign capital indicators insignificant. Interestingly, Arab women’s political rights also seem to be the least influenced by external financial capital when compared to economic and social rights. These results are especially surprising considering the significance of foreign capital for women’s legislative representation and the adoption of gender quotas in previous chapters. Yet, there is a ready explanation for such findings. The women’s political rights indicator as coded by Richards and Cingranelli focuses on the right to suffrage, to run for office, as well as to join political parties, which had been granted in many of the Arab countries prior to the 1990s (the time period under observation) so the presence of non-significant findings for foreign capital is not unexpected (see Table 4.8 in the Appendix).

Across four models in Table 4.4 using Arab women’s political rights as a dependent variable, only foreign direct investment had a significant and negative relationship from the indicators expressing external finance disconfirming hypothesis one on the importance of aid. In the base model, every one unit increase in foreign direct investment was associated with a 47 percent decrease in the odds of having more extensive political rights for women. Additionally, a one-unit rise in fertility rates resulted in a 60 percent decrease in the odds of having more extensive political rights. Upon the inclusion of women’s prior legislative representation into the model, the effect of foreign direct investment rose to 53 percent, while fertility’s effect dropped to 54 percent. For each percentage increase in female legislators within Arab assemblies, the
odds of progress on women’s political rights increased by 30 percent. These same relationships maintained their significance with the inclusion of supply-side variables channeling women’s education and labor participation. The final model restricts the sample to non-Gulf countries. ⁹¹ Again, foreign direct investment and women’s legislative representation exhibited the most pronounced effects, while fertility lost its significance. Each one-unit increase in foreign direct investment decreased the odds of progress on political rights by 58 percent in non-Gulf countries, while a one-unit increase in women’s legislative representation raised the odds by 40 percent. Removing these states from the sample dampened fertility’s effect on women’s political rights in other Arab countries. ⁹²

Foreign direct investment’s negative impact on women’s political rights is likely an artifact of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) attracting a majority of the foreign investment flowing into the region, yet arguably making the least progress in terms of women’s legislative and executive presence. ⁹³ However, controlling for non-GCC countries demonstrated that foreign direct investment also had a negative impact on political rights in the Levant and North Africa. In prior chapters, foreign direct investment increased the numbers of women within Arab legislatures, possibly serving as an alternative source of campaign money for credible parliamentary candidates since in my experience many of these women had jobs tied to foreign investments. Even though successful female candidates may actively use money derived from jobs working for foreign companies to sponsor their campaigns, that money does not necessarily promote agendas that favor women’s political participation. Consequently, foreign direct

⁹¹ Unfortunately, there are too few observations to make the same comparison across the states of the Persian Gulf.
⁹² The Gulf countries have notoriously high fertility rates and many women are afforded the luxury to remain in the hearth due to generous government subsidies, while their counterparts in the rest of the Middle East cannot afford to remain at home yet must simultaneously lobby for officially granted mobility.
⁹³ In the case of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, full suffrage has not even been extended.
investment may ultimately operate as a supply-side factor—i.e. it promotes female candidates by empowering women financially in environments where political parties may not be willing to risk their funds on a questionable candidate. Yet, it decreases the likelihood of progress on women’s political rights because it favors status quo politics. The interests underlying foreign investments do not have much to gain from women’s political empowerment, but have quite a bit to gain from women having more economic opportunities as they represent a cheap workforce and a network of new, independent consumers—hence, the positive impact of foreign direct investment on economic rights.

Finally, high average fertility rates dampen political rights likely by restricting the supply of politicized women since the associated domestic responsibilities take women out of the public sphere directly decreasing their influence in advocating for improved political rights. Women’s prior legislative representation significantly increased the odds of improved political rights, hinting at this indicator’s simultaneous effect on the demand and supply of female political candidates. With women already filling seats in Parliament, there is a population potentially demanding or serving as beacons for enhanced political rights (demand-side), though there are often women who actively lobby against those self-same rights especially among Islamist candidates (see current MP Bassima Hakkaoui of Morocco or former MP Hayat Massimi of Jordan). By virtue of women’s presence in political institutions, they are also a likely pool for future government positions (supply-side via incumbency) and still serve as role models for other women looking to enter the political arena regardless of their political affiliations. Related

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94 In my observations from interviews with female political candidates and parliamentarians in Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain, it seems that these women generally mimic the fertility rates of their respective countries and do not have fewer children than the norm. Importantly, many of these interview subjects stated that they waited until their children were adults to become politically active. According to this logic, the more childbearing is spaced out over time, the longer a woman would have to wait for the opportunity to engage in politics.
research conducted in Western Europe (Childs 2001; Dahelerup 1988; Mckay 1996; Sainsbury) and Sub-saharan Africa (Devlin and Elgie 2008) has found mixed results regarding whether female parliamentarians help the passage of women-friendly legislation. In most cases, they have raised these agendas, but have not been successful in promulgating them into legal reforms.

*Economic Rights*\(^9^5\)

All of the indicators representing global finance were significant in the model incorporating women’s economic rights presented in Table 4.5. In the base model, each unit increase in official development assistance raised the odds of progressive economic rights by 87 percent, while foreign direct investment increased them by 118 percent, thus confirming *hypothesis two*. Contrarily, each unit increase in remittances decreased those odds by 47 percent. Magnitude-wise, levels of economic development had the most substantial impact, increasing the odds of progressive economic rights by 330 percent. These same relationships were repeated across the expanded models with even the model incorporating the non-Gulf countries revealing similar patterns and approximately similar magnitudes. These results are not surprising since recent development-related research has shown that foreign aid may yield the best outcomes when fostering entrepreneurship among women in disadvantaged communities through micro-lending and related economic initiatives (Kabeer 2009; Moghadam 2003). Foreign direct investment is also positively related to women’s economic rights, which is unsurprising considering foreign companies tend to be more open to hiring women and may even push to

\[^9^5\] In the next two analyses, I remove majoritarian electoral systems from the control variables, as I do not believe this indicator is relevant in determining whether we see improvements in women’s economic and social rights. Technically, women’s presence in Arab legislatures will channel the extension of these rights more effectively than the type of electoral system and whether it curtails women’s access into the political arena. This indicator is far more important for analyzing what contributes to women’s legislative presence as I do in chapter two. Finally, robustness tests showed it had a non-significant effect in all iterations.
liberalize labor laws limiting their mobility (Braunstein 2007; Coleman 2010). Surprisingly, remittances have a negative effect on women’s economic rights. The extensive amount sent back to Arab countries from males working abroad may render the need for women entering the labor force—often to compensate for the shortfall in domestic income—unnecessary and thus cripple efforts to grant women more access to the workplace. According to Mernissi’s claim, women’s entering the labor market was considered a necessary evil in the past and newer statistics show that these attitudes may still be pervasive (see Table 4.4 below).

### Table 4.4 Arab Public Opinion on Women’s Economic Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Values Survey 2005-2008</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women.</strong></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab Barometer 2006&lt;sup&gt;97&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages</strong></td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Social Rights**

Finally, women’s social rights exemplify the most pressing set of rights in terms of women’s public and private mobility as coded by Cingranelli and Richards, and in many respects, the most difficult liberties to standardize and institutionalize in the Arab world. Social

<sup>96</sup> If the remittances from Arab males working abroad compensate for this short fall, there would be no need for families to encourage their women to work—hence, the negative effect of remittances on women’s economic rights.

<sup>97</sup> Available at http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/countryreports/comparisonresults06.html
rights are singularly important for Arab women since they are closely linked to female roles within the family unit or private sphere. This is especially the case since most of the social rights captured by this indicator tend to fall under family or personal status codes in the Middle East and North Africa, and translate most reliably to the degree of access women have to the public sphere. Here, two indicators encompassing global finance were also consistently significant—namely, official development assistance and remittances. Official development assistance increased the odds of more progressive social rights by 245 percent for each unit increase—an expected outcome considering the extensive lobbying by foreign non-governmental organizations to reform family codes across the Arab world. This was the case of Morocco with the passage of the revolutionary Moudawana laws and to some extent in the recent revisions of the Sunni family code in Bahrain. Remittances had a negative effect on women’s social rights reducing the odds of progress by 44 percent. By propping up the domestic status quo favoring the patriarch’s control of the household, remittances neutralize the importance of women in the private and public sphere, which gives women less leverage to bargain for other rights. Level of economic development similarly reduced the odds of progressive social rights by 98 percent, while each unit increase in average fertility reduced them by 96 percent. These same relationships persist in direction and magnitude, but running the analysis on a non-Gulf subset of the Arab world, increased the significance of foreign direct investment, which decreased the odds of progress on social rights by 66 percent.

---

98 Personal status codes are further complicated by the fact that Sunnis and Shiites conceptualize them differently (see Welchman 2009).
99 This will be discussed in more depth in chapter five.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients/Robust Standard Errors</th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Expanded Model 1</th>
<th>Expanded Model 2</th>
<th>Non-Gulf Arab Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>-0.64*</td>
<td>-0.77*</td>
<td>-0.91*</td>
<td>-0.87***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>-1.35**</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>-0.93***</td>
<td>-0.78**</td>
<td>-1.13**</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System (Majoritarian)</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation (lagged)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td><strong>0.34</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Secondary Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Labor Participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Dummy</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.67)</td>
<td>(2.48)</td>
<td>(2.27)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-89.67</td>
<td>-78.033</td>
<td>-42.59</td>
<td>-64.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Too few observations in Gulf countries to run regional comparison model.
ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.
Incorporates time-varying covariates Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Expanded Model 1</th>
<th>Expanded Model 2</th>
<th>Non-Gulf Arab World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.61***</td>
<td>0.90***</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>0.78**</td>
<td>0.81***</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>-0.64***</td>
<td>-0.60***</td>
<td>-0.77***</td>
<td>-0.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Economic Development (log)</strong></td>
<td>1.46**</td>
<td>1.58**</td>
<td>1.22*</td>
<td>1.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fertility Rate</strong></td>
<td>-0.57*</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-1.31***</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s Legislative Representation (lagged)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s Secondary Education</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s Labor Participation</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gulf Dummy</strong></td>
<td>-3.32</td>
<td>-3.06</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
<td>(2.30)</td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R²</strong></td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log-likelihood</strong></td>
<td>-77.177</td>
<td>-75.56</td>
<td>-44.40</td>
<td>-71.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Too few observations to run a regional comparison model for the Gulf countries

ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.

Incorporates time-varying covariates

Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Expanded Model 1</th>
<th>Expanded Model 2</th>
<th>Non-Gulf Arab World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>1.24***</td>
<td>1.25***</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-1.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong>*</td>
<td>-0.44*</td>
<td>-0.44**</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>-4.04***</td>
<td>-3.97***</td>
<td>-3.90**</td>
<td>-2.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(1.94)</td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>-3.35***</td>
<td>-3.31***</td>
<td>-3.15***</td>
<td>-2.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation (lagged)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Secondary Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Labor Participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Dummy</td>
<td>9.39***</td>
<td>9.38***</td>
<td>8.68**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.40)</td>
<td>(3.38)</td>
<td>(4.30)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-70.67</td>
<td>-70.64</td>
<td>-35.78</td>
<td>-77.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.
Incorporates time-varying covariates
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conclusion

Overall, I find that all three kinds of global finance (official development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances) have significant effects on women’s economic and social rights, but often have negligible impact on their political rights. Most intriguingly, official development assistance positively impacts both women’s economic and social rights, challenging existing literature on the minimal effect of aid on human rights, in general (Richards and Gelleny 2007; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001). The immediate implication of this finding is that foreign aid may not have the same effect across all regional contexts. Most scholarship considering the consequences of an influx of foreign capital (usually conceived as “economic globalization”) on human rights overall or women’s rights specifically has been macro in scope. My findings imply that more micro-level regional inspection may yield decidedly different outcomes than large-scale cross-national analysis. The previous two chapters demonstrated conditionality has been effective in the case of gender-related policy change in the Arab world. It is possible the strategic interests and pressures underlying the allocation of development assistance to the Middle East and North Africa (as well as the sheer amounts pumped into the region) are more likely to “yield” progress on women’s rights indicators than in less targeted regions of the world. Such a result demonstrates the potential fallacy of approaching development policymaking and aid allocation from a one-size-fits-all perspective and highlights the importance of recognizing the unique qualities of aid recipient countries.

I believe the latter result is the byproduct of the political rights’ indicators focus on extending suffrage to women. The majority of Arab League member states extended the right to vote to women before the 1990s (the period under investigation dates from 1990 until 2009) with only a few exceptions among the Gulf states (see Table 4.7 for a timeline of suffrage in the Arab League).
The legacy of foreign direct investment is more challenging to interpret since in past chapters it has had a positive effect on women’s legislative representation, yet has also decreased the likelihood of adopting political party quotas. Here, it negatively impacts the extension of women’s political rights, but empowers women in terms of economic rights. Considering there are only four countries that extended the right to vote in the period under observation (Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) from 1990-2009, we can safely assume foreign direct investment had the greatest impact on these four Gulf Cooperation Council members. The four countries have a mixed record in terms of women’s political inclusion, but all four primarily attract investment geared at oil production—an industry promoting “atypically patriarchal norms, laws, and political institutions” (Ross 2008, 1). Ross (2008) and Moghadam’s (2003) research revealed an empirical link between lagging female political representation and oil wealth since oil production reduces incentives to incorporate women into the labor force, which tangentially curbs their political influence. Oil-wealthy countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman had the fewest women in their workforce and political institutions, and were also reluctant to grant female suffrage. Conversely, Arab countries that had little to no oil wealth (Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Djibouti) were some of the first to grant female suffrage and performed better on the aforementioned indicators. It is no accident that Algeria, the only North Africa net oil exporter, also has some of the lower rates of female representation for the Maghreb.

Interestingly, the perverse incentives engendered via a dominant petroleum sector also explain why remittances negatively impact women’s social and economic rights. Countries such as Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan have never been never oil-rich, yet they performed more poorly on
gender indicators than their North African counterparts. Importantly, these states are the largest exporters of labor to the oil-wealthy countries of the Persian Gulf. Both remittances and oil bring in foreign exchange to Arab nations raising the real exchange rate bolstering household income (Ross 2008). As discussed previously in this chapter, a boost in household income decreases the need for women to seek work outside of the hearth. Moreover, a strong currency penalizes low-wage, export-oriented manufacturing jobs that tend to employ women further reducing opportunities for women to find employment.

Ultimately, my findings clearly demonstrate that Arab women’s social and economic status (and political rights to a limited extent) is associated with the international financial capital, while highlighting the disparate effects of development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittances. Furthermore, they re-affirm the importance of development assistance in improving conditions for women whether by forcing the hands of policymakers or through programs that place cash and opportunity into the hands of women. While other research has shown that this is not universally the case, development assistance seems to have a particular import for improving women’s social and economic rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, the results also corroborate Michael Ross’ (2008) conclusions regarding the potentially corrosive effects of the “resource curse” on women’s empowerment in the Arab world in terms of foreign direct investment and remittances.
CHAPTER 5: BEYOND NUMBERS? EXPLORING THE SUBSTANCE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL INCLUSION

“...talking about feminism is like academia... when you go outside it doesn’t matter.”
Interview with employee of the Subul Assalam Center
Fes, Morocco 2008

The quote above came from a women’s activist I interviewed in Morocco in the summer of 2008. She was one of my first interview subjects and I was prone to believe her take on the futility of feminist advocacy in the Arab context. Over time, I realized her skepticism was misplaced and that the open discussion of women-specific objectives and the activism of local feminist networks was key in fostering policy changes that directly benefited Moroccan women in the new millennium. Development assistance and foreign aid were particularly instrumental in keeping feminist voices alive over the last two decades, and both were inextricably linked to the visibility and prominence of Moroccan feminists and their appeals to revise the kingdom’s antiquated family code—the Moudawana. This political dynamic is by no means indicative of the rest of the Arab world even though many Arab nations both host a substantial number of women’s NGOs and receive development assistance. The influence of grassroots mobilization is more difficult to evaluate empirically since such interest group activity is not as readily quantifiable as the flow of development assistance.

Previous chapters explored state incentives to politically incorporate Arab women through the prism of descriptive representation and socio-political rights, and ultimately revealed the growing effect of international capital flows. In this chapter, I use country-case studies of three kingdoms representing Arab sub-regions: Bahrain (the Gulf), Jordan (the Middle East), and

101 The Moudawana code is a system of laws based in shares’ that regulate women’s roles within the family unit in terms of marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, polygamy, etc. In Morocco it is based on Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence.
Morocco (North Africa) to consider alternative non-quantifiable mechanisms to explain variation in women’s political incorporation. The Arab world tends to be viewed in monolithic terms by the Western press and, in many respects, the three cases chosen for this study do not disabuse these assumptions as they all represent Muslim-majority monarchies with mid-range ratings in terms of women’s political rights and freedoms (see Table 5.1 below). Importantly, the chosen countries’ regime-specific and socio-cultural similarities allow for a most-similar systems\textsuperscript{102} comparison. While they are superficially similar, the respective monarchies still exhibit varying approaches to politically empowering women, which may be partially influenced by the different types of foreign capital flowing into each alongside the interaction between elite and grassroots actors (see Lijphart 1971, 1975; Przeworski and Teune 1970; Skocpol and Somers 1980 for seminal examples of the most-similar systems approach)(see Table 5.3 in the Appendix for a breakdown of the types of capital flowing into the three kingdoms).\textsuperscript{103}

| Table 5.1 Freedom House’s Scores for Women’s Rights and Freedoms in the Middle East and North Africa |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|                             | Bahrain | Jordan | Morocco |
| Political Rights and Civic Voice | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
| Nondiscrimination and Access to Justice | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
| Autonomy, Security, and Freedom of the Person | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| Economic Rights and Equal Opportunity | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| Social and Cultural Rights | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 |

*On a scale of 1-5, with 1 representing the least rights and 5 representing the most rights available. Source: Freedom House (2009, 2010)

\textsuperscript{102} Theoretically, the chosen cases are similar on all measured independent variables except for the independent variable of interest, which thus generates differing outcomes, as well.

\textsuperscript{103} Morocco has a French colonial legacy, while Bahrain and Jordan were both under the British.
Political incorporation is a complex concept that is challenging to model quantitatively and/or qualitatively. While previous chapters quantitatively alluded to the structural and institutional factors that affected the choice to incorporate women, this chapter qualitatively considers the interest group dynamics informing these decisions. Scholars have explored this complexity in myriad ways when surveying the choice to include “out-groups” into the political processes of Europe and North America. These same observations are surprisingly applicable to an analysis of the incentives behind women’s political inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa. In Christina Wolbrecht and Rodney Hero’s (2005) seminal text on the politics of democratic inclusion, Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate combined the *elite model* with the *societal-change model* to aid in interpreting the incentives behind minority inclusion into the political parties of the United States and the United Kingdom. Here, the elite model represented rational actors altering the party environment through top-down agency, while the societal-change model offered an explanation where social movements and citizens groups lobbied for inclusion and change via a bottom-up process (Wohbrecht and Hero 2005, 164). In fact, Kittilson’s research found support for this notion in the patterns of women’s integration into European political parties. Within the political party microcosm she observed, “From the societal-perspective—in a more permeable party structure—rising support from women and women’s groups pressure the party from below to promote women candidates for office. From the elite-led perspective—in a more centralized party organization—women in top party leadership posts encourage greater numerical representation in national legislatures. These two

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models differ in terms of how they represent the sequence of change but are not necessarily rival theories” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005, 165). Combining the elite-led and societal-change models to analyze patterns of women’s political inclusion in the Arab world would naturally lead to an examination of state-led gender reforms in conjunction with an exploration of the presence and activism of diverse women’s networks. Amaney Jamal (2010) further points out the dynamic interaction between women’s grassroots mobilization and the commitment of Arab leaders to gender reform (alongside international influence) prompted the adoption of progressive family code laws in choice Arab countries and, specifically, in the case of the Moudawana reforms in Morocco. Per Amaney Jamal’s analysis, I can assume the Kittilson and Tate’s framework can be readily applied to other Arab states and should reveal the interests operating behind specific gender-related policy outcomes.

Importantly, Kittilson and Tate (2005) expand their framework beyond top-down vs. bottom-up mechanisms to also include political opportunity structures, which can ultimately aid and abet policy change. Examples would include shifts in the political environment or group strategies among relevant actors. The political opportunity structure model describes the institutional environment elite and mass-level actors operate in—in many ways akin to the strategic choice approach introduced by David Lake and Robert Powell (1999) or the “issues, agents, context” framework of Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon (2007). These structures, while lacking agency, act as “intervening variables that make it more likely for groups or leaders to take strategic action” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005, 175). Here, international economic influence plays an important role in the Arab world. Foreign capital flows and conditional aid in particular, can change the institutional “rules of the game” by either directly providing financial incentives
to Arab leaders for improving the status of women or by specifically funding feminist networks to promote progressive, secularizing policies. Indirectly, these monies can also encourage women to independently engage in politics by financially empowering them through work opportunities and skill transfers that would not occur in oftentimes deeply misogynistic societies. Thus, foreign aid and investment changes the incentive structures for both in-groups and out-groups vis-à-vis the question of women’s empowerment. Alongside aid, the politically charged international environment since September 11th and Western fears of an Islamist threat have also shaped how women are viewed by Arab leaders, as well as how local feminist organizations choose to market themselves to local and global elites (i.e. as a “modernizing and secularizing” influence).

I use Kittilson and Tate’s (2005) analytical trifecta of the societal-led model, the elite-led model, and political opportunity structure model to compare the outcomes of women’s political inclusion across Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco. I anecdotally examine the nature of women’s networks in each country, as well as the commitment of the country’s leadership to gender empowerment, and ultimately consider how inflows of foreign capital condition both actors’ approach to gender empowerment. How these three factors converge determines how women fare politically. The utility of this framework for comparison lies in its ability to illuminate characteristics in approaches to enfranchising women across the three countries, while exposing interest groups and institutional features unique to each state. Incorporating the perspective of the societal change model provides a framework for understanding how Arab elites respond to public pressures for change and whether it is the byproduct of shifting demographics, values, or the demands of grassroots activists (see Inglehart 1997; Wolbrecht 2000). The elite-led model
demonstrates how particular politicians—here Arab monarchs—drive political change in a bid to market themselves to domestic electorates and foreign donors and investors (see Downs 1957; Riker 1965).

These two interest groups dominate the Arab political landscape when it comes to gender-related policy alongside the Muslim clergy (Mahmood 2005) and tribes (Charrad 2001). However, without a consideration for how the international arena penetrates and shapes the domestic political environment, there is no ready explanation for the recent changes seen in the region—from the political popularity of gender quotas to the highly controversial attempts at reforming shari‘ah-based personal status codes. The presence of international monies promotes a gender agenda that creates the opportunity to activate one of these two interest groups or both in occasionally unexpected ways. It provides incentives for Arab politicians to create political institutions pandering to the idea of women’s inclusion, but also encourages women and women’s NGOs to participate in the political process and compensates for their lack of monetary means or public visibility. More importantly, external funds can also change the strategies of grassroots organizations allowing them a measure of financial and political autonomy from the government, thereby affecting the types of policies they formulate and promote. In Doug McAdam’s (1999) analysis of the decline and rise of the black civil rights movements, he views political opportunity structures as decreasing “the power disparity between the group seeking power and the majority in power” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005, 175). Foreign capital can effectively help in breaching this gulf as will be shown in the Moroccan case.

Table 5.2 below illustrates the primary actors affecting incentives to incorporate women across Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco. All three kingdoms have elites ostensibly showing
commitment and interest in the issue of gender empowerment, but encouraging very different strategies to manage women’s political inclusion. Both Bahrain and Jordan created overbearing government-sponsored non-governmental organizations (GONGO) to completely regulate the process of women’s political participation possibly due to a fear of restive portions of their populations (Shiite in the case of Bahrain and Palestinians in the case of Jordan). Conversely, Morocco has a Ministry of Social Development that facilitates women’s public activities, but has no tangible role in controlling them, nor does it actively recruit women for appointments to token political positions as Bahrain’s Supreme Council for Women (BSCW) and the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) do. Thus, Morocco’s institutional infrastructure for women is more autonomous from the state, if not completely independent from elite interests.

Table 5.2 Two Models Explaining Women’s Political Inclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Feminist Political Mobilization (Societal-led Model)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Women active, but not focused on women’s rights rather on human rights (Shiite)</td>
<td>*Women active, movement feminist in nature but not independent of the state</td>
<td>*Women active, movement independent of the state and overtly feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader/State Commitment to Women (Elite-led Model)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Actively promoting women though initiatives focusing mostly on Sunni women</td>
<td>*Actively promoting women as a response to foreign pressure and some grassroots mobilization</td>
<td>*Actively promoting women as a response to foreign pressure and grassroots mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Presence of government-sponsored women’s umbrella organization (SCW)</td>
<td>*Presence of government-sponsored women’s umbrella organization (JNCW)</td>
<td>*The Ministry of Social Development fosters women’s activity, but does not have oversight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SCW=Supreme Council for Women (Bahrain)  
JNCW=Jordanian National Commission for Women

The types of affirmative action policies adopted in the three kingdoms also reveal the

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105 This may be the by-product of current Minister Nouzha Skalli’s feminist past and active collaboration with ADFM (she is one of the founders of the organization).
level of autonomy women’s issues and their proponents wrested from state elites. Bahrain explicitly opted out of implementing any gender quotas under pressure from the GCC, but Jordan and Morocco both adopted quotas in the last decade. But the similarities end there with Morocco’s legislative quota regulated and enforced by its political parties through mutual agreement, while the Jordanian quota was largely forced on the parliament through a royal decree. Finally, while all three countries have the vestiges of a grassroots women’s movement, Morocco is the only country where the movement is truly autonomous from the monarch and is able to formulate independent policy recommendations, as well as be explicitly feminist in its demands. External funds allowed Morocco’s feminist networks to sustain and popularize their agenda domestically and abroad, leading to groundbreaking legislation in the case of the Moudawana reforms and women-friendly changes to labor law.

I derive the following analysis from 102 elite interviews conducted across government officials, NGO representatives, journalists, and scholars in Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco from 2008-2009 using the respondent-driven snowball sampling method (see Atkinson and Flint 2001; Heckathorn 1997, 2002) (see Table 5.4 in the Appendix for sample interview questions). The responses to these interview questions drove the subsequent quantitative exploration of the impact of foreign capital on indicators of women’s political empowerment. The previous chapters showed foreign capital flows had a statistically significant impact on institutional measures of women’s political incorporation. The consistently positive impact of development assistance was particularly striking, especially for adopting gender quotas and the improvement of women’s rights. Furthermore, foreign direct investment was also associated with higher numbers of women in Arab parliaments hinting at its ability to empower through offering a
steady stream of revenues to fund burgeoning female politicians. Yet, foreign capital does not “cause” women’s political inclusion as much as it facilitates it. This chapter nuances my empirical results by going beyond the numbers and illuminating how dominant local interest groups directed the process of women’s political incorporation across three country contexts. The conclusion reveals the importance of sequence as initial and explicitly feminist grassroots mobilization with subsequent state acceptance of the women’s agenda yielded the most substantive political outcomes for women as illustrated by the case of Morocco. Importantly, external funding was instrumental in sustaining Morocco’s women’s movement in the first decades of its existence and allowed it to become the formidable veto-player it is today, brokering significant reforms in family code policy, labor law, and beyond.

**Bahrain—State-Sponsored Feminism in the Gulf**

“I think changes in women’s roles are both substantive and cosmetic. You can definitely see a big contribution in government. You now see women in senior, higher positions in government.”

The Kingdom of Bahrain represents an intriguing case for examination since it is under-studied, yet often considered the most “progressive” and “liberal” kingdom in the Persian Gulf (Fakhro 2009). Both Bahrain and Kuwait host “directly elected” female representatives and offer desegregated education and work environments. In 2002 Bahrain was the first Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member to grant women’s suffrage as well as ratify the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) with reservations. Bahrain is also the first GCC member to have a female representative to the United Nations. Much like the rest of the GCC, however, the kingdom’s track record in standardizing family code policy,

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106 Interview with Bahraini academic at the University of Bahrain, June 2009.
107 Bahrain’s reputation is partially fueled by its serving as a heady stopover for Westerners and Gulfis alike to partake of booze and women. The webportal AskMen even ranked it as one of the top ten “Sin Cities” in the world http://www.askmen.com/top_10/travel/top-10-sin-cities_8.html
curbing domestic violence and women trafficking, and enforcing constitutionally guaranteed women’s rights leaves much to be desired.

Still, over the last ten years Bahraini women have featured heavily in the country’s political arena. In the new millennium multiple women were appointed as heads of high-profile ministries.\(^{108}\) The Shura Council (Upper House or Majlis Al-Shura) currently hosts 11 women appointed in 2006, roughly composing 27 percent of the Senators.\(^{109}\) Bahrain even has a quasi-Ministry for Women’s Affairs in the government-sponsored Supreme Council for Women (SCW) headed by King Hamad Isa Al-Khalifa’s wife, Sheikha Sabika bint Ibrahim Al Khalifa. However, the kingdom has yet to see a woman directly elected to the Council of Representatives (Lower House or Majlis Al-Nuwab). While the year 2006 witnessed the election of the first woman to the Council of Representatives—Latifa al-Gaoud, the circumstances of her election were dubious considering she ran unopposed in an island district rumored to be uninhabited and set aside by the King specifically for her.

In 2002 six women candidates ran unsuccessfully in the first elections since the Parliament was suspended in 1974.\(^{110}\) In total some 22 female candidates have run in parliamentary elections since 2002, most of them independents with only one party, The National Democratic Action Society (Al-Wa’ad, Bahrain’s largest secular-left political association) fielding a female candidate—the prominent university professor, Munira Fakhro. None of the female candidates have been members of the two major Islamist parties (Al-Wefaq

\(^{108}\) In 2004, Nada Haffadh became the first female minister of health; in 2005 Fatima al-Baloshi was appointed the minister of social affairs; and, finally, in 2008 Sheikha May bint Mohammed al-Khalifa was appointed to the ministry of culture and information.

\(^{109}\) The Shura Council is appointed by the King while the Council of Representatives is directly. Elected.

\(^{110}\) Martial law was declared in response to rising unrest between the Sunni and the Shiite and the Parliament, as well as all political activity and dissent, was suspended.
National Islamic Society which is Shiite and Al-Menbar National Islamic Society which is Sunni), which won the plurality of available seats both in 2002 and 2006. In fact, official female membership across Bahraini political associations does not exceed 16 percent.\footnote{Mohammad Moussawi and Batoul Assiri, “The situation of women on the political landscape in the Kingdom of Bahrain” (in Arabic), a study submitted to the first congress of the Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, January 21-23, 2003.}

Bahraini women have had a long history of political mobilization dating back to the 1950s and 1960s (Fakhro 1990; Seikaly 1994, 1998). This can partially be ascribed to a British colonial legacy in building the momentum for an independent Bahrain, but also due to the British introducing schooling for both men and women in the early 1930s (Pandya 2010; Seikaly 1994). A Bahraini UNDP official working in their gender empowerment division stated: “The British were an active component even though they did not restructure the society as in other places. The mushrooming of NGOs occurred initially during British occupation. Women were a symbol of resistance and a by-product of pan-Arabism. However, the government had no institutions to absorb women, so only the NGO developed with this capacity. The British actively used women politics to promote their position.” Bahraini women have enjoyed the Gulf’s longest tradition of female schooling to which many ascribe their relatively high labor participation rates and political activism (20 percent according to the World Bank in 2007).\footnote{Mona Al Moayyed 2002, Freedom House 2009. Approximately, 38 percent of women work with 40 percent of the public sector workforce composed of women.} Much of this activism stems from the majority indigenous Shiite population and their attempts to obtain more rights and political recognition from the dominant minority Sunni population (Gause 1994; Pandya 2010; Seikaly 1994, 1998). Interestingly, most Shiite women are not actively appealing to
enhance women’s rights, often perceiving such agendas as Western impositions. Rather, they are mobilizing for greater Shiite political representation and the adoption of broader human rights.\textsuperscript{113}

\textit{Top-Down Empowerment}

In much of the Arab world, women’s political inclusion is a top-down affair and this is especially the case in the Persian Gulf—a region that has only recently joined the “women’s empowerment” bandwagon. Culturally-speaking, Bahrain shares the same conservative-tribal orientation of the rest of the GCC, while occasionally harboring a more lax attitude toward certain Islamic proscriptions—for one, the kingdom allows the consumption of alcohol and prostitution within its folds (Fakhro 2009; Gause 1994). Much of this conservatism is the result of Bahrain’s proximity to Saudi Arabia—the seat of Islam and, currently, the incubator of particularly restrictive brand of the Islamic faith, Wahhabism. According to Mounira Fakhro (2008), “Saudi Arabia is holding back the whole region. Because it is a country with weight, and the largest in terms of population and area, it affects the progress of the other Gulf countries. The late King Faisal imposed women’s education by force. He was a reformer and powerful, but now the rulers do not want to educate their peoples nor do they want reform.”\textsuperscript{114} Bahrain’s recent progress on women’s issues rests squarely at the feet of the King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa’s initial reformist tendencies (Wright 2008). His ascendance to the throne in 1999 broke with his father’s \textit{modus operandi}; specifically King Hamad explicitly attempted to engage both the Shiite and Sunni in a national dialogue. This culminated in the drafting of the National Action Charter (NAC), which transformed the country into a constitutional monarchy. The national referendum

\textsuperscript{113}Interviews conducted in Bahrain in 2009 spanning the four major political associations (\textit{Al-Waad}-Secular Liberal, \textit{Al-Wefaq}-Shiite Islamist, \textit{Al-Menbar}-Sunni Islamist, \textit{Al-Islah}-Sunni Salafist) further impressed this upon me. I interviewed more than 30 subjects from political associations (parties), the Shura Council, the Council of Representatives, the local and international women’s NGO community, the Supreme Council for Women, and the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Affairs.

of 2001 and subsequent ratification of the new constitution in 2002 granted women full suffrage, as well as the right to stand as political candidates. In fact, the passage of the new constitution represented the first opportunity for women to vote on national legislation as well as a second opportunity for the Shiite population to reconcile with the Sunni monarchy after the tensions of the 1970s. Even with these new guarantees of women’s political equality many of the most important laws affecting women’s political capacity still remained under the conservative jurisdiction of *shari’ah* law.\(^\text{115}\) The majority of my interview subjects claimed that the political access granted to women, as well as initial appointments of women to the newly re-constituted Shura Council, was largely at the behest of King Hamad’s need to be perceived as a reformer. Per Mounira Fakhro (2008), “They [women] are placed in leadership positions simply to preserve the state’s reputation before the West, not out of a belief in women’s participation.”

*The Supreme Council for Women (SCW)*

Continuing with the top-down strategy for managing women’s political activity, the King created the quasi-governmental Supreme Council for Women (SCW) by royal decree in 2001. The official management of women’s political activity and participation reverted to this institution as well as the Women’s Union umbrella group. Officially, the SCW was created to serve as a resource to the government in crafting gender-related policy with the head of SCW equivalent to a minister without a portfolio (Fakhro 2009). The organization has actively promulgated an array of pro-women legislation from a unified family law code to monitoring the unfair application of *Shari’ah* law to women, and asserting women’s rights to equal

\(^{115}\) Islamic law represents the main source of legislation for family law courts, and determines the rights, duties and gender roles of Bahraini women.
citizenship. However, many female citizens of both Sunni and Shiite origin rail against it perceiving it as a “Big Brother” entity aimed at controlling rather than fostering women’s political participation as well as being a “foreign” imposition. An academic from the University of Bahrain proclaimed: “The Supreme Council of Women is a “Western” idea; “part of the [regime’s] control! Most women’s unions oppose the council.” A local official from the United Nation’s Development Programmer’s (UNDP) gender unit confirmed: “The global influence has informed the charter and creation of the SCW. These institutions identify a role for women as well as identify individual women…They are instrumental in recent changes.” Importantly, the SCW is the primary allocation mechanism for the majority of gender-related aid coming into Bahrain and successfully brokered a close relationship with the UNDP receiving 1.5 million dollars from the organization. Many argue it has deliberately diminished the role of other prominent and independent women’s rights organizations—in particular those of Islamist persuasion. In my interviews with other employees from the Bahraini UNDP’s gender unit, one of them noted the local women’s NGO community often refused to work with the government or the SCW, a strategy in stark contrast from their experience with NGOs in Lebanon and Jordan where women’s networks actively collaborated with the government.

Political Societies/Parties

Alongside the dominance of the SCW in coordinating government-sanctioned modes of women’s political participation, Bahraini women face unique obstacles when campaigning for political office. They have fewer opportunities to address mixed-gender groups than men due to their inability to campaign in mosques. Furthermore, they receive limited support from

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116 A family code for the Sunni population was recently passed much to the consternation of the Shiite population, which opposes any government regulation of the family.
117 In general, the women of Bahrain enjoy a fairly high level of mobility with married women permitted to apply for
Bahrain’s political societies (effectively political parties) for oftentimes strategic, as well as religious reasons (Bahraini Women’s Union 2007). An official from the UNDP ventured, “Women have been successful in convincing boards and societies to field women… Now Al-Asalah, Al-Wefaq, Al-Wa’ad, all wanted women but are worried about winning the districts… The Islamic parties confirmed in a survey by UNDP that they would field women candidates if they felt they had a shot at winning the district.” The Bahrain Women’s Union funded an independent study confirming this assessment and documented that some political associations had shown a willingness to back female candidates in districts they suspected they would not win, essentially engaging in “a public relations exercise, rather than being genuinely politically motivated” (Bahrain Women’s Union 2007, 77).

In an illustration of the pragmatism of Bahrain’s political societies, the Islamist Al-Wefaq (Shiite) supported the secular and Sunni Al-Wa’ad candidate, Mounira Fakhro, in the fourth constituency of the Central Governorate knowing their chances were slim to win in this pro-government Sunni enclave. They gambled the political society would stand to benefit from this alliance if she won—especially since Fakhro’s husband is Shiite (albeit secular). Al-Wefaq itself is known for having several high-ranking and politically competent women and 13 percent of its membership is female. In addition, it has a highly active women’s branch in the offshoot passports without permission from their husbands and women in general not being required to seek permission from their guardians to travel abroad. Younger unmarried have more culturally imposed barriers to their freedom of mobility (Freedom House 2009). Freedom of assembly in Bahrain is equally restricted for both men and women. 

118 Political parties are actually illegal in Bahrain after the Kingdom’s experience with Hezbollah and several militant pro-Iranian groups. However, political societies are allowed. The distinction is somewhat moot since the largest political society/associations effectively function as parties, but just cannot be called political parties. Furthermore, additional legislation was passed in 2005 to regulate the nature of associations stipulating they cannot be based on class, profession or religion, as well as raises the minimum age to join society ranks from 18 to 21. The King also imposed restrictions on foreign funding and mandated that all societies re-register with the Ministry of Justice.
organization, the Future Society (Al-Mustaqbal). Yet, Al-Wefaq has openly stated it is wary of supporting female candidates in districts where it already fields male candidates. Since it represents the primary opposition within Bahrain these choices are not negligible. In my interview with a prominent and long-time female member of Al-Wefaq, she stated she had been encouraged multiple times to run for office by both men and women within the association, but relinquished the candidacy to her husband even though she technically had a higher rank and better connections within the organization. Another prominent female member of the society faced a similar conundrum. She unsuccessfully campaigned in the previous two elections and was wary of hitting the campaign trail again since she would also likely be running against her husband—a problem often faced by “political families” in Bahrain.

These scenarios are especially problematic since Al-Wefaq legitimately fears that fielding multiple candidates in the same district will split the vote and inadvertently allow for rival candidates to win the district due to Bahrain’s first-past-the-post electoral system. In most cases, the male spouses have already successfully secured a parliamentary position so fielding a female candidate is deemed an unnecessary risk or a duplication of the candidate pool.

The Islamist political association Al-Menbar (Sunni) supported a female candidate, Fazio Zainel, in the 8th constituency of the Central

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119 My interviews with members of this movement were highly informative. They exhibited a surprising level of organization and media-savvy and can easily be said to be at the forefront of coordinating virtual and physical protests featuring Shiite women for greater rights.

120 Obviously, this is a not uncommon phenomenon in the West, as well. The Clinton and Kennedy dynasties come to mind.

121 An interview subject from the Awal Women’s Society had the following to say about the political parties: “The political associations are a bigger problem than the recent constitutional changes. The constitution itself still has value. However, the problem with political associations is that none of them have clear strategies. I have lost faith in them because of this, especially the democratic ones. They have no strategies and they do not help women. The National Democratic Association (Waad) does less to help women than the conservative parties such as Weal. In fact, their women’s unit/office is competitive with us. They duplicate our activities, hold conferences and workshops on the same themes. All the other parties utilize pre-existing organizations or societies (such as Weal using the Al-Mutable movement), yet Wad does not utilize what already exists—instead they duplicate it. Honestly, this policy has weakened us, has affected our membership.”
Governorate, despite already fielding a male candidate with more experience in the district, which again many believed was a public relations stunt.\textsuperscript{122} 
\textit{Menbar’s} membership is strikingly 24 percent female. In my discussions with one of their prominent female members, she readily revealed women were largely responsible for candidate drives, as well as the coordinating of political campaigns during election season. These statistics are in stark contrast with the secular opposition’s contention that Islamist parties have no willpower to integrate women into their ranks. “Shiite parties tend to have more women but focus their women on more social rather than political activities. In Sunni parties women are not as prevalent. Women are used as a tool to enforce votes,” claimed a professor at the University of Bahrain.\textsuperscript{123}

Arguably, this tentative embrace of women within the political ranks of Bahrain’s political associations has not led to meaningful change in terms of legislating for more women-friendly policies beyond the king’s initial decision to extend of suffrage, possibly because women have never been directly elected to any of Bahrain’s legislative bodies. Those who are appointed to the Shura Council usually reflect elite interests and draw the reigning dynasty’s party line. Still, the fact that political associations feel the need to use women in their public relations stunts is a relatively new development. It intimates either the growing importance of women as an interest group, or the monarchy’s rising pressure on civil society institutions to demonstrate their “progressive” values to foreign interests.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Al-Menbar} is effectively an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain, using the same political strategies and rhetoric. In many respects, its politics are similar to the Islamic Action Front in Jordan.

\textsuperscript{123} Even within the Shiite community there are diverging attitudes towards the scope of female political mobilization. \textit{Al-Mustqbal} is geared at women reaching decision-making positions and has even been promoted by Sheikh Issa Qassem—the spiritual leader behind Al-Weal (Mersshed 2010). While the Women’s Committee of Al-Weal, merely promotes an Islamic education for women and children.\textsuperscript{123} The two organizations even target separate demographics with Al-Must bal recruiting predominantly younger, educated, working women focusing on developing their competences and political acumen, while Al-Weal’s Women’s Committee targets housewives and focuses on their religious activity and awareness-raising.
Women’s Grassroots Mobilization

With the new King’s constitutional reforms and the creation of SCW there has been a limited attempt to create space for women’s political participation, but is there a real interest on the part of women to be politically active? A few of the female political candidates I interviewed claimed most of the women within their political societies were more interested in the service aspects of their respective organizations or the pursuit of charitable activity. This was particularly the case in the religious societies such Al-Wefaq, Al-Menbar, and Al-Aslah. The culture of service has always been present in Bahrain whether through charitable organizations or NGOs. According to a survey conducted by the Bahrain Women’s Union (2007), women’s participation in NGOs directly related to their success in local and national elections because female candidates often depended on financial and voter support from their group’s members.

The first women’s society in Bahrain (and in the entire Gulf), the Bahraini Women’s Awakening (Jam’iyat Nahdat Fatat al-Bahrain), was formed in 1955 (Peterson 1989). It represented an opportunity for educated women from well-established merchant families to engage in volunteer activities assisting poorer families. In the early 1970s, the group began to promote women’s suffrage for the existing constitutional and national assemblies. The next oldest and probably most active women’s society is the Motherhood and Children’s Welfare Center (Jam’iyat Ri’ayat al-Tafala wal-Umuma), founded in 1960 by the female members of the ruling Al-Khalifa dynasty. It catered to civil servants and middle-class women interested in philanthropy and focused on providing nursery school facilities to the impoverished, but never asserting a political role (Peterson 1989. In 1969, the Awal Women’s Society (Jam’iyat Awal al-Nisa’iya)—probably the most prominent and still the most active of the women’s groups—was
geared at young, unmarried women, and openly promoted women’s rights and engaged in strident political activism. Currently, more than 4000 women work for or are active members in local and international NGOs, and most of them participate while holding down full-time jobs, as well as tending for extended families.

As stated previously, most women’s organizations are primary charity-based. However, this interest in charitable work and social service seems to be morphing into a more politicized activism certainly among the Shiite population, as my conversations with the women of Al-Wefaq and their sister organization Al-Mustaqlbal attested to. Beyond the government-sanctioned NGO community exists the extensive political activity of Shiite women’s organizations and, newly, a more politicized activism within the religious mata’im (Pandya 2010). Mata’im are known as venues for the veneration and eulogizing of Shiite martyrs, familiars of the Prophet, and contemporary religious leaders. These institutions serve as rallying points for the Shiite community alongside mosques and are increasingly politicized. In particular, with the marginalization of the Shiite within the public sphere and strict laws preventing public assembly that in their enforcement tend to penalize the Shiite more heavily, the mata’iam have become the central source of the political education of men and now women.

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124 Their current chair, Sabeeka Najjar has stood for political office three times and used the society as her primary campaigning tool.
125 Women comprise over 60 percent of total membership in the 456 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Social Development, yet only 19 organizations concentrate on women’s issues (Freedom House 2009).
126 The Bahrain Women’s Union coordinate the activities of 12 NGOs specifically dedicated to women’s issues and despite its ties to local elites had a difficult time in obtaining licensing (was blocked by the Ministry of Social Development) without the direct support of SCW who sees it as a rival organization. In fact, women’s presence and benefit from the NGO community is so ubiquitous that they now compose 73 percent of the beneficiaries of microcredit in the country (through a joint project between the UNDP and the Bahrain Development Bank).
127 My interviews with female representatives from Al-Wefaq and Al-Mustaqlbal confirmed this.
128 It is regulated by Law No. 32 of 2006, which requires persons organizing a public meeting to notify the Department of Public Security. In recent years, women have freely participated in a number of demonstrations and political and social gatherings. However, in a December 2007 demonstration by families of detained political activists, both the Special Security Force and the Women’s Police, Bahrain’s all-female police force, were accused
[1990s] no one could speak about politics, except for in the mata'am. This was the only place we could speak the truth,” maintained a female Shiite politician (Pandya 2010, 39). The Bahrain Scholar, Sophia Pandya, claims that Shiite women have begun to use religious space in ways akin to what was seen in the Shiite Islamic resurgences of Iraq and Iran, reflecting a broader trend in the Middle East of women using religious space for political means (Boyle 2004; Clark 2004; Mahmood 2005). Increasingly, this has manifested itself in very organized protests against state attempts to standardize the family code and other platforms during the parliamentary elections. Pandya and my interlocutors emphasized the role of the mata'im in the first parliamentary elections in Bahrain in 2002 where all candidates used them as places to campaign. Finally, she makes the case that the evolution of the role of the women’s mata'im is directly related to women’s educational development (the majority of the Bahrain’s university graduates and students are female) and their participation in the greater Shiite resistance movement.

**International Influence**

Ultimately, there is abundant evidence that the royal family has made overtures to women in the past and the present, and, as in most Arab countries of late, has actively promoted legislation to aid women’s political participation. Despite the lacking presence of women in

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129 Since Shiite women are granted access to the women’s mata ‘im within the Shiite community, they potentially have an additional religious venue for campaigning that their Sunni counterparts do not similarly enjoy.

130 May Seikaly (91994) contends that only through their gradual integration into the economy did women’s social roles become more salient—especially as they became ever more present in the public sector and expanded their activities beyond charity to education programs. More importantly, alongside the fact that many women had been educated, they had to work side-by-side with men in what many claim is the “poorest country of the GCC” and certainly one with most rapidly diminishing oil reserves. Upward spiraling consumer habits, the high consumer prices of a country suffering from Dutch Disease and raised expectations of living standard created incentives for the advance of a two-household income—especially within the more impoverished Shiite community (Seikaly 1994). This phenomenon largely explains the rise in numbers of women entering the workforce in Bahrain from 6.5 in 1991 to 38 percent by 2007. These are the women responsible for running and participating in the political societies and the charitable organizations of the country.
institutions of direct representation, Bahrain also has a very active and politicized grassroots women’s community—in particular, among the Shiite population—though this activism has not been geared toward attaining explicitly feminist goals, as much as promoting greater respect of human rights overall. Furthermore, the fact that the Shiite represent a “dangerous” out-group backed by rival Iran in the mind of the Al-Khalifa dynasty stifles the community’s potential for re-framing their any of their demands in terms that are acceptable to the dominant Sunni elites. Certainly, the 2011 crackdown on peaceful protesters in Pearl Circle and Bahrain’s invitation for the Saudi military to enter the kingdom and forcefully put an end to nation-wide protests attests to the singularity of this fear.131 The question remains, why the state chose to expand women’s political participation with the onset of the new millennium—especially considering grassroots lobbying for the enhancement of women’s rights was not as robust as lobbying for increased Shiite political inclusion. Here, the role of the international community becomes salient.

Bahrain hosts the United States’ 5th Fleet and is thus immediately within the U.S.’s sphere of influence, but also directly connected to broader geo-political events. The kingdom’s reliance on oil exports as a primary source of foreign exchange, as well as a means to keep its expansive public sector afloat, integrates it even more into the global economic community (Gause 1994; Wright 2008). In fact, as seen with the reticence of the Obama administration to intervene in the Bahraini government’s crack down on reform-oriented protests in March 2011, the West is quite willing to tolerate the GCC’s traditionalism and authoritarian–orientation in the interest of maintaining stability in the Gulf. Yet, the U.S. also promotes a broad democratization agenda in the kingdom through the Middle East Peace Initiative program, and, previously,

through development contractors working at the behest of USAID such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The promotion of women’s political empowerment goes hand in hand with this agenda. Since the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have limited dependence on foreign aid due to extensive oil wealth, linking the image of gender empowerment to “stability via democratization” has been the most effective, yet inadvertent way to push for gender-related change in Bahrain and the Gulf. Namely, convincing Gulf monarchs that financial risk assessments rely on guarantees of stability, which are contingent on political progress and economic development, which in turn are correlated to numerical indicators of the status of women. According to an academic I interviewed at the University of Bahrain, “I think most of the changes [related to women] are galvanized by national reports. They [the government] take international ratings very seriously. They [the government] use amendments to cover things; they try to make up positions for women; but many ministries that women belong to are of secondary importance. The ministry of interior, finance, etc. these will affect government decisions.”

Importantly, the spread of international norms furthers the profile of women’s issues—especially through the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG), as well as the Convention of the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). All of my interview subjects were well acquainted with and keenly aware of both of these institutions (see Hafner-Burton and Pollak 2002). In response to my questions regarding these international compacts, a male member of the Al-Menbar political association asserted to me, “The West is

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132 The Bahraini government kicked the organization out in 2006 accusing it of violating laws pertaining to funding political associations. It is illegal for local NGOs or political associations to obtain funding from foreign donors or external networks. See http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=209434
133 Interview with MEPI Coordinator at U.S. Embassy, Manama, June 2009.
134 Interview with scholar at University of Bahrain, Manama, June 2009.
pushing this agenda [women’s empowerment], not the Arabs.” Considering his sentiment, it is no accident that full suffrage was extended to women in Bahrain after the Millennium Development Goals were ratified in 2000. Yet, even King Hamad is willing to go only so far in promoting women to high political office and has largely limited women’s incorporation to universal suffrage and appointments to the Shura Council.\(^{135}\) For instance, the adoption of a gender quota is completely out of the realm of possibility I was assured by members of the SCW. Most future attempts at promoting women’s issues will likely continue through the strategy of the SCW hand-picking women for appointments to various low profile ministries.\(^ {136}\) Even local women’s NGOs did not see much hope in adopting a gender quota—certainly not one run through the government. Mounira Fakhro (2008) articulated the popular sentiment well, “It should be political parties...who implement quotas, as in France, where women make up 50 percent of the candidate slates. The quota by this means is better and fairer... The problem is that the decision to implement a quota is a government one, and the government will try to exploit the women representatives who owe their positions to it. Unfortunately there are women, for example female ministers, who carry out government decisions against women.” The key to women’s political inclusion in Bahrain seems to be creating incentives and institutions for the political associations themselves to incorporate women into their folds. As in the case of Jordan, Bahrain’s majoritarian electoral system plays a key role in reducing incentives among political parties to field female candidates (usually in addition to their preferred male candidates) for fear of unnecessarily compromising a district win. The empirical results in chapter two highlight this

\(^{135}\) Pressures contingent on financial incentives can only get you so far in countries that can export their way out of dependence via oil.

\(^{136}\) My interlocutors at SCW told me that the GCC had collectively decided to remove gender quotas as a policy consideration from the table.
issue and consistently demonstrated that the presence of a majoritarian electoral system had a
significant negative relationship with levels of women’s legislative representation. Finally, an
additional obstacle for substantive women’s empowerment in Bahrain may be the lack of an
explicitly feminist women’s movement actively lobbying for the evolution of women’s social
and political rights that is not split down denominational lines.

Jordan—State Sponsored Feminism in the Levant

“In Jordan you have political liberalization without social liberalization”.137

Much as in Bahrain, the formal inclusion of women into the political process was largely
led by the state and occurred at the behest of King Abdullah of the Hashemite dynasty—Jordan’s
reigning monarch. That said, Jordan has had an active women’s movement among its Christian
and Muslim elites dating back to the early 1940s, which has always played a role in informing, if
not spearheading, an explicitly feminist agenda. As discussed previously, in Bahrain women’s
grassroots mobilization was largely situated among the Shiite population and focused on
enhancing human rights overall, while Jordan’s women’s movement promoted female
empowerment specifically, which perhaps explains the more progressive gender-related policy
outcomes. Yet, women’s political inclusion is still very much a top-down process in Jordan with
the King as the primary architect and the quasi-governmental women’s NGO the Jordanian
National Commission for Women (JNCW) functioning in a consulting capacity, while the
women’s directorates across select ministries and pro-government women’s organizations serve
as enforcers of reforms dictated from above. The relationship between the monarchy and
women’s networks is thus more collaborative than encountered in Bahrain. According to many
of my interview subjects from these women’s organizations and the foreign development

137 Laurie Brand 1998, 173.
agencies that fund them, there is a significant amount of jockeying for royal favor and general squabbling *between* the NGOs as to how gender-related policies should be formulated.

Constitutionally, Jordan has guaranteed male-female equality since 1952 (Article 6(1)). In fact, Article 6(2) mandates the government insure this equality across the public and private sphere, but does not actively proscribe discrimination based on gender. However, Jordan’s three-tier judiciary system composed of civic courts upholding the constitution, *shari’ah* courts upholding Islamic law, and special or supreme courts adjudicating crimes related to national security—has facilitated differential implementation of the constitution across the sexes and even gender-based discrimination where disputes fall under the jurisdiction of Islamic courts.\(^\text{138}\) In *shari’ah* courts women are already at a disadvantage considering Islamic law mandates the testimony of two women is equal to that of one man, and female expert witnesses and translators are not accepted in the court (Husseini 2010).

In terms of women’s political rights, educated women were granted suffrage as early as 1954, but universal female suffrage was not extended until 1974, garnering women the right to vote and stand as candidates for the House of Representatives (Lower House or *Majlis al-Nuwab*).\(^\text{139}\) However, this royal decree was not enforced until 1989 when parliamentary elections were re-instated after two decades of martial law owing to internal conflicts with the kingdom’s Palestinian refugee population.\(^\text{140}\) The re-instatement allowed the first group of women to


\(^{139}\) The Senate or Upper House is directly appointed by the King.

\(^{140}\) Prior to the Six-day War of 1967, the West Bank fell under Jordanian jurisdiction, thus Jordan has always hosted a sizable (if not majority) Palestinian population, alongside its primary indigenous inhabitants, the Trans-Jordanians (essentially Bedouin tribes). The Trans-Jordanians and Palestinians have had a particularly tense relationship since the events of Black September (1970-1971) when King Hussein moved to eradicate Palestinian militancy in Jordan in an attempt to restore Hashemite Rule. The period culminated with the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its sympathizers to South Lebanon.
unsuccessfully stand as political candidates. In 1982 women were also granted the right to vote and to stand as candidates at the municipal and village councils, yet there were no female candidates until 1995 with the establishment of the “Network of Jordanian Women’s Committees” to directly encourage and oversee women running for local office.\(^{141}\) With the new millennium and in the wake of the second *intifada*, the government launched a national campaign under the slogan “Jordan First” to unite the kingdom across ethnic lines, which also extended to forming a series of national committees dedicated to strengthening political participation in the country overall. This particular initiative explicitly benefited women and in 2003, with the heavy encouragement of King Abdullah, quota legislation passed reserving six seats for women in the House of Representatives.\(^{142}\) The quota was expanded to 12 seats in 2010 after a decade of intensive lobbying on the part of the Jordanian National Commission for Women and its sister organizations. A 20 percent quota was adopted at the municipal level in 2007, as well, under ostensible pressure from U.S. donors (Nanes 2010). Per Freedom House’s 2010 report, an average of three ministerial portfolios had female appointments in each cabinet since 2004.\(^{143}\) In conjunction with legal changes further promoting women’s political participation, since 2005 the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) has actively participated in developing “gender units” within the more prominent ministries in a bid to implement “gender mainstreaming” more thoroughly within the political bureaucracy and under the direct advisory of USAID’s development contracting agencies (National Democracy

\(^{141}\) The local level has traditionally been perceived as more of a man’s domain in Jordan. The Network of Jordanian Women’s Committees helped 20 women run for municipal office for the first time in 1995.

\(^{142}\) Much as in Bahrain, the House of Representatives (Lower House) is directly elected and the Senate (Upper House) is appointed.

\(^{143}\) This statistic if often downplayed due to the appointments largely being for “traditionally” female portfolios such as the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Culture.
Institute—NDI, International Republican Institute—IRI, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems—IFES) and the UNDP.\textsuperscript{144}

This flurry of state-sponsored institutional change has resulted in some tangible gains for women in the political arena. The 2003 elections featuring the gender quota increased women’s parliamentary representation from zero to 5.5 percent. The newly expanded quota reserving 12 seats in the House of Representatives has raised this number to 11 percent. Still, it took 19 years for Jordan to see its first female representative in the lower house—Toujan Faisal—who was elected via an effective Circassian quota in Amman’s third district in 1993. Only with the new millennium have two women been directly elected to the House of Representatives: Falak Jama’ani won a seat outright in 2007 and Reem Badran won her seat in 2010.\textsuperscript{145} Dr. Jama’ani’s case is particularly instructive since she was originally elected to the Parliament through the quota in 2003, but was so successful in promoting her tribe’s interests through extensive public service provision, that she won 3,301 votes in her district, handily beating her nearest male competitor’s 1,820 votes (Husseini 2007). Women’s representation at the municipal level has also seen a boost with women winning a total of 215 seats across 93 municipalities, 195 of them through the quota and with an astonishing 20 through direct competition in the 2007 elections (Husseini 2010; Shukri 2007). In fact, according to Shukri (2007) nine times more women nominated themselves for municipal council positions once the 20 percent quota was adopted.\textsuperscript{146}

In the policy realm, steps have been taken to address domestic abuse with the opening of

\textsuperscript{144} In an interview the former Director of Parliamentary Affairs revealed that UNDP actually had an advisory office within the Parliament to help implement suggested political reforms.

\textsuperscript{145} Falak Jama’ani won a seat representing Madaba’s second district and Reem Badran won a seat representing Amman’s populous and rich third district.

\textsuperscript{146} There were 355 women total who nominated themselves in 2007—a substantial increase from the 20 that originally ran in 1995.
the first women’s shelter, as well as the passage of the Family Protection Law in 2008, which reverts domestic abuse cases to the jurisdiction of civic courts, and legal and medical professionals.\textsuperscript{147} There have also been lukewarm attempts to criminalize “honor killings”\textsuperscript{148}, but even these new laws offer leniency to perpetrators. Women still face discrimination through nationality and citizenship laws barring their ability to pass either to their children or spouses. They are also vulnerable to gender-biased family laws (personal status codes) when it comes to disputes relating to marriage, divorce, child custody, and property; all of which still fall under the jurisdiction of shari’ah courts. Women in the labor force often cope with discriminatory practices in the provision of social security benefits and pensions. Finally, where legal equality has been guaranteed as in the political and economic arenas, local enforcement of these constitutional provisions is still problematic due to entrenched patriarchic norms (Amawi 2000; Husseini 2010). Consequently, while we see Jordanian women inhabiting political space, it is not readily obvious that they wield any political influence in it.

\textit{Top-Down Empowerment}

Much of the aforementioned gender-related progress has been the product of the King and royal family’s personal initiatives to promote women into public positions and partially the result of homegrown lobbying on the part of feminist women’s organizations. Considering Jordanian women tend to enjoy more official freedoms than many of their Arab counterparts elsewhere in terms of mobility, health care, education, political participation, and employment, it

\textsuperscript{147} There cases often fell under Islamic or tribal jurisdiction in the past.

\textsuperscript{148} This practice effectively allows the male kin of a woman often arbitrarily accused of disgracing the honor of the family through loss of virginity out of wedlock, adultery, or some other social infraction. While laws have been passed proscribing this practice, in practice leniency is often offered to the perpetrators of these crimes since they fall under the jurisdiction of shari’ah courts. See Rana Husseini’s “Murder in the Name Honor” (2009) by OneWorld Press for a more thorough accounting of honor killings in Jordan.
is surprising they have not had a more instrumental role in this political renaissance. A 2006 UNIFEM study criticized the female deputies appointed to the Senate in 2003 for failing to pass laws protecting women’s interests. In fact, until recently, female deputies openly avoided embracing women’s platforms once in Parliament for fear of alienating male colleagues and constituents (Husseini 2011, UNIFEM 2006).149

*The Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW)*

Much as in Bahrain, Jordan hosts a semi-governmental body serving as an umbrella organization for women’s NGO activity—the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) whose patron is King Hussain’s sister, Princess Basma. The Commission is primarily responsible for drafting and promoting legislation on women’s issues and was created in 1992. The JNCW is also in charge of monitoring Jordanian compliance with the CEDAW treaty, which the kingdom signed in 1980 and ratified in 1990 with three reservations regarding women passing citizenship and nationality to their children.150 Members of JNCW, as well as its sister organizations The Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU), The General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW), the Business and Professional Women’s Association (BPWA), the Women’s Status Committee (WSC) and many others, drew up the first National Strategy for Women (NSW) in 1993, conceptualizing it as a system of guidelines for the kingdom vis-à-vis women’s empowerment and attracting significant attention from the King Hussein. In 1996, the reigning cabinet decided the JNCW would officially become the government’s “reference point” for all issues related to women. Over time, the organization has also provided a ready pool of women for appointments to the Senate, and is responsible for providing training to vetted female

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149 This was also my impression from interviewing three former female deputies and three female senators in the spring of 2009.

150 In 2007 the CEDAW was given force of law and one of these reservations was repealed.
candidates for the House of Representatives and the Municipal Councils. Out of the 13 female deputies currently serving in the lower house, six of them are members of the JNCW, while 52 percent of the municipal councilors have been trained by or are members of this organization. While the organization has had a somewhat over-bearing presence relative to smaller independent NGOs, the JNCW has been instrumental in promoting the adoption of gender quotas, organizing professionalizing workshops for female representatives and candidates, and has kept women’s issues in the public eye (Brand 1998). Still, members of the smaller women’s NGOs I interviewed often complained of its tendency to dictate agendas across the civil society spectrum without fully understanding the needs of women in specific communities. They also criticized the petty competition for media attention between the royal figureheads running some of its sister organizations. In particular, the women of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), believed the JNCW was unfairly speaking in the name of Jordanian womanhood, while only representing a small portion of the interests of women in Jordanian society.\footnote{This was also a position endorsed by the leftist Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU) until it was semi-co-opted into the JNCW by its founder’s, Asma Khader’s “defection”.
}

\textit{Gender Quotas}

Quite possibly the biggest coup achieved by the JNCW and its sister organizations was the adoption of the “open quota” system.\footnote{The open quota gave women the opportunity to run for a parliamentary seat through the quota system or by direct competition. Article 3 of the Election law governs the process of selecting quota seat winners: effectively, the percentages of votes across each individual candidate are tallied and the candidates who win the seats are those who have secured a place among the top six percentages. Article 45 of the Election Law mandates a vacant quota seat be filled by a candidate from the same district (al-Attiyat, 2005:42).} As discussed previously, the adoption of reserved seats led to a groundswell of women running for office, though it also engendered much criticism
within Jordan among conservatives and liberals alike. However, there is no denying quotas have opened up the public political space to women in some very unlikely ways—especially considering Jordan’s women-inhibiting majoritarian electoral system. Since the quota results are calculated based on the percentage of votes obtained in each district, this biases the winners toward smaller districts with lower population densities. Consequently, the most successful female candidates have usually come from rural areas or smaller cities such as Tafileh, Mafraq, and Kerak, but never the capital until recently with Reem Badran’s direct win of a seat in Amman’s rich and populous third district. Islamic Action Front (IAF; Jabhat al-’Amal al-Islami) candidate Hayat Massimi’s run in the densely inhabited Zarqa suburb of Amman was a notable exception and, up until recent deputy Abla Abu Olbeh quota seat for the Hashed Party in 2010, was the only successful female candidate to receive extensive backing from a political party. The IAF rallied its considerable network and organization capacity to help her secure a seat through the quota system. Many claimed that she would have won the district of Zarqa outright but for widespread rumors of ballot tampering.

Generally, women tend to win quota seats in smaller districts since they are usually more advantageous for female candidates, sparing them the need to travel extensively when campaigning and increasing the likelihood that they are known in the community. Interestingly, these districts also tend to be the most conservative in the country. Nonetheless, smaller tribes have readily taken advantage of this opportunity to secure parliamentary seats and the

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153 Dr. Massimi was only short some 50 votes of the next leading male competitor who was not a member of the IAF, which is hugely popular among Zarqa’s restive Palestinian population. See http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=30805
154 The Islamic Action Front is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm.
155 In my interview with her Massimi stated she had won seven times more votes than the nearest female candidate, showcasing the power of party connections to go out drive voters to the polls even in the case of a woman.
consequent access to political rents by nominating women, while larger tribes hope to benefit doubly by directly electing popular male candidates, but also obtaining an extra seat by fielding women through the quota.\textsuperscript{156} In fact, the quota resulted in a few small districts being informally set aside for women—i.e. everyone knew that only a woman would win in these districts so all the tribes only put women on the ballot and threw themselves whole-heartedly into campaigning for them.\textsuperscript{157} Some small tribes even actively discouraged men from being candidates so as to insure their female candidates would not be robbed of votes. Jordanian tribes tend to vacillate between facilitating and inhibiting women’s political participation depending on their interests. Noted scholar and political activist, Amal Sabbagh, posited an interesting take on the role of tribes here, differentiating between a political and a social tribalism conditioning woman’s political incorporation.\textsuperscript{158} The political variant was pragmatic and actively used the women’s quota and women’s votes to finally secure seats for small tribes in Parliament; while the social variant wanted women to remain in the hearth and did not trust them in the political arena due to Islamic scripture and conservative patriarchic sentiments.\textsuperscript{159} In many respects, the Islamic Action Front fuses these two mindsets by using conservative women’s votes and female candidates to legislate the extent of women’s personal freedoms (specifically to veto any attempts at modifying Jordan’s personal status code).

\textit{Political Parties and the Tribes}

\textit{“There are no real politics in Jordan, only tribes.”}\textsuperscript{160}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{156} Interview with tribal expert at the University of Jordan, Amman, March 2009
\item \textsuperscript{157} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Interview with Amal Sabbagh, Amman, Jordan, December 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Only one hadith relates to women’s political leadership. Mohammad is documented by Sahih al-Bukhari (5:59:709) as having said, “Such people as ruled by a lady will never be successful.” This hadith has often been used (but also challenged) by Islamic scholars as a justification for barring women from standing for political office.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Interview with tribal expert at the University of Jordan, Amman, March 2009.
\end{itemize}
Mohammad Masri (2008) argues that Jordanian women’s political agency is ultimately the byproduct of three structures: the state conditioning formal political participation through the legal environment, the institutional infrastructure for women created via the gender quota (this includes the gender units within ministries, as well as women’s organizations created to implement policy), and the patriarchic tribal society determining women’s roles in the private vs. public sphere. All three structures are very much the hallmark of “managed” political incorporation. Surprisingly, political parties are not prominent in Jordanian politics since tribal allegiance trumps all other loyalties. With two decades of martial law forbidding party activity in 1974, as well as the adoption of the one-man-one-vote electoral system, Jordan’s fragmented political party system was effectively and quite deliberately gutted. The resumption of political liberalization in 1989 and the passage of a new political party law resulted in 32 registered political parties. However, women’s membership in them still does not exceed 8 percent and very few women are present in the higher echelons of the party establishment. Most of these political parties have a low profile and limited success in attaining representation within any of the kingdom’s governing institutions. The notable exception is the Islamic Action Front, which borrowed its platform and modus operandi from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

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161 Surveys by the Center for Security Studies at the University of Jordan showed Jordanians primarily self-identified according to tribe.
162 This was King Hussein’s response to Black September and the destabilizing activity of the Palestinian Liberation Organization on Jordanian territory.
163 “One person, one vote” replaced the law of proportional representation and representation by district.
164 Article 4 of the Political Parties Law granted all Jordanians the right to form and join political parties from 1992 onward. An overhaul of the party law in 2007 (Article 5(a)) required individual parties to have at least 500 founding members with the membership representing a minimum of five governorates with 10 percent of the overall membership in each governorate. These rules effectively reduced the number of registered political parties, but simultaneously created incentives for the recruitment of women to hopefully increase party numbers in a bid to abide by the law.
(Abu Hanieh 2008), and sustained a coherent party platform by rallying around the issue of Palestinian independence.165

Most of Jordan’s political activity is centered on tribal affiliations with the majority of political candidates and representatives campaigning as “independents”, and effectively running as proxies for the dominant tribes across Jordan’s major electoral districts. Many argue the king’s decision to scrap proportional representation re-invigorated Jordanian tribalism and encouraged political patronage to the Hashemite dynasty (Brand 1998; Fathi 1994; Richards and Waterbury 2007; Shryrock 1997). A substantial number of my interview subjects argued this ultimately hurt women’s participation and openly criticized the King for conserving the policy of “one-man-one-vote” which promoted tribal identification over a more “neutral” culture of party identification. Certainly, the conservative patriarchic values tribes often cultivate are the most transparent detriment to women’s substantive political participation. Yet, reverting to a system of “independents” has penalized female candidates in other ways. In countries with more established political parties, the party will foot a substantial portion of campaign expenses. Without the party system in place, Jordanian women’s access to the labor market and familial wealth becomes of paramount importance and women’s limited labor force participation directly affects their political opportunities.166 In fact, lack of funds was and is probably the most commonly cited impediment to women seeking political office, alongside patriarchic values (Husseini 2010; Malkawi 2010). Until recently, political parties, civic organizations, and even women’s groups endorsing female candidates were uncommon. The first 12 women who ran as

165 The Islamic Action Front is the political party incarnation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and has largely drawn its ranks from the Palestinian refugee population in the Kingdom—in particular, the city of Zarqa.
166 Until recently there was no concept of fundraising in Jordan, rather one directly engaged in vote-buying from the community.
independent candidates in the elections of 1993 campained without endorsement from any of these civil society groups and, unsurprisingly, had no success (Abu Hanieh 2008). Such political dynamics have only gradually begun to change. Since 1997 even Islamist parties such as the IAF and the Muslim Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami) have begun nominating female candidates. However, the IAF is the only political party within Jordan with the profile and platform to consistently and successfully field candidates of any gender. Therefore, the government’s recent offer of financial incentives to political parties recruiting women seems a rather tepid overture to women in a political system where parties barely exist. 167

It is no accident that the women who attain posts in the Jordanian House of Representatives or in the Senate tend to be well connected and independently wealthy—often with close ties to the international NGO and business community. Yet even these women face significant challenges in obtaining campaign funding. In a candid interview with USAID (2007), Senator and a wealthy businesswoman in her own right, Wijdan Talhouni Saket, recalled almost being denied a loan because her husband was not with her during the application process: “Despite the fact that I inherited significant money, property and shares from my parents – and under Islamic law this remains mine – when I applied for a bank loan for my already established and successful antique business, the banker still insisted I get my husband to sign as guarantor on the loan. Why? Just because he is male. My husband is a government employee and would never be able to pay back the loan on his salary. It’s ridiculous. The same would never happen if the sexes were reversed. If a wealthy, established businesswoman like me still faces discrimination in access to credit, imagine how much harder it is for other women in business” (USAID 2007, 169

167 al-Arab al-Yawm, 2004. [Daoudieh: Parties are national institutions that will be supported]. No. 2596, 14 July, p. 23.
9. Her words are not negligible in a political environment where all candidates are expected to fund their campaigns through extensive and direct vote buying. Consequently, women’s lack of participation in the labor force and independent access to funds, whether regulated through discriminatory Islamic inheritance laws or social norms (“women’s place is in the home”), directly affects their political opportunities in an environment where political parties do not extensively field or fund political candidates. According to Rana Husseini (2010), Jordanian women contributed 8 percent to the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2007, constituted 37 percent of the workforce in the public sector and 12 percent in the private sector, but constituted a low 14.7 percent of the total labor force. This is striking considering the GCC countries’ women’s labor force participation is close to 30 percent (see Table 4.2 in chapter four). Most of these women are also employed in low-paying “social professions” such as education (41 percent), health and social work (15.1 percent), and the broader service sector (5.7 percent) (Husseini 2010). While these statistics represent significant gains in the past decade from the single-digit numbers characteristic of the 1990s, they are also suggestive of the simple financial restrictions women may face in actively contesting political seats without significant, often inherited wealth.

Women’s Grassroots Mobilization

As with Bahrain, women’s activism in the public sphere was largely confined to charitable and voluntary social activities prior to the independence of Jordan. Importantly, when women finally mobilized politically, it tended to be of a more explicitly feminist nature than in Bahrain. In fact, one of earliest women’s organizations was founded in 1945— the Jordanian

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168 Interview with sociology professor at the University of Jordan, Amman, April 2008.
Women’s Union—and had (has) the reputation of being secular and leftist. The original women’s society—the Women’s Social Solidarity Society—was founded by Princess Misbah and mostly focused on caring for the poor and providing childcare for the needy. While this organization soon became defunct, it set the precedent for royal involvement in women’s issues that ultimately directly translated into the formation of the JNCW with Princess Basma at the helm.

Probably the organization most instrumental and persistent in publicly promoting women’s suffrage from 1954 onward was the Arab Women’s Federation (AWF, Itihad al-Mar’ah al’Arabiya) channeling both Palestinian and Trans-Jordanian women’s fervor for liberalization at the time. It successfully pushed for the extension of full suffrage for women by 1974. However, with the Six-Day-War of 1967 attention turned to the Palestinian question domestically and the women’s movement was overshadowed (Brand 1998). Furthermore, with the violent crackdowns on the Palestinian resistance movement within Jordan from 1970-71, the political dynamics in the kingdom changed and King Hussain imposed a martial law for the next two decades that effectively curbed most political activity. The only women’s organization that survived this period with its platform intact was the Business and Professional Women’s Club (BPWC) whose activities were too innocuous to come under the scrutiny of the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Interior. During the 1980s, as King Hussain relaxed his stance on political activity, the General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW) was formed in a bid to unite rival women’s activists under one roof. It took until the 1990s for a powerful, government-sponsored umbrella organization to form under the auspices of a high-profile royal patron—

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169 Jordan gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1946.
170 The establishment of this organization coincided with the pan-Arab movement and its egalitarian sentiments directly influenced the AWF’s mission.
Princess Basma’s JNCW. Its formation was largely catalyzed by the reigning establishment’s need for Jordan to present a unified face at the U.N.’s Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Yet, as Brand (1998) points out, the co-optation of the women’s movement by a royal patron had some negative results—namely the development of patron-client relationships between the princess and varied women’s activists. In fact, every secular woman’s organization—even the staunchly independent Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU)—is now under the thumb of the JNCW. In less than a twist of fate, the former chair of the JWU—Asma Khader—is now the director of the JNCW. Furthermore, Brand states, “While Basma brings a generally enlightened outlook to many issues, her leadership of a national women’s movement in the kingdom means that certain topics will not be broached” (1998, 172). Brand claims further that many of the women’s activists she spoke with in the wake of Beijing (1995) were reticent to offer ideas on how to proceed with the women’s agenda for fear of offending the princess.

An additional barrier to women’s parliamentary representation translating into tangible reforms is the tense relationship between female representatives and women activists, even though both groups tend to have cordial relationships with the royal family and its mission (Brand 1998; Husseini 2010). Deputies routinely criticized the women’s associations for lack of political support and for insulting their qualifications, while the women’s associations see the deputies as little more than tokens who neglect to promote the aspirations of women through relevant legislation and are preoccupied with securing rents for their constituencies.\(^{171}\) Many

\(^{171}\) From my personal experience interviewing three female deputies and two Senators, I gathered procuring these rents was a full-time job in and of itself. During one of my interviews, the representative in question had a line of 30 tribesmen and women outside of her door directly requesting either money or employment for themselves or their kin. In most cases, the representative obliged them.
believe the quota is being used by the deputies in question not for the advancement of women, but for self-advancement or other self-serving interests.  

On this note, perhaps it is not surprising that many Jordanian women are turning to Islamist women’s groups for guidance. Nearly 21 percent of the membership in professional organizations is female and includes a range of professions in its ranks from female engineers and physicians to lawyers and journalists—and a majority of these women are members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ab Hanieh 2008). Islamist women usually run and coordinate women-centric educational and informative events on issues ranging from breast cancer to family code policy within these unions. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood has promoted the creation of women’s committees and non-profit associations geared at recruiting women such as the Charitable Association of Virtue, as well as the Association for the Preservation of the Holy Quran, both established in 1992 and aimed at fostering women’s awareness regarding their rights as stipulated by Islamic law. More importantly, there has been a degree of revisionism in the attitude towards Islamist women’s participation with the split in the ranks of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the IAF, down “traditionalist” and “progressive” lines. The latter has attempted to integrate a framework for the liberation of women into the party platform through progressive interpretations of Islamic ideology (Clark 2006, 2004; Abu Hanieh 2008).

*International Influence*

Jordan’s precarious position in the Middle East, much like Bahrain’s in the Gulf, necessitates external aid to insure its continued peaceful existence both economically and

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172 The trend is for women to initially participate through civic organizations or public sector work and then move on to more political activity—though this is somewhat hampered by laws limiting political gatherings.

173 Almost 400 branches of the Association for the Preservation of the Holy Quran exist across Jordan.
politically. The kingdom has long strived to satisfy its foreign donors and secure future assistance through strategic reforms and it is well documented that external relations influenced the way liberalization unfolded (Brand 1998; Carapico 2002; Choucair-Vizoso 2008; Greenwood 2003; Ryan 2004). During the British colonial period, the U.K. propped up the kingdom, but with independence in 1946 Jordan began to rely more on a combination of Arab League and U.S. funds. The country is the fourth largest recipient of US foreign aid, garnishing approximately $225 million a year for the past decade and a half (Choucair-Vizoso 2008). In 2003 aid money alone funded 42 percent of government expenditures (Peters 2008). Nowhere was the conditionality associated with aid more evident than with the recent passage of the 20 percent gender quota for the Municipal Councils. Stephanie Nanes (2009) research directly tied the promotion of this policy to a $24.6 million grant from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Her interviews with USAID officials confirmed the policy was adopted under pressure from the U.S. government: “…a governance advisor at USAID acknowledged that Jordan’s 2007 Municipal Law, which included the provisions for the women’s quota was a “conditioned precedent,” i.e. among the reforms required of Jordan to qualify for the MCC Threshold program (Nanes 2010, 4). According to Nanes, this arrangement allowed the Jordanian government to appear progressive and modern, while avoiding controversial reforms that would more directly impact the status of women such as revisions to the personal status, nationality, and divorce laws. Laurie Brand’s historical research on previous efforts by the JNCW to appoint women to municipal councils lends credence to Nanes’ present-day anecdote. “Some contend that the regime had made a decision that women should be so appointed [to municipal council seats], since it is good for Jordan’s image with the West and with donor agencies to increase women’s
visibility in public life. The fact that these efforts took place during the immediate prelude to Beijing should also not be forgotten” (Brand 1998, 170).

Beyond funding, many external agencies have also played an instrumental role in the crafting and framing of gender-related policy. Princess Basma, the royal patron of the JNCW, directly requested that USAID participate in drafting the first National Strategy for Women in 1993 (Brand 1998). In fact, the story of the JNCW’s creation illustrates the influence of external powers on the promotion of the gender agenda in Jordan. In 1991 a delegation from the United Nations Fund For Population suggested the establishment of such an institution to insure women would be part and parcel of the development process (Brand 1998). Amideast also partnered with the BPWA to sponsor workshops on women’s participation in governance and NGO networking during the 1990s—an activity somewhat beyond its mandate of linguistic and technical education. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has consulted with the Jordanian government on how to increase women’s political participation through various institutional mechanisms and runs state-approved workshops to professionalize female parliamentarians, while the International Republican Institute (IRI) claims this job for female municipal councilors. Of the non-U.S. organizations, the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), and the Friedrich Neumann Stiftung (FNS) have also played pivotal roles in conditioning how the kingdom approaches women’s political empowerment (Brand 1998).

Why do foreign interests focus on Jordanians incorporating women into their politics? Much of the aid currently disbursed in the region has been earmarked for democracy promotion and reforms across civil society, the legislature, and the judicial system in a bid to democratize
Arab states without truly reforming authoritarian executives (Carapico 2002; Yacoubian 2004). The United Nations Arab Human Development Report of 2005 even suggested superficial reforms promoted by external aid interests often gave Arab government’s a carte blanche by allowing them to legislate shallow institutional changes such as quotas in the place of crucial reforms to personal status laws. The latter would genuinely change women’s status within Jordanian society, but also risk antagonizing restive Islamist factions, which the Jordanian government is none to keen on aggravating since the 2005 Al-Qaeda-masterminded terrorist bombings at the Day’s Inn in Amman.

Ultimately, Jordan represents the curious case where all the institutional trappings that would facilitate women’s political participation are in place. There are gender quotas to insure women’s election at most levels of politics, the women’s NGO scene is fairly robust if not very diverse or independent from the state, and the overall level of economic development and education is high for the region. Yet, it is still questionable whether women would be elected without the incentive structure of quotas, and the enforcement of existing legislation guaranteeing gender equality is still choppy, partially due to a complex judicial system. The grassroots women’s movement has been almost entirely co-opted by Princess Basma’s JNCW, a powerful patron who women’s activists are leery of “offending” and thus only introduce tepid agendas. Furthermore, the lack of a strong political party system penalizes prospective female politicians since many women do not have independent access to campaign funds, while a majoritarian electoral system discouraged parties from fielding female candidates until the adoption of gender quotas. More than in any of the three cases covered in this chapter, women’s lacking labor force participation puts Jordanian women in a particular bind if they wish to wield
any political influence. Certainly, foreign capital flows have been opportune since they have provided many of the candidates with lucrative jobs allowing them to self-fund their candidacies. And, of course, conditional development assistance has directly pressured the government into passing pro-women legislation, but it has largely lacked substance due to the absence of a strong grassroots movement to independently articulate the needs of a broader swathe of Jordan’s female citizens.

**Morocco—Grassroots Mobilization inspires state-sponsored feminism**

“Feminism is irrelevant because Islam has already granted rights, if people define feminism as struggling against repression.”

Women obtained the right to vote in Morocco in 1956 along with the right to a free education as the kingdom declared its independence from the French. However, the personal status codes established in 1957 effectively treated all women regardless of their background or marital status as dependents of their husbands, fathers, or even brothers—effectively, these women were treated as minors (Sadiqi 2009). The late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the creation of a significant number of women’s groups with close links or emerging from political parties, such as Association Democratique des Femmes Marocaines (ADFM) in 1985 and Union de l’Action Feminine (UAF) in 1987 that demanded the end of women’s legal inferiority—especially the principle of guardianship, polygamy, and unequal rights to divorce. The latter laws were all part of the Moroccan personal status code, commonly referred to as the Moudawana. King Hassan II introduced the first legal changes to the code in 1995, abolishing the necessity for women to have their guardian’s signature in order to obtain a passport. At the turn of the century, a new wave of activity on the part of women’s associations elicited discussion on the Plan of

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174 Interview conducted with founding member of the Subul Assalam Center, Fes, Morocco June 2008.
Action for the Participation of Women in Development (Plan d’Action pour la Participation de la Femme au Développement) and galvanized a second round of gender-related reforms to Moroccan labor laws. The end of the repressive rule of King Hassan II in 1999 resulted in a groundswell of hope that his son Mohamed VI would be more of a reformer and the initial years of his reign partially confirmed these hopes. After two decades of lobbying for reforms in the Moudawana, as well as for revised citizenship laws and the adoption of gender quotas, the new millennium saw progressive changes in terms of women’s rights and their access to political space more broadly. Since 2002, a 10 percent gender quota has been in place raising the number of women in the House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nawab or Lower House) from two in 1997 to 34 in 2007.175 Furthermore, in 2009 a 12 percent quota was applied to the local elections, a measure which had also been vigorously championed by women’s NGOs, as well as the women’s units of Morocco’s primary political parties: Istiqal, Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), the leftist Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS), and the relatively new Mouvement Populaires (MP). Consequently, more than 3,400 women secured positions in the local elections, many of them through direct election. In addition to the adoption of legislative and municipal quotas, in 2007 the nationality code was revised to allow women to pass on citizenships to their children and in 2008 all reservations to CEDAW were lifted (Jamal 2010; Sadiqi 2009). Currently, seven women head ministries in the government across a range of portfolios including the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water, and the Environment. Women are even reasonably well represented in the judiciary largely due to the changes in the family law. From 2006 onward, women composed 19 percent of all judges and 16 percent of those on the judiciary.

175 The political parties in 2002 signed a charter that reserved 30 seats on a special National List, for women. The quota itself is not legally mandated, rather the parties themselves enforce it through a mutual charter.
Supreme Court (Sadiqi 2010). Most importantly, the Moudawana was revised in 2004 standardizing legal procedures for divorce and requiring divorce be adjudicated in court, as well as limiting the Islamic practice of repudiation (talaq). Women were finally allowed to apply for passports on their own, enhancing their personal mobility. They were also permitted to file for child custody. Finally, the marriage age was raised to 18 and polygamy was officially circumscribed, though not banned outright. Alongside these seminal changes, the passage of the revised Moudawana laws also inspired progressive reforms to other laws such as those governing equality of employment and sexual harassment in the workplace (which was finally criminalized). Yet, the enforcement of the new Moudawana law is a notorious sticking point and activists complain the gender agenda has lost much needed steam since these reforms were passed, which indelicate pundits argue was the King’s intent all along (Sadiqi 2009).

In many respects, Morocco has seen the greatest progress in terms of women’s political incorporation in the Arab world over the past decade and is deservedly highlighted as a beacon for development in the region. Using Schmidt et al.’s (2002) benchmarks for political inclusion, we can see that Morocco has been successful in incorporating women on a number of levels. Schmidt and company suggest full incorporation entails “(1) full access to participation, (2) representation in important decision-making processes and institutions, (3) influence in/power over government decisions, (4) adoption of public policies that address group concerns or interests, and (5) socioeconomic parity” (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005,4). The extension of full women’s suffrage, the adoption of gender quotas as affirmative action policy, the direct election and appointment of women to political positions across the executive, legislative, and the judiciary, and the passage of the revised Moudawana laws all indicate the Moroccan women’s
movement has substantial political influence within the kingdom since all of these benchmarks have been part of its platforms in the past and present. The only category that has seen more limited progress is socioeconomic parity between the genders—a problem endemic to the broader world—and surprisingly, one that few women’s organizations in Morocco address. In an interview with a prominent member of the women’s NGO, L’Association des Femmes Chefs d’Entreprises du Maroc (AFEM; the Association of Women Chief Executives of Morocco), my subject candidly spoke of the feminist networks’ lacking attention to the active discrimination against women in the labor force and in the business community more broadly. She openly criticized how the focus on women’s political rights was distracting from an appeal to improve their situation socio-economically, which she claimed would most directly enhance women’s standing in Moroccan society and give them a more substantive political voice.

**Women’s Grassroots Mobilization and Top-Down Empowerment**

Of the three kingdoms discussed in this chapter, Morocco has had the most vibrant and pivotal grassroots women’s movement dating back to the struggle for independence in 1946 (Brand 1998; Sadiqi 2009,). One of the signatories to the Independence Manifesto (Manifest de l’Indépendance), was a female relative of the most prominent independence leader, Allal al-Fassi—the founder of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. Other Moroccan women contributed to the cause by actively smuggling food and arms to rebel leaders during their struggle against French colonial rule. King Mohammad V even encouraged his eldest daughter Lalla Aicha to shed the veil in public and serve as a symbol for Moroccan women’s and the broader kingdom’s emancipation in 1947. Moroccan political parties were also quick to embrace a role for women in the women’s branches of the Istiqlal and Moroccan Communist Party in the 1940s.

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176 Interview with AFEM member in Rabat, Morocco, November 2009.
Consequently, many of the subsequent independent women’s organizations that developed were originally founded within these selfsame parties. The ADFM was actually an outgrowth of the Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (the Party of Progress and Socialism). While the stridency of the women’s movements demands has ebbed and flowed, it has always been feminist in character and decidedly more independent since the 1980s—a period of liberalization in the former King’s reign. Many of the movement’s offshoots also grew out of the world of the media and socialist literature. The UAF was thus formed by a group of leftist women who began to write and public the feminist magazine 8 Mars (Brand 1998). In particular, during the 1990s the one million signature campaign to revise the Moudawana re-invigorated the gender agenda and resulted in the creation of the Association Marocaines des Droits des Femmes (AMDF; the Moroccan Association of Women’s Rights) and the Ligue Democratique des Droits de la Femme (LDDF; the Democratic League of Women’s Rights) both of which dealt with issues of domestic violence and have increasingly turned to lobbying for rural women’s rights.

Much as in Egypt, the women’s movement developed independently from the ruling establishment and has consistently lobbied for reform of the personal status laws since the passage of the first family code in 1957, as well as for enhanced women’s rights overall. In Morocco we see the rare outcome of grassroots mobilization ultimately pressuring the state to foster progressive change in conjunction with significant reputational pressures from abroad. Sater (2007) contends “women militants” are now one of the key alliance groups for the monarchy alongside the more traditional alliances with the religious community (‘ulama), the rural elites, and urbane leaders of political parties. In fact, if anything the movement is in danger of becoming an “in-group” potentially alienated from the diverse set of women it aims to
The discussion of women’s rights suffers no censorship in the media despite being controversial among the more religious members of the Moroccan population. Furthermore, women’s rights activists are able to hold rallies when the police harass other dissident groups, and clearly enjoy a preferential relationship with the state (Sadiqi 2009; Sater 2007). The relationship between women’s NGOs and the monarch became particularly friendly with the beginning of the new millennium when the state openly used feminists as a bulwark against Islamic radicalism. Fatima Sadiqi (2008) claims the Moroccan government co-opted women’s issues to combat Islamist radicalization in the wake of the Casablanca terrorist attacks of 2003. Subsequent widespread anti-fundamentalist sentiment gave the feminist movement opportunity to pressure the kingdom and the government into real reforms of the antiquated family code. The Casablanca attack also enabled women’s organizations to frame their goals as part and parcel of the all-important transition to democracy, by highlighting their mission to re-orient Morocco towards secularism.

According to Zakia Salime (2008), both feminist and Islamist women’s networks used Casablanca to activate what she terms a “feminist agenda”—the former using the discourse of modernity and democracy to push for reforms of the personal status code, while the latter lobbied for positions within the state-controlled religious leadership. Both appealed to the “moderating” effect of women on popular sentiment—a catchphrase that the state was particularly sensitive to in the wake of September 11th and the resulting pressure from the West to curb perceived Islamist threats. Soon after, 30 female preachers (morshidate) were appointed to state-run mosques in the interest of moderating the “poisonous” tone of Friday sermons.

Interestingly, secular feminist NGOs co-opted the language of Islam with many of

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177 This is especially the case with women from rural areas and of Amazigh (“Berber”) descent.
organizations re-calibrating their message and appealing to women’s rights within the framework of *Shari’ah* law in an effort to appease Islamist factions critiquing changes to the personal status laws. The two factions have never seen eye-to-eye, as most secular activists see the Islam as fundamentally autocratic, fostering the patriarchic mentality that effectively curtails the enforcement of women’s rights even when they are constitutionally mandated. However, Islamist parties have also shown themselves to be extremely pragmatic when it comes to women’s political representation. The Islamist *Parti de la Justice et du Développement* (PJD; Justice and Development Party) immediately embraced gender quotas, much as the Islamic Action Front did in Jordan, in the interest of increasing their parliamentary representation.\textsuperscript{178} Currently, the PJD is the political party with the highest percentage of female parliamentarians. Of the 46 seats the party currently holds in the House of Representatives, six are filled by women whose names were strategically placed on the top of party lists to enhance their chances of election in conservative constituencies. Furthermore, it presented a list only made up of women to the municipal elections of 2003. My interviews with gender mainstreaming consultants from two prominent international NGOs: the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the German *Gemeinschaft fur Technische Zwischenarbeit* (GTZ) further impressed upon me how promoting women within party ranks had become an important strategy for the PJD. Representatives from both organizations revealed that when organizing workshops for political campaigning during the last municipal elections, the PJD were the only party to send their women to the training. According to an official from GTZ’s gender-mainstreaming unit, “In January [2009], Nouzha Skalli requested that we assist them with the municipal level elections. Organizations such as NDI and IRI were more instrumental in this. They told us when they held campaign workshops,\textsuperscript{178} The PJD is the Moroccan political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
however, only the PJD candidates showed up. The PJD also had the highest showing for women at the municipal level.”

Yet, beyond the possibly cynical co-optation of women into the PJD, there is actually a very open attempt to meld Islam and feminism through the activism of Nadia Yassine—the daughter of nationally known opposition leader and avowed anti-monarchist, Sheikh Abdesslam Yassine. Sheikh Yassine was the founder of the ultra-conservative and currently banned Justice and Charity movement (Al Adl wa al Ihssane). Nadia Yassine maintains, “Secular feminists live in a separate world. They ape the imperialist West. The fact is, we are Muslims here. How else can women see rights except through Islam?”

The political successes and mobilization of women across the feminist and Islamist paradigms is particularly impressive considering the rampant illiteracy among both rural and urban women, much less the divisions between Arab, Amazigh (“Berber”), and African women in Morocco. The World Bank reported only 43.2 percent of adult women were literate in 2007 (Sadiqi 2010). Yet, women have had prominent economic roles in Moroccan society since the 1960s and the 1970s, with a full 27 percent of the workforce female in 2007. Still, Morocco has some of the highest levels of women’s illiteracy in the region and even in the world, as well as rampant discrimination in the workplace. While labor codes and constitutional provisions guarantee women’s rights to private property, in practice it is a different story and exacerbated by the high illiteracy and lacking formal education of women, in particular. Furthermore, while well represented in the low-wage textile industry, women have limited access to the kinds

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179 Interview with gender project coordinator within GTZ, Rabat, Morocco, November 2009.
181 In conjunction with this, most women when employed are filtered into particular industries such as the low-paying textile industry (where they make up 71 percent of the workforce), agriculture (employed 61.4 percent of the workforce), or they work as domestic servants.
of jobs that would generate enough independent wealth to fund political activity. The presence of a strong party system somewhat alleviates this problem, but politics still remains the province of Moroccan elites whether nationalist, socialist, or Islamist. Per representative Milouda Hazib of the Parti National-Démocrate (PND; National Democratic Party): “The problem is that an electoral campaign costs a lot of money, and women are often financially dependent on men. If it comes to the question of who should stand for elections, men come first, and women second” (Sater 2007, 729).

Even these significant challenges have not been able to completely impede women’s agency as the case of the Soulaliyate Women’s Movement has demonstrated (Mandraud 2011). The Soulaliyate are a group of largely illiterate, divorced and widowed women lobbying to reform inheritance laws that deprive them of a stake in “common lands” in the vicinity of the city of Kenitra. For the past three years they have been attempting to gain compensation for the unlawful sale of their lands by male members of their tribe. However, most of these women had no recourse to contest this sale since they were all without male kin, and were thus forcibly evicted from their land to adjoining shantytowns. The Soulaliyate successfully partnered with the more prominent ADFM to fight for compensation from their tribesmen and won a decision by the Ministry of Interior on October 24th, 2010 to recognize the right of all women to enjoy compensation related to collective lands transfers in Morocco on an equal footing with men (TelQuel 2011). This legal outcome is almost incredible considering it was originally spearheaded by illiterate women who intelligently partnered with a women’s NGO they knew was prominent enough to plead their case to a higher authority...from watching television.182

182 Interview with Soulaliyate caseworker at ADFM, Rabat, Morocco. November 2009.
International Influence

The role of women’s NGOs has been unprecedented in fostering increased state awareness of women’s issues in Morocco. The question arises why the Moroccan government and, more importantly, King Mohammed VI, decided to institute so many women-friendly policies at the turn of the millennium. The Casablanca attacks of 2003 played an important role in galvanizing government action. In fact, the founder of the ADFM, Najia Zariri, openly and somewhat bizarrely stated that the feminist movement’s promotion of democracy and modern values could curb the spread of radical Islam, preventing a possible American military intervention to “stabilize” Morocco (Salime 2007). Over the past three decades, the IGO community also created an environment in which empowering women became a tool for the state revamp its global image. “Gender was central to the repositioning of the Moroccan state in this international context” (Salime 2007, 4).

Morocco’s relationship has largely remained cordial with its former colonial master—France, thus the country has continued to receive aid from the European Union, and newly from the U.S. During the 1980s Morocco even made a failed bid to join the European Community arguing it was a logical extension of the union considering the E.U.’s South Mediterranean Policy. However, it was summarily rebuffed when it formally applied in 1987 with the E.U. member states affirming the Treaty of Rome stipulated any future members would both have to be European and democratic (Brand 1998)—a political outcome that would further inspire King Mohammed VI’s reforms. One of my interview subjects openly stated, “the government is conforming to US and EU pressure as a means to overcoming terrorism; it’s a way to control Islam in Morocco.”183 More importantly, women’s networks used the state’s increasing

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183 Interview with a representative of the Subul Assalam Center, Fes, Morocco, August 2008.
sensitivity to international norms and the global fear mongering of radical Islam as a launching point to promote gender reforms.

The activities of women’s organizations have been directly funded and heavily influenced by European and U.S. organizations. Middle East expert Laurie Brand (1998) cites the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Amideast, and USAID as directly impacting and facilitating change through funding women’s conferences, seminars, and, in general, lobbying for relevant policy change and insuring women’s access to public platforms. According to Brand, prior to the 1990s women’s organizations in Morocco chose activities based on personal assessments of the needs of women, yet in a post-1990 world awash with development aid, many women’s groups found their agendas shaped by the projects they could secure funding for from international donors (1998, 66). Essentially, Moroccan NGOs have always been politicized, but external funding gave them and their government more incentive to expand women’s political opportunities.

Perhaps the most striking contrast between Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain is the lack of a government-sponsored umbrella organization to monitor and coordinate women’s empowerment in Morocco. While the ADFM is the most high-profile women’s NGO in the country and its own Nouzha Skalli is currently the Minister of Social Development and Family Affairs, the organization has remained independent from the government and Minister Skalli has not made any overtures to detract from this position. Both feminist and Islamist networks tend to collaborate with the government, but are largely independent of it, and in many respects have a tit for tat relationship with the state as demonstrated by the bargaining of the feminists for reforms of the family code and the Islamists for the appointment of the morshidate (female
preachers) to state-run mosques. Furthermore, women’s NGOs are often aided by the women’s units of political parties in their activities further bolstering their credibility and reach within Moroccan political society. This may ultimately explain why Morocco is the only country to have substantially reformed their personal status laws in a direct concession to two decades of feminist lobbying and despite much consternation from Islamist factions. Women’s groups operate within and without the government and can thus more readily offer critical assessments of regime policy and genuine additions to and improvements on it. Finally, a relatively vibrant party system, partially due to a proportional electoral system, offers women more opportunity to externally fund political campaigns.

**Conclusion**

The interaction of grassroots mobilization, elite/state agency, and international economic incentives conditioned very different approaches to and results for women’s political incorporation across Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. State support for gender empowerment is consistent across the three cases, but its implementation varies. In Jordan and Bahrain, the government via the monarch created umbrella-organizations (GONGOs) with royal patrons to coordinate and oversee women’s political participation and NGO activity, while in Morocco these activities were largely coordinated by the NGOs themselves. This autonomy allowed Moroccan NGOs to genuinely engage in agenda setting. Women’s grassroots mobilization highlighted how social movements vary across the individual countries and hinted at a potentially significant factor for substantive incorporation—the presence of an independent and explicitly women’s rights-oriented social movement. Furthermore, extensive development assistance in both Jordan and Morocco has helped sustain women’s political mobilization when funding from
mediating institutions (political parties, etc.) has been unavailable. In the Moroccan case, it has even allowed feminist networks to mobilize independent of the state. While external aid did not explicitly generate substantive political outcomes for women, it facilitated and sustained political access for those interested in lobbying on women’s behalf.

In Bahrain an incipient women’s movement developed around incentives from the monarchy, but never managed to co-opt the larger and more activated female Shiite population. Conversely, in Jordan King Abdullah revitalized a dormant women’s movement with his bid to put “Jordan First” enhancing political participation and re-opening political space to women, but the local women’s movement has been largely co-opted by and turned into a pet project for the royal family. Finally, Morocco always enjoyed an active and explicitly feminist women’s movement, which served as the necessary catalyst for King Mohammad VI to promote women-friendly policies and the revolutionary reforms of the Moudawana. Notably, terrorist attacks in both Morocco (2003) and Jordan (2005) in the post-September 11th, further galvanized the monarchs in these two countries to seek out support from feminist groups, in the hope that empowering them would have a moderating and secularizing effect on their societies.

The results from this case analysis imply that an independent women’s movement in conjunction with external funding, as well as even a haphazard commitment from political leaders yields the most progressive policy results for women. It is quite likely that without the overt commitment of foreign donors to Morocco’s landmark women’s movement, it would not have been capable of sustaining itself over time or so effectively popularizing its mission. Moroccan women activists represent the primary architects of gender-related policy and a tangible veto-player in their kingdom’s political system—effectively a sign of their growing

184 See Wolbrecht and Hero (2005, 10) for more exhaustive explanation of mediating institutions.
political influence (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005). While Jordan currently has more female representatives within its governing institutions than Morocco (see Table 5.3 in the Appendix), they have been less capable of legislating for meaningful gender-related policy change, which aptly illustrates the gap between descriptive representation and substantive participation. Even with an increased number of female representatives, Jordanian women still cannot pass on citizenship or nationality to their children. The judicial system still offers leniency to the perpetrators of honor killings and the arbitrary right to divorce through repudiation still exists (Husseini 2010). While descriptive representation may offer future generations of Jordanian women with female role models (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007), passing substantive legislation gives contemporary Moroccan women more tangible political, economic, and social opportunities.

185 At the time of fieldwork, Jordan had fewer representatives and a more restricted quota (only 6 reserved seats).
6. CONCLUSION

The stirrings of revolutionary protests across the Arab world in 2011 have re-invigorated the debate on women’s roles in the politics of the region. Furthermore, women’s current activism has engendered polemical debates whether Western democracy promotion and gender empowerment efforts have been instrumental in creating the necessary groundswell and skill-sets that allowed protesters to coordinate and appeal for change (Carothers 2011; Democracy Digest 2011). The situation for women still remains precarious, as there are no guarantees that their current boldness will be rewarded with greater legal and social recognition in any transition to new regimes (Cole and Cole 2011). The experiences of women in the independence movements of Morocco and Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s attest to how easily women were relegated to second-tier status after being at the forefront of both revolutions. Still, many female activists see a new dawn with women taking to the streets in protest alongside men, and even deem it the beginning of a social revolution. However, political liberalization without social liberalization is a very likely outcome of the current unrest. How did Arab women come to this crossroads yet again and will they be able to sustain an active political role whilst rebuilding their societies?

This dissertation has no ready to answer to the question posed above, but has aimed to convey the complex story behind women’s political incorporation across the Arab world, hopefully illuminating the roles Arab women have always played within politics. Over time, these roles have become more varied and with the revolutionary sentiment of 2011 even more visible. In particular, my research gauged the levels of women’s political inclusion across indicators of descriptive representation, women-friendly policy change (i.e. gender quotas and revisions to personal status laws), and women’s capacity to enjoy the social, political, and
economic rights that afford them a space at the political table. As mentioned in chapter five, Western perceptions of democratic inclusion broadly expect it to reflect an out-group’s access to participation, institutional representation, influence over government decisions, the promotion of related policy, and socioeconomic parity with the in-group (Wolbrecht and Hero 2005). While it is impossible to assert that Arab women enjoy all of these benchmarks fully (and questionable whether Western women do either), they have made considerable progress as evidenced in the quantitative and qualitative research presented here.

**Summary of Findings**

The empirical chapters demonstrated that external financial flows have had a growing impact on women’s status across the region—especially with the onset of the new millennium. This is partially a byproduct of the renewed strategic importance of the Arab world since the September 11th Al-Qaeda attacks, which re-invigorated efforts to moderate the region through democracy promotion by both Western governments and Intergovernmental organizations. Women’s empowerment became a focal component of these efforts once gender was identified as the most meaningful “gap” between Islam and the West (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003a, 2003b). Official development assistance was shown to have a positive effect on the likelihood of adopting gender quotas and on women’s economic and social rights. Surprisingly, it had limited effect on women’s legislative representation and political rights. Here, foreign direct investment displayed an astonishing impact and was consistently positively related to increases in women’s legislative representation. My explanation for this intriguing relationship is that many of the female deputies I spoke with had at some point been employed in foreign firms or had close relationships with foreign business interests—which, in turn, directly increased their
access to funds for political campaigns and enabled them to bribe their constituencies more effectively. As was illustrated in the case of Jordan, especially in systems where political parties are weak women’s independent access to funds becomes of paramount importance for funding political campaigns and negotiating daily political activities such as public service provision.\(^{186}\) While it is surprising that development assistance did not have a greater impact, it is perhaps expected that it may all come down to Arab women’s direct access to money if they wish to be involved in politics at the institutional level.\(^{187}\)

In the case of gender quota adoption, development assistance showed the most robust and consistently positive relationship with the likelihood of adopting this electoral policy, overall, and specifically in the case of adopting reserved seats. Reserved seats demand the most radical institutional overhaul of existing chambers of power since they require the earmarking of a specific number of seats for women within governing bodies. This particular quota seems to be the most widespread among impoverished authoritarian regimes with a dependence on foreign aid (Krook 2006). Both chapters three and five outlined the pressures Arab countries faced to implement these policies and their relative unpopularity among conservative Muslim constituencies. Interestingly, remittances—a variable initially included in the analysis as a control for the impact of rival sources of foreign exchange had a positive impact on the likelihood of quota adoption. I will touch upon this further in the section dealing with future avenues for research.

Finally, the last empirical chapter (four) considered the capacity of women to access the

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\(^{186}\) Connections to both the private and public sector can be invaluable for insuring the employment prospects of a given district, as my shadowing of deputy Falak Ja’amani impressed upon me.

\(^{187}\) This is especially surprising considering many IGOs and foreign development agencies directly fund workshops and programs to train female candidates.
political arena through an accounting of their political, economic, and social rights. The results paint a complex picture where development assistance positively impacts both social and economic rights, while remittances negatively affect both. Neither of these indicators displayed an effect on political rights, which raises the question why foreign capital would still have an effect on the adoption of gender quotas. An explanation for this lies in the sensitivity of Cingranelli and Richards’ measure for political rights to the timing of universal suffrage. Women were extended the right to vote in almost all Arab countries (with the exception of the GCC states) earlier than the 1990s (see Table 4.8 in the Appendix), yet the period under investigation in this dissertation is from 1990 until 2009. Thus, aid would not have had an impact on the extension of universal suffrage—especially since the only countries to grant women the right to vote in the new millennium were the oil-wealthy states of the GCC. Quota adoption has been much more recent and followed the increase in capital flows of the 1990s. Therefore, we easily observe a pattern where financial instruments would and do have an impact on this particular electoral policy. Remittances negatively affected women’s economic and social rights by bolstering household income, which effectively abolishes the need for women to work outside of the home and thereby lobby for improved economic rights (Ross 2008). Finally, foreign direct investment was positively associated with women’s economic rights, countering claims that this type of capital necessarily renders women more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of globalization. In the Arab world it seems to offer opportunity as Tunisia’s textile-industry poignantly illustrates, and more of a bargaining chip vis-à-vis government (Ross 2008; White 2001).

It is important to note that these findings have limited meaning without situating them into the context of the actual experience of Arab countries. Furthermore, due to the paucity of
data available for the region (whether because countries do not release or do not collect data), there are many important concepts influencing levels of women’s political incorporation that are not readily quantifiable and were thus not included in the empirical analysis. The inability to capture the interests of relevant actors instrumental in lobbying or legislating for gender empowerment renders quantitative analysis an unsatisfying venture when considering the incentives and actors behind the decision to politically incorporate women. Chapter five dealt with these setbacks through a qualitative analysis of the interaction between grassroots women’s movements and the agency of relevant political leaders as structured by international economic incentives. My observations in this chapter were based on over 100 in–country elite interviews and extensive case research on Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco. The findings are suggestive, demonstrating that substantive incorporation was largely the by-product of autonomous and explicitly feminist grassroots mobilization partnered with subsequent government support as in the case of Morocco. Importantly, external funding served a crucial role in sustaining these movements through multiple decades of lobbying on the part of women activists and helped popularize their mission through direct cash inputs and, in some cases, pressuring the state. These conclusions are not surprising considering extensive evidence that robust women’s movements have often been connected to the promotion of women’s rights within Western governments as well as those in other parts of the world (Htun and Weldon 2007; Katzenstein 1989; Stetson and Mazur 1995; Weldon 2006). However, they do suggest a closer assessment of how these movements operate internally would be instructive. For example, I am sure the women of the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) would all claim they are staunch feminists promoting an explicitly women-oriented agenda. That said, their intimate connection to
the government and the royal family prevents them from advancing independent agendas and explicitly critiquing the kingdom’s gender-related policies.

There are several important policy implications from these findings. Development assistance obviously has an impact on incentives to politically incorporate women in the Arab world across myriad indicators, but has to be more selective of whom it is funding. A government-based umbrella organization such as the JNCW (Jordan) stifling women’s autonomous political participation and out of touch with local women may not be the best aid investment, whereas an ADFM (Morocco), which facilitated diverse participation and successfully lobbied for voiceless women in the *Soulaliyate* case shows potential.

Furthermore, the empirical data suggests a re-evaluation of the monolithic ways in which paradigms such as Women in Development (WID) and Gender and Development (GAD) perspectives view the effects of foreign capital. As it was shown, the effects of development assistance, foreign direct investment, and in some cases remittances were incredibly divergent, and this divergence may even more drastic in other regions of the world. Again, it is important to emphasize that the Middle East is a unique case and the patterns unveiled in this analysis may not hold elsewhere because of regional specificities.

**Limitations**

The most direct limitation of this research has been the difficulty to obtain accurate and thorough quantitative and qualitative data on the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, the more social variables are not always readily available since the culture of documenting such information is a relatively new practice, which coincided with the entrance of intergovernmental organizations and development agencies into the region during the past decade and a half. I made
a concerted effort to visit the national statistics offices of Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, as well as the regional offices of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in both Rabat, Morocco and Amman, Jordan in the hope of obtaining original data. However, most of the data I used was already available online through the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.

The absence of “religion” as an important constraint for women is a notable problem with the empirical models introduced in previous chapters. There are, as of yet, only limited quantitative indicators encapsulating Muslim religiosity and most gender-related studies have treated the peculiarities of the Muslim faith by incorporating a binary variable indicating whether a country was majority-Muslim or not (Fish 2002; Hughes and Kunovich 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997; Ross 2008). In this analysis, all of the countries are majority Muslim so a binary variable was not an option. However, the analysis here is more interested in exploring the structural variation in women’s political incorporation across a region that is majority Muslim, than considering the religion itself specifically. As we can see throughout this dissertation, even across a subset of 22 Arab League countries there is significant divergence in the levels of women’s political incorporation, contrary to the expectations of scholars who view the faith as having a unitary impact on women’s and more broadly human rights. The research presented here does not directly account for the salient differences in how Islam is practiced across Sunni vs. Shiite populations in the quantitative section, though it does cursorily touch on it in the evaluation of women’s status in Bahrain.

\footnote{I do attempt to capture some of this “religiosity” by controlling for Saudi Arabia’s sphere of religious influence through a “Gulf dummy”.}
Weldon and Htun (2007) make a compelling case that the significance of religion depends on the gender issues in question—i.e. religious organizations may not be opposed to women participating in politics, but have more strident views on doctrinal topics such as abortion (Htun 2003; Weldon 2007). This has been the case in much of the Arab world where progressive Islamists have not directly opposed and, in some cases, even embraced gender quotas and the extension of universal suffrage. However, amending personal status laws is a completely different matter and strikes at the heart of Muslim doctrine regarding the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the sexes. Considering the empirical analysis in this chapter has largely used non-controversial indicators of women’s political inclusion such as legislative representation and the adoption of gender quotas, this could be construed as a moot point. On the other hand, women’s “social rights” are more directly related to controversial personal status codes and do require a thorough accounting of the effects of religiosity.

Ultimately, the results described in this research are specific to the Middle East and North Africa and therefore may not hold across other regional contexts since they are exploring a predominantly Muslim and largely conservative culture where tribal dynamics still play a significant role (Charrad 2001; Gause 1994; Shryrock 1997). Cultural specificities likely make specific gender-related policies more or less controversial than they would be in other regions of the world. Furthermore, since September 11th and even dating as far back as the oil crisis of 1973, the West believes it has an important stake in the political and economic development of the region. This belief renders the international community acutely aware of unfolding politics in the Arab world and more willing to intervene in them. It is no accident that out of the three conflict situations the United States is currently involved in two are located in Arab countries;
namely, Iraq and Libya. The region also attracts the most sizable chunks of U.S. foreign aid as multi-billion dollar inputs into Egypt, Israel, and Jordan confirm. Thus, there may be more interest in insuring foreign aid is allocated “appropriately” in Arab settings, than in less strategically important regions. All of these peculiarities render the Middle East and North Africa a unique environment whose experiences with foreign capital and women’s political inclusion may not readily translate to other regions.

What is generalizable from this research is that macro-level analysis veils significant differences between and across regions in terms of the effects of foreign capital and, more precisely, the effectiveness and relative fungibility of foreign aid. In the context of women’s political incorporation in the Arab world, it has shown itself a potent force, yet this may not be the same for other development-related projects in the region or even for gender-related programs in the rest of the world! I hope these findings encourage policymakers to view the disbursement of aid as well as the encouragement of investment abroad in instrumental terms—recognizing both the potential and the pitfalls each can engender in specific environments.

**Future Research**

In an expansion of this research agenda, I hope to elaborate further on the intriguing and unexpected effect of remittances on domestic policy (quota adoption) and human rights (women’s economic and social rights). In this dissertation, we see that remittances can impact policies other than those related to the monetary and fiscal realm (Singer 2010), which raises the question whether these monies are flowing into the region to fund political activity alongside bolstering household incomes (Kapur 2003). In my conversation with an *Amazigh* (“Berber”) women’s activist in Morocco, she explicitly stated that the *Amazigh* diaspora in France and Spain
financed local dissident activity in Morocco—wiring funds through Western Union. She highlighted their success in pushing for the kingdom to initiate school instruction and television programming in the Berber language, *Tamazight* as well as officially recognizing more *Amazigh* names given unto newborns. Up until recently all Moroccan children’s names had to be *arabized* (Human Rights Watch 2010). Considering the revolutionary protests currently rocking the Arab world, an accounting of the role of remittances in sparking, funding, and sustaining these types of collective action is important. However, remittances may also play a salient role in funding dissident organizations petitioning for changes in social policy through institutionally approved channels much as the *Amazigh* rights movement did in Morocco. Where remittances are sent from may also be important since alongside monies, values may also be exported. For example, North Africa receives the majority of its remittance money from expats in the E.U. while the Levant (Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Syria) receives remittances from the GCC. Perhaps there are important differences regarding which political agendas such wired monies foster and how they impact domestic policy change.190

**Final Conclusion**

This dissertation represented an important personal and academic journey into exploring the political influence and roles of Arab women. It has also been an uncharacteristically timely one considering recent events. Arab women have shown themselves to be amazingly resilient in the face of tremendous odds inspiring and sustaining revolutionary fervor across Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and, newly, Morocco. They have been “protesting, organizing, blogging, 

189 Interview with women’s activist, Marrakesh, Morocco, December 2009.
190 In addition, North Africa tends to send more female labor to the EU than the Levant does to the GCC. This could also likely impacts how money is sent and spent in the home country.
and hunger-striking” according to a Guardian article on the Arab Spring.\footnote{Rice, X., K. Marsh, T. Finn, H. Sherwood, A. Chrisafis, and R. Booth. 2011. “Women have emerged as key players in the Arab Spring.” The Guardian, April. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/women-arab-spring}  Many fear that even if this activism results in regime-change, women’s status will not change substantially. Still, it is now clear that Arab women have more political tools at their disposal than their Algerian and Moroccan counterparts did in the 1950s, between experienced grassroots networks and generous external funding—here’s hoping they will not be afraid to wield them in the future. In the words of Alia al-Faqih, a 19-year-old Saudi woman, “The protesters in Egypt and Tunisia did something that was almost impossible... If they could bring down two tough presidents, why can’t we demand our rights?”\footnote{Benson, K. 2011. “Women in the Arab Uprisings.” International Labor Research and Information Group, April. Available at http://www.ilrig.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27:women-in-the-arab-uprisings&catid=3:building-womans-activism&Itemid=5} According to the findings in this dissertation, the key to sustaining this momentum is for Arab women to band together and continue to independently promote explicitly women-oriented goals through the prism of secular feminism or even progressive Islam, and for international aid agencies to continue offering them financial support.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


_____. 2005. “Quotas as a Fast Track to Equal Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia Is


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_____. 2010b Democratic Governance and Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). White Paper for Department for International Development (DFID) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)


220


2010a. Data retrieved June 1, 2010, from World Development Indicators Online (WDI) database.


## Table 2.4 Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) Population-Averaged Model of Women’s Legislative Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Auto-regressive</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong></td>
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<td>0.12*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong></td>
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<td>0.05***</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy Score</strong></td>
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<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.61***</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Fertility Rate</strong></td>
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<td>-0.14**</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.00</td>
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<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-2.59***</td>
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<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>269</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5 GEE Population-Averaged Model with Reduced Observations of Women’s Legislative Representation (controlling for the election cycle)

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</thead>
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<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong></td>
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<td>0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>-0.14***</td>
<td>-0.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>-0.91**</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>-0.58***</td>
<td>-0.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Dummy</td>
<td>-1.65*</td>
<td>-2.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 46 46

Insufficient observations with auto-regressive correlation structure. No convergence with unstructured correlation structure. ODA and FDI are coded as a percent of GDP. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6 Prais-Winston Time Series Regression with Panel-corrected Standard Errors of Women’s Legislative Representation

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Exp. Model 1</th>
<th>Exp. Model 2</th>
<th>Exp. Model 3</th>
<th>Exp. Model 4</th>
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<th>Only During Election Cycle</th>
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<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong></td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy Score</strong></td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Economic Development (log)</strong></td>
<td>-0.59***</td>
<td>-0.37**</td>
<td>-0.47***</td>
<td>-0.41***</td>
<td>-0.67***</td>
<td>-0.37***</td>
<td>-0.91***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fertility Rate</strong></td>
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<td>-0.44***</td>
<td>-0.46***</td>
<td>-0.40***</td>
<td>-0.40***</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>-0.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gulf Dummy</strong></td>
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<td>-0.82*</td>
<td>-0.90*</td>
<td>-0.89***</td>
<td>-0.66*</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-1.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Presence of Gender Quota</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s Economic Rights (CIRI)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s Political Rights (CIRI)</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>R-squared</strong></td>
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<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.62</td>
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<td>218</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>249</td>
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ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
### Table 3.5 Multi-Nomial Logistic Regression of Quota Adoption

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<td>Political Party Quotas</td>
<td>Legal Candidate Quotas</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18.91*** 1.20***</td>
<td>9.29*** 4.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.79) (0.32)</td>
<td>(1.29) (1.97)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Party Quotas</td>
<td>-3.62***</td>
<td>9.29*** 4.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(1.29) (1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-3.49*** -0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(2.21) (2.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.34*** -4.41***</td>
<td>5.27** -6.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.75) (0.98)</td>
<td>(2.21) (2.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-75.39*** -5.86***</td>
<td>-59.88*** -0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.58) (0.18)</td>
<td>(3.58) (2.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.94*** 0.72***</td>
<td>12.41*** 1.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.61) (0.23)</td>
<td>(2.48) (1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.46*** 0.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral System (Majoritarian)</td>
<td>(0.21) (0.12)</td>
<td>(0.15) (0.15)</td>
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<td>Democracy Score</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log)</td>
<td>(3.37) (0.81)</td>
<td>(2.37) (1.54)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(log)</td>
<td>-68.22*** 15.94***</td>
<td>-49.26*** 12.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log)</td>
<td>0.72***</td>
<td>1.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>(2.44) (0.61)</td>
<td>(2.48) (1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation</td>
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<td>2.30*** 1.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>(0.39) (0.49)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Women’s Secondary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Secondary Education</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Labor Participation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Labor Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>132</td>
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ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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<th>df</th>
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<td>0.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Labor Participation</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Test</strong></td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is important to note that Morocco has a GDP per capita of $5000 adjusting for PPP, while Lebanon’s is $10,746 according the International Monetary Fund’s 2011 data. Essentially, while Morocco’s per capita aid disbursement may seem smaller, especially as it is being “eaten up” by a precipitously growing population (Lebanon has had declining birth rates), $50 goes a lot further in Morocco than in Lebanon.
### Appendix C (Chapter 4)

**Table 4.8 Year Universal Suffrage Granted in Arab League Member States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab League Member State</th>
<th>Year Suffrage Granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bahrain</em></td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kuwait</em></td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Oman</em></td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Under British Mandate)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Qatar</em></td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>United Arab Emirates</em></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Limited)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1967 (South Yemen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970 (North Yemen)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union Suffrage Database at [http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm](http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm)
Table 4.9 Ordinal Logistic Regression of Women’s Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Economic Rights</th>
<th>Social Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong></td>
<td>0.26 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.62*** (0.22)</td>
<td>1.33*** (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.25 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.55*** (0.21)</td>
<td>1.45*** (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong></td>
<td>-0.38 (0.34)</td>
<td>0.78*** (0.30)</td>
<td>-0.35 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.61* (0.37)</td>
<td>0.78*** (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.43 (0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong></td>
<td>-0.18 (0.15)</td>
<td>-0.65*** (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.57*** (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.24 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.69*** (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.55*** (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>0.01 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.12 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>-1.22* (0.68)</td>
<td>1.66** (0.67)</td>
<td>-3.94*** (1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.91 (0.64)</td>
<td>1.69** (0.69)</td>
<td>-4.32*** (1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>-0.99** (0.41)</td>
<td>-0.50 (0.33)</td>
<td>-3.36*** (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.80** (0.38)</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.34)</td>
<td>-3.59*** (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System (Majoritarian)</td>
<td>-0.33 (0.44)</td>
<td>- (0.06)</td>
<td>- (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation (lagged)</td>
<td>- (0.52)</td>
<td>0.28*** (0.28)</td>
<td>- (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.34 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.13** (0.25)</td>
<td>- (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Dummy</td>
<td>-1.70 (2.81)</td>
<td>-3.52 (2.52)</td>
<td>8.33** (3.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.22 (2.28)</td>
<td>-2.95 (2.28)</td>
<td>10.78*** (4.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-87.88</td>
<td>-75.16</td>
<td>-67.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP. Time Varying covariates incorporated. Odds not proportional. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Economic Rights</th>
<th>Social Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance (log)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (log)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (log)</strong></td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Economic Development (log)</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-1.28***</td>
<td>-0.72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>-0.33**</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Legislative Representation (lagged)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ODA, FDI, and remittances are coded as a percent of GDP.
Incorporates time-varying covariates
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
## APPENDIX D (CHAPTER 5)

### Table 5.3 Country-case Breakdown According Indicators of Women’s Political Incorporation and Foreign Capital Flows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s Legislative Representation</strong></td>
<td>Upper House *(11 women; 27.50 %) Lower House *(1 default; 2.5%)</td>
<td>Upper House *(9 women; 15%) Lower House *(12 seats reserved, 1 seat won directly; 10.83%)</td>
<td>Upper House *(3 women; 3.33%) Lower House *(30 seats reserved, 4 won directly; 10.46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender Quotas</strong></td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>Reserved Seats</td>
<td>Political Party quotas and Reserved seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIRI Women’s Political Rights Score</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIRI Women’s Social Rights Score</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIRI Women’s Economic Rights Score</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Development Assistance</strong></td>
<td>$57 million *(106 per person)</td>
<td>$400 million *(130 per person)</td>
<td>$1.2 billion *(26 per person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment</strong></td>
<td>$1 billion *(oil-related) *(1156 per person)</td>
<td>$2 billion *(157 per person)</td>
<td>$2 billion *(textile-related) *(28 per person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances (2009)</strong></td>
<td>None /Pays out *(0 per person)</td>
<td>$3.6 billion *(14% of GDP) *(392 per person)</td>
<td>$6 billion *(7% of GDP) *(112 per person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita (ppp)</strong></td>
<td>$20,616</td>
<td>$4481</td>
<td>$4747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4 Sample Questions from Elite Interviews Conducted in Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco (2008-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Introduction      | • Are women playing a role in politics these days; if you agree, what is the main cause?  
                        • What is the government’s interest in addressing women’s issues?  
                        • Which issues do you believe the government chooses to address and why? |
| State             | • Which government institutions have had the most impact on women’s political activity?  
                        • Does the type of election (parliamentary vs. municipal level) make a difference for women’s political participation?  
                        • Do quotas, districting, the campaign cycle, or inter-party politics make a difference for women’s political participation? |
| Labor             | • Does public vs. private sector employment affect women’s political opportunities? If so, how?  
                        • Are there any particular economic/labor backgrounds of women who are elected/appointed to political office? Explain.  
                        • How does public vs. private sector employment color women’s experience and efficacy in fulfilling political roles? |
| Education         | • Does educational attainment translate into political activity for women?  
                        • How do women enter politics or become political; what is the process?  
                        • Is there any political socialization of women at the university level (i.e. political recruitment by organizations, political parties, etc.)? |
| Social Networks   | • Which social networks/organizations affect women’s political activity and how (unions, political parties, foreign/local special interest non-profits, religious organizations/communities, tribe, etc.)?  
                        • What is the nature of these networks? Are the most influential networks local or international, religious or secular, state-sponsored or independent?  
                        • What is the role of the media in conditioning public perception of politically active women before and after election season? |
| Comparison        | • How does your country compare to the rest of the Arab world in terms of women’s political status? |