The Interactive Achievement of Morality in Everyday Talk: A Discourse Analysis of Moral Problems and Practices in Interpersonal Relationships

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THE INTERACTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF MORALITY IN EVERYDAY TALK:  
A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF MORAL PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS 
IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 

by 

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The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards
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The Interactive Achievement of Morality in Everyday Talk:
A Discourse Analysis of Moral Problems and Practices in Interpersonal Relationships
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Abstract

This project has two primary purposes. The first purpose is to formulate the key problems involved in enactments of morality in interpersonal interaction, and how these problems are constructed and managed in participants’ discursive practices. Based on a communicative perspective situated in a grounded practical theory approach (chapter 1), this project draws on literatures across the field of communication (chapter 2) and applies discourse analytic methods (chapter 3) to video recordings of interpersonal interactions. Results of these analyses indicate that doing morality involves confronting the problematic nature of difference with regard to the fundamental commitments of interaction (intersubjectivity, chapter 4); the conditions of the particular relationship and its closeness (intimacy, chapter 5); the judgment-inflected ideas and norms arising in cultural contexts (ideology, chapter 6); the impact of salient cultural differences implicated in intercultural contact (culture, chapter 7); and the effects of difference on relationships over time (conflict, chapter 8). The second purpose of this project is to move toward identifying normative ideals for local concepts of moral communication in interpersonal relationships (chapter 9).

Keywords: grounded practical theory, discourse analysis, interpersonal relationships, morality, intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, conflict, difference
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Goffman (1967) claimed that interaction is a committed enterprise. The expectations and responsibilities attendant on such a commitment are part of what makes interactants morally accountable to one another. The other side to the morality of human interaction is that it produces, reproduces, ratifies and instantiates the social order. As Garfinkel (1967) proposed, people’s day-to-day interactions are orderly recreations of the mechanisms of interactive processes, the practices and activities that move interaction along and make it work. To disrupt the order is to break the social contract, if you will, by which people are ordinarily able to get on in the world. Thus, morality is not only visible when people mention it explicitly or in obviously morally-imbued contexts, such as religious arguments: morality is apparent and relevant from the most contentious social controversy to the tiniest hitch in social graces.

This work is centrally about the discursive construction of morality—the ways in which talk orients to the ideological judgments of persons and their actions in interpersonal conversation. Based on a grounded practical theory discourse analytic approach to interpersonal interaction, this work argues that the pervasive possibility of difference underlies moral interaction. Specifically, the threat of potentially irreconcilable differences between close interactants is made visible through, constituted by, and managed in discursive practices for accomplishing intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict. These “moral problems” are part of a moral vocabulary with which discourse analysts (and potentially interactants themselves) can make sense of the communicative constitution of close relationships. Data include more than 50 hours of naturally-occurring talk, primarily from video.
recorded observation and home movies, supplemented with audio. Through discourse analysis influenced by grounded practical theory, this project examines morality as an interactional achievement comprising practices for dealing with the potential problems of difference.

The “problems” of moral interaction involve different angles on what morality is and how it affects interpersonal interactions. “Intersubjectivity” captures the sense in which all interaction has, at its base, a foundation of morality insofar as it demands a commitment to the rules and regulation of participating with others in the social world. Morality as an interactional achievement involves participants’ co-constructions of intelligibility in relational situations: interactional sense is accomplished by conforming to tacit expectations, and to make explicit those expectations by questioning or violating them is to threaten the common ground on which such expectations depend (Garfinkel, 1967). Practices for achieving morality are practices for maintaining the assumptions of sharedness on which social interaction relies—thus, problems with morality involve the inevitability of difference.

“Intimacy” represents the context by which morality matters in different ways for different relationships between interactants. Intersubjectivity is a moral requirement for strangers as well as lovers, but its enactment will differ along the continuum of closeness and distance, and for different relationship “types.” Because this study looks at people who are ostensibly “close,” “intimacy” is an important condition governing what morality is or looks like as an interactional achievement between people.

However, morality is not only the basis of a responsibility to interaction and others, and particularly in intimate relationships, its character and enactment require more than passing or superficial acts of judgment. Moral interactions are deeply consequential. Their success and failure can determine the success or failure of moments as fleeting as a service encounter or as
enduring as filling a political office. This project focuses on a midpoint between such moments
to look at close relationships—which are both constructed moment-to-moment, and maintained
over time—as a site of morality. Judgments in relationships which would be constitutive of
doing morality at this level of significance involve “ideology”—judgments must enact or
implicate communication, character and actions which are socially and culturally significant,
which are essentially “right,” or “wrong,” in a consequential way.

“Culture,” then, references a problem which is tied up in the intrinsic connection between
the context of intimacy (the morality of the relationship) and the context of society (the morality
of the community). While ideology is indeed cultural, its use in this project focuses on the ways
in which judgments are attributed to individual rhetorical choices within the context of
presumably shared cultural assumptions. The use of culture, on the other hand, focuses on the
ways in which judgments are attributed to backgrounds and patterns of community values
enacted in and made salient by the context of intercultural interaction.

Finally, “conflict” describes a mode of interaction intrinsically related to the enactment of
morality. Because morality orients to potentially, and perceivably, different ideological
differences between close interactants, conflict is relevant to the extent that such differences
cause trouble and are managed over time. Intersubjectivity can cause conflict when people fail to
uphold interactional expectations, violating the almost sacred “trust” people have that others will
act in intelligible ways. Intimacy shapes the relational conditions which govern how conflict
unfolds, why it matters, and why it is moral in a particular way (versus, for instance, conflict
between non-intimates). Ideology involves values and norms which are the interpretive
mechanisms by which conflict is enacted and made sense of. And culture refers to the ways in
which salient differences may be invoked or indexed to manage possible conflict.
What is difference? Difference involves distinctions between things, and is identified constantly in daily life (Littlejohn & Domenici, 2007). Differences are (a) perceived and interpreted, (b) made and communicated, and (c) assessed and judged. Difference is in a way at the heart of human interaction. From Garfinkel’s (1967) perspective, the fact that human beings are not “the same” requires difference to be something which is continuously overcome—or ignored—in order to establish some intersubjective basis by which people are judged recognizably “as people” and their actions make some sort of respond-to-able sense. But difference also refers to ideologies, the names and labels humans devise for abstractly representing what counts as right and wrong kinds of persons or actions.

Differences which are perceived are not straightforward. Some differences have probably been learned and treated as salient for social reasons (skin color, for instance) while other differences are rarely noted or remarked on (hence expressions such as “the sort of person who wouldn’t stand out in a crowd”). Difference also exists in tension with “sameness.” On one hand people associate difference with positive evaluations, particularly in individualistic cultures such as the U.S. People with exceptional talents or who are seen as “distinguishing themselves” are valued. On the other hand, there is a limit to what differences are tolerable and to what extent. People who share certain values are taken to be somehow “the same.” References are made to “our people” or “people like us.”

This project investigates moments of morality—where ideological judgments are made, if fleetingly, salient—and the role of difference in marking where ideological judgments will be associated with potential problems or conflicts. In particular, the contradictions inherent in being close in the context of differences make interactions morally dilemmatic. The goals of this project are (1) to formulate key problems which participants confront when doing moral practice
in interpersonal relationships, as well as ways of dealing with those problems, and (2) to describe important points of reflection relevant to determining local normative ideals of a concept of moral communication.

Over the course of the next several chapters, I will describe an approach to morality as a communicative practice in the context of interpersonal relationships. Though many of the claims made herein may be true of other kinds of situations, I focus on how morality is enacted by people in close friend and family (and occasionally romantic) relationships in largely private settings. Because qualities and processes that characterize “morality” can also be true of other concepts, I focus on how interactants treat one another’s communicative actions as morally implicative. Morally implicative discourse, as will be made clear throughout this project, involves the consequential relationship between interaction and ideology, as well as conflict and difference.

**Morality and Communication**

Morality has been studied in a number of ways, largely in humanistic disciplines such as philosophy and rhetoric, but also in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and other social science disciplines. Morality is often taken to refer to the social and cultural senses of persons and behaviors which are good (and right) or bad (and wrong) based on descriptive or normative judgments made by particular groups of people (Stace, 1937). In communication studies, morality is studied in many ways, specifically via the perspective that it is created, reflected, and negotiated through communication. This project focuses on the importance of communication and morality in interpersonal relationships. It is suggested that morality, though it can have societal and interactional meanings, is particularly significant relationally.
“Morality” is an ambiguous concept and is visible in different ways depending on the level at which one looks and the context in which one is looking. Though morality is accomplished moment-by-moment in the nature of interaction as an accountable social enterprise, this project focuses primarily on morality at the level of ideological assumptions and judgments (though not necessarily ones so-named by participants). In interpersonal relationships, the “morality” implicated in discourse goes deeper than the surface action of an utterance—labeling something as a criticism, for instance, which is as true of doing evaluating as it is of doing morality. Rather, various interactional moves, from eye contact to gossip, are indicative of ideological assumptions, and are taken by interactional participants as consequential for identities (not just what someone is doing communicatively, but the kind of person who does such things) and for the relationship (not just that people are individuals-acting-together, but that they share a joint commitment and responsibility to the other).

Thus, the common thread that links disparate and complex moral interactions together is that, in close interpersonal relationships, morality is a way of making sense of the deepest ties that bind people together. Morality is about a sense of good or right—and bad, or wrong—that is seen as more fundamental and less changing. Morality lies at the intersection of how people work out stances and identities in the moment, and how these things are maintained over time, taken as inherent. To ignore that participants treat morality as being about certain kinds of people and their deeply-held beliefs would be to ignore what makes morality so important to people’s everyday lives. For that reason, this project combines a perspective aimed at participant actions of which they may be unaware (or would not call “moral”), and the sorts of tensions, troubles and arguments of which they, at least at times, are.
In interpersonal relationships, the threat of morality is the threat of irreconcilable difference. Morality causes anxiety and tension because it makes visible the work people are doing to constitute their relationship as one in which basic values and ways of being are unproblematically shared. Even something so seeming-innocent as one’s movie preferences can point to deeper differences between people. Morality is enacted where people are seen to work out how interactional moments are implicative of potentially damaging ideological differences, and the tensions and dilemmas that such working-out entails. Differences may not always themselves make a difference to those in close relationships, but ideological differences can be signaled by small moves as well as large ones: not asking about one’s day, someone changing his or her mind on something previously agreed, a sudden emphasis of distinctions rather than shared interests or goals. This work examines moments of trouble where differences which seem quite small could be implicative of something morally serious.

This work examines differences and their role in morality and ideological judgment by focusing on discourse—the social, symbolic, rhetorical moves and acts which people coordinate with each other in ordinary interpersonal interaction. As explicated by Bergmann (1998) in an introduction to a special issue of Research on Language and Social Interaction on the relationship between morality and discourse, there are two primary discourse approaches to morality: one can start with morality and look at how it is shaped in interaction, or one can start with interaction and look at how it implicates morality. I tack back and forth between these perspectives.

On one hand I do adhere to the idea of what Bergmann calls “proto-morality.” This idea assumes that interaction is based on assumptions of responsibility that interlocutors have to one another and to the interaction. To violate this responsibility is to be held accountable for a
wrongdoing. The error is a structural one, but it is named and oriented to participants as a personal or social error. This leads to attributions such as “she's so rude,” but at the basis of this perspective, an account of the so-called “rudeness” is really due to the violation of an expected turn-taking procedure. This perspective is consistent with concept of “intersubjectivity” (chapter 4) as a foundation upon which anything labeled “morality” rests.

On the other hand, I do not necessarily want to end the discussion there. In terms of making practical changes in talk, it is conceivable to be able to say things like “being sensitive to preference will improve interactions.” On the other hand, telling someone in the midst of a divorce that they ought to worry about their second pair parts more just doesn't seem to do the trick. People in troubled situations with their close others perceive problems as being based on differences of attitudes, values, emotions, personalities—attributions that may be mistaken or based on deeper, unexamined assumptions, but attributions that are consequential. Such attributions are made relevant, are treated as relevant, and shape the interaction—ultimately, can shape the relationship itself. Thus, I also want to study how moral concepts, once made relevant, exert an influence on the interaction and the people involved. This perspective centers on “ideology” (chapter 6), seeing as relevant the ways in which people do morality through their implicit and explicit judgments self and of one another’s character and actions.

Based on these discourse approaches, moral practices are discursive practices, and involve a wide-range of potential communicative actions, from winking to gossiping. Furthermore, because the approach described in this chapter sees communication as social and relational as well as symbolic, it is not only the case that winking and gossiping practices symbolize moral orientations or judgments on behalf of participants. Such symbolism would indeed be meaningless if there were no social element to interaction—no need for getting on
with others—and thus, such symbolism is more consequential for closer relationships, for relationships with explicit commitments which index shared histories and potential futures.

Close relationships are therefore my site of study. However, I see relationships as discursive constructions that are worked out between participants over the course of interacting—in the moment, and across interactions. “Relationality” is a concept that situates identities “in relation” to one another in particular, namable ways. Close relationships are consequential in ways in which less close, or institutional, relationships are not. Thus, this makes close relationships an important site for considering the importance of conflict and morality in everyday life. This is why “intimacy” (chapter 5) is analyzed as an important condition for mediating how intersubjective proto-morality and interpersonal ideology are enacted.

Morality is not just an interpersonal discursive practice, however; it is also a cultural and performative, rhetorical one. Morality is not designed by individuals on a purely personal basis, but is infused in the teachings, religions, norms, expectations and ideologies of particular communities. From notions of politeness to beliefs about appropriate relationships, cultural settings shape and are enacted and maintained through people’s performances of selves as moral and moralizing beings—identities-in-relation who do not only instantiate judgable performances, but also perform judgments toward others, in relationships and in communities. Such performances constitute the rhetorical means by which local participants influence appropriate behavior, choose particular sensibilities of performance, convince one another of their authenticity, and construct persuasive narratives for explaining the ideological bases of their interactional commitments. For this reason, “culture” (chapter 7) in terms of context, practice, identity and intercultural contact is examined in this work.
Thus, morality is undergirded by social/relational/interactional commitments in particular cultural contexts. These aspects distinguish morality as an interactional practice with ideological implications. There are many kinds of interactional choices which can potentially, but not necessarily, “do” morality. Criticizing someone, for instance, is a way of performing judgment. But in order for that judgment to be moral, it must link to ideological assumptions—deeply-rooted and often tacit notions of what a person ought to be or do in a serious way. Criticizing someone for leaving the toilet seat up is not, by itself, a moral practice. The leaving-up of toilet seats does not alone make someone a “bad person.” However, this criticism would implicate ideology, and thus constitute a moral practice, if it can be shown empirically to be indicative of morality. If toilet seat leaving-ups are just one way in which a partner demonstrates disrespect to her or his loved one, in concert with other demonstrations of disrespect over time, then the doing of this criticism is a doing of morality—as is the criticizeable offense.

This dissertation unfolds by (1) setting up the project, its perspective, relevant literatures, and method (chapters 1-3); (2) describing five discursive practices for accomplishing morality, and participants’ techniques for managing them (chapters 4-8); and (3) discussing how reflecting on the empirical results of these practices might lead to the reconstruction of normative ideals for moral communicative practice (chapter 9). The remainder of chapter one describes the grounded practical theory approach which guides this work, including theories and assumptions which motivate the analysis. Chapter two covers various literatures within the communication discipline as well as across various language and social interaction disciplines to set up the central questions of this project. Chapter three sets up the discourse analytic method and the data used the analysis. Chapters four through eight feature analyses of moral discursive practices for accomplishing intersubjectivity (chapter 4), intimacy (chapter 5), ideology (chapter 6), culture
(chapter 7), and conflict (chapter 8). Chapter nine summarizes the project, examines important considerations for investigating local ideals of moral communication, discusses limitations, and identifies potential directions for future research. In the next section of this chapter, I outline this project’s grounded practical theory approach, a metatheoretical orientation developed by Craig and Tracy (1995). The section thereafter reviews the theoretical influences and assumptions which guide this project and its analyses.

**A Grounded Practical Theory Approach**

This section provides detail on grounded practical theory (GPT), the metatheoretical approach that guides this project. First, I discuss some of the background on GPT and outline its key tenets. Second, I describe how this approach is linked to viewing communication as a practical discipline. And third I discuss communication as a practice, and what that means for this project.

**Background and Practice of GPT**

Developed by Craig and Tracy (1995), grounded practical theory (GPT) is influenced by interpretive and practical metatheory. While scientific metatheory judges theories by their ability to predict and control realities about the world, interpretive metatheory judges theories by their ability to describe and explain people’s experiences and sensemaking; and practical metatheory judges theories by their usefulness or ability to effect normative change (Craig, 2009). Because GPT orients to the notion of “practical” in at least two senses—as that which is useful or effective, and as that which is accomplished in everyday activities—GPT is both a theory about practice, but also a theory about the practice of theorizing. Theorizing practices is a process that aims to be practically relevant.
GPT assumes that theory and practice are mutually constitutive, in line with Craig’s orientation to communication as a practice (1999, 2006). GPT is also based on the perspective of communication as a practical discipline (1989), with the goal of research being to develop normative theories about what ought to be (Craig & Tracy, 1995). The ideals identified in particular practices provide principles for guiding the conduct of, and critiquing, the practice. Such principles, often implicit in interaction, are made explicit through the process of reconstruction of situated problems and techniques.

A grounded approach (similar to grounded theory, Charmaz, 2005) assumes that theory must be grounded in empirical data and attend to the practical activities of interactional participants. Theories are data-driven and are used to normatively guide critique of those practical activities as well as inform the practices of researcher-theorists. This is a highly reflexive orientation in which theory guides practice and practice guides theory, and it has engendered various concomitant approaches, the most consistent being the methodological approach of action implicative discourse analysis (AIDA) developed by Tracy in 1995 (and to which I return in chapter three).

The purpose of GPT is to develop theoretical reconstructions—idealized, generalized descriptions of tacit practices, made explicit and used for informing and judging situations—based on empirical analysis. Reconstruction takes place on problem, technical, and philosophical levels. The problem level of GPT reconstruction requires a focus on dilemmas and troubles commonly experienced in peoples’ private and public lives. The technical level of GPT reconstruction collects strategies that people employ when encountering problems. The philosophical level of GPT reconstruction develops norms for judging the use of strategies.
GPT is guided, as mentioned, by two orientations to communication and practice. On one hand, GPT is based on the notion of communication as a discipline which engages with practical theory, or the creation of normative theory for improving communication. On the other hand, GPT is based on the notion of communication as a practice, a meaningful human activity which can be organized, talked about, reflected on, and improved. These perspectives are discussed further in the following sections.

**Communication as a Practical Discipline**

Craig (1989) suggested that the approach of a practical discipline is one which relates theory and practice through critical reflection. As practical theories aim to address practical problems in the world (Craig & Muller, 2007), a practical discipline seeks to cultivate communication as an art. Unlike critical theory, which involves a similar interest in addressing problems through theoretical critique, practical theory would not just study social problems of power and inequality, but also mundane, everyday considerations (Craig, 1989).

To propose communication as a practical discipline is to acknowledge the many perspectives within the field. Because the traditions in the field have their own confluence of theories, the perspective of communication as a practical discipline is a metatheoretical one (Craig & Muller, 2007). As mentioned at the beginning of the last section introducing GPT, metatheories involve different ways of judging theory. Such judgments are based on certain ontological, epistemological, praxeological and axiological motivations (Craig, 2009). There are theories in communication, for instance, which look more scientific, believing that the world exists objectively to our study of it (ontology), that it can be studied empirically (epistemology), that it should in some ways strive to be carried out and presented in the manner of natural science research (praxeology), and that theory should be value-free in its contributions to society
Craig’s (1999) theory of a field of communication starts from this idea of communication as a practical discipline particularly as a way of bringing coherence to the multitude of communication paradigms and theories. Craig insists such eclecticism can be productive across a possible field, and not just within particular research programs, if communication areas strive for “dialogical-dialectical coherence.” This awareness of the tensions and complementarities between communication programs would foster debate across communication. The metamodel which Craig develops based on this goal of productive argumentation provides a reconstruction of communication theory within the concept of communication as a practical discipline.

Based on this practical orientation, it is not the case that communication theories would seek a unifying theory, or propose particular theories as truer than others, but that different theories would be useful in their own ways. Craig (1999) provides the example of transmission-based understandings of communication processes—important to the history of communication research and to many areas of communication study today, though much maligned in others—as providing a practical conception of communication in certain contexts where it has cultural currency. Thus, the metamodel does not aim to reveal what communication is, but demonstrates how communication can be constituted in different ways for different purposes.

For Craig (1999), communication theory is a kind of metadiscourse. Metadiscourse (literally, “discourse about discourse”) is one of many related terms (metalanguage, metacommunication, metapragmatics) which make visible the very human phenomenon of reflexivity in speech. Language provides the ability to comment on the world, but also on itself.
To say anything about communication is to participate in the practice of communication. Communication theories make arguments about discourse through discourse. Thus the technical or intellectual practice of communication theory is derived from, and informs, everyday talk about communication. The goal of communication as a practical discipline is to “reconstruct communication theory as a theoretical metadiscourse engaged in dialogue with the practical metadiscourse of everyday life” (p. 129).

The current work advances this aim through the GPT approach. GPT offers a way of theorizing which is aimed at practice. This project theorizes ways of thinking and talking about communication as a moral practice. GPT is grounded in the practical communication activities of everyday life. This project’s argument and evidence is grounded in naturally-occurring, ordinary conversations. GPT aims to develop practical theories for addressing communication problems. This project offers points of reflection for developing ideals of moral practice to critique and improve moral interactions. Furthermore, the GPT project is part of the practical orientation to the discipline which seeks dialogical-dialectical coherence (or at least debate) across the field, which this project pursues by bringing numerous perspectives in conversation. The next section further presents the meaning of communication as a practice, and how practice is conceptualized in this project.

Communication as a Practice

In order to present this grounded practical theory investigation into the communicative concept of morality, it is important to review what is meant by “communicative” and “communication as a practice” for the purposes of this project. The communication discipline is rife with definitions of “communication” as an object of study as well as a way of seeing the world. Thus, the remainder of this section specifies this project’s primary view of
communication as a complex practice. Taking a grounded practical theory perspective already implies a practice-based understanding of communication. According to Craig (2006), practices are coherent sets of activities which are meaningful to people. Their meaningfulness and possibilities of improvement also make practices capable of being judged and changed—practices can be reflected on. The conceptualization of communication as discursive practice emphasizes everyday talk activities—telling stories, calling people by nicknames, etc.—as the constitutive activity that shapes human interaction (Craig, 2007; Tracy, 2002).

In proposing that communication is a practice, Craig (2006) claimed that there is a cultural concept of communication—that “communication” is meaningful as a coherent activity recognized by many people (assumedly in the western world, but possibly all over—Craig does not specify). Katriel and Philipsen (1981) identify “communicating” as a U.S. cultural category, and Cameron (2000) identifies a similar interest in the concept of communication in the United Kingdom. Often studies of communication and culture look for the way culture is expressed through communication, rather than looking for cultural concepts of communication (e.g. Clyne, 1996), but indirectly, any communicative study that is culturally grounded will indicate the presence or lack of such a thing. Studies of norms, politeness and interactional rules across cultures certainly indicate that people in different places have concepts of culturally appropriate ways of talking (Kiesling & Paulston, 2005).

Being a coherent, identifiable practice, “communication” is also a concept that people will invoke in talk. It can be judged, evaluated, reflected on, and potentially improved. It is certainly the case that examples of people talking about communication, to laud or lambast it, abound in ordinary talk. As Craig (e.g., 2008) has pointed out, particular communicative
concepts (dialogue, argument, rhetoric, voice) are regularly named, evaluated, and put forward as the reason, or solution, for problems in society—from marital spats to international crises.

Practices involve different ranges and occurrences in human activity. For example, practices can contain almost anything people do, not just in a moment, but across lifetimes and throughout communities. For Bourdieu (1977), practices comprise the daily activities of people who share certain ideologies or beliefs about the world. The practices are ways of building up collectivity and addressing practical issues in everyday life. Bourdieu would not necessarily see “talk” as the only important community practice. As an anthropologist, he was interested in the range of activities that people do together. Because I am mainly interested in characterizing situated instances of interaction rather than interaction across a speech community, I assume that not all practices are created equal “in the moment.” Some community practices will be relevant to a particular interaction, and some will not. The determining factor of what is relevant will depend on what is indexed in interactants' discourse and interaction.

Practices can also be distinguished by their occurrence. Some practices one sees in a particular moment are common to many such moments, while others are particular not to a kind of moment, but to a site or institutional activity. Schatzki (1996) conceptualizes practice as both a performance, and a coordinated entity. Coordinated entity practices are doings and sayings that are temporal and spatial, linked by (1) understandings of what to say and do; (2) explicit rules, principles and/or instructions; and (3) projects, purposes, beliefs and emotions. Performance practices constitute the carrying out of practices in such a way as to sustain the understandings, explicit regulations, purposes and moods that formulate their patterns in human action. Practices can be dispersed, that is, occurring in many areas of social life. Describing, explaining and imagining, for instance, would be dispersed practices. Such practices require an understanding,
largely tacit, of “how to” do and recognize the practice. Integrative practices refer to complex practices found in particular domains. They involve dispersed practices, but those always link back to the integrative practices, such as in business practices, by way of explicit rules and goal-oriented logics.

By focusing on morality as a dispersed discursive practice, I propose that morality is a recognizable activity in which people engage; that there are particular ways of engaging in the activity; and that these means of engagement are symbolic, involving discourse but also movement, gesture, space, and other elements of the social-semiotic world. I also propose, as Craig's (2006) article on communication as a practice requires, that there is a “cultural concept” of morality in communication—of a subset of the communication possibilities focused on communicating well in situations of difference.

GPT conceptualizes communication as a practice, and for the current project, morality is both a broad and a dispersed sort of practice. In particular, this project sees morality as a discursive practice. Discourse, like practice, is a concept that is applied at different social or analytical levels as well as to different ranges of activity. A “larger level” discourse is the focus of many critical theorists. For Foucault (1992), for example, practices in discourse are ways of constituting certain institutional aspects of the world: through language, people create objects, vocabularies that surround them, and ways of dealing with them. A “discursive practice” for Foucault might be the practice of creating technical definitions of illness for diagnostic purposes. The “discourse” is then about who is normal and who is not. Since this project is not necessarily working at the level of societal critique, this kind of discourse is less an object of study for me, and more a site of cultural knowledge. For instance, in an ordinary argument, someone may use the word “crazy” to describe someone's apparently unreasonable actions. Certainly this draws
from some cultural concept of what is reasonable, and which may owe its formulation to the societal “discourses” of what constitutes sanity and insanity, but making that link is not my primary goal. Rather, I am interested in how a term like “crazy” situates itself in a particular moment and between particular people. This is analogous to later sections of this work which deal with ideology and culture as interactionally accomplished. Depending on the context, Foucault’s notion of discourse may be relevant insofar as it is enacted in interaction.

That establishes the level of discursive practice with which this project is interested: interaction between people in conversation. But what is the range of discursive practice? Does it stop at talk? According to Bateson (1972), “communication” involves the whole system of interaction—not just words, but the environment as well. The meaning of communication could not only, or even primarily, be linguistic: the context had to be taken into account, which for Bateson could include past interaction and situational factors, but the most important contextual element comprised the nonverbal or metalinguistic dimension of communication. Bateson’s perspective contains cybernetic elements that have made it amenable to the sociopsychological tradition from which classic interpersonal communication emerged. While not adhering entirely to Bateson’s cybernetic approach, his focus on certain ideas such as metacommunication, and especially the importance of context, are important to the current undertaking.

Most people accept the idea that “communication” is broader than words: everything from the twitch of an eyebrow to the clothes one wears “communicates” something. In this project, discourse occupies a similar range of activities. As Jaworski and Coupland (2006) note, “discourse,” even at the level of interaction, can mean more than just participants' talk. Though the talk may be the explicit organizer of how people come together and what they are expected to attend to, situational resources abound in any interaction. In the world of making conversation,
many actions and objects in the surrounding space—including the space of shared knowledge between participants—become an important resource in interaction. In nonverbal research, facial expressions, gestures, and other physical movements can convey as much meaning to a turn-at-talk as do actual utterances (e.g., Manusov, V., Manusov, V. L., & Patterson, 2006). Paralinguistic information—pauses, intonation, emphasis and other sound-related elements—have long been treated as interactionally relevant by conversation analysts (Schegloff, 2007). And researchers interested in embodiment have demonstrated numerous ways in which physical movement and placement, objects, gestures, and spatial orientation contribute to analyses of interaction (Fox, 1999; Goodwin, 2000, 2003b, 2003c; Heath, 2002).

These contextual elements comprise the world at hand from which participants may draw to accomplish particular purposes in interaction—such resources potentially include anything in the realm of the discursive, communicative, material, abstract, social, psychological, etc. All of these things are available for references and use in interaction. The *use* component gets done in the actions that people do with one another. Therefore, as Craig (2006) has stated, communication is a practice: it is something that people do. But the things that people do require materials—equipment, as Heidegger (1962) would say. Thus, in addition to being a practice, communication is also a symbolic activity with social, relational, interactive, cultural, performative, and rhetorical dimensions.

In this section I reviewed grounded practical theory, the perspective of communication as a practical discipline, and concept of communication as a practice. In doing so, I specified the current project’s focus on the ranges and occurrences of practice and discourse. The next section develops further the perspective taken in this project by discussing particular theories and
assumptions associated with or amenable to the practical, interpretive, and empirical and problem-centered thrust of grounded practical theory work.

**Theories and Assumptions**

This project is primarily influenced by the focus on interpersonal interaction and relationality found in interpersonal communication research, and the empirically-driven discourse analytic work found in LSI research. This section begins with some theories, theorists and ideas relevant to this project and associated with interpretive, practical, empirical communication research, and ends with some assumptions based on these theoretical influences. This section focuses on the theoretical perspectives which provide a social and discursive approach to interpersonal communication and relationality. First I discuss social interaction from a sociological perspective. Then I consider some interpersonal approaches to close relationships. I follow with a discussion of context and culture. I end by considering communication approaches to conflict.

From a sociological perspective, the two primary scholars drawn on in this work include Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman. Ethnomethodology takes an explicitly moral orientation to social interaction (Heritage, 1984). Garfinkel (1967, 2006) developed his ethnomethodological perspective to understand how interactions are morally accountable. The word, “ethnomethodology,” refers to people’s methods for socially organizing the world and making sense of it.

In order to piece together people’s ways of doing ordinary interaction, Garfinkel (1967) developed a number of “breaching” experiments, carried out by his students, in which people would purposefully violate interactional expectations. For example, someone might sit right next to someone else on an empty bus, or ask endless questions about an event such as a flat tire.
Reactions to these breaches were swift and negative, even more so when the participants had closer relationships. People have interactional expectations, and to violate them is to violate social norms and, to some extent, the very order that keeps social life running smoothly. A similar principle lies behind expectancy violation theory (Burgoon, 1978). Expectations are built into the structures of interaction, and violating them, even in a tiny way, has serious consequences. Thus people are held accountable to their part in maintaining the social order, in accomplishing everyday interactions and conforming to their norms.

Goffman’s (1959, 1961, 1967, 1974, 1981) work similarly studies what he called the “interaction order,” in a different but nonetheless sociological way. Goffman, like Garfinkel, examined the invisible world of social interaction—the unspoken rules and expectations for participating in situations. For Goffman, communication is performance. Through concepts such as face (1967), ritual (1967), framing (1974), and footing (1981), Goffman investigated moments of ordinary interaction in ways that accounted for what people performed in social interaction, and why. For Goffman (1974), communication frames and defines a situation and thus the morally appropriate roles and actions that should occur within it.

Both Garfinkel and Goffman, in focusing on social interaction, ask the question of how people know how to act, and what to do, with one another. Garfinkel’s inquiry into these questions emerged from work by Parsons (1937) and Schutz (1967) (Heritage, 1984), while Goffman’s drew from Mead (1934), Schutz (1967) and Durkheim (1895) (Calhoun, Gerteis, Moody, Pfaff & Virk, 2007). For Garfinkel, intersubjectivity served as part of the phenomenological lineage which, for him, helped explain people’s ability to interpret and produce intelligible social interactions (Heritage, 1984). For Goffman, face (1967) served as the mechanism by which interactants followed one another’s “line” or actions in order to define a
situation and fit one’s actions within the setting. These concepts emphasize an orientation to the other as the foundation for interaction. Without an other, there would be no reason to create a social order, no one to perform for. This and related research is discussed further in chapters two and four.

Intersubjectivity is a concept which provides a particular way of getting at relationality, or how people interact in relation to one another. Relationality has been an important concept in interpersonal communication research. The concept of intersubjectivity, however, has not often been taken up as a way of getting at how people relate to one another in and through communication within interpersonal research traditions, though potential connections have been noted (Morganti, Carassa & Riva, 2009). Instead, two different theoretical standpoints have been influential: symbolic interactionism, and the interactional view. These comprise two important approaches in interpersonal research on close relationships.

Mead’s (1934) and Blumer’s (1969) symbolic interactionism, for example, focuses on the ways in which people treat the world based on the meaning that world has for them. For example, according to the concept of the “looking glass self,” your self-concept is formed based on what you assume other people think about you or see you as (see Cooley, 1902). This perspective focuses on the ways in which individuals' actions, attitudes and beliefs are formed from the social and relational bases of interacting with others. The interactional view, developed by the Palo Alto school, saw the organization of human interaction as a system of variables involving time, environment, and various subsystems which together were greater than the sum of their parts (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). The relationship between people and their environment, as well as each other, was based on a engaging communicatively and modifying communication with regard to feedback from the system.
Though these perspectives could be applied to many different kinds of social relationships, in interpersonal communication research, they are usually applied to close relationships—friends, family, romantic partners. These relational contexts provide “sites” in which relationality is particularly strong or accomplished between particular others. This focus on closeness suggests the concept of intimacy. Work by Baxter and Fitch is particularly relevant to looking at intimacy within this project. Baxter (2004a, 2004b), for instance, focuses on some of the problems and dilemmas of intimacy, and the competing emotional needs that arise, drawing from Bakhtin’s (1981) dialogism. Intimacy is a central concern for making sense of people’s contradictory needs to be close but independent. Fitch (1998) takes a cultural and discursive approach to relationships and a relational approach to communication. Intimacy is constructed through cultural relational codes and built in talk. This and related research is discussed further in chapters two and five.

The focus on relationality and intimacy makes close interpersonal relationships an important relational context for this project. However, there are many other elements of context which are treated as potentially relevant to analysis in this work. Context in part incorporates something similar to the system perspective taken in the interactional view (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967), but also involves environmental elements, interpersonal histories, and culture. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Bateson (1972) proposed seeing communication as a system, and the Palo Alto school’s interactional view, described above, built on this notion. Rather than taking this more cybernetic approach, this project focuses on the actors within a system and the ways in which they simultaneously construct and are constrained by situated and cultural context.
Goffman’s (1959, 1961, 1967, 1974, 1981) focus on situations looked at how the immediate social context—the definition of the situation, and rules and roles which it afforded—created for interactants their appropriate actions. In conversation analysis, such context is treated as relevant with regard to the placement of utterances in relation to prior and following turns at talk (Psathas, 1996). For discursive psychologists, mental states such as emotions and attitudes may be rhetorically employed and thus become interactionally relevant (Potter, 1996). And for micro-ethnographers and others who study embodiment and environment as potentially interactionally relevant, the situated context can include space, gesture, and objects (e.g., Goodwin, 1986; Heath, 2002). All of these resources are treated as potentially situationally relevant context in the current work.

Cultural context is also potentially relevant to moral discursive practices. Culture is a widely debated concept which has changed its meanings over time among (as well as within) various disciplines. For this project, culture involves shared systems of symbolic and material practices (Fitch, 1998) which are largely based on tacit (Philipson, 1975; Bourdieu, 1977) ideological relationships. From a discourse analytic perspective, discursive practices are ways of constructing culture—organizing particular speech codes based on the ideologies that undergird their logic. Culture may be explicitly named (e.g., “we don’t share that value” or “she’s from the Middle East”), indexed in ways of speaking and common knowledge (e.g, accent, what is explained or not explained, known references), or acted upon in ways which are not always easy to empirically ground. Culture is ideological. According to Bakhtin (1981) ideologies refer to systems of ideas, interrelated beliefs spoken into being through language. Rather than being unitary and homogenous, however, Bakhtin argued that ideologies were heteroglossic, multiple and contradictory, and that the impulse to unify language existed in tension with language’s
tendency toward dialogism. This and related research is discussed further in chapters two, six and seven.

Finally, as mentioned, the grounded practical theory approach is problem-oriented. Problems are identifiable when oriented to as problematic in interaction, and where participants treat elements of communication as problematic, there will be a potential for conflict. Conflict is sometimes seen as a society occurrence (where groups, or even nations, clash) but is also an interpersonal occurrence, and is always present or possible in some degree (Simmel, 1953). Conflict in communication research is defined in various ways—sometimes at a broad level as perceivably irreconcilable disagreements in a context of interdependence (Roloff & Soule, 2004), sometimes at a local level as patterns of communicatively constructed divergence over time (Bailey, 2000a).

The notion of difference is at the root of conflict. But this does not mean that difference is the cause of conflict, indeed, Baxter (2007) sees the problem of difference as the problem of sameness—it is people’s assumptions that difference is negative that leads to conflict. For this project, it is not the case that sameness or difference in themselves are problematic. Rather, participants treat difference as threatening and work to construct common ground, partly for practical reasons, but also because of the assumption or ideology that similarities are a foundation for intimacy. It is not the case that differences are inherently bad, but that one cannot say “differences are good” and leave it at that—differences are problematic. Differences inherently dilemmatic, and their constructions and subsequent responses are hard to manage and consequential in their management.

According to Craig (2007), the question “what is a communication problem?” yields the question, “how should we theorize communication problems?” A discursive focus on conflict
suggests that theorizing morality as a communication problem requires understanding how participants see difference and conflict as interrelated and problematic. This and related research is discussed further in chapters two and eight. In this section so far I have discussed theoretical perspectives on social interaction, relationality, context and problems—and the ways in which these concepts cue intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict—as a foundation for this project. These perspectives yield a number of assumptions which guide this work and its analyses:

Assumption 1: Social interaction is problematic—it is fraught with conflict potential. On the surface, it seems as if communicating is an effortless activity—that it can be done on “autopilot.” As has often been pointed out to me, most of the time, communication works: it does what it is supposed to do, and everyone goes along with their business. On the other hand, communication is consequential. Even small discords can have serious impact. And rather importantly, it has also been suggested that interacting is not as effortless as it seems. To assume social interaction is problematic is to assume a particular kind of world that we live in—an ontological perspective of chaos and multiplicity.

Assumption 2: Social interaction is moral—we are accountable and judgable for our actions. If we were machines, and interactional problems were conceived of merely as errors, it seems conflict would not exist. Upon encountering a problem, we would simply seek to correct the error. There would be no need to blame, justify, repair or engage in the countless other careful activities that we feel we must employ to maintain order. Social interaction matters in ways that are not easy to pinpoint or address, but which we all certainly feel. To focus on the moral aspect social interaction is to assume certain things about human beings, what they are like, and how they conduct themselves in regard to one another.
Assumption 3: Closeness is consequential—close relationships may not be more important than the many social ties which bring people together, but they certainly have a deep impact on people’s lives and are treated by participants as mattering in fundamental ways. Though morality is potentially relevant to all interaction, looking at its construction between intimates highlights the ways in which morality involves a struggle between the desire for a shared life, and the backdrop of difference amidst which effortful constructions of sharedness take place.

Assumption 4: Conflict is revelational—it exists in intersections between the ordinary veneer of expected everyday goings on, and the invisible world of effort that keeps it together. When things go wrong, we notice them in ways we did not before. To return to assumption 1, by accepting the commonplace state of things, one must orient unproblematically to social life, taking interest in its workings, but not ready to judge. By seeing interaction as harmonic, one misses what such harmonies are assuming, what effort it takes to maintain them, and thus the opportunities for addressing important everyday problems in human life. As a discourse analyst interested in conversational problems, I see conflict as potentially relevant to most discourse. I assume that people are different, and that this can cause tension. I assume also that relationships are unstable, and that this, too, can be an insecurity for people. Furthermore, I assume that discourse is not easy. There are often multiple goals to be achieved in talk. Determining what and how to say things can involve differing and even contradictory impulses. Thus, the potential for conflict is always there because interaction is fraught with tensions. Even very small moves can lead to trouble. The fact that they often do not, however, points out how careful people are about managing this trouble.
These assumptions make explicit the justification for a problem-oriented approach to studying morality. By looking at the problems of morality as a discursive practice through the GPT frame, a better understanding of the practice can be obtained. This understanding can potentially be useful for making practical changes in communication action, as well as for analysis and theorization by communication scholars. The ideas and assumptions described in this chapter thus provide a theoretically-informed perspective within the GPT approach for analyzing problems of, and formulating ideals for, morality as an interactional practice. The following two chapters describe the literature and methods of this project. The next chapter, chapter two, lays the foundation for morality as an area of research. Chapter two argues for a unique communicative concept of morality as a practical interactional achievement in interpersonal relationships.
Chapter 2

Morality as Discursive Practice

This project draws from a range of literatures across the area of language and social interaction (LSI) as well as across the communication discipline. The thrust of practical theorization is such that the usefulness of the theory is more important than its faith to one particular theoretical tradition. In that spirit, the theories described in chapter one drew from a number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary traditions within and related to communication scholarship; and the review undertaken here draws similarly from a range of perspectives.

Primarily this work aims to contribute to two bodies of literature in communication research: interpersonal communication research and discourse analytic LSI research. These established communication traditions provide the background on the contextual and epistemological basis of this work. The LSI tradition provides much of the grounded practical theory and discourse analytic approach and methodology, while the interpersonal tradition provides the focus on relationships and relationality as a site of communication study.

After describing a brief history of these areas and their general approaches to the topic of morality, I discuss how interpersonal communication and LSI research inform a unique communicative concept of morality. Following that section, I discuss research on five moral “problems” articulated within a range of research programs related to the study of interpersonal communication, discourse and interaction. Within that section, I review the practices involved in enacting intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture and conflict as the means of accomplishing morality in interaction. This is followed by a section which displays examples of those practices. Chapter two ends with a discussion of the questions and directions which arise from bringing this research together as the basis of the current project.
Interpersonal Communication and LSI Research

Interpersonal communication research developed alongside the institutionalization of the discipline of communication. The first communication departments and research programs of the early 1950s, influenced by social psychology, focused on developing communication theories through scientific research on interpersonal processes (Rogers, 1994). Major work in this line of research includes Berger and Calabrese’s Uncertainty Reduction Theory (1975), which like the Palo Alto school (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967) took an axiomatic systems approach to communication. Later, more constructionist approaches began to emerge, such as Pearce and Cronen’s Coordinated Management of Meaning (1980), and Baxter and Montgomery’s (1996) relational dialectics. These programs heralded a more qualitative approach to interpersonal communication, and paved the way for a new way of studying of interaction to emerge.

LSI grew up in—and eventually, grew out of—interpersonal communication research. Language and Social Interaction is an area that emerged out of the “social approaches” to interpersonal communication research, which included a group of scholars committed to taking a new, language based, qualitative approach to communication study (Leeds-Hurwitz, 1989, 1995, 2009, 2010). Influenced by qualitative work outside communication (such as in sociolinguistics, sociology and anthropology), these scholars took on a more social constructionist than post-positivist stance, and saw the empirical analysis of talk as central to their enterprise. Eventually these people came to be what is now called “LSI” in communication, though LSI as a category spans disciplines.

There are several research traditions that have shaped LSI’s direction and influenced its scholarship over the years. Ethnomethodology, for example, has been a founding area from which conversation analysis emerged. Other influences include linguistic pragmatics,
interactional sociolinguistics, ethnography of speaking, philosophy of language, and language and social psychology (Fitch & Sanders, 2005; Glenn, LeBaron & Mandelbaum, 2003; Maynard & Peräkylä, 2003).

LSI research focuses on understanding the basic constructs of language and interaction, explaining the functions of talk, and describing strategies employed in particular sites of interaction. A typical LSI study will identify features of language, describe interpersonal, organizational or political functions of talk, and show how these things create interaction. LSI scholars study a variety of sites including health and educational settings, legal or law related areas, democratic fora and meetings, businesses and organizations, and mundane (“non-institutional”) sorts of interactions between family or telephone conversants (Tracy, 2008a).

This project’s approach to analysis a discursive one, which I will explain further in chapter three. However, there are important potential intersections between LSI and interpersonal work that have been little explored in the current research. For example, LSI has been more site-based than relationship-based, and even studies that clearly imply relationships (phone calls between friends, conversations between family) have privileged interaction mechanisms and strategies over seeing how those link up to relationships. Furthermore, there are myriad fascinating and consequential studies in the field of interpersonal communication on topics such as hurtful communication, deception, support and intimacy (Smith & Wilson, 2010) which are not engaged with directly by most LSI research (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2010).

Thus, the current project joins these areas of communication research to investigate the communicative practice of morality in interpersonal interaction. From the interpersonal perspective, morality is largely related to individual beliefs or values, while in discourse studies, morality is espoused in the judgments interactants make of one another. Both of these aspects of
morality seem to be true to some extent, but are simultaneously too specific, and not entirely unique. Why use the term “morality” at all? Is it a useful concept for research?

Many areas of the communication field have explored the concept of morality in different ways, all of which can be said to characterize some aspect of morality. Interpersonal research, as mentioned, has largely looked at morality in terms of individual beliefs and values (e.g., Fogel, 1993; Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993; Killen & Hart, 1999; Miller, 1994, 1999; Miller & Bersoff, 1992). Cultural perspectives take up the same idea on a communal level, focusing on the norms among groups of individuals who share a common background or way of life (e.g., Boromisza-Habashi, 2007a, 2007b; Philipsen, 1975). Rhetorical and critical work has engaged morality through normative lenses which identify the rightness or wrongness of communicative practices (e.g., Benardete, 2009; Burke, 1935; Condit, 1987). This work follows discourse analytic traditions by looking at morality as an interactional achievement. The next section specifies the discursive approach to morality undertaken in the current project.

A Communicative Concept of Morality

Discourse approaches to morality have largely consisted of two varieties: one which looks at morality as inherent in the basic structure of interaction, and another which looks at how morality shapes and is shaped by interaction (Bergmann, 1998). Discourse scholars (or even scholars who consider discourse at all) contributing to these approaches (e.g., Bergmann, 1993; Cameron, 2000; Ibarra & Kitsuse, 2006; Marston, 2000; Stokoe, 2003), have looked at morality in many different ways. Morality is a squishy concept which seems to contain many different aspects, and yet also overlaps with other concepts, such as ethics, evaluation, and judgment. This project differentiates morality as a concept by focusing on unique problems with which it is associated and through which it is worked out in practice.
Morality is not the same as other concepts, but does involve practices which aim to produce, reflect or challenge those other concepts (i.e., judgments, ethics, norms, values, mores). Individual beliefs and values, for instance, can be espoused or indicated through moral practices. Ethics provide institutional systems for organizing and evaluating moral practices in particular settings. Evaluation and judgment are assessments that might also be mobilized as moral practices, if such assessments deal in some way with the problems of difference which are consequential for relationships.

Thus morality encompasses the concepts of interactional commitment and responsibility, judgment and evaluation, beliefs and values, and ethical guidelines where participants must also deal with problems of difference. As stated in the previous chapter, this is not to say that “difference is a problem.” Indeed difference is not just always potentially present, but is often the basis of creativity and learning in interaction. Rather, it is the possibility that differences may prove insurmountable and lead to debilitating and relationship-troubling conflict that underlies participants’ treatment of difference as problematic.

In the introduction in chapter one, “the discursive construction of morality” referred to the ways in which discourse constructs ideological judgments of persons and their actions in interpersonal conversation. Morality as an achievement, in moments and over time, is about how to be a “good person” in interaction, where being a good person is accomplished through everyday choices in social actions and here, particularly toward or with close others. For the purposes of this project, the term morality will generally be used in the following ways:

1. “morality” will refer to an analytical concept which describes the accomplishment of an interaction in which participants enact ways of doing and being which can
be judged as right or wrong with regard to the interpersonal and interactional commitments implicated in discourse processes.

2. “moral interaction” (also “moral event” or “moral encounter”) will refer to a particular instance of people doing morality, or the phenomenon of such instances.

3. “moral practices” or “moral discursive practices” (also “moral activities” or “moral rituals”) will refer to the communicative practices in which participants engage for the purpose or in service of achieving “morality” as an interactional accomplishment.

4. “moral communication” will refer to espoused and situated normative ideals for what counts as an appropriate moral discursive practice, how it should be practiced, under what conditions it should be practiced, with whom it should be practiced, and its relationship to situational, relational, and cultural ideologies about identity, communication, action and relationships in the world.

In other words, “morality” is a complex construct which can describe many aspects of social life—situations, judgments, ethics, problems, orientations, rituals, identities—but is empirically visible in the deployment of ideological implications in contexts of potential difference. Morally-inflected concepts such as norms, judgments, evaluations and ethics may always be potentially moral (and certainly layer atop proto-morality, discussed more in the following section), but are analytically labeled “moral” if participants orient to consequential differences. This happens when people ignore or do not notice (or pretend not to notice) differences, as in apparently-shared cultural contexts, constructing a sense of shared moral action. This also happens (and is perhaps more visible) when participants orient to differences or
possible differences. In such cases, the work of morality involves managing the difference based on what it might mean for the relationship. Such management may constitute the briefest quip, an apology, a humorous remark; but differences may also be pursued and even emphasized.

Morality is not something which people “have,” but is continually accomplished through the ways in which people hold one another critically accountable for social actions. This consequentiality is embedded in the working-out of intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, and conflict differences in close relationships. The next section reviews the problems and practices associated with moral interaction across LSI and communication literatures.

**Moral Problems, Moral Practices**

The labeling of something as a problem is not merely an identification, but an action in its own right—one which may assign or deflect blame in different ways (Tracy & Muller, 2001). In describing the following “problems” of moral interaction, I am only in part asserting that they are problems. A different, and I would propose more important, component of these alleged problems is that they represent a name for empirically-visible practices which participants treat as morally relevant. In other words, though participants may not “call each other out” on intersubjectivity violations, they will treat those violations as morally consequential, for example, by saying “are you listening?” or “look at me when I’m talking to you” or “you misunderstood me.”

Morality as an interpersonal discursive achievement is accomplished at different levels and under particular conditions. In this section I review literature related to ideas and practices which can become morally problematic in interaction. Specifically, this section discusses how intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture and conflict have been conceptualized with regard to morality, and how these concepts capture problematic aspects of moral interaction.
Intersubjectivity: The Proto-Morality Approach

This section reviews the concept of intersubjectivity as a key problem within the approach to morality which sees morality as omnirelevant (Bergmann, 1998). In discussing proto-morality, other practices within which intersubjectivity takes place are also discussed, i.e. turn-taking. This section begins by linking intersubjectivity to omnirelevant moral practice, and stating its importance in relationships. I then cover major work which takes or contributes to the proto-morality approach, primarily including Garfinkel, conversation analytic studies, and discursive psychology work. The section ends by considering examples of specific interactional practices and how they are morally implicative.

Intersubjectivity is the most fundamental moral practice, without which other more complex interaction rituals would be destined to fail. Accomplishing intersubjectivity is a practice basic to nearly all interactions—there must be some basic shared understanding of a situation (Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1967) in order for interaction to move along—but it is particularly meaningful in close relationships as a way of achieving relationality. Displaying signs that one is attending to the other and the interactional and relational situation at hand is necessary. Over time, the particular patterns and means of doing intersubjectivity with close others mark a relationship as special, different from others. This section focuses on intersubjectivity as conceptualized in the approach that morality is omnirelevant. This foundation for morality as an ideological concept emphasizes the extent to which morality is managed in the ubiquitous give-and-take expectations of communication, and is required for ideological judgments to even exist.

Intersubjectivity is founded on the commitment to upholding expectations when interacting with others. Participants are treated as responsible for and accountable to interactional
expectations, but even more so in close relationships. Because interactional expectations are always relevant, approaches that deal for instance with intersubjectivity would see morality as omnirelevant. Seeing morality as omnirelevant implicates interaction as a committed enterprise in which people are held responsible for their actions—and judged accordingly. Most of this research is considered language and social interaction research, and comes out of ethnomethodological, conversation analytic, and discursive psychological traditions.

According to Bergmann (1998), the proto-morality approach begins with interaction and notices how it is moral. This is based largely on work by Garfinkel (1967, 2002, 2006, 2008; Heritage, 1984) in which interaction forms the basis of the social order. Because human beings are responsible for the social order, their interactional choices, including intersubjectivity practices, are seen as part of that commitment. Conversation analysis, which grew out of ethnomethodology, further distinguished what such morality means in interactional terms largely through the notion of adjacency, or the next-to-ness of sequential utterances. Not only is one responsible for providing a second pair part when a first pair part is proffered, but one is furthermore responsible for providing the conversationally preferred second pair part (Schegloff, 2007). Intersubjectivity is achieved insofar as next utterances display understandings of prior utterances, and following utterances ratify that display of understanding (Schegloff, 1992).

What this means is that when someone speaks, interlocutors’ commitment to the orderliness of social interaction demands a response. Not just any response is permitted: a response must be fit to the original utterance, such that, for example, question first pair parts are best fitted by answer second pair parts; invitations make relevant acceptances, or at least, rejections; and how-are-yous regularly require some acknowledgement and answer (usually in the form of “fine”) plus a turning-back of the question to the original speaker. Anything less will
incur swift, though not always spoken, judgment. At the least, a violation of such basic interactional moves will result in a strange look, or pursuit by one speaker of the missing or appropriate action implicated by the other speaker’s violation. In more extreme situations, such violations can lead to serious, even violent conflict. This is rarely, however, the result of single interactional moment. For the most part, interactional violations which are moral to this extent will result in discomfort, awkwardness, annoyance, frustration, or confusion.

A number of studies, some of which explicitly study the “morality” of interaction and some which do not, have taken up morality in this manner. Garfinkel’s (1967) breaching experiments notoriously demonstrated the implications for social judgment when participants violate interactional expectations. Students of Garfinkel inflicted various violations upon strangers, friends and loved ones, engaging in such activities as (1) asking endless questions about apparently simple situations (e.g., a flat tire), (2) facing the other people on an elevator rather than the door, and (3) withholding “reasonable” responses to questions and comments. Not only did such breachings incur the stupefaction, annoyance, and sometimes wrath of others, but were also experienced as deeply troubling to the “breachers” themselves. For Garfinkel, these experiments were ways of getting, indirectly, at the way in which social order is produced and the morality with which it is interwoven (Heritage, 1984).

Conversation analysis took a similar, but more technical, approach to the basis of morality in interaction. In conversation analysis, morality is relevant in the ways people do and do not attend to the obligations of ordinary interaction—for instance, the structural demands for a preferred second pair part to certain first pair parts (i.e. that invitations should be followed by acceptances), or indeed the accountability that arises when people contribute no second pair part at all, constituting a “noticeable absence” (Heritage, 2005; Silverman, 1998). There is also work
in conversation analysis on the kinds of actions which are treated by participants as having a moral or judgmental dimension, including complaining (Drew & Walker, 1998) and blaming (Maynard, 1998).

In these traditions, morality is studied from the perspective of social actions—the word “morality” is not always used. Conflict-relevant activities such as disalignments (Stivers, 2008), complaints (Drew, 1998), and news-expression (Maynard, 1998) have moral implications which may or may not be explicitly discussed. Research on conflict, argument and disagreement from an interaction perspective often involves attention to the ways in which people interactively orient to their exchanges as conflicted turn-by-turn, and often the turns that constitute conflicted sequences are morally infused. Turns may question the reasonableness of prior turns, bring up prior turns as evidence of guilt, project disagreeing next turns with preference structure, or demand accountable responses (e.g. Grimshaw, 1990).

In discursive psychology, some strands of which are highly conversation analytic, morality is made relevant in interaction through the way in which talk draws on moral concepts in the invocation of accountability, responsibility, intention and other psychological themes (Edwards, 2006). The notion of script formulations, for example, draws on the traditional social psychological concept of scripts as mental rules for action, but reframes them as built through descriptions in talk that construct action as part of a routine or standardized procedure (Edwards, 2005). Morality is treated in part as the practical accountability of action, as in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, but is also treated more explicitly in some studies as the discursive mobilization of moral concepts, logics and motives in people’s sense-making activities (e.g., Sneijder & te Molder, 2005; Stokoe, 2003; Stokoe & Wallwork, 2003).
Much of work by scholars who study the orderly accomplishments of sequential interaction would see morality in one of two ways: (1) as a subjective label which describes particular actions in talk; or (2) as the foundation for participants’ commitments to contribute appropriately to interaction. This review has focused on the latter, in which morality, like action, could be seen as omnirelevant. By such analysis “morality” is still a label, but it is label with an interactional meaning rather than being about beliefs or values. When someone for instance accuses another of being “a bad person,” what they are really doing is describing, for example, a recurrent pattern of dispreferred interactional choices made by a conversational partner. Moral concepts are used to do action in talk, but talk is also to some extent morally undergirded in interactional commitments.

There are many potential practices implicated by research within the proto-morality perspective. Intersubjectivity is a practice which involves many different verbal and nonverbal devices, and is described in more detail in chapter four. In this section I will touch on the concepts of turn-taking, adjacency, preference, and assessment, which are the generative mechanisms of talk in conversation analysis, and therefore means by which participants organize and display intersubjectivity.

Turn-taking is the basic mechanism for moving interaction forward. People usually speak one at a time and generally wait until the end or near the end of an utterance before providing their own turn. The handing back and forth of turns allows conversation to unfold as a social activity. Conversations move forward in terms of actions that get accomplished, for example, asking someone out on a date (Sacks, Scheglof & Jefferson, 1974; Scheglof, 2007). Turn-taking can become problematic. People might “speak out of turn” or “speak over one another.” There can be a “competition for the floor.” People may not take a turn designed for them, or they
may misinterpret the turn. However, these problems are overwhelmingly not the norm, according to Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974).

The concept that makes this moving-forward work coherently is adjacency. Turns are made relevant to prior turns, and shape upcoming turns. The nearness of one turn to another makes it relevant. Turns are therefore addressed to upcoming turns, and the following turns indeed address themselves to the prior turn. This allows not just a random exchange of turns, but one guided by relevance and adjacency (Schegloff, 2007). It is possible, of course, to run into trouble with adjacency. Someone might misinterpret what the turn is about, and provide an irrelevant turn. Someone may not hear the last few turns, addressing a turn instead to a yet older and now-irrelevant turn from several turns back.

Relevance of adjacent turns in terms of nearness is not itself going to make interaction work. Turns must also be preferred in order to be relevant, that is, they are not just “related” in proximity to adjacent turns, but provide the expected and appropriate format of response (Pomerantz, 1984). This is where the “action” of turns becomes significant. Turns have types, such as being openings, requests, assessments, etc. Thus the responding turn must be able to recognize the type and give a type-conforming response. Assessments, for example, can be either ratified or challenged. A challenge may be conversationally dispreferred, but its format is preferred because it conforms to the type of adjacency pair. Preference is at the root of interactional problems in conversation analysis. It is by doing dispreferred actions that people accomplish troubles and disagreements in interaction.

These practices form the foundation of more complex practices described later in this chapter and in the analysis chapters. Adjacency, for example, is part of what makes actions intelligible for interlocutors, and displays of intelligibility are part of what makes up the practice
intersubjectivity, discussed in chapter four. The work reviewed in this section implicates that morality is potentially omnirelevant based on responsibility to the social order and judgment of people’s interactional moves. This view of morality is assuredly important, but I want to make a distinction between the view of morality as omnirelevant and the more social or ideological view of invocations of morality as an interactional resources.

It is not the case for instance that proto-morality does not exist, but that its empirical instantiations’ crossing-over into morality proper would be the result of sustained patterns of interaction, which can only be seen when taking a more relational or cultural—in another word, contextual—perspective. Furthermore, morality is not only an invocation used by participants or analysts to describe an action—it is also a situated accomplishment which may not be explicitly named, but which is treated as meaningfully moral. Activities taken as moral in this sense by participants, such as some of those mentioned in this section (e.g. blaming), are the focus of the next section.

In the next section I look at how intimacy forges the relationship between proto-morality practices, such as intersubjectivity, and ideological moral practices, such as gossip. The next section focuses on an approach to morality which begins with concepts commonly viewed as morally-charged in society, and the ways in which these concepts are enacted and shaped in situated interaction.

**Intimacy: Linking Identities to Relationships**

This section reviews the concept of intimacy as a key problem within the approach to morality which sees morality as the ways in which ideologies are constructed and shaped in interaction (Bergmann, 1998). In discussing intimacy, the proto-morality of intersubjectivity is thus linked to the ideological moralities more familiar and namable to participants. This section
begins by linking intersubjectivity to intimacy, and intimacy to relating and identity, as moral practices for doing closeness in relationships. I then cover major work which takes or contributes to this approach to morality, primarily including symbolic interactionism, Goffman, studies of identity, interpersonal communication research, and discourse analysis. The section ends by considering examples of specific intimacy practices and how they are morally implicative.

Proto-morality and its practices take place in any kind of interaction. Intimacy presents a different order of such practices, one designed to signal other-orientation as intimate and enduring. The relational component of interpersonal interaction is qualitatively (and to some extent quantitatively) different for close relationships. Thus, intersubjectivity practices unfold in a particular way, shaped to be made relationally meaningful. The accumulation of doing intersubjectivity in a particular way accomplishes intimacy. This means that in a sense, “intimacy” is what distinguishes ideological and relationally-implicative morality from the morality of all interactions. Intimacy is also a condition for morality to be ideological in the sense in which it is consequential for relationships. In this section I discuss intimacy practices as the constitution of relational identities.

This emphasis on relationality brings me to interpersonal communication. So far I have focused on the discursive analytic perspective based in a grounded practical theory approach. Due in part to my “site” of study—interpersonal relationships—interpersonal communication research is relevant; however, it is also theoretically relevant to my perspective on the concept of moral interaction. Interpersonal communication research treats “relating” as theoretically significant. Many of the discursive concepts and approaches which have been described (and which are described later) do not. Indeed, insofar as “relationships” may often be assumed, a priori, as those which seem obvious (mother, sister, friend), many strong empirical discourse
approaches, such as conversation analysis, would see looking at relationships as imposing analytic categories onto the data. However, that is not, in focusing on relationality, what I mean to do. Instead, I seek to ground relating in discourse and see relationships as discursive constructions.

In order to understand intimacy as a practice for discursively constructing relationships, the next portion of this section links interaction, relationality, and identity. Interaction and relationality are key interests in interpersonal communication research. The symbolic interactionist perspective, which has had an enduring influence on interpersonal scholarship, formulates “identity” at the center of interacting with others. An identity cannot be formed outside of society, and is most meaningful in interacting with others. Self concept is based on a person’s perception of their own identity, usually based on stable notions of one’s “personality.” This sense of unitary stability is deceptive, however, as the self concept is in fact dynamic and complex, formed out of interactions with others and changing over time (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Social identity refers to one’s identity in relation to particular groups, for example, gender, ethnicity, religion, occupation. Social identity theory seeks to explain when and why people act more as individuals and more as group members in different situations (Tajfel, 1978, 1982). The idea of “identity” in interpersonal research is based on the notion that individual differences do exist and are important in communication (Daly, 2002).

Impression management refers to the ways in which people make effortful (if not conscious) attempts to control information and thus create a particular view of a person or situation (Schlenker, 1980). Based in social psychology, this idea is taken up sociologically by Goffman’s notion of facework. Facework is the work people do to make their actions consistent with and interpretable in relation to a desirable presentation of self (Goffman, 1967). Face can be
threatened, saved, maintained, supported, attacked, etc. Facework is especially apparent in
tenuous, conflicted or interactionally troubled situations. Because one aspect of morality is that
people talk themselves into existence as moral beings, face is an important and performative
notion of self that is relevant to the doing of morality.

Terms for “identity” have long been opposed by conversation analysts. The CA
perspective seeks to discover the basis for conversation in talk-in-interaction—the ways in which
structures for interacting are sequentially organized into meaningful talk. Thus, intersubjectivity
practices, as described in chapter four, would not be conceived of psychologically or
phenomenologically, but would have to be indicated, for example, by instances of repair. As
Schegloff (1992) noted, repair—correcting what one is saying—recognizes a problem of
understanding that could occur for the talk recipient, and so is oriented to this notion of the
intersubjective. As mentioned earlier in this section, intersubjectivity is a foundational practice
for doing intimacy, and involves the positioning of identities as in relation through discursive
resources.

This CA perspective extends also to any word with which one might identify a talk
participant: mother, boy, Latina, teacher, etc. All such terms would be seen as an analyst’s
creation, not one necessarily attended to by conversational participants, and thus to label and
then go even further to make claims about such labels (i.e. “she spoke that way because she is a
woman”) would be seen as grossly unempirical. This is one reason why certain strands of CA
often come into confrontation with more critical perspectives (Billig, 1999; Schegloff, 1997;
Schegloff, 1998; Schegloff, 1999a; Schegloff, 1999b; Wetherell, 1998; Stokoe & Smithson,
2001).
Although taking an empirical view, and strongly influenced by many conversation analytic ideas, this project does not go so far as to eschew any references to categories of identity. Indeed, part of the aim of this project is that relationships and identities do matter to participants, but that this “mattering” must be attended to by participants, and shown to be a feature of the interaction. Thus, a discourse perspective is needed which would account for the claims made about identity in interpersonal, sociological and other literatures, but still allow for such claims to be situated in the interaction between participants. “Intersubjectivity” is one concept used to accomplish this in chapter four, while in chapter five, the concept of “facework” becomes more central. Both are part of the way in which talk does identity.

“Identity-work” is a concept used in various areas of the communication field and, similarly to the idea of facework, implies a kind of effortful management of identity. Tracy’s (2002) definition of identity-work shifts the perspective more squarely to a discursive one by defining it as the work talk does to manifest the “who” doing the talking. In other words, who a person seems to be (based on prior performances or discourse) will shape how their talk is interpreted; and how people talk will shape the person their interlocutors take them to be. Antaki and Widdicombe (2008) take a similar stance in noting that identity is both an achievement and a tool. From a discourse perspective, identities are not always and already equally relevant, but become salient in different ways and in different situations.

This concept is the one I wish to employ in this project. In identifying “relationships” as a context for moral talk, and in orienting to interpersonal and discursive research, this project has to at once acknowledge and value “relationships” and “relationality” as important ideas in communication research, while grounding those ideas in specific interactional moves. According to Tracy (2002), “relational identities” are the identities people enact with particular others.
Having an identity that is “relational” does not just refer to a quality of being identifiable as “in the relationship” (i.e. “they’re siblings”) but also refers to the specific ways in which people discursively indicate that they are “doing” some cultural notion of “being a sibling” together.

The site of this project is not a physical place, but a kind of interaction—the kind oriented to the ways in which people interact with one another as particular, meaningful “others”: a kind of interaction based in relating “closely,” in sharing a history and a commitment to particular modes of interaction and their maintenance. In other words, the site of this project is the relationship between people, as it is enacted in discourse. And the uses of “identity” here, as I hope has been apparent, refer to the relationship and ways of constructing it, and not to individuals or their traits.

Intimacy has been linked to a number of communication activities, including arousal (Patterson, 1976), social support (e.g., Burleson, 1985, 2003), communication competence (Buhrmester, 1990), self disclosure (Laurenceau, Barret & Pietromonaco, 1998), talk about the relationship (Knobloch, Solomon & Theiss, 2006) and nonverbal cues (Patterson, Jordan, Hogan & Frerker, 1981). In these literatures, such actions are often based on having an effect on attention and involvement in experimental observation, or based on self-reports of people’s feelings of intimacy with regard to these actions. These communication activities are relevant, but the way in which they are seen and analyzed is based on how they are accomplished in ongoing interaction.

Tannen (e.g., 1999) has studied the ways in which talk (particularly women’s talk) works to do intimacy or rapport. Style and actions in communication, such as listening/understanding practices (continuers or feedback such as “yeah” and “m hm,” eye contact, sharing similar experiences), demonstrate that one is “on the same page” and cares about the other. When such
practices are not employed, it is seen as a threat to intimacy. In fact, some of Tannen’s examples point to the way in which these practices are associated with deeper differences between people, as when what appears to be a small disagreement turns to the viability of the relationship itself. From Tannen’s perspective, this indicates that different communicative moves have different meanings, in this case, for men and women, as in different cultural contexts.

Goldsmith and Fitch (1997) looked at advice as a way of doing social support, and the dilemmas involved. They demonstrated that advice seeking, receiving and giving can involve problems that construct but also depend on the intimacy assumed by the relationship between the people in the advice situation. Giving advice, for example, could be seen as “butting in” as well as caring or supportive. Maynard and Zimmerman (1984) examined the use of topics as a way of establishing intimacy between non-close interactants, establishing the basis of membership categorization and relational development through self-disclosure. Others have looked at the role of laughter (Coates, 2007; Jefferson, Sacks & Schegloff, 1987), storytelling (Mandelbaum, 1987, 1993; Stokoe, 2006) and troubles-talk (Jefferson, 1988) in doing intimacy.

Intimacy practices are buttressed by intersubjectivity practices. Displays of understanding, of common knowledge, and of an optimally shared orientation to or stance on a variety of aspects of life are all related to doing intersubjectivity in particular ways with particular others. Other ways of jointly organizing talk can display intimacy, for example, co-constructed talk, overlap, convergence, narrative, positioning, facework, and support.

Co-constructed talk and overlap are ways in which the basic turn-taking structure of social interaction can be modified and used to convey social meanings. Though as mentioned in the last section turns overwhelmingly pass between speakers and occur close to the ends of former turns (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974), violating such expectations can mean
different things. Turn-taking violations may be problematic, and attributions of rudeness or
demands to let one finish speaking would signal that being the case. But sometimes people share
turns to jointly construct stories or attitudes, thus showing how closely they are aligned through
experiences or opinions. Overlaps can signal conversational involvement. These “violations”
then become supportive (e.g., Mandelbaum, 1987; Schegloff, 2000).

Co-constructed talk is similar in some ways to the notion of convergence—that speaking
styles will converge when people want to identify or affiliate with one another. Giles’s
communication accommodation theory (Giles, Taylor & Bourhis, 1973) developed a specifically
cultural approach to the concept of convergence as a way of explaining people’s desire to
accommodate (or not) in conversations with others. Accommodating one’s speech in terms of
accent, word choice, pacing, etc., is a way of displaying interest and sharedness with another
person, as well as intimacy where such convergence is particularly strong. Divergence, on the
other hand, often signals the opposite—a way of putting distance between interactants and
signaling disagreement or disaffiliation (Bailey, 2000a; Giles & Coupland, 1991).

Narrative has already been mentioned as one way in which people can do intimacy with
another through jointly-told stories. Often such story-telling is for an audience: a dramatized
version of married couples’ stories of their relationships occurs at the beginning of the film
“When Harry Met Sally,” and demonstrates various examples of jointness in storytelling. Stories
are a way in which people make sense of their relationships. Stories are not only jointly-told as a
way of showing experiential closeness, but can become “myths” for couples and families, told
over and over again to each other and close others. References to stories (“remember when?”)
left untold, or only told in part, also demonstrate the shared memory and history which identifies
people as being in a close relationship (Norrick, 2000).
Positioning can also be a way of doing relational identities. Narrative, for example, can be a way of positioning people in relation to others and to communities. Narratives can present certain versions of selves and other, and of relationships. Identity enactments describe ways of accomplishing one as having a certain kind of situational, relational, personal or cultural identity (Tracy, 2002). Identity positioning, for example, is a way of enacting identity against, with, in contrast to or in relation to the identities of others (Davies & Harre, 1990). Thus, to position one’s self in relation to someone in certain ways indicates different levels of intimacy.

Facework, a way of managing the positive portrayal of an appropriate identity (Goffman, 1967), is also always in relation to another’s identity, and thus is a form of positioning to some extent. Doing facework for others is ubiquitous, but special ways of doing facework occur among friends. Attending to another’s face is a way of showing care about that person’s social identity, of mending conversational troubles, and reinforcing solidarity with another (Agne & White, 2004; Cupach, 1994; Lim & Bowers, 1991; Trees & Manusov, 1998). Facework is also a way of doing support, another practice which shows closeness. Social support involves myriad communication activities, such as giving comforting messages, showing empathy, and displaying sensitivity (Burleson, 1985; Burleson, 2003; Burleson & Albrecht, 1994).

Relationships are particularly suited to the empirical study of how people work out their moralities in relation to one another. It is indeed, in close relationships, where the concept of “morality” becomes most personally consequential. In conflict-relevant situations between close others, an idea of how to do the business of engaging or avoiding conflicts will practically demand an idea of how to conduct that business well.

So far this section has grounded the concept of intimacy in relationships as being related to intersubjectivity, relationality, interaction, and identity. As indicated by the last paragraph,
however, there is an idea of how to do closeness in contextually appropriate ways. This indicates the role of ideology in the moral practice of intimacy. Practices are not created brand new in every interaction, but are guided by, and therefore also ways of reconstructing and achieving, ideas about what a practice is and how it should be done. The normative ideas about moral practice and the logical assumptions that link them are what I am calling ideology. In the next section I look more closely at the concept of ideology as a cultural construct shaping how practices for doing intimacy should unfold.

**Ideology: The Cultural Logic of Morality**

This section reviews the concept of ideology as a key problem within the approach to morality which sees morality as constructed and shaped in interaction (Bergmann, 1998), as well as within cultural approaches. Therefore in discussing ideological practices, I also discuss how ideology is cultural. This section begins by linking ideology to intimacy as moral practices for doing relationships. I then cover major work which takes or contributes to an ideological approach to morality, primarily including Bakhtin, Goffman, interpersonal communication approaches, and various discourse analytic and ethnography of communication research. The section ends by considering examples of specific ideological practices and how they are morally implicative.

The last section mentioned the concept of ideology as being part of the logic by which people judge intimacy practices in interpersonal relationships. In this section I focus on the connection between ideology and relationships. This connection is a cultural one: ideologies are culturally constructed and meant to represent the normative ideas of practical conduct for a particular people. This means that ideology is what provides the logic or organized sense of what moral practice should be in a particular cultural context. This section is about work which has
focused on the ways in which interaction is guided by and instantiates sociocultural beliefs about appropriate, good, or right behavior, and the consequences this can involve. This research falls under several areas of communication, including language and social interaction, discourse analysis, rhetoric, critical approaches, interpersonal communication research, and cultural approaches. Though ideology and culture (as well as relational intimacy and interactional intersubjectivity) are deeply intertwined, the focus on ideology involves a focus on a rhetorical perspective in which, in situations where culture is assumed to be shared and is thus not salient, people’s moral actions will generally be attributed to choice.

As mentioned in chapter one, “ideology” is not meant here in the strongest sense—having to do with power, or manipulation—but regarding an “idea-system” as Bakhtin (1981) would say, a constellation of beliefs, reasons, assumptions and attitudes about what the world is like, how people should be, and such. Thus, this section discusses the other approach to morality in discourse described by Bergmann (1998) in which the analyst begins with morality—a concept such as truth or politeness employed in human interaction—and looks to how it plays out between, guides, and is shaped by people’s intercourses with one another. Also relevant to this work, as mentioned in the last chapter, are discourse studies which focus less on morality as omnirelevant and more on morality as oriented to in participants’ actions of judgment. However, in this section I focus on more socially-oriented studies of socially interaction which do not focus on the sequential organization of talk.

Ideologies are linked to cultural value judgments—they are wrapped up in identities, aesthetics, epistemology, and morality (Schieffelin, Woolard & Kroskrity, 1992). Ideology is part of what gives cultural practices their moral inflection—why practices are treated as “moral” will be linked to the ideologies that participants index as guiding practice, the beliefs about
“normal” life situated in historical and material processes which are often obscured (Blommaert, 1999). Ideologies tend to be enduring and unquestioned ideas of the nature of right and wrong in the social world, and are treated as taken-for-granted, commonsensical notions (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998) similar to Bourdieus’s (1977) concept of doxa.

As mentioned, for Bakhtin (1981) ideology means a particular way of viewing the world, a view which is constituted by the material and social system in which it is embedded. It is through speech that ideology is transmitted: everyday speech, and its endless recycling of stylized and standardized quotations, provides interpretive frames for situations by re-conceptualizing and re-accenting utterances spoken before. By such everyday speaking do social actors engage practically with cultural ideologies in order to achieve social significance in local interactions. Ideologies are similar to discourses in the Foucauldian sense—cultural themes and sometimes cultural coercions underlying and rationalizing everyday practices.

Ideology, then, has to do with the worldview embedded in the norms of particular societies—ways not only of implicating what the world is, but also what it should be, and how people can achieve that in their everyday lives. “Respect your elders,” “be honest with lovers,” and “honor your family” are examples of ideological norms that provide the logic for local ways of speaking and how they are judged. This logic is often unstated and is one into which cultural participants are socialized rather than something which is taught explicitly. Philipsen (1975) defined culture as that which is “shared, tacit” (p. 13). This emphasizes part of what makes conceptualizing culture so tricky: it is amassed by largely unacknowledged expectations. It also emphasizes the connection between ideology and culture.

According to Bakhtin (1981, 1986), discourse is social, material, dialogic and ideological, and that this is part of why discourse matters so much in moral interaction. Bakhtin's interest in
everyday speech (despite being a literary critic) makes what he says relevant to a discursive perspective. Bakhtin claimed that when people speak, they participate in a world of people, referencing relationships and the words of others. Speaking is material because it has consequences for one’s self and for others. The ways in which things are said matter. The dialogism of speech points to language’s heteroglossia—that there are always many “languages,” ways of speaking, and ideological commitments inherent in any speech, and that these languages and perspectives are always engaging one another in a dynamic interplay of meanings. Thus, language is ideological because it indexes “idea-systems,” cultural ways of thinking and believing that are marshaled rhetorically in people’s speech. The multiplicity of ideologies in discourse can be quite different and contradictory, but as Kim (2007) proposes, they are often not mutually exclusive, but define and are defined by (or against) one another.

In most LSI work, ideology is not an oft-referenced term; however, it refers to the kinds of morally-inflected topics taken up in studies of language and interaction. In 1988, Maynard suggested that the study of language and interaction was an important site for addressing the study of social problems from a perspective oriented to the “interaction order” (Goffman, 1967). Maynard (1988) proposed that integrating “micro” language-oriented studies would demonstrate how people use language to confront the problems they encounter in everyday life. This is not to say that more “macro” studies ignore the situated occurrence of morality in conflicted talk. Gordon (1990) for instance studies the way in which social structures have built-in cultural expectations about the role of emotion in everyday problems, including specific names for emotions, norms about when and how to show emotions, and beliefs (ideologies) about the nature of emotions. He refers to these expectations as “emotion culture.”
Most LSI studies, however, focus on discourse more directly, taking up particularly morally-inflected strategies by which people use discourse to deal with problematic situations. One such strategy is through categorization practices. Often drawn from Sacks’ (1992) concept of the membership categorization device (MCD), these literatures look at ways in which linguistically placing people in certain “categories” based on age, gender, race or other master identities (Tracy, 2002) presupposes a moral ordering. For instance, Nikander (2000) analyzes a 50-year-old woman’s talk regarding her identity as both “old” and “little girl” in ways that index cultural notions of age appropriateness.

A study by Rapley, McCarthy and McHoul (2003) join categorization practices with accounting practices, arguing that both are inescapably moral. In their analysis of lay and expert media accounts of a mass murder in Tasmania in 1996, they found that explanations for the moral categorizations of selves, others and tragic situations were remarkably congruent among all accounts, regardless of their standing as ordinary “people on the street” versus professionals. The authors argue that moral accounting grounds the technical, clinical or scientific judgments made by professionals.

Others have approached morality and conflict from the angles of support talk, resolution and problem-solving. White and Watson-Gegeo (1990) for example looked at what they called “tangles”—conflicts, dilemmas and problems—and the way in which people draw on moral assumptions in their discursive attempts to “disentangle.” Other studies of how discourse draws on moral concepts include research on criticizing, blaming, arguing, and generally doing face-threatening actions. Tracy (2008c) looked at conflict at a school board and how “face-attacks” could be situationally appropriate ways of doing, for instance, “moral indignation”—showing passion and commitment for important community issues.
What I am calling the “ideological” approach is not only taken by language and social interaction scholars. Most interpersonal research, for instance, also starts at this level—by looking at morality as related to beliefs, values, judgment, and ideologies (though not necessarily using the latter term). In this literature, judgment is not about actions that assess prior turns, but is more about the ways in people judge one another as good, bad, reasonable, unreasonable, etc. Classically, such work has looked primarily at morality as a dimension of attitudes toward particular actions which are measured in the service of learning how communication reveals, or is shaped by, people’s internal notions of right and wrong (e.g., McCroskey, Richmond & Daly, 1975).

Others who have not taken this more strict social scientific approach have looked at morality and its relationship to emotion and conflict (e.g. Jones, 2001; Planalp, 1999). Baxter’s relational dialectics (2004a, 2004b) sees intimacy and independence as complementary emotional needs in tension with one another. For Baxter, ideology is captured in relational discourses such as “couples should spend time together” or “sisters should be able to tell each other everything.” Fitch (1998), who takes a cultural approach to discourse in relationships, links morality to relationships and culture through the concept of interpersonal ideologies, “premises about personhood, relationships and communication around which people formulate lines of action toward others and interpret others’ actions” (p. 12). She notes that such premises are often unspoken and assumed.

The interpersonal approach to morality usually begins with an assumption of what morality means. Rhetorical approaches are similar in this regard. Burke (1935, 1945, 1966) however goes more deeply into the human foundations of morality, which he identifies as the need for actions to “fit” the environment. Thus, certain moral concepts such as “duty” will be
invoked to explain motives for particular actions in order to make one’s conduct appear suitable, appropriate or as Burke calls it “pious” with regard to a situation. In a sense, some of what Burke says is not too different from Goffman’s (1959, 1961, 1963, 1967) perspective. Morality is for Burke deeply ceremonial. Ritual actions, from legal and religious ones to social ones, perform a social and cultural function for establishing a sense of order, rightness, or identity. Thus, Burke’s view is also not too different in some ways from Garfinkel’s (1953, 1967, 2006).

The ideological approach does not leave behind the concepts of commitment and responsibility which were important to intersubjectivity and to the proto-morality approach. Similar to the discussion of intimacy, looking at ideology means focusing on commitment and responsibility at more relational and communal levels. It also tends to take a more social and cultural approach. Goffman (1959, 1961, 1963, 1967) for example is considered by Bergmann (1998) as the exemplar of this approach to morality. Though Goffman does not consider culture, his descriptions of the “rules” of the interaction order are certainly grounded in particular contexts—the ones he discusses, however, are generally situational rather than cultural.

The ideological approach comes from many more disparate communication traditions than did the proto-morality approach. Cultural approaches within the ethnography of communication tradition come closest to the way in which morality is studied in the current project. In this research, discourse analysis is situated within culturally-contexted relationships to uncover the culturally variable practices and meanings of interaction (Carbaugh, 2007). Some work that takes a cultural approach also considers the importance of relationality (e.g. Fitch, 1994) as well as looking at the use of moral concepts (such as “respect”) as strategy (e.g. Buttny & Williams, 2000; Bailey, 2000a). However, much of this work tends to see morality as synonymous with norms; does not engage as closely the concept of commitment explored by
proto-morality approaches; or does not incorporate difference and conflict explicitly in the
consideration of ideology or norms.

Ideology and “discourses of” are often analyzed negatively. The research above, as I
hope to have made clear, does not necessarily require seeing these concepts as oppressive. The
tradition of doing so comes from a particular place, and is often attributed to Marx, who equated
ideology with the false consciousness that kept certain social groups oppressed (Purvis & Hunt,
1993). Many of the terms discussed in this and the next section overlap regarding these
concepts—ideologies, discourses, doxa, premises, assumptions, and others—and they each offer
different emphases and have been analyzed in more or less negative ways. Like “rhetoric,”
ideology has developed a negative pall through its associations and usages, but this project takes
a more sociological perspective which sees ideology as the social construction of shared
meanings. It can certainly become oppressive, and is undoubtedly problematic, but is not
necessarily only a tool of the powerful.

Purvis and Hunt (1993) make a distinction between discourse theory as describing
internal societal ideas, and ideology as describing external ideas—in other words, ideology is a
name for a large concept in society or culture, and discourse is the linguistic way of describing
that concept. This is similar to the perspective taken in this project. Ideology represents a general
social value such as “trust.” Discourses refer to ways of formulating the ideology as mottos or
sayings, such as “be trustworthy” or “trust me.” A discourse of trust is a way of describing what
the ideology is.

These ways of describing, however, are not floating above and guiding interaction.
Rather, they are ways of making sense of practical interactional choices, for instance, whether to
disclose something personal to a friend, and how (Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001). As Gal (1992) notes,
Ideology is conceptualized—implicitly or explicitly—not only as systematic ideas, cultural constructions, commonsense notions, and representations, but also as the everyday practices in which such notions are enacted; the structured and experienced social relations through which humans act upon the world. (p. 445-446)

Practices for forming sociocultural bonds require the constitution of broad, shared ideas of how to be in the world, and also provide ways of talking about problems with the ideology (i.e., “I wouldn’t trust you any further than I could throw you”). Thus, ideology is a way of creating a sense of commonality or shared values and ways of doing things. However, ideologies are multiple, and this sharedness thus an effort; furthermore, ideologies often provide the means of positioning people and ideas as different from, or even against, one another (Gal & Irvine, 1995). Ideologies provide the logic for explanations of why certain practices exist (because they are “good”) and thus can inherently imply that opposite practices are “bad.”

There are many potential practices implicated by research within the ideological perspective. In the remainder of this section I will discuss briefly the concepts of judgment rituals, demonstrations, identity enactments, and metadiscourse. I will then discuss how they are relevant to my analyses, and definitions and examples of them will be provided in the vocabulary section.

Judgment rituals involve the kinds of assessment and accounting relevant to the protomorality approach, as well as speech acts such as blaming and criticizing, but also more complicated rituals of judgment, such as gossip. There are many kinds of discursive practices which can do judgment. I begin with accounting, partly because accountability is what makes even the smallest actions morally implicative, partly because research on accounting spans
interpersonal and discourse analytic approaches. Accounting is one category of discourse, in the general discursive world of reason-giving, which specifically deals with problematic situations. Giving accounts is one activity in which people respond to potentially problematic situations by mitigating their own responsibilities (Tracy, 2002). Account-giving is quite broad because it involves a number of different practices such as justifying, arguing, being defensive, and criticizing-back. Accounting shows attendance to a problem, but also provides plenty of room to avoid being explicit, and so is a site where managing the directness of moral talk becomes visible.

Accounts can be described with speech act verbs, such as blaming, justifying and apologizing. Narratives are a common way of giving accounts (White, 1980), as are descriptions and explanations. An “account” will often combine particular ways of describing people and situations, attributing reasons and causes, and explaining behaviors. Accounts are ways of mediating the relationship between particular events and situations in our daily lives, and the identities of our selves and others as we make our way through, within and in relation to such circumstances. By accounting, we seek to present to others how this relationship should be interpreted, and what moral implications can be drawn about the persons and situations embedded therein.

Accounting accommodates many different kinds of practices that seek to negotiate one’s responsibility with regard to problems or potential problems. Another category of moral practices involves passing judgment on others or on situations for which the teller of the situations perceives herself as not being accountable. Complaining is one example of an activity that does this (Edwards, 2005). Troubles telling and other narrative events are others (Jefferson, 1988). One kind of ritual in which people regularly engage is that of reproaching or complaining-
to—criticizing someone’s actions as problematic, wrong, or bad in some way (Tracy, 2002). This can be done ritually when it follows a particular format, for example, criticism-account-reformulation-apology: Bill says Suzy never takes out the trash; Suzy says she is too tired when she gets home; Bill says he gets home even later than she does; Suzy says she is sorry. As indicated by the long history of research on the demand/withdrawal syndrome among romantic couples (e.g., Christensen, 1987, 1988; Christensen & Heavey, 1990), criticizing or “nagging” rituals are easy patterns for intimate people to fall into, but can seriously damage a relationship over time.

Another category involves gossip or complaining-about, in which people evaluate the actions and characters of non-present third parties (Bergmann, 1993; Edwards, 2005). Gossip is an especially ritualized activity because it often involves an explicit contrast between the character and actions of the gossip-subject versus the gossip producers and receivers. This contrast serves to emphasize the goodness of the in-group by pitting it against the badness of the out-group or “bad” person, similar on a small scale to Garfinkel’s status degradation ceremony (1956) or even Burke’s scapegoat (1935). What Garfinkel (1956) calls the “status degradation ceremony” is probably the most extreme form of passing judgment, and is described as a ritual destruction of total identity in a community, but also takes place within interpersonal interactions.

Gossip may be a way of doing status degradation. Gossip, like status degradation, also follows particular structural formats. It involves a pre-gossip phase in which the gossiper tests the possibility of receptions to the gossip and gossip phase which is often characterized by vulgar language, reconstructions of events and dialogue, and moral indignation (Bergmann, 1993). Gossip involves delicate maneuvering by interactants because though it is “about” threatening
the reputation of others, it is in practice face-threatening to the gossip producer (who can be seen as “a gossip”) as well as the gossip-receiver (who can be seen as passively participating in the gossip).

Gossip involves different kinds of instances of judging others, in other words, it is really a set of moral discursive practices. Stance-taking, which may or may not involve or occur within gossip, is similar in that it potentially involves many kinds of discursive practices. As Bergmann (1993) notes, gossip is especially complex because it is itself a morally-suspect activity. Tellers, recipients, and subjects of gossip achieve different kinds of status and tainting throughout a gossip event.

Another class of practices has to do with ways of talking which I refer to as “demonstrations,” often which are themselves judged as ways of enacting moral practices. Impoliteness research is an area of this kind of class, involving many practices that can achieve actions or personalities labeled “rude.” Brown and Levinson (1987) developed the theory of politeness, the two main types of politeness (positive and negative), and the conditions under which face-threatening actions are done or not done. Critiqued for its claims to universality and its inability to handle more complex situations (Tracy, 2008c), it continues to be a strong area of research in linguistics, and has given rise to numerous impoliteness studies (e.g. Bousfield, 2008; Culpepper, 1996; Mills, 2002).

Emotionality is another kind of demonstration. It is a special category of doing morality because in a sense it is the most apparent lamination atop the many practices detailed above. According to Planalp (1999), we can tell something is morally meaningful to a person based on the emotions they communicate: emotions cue or index a set of personal or cultural ethical standards regarding events, people, or actions being talked about. Morality is emotionally
charged. This “charge” is exactly part of why communication is a kind of commitment that carries serious consequences for participants. One cannot give a criticism and walk away; one cannot ignore a plea and expect to be shrugged off.

The way in which we show the accountability of social actions most directly is by communicatively performing certain verbal and nonverbal actions that correlate with cultural notions of “feeling.” Such emotional display can be accomplished by a number of means: word choice, tone of voice, facial expression, etc. Whether emotions really “are” a person’s feelings, moods or mental attitudes is not relevant; what is relevant is that emotions are taken by others as such (or as manipulations of such). Emotions are treated as relevant, interpretable, something to respond to (Perinbanayagam, 1991). Their display involves particular meaningful actions (a glare, a sob) indicative of a particular stance.

In interactions between members from the House of Lords, for example, once someone asks a question, they tend not to get a chance to follow up, and definitely not directly. Often, people will display a response to the answer to their question with emotionality markers, even rather exaggerated ones in such a formal setting, including eye-rolling, visible sighing, frowning, head-shaking, and arm-crossing (Robles, 2011). Emotions can be rhetorically expressed to achieve particular purposes or present certain identities (Bailey, 1983).

According to Parrott (2003), emotions are a key way of doing positioning—one can convey one’s position by evincing the emotions appropriate to one’s position, and do the same for others. For instance, stating that someone should feel “shame” is a way of positioning them in a conflict or in relation to others in a social drama. Parrott’s claim makes another important point: that all of these strategies are interrelated, and can be accomplished in concert with one another.
The last section of practices discussed here involves the use of language and metadiscourse. Language in this case refers to topicalization, “taboo” words, or use of formal languages (e.g., code-switching). Taboo words are a part of “sin talk”—conversations that revolve around classically “sin-relevant” topics such as excessive drinking, infidelity, deception, and violating sexual mores. Such talk of course occurs through and within some of the rituals I just described, but here I point out particular regularly-occurring topics that are taken up across ways of talking about them. Sinful topics are easiest to share with those closest to us, but also are constantly in danger of breaking the social norms about what is appropriate to talk about in certain situations.

Over time, particular words develop strongly value-laden, moralized meanings. They are often politicized, contested, and when they become highly abstract, can be regarded as “meaningless.” Words for categories of person, such as MCDs (Sacks, 1992), are moralized in this way. So are racial slurs and pejorative terms (Bergmann, 1998; Thurlow, 2001; van Dijk, 1992) as well as what Goffman called “stigma terms” (1963, p. 132). Terms that reference “bad” kinds of communication, such as “hate speech,” are included in this category (Boromisz-Habashi, 2010), as are terms with strong positive connotations such as “freedom” and “equality,” or “democracy” and “children” (Tracy, 2008c, 2010). Such words are not only tricky because they are emotionally sensitive, clearly impart value, and have contested meanings, but also because they are often invoked strategically to manage other kinds of morally problematic situations.

Metadiscourse is a broad category of communication activities that comprises a net of relevant practices. At one level, metadiscourse is literally “talk about talk,” in which people explicitly describe, explain, and evaluate communication: ordinary folks, as well as
communication researchers, do this—albeit the latter does so about the former, and at a remove (Craig, 1999). The reference to “hate speech,” above, is a kind of metadiscursive term related to a devalued form of communication. Metadiscourse can also refer to particular practices that indicate commentaries or normative attitudes toward ongoing talk (Jaworski, Coupland & Galasinski, 2004).

Metadiscourse involves in part what people say about communication (literally, discourse about discourse). Metadiscourse, or metacommunication, involves the ways in which people explicitly mark the topic of their talk as (1) prior talk, (2) the process of talk ongoing at the moment, and (3) future talk. For example, (1) “I don’t think the argument we had last night was very productive”; (2) “what you’re saying right now isn’t very intelligent”; (3) “I think next time you talk to her you should be more polite.” “Discourse” of course needn’t be taken primarily as “talk,” as people are capable of commenting on nonverbal communication in relevant ways as well (for example, “look at me when I’m talking to you”). And people also can comment on communication in ways that draw more specific attention to communication functions, which is sometimes called more specifically “metapragmatics” (Jacquemet, 2006; Silverstein & Urban, 1996). Examples of this include “it really angers me when you call me that” and “no one will understand you if you phrase it that way.”

Framing is a metadiscursive way marking the boundaries or characteristics of some area of life so as to “define” a particular situation as one kind of thing versus another. Often this is done very implicitly in the particular words one uses. In situations of high institutionalization, the vocabulary with which to frame something is often already provided, and members of the institution (as well as those frequently in contact with it) are aware of the rituals for employing the vocabulary and interacting with one another. According to Bateson (1972), “framing” occurs
Framing is often done to set up a particular behavior or attitude that is to be communicated. Framing frequently becomes relevant in conflict. How someone frames an argument (even as an “argument” in the first place), an issue, a controversy, will matter to who in the matter is set up as “problematic” (thus accountable!) and how the situation is to be understood in a moral sense. Arguments around same-sex marriage in the United States are a good example of this. Framing it as a “controversy” gives it particular import. Framing it as a political, personal, legal or religious issue provides yet another definition of the situation and implicates who the major players in the scene are, what they are like, and how the discussants stand in relation to the situation.

Framing and commenting on communication and communicative situations is the basic way in which people understand “what is going on” in a situation—it allows people to interact (Bateson, 1972; Goffman, 1974). Gumperz’s (1982) theory of conversational inference sought out the linguistic details of talk that do metacommunicative and framing work, and as it turns out, there are myriad such devices (Jaworski, Coupland & Galasinski, 2004; Tannen, 1993). Reported speech is an example of a particular metadiscursive device which can be employed in talk to comment indirectly on what is being said. Reported speech, or constructed dialogue, involves the many ways in which people use the words of others in what they say. Discussing
something someone else said, or quoting someone, is a way of indexing a variety moral weights in social interaction, including epistemic access and authority, strength of claims, blame-ability, investment in a situation, ideologies, and rhetorics. Reported speech can be used to decrease responsibility for an utterance, strengthen something’s epistemic value, or convey indirect emotions, feelings and opinions (e.g. Buttny, 1997; Buttny & Williams, 2000).

Metadiscourse is a sort of “net” that captures many of the morally-tinged discursive practices described in this section. In a sense, any communicated morality will inevitably comment on an aspect of life that is ultimately itself communicative. To gossip about a woman and label her a “slut” is to comment on various communications of personality and behavior attributable to that person: her style of dress, interactions she’s had with others, stories she’s told, regularly occurring speech acts, presentations of self. That such disparate activities can become crystallized in judgment is part of what makes morality inherently ideological and cultural. There must be a mechanism for making such connections and drawing conclusions from them. In other words, there must be a theory of morality, a cultural concept of how morality is communicated and on what basis it generates judgments of people and actions.

Based on this approach, morality is ideological because it involves people’s beliefs, values, expectations and sense of right and wrong, often heavily steeped in a social and/or cultural context. From this perspective, the consequentiality of action is more intense, progressive, long-term and larger scale than the consequentiality of a single dispreferred response as described in the section on proto-morality. Though this work also focuses on individuals in single interpersonal relationships, the commitments and consequences of this context continue to be relevant in a way not considered from the proto-morality approach. The stakes, in this approach, are higher.
The work reviewed in this section implicates a definition of morality based on social judgment of persons and their actions, and the cultural norms on which such judgments are made. In some ways, this definition seems to better capture people’s commonsense experiences of morality in their everyday lives. It offers what about morality seems so important to social life. It links notions of morality to social and cultural contexts in ways that make sense. However, it is missing two important components. One is that it does not consider as strongly the interactional grounding of morality. Rather than moving away from the proto-morality approach, the ideological approach should be able to meet it halfway. One example of this is Tracy and Ashcraft’s (2001) discussion of the relationship between interactional and ideological dilemmas.

This section discussed how relationships involved ideology, and some of the ways in which ideology is culturally constructed. In the next section I delve deeper into what makes ideology cultural, and how cultural practices shape relational interactions.

**Culture: Organizing Ideologies**

This section reviews the concept of culture as a key problem within cultural approaches and approaches to morality as constructed and shaped in interaction (Bergmann, 1998). In discussing cultural practices, I also return to ideologies. This section begins by linking culture to ideology and discussing how ideologies are rhetorical. I then cover major work which takes or contributes to a cultural approach to morality, primarily including Goffman, Burke, Bateson, Geertz, Bourdieu, and ethnography of communication. The section ends by considering examples of specific cultural practices and how they are morally implicative.

Culture and ideology go hand in hand. As discussed in the last section, ideologies are cultural. In separating then, I do not mean to imply that culture can be free of ideology or ideology free of culture, but that “ideology” provides a way of describing how cultural
participants conceptualize differences within an assumedly shared community, whereas “culture” emphasizes the difference between people of saliently different backgrounds. Though ideology and culture are deeply intertwined, the focus on culture here involves a focus on a perspective in which, in situations where culture is not assumed to be shared and is thus salient, people’s moral actions will generally be attributed to their background or participation in patterned ways of speaking and being.

Ideologies evolve out of particular places and histories and peoples. They are practiced into being. However, the histories and efforts of ideologies are often invisible. The tacit assumptions that justify and rationalize ideologies are normalized and taken for granted as commonsense (Jaworski, Coupland & Galasinski, 2004). “Culture,” too, is often invisible where it is shared (Fitch, 1998). The rest of this section deals with various approaches and their relationships to culture, ideology, and morality.

Goffman does not much talk about culture explicitly—though as a sociologist conducting ethnography he worked amidst the same kinds of bounded “sites” as do anthropologists, his focus is “moments” rather than societies. As Streeck (2002) notes, however, Goffman’s perspectives imply that culture is consistent with a particular framing of experience. Goffman (1974) connects the frame to the enactment of it, asserting that “what people understand to be the organization of their experience, they buttress, and perforce, self-fulfillingly” (p. 563). He also discusses how the frameworks of everyday life are taken for granted. Again, this points to the tacit nature of expectations and ideologies. According to Goffman, interactants rely on the surface matter of ordinary interaction—gestures, expressions, smiles and utterances—to cue them to the frame. But acting within the frame is not only a guessing game, it is a guessing game in which that which is being guessed at may be cloaked in other frames. This is what makes
everyday experiences vulnerable. Frames can be misapplied, mistaken, broken, mangled; they can becoming trapping, stifling, deceptive. And yet, as constructed as frames are, they are taken by participants as “real,” and that of course is what leads to problems.

To reinterpret this notion of frames from a cultural perspective, that which is culturally constructed to guide interactions is often assumed to be reasonable, right, and good. The moral frame in which cultural assumptions operate can cause problems when working within that frame as well as in situations in which framings differ. Ideologies are part of what builds up and makes sense of cultural frames. In practical everyday interactions, the tacit workings that keep cultural participation going allow social life to run smoothly, and are embodied rather than reflected on (Bourdieu, 1977). But when something goes awry, the unreflective nature of daily practice reveals itself as problematic.

The invisible nature of morality in the most mundane moments of cultural participation is part of what makes culture a rhetorical practice. Ideologies work because they are highly persuasive, thus implicit—enthymematic (Aristotle in Bitzer, 1959; Jackson & Jacobs, 1980). Burke’s rhetorical methods and analyses (1935, 1945, 1950, 1966) draw on the crucial, enthymematic role that orientations play in human life. Orientation is Burke’s word for what I am calling ideology. Orientations are ways of seeing the world which guide associations between events and causes, motives and actions, needs and responses. To learn is to be enrolled in a particular orientation. As Burke points out, however, such learning ill-prepares one for encountering new experiences. Humans often engage in “faulty selection of means” (1935, p. 9) based on attributing complex situations to shorthand, motivated moral exigencies such as “duty.” To say one acts in the name of duty is to apply a particular interpretation that conceals as much as it reveals. The symbolic choices one makes in attributing blame, deciding actions and
justifying beliefs are rhetorically constructed out of the orientation in which one lives. Though
Burke does not discuss culture specifically, his views are analogous to the role of culture as
rhetorically motivated through the enactment of ideology in interaction.

Fitch, like Burke, connects culture and rhetoric, but more explicitly considers the
relationship between the two. In her article on cultural persuadables (2003), she discusses “how
culture constrains and enables persuasion” (p. 100) based on what people can be persuaded of,
what may be used to persuade them, and how such persuasion might unfold. Rhetoric, thus, is
culturally motivated—the foundational, unstated premises that make persuasion work so well are
cultural in nature. Persuadables exist in the cultural domain between that which is not
persuadable (and which must thus be enacted through coercion) and that which needs no
persuasion (is taken for granted). Thus for Fitch, ideologies would probably not be seen as
persuasive, or at least, would be highly implicit in their persuasion. Persuadables are part of the
stuff of culture, strategic communicative events made intelligible through their coherence in
relation to cultural “common sense” notions of right and wrong in the interpersonal world.

The importance of strategy in morality requires a rhetorical and performative orientation
as well. Strategy is the link between discursive practices and moral judgments. In order to judge
people's communicative conduct as good or bad, talk must be purposeful in some way (as well as
assumed to be purposeful by others)—it has what we might call a “motive” to convey
evaluations, as well a “motive” for how, and why, to convey them in particular ways. In terms of
joining moral concepts and rhetorical expression, perhaps no scholar was better suited to the task
than Burke (1935, 1945, 1960). Although Burke, like Bakhtin, does not always (or even often)
consider particular instances of language use outside literary examples, he is explicitly interested
in language as social, symbolic, and oriented to motives. He devises a sort of underlying human
motivation for action based on principles to which he assigns religious names, such as the primary one, “piety” (essentially a desire for “fit” or appropriateness). Though Burke's ideas are not based in empirical analysis, his perspective is culturally and historically sensitive to the role of morality in everyday life and how people perform themselves as moral beings.

So far this section has made more explicit the link between ideology and culture, and how that link is rhetorical. The remainder of this section focuses on how exactly to conceptualize culture. In this project, culture is a practice. Seeing culture as a practice traces its lineage to anthropology. From Boas (1940) to Bateson (1958) to Geertz (1973) and Bourdieu (1977), many of the most influential anthropologists have taken some form of a practice approach. Bateson’s (1958) cybernetic approach was more interested in process than practice, but his consideration of patterns of actions is not inconsistent with practice theory.

The practice approach is clearest in Geertz (1973) and Bourdieu (1977)—Geertz whose symbolic approach and consideration of local logics provided the foundation for practice theory’s arrival on the anthropological scene, and Bourdieu, who helped usher practice theory in alongside others such as Giddens (Ortner, 2006). Geertz (2004) for example took a cultural approach to a particularly moral system, religion, arguing that religion formulated a particular view of reality and gave meaning to action. Like Malinowski (1925), Geertz built on the functionalist approach that religion occupies a local social purpose, and focused on the morality of religion through people’s religious practices beyond only mental or psychological “beliefs”: “out of any dim and inaccessible realm of private sensation into that same well-lit world of observables in which reside the brittleness of glass, the inflammability of paper…the dampness of England” (2004, p. 10).
Practice theory focuses on the ways in which cultural systems constrain, but are also constituted and transformed by, local practices—the activities, actions, rituals and events accomplished by people in their everyday life. Thus practice theory is a perfect fit for close ethnographic analysis and social theory. Oddly enough, however, early practice theorists did not articulate a concept of culture (Ortner, 2006). Culture was left to be discovered as being equal to the place and people studied, which reinforced the essentialism attributed to the classic anthropologists such as Benedict and Boas.

Several advancements of research and theorizations of culture—in cultural studies, critical theory, and the historical turn—have reinterpreted culture in numerous ways (Ortner, 2006). In following, in particular, Bourdieu’s notions of practice (1977, 1990, 1991), this analysis looks to the role of norms of symbolic and linguistic practices through which people enact themselves as belonging to a common habitus, or a tacit, embodied mindset comprised of memories, histories, practices and dispositions into which people are socialized as they become members of a culture. Doxa represents all that is undiscussed and assumed regarding the practices and their enrollment in habitus. Doxa is “known” and guides practice—it involves a sense of what is going on and what to do within a scene. The unified sharedness of such doxa joins people in a particular cultural tradition (Bourdieu, 1998). In this project, ideologies link the doxa to the habitus.

Though ideologies rest on many unexamined and invisible beliefs, they are not “unexpressed.” Rather, their expression offers a partial, but persuasive, reasoning for being part of a certain group which accomplishes certain activities. This is not to say that what people name as their norms or reasons would necessarily be “accurate” (Bourdieu thought they could not be—1977) but that such invocations nonetheless reveal something about the way people make sense
of actions through locally appropriate moral ideals. Doxa is in fact not wholly unified or shared, as evidenced by some of the analyses in later chapters. But ideologies of cultural practice are managed interactionally to create consistency and intelligibility as one goes along in one’s daily life.

In ethnography of communication, cultural research is often associated with particular communities. In taking an ethnographic approach to communication activities, researchers seek to understand discourse within its local variations and meanings (Cameron, 2001). Rather than defining a local setting by region or ethnic background, ethnographers of communication look for “speech communities” bound by ways of speaking and beliefs about speaking (Philipsen, 1975). Thus in a particular region where other attributes such as race or religion are not linguistically marked, class or profession distinctions may be. This provides a more explicitly communicative way of identifying how people construct themselves as a group. Speech communities are both accomplished in moments and maintained over time, “constituted in local and continuous performances of cultural and moral matters” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 42).

Ethnography of communication research takes up theoretical concerns, such as the relationship between identity and communication practices, local rules and ways of talking about communication, and community-specific meanings for cross-cultural communication practices (Carbaugh, 2007). Such studies focus on members’ perspectives on communication in their everyday lives. Who counts as a member of a community is, of course, not always clear. In a sense, Goffman’s (1981) notion of participation frameworks, like framing, can also be taken as a way of seeing culture as interactional practice: different people participate to different extents in conversations, just as they do in communities.
Practices are both local enactments, and guided by cultural norms and expectations. To come across the doing or referencing of a practice in talk is to come across an underlying and often unarticulated idea of what the practice means, how it should be done, and who should do it. Such unarticulated ideas—ideologies—often become explicit when culture is perceived as different. There are many potential practices implicated by research within the cultural perspective, and all of the practices discussed in the previous sections can exist in culturally specific forms or with culturally specific meanings as a way of practicing, or participating in, a community. In the remainder of this section I will discuss briefly the concepts of language, person reference, codes, ritual, and socialization. I will then discuss how they are relevant to my analyses, and definitions and examples of them will be provided in the vocabulary section.

Language, as mentioned in the previous section, involves uses and forms of language. Language practices which are particularly relevant to a cultural approach involve code-switching, terms, and dialect. Code-switching involves the grammatically-constrained switching between different languages, for example, English and Spanish (Bailey, 2000b). This is different from say “Spanglish” or forms of talk in which a language is incompletely known, and thus unknown words are filled in with words from the fluent language, or unknown words are invented to “sound like” the nonfluent language. Terms can refer to special concepts with no easy translation which mark a particular kind of identity or activity, for example, “sa-jiao” refers to a whiny or needy type of person (usually female) in Taiwanese communities (Yueh, 2010). Terms can also be more explicitly communicative, for example, “palanca” refers to a kind of narrative form in Spanish Colombia (Fitch, 1998). The use of dialect is another way in which modified forms and sounds of language can mark someone as being a part of different communities, or groups within a community (Bayard, Weatherall, Gallois & Pittam, 2001).
Person-reference refers to the naming and labeling of people, and can involve formal naming, titles, pronouns, forms of address, and nicknames. Names (including naming a child and choosing surnames in marriage) are cultural resources which are made sense of against the background of naming practices in a community (Carbaugh, 1996). Titles mark people off in professional, institutional, and hierarchical relationships, and how these are used in address can signal closeness and distance (Fitch, 1998). Pronouns and other naming terms that associated with groups of people are one way of doing membership categorization (Sacks, 1992). Nicknames and diminutives offer particular coded ways of signaling special, intimate relationships with others, and are often used in rule-governed ways (Mehrabian, 2001).

According to speech code theory, a code is a principle governing what, how, and when to speak in certain ways in a given community. Speech communities will have multiple and often distinctive codes which are assessed by members and guided by a particular psychology, sociology and rhetoric. The premises of a code are woven into the speech itself. Communities assess the meanings of codes, and codes impact social life in meaningful ways (Griffin, 2008; Miller, 2005; Philipsen, 1997). Codes are very similar to ideology (or perhaps language ideology—Blommaert, 1999) and contain many different kinds of practices.

Rituals involve particular styles and patterns of communication for achieving particular purposes, and can be quite simple, for example, saying “sorry” as a way of restoring interactional balance rather than as an apology (Tannen, 1995). A ritual discussed in the previous section involved criticism. Rituals govern how communication is delivered and the subsequent unfolding which results. Often rituals are stereotypical or at least common (consider for instance greetings and getting-to-know-you talk). Rituals can also be complex and institutionalized. Weddings, for instance, are essentially a communication ritual in which the declaration of a certain kind of
person transforms, legalizes and publicizes two other people’s relationship (from unmarried to married) (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2002).

Socialization is a cultural practice which has briefly been mentioned before. Socialization is a way to model for others the forms of participation which will make them welcome, legitimate, “normal” members of their society. This can include language, nonverbal communication, speech codes, rituals, and any other practice which has been described (Ervin-Tripp, 1964; Ochs, 1993, 2001). Norms, customs and ideologies are inculcated through the teachings, often implicit, of how to be a moral member of society. It is a process, however, which can lead to any number of outcomes, is incredibly complex, and involves the influence of many different kind of people, situations, and setting within a community (Parsons & Bales, 1956). Through socialization (or “sociation”), people come to see and enact themselves as members of a society (Simmel, 1953).

These practices, as well as the others mentioned throughout the last few sections, are not for example “cultural not ideological.” As mentioned throughout this chapter, all of the practices described could be labeled as intersubjective, intimate, ideological, cultural. Indeed, practices within one “group” can be ways of doing another, or several others. Separating them has been part of the attempt to show what some of the research in a particular area has focused on, as well as the ways in which, in interaction, what otherwise might be called “variables,” “conditions” and “levels” of concepts are messy and interrelated.

This section focused on the cultural aspect of practice and morality with regard to interaction in close relationships, and so focused on practices most relevant to cultural research. Research in this area has not often linked looked at conflict (Jacquemet, 1999), even though morality and conflict in cultural context are probably concurrent enough to be practically
mutually constitutive. Next, I look at definitions of conflict morally, of morality through conflict, and of “moral conflict” to propose that difference, and its conflict implications, is a key component of morality as a discursive practice. The next section examines conflict as a relevant practice in moral interaction.

**Conflict: Confronting Morality**

This section reviews the concept of conflict as a key problem across the variety of approaches to morality in interaction previously discussed. In discussing conflict practices, then, I consider also the role of relationships, ideologies, and culture. This section begins by linking conflict to conflicted practices such as disagreement. I then cover major work which takes or contributes to work on conflict which is relevant to morality, primarily including interpersonal communication approaches and relational dialectics, work on moral conflict, argumentation pragmatics, and discourse studies. The section ends by considering examples of specific conflict practices and how they are morally implicative.

The last section discussed the importance of culture in moral practice. This section focuses on conflict, which is a form of interaction that makes visible the work people are doing with regard to intersubjectivity and ideology in intimate, culturally-contexted interactions. This section takes up a practice which is significant to morality, and which is itself intersubjective, intimate, ideological, and cultural: conflict. This section is about work which has focused on the ways in which interaction involves difference and conflict around moral issues, some of which has led to normative and critical approaches to communication research. This research falls under several areas of communication, particularly in defining conflict, and includes language and social interaction, rhetoric and argumentation, and group and interpersonal research. This section defines this conflict-based approach to morality, discusses its implications for a
communicative definition of morality, and argues why this concept of morality alone is insufficient.

Conflict and disagreement are sometimes used nearly interchangeably, but usually, conflict is considered to be more protracted and serious. In devising a scale for intrafamily conflict, Straus (1979) for instance notes that many conflict theorists use “conflict” to mean “conflict of interests,” in which the differences between people or groups of people often inevitably collide when they interact. Straus distinguishes this from “hostility,” marked by negative feelings that may be associated with conflicts of interest, and his focus of study, “conflict tactics,” which refer to the particular moves people use to deal with conflict. Though Straus does not discuss the difference between “conflict” and “disagreement,” his use of the terms indicates that “conflict” is more likely to involve hostility and to take place over time, while “disagreement” may be relatively bounded and involve little hostility.

Studies of conflict and communication grew rapidly after a 1972 Speech Communication Association (now the National Communication Association) conference on the topic. In her history and overview of the area, Putnam (2006) listed three key components that the many different definitions of conflict tend to share: interdependence between parties, incompatibility, and an expressed struggle. These align in part with the definition of morality developed herein (e.g., interdependence as relational commitment, incompatibility as difference). Researchers from different areas of communication treat each of these notions slightly differently. For instance, where do incompatibilities, or differences, come from? Are they individual, cultural? For this reason, “conflict” is a concept that is unpacked in a variety of ways across the field. Treating conflict in these different ways has led to a variety of conflict models, approaches and methods. In interpersonal communication research, studies of conflict will often consider, to
differing extents, people’s relationships, personal histories, perceptions toward/ideas about conflict, and aspects of identity (gender, culture) and their effect on conflict.

Conflict, of course, is not necessarily categorically “bad.” On the other hand, it is a pervasive issue of concern in all areas of communication, and no less for interpersonal relationships. Some of the most influential theories of communication—Uncertainty Reduction Theory, the Theory of Interpersonal Deception, Relational Dialectics Theory—are important to understanding how conflict arises, unfolds, resolves or remains in interpersonal relationships. Key research in interpersonal communication has considered how communication cycles can lead to destructive patterns of interpersonal behavior (Christensen, 1988); impacts of hurtful messages (Vangelisti, 1994); and various other aspects of what is called the “dark side” of communication, including abusive communication and “stalking” (e.g., Spitzberg, Nicastro & Cousins, 1998).

The first important consideration for understanding relational conflict is to consider the type of relationship in which it occurs. A large amount of work on conflict in relationships has been done regarding family communication. Medved (2004), for example, examines conflict in the context of work-family balance and ways in which people practically manage conflict in their lives. Romantic relationship and friendship research has investigated differences in conflict between romantic relationships at different stages and among different age groups, same-sex and cross-sex friendships, intergenerational friendships, and concerning cultural background (e.g., Zachilli, C. Hendrick & S. Hendrick, 2009; Zhang & Lin, 2009).

The communication environment is a crucial aspect of this research. As Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967) pointed out, dysfunctional communication in families is not the result of a single “trouble member” of the family, but is fundamentally entangled within the family as a
Ordinary patterns of communication are crucial in understanding how people deal with or around possibilities for conflict. Aspects of family life including the structure of the family and whether the family tends to address or avoid conflict influence how conflict occurs (Bradford & Barber, 2005). Morality is thus bound up in conflict situations, even through people’s beliefs about how to communicate in conflict, and how that affects communication in conflict situations (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002).

The idea that people have particular conflict orientations or “styles” is associated with work by Thomas and Killman (1974) and has been used in describing how individuals manage conflict in business and interpersonal situations. Based on continuous axes of “cooperativeness” and “assertiveness,” one’s placement (high to low) could pinpoint whether that person had a competing, avoiding, compromising, collaborating, or accommodating style. Based on a person’s style, and the compatibility of that style with the style of participants in the conflict, predictions could be made regarding how that conflict would be addressed (if at all) and how well or poorly it would play out.

Whether conflict is expressed or unexpressed is another important matter relevant to this project. Most of the data to be analyzed in later chapters do not feature overt conflict. Regardless, however, conflict does get “pointed to” and managed in different ways. According to Roloff and Soule (2002), unexpressed conflict exists when incompatibilities do not result in confrontation, but can still (and often do) have an impact on relationships. The process of conflict which unfolds over time may be attended to and ignored in an on-and-off manner, until there is a “quarrel” or the problematic event or behavior is discussed. Sometimes acknowledging the problem “escalates” the conflict; other times, the problem will come up again and again, depending on how it is dealt with each time. Expressing forgiveness is an important
communication action that can lead to conflict resolution (if temporary) in romantic relationships—when done well (Merolla, 2008). Narratives also are employed for making sense of conflict, giving accounts of conflict situations, or managing disagreement so as to keep it from becoming a full-blown conflict (Kjaerbeck, 2008).

According to Relational Dialectics Theory, contradictory impulses that can lead to conflict are a normal part of relationships, and cannot be resolved—only managed, or balanced (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996). It is when this managing goes astray that relationships can run into conflict, for example, over competing desires for independence and intimacy between romantic partners. The polarization of these desires can lead couples to see themselves as significantly “different” and can contribute to increased conflict and, eventually, the decline of the relationship (Baxter & West, 2003). This captures a key point about conflict and morality: differing moral inclinations or values will often be a part of conflict, what Roloff and Soule (2002) refer to as “principled conflict.”

This idea of “principled conflict” is similar to Pearce and Littlejohn’s (1997) “moral conflict.” Moral conflict is conflict about ideologies or fundamental beliefs which differ in often intractable ways between social groups. Pearce and Littlejohn take a practical theoretical approach to moral conflict by seeking to develop forms of communication for dealing with this kind of conflict. These moral and practical angles on conflict demonstrate overlap between Pearce and Littlejohn’s project and this one, but not as much as would initially appear to be the case. Their practical approach is not, for instance, grounded in empirical interactions, but devised in response to large-scale case studies of conflicts glossed as “culture wars” (p. 10), “the 1992 gay rights battles” (p. 14) or “the divorce mediation of Jane and Roy” (p. 19). Furthermore, the
identification of something as a moral conflict is assessed by the analyst based on examples of apparently irreconcilable and fundamental differences of belief.

The current project, however, takes seriously the view of Tracy and Muller (2001) that an analyst’s naming of a problem organizes a scene in different ways from participants’ problem-namings, and in fact both of these could potentially be different from the problems which participants orient to in their interactions. For Pearce and Littlejohn (1997), moral conflict involves incommensurate moral orders. Moral orders are produced in discourse, but reflect rather than construct their ideological foundations. Moral orders have their own ideologies of conflict which only work within their own order, leading efforts to seek common ground destined to fail (Freeman, Littlejohn & Pearce, 1992).

Pearce and Littlejohn (1997) seem to largely see moral conflict as misunderstanding, or even a problem of translation. For example, the authors’ list for how to see a moral conflict relies on objective criteria, i.e., where interactants use “the same vocabulary but mean different things by it” (p. 68). Firstly, the focus is communicative, but the task of the analyst is to discover what a group means when it says “honor,” rather than what “honor” means for a group in an interactional moment. Secondly, the ways in which people rhetorically “misunderstand” one another is not considered. And because Pearce and Littlejohn are looking at larger-scale conflicts, their unit of analysis is larger and necessarily occludes the fits and starts of local ordinary interactions and their ideological sense-making.

Conflict that take on this more heavy social significance of Pearce and Littlejohn’s (1997) “moral conflict” involves the presence of arguments, as do everyday conflicts. “Arguments” are a key characterization of and practice for conflict. Argument pragmatics scholars study argument in an interactional rather than classic formal sense, though many have
retained more classical vocabularies to different extents. Walton (1995), for example, has done numerous works on ordinary argumentation, grounding arguments in examples of people’s interactions rather than in logical form. According to Walton, analyzing arguments should be based on people’s commitments to particular views rather than looking on the basis of conforming to logical presentation (Walton & Krabbe, 1995). For this reason, possible occurrences in argument that are usually ignored or criticized are seen by Walton as normal and even positive aspects of the argument process. Such aspects of argument include fallacies (1995) and emotion (1992).

The Amsterdam school headed by van Eemeren (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 1987) also considers arguments from a more pragmatic perspective. Their normative model of discourse, rather than being based on logic, is based on an ideal “critical discussion,” which has its own rules for interaction. These rules, however, are not based primarily in empirical instances of people as they argue in real life. Others argumentation pragmatics scholars such as Jackson and Jacobs (e.g. 1981, 1982, 1989) take a closer look at discourse, starting there rather than with models to determine whether interaction is indeed an argument.

Discourse studies of conflict look for features of conflict talk in interaction. Giving dispreferred responses, for instance, is a particularly conversation analytic approach. Other sociolinguistic approaches include how people index disagreement, disalign from each other’s stances, disaffiliate from each other’s identities, and diverge in communicative style (Grimshaw, 1990; Bailey, 2000a). Accounts (Antaki, 1994), complaints (Dersley & Wootton, 2001), opposition markers (Kuo, 1992), assessments (Schiffrin, 1985) and responses to assessments (Pomerantz, 1984) can be used to do conflict.
Schiffrin referred to everyday argument as “the organization of diversity in talk” in the title of her 1985 article. Conflict is the most explicit moral practice for managing difference. Conflict often reveals (or involves strategic revelations of) disputants’ maneuvers. Metadiscourse in conflicts, or what Jacquemet (1999) calls “metapragmatic attacks,” are performative ways of calling out others’ strategies (i.e., “don’t use that tone with me” p. 43). By serving this potentially unmasking function, conflict can do serious damage, but can also serve to stimulate reflection on critical issues.

Conflict is a regular feature of concern for communicators and scholars of communication. According to several scholars, “conflict” is becoming more and more relevant in modern society, attributed varyingly to greater diversity, scarce resources, more needs to cooperate globally, sometimes all of these things (e.g. Ayim, 1997; Deetz, 1992, 1994; Littlejohn & Domenici, 2007; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997). Whether or not that is the case, it is certainly taken to be the case, even for people in their everyday lives, that the world is changing and somehow, this change makes conflicts and attendant moral considerations more difficult to deal with, and more consequential. The consequentiality of interaction and the role of difference in formulating moral stances and dealing with conflict is just as important, and more immediately crucial, for people in close relationships.

Conflict, though formulated here and in much of the literature as a “problem,” is not inherently negative or bad. It is problematic insofar as it is delicate, difficult, and potentially harmful. As Simmel (1904) pointed out, conflict is the process of confronting tensions and seeking to resolve them, and is a necessary and unavoidable social practice that in theory can reestablish unity. For Simmel, then, it is the causes of conflict that are most troubling. The idea of conflict as the working out of contradictions and differences is fundamental to the current
work. However, there are two departures: (1) from a discourse analytic approach, conflict is
interactionally achieved through the display of acts which can later be said to have caused, or
represent the causes of, the conflict; and (2) as mentioned by Baxter (2007) such contradictions
cannot ever really be resolved. Conflict is certainly a working-out and a managing-of, but not an
answer to difference. Sometimes—in some contexts, perhaps often—conflict exacerbates
differences, or is a way of doing so.

As has been indicated in this section so far, moral ideas and conflict situations go hand-
in-hand. Morality is made relevant by the possibilities and occurrences of conflict. And conflict
is relevant in the attention that is paid to morality. Thus, any empirical grounding of morality
must be prepared to confront participants’ indexings of notions of conflict potential, and any
study of participants’ conflict interactions will deal to some extent with concepts and invocations
of morality.

There are many potential practices implicated by research within the conflict perspective.
In this section I will discuss briefly the concepts of conflict, argument, disagreement, and
dispreference. I will then discuss how they are relevant to my analyses, and definitions and
examples of them will be provided in the vocabulary section. The first thing to note is that
because the moral practices discussed in the previous sections involve conflict, and can also
accomplish conflict, some of them will be mentioned here again as moral practices for doing
conflict and conflict-relevant activities, such as disagreement.

Certain ways of speaking, including speech acts, characterize conflict for interpersonal
research as well as in language and social interaction. “Criticizing” seems to be a key practice in
causing or creating conflict (Zhang & Lin, 2009). Displays of contempt, defensiveness, and
withdrawing also create, maintain, or worsen conflict situations in relationships (Gottman, 1994). This points out another critical point of inquiry regarding how communication expresses conflict.

   Emotional expression is another practice for doing conflict. Conflict is marked by negative emotionality displays, such as hostility, disappointment or negative evaluations of others’ personalities or behavior. As Simmel (1953) has noted, antagonism and hostility are primary components of conflict. These are part of the experience of conflict as a “struggle.” How people express emotions leading up to or within conflict situations, especially showing anger, is memorable, accountable, and consequential for the people in the relationship. Expressions of anger affect retrospective narratives of conflict, shape how the conflict unfolds, and make important impressions on the relationship itself, especially when such expressions develop into patterns over time (Clark & Phares, 2004). How couples interpret the emotional state of their interactions is a strong predictor of relationship satisfaction (Flora & Segrin, 2000). Emotional expression can also become a source of conflict itself, with serious and generally negative results for relationships especially when partners’ attitudes toward emotional expression are not congruent (Mongrain & Vettese, 2003). All of these actions have moral implications and relational consequences, and are part of how conflict is achieved between people. This also applies to work on communication strategies people have for addressing, avoiding, engaging, and managing conflict.

   Accounting is another practice which is involved in conflict. Accounting is related to the ways in which people frame their conflicts and attribute blame, guilt and forgiveness for relational problems. Accounting literature in interpersonal research has taken a number of different tacks. Narratives, for example, are way in which people give accounts for their and others’ actions. The stories people tell about conflict situations—who was responsible for what,
why things unfolded as they did—are part of the ways in which people make moral attributions to the various players in a drama and make sense of their social world (Orbuch, 1997; White, 1980). Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1995), for instance, found that narratives about guilt, specifically regarding relational transgressions and subsequent actions of apologizing, confessing, and recognizing value differences, were related to maintaining a close relationship following a serious moral conflict episode, such as cheating.

In addition to the role of giving accounts and how those accounts impact relationships, the role of accounts as interpretations, and which are themselves interpreted by others, is also important. Baumeister, Stillwell and Wotman (1990) discussed the role of accounts in providing different subjective interpretations of the same offense episode based from the perspective of the offender and the offended. They found that the role of anger, and the reasons people attributed to it, were an important part of how people made sense of conflict situations: who behaved unreasonably, who behaved reasonably, where the fault for the situation lay, and why things happened as they did.

People may not use the word “conflict” to describe their ordinary interactions. This points to the occurrence of metadiscourse as a moral practice for conflict. Other common words would be “fight,” or even “quarrel” or “argument.” The lay meanings of these terms seem to have similarities to the notion of “conflict,” involving the criteria of consequentiality and negative emotions. I will mean these when I use the word “conflict.”

Conflicts involve argument practices. Jackson and Jacobs (1981, 1982, 1989) draw on speech act theory to characterize sequences of argument based on the social function or interactional purpose of the argument. Brockriede (1975) defines “argument” as an interactional process in which participants engage in reason-giving for particular perspectives they have. In
order for their argument to be coherent, the perspectives must be different enough to disagree about, but should not be so vastly different that there is no common ground from which to talk about them. The perspectives should also not be obvious: there should be something worth arguing about, that requires persuasion and reason-giving, and cannot be solved merely by looking up the information online or finding some bit of empirical evidence. In other words, people argue about things that are interpretable.

Not all conflict involves an argument. Arguments can involve an engagement with conflict, but sometimes conflict happens precisely because people do not really “argue” about what is going on. Conflict is a more long term and complex practice characterized, sometimes, by arguments, but more generally by a collection of social actions that involve processes that take place over time and between people with relationships, and which involve difference and emotion. This definition points out multiple communicative aspects of conflict, and is consistent with conversation analytic (Stivers, 2008), sociolinguistic (Grimshaw, 1990), and various discourse approaches toward conflict and communication.

In addition to arguments, disagreements can also be a moral practice for conflict. Conflicted social actions are composed in part, for example, of disagreements about certain things which are explicitly oriented to in talk (for example, disagreements about what to do in a certain situation; disagreements with another person’s opinion; etc.). Disagreements often involve the topic or content of conversation, while dispreferred and disaligning practices focus on the actions of conversation.

The concepts of alignment and affiliation come out of the conversation analytic tradition and are ways of focusing on the talk-in-interaction rather than the researcher’s interpretation of there being a “disagreement” at play. Alignment is a similar concept to preference, and refers to
the way in which utterances are sequentially required or projected by the actions of prior utterances. Affiliation covers the more socially-inflected notion of agreement in talk, and refers to whether participants take the same perspective or stance as a co-participant (Stivers, 2008). Disagreement and dispreference could be categorizable as conflict if participants oriented to it as such. This orientation could be accomplished explicitly (if one or more participants name their interaction as a conflict) or implicitly (if one or more participants treat series of disagreements as part of a coherent problem, as consequential for their relation, as needing to be addressed, as negatively marked in meaningful ways). Bailey (2000a) discusses how divergence in styles of talk, which involve disalignment and dispreference if not content disagreement, can accomplish social conflict between different ethnic groups over time.

Conflict emerges as a potential theme throughout the analyses in this work. For the most part, conflict does not begin as a major issue in the beginning chapters, though problems, troubles and dilemmas are pointed out as being possible conflict markers or instantiators. However, each chapter subsequently demonstrates how conflict becomes more and more of an issue for moral practices: its cause, enactment, and constitutive partner, difference, are all components of moral discursive practice. Chapter eight develops the theme of conflict most explicitly by looking at divergent or disaffiliation practices as moral discursive practices, and their creation of conflict in a family over time.

Based on this approach, morality is deeply tied to difference and the conflict implications of difference. This builds on the previous approaches. First, the prospect of difference lurks behind the interactional and intersubjective expectations of proto-morality. Interactional violations done in error indicate a lack of sharedness regarding being present in the moment, paying attention, knowing the appropriate responses, engaging in a common system of
expectations, etc. Interactional violations done deliberately indicate knowing the basis of sharedness, but intentionally displaying difference. Second, difference characterizes intimacy, both in the tensions between closeness and independence, and in the expected ways of demonstrating love, affection and support of others. Third, difference is marked in the ideological approach. Intercultural encounters are assumed in some part to involve ideological differences and their interactional instantiations, for example, when cutting someone off in an argument signals indifference to hearing, and disagreement with, the other’s view. Fourth, difference exists within culture but is particularly marked between what might be called “national cultures,” as when sustained eye-contact can mean respect in the U.S., and disrespect in Japan.

It does not seem to be the case that difference is in some way a side issue to morality. One could say, for example, that difference only matters where people do not share moral orientations; or that morality can be shared, or unshared. But I propose that to take this line is to ignore the possible omnirelevance of difference. Difference exists because no one is the “same”—not even when they share a close relationship, live in the same cultural context, were raised in the same house or even developed in the same womb. Thus, even “sharedness” or similarity is interactionally achieved amidst a backdrop of differences, some of which are explicit (as in intercultural encounters) and some of which are implicit (as in a culture which appears relatively homogenous). This is not to say that morality is always negative, but rather, that morality is always fraught: it is effortful, significant, and worked out discursively in complex ways as people deal with the potential conflict implications of their potential differences.
Scholarship in communication which looks at conflict or related concepts does not always contain a critical or ethical orientation, but clearly the importance and consequence of conflict in human life often involves these perspectives. Earlier in this chapter I distinguished ethics from morality—morality is a name for invocations involved in the doing of ethics, which here refers to a more explicit and organized system of right and wrong action. I am not in this work trying to be critical, that is to say, determine when people are doing morality “wrong” or in such a way that disadvantages others—though of course doing morality can accomplish such results. I am also not developing an ethics of communication, or an institutionalized way in which practices should be done.

Instead, my stance is more gently normative. My aim is that by discussing the key problems of morality, grounded in empirical work and tested among many cases, one can also develop an understanding of morality in interaction which may be practically useful in understanding when it is relevant, how people are doing it, what problems are involved, and how people might work to address them. In doing so, a practical theory of moral communication can be developed—a means not of defining one theory of moral communication, but of devising what an ideal of moral communication would mean or involve for participants in close relationships in a variety of different contexts.

This section reviewed approaches and practices for accomplishing conflict in interpersonal relationships. Over the course of the last few sections of this chapter, I have discussed the kinds of problems and their practices which are particularly relevant to looking at morality as an interactional practice. The next section lists some of the practices described in these sections and provides an example of how they are worked out in discourse.

A Vocabulary of Moral Practices
Morality is a practice which can be accomplished through many practices. This section categorizes types of moral practice and describes how they are enacted and why (or under what circumstances) they are moral, given literature discussed in the previous sections. The dividing up of these practices is not meant to imply that they are discrete or separate from one another, but is an attempt to discuss what about each set of practices is slightly different in how it accomplishes interactional moralities. Prior research on these practices is described above; here, I provide a working definition for analysis and give empirical examples of the practices in action. These practices cut across accomplishments of intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture or conflict. Participants will use whatever resources and practices available to enact and confront the morally implicative situations in which they find themselves.

Under the purview of the concept of morality developed and employed here, these practices accomplish morality proper if they can be shown to (1) be grounded in the enactment of relational commitment (morality matters to the shared identity of the people, and vice versa), (2) invoke and instantiate ideological orientations (significant ideas about what is right or wrong), and (3) encounter the prospect of difference in ideological orientations (in needing to confront interactional dilemmas and tensions which are the local ways of accomplishing the ideology). As mentioned above, these practices are not easily separable, and all can involve ways of doing intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict.

**Interactions.** There is a set of moral practices which are observed in the proto-morality approach and which constitute the foundation of interaction—the particular rules of turn-taking, adjacency and preference which create and maintain the orderliness of interaction. Here I give some examples of how these practices unfold in ordinary conversations.
I define these terms in the conversation analytic sense described earlier in this chapter.

This example demonstrates these concepts in practice:

[fam.evts96.15.E3.2]

Sam: You look pretty gramma
Gramma: What
Sam: Your robe’s pretty
Gramma: I dressed up for thanksgiving ((laughs))
Sam: I didn’t [know (that’s) ( )]
JR: [is this your ] dressy robe?
Gramma: ((laughs)) (1.0) yes I’m dressed up

The participants here—Gramma and her two granddaughters—converse in an organized fashion, with each person taking a turn one after the other. The only instance in which this does not occur is toward the end, when JR overlaps with Sam. Sam’s initiation of “I didn’t” projects more to come, and thus JR’s entrance with her own utterance, as well as the fact that she doesn’t repair and stop speaking, is a violation of turn-taking, though it does not appear to cause trouble. As mentioned in a previous section, overlap can signal closeness. Though what is being overlapped was not transcribable, it could very well be that the overlapper anticipated and is rephrasing or choralizing the overlapped utterance rather than blocking it out.

The adjacency between each utterance is part of what explains why this conversation makes sense. When Gramma says “what,” it is a request for a repeat; thus, “your robe’s pretty” can be heard as a reformulation of “you look pretty gramma.” Preference is heeded here as well. “Is this your dressy robe?” prefers a yes/no answer (it seeks confirmation or disconfirmation). Interestingly, there is laughter and a pause before Gramma’s response, which could indicate a dispreferred response, but here it turns out to be preferred.

Interestingly in this case, and in many of the cases looked at in the analysis, there is a bit of cultural context here which adds a “teasing” meaning. “Robes” are generally not considered
“dressy” or “dressed up,” and even calling a robe “pretty” sounds less straightforwardly a compliment when given in the context of Thanksgiving, which may be taken to be a more formal occasion. Thus, the use of concepts such as turn-taking, adjacency and preference will be joined also with styles of analysis which are not solely relegated to constructing structural actions.

This interaction can potentially be moral. Participating in complimenting can be a way of constructing the goodness of someone’s identity. On the other hand, the compliment here is about a garment and seems to be teasing. The relationship constructed between granddaughters and grandmother indicates a kind of closeness that is informal. “Respect” is not conveyed in ways that would be culturally appropriate in other kinds of relationships. The possibility for a difference of meaning (that the compliment, rather than teasing, could be sarcastic or insulting) is assuaged by Gramma’s willingness to play along and both (1) accept the compliment while (2) carrying on the joke.

**Judgment rituals.** Perhaps the most pervasive of moral practices involves serious judgments of persons and their actions. The evaluation of a painting as a good or bad work of art would not necessarily constitute a moral judgment, while the distinction between an honest person and a liar more probably would. Narratives are an example of a practice that can do judgment, for instance, in a story in which someone blames another for a tragic occurrence. Thus, narrative also accomplishes speech acts, such as blaming, and blaming is also a kind of assessment. The example below demonstrates the unfolding of an assessment as a means of judging someone’s identity as inappropriate.

[fam.frn.jul08.1.E1.1(audio)]

| JR: | Peter’s mom is a bit of a fashion plate |
| Raymond: | aw I know poor Peter |
| JR: | high heels in London, what is she thinking? |
| Raymond: | poor Peter |
In this exchange, JR and Raymond make negative assessments of Peter’s mother, who is more than 50 years old, but does not necessarily act or dress like a typical 50-year-old or a typical mother. They express regret for Peter and evaluate what mothers “should” be like. After this exchange, they cite more evidence related to Peter’s mother’s actions as negative, complaining about how she “squeezes her body into tight jeans,” “tries to look like a 20-year-old” and is “not comfortable with herself and her age.” In doing so, they reveal some of their own assumptions about what is expected, typical, and preferred for women of a certain age range and with certain roles (such as “being a mother”). Thus, expressions of morality are a way of getting at what people’s unstated assumptions about the social world are—the assessments made in this exchange are cultural ones. Notice also that the interactants demonstrate convergence to show how they affiliate with one another’s assessments. They converge on the topic (with preferences for agreement such as “I’m” and “what is she thinking?” as well as the “I know” and “yeah”s). But they also converge in style, which is noticeable at the end when JR begins by using the U.S. English diminutive for “mother” (mom) then switches to the British English form (mum) after Raymond uses it, in fact repeating the adjective as a whole (mumly).

Accounts are another practice which involve judgment. Pursuing an account is a way of invoking judgment against the apparently accountable person, and giving accounts often involves accepting or challenging the basis of the account. Accounts can also conflict, do facework, and cause quarrelling, as in the following example (1):
Ellen: Whenever he used to feel like getting his rocks off a little bit because he felt depressed with his own situation he would say to me “you’re a nothing, you’re a nobody, all you are is a waitress, that’s all you’re ever gone be”

Marshall: and wouldn’t that prod you into action? I did that as a teacher

Ellen: oh come on!

Marshall: to prod you into action

Ellen: that was cruel behavior!

In the Ellen/Marshall example, Ellen relates a regular occurrence about something her ex-boyfriend, Marshall, used to say to her. However, Marshall offers a different explanation for the situation, implying it was done for different reasons and thus should be interpreted differently from how she presents it. Specifically, there is a contrast between the action, which is framed by Ellen as “cruel behavior” while Marshall frames it as being to “prod” her into action “as a teacher.” This also shows how a narrative can be used to frame Ellen as the victim of Marshall’s immoral behavior.

Complaints and criticisms are other ways of doing judgment that involve different assessments. They can also be accomplished by narrative. Other more complex ways of doing judgment include status degradation ceremonies and gossip. Status degradation discounts a person’s total identity or “character” identity, and is usually a formal, public affair. More relevant to the analyses of this work is gossip, which is a more informal, private way of degrading someone, as in the following example:

[frn.assigs09.2.E2.2]

Anna: do you remember Katie
Julie: oh yeah
Anna: did you know she’s pregnant now
Julie: oh nuh uh!
Anna: yeah my brother saw it on Facebook. That’s funny
Julie: well so she sees it as something to brag about or I mean, a good thing
Anna: she’s not married
Julie: ohhhhh wow
Here, Anna and Julie discuss the possibly discreditable action of someone they knew from high school, who is now pregnant. In another situation, such sharing of information could constitute a positive or celebratory ritual. This possible meaning is revoked by comments such as “that’s funny” (whether in reference to the pregnancy or the fact that it was announced on Facebook is unclear), “something to brag about” and “she’s not married.” These comments cast a negative pall on the information: “that’s funny” indicating that something is odd or inappropriate about the news; “something to brag about” indicating that it perhaps is not braggable, since “bragging” is considered self-aggrandizing activity; and “she’s not married” cueing cultural expectations for what is considered normal conditions for a happy pregnancy.

**Demonstrations.** This category refers to the generic, stylistic, and ritualized means of doing morality which may be apart from, concomitant with, or in opposition to the particular rituals of talk otherwise employed. As with all of these categories, they are not distinct, but refer to a different manner of moral achievement.

Politeness, for example, refers to accepted styles of talking that are considered more formal and face-attentive. To conform to politeness is a cultural and situational activity which can be a positive moral practice in some cases (for instance, a job interview) and a negative one in others (for instance, between lovers, where it would be seen as distancing). Impoliteness, also, can be more or less appropriate. In this example from a meeting of the British Parliament House of Lords (2), for instance, it is an institutionally accepted way of doing disagreement:

Lord B: Can he tell the house how the present shambles of an organization which runs our railway system will get back to the established practice?

In this instance, a member of the British House of Lords, addressing a governmental minister in the third person (“he”), asks for an account for a negative assessment of the country’s
railway system. The word “shambles” is highly negative, and Lord B’s requesting of an account of the minister positions the minister as responsible, making this a face-threatening, and thus impolite, move, yet one which is common in this context.

Emotional display is another way of doing morality, as well as for doing disagreement. Emotional displays involve a number of paralinguistic, verbal, and nonverbal stance indicators of person’s feelings or attitudes toward people, situations, etc. In the following example, the interactants display negative emotions toward each other:

[frn.assigs09.3.E1.1(audio)]

Matt: I came back, and started ripping the garage apart and there’s just way too much stuff in there so I tried to move the TV ((sigh)) that was in there which is way too heavy for me to move, and even though I was saying this is way too heavy for me to move, I decided to move it anyway, and of course, I broke it, and uh yah
Kelsey: ((laughs))
Matt: Is that funny?
Kelsey: Ha yup
Matt: Why’s it funny?
Kelsey: Because of course you’d break something that isn’t yours.
Matt: What is that supposed to mean?
Kelsey: That you aren’t careful with other people’s belongings.
Matt: That is completely untrue. I am more delicate with other people’s belongings than-
Kelsey: I can just see you getting really frustrated and (. ) pushing the TV carelessly
Matt: Well it was too heavy for me to lift, so I don’t know, I guess I’ll buy her a new one.
Kelsey: Moving on, how long did that take you?
Matt: Too long, an hour, two hours maybe. Went to work, packed and shipped some stuff, and then came to get you
Kelsey: Ya, you were kind of sassy
Matt I was not sassy. Maybe I was- I was sassy because you always call right when I’m on my way, or right after I say that I’m on my way, you call and see where I am. Like, I’m driving, in the snow.
Kelsey: Fine we don’t have to worry about it in the future because I have my own car, hmm
Matt: I know you do, but it’s like I dunno do you think it’s courteous to call somebody and check in on them every five minutes? I mean, don’t take it the wrong way.
Kelsey: You just took that to a whole other level. Screw you, I don’t want to talk about this
In this example, Matt and Kelsey state negative assessments of and toward one another, such as “you’re not careful with other people’s belongings,” “do you think it’s courteous to calls somebody and check in on them every five minutes,” and “screw you.” “Bad” language (such as the expletive “screw you”) upgrades the negative emotionality.

Humor is another practice for doing morality, one which can be highly effective, at least in the short term, in potentially conflicted situations, as in the one below:

[fam.jul08.1.E4.1]

Carl: I never get any ‘elp washing up
JR: mm
Jenny: wha- what ‘ave you done today Carl?
Carl: well-
Jenny: you haven’t done nothing today except talk to Peter talk to Roy Parker
Carl: I’ve been researchin on the internet all day. Sometimes it does- in fact it does take a lot of time

In this example, Carl complains about not getting help doing dishes, and Jenny immediately counter-challenges the complaint by hinting that Carl hasn’t done much today. Carl then relates what he has been doing all day, but it turns out that activity was “researching on the internet.” As this is blatantly not a good excuse, particularly in light of Jenny’s having been at work all day, it is meant to be taken as a joke. It also works to deflect Jenny’s criticism and shift the topic.

**Identity enactments.** This refers to moral practices which situate people in relation to others. This can also be accomplished by the other practices indicated, not just obvious ones such as intersubjectivity and gossip, but any action which is performed jointly between people in a relationship. Here, however, such practices can be analyzed as about identity and how identities must confront one another.
Identity positioning, for instance, is a practice which accomplishes identities in relation to other identities. The following example from the House of Lords, for instance, includes explicit references to institutional affiliations and identities in relation to one another:

Lord S: The noble Lord the Minister criticized the Conservatives for um uh privatizing the railways. And I agree with that. But he must be aware that the present government have had 12 years to renationalize the uh railways as some of us uh uh suggested.

References to names, titles, political affiliations and time all position the speaking in relation to others in the room. Intersubjectivity is a more action-oriented way of moment-by-moment orientation toward particular other people. Intersubjectivity is about the recognition and deployment of identities—subjectivities—through interactive processes that achieve “common knowledge” or lapses of it. Intersubjectivity is in many ways the most basic of identity constructions because it is a way of doing mutual attention that is required before other, more complex ways of interrelating can occur. Intersubjectivity practices can include repairing misunderstanding, demonstrating attention, and speaking with various levels of context-dependence. Specific ways of doing intersubjectivity can involve verbal and nonverbal components, and even the use of the external world, and objects in it. In the next example, for instance, Carl uses his video camera to notice, engage and interact with other members of his family, one of whom contests Carl’s use of the device for engaging his attention:

\[ \text{fam.jul08.1.E3.1} \]

\begin{itemize}
  \item CARL: just interview Jeff- here Jeff
  \item JEFF: your flash is upsettin my daughter
  \item JR: ((laughs))
  \item CARL: (we’ll just interview) there’s no flash on this Jeff, flash is uh down uh- we’d just like to interview you
\end{itemize}

Carl uses his video camera and the format of an interview to pursue attention from Jeff, his son. Jeff, however, uses his infant daughter as a method of critiquing Jeff’s actions and trying
to avoid participating in the conversational project of a mock interview. Identities and object thus are invoked in service of managing interpersonal engagement through interactional participation. Person reference also serves as a way to communicate, for instance, Jeff refers to “my daughter” rather than calling her “Lizzy” or “your granddaughter” or “the baby.” By saying “my daughter” Jeff incorporates the affront into his own identity and is indignant on Lizzy’s behalf.

Facework is a practice that involves the efforts a person makes to protect the communicated value of one’s own, and other’s, faces, or performed identities. In the following example, an apparently accidental face-threat requires face-saving for another:

[frn.vis05.1.E2.2]

JR: your hair is like so gleaming and red
Jill: I dyed it- no I just dyed it brown!
JR: oh you did? I’m sorry
Jill: it’s not supposed to be red!
JR: it’s because of the sun. It does look darker
Christa: it’s not- it has more brownish undertones? I think
Jill: ((growls))
Christa: it’s not really that red

In this instance, the apparently complimentary action about Jill’s “gleaming red” hair turns out to be face-threatening when the other parties find out Jill has just dyed her hair brown. Both JR and Christa work to take back what they said and mitigate the error by attributing it to the sun and pointing out the “brownish undertones.” This facework supports Jill’s choice (dying her hair) and implicitly ratifies her desire not to have red hair. The immediate withdrawal of the mis-applied compliment and all of the work to downplay it also shows JR and Christa doing facework for themselves as “good friends.”

Relating involves practices which identify roles and relationships between people. Here, relating practices indicate some of the subtle ways in which people demonstrate their relationships to each other through positioning expectations with regard to household activities
and events. This activity is particularly salient because of an outsider’s presence (the author) and in fact, a household gripe is started as a topic through the presence of the researcher and her video camera:

[fam.jul08.1.E4.1]

Carl: you could video me washing up
JR: mmm
?: ( )
Carl: that’s the job I always get
JR: ohh
Jeff: ( ) not true
Carl: I never get any ‘elp washing up
JR: mm
Jenny: wha- what ‘ave you done today Carl?
Carl: well-
Jenny: you haven’t done nothing today except talk to Peter talk to Roy Parker
Carl: I’ve been researchin on the internet all day. Sometimes it does- in fact it does take a lot of time
Jenny: ((exaggerated yawn))
JR: mm
Jenny: exactly. ( )
Carl: and then I lie on the settee for maybe an hour. Or two?
((laughter))
Carl: well I have to get up cuz it gives me neck ache
Jenny: well that does it
Carl: well I’m saving meself cuz at the moment Jeff doesn’t need me to do his working. I’m working exclusively for Raymond
Jenny: on things that stick to the ceiling
Carl: yes ( )
JR: ((laughs))
((everyone looks up at some sticky red stuff on the ceiling))
Carl: ( ) you wanna stand on me shoulders ((to Raymond))
JR: ((laughs))
Carl: that’s twelve feet at the top. That is defying one of the laws
Jeff: which one’s that?
Carl: that what goes up must come down

Everyone present in the interaction is structurally related, if you will, by birth or marriage, except for JR. The primary interlocutors in this exchange are Carl and Jenny, who are married, and Jeff, their son (their other son, Raymond, is also present, but doesn’t speak here). It
would be a lot to ask that such specific relational ties be indicated by a single exchange, but what
does this exchange say about the participants’ relational identities? First off, there is the
complaint about “washing up” (doing the dishes). This is a complaint that only makes sense
between people who live together. Not necessarily a solely familial “role,” it arises whenever
people live together, as with roommates. Here, the complaint is challenged by Jenny when she
asks Carl what he’s done all day. The implication is that he probably has not done much, and
thus doing dishes would not be much to ask. Jenny seems to be familiar with Carl’s schedule (or
lack thereof), and Carl confirms this, adding to the intimacy between the living-together
participants (as roommates are not always familiar with each other’s schedules). This is
strengthened by Jenny’s references to exactly what Carl has been doing all day (talking on the
phone) and her mention, by name, of two people with whom Carl has spoken. As this
information is not elaborated or marked, it shows more common knowledge between Jenny and
Carl than usually exists between “mere” roommates—upgrading the relationship possibly to
“friendly roommates.”

It is how these utterances get done that indicates a stronger bond between Jenny and Carl.
Carl’s initial complaint is indirect, passed through JR as a general comment that anyone in the
room might respond to. That Jenny responds rather than anyone else indicates a stronger
commitment on her behalf to the activity of doing dishes—who does them, how that is decided,
and the consequences of it having been decided poorly. Imagine, for instance, if one of their sons
had responded. Jenny took the comment as directed toward her because she is in some sense
responsible for household activities such as “doing dishes/washing up” in ways that her sons are
not. Her choice to respond directly to Carl as if he had addressed her simultaneously goes to the
heart of the unspoken nature of the complaint (“why do I always have to do the dishes/why does
nobody help me do the dishes”) and provides a good reason for Carl to be expected to do dishes. Since she asks what he has done all day (implying and later stating, to effect, nothing), she indicates by contrast that she has been doing something.

There are some odd elements to this exchange that would, of course, bear more looking into, because they seem to violate some expectations. For instance, in some sense the traditional roles in this situation are reversed. Without information such as names and gender, one might gather that Jenny was the husband (out working all day) and Carl a sort of housewife (on the phone and internet all day). And based on Carl’s references to “working for” Jeff and Raymond, one might think his relation to them was one of business rather than family. This demonstrates that relationships are enacted over many scenes, and are hard to pinpoint in single instances. Still we can see a picture forming of how these people are related based on their interactional commitments, relational expectations, and shared knowledge with one another.

**Language and metadiscourse.** This last category is particularly encompassing because depending on definitions, it can refer to many of the concepts already referenced. Here, I focus on the way in which words are used, referenced, and commented on in a variety of ways.

The use of particular “loaded” or “taboo” words can invoke or topicalize morality in different ways. In the following example, a formulation involving the term “gays” is treated as notable.

[frn.hol08.2.E1.1(audio)]

Carrie: so I have a question before you start on that, is- when they have the uh- uh gays take over bar night? I dunno. What it’s called. Um
Jane: ((laughs)) It’s usually called Night Out ((laughing)) ( )
Carrie: yeah something like that um is it just the men who go? Or do lesbians go too
Mary: I think it depends on what sort of like uh
Jane: to generalize lesbians don’t go out. Once they’ve partnered ((laughter))
In this example, a group of four young women, some who would self-identify as gay/lesbian and some who would not, have been discussing being a “closeted” gay person as being a possible reason for bad poetry. The topic was about to shift to other complaints about the young man in question (already identified as definitely a bad poet, possibly gay) when Carrie made this segue regarding the “Night Out” phenomenon. Though the talk of these women is often peppered with sexually explicit dialogue and detailed discussions of various persons’ sexuality and/or sexual activities, Carrie’s phrasing of “gays take over the bar night” is not automatically oriented to as either clearly problematic, or clearly not.

In another setting, for example, “gay” might always be seen as a word to be avoided. Certainly that is not the case here. And yet, something about its use seems odd. Jane comments on this oddness by, after a pause, laughing, and then formulating the “official” name of the phenomenon. Throughout the exchange, until Jane’s second comment about lesbians not going out, Carrie treats the topic of conversation as a serious one. Thus, her formulation of “gays take over the bar night,” while sounding like it should be joke-y, is not presented with a joking tone, accompanied by laughter, or treated ironically. It may be the case that because Carrie does not identify as lesbian, while Jane does, her ability to use the word “gay” in certain contexts needs to be marked more explicitly when the discourse-context of use could be taken as slightly insulting. That Carrie’s questions, too, treat Jane as “expert” in the realm of gay/lesbian activities could also have put the frame of this interaction on shaky ground. The slight discomfort is very short-lived, however, and once the joking frame reasserts itself, the problematic nature of the word “gay” as used in the utterance “taking over the bars” is diffused.

Metadiscourse involves a number of practices. Talk about talk, for instance, involves commenting on prior, future, or ongoing communication or particular utterances. The excerpt
below is an example in which the speaker, Jill, explicitly comments on her boyfriend’s talk in
telling a friend about a conversation she had with him:

[frn.calls08.3.E4.2(audio)]

JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said
that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took)
it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im

Here Jill’s comment contains both metadiscursive devices (reported speech) to make
implicit comments on her boyfriend’s talk (she presents his utterance in a “rude” tone of voice)
and more explicit talk about talk. In the quote, she paraphrases herself as commenting that “it
wasn’t very nice how you said that.” It is interesting to note that it is not just content being
referred to here (for instance if Jill had said “it wasn’t very nice what you said”), but the form or
style of her boyfriend’s questionable utterance is also negatively assessed.

Framing involves ways of implicitly and explicitly defining a situation and shaping the
interactional expectations within it. The following example, for instance, takes place in the
British Parliament’s House of Lords, and features some of the specific, almost ritualistic ways in
which members are expected to formulate their questions:

Earl A: My Lords, does the Minister agree that it would be madness to
engage in combat operations on land without appropriate air
cover?
Baroness T: Yes, My Lords.

References to “my Lords” and referring to the Minister (to whom he is speaking) in the
third person indicate the high formality of the situation. Such framings reinforce the institutional
norms of the situation, setting expectations about how people should act and what is appropriate.

Reported speech, or constructed dialogue, is another metadiscursive device which can
also accomplish framing and comment on talk, but does so through apparent “quotations.” The
following is an example of a conversation between two friends about California highways, and includes several examples of reported speech using a variety of quotatives:

[frn.vis05.1.E2.3]

JILL: I was like “where is 580”
JR: ((laughs))
JILL: No no no what is it- we- what’s the one we live on ss- 580, right? 780
JR: 780
JILL: Yeah I said “where is 780?” and he goes “uh, you live off of it” and I said “No”
JR: ((laughs))
JILL: “I don’t think that’s 780” and he was like “Jill it’s 780” and I was like “I- I’m pretty sure it’s not”

In this example, Jill moves from a past-tense non-standard quotative (was like) to a past-tense standard quotative (said), a present-tense non-standard quotative (goes), then back to said, followed by two examples of “was like.” Though reported speech can be used to “quote” imagined thoughts and hypothetical responses as well as things people probably did say, this instance seems to primarily construct approximated utterances from the prior conversation being described. This exchange also does facework—though not included in the excerpt above, the conversation began with JR not knowing where a particular freeway was. Though JR had been out of the country for a year, she was familiar with the area for many years. Jill’s immediate next turn, bringing up her own confusion despite not having left the area at all, thus saves JR’s face, in a way, by threatening her own (Tannen, 1999, suggested this “one down” kind of behavior as an equalizing practice associated with women’s communication).

**Conflicts and disagreement.** Conflict and disagreement practices can involve disagreement, dispreference, disalignment, and argument as well as many of the practices listed above. I treat “disagreement” mainly as referring to topical or content disagreement. For instance, the following disagreement is over what to call a particular item that Christa (CHRIS) received in the mail:
CHRIS: What were you saying about my Mexican rug?
VAL: Oh about when I came in and your- and your aunt and uncle had sent you an I Love Lucy blanket and you had it spread out on your floor “look at my new rug” like “that’s not a rug, that’s a blanket” you’re like “nuh uh”
CHRIS: ((laughs))
VAL: “Really for real? I thought it was a rug” “Man shut up”
CHRIS: I thought it was a Mexican rug.
VAL: “I thought it was a Mexican rug I thought my- my-my- relatives were just hella white trash”
CHRIS: ((laughs))
VAL: dude I’m like people don’t make rugs with I Love Lucy on it good lord
CHRIS: It looks like a rug
VAL: No. It doesn’t. Does it have backing on it? I don’t think so
CHRIS: Not all throw rugs have- oh
VAL: most of ‘em

In this example, the two parties experience a difference of opinion over what exactly is a “blanket” versus a “rug” and which is the more appropriate label for the gift Christa received from her aunt and uncle. One fleeting disagreement may not a conflict make, but several disagreements over time, or a disagreement that evolves into an extended quarrel, would count as conflict, as would disagreements that link up to conflicts in some way. The exchange above, with a bit of background knowledge of the participants’ relationship and prior interactions, may well be doing conflict. It also is at least in part jointly told, with Christa requesting the story and intermittently backing it up or disagreeing with it.

Dispreference refers to the concept of preference used in conversation analysis, in which the format of a response is not fitted to the original utterance. Disalignment refers to the work interlocutors do to separate their identities and opinions from one another, sometimes accomplished through disagreement or dispreference, but also through diverging styles of talk.
The following example highlights how disagreement, dispreference, and disalignment work together:

[frn.assigs09.4.E1.1(audio)]

Annie: if you’re a chick and you just don’t like your nose that’s retarded. Or, the other thing with-
Carl: well I don’t know. I wouldn’t say it’s retarded.

In the discussion about cosmetic surgery above, the interactants distinguished between “necessary” and “unnecessary” surgery. Annie’s first utterance prefers agreement structurally: she proffers an opinion, and in order to keep speaking, Carl should agree with her, especially as she has not been saying anything much different from what they had already agreed on. By not following with a positive continuer or something like a “yeah” or “go on,” Carl interrupts the sequence of actions. The format of his utterance is also dispreferred, as he doesn’t outright say “no,” but gives a mitigated lack of assent. Thus, Carl’s utterance is disaligned. However, this utterance also disaffiliates. Up until now, Carl and Annie had been largely in agreement on surgery, that some is necessary (for example, in injury) and some is unnecessary (for example, cosmetic surgery). But Carl disaffiliates from Annie’s use of the word “retarded” and this displays an opposing stance toward the topic.

Arguments are another practice for doing conflict. In this work argument will refer to a situated, multi-turn disagreement (which may also involve dispreference, disaffiliation, divergence) in which people challenge one another’s utterances/actions (assessments, complaints, etc.) regarding a substantive issue, topic, person, object, situation, etc. Arguments can involve an engagement with conflict, but sometimes conflict happens precisely because people do not really “argue” about what is going on. To return to a previous example, in the following conversation, argument does not seem to apply:
Kelsey: Fine we don’t have to worry about it in the future because I have my own car, hmm
Matt: I know you do, but it’s like I dunno do you think it’s courteous to call somebody and check in on them every five minutes? I mean, don’t take it the wrong way.
Kelsey: You just took that to a whole other level. Screw you, I don’t want to talk about this.

Kelsey’s decision to leave the conversation ends the possibility for argument: neither party addresses the issue or gives reasons for why they see it in different ways. However, there certainly seems to be a conflict going on, one that started before this particular instance, and is likely to come up again in the future. Thus arguments, like disagreements, disaffiliations and dispreferreds, are an important aspect of conflict, though while disagreement is a necessary criterion for conflict, argument is an option not all people will take. In fact, arguments were extremely rare in this project’s data.

**Implications, Questions, and Directions**

In chapter one, I outlined the approach and some guiding theoretical influences and assumptions in which this project is based. In this chapter I delved deeper into particular literatures to provide a background of, and foundation for, the continued study of morality. In doing so, this review suggested a particular way of conceptualizing morality, namely, that interaction is moral where participants engage in practices for dealing with intersubjective, intimate, ideological, cultural and conflictual dimensions of difference. This chapter also described some of the key research and practices associated with the communication activities for accomplishing intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture and conflict.

These troubles associated with morality as an interactional achievement and discursive practice are based on empirical analysis in response to the following questions: what problems are constructed, keyed or managed in order to constitute an interaction as “moral?” With what
practices do participants enact moral identities and situations? With what techniques do
participants respond to the problems of morality? Based on these questions of problems and
practices, the next chapter describes an analytic method for analyzing ways of constructing and
managing morality in interpersonal interaction.

1. From a documentary on anger
2. All three “House of Lords” examples are from Robles, 2011
Chapter 3

Morality in Interaction: A Discourse Analytic Method

This project seeks to bring a discourse analytic approach to interpersonal relationships. Grounded practical theory (GPT) provides the perspective within which this discourse analytic approach is employed. Based on GPT, problems and normative ideals should be grounded in empirical analysis of situated practices. In this project, the practices are those which involve morality—thus the problems and ideals revolve around how to do moral practice well. These practices are situated in the cultural, situational, and relational contexts within which people interact as intimates. The empirical analysis is undertaken through discourse analysis, which involves a specific kind of approach detailed in this chapter. That approach involves (1) a number of influences from different methods of doing analysis of interaction, (2) a particular way of conceptualizing practices and their situations, and (3) certain data and ways of representing that data.

This chapter describes a discourse analytic approach designed to tackle empirical data while drawing on the commitments and literature discussed in chapters one and two. In this section, I discuss ways of doing discourse analysis and how they inform and are modified in the approach this project employs. Following sections describe the research project, the participants, and the data. This chapter ends with a sample analysis demonstrating the importance of these data to the aim of the project, criteria for representing data and analysis, and a discussion of the analysis chapters to come.

Method

Almost all LSI approaches involve, to some extent, analyses of discourse. Discourse work that might fall under the LSI umbrella includes a wide range, but there are several
approaches which have become definite mainstays. These include conversation analysis, discursive psychology, action implicative discourse analysis, ethnography of communication, and critical discourse analysis (Cameron, 2001; Tracy, 2008a).

Conversation Analysis (CA) emerged out of Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology and is associated strongly with the Schegloff brand of CA which was developed among Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson in the sociology department at UCLA in the 1960s (Heritage, 1984; Schegloff, 2007). CA focuses on small details of talk represented in a transcript (notations developed by Jefferson) and sees the role of sequence organization as central to interaction and conversation. Discursive Psychology (DP) was developed by scholars in England (Potter, 1996) and has strands similar to CA as well as strands that are more critical. DP focuses on grounding psychological concepts in their instantiation in discourse. Action Implicative Discourse Analysis (AIDA) (Tracy, 1995, 2004, 2008b) is a methodological approach based in GPT (Craig & Tracy, 1995) which focuses on problems, offers rational reconstructions of participants’ practices, and presents a normative critique. Ethnography of Communication (EoC), out of anthropological influences and especially ethnography of speaking, joins ethnographic research with discourse analysis (Carbaugh, 2007; Tracy, 2008a). And Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) comprises interests analyzing features of language use to uncover the workings of power in ordinary, institutional and mediated discourse (Tracy, Martínez-Guillem, Robles & Casteline, 2011).

Many of these discourse analytic methods have influenced the method employed in the ensuing analysis chapters. Because the method of analysis described herein exists within the perspective of grounded practical theory, the practices, tenets and methodological implications of GPT are significant to the approach which this chapter lays out. GPT, as mentioned in chapter one, focuses on identifying problems, techniques, and ideals of practice (Craig & Tracy, 1995).
The focus on empirical analysis, participant sense-making, and practices are amenable in different ways to most forms of discourse analysis. However, not all methods of discourse analysis would focus on problems, make any normative moves, or study practice in the manner employed herein.

Influences and Modifications

The DA approach taken throughout the analysis chapters incorporates many different LSI analytic approaches. CA, for example, guides many of my transcription practices and vocabulary. It is often the initial way in which I approach data and begin to think about it. However, my use of CA is primarily ethnomethodological and discursive psychological because it (1) considers the importance of morality and the role of context, and (2) is interested in the way moral psychological concepts such as beliefs, attitudes and personality are invoked in talk. Furthermore, the understandings of turn-by-turn workings of sequential actions in talk provides the starting rather than ending point of most of the analyses in the following chapters. On the other hand, CA often focuses on the successful accomplishment of interaction rather than its problems, would look at “practices” in a different way, and would not be normative.

The most similar discourse approach to that which is employed herein is AIDA, which was developed alongside and to be consistent with GPT. My use of DA is highly influenced by AIDA, in part because of the link to GPT, but also because AIDA has dealt with a number of topics and issues related to my interests here. AIDA’s connection to EoC through being ethnographically inflected (while not engaging in classic “fieldwork”) lines up with my own use of discourse analysis so far. However, I do employ a stronger sense of ethnography involving more extensive on-site research and/or contextual research and interviews, as well as a more
culturally-focused approach. And AIDA’s evaluative approach, more normative than critical, is also relevant. Finally, the rhetorical perspective advanced by AIDA is similar to my own.

However, there are some important ways in which the approach in this project differs from AIDA, and this must be accounted for in a GPT framework. First, AIDA studies practices that are of a particular site and scale, for example, school board and city council meetings, 911-calls, legal oral arguments, etc. (Tracy, 1997, 2009a, 2009b; Tracy & Agne, 2002; Tracy & Anderson, 1999; Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001; Tracy & Dimock, 2004; Tracy & Durfy, 2007; Tracy & Naughton, 2007; Tracy & Tracy, 1998). Here, I study “morality” as a practice that has different variations with different attendant strategies. Second, AIDA favors institutional settings where practices are more explicitly defined. Here, I study loose sets of strategies that comprise an activity that crosses personal and institutional boundaries and for which there are no obvious or formal rules, guidelines or expectations. Third, AIDA’s GPT approach studies recognizable practices in defined sites that lend themselves well to normative reflection, indeed, analyzing and improving practices in such situations may already be done to some extent at the local level. My approach would study practices that are largely tacit and unnoticed, and thus could be difficult to reflect on or improve. I will respond to each of these differences in turn.

**Practice.** As mentioned in chapter one, Schatzki (1996) makes a distinction between dispersed and integrative practices. The latter are the kind AIDA typically looks at. The kinds studied in this work are dispersed. Moral practices are not tied to particular times and places, but take place in a variety of ways across situations. While “morality” itself implicates a coherent type of activity, it is also comprised of the “performances” (Schatzki, 1996), including sets of smaller, utterance-level practices, that hold its shape in a recognizable way. Such performance practices are of the kind I discussed at the end of the last chapter: things like reported speech and
accounting. These present cultural modes of doing interactional business which may be drawn on in troubled situations.

**Setting.** While AIDA tends to focus on institutional sites, the practices I look at span sites. Moral practices can occur in a number of arenas, and some of the examples I have given involve institutional sites. However, for this particular project, I am focusing on primarily non-institutional, often private settings (except in the broad sense of the word “institutional”—I agree with Garfinkel that social interaction is a moral institution in itself: Heritage, 2001). More specifically, I am focusing on the relationships between interactants, particularly close relationships, as part of the “situatedness” of interaction. The familiarity or strangeness, publicness or privateness of settings are interwoven with the relationality of the individuals in the setting and the sequences of utterances at play. Practices are thus relevant to many areas of life, including ones that are less organized. Furthermore, the “setting” like anything is situated in a cultural context, which is acknowledged but not necessarily a strong focal interest in AIDA scholarship.

**Reflection.** Schatzki (1996) notes that the more organized, integrative practices have explicit means of addressing performance: rules, expectations and guidelines. Dispersed practices, on the other hand, are performed under the guidance of largely tacit norms for understanding and doing. To some extent, this makes them harder to reflect on. There is no specific rule for how to do morality, so there is no way to freeze it for contemplation—no way to write it down, think about it, and think about reforming it—at least, not in the ordinary, moment-to-moment process of interaction. The goal of my project is to begin to specify some of these implicit means of doing a practice, expressly for the purpose of being able to reflect on and improve them.
Approach and Modes of Analysis

The discourse analytic approach taken in this project is influenced by a number of different LSI methods. Firstly, it seeks to be detailed and treat the structure of talk and symbolic actions as potentially important. Thus, CA is an important contributor to the transcription and analytic concepts used in analysis, particularly methods of CA which account for embodied or microethnographic details. Secondly, this approach seeks to consider participants’ treatment of relationships, attitudes, characters, content and ideas as relevant and significant to their actions. Thus, ethnomethodology, Sacks’s perspective, discursive psychology and the concerns of interpersonal communication research are influential to analysis. Thirdly, this approach seeks to ground talk in multiple contexts, including situations and cultural orientations. Thus, Goffman’s perspective and cultural approaches to communication are important to the analytical claims made herein. Fourthly, within the GPT perspective, this approach seeks to provide reconstructions of participant practices in a more generalizable or abstract way. Thus, analyses use AIDA’s approach to interpreting, naming, and describing practices and ideals not necessarily named or explicitly referenced in participant actions. This section describes in more detail how the analytic method employed herein plays out with regard to “what” is analyzed.

First, from the various perspectives associated with CA, interpersonal conversation is context-shaped and context-renewing: the setting itself does not construct interaction, rather, participants construct interaction which may be sensitive to the setting (Mandelbaum, 2008). CA perspectives focus on talk-intrinsic context rather than talk-extrinsic context. The link between context and talk must not be made solely by the analyst, but grounded in the actual sayings and doing of participants. To make the link as an analyst, or to ask the link of participants, would be to rely on mundane reasoning rather than empirically verifiable data (Mandelbaum, 1990). To
take seriously the worth of conversation as orderly and empirically analyzable data involves paying careful attention to participants actions, even ones which may seem very basic (such as taking turns to talk) or very small (such as the twitch of an eyebrow).

This perspective is compatible with Ervin-Tripp’s (1996) assertion that “context permeates language” (p. 21). That is, in one sense, context is “coded” in language in a noticeable way, in explicit references to, say, “this meeting.” However, Ervin-Tripp also emphasizes that context involves the background assumptions built into language, for instance, the relational information employed in uses of honorifics. Such context may be implicated more subtly and involve larger sequences of actions than typically attended to by CA approaches. So, second, the analyses employed herein take account of ways in which content or topics of talk, relational expectations of interlocutors, and assumptions about interpersonal attitudes may bear on interaction. This is not to say that such concerns are “outside” participant actions, but that they may be implicit or constructed in ways not easily observable. As Tracy (1998) notes, it is problematic to assume that text and context, or talk-intrinsic and talk-extrinsic features, are separable.

Garfinkel (1967) proposed that ethnomethodology’s task, as inherited from Schutz, involved treating the “morally necessary character of its [the societal member’s practical circumstances] background features as matters of theoretic interest” (p. 37). What was unnoticed—not readily available to participants, but not especially clear to sociologists either—were the background expectancies involved in people’s interpretations. Such interests did not always lead Garfinkel to supply detailed histories in his documentary methods—he saw all context as indexical, seeable through links to occasions and their activities in the moment—and yet, his work on particular cases such as that of the “intersexed” Agnes involved lengthy
descriptions of Agnes’s life story and relationships with others in order to make sense of her own accounts of self as authentically female.

Sacks (1992) too saw identities and relationships as potentially crucial components for making sense of discursive actions. His example “the baby cried; the mommy picked it up” demonstrates how person-references are organized based on their assumed relational identities. Interpersonal communication research has long seen relational components as crucial to understanding communication, and Ervin-Tripp (1996) noted that even syntax is grounded in interpersonal acts: the relationship between interlocutors provides the procedure for structuring utterances and their responses. Mandelbaum (1990) suggested that there are two orders of communication phenomena which provide objects of study: one focuses on known communicative structures such as turn-taking, and analyzes them in various situations; the other focuses on situations and looks at what is being done there, and how. This project focuses more on the latter while acknowledging that the former is a crucial part of understanding the “what and how.”

The scholarly practice of interpretation involves sophisticated, theoretically-informed versions of the same procedures used by participants. This inevitably involves some of what is known as “glossing.” A “gloss” is a sort of general account which involves backgrounded information. In participants’ talk, such information may be withheld, or may not need speaking. In analysis, such information should be proffered as part of an explanation. What is tricky, of course, is whether such information is accepted by different scholars as relevant or necessary to the explanation provided. The CA perspective solves this difficulty by restricting the scope of what is taken to be empirically relevant. Other perspectives, however, such as Goffman’s (e.g.,
1974) or that of the ethnography of communication, see situational or cultural components as crucial aspects of the empirical scene.

Third, then, certain elements of such “backgrounds” are discussed in analysis, both as ways of making sense of otherwise murky or minimally explicable participant actions, but also as a provision for understanding what possible contingencies for interaction may exist which are not readily analyzable. It is not suggested that such possibilities are always relevant, but only that they could be, and thus are included in order to “set the scene” with that which is empirically providable (certainly psychological states are relevant, but are often only empirically observable in the discourse itself, whereas cultural context is observable to participants and analysts through and alongside talk).

Though it may sound radical, drawing on cultural knowledge (even when it is not explicitly seeable in a conversation) has a long history even in classic CA analyses. In Jefferson’s (1985) discussion of how participants may investigate and “unpack” glossed accounts, she proposes—as an explanation for a speaker’s gloss of “laying down on the couch” for what later turns out to stand in for “in the bedroom sleeping” (p. 437)—that in the U.S. lying down on the couch signals a greater commitment to business at hand while sleeping in bed implies less commitment. This is not offered as fully explaining the gloss or its interrogation, but is suggested as a way of making sense of participant actions which seem to go against cooperativeness in conversation. The situational and cultural information discussed in the ensuing analyses is offered in a similar spirit.

This offer highlights the aim of analyzing such varied modes as talk, nonverbal communication, relationships, situations, and culture: the method of analysis is not meant primarily as a lens for describing actions, but as a means of reconstructing practices and
problems. Practices and problems are built up by, but not exhausted in, specific actions done in communication. And so fourth, from the perspective taken by a GPT approach such as AIDA, the analyst should provide an account of participant activities that will prove useful in reflection toward improving practice. The unit of analysis—the practice—is on par with communication events and should be recognizably meaningful to participants (Tracy, 2004). To label practices as “morality” is to suggest that morality is a useful name for describing set of actions participants do which cohere in a recognizable way.

Thus, the analyses employed hereafter bring many communicative modes together—details of talk and symbolic actions; spaces, environments and objects; relationships, situations, and cultural contexts—in order to reconstruct, from the ground up and from the ceiling down, the sort of “mesolevel” moral events which will involve problems, practices, ideals, and ways of reflecting on how to coordinate those aspects of social life. The problems and practices described in chapters four through eight (intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, conflict) are names for important issues which need to be dealt with in any moral situation. By naming these issues, describing their problems, practices for accomplishment and techniques for management, and considering their aims or ideals, the following analyses offer a vocabulary for identifying, examining and reflecting on moral situations in everyday life.

The Research Project

The research I have engaged in to begin a project of studying morality and communication involved, roughly, four preliminary data collection processes, and a final, fifth, primary one. The first was a survey sent to native speakers of American English living in the United States. The second involved questionnaires, interviews, and audio and video recordings gathered from survey participants who volunteered to be a part of further research. The third
process was a replica of the first, except broadened the population beyond the United States and beyond American English (or even English in general). The fourth process replicated the second, but with the new population. The fifth focused on obtaining video data from members of the preliminary populations who identified, or volunteered acquaintances who identified, as being in a close relationship with someone characterized by conflict, argumentativeness, or disagreement.

I did a preliminary and primary phase for two reasons. First, the four preliminary data collection processes were meant to explore ways of obtaining data, and to see what ways might best serve data collection with the basic frame of “conflict” in mind. For example, would I find enough metadiscourse in the audio/video to talk about it? And if not, would the interviews or surveys be supplemental to that? As another example, would certain recorded situations yield more of a certain kind of data? Could I “focus” my primary phase in certain areas or sites?

Second, the four preliminary data collection processes were meant to explore the data itself—to work with the data as much as possible without focusing on “conflict” or “morality.” Given that I was developing an interest in conflict and morality, and given that I had begun reading on these topics, would I see what I had read about? Would I look for those things? Would they even be present enough to talk about? Would they explain enough of the cases to warrant the significance to which I wanted to attribute them? I wanted to be careful that I was not merely finding what I wanted to find. Taking care not to throw my perspective at everything, while acknowledging that I am a human being with non-neutral eyes and a passion for the very things I am currently writing about, demanded attention to my initial efforts to obtain the data—even before I confronted the data.

An overarching goal of these data collection processes was to get a lot of empirical evidence. The surveys, questionnaires and interviews were explicitly “primed” to get people
talking about communication and communication problems. Directly, this jump-started the broader category of metadiscourse (described in the last section of chapter two) in which people explicitly discussed their communication. Indirectly, this used the “problem” frame so as to see how people would distinguish “conflict” and talk about communication and conflict in different ways.

The audio and video data (both from the interviews, and from participants who recorded their everyday lives) were collected with a number of purposes. First, I wanted to add to the collections which I had already studied, and in which I had already noticed some of the activities that got me interested in this project of morality. Second, I wanted to see how communication in interaction could indicate morality in its most basic hiccups: could, would moral practices erupt out of, or constitute, something like a noticeable absence? And third, I wanted to look at how people oriented to their actions as moral, and what morally-inflected strategies arose in cooperation with the achievement of interpersonal troubles, dilemmas or conflicts.

Data

The research project, as mentioned, involved surveys, questionnaires, interview schedules, audio devices, and video devices (see surveys, questionnaires and interview schedules in appendix A). Most of the forced-choice questions in the surveys were not the focus of my project, and I only mention them in a supplementary way to the qualitative data that are my focus. The audio data are used primarily as examples throughout this project, and as the background for analysis. My main focus is on video data obtained during the preliminary and primary stages of research.

The complete naturally-occurring data set is recorded in a chart in appendix B. Most of the audio data is older and has been transcribed to various levels of detail over the past six years.
Newer audio was transcribed at a basic level. All audio data were used to supplement video analyses or as examples earlier in this document. Video data, the focus of analysis, were all transcribed to a basic level, and comprise the whole data drawn from for analysis chapters.

The following chart shows an overview of the range and types of these focal data. “Corpus” lists the name of each set of data, usually gathered during a particular time frame and/or in a particular location. “Year” refers to the time of data creation. “Hours” are the total rounded number of hours in that set which were used in analysis (total hours for the whole set are recorded in appendix B). “Format” here refers to how the video was made (in appendix B it refers to audio or video, but here, most recordings are video). Home videos were made to capture family events and have been donated for use in research. Researcher videos were made by the author, informally, with a held camera. Assignment videos were created by the author’s former students, and later donated for research. Data videos were made by the author or voluntary research participants, formally, with a stationary camera. “Place” is the location of the recording. “Language” includes all languages and dialects spoken in the recording. US. English is United States English, and Br.English is British English. “Recordings” refers to how many total separate videos are included in the set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Recordings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fam.new</td>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>27 m</td>
<td>Home video</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>US.English</td>
<td>1 E1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fam.ren</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>30 m</td>
<td>Home video</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>US.English</td>
<td>1 E1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fam.hols</td>
<td>1980-90s</td>
<td>2 h 15 m</td>
<td>Home video</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>US.English</td>
<td>1 E8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fam.evts</td>
<td>1994-2004</td>
<td>28h</td>
<td>Home videos</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>US.English</td>
<td>30 E40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frn.don</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2 h</td>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>A.English</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fam.Frn.vis</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2h</td>
<td>Researcher videos</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>US.English</td>
<td>4 E5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fam.Frn.jul</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3h</td>
<td>Researcher video + audio</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Br.English, US.English</td>
<td>1 E7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frn.assigns</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4h</td>
<td>Assignment</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>US.English</td>
<td>5 E4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Under “recordings,” the letter E followed by a number refers to how many excerpts from that recording were pulled out as sections for analysis. The labeled excerpts also contain a final number (not shown in table) indicated which of the excerpts the instance analyzed comes from. Thus, a label for a particular example in an analysis chapter might be, “Fam.New30s.1.E1.1,” where “Fam.New30s” Refers to the corpus and year range (or particular year, if known), “1” refers to the first recording in the corpus, “E1” refers to a section of the recording transcribed and analyzed, and the final “1” refers to the bit of that section which is displayed in an analysis chapter. Audio is noted at the end of transcripts done from audio only. Excerpts reproduced in an analysis chapter include video screen shots and may also include more, or less, detailed transcription than in original and other versions of transcripts.

**Participants**

The research participant enrollment process relied on the “snowball” method in which I emailed the surveys to everyone I knew, and they emailed them to everyone they knew, etc. Some people also put the link to the survey on websites and social networking pages, and others printed it and passed it on. All in all this resulted in a substantial amount of responses—more
than 100—that ranged beyond people in my department, my university, or my network of friends, relatives and acquaintances. In the preliminary phase, participation beyond the survey was recruited through the survey on a purely voluntary basis, and from there, was restricted further to those who responded to my contact and returned the necessary consent forms, as described in the previous section. In the primary phase, participation was solicited by word-of-mouth via myself and others who had participated in the first phase. Participants and sites of recording were dispersed, geographically, across the United States, the United Kingdom, and parts of Europe and Scandinavia. The primary language of talk in all cases was English, though some interactions featured considerable code-switching or long periods of speech in other languages (3).

**The Transcription Process**

Transcription is one of the most crucial parts of discourse analysis. Transcription is the process of taking huge amounts of data and making it workable for analysis—to “hold the smoke of interaction still for study” (Moerman, 1988, p.3). And yet, transcription itself is both theoretical and analytic. The process, materials and representations involved in transcription involve choices that are informed by particular perspectives, and lend themselves to particular ways of analyzing (Bucholtz, 2007; Ochs, 1979). Working with these sets of data, as well as data from prior projects, involves hours of listening, often to the same bit over and over; multiple layers and complexities of transcription; making initial analyses; and sometimes even setting something aside and coming back to it several weeks later, seeing if the original ways of representing and explaining it seem to hold up (Tracy & Mirivel, 2009). Because I approach data from interactional and social-relational levels, analysis can involve more “baby-steps” before a coherent analysis is drawn up. Looking at different bits from different angles, with different
levels of detail in the transcription, and making several such passes, are my ways of
“triangulating,” if you will, the analytical process. In doing so, I seek to understand a segment
from many perspectives before I make a decision about which presentation will be most relevant
to the interactional accomplishment of morality.

On Data and Empirically Relevant Context

I am balancing several tensions between differing assumptions and approaches. I have
pulled together disparate literatures, disparate methodologies, disparate data. I see these tensions
as productive. The analytical framework of this project is guided by a number of starting
assumptions and theoretical conceptions, but following GPT, the following analyses are
empirically based on the situated instances in the data. Also following GPT, the methodological
approach described above is focused on the identification and evaluation of practices.
Before moving into the analysis chapters, this section provides an example that demonstrates the
relevance of these data and method to the project of conceptualizing morality in relationships.
This sample analysis demonstrates the importance of these data to the aim of the project and
criteria for representing data and analysis in the subsequent analysis chapters.

CA scholars have been working with audio-only data for years, data which have yielded a
number of important claims about interaction. In determining the interactional meaning of any
given point in a conversation, however, not having access to video can result in difficulties.
Consider the following example, an excerpt from an audio tape recorded by two young women
as they chat during a typical visit by Val to Christa’s house:

Excerpt 1 “At Home” [frn.don04.1.E3.1(audio)]

1   Val:    In eighth grade we had to make a paper mache globe. That was a bitch
2   Chris:  .hh hey we should do that
3   Val:    paper mache globe?
4   (0.5)
Chris: We could sell them at a yard sale (1.8) at the flea market you know Mexicans love that ki- oh-

Val: No comment (. ) [(acist ass)]

Chris: [rewind ] (3.0) dude

Val: My boyfriend doesn’t own a globe shut up

Chris: ((laughs)) but if you made him one I’m sure he’d love it

Val: I don’t think so

Chris: What would he say if you handed him a paper mache globe?

Val: “*I don’t know what ees*”

((laughter))

Val: “looks like shit”

Chris: “oh thank you”

Val: “*Oh, thanks bayby*” (1.0) “*I lofe it*” ((laughs)) “what the hell is it?”

CA and other discourse analysts are fond of versions of the question “why that now?”

Why, in other words, was some action produced at some particular point in a conversation? We might note, for instance, that this conversation is riddled with long pauses. Sometimes referred to as the “harbinger of the dispreferred” (Pomerantz, 1984), long pauses can signal problematic prior utterances or upcoming dispreferred responses. This conversation seems to have several such pauses, and there are certainly elements of the participants’ talk which is problematic (Christa makes a questionable remark about Mexicans, only to be reminded that Val’s boyfriend is Mexican). However, what cannot be “seen” here is that these interactants are watching television during the conversation.

Engaging in multiple tasks during conversation is common, and friends will often be actively watching television programs, or have it on in the background, during casual chats. Thus, analysis which does not consider multimodal and nonverbal elements can run into problems during analysis. How many of these pauses are signaling a problem? How many are due to the participants becoming distracted by something on TV? Is “the television” becoming
enrolled in the conversation to manage something problematic that is going on? It is hard to tell. Without the benefit of clues such as gaze, gesture and physical orientation which would indicate where participants’ attentions were directed, it is hard to say for sure what all those pauses mean.

The next excerpt illustrates a far less common transcription situation: one in which only video is present, with no audio. Similar situations can arise, of course, when audio quality is poor. But generally, this kind of analysis—one of video only—does not occur among the standard analyses of discourse which generally require talk of some form. It is interesting to notice, however, how such an example compares to the more common one just described.

This excerpt comes from a black-and-white, 30-minute home movie from sometime in the late 1930s to early 1940s—when the possibility of a “home movie” was extremely new, and audio was not yet available. Over time, home movies have changed a lot. In much of the home movie data for this project, which is primarily from the late 1980s onward, it is normal to see the camera left on for long periods of time, recording people who are going about their interactional business and, at least after the first few minutes or so, not paying much attention to the fact that they are being filmed (sometimes not even apparently aware of it). In this period, however, video cameras were still quite new, and were treated largely the same as still photography cameras: people would stop and pose, or just stand there waving in front of some monument.

There are times, however, when people are caught in less camera-aware moments: walking down sidewalks, moving into place pre-pose, coming out of houses and cars, meeting other people. The following series of screen shots is from one such moment in which two men are walking toward the camera, and stop to light each other’s cigarettes.

*Excerpt 2 “An Old Home Movie”* [fam.new30s.1.E1.1]
Based on the visual elements alone, one can see that these men talk intermittently throughout the interaction. There is some basis to distinguish turn-taking, as we see one man’s mouth moves while the other’s stays still until the first man finishes talking, after which point the second man’s mouth moves. Other than that, there is little way to tell what they are talking about or what kinds of formulations (questions? offers?) they are making, let alone whether their utterances are preferred or what actions those utterances might be performing.

What we are left with, however, is not unanalyzable. First, the sequence of actions: when the men first meet each other on the sidewalk, they stop and look at the camera and glance at it twice while talking to each other (line 22). They continue speaking as they begin walking in the direction of the camera, after which point they look only at each other, or down (generally at what they have in their hands) (lines 23-24). Adam (on the left) pulls a packet of cigarettes out of his right pocket (line 25), and Edward reaches toward it, as if to take the cigarette out himself (line 26), before withdrawing his hand as it becomes obvious that Adam is going to take the cigarette out for him (line 27). Adam hands Edward the cigarette (line 28); Edward puts the cigarette to his lips (line 29); Edward removes matches from his own pocket while Adam also takes a cigarette out (line 30).

Then Edward leans in and uses the match to try and light Adam’s cigarette (line 31) before lighting another match and attending to his own (line 32). We can tell that Adam’s cigarette was not successfully lit the first time because after successfully lighting his own cigarette (evidenced by a sudden plume of smoke in line 33), we see Edward lean in again to Adam with the second match (line 34). The smoke rises and Adam gives a quick nod to indicate that his cigarette is now lit (line 35). They continue walking, and when the camera cuts again, it shows them right in front of it, now in a more “performative” mode: Edward playfully adjusts
Adam’s tie (line 36) and gives his face a pat (line 37) before they put their arms around each other and smile for the camera (line 38).

What is the meaning of these actions? We can tell right away that these men are attending to, and friendly with, one another. They continually orient to one another with gaze, head-direction, and a turning-in of their shoulders. They display understandings toward one another with head shakes and gestures, as when Edward withdrew his hand (repaired his gesture, so to speak) once he realized Adam was taking a cigarette out for him. They also display familiarity, smiling, nodding animatedly, standing very close to each other, and making frequent physical contact. Though the performance at the end of this sequence shows an orientation to the camera, it still speaks a lot about their relationship. Edward’s straightening of Adam’s tie is met by Adam lifting his chin up, as if allowing Edward to get a better look at him, and this is followed by Edward giving him two quick “light slaps” to the face.

Edward seems to be playing the role of an “older brother” here. Though they may either be brothers or close friends, they seem to be intimate and Edward’s actions portray him as having a more authoritative relational identity (as the “evaluator” of Adam’s appearance). At the end of the sequence, after they smile for the camera, they turn their faces back toward each other and Adam says something (line 39), to which Edward thrusts his face toward him with his mouth in a tight line, almost in a “mock aggressive” expression (line 40). Even without the benefit of sound, there seems to be teasing going on, and this segment of the camerawork ends. In the case of this data, there is a lot left out. And yet, on the basis of visual, nonverbal, semiotic information, one can still begin to make good hypotheses about who these men are to each other.

The analyses that follow feature recordings primarily from video, making the task of pinning down the cues of relating in some ways easier, though in other ways more complicated.
The analyses employ varying levels of detail and contextual information, as was deemed relevant to explaining the accomplishment of morality. Chapter four, for example, focuses on very minute facial, physical, environmental, verbal and nonverbal details. Thus, that chapter contains very detailed transcription and multiple screen shots because such elements are referenced as evidence in the analysis. In other chapters, there is sometimes less transcription detail and fewer screen shots. In such cases, those details were not referenced in analysis, and thus were removed to provide only that which was shown to be relevant both for analytic clarity and other practical purposes (length of transcript, size of document file, etc.) (4).

This section closes the discussion of the discourse analytic perspective and method with examples that highlight the potential level of detail at which participant moves may be seen as relevant to analysis. This does not mean that these moves are always, nor the only, relevant actions. But such details are one way of establishing all that is going on in the scene and all that potentially guides interaction; thus, in subsequent analysis chapters, there are often featured initial analyses which are less focused on examining morality and more focused on setting the interactional, situational, relational, and/or cultural scene.

The last three chapters covered the theoretical, conceptual and methodological foundations of the current project on morality. Chapter one described the aims of the project, its importance, the grounded practical theoretical perspective that guides it, and some influential theories and ideas which inform it. Chapter two outlined the basis of a communicative conception of morality based on research from a range of scholarship and reviewed the practices and problems described in those literatures. Chapter two organized these reviews based on the key problems discussed in the current project (intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, conflict) and ended with examples of practices to demonstrate their relevance to morality.
Chapter three discussed the methodological approach of this project, based on discourse analysis within a grounded practical theory approach. These chapters have provided reasons, perspectives, and methods within which the ensuing analyses unfold.

The analysis chapters, which make up the bulk of this project, offer the evidence for and outcome of the investigation of the concept of morality as a practice. The next five chapters take up a different moral “problem” and show the practices by which that problem is constructed and confronted in interpersonal interactions. Each analysis chapter begins by specifying the problem and its importance to morality in interpersonal relationships, followed by a more detailed review of some of the literatures which were mentioned in chapter two. After a brief mention of methodological issues specific to that particular problem, the analysis reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and managing the problem. Each chapter ends by considering some what these reconstructions indicate regarding participants’ situated ideals for the moral practices described. These normative ideals for moral practice are returned to in chapter nine.

Chapter four focuses on the problem of intersubjectivity, probably the underlying requirement for any more interaction. Though acknowledging the extent to which intersubjectivity constitutes a proto-moral practice, and is thus omnirelevant to all interaction, the chapter focuses on examining how intersubjectivity becomes a resource for showing careful orientation to close others in friend and family relationships. The problem of intersubjectivity for morality involves the way in which the practice can signal or create an occasion of difference, disrupting the assumption of an intimately shared world or understanding.

Chapter five focuses on the problem of intimacy, a practice for doing closeness which is based on intersubjectivity, but also characterized by other more complex interactional rituals. The chapter focuses on how doing intimacy constructs relationality and relational identities
through the management of morally questionable communication. The problem of intimacy for morality involves the way in which doing the practice constitutes a dilemma between the comfort to engage in morally questionable activities with close others, and the potential damage such engagement may cause if it implicates ideological differences.

Chapter six focuses on the problem of ideology, a practice which both constructs and is constructed in intimate interaction, and which is culturally contexted. The chapter focuses on how ideology is interactionally achieved to guide relational norms and accomplish culturally “good” identities. The problem of ideology for morality involves the way in which ideologies can be complex and contradictory, posing difficulties for the continued maintenance of a shared relational, cultural moral orientation.

Chapter seven focuses on the problem of culture, and how cultural practices become particularly problematic during intercultural moral encounters. The chapter focuses on how culture shapes and is shaped in relationships to manage ideologies associated with cultural differences. The problem of culture for morality involves the way in which different cultural assumptions, and their potentially different ideologies, are dealt with in close intercultural relationships.

Chapter eight focuses on the problem of conflict, and how moral practices can indicate, cause, confront or construct conflict in interpersonal relationships. The chapter focuses on how conflict comes to characterize interactions based on moral practices which develop and maintain ideological differences. The problem of conflict for morality involves the ways in which it lurks in the possibility of difference linked to all moral interactions, and the ways in which it can do irreversible damage to relationships.
The next chapter, chapter four, begins with intersubjectivity as a moral discursive practice. Within the GPT approach, the problem of intersubjectivity is a practical one: given that human beings and their subjectivities can never be assumed entirely identical (and almost certainly are not), how does one construct shared understandings with others? Chapter four situates this question in friend and family interactions to reconstruct intersubjectivity as a moral practice.

3. Participant confidentiality involved different levels indicated by participants themselves in informed consent documents. Most participants requested no more than pseudonyms. Some requested modification of screen shots to make their features less recognizable. Others kept out of the camera frame or requested not to have scenes in which they appeared in the camera frame made into screen shots.

4. Some such cases also involved poor or less informative video, or requests by participants for a level of identity masking which would have been difficult to do if including particular shots.
Chapter 4

Intersubjectivity: A Fundamental Moral Problem

Communication scholars across the discipline have tackled the issue of “relating.” From interpersonal communication to dialogue studies to phenomenology to communication ethics, the relationality of interaction and quality of communication has been a recurrent theme. A discourse analytic approach to relating sees interpersonal closeness as the process by which interlocutors co-construct mutually oriented relational identities through the coordinated actions of relational practices. These practices provide the interactional foundation for participants’ social and relational formulations of moral stances, and constitute the first and most basic signal when something goes wrong.

This chapter reconstructs intersubjectivity as a moral discursive practice. Within the grounded practical theory approach, the problem of intersubjectivity is a practical one: given that human beings and their subjectivities are not identical, how does one construct shared understandings with others? This chapter analyzes friend and family interactions to argue that intersubjectivity is a means of establishing a shared world. By overcoming difference and managing multiple goals and potential problems, participants lay the foundation for closeness and make relational conversational identities relevant. Intersubjectivity is a practice inherent in social interaction. In this chapter recognition, attention, intelligibility and other-orientation are devices which, through verbal actions, nonverbal actions, and interactions with the world and objects in it, are marshaled to do the practice of intersubjectivity.

The problem of intersubjectivity is probably the underlying requirement for any interaction. Though intersubjectivity as a proto-moral practice is omnirelevant to all interaction, this chapter focuses on intersubjectivity as a resource for showing careful orientation to close
others in friend and family relationships. The problem of intersubjectivity for morality involves the way in which the practice can signal or create an occasion of difference, disrupting the assumption of an intimately shared world or understanding.

This is the first and most detailed chapter because it sets the scene for subsequent chapters by analyzing the morally-influenced basis of interaction in everyday life. Through the concept of intersubjectivity, this chapter looks at how fleeting coordinated moves between family and friends orient people to one another such that the ideological level of morality—in judgments of identity and conduct—are occasioned and possible.

This chapter analyzes naturally-occurring interaction in family and friend video recordings to argue for intersubjectivity—a basic, interactionally-achieved orientation to the other—as a practice for continuously doing, reinforcing and recreating relational commitments through displays of interactional committedness. By engaging in certain practices related to do recognition, attention, intelligibility and co-identification, participants enact a culturally and relationally local ideology of how to be a good friend or family member. Thus, intersubjectivity is a moral discursive practice for the interactional achievement of interpersonal commitment and closeness.

Intersubjectivity is a kind of sharedness, a grasp of the external world and other’s “minds.” Rather than a psychological or philosophical problem, intersubjectivity is seen here as a practical problem which must routinely be confronted and managed by social actors (Schutz, in Heritage, 1984). Such basic sharedness is necessary for the continuation of social interaction. Shared understanding (if not agreement) is the minimal requirement to have any kind of engagement with others at all. Intersubjectivity is an important social and relational practice
because it can be used for any interaction in the social world, but also to interact in specialized and more deeply committed ways with particular others.

What makes this a problematic practice is the invisible work that goes into it (which flouts the commonplace assumption that sharedness between intimates is natural and easy) and the multiple goals to which it attends (making interactional choices sometimes difficult). The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to intersubjectivity. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and managing intersubjectivity. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for participants’ situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.

Sharedness: Commitment and Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity is relevant to interaction and relationships. In a sense it is a practice for constructing both. Intersubjectivity is social. The sharedness it constructs is simultaneously part of the basic requirement of interaction (there needs to be a minimally shared basis of understanding to determine the relevance required in meaningfully undertaking conversation) and an order of demonstrating commitment to an interaction and more importantly, to people within it (intersubjectivity can be done in different ways to signal greater interest, involvement and intimacy with particular conversations and people). This section discusses first the concept of relational commitment in interpersonal research, then analyzes interactional commitment through the practice of intersubjectivity from an ethnomethodological and discourse analytic perspective.

Interpersonal and Interactional Commitment
The study of interpersonal relationships provided one of the first sites or “contexts” for research on human communication, and still thrives as an intellectual area of communication scholarship today. Romantic relationships are probably among the most numerous of interpersonal communication studies, but here I will focus on the kinds of relationships analyzed in this chapter: family and friends. As Fitzpatrick and Caughlin (2002) contend, defining a relationship is a difficult thing to do in a neutral, scientific manner. Definitions of “family,” for instance, are deeply cultural, ideological, and political. Efforts at defining have focused on structure (ties of blood and marriage), tasks (e.g. raising children), and intimacy: interdependence and commitment. Many theories of friend and family communication combine interactional and cognitive perspectives (e.g. Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002). It is common in reviews of literature on families to see the family group treated similarly to other “small groups” in social scientific research, even using such familiar language as endogenous and exogenous variables, inputs, and outputs (Fitzpatrick & Caughlin, 2002).

Friendship communication studies are often interested in friendship processes and the ways in which different variables can impact the friendship over time. For instance, scholars have studied the effect of same-sex versus cross-sex friendships on the friendship (Davidson & Duberman, 1982), the role of communication values (Burleson, Samter & Lucchetti, 1992), the impact of social skills (Burleson, 2003; Burleson & Samter, 1996), interactions with computer mediated communication (Parks & Floyd, 1996), and conditions for maintaining friendships (Wood, 2009).

Definitions for “committed” relationships are future-oriented and often rely on the reports of relational partners (Adams & Jones, 1999). Often this research focuses on romantic relationships (Wood, 2009), though families and friendships, too, are long-term and thus
committed relationships. Commitment is sometimes seen as a kind of loyalty. As a concept, loyalty has been explored most in literature on responses to arguments, dissatisfaction or decline in (often romantic) relationships, where “loyalty” (remaining in the relationship or communicating/not communicating so as to preserve it or in the hopes it will improve) is a more positive but potentially hopeless strategy in the long term (Rusbult, Johnson & Morrow, 1986; Rusbult, Zembrodt & Gunn, 1982). Faithfulness (Simpson, Wilson & Winterheld, 2004) and attachment styles (e.g., Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Simpson, 1990; Simpson, Rholes & Nelligan, 1992) have also been investigated as concepts relevant to commitment and relational satisfaction.

These interpersonal perspectives on commitment focus on the psychological background or processes of individuals, largely in romantic relationships, and how this background or cognition leads people to remain in (and honor the rules of) monogamous relationships, or not. Though communication is a key interest in such literature, from an interactional perspective, this view neglects entirely the way in which discourse constructs commitment as a way of constructing the relationship. Interactional perspectives are also more interested in the social than the psychological. In the behaviorist and phenomenological approaches for instance of Mead (1953) and Schutz (1967), commitment would be formed through social life. To the extent that the social world matters to and shapes individuals, commitment underlies the continuing interest in, involvement for, and adjustment to others which people routinely make in their everyday lives.

commitment to the social world. A shared understanding of what is going on (the definition of the situation) is necessary for constructing and fitting into situations. Without this shared understanding, situations fall apart. As a corollary to the interpersonal perspective, without a shared understanding of the relational situation and the moments that create it, the relationship falls apart.

According to the proto-morality approach, morality is omnirelevant in the commitment, responsibility and accountability people have to those moment-by-moment actions which maintain social order and allow interaction to occur (Bergmann, 1998). In the next section I review the concept of “intersubjectivity” as a practice for “doing” the sharedness on which interactional and interpersonal commitment depends.

**Intersubjectivity**

“Intersubjectivity” generally refers to the subjectivities or unique identities of people interacting with one another. It is associated with phenomenology and dialogue studies—in work by Husserl, Schutz, de Beauvoir and Buber, for instance—where it means otherness, inflected in various ways by emphases on experience and/or empathy (Buber, 1923; de Beauvoir, 1947; Husserl, 1973; Schutz, 1967). In ethnomethodology, intersubjectivity is a kind of shared intelligibility. Garfinkel (1967) claims that members in social interaction do things that can be glossed in a number of ways as “recognizing, using, and producing the orderly ways of cultural settings from ‘within’ those settings” (p. 31). For Garfinkel, settings organize activities within which members must employ methods for evidencing accountable events with regard to one another.

Schegloff’s 1992 article presents a conversation analytic grounding of intersubjectivity in the display of understanding for immediately prior utterances. Schegloff argues that sociological
approaches conceptualize intersubjectivity vaguely and unempirically as well as assuming it is the meeting of mind-internal “subjectivities” and the extent to which they match. He then describes Garfinkel’s (1967) perspective, which moves intersubjectivity out of the mind and into the social realm. Schegloff does not entirely agree with Garfinkel’s answer, however, proposing that interpretive procedures must and can be grounded in conduct. Schegloff (1992) argues that intersubjectivity is woven into the basic structure of conversation, such that particular utterances provide relevant ways of responding that do displays of understanding. The resources of displaying subjectivity are thus built into the process of interaction. Intersubjectivity need not be a phenomenon abstractly socialized, but is observable in the “procedural infrastructure of interaction” (p. 1299).

In their discussion of Schegloff’s and Garfinkel’s notions of intersubjectivity, Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) describe the difference between their approaches as based in Garfinkel’s rejection of classic sociological experiments as having gone “too far” in a sense. Garfinkel ended up taking a more phenomenological, hermeneutic route, while Schegloff did not want to say that a rigorous study of conduct could not be achieved. Schegloff’s perspective has been important in representing the CA treatment of intersubjectivity, though as a topic it has not often been taken up as a primary focus. Exceptions include Wilkinson’s (1999) study of aphasiac interaction, and Hepburn and Potter’s (2010) work on intersubjectivity and tag questions. The latter is particularly relevant. Similarly to Schegloff’s (1992) discussion of third position repair, tag questions are a way of checking, affirming, or demonstrating an assumption of mutual understanding, one which is afforded by structure (the placement and type of action constituting a tag question) but also content (since tag questions can also check for agreement or accuracy regarding a topic).
The following analysis presents a grounded practical theoretical discourse analysis of friend and family interactions. In this analysis, intersubjectivity is a practice for solving the problem of creating a shared world—an omnipresent problem partly because worlds are never wholly shared (people do not think or perceive in exactly the same way) and partly because the assumption of sharedness in close relationships is utterly assumed and taken as natural. The next section begins with a discussion of the methods of analysis, then presents examples of four devices for doing intersubjectivity.

**Intersubjectivity as a Moral Discursive Practice**

Based on the previous section (and earlier chapters), the discourse analysis employed in this chapter combines elements of ethnomethodological and discursive psychological conversation analysis, embodiment and semiotic conversation analysis, and a grounded practical theoretical, AIDA-influenced discourse analytic approach that takes account of some ethnographic details. Based on this approach, the data studied comprised video recordings of family and friend interaction from a range of time periods, geographic regions, recording devices, and recording formats (home movies and non-induced naturally occurring interaction).

The following analysis, most of any in this project, studies closely the entire situation of interactional practices, including verbal and nonverbal communication and movement/manipulation of objects. Talk is one of many symbolic practices that speakers mobilize in accomplishing activities together. Though Schegloff and most CA have traditionally focused on *talk*-in-interaction, sequence, repair and preference—thus intersubjectivity—can be accomplishable through, and organizing of, non-discursive turns. Goodwin is an example a scholar who takes a highly contextualized approach that brings in the environment, body, gesture, objects, and many other aspects into the study of conversation (e.g. Goodwin, 2003a;
Symbolic resources, or what Goodwin calls semiotic media, refer to the “heterogeneous array of different kinds of sign vehicles” (2003b, p. 29). For Goodwin, the world is filled with potentially relevant data that interactants make use of through bodies, talk, scenic phenomena, objects and anything else at hand which can be indexed as meaningful. Heath, another scholar who takes a similar approach, refers to this as multimodality (2004, 2010), and microethnographers (Streeck, 2002) do similar very close, highly contextual studies of interaction.

Actions that make use of these resources provide the structure that organizes the social, cognitive, and physical world through interaction, making it socially meaningful. Though in some ways Goodwin’s work is not typical to the classic CA approach, he adheres to many CA conventions and shows through his analysis that the context he analyzes is relevant, necessary, and interesting to the study of conversational moments. As interpersonal scholars have long pointed out, nonverbal and verbal communication are “highly integrated constituents of the total communication system” (Burgoon & Hoobler, 2002, p. 240).

**Some Devices**

For presentational purposes, I selected several “case studies” to be used as exemplars in reviewing the results of analysis. These cases are indicative of particular patterns observed across the data. By transcribing and analyzing video data of friend and family interaction, this chapter also displays the importance of non-talk interaction to relating, the ways in which relationships provide an ideal site for theorizing moral communication, and the importance of interactional accomplishments of other-orientation for a discourse-grounded conception of morality.

Results of analysis indicate that doing intersubjectivity—attending, recognizing, orienting and displaying understandings toward others—is a way of doing closeness. Based on a proto-
morality approach, this section demonstrates how symbolic resources, including talk, gesture, environment and objects, are mobilized to accomplish interlocutors as closely and identifiably related. Relevant to a more ideological approach to morality, this section demonstrates how intersubjectivity provides an interactional strategy for doing relational committedness. The ensuing analyses parallel and extend the results of an earlier work on intersubjectivity (Robles, 2010). In the next four sections I point out examples of ways in which intersubjectivity can be accomplished through recognizing, displaying understanding, attending to, and orienting or positioning identities with close others.

In the following sections I review the results of this analysis by providing examples of friend and family interactants engaging in recognition, attention, intelligibility and other-orientation as devices (to use a Garfinkelian word) for intersubjective practice. I begin by describing and defining the device, and provide analysis of a typical example to show how it unfolds in use. I then display a second example to describe how its use can accomplish morality through an analysis of its method for displaying relational commitment, context-embeddedness in cultural or ideological expectations, and potential problems.

**Recognition devices.** I use this designation to refer a “basic” form of intersubjectivity: the display of awareness that the world, and the people in it, exist. Without displaying this basic awareness, speakers are not likely to engage in conversational projects because there would be no frame of reference for which to employ such fundamental discursive activities as turn taking. This basic awareness then requires recognition of the particular people who are relevant to an instance of interaction. Participants must display as relevant the people with whom they engage in conversational projects as well as the people who are relevant to those projects. Such displays may be accomplished by speaker address or reference and gaze.
Excerpt 3 provides an example of the use of gaze as a way of recognizing someone as an interactional participant. In this recording during a routine visit by the author and her partner to the partner’s family home in Nuneaton England in 2008, the author is standing in the doorway to the room, holding the camera, which is aimed at Jenny and her granddaughter, Lizzy. To the right of the picture (out of the camera frame), the baby’s mother, Gertie, is attending to the interaction between Jenny and Lizzy, while Jenny’s sons Raymond and Jeff are carrying on a side-conversation (highlighted). For this analysis, the focus is not on the side conversation.

Excerpt 3 “The Newtons” [fam.jul08.1.E2.1]

41 JENNY: [oy↑]

42 RAYMOND: [th top] one=

43 JEFF: =[n:o:: I mean- how much is that one]

44 GERTIE: [(I don’t know if she is] 45

46 GERTIE: smiling I says well .hhh (.) I don’t know if she is or not so I 47 don’t know if it’s wind, 48

49 JEFF: [(does it say it’s xxx] 50

50 GERTIE: [but anyway she mo:uthed at him] for a bit 51 JEFF: [(xxx xxx xxx)] 52

52 GERTIE: [and she went] ((mimics a smile, 0.3)) she’s definitely 53 smiled 54

54 RAYMOND: [(this one)]
GERTIE: [see she’s just smiled at me four times she sa(h)ys(he)]

[11:26 camera moves]

JEFF: (*three six eight*) might be [ten] [11:30 camera moves]

JENNY: [Eyh] hey hello:

JEFF: and it coulda been [nine,]

JENNY: [(. e]lllo:

RAYMOND: it’s ten on each side

JENNY: *canya give grand(mum) a smi:le*

RAYMOND: it’s ten on each side

JENNY: eyh (0.7) *I got a bear for ya* .hh ((breathy voice, exaggerated accent))

((high-pitched sound, laughter-like))

JENNY: yeah I got a bear for ya [11:40 camera zooms to bear TV]
JEFF: [yeah it’s (like a totally different) frame]

[11:45 camera zooms out]

JENNY: [been knitting crazy all week (0.2) I got a bear]

JEFF: I’ve never seen this design before

JENNY: [(b’) you won’t take no notice of it]

JENNY: ↑you won’t be ↓bothered with it =

LIZZY: =((small coo sound))

JENNY: (0.3) ↑no ↓o: (0.5) ↑no you ↑wo:n’t

LIZZY: ((yawns))

JEFF: [(have to get xxx)]

JENNY: [owh::]

(1.0)

RAYMOND: suppose it was carbon fiber wasn’t [it]

JENNY: [wh](h)ere did she get those jean(h)ns fro(h)m=

GERTIE: =I don’t (know)
JENNY: ((laughs)) she’s go(h)t a be(h)lt o(h)n aoh (. ) *oh my
*goodne[ss ((glottalized))
GERTIE: [she’s gettin (like) too big now so]
RAYMOND: [that’s a nice one there]
GERTIE: ↑some of the other stuff still fits her but it- .hhh she says I
don’t know (I don’t think)- she has got long legs,
GERTIE: but (. ) [12:07 camera moves] it seems to be on the legs
where th-she’s um- it’s- she’s strugglin=
JENNY: =yeah
Here, Jenny does recognition through eye contact to primarily two people: Lizzy, and Gertie. Her attention to Lizzy is not entirely matched, as Lizzy, who is only a few months old here, seems not to have learned that one should pay attention to others. The result is that Jenny frequently pursues Lizzy’s gaze, ratifying her as a meaningful participant in the conversation, even while commenting that Lizzy is unable to appreciate the significance of the bear Jenny has recently knitted for her (lines 79-80). Intermittently, Jenny’s gaze turns to Gertie, though for most of the conversation, this only occurs when Gertie speaks (e.g. line 46). Only at the end of this excerpt, when Jenny asks Gertie a question (line 89), does she open a conversation with Gertie.

This example shows one way of managing recognition in a conversation. Jenny could, for example, have only held Lizzy while giving full eye contact to Gertie. Since Gertie is an equal regarding her linguistic abilities, this would not have been a strange thing to do. It would have been strange, probably, if Jenny had paid full eye contact to Lizzy without ever looking at Gertie, even if Jenny had responded to Gertie verbally. This fact points to a cultural difference between the use of gaze as a display of commitment. According to Ochs and Schieffelin (2001) (and Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986) infants and young children are not given the same interactional roles cross-culturally. Many ways of bringing up infants outside England would not involve such sustained eye contact, direct addressing of utterances, and dogged pursuit of recognition. This does not mean that in other communities, parents are less relationally committed to their children. Rather, in certain communities, gaze is one recognition device which interactionally achieves commitment to a particular moment, conversation, or project. The patterned use of this device over time alongside other intersubjectivity devices sustains its use as a practice for doing
relational commitment in a particular context. In this example, Jenny successfully manages the problem of recognizing both Lizzy and Gertie in the interaction, demonstrating that one difficulty in doing recognition involves the need to sometimes recognize multiple people without withdrawing recognition from any one of them. This feat would certainly have been more difficult had Lizzy not been an infant.

The next example demonstrates how this intersubjectivity device can accomplish moral practice. This excerpt demonstrates a use of the gaze recognition device for signaling the relevance of other persons to an interaction despite their not actively participating in the talk at hand. By looking at someone who is not directly involved in a conversation, one (1) can signal that person is relevant to the conversation, (2) can indicate that person should contribute to the conversation (or can ask them to do so), and/or (3) can comment on the conversation underway for that person’s benefit. This excerpt, from a home movie, features several immediate and extended members of a family opening presents for a “mass birthday party,” and takes place in California during the late 1980s. Jilly (and sometimes Beatrice, her mother, on the right) is the only person visible; Mike, Jilly’s husband, and their daughters sit across from her, while Mike’s parents and sister are to her left. Mike’s sister’s husband is on the other side of Beatrice. Jilly’s father, Jack, is behind the camera, and is standing while he holds it (hence the downward angle).

Excerpt 4 “The Reynolds” [fam.hols88.1.E5.1]

104 Beatrice: Oh look at the pretty colors=
105 Jim: =unmentionables= ((off camera))
106 Jilly: =O::
107 Jim: we must not mention them ((off camera))
108 Beatrice: [o↑o::]
109 ?: [((giggles))]
110 Jim: I look over at Mike here “oh well”
111 Mike: It (must be) my birthday ((off camera))
112 ((laughter))
Jilly: yeah I guess we're celebrating your birthday too=

Jack: =hey (0.5) those'll be a big hit when you're out on the balcony ((off camera))

Jilly: ◦y(h)eah◦

Jilly: drinking the coffee in the- after you're gone ((points to Mike))= 
Beatrice: =that’s right=
Jack: =yeah right ((laughs)) you watch that UPS stops-  ((behind camera))

Jack: truck stop now ((laughs)) ((behind camera))
In this excerpt, Jilly, who as the current gift-opener is the focus of the camera, regularly shifts her eye contact and gestures to recognize different people in the room and to bring them in as relevant to the conversation in some particular way, either to comment on those people, or to comment about the conversation to those people. Until line 113, Jilly looks at the gift, even as she holds it up to display it to others. As she is the focus of attention, the only other person on camera (Beatrice, Jilly’s mother) is looking in the direction of Jilly and the gift, as assumedly everyone else in the room is also doing. Even after Jim’s comments, Jilly continues to look at the gift, and does not look up until after Mike’s comment (line 111). Then, she looks first down at the box into which she is returning the gift, then laughs, then looks in the direction of Mike (since he is not on camera, it is not conclusive that she is looking at him, but is a safe guess to make given he has just spoken). As she produces the utterance in line 114, she glances at the camera, glances back into the box, glances at Mike, then back down as she starts putting the gift away (line 118).

Jilly’s gaze actions seem largely a response to the situation at this point. She has to attend to multiple people, including the camera, and her glances back and forth between the camera, Mike, and the gift show an orientation to particular identities as (1) conversationally relevant (since Mike became a topic in relation to the gift) and (2) situationally relevant (since this is happening “on camera”). When Jack makes his comment (line 116), she glances at him (line 117), then utters “yeah” (line 118) and looks down again where she is in effect re-wrapping the gift. She then makes the joke about drinking coffee on the balcony in this outfit, first glancing at Beatrice and making her hand into a “coffee-cup holding” shape (while “swilling” the imaginary cup) (line 122). She ends the utterance by focusing attention to Mike and pointing at him while saying “you’re” (line 122). The three deictic actions (looking at Mike, saying “you’re,” and
pointing) reinforce the idea that he is both a conversational participant and a topic of the conversation. Sadly we cannot see Mike’s facial reactions to this hypothetical situation, but laughter follows, ratifying the action as a joke.

At this point, Jilly shoots a quick glance at Beatrice (line 123), then looks back down at the gift before glancing at Jack as he says “stops” (line 125) but gives otherwise no reaction, instead again turning attention to the gift as she closes the box on it. No one else attends to or laughs at Jack’s comment (though he does; line 128), and the conversational direction changes. Jilly’s glance at Beatrice here seems different from the earlier glance during the “coffee” joke. In the first instance, her head turns toward Beatrice, her eyes are fully opened, and orientation shifts from Beatrice to Mike. In that instance, Beatrice seems to be brought in as a conversational participant, perhaps someone who can appreciate the joke, or perhaps as a way of recognizing Beatrice, who has not said anything since her last comment on the colors of the gift. Other than a quick glance at Jack when he begins speaking (line 124) Beatrice focuses on Jilly, indicating involvement in the situation if not in the current conversation. But after Jilly’s comment, which she had prefaced by directing it toward Beatrice, Beatrice does say something (“that’s right,” line 126).

Jilly’s second glance at Beatrice, however, is produced differently. Her head turns only slightly, and the “glance” is produced out of the corner of her eyes rather than more directly. This glance occurs as Beatrice says “right” and seems to simultaneously attend to Beatrice’s utterance and the fact that she produced it, while expressing some sort of attitude, to Beatrice, about the conversation. It is unclear what the glance means, who/what it is about, or why exactly it was produced. But it meaningfully recognizes Beatrice and Beatrice’s part in the interaction.
There are a number of ways we can tell empirically that the people in this interaction are a family. They share knowledge of each other’s histories and personal lives. They reference the meaningfulness of different interactants to one another. They interpret particular actions and objects as having “relational significance,” as when Mike’s father indicates how happy Mike should be about Jilly getting lingerie. They show a commitment to the interaction if not the content of others’ talk, as when Jilly continues to look at, and respond verbally to, her father despite his off-color remarks. And they display commitment toward each others’ participation in the total interaction, as when Jilly continually looks at her mother.

Recognition is a way of managing who matters to interaction, how much, and in what ways. In this situation, there was some trouble regarding Jack’s jokes, which Jilly did not always seem to find funny, and which often no one in the room ratified as humorous either. Rather than calling Jack out or strongly indicating her displeasure (perhaps because of being on camera, or not wanting to “spoil” the occasion), Jilly modifies her recognition. Though continuing to make eye contact with Jack, she does not smile at him or respond strongly to many of his later comments. Instead, she shifts her attention to Beatrice, recognizing Beatrice continually, and indicating a closer intersubjective relationship in that moment. Jack, notably, seems unaware (or unadmitting) of the discomfort or lack of humor resulting from his remarks. Rather than noting any intersubjective gaps, he carries on with his own projects.

Recognition is a device for the practice of relational commitment because it can be employed interactionally to demonstrate that, interpersonally, participants are responsible for and accountable to interacting with one another. The ideologies attached to this interactional dictum are many, and not only are they at times named explicitly by participants, but they will be readily familiar to most people raised in the U.S. or England. Typical examples include, for instance,
“look at me when I’m talking to you” and “don’t walk away from the conversation.” To violate
the ideology may violate a small interactional rule—thus indicating disregard for an interactional
instant or disagreement with what someone said—but could also violate the standards of regard
expected between close relational interlocutors.

**Intelligibility devices.** Recognition is a fairly simple device for practicing
intersubjectivity with others. A higher order device for intersubjectivity is intelligibility or
understanding. Once there seems to be a world and people in it that are acknowledged as
important, the particular meanings of interactive parts have to converge in some way. To have
every turn be completely unintelligible would constantly halt conversation, requiring endless
repairs and repetitions. The conversational project underway must be comprehensible enough for
it to be taken up in the next turn, and for the following turn after to display an uptake that
demonstrates nothing problematic about the prior turn’s uptake of the previous one.

Intersubjective display of intelligibility can include facial expressions and gesture. The
next excerpt, which is also from the weekend at the Newton’s, features a later conversation about
a television program.

*Excerpt 5 “The Newtons”* [fam.jul08.1.E3.1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>JENNY:</td>
<td>there’s somethin(g/k) on, I told you about it on Thursday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
<td>about the the girl who wanted a baby when she was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td>fourteen (0.5) [19:34 camera moves] th whole program was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
<td>done Thursday evenin (.) and she’s convinced now (.) she</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td>doesn’t want a baby=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>RAYMOND:</td>
<td>=oh right=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>JENNY:</td>
<td>=not til she’s at least twenty six</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>RAYMOND:</td>
<td>o↑h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>GERTIE:</td>
<td>(someone was telling me about) [that]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>JENNY:</td>
<td>[yeah] they gave one of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
<td>these dolls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JENNY: that was computerized

RAYMOND: oh yeah

JENNY: to a baby’s (.) full twenty four hour

JENNY: and uh in the middle of the night she was goin SHUT UP

shu(h)

GERTIE: [it’s just constant] all the time

JENNY: [just shut up]
149
150  GERTIE:  [oh my god]
151  JENNY:  [I need to] sleep (. ) shut up

152
153  JENNY:  n you can’t do that to a baby can ya
154  LIZZIE:  ((wails))
155  JENNY:  no that was it she’s decided (0.5) don’t want one
Jenny’s gestures do work alongside her talk in ways that are not merely emphasizing. Instead, her gestures work to make intelligible her building-up of actions in telling a narrative. The gestures are not necessary to understand her story, but make their own distinct point. First she uses her hands open and low in her lap (line 137) to represent a “doll.” This gesture seems to emphasize the relationship between the doll and its representation of a real baby. When mentioning “computerized” Jenny makes a twisting gesture with her hands (line 139) indicating movement. Computerized thus means to some extent “motorized” or mechanical. The doll is not just any doll that looks like a baby, but has some sort of baby-function built into it. It is not clear whether the baby moves or just makes noises, but it does something baby-like, and her motions, which move from open in her lap to tilted, make it seem as if the imagined doll could lie down and sit up.

Subsequently, Jenny moves her hands so that the top hand crosses the other while the bottom hand moves opposite, and then her hands move back into the original perpendicular position (line 142). Her hands in once sense represent a kind of cycle (the full 24-hour) and also represent the baby doll as an object meant to be interacted with insofar as they build on her previous symbolic presentation of “doll.” The participants in the conversation must be able to see her gestures as intelligible in their description of a special kind of doll that is supposed to be similar in ways to a real baby. This is an important part of her story which is moving toward an assessment.

In lines 145, 148 and 151, Jenny mimics the response to the baby doll with vivid facial expressions, a loud, repeated proclamation of “shut up” and a dramatic arm gesture which cuts across several times as if to “shoo” away, or even hit, something. Her prior gestures must have been intelligible for participants to understand what is going on. Without knowing that babies cry
in the night, and that a baby doll computerized to act as a baby would also cry in the night, the dramatization of responses to a doll’s actions would be overt. Instead, it seems reasonable to assume that the girl in the narrative is experiencing something that a real mother would. Gertie shows her understanding and agreement by chiming in with the assessments (lines 146, 149). Because Gertie responds to inferences that can be made by Jenny’s gestures rather than to the straightforward content of the story, she displays an intersubjective understanding in her talk that agrees with the joint discursive and symbolic presentation made by Jenny.

Nonverbal communication, including gesture, conveys important interactional meanings. It can be responded to separately from verbal content or actions. Jenny’s use of the quotative “goin” is not as unambiguous as “said” for reproducing an action, but when she says one “can’t do that to a baby,” she makes clear that the “shut ups” and hitting motions in earlier lines were not hypothetical, imagined, or thought reactions to the crying mechanical baby. This, in the end, is what is commented on and assessed—not the thought that a crying baby will drive one slightly mad (that is acknowledged by Gertie, and unproblematically accepted) but that there is a physical (and perhaps verbal) reaction which is proscribed. In other words, one must not communicate by word or deed one’s frustration toward a crying infant. A cultural ideology is at play which determines what elements of the story are assessed negatively.

But there is also a cultural concept for how to enact stories with others. Here, gesture is a relevant simultaneous turn. It is done to be meaningful to participants, and it is expected that participants will treat it as meaningful. A person’s gestures will be taken as directed toward conversational participants—the verbal cannot occlude them. And gesture can mediate problematic aspects of verbal comments (as well as vice versa), as when someone states “I would kill you if you ever did that,” but smiles while saying so. Intelligibility is can be a way of doing a
shared (moral) orientation, of creating the conversational context for interlocutors to, without saying it, agree on the assessment of right and wrong in the story. In the next excerpt from a group of friends watching television, lack of gaze and sustained interaction with an object rather than others holds a “questionable” position for a large part of the interaction. During this sequence, the television is on and is close to the camera, so quieter speech was not transcribable. The camera is placed by the television set. Ben is on the left side of the couch, Alex on the right, and Carrie is right of Alex and not in the camera frame.

*Excerpt 6 “Hanging Out”* [frn.rdm10.2.E3.1]

240  Ben: a satellite shot of Colorado cuz it was a perfectly clear day

241

242  Ben: [( )]

243  Carrie: [( )] ((off camera))

244  Ben: everywhere and you can see these like

245

246  Ben: ( )

247  Carrie: yeah apparently (it stretched) to Kansas ((off camera))
Jana: like it was eerie I was at the grocery store? And I walked out and I’m like this is like a weird colored cloud coming in=

Alex: [yeah]
Carrie: [yeah]

Jana: and it was like kind of just like a reddish tinge

Alex: [yeah] it was (like that huh)

Jana: yeah when the lights ( ) outside I was like this isn’t normal

Alex: ( )

Ben: check that out

Alex: hey ((to the dog))

Ben: ( ) (0.5) ( )
266  (2.0)
267  Jana: eerie (0.5) wow that far
In this excerpt, three friends sit on a couch watching television, while a fourth friend stands near the camera and television (and is not on camera). Ben is discussing a strange “sky” phenomenon in which an oddly-colored cloud had appeared following a series of fires in the area. He mentions that it was captured on satellite (line 240), and Carrie mentions that it stretched all the way to Kansas (line 247). The “uncertain” object here is Ben’s cell phone, which he picks up as he is describing the satellite shot (line 241). He has previously passed the cell phone around to show a picture of something having to do with the fires, and it seems safe to assume that he is going to use the phone in a similar manner. However, he doesn’t explain the use of the phone, and since people often use their phones for a variety of non-interactionally relevant purposes within an interaction, the purpose of his using the phone could go either way. He spends several moments (lines 241-264) looking at the phone. Is he texting? Checking messages? Reading emails? It is unclear, and he does not work to attend to the conversation occurring around him except that his body is still angled toward the other people in the room.

It isn’t until line 264 that Ben passes the phone, signaling previously (line 264) that he’s found something he wants to share which relates to the ongoing conversation. It is only at this point that it is certain he was using the phone for an interactionally-relevant purpose rather than attending to something or someone else. The use of cell phones is ambiguous and depending on the situation, people may be called out for using a cell phone during interaction if its use is suspected to be external to the conversation. The fact that Ben’s friends do not call him out for looking at his cell phone indicates a few possibilities: (1) his use of the cell phone for extra-interactional activities is deemed acceptable; (2) it likely based on prior interactions that he is using the cell phone relevantly to the conversation; or (3) the cultural expectation of focusing full attention on conversational participants may be starting to relax.
Intelligibility devices show understanding in interaction. Participants are held responsible for making themselves understandable, and for following others as well signaling when such following necessitates repair. In the case above, the cultural and relational demands of recognizing and attending to (more on attention below) others also involves expectations regarding intelligibility. As an outsider, it is unclear whether Ben is “following” the conversation, since he is not employing other devices. But since the others do not seek acknowledgement that he is following, it seems safe to assume that in this instance, they assumed (or hoped) that what he was doing would prove, eventually, to be relevant—and itself followable.

Eventually Ben’s actions were made intelligible, but they needn’t have been. The complexity of interaction makes intelligibility difficult. Interaction often involves more than the people—it involves technology such as phones and televisions, objects such as food or books, and encounters that demand multiple intersubjectivities. Maintaining intersubjectivity with others takes place in a chaotic world filled with distractions and side-actions. In the next section I discuss attention, which can involve the use of objects as devices to display (or not, as the case could have been here) engagement in complex interaction.

**Attentional devices.** Attention-orientation includes more explicit attentional devices that build on recognition and intelligibility, and which are primarily engaged in sustaining multi-turn orientation to other subjectivities. Attention brings together recognition and intelligibility to implicate identities and interlocutor expectations in how interaction involves others.

What is interesting about attention is that it can be done through the use of objects. If one wishes to display attention to another, why not do so solely through the means of gaze, or “following” connectives such as “uh huh,” “yeah,” “really?” and “m hm”? Instead, people
commonly use aspects of the world around them to show attention to particular people and conversational projects. Rather than being a distraction, context outside the immediate talk gets relevantly drawn into conversation on a regular basis through object reference and manipulation.

This excerpt is the same as excerpt 3, but this time, I focus on Raymond and Jeff’s side conversation about bicycles in a magazine.

*Excerpt 7 “The Newtons”* [fam.ju08.1.E2.1]

153 JENNY: [oy↑]
154 RAYMOND: [th top] one=

155 JEFF: [=n:o:: I mean- how much is that one]
156 GERTIE: [(=I don’t know if she is she) says is she]
157 GERTIE: smiling I says well .hhh (. I don’t know if she is or not so I
158 GERTIE: don’t know if it’s wind,
159 JEFF: [(does it say it’s xxx)]

161 GERTIE: [but anyway she mo:uthed at him] for a bit
163 JEFF: [(xxx xxx xxx)]
164 GERTIE: [and she went] ((mimics a smile, 0.3)) she’s definitely
165 smiled
166 RAYMOND: [(this one)]
GERTIE: [see she’s just smiled at me four times she sa(h)ys(he)]

[11:26 camera moves]

JEFF: (three six eight) might be [ten] [11:30 camera moves]

JENNY: [Eyh] hey hello:

JEFF: and it coulda been [nine.]

JENNY: [(. e]llo:

(1.0)

JENNY: *canya give grand(mum) a smi:le*

RAYMOND: it’s ten on each side
JENNY: eyh (0.7) *I got a bear for ya* .hh ((breathy voice, exaggerated accent))
((high-pitched sound, laughter-like))
JENNY: yeah I got a bear for ya [11:40 camera zooms to bear]
JEFF: [yeah it’s (like a totally different) frame] [11:45 camera zooms out]
JENNY: [been knitting crazy all we:ek (0.2) I got a be:ar]
JEFF: I’ve never se[en this design before]
JENNY: [(b’) you won’t take no notice of it]
JENNY: ↑y’ won’t be ↓bothered with it =
LIZZY: =((small coo sound))
JENNY: (0.3) ↑n↓o: (0.5) ↑no you ↑wo:n’t
LIZZY: ((yawns))
JEFF: [(have to get xxx)]
JENNY: [owh::]
RAYMOND: suppose it was carbon fiber wasn’t [it]
JENNY: [(wh)(h)ere did she get those jea(h)ns fro(h)m=]
GERTIE: =l don’t (know)
JENNY: ((laughs)) she’s go(h)t a be(h)lt o(h)n aoh (. ) *oh my *goodne[ss ((glottalized))
GERTIE: [she’s gettin (like) too big now so]
RAYMOND: [that’s a nice one there]
207
208 GERTIE: ↑some of the other stuff still fits her but it- .hhh she says I
209 don’t know (I don’t think)- she has got long legs,
In this excerpt, Raymond uses the magazine as an attentional device. Objects can often be used to communicate to people. For example, listening to music or reading a book on a bus is a signal *not* to communicate, and attempting to do so can be an accountable offense. Here, however, Raymond uses the magazine in a different, indeed opposite, way, to maintain the interaction he is having with his brother across the room. Throughout the conversation, he shows he is continuing to attend to Jeff. In line 155, Raymond holds the magazine up to ask for clarification about a bike Jeff has mentioned as having seen in the magazine before Raymond started looking at it. Jeff repairs what he had asked before about the bike (not wanting Raymond to identify it, but rather identify the size of some part on it), and offers a candidate answer (lines 156, 160) as Raymond turns the magazine back to himself (line 161).

It is notable that when Raymond turns the magazine back to himself, he does *not* lower it into his lap, but continues to hold it up, signaling that it is still functioning as maintaining his attention to Jeff. In lines 166-167, Raymond checks again, again turning the magazine back to Jeff, and Jeff responds with more guesses (lines 170, 172), prompting Raymond to once again turn the magazine back to himself to check (line 176). The magazine is positioned as the source of information, allowing Raymond to “correct” Jeff’s incorrect guesses in a preferred manner (line 177) and holding up the page that displays this information (line 178) as if allowing Jeff to check it himself. As Raymond and Jeff continue to comment on the bikes, Raymond holds up the magazine so the relevant page faces Jeff, but angles his head so that he, too, can see it (line 207). This rather awkward position creates a situation in which Jeff and Raymond are looking at, and commenting on, the bikes “together” despite the fact that they are seated on opposite ends of the room. The magazine in this excerpt serves, therefore, as an attentional device through which Jeff and Raymond can attend to one another through the practice of looking at the magazine.
Attention can be given in different ways. In different situations, attention need not be given in these ways. In other cultural contexts, it may not be necessary to show sustained interaction so “obviously.” Attention is one way of indicating that one cares to continue interacting. Its display even in the absence of explicit attention-seeking (in the excerpt just discussed, Jeff does not actively pursue Raymond’s attention) is an even stronger indication of interest in being conversationally involved. While objects can complicate intersubjectivity practice, here, an object was able to be repurposed to maintain intersubjectivity. In the next excerpt, one from the Reynolds’ a few years later at a Christmas gathering, a different kind of object takes on a similar use. The person holding the camera is unknown during this recording. Samantha and her grandfather, Jack, are in the frame. Beatrice, Samantha’s grandmother and Jack’s wife, is the right, out of the frame. JR twice passes through the frame, and, Lisa, Samantha and JR’s other grandmother, also appears on the staircase behind Jack in the background.

*Excerpt 8 “The Reynolds”* [fam.hols94.1.E8.1]

210  Mike: o: that looks like popcorn ((off camera))
211  (1.0)

212  Beatrice: o:: (is it little) (. ) bites? ((off camera))
214 Beatrice: oh it’s a little (bag) how cute ((off camera))

216 Samantha: (for you)

218 Jack: oh really? For goodness sakes
Jack: well look at that
Samantha: (it’s for you)

Jack: ah look it this is for
Jack: you
Jack: and JR
(0.5)
Jack: also
Jack: see and Benny
Jack: so you know there’s dog bones in there
In this interaction, Jack uses a large can (presumably of popcorn) to pursue attention from his granddaughter, Samantha. Samantha and her sister (JR) have been distributing Christmas gifts, and Samantha looks at the tin on the ground, then picks it up as Mike makes his guess about what is inside (line 210). Samantha then orients to Jack by walking the tin over to him, standing next to him, and displaying the top of it, where the label for whom it is intended is affixed. As they are both looking at the tin (line 212) Beatrice, her grandmother, speaks (line 213) and Samantha looks in her direction (214) before she and Jack return to looking at the tin, and it is clear in line 216 that Beatrice is carrying on a conversation with someone else, and is no longer noted in the rest of the sequence between Jack and Samantha.

Jack takes his glasses out of his coat pocket, indicating that there is some question about who the tin is for (line 217), and Samantha holds the tin out to him. Samantha says something (line 218) and Jack responds on line 219 by putting on his glasses. His utterance in line 220 seems to indicate that Samantha was telling him that the gift was his, which makes sense, as she appears to be trying to give it to him while consulting with him about who the gift is really for. This prompts Samantha to hold out the tin (line 221), since Jack seems to have acknowledged it is his, but after he takes it she does a head-stretched-out “looking” expression, as if to continue checking (line 222). Jack continues to exhibit disbelief or surprise (“well look at that” in line 223) and Samantha again asserts the tin is his (224). It is hard to hear what exactly she says, but this seems confirmed by her pointing gesture and subsequent turning away, as if her job is done (line 225).

However, Jack is not finished. As she is turning away, Jack starts to speak (line 226), and Samantha stops moving and shifts toward him slightly, though she does not turn all the way back toward him (line 227). As Jack continues speaking, particularly with the word “you” (line 228)
which indicates he is addressing her and not the room, Samantha still does not turn back, but she continues to stand close by (line 227). When Jack finishes his utterance that the tin is for her and her sister, Samantha finally turns her head back in his direction (line 230-231). Jack responds to her attention with a little shake of the tin (line 231) as if to give a clue about what is inside, but Samantha shakes her head and starts to move away again. It seems as if she is not taking Jack’s assertion seriously.

Jack once again addresses her as she starts to leave him, however, by mentioning “and Benny” (line 235), which is the name of his dog. At this Samantha turns back again, and Jack looks up from the tin, where apparently he was “reading” all these other people for whom the tin was intended. Once Jack has her attention again, he makes the joke that there are dog bones inside (line 237). At this Samantha smiles and tilts her head (line 238), then finally moves away and out of the conversation with Jack.

Throughout this interaction, Jack uses references to and indications of the tin to pursue interaction with Samantha. At the beginning of the conversation, Samantha seemed to orient to the tin and was not moving away. This seemed to indicate some confusion about whether the tin was really meant for Jack. Jack at first attends to this co-orientation to the tin, and the reasons for it, ratifying the confusing element by switching his glasses so as to read the label on the tin. Once he’s seen the label, Samantha seems satisfied and tries to move away several times, but Jack continues to question the label and keep the interaction going.

Every time Samantha tries to leave, Jack once again references the tin and maintains her attention. At the end we find the purpose of this was a teasing one, which confirms Samantha’s earlier reaction to Jack’s insistence that the tin was for her and her sister as well, which she seemed to treat as a joke. This seems to imply a history between these two, as Samantha guessed
that Jack was joking before he got to the punchline. Jack uses the tin as a device for pursuing Samantha’s attention and her participation in an extended interaction.

Attention here has a meaning far more relationally significant than merely “paying attention to the current interaction.” To pursue someone’s attention in such an extended way, for seemingly no other reason than to make a small joke, indicates a certain extent to which people interact for interaction’s sake, indeed, for the sake of interacting with that person. Jokes have a reason to be told which is already highly social, but also relational. There are cultural rules for what jokes are appropriate for telling with whom, and how joking should unfold. Problems of course arise, as when a joke is told which turns out to be inappropriate. And here, for instance, Jack almost loses the floor for his joke due to Samantha’s continued attempts to leave. The object, however, provides the means to pursue a particular other’s interactional attention despite whatever other actions are occurring.

Thus a person’s identity is deemed important to the other person, through interacting for the sake of interaction itself. Intersubjectivity is accomplished in a particular way, overcoming the larger situation (passing out gifts) in order to establish a special kind of occasion-internal interaction which is just between Jack and Samantha (though watched by the camera, these participants seem unaware of it). Jack’s use of the interesting object, the tin of potentially delicious popcorn, remedies the trouble of Samantha’s desire to disengage. The next section builds on this connection between intersubjectivity and relationality to show how people interactionally position themselves with regard to the particular relational identities of others.

Co-identification devices. This intersubjectivity device has to do with the way in which conversational participants identify with one another, in ways that would not be done with strangers or acquaintances. This idea is not too far afield from Burke’s (1950) notion of
“identification,” in which the perception of similarity based on almost any criterion (physical appearance, interests, beliefs, practices) can identify one individual with another individual or group. The genesis of this concept in discourse analysis is that people often acquire special modes of interactional accountability based on a meaning of “the relationship” which is made relevant to conversational projects. Even without “the relationship” becoming a topic, then, participants will nonetheless index the relationship in their talk and other symbolic-discursive actions.

Intersubjectivity thus is not only about interaction, but about how identities in relation to one another are relevant to interaction. By engaging in practices such as working together, disattending to criticism, doing “the mundane,” side conversing, displaying intimate knowledge, and reporting the particular other’s speech, people will continuously achieve “doing being related” or “doing being intimate.” The following excerpt occurs after a Thanksgiving dinner among the Reynolds family during which the author (as a much younger person) is filming her father Mike, and Mike’s mother Lisa, cleaning up after dinner in the kitchen.

Excerpt 9 “The Reynolds” [fam.hols93.1.E7.1]

269 Lisa: I have an old fashioned (. ) meat grinder
270 Mike: m: (1.0) *hi†i*
272 JR: ((giggles))
Mike: oh god this thing better not leak all over the place

Lisa: (that’s the wrong one/bag)
Mike: I tied it
Lisa: well you untie it
Mike: I didn’t wanna have to do that
In the opening sequence, Mike and his mother have already been engaged in cleaning up for the past fifteen minutes. Throughout, they have been largely silent, and do not do “attending” in many of the ways already mentioned. Instead, they work “side-by-side” instead of “toward each other,” seemingly mutually oriented to the task rather than oriented to each other. After Mike asks about the ground meat he is cleaning up, Lisa gives an explanation (line 270), and then Mike notices they are on camera, producing the exaggerated “hi” (line 271) which is followed by the camera person’s giggles (line 272). Mike and Lisa continue to work back-to-back (line 273), then Mike announces a problem: he has put some leftovers in a plastic bag, but is worried it might leak (line 276).

Mike walks over to where Lisa is cutting up pecan pie and displays the bag of food to her (line 278). Lisa announces that the problem is Mike’s, indicating that he has chosen the wrong sort of bag to put the food in (line 279). Mike gives an account (line 280) which Lisa indicates is unsatisfactory by doing a demand in a markedly louder voice, coming almost to a shout on the word “untie” (line 281). Mike retorts as he walks away (line 282), but the next scene shows him withdrawing a new bag from a drawer as the two assume the previous back-to-back positions (line 284). Seconds later, Mike abruptly changes topic (line 285).
Throughout this exchange, Mike and Lisa move easily around each other in the kitchen, saying very little and indicating through gesture, eye movement, and head movement what each other should do. As with employees at a restaurant, for instance, they have clearly done this task together so many times that there are no explanations necessary. All is not perfect, however, as one discovers when Mike makes the error of choosing an inappropriate bag in which to put leftovers. This causes a ritual sequence of criticism-account-command-complaint-compliance which is typical of parent-child and sibling relationships: someone in a higher position criticizes someone in a lower position; the lower person attempts an explanation; the explanation is ignored and a correction of the error is demanded; the demand is met with a complaint, but is nonetheless complied with.

Another point of interest in this interaction is the fact that the problematic episode is completely ignored by the next topic, and is never brought up again throughout the cleaning-up process. The event is treated as “small.” It is not relevant to future interactions. With people who are not as close or who are close as friends, criticism-sequences can cause discomfort because the relationship is assumed to be equal; with parents and children, the relationship is assumed to be unequal, and the parent is legitimized in taking a higher relational position. A state of “normal interacting” is reasserted, turning the conversation to Mike’s head cold. One way of doing closeness is by ignoring problems as unexceptional, while attending to very small matters as worth talking about. This is a way of doing “the mundane” or routine (Schegloff, 1986) life of relating, which usually consists of discussing fairly trifling events.

There are many ways of showing someone is familiar and close to another. One is more explicit. There are rituals of closeness: saying “I love you,” giving gifts and compliments, hugging, kissing, displaying photographs, sharing stories. But there are also implicit ways of
showing closeness. Refraining from such rituals, in a sense, can communicate “we don’t need to say/do it, we know it so deeply.” Doing “nothing special” is a way of showing the normality of interacting with another, which requires familiarity. These are all cultural, as well as dependent on particular relationships.

In this interaction, a potentially moral problem arises. One might call this problem “misunderstanding” (Mike did not understand the kind of bag he was supposed to use) but given that it is ambiguous what Mike’s instructions beforehand were regarding the clean-up, this problem could also be “not paying attention,” “not listening,” “not following through on orders.” Thus, Mike and Lisa experience a brief intersubjective break. Their orientation to each other is disrupted by the lack of sharedness on particulars of the actions in which they are involved. Their particular ways of relating to each other reestablishes order by immediately correcting the error and moving on.

The following examples are more explicit, perhaps because they show how people display particular important relationships amidst a backdrop of other kinds of relationships. The next series of fragments features a group of friends, who also consist of three pairs of married or romantic couples, talking while eating dinner together. Throughout the interaction, people get up and move around intermittently as they finish the meal at different times and leave to do dishes, get seconds, use the restroom, etc. There are several occasions of co-orientation, particularly between the couples, which is marked in a personal way as “within” the rest of the ongoing interaction. Here, I present two examples. John, Jim, and Jim’s wife Nicky are seated on the far side of the table. Mary is across from them, with her back to the camera. Mary’s partner Jane is off camera to the right. John’s wife Nicole is off camera on a nearby couch. The camera itself is sitting on a counter.
Excerpt 10 “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E4.1]

287 Nicky: this stick is giving me problems

288 Nora: I can’t believe how much trouble you have with this this whole time it’s awesome=

291 Mary: =no one else is struggling

((laughter))

292 Jim: ( )

((laughter))

295 John: just put it in your mouth and be done with it

((laughter))
In this fragment, Nicky announces her difficulty with a stick she is supposed to be using to eat her Thai dinner with. As everyone teases her, Jim, her husband, looks at the stick but makes no comment. Throughout Nicky laughs (e.g. line 293), displaying her amusement and seeming to be comfortable in the role of being teased. Instead of orienting to Nicky’s problems with the stick, Jim notices she has some food around her mouth and makes a comment (line 294) before pointing out the issue (line 295) to which Nicky responds by dabbing her mouth (line 295). John then makes a double entendre-like comment, similar to many which have been made throughout the night, and in her laughter, Nicky drops the napkin (line 298). This is followed by her leaning over to retrieve the napkin, and as she does, she places her hand on Jim’s arm after looking at him (line 298).

In this sequence, Nicky and Jim orient to each other in ways that are different from how they orient to others. They do “side-interacting” in which they open small interaction-internal sequences meant only for the two of them, separated from the sequence which was ongoing (Jefferson, 1982). These are often quite intimate, as when Jim comments on food around Nicky’s mouth, and when Nicky puts her hand on Jim’s arm as she gets her napkin (there appears to be no fear she is falling, so the touch seems to have more than a meaning of “steadying” herself). This is one way of displaying that people are in a close relationship of a different type than those
around them—in other words, Jim and Nicky relate to each other in a different way than they do to the others in the room, who are their friends rather than romantic partners.

Through eye contact, intimate noticings, and side interactions, Jim and Nicky co-orient in a way that establishes a unique relating within the setting of general friendly, joking interaction. They sustain a different sense of commitment to each other, simultaneously, while continuing to participate as friends with the others. Co-orientation through side-interaction devices comprises the intersubjective practice for creating an orientation-within-an orientation. This shift in participation (Goffman, 1981) is an intersubjective shift that demonstrates a different form and extent of relationality with a particular person. As in so many examples related thus far, participants can cue different relationships with particular others within the same general interactional event. The next example re-focuses on friendship relationships, and how those are highlighted against the romantic relationships that also exist. This fragment comes from near the end of the dinner. Mary asks Jim what he’s brought for dessert. John, who is a much closer friend to Mary than Jim is, takes advantage of a comment by Jim to display his friendship with Mary.

Excerpt 11 “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E5.1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>Mary: so what did you bring for dessert (0.5) since it’s not [()]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>Jim: [chocolate mousse-] chocolate mousse cake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>Mary: ( ) yes=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>Jim: =it’s- it looks good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>Mary: it sounds good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>Jim: it’s big</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>306</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>Mary: o↑o:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308</td>
<td>[((laughter))]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mary: [()]

John: [() (laughing)]

Nicky: walked into that one baby

((laughter))

John: Mary’s like “that’s great (.) I don’t care”

((laughter))
In this interaction, Mary treats Jim’s comment of “it’s big” (line 305) as another one of the typical double entendres that has been occurring throughout the dinner by giving an exaggerated reaction (line 307). Whether Jim meant it this way is unclear—he expresses a kind of chagrin, and everyone around him treats it as though it were an accident, with John shaking his head and patting Jim’s arm (lines 309, 311) and Jim’s wife Nicky stating that he “walked into that one” (line 313). John then builds on Jim’s faux pas by making it particularly consequential because, in addition to being a sexual reference he should have been aware of, it is also treated as a heterosexual reference which is given to a woman who identifies as lesbian. John calls this out by “speaking for” Mary in line 316: he reports a thought or hypothetical utterance that Mary might say in response to Jim saying “it’s big.”

This response (line 316), accompanied by a dramatic nonverbal enactment (line 317), implies that Jim’s utterance was inappropriate especially for Mary. John on the other hand positions himself as knowing Mary well enough to guess how she would react to the situation if Jim’s utterance actually had been referring to a male sexual organ (as seems to be the reference). Thus, John’s display of, and apparent comfort with, the intimate knowledge of Mary’s sexual identity (and the supposed distaste toward men that this identity assumedly implies) becomes grounds for him to display, for the purpose of humor, a righteous indignation on her behalf toward being prey to inappropriate heterosexual references. This indignation is exaggerated through nonverbal performances (lines 309, 311, 317) and culminates in John’s performance “as Mary.” To speak for another is a strong form of co-identification, in which the interlocutor feels close enough to another to be legitimized in speaking on that other’s behalf, and indicates (though whether Mary would confirm it is unclear) a strong form of intersubjective relation between John and Mary.
Commitment is not only displayed to the committed other, but for various others. In more explicit or public social and cultural contexts, commitment is displayed through a number of special markers: wedding rings, references to “my partner,” photographs displayed on a desk, changing one’s last name, telling shared stories, etc. In more private contexts where multiple others appear, co-orientation devices in gesture and talk can manage different types and strengths of closeness with the different participants. This is to some extent always a delicate negotiation. It is eminently possible to display too much closeness to one person for another’s liking; to show too little closeness to someone who expected it; to take liberties with closeness; to demonstrate closeness in an inappropriate situation; etc. In this situation, intersubjectivity was practiced for demonstrating closeness and doing humor, and though it is not strongly ratified by Mary (she could have said “exactly” or reinforced John’s comment), it is neither treated as problematic.

Through the devices described, for the most part, intersubjectivity was practiced without too many serious problems arising. And yet the potential for conflict was imminent throughout. Gaze may be overt or withheld, signaling dissatisfaction with a prior utterance, or a person’s typical way of responding. Gestures may acquire different meanings to different people. Attentional pursuit may be ignored, or misinterpreted. Co-orientation may alienate. Displaying commitment is a delicate business, and intersubjectivity must be carefully managed to do it well.

**Intersubjectivity as Moral Relational Practice**

This chapter presented a number of devices which can be used to accomplish intersubjectivity between interlocutors. Intersubjectivity is perhaps the least minimal requirement for conversation, and can likely be shown as a practice that occurs across contexts where people have to interact with one another. When, where and how intersubjectivity is practiced, however, will be contextually bound. Here, I have demonstrated how intersubjectivity can be used in doing
intimacy and commitment in interaction, a higher level of commitment than in interactions between strangers or casual acquaintances. The consequences of not holding up one’s end of the interactional bargain is harsher for people who share a special co-oriented identity with one another, one achieved over long periods of time and based in intersubjective care.

In these examples, the problem of intersubjectivity was largely successfully overcome. Sometimes troubles did intrude, and intersubjectivity was threatened. But devices such as recognition, intelligibility, attention and orientation were employed to maintain the sharedness of interactional projects and the ongoing situations they constructed. Efforts to maintain intersubjectivity with close others are treated as consequential when those efforts fail (or perhaps were not taken in the first place). In the example of Mike and Lisa, Lisa’s emotional display (the shouted criticism) seems harsh given Mike’s relatively small error. The extent to which family members expect certain actions to be performed in certain ways depends on the hierarchy of the family. It is difficult to imagine, for example, Mike having the same response to Lisa. Lisa’s reaction displays an analysis of Mike’s error-admission as consequential given her intersubjective expectations. As Francis and Hester (2004) note in an ethnomethodological analysis of family interactions, “talk may be both recipient designed and grounded in locally relevant categorical entitlements” (p. 72). Intersubjectivity is a practice for organizing different people’s commitments to one another. When some action signals a commitment as potentially unshared, intersubjectivity becomes a moral problem.

In line with a grounded practical theory approach, this chapter described practices participants have for dealing with potentially problematic interactional and ideological situations having to do with intersubjectivity practice. Though in all of the cases here there were no serious troubles, the withholding of recognition, intelligibility displays, attention or other-orientation
could be disturbing in a moment, and devastating over time. The achievement of interactionally “successful” discursive moral practices in these cases implicates an idea for an ideal version of this practice—a theory of what constitutes “moral communication” in this setting. Though participants would likely espouse norms for intersubjectivity practices such as “you should pay attention to me when I’m talking to you” or “can you tell me whether I’m making sense or not?” there nonetheless exist many tacit norms at work. For example, one might be articulated as “it’s okay to pay less attention to me if you have a cute baby in your arms.” Furthermore, the assumption of sharedness seems to be stronger for people in closer relationships, as when Lisa’s criticism of Mike treats a fairly small error as requiring a strong response. These considerations are returned to in chapter nine.

This chapter has worked at specifying the practices that achieve different situated forms of intersubjectivity and some of their interactional and interpersonal meanings. The analyses provide evidence for the argument that intersubjectivity overcomes the problems of difference regarding interactional projects by working to constructed a shared interactional and interpersonal world. Through the course of the next several chapters, I will build on the implications of the empirical results reviewed in order to move toward what constitutes moral communication across these instances.

Chapter four reconstructed “intersubjectivity” as a collection of practices for doing the foundation of morality based on an assumption of sharedness. Intersubjectivity is practiced by people in all sorts of relationships to one another. The next chapter, chapter five, discusses intimacy as a moral discursive practice. Intimacy involves close relationships. Furthermore, intimate relationships themselves can be quite different, and affect how morality is expected to unfold. The next chapter looks at intimacy particularly within families and friends, but also
between romantic partners. Within the GPT approach, the problem of intimacy involves a
dilemma regarding the danger of engaging in questionable moral practices with close others.
Chapter five analyzes this dilemma in friend and family interactions to reconstruct intimacy as a
moral practice.
Chapter 5
The Dilemma of Intimacy in Close Relationships

The link between relationships and morals is in some ways an obvious one. Values, beliefs, and attitudes about how people should treat each other and what a relationship should be like are part of what shapes and transforms relationships over time (Burleson, 2003). To “relate” intimately with another is to implicate consequential but often unspoken “contracts” between people, for example, what to do about secrets, how to react to mutual friends’ criticism of a non-present friend, how to frame problems and arguments, when to apologize and when to forgive, expected duties and responsibilities, and how to do aligning and agreement.

This chapter discusses intimacy as a moral discursive practice. Within the GPT approach, the problem of intimacy is a dilemma involving the simultaneous ease and danger of engaging in questionable moral practices with close others. Based on an analysis of this dilemma in friend and family interactions, this chapter argues that an assumption of shared understanding with regard to the stable moralities of close others is in tension with the moral questionableness of certain moral practices which can reveal fundamental differences. Based on particular actions and topics which implicate the identity of the speaker as well as the identities of others, intimacy requires careful management of the potential for moral judgments.

This chapter focuses on the problem of intimacy, a practice for doing closeness based on intersubjectivity and more complex communicative activities. This chapter looks at intimacy as a practice which constructs relationality and relational identities through the management of morally questionable communication. The problem of intimacy for morality involves the way in which doing the practice constitutes a dilemma between the comfort to engage in morally questionable activities with close others, and the potential damage such engagement may cause if
it implicates ideological differences. Intimacy is partly built out of intersubjectivity, but is also a different way of interacting that provides a different context for morality. It is not exactly a requirement for morality, but is a requirement for the analysis of morality as an interpersonal achievement in close relationships.

Morality and intimacy are inextricably bound in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. On one hand, people seem less likely to discuss moral concepts in a personal way with less close others. Being close seems to imply a comfort level that makes certain activities and topics easier to bring up. On the other hand, the implications of these activities and topics are far more consequential for close friends and family than for acquaintances. Closeness in relationships seems to create interactionally-achieved ideological dilemmas between the ease of participating in morally-implicative interactions, and the consequentiality those interactions can have for the committed relationship. This chapter considers social rituals and management of moral topics in which participants engage and how the handling of communicated moralities constitutes the management of a kind of openness and closedness dilemma. It may be easier for close friends and family to engage in moral practices, but the way in which they are engaged matters more. This creates a tension in which the management of morality in interaction becomes especially salient, and potentially threatening.

The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to intimacy. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and managing intimacy. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for participants’ situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.

Closeness: Relationality and Intimacy
In the last chapter, closeness was implicated by the underlying requirement of a shared interactional and interpersonal world. Intersubjectivity is the most important basis for social interaction to have any kind of sense (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). This chapter builds on that by looking at close relationships in which intersubjectivity is assumed, and intimacy becomes the problem (though in practice these actions are mutually constitutive). Intimacy involves relational-level sets of practices which are identifiable by participants and implicate certain forms of communication not possible in distant relationships. In this section I discuss relationality as implicating identities and commitment in relationships, and the following section focuses on intimacy as a practice.

**Relationality: Identity and Relationships**

The last chapter discussed commitment as an interactional and interpersonal construct achieved in its most fundamental form through intersubjectivity practices. Commitment is strongly linked to intimacy, or displays of closeness. Together, these concepts comprise what is often deemed to be a significant relationship. Research on intimacy has also focused primarily on romantic relationships, though not exclusively. The enduring Uncertainty Reduction Theory (Berger & Calabrese, 1975), for example, is one way of explaining how people in many stages of different kinds of relationships increase intimacy through the decrease of uncertainty. Relational dialectics (Baxter, 1988; Baxter & Montgomery, 1996; Baxter, 2004b; Montgomery & Baxter, 1998) is another approach that describes some discourses of intimacy (that partners should spend a lot of time together, disclose personal information, and develop routines) and how those turn out to be only one-sided components of relational tensions with other, competing discourses.

Relational dialectics, developed by Baxter and Montgomery (1996) and later Baxter and others (e.g., Baxter, 2004a, 2004b; Baxter & Braithwaite, 2002; Baxter & West, 2003;
Braithwaite & Baxter, 1995), is an interpersonal theory for describing common tensions experienced by those in close relationships. Though it has focused on romantic relationships, the theory is not inapplicable to other close relationships, such as friends and families. Based on the dialogue work of Bakhtin (1981, 1986), relational dialectics posits that people in close relationships experience competing needs which are dilemmatic (attention to one need withdraws attention to the other). The interplay of these tensions can take place between a couple, within each person, or by both in different situations. The tensions can never be resolved—only managed.

Relationships involve people’s identities with and for each other. “Identity” has long been a focus of study in sociology and psychology, as well as communication approaches influenced by these disciplines. In interpersonal research, which has been heavily influenced by psychology especially in its inception, “identity” is associated with particular traits such as demographic information, cultural background, ethnicity, age and gender; cognitive dispositions such as complexity, control, authoritarianism, emotion and intelligence; social-personal qualities such as self esteem, humor, self-monitoring; communicative tendencies such as argumentativeness and competence; and relational characteristics such as attachment styles (Daly, 2002).

Much of sociology that was more quantitative took a similar approach, but other areas of sociology—such as symbolic interactionism and narrative theory—as well as communication studies influenced by qualitative sociology and social theory, went a different route. Identities were seen as fluid and accomplished in interaction. Goffman’s approach is particularly relevant to a sociological perspective on identity, and as a scholar who has influenced numerous
communication studies (including work in interpersonal communication and Language and Social Interaction) Goffman’s conceptualizations of “identity” are particularly relevant.

Goffman does not often use the term “identity” in his work, but much of what he has written deals with identity. For Goffman, identity is always social. In considering the presentation of self, for example, Goffman (1959) situates the idea of “selves” in interaction. By seeking to find out about others, he proposes, people develop a “definition of the situation” which guides their actions, tells them what to expect from that person, and constitutes the “what is going on here” into which interactants then fit themselves. Goffman takes an empirical approach by asserting that “what people are really like” can only be ascertained by what people say and do—their actions and expressions. People also act toward each other as if this were the case, and thus work to display a particular sense of self—one appropriate to the most desirable definition of the situation at the moment, for instance. For Goffman, the mechanism of this other-oriented display of self is facework (Goffman, 1967). Facework is the management of one’s own, and another’s, face—a positive image of one’s identity.

Throughout his work, Goffman tackles a number of different kinds of “identities”—staff and patients in a mental institution (1961), “normals” and “stigmatized” individuals (1963), and callers and call takers in radio (1981). Throughout, he treats identities almost as placeholders: that in a given situation, people will take on the identities, the roles, needed to accomplish a particular definition of the situation. This is particularly the case for organized settings, such as for teams in organizations, but it extends loosely to other areas of everyday life. “Facework” has been an influential way of conceptualizing identities as a kind of self-in-relation-to-others.

Discourse approaches in communication scholarship have taken an ongoing interest in identity, some drawing on Goffman, some not (De Fina, Schiffrin & Bamberg, 2006).
Conversation analysis (CA), on the other hand, is an approach that has long been wary of considering identity. Because CA scholars seek to ground any analyst observations in the talk structure itself, “naming” identities and relationships as a researcher is considered somewhat suspect, akin to imposing an interpretation that may not be there. Other people doing CA and CA-influenced, ethnomethodological work have worked to show that interlocutors do attend to such categories. “Identity” is thus treated as a construct used in talk to achieve interactional goals (Antaki & Widdicombe, 2008).

The CA perspective is a specific kind of discourse analysis approach. Other approaches do not take the same route to getting at the meanings of interaction. For instance, discursive psychology (Potter, 1996) has developed into two strands—one more CA-like, the other more rhetorically oriented—both of which seek to ground “psychological” attributions in discourse. Such attributions may refer to morally-inflected concepts such as motive and intention, personality traits, character, and mental states (“being morally conflicted,” for instance) as well as to relationships such as “my brother,” “your friend,” “a conscientious colleague,” “a good father.”

“Identity” is looked at differently by, and taken up as a recurrent theme of, the work of action implicative discourse analysis (AIDA) (Tracy, 1995, 2004). AIDA has studied such identity through such phenomena as facework at schoolboard meetings (e.g., Tracy, 2008c; Tracy & Durfy, 2007; Tracy & Muller, 2001) and questioning in court appeals (Tracy, 2009a). Unlike CA approaches, AIDA takes an approach associated with the concept of “identity-work” and assumes that identities are an important part of everyday talk: talk shapes the identities people are presumed to have, and identities people are presumed to have shape how their talk is interpreted (Tracy, 2002). As an approach that is ethnographically informed, AIDA makes close
study of the institutional sites for which it was designed, requiring various methods of gathering
the history, background, identities, situations and “scenes” contextually relevant to the focal
discursive practices that occur at the site. Though not as strongly ethnographic as an ethnography
of communication approach (which itself includes a range of ethnographic depth: Carbaugh,
2007), AIDA nonetheless seeks to situate the practices it studies in a context—a quite different
approach than that of CA.

In Bucholtz and Hall (2004), identity from a linguistic anthropological perspective is
comprised of practices and negotiations of sameness and difference, indexed through language
and ideologically infused. In Bucholtz and Hall’s (2005) sociolinguistic framework for
understanding identity, they distinguish five principles of identity: (1) it is the product rather than
source of linguistic and semiotic practices (so is social-cultural, not internal-psychological); (2) it
encompasses demographic categories, interactionally specific stances and participant roles, and
ethnographic cultural positions; (3) identities can be indexed through labels, implicatures,
stances, styles, linguistic structures and/or systems; (4) identities are relationally constructed
through the relationship between self and other; and (5) identity can be intentional, habitual, and
unconscious: negotiated with others, perceived and represented by others, and ideological.

There are many different ways of defining and understanding identity. As indicated by
the different categories studied in interpersonal research, identities can be divided up a number
of ways and can include many different aspects of individual’s personal, social and cultural lives.
This analysis focuses on identities that are salient in people’s orientations to particular others, but
other ways of conceiving identities, it turns out, are not easily separable from relationally-
oriented identities. This means, then, that there is something special about closely-related
identities which gives interactions greater moral weight. If the comfort to speak freely is
particularly in tension with the damage that speaking freely can cause to the closeness of people in close relationships, then it is worth considering exactly what identity is, and why certain relationships of identity experience such tensions in moral interactions. The next section focuses more on intimacy, or the creation of closeness among and between identities, as the site of analysis in this chapter and as a problem for morality.

**Intimacy**

In her discussion of an emotionally-charged internet listserv discussion, Fitch (1999) discussed how interactional participants construct relational codes, culturally appropriate systems of meaning which draw on cultural premises about relationships and their norms for interaction, as a way of doing intimacy. Intimacy is not taken to be an internal process or feeling, but a visible marker of a “close relationship” which is communicated through culturally intelligible practices.

Baxter (& Montgomery, 1996) describes the most common tensions in intimate relationships as dilemmas between autonomy and connectedness, openness and closedness, and spontaneity and predictability. The dilemma between feeling very intimate with another, and yet maintaining one’s individuality, for instance, is compatible with the autonomy-connectedness dilemma. This chapter focuses on a number of intimacy dilemmas created by participation in moral practices. These dilemmas are similar to the openness-closedness dilemma, in which people want to share or engage in certain ways with their close other, and yet too much sharing can reveal information which is potentially threatening to the relationship. In each of the dilemmas presented in this analysis, interactants must balance the ease with which morality can be enacted with the heavier consequences of problematic misenactments. Thus, as Fitch’s (1999) comments suggested, the dilemmas of intimacy are not treated as emotional or psychological
dilemmas (as in an intrapersonal struggle for what one “wants”) but are made visible in discursive choices.

This chapter assumes that the dilemmas just described—which might be labeled emotional, interpersonal, or relational dilemmas—are also ideological dilemmas (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988) which index cultural assumptions regarding how people should be with one another. However, since this work is situated in discursive approach, these dilemmas are always, in a sense, also, and constituted by, interactional dilemmas (Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001)—dilemmas regarding what actions to take in talk.

This chapter deals with the relational level of problems discussed so far, for example, how to show closeness with a friend by divulging gossip without being seen by one’s friends “as a gossip.” This chapter will also deal with the ideological level of problems, the ways in which these moral practices reflect and recreate cultural ideas about how to be a good person, a good friend, a good daughter. This chapter also submits, however, that managing these problems is a moral practice itself, achieved through the interactional dilemmas inherent in moral practices. To engage in moral practice is to confront the commitment, consequentiality, ideology and conflictual differences between and within participants, relationships, and cultural contexts.

This chapter proposes that relating is a moral interactive process in which upgrading judgments of persons and actions is co-constitutive with doing closeness between people who could be identified as “related” or in a friendly relationship—in other words, people who are intimate. In addition to intersubjectivity practices discussed in chapter four, which accomplish the fundamental structure of relating through recognition, intelligibility, attention and identification, particular communication events or rituals, as well as topics, can be used to manage relational closeness. In participating in morally-relevant rituals and handling moral
topics, participants indicate their relationship in different ways. Through the course of conversation, people will negotiate their values particularly in relation to one another.

This poses a problem for interactants that is unique in comparison to the way in which strangers interact. Among strangers, moral accountability and judgment is handled quite carefully, but even when it is not, the consequences are not great. You may feel the sting of a snub at the symphony ticket counter long enough to complain about it to someone else, but it would never hurt as much as hurtful words from a loved one. Even among strangers who do confront clashing ideologies and openly disagree with one another, the effect is different. As Tracy (1997) notes, it is not the case that arguments over ideas are not tied at all to persons. But there is a sense in which such arguments are not as personal. Strangers arguing in a debate, or even colleagues arguing in an academic forum, encounter dilemmas when handling moral issues such as beliefs, opinions, and judgments. But only in extreme cases do such dilemmas have the potential to threaten the relationship itself.

Morality is linked to the ways in which people perform intimate relational identities with one another. Thus to deal with an ideological dilemma is to deal with a relational dilemma. And to deal with an ideological or relational dilemma is to deal with an interactional dilemma. This chapter analyzes the practices with which people construct intimacy through the negotiation of appropriateness for engaging in moral practices.

Such practices are multiple, and have been described elsewhere (see chapter two). I will discuss such practices and cues of intimacy in the next section also, which asks the question, what does intimacy look like empirically? If commitment is defined as the communication of intimacy over time (or at least, the communication of intimacy in a future-oriented way), is there any sense in which it can be pinned down in interaction? The common criticism from a discourse
analytic perspective is that interpersonal research does not ground relationships in empirical, discursive data. Though different interpersonal scholars have urged a more discursive approach to interpersonal communication (e.g. Beavin Bavelas, Kenwood & Phillips, 2002; Jacobs, 2002), there has not been a strong attempt to pin down “relating” in actual discourse. On the other hand, there has also not been much work in discourse analysis, particularly among conversation analysts, to consider the role of identities and relationships in interaction, particularly regarding how they are accomplished through contextual and non-talk practices.

According to Bergmann (1998), a more social approach to morality looks at how moral concepts (ideological, cultural notions such as “fairness” or “goodness”) are shaped and managed in interaction. In the ensuing analysis, such concepts and their construction are ways of indicating intimacy between people in close relationships who have particular identities for and with one another. The next section begins with a discussion of method, presents an example to highlight the practices of intimacy, then shows how morally questionable practices can be ways of managing relational closeness.

**Intimacy as a Moral Discursive Practice**

This view of morality in talk is compatible with the previous discussion of identity and relating, in that communicative events can be analyzed as meaningful to speakers in addition to being structurally meaningful. In other words, speaker assignations and analysts’ reconstructions of what speakers are doing and who speakers are being are reasonable moves to make given that, from a GPT and AIDA perspective, the goal is to formulate improvable practices. The next section begins with an overview of empirically grounding relationship differences around moral concepts, then points out moments of morally-sensitive interaction between close friends and family members. While the management of these events is a way of constituting a close
relationship, the problem of dealing with the dilemma that close relationships create for moral interaction gets handled in different ways. The choices participants make in confronting dilemmas in moral interaction provide insight into how relational contexts inform discursive practices.

The work of which this chapter is a part has proposed that morality is more consequential for committed relationships. If morality is interactionally achieved through particular discursive practices, then that means that such practices matter in a fundamental way. The apparent ease of engaging in moral practices with another is itself a morally judgable activity built on the expectation of shared understandings between friends and family. Assumedly, one can criticize more openly; gossip more freely. And yet to engage in these practices reveals potential differences of understanding between friends, different enactments of ideologies about what a person should be like and what that means for their communicative comportment. This makes such engagements tricky. Granted, it is probably easy to imagine that a small or even not-so-small moment of nastiness between loved ones can be easily moved past—but how people treat the potential for conflict is a matter for a later chapter. Here, I discuss how the consequentiality of moral practice in a close, committed relationship implicates an interpersonal dilemma.

The relational context in the analyses in these sections constitutes close friendships, families, and romantic partners. These relationships achieve their closeness based on the practices discussed in chapter four—practices of intersubjectivity and other-orientedness which they perform for one another, and others around them. But this closeness and sense of commitment is also achieved through doing social actions together, including moral practices. In the next section I discuss what the difference between non-close and close friends “looks” like in the process of engaging moral practice for the purposes of making clear, empirically, the
relational basis which I will describe in more detail in the ensuing analysis. After that, the following section reviews particular moral practices and how they play out among friends and family members, particularly regarding how the danger of doing morality is balanced against the ideological risk.

**Intimacy-Relevant Cues and Morality**

This section begins with an illustrative example that builds on the examples of commitment as intersubjective morality practice discussed in chapter four. Rather than obtaining information about intimacy through relational partners’ self-reports or analysts’ knowledge of the participants’ relationship status, a discourse analytic approach seeks to ground what it means to be “close” in empirical data. If two people consider themselves to be in a close relationship, then their talk must orient as such. What are the “signs” of closeness? In this section I present a comparison of two sets of friends, one pair merely friendly acquaintances, the other pair close friends for several years, to present some of the features that make certain friendships empirically closer than others. Though these data involve morally-freighted topics in some sense, the focus in this initial analysis is to ground intimacy rather than to consider explicitly its link to morality, which is taken up in subsequent analyses in this chapter.

This section analyzes two “assigned” videos created by undergraduate students at a Midwest university to make the point that even in this rather “unnatural” recording context, participants display cues that indicate how close they are to one another. The assignment was to introduce themselves (as one might do in any ordinary conversation), watch a short YouTube video about technological advances, and discuss attitudes toward technology and its impact on society as positive or negative. Students were to record 30-40 minutes by audio or audio/video. Communicative actions, topical choices, displays of common knowledge and adherence to “the
assignment” are all ways in which these two “teams” do different kinds of relating to one another. The first series of fragments demonstrates different changes in conversation across the recording.

*Excerpt 12 Fragment 1 “Team A”* [fm.assigs09.1.E2.1]

1. Laura: that we rely too much on it=
2. Maggie: definitely rely too much on technology (.) and how=
3. Laura: yeah like (0.5) we expect it to work no matter what all the time and when it doesn’t

*Excerpt 11 Fragment 2*

4. Laura: we have so many cameras out in our public that like I think it’s an av-
5. Maggie: you’re caught on average (.) on camera eight times a day
6. Laura: yeah but in a way I mean it’s also [a good-
7. Maggie: [it’s a] good
8. Maggie: [cuz you] can like catch=
9. Maggie: that is (.) ridiculous=
10. Laura: =yeah but in a way I mean it’s also [a good-
11. Maggie: [it’s a] good
12. Laura: [thing]
13. Maggie: [cuz you] can like catch=
Laura: =Amber alert and catching like you know if [kids are kidnapped ]
Maggie: =criminals] exactly

*Excerpt 11 Fragment 3*

Maggie: if we can figure out things that’s awesome but at the same time it’s like (. )
n:o this- this shouldn’t be allowed because it’s like =
Laura: =*yeah*=

Maggie: =invading all that (. ) I don’t know
Laura: right
Maggie: it definitely- there’s so many problems when it comes to it

The conversation between the women in Team A—Maggie and Laura—is typical of a number of audio and video recordings received by the author upon completion of the assignment, and is also typical of the audio and video recordings donated to the author upon the completion of the course. It demonstrates a familiar pattern, beginning with introductions and a marked self-consciousness toward being recording; continuing with a more casual attitude as the conversation becomes more relaxed and the camera becomes less of a conversation piece; and encountering moments of awkwardness when participants run out of things to say for a moment, check the time, and realize they need to keep talking, at which point there is a return to the earlier self-consciousness.

Maggie and Laura largely stick to the topic and employ a loose “interview-style” format, going back and forth and asking each other questions about various technology-related issues and how they are or are not problematic. In their responses, Maggie and Laura are careful about how they answer questions that seem to seek sensitive information or which are about potentially sensitive topics. In fact, most of the time they frame their opinions in terms of cultural orientations, for example, “people wouldn’t know what to do without technology” and “there are pros and cons to both side” or “a lot of people say x”—references to general opinions in the society rather than ones that are closely tied to their personal opinions. Even when discussing
their own dependence on technology, the way into this conversation was achieved with a more
general discussion about the society’s dependence on technology.

Across the discussion, Maggie and Laura work to align themselves with one another, and avoid disagreements. They constantly agree on subjects brought up, and on subjects which they seem to have slightly different orientations, they manage to avoid addressing the disagreement directly or discussing it in depth. Toward the beginning of the assignment, they are angled toward each other but facing the camera, and glance at the camera frequently. Fragment 1 shows them displaying strong agreement with each other (lines 3 and 4, “yeah” and “definitely”) with no pauses between turns. Fragment 2 shows a typical instance in which agreement was even more marked, and here they display stronger orientation to one another (lines 8, 14) and overlap in a cooperative fashion that reinforces their agreement (lines 10-16).

After a rather ironic five-minute break during which Laura takes a call on her cell phone, the conversation continues roughly where it ended, and continues also to be largely agreeing. In fact there is only one moment where a slight difference in alignment seems to be expressed. Just before fragment 3, Laura had brought up the role of technology in people’s lives as being linked to surveillance, but having good reasons. She describes for instance the idea of listening in on people’s cell phone conversations for terrorist activities as being an invasion of privacy on one hand, but also notes that she doesn’t say anything over the phone that she would mind others hearing. This positions her as trying to be fair to the situation.

Maggie begins by agreeing (line 18), but makes it clear that the invasion of privacy continues to trouble her (lines 18-19, 22, 25). Laura responds to these comments with “yeah” and “right” (lines 20, 23), but notably, her responses do not display the same enthusiastic agreement as others. Here, “yeah” and “right” seem to function more as continuers, or markers of having
understood what Maggie is saying, rather than outright agreement. They are produced in a lower tone of voice and Laura looks down at the table as she produces them (lines 21, 24).

This recording shows an example of two people who do not appear to be close. They do not know each other’s opinions beforehand, and are careful about displaying their opinions, choosing instead to talk about topics in reference to larger social issues. They do not seem to share information about each other’s personal lives (Laura’s explanation of who was calling her during the cell break assumes no prior knowledge) and make no references to shared pasts or upcoming events. Problematic and morally-inflected topics are handled impersonally and are co-constructed to maximize agreement, while similar topics that seem to contain disagreement are managed so as to avoid any outright conflict. Though friendly acquaintances such as these two women can be animated and talk about a number of consequential moral topics, they do so in a particular way that does not accomplish close relating, but instead manages interpersonal distance.

Excerpt 13 “Team B” [frn.assigs09.2.E4.1]

   26  Julie: senior year I went to prom with Hank
   27   Anna: ((snorts)) didn’t you guys like ditch each other afterwards
   28  Julie: yeah then we ended up running into each other at like King Soopers
   29   Anna: oh::

   30  Julie: and he was so pissed cuz I told him I couldn’t like go out afterwards an ((sharp inhalation))
   31   Anna: [whoopsie
   32  Julie: [who:: yeah] I don’t think he was [very happy
   33   Anna: [sma:ll world]
   34  Julie: he didn’t talk to me for like a year after that [((laughs))]
Anna: [w0]

Julie: I finally started talking to him after like high school ended ((laughs))

Anna: that’s so funny (.) well it didn’t really sound like you guys wanted to go with each other anyway you guys were just going

Julie: we di- yeah we went because he asked me before we broke up and

Anna: oh::

Julie: I did- I didn’t- I wanted to go with Matt (.) cuz I was dating Matt at the time=

Anna: =yeah

Julie: and=

Anna: =but Matt was in Wyoming

Julie: no he wasn’t (.) I hung out with him after=

Anna: =that’s right=

Julie: =after prom ((laughs)) and that’s why I told Hank I think that I couldn’t go out

((laughter))

Anna: that’s e(h)vil=

Julie: =I know (0.5) and then the year after I went with Matt to prom and I wanted to go

with Taylor cuz I was dating Taylor
Julie: I never went with the person I was dating
The Team B pair—Julie and Anna—have an interaction which is markedly different from that of Team A, but still follows a noticeable pattern across the data. Rather than beginning with introductions, they jump right into talking after saying their names (making their introductions to the camera rather than to each other). They mention the assignment topic, but quickly move on to other things. They don’t run out of things to talk about, and they don’t seem to censor their conversation. There is less self-consciousness, and their conversations move very quickly with very few pauses.

Julie and Anna cover many topics, all of which relate to their personal lives. The format of their conversation is casual, as might occur between friends who were talking as they usually would, without a camera recording them. The only difference is that like Team A, they are angled toward the camera, and glance at it intermittently. They discuss several problematic instances in their lives, and react expressively to them. Throughout, they make references to personal details in each other’s lives, seeming to share knowledge about past events in high school, information about each other’s family members, references to mutual known persons, and an understanding of each other’s daily activities. They frequently co-construct prior experiences together and make agreeing assessments toward those experiences. They also make eye contact much more often, gesture toward each other, and even turn their heads entirely. Despite the fact that they are seated, if anything, more directly facing the camera than Team A, their orientation seems to be much more toward each other.

In this excerpt, Anna and Julie discuss Julie’s prom-related mishaps in which, twice in a row, she ended up going to a prom with an ex-boyfriend after she’d already started seeing someone new, and the problems that this caused. Both Julie and Anna orient to Julie’s behavior
as questionable—not so much because she went to the prom with people she didn’t want to go with, but because at least in the first place, she lied to the person she had gone with so that she could spend time with her current boyfriend after the prom. At first, this specific reason for the lie is not known. When Anna recalls that they ditched each other (line 27), it still seems as if both could be held accountable for their actions. Anna’s response of “ohh” (line 29) and her exaggerated, open-mouthed expression (line 30) is in response to the fact that they were both “caught out” being around town when both had left each other after the prom. That this is the interpretation by Anna is strengthened when Anna makes the comment that it is a “small world” (line 35), indicating that it was an unfortunate accident.

Julie goes on to explain in various ways that Hank was not happy about this incident (lines 31, 34, 36), however, which provides a clue that the “ditching” was perhaps more one-sided than Anna had assumed. Anna at first still orients to the situation as an error rather than caused by Julie (line 33) and she continues this assessment by making a sound of surprise that Hank apparently held the incident against Julie for so long (line 37). Anna attempts to formulate explicitly what she’s been assuming in lines 40-41—that both Julie and Hank had ditched each other, and thus Hank’s continued anger is “funny” (line 40) and perhaps unfair.

It is only at Julie’s explanation in line 42 that Anna realizes what the situation was, and that Hank actually did not ditch Julie, but Julie lied to Hank to ditch him, making the problem more one-sided than it had seemed. Anna shows her acknowledgement of this news by again remarking “ohhh” and making another dramatic facial expression (lines 43-44). Julie continues giving an account of the situation, which is that she really wanted to go with her current boyfriend, but was stuck with the old one because he’d asked her to prom before they broke up (line 45). Anna continues to provide possible ways of downgrading Julie’s fault, however,
suggesting that the current boyfriend was not around during prom anyway (line 48), but Julie admits then that Matt was in town, and in fact, that was why she’d lied to Hank about going out after prom (lines 49, 51). Both laugh at the incident (lines 52-53), but Anna’s comment “that’s evil” (line 54) and Julie’s immediate agreement (“I know” line 55) shows they both recognize it was not a nice thing to do.

One way of doing closeness is to assume the best interpretations of the other’s actions. In this excerpt, Anna continually interprets Julie’s narrative in a way that is forgiving and face-attentive to Julie. Anna’s reactions are situated within a humorous frame through her laughter, and her exaggerated facial responses show a lack of seriousness in her assessments of Julie’s behavior. Thus, even when she does finally acknowledge Julie’s fault for the problematic situation and labels it as a bad act (“that’s evil”), her assessment is not heard as being critical of Julie because she has already worked to define the situation as a humorous one rather than one worthy of serious judgment. Julie appears to experience little discomfort at revealing her bad actions to Anna, and this strengthens the sense of reciprocity between them: Julie trusts Anna not to judge her too harshly, and in return, Anna withholds judgment and only provides it in an acceptable frame.

There was once a disagreement in a class of mine over whether close friends were more comfortable arguing, or less so. One student insisted friends are more comfortable arguing because they know the other person does not “really mean it” if the insults start flying. Another student claimed friends are less comfortable arguing because they do not want to start a fight that could ruin the friendship. Clearly, what the fight is about and the kind of friendship being constructed will impact which orientation to argument is truer. But it does seem to be the case that closer friends will bring up and deal with possibly “taboo” topics in different ways.
Interactions between casual friends and friendly acquaintances in the assignment described above followed a different pattern than interactions between closer friends. Comparing these different ways of interacting in the context of a relatively stable assignment format reveals some of the ways that friends signal closeness to one another. This comparison also points out how the ways in which moral topics can be sensitive among closer friends, and some strategies that friends have for dealing with that.

Closer relationships are more morally consequential because ideology is more relevant. Fundamental beliefs can matter in brief moments between strangers, but they matter a lot more when people have a commitment to and assumed future with one another. One way of achieving closeness is in engaging in activities, including moral practices, together. These sharings constitute social and cultural rituals for affirming the relational identities of people in close relationship. However, such sharings must be balanced because dealing with ideology is risky. Perhaps even more difficult is the difference between how ideology is enacted, and the local assumptions about ideologies themselves. This analysis takes ideology to be a discursive enactment, something which is interactionally achieved, oriented to by participants, and namable by analysts. Participants, however, may (and often do) see ideologies as fixed and permanent; as part of a person’s unchangeable character; and, when different, as irreconcilable. These assumptions are part of what guides people to manage their moral practices so carefully with their loved ones.

**Moral Discursive Practices and their Dilemmas**

This chapter uses discourse analysis in a grounded practical theory perspective to identify a kind of intimacy practice which is highly problematic: the engagement of morally questionable interaction. This analysis draws on discourse, relational and cultural context to make sense of the
ways in which participants treat morally-charged actions such as gossip and sex as unproblematic or troubling, and the underlying dilemmas they confront in enacting such actions. One way to study morality is to begin by considering what kinds of communicative activities feature “moralizing” elements—situations in which people hold each other accountable, judge one another’s actions, and evaluate each other’s characters. In this analysis I discuss four of such activities which were discussed in chapter two. This section in particular focuses on two ways of looking at what people do in their communication. One focuses on the notion of “ritual,” from Goffman (1967)—how people cooperatively conduct particular and recognizable communicative forms—while the other focuses on conversational topics: the “what” about which people talk. Conceiving of a communication activity in terms of ritual draws attention to the patterned communicative forms people engage in, and for which are prescribed particular practices that make up the ritual.

In this section I review three forms of moral practice which involve interactional accomplishments of commitment, ideology and difference or sameness. The first form of moral practice has to do with particular social actions which have moral consequences due to their being face-threatening in a relationship-implicative, ideological way. Such actions, some of which were described in chapter two, include complaining, criticizing, threatening and insulting. These were grouped in chapter two under the heading “judgments” because they revolve around the joint actions of assessing and accounting. The second form of moral practice has to do with degradation rituals, also discussed in chapter two, such as gossip. These were also grouped under “judgments” in chapter two as complex practices for enacting total and damaging character assessments.
The third form of moral practice involves the use of morally-weighty topics in talk. This was labeled “morally-implicative topics” and is considered part of the cluster of moral practice related to language and metadiscourse. These are not quite the same as “taboo topics” (Baxter & Wilmot, 1985) which are considered off-limit conversations in romantic relationships (such as talking about the relationship ending).

The examples discussed previously involved a set of friendly classmates, and a set of close friends. The subsequent examples also feature families and romantic couples. Though intimacy sometimes looks the same among them, some of the rules turn out to be different for moral practices in different relationships. In each section I begin by describing the category of practice and giving examples. I then discuss one particular practice and how it plays out in interaction. I follow with a comparative analysis in a different setting.

**Accounts and account demands.** Account and account demands include any actions that involve addressing a problematic issue, identity, or action. “Reproaching” or criticizing is one way in which people question each other’s actions. Reproaching is a kind of activity that takes place around the question of what people do and how those doings are appropriate or not. This kind of assessment of a person’s actions can occur with regard to many kinds of activities. In the following excerpt, it occurs in relation to how much two friends are expected to know about each other. The friends in this example have been closer to each other than to any other non-family or non-romantic others in their lives for about five years at the time of the recording. In this situation, JR is driving while Amelia holds the video camera. They are driving aimlessly down the California coast and talk on a number of random topics throughout the more than hour long recording.

*Excerpt 14 “Around the Bay” [frn.vis05.3.E4.1]*
One way in which good friends are held accountable for proving their closeness is by remembering particulars about the other’s life. If demonstrating a knowledge of someone’s past, family, preferences and personalities can be a way of getting closer to someone, then a relationship already assumed to be close would assume such demonstrations would occur. When there is an error, it will likely be called out. Among strangers or acquaintances it is not unusual to experience this forgetfulness, and the “calling out” occurs unproblematically, if at all. But the closer people are, the more delicate the situation becomes.

The choice made by the reproacher in this exchange is that the reproach is not given directly. Amelia has mentioned a horror film she saw recently, and her presentation of it conveys
a semi-ridiculing stance. She laughs while describing it (line 60) and the facts she mentions about the film are the most “extreme” ones (“inbred cannibals” “ate her friends” lines 59, 63), skipping straight to what is notable about the film and skipping over any of the plot or characters. She also mentions the name of the actress, which may indicate the common notion that actors’ names alone can sometimes imply the quality of a film. JR displays that she is following Amelia’s utterances (line 68). Her first verbal response seems to be in agreement with the assessment of the funny-bad quality of the film (“oh my god,” produced with laughter, line 61), but in line 66 she says “that sounds like a good movie,” which seems to contradict the prior assessment. Amelia’s comment of “you might enjoy it” (line 69) is produced with rising intonation gradually over “you might” and falling intonation over “enjoy it,” giving the sense that it is neither an incredulous nor affirming statement, but fairly neutral.

Once JR reaffirms that it sounds good to her—that indeed she “probably would” enjoy it (line 70)—Amelia laughs and once again tries to point out what had previously seemed clear between the two, which is that this is actually a “really really bad horror movie” (lines 71-72). At this, there is a brief pause and JR replies “um, sorry, do you know me?” This is not an information-seeking question, but one that is meant to be rhetorical and prefer agreement; that it does so, and that it is obvious Amelia does know JR, makes it clear that the content of the question (Amelia knowing JR) is being contrasted with the inconsistent prior behavior by Amelia. What this utterance is really saying is “you should know me, so you should know what my preferences are.”

Amelia and JR have to manage the problem that arises when one of them makes an accountable mistake about the other. Amelia’s response to the complaint emphasizes her seeing JR as someone with good taste (“I know you look some good horror movies,” line 75), thus
providing a compliment in exchange for the error. JR, rather than pursuing the issue, after explicitly stating her preference for all horror movies (“I like bad ones too” line 76), moves on to discuss particular ones she has seen. By not attempting to provide an account, Amelia’s orientation displays her as having a generally positive view of JR, even if that view is so positive it becomes inaccurate. JR’s response admits the “badness” of the horror movies she likes and glides over Amelia’s error with humor and a change of subject.

If the closeness of a friendship is indexed by references to shared pasts, events, preferences, opinions, etc., then one way of spotting what counts as closeness is when one friend “fails to perceive” or “makes an error” regarding something the other assumes is common knowledge. Since this action indicates a discrepancy, it is held accountable by participants for whom that shared background matters: such actions will be “called out.” This calling out critiques the other person for not having known what was expected to be common knowledge. In choosing how to call out and how to respond to a calling-out, friends must deal with the consequences of addressing their expectations of one another.

The practice of reproaching in this instance is a practice for checking in on someone’s commitment. To accuse someone of not knowing their best friend very well, even in a joking way, is a sort of test. The accused can only provide an account or, as Amelia did, offer a potentially incorrect but flattering reason for the error. To over-address the error (with profuse apologies, for instance) would probably come across as alienating. As Planalp (1999) notes, many of the emotional reactions which would be appropriate with strangers are insulting to close relationships; close relationships involve forgiving quickly for matters deemed small. On the other hand, to act as if the error itself were of no consequence at all would perhaps not, in a
single instance, matter much; but it is the pattern of such behavior, and the situated evidence of such patterns, which point to a more disturbing lack of care for the relationship in general.

The doing of the reproach also involves a dilemma. Bringing up the error can be threatening because it points to a problem and challenges the face of the other person. Ways of describing this in talk include “making a big deal out of nothing” or “making mountains out of molehills.” However, to let it passed unnoticed would potentially perpetuate the error and make it more of a problem in the long run. One can imagine a fictitious scenario in which in the future, Amelia makes scathing remarks about people who watch bad horror films, and this could be hurtful. It sounds like a small instance, but the form of the action could easily enact morality in a critical version of the situation. This is the dilemma involved in deciding when to share something (or remind someone of something assumed to be shared): is it important enough to share? Will it be relevant to the relationship? What problems could arise if it does not become common knowledge?

If relationships are situated accomplishments, then threats to relationships are also. The assumption underlying the interaction described in this example is namable by participants with descriptions such as “friends should know each other’s preferences” or “my best friend knows everything about me” or “my friends keep track of what matters to me.” These sayings are culturally-bound ideologies of friendship in the U.S. context in which these friends were raised.

In the next excerpt, the criticism that occurs in a family interaction and is not explicitly about the relationship between the interactants, but functions to enact the relationship based on how the people respond to one another. The interactants are an elderly mother, Lisa, and her adult son, Mike. They are cleaning up after Thanksgiving. It is the late 1980s in the U.S. This example was also discussed in the previous chapter.
Excerpt 15 “The Reynolds” [fam.hols93.1.E7.1]

79  Mike: oh g(h)od this thing better not (. ) leak (. ) all over the place
80 (2.0)

81

82  Lisa: (that’s the wrong one)
83  Mike: I tied it
84  Lisa: well you U↑NTIE it
85  Mike: I didn’t wanna have to do that
86 (5.0)

87

88  Mike: I have an extreme sinus condition right now=
89  Lisa: =I can hear that
In this interaction, Mike and Lisa are co-oriented in a particular way through the criticizing ritual they enact. Lisa’s authority as taking the role of the “criticizer” regarding Mike’s actions in relation to a simple domestic task implicates her assumption that she has the right to criticize. People who live together do criticize each other for household tasks, even if they are friendly roommates or romantic partners. For instance, roommates and couples will criticize the other’s failure to do something (dishes, taking out the trash, cleaning up a room, etc.). This references expectations for who should do what in the house—a contract generally based on equality (the criticizer has “moral authority” because the other person has failed to hold up their end of the bargain). When people criticize how the other does a specific action—methods of cleaning, for instance, or cooking procedures, etc.—it implies a different kind of authority, not one based on “you haven’t contributed equally,” but one based on “you haven’t done X correctly.” The authority lies in the criticizer’s ability or experience, as a kind of “expert.” If the criticizer is not clearly an authority on the matter, the criticized person will almost certainly give a rebuttal.

The problem with dealing with this kind of criticism, then, is whether to acknowledge the validity of the critique (which puts one in a subordinate social position, if temporarily) and if failing to acknowledge it, whether to give criticism back or to provide an account. It is easy to get caught in a cycle of criticism if both parties see themselves as reasonable, and it is even easier if there are “stores” of complaints garnered over time and waiting at the ready. Acknowledging such complaints and keeping the conversation from being too hurtful is not an easy task.

But that does not happen in this case. When Lisa criticizes Mike’s choice of storing leftovers (line 82), she positions herself as an authority on the matter, and Mike does not
disagree—he gives, instead, an account for why he did what he did (line 83). Accounts are given because the person called to provide them recognizes that something problematic has occurred which requires an explanation. If that were not recognized, the criticism, or the need to account itself, would be challenged. Because Mike does not do this, and in fact follows Lisa’s instructions to rectify his error (line 87), he shows that he accepts her authority. Though their criticizing ritual takes a disagreeing form, it actually upholds the nature of their relationship rather than questioning it. This is probably why it is immediately diffused and transitions to the topic of Mike’s head cold.

Though Mike is a grown man and can probably store food well enough, he is in Lisa’s kitchen and he is, at the end of the day, Lisa’s son. She has more experience than he in most matters, including this one. Mike’s choice not to whine about the situation, and his choice to comply with the request even as he gives an account, manages the tension of giving the account, which could have been an excuse not to comply. By avoiding raising Lisa’s ire, Mike avoids the kind of conversation common among parents and children in which a parent questions a child’s actions and the child argues about the parent’s right to do so. This interaction would be unlikely among most friends.

The ideology of “respecting one’s elders” cues a number of interactional practices which are assumed to do so in U.S. (and other) cultural contexts. In this context, for instance, it would be reasonable for Mike to give an account. He is an adult after all, with experience living on his own. There is perhaps a gendered expectation at play, since women are expected to be experts in the kitchen over men, but there was not enough empirical evidence in this data to make the claim for this particular pair of people. Here, it seems to be the case that Mike follows the cliché of “mother knows best.” His complaint in respond to her criticism is more an admittance of fault
than a challenge to her. The flare-up of emotional negativity, indicated by Lisa’s sharp tone and Mike’s complaining response, is quickly passed by in order to re-engage in the mundane interactional sequence already in progress. The potential for there to be a problem is quickly addressed and then side-stepped. Lisa’s dilemma of criticizing at the expense of hurting or causing an argument with her son is a possible one, but is managed here, as is Mike’s dilemma of complying respectfully while still maintaining his own sense of autonomy. If he feels hurt by the comment, he has chosen not to share it—an action which could cause an argument. The next section discusses even more complicated, multiply-moral rituals for practicing morality with others.

**Complex identity degradation.** There are various institutionalized ways to question people’s conduct and identities in society. Gossip is a kind of highly informal, distributed means of status degradation which, depending on its impact, can have serious consequences for the identity of the gossiped-about person. However, gossiping is an extremely threatening act for the people who engage in it as well. Bergmann (1993) claims gossiping is “like a moral balancing act” (p. 149). Gossip is socially satisfying and widely practiced despite (or Bergmann would say because of) its complex orientation as both an enactment of moral indignation, and as a morally suspect activity in itself. The examples in the following section take up different angles on gossip, demonstrating how difficult it is to pin down in interaction. The following example is a version of “light” gossip, in that it mocks the abilities of various people’s mothers to cook, but does so in a way that is not too threatening. The situation is a dinner party, and involves a number of friends comprised of sets of romantic partners. All of the romantic partners are either married or long-term committed, while the friendships are of varying lengths, from several years to a couple of years. This dinner occurs in the U.S. in 2010.
Excerpt 1g “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E3.1]

157  Jane:  you should go visit my parents for a while
158  ((laughter))
159  Nora:  let Maya cook for me?=
160  Jane:  =let my mom cook? There won’t be any [flavor at all
161  Mary:  [and it’ll all] be burnt
162  John:  she’ll cook that flavor right out
163  Nora:  and it’ll all be ( )
164  Jim:  ( ) are you? Is that the same house?

165  Nora:  your mom? My mom has never bothered to cook she does so bad
166  John:  I don’t know why they even bother to put a kitchen in that house
167  .
168  . (31 seconds omitted))
169  .
170  .
171  John:  I remember when I first came over to their house they didn’t know which knob
172  was for the baking and which for the stove=
173  Mary:  =are you kidding?

Gossiping about people who are close to you can be tricky. There is a limit to what is considered appropriate to joke, complain, or talk about. Bergmann (1993) notes that the “secrecy” around telling mutual friends about another friend’s actions must be managed delicately so as to avoid being seen as disloyal. Gossip always retains a flavor of saying things one might not say to another’s face, at least in the case of other, less close persons being able to hear it. Would Maya be okay with Jane, her daughter, criticizing her cooking? Possibly. But would Maya be okay with Jane criticizing her cooking in front of others? More likely not. Thus, this constitutes gossip, and the interactants must deal with the “balancing act” of threatening their parents’ faces without appearing too tainted of character to one another.
In this excerpt, the couples make fun of mothers who cannot cook—though “parents” are referenced throughout (line 157, 164, 170), until toward the end of the conversation, the focus is particularly on the lack of cooking skills among the mothers, perhaps as this seems to be somehow more “unexpected” given the traditional cultural assumption that mothers are good cooks. Nora has been explaining that her recent illness leaves her unable to eat food with any kind of flavor, and Jane jokes that Nora should visit her parents (line 157). Nora references the shared friendship she has with Jane by providing the name of Jane’s mother (line 159), and Jane and Mary, who are partners and both know Jane’s mother well, collaboratively produce the assessment that Maya’s cooking is flavorless and burnt (lines 160-161). John and Nora, partners and longtime friends of Mary and Jane, participate as well, demonstrating that they have been subjected to Maya’s cooking.

Jim and Nicky have not been friends with the other couples as long, but Jim finds an intersection by referencing Nicky’s parents (pointing to Nicky and asking Jane if they share the same house) (lines 164-165). Nora joins in by indicating her mother is a terrible cook as well, and John indicates his knowledge of this with his comment in line 167. This is followed by an extended discussion of a particular stove in the house of Nora’s parents—a stove that is both 25 years old, but so fresh and clean it appears never to have been used. The conversation returns to this indicating what bad cooks Nora’s parents are in lines 171-172 and this points out further that both parents are so bad or uninterested in cooking that they do not know how to use their own stove.

In this interaction, participants display their closeness to one another through knowledge of each other’s lives, particularly having to do with family and cooking skills. The format is implicative of gossip because it involves familiar but non-present third parties who are criticized.
This cannot exactly become centrally an example of gossip, however, because slandering someone’s mother is not a nice thing to do—so it stays safely in the realm of humor without venturing too far into the moral implications, though moral implications hover around the edges in people’s calling out of the mothers, as well as during the omitted portion when Nicky asks Nora whether she was fed properly as a child, and Nora admits they ate out a lot. Thus, once again, couching a morally suspect activity in a humorous frame lets participants divulge in potentially blameworthy ways without that activity becoming a blameworthy one in its own right.

Thus, it seems that the problem of doing gossip can be mitigated if the gossip occurs in a joking frame and the matter of gossip is not too “nasty.” The sharing of potentially sensitive information about a third party can proceed with little problem. This seems to manage the dilemma of doing gossip in some sense, but what about in situations where the gossip material is far more damaging? The next excerpt is more strikingly moral, but is off-center of typical gossip because the gossip subject is not very familiar to the gossip participants. This example takes place among a group of friends who have been close for over a year. Brought together through their love of rock-climbing, they live in Colorado and in this situation are watching television and eating dinner together. The camera is on top of the television. Anna is on the left, Carrie on the right. Janna starts off on the left off camera, but move into the frame.

*Excerpt 17 “Hanging Out”*[frn.rdm10.3.E2.1]

174 Carrie: So there’s- not my immediate neighbor but the one in another apartment down from me? (0.5) I don’t know what the fuck they do but
the only time you see her she’s either in her robe or wrapped in a blanket? Sitting outside their door passing out cigarettes=

Anna: =wo::w

Carrie: ((shakes head)) I don’t know .) I think your theory is that they do a lot of drugs right=

Janna: =yeah
What is gossip? The “prototype” case is one in which the subject of gossip is known to gossip producers and gossip recipients (because that makes the information about that person all the more consequential and interesting); and when the information conveyed is either negative, or one which the subject of gossip may not want shared with others. Gossip, then, consists often of either secrets, or behavior that can be seen as inappropriate or bad in its social context. There are variations outside this typical case which nonetheless make up a large proportion of gossip. Celebrity gossip, for instance, involves people not known personally to gossip participants, but known by reputation (and note how gossip columns and magazines do work hard to make celebrities seem “knowable” and “familiar”—publishing mundane photographs of their everyday lives, interviews, facts about their lives, etc.). Gossip can also involve people who are not well known to any of the participants, but who are potentially “knowable,” as is the case in the excerpt just discussed. This sequence prompts further gossip-production from another participant, then works its way back to the people who live near Carrie, and Carrie mentions that she thinks she’s seen the woman dressed “twice” in the several months she’s lived there. Another participant responds by saying “she was between clients,” a reference to her being a prostitute, which leads to further speculations (who the man is who lives with her—a porn cinematographer? etc.). The initial sequence above, however, is the first mention, is unsolicited, and does not appear to be linked to anything that came before it except that cigarettes were mentioned.

Though not typical, this excerpt nonetheless is a case of gossip. It involves someone familiar at least by sight to two of the participants (Carrie and Janna) and is produced as if it will be meaningful in some way—which it apparently it is, as the “news” of the gossip is met with a “wow” by Anna (line 179). It involves strange and potentially transgressive behavior (never
being dressed, passing out cigarettes) related by evidence of direct observation (she is “seen” to
do this, lines 177-178). The fact that the gossip yields other, similar stories and engenders
negative speculation about other “morally suspect” elements of the woman’s character (drug use,
prostitution) also marks it as gossip. In displaying shock, indignation, incredulity and a mocking
stance toward the gossip subject, these friends align themselves as certain kinds of people in
contrast to the woman being described. By unreflectively maligning her and showing no
hesitation or discomfort when doing so, they create a shared perspective, showing comfort with
making these assessments—a comfort that comes from knowing the assessments will not be
questioned or criticized.

As Bergmann (1993) notes, producing gossip is a potentially undermining activity for the
gossip-producer. One does not want to be seen “as a gossip,” and careful work is done to avoid
that label: testing interlocutors for the possible reception of the news (i.e. with questions, “did
you hear about Jane?”); and providing enough detail to be seen not to be making it up, but not so
much detail as to have come by the information “actively.” Here, Carrie does little of that work,
showing that gossip seems to be a regular feature of her and her friends’ lives. Gossip and
gossip-like activities are certainly regular features of the nearly two-hours of video recording of
their interactions during a night of hanging out, watching television, and eating dinner. Gossip
functions in one way as a method of establishing a group’s cohesiveness and values by
contrasting them with those of other persons or groups.

The danger of gossip is that it can threaten the group as well. To gossip about others
implies the potential for gossip to occur within the group. And perhaps more immediately, to
gossip is to show one’s ideas about what makes others “bad.” If anyone in the group were to feel
sympathetic to the gossip subject, or to identify with their maligned actions, it would create a
problem. Here, no one defends the gossip subject. People jump in and contrast themselves with her instead. This indicates that if anyone is sympathetic, they have chosen not to say so. Friends may feel safer about disagreeing with one another, but to what extent? Some moral topics and activities may preclude addressing possible disagreement. For any one member to challenge the gossip subject’s reconstruction here, or the gossip activity in general, would be extremely threatening to the participants in the gossip and to the safety of the challenger’s place in their circle.

It seems then that another way to manage the double-edged sword of gossip is, if the information is highly damaging or negative, is to make sure it is not about someone close or well-known to the group. In all of the data analyzed for this project, there were no outright cases of open discussion of highly negative gossip material regarding well-known identities with close others. If gossip about known others were quite negative, it was couched so indirectly that it was not empirically analyzable—which represents another response to the dilemma of gossip: if the material is damaging and the person is known, be as indirect as possible. The next section considers more closely topics that revolve around “sinful” activities, many kinds of which have already been mentioned, particularly those which are related to sex. In these cases, talking about sex may be done through various activities and rituals described here and in chapter two, but the focus is on the way in which “sex” is topicalized to manage relational closeness, and the problems that arise in this management.

**Sex topicalization.** The idea of “sin talk” is that it revolves around particular significant and morally implicative topics associated with classic “bad behavior” or at least indicative of the possibility of bad behavior. In other words, people “having sex” can be an unproblematic topic, but is often only brought up when there is some problematic aspect of it that violates perceived
social norms (the age of the people having sex, the relationship of the people, the relationship status of the people, the kind of sex being had, the situations in which it is had, etc. tend to be of questionable appropriateness). The bringing up of such topics is not just about a social critique, but is also intricately tied to the relationship of the people discussing them.

One aspect of being close with someone is that talking about such topics can be easier, particularly in privacy. In the recording of the friends in “Around the Bay,” the excerpt discussed at the onset of this section, face-threatening and taboo topics are brought up on a regular basis, especially when Amelia is playing “mock documentary filmmaker” and asks questions such as, “so JR, why are you so stupid?” or “What was your first sexual experience?” or makes random stance-evoking utterances such as “I don’t like watching blowjobs” and “they really should just blur out the penises in porn.” These kinds of unmitigated, directly-formulated and sometimes “extreme” topics are handled in particular ways among people who are close. Among people who are not close, they would be treated differently, or perhaps not brought up at all.

The topicalization of sexuality can occur around particular events, as in a story; actions or comments; objects; and many other interactional resources. In the next excerpt, discussed also in chapter four, family members celebrating a mass birthday bring up sexually-tinged topics regarding a gift of underwear. The family, including extended members, all sit in a circle and watch each other open gifts. This event takes place in the U.S. in the late 1980s.

*Excerpt 18 “The Reynolds”* [fam.hols88.1.E5.1]

182 Beatrice: Oh look at the pretty colors=
183 Jim: =unmentionables=
184 Jilly: =O:;=
185 Jim: we must not mention them
186 Beatrice: [o↑o:;]
187 ?: [((giggles))]
188 Jim: I look over at Mike here “oh well”
189 Mike: It (must be) my birthday
Jilly: yeah I guess we're celebrating your birthday too=
Jack: =hey (0.5) those'll be a big hit when you're out on the balcony
Jilly: °y(h)eah°

((laughter))

Jilly: drinking the coffee in the- after you're gone ((points to Mike))=

((laughter))

Beatrice: =that's right=
Jack: =yeah right ((laughs)) you watch that UPS stops- truck stop now
((laughs))

The problem with bringing up the sex among family members is that so many people in
the interaction are related in different ways. In this situation, for example, there are married
couples, parents and children, and siblings. Bringing up sex in relation to one of them will cause
difficulties depending on the identity of that person and her relationships to the others present.
This interaction features a brief sequence that stands out from what came before, and what comes after. As indicated by Beatrice’s utterance, Beatrice and Jilly had been commenting on the gifts Jilly was unwrapping, largely amidst the usual “ooing” and “ahhing” that accompanies gift receiving. With Jim’s comment at line 183, the topic of conversation is shifted to the nature of the gift, which is that it is a flowery-lacy negligee sort of underwear. This leads to commenting on the implications and possible consequences of such a gift. Afterward, the conversation shifts to being about where the underwear was purchased, and there is a discussion of the difference between Victoria’s Secret and Frederick’s of Hollywood.

During this interaction, there are several references, verbal and nonverbal, to the ways in which different present persons are implicated in the talk underway. Jim’s reference to his son Mike, for instance, indicates a relationship between Mike and Jilly, such that the gift for Jilly (being a “sexy” one) is also a gift for Mike, which Mike ratifies explicitly (line 189) and Jilly makes even more explicit (line 192). The implications of the gift for Jilly and Mike are then moved away from focusing on their relationship as husband and wife, and instead toward the consequences of the gift for Jilly in situations not involving her husband. Jack, who is Jilly’s father and who holds the camera, brings in the idea of other people potentially seeing Jilly in this outfit as she stands out on the balcony of her house. Though a gift of underwear need not have been especially remarked on (they are from Jilly’s sister-in-law, rather than for example Jilly’s husband or some less appropriate person such as her father or father-in-law), almost immediately, the sexual nature of the gift becomes a topic.

The first person who brings this up simultaneously proffers the topic, but claims not to be doing so, calling them “unmentionables” (line 183) and then explicitly unpacking that to say “we must not mention them” (line 185)—when of course, that is exactly what he is doing. Jim, who is
Jilly’s father-in-law, then directs this topic into what might be a “suitable” arena by implicating Mike and Jilly’s relationship (as husband and wife) and speaking on Mike’s behalf of the positive nature of Jilly’s receiving the gift (line 188). For Jim to bring up the topic of Jilly and the gift of underwear as sexual in nature has the potential to be problematic, but he mitigates his own connection to bringing up the topic by disclaiming doing so (“we must not mention them”) and by directing the focus of the comment toward his son, Jilly’s husband.

Mike and Jilly play along with this joke, in which Mike says it must be his birthday too (an ordinary kind of response to a wife’s getting a birthday gift that implicates his own enjoyment), and Jilly comments that this is in fact explicitly the case (because it really is his birthday) (line 191). The conversation could have ended there, diffused in the sexuality of its nature or at least safely in the context of a husband-wife relationship, but Jack changes the course of things with his comment. His comment (line 192) re-invokes the sexual nature of the gift (that it would be titillating to see Jilly in it for outsiders—literally, “a big hit”) and presents it in the context of Jilly being out on her balcony, in her underwear. Jilly at first seems unwilling to join along with this joke, as she looks down at the gift, putting it away, and answers “yeah” in a markedly quieter tone, though with a soft laugh (lines 193-194).

When Jilly does decide to pick up the joke, she directs her own extension of it toward her mother, Beatrice, who has not joined in on the jokes previously, and whose first comment on the gift was safely regarding its “colors” and not what it was or what it could be for (line 182). Jilly makes explicit the implication that the gift is not in this context for Mike’s benefit as she outright states that Mike would have gone to work by then. She paints a picture of herself as nonchalantly going out to the balcony to drink coffee, and she acts out this fact, making it central to the image, and not mentioning the fact of wearing the underwear, though that is implied (line 196). It is
unclear exactly what this utterance is doing, but that she directs it to Mike and to Beatrice rather than Jack, her father, who brought it up, is interesting. She offers the story for Beatrice first to comment on (which Beatrice does in line 198), then moves the context back to being between her and Mike, though in a negative and rather teasing sense.

Jilly’s glance at Beatrice after this comment is also interesting (line 197). The glance seems to be making an assessment on the conversation for Beatrice, as the quickness of this glance, and its being produced subtly (in the eyes and smile rather than with accompanying verbal or nonverbal information), makes it seem not to be for the room in general. The fact that it is through more narrow eyes indicates a negative assessment, or at least not straightforwardly positive, despite the smile. What the assessment is about is unclear: her and Mike’s relationship? Jack’s comments? The direction of the conversation in general? Her own participation in Jack’s comments? But it conveys a withdrawal from the conversation and the line it has taken, “stepping back” in a way to relate to Beatrice rather than relating as a participant to the room and the talk therein.

Jack’s next comment once again re-invokes the gift’s sexual nature in a “naughty” context, however, continuing to focus on the reaction of strangers, and people who are not Mike, to seeing Jilly “in” the gift (e.g. the UPS truck driver). Jack is the only one who laughs at this comment (twice, line 199), and after making it, the conversation redirects into one about where the gift was purchased and the implications of that. Interestingly, even in that conversation, the sexually-explicit nature of the gift is softened by identifying it as a Victoria’s Secret purchase: various participants comment on the banality of purchasing underwear from Victoria’s Secret versus purchasing underwear from Frederick’s of Hollywood, which is identified as a sort of “porn shop.” Thus, there is an interesting tension between commenting on the sexual nature of
Jilly’s gift, but placing the sexual nature in an appropriate context. Jack in particular, but also others, move the gift’s status in and out of the appropriate context.

The “appropriate” context for a gift that implicates, however indirectly, Jilly and Mike’s sexual relationship, will be different for different people. It could be the case, for instance, that Jack is more comfortable contemplating and bringing up Jilly’s sexuality as being for stranger-voyeurs, who could not do anything about it (she’s up in a balcony on the second floor, after all), than he is with the idea of Jilly’s sexuality in relation to her husband, which though morally ratified indexes actual sex rather than mere looking. This is in tension with the appropriateness identified by other conversational participants, which is that it’s okay for Jilly to have sexy underwear as long as the sexiness is relegated to the context of her marriage. Even when Jilly herself jokes about being in underwear on the balcony, and mentions that Mike is “gone” for that hypothetical scenario, she nonetheless brings him in as a focal person who might care about that. She also acts out the coffee cup rather than playing up the underwear component, and glances in a slightly-negatively assessing matter at Beatrice who, as her mother and lesser participant in all this sex-relevant talk, becomes a sort of “moral authority.”

Bringing up Jilly’s sexuality, even implicitly, is a delicate task. Her father-in-law, for instance, cannot do so without seeming implicitly in competition with his son. He avoids this problem by making the comment in the guise of its “not being a comment” (“unmentionable”) and directs the focus toward his son, Mike. Jilly’s husband can make such comments, but it would be inappropriate to do so explicitly—he comments instead by referencing a commonplace regarding married couples and lingerie gifts. All of these comments are safe for the selves and particular others, but they threaten, to some extent, Beatrice and Jack’s ability to see their daughter as an innocent girl. Beatrice just avoids the issue altogether, while Jack avoids the
sexuality of his daughter with her husband by creating a more general kind of “sexiness” that is voyeuristic, but also highly improbable. Though he keeps it in this improbable joking realm, his comments are treated variously as inappropriate. Jilly manages being the center of this attention by variously playing along, ignoring, mitigating, and aligning (with her mother).

There are multiple dilemmas regarding the topic of sex in families which are demonstrated here, but would likely not be treated as problematic, or as problematic in the same way, among friends. In one sense, sex is unproblematic when it is referenced as an activity between a married couple, perhaps especially one with children (though having those children in the room at the same time probably makes it harder to mention). On the other hand, one would not want to discuss a sexual relationship explicitly among other family members, such as parents and siblings of the couple in question, as are attendant in this example. One way of managing this is to make it indirect. Jim does this by referring to the “unmentionables” as a way of bringing them up. “Unmentionables” is a kind of metadiscursive device that comments reflexively on the questionable nature of a topic, while drawing attention to it. Another way to do this is to frame it as a joke, but as demonstrated with Jack’s lack of total success in this account, humor is not a foolproof method.

The next excerpt, also about sex, is done in a more direct way. Whether this is because the participants have been drinking, are mainly friends rather than family (though friends composed of committed and married couples), or because there are no children present (as in the prior case), the sexuality and the idea of people literally having sex is referenced without being treated as problematic.
Excerpt 19 “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E2.1]

200 Nora: and then when I went by to get my blood drawn today they said ‘are you sure
201 you’re not pregnant’? So you know what I did?=
202 John: what=
203 Nora: I went by the pharmacy and I bought a fucking pregnancy test and I took it today
204 and it was negative? ((laughs))
205 Mary: wow if you were pregnant [that would be wild]
206 Jim: [( )]
207 John: yeah
208 Nora: there is no way it would be like g(h)od had done something to me
209 Mary: ((laughs))
210 Jane: to punish you
211 Nora: yeah for all that premarital sex we had
212 ((laughter))
213 John: we were just practicing

In this excerpt, again, the conversation revolves around sex and sex-implicative topics
(pregnancy). Nora has been feeling ill, and a comment by doctors when she had her blood tested
(lines 200-201) compels her to get a pregnancy test. Her frustration is indicated by an upgrader
(the expletive “fucking” line 203), demonstrating her anger at even the thought that she might be
pregnant. Thus, where in a different situation (one in which Nora were hoping to have children,
or perhaps even seeking to do so) Nora might respond with hope or excitement, here it is treated
as “bad news.” Her announcement that the test was negative is followed by laughter, perhaps
indicating relief (line 204), and Mary emphasizes the shocking nature of the possibility of
pregnancy (line 205): “wow if you were pregnant that would be wild.”

Though Mary’s comment emphasizes Nora’s opinions, it also manages the difficulty of
being too extreme (by saying for instance “that would be terrible”), which is a safe move to make
given Nora may one day want a child. Since Mary and Nora are close, Mary would not want
Nora to remember such a comment at that point in the possible future. Thus, one problem that
arises right away in this conversation is around the norm that married people have children. The
interactants who are close demonstrate their knowledge of each other’s views, while not “going to far” by saying things they could be held accountable for later.

Because pregnancy makes sex relevant, and because the dinner in this example was so characterized by sexually explicit jokes, it is not surprising that this conversation, too, takes that turn. After John, Nora’s husband, chimes in positively toward the negative assessment of a possible pregnancy (“yeah” line 207), Nora continues to make explicit the negative nature of pregnancy for her by jokingly indicating it would be a punishment from God (line 208). Jane labels this implication explicitly (“to punish you” line 210) and at that point Nora references a possible reason for the punishment (“all that premarital sex we had” line 211).

Everyone laughs at this confession, one which is slightly shocking because of its content and directness, but at the same time not very shocking because waiting for marriage to have sex is perhaps not as widespread a practice as it once was. John then comes in and ends the conversation with an account for the offense, “we were just practicing” (line 213). This too is an interesting move, an agreement with the confession as it were, and at the same time a rather “fake” excuse for the act from the invoked perspective of someone who believes in God and sees premarital sex as sinful and worthy of punishment.

Attitudes toward sex and religion are incredibly sensitive for people who do not know each other very well. Here, that is not the case. The fact that this mention (one of many sexually explicit conversations) is treated by the friends as amusing rather than awkward or uncomfortable has a number of possible causes. One is the amount of wine that’s been drunk at that point, which may ease discomfort even amongst people who do not know each other well. That seems like it can be in part responsible for the fact that the topic is talked about, but other explanations better account for the more specific utterances produced in response to the
comments made throughout this exchange. For instance, it is true that Nora’s obvious treatment of the possible pregnancy as negative cues a response that recognizes it as such, but that Mary’s response builds on that by adding her own assessment (“that would be wild” line 205) implies that Mary is familiar with Nora’s perspective. Perhaps they have known each other long enough so that Mary already knows Nora’s stance on the matter.

We also see John and Nora indicating their shared perspective toward pregnancy when John agrees with Mary’s assessment (line 207). When Nora brings up the moral orientation—the idea of being punished by God for inappropriate sexual contact—John joins in on the joke and extends it, simultaneously displaying comfort with the topic, an understanding of Nora’s attitude toward pregnancy as punishment, and the willingness to play along with the “religious” frame that Nora has introduced. His comment at the end simultaneously is within that religious frame, but also comments on it by offering an account for the questionable behavior that would not be acceptable for someone who actually existed within the frame. He acknowledges that he and Nora are not within the frame, and that whatever their spiritual background, they know each other well enough to know that they do not share a serious belief in a God that would punish them for premarital sex. That they are comfortable joking in this way with their friends shows an assumption that no one else present has that belief, and the fact that no one treats the joke as problematic seems to ratify that assumption.

The relational context is an important one when considering to what extent moral practices will become dilemmatic. Here, for example, the romantic couples are situated among a group of friends rather than family, which makes a difference compared to the previous example with the lingerie. Furthermore, there has already been established an interactional pattern of sexually explicit jokes throughout the night—so the situational context is also favorable.
Culturally speaking, sex is not considered a taboo topic among friends except in certain social, political, generational or religious groups in the U.S. If anything, sex is considered a “safer” topic than religion or politics, though here the seemingly-safe mention of religion points to another shared frame among the friends.

Talking about sex can be delicate even for close friends, however, because it can become that much more uncomfortable if the conversation “crosses the line” (even if that line were rather far off). The next excerpt is from the same dinner and among the same people, but here occurs a brief moment during which the appropriateness of a sexual comment must be negotiated.

*Excerpt 20 “A Dinner” [frn.rdm10.4.E4.2]*

214 Jane: Jim and Nicky were in the kitchen? And I heard Nicky whisper (1.5) “*fuck me*” (0.5)
215

216 John: ha
217 Jane: ((laughs))
218 Nicky: what?
219 Jane: when you were in there=
220 Nicky: =m:=
221 Jane: =she was tryin to yank the=
222 John: =classic Jane taking things out of context
223 Nora: she’s trying to get people in trouble
224 ((laughter))
225 Nicky: no I think I looked at this
And said “fuck me” cuz it’s almost empty

but all I heard- all I heard was=

then she went and poured some more

((laughter))

Nicky: che::ers
This excerpt contains a fairly typical point in bringing up a sexually explicit topic for humorous purposes, but in this case, it falls flat. Rather than performing a double entendre or as the participants refer to this practice, “talking dirty” or being “in the gutter,” Jane makes a reference that is formulated as an actual event that took place, complete with reported speech (line 214). This is met with a moment of silence (line 215), then Nicky does a laughing face, but without producing laughter, while John remarks “ha” (line 217) but does not actually laugh. Jane laughs at 218, and finally Nicky asks “what” at line 219. Rather than admitting to the act in a humorous way, and validating it as a funny conversational topic, Nicky puts the comment in a questionable light by not remembering its occurrence. Jane then tries to explain the situation, and John and Nora head off a problematic clash of accounts by indicating Jane took the comment out of context and is just being a troublemaker (lines 223-224).

Among family, sexual comments seem to need more delicate handling. In this group of friends, sexual comments are usually taken in stride, but in this case, calling out a sexual act in this explicit a fashion is deemed too face-threatening. Jane has enacted the same sexually-explicit personality as the rest of them, but her comfort at doing so has crossed a boundary. She refuses throughout, however, to take back what she said or acknowledge that she has crossed a boundary. This leaves the face-saving up to the others in the group. John and Nora’s indication that Jane took the comment out of context provides a potential account of the situation for Nicky. Nicky then is tasked with coming up with such an account. She could have mentioned anything that might save her own face, since the others seem inclined to side with her anyway, but she makes an interesting move that provides an account that saves both her face and Jane’s.

Nicky presents a case for misunderstanding on Jane’s part, rather than a deliberate taking-out-of-context (removing the need for the “troublemaker” label). Nicky picks up the bottle and
re-enacts the same quoted utterance, “fuck me,” but in a way that changes and potentially repairs its meaning. In the first reconstruction, the stress was on the word “fuck,” which colloquially is a request for sex. In the second reconstruction, the stress is on the “me,” which colloquially is an expression of dismay. She thus indicates that she said what Jane heard, but it was an expression of disappointment due to the wine being almost gone (line 228). Jane attempts to regain her ground by providing her (possibly mistaken) interpretation (line 129) but John cuts her off by bringing attention back to the “actual” newly-constructed and deemed acceptable act, which focuses on Nicky’s wanting a drink, not wanting sex (line 230). Nicky gives a mock toast to this (line 232) and the conversation redirects.

Though these friends have talked about sex nearly constantly throughout the almost 30 minutes of dinner, this particular sexual comment is not taken in the same way as that of every other. The lack of laughter, Nicky’s uncertainty, the proposal that Jane is mistaken, Nicky’s discovery of an account for the error, and everyone’s ratifying of the topic shift (and ignoring of Jane’s attempt to bring the conversation back to her interpretation) all indicate that Jane’s comment crossed a line. There is thus a limit to how explicit or in what circumstances people can discuss sex amongst friends, and this example provides a way in which that is managed when someone exceeds the limit. A more relaxed moral atmosphere among close friends is not the same as being able to “say anything.” Though Jane does not understand, or is too stubborn to withdraw her error, the others in the party make choices that save as much face for all of them as possible and keep the interaction light-hearted.

Part of the dilemma of discursively enacting morality is that it cues contradictory norms in the cultural and social context. Often such norms are tacit; and always, such norms are interactionally negotiated. Here, the situational context is already one of ribald humor. Sex is
considered a fairly free topic for discussion. However, such explicit mention of sex, or perhaps the mention in the context of a kitchen interaction in someone’s house, proved to cross the line from playful to face-threatening. How can one negotiate situations in which competing ideologies include “we’re close enough to talk about sex” and “don’t talk about me asking for sex in your house, even as a joke” can exist simultaneously?

**Moral Dilemmas: Ideological, Interactional, Interpersonal**

In the examples given above, ideologies are interactional enactments—and ideological dilemmas thus are instantiated as interactional dilemmas. But furthermore, these are relational, interpersonal dilemmas. As Baxter (1988, 2004a, 2004b) notes, the emotional and personal needs accompanying increasingly close relationships is a dialectic of competing impulses. These impulses are in a sense ideological in the ways I have described. The openness-closedness dilemma can be situated in cultural expectations that “if we’re close, I can tell you everything” versus “if I tell you some things, you might not like it, and turn on me.” But these impulses are also interactional. Do you participate in the moral practice, or not? If you do, how do you do it? If you anticipate or encounter potential trouble, how can it be dealt with?

From a grounded practical theory perspective, the results of investigating these questions indicate some of the techniques participants have for doing moral practice as well as dealing with its troubles and dilemmas. It has been demonstrated that different relational, situational and cultural contexts may guide the local ideals for these practices. Because, however, moral practices involve sometimes contradictory, dilemmatic ideals (“such as tell me everything/don’t tell me everything”), they must be worked out in context through different communication strategies. Thus, one important implication from this chapter for an ideal of moral communication involves the need to confront situations in which situated ideals conflict.
In these examples, humor emerged as a common way of treating potentially troublesome moral practices. It did not, however, always work well. One nice thing about being close with someone is that “awkward moments” become fewer and fewer. But when they do arise, they tend to indicate possible problems. They are a “red flag” for the tensions, contradictions and dilemmas which lurk among close committed relationships. Troubles that arise when managing the dilemma of morality for intimacy show a difference between unspoken assumptions regarding what is okay to talk about. The sharedness assumed between close others may not correspond enough to say “whatever one pleases.” These concerns for intimacy are returned to in chapter nine.

In the next chapter, such tensions, contradictions and dilemmas prove to exist not only among couples who presumably share an ideological orientation together, but also within supposedly homogenous cultural contexts. Chapter five reconstructed “intimacy” as a collection of practices for doing morality through close relating. The next chapter, chapter six, discusses ideology as a moral discursive practice. Based on a GPT approach the relevant question about ideology is, how do people manage ideology and its contradictions in practical conduct? Chapter six analyzes the problem of enacting ideology and dealing with its differences in ostensibly culturally homogenous friend and family interactions to reconstruct ideology as a moral practice.
Chapter 6

Ideology as a Problematic Moral Achievement

The life of relationships is not isolable from their situatedness in particular events, places, times, histories—in other words, relationships are contextualized. Participants index cultural contexts and societal norms in their talk, interactionally achieving relational commitment and cultural ideologies. When people enact relationships, they do so embedded in a background of tacit assumptions about what constitutes a relationship, how one should be “done,” and the role of communication in this process. As interactants implicate the morality of their relationships with one another, they also implicate the sociocultural expectations in which their relationship is enacted.

This chapter discusses ideology as a cultural moral discursive practice. Based on a GPT approach a relevant question is, how do people manage ideology and its contradictions in practical conduct? This chapter analyzes the problem of enacting ideology and dealing with its differences in ostensibly culturally homogenous friend and family interactions to argue that ideologies are morally problematic and contradictory in close relationships. Though people who share culture (through religious, regional, linguistic, political or other practices) assume sharedness on ideological assumptions, the complexity and contradictions of ideologies within and between social groups can cause problems when differences arise.

“Ideology” is on the level of morality in which interaction/intersubjectivity, relationships/intimacy, and cultural context come together. Ideologies can be interpersonal or cultural, about interactional choices or beliefs and values. In this chapter, I focus on ideologies as rhetorical, indicating the ways in which moral interaction involves different enactments within cultural contexts which are assumed to be shared. In such contexts, difference is generally
attributed to choices rather than to societal patterns, which are invisible where they are assumed to be shared.

This chapter focuses on the problem of ideology, a practice which is relational and cultural. This chapter examines how ideology interactionally achieves relational norms and accomplishes culturally “good” identities. The problem of ideology for morality involves the way in which ideologies can be complex and contradictory, posing difficulties for the continued maintenance of a shared relational and cultural moral orientation.

Moral discursive practices must confront the tacit contradictions inherent in cultural ideology through interaction. In each of the following cases, people who share cultural community expectations find those norms in conflict with other expectations or more local, relational norms. In dealing with these contradictions, participants negotiate the meaning of their relational identity and how it is situated in cultural moral contexts. This chapter looks at ideology as a cultural phenomenon which is interactionally achieved in relationship settings through particular moral discursive practices. Though a cultural approach can lead an ethnographer to see what is ostensibly a “same” culture as sharing ideologies and the norms those ideologies create, this chapter explores the contradictions inherent in the ideologies of what appear to be homogenous cultural contexts.

The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to ideology. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and managing ideology. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for participants’ situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.

**Moral Discourses: Relationships and Ideology**
Relationships are guided by cultural ideologies of what they should be like. As Fitch (1998) posits, relationships are guided by interpersonal ideologies, ideas about relationships, communication, and their appropriateness. The next section discusses relationships as enacted in communities. The following section discusses how this implicates ideologies and “relational ideals” (Fitch, 1998).

**Relationships: Relationality and Culture**

There is a long and rich history of studying the role of culture in interpersonal communication. Similar cultural values have been looked at as a foundation for romantic relationships (Gudykunst, 1985). Concepts such as emotion and facework in interpersonal relationships have been considered taking culture into account (Burleson, 2003; Ting-Toomey, 1994). Cultural perspectives consider to varying degrees the role of norms, interpersonal expectations and/or interactional problems that highlight the ways in which culture in interpersonal communication can be morally inflected.

The study of culture and interpersonal relationships is sometimes connected to, but not quite the same thing as, the concept of a “relational culture,” a private transaction of attitudes and expectations that constitute the life of a particular relationship (Wood, 1982). There is research that indicates that relationship cultures and cultural norms of context in which the relationship exists are mutually informing (e.g., Harding, 2007; Moore, Laflin & Weis, 1996; Straus, 1976). As Fogel (1993) notes, there is a cultural component to relationships and a relational component to culture: “cultures are relational and embodied, expressed as the actions and products of the participants” (p. 6). Culture provides tools and means—forms of narratives, histories of communities, linguistic resources and social expectations—with which people formulate relationships.
According to Streeck (2002), a concept of culture that focuses on “symbols and meanings” (p. 322) requires an attention to language. Communication Accommodation Theory (Giles, Coupland, N., & Coupland, J., 1991) is an example of an interpersonal intercultural communication theory interested in how people’s particular verbal and nonverbal strategies indicate convergence or divergence in communication styles (and thus affiliation or disaffiliation between conversational partners). Streeck (2002), however, focuses on reviewing more discourse-focused methodologies—ethnography of communication, microethnography, and conversation analysis—as most appropriate for analyzing cultural productions through attention to language.

Discourse approaches focus on the uniqueness of language in culturally situated instances of social interaction. Bucholtz and Hall’s (2008) sociocultural linguistics, for instance, emphasizes ethnographic grounding and honoring of participant perspectives. Other approaches focus on the role of politeness and interactional or linguistic norms (Kasper, 1997), construction of identity (Ochs, 1993), cultural models (Kiesling, 2003), style (Tannen, 1981), rituals (Katriel, 1990), framing (Tannen, 1993), and power (Eades, 2005). In each case, discourse analysis forms the basis of making claims about the unique cultural aspect of communication.

The ethnography of communication is perhaps the most culturally-focused discourse analytic approach within language and social interaction and in discourse studies in the communication field. Studies in the ethnography of communication have looked at interactions in, for example, Hungarian (Boromisza-Habashi 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, 2010b), U.S. American (Carbaugh, 1988), Finnish (Berry & Carbaugh, 2004; Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmikari-Berry, 2006; Carbaugh & Poutiainen, 2000; Poutiainen, 2009), Blackfeet (Carbaugh & Rudnick, 2006), Indian (Hastings, 2001), teen (LaGrande & Milburn, 2003), hip-hop (McLeod, 1999), Puerto
Rican (Milburn 2000, 2002), and organizational/community settings (Milburn, Kenefick & Lambert, 2006; Morgan, 2007). In analyzing these settings, ethnographers of communication describe cultural-specific communicative practices—rituals, speech acts, concepts, definitions, etc.—and systematically unpack their use in situated instances (Carbaugh, 2010). In order to rigorously situate the study of people’s communicative practices, ethnographers of communication create a detailed record of field notes, recordings, and interviews, and interpret their meaningfulness.

Fitch (e.g. 1994, 1998, 1999, 2003) is an example of an interpersonal scholar who also takes a cultural, ethnographic approach and attends to details of talk. As Fitch notes in her 1998 book, most interpersonal research emphasizes (perhaps over-emphasizes) the role of individual agency. Fitch’s book shifts that focus to a more social and cultural perspective by analyzing daily interactional practices in interpersonal relationships as cultural practices. Fitch asserts that concepts of personhood, relationships and communication are the symbolic underpinnings of interpersonal practices. Culture and talk are inseparable because cultural concepts of personhood, relationships and communication are both reflected in and constituted by discourse.

Wood (1993) asserted that culture matters for relationships, but most studies of interpersonal relationships do not take a cultural perspective. This section discussed how relationships are cultural enactments, and how culture is a discursive practice. The next section continues this discussion by focusing in ideology as the cultural practice of creating shared communicative ideas for how to conduct relationships.

**Ideology**

An important aspect of Fitch’s work relevant to this chapter is that she discusses the often invisible premises that underlie communicative acts (1998). Culture is built of beliefs, and
beliefs are not always spoken—sometimes they are even unspeakable. In this section I discuss the background of assumptions that guide cultural interaction. As discussed in chapter two, “ideology” has many meanings. Baxter (2004a, 2004b), for instance, conceptualized ideologies as ideas of what makes people attracted to each other, how people in relationships should act, and what good relationships are like. Ideologies are indeed ideas, but they are not single ideas—they are a web or system of relationships between ideas and the world, between symbols and materials (Bakhtin, 1981).

Ideologies are cultural. Similar to Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of doxa, ideologies are often enduring, unexamined, and unspoken. They often are not said because they are taken for granted as not needing to be said (like Fitch’s “persuadables”: 2003). Ideologies are, however, discursive. On one hand, ideologies do get spoken. Sometimes they are spoken for rhetorical purposes. Other times they are spoken because something goes wrong. And they have common formulations, idioms and clichés, “discourses of” which give people the vocabulary, though often not necessarily the reflective resources, to talk about them (they may be accused of “sounding good” but not “saying anything”). On the other hand, ideologies are not merely reflected in talk or shaping of talk. Discourse also constructs ideologies. Ideologies are, in a sense, names for practical interactional choices. They are large, ambiguous, assumedly-shared ideals which are invoked to give meaning, sense, reasons and morals to practical conduct in everyday life.

Ideologies are everyday occurrences. Ideologies are inherently normative, and thus involve cultural moral ideas which are shaped by and shaped in talk (Bergmann, 1998). From a grounded practical theory approach, ideologies are problematic because they are assumed to be shared, particularly in apparently-homogenous cultural contexts, and yet are often not shared, or
contain inherent contradictions and dilemmas for practice. In the next section I discuss some of
the issues related to analyzing ideology and culture, then offer case studies of ideologies in
action.

**Ideology as a Moral Discursive Practice**

In Streeck’s (2002) review of cultural research, he discusses the importance of the
symbolic role of culture, how culture is indicated by and created in patterns of interaction, and
the ways in which culture configures processes of personality and emotion. Streeck draws on
both Geertz (1973) and Bruner (1990) to describe an anthropological approach to culture, seeing
it as both a context, and a mode of participation that gives meaning to experiences. The meaning
of culture, Streeck (2002) notes, is a difficult one. Interpersonal communication, as a cultural
achievement, is always local and general at the same time. The challenge is both where to
analyze, and what to count. The materiality of culture is an aspect Streeck claims has been
largely neglected in human communication research. As mentioned in chapter one, I join notions
of practice, indexicality, ideology, materiality, and rhetoric to capture the kinds of “stuff” this
analysis recognizes as cultural. In this section, I discuss how culture is analyzable in talk.

Culture in interaction can be ambiguous and fleeting. Spotting it often requires a theory
of culture before the empirical looking, which is why some conversation analysts find cultural
analysis a troublingly non-inductive practice. On the other hand, to ignore cultural aspects in
interaction entirely also seems remiss. Sometimes analytical sense cannot be made of interaction
without some understanding of a history or context—of the relationship, of the situation, of the
people involved and the background assumptions that guide their uptake of one another’s
utterances.
Since then it seems equally problematic to ignore culture in favor of the structure of talk-in-interaction as to account for talk with the imposition of cultural assumptions, I propose the best way to check one’s assumptions of where the explanatory power lies is by doing a bit of both. Moerman (1988) tackles both ends of the spectrum of analysis by joining conversation analysis and ethnography in a study of Thai culture. Moerman combines a sequential, interactional analysis of turns-at-talk, faithful to conversation analytic principles and vocabularies, with an in-depth understanding of local participant meanings. As Moerman points out, to speak the appropriately next utterance does not explain an interactional account “all-or-none, now-and-forever” (p. 46). To focus only utterances and their uptake masks the ways in which talk is problematic for people in a social and cultural sense. On the other hand, to ignore the organization of talk is to ignore the “managed quality” of daily life (p. 120).

The analysis in this chapter focuses on culture in ways the previous chapters did not, but that does not mean other chapters took no note of culture. Discussions of local vocabularies and ideas about the moral practices and their norms which were provided in chapters four and five were based partly in participants’ interviews or the author’s background in the cultural context, but were largely noted through the concept of indexicality. Developed in part by Garfinkel (1967), indexicality refers to the ways in which symbolic actions point to, or reference, other meanings outside the action itself. There are grammatical constructions where this is the case, for example, the word “there” means almost nothing without some sort of physical, discourse or social context. This kind of indexicality is known as “deixis.” But indexings of cultural meanings, expectations or categories are more complicated. They often require interpretation, and difficult analytical decisions must be made regarding to what extent an indexed cultural concept is really “relevant” to the talk at hand.
One way to think of indexicality is to consider much of what people say to be shorthand abbreviations for something more complex. This is what Bakhtin (1981) meant when he said everything uttered is “ideological.” A single utterance can stand in for a world of assumptions, situations, beliefs and dicta. This is similar to the connection Tracy (2002) makes when she discusses the cultural perspective in communication research, in which interpersonal ideologies are what provide the logic for speech codes. In the analyses in this chapter, ideologies situated in cultural context offer the tacit reasoning that guides moral discursive practices. For example, friend A might make a comment which, based on its uptake, friend B seemed to find face-threatening or disaligning. If friend A then rapidly supplies a number of compliments, preferred actions and well-received comments, then some analytical decisions have to be made regarding an explanation for this sequence.

One could take an equilibrium view, for instance, that friends must always maintain a state of equality and neutrality, such that apparent negative actions are balanced by positive ones, or even vice versa. One could take a relational view, in that friends want to make each other happy, and if a friend ends up doing something insulting, then it must be “taken back” or “made up for” in some way. One could take a sequential interactional view that dispreferred actions require work to get the conversation back on track in the direction in which it was originally headed. But all of these “perspectives” on the situation could be variable according to cultural contexts, or explained by known or discovered norms of a cultural context. This chapter’s analysis discusses to what extent moral discursive practices are both guided by and locally enacting cultural ideologies based on how the apparent best explanation for the interaction fits with available ethnographic background on the context.
The ensuing analysis works to provide ethnographic background, but not to assume that this background is relevant to or informing of participants’ interactions at all times. Just as, sometimes, silence is not problematic (one does occasionally stop speaking to chew food, check a cell phone for messages, change a television channel, etc.), not all aspects of a relationship’s history, genders, and cultural context will be bearing upon their talk all of the time. Analysis that is sensitive to these aspects of social life must seek one or the other when troublesomely evasive conversational events occur. The next section draws on video recordings of naturally occurring interaction, participant interviews, field notes and site-based research to provide discourse data and ethnographic detail.

Cultural moral norms can be particularly hidden for people who share a cultural orientation—who were socialized, implicitly, into a way of life that has become second nature. The following examples feature such situations. These analyses cover a series of cases set in particular fairly homogenous cultural contexts. In each situation, I begin with some background on the cultural context based on interviews, field notes, personal or ethnographic experience, and research.

This chapter considers two cases: one in the context of an English family, the other in the context of a set of friends in the U.S. Each case considers how participants conceptualize morality in communicative instances, and in what situations norm-driven assumptions can lead to interactional and relational trouble. The chapter ends with a discussion of how culture is morally problematic in interaction.

The Case of an English Family

I begin analysis of culture in interaction by starting with a fairly bounded, paradigmatic case of a single ethnically homogenous family from a particular region. Discourse analyses are
drawn from two hours of video data that occurred during routine visits in 2008 and 2010. Other data include seven hours of audio recordings collected between 2006 and 2010, interviews with family members, field notes from routine visits spanning two weeks between 2008 and 2009, and observations made in the course of knowing the participants through a relationship with one of them.

The Newtons are from the a small market town in Midlands of England, an industrial, working-class region to which they can trace ancestors of both sides of the family back at least three generations. Work on British culture encompasses a number of perspectives which I will just touch on here. One issue involves the difficulty of the national “English” identity versus the political “British” identity and how people conceptualize their own culture as being one or the other (Langlands, 1999). Overwhelmingly, people who live in England and who identify as Caucasian prefer to call themselves “English.” Other work has focused on media creations of a British identity associated with particular practices and geographic landscapes (fox hunting, green fields, hedgerows) (Wallwork & Dixon, 2004). Critical studies have investigated Britain’s troubled history as an empire and the lingering ways in which British culture still contrasts itself with non-British (nonwhite) “others,” particularly those who were historically part of the empire and who comprise a large portion of the British population today (Colley, 1992).

Fox’s (2004) anthropological investigation of English culture provides a more situated, albeit popularized, account of what life is like in England. Fox notes that certain conversational codes exist among the English which have been noted over the last two hundred years. Beginning conversation with talk about the weather, for instance, is one such code. Fox claims it is a way of easing into conversation for a people who have a “natural reserve”—whether that is
the reason for it, weather talk is ubiquitous in conversational openings in England, and this fact is
sometimes noted ironically by English people during its production.

Fox refers to this and other ritual English topics as “grooming talk,” the equivalent of
apes picking fleas off one another. Others include greeting rituals, for instance “how do you do,”
which is pronounced with no rising intonation and generally is repeated back to the person (“how
do you do,” “how do you do”). One I have noticed in the Midlands and Southeast parts of
England is the question “you alright?” This one does tend to require an answer of sorts. It is
interesting because to a U.S. American, it sounds like a question of concern, but actually in this
context it means roughly the same thing as “how are you?” Fox (2004) notes that greetings and
conversational topic-starters are produced badly—awkwardly—by someone as a display of
typical English identification. Being too “smooth” in a conversational encounter would be
considered “unEnglish.”

But the most pervasive element of talk in Britain, according to Fox (2004) and certainly
echoed in U.S. stereotypes about the English, is the role of humor. To people in the U.S., English
humor is sometimes unfathomable. As Fox notes, there are occasional patriotic attempts in
England to somehow “prove” that English humor is distinct (and superior) to humor in other
locations, particularly regarding the use of wit and irony. Fox asserts that English humor may be
distinct in some ways—certainly people within and without England tend to think so—but that
the real point of interest is the incredibly high *value* that English people place on humor.
According to Fox, humor is rarely constrained to certain “appropriate” contexts in England, but
runs through (or potentially runs through) any talk occasion. In fact, if there is a proscription on
talk, Fox claims it is on being too earnest, too solemn. Other noted features of English humor
include understatement and self-deprecation. According to Fox, in class-conscious England, humor may be the only aspect of being English that crosses class barriers.

As soon as an English person speaks, her or his class will be revealed (Fox, 2004). Class is identified with particular regions in England as well as socioeconomic status. Large cities, for instance, contain a mix of “classes,” and their dialects will reveal them to any English listener. But anything outside of the larger cities, excepting certain “posh” beach/vacation towns, is seen as rural or working class, and thus the speech varieties of that area are associated with class as well as the region. In terms of defining the British Midlands as a speech community, the data on the particular area in this case are unfortunately sparse. The dialects of Britain are famously numerous and not all of them have been studied in detail. Though the dialect of the largest city in the area has been studied a great deal, it is nonetheless distinct from that of the Newtons’ hometown.

Known variations which are typical to the region and to the lower classes include accent, vowel pronunciation, certain consonant clusters, and particular words and phrases. The accent bears little resemblance to the standard Received Pronunciation known by U.S. consumers of British media. Though the dialect lacks rhoticity (the “R” sound at the end of r-ending words) like most British dialects, it is peppered with glottal stops (e.g., bu-er instead of butter) as in Northern dialects, and has very different vowels. For example, the “u” in words such as “cup” and “cut” is pronounced like the “oo” in U.S. standard English words such as “foot” and “stood.” There also exist (though vanishing) substitutions, such as replacing “th” with a “v” or “f” sound (“brover” instead of “brother”) or “g” with “k” (“somethink” or “somefink” instead of “something”) (Fox, 2004; Trudgill, 1982).
There are differences in grammatical constructions and particular vocabularies as well. A notable one which is common to most places outside the south of England and which is also associated with lower class speech involves use of indirect pronouns and possessives. It is common, for example, for people to drop prepositions, resulting in utterances such as “give it me” and “she gave it me.” People also often use “me” in place of the possessive “my,” as in “I lost me hat.” Finally, the use of “dove” or “love” as a term of endearment for women is largely considered a southern encroachment, and the traditional phrase, particularly in the working class, is “ducks.” A common way of requesting one’s wife to pass the salt using this moniker plus the nonstandard possessive, then, would be “could you pass the salt, me ducks?” Other markers of the region allegedly shared by lower class speakers is saying “toilet” instead of “loo” or “lavatory,” requesting someone repeat something with “pardon?” rather than “sorry?”; using “serviette” for “napkin,” and referring to an evening meal as “tea” rather than “dinner” or “supper” (Fox, 2004; Trudgill, 1982; Field notes, 2010).

This dialect, like many in mostly working-class, non-southern towns, is not valued. But in private interactions among close friends and family, it is present. Unfortunately, there is little discourse analytic work on talk in this setting. Most of the discourse studies that feature English or British contexts are of media or political arenas (e.g., Bell & Garrett, 1998; Hutchby, 1996). Many of these studies take a critical discourse perspective rather than an ethnographic one, and thus investigate the speech of powerful elites rather than that of ordinary people (e.g., Fairclough, 2001; van Dijk, 2001).

With this background on the area, its speech variety, and characteristics of “Englishness,” I will now turn to a brief history of the participants. Carl, in his late 50s, received a strict, religious, Victorian-style upbringing, worked most of his life in trade (construction) and skilled
labor (woodworking, ironworks), and later as a teacher of these skills to teenagers with developmental disabilities. He married twice, with one son from his first marriage who lives in Australia, and two sons from his second marriage to Jenny. Jenny, in her mid-50s, was raised in the next town over from where the couple currently lives. From a very poor background, she never completed her secondary degree (high school equivalent), instead helping to raise her sisters and assist her ailing mother. Later she became a nurse, the occupation she still holds more than 30 years later. This background is relevant because it shows the fairly traditional background of the family which, despite their movement into a more middle class lifestyle during Carl and Jenny’s marriage, still demonstrates a retention of local class-guided speech codes.

Their sons have followed markedly different paths. The eldest, Jim, in his early 30s, took the more traditional route by working in industry, marrying, having a daughter, and living local. The younger son, Raymond, in his late-20s, was at this time completing his PhD in London. The entire family is very close, and their home reflects the interests and skills of the men in the family. Though Jenny and Carl have lived in two houses in the town since their marriage (only a few blocks apart, at that), they have lived in their current residence for about 20 years. Since moving in, Carl has engaged in a number of construction projects: building a shed, adding a room, etc. Much of the furniture and décor, even some toys that are still displayed in the boys’ old bedrooms, were created by Carl and other (male) members of his family. Thus the physical space they inhabit is a testament to the family background in construction and skilled labor. But a preoccupation with newer technologies also is evident, as the house contains several electronic devices: radios, computers, television sets, not all of which are operational, many of which clutter Carl’s office.
Despite the fact that Jenny has worked as long as Carl has, the couple largely occupies traditional gender roles. Jenny is mainly responsible for the cleanliness of the house and the cooking, despite the fact that she works more hours than Carl, and even during a short period of time in which Carl had retired. Jim’s family is similar, in that his wife Gertie quit her job when she got pregnant, and is now firmly a housewife with no apparent desire to return to work. Jim does, however, share to some measure the responsibilities of caring for their daughter, Lizzy, when he is home. These facts are the most relevant to the analysis below.

The interactional patterns of the family display some of the background mentioned above through a particular interactional frame, one which is also associated with their English background: humor. As mentioned above, Fox (2004) claims that humor is pervasive in British life. Whether this is true or not, it is undoubtedly pervasive in the Newtons’ everyday interactions. Humor is a way of bringing up complaints, smoothing out troubles, reconnecting after being apart, indicating concern, commenting on situations, and accomplishing many other communicative actions.

National identity, like any identity, is accomplished through routine practices which are patterned to be associated with “being x” (Hester & Housley, 2002). The achievement and indexing of cultural ideals—ideologies—is a way of reinforcing shared culture. However, ideologies can conflict within a culture. This causes trouble because it makes visible the differences between people who seem to share an identification. The examples discussed in this analysis implicate a number of moral cultural assumptions at play. It is not simply the case that their interactions are merely a reflection of the family’s English working-and-middle class background. Their interactions have also been patterned within their family over the years so that the cultural implications are also tied up with their relational histories. As Gordon (2009) notes
in her work on repetition, intertextuality and framing in a family study, “family” is an interactive construction situated in patterns of talk. The example discussed is a case study of such interactional patterns, though other examples are provided to give further evidence to the pattern. In this scene, the author is holding the camera, and moves it between Carl and Jenny, sometimes widening the angle to capture as much of both of them as possible (though this was difficult because of the placement of people in the room). Raymond is off camera, to the right of Jenny.

Excerpt 21 “The Newtons” [famJul08.1.E4.1]

1 Carl: I never get any ‘elp washing up

3

4 JR: mm

5 Jenny: wha- what ‘ave you done today Carl?

6 Carl: well-

7

8 Jenny: you haven’t done nothing today except talk to Peter (.) talk to Roy Parker
Carl: I’ve been researchin on the internet all day. Sometimes it does- in fact it does take a lot of time.

Jenny: ((exaggerated yawn))

JR: mm

Jenny: exactly. ( )

Carl: and then I lie on the settee for maybe an hour. Or two?

((laughter))

Carl: well I have to get up cuz it gives me neck ache

Jenny: well that does it

19

20

Carl: well I’m saving meself cuz at the moment Jim doesn’t need me to do his working.

I’m working exclusively for Raymond

In this excerpt, Carl complains about not getting help washing up (doing dishes) (line 1). The complaint is given to JR rather than anyone who might be relevant to the complaint (such as his sons or wife), and thus is done indirectly. However, it is explicit enough that it begs a response of some sort, especially as JR, the conversational partner being addressed, does not give one. Jenny’s response (line 4) challenges Carl’s right to make the complaint. That she does not allow Carl to respond to this initial challenge, answering the question for him (line 7, “done nothing”) indicates she does not feel Carl’s complaint is valid. Here two situated norms can be identified. One assumes equality of family chores and the notion of interdependence, that people
should help one another. Based on this ideology, the critique of having to wash up all the time, with no help, is a valid one. However, another norm at work has to do with situating household chores in a larger context. Jenny has been working all day. Carl at this time was retired. In this case, then, there is a norm that it is reasonable to expect one person to do more chores at home if the other is doing more work out of the home.

This norm has a long basis in the traditional separation of gender roles: women were expected to stay at home and take care of the house, and men to do the work outside of the house. It was not considered fair to expect men to do housework at home because they had been out doing “work-work” all day. During the weekend of this filming (five days), “washing up” is just one of many references to the reversal of gender roles. Earlier, for instance, Jenny complains about how every morning she leaves the vacuum out as a hint for Carl to vacuum, and every day when she comes home she finds it in exactly the same place. In that case, as in this one and others, Carl’s response to Jenny’s taking on a different gender role is the same: he jokes about it. In that instance, he complains about how annoying it is to trip on the vacuum every day. His complaint is not “real,” but a joking way of acknowledging Jenny’s rightness without acknowledging his fault.

Other similar occurrences have occurred across the audio and video data gathered on the family during 2008 and 2010 (and a recent visit in December of 2010 had proven that these instances continue to be recycled, sometimes almost word-for-word). In these instances, the problem is opened with a complaint. Jenny is often the one who does this, usually making a reference to Carl’s lack of effort or completion regarding a household task. Sometimes, however, Carl will mention something—for example in one case he mentioned that the laundry was in the way in the kitchen (washing and drying machines in England often are found in the kitchen). In
response to this noticing, which makes the business of laundry relevant to Jenny, Jenny in turn asked Carl why he had not done anything about it. Since there was no way for Carl to concede Jenny’s point without acknowledging his own fault, nor argue with Jenny without seeming to explicitly treat her in a “housewife” role, Carl could only make a joke in response. Thus, in this case, the competing ideologies of fairness in the home constituted an ideological, and interactional, dilemma.

In the case of washing up shown in the excerpt, Carl jokes while accepting Jenny’s point as well: he gives a not-real complaint about how long it takes to research on the internet (lines 8-9), which as in the case of tripping over the vacuum, is clearly not a good reason to have not done, or to complain about, the household tasks Jenny keeps trying to assign to him. Carl goes on to give several such complaints about his life at home (lying down, getting a neck ache; lines 13,15) and his turning the situation into a humorous one provides an opening for him to transition to a new topic without being held accountable to the old one.

This interaction serves to maintain the status quo of the family roles. On one hand, it indexes the family’s past of who did what. Though previously Jenny and Carl both worked, Jenny was still consistently responsible for cooking, cleaning house, washing up, doing laundry, etc. Now that Carl has even less to do than Jenny, that expectation remains. Carl resists household tasks and complains about the ones he does get even though they continue to be much smaller responsibilities than Jenny’s. He acknowledges Jenny’s point of view regarding the norm of fairness and equal tasks, but he resists her point of view based on the gendered expectations within which he was raised. A local fairness norm is thus in conflict with a cultural gender norm. Carl’s use of humor functions to acknowledge Jenny’s rightness and stave off her counter-critiques for the time being, shifts the conversation and takes the seriousness of the question of
his responsibility “off the radar.” This recreates the family’s identity in which Jenny’s role remains the same as it has always been.

The meaning of this interaction is manifold to the participants. It is simultaneously a judgment ritual, dealing with criticism and accounts; some light-hearted teasing; a serious issue; and a problematic event. The norms for doing domesticity seem to conflict in this and other instances. Humor is used to frame all of the interactions around this ongoing issue, such that it is never treated as a very serious one. And there is no evidence, also, that it is treated as serious gender issue by the participants—locally, its codes appear guided by an ideology of fairness. Present in many cultural contexts in the West at least, fairness guides many of people’s espoused constraints on particular actions. But the fairness expected of relational partners in the home may not line up with traditional expectations of men and women in the community.

Indexing in families is complex because as Gordon (2009) notes, talk contains intertextual references to interactional instances in the family’s history—this is woven through indexical references to culture. Repetition is a way of maintaining certain family beliefs, practices, myths, and problems (Gordon, 2009; Tannen, 2007). By participating in cultural expectations for family member roles and duties, families enact their private identity while positioning themselves in relation to local notions of family. Because family norms and larger community ideologies do not always match entirely—or in cases in which tensions exist between private norms and public discourses—problems will inevitably arise. Family norms can incorporate the multiple ideologies of the culture in which they live. Often families are constructed of multiple ideologies, not necessarily spoken individually by members, but shared and negotiated between (and within) all of them differently across time (Baxter, 2006).
Because conflicting ideologies are backgrounded in “shared” cultures, they are negotiated in the moment through other available resources, such as particular topics (household chores, work). In the case of this family, complaints and criticisms became a moral discursive practice for raising a fairness issue, while humor was used as the primary method for working out which moralities the family would orient to for that moment. Though cultural moralities related to gender roles and work values are not specific only to British life, they are contextualized in a British setting and managed through the particularly ubiquitous British strategy of humor.

This analysis is a particularly “family-like” situation. The particular pattern over many years around domestic chores is not common among friends. The next analysis again concerns a group of people, this time friends, who encounter different kinds of situations around gender and work in different ways. These friends were born or raised from a young age in the same town. As with this example, the existence of differing and contradictory ideologies around work, relationships and identity prove problematic for the practice of morality.

**The Case of U.S. American Friends**

Studies have demonstrated the phenomenon in which people of Caucasian background see themselves as “having no culture” and resist ethnic labeling (e.g., Bucholtz, 2001; Thurlow, 2003). The culture of such people is often taken to be representative of the U.S. majority, and is associated with being middle class and living in the suburbs. In this analysis I discuss an example of a group of friends within this category to consider how they negotiate cultural expectations of education, gender and work in a time in which those expectations are in flux. Data come from field notes, interviews, and eight hours of audio and video data recorded in 2005, 2008 and 2010.
The group of friends consists of a core group of six men, and a rotating group of various others as well as romantic partners. The town they live in is a small, largely suburban, largely white middle class town in the San Francisco Bay Area. They were raised, and still live, in the “downtown” area, which is associated with lower middle class and working class people, subsidized housing, and greater incidences of juvenile delinquency. Serious crimes are rare, and when they occur, are attributed to these lower class neighborhoods or the influx of “outsiders,” largely Latinos and African Americans, moving in or visiting to cause trouble from the neighboring poorer and much more ethnically diverse town. Despite the lower class perception of the area, the standard of living is in reality far higher than even that of the neighboring city.

Elementary schools are abundant in this little town—there are five total—and restrict enrollment to their immediate neighborhoods; thus the elementary schools reflect the background of the people in the area, and are largely homogenously composed of those people. However, all of these students are fed into only one middle school, and then one high school, creating a significant mixing by the time people graduate. Interestingly, however, high school students for the most part associate strongly with their neighborhoods and the elementary schools where they first met. This results in social groups that form around class-based backgrounds in addition to particular hobbies, interests and activities that bring people together in high school. Though the differences between the classes are not huge—housing is costly throughout the area—the small differences in student backgrounds are marked in the high school.

The high school’s institutional ideology drives at a white, upper class, education-oriented ideal. Students are encouraged almost immediately, through counselors and countless practice SAT tests, to think of college as an inevitable next step. From sophomore year, Advanced Placement classes separate the academically excellent from the mediocre—supposedly. And,
also from the second year, students who regularly underperform or exhibit behavioral problems are transported to the continuation school. Every step of the way, an institutional rule serves to separate those who fit within the school’s discourse, and those who do not.

The six men all attended the high school and were subject to the discourse of education and liberal perspective on gender roles. These men, however, face tensions between their own gendered norms and the norms espoused by parents and community members of their town. These men have come to reject the role of “organized” education, take up working class occupations and values, and date significantly younger women whose anti-feminist orientations align with the maintenance of this way of life.

All of the men in this group stayed at the main town high school, meaning they never did poorly enough or misbehaved enough to be sent to the continuation school, though all graduated with GPAs below 1.7. Throughout the end of high school, all articulated desires to go to college and find good jobs which were consistent with the orientation of their school and the middle class background of their parents. There are some notable differences, however, between these young men and other men and women who espoused the same goals. First, these men did not do well in school and were never admitted to an Advanced Placement course. Second, they did not participate in school activities such as sports, clubs, music or drama. And third, they identified throughout high school with a “punk” ethos that was distrustful of conformity and authority.

Subsequently, these young men also did not do similar things as their classmates after high school. One never attempted to go to college. Two started in a four-year university but eventually dropped out. Three have been in and out of community colleges, but have never moved onto a four-year university and rarely complete their semesters at the community college. All of them, regardless of where they moved after high school, eventually returned to their
hometown and have been there at least six years. All of them are either currently unemployed or work in industry or local service jobs. All have worked several jobs in succession, sometimes several simultaneously, and between jobs have moved back in with their parents due to the high cost of living in the area.

These men constitute a contradiction. On one hand, they are raised in liberal, white, middle class neighborhoods (even if they live in lower class sections of them) where they receive the same education, are encouraged to value that education, and receive the same gendered discourses as others in their community. There has been research (e.g. Archer & Hutchings, 2000) which indicates that these discourses are less successful among ethnically diverse, lower class high school students—that not only do such groups not achieve the ideals presented to them, but that even if they espouse those ideals initially, eventually they will adopt a counterrhetoric, constructing their own ideologies. Interestingly, however, most of the men in the larger group, and in this immediate group of six individuals, are white; and though they were raised in the perceived “lower class” sections of the downtown area, they are significantly better-off than those living in poorer neighboring cities. For all intents and purposes, despite having the “right” background and receiving the same education and support (at least to begin with) as others in their high school, these men did not end up enacting the portrait of success with which they were presented by the liberal educational ideologies of their town and school.

These men, for various complicated reasons, find themselves unable to live within those discourses, unable to work within those frames. Instead, they develop their own frame in which they form a working-class enclave within a middle class background in which labor and toughness is valued over white collar jobs and education. Their large circle of friendly acquaintances, as well as their girlfriends, support this frame; and the attitudes of friends and
girlfriends are valued by the men much more strongly than the admonitions of their parents. In their interactions, they enact conservative, working-class, masculine-centered identities that favor the status quo lifestyle they have achieved in which having freedom and being tough is more important than education or financial stability.

The excerpts below demonstrate how the men in this community deal with perceived threats to their interpersonal norms from the cultural norms espoused by their communities. The first excerpt deals with the value of work and the importance of freedom. The second excerpt features attitudes toward masculinity. In the third excerpt, two of the men and their girlfriends collaboratively produce an anti-feminist stance that affirms their orientations toward traditional gender roles.

Excerpt 22 “Six Men” [fm.vis05.2.E3.1(audio)]

69 Jon: Hey I just got a new job=
70 JR: =oh yeah?
71 Darren: washin dishes
72 Jon: washing dishes yeah at that new restaurant on second (.) have you been there?=
74 JR: =no
75 Jon: not the best job but (.) it’s pretty laid back
76 Alex: [except when you have to wake up in the morning]
77 Darren: [except when you sleep in and [the boss calls you] ((laughs))]
78 Jon: [except- yeah- ha ha but- but-]
79 JR: oh no
80 Jon: it was fine my boss is cool (.) I don’t have a lot of hours right now which kind of sucks but (.) I mean I like the time to myself but I need the money
82 Darren: that’s why I love my job I have the whole day to myself[and my job]
83 Alex: [and your] job
84 makes hella money
85 JR: but you get off so late (.) I never see you anymore (.) I just can’t wait until two am these days (.) gettin old=
87 Darren: =that and I’m usually sleeping until the afternoon
88 (1.0)
89 JR: these tiny windows of opportunity
90 Alex: I’m thinkin of quittin my job (.) even though I’m broke
91 JR: I thought you liked that job
In this excerpt, which occurs a year and a half after graduating high school, three friends from the group are sitting around Jon’s living room, listening to music and talking. Jon makes an announcement (line 69), clearly meant for JR as everyone else knows about it. This turns the conversation to work. Jon had previously been unemployed for several months, so getting a job is particularly newsworthy. This prompts others to talk about work, Darren mentioning his job at a recycling plant (line 81), where he works from late in the evening until early the next morning, and Alex mentioning possibly quitting his job, which is with a construction agency (painting houses) (line 90). In these references, money and freedom are prominent themes. Having a job is seen as better than not having one, but not having a job is seen as better than having a restrictive job (e.g., lines 92-94).

There is little effort here to downplay the types of jobs the men have, though these jobs were not the ones toward which their educations were aimed, and are not culturally high-status jobs. Instead, the jobs are evaluated based on their ability to pay a lot and provide freedom and a good working atmosphere. However, playing up the positive sides to these jobs could be a performance for JR, who at that time had just returned from getting her MA. Or such performances could be implicitly contrasted with associations of typical “business jobs” where people have to dress up, stay in an office, and don’t necessarily have flexible working hours or much free time.

The next excerpt features an interesting contrast of talk around notions of masculinity. In the first fragment, Jon relates the story of a friend JR has not met, Casey, and Casey’s various accomplishments. Shortly after, an impromptu “drag” performance prompts multiple displays of
gender. The two fragments here occur during a party where the main group of friends (the “six men”) are gathered, with the author, in chairs around a coffee table. Others are in the kitchen, and a couple are on a sofa by the television set.

Excerpt 23 Fragment 1 “Six Men” [frm.vis05.2.E3.2]

94 Jon: have you met Casey
95 JR: m (.) I don’t think so
96 Darren: you’ve met Casey
97 Jon: she hasn’t
98 Owen: he’s a high schooler
99 Jon: yeah (.) but he’s the toughest fucking high schooler you’ve ever-
100 Owen: [oh yeah I wasn’t saying]
101 Alex: [that guy is huge]
102 Jon: he’s bigger than Marvin
103 JR: wo (.) how old is he?
104 Dan: he’s like (. f[h][ifteen]
105 Jon: [fifteen] (> .) yeah
106 JR: is he coming here? Tonight I mean
107 Jon: I don’t know (. .) yeah people are so scared [of him]
108 Darren: [which is] so ironic-
109 Jon: he’s like an actual punk Mohawk leather jacket everything
110 Dan: there’s reason to be scared
111 Frank: I heard he curbed someone
112 Owen: [no::]
113 Alex: [fuck] no that’s- I’ve never heard that=
114 Frank: =well I heard something=
115 Craig: =what that he put a guy in a coma?=
116 Darren: [oh:: shit]
117 Jon: [seriously?]
118 Dan: [(I heard that)]
119 Jon: well- well what I know is he cracked one of Tim Cleeve’s teeth
120 Darren: yeah (. .) Bill told me that
121 Jon: Tim said some shit about his sister (. .) Casey’s little sister
122 Darren: yeah that’s the thing about Casey he’s not just like (. .) like=
123 Craig: =(like) just kicking ass like some baboon
124 Jon: right (.) but he’s hella strong and he looks scary as hell
125 Darren: yeah but he’s the nicest guy that’s the thing=
126 Craig: =what a sweetie ((laughs))
127 Alex: just don’t cross him

Excerpt 23 Fragment 2 “Six Men”
Taylor: [slap his ass again]

Jr: [((laughing)])

Alex: ( ) be and then a fuck- oh:: (. ) damn brother=

Sara: =that’s disturbing

Alex: problems

Darren: I have no problems (. ) I can get any man I want

Jr: [((laughing)])

Craig: oh:: fuck

Jr: wow

Alex: that man is very secure [with himself (I’m just saying)]

Craig: [ ( )

Excerpt 23 Fragment 3 “Six Men”

Alex: Hey fucker quit grabbin my titties (. ) that’s sexual harassment I took a

training class=

Dan: =I didn’t (. ) hey her ass- her ass is two words fucker=

Darren: =that’s [right]

Dan: [her ](. ) ass

Alex: I swear to god (. ) (it fuckin fit) I need to keep drinkin

Jr: [laughs]

Georgia: hey I have another outfit who else wants to be dressed as a [girl]

Craig: [how] does that

Alex: like I should be able to ( )

-. ((4.0 seconds of unintelligible overlap deleted))

-. Georgia: please will you be dressed like a girl?

Craig: I don’t mind at all

(2.0)

Alex: you want some baby how you doin boy how you do::in::
In the first of these fragments from a party, various people use the identity of Casey to work out what an “ideal” man is like: scary, large, tough, skilled at fighting (lines 99, 101-102, 107, 109), but not “a baboon” or someone who just goes around beating people up (121-127). Revealed here is a kind of “ideology of honor” similar to that found among the men of Teamsterville in Philipsen’s study (1975). To fight on behalf of someone else is considered the best reason to fight; and fighting is considered a reasonable response to insults directed toward self, but particularly toward friends, family or romantic partners. These masculinity values are not shared by the men’s larger communities or families, but have been constructed by these men to form a distinctive identity with one another. Though the stereotypical masculine performances prohibit certain characteristics of closeness such as displays of affection, it is clear from the
collaborative talk practices, the large body of common knowledge, and the shared orientations toward gender and work that these men are in fact very close friends.

This celebration of “tough” masculinity is contrasted only a few minutes later when a young woman who lives at the house convinces Darren to dress in her clothes. In the second fragment, Darren has just emerged in drag and there is an explosion of teasing. The negative element of the teasing (swearing at the situation, claiming it is disturbing and that Darren has “problems”) (lines 130-132) are turned around by Darren himself. He reframes the allegation that he has “problems” (i.e. gender problems, mental problems) by asserting he can get any man he wants (line 133) and then mock-attacking Craig (line 134). Thus the meaning of “problems” is demonstrated in relation to sexual prowess. But it takes on a different meaning as well, in which Darren has no problems with his known identity as a heterosexual male. Alex picks up on this meaning in line 138.

This tension between how to display masculinity emerges out of changing and competing cultural ideologies. In the past, and among more conservative working class men, the way to show masculinity was to ridicule anything female or homosexual-male. Clearly the men are orienting to that tradition here. But there is a new ideology regarding homophobia in the U.S., which is that to display too much discomfort toward homosexuality is considered a sign that one is “closeted” or insecure in one’s own masculinity. That ideology, simultaneously, is at work here, and perhaps because of it, Alex and Craig eventually join in.

Between fragments two and three, Darren is convinced to sit on Dan’s lap alongside Dan’s girlfriend (he is referred to as “Dan’s new bitch” and someone else shouts “Dan’s got two bitches!”). Then another guest at the party picks Darren up and there are shouts of “take him across the doorstep!” This is followed by a break in the film, and upon return, Alex has also
dressed up in women’s clothing (fragment three). Fragment three continues the invocations of various gender roles that occurred in between the fragments, which espouses a dominant stance of men and masculinity toward women and femininity. By taking on a feminine persona, Darren becomes a “bitch”; Alex’s mock claims of sexual harassment are ridiculed (139-143). None of the small minority of women (only three out of the whole crowd) treats these comments as unusual or responds to them at all.

In the last part of fragment three, Craig too agrees to be dressed like a girl, and the utterance “I don’t mind at all” (line 154) again is a way if displaying masculinity by being agreeable to dressing more “feminine.” Since dressing in drag here serves to (1) ridicule femininity, (2) display one’s security with one’s own masculinity, and (3) allows the men to show more of their clearly masculine bodies, it becomes a safe activity, and might in fact be taken as face-threatening for someone who protested, refused to dressed up, or was openly uncomfortable. In fact, the only person at the party who displays some discomfort is significantly older (by 15 years) than the rest of the people there, and thus could be said to be more affected by an older ideology of how to display masculinity. He is notably silent during the previous “shows” and when Alex picks him up and “comes on to” him (lines 156-157), he puts up with it, but makes no response, and his tense reaction seems to be one of waiting for it to end. In line 159, when Alex finally lets him go, he kicks at Alex as he walks back into the kitchen.

In the next example, traditional attitudes toward men and women are also constructed, this time through disparaging feminism and performing the expectation that a woman’s role is to take care of her man. This excerpt takes place three years later, at Jon’s house. Jon and Darren, by this time in their late 20s, and their girlfriends, who are in their late teens and who are also sisters, are watching a film when JR comes to visit. After the film they all end up playing a card
game called “Apples to Apples.” In this game there are red cards with nouns and gerunds listed, and green cards with adjectives listed. The red card is placed face up with the noun/gerund and the other players pick the adjective they think best describes the noun. At the beginning of this excerpt, a game has just ended, and Georgia is going through red cards, making up her own adjectives, and trying to get people to guess what the noun on the card is.

*Excerpt 24 “Six Men” [frn.vis08.4.E1.1(audio)]*

160 Georgia: oh this one’s (0.5) okay how about man hating bitch?
161 Darren: Hilary Clinton?
162 Nancy: what is it? ((Georgia shows her the card)) oh ((laughs))
163 Jon: what is it?
164 Nancy: feminist=
165 Georgia: =oh you’re not a feminist are you?
166 JR: n- uh I don’t think I’d call myself that no
167 Georgia: so stupid (.) ugly women
168 Darren: like I said (.) Hilary Clinton
169 Jon: smoke break?
170 (5.0) ((Jon and Darren go outside, Georgia shuffles the cards))
171 Georgia: it’s amazing how much laundry I have to do this weekend (.) I’m doing
172 Jon’s too (1.0) if I didn’t do it he would wear the same shit over and over
173 Nancy: yeah I do Darren’s laundry his shit gets so dirty from his job=
174 Georgia: =oh yeah (0.5) when Jon has a gig it’s the same thing
175 Nancy: somehow I end up cooking most of the time [too]
176 Georgia: [yeah] and Jon is a good cook
177 actually but it’s like (.) he’ll just have cheetos or something (.) and
178 there is never anything in this house=
179 JR: =yeah [it’s always been like that]
180 Nancy: [I’m pretty sure Darren] wouldn’t eat at all if it wasn’t for me (.)
181 god knows how he made it this far
182 Georgia: oh my god I know ((Nancy and Georgia laugh))
This excerpt begins with Georgia coming up with the not-quite-an-adjective “man hating bitch” as a descriptive (in this case alleged synonym) of the noun, “feminist,” which is on the card she is holding (line 160). This joke is not produced as if it were going to offend anyone, until Georgia realizes JR is there (whom she doesn’t know well) and thus checks in to make sure JR is not a feminist (line 165). Various other descriptors are also attributed to feminism and feminists and to the supposed negative qualities of feminists (e.g., “stupid,” “ugly women,” “Hilary Clinton”) (lines 167-168). As in the prior examples, this enactment secures the traditional gender orientations in the group. This is discussed in terms of romantic relationships by Georgia and Nancy, who are sisters, in lines 171-182. They go through a litany of non-serious complaints about their boyfriends (Jon and Darren) who are out having a smoke break. These complaints are produced almost as a “one upping” ritual, with each young woman going back and forth trying to prove how much more devotedly each cares for her boyfriend. By dressing these boasts up as complaints, they are able to show pride toward their nearly wife-status domestic duties as a way of showing the level of commitment in their relationships. As sisters, they compete in a small way while aligning in values. As romantic partners of the two men and friends of the group, they also support the conservative orientations toward gender which are displayed over and over again by their boyfriends and the larger group of men which whom they spend most of their time.

The interactions above featured various tacit stances being displayed against the discourses within which the men were raised. These stances acknowledge but do not confront the assumptions of education, gender and work dominant in their community. Though their interactions contained an outsider (the author) who could be said to represent that community and its ideals of success, and perhaps thus prompted these performances, it is not necessarily the
case that these enactments would never have happened. Doing social identity is often in part achieved by contrasting one’s identity with that of an explicit or unnamed other in order to “do” the boundaries of the group (Bailey, 2000a).

The meanings of these interactions are largely about group identity. Group identity can be achieved in many ways, but here, moral discursive practices seem to serve to interactionally achieve a conservative, working-class ethos of masculinity. The men follow codes of conduct and communication designed to enact themselves in fairly stereotypical ways at times, but also in ways that are perceived as authentic and real. Doing these identity enactments strengthens their sense of closeness with one another and reinforces the morality of their communicative behavior. Nonetheless, problems arise, from other potential ideologies existing in their community and cultural context, from the presence of outsiders to their group, and from changes occurring in their society.

The two cases described here featured people from more or less similar backgrounds. These people live or have lived in a particular place. They share common activities and values. And yet, their lives are not all harmony. Contradictions arise which must be interpersonally managed to achieve a particular relationship identity. Competing ideologies within communities and cultural orientations were interactionally negotiated through humor, accounts, and gender displays. These moral interactions were accomplished in slightly different ways between the family and friend situations. For example, in the family interaction, gender roles were largely tacit, forming the basis of people’s judgments of one another’s behavior. In the friend interaction, gender was more explicitly a topic, related to entertainment and employed as a way to negotiate identities with one another. In the next section, I summarize these analytic results and discuss their implications.
The Cultural Context of Moral Practice

Cultural ideologies abound in society. They are communicated through family, media, and networks of friends, coworkers, romantic partners, acquaintances. These ideologies do not exist prior to, or above, interaction. Instead, they are interactionally achieved as conversational participants go about their daily lives, performed and ratified into continued existence. Even small moves such as when to smile at someone, the games one plays, and the best way to turn a person down for lunch are ways of recreating ideology in a local situation. Moral discursive practices—actions, rituals, ways of talking, language—are a technique for instantiating ideology as well as confronting its problems. In the examples discussed above, ideological themes—around how to be a good housemate, a good husband or wife, a good man, a good girlfriend, a good communicator—proved interactionally problematic because the ideologies around these notions are not homogenous even when the “culture” appears to be shared.

This lack of homogeneity brings up the point about the intersection of morality and difference, which will be developed further in the next two chapters. To preview, as Bakhtin (1981) noted, language and the world it creates is not unitary, but heteroglossic, a dynamic interplay of voices and ideologies in tension with one another. This is true about cultural backgrounds, situations, relationships and individuals; it is true about interaction, and interaction’s accomplishment of these things. And yet, the achievement of commonality and sharedness, of group identity, or some minimal convergence of interaction, is a significant factor in human life. Thus, the difference involved in ideology has the potential to produce anxiety, and moral practice is in part seeking to manage that anxiety even as it creates that anxiety.

Though the cultural contexts examined here were prima facie uncomplicated, culture is indeed a complex concept which encompasses many contradictions. As Streeck (2002) points
out, the enduring association between culture and particular groups or geographic locations is a problematic one. It leads to assumptions of discrete, clear boundaries, homogenous groups, and abstract histories that essentialize and oversimplify people’s practices and identities. However, empirical studies of culture largely focus on particular groups of people in particular places. Because cultural approaches are so tied to an ethnographic methodology, and because ethnography is generally site-based, studies of culture do tend to study something that appears to echo was Streeck and others have cautioned against. My point in bringing up this tricky relationship between theorizing culture and practicing the research of it is that the delineation between “cultural communication” and “intercultural communication” is no longer clear at all, if it ever was. Thus the problem of ideology is also a problem of culture, but the problem of culture is often obscured unless culture becomes saliently different (as in the next chapter).

From a grounded practical theory approach, the results of this chapter indicate some of the cultural problems which can arise in the joint process of interactionally creating a “moral” situation. Participants engaged in a number of strategies, such as humor and facework, in order to reconcile the competing cultural ideologies being worked out in interaction. In doing these strategies, certain ideals for the practice were revealed, including the idea that practices should accomplish harmony in a social or familial group—the upshot of this being largely an orientation toward maintaining the (apparently positive) “status quo” rather than engaging in conflict or challenging routines. This brings up a couple of difficulties in theorizing moral communication: (1) that ideals for a practice may themselves conflict, and (2) that where ideals do not conflict, they may be damaging in the long run for relationships. These issues are returned to in chapter nine.
Chapter six reconstructed “ideology” as a collection of practices for doing morality based on an ideal of shared moral orientations. The next chapter, chapter seven, discusses culture as a moral discursive practice in intercultural communication. From the perspective of GPT, culture and intercultural contact involves explicit confrontations with expected differences which are assumed to need managing to (re)construct a shared relational orientation. Chapter seven analyzes the problem enacting culture in intercultural friend and family interactions to reconstruct culture as a moral practice.
Chapter 7

The Trouble with Culture for Doing Morality

Culture is, to some extent, composed of “intercultures.” Groups come into conflict. Romantic couples find themselves at odds with their communities. Friends raised in the same town clash over ethnically marked but morally invisible backgrounds. When people who index themselves as culturally similar engage in communicative practices, they work out tensions so as to render them as coherent and non-conflicting as possible. People of course will have differences in particular communities, but in close relationships, such communities (religious, political, etc.) are shared or assumed to be shared—people refer to “my community,” “our community” (Schotter, 1993) and rarely “one of my communities.” This reinforces the notion of a strong relational identity situated in a common culture. But among close people whose cultural differences are more clearly marked, different strategies must be employed, ones which manage the ways in which contradictory moral values in participants’ backgrounds can potentially damage the shared relationship of those participants.

This chapter discusses culture as a moral discursive practice. From the perspective of GPT, culture and intercultural contact involve explicit confrontations with expected differences that must be managed to construct a shared relational orientation. Chapter seven analyzes the problem of enacting culture in intercultural friend and family interactions to argue that intercultural interactions make salient cultural ideologies in a way that offers different management techniques than in situations where culture appears more obviously shared. To relegate the potential difference implied in intercultural relationships, friends and families work to align and signal a unique “shared” culture based on overlapping or merged ideologies.
This chapter focuses on the problem of culture, particularly of intercultural moral interaction. In this chapter, ideologies are more saliently attributed to cultural backgrounds or patterns of speaking and being rather than orienting to invisible unshared ideologies. A difference is noted, commented on, and/or acted on. The chapter analyzes how cultural differences and the assumedly different ideologies associated with them shape and are shaped in relational interaction. The problem of culture for morality involves the way in which different cultural assumptions, and their potentially different ideologies, are dealt with in close intercultural relationships.

This chapter focuses on intercultural families and friendships and the ways in which different cultural ideologies are interactionally achieved in moral practice. Intercultural relationships can encounter different ideologies and include different notions of what moral practices are for and how they should be done. In the last few chapters, I have mentioned how the concept of “difference” can be problematic for enacting morality in interpersonal relationships. Some of these differences may be situational or relational, as when a private conversation in a car occasions more explicit moral talk than would occur among family. Chapter five, for example, looked at how talking about sex was sanctioned in some situations and not in others; and for certain relationships, but not others. Some of these differences may be cultural, with different expectations regarding giving others attention or enacting appropriate gender roles. Chapter four for instance looked at fairly Western notions of how to do good intersubjectivity in a family, while chapter six examined local situations where contradictory cultural gender norms had to be dealt with. In all of these situations, problems could always arise.
The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to culture. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and managing culture. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for participants’ situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.

**Morality as Cultural Practice**

Chapter six discussed cultural practices as ideological. This chapter continues that theme, but focuses more explicitly on saliently “intercultural” interactions where people’s identifications with different cultures are marked. The following sections begin with a review of intercultural and cultural research, then review the link between culture and ideology as an intercultural problem.

**Intercultural Interaction and Cultural Practice**

Interpersonal research has explored numerous avenues regarding intercultural relationships, including that of intercultural difference as a barrier to uncertainty reduction (Gudykunst, 1985), and comparing interpersonal relationships cross-culturally (Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey & Nishida, 1996). Interpersonal relationships which are themselves intercultural have also been investigated (Ting-Toomey & Korzenny, 1991), and studies of cultural, intercultural and cross-cultural communication theories have been developed which seek to explain the effects of culture on group outcomes and effectiveness, identity, adaptation, face, standpoint, and competence (Gudykunst, 2003). All of these perspectives consider to varying degrees the role of norms, interpersonal expectations and/or interactional problems that highlight the ways in which culture in interpersonal communication can be morally inflected.
Discourse approaches to culture include interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz, 1982), ethnography of speaking and communication (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972), anthropological linguistics/linguistic anthropology (Duranti, 1997), and sociocultural linguistics (Bucholtz & Hall, 2008). These perspectives focus on slightly different kinds of social interaction. The ethnography of speaking, for instance, was designed for obtaining a rich portrait of a particular cultural setting through the SPEAKING acronym (Scene/Setting, Participants, Ends, Act sequence, Key, Instrumentalities, Norms, Genre). Interactional sociolinguistics, on the other hand, was more focused on intercultural encounters and the contextualization cues which implicated participants’ attributions of cultural identity to one another (Gumperz, 1982). These two approaches also indicate the uneven focus on problems in studies of culture, in which intracultural research is less likely to focus on problems than intercultural research.

Goffman (1974) presented numerous potential problems for people who do not share the same frame. As mentioned in chapter two, framing practices are analyzeable as cultural practices, local community ways of seeing situations in a certain way. Thus, if two people from two different cultures or ways-of-framing come together, trouble can arise. In order for people to adjust their actions to one another and see the situation as intelligible, there must be an intersubjective overlap (see chapter four) and ability to comprehend the signals (Bateson, 1972).

From a grounded practical theory perspective, then, intercultural contact poses potential problems for people in close relationships, where what might otherwise be called “misunderstanding” can create serious consequences where relational sharedness is assumed. The next section further discusses the problem of culture and its relationship to ideology.

**Ideology and (Inter)culture**
As discussed in chapter six, ideologies are situated accomplishments. They are labels for and ways of making sense of interactional practices. Moral practices are thus ways of doing ideology. Cultural practices which involve morality—raising a child to be a “good” member of society, for example—may themselves be based on competing ideologies, but are complicated further when cultures are seen as different. Different relational ideals can exist for families and friends. Fitch (1998) notes for example in her study of Colombian relationships that Colombians have an ideology of “connectedness,” that people’s identities are actually formed of the bonds they have with everyone else. This ideology can clash in practice with a more individualistic one that might be found among many U.S. Americans.

In the last chapter, ideologies were rarely indexed directly because they were tacit, assumed to be consistent and compatible. In this chapter, ideologies may not be explicitly talked about, but are pointed out more clearly in metadiscursive moves which, as Fitch (1998) mentions, are one way in which people indicate their unspoken premises about interpersonal ideologies. The examples in the ensuing analysis are often not of the paradigm “two different cultures.” As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and in chapter six, cultures are multiple, and involve different extents of participation. The next chapter discusses some methodological issues, then presents case studies of complex intercultural interactions.

**Culture as a Moral Discursive Practice**

In the previous chapter, I described several ways of conceptualizing culture—as practice, as material, as ideological, as rhetorical—and how it might be “seen” as indexed in discourse. I employ this conceptualization alongside that analytic approach in this chapter in an analysis of increasingly culturally complex situations. The situations present, most obviously, “intercultural” communication. Yet at the same time, none of these cases involve people who have completely
separate, never-overlapping cultural orientations. And when it comes to moralities—norms of how to be and how to act—each of the cases presented share certain values.

This has implications for analysis. In some ways, it makes analysis easier. People who have some unshared cultural elements tend to be more sensitive to differences and reflexive about culture in their talk with others. On the other hand, because elements of culture and norms are shared, it is sometimes difficult to say exactly when one culture is being indexed versus another. The following analyses account for these difficulties in two ways. First, indexings of culture are situated within the relationship. Orientations to cultural difference are presumed to manage differences within the relationship. Ignoring differences and focusing on agreed-to relationship norms without attention to culture are presumed to construct a shared sense of culture.

Second, instances of accounting are treated as relevant to the perception of a cultural difference when such accounts reference general rather than personal norms. For example, in one of the following examples, a young woman discusses ethnicity in relation to physical appearance. Her accounts, which seek to minimize the face-threat of her statements, reflect a sensitivity to an American cultural norm of being “blind” to ethnic difference. Thus, her construction of self in relation to her friend indexes a cultural difference based on ethnicity, and a cultural sameness based on the expectation that people should not care about ethnic difference. Thus, in all cases, culture is seen as relevant when participants treat it as such, but because such treatments may be highly implicit, cultural background is needed to unpack the precise cultural resources which are drawn upon and proffered as relevant to interactional projects.

The following analytic examples include a Finnish-American family in Finland and two sets of white and Asian American friends in the U.S. The first example, as in the last chapter,
involves a family, and also takes place in a particular region. However, it proves more complex because the family consists of people with numerous backgrounds who have lived, worked and traveled in a variety of places. These analyses highlight some of the intercultural problems that arise as friends and families seek to construct shared ideologies.

**The Case of a Finnish-American Family**

This case is slightly more complicated than of the family discussed in the first example of chapter six. This example portrays the Bantry family of Mina and Albert, two college-educated individuals in their mid-30s who have two children, aged five and seven. Mina was born and raised in Finland, and Albert was born and raised in California. Both Buddhists, they met in India while Mina was doing research for her MA degree and Albert was on a personal pilgrimage. Data include a week’s worth of observation and field notes, interviews with Albert and Mina and a mutual friend, and more than three hours of video recording.

The place where this family currently lives is on an island in the dense archipelago of southwest Finland. The municipality in which the family lives is tiny—less than nine inhabitants per kilometer—but the island they live on is especially empty: their community elementary school is about the size of a modest barn. Despite the small size, the highest standard of living is in the southwest. And almost everyone in Finland has a “summerhome” in the archipelagos which they visit in the summer, and everyone gets the entire month of July for vacation (the better to visit the summerhome, presumably).

Finland is a country in which most people exhibit strong ties to a national, historic identity—many are familiar with old customs, practices, folklore and traditional artifacts, and many identify with the idyllic country even if they live in the city most of the year. According to Hakli (1999), this is due to the widespread campaign on behalf of political leaders to develop a
unique Finnish identity, separate from Sweden and Russia, which occurred in the 19th and 20th century. But despite this widespread orientation with and understanding of larger discourses about Finnishness, the concept of a local Finnish “identity” is, according to Ollila (1998), a relatively recent one, only notable since the 1960s. In other words, people did not explicitly in their everyday lives “claim” being Finnish or talk about people’s Finnishness.

Nowadays, however, such talk is far fairly common. According to an interview with Mina, Finnish people are aware of behavioral and communicative differences (or stereotypes), particularly based on the east-west distinction. Western Finnish, for instance, are seen as more reserved and less expressive. Mina told what she called a “common joke” of the region, in which she remarked, “if you see a man laughing, smiling and saying hello to everyone, Finnish people will tell you he must be either drunk, insane, or American.” This notion of the “stoic Finn” is reflected in discourse research on Finnish communicative styles (Berry & Carbaugh, 2006; Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmi-kari-Berry, 2004; Wilkins, 2005).

There is a sizeable body of discourse analytic work in Finland, though as with the British example, it tends to be more critical and/or more oriented toward political and media talk (e.g., Pietikäinen, 2000, 2003; Pietikäinen & Dufva, 2006; Vaara & Tienari, 2002). Conversation analytic work also exists, deconstructing turn-taking and sequence in Finnish conversations (e.g., Ogden, 2001, 2004). The body of work within the ethnography of communication has demonstrated Finnish communicative styles as being oriented toward matter-of-factness in public and civic interactions (Wilkins, 2005), and demonstrative of the value of “quietude” (Berry & Carbaugh, 2006; Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmi-kari-Berry, 2004).

This background on Finland is meant to give a picture of the setting of the family, but the identity of the family is more complex because their backgrounds are not straightforwardly
Finnish. Though Mina was born and raised there, she has also travelled extensively, identifies strongly with California, and is Buddhist, which is not a common religion in Finland. Albert, though he has spent time in Finland and can speak some Finnish, was raised in a very liberal California town by “hippy” parents. Also Buddhist, he is much more open and expressive of his spiritual views. Their children, born each on a different continent, are bilingual in English and Finnish. Because Albert’s Finnish is still not as good as his English, often he and the children will converse in English, while the children and their mother converse in Finnish. Mina and Albert also mainly speak to each other in English. Thus, though this family lives in a particular region, they bring together many different backgrounds and cultural orientations.

Their history is also an extremely mobile one. After spending several weeks together in India, Albert joined Mina in Finland and they married and had their daughter, Tina. Once Mina finished her degree, and since Albert during this time had been unable to find work in Finland, they decided to move to the U.S. They lived on the east coast for a couple years, where their son Ivan was born, then moved to California, where Mina worked at an elementary school and Albert worked in technology in a beach community. After a year they moved back to Finland, where they have lived in the same region in which Mina grew up for the last year and a half. Albert works in technology support from home and Mina has taken up various jobs related to the local church and works as a geriatric nurse. She also volunteers with a musical group and is often in the process of choreographing local performances for herself and Tina.

Mina and Albert’s home is heavily influenced by their Buddhist beliefs. They follow Feng Shui principles in their decoration, and there are numerous Buddhist icons and framed pictures of the Dalai Lama throughout the house. The primary color of the house is white, and it is extremely airy and sunny, with large windows that offer a view of the ocean on one side, and
forest on the other. Both Mina and Albert see themselves as raising their children in a Buddhist-influenced “American” style rather than a Finnish one. Albert enjoys living in Finland, but does not culturally identify with it. Mina’s attitude is mixed, sometimes critical of her homeland, other times strongly identifying. She positions herself as an insider-outsider, claiming to be able to comment more easily than others on the cultural assumptions of Finland.

In the family’s interactions, they work to negotiate the complexity of their cultural orientations and the meanings this has for their communicative practices, particularly in “finding their place” in Finland and raising their children. The use of English and Finnish, and code-switching between them, become strategies for formulating identity alongside explicit discussions of culture (Hyrkstedt & Kalaja, 1998; Poplack, Wheeler & Westwood, 1987; Taavitsainen & Pahta, 2003). The two examples analyzed below display fragments of instances in which the family (1) tries to constitute its cultural identity and (2) manages the communicative practices of disciplining their children within the tension of American and Finish communicative norms.

Excerpt 25 “The Bantrys” [fam.frn.vac10.1.E2.1]

Albert: Jan had to wait til nine to start so I was just talking to Mom (.) before (.) she had-
but um (. ) Ivan has (0.5) a card ((kisses Tina)) for Ivan (. ) waiting for him (. ) on the computer ((sets Tina down))

Mina: will you take this to JR? ((to Tina))

Tina: ((in Finnish))

Mina: ((in Finnish))

Tina: ((in Finnish))

Albert: you wanna see the email Ivan? (1.0) you’re gonna see a birthday card=

Mina: he’s- needs to eat his candy first Ivan please sit down and finish your candy

This excerpt takes place during dessert. Mina, Tina and Ivan, plus Mina’s visiting friend from California, have been eating dinner. Albert during this time was supposed to get a
conference call from work, and was in his office. While everyone is eating candy, Albert comes out and mentions to Mina that his call was delayed, but in the meantime his mother (who still lives in California) had been speaking with him and informed him that she’d emailed Ivan a birthday card (he was turning five the next day) (lines 32-35). During this sequence, Tina gets up from the table, puts her arms up to Albert (line 34), is lifted to get a kiss, and is put back down. Mina does not respond to Albert, instead directing Tina give a candy to JR, who is not present at the table. The elapsed time features JR and Tina discussing the candy while Mina asks Albert questions about the party they are having for Ivan the next day.

When Tina returns to the table, she immediately begins speaking with her mother in Finnish, and her mother responds, also in Finnish (lines 41-42). Interestingly, during this talk interchange, Mina also engages in an interaction with Albert in which Albert shows her something related to his work (line 43). During the two seconds following, the Finnish talk ceases while the nonverbal interaction between Mina and Albert continues. Tina then starts up a conversation with her mother in Finnish again (lines 45-47) and at the end of this exchange, Albert turns to Ivan asks if he wants to see the email (line 48). Mina immediately disagrees with this invitation (line 48), directing her utterance first at Albert, then at Ivan, who had begun to leave the table as Albert was inviting him away (line 49). In the three seconds that elapse, Albert walks into the kitchen and, as Ivan turns back to the table, Mina makes a circular motion with her hand (line 50) that further encourages Ivan to turn all the way back into the table.

This interaction features a particular pattern of language use and code-switching. For requests and orders initiated by Mina toward her children, English is the language of choice. This is the case here, in lines 37 and 49. When Finnish conversations are initiated by the children, Mina’s responses are in Finish, as in lines 41-42 and 45-46. Only if the children’s first pair parts
are followed by orders or requests from Mina will she switch to English (not shown in this example). Furthermore, Mina will initiate other kinds of actions with her children in Finnish, for example, asking questions (indicated by the particle “ko”). Unless giving an order, if Albert addresses the children in English, and Mina follows with an utterance, it will be in English (line 49 follows Albert addressing Ivan and contains an order). If the children initiate talk in English, however, Mina’s responses seem equally likely to be in English as in Finnish (or at least, the author could distinguish no pattern).

Notably also, there are rarely side conversations in the family, though such conversations could easily occur. For example, here, Albert waits until an appropriate transition relevance place in Mina and Tina’s Finnish talk to speak to Ivan, even though he is addressing Ivan and not them. Though this happens far more often than not, it is not entirely clear why. Perhaps Albert understood the Finnish and heard it as partly addressed to him; or Albert was listening to see if he could understand and whether it did apply to him; or Albert could not understand, but did not want to chance being rude; or Albert wanted Mina and Tina to be part of his interaction with Ivan. Regardless of the specific reason, the accomplishment of doing this regularly creates “whole family” interactions in which everyone hears what everyone else says, regardless of the language or how well they understand it.

These language practices create the sense of the family as managing both American, English-speaking identities and Finnish identities. Because most of the family is fluent in English and Finnish, they employ them differently for different purposes. Those purposes, however, are also culturally mixed. Finnish association with reservedness and self-discipline extends to their child-raising practices, which are stricter than the more American style that Mina and Albert employ. Finnish people do not pay attention to their children in the same ways as Americans.
Thus, it is interesting for instance that Mina tends to use the Finnish language for more American orientations to her children (eliciting narratives, for instance—showing interesting in their opinions and personal lives) while using English to accomplish a more “Finnish” style of parenting associated with discipline and directives. However, this disciplining is not only accomplished in the language of the typical American style, but also in a communicative style that is less direct, as in the example below.

*Excerpt 26 “The Bantrys” [fam.frn.vac10.1.E3.2]*

50  Mina: and now I have such a different perspective after being here? and (. .) how
51  (. .) you know I'm- I'm- I'm not even a person- I don't take easily things
52  personally I don’t I just (don’t do it because) (I don’t need) to take it? And
53  I don't- I don’t- I just (think) that people their own little (. .) worlds (in their
54  minds) ( ) (because) whatever it just- in their mind it's hard when you
55  work in a place where people are actually mean?=
56  Kathryn: =of course it is
57  Mina: It’s just- even if you- you think that you're a duck and the water is just
58  gonna roll off of your back you know you’re gonna swim through it [( )
59  it's like]
60  Tina:                         [( )
61  Mina: please (. .) go to your room
62  Tina: I like it (here)
63  Mina: =Tina=
64  Tina: =(in Finnish)=
Mina:  go to your room (. ) Tina go to your room
Tina:  (I think I have to be) here
Mina:  Tin- okay

you can't think and write there when (you/we)'re talking sweetie
Tina:  I can
Mina:  ( ) (0.8) (I really do miss the school) (. ) (a lot)
Kathryn:  m hm
Mina:  ( ) I just- you know it- it- (. ) of course it's- it’s cultural also? But (0.8) i- it
felt so good I  remember the day you know that Hanna came to visit? And
then uh Mrs. Rose- Tina go to your room if you can't do what you are
supposed to do
Tina:  What?
Mina: Just go to your room now
Tina: I'm thinking

Mina: and I'm talking
Tina: I’m thinking and you’re talking

This interaction occurs after dinner and dessert. Albert has retired to the office to take his conference call and then do some work, and the children were playing in their room. Mina takes this time to talk to her friend, Kathryn, who worked with her in California. Over the course of their more than 30-minute conversation, Mina continually returns to the theme of how different her life is in Finland and how she is having trouble adjusting to the difference in her work environment. The conversation is a fairly serious one, with Mina mainly narrating her feelings of uncertainty and discontent, and Kathryn being fairly quiet and listening. However, during this conversation, Tina appears and interjects on a regular basis. Her questions are small and non-urgent, and her continued desire to be a presence in the interaction indicates that she just wants to be around. However, Mina’s directions to get Tina out of the interaction indicate she wishes the conversation to be a more private one.

Before the excerpt above, Tina had already appeared four times, and each time, Mina made a suggestion that would take Tina out of the room—looking for things, making things, etc., having to do with a gift she wished Kathryn to convey back to California for a former teacher. However, as Tina keeps reappearing, and it becomes more and more difficult to coax her away, Mina becomes less patient. In line 66 she reaches across the table entreatingly as she finally does
away with the pretenses and asks Tina to go to her room. When Tina continues to resist this request (lines 63, 68, 73) Mina at first becomes more firm (line 67, “go to your room,” with each word enunciated), then acquiesces, (line 69) but demonstrates frustration with a sigh and pulling back of her hair (line 70). She makes a second attempt in line 72, then in lines 78 and 81 repeats the directive that Tina go to her room, with which Tina finally complies (line 85).

Throughout these attempts, Mina’s language in almost every case is extremely indirect. In the first case she prefaces the directive “go to your room” with “please” (line 61). Her next directive (line 67) is the most direct, with the phrase “go to your room” repeated twice and upgraded with emphasis on the recycling, but following Tina’s reply, she repairs a possible next directive and gives in (line 69). Her next attempt is even more indirect than the first, putting her suggestion that Tina go to another room in the context that it would be easier for Tina, and adding “sweetie” at the end (line 72). But after Tina’s reply Mina makes no response at all, carrying on the conversation until she interrupts herself in line 78. Again she says “go to your room” but adds the qualifier “if” Tina cannot do what she is supposed to (assumedly, be quiet or not be a distraction). Finally in line 80 she is direct again (“just go to your room now”) but the seriousness of the directive is still not attended to by Tina, who resists even as she starts to leave (line 82), and mimics her and her mother’s prior utterances in a sing-song voice as she disappears from the frame (line 85).

Here, Mina enacts a more American style of parenting through her indirect directives which is very different from what is presumed to occur in Finnish families—in fact, the Finnish are known for being some of the most direct speakers in general, and this extends to disciplining children (Berry & Carbaugh, 2006; Carbaugh & Berry, 2001; Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmikari-Berry, 2004; Wilkins, 2005). On numerous other occasions, both Mina and Albert enact this style
of parenting in which the children are encouraged to talk about their feelings and participate as equal conversational partners even while being remonstrated for particular behaviors. In this case, Mina’s desire to speak only among adults—an expectation that would be normal in Finland, and certainly an expectation that is interpersonally understandable given her topic of talk—conflicted with her desire to enact the role of an attentive mother.

In the U.S. it is more common for parents to act as Mina did, and display attentiveness and an almost-equal regard even in the face of unreasonable or annoying behavior. Of course, this is probably in part because Mina may have recognized that even if Tina’s behavior is annoying to Mina, from Tina’s perspective, Tina just wants to be a part of the interaction and does not understand her mother’s need for privacy. Also involved is Mina’s Buddhist beliefs. Being Buddhist brings its own contradictions in the world of parenting. On one hand, Buddhism is compatible with a Finnish approach to parenting through its emphasis on “nonattachment,” a principle that claims attachment causes desire and desire causes loss. This would result in a more “distanced” parenting approach. On the other hand, Buddhism also promotes avoiding anger and control, which are emotions/impulses often associated, if not with parenting, at least with the communicative actions associated with disciplining an unruly child. Instead, a person is urged to be compassionate and “let things go.”

Throughout this interaction, Mina intersperses her attempts to get Tina to leave with the conversation she continues to have with Kathryn which, interestingly, revolves around cultural notions. She contrasts the positive experience in California with her negative experiences in Finland, demonstrating her own identity as “between cultures.” Because she balances her own experience growing up in Finland, her identification with California, and her Buddhist beliefs, she is simultaneously adept at linguistically formulating her relationship to these frames, but
unaware of the ways in which their unspoken assumptions become contradictory, as demonstrated in her discursive practices.

This not only poses potential problems for Mina when disciplining and interacting with her children, but also with her husband. Recall for example that Albert in the first excerpt invites Ivan away from the table. Though a small action in that instance, it is part of a pattern of actions through which Albert displays himself as “relaxed.” Mina may be an intercultural “person,” but Albert’s cultural practices are more consistent, and he displays almost no evidence of strictness. During the entire week, he did not raise his voice, dole out punishments, or offer up rules to the children. Instead, he approached problems in an almost “therapeutic” way, trying to get the children to “talk about” why they were behaving in manner x. Mina thus seems to be more conflicted because in part she does similar actions as Albert, but is also influenced by the strict Finnish ideal of “asiallinen,” a direct, blunt speech code (Berry & Carbaugh, 2006; Carbaugh, Berry & Nurmikari-Berry, 2004; Wilkins, 2005). Though only very small instances of disagreement arose between Mina and Albert related to discipline, there were enough instances to show that differences do exist, and that intercultural ideologies are a problem for the both of them as well as Mina and the children.

The excerpts above demonstrated small slices in a larger pattern during which the Bantrys used language to construct their family identity through language, and engaged in indirect forms of disciplining to raise their children within a frame more oriented to American and Buddhist approaches than a typical Finnish approach. These actions demonstrate how people with multiple cultural orientations manage their identity and communication in the face of problems of differing norms and expectations. Mina works to achieve intelligible interactions with her children, and constructs her own intercultural ideologies in practice.
The sense of “togetherness” is of a different order for families—Mina and Albert are conscious and deliberate about at least of the cultural choices they make with regard to their lives and their children. Friends, however, coordinate in a different way. Cultural differences may not be remarked upon as explicitly or thought about as reflectively as in a family (or in romantic partnerships). The next examples feature cases of Asian American and white American friends in which their different cultural ideologies cause potential problems in interaction.

The Case of Two Asian American Friendships

This section features two cases from different communities of Asian Americans as they interact with their white friends in largely white communities. The first case looks at the experience of a half white, half Japanese young woman and her interactions with two different white female friends. Data include ten hours of audio and video recordings over the past six years as well as participant interviews in 2010. The second case looks at the experience of a “Hapa” girl—half white, half Japanese, raised in Hawaii—and how she negotiates her marriage to a white man and the ethnic culture of their unborn child in constructing her relationship for a white female friend (the author). Data include eight hours of audio and video recordings over the past five years, a two-hour home movie (the wedding) from 2006, and an interview in 2010.

First, I consider the example of Christa. Christa was born to a Caucasian father and Japanese mother. She was raised in predominantly white, middle class, small Bay Area town. Though she was not raised in a Japanese setting, she did make trips to visit Japanese relatives in their hometown of Kyoto on a yearly basis. Throughout her life, she was also extremely close to her mother. She spent far more time with her mother than with friends throughout high school, and had no plan to move away from home for college (she planned to attend a community college). Her mother would often excuse her from school so they could spend even more time
together. Christa’s father was an ex-Vietnam veteran and did not work, and her mother did not work either. They lived off of her father’s disability pay, and her mother’s family’s money. Yet Christina spent little time with her father, and he was often away from the house doing the shopping, visiting his friends, or out at the shooting range.

Japanese culture has been studied from a number of perspectives which have investigated the role of imagery and heroes/villains in folklore (e.g., Benedict, 2005; Buruma, 1984; Gorer, 1943); Japan’s political and cultural history, particularly in relation to China (e.g., Varley, 1977); and its pop culture, especially in media and games in the U.S. (e.g., Iwabuchi, 2002). Portrayals and attitudes toward Japanese culture indicate contradictions between Japanese pop culture, which tends to be flashy and expressive, and classical portrayals of Japanese people as stoic and controlled.

Work in intercultural and cross-cultural communication indicates that Japanese communication is distinct in terms of its style and use in social interaction, whether Japanese speakers are speaking their own language or English (Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim & Heyman, 1996; Maynard, 1997; Wetzel, 1988). Japanese communicative style is often seen as highly indirect and “powerless,” associated with the style of U.S. women (Wetzel, 1988), and consistent with Japanese location in a “high context culture” (Gudykunst et al., 1996) and with many prevailing attitudes in the U.S. toward indirect speech (Wetzel, 1988).

Discourse work on Japanese includes conversation analytic studies which look at overlap, turn projection, narrative, and linguistic details (e.g., Hayashi, 1988; Lerner & Tagaki, 1999; Mori, 2002; Park, 1998; Tanaka, 2000). This work demonstrates some differences in uses of interaction structures between Japanese and U.S. English. More ethnographic work has focused
primarily on kinship, status terms, the role of authority, and pronoun use (e.g., Cook, 1999; Ervin-Tripp, 1964; Fischer, 1964).

There has been considerable criticism in the way in which Japanese and U.S. culture are often contrasted, even when such contrasts have good intentions, such as in educational research. Kubota (1999) for instance challenges the dichotomy in education between U.S. and Japanese communication and learning, and Lebra’s (2000) work on Japanese “self” suggests that within Japan, academics are resisting Western notions of “personality” as central to self-concept. Throughout these analyses so far I have indicated that perceptions of cultural differences may not be innate, but do figure in people’s interactions as interpretive schemata. Thus, part of enacting a Japanese style in the U.S. has as much (or more) to do with how it might be perceived as “more Japanese” by non-Japanese Americans as it has to do with how Japanese and Japanese Americans might interact socially with one another. In making sense of culture, interactants may draw on potentially incorrect or exaggerated notions of culture. That they enact such representation should not be taken as a direct correspondence to what the culture is “really” like.

With that background in mind, I return to Christa’s story. During Christa’s first year at the community college, her mother was diagnosed with brain cancer, and three months later, she was dead. The event devastated Christa. She became more interested in her mother’s life story, her family’s history, and her Japanese background during the time following her mother’s death. But regardless of these explicit displays of a cultural orientation, Christa’s incredible closeness to her mother during her mother’s life contributed to her taking a much more Japanese style of interacting with her friends, despite the fact that she is not a fluent speaker of Japanese. Her mother raised her very strictly, and was explicit about instilling values in her daughter which were located in a tradition based in her own upbringing in Kyoto.
The excerpts below feature conversations in which Christa engages in a particular style of interacting with two different white female friends. In each case, different cultural values underlying talk creates interactional trouble. Specifically, in the first excerpt fragments, a U.S. American orientation toward “openness” clashes with Christa’s orientation toward politeness and avoiding disagreement. In the second excerpt, discomfort around insults and compliments are managed through humor to avoid taking the conversation in a serious direction.

*Excerpt 27 “Christa”*[frn.vis08.2.E1.1(audio)]

83  Jill:   ((coughs)) (0.5) ((coughs again)) (0.5) gave me a mean look
84  Christa: No I didn’t I went (1.5) a concerned look, and you went “HUA” (( )like)  
85   ((laughter))
86  Christa: It was a concerned look, it was a (.5) “*I hope you feel better soon (.2) my 87  dear friend***”

This is a case in which context is not just complicated, but almost essential—and yet, it is also rather opaque. In this example, the physical context turns out to be just as relevant as the relational context. Jill accuses Christa of giving her a “mean look” when she coughs (line 83). Christa then narrates her own version of the events and provides a reinterpretation of the “look” she gave Jill (line 84). However, Christa’s self-presentation is not entirely “authentic.” Her mimicry of Jill’s cough seems to indicate she is not quite as sympathetic as she makes herself out to be (line 84), and her phrasing of the “look” as a quote which seems slightly over-the-top (lines 86-87) also demonstrates a hint of insincerity.

Coupland (2004) discusses apparent inauthenticity through stylization as an authenticating act. Christa’s performance of her “look” in line 84 is definitely stylized: she says it in a sing-song voice which is not her own, and uses sappy language which is directly at odds with her personality (she is not in the slightest disposed toward openly displaying affection). She seems to demonstrate metapragmatic awareness of the mismatch between what she says and
what the people around her know about her, since she makes fun of herself as well as the others in a way that acknowledges this. The fact that people are at her house is also relevant. Prior to this visit, Jill had mentioned to the author that she was sick and that she was anxious about going to Christa’s house. Christa is a bit of a germophobe, and Jill was already anticipating that Christa would resent her presence because of her being ill. This could explain Jill’s sensitivity to Christa’s facial expression, and may also indicate why Christa’s actual intention seems to be ambiguous (since she insists she was not giving the mean look, but does so within a mocking performance).

This interaction can be interpreted on different levels. On one level, Christa’s reaction to Jill’s accusation reframes the interaction so that it becomes a discussion about the “look” rather than a discussion about whether Christa is resentful of a sick person at her house. But on another level, it also reframes the interpretation of the situation as being about Christa’s personality rather than about the actual expression on her face: the use of reported speech displays Christa’s stance toward herself. Thus there is an element of layeredness to the situation in which each interpretation or lamination (Goffman, 1974) diffuses a possibly conflictual element in the previous one.

This example is illustrative of Christa’s identification with a particular interactional style, and the nature of the relationship between Christa and Jill. Many of the values that Christa identifies within herself as “Japanese traits” are ones she learned from her mother—most relevantly here, cleanliness and emotional restraint. Christa’s insistence on a clean, germ-free environment is well-acknowledged by her friends and herself, and is something of a running joke between them. Similarly, her lack of demonstration of affection is known and commented on regularly. For a while, it was accepted that if Christa threw a small painful object at you, or
poked you with her finger on the knee or shoulder, it should be interpreted as a demonstration of affection. Though in many ways Christa, who has been raised entirely in the United States and has been to Japan only for summers during her childhood, might be considered thoroughly “Western” in her behavior and preferences, she nonetheless performs what she and others take to be a more Japanese style of interacting.

One example of the interpersonal distance already mentioned is demonstration of affection, which is extremely rare and, when it occurs, is joked about immediately afterward. Another example is aversion to conflict. Jill and Christa have known each other for a very long time, and are intimate friends, but they have gone through periods of not speaking for months at a time due to conflict. The pattern is always the same: Christa does something to upset Jill; Jill tries to talk to her about it; Christa ignores Jill for a few months; they resume their friendship as if nothing happened. Because of this pattern in their relationship, potential conflicts must be managed carefully. The function of performance in such situations is crucial. Though Jill is not willing to confront Christa on her possible resentment of having a sick person in her house, Jill is willing to be direct with her accusation of the “mean look.” The value in the U.S. of acknowledging problems and “talking things out” is clearly espoused, and yet Americans are sometimes also seen as avoiding conflict (Blum-Kulka, 1997). In acknowledging a potential conflict, but indirectly, Jill is attentive to different ideologies within U.S. culture, but Christa’s even stronger inclination to avoid conflict takes control of the way the interaction could have gone.

Upon Christa, then, is placed the burden of dispensing with the criticism in such a way that avoids conflict. She cannot, however, merely pretend there is no basis for Jill’s reaction, since this kind of behavior is typical of little instances that have led to their brief separations in
the past. She has to acknowledge Jill’s feelings, and her own feelings on which Jill’s reaction was based, without acquiescing to the full validity of Jill’s reaction, which might validate an ensuing argument or future conflict. Christa’s performance exaggerates and parodies Jill’s cough, her own facial expression, and an interpretation of what her expression meant. She makes fun of her own flaws through parody, and downplays Jill’s “flaw” (the illness) through obvious exaggeration. Thus she legitimizes their mutual understanding of each other, but negates the possibility for serious discussion about whether she resents having a sick person in her house. Performance becomes a way of carefully displaying, or sometimes hiding, the self. This is not necessarily an intention on the part of Christa, but something that has evolved out of her interactions with people as well as her cultural background. In certain specific moments, maintaining interactional distance becomes necessary, and performance and humor are Christa’s typical responses in such situations.

By using reported speech in non-standard ways, Christa separates the content of what she says from her own claims of that content as “truth,” presenting it in such a way that she cannot be held accountable for its misinterpretation or misrepresentation. This very indirect way of communicating occurs in almost every interaction of possible conflict between herself and a friend during this and other recordings. Using reported speech in a non-standard, indirect, performative way appears to do the work of reaffirming the positive nature of this friendship in a way that is jokingly insulting, toward self and other, but does so in an “inauthentic” way that in fact avoids “real” conflict. The next excerpt presents another example in which humor is used to manage orientations to conflict.

*Excerpt 28 “Christa” [frn.don04.1.E2.1(audio)]*

88 Val: oh look billowy ((laughs))
89 Chris: dude you so reminded me [of
In this excerpt, Christa interacts with another close friend, raised in the same town, but who is not close to Jill (thus Christa tends to hang out with each of them separately). In this interaction, both girls are watching television when a potential conflict emerges. It does not have the feel of a very serious possible fight. When Val accuses Christa of calling her “fat” (line 96) it is after (1) Val herself pointed out the “billowy” pants she was wearing (line 88), and (2) Val had compared herself to the “marshmallow guy” (line 90). Thus, even as Christa was trying to make a comparison between Val and the Michelin man (a commercial cartoon character), Val was already making fun of herself along similar lines. The fact that Val laughs after the “fat” reference could be either her acknowledgement that she is not seriously attributing such an
assessment to Christa, or that she is uncomfortable with her own joke and the possible associations that could be made between herself and “being fat.”

As Christa works to distance herself even from the possibility of such a statement, Val then moves in to make a negative assessment of Christa as too skinny (“string bean” line 100) and compares her to Olive Oil (a skinny Popeye cartoon character) (line 106). Amidst accounts and teasing insults, another strategy for diffusing the seriousness of weight issues involves giving compliments (lines 107, 115) that refer to one another as “beautiful” or compare each other to celebrities, albeit in a joking tone. Throughout the interaction, Christa and Val display a shared knowledge of cultural information regarding television characters and people. On the other hand, Val’s pursuit of an account for the implication of being fat clashes with Christa’s avoidance of being connected to a criticism and thus a possible conflict or discomfort between them.

Interestingly, though Val and Christa were both raised in the same white town, both have strong ties to a heritage outside the U.S. Christa’s, as mentioned, is to Japan; Val’s is to Finland, where her family is from. Val speaks about as much Finnish as Christa does Japanese, but both have at least one parent born outside the U.S., have made frequent visits to the family homeland, and identify with their non-U.S. cultural backgrounds (bringing it up as a conversational topic, labeling their background or ethnic identity, claiming to be “acting like” a typical native of the region, etc.). In Finland, being direct is valued, whereas in Japan, being indirect and saving face is valued. In this interaction, Val pursues the implications of Christa’s comments directly, while Christa tries to avoid those implications and any possible conflict.

There is another way, however, in which Christa and Val’s backgrounds overlap, which is in terms of interpersonal distance. In Finland, as in Japan, there is an emphasis on restraint, and a proscription against being overly demonstrative toward intimates. In this interaction, both
participants use humor to maintain this interpersonal distance even through accomplishing the different means of engaging directly and indirectly with the potential face-threats. These friends demonstrate their connection to one another through humor, keeping their interactions positive without having to deal with negative or positive displays toward each other. Though this would not be a strange sort of interaction among any set of friends, it is characteristic when comparing their interactions with each other to those with others; furthermore, Christa and Val are conscious and explicit of labeling their communication practices in cultural ways, though the examples above do not show such explicit markers.

Christa’s interactions with Jill are quite different from her interactions with Val. With both friends, Christa is not demonstrably affectionate or open about feelings and conflict. Her criticisms will be indirect and her attitude toward conflict one of avoidance. With Jill, this causes trouble when Jill wants to address conflict—as mentioned, this is proven by their pattern of argumentation, and shown in the instance described in which Jill calls Christa out and Christa avoids making the complaint. With Val, Christa’s behavior is similar, but because of Val’s different interactional norms, their potential arguments play out differently. Val is even more likely than Jill to call out implications and pursue an account or complaint, but like Christa, is also not interested in engaging in serious talk and sharing feelings; thus, Val’s pursuits are always occurring in a teasing frame which Christa finds acceptable. Perhaps this is why Val and Christa, though they have not been friends for as long as Val and Jill, have had far fewer “fights” in their friendships.

In the cases above, tacit cultural assumptions around openness, directness and confrontation caused possible moments of interactional trouble between friends. In the first excerpt, cultural orientations were not shared despite the two women having grown up together
in the same town. In the second excerpt, again both women grew up together, and again came from different family backgrounds, but shared a complex orientation toward directness and seriousness that was managed through a shared frame of humor. In these conversations, assumptions of how best to deal with problems between friends were linked to different cultural norms about how friends should treat one another. These cases were slightly different from the family interaction described previously, in which “you do your thing and I do mine” would be unlikely to work, and the occurrence of an argument would be more consequential.

The next example is of a conversation between a Hapa woman, Amelia, and her female friend, JR, regarding Amelia’s marital choice and pregnancy. Amelia, like Christa in the previous example, has a Caucasian father and Japanese mother. However, Amelia was born and raised in Oahu, Hawaii. Her upbringing included an infusion of Hawaiian and Japanese educational values. The schools she attended were private and college-driven, and were predominantly composed of people with varying degrees of Hawaiian and Japanese ancestry. High school students were encouraged to attend prestigious colleges on the “mainland,” which Amelia did.

Oahu is the most populous island in Hawaii and a top tourist destination. The town where Amelia grew up was once agricultural, but is now primarily residential. It is surrounded by bamboo forests and contains three golf courses. It is a diverse and also upper middle class area, and the private school of the town is prestigious and expensive. Amelia’s mother was a nurse most of her life and her father was a medical pathologist. Amelia provided part of the evidence of their being well off by citing the fact that her parents owned matching Lexus cars.

Amelia and her younger brother were steeped in Japanese and Hawaiian culture from a young age due to the schools they attended and her mother’s closeness to the Japanese side of the
family. Amelia’s maternal grandparents, while alive, were regular visitors. After Amelia moved to California to pursue her college degree, she interacted regularly with family in the area, including her mother’s sisters, cousins and their families. Amelia identifies herself as Hapa, a Hawaiian term referring to someone of mixed Asian background, mixed Hawaiian background, or half-white. She dated a Hapa man from her hometown for four years, but eventually ended up marrying a man who was white and a California native.

In April of 2010, Amelia discovered she was pregnant with a son, Jules, who has since been born in December 2010. Pregnancy was a recurrent topic of Amelia’s conversations with friends up to the point of discovering her pregnancy. Her family, including her husband, were all pressuring her to have a child before she reached 30—her family because stillbirth was common among the older women in her family, her husband because he was eager to start a family. Amelia expressed ambivalence about when to have a child (she was obtaining a degree in nursing during this time) but at the same time was deeply concerned that if she waited too long, her mother might die before the child got to know her mother well. She was worried not only about the potential child not knowing its grandmother, but also being separated from the grandmother’s Japanese background. Once she discovered she was pregnant, these worries were discursively transformed within the context of actually having the child. In this excerpt during a telephone conversation with the author, she discusses her concerns about Jules’s possible lack of connection to Japanese culture.

Excerpt 29 “Amelia” [frn.calls08.1.E1.1(audio)]

116 Amelia: I just don’t know- it’s really stupid of [me]
117 JR:  [((breathy laugh))]
118 Amelia: ((laughs)) I know (1.0) .hh I just- what if he doesn’t look Japanese at all=
119 JR:  =the baby=
120 Amelia: =yeah
121 (0.5)
Amelia: I just- I just really want him to identify with my mom you know? Like- I don’t know- I want them to be close (. ) I want him to appreciate her= of course

Amelia: It almost feels (1.0) .hh like I’m doing a disservice to my heritage or something if I have this totally white baby=

Amelia: like it’s a slap in the face to the family I mean (. ) it just becomes more and more- you know every time- because I want to the family I create to look like the family I’m from

Amelia: but I’m half white and Alan’s like totally white=

Amelia: and so my baby might be so (. ) I don’t know=

Amelia: that sounds pretty terrible

((laughter))

Amelia: .hh anyway
Amelia initiates her potentially problematic concerns about her child’s ethnicity with a disclaimer (that what she’s about to say is “stupid”) in line 116. She does considerable work to frame her worries about having a baby that looks “totally white” (line 128) and “not Japanese at all” (line 118) within the context of honoring her mother and her mother’s family. In doing so she works to mitigate the possible face threat toward JR (who looks white), and possibly her husband Alan, as well as manage the contradiction between talking about ethnicity and living in a country that for many years espoused being “colorblind” in response a history of racial tension. In the U.S. it is common to find people using terms such as “culture,” “color” and “ethnic” as euphemisms to avoid talking about physical racial characteristics (i.e. the city was “ethnic,” “colorful,” “cultural”). Because Amelia is not doing that, she opens herself up to criticism because she implies a distinction between how white and Japanese people “look.”

Through the metadiscursive disclaimer of her opening, and the subsequent family-oriented accounts throughout, Amelia admits something that seems to be difficult, which is that “looking Japanese” matters to her. By framing this value as an homage to her mother, and finishing with another metadiscursive comment (“that sounds pretty terrible” line 138) in response to JR’s reference to “diluted,” Amelia explicitly aligns culture with the physical display of an ethnic background, while trying to mitigate the potentially problematic nature of this claim for her friend and in relation to the ideologies of culture in the U.S.

In this example, one friend was presented with a dilemma: how to voice her concerns about maintaining the ethnicity of her cultural lineage, while keeping her conversational partner from perceiving this as face-threatening and keeping her comments from violating too harshly a U.S. cultural dictum of color blindness. Her handling of this dilemma employed metadiscursive
comments in order to provide a frame that would not prove face-threatening to JR, and would also maintain Amelia’s own face.

The examples which have been analyzed in this chapter are in some ways very different. One important difference involves the ways in which culture is brought in. In the case of the Finnish-American family, culture is an everyday part of their lives as they struggle to make a home in Finland, each person finding ways in which they fit in and ways in which they do not. Their references to culture are explicit, yet some of their cultural styles are not remarked on, but managed in ways that attempt to discursively “fit” cultural ideals of, for instance, parenting together. In the case of the friends, culture was sometimes explicitly marked, as when Amelia discussed the appearance of her child with metadiscursive disclaimers. And in other cases among the friends, culture was part of what made sense of the friends’ responses to one another given detailed knowledge of their personal histories and friendship over long periods of time.

In these analyses I have presented examples of interpersonal relationships in family and friendship contexts. In each case, the people who were involved participated in different shared and unshared cultural orientations toward relational norms. From parenting practices to conflict avoidance, interactants engaged in various strategies designed to circumvent threats to the relationship which emerged out of complex contrasting tacit ideologies. Metadiscursive comments, such as Mina’s criticisms of Tina’s communicative behavior and Amelia’s comments on the topic she has brought up regarding her unborn son, were joined with a number of others—including humor, mitigation, and face-saving—to manage different cultural ideologies and the problems they could have caused in these interactions.

**Moral Orientations in Intercultural Relationships**
In Philipsen’s recent work (2009), he discusses “culture” as something which people must confront and come to terms with. In people’s everyday lives, they are more likely than not to encounter cultural differences, ones both obvious, and so invisible that precisely what is going on can be hard to pinpoint. When people make negative assessments of others based on tacit cultural differences, they often frame those differences based on their own moral interactional standards (Bailey, 2000a). The situation is more complicated for family and friends who share some values, but may run into trouble when assuming they share them all.

According to Tracy and Ashcraft (2001), dilemmas can be both ideological and interactional. A dilemma refers to a case in which two options, neither of which is a perfect solution nor can be accomplished practically with equal success, arise from a single situation. Ideological dilemmas, for instance, might occur when two norms relevant to a certain situation conflict, as with freedom of speech and anti-hate speech. Interactional dilemmas emerge from talk situations, such as when you have to be direct enough to break up with someone, but indirect enough to spare their feelings. Cultural contexts of interaction provide a link between these dilemmas. Within cultures, norms often cause problems for each other, and among different cultures, different norms can exist for the same context. These dilemmas are both a cause of, and constituted by, the interactions which make norms relevant. By studying interactional dilemmas in discourse, one can begin to see the spaces in which participants orient to cultural ideological dilemmas in practical ways.

The examples in these last two chapters presented a variety of cases, assembled with varying quantities of data and ethnographic detail, and concerning varyingly complicated intersections of cultural and interpersonal identities. Geographic regions, ethnicities, genders, classes, and languages rarely lined up neatly. And yet, conversational participants do orient to
these cultural categories and aspects of identity as they orient to one another. Contextualization cues, though highly implicit in the surface action of utterances (Gumperz, 1982), reveal people working out their intercultural differences and treating those differences as meaningful. Whether among family or friends, sharing backgrounds or not, participants’ talk demonstrated cultural concepts of relationships and communication to be relevant to and occasionally problematic for instances of interaction. Cultural differences seem to be more saliently problematic and in need of addressing in moral practice. Because close relationships assume sharedness, an ideal of intercultural relationships involves discovering or creating ideological overlap.

Because relationships are infused with potentially problematic moral accountabilities—in intersubjectivity, ritual enactment, handling sensitive topics and enacting cultural orientations—conflict is always potentially imminent. In chapter four, intersubjectivity practices were demonstrated as the underlying foundation for accomplishing closeness in relationships. People are held accountable to this responsibility to attend to others, and to mis-perform in that responsibility can cause serious problems in a relationship, where people’s identities are invested in their ways of orienting to one another. Based on grounded practical theory, this chapter has discussed in further detail aspects of a communicative concept of morality, demonstrating the intersection between consequential moral practices for commitment and ideology amidst cultural difference. It identified moral discursive practices, problems that can arise, and participants’ strategies for managing those problems. It demonstrated that any theory of “moral communication” would have to account for differences between cultural contexts as well as within them. This consideration is returned to in chapter nine.

Chapter seven reconstructed “culture” as a collection of practices for doing morality in a way which was salient in intercultural interactions. The next chapter, chapter eight, discusses
conflict as a moral discursive practice. Within the GPT approach, conflict is a practice linked to
the prospect of ideological difference, and thus morally relevant in interactional practices.
Chapter eight analyzes the problem of constructing ideological difference in a case study of one
family’s interactions to reconstruct conflict as a moral practice.
Chapter 8
Conflicted Consequences of Moral Interaction

In his study of Korean immigrant storeowners and African American customers in Los Angeles, Bailey (2000a) examined the ways in which divergent patterns of communication in service encounters served to locally enact conflict. By achieving cultural difference and claiming moral difference, these ethnic groups constituted and maintained their boundaries of identity. In this chapter, I examine a similar case on a smaller scale, a case in which the enactment of ideological difference constitutes a conflict within a family over the course of nearly 30 years.

This chapter discusses conflict as a moral discursive practice. Within the GPT approach, conflict is a practice linked to the prospect of ideological difference, and thus morally relevant in interactional practices. This chapter analyzes the problem of constructing ideological difference in a case study of one family’s interactions to argue that difference can be employed to create distance in interpersonal relationships. Since interaction requires some form of sharedness (chapter four) while intimacy requires even more (chapter five), intimate families, friendships and romantic relationships generally work to coordinate their actions, views, and communicated identities. Thus, to emphasize differences is to construct ideologically-grounded conflict which erodes the sense of a relationship as minimally coordinated.

Conflict is not something accomplished all by itself in a moment, but is characterized by the accumulation of instances of disagreement, dispreference, disalignment, and argument. Conflict also provides a good case study of the ways in which intersubjectivity, ideology and culture can come together in contexts of intimacy, and the ways in which differences exist and are drawn on in interpersonal interactions. Emphasizing ideological differences through moral practice is a way of accomplishing conflict over time.
Chapter eight investigates the problem of conflict, and how moral practices can indicate, cause, confront or construct conflict in interpersonal relationships. The chapter focuses on how conflict as a moral practice for developing and maintaining ideological differences. The problem of conflict for morality involves the ways in which it lurks in the possibility of difference linked to all moral interactions, and the ways in which it can do irreversible damage to relationships.

The interactional achievement of morality involves an orientation to difference—in other words, that ideology, or the constellations of ideas about right and wrong in societies, always involves multiple and conflicting values and norms. Drawn from three decades of home movie and video research in a U.S. family, this chapter’s analysis examines the moral discursive practices that constitute a dilemma for the parents regarding the raising of their children. In the management of this dilemma, each parent emphasizes their differing ideologies and diverges in their enactments of “being a good parent” with regard to the moral value of “fairness.”

The next section of this chapter gives a more detailed review of some of the literatures introduced in chapter two, followed by a brief discussion of methodological issues specific to conflict. The analysis thereafter reconstructs the practice of and techniques for constructing and managing conflict. The chapter ends by considering the implications of analysis for participants’ situated ideals regarding the moral practices described.

**Difference: Ideology and Conflict**

In the last few chapters, intersubjectivity and ideology have emerged as two parts of the same interactional process, and key problems for morality. If morality requires care and commitment, intersubjectivity must exist for interaction itself to exist and for intimacy to be built up. Ideology provides the logic of cultural practices for forging intimate relationships and maintaining them over time. In this chapter, the danger of difference emerges as a counterpart to
the sharedness upon which participants assume their relationship depends. The next section
discusses conflict and how it emerges out of relational dilemmas. The following section
discusses conflict as an interactional, discursive practice for highlighting difference.

**Difference and Communication**

In finding moments where interpersonal tensions are visible, relational dialectics (Baxter, 1988, 2004a, 2004b) work has tended to focus on self reports of relationships, or “turning points” that are likely to elicit reports of experiencing certainty or uncertainty, expression or nonexpression, and autonomy or connectedness. In addition to these studies being focused on major life events, there is the added difference that most relational dialectics work looks at reconstructed memories of dialectical tensions rather than demonstrating the working out of such tensions discursively. Furthermore, relational dialects conceives of tensions as competing emotional needs, whereas this work investigates the ways in which particular moral values and interactional expectations can be inherently dilemmatic—offering contradictory possibilities for action.

Though relational dialectics can lead to or be symptomatic of interpersonal conflict, the kinds of dilemmas I am exploring are in some ways more actively conflictual because there is often no successful way to manage them, whereas there are a variety of better and worse ways to manage dialectical tensions. Segmentation, for instance, is a way of compartmentalizing competing needs, for example, spending time together on weekends and spending time with friends on weekdays as a method of “splitting up” when to be close and when to be autonomous. This would not work in the same way if the very methods by which people achieve closeness can be the same methods that could potentially drive them apart.
Relational dialectics is in many ways similar to the notion of ideological dilemmas (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988)—broader social values for which attending strongly to one can compromise attention to another, i.e., expertise/equality. Such dilemmas result from reflection about U.S. society, similar to the way in which Baxter’s (1988, 2004a, 2004b) relational dialectics result from reflections about relationships. These are different from what Tracy and Ashcraft (2001) called “interactional dilemmas,” which are derived inductively. What is interesting about moral interaction is that it combines both of these kinds of dilemmas. Situated problems in interaction involve the local enactment of more abstract cultural values as well as the discursive questions of what to say when and how in such a way as to manage morality in a moment. As such, moral dilemmas have the potential to cause conflict at multiple levels. Indeed, conflict—like identity/commitment and culture/ideology—is a dimension of morality in discourse.

For the most part, conflict is assumed to arise out of the diversity of human experience (Roloff & Soule, 2004). Conflict involves incompatibilities between individuals based on principles, behaviors and attitudes, and transgressions. Conflicts revolve around different issues, are tied to particular kinds of relationships in particular contexts, and involve different participant conflict perceptions, management styles, and argumentative patterns. As Mortensen (2006) notes, conflict is tied to people’s identities, values, and ways of acting and talking. Moments of disagreement or problematic interaction can easily become conflict because such moments implicate important and deeply-held facets of people’s lives—who they are, what they believe. In interaction, Morstensen claims, people often employ self-defeating means of dealing with conflicts by for example being defensive, employing harsh criticism, making errors about others’ intent, failing to empathize, and using verbal abuse. Hocker and Wilmot (1995) suggest
that in the U.S., the metaphorical association of conflict with war has resulted in an almost entirely negative way of viewing conflict.

Conflict is bound up in the studies of the so-called “dark side” of interpersonal relationships (Cupach & Spitzberg, 1994). Communication incompetence (Spitzberg, 1994), hurtful messages (Vangelisti, 1994), deception (O’Hair & Cody, 1994), and transgression (Metts, 1994) are linked to negative outcomes such as destructive interactional patterns (Wilder & Collins, 1994) and physical and psychological abuse (Marshall, 1994). As Spitzberg and Cupach point out in their volume, the “dark side” is not only negative. Conflict can be healthy. However, this does not change the fact that it is often treated negatively by participants. Conflict, even if healthy, normal, and even ultimately positive, has the potential to cause pain or at least trouble. The closer the relationship, the more conflict can hurt, and the greater its consequences can be.

I have mentioned that part of the purpose of this chapter is to understand more subtle ways in which conflict participants orient to conflict—whether they seek to avoid or confront it. Roloff and Soule (2004) note that conflict is not always expressed. Individuals may withhold complaints. Other efforts at avoiding conflict involve withdrawing from conflicted interactions or directing complaints toward superficial matters. Work on responses to possible or actual conflict has described various attitudes toward conflict, styles of engaging (or not) in conflict, and tactics employed within a conflict (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974; Rusbult, Zembrodt & Gunn, 1982; Sillars, 1980; Straus, 1990). As Roloff and Soule (2004) notice, these studies do not focus on particular tactics or situated responses in conflict that can be coded.

There is a strong link between the enactment of morality in interaction, and the potential for conflict. The intensity of a moral comment, the performance of certain moralities over time, and orientations to conflict across people’s lives can impact a relationship in significant ways.
Most interpersonal research on conflict in relationships has measured certain kinds or styles of conflict engagement and then compared that to relationship ending potential (i.e. divorce) or partners’ self reported thoughts of that potential. There has been little work that looks at how conflict shapes relationships over time through particular ways of interacting. The link to identities and values makes conflict morally pertinent. The extent to which conflict is expressed or not also affects interactions and relationships. Just because conflict is possible or even indicated does not mean it will actually “erupt” into an argument. Conflict has to be engaged.

Hocker and Wilmot (1995) describe people in conversation as having multiple goals related to the interaction, their identities, the content of talk, the relationship, and how conflict processes should go. Since any of these goals could be complex, different or even contradictory, conflict is possible in many ways. Thomas and Kilmann’s (1974) conflict styles scale describes various orientations to conflict: avoidance, collaboration, competition, compromise, and accommodation. As Hocker and Wilmot (1995) point out, however, these individual styles do not account for changing communication processes over time, nor the dynamics that occur between styles when individuals are in interaction.

According to Simmel (1904) conflict is necessary, valuable, and interwoven into the social nature of humans and their differences. Baxter (2007), too, notes that conflict is not necessarily negative. Difference itself is creative and generative, and need not be threatening. However, where the creation of conflict emphasizes ideological differences, it becomes moral and highly consequential. Over time, this consequentiality can become a process of rebirth, or a process of dissolution (Baxter, 1984). As consequential, conflicts of ideological difference bring relationships to the brink of their possibilities, possibly resulting in revitalizing or improving them, but at the risk of destroying them permanently.
From a grounded practical theory perspective, the investigation of this chapter yields a focus on how conflict can be morally problematic for relationships. Thus the example discussed in the analysis presents a case in which conflict proves destructive. Before that, however, the next section turns to more discursive approaches to conflict.

Conflict

According to Jacquemet (1999), most cultural approaches to communication have focused on how discourse coordinates the shared practices that make up a community rather than looking at conflict. When conflict was analyzed, it was often attributed to “breakdowns” or misunderstanding. Jacquemet urges researchers to look at ways in which conflict is not just misunderstanding, but involves difference and struggles for power (see also Cameron, 1998). This analysis takes the views of Grimshaw (1990) and Bailey (2000) that conflict can be a rhetorical practice for accomplishing difference.

Grimshaw (1990) sees conflict as a social process which is accomplished and managed, rather than as a result of error or misunderstanding. “Conflict talk” is the name he gives to practices which involve sociolinguistic devices for constructing conversations as being “conflict.” Studies in his edited collection include investigations of arguments and constructions of difference and dominance (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990; O’Donnell, 1990).

Bailey (2000a, 2004) also sees conflict as constructed through interaction. In a discussion of misunderstanding (2004), he begins by noting how instances of misunderstanding threaten intersubjectivity, and are thus interactionally important. He then moves however to describe how misunderstandings may not merely be “errors” of miscommunication, but actually instances of larger conflict based on serious differences. In his study of the negative attributions Korean retailers and African American customers make about each other regarding service encounters,
Bailey (2000a) proposed that their service encounters accomplished local, discursive enactments of preexisting conflict. By emphasizing social differences and attributing negative intentions and behaviors to one another, the problematic service encounters were not examples of miscommunication, but constructions of divergent communication styles which emphasized, labeled, and blamed “difference.”

In the following analysis, the problematic interactions in a family, particularly between a husband and wife, serve as local enactments of a larger conflict regarding basic ideological differences between them. By emphasizing rather than converging on their moral practices, these relational partners disaligned from one another and deconstructed the sense of sharedness on which intimacy relies. In the next section I begin with some methodological comments, then present the results of the analysis of this case study.

**Conflict as a Moral Discursive Practice**

The moral implications of relating can easily trigger problems and potential conflict, and conflict itself carries relational and identity implications. The ways in which relational partners confront problems through conflict—or through avoiding conflict—is part of the process of constituting a relationship and its moral demands over time. In this section I discuss how conflict is visible in interaction. The following section then discusses a case study concerning examples of conflict potential in a family’s interactions over time.

From a discursive perspective, identifying conflict is not the sole task of an analyst who decides whether or not participants are “in” or “having” a conflict. Instead, the goal is to focus on how participants themselves act as if they were referencing, confronting, avoiding or managing conflict through their participation in morally contentious moments. If conflict is being engaged in a particular instance, oftentimes participants will employ a metadiscursive
vocabulary for talking about that, for example, “we're having this argument because,” “why are we fighting about this?” “I disagree with that,” or “let's not continue quarreling about it.” Some vocabularies can indirectly reference conflict by mentioning associated or contrasted activities or modes of interaction, such as “can't we talk about this rationally?” or “there's no need to bite my head off.”

Similar vocabularies may be used when talking about former conflicts (“remember the last fight we had?”), seeking to avoid a potentially imminent conflict (“let's not get into this right now”), or telling conflict stories to third parties (“we had quite an argument last week”). But quite often, participants among people who are nonconfrontational, and particularly when being recorded, will indicate conflict is far more subtle ways. Emotional displays in tone of voice, for instance, can give off hostile, angry, frustrated or annoyed stances. The presence of shouting, growling, frowning, furrowed eyebrows or flushed skin can also indicate conflict. Certain speech acts—criticizing, blaming, accusing, insulting, demanding—can cue conflicted situations; so can long silences, dispreferred responses, and turn-taking patterns.

Spotting moments in which participants indirectly indicate conflict is not the same thing as identifying what the conflict is or what those indications mean for the conflict. As Bateson (1974) points out, communication is a system of interrelated participants, actions, objects and environments in which a clear causal link is hard to point out. Bateson calls the assignation of cause and effects to particular people, events and situations “punctuation.” As grammatical punctuation breaks a flow of words into a meaningful sentence, this form of punctuation organizes the chaotic streams of experience into logical relationships. Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson (1967) build on this notion in their example of demand-withdrawal sequences in which
one person demands and the other withdraws, with each attributing their action as being caused by the action of the other person.

Because of this complexity inherent in interaction, it can be difficult to ascertain, when an action cues conflict, whether that action is a cause, result, symptom, etc. of conflict, and whether the “conflict” participants have in mind is in the past, present, future, or even shared between them. As to how people deal with conflict and conflict possibilities in their talk, this analysis does seek to determine whether in their conflict cueings, people are avoiding, confronting, or managing conflict; and whether such conflict is one which is or even can be expressed.

**Case Study of Conflict Management in a Family**

This section analyzes home video data from a single family comprising a little less than 50 hours of data from videos filmed across nearly 30 years. Though the data are home movies, and thus depict people who are aware and self-conscious of being filmed, there are nonetheless definite patterns that emerge regarding how to deal with potentially conflictual, morally-charged interactions.

The presence of negatively-emoted disagreement and disalignment through divergent moral practices, despite these being captured on film, is indicative of the presence of conflict of some sort in this family. Furthermore, the constant and repeated patterns of interaction, as well participants’ espoused ideas of what they are doing, indicate very different interactional achievements regarding a parent’s role in creating fairness for their children. Though the data feature several recurring interactions with extended family members, the focus of analysis is a family of six: mother, Jilly; father, Mike; daughters JR and Samantha; and sons Abraham and Dennis. The analysis focuses on divergent patterns of moral practice between the parents, but
demonstrates how these practices are participated in and ratified to differing extents by their children as well.

The issues discussed in this analysis have to do with the concept of fairness as it relates to child-raising as a moral practice, particularly through vigilance in parenting. One goal of parenting is to raise a “good person,” someone who will learn as a child the communicative behaviors which will “do moral character” in their later adult life. In the U.S., fairness and equality is a value and a problem, evinced by the ongoing social, legal and policy controversies related to fostering a fair society without “rigging” the game so as to create a contrived equality. Affirmative action is an example of an issue that, for some people, is about evening an inherently unequal playing field, while for others, it gives certain people unfair advantages. As a social and cultural issue relevant to U.S. history as well as to people’s everyday lives, fairness and equality constitute an “ideological dilemma” (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988).

This dilemma is also a relational one (e.g., Baxter, 2004b). In a family context, dealing with this dilemma is at the heart of parenting practices. Creating fairness in an inherently unfair situation—for instance, evening the playing field between an older and younger brother—requires a far more involved parenting approach than just letting children learn a more individualized notion of fairness for themselves. This is conceptualized in this analysis as a sort of “hand-on/hands-off” dilemma in doing parenting. Thus, this dilemma is also an interactional one (Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001). The dilemma for this family involves situated moral practices which deal with questions of what behavior should be monitored, how it should be monitored, and for what ends.
In chapter seven, one family with a husband and wife from different backgrounds faced different notions of the appropriateness of controlling children. A similar problem arises in the examples here. Though the parents are both from the U.S., their different ideologies regarding fairness involve different notions of how interactionally involved they should be in monitoring and controlling their children's behavior. Thus, different family members, and particularly Jilly and Mike, engage in different moral practices around the raising of the youngest family members, Abraham and Dennis.

Parenting activities are often likely to be cast in a moral light. The decisions one makes with regard to children are considered highly consequential for that child's life and livelihood. As Ochs and Kremer-Sadlik (2007) point out, morality is a family practice: families inculcate, socialize, and teach certain ways of being as right or wrong. But like so many difficult and complex moral activities, there is no one right way to do parenting. Making everyone happy can be at odds with letting them learn certain life lessons. In the following examples, conflict is imminent in both kinds of situations, but particularly where being a hands-on parent and being a hands-off parent come into conflict.

Parenting is a delicate balancing act between explicit teaching and letting children learn from experience. In the examples below, each parent takes a different orientation to this dilemma which becomes more marked over time. This “hands-on/hands-off” dilemma is in some ways similar to the relational dialectic tension of autonomy v. connectedness, and demonstrates a more private, family-level version, to some extent, of a collective v. individual dilemma (Baxter, 2004b). On one hand, being a family is about being close and connected, doing things together, being engaged, playing a large role in each other's lives, etc. Part of this is norm involves establishing equality and fairness among all parties. On the other hand, particularly in societies
like the U.S., individualism and self-sufficiency is strongly valued. Creating fairness in a “naturally unfair” situation violates the norm that values individual ability.

In the examples below, a hands-on/hands-off dilemma is apparent, particularly between the parents, regarding monitoring their children’s behavior with regard to issues of safety, behavior, and fairness. Over time, this difference becomes increasingly marked, and is taken up in different ways by the older children as they too take on parenting roles with their younger brothers.

The pattern of the problem of fairness is apparent even before the sons’ births. For example, in home movies from the 1980s, most of the content of the videos revolves around special events (as home movies often do) including birthday, holidays, and special trips. The birthdays and holidays are notable for this analysis in revealing the careful work that all family members, even extended ones, put into the only children of the family at that point. The daughters of Mike and Jilly always had the same number of gifts, always matching. They were also consistently given gifts during other people’s birthday occasions. During this time period it is hard to tell the difference between Mike and Jilly’s orientation to raising their daughters “fairly,” but it is apparent that equality is valued as a sort of “kindness” not afforded adults, that is, Mike would not get a gift if it were his daughter Sam’s birthday, but she would get a gift if it were his. This only occurs while the daughters are quite young, up to the age of eight or so.

After that point, the interactional achievement of a situation as “fair” or “unfair” becomes visible during the daughters’ interactions among themselves. In several videos between 1994 and 2000—when the daughters were in age around 11 or 12 up to 18—there occur instances of arguments over fairness on tape which indicates that this is a tension already present among the children, separate from their interactions with their parents. The first example illustrates the
problem of fairness regarding some Easter candy. In this case, there was a large basket, shared by the daughters, containing candy in which there was two of everything. Based on the prior expectations, in which the daughters always received the same sorts of items in equal measure, the older daughter assumes ownership outside any “claiming” of the candy. However, her younger sister takes advantage of the lack of explicit ownership to eat both of a particular candy type (a candy “ring”) and refuses to admit this as a problematic action—after all, the candy was left available to anyone who could take it, and was never “claimed.” In this video JR is holding the camera aimed at Samantha, while their little brother Abraham appears intermittently in the background, but does not directly participate.

Excerpt 30 “Stealing” [fam.evts98.18.E3.1]

61 JR: Oh you have one of those rings where’s mine
62 Sam: doh know (1.0) you didn’t get one
63 JR: I got one
64 (1.0)
65 Sam: Is cherry?
66 JR: Yeah
67 Sam: Did you ever eat it?
68 JR: y- no
69 Sam: Was it in a basket?
70 JR: I don’t know (.) what basket
71 Sam: The basket (.) next to the cupboards
72 JR: n- u:h
73 Sam: I’m not pointin over there=
74 JR: =uh I don’t know
75 (1.0)
76 Sam: I think it was
JR: Was that one yours- I mean mine?

Sam: I believe so=

JR: Is it mine? then why’d you eat it did you already eat yours .. huh?

Sam: I didn’t know

JR: Oh yeah you already ate yours and you didn’t know

Sam: I didn’t know it was yours .. I have this stuff on my [tee::th]

JR: [who’d] you think it was?

JR: You’re dumb.
In this exchange, JR slowly comes to realize that Sam is eating JR’s candy. As soon as JR mentions that she should have a candy (“mine” line 78) Sam tries to pass it off as if JR did not get one. This opens up the first possible scenario, which is that there was only one candy of this type available, and that Sam is eating the only one. Sam begins a question and answer sequence that seems designed to elicit whether JR truly had her own candy and whether she knew where the candy was (lines 65-71). When JR admits she is not sure where the candy actually was (line 74), Sam admits that JR’s candy (line 76) was in fact in the basket, and holds up the ring on her own finger, smiling (line 77). JR suddenly realizes (line 78) that Sam is currently eating JR’s candy, and Sam admits that it appears to be true without admitting so directly (line 80).

JR accuses Sam of a wrongdoing directly when she points out the fact that if Sam already had one, she should have known the other was not for her (line 81), but Sam continues to act as if the presence of two candies did not necessarily mean one was set aside for JR (“I didn’t know” line 83). JR makes the error in this claim of not knowing more explicit by mentioning again that if Sam ate one, and there was another in the basket, she should have known it was not hers (line 84), but Sam continues to claim not knowing and tries to change the subject (line 86). JR calls Sam out again (line 87) and finally insults her (“you’re dumb” line 89).

In families with more than one child—particularly two children close in age—it is typical for there to be “two of everything” in an effort to establish fairness. However, this fact is not always explicitly discussed, and here Sam seems to have exploited the unstated assumption in order to get more candy for herself. JR continues throughout the exchange to reference (but not explicitly state) the assumption that if there are two of a candy, and two people, then each person should get a candy; while Sam continuously pretends not to know of this assumption, and avoids even looking at JR through most of the interaction (lines 77, 82, 88).
The conflict possibility in this excerpt is continuously referenced but never fully realized. There is a dilemma of sharing and ownership, of fairness and equal access, which creates a problem on both sides: how to indicate that “stealing” is even possible in a situation where distribution is unstated and sharing is valued; and how to avoid being labeled a “thief” when one has clearly violated a norm. JR could have displayed more anger or demanded something in return (whether an apology or another candy); Sam could have apologized or offered something. Neither person does this. JR’s lack of explicitness or intensity in her indignation, and Sam’s determination not to fully engage JR’s accusations, seem in this situation to diffuse the conflict.

It is difficult to pursue conflict when one person treats it as nonexistent; and the lack of seriousness in the accusation, as in the previous example, keeps the accusation from needing to be taken seriously. This appears to be a conflict tactic that works, though perhaps only temporarily. It also constitutes the way in which the sisters deal with one another. Sam has already apparently learned that she will probably not be held strongly responsible for her actions by JR, and JR demonstrates that at least in this level of offense, she is not willing to push for an apology (or even a strong acknowledgement).

Accusations are similar in conflict potential to criticisms—they can be, in a sense, the same speech act, where an accusation is doing criticism, or a criticism is doing an accusation. The potential for conflict in such situations is high, because most people do not want to “agree” with being responsible for a criticizable or accusable offense. In many cases among the data for this family, criticisms could only be accomplished indirectly, and through this indirect management, sustained or serious conflicts were avoided. In this section, an accusation served a different purpose, but was not accomplished within a very serious frame, and thus conflict itself did not have to be dealt with very seriously. It seems to be the case that certain kinds of
dilemmas lend themselves more easily to avoidable conflicts. In situations where the line between individual and family ownership is blurred, “stealing” appears to be a less serious offense, or at least, need not be treated as serious.

This is not the only case, by any means, where a similar situation occurs. Though it arises commonly between the sisters, it happens in the larger family context as well. In another instance from about a year earlier, the family receives a Christmas gift of chocolate-covered pretzels, which proves to be an unexpectedly popular delight for the family. The large bag is left out in the kitchen because it becomes so popular that people are always eating it. It is also, however, left low enough for Abraham, a two year old at this point, to reach it—and Abraham makes no attempt to control how much he eats. We hear Jilly mention at one point on tape that he should not eat them all, but no attempt is actually made to remove the bag, or provide consequences to Abraham when he does not listen to the request (it is phrased as a request rather than an order). Later on in the video, Samantha discovers that the bag is completely empty, and confronts Jilly about Abraham having eaten all of the pretzels. Jilly treats the situation as unproblematic, and Sam ends up sighing and walks away.

The rest of the examples in this analysis focus on the parenting practices (by Mike and Jilly, but also Sam and JR) toward the youngest members of the family, Abraham and Dennis. It is in these interactions that the dilemma emerges and becomes conflicted among the family. In the early years of Abraham’s birth, “safety” is the theme most prevalent regarding how closely to monitor, or become physically involved, in the children’s behavior. Abraham was born 11 years after Mike and Jilly’s daughters, and so most of the first three years of his life are the subject of video recording—there are literally multiple tapes, hours long each, devoted to following him around the house. Even at this stage, Jilly’s “hands-off” approach is apparent. She does not tell
Abraham what to do or what not to do. The videos take on an almost anthropological feel. Scenes include, for instance, Abraham pulling everything out of the refrigerator, emptying a cupboard, removing silverware from a dishwasher, and going through his sisters’ things.

Throughout such instances, Jilly merely records and does not intervene. But this could be part of her style of creating the videos, as a sort of “objective” record. In later videos with other family members, Jilly’s hands-off approach becomes more apparent. Common scenes at this stage revolve around Abraham moving toward dangerous arenas (e.g. tops of stairs, a hot stove) or putting odd things in his mouth (e.g. Styrofoam, plants). In each of such cases, Jilly, if recording, merely records, and if not recording, does nothing until Mike orders her to do so. As Abraham gets older, and after his little brother is born, a slightly different pattern emerges and extends from dangerous to “bad” behavior. If a child does something deemed inappropriate, and Mike and Jilly are present, Mike will be the first to comment. Jilly only comments if her daughters also comment, and sometimes not even then. If Jilly is alone, she comments but takes no action. Over time, if Mike comments, and Jilly either comments or does not but (which is almost always) does nothing, Mike will often step in. Later on, he steps in even without Jilly’s comments. Thus, the pattern changes over time.

During the first couple years of Abraham’s and Dennis’s lives, the disciplining action ends with verbal comments which are directed toward the boys, but don’t make strong demands. For example, in one scene, Abraham pushes Dennis, who falls over. Jilly says nothing; Mike criticizes the action (“don’t do that”), but otherwise makes no move. Even after Dennis starts crying, no one disciplines or comments on Abraham’s actions. Thus, at this stage, Mike and Jilly’s actions regarding the children’s behavior are not markedly different, except that Mike is quicker to take verbal disciplinary action.
Over time, however, things shift. When Jilly is alone, she continues the same strategy of not intervening: she criticizes, but takes no action. As Jilly is a stay-at-home-mom at this point, there are several videos in which she is alone with the children. When one of the children engages in unsafe or bad behavior, she comments (with phrases such as “don’t do that,” “that’s not nice,” “no hitting,” or “stay near me”) but very rarely physically intervenes, never provides possible consequences (such as if you do x you will be punished in manner y) and never doles out any consequences when bad behavior is continued.

The next example demonstrates a typical example of the ways in which problematic child behavior is controlled in a hands-off style when Jilly is alone, and takes place when Abraham and Dennis are about four and two years old, respectively. Jilly is filming the house, which is filled with boxes as they are about to move. She comes across Abraham and Dennis watching television in their room, and notices that Abraham is holding a double popsicle.

Excerpt 31 “Food in the Room” [fam.evts99.19.E6.1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jilly:</th>
<th>Abraham:</th>
<th>Jilly:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Don’t set those down in here</td>
<td>Big one</td>
<td>(two big popsicles) this room’s clean you shouldn’t have food in here at all (1.0) why do I keep sayin the same stuff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>(. caught you you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>92</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
This instance is quite normal across the recordings whenever Jilly is alone with one or both children and comes across or is witness to “bad” behavior. In this instance one can tell by Jilly’s reaction to the popsicle that having the popsicle in the room is not allowed, perhaps not ever, or perhaps because the house is clean and they are moving soon—it is difficult to tell. Jilly gives an order related to keeping the room clean rather than having the popsicles there in the first place (line 90). She also points out that she has “caught” the bad action. Abraham avoids acknowledging he has done anything wrong by commenting on the popsicle itself and waving it around (line 92). Jilly then further explains the problem with having popsicles in the room (line 93) and as she walks away, comments on the fact that she’s said this before (line 94). She is clearly annoyed that she keeps repeating her requests and that these requests are not followed, but is unwilling to take action besides the verbal acknowledgement of such violations.

On the other hand, when the family is all together, multiple people will often criticize and/or discipline the children, while Jilly continues not to get involved. Thus, Sam and JR end up taking the more hands-on approach which begins to be developed over time, while Jilly becomes increasingly hands-off. This pattern becomes stronger as years pass. The next example shows an instance in which the hands-off approach is challenged by Jilly’s husband. This example takes place in the same time frame as the prior example.

Excerpt 32 “Sand in the Bag” [fam.evts99.19.E3.3]

94 Mike: Oh:: (.) I didn’t want him get- gettin his sandy hands into that sweetie
95 Jilly: Is it ( )?= 
96 Mike: =ye:s (.) that ruins that whole bag
97 Abraham: ((screams))
98 Mike: Now that whole damn bag’s gonna be sand
99 Abraham: [( )] ((shouting))
100 JR: [( ]
101 Mike: That’s why I was (saying)=
102 Jilly: =I’m sorry
103 JR: It’s not that bad (.) they’re not that sandy=
Mike: alright, okay. I'll take your word for it I guess.
In this example, Mike complains about Dennis’s putting his sandy hands into a pretzel bag (they are at the beach). His complaint makes it clear that he was expecting the sandy bag to be a potential problem and that he also expected Jilly would exhibit the proper control to keep the situation from arising. In lines 94 and 101, he refers in the past tense to this desire and to some prior action, which seems to indicate he had either complained about this possibility before or perhaps had even recruited Jilly in ensuring the problem would not occur. Jilly acknowledges that she was held responsible for this action, and even seems to accept this responsibility, in line 102. Mike’s complaints make it clear that he expects the children’s behavior to be monitored, if not by him then by Jilly—perhaps even preferably by Jilly. This latter point seems validated by the fact that several scenes such as this feature Mike criticizing Jilly for failing to be vigilant enough about one thing or another regarding Abraham and Dennis’s behavior. Perhaps because Jilly exhibits so little monitoring or vigilance more and more over the years, it seems the case that Mike and the daughters tend to turn to her when the children are acting up, treating her uninvolvevement as problematic.

The examples so far have demonstrated a few notable patterns. One is that Jilly typically employs a hand-off approach with intervening in the behavior of, and disciplining, the children. Though she occasionally comments on bad behavior, and presumably has given the children directives regarding certain kinds of actions, she otherwise does not become directly involved. Mike, on the other hand, seems to expect more direct involvement. He is often the first to comment on the children’s behavior when present, and criticizes Jilly or orders her to become more involved if it seems the children are doing or have done something wrong. Over time, Mike’s way of handling the children seems to become the norm, and is adopted by the other immediate family members, Mike and Jilly’s older daughters. In the following example, which
takes place shortly before the prior ones, Mike and Jilly’s older daughters, JR and Sam, are about seventeen and fifteen respectively. In this instance, it is Dennis’s second birthday, and both Abraham and Dennis are acting up a bit as the rest of the family tries to set the table and prepare the cake (they have just sung “happy birthday”).

Excerpt 33 “Birthday Cake” [fam.evts98.17.E4.1]

105  Abraham:  Happy birthday poop you (0.5) happy birthday super poop

106  Mike:  Super poop? no:: none of that stuff=
107  Sam:  =wait (.) wait Dennis=
108  Abraham:  =( ) [( )] ((shouting))
109  Sam:  [SH::: (. )] [SH::: (. )] would you cut it out- wait=
110  Jilly:  =wait a second Dennis we’re gonna cut you a [piece]
111  Sam:  [>wait] wait wait wait wait
112  wait wait wait [wait<]
113  Jilly:  [w^ait] wait wait=
114  Sam:  =that’s not all for you

115  (2.0)
116  Abraham:  I’m takin the cap off (. ) what do you think I’m doin (. ) just takin the
117  [cap off]
118  JR:  [where’s the] cake cutter mommy
119  Jilly:  I don’t have a cake cutter=
120  Sam:  =Dennis stop it
121  JR:  Don’t you have an old one we can use?
122  Jilly:  No
123  Sam:  Wait
124  JR:  Red? Maybe that’s Gramma
125  Jilly:  Uh uh

126  Jilly:  That’s gramma I don’t have one
128  (4.0) ((Dennis tapping spoon))
129  Sam:  He’s rippin up the cake
130  ((Dennis throws spoon on floor))
131  Sam:  DENNIS=
132  JR:  =what’d you do that for (.) punk (.) this

133  get your head

134  to the table lick (3.0) you puppy you
This example demonstrates that Jilly only speaks to control Dennis’s behavior once others in the family have identified it as problematic (line 110). Jilly does not make a comment at Abraham’s references to “poop” (line 105); Mike, as usual, does comment (line 106) and furthermore, physically interacts with Abraham, though in a teasing way. After Mike leaves, however, the other children of the family display a similar orientation to Abraham and Dennis’s behavior, not just verbalizing criticisms, but physically intervening. Jilly makes no comment when Dennis starts putting his finger into the cake, even though Jilly is watching him the closest (with the camera, even). Instead, Sam (107, 109, 111, 114, 120, 123) continuously tries to stop Dennis’s attempts to eat the cake with his hands before it has been cut. Sam also is the one who orders Abraham to stop shouting (line 109). Jilly does tell Dennis to wait (lines 110, 113) but only after Sam has made that request twice (lines 107, 109).

In line 115, Sam continues taking the majority of the control over the children’s behavior by taking the milk away from Abraham, who protests the need for such action in lines 116-117. While JR and Jilly start a side conversation, Sam continues to order Dennis to stop trying to eat the cake (lines 120, 123) and finally moves the cake out of reach in line 126. Dennis responds by picking up a spoon and beating it on the table (line 128). Sam directs a criticism about Dennis’s behavior to Jilly in line 129 demonstrating that, like Mike perhaps, she expects Jilly to be more in charge of the children’s behavior. But even when Dennis throws his spoon on the floor (line 130), Jilly continues to maintain silence. Instead, Sam shouts Dennis’s name, and JR also exhibits a highly physical, engaged style by addressing Dennis, pointing to the blob of chocolate he created by banging the cakey spoon on the table, and grabbing his head to indicate he should put his head to the table and lick up the mess (lines 132-134).
This example shows, again, a typical evolution on the pattern of involvement in controlling behavior. If Mike had been there, he likely would have taken a very active role in verbally and physically directing Abraham and Dennis. Instead, since he leaves the room, Sam and JR take on this role, with Jilly, as usual, having limited involvement. This happens in many other instances, including ones in which Jilly is not filming. In these instances, there are moments of what are possibly “demonstrations” of conflict. Emotionally marked criticisms, upgraders, sharp tones, criticisms and complaints mark these interactions as becoming more problematic over time as the interactional moral practices for achieving them diverge. For several years though, Jilly seems to largely accept this and does not respond; but nor does she change her own behavior. The next example shows how this pattern begins to have a negative effect over time. In this case, the level of “control” is more directly related to establishing fairness rather than disciplining.

In the next excerpt, a year later, Abraham and Dennis are Easter egg hunting in their backyard. Almost immediately, Abraham is finding eggs all over the place, while Dennis follows him around, not seeming to realize this tactic is not going to get any eggs for himself. The boys’ parents encounter the dilemma of whether to ensure the boys have equal numbers of eggs, and how to do so. Mike and the other children, particularly Sam, become actively involved in trying to ensure equality in the number of eggs for each child, but Jilly, though she participates, espouses a different ethic. In the video JR is filming, Dennis and Abraham are in and out of the frame, and Sam moves into the frame once when she helps Dennis find an egg. Mike and Jilly are off camera.

*Excerpt 34 “Easter Egg Hunt”* [fam.evts99.20.E5.2]

133    Sam: Get some Dennis get some
134    (2.5)
Sam: Hurry Dennis I look for [eggs]
Mike: [Go] on
Jilly: [>(they’re not just)<] here
JR: Don’t get all of em Abraham
Abraham: ((shouts))

(1.0)
Jilly: ( ) [( )]
Sam: [Don’t] just follow Abraham Dennis
Mike: ( )
Jilly: WHAT (.) They’re everywhere yes
Mike: Send him over here then (.) so he’s not following Abraham=
Dennis: =I’ve got one
(0.5)
Jilly: He got one
Mike: [Dennis]
Sam: [come over] here
Mike: Dennis over here
Sam: Dennis come here
Mike: Over here
Sam: Don’t just follow Abraham
Mike: Over here (.) over here Dennis over here (.) look around look
[ everywhere]
Jilly: [He got] (.) one g(h)ood boy
Mike: Dennis
Jilly: Leave im alone he’s got to do it
Abraham: I’m doin fi:ne (.) my basket [(is full)]
Mike: [Come on Dennis]
Jilly: [Keep lookin oka::y]=
Mike: =Look in the planter

(3.0)
Sam: (here’s) an egg
(3.0)
Sam: [Good job]
JR: [Good job] Dennis
(1.0)
In this situation, Dennis’s inability to find eggs (or even to look very hard for them) causes distress among the adults. Dennis and Abraham, being close in age, had already at this time exhibited strong competitiveness toward each other. Thus the idea of fairness, a value common among most non-hierarchically oriented families, becomes grounded in a kind of “absolute” equality in which everyone should get the same amount and same quality of things. This was demonstrated as a tension for Sam and JR in the first excerpt, but in that case the conflict was avoided because the expectations remained tacit. Here, it becomes immediately obvious that there is a lack of equality between the brothers, and the ideal of fairness thus becomes explicit.

Sam identifies this problem first, urging Dennis on (lines 133, 135), and JR even directs a comment to Abraham (line 138) indicating he, too, should be thinking about his brother and perhaps “holding back” from picking up all the eggs he can find. In lines 136 and 143 Mike demonstrates an increase in worry from sounding frustrated to openly complaining about the situation and, based on Jilly’s response (a shout and irritated account in line 144), seems to blame her for what’s happening.
All—except Jilly—continue to take charge of Dennis’s efforts and try to direct him toward eggs, in one case even finding an egg for him (lines 150-155, 164). Jilly’s only contribution during this time is to point out when Dennis finds one on his own (line 157) and she praises Dennis for the accomplishment. After Mike again says Dennis’s name, Jilly makes explicit her expectation that “he’s got to do it” (line 159). She directly states her own preference that Dennis should be left alone, and implied in that statement is that he should be left alone even if it means he ends up with fewer eggs. Notably, however, no one in the family pays attention. After Mike’s and Jilly’s next turns (lines 161-162) which are encouraging but not necessarily directive, Mike reasserts the pattern in which Dennis is “helped” to find eggs rather than finding them on his own (line 163). Mike even upgrades this practice when, after Abraham finds another egg next to Dennis (line 173), Mike directs Abraham to give the egg to Dennis (line 174).

This case is almost a micro-example of the larger pattern that develops in the family interactions, as caught on video, between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s. The moral practice of ensuring fairness is done differently, and diverges to be done more and more differently, over time; concomitantly, the disagreement and disalignment between Mike and Jilly also increases over time. The pattern also becomes more noticeable to participants over time, with more explicit references to the conflicting moral values of fairness versus independence. The Easter egg hunt is a prime example because it is in some sense a competitive game, but other similar instances in the videos include (1) again, gifts and their equal amounts and qualities, (2) other games, such as Monopoly, or spontaneous “running races” between the brothers, and (3) the extent to which Mike in particular “does things for” the sons. Examples of the last arise for instance when the boys get a new game or toy, and Mike plays the game or builds the toy for them. A few instances
even show him physically taking one of his son’s hands and putting it on the buttons that make the toy work.

In the short period of time demonstrated with these examples, Mike and Jilly’s different styles, interactional choices and apparently differing ideological approaches to parenting diverged. Though there are only a few videos following the example described, all of them feature further situations, similar to this one, and marked by emotional, negative responses which could be characterized as criticizing, bickering, or “snapping.” That their differences were not discussed, explained, accounted for, mutually-oriented or adjusted in any way but apart indicates that an unaddressed conflict was at work.

A couple years after the Easter egg hunt, Mike and Jilly divorced. It is not suggested that the hands-on/hands-off dilemma caused their divorce, but that divergent communication is a way of showing a lack of shared orientation, and thus a lack of commitment to the same goals. And after the divorce, perhaps because there was no longer a need to adjust to each other, Mike and Jilly’s approaches continued to evolve in opposite directions and become more explicit. Jilly, for instance, was minimal in her approach to making Abraham and Dennis do their schoolwork. She would help them when requested, but otherwise indicated it was up to them to do what they needed to do, and if they did not do so, they would suffer the consequences at school (having poor grades, getting in trouble, etc.). Mike, on the other hand, would do homework with Abraham and Dennis every night that he had the kids (which was every other week), and would not allow anything else to occur (even dinner) until the work was finished. He was at times overly involved, going so far as to do parts of the work for his children. He was also in constant meetings with members of the children’s school, while Jilly left it up to the kids whether they were to fail a class or not—and sometimes they did.
The following excerpts take place about seven years after the divorce, and demonstrate how the patterns of orientation to fairness have become more different and more explicit. At this point Abraham and Dennis are about 16 and 14. In the first excerpt, Mike discusses with JR (the children are not present) his concern about the idea of fairness. Over the years, Abraham and Dennis’s competitiveness increased until it was common for Dennis to throw elaborate tantrums because he often could not keep up in certain games with his brother. Though at the time of these recordings (2009-2010) that tendency had abated, it was nonetheless still present enough to continue to worry Mike. Here, he discusses Dennis’s temper after relating a recent incident in which Dennis had stalked off after a game with Abraham and refused to eat dinner.

Excerpt 35 “Dennis’s Temper” [fam.nov09.1.E1.1(audio)]

175 Mike: he’s a little better than=
176 JR: =yeah than before=
177 Mike: =but he still gets (. ) just (. ) livid sometimes
178 (1.0)
179 JR: yeah (. ) he’s at that age
180 Mike: I try to tell Abraham you know ju::st let im (. ) just back off for a minute
181 JR: yeah
182 Mike: but Abraham’s like me
183 JR: can’t ease up? (0.5) even for a good cause=
184 Mike: =no:: not at all (1.0) I just want em to be happy=
185 JR: =of course

Here, Mike constructs the “problem” of Dennis’s temper (line 177) as being due to the fact that Abraham does not ever “back off” or let Dennis win at things once in a while (line 180). Mike equates the result of letting Dennis win once in a while with “happiness” (line 184). Here Mike presents himself as actively worried and involved in the inequity between Abraham’s skills and Dennis’s apparent lack thereof. Mike presents himself as “telling” Abraham to back off (line 180) as an example of his efforts to create a greater if artificial fairness between the brothers, one in which they are more equally “good” at the same things. Thus, even years later, Mike continues
to employ intense levels of involvement with his sons’ behavior and to show distress even at fairly mild incidents of “unhappy” (tempermental) behavior.

The next example takes place during the same time, but here the boys are with Jilly and her parents, camping. In this interaction, the family members have been painting, and now are going to have a contest in which each person votes by “secret ballot” for their favorite painting.

Excerpt 36 “Painting Contest” [fam.sum10.2.E1.1]

186 Dennis: so do we get like (.) categories like (.) best- you know what[ever]
187 Jilly: [no::]
188 Grampa: [no no] that
defeats the whole idea of a contest
190 Abraham: yeah the winner wins=
191 Jilly: =you can’t have everyone be a winner
192 Grampa: not like in the schools ((laughs))
193 Dennis: oh okay right
194 Jilly: yeah ((laughs))
195 Grampa: this is a real contest
196 Jilly: none of that (.) crap
197 Grampa: no preferential treatment here
198 Jilly: you can’t have all winners
199 Gramma: oh ((laughs))
200 JR: I still need a ballot
201 .
202 . ((2.0 minutes deleted))
203 .
204 JR: Wait- do- we get to vote fer (1.0) just one right now?= 
205 Abraham: =just one=
206 Jilly: =just one=
207 JR: =[oh]
208 Dennis: [and] it can’t be [yours]
209 Jilly: [()]
Grampa: wh-.hh
JR: I thought we were gonna have first second and third=
Grampa: =well=
Gramma: =yeah and then- whoever gets the most one would be (. ) first second and
third=
JR: =ah::=
Gramma: =that’s how it works out
JR: oh::
In this example there is an explicit reference to the idea of making things “fair” as being letting everyone “win.” In line 186, Dennis tries to find out if there are different categories in which a person can win. Since there aren’t *that* many “contestants” this seems to cue that many people (if not all) could “win” given the right categories, and Jilly and Grampa pick up on this implied meaning right away, emphatically disagreeing with it (lines 187-188). Abraham and Jilly reinforce the implication of this disagreement by pointing out that the concept of winning is in conflict with having more than one winner (lines 190-191). Grampa (line 192) then draws out another implication by contrasting the family notion of what it means to win with the one the boys might encounter at school. This implication is that in school, in an effort not to upset children, teachers might “rig” a situation so that everyone wins. This is a typical complaint made of “liberal” education and comes in a category of complaints about being politically correct or hindering free speech in supposed efforts to keep from offending others. Grampa and Jilly continue to reinforce the idea of “one winner” calling it a “real contest” (line 195) and equating anything else with “crap” or “preferential treatment” (lines 196-197).

After a couple minutes of dealing with ballots, JR cues the value of “one winner” again by asking about how many get voted for (line 204). The camera is on Grampa, who makes a series of faces and some noises indicating something like indignation or surprise at the question. JR seems to understand the implied criticism that may be coming as she repairs her earlier question to be specifically about second and third place rather than about different categories of first (line 211). Gramma (lines 213, 215) explains that that does not need to be voted on, but will be worked out by how many votes each person gets in the first place. Ironically, there ends up being a three-way tie. But it is considered unproblematic, perhaps, because it was accomplished in the right (loosely democratic) manner.
Jilly and Mike were raised in very different ways. Jilly’s parents were strongly conservative Republican, Mike’s liberal Democrat. This is not to say that these political beliefs actually caused, alone, Jilly’s and Mike’s different approaches to raising their children. Rather, there are particular ideas about how to be morally good which cue different ways of achieving goodness—ways of achieving that line up with, for instance, ways to parent, political beliefs, and other espoused and enacted methods of managing interactional dilemmas. One sees this connection being made when in excerpt 13 Grampa and Jilly reference political stances (regarding education, preferential treatment) in the context of designing an informal painting contest.

This is also consistent with Lakoff’s (2002) work on different “cognitions” of liberals and conservatives, with the liberal perspective being oriented to nurturing while the conservative one is oriented to strictness. This difference is also presented as a moral one, based on different ideologies of the meaning of authority and intervention for the creation of a “good family” (which for Lakoff provides the metaphor, and thus sense-making, for a good government). Lakoff associated the “strict” with the father and the “nurturing” with the mother, though these associations, as in this case, can be reversed.

In interaction, people orient to particular ideologies associated with the cultural and relational meanings for their discursive choices. Part of the construction of a relationship as one that shares—or does not share—moral values is about continually achieving in interaction the sense that people are acting within coherent moralities. Thus, people work in their relationships to reaffirm that their values are consistent and reasonable. This requires work because difference is always present. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, even in assumedly shared situations, differences and contradictions and dilemmas exist.
This occurs in the case of Jilly and her parents, for instance, in maintaining similarities between political and personal espoused values as a way of showing that they all share a coherent moral orientation. In the case of Jilly and Mike, each person wanted to be “fair” but had different ideas of how to do so. Mike’s idea of fairness was about ensuring everyone had the same amount of “stuff” whereas Jilly’s was more about independence and achieving things on one’s own. Thus, Mike’s moral practices revolved around high involvement, physical interaction, close monitoring of behavior, and intervention; while Jilly’s revolved around maintaining distance and chiming in now and then with verbal comments. Like the issue of ownership discussed in the first excerpt (being collectively or individually oriented with regard to ownership), ensuring fairness constitutes a dilemma. The more one tries to make everything equal, the more some people end up losing out. In the case of the Easter egg hunt, for instance, Abraham ends up not being able to keep all of his eggs, while Dennis attains his through outside help.

In these examples, the dilemmas of how to parent were not able to be easily avoided. Though in the moment of recording, at least, the conflicts inherent in such dilemmas were not engaged in a sustained way (there was never an outright extended argument, at least on film), their occurrence over time proved consequential for the relationship between the parents of the family. Over time, concurrent with not dealing with the difference in parenting styles, the practices each person employed for dealing with parenting evolved in separate directions, further and further apart. By the time the parents had divorced, and years after, their approaches to raising their children had become markedly different and were associated with very different values. Their different moral practices for child-raising were employed for different interactional accomplishments of the ideology of fairness.
In this chapter, I analyzed a long-standing dilemma in a family and examined (1) how it implicated conflict, (2) how it was responded to, and (3) its impact on interaction over time. Dilemmas—like the dialectical tensions described by Baxter (2004a, 2004b)—can only be managed, not resolved. This analysis provided examples of a kind of conflict that, for this family, could not be satisfactorily managed, let alone attempt a resolution. In fact, by consistently maintaining and then by diverging their parenting styles, the parents in this family constructed their differences more and more starkly—in a sense, ensuring that resolution would never occur.

**Morality and Conflict**

In this case study, conflict over different parenting styles proved hard to avoid and made an impact on the family over time. There was little attempt made by either parent to adjust their style to the other, though in earlier videos Mike’s style seemed more similar to Jilly’s. Even in a short period of a couple years, however, the styles grew further and further apart. The lack of an attempt to reconcile these competing ideas about how to raise the children both constructs and is indicative of the way in which Mike and Jilly accomplish their relationship in moments of interactional morality.

In this family, a problematic orientation to conflict arising from a dilemma was exacerbated, with each parent using their own style in more marked ways. The evolution of increased difference led to more and more severe conflict potential, none of which were engaged with directly or aimed at resolution. In the end, the parents divorced. It is impossible to say whether the parents’ differing approach to parenting, and avoidance of conflict, caused their eventual divorce—but certainly, these enactments with regard to morality and conflict constructed a way of interacting that must have proven incompatible over time, perhaps
alongside other ways of interacting not captured in the home movies or to be noted in future analyses.

Conflict is a moral practice which designates the most immediate and explicit threat of morality for relationships. Conflict is forced to address the possibility of difference and involves either constructing sharedness, or emphasizing difference. To construct some level of sharedness is to construct the continuation of the relationship, to demonstrate that there is sufficient overlap of intersubjectivity, intimacy, and ideology to go on. To emphasize difference is to challenge the relationship itself, not necessarily “consciously,” but as an action produced over time.

This chapter presented some of the dilemmas of parenting, and the ways in which participants in the family chose to construct different and opposing practices rather than seeking to manage those tensions. This phenomenon is similar to what Bateson (1972) called “schismogenesis”—the creation of struggle or conflict based on the interaction between people or groups and the ways in which they respond to one another. This study indicates that an ideal of moral communication would not necessarily avoid conflict, but that conflict would be managed in a different way. Rather than emphasizing difference, convergence would be sought and practiced. This notion is returned to in chapter nine.

Chapter eight reconstructed “conflict” as a collection of practices for challenging sharedness and constructing difference in the interactional achievement of ideology. Chapter eight is the final analysis chapter in this project. In a sense, it represents the culmination of many of the ideas brought forth in the previous four analysis chapters. Chapter four discussed the problem of intersubjectivity as one in which a shared world is a minimal requirement for interaction, and an assumption for intimacy. Chapter five discussed how intimacy can be problematic for participating in morally questionable actions. Chapter six discussed ideologies
and their contradictions as unspoken and thus problematic for the relational sharedness of people operating in an ostensibly shared culture. Chapter seven discussed how different ideologies are more salient for intercultural relationships. And this chapter brought these arguments together to show how moral practices for intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology and culture can be employed for emphasizing difference in conflict. The next chapter, chapter nine, takes up some implications of these analyses to formulate considerations for an ideal of moral communication as a practice.
Chapter 9

Moral Communication: Toward Ideals of Practice

If morality is a practice, how is it to be done well?

The problems discussed in this project are serious ones with relational and ultimately community consequences. Such problems are inherent to human beings and interaction—as so many (Goffman, Garfinkel, Burke and others) have noted, humans and interaction are moral. Moral situations are confronted on a daily basis, by all people, and must be managed communicatively. Morality involves ways of dealing with difference. It is not necessarily the case that differences are always negative or cause for conflict. But differences are not simple or straightforward. Differences pose problems for understanding. Differences can threaten closeness. Differences can seem misguided, wrong, malicious. Differences make coming together, in everything from service encounters to marriage, a challenge.

This work has advanced the concept of morality as a practice. The project had two primary purposes. One purpose was investigate the problems and practices of morality, based in a particular communicative perspective (chapter one), drawing from literatures from across the communication field (chapter two), derived from a discourse analytic approach (chapter three) and grounded in empirical data (chapters four through eight). Another purpose was to work toward developing a grounded practical theory of moral communication which explains normative ideals for moral discursive practices. This chapter begins with a summary of the analysis, discusses some implications for “moral communication” as an ideal of moral practice, and situates these conclusions with regard to previous work on similar topics. Following that, limitations and directions for future research are discussed.
The analysis of this project covered five chapters related to intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict. These chapters involve problems involved in doing morality. Intersubjectivity represents the most fundamental basis on which morality relies, and is tied to the assumption that humans are, in a sense, human—intelligible, comprehensible, and “real.” Intimacy constitutes the way in which morality is worked out in relational contexts and through relational practices in terms of closeness and distance of people to one another. Ideology is as the heart of how people construct shared morality together, and the ways in which no cultural context is homogenous, but is riddled with contradictory ideologies which must be managed so as to create a sense of common ground. Culture involves the ways in which salient differences are associated with certain kinds of people, places and perspectives. And conflict is a sort of long-term practice which is deeply tied to the way in which morality is confronted and managed in relationships.

In each chapter, participants engaged in different practices for working out their morality to and with one another, and for dealing with the inherent and inevitable troubles which differences make for moral interactions. Intersubjectivity involved challenges and practices designed for orienting to others in conversation and ensuring that interaction could and would unfold in an orderly, jointly-accomplished socially-meaningful manner. Intimacy presented the particular ways of doing intersubjectivity which would accomplish closeness, and the particular new moral challenges associated with closer relationships. Ideology described the ways in which people make choices with regard to their moral actions, and how the cultural and “different” nature of those choices are occluded in part by the assumption of a shared cultural and ideological background. Culture indexed how practices associated with different cultural contexts were noticed, referenced or enacted to accomplish different moral norms for how to be a
good friend or family member. And conflict demonstrated how these things come together and cause problems, and in particular emphasized the role of difference in moral interaction.

Chapter four argued that intersubjectivity is a means of establishing a shared world. By overcoming difference and managing multiple goals and potential problems, participants lay the foundation for closeness and make relational conversational identities relevant. Recognition is one way of accomplishing intersubjectivity by demonstrating awareness of others as relevant identifiable humans involved in the interaction. Recognition attributes personhood and interactability to actors in a social scene—a situation that can become complex as more actors participate in different ways, for example, displaying recognition to a baby while conversing with a fellow adult.

Intelligibility refers to the comprehensibility of utterances, people and situations, and is the basic mechanism of sense-making. Utterances and turns are assumed to have relevant meaning which is sought if not made apparent. Next and subsequent turns which signal problems with interpretation demonstrate an intersubjective break, as when prolonged misunderstandings occur. Attention sustains intersubjectivity across turns for the purpose of developing sequences of action. Attention involves complex social meanings regarding the participants maintaining their interactions. Attention is a procedure for participating in interaction, and signals commitments both to the interaction, and the people within it. Other-orientation is a way of marking particular identities in a special way within situations. Intersubjectivity can thus be accomplished in different forms or to different levels of intimacy for certain but not other people in an interaction.

Chapter five argued that an assumption of shared understanding with regard to the stable moralities of close others is in tension with the moral questionableness of certain moral practices
which can reveal fundamental differences. Certain practices for moral interaction (judgments, gossip, taboo topics) can have negative implications for participants’ identities. Among close others, there is an unspoken assumption that the other is basically a “good person.” Standards for goodness, however, are tacit and based on complex ideologies, which may not be perfectly shared in a relationship. Therefore, there is a dilemma between feeling safe to participate in morally questionable practices, and potentially stepping outside the expectations of the other and thus losing face. Gossip, for example, involves harsh judgments of others, but is seen as morally suspect as an activity. Thus it has negative face implications not just for the subject of gossip, but also for the producer of gossip and (if ratified as an activity) for the receiver of gossip as well.

Chapter six argued that even within apparently shared cultures, ideologies are morally problematic and contradictory in close relationships. Shared ways of doing and expressing are based not just on relational coordination, but on the practices taken as commonsense in a community. Because commonsense notions of how and why things are done can and often are contradictory, they always run the risk of creating an interactional dilemma. For example, complaints and threats assert certain action “rights” in families (Hepburn, 2010). If in an example of a mother and adult son such rights are afforded by one ideology (for example, “mothers can tell children what to do”) but removed by another (“men can tell women what to do”) then there arises not just a clash of ideologies, but a clash goals and actions.

Chapter seven argued that intercultural interactions make salient cultural ideologies in a way that offers different management techniques than in situations where culture appears more obviously shared. The “difference” of ideologies where culture is assumed to be shared are silent, ignored, or not attributed to ideology. The difference of ideology in intercultural interaction is often, on the other hand, taken as a given even where it is not the case. In
intercultural relationships, participants are often reflexive about ideological differences, and are more likely to engage in metadiscourse about them. However, there is more palpable work needed to construct a sense of sharedness in a situation where difference is notable and practically present.

Chapter eight argued that difference creates distance in interpersonal relationships through divergent moral practices. If moral practices construct ideology through interactional choices, then the lining-up of ideology is intersubjectively and intimately relevant. If ideologies do not match—if interaction seems to aim at different sorts of actions and goals—then the sharedness and closeness of a relationships is called into question. Working to maintain sharedness in the face of always-possible difference is a characteristic of (and practice for) relationships which are experienced as a “we,” as a unit in itself rather than a fleeting dance of individuals. Work that creates, emphasizes and maintains difference, on the other hand, is a way of interactionally achieving troubled relationships whose conflict leads to disengagement.

Each of these chapters identified tensions, troubles and dilemmas which relate to a central problem with moral practice: difference. The human mind is unknown and, for many, unknowable. In discourse analysis it is not treated as relevant because it is not practically empirical. It is, however, a meaningful communicative concept. We care about what others are like. Kinds of persons matter to us. We are disturbed by actions that seem unimaginably wrong, and cheered by those which affirm what we think is right. We assume that we do not need to explain our every action, that the words we use will make sense to one another. And the closer we are to someone, the greater that expectation is.

The next section discusses the implications of the analytical arguments and their evidence regarding moral problems. A key part of these implications involves illustrating how they are
relevant to developing a grounded practical theory of “moral communication” as an ideal for moral practice. The sections thereafter discuss the limitations and future directions of this project.

**Implications**

Morality has been asserted in this work as a practice—a common, dispersed, performed and problematic practice which matters in different ways to different sorts of relationships. “Morality” as a term for situations created through participant interactions describes different kinds of situations as well. “Judgment,” for instance, can be moral. In some conversation analysis, ethnomethodology and discursive psychology, for instance, interaction is omnirelevantly moral because it always requires commitment, responsibility, and accountability. For this project, however, “morality” is better ascribed to situations where judgment implicates fundamental ideological differences between people in close relationships.

Ideology refers to the practices which construct systems of belief about the world, people, their relationships and their communication. Intersubjectivity is a practice for establishing and maintaining the sense of sharedness required of participants to interact meaningfully with one another. In ethnomethodology, it is part of the means by which participants practically construct sense with one another in their everyday conduct. But intersubjectivity is also ideological. There are assumptions—cultural premises—that govern its practice.

As Goffman’s work suggests, there will be a meaning to any situation which has to be arrived at. Sometimes there will be clues in a situation’s form (classroom expectations versus party expectations) but often a definition of the situation must be primarily worked out among people as they seek the appropriate actions. The clues to what the situation is and what to do in it depend on the community. U.S. colleges are often lenient about eating in classrooms, while
Japanese colleges usually assume eating would remove attention and thus constitute an intersubjective break. Thence, an ideology: “respect,” and hence, a rule: “do not eat in classrooms.” Attendant on the rule is the unspoken system of reasoning: eating in classrooms is disrespectful (Stakhnevich, 2002).

Intimacy, too, has its own ideological basis. It too is culturally and historically situated. In the Victorian era, “restraint” was a moral ideology which governed public interactions. Nowadays it seems commonsense that hand-holding provides a communicative marker of romantic closeness, but in Victorian England, it would have been far too explicit (let alone kissing in public) (Chase & Levenson, 2000). And in other points in the West’s pasts, as well as in many Eastern countries, holding hands demonstrated friendship, and not a sexual relationship. It also matters differently for different relationships (it seems normal to hold your father’s hand as a toddler, odd as a teenager). Ideologies provide ways of knowing who is what to whom, and based on what criteria. Depending on the situation, intimacy can be demonstrated with something as demonstrative as an embrace, as subtle as a glance.

The ideologies described in this work are not only interpersonal (insofar as they can apply to societies and individuals) but in this case, they are relevant to interpersonal relationships, and thus made, in situated interaction “about” relationships. Much work in ideology has been Marxist-influenced critical scholarship. There is undoubtedly room for such criticisms in the work here, and some of that has been pointed to. Ideologies can be used to explain why certain people should dominate others, or why certain actions are suitable for one person and not for another. But ideologies can also be used to accomplish shared beliefs about the right and wrong which are not just not negative, but downright encouraging. Where troubles arise is when ideologies are enacted or used to explain in an unproblematic way, as if they were
natural or as if everyone should know how they need to be accomplished. Also tricky is the relationship between ideologies which conflict, and the dilemmas they can cause. The assumption of sharedness may be the basis of relating, but it is also a conceit which requires some modicum of blindness to accept. By employing grounded practical theory and illuminating some of the work people do to practice morality, this project aims to make assumptions visible so that they may be reflected on.

The idea of morality as a practice does not contradict the current research on morality undertaken in LSI and across communication, indeed, in many areas it is already asserted as an everyday, mundane practice (Stokoe & Edwards, 2011). Nonetheless, even practice orientations to morality do not always grapple with the varied and important work on morality across the field. For example, cultural and relational ideological approaches to morality often fail to appreciate the ways in which morality is accomplished in interaction, while proto-morality approaches tend to eschew the cultural and relational ideological practices at work in moral interaction. Focusing on interpersonal communication research attends to values and beliefs but not interaction; focusing on discourse analytic research attends to interaction but less to values and beliefs.

Heritage (2010) notes that all interaction is normative: it has expectations. Heritage also maintains an attitude of deep suspicion toward all discourse analysis that purports to know participants’ motives or intentions, what their “conscious” strategies aim for. But there is no need, as an analyst, to worry about what people really think about or want from interaction. Participants respond to each other as if they do have minds, feelings, motives, intents, and specific goals. Participants regularly reproduce social expectations without naming them
explicitly. The work of interpersonal communication research is relevant to discourse analysts in the same way that social psychology is relevant to discursive psychologists.

Finally, the idea of “difference” as a key problem in morality has not been fully grappled with in current literature. Difference is certainly mentioned repeatedly in relation to conflict, and especially moral conflict. But the ways in which difference makes morality relevant even in the most basic practices of intersubjectivity suggests something far more pervasive and important about the ontology of studies of morality. Much of the genesis of social science research today owes its lineage to the Enlightenment. Though modern writers have criticized the faith in reason and order which characterized Enlightenment inquiry (i.e. Weber, Habermas: Habermas, 1985) most writers of the modern and now postmodern era engage in fairly Enlightenment-guided ideals of research: how does x work? How is it rational, orderly? How does conflict signal a departure from the norm? How can we reach consensus through reasoned arguments?

The approach of this project sees such orderliness as an accomplishment in the face of chaos. Difference is not the exception, but the norm. Consensus is not possible or even moral. As such, it is not that difference is problematic in itself, but that difference is problematic in the context of sharedness, where sharedness is both the ideal, and the status quo assumption of close relationships. As it occupies both that which is “good” and that which is “normal,” it is indeed a formidable ideal with which to contend. This is not, of course, to say that sharedness is bad either. In fact, it is the foundation of social life. “Difference” however, rather than being seen as a problem or an opposite of sharedness, could much better be seen as its counterpart, as necessary, practical, and valuable. What is problematic is not always what is wrong.

Throughout these analyses, I have mentioned some of the participants’ local vocabularies, ideals, and norms for doing the moral discursive practices herein described. In this
chapter I bring these and other implications of analysis together to discuss potential ideals of “moral communication.” The purpose of these considerations is to discuss important possible ideals which would offer flexible means for participants and analysts to reflect on and investigate the norms and ideals which guide moral practices.

Normative Ideals of Moral Practice in Interpersonal Relationships

Difference emerges as the key problematic confronted by morality. Moral practices seem to be designed, in fact, precisely to deal with this problem in everyday life. Intersubjectivity, for example, has to construct enough overlap so that people can accomplish all the little things that make up social existence—telephone calls and restaurant orders and drugstore purchases, even crossing the street at a busy intersection. If meaning is social, then it must approximate some shared intelligibility; meaning cannot be purely internal and private, or acting with others would be difficult, if not impossible. Thus, intersubjectivity is a problem because it cannot be fully accomplished. Instead, intersubjectivity practices are designed to overcome differences in understanding so that interaction can unfold.

Intimacy builds on intersubjectivity—practices for the latter can be ways of accomplishing the former—but they are done in different ways, and signal a close relationship (whereas intersubjectivity is needed for any interaction, intimacy is desired for special interactions between people who have some level of relational commitment). Through particular patterned and marked actions, people seek and build “closeness” with one another. But the differences involved here are in a sense even more troubling. Problems with intersubjectivity and intimacy where closeness is desired do not just signal a break in understanding, but signal distance. Distance is associated with not wanting to be close, or with not sharing the same meanings of closeness. It is more consequential and involves more complex rituals for
overcoming it. A break in intersubjectivity may be repaired with small effort, but a break in
intimacy creates a potential gulf between people that requires more, and different, levels of
practice. The intimacy level of practice makes relevant the relationship of interactants because
the interactants themselves will key it as being so.

Intersubjectivity, as mentioned, rarely becomes a topic of participant talk unless it goes
wrong. And it is rarely thematized as a moral problem because it occurs at the level of actions—
something difficult to identify as a participant, though it is certainly accomplished easily enough
most of the time. Intimacy is slightly more complex because it requires a relational component. It
brings people’s identities relevantly to light, and makes up a class of procedures for doing
relationships with others. Though based on intersubjectivity practices, intimacy practices also
provide participants with ways of talking that are about the relationship, and not just about
general social expectations. It constitutes the distinction between “people don’t listen to each
other enough” and “you never listen to me.” A difference in intimacy is a difference in
expectations for the relationship.

With ideology, difference becomes more complicately linked to cultural and social
contexts. Ideology practices will link to their contexts in a more large-scale way. This is not to
say that intersubjectivity and intimacy are not ideological—of course they are. But they can be
about much more immediate, local actions. Intersubjectivity occurs between interactants in a
moment—it is not accomplished between nations (or at least, not in the discourse analytic
perspective taken here). Intimacy, likewise, may be governed in part by ideological notions of
what relationships should be like in a cultural context, but intimacy is constructed between
people—not just any people, people accomplishing closeness beyond the intersubjectivity
needed to get by on a day to day basis. But ideologies are accomplished by large groups of
people and maintained over time. The work done to enact or cue ideologies in a moment is not
only about the interaction or the particular people relating to one another, but is about more
general sociocultural values and expectations. In the context of close relationships, intimacy is
what grounds both intersubjectivity (a moment-by-moment accomplishment) and ideology (the
accomplishment of social groups) in relational interaction. If there were no intimacy,
intersubjectivity could be mended quickly or even ignored, at least in many contexts. If there
were no intimacy, ideology could too be ignored, or discussed without any perception that it
might threaten a relationship irreparably.

Culture is linked to ideology. Ideologies are cultural ways of making sense of, labeling,
justifying, explaining and maintaining certain patterns of interaction. Difference in cultural
contexts has to do with the assumptions that intercultural interaction involves ideological
difference. Such assumptions are rarely sophisticated enough to see sequential actions as
involving ideology—most people judge actions from the perspective of their own culture,
assuming actions mean the same things and thus violating expectations may safely be labeled
“rude.” What people are aware of is the idea of values as ideological. In intercultural
relationships, then, there is a more explicit metadiscourse regarding differences in ways of seeing
the world. To some extent this makes difference easier to label than when people assume they
share a cultural perspective. When people assume their culture is shared, they attribute
ideological differences to individuals, and that can be more damaging in a relationship because
people are then accused of having motives in a different way.

When people do not assume they share a culture, ideological differences will often be
attributed to assumptions about background and upbringing. The individual is not held as
strongly accountable. This does not make intercultural relationships easier, but provides a
different sort of vocabulary for talking about moral difference. On the other hand it makes
difference more “visible” and thus easier to emphasize—which brings this section to conflict.
Conflict is a different sort of moral practice, one for managing the differences that can emerge
from intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology and culture. Conflict is the practice for managing
difference when difference itself can no longer be managed or ignored. Conflict practices may
seek to reestablish a sense of closeness in relationships—to compromise, ignore, conjoin or live
with differences by establishing new modes of relating and interacting, or reifying old modes.
But conflict practices can also emphasize differences and construct distance between people.

The following sub-sections review the results of analysis for each problem of morality as
a practice, discuss the techniques for dealing with the problems of the practice, and offer possible
ideals for guiding critique and improvement of the practice. In this work, “morality” was seen as
an analytical term to describe the ways in which people employ moral discursive practices for
achieving certain interactions. “Moral communication” is a term for what would count as
“moral” moral discursive practice, or the best practices for doing morality interactionally. Of
course, to try and specify precisely what such practices are across contexts would be impossible
given the diversity of analyses presented in the last several chapters, and contrary as well to the
project of grounded practical theory. Thus, in this section I discuss some of the implications from
the analyses for developing a set of guidelines for understanding, concepts for reflection, and
issues for action involved in analyzing and doing moral practice. The section thereafter considers
this project’s contribution to studies of morality in communication and relationships.

**Intersubjectivity.** Chapter four argued that the problem of intersubjectivity for morality
involved the threat of difference to cause ruptures in an assumedly shared world. One device for
establishing intersubjectivity involves other-orientation, verbal and nonverbal moves or object
manipulations for doing intersubjectivity with particular others. An example of this was
demonstrated in the clean-up situation between Mike and his mother, Lisa (chapter four, pages
181-182; also chapter five, pages 223-224):

Mike: oh g(h)od this thing better not (. ) leak (. ) all over the place
(2.0) ((Mike shows Lisa the bag))
Lisa: (that’s the wrong one/bag)
Mike: I tied it
Lisa: well you U↑NTIE it
Mike: I didn’t wanna have to do that ((walks to the drawer to get a new bag))

In this example, Mike expresses concern about the bag he’s used for some leftovers, and
Lisa criticizes his choice. When Mike attempts to provide an account for his choice, Lisa
provides a directive which is emotionally marked. Responding this negatively is attributable to a
few possible reasons. One is that Mike had already set up the bag “as a problem” (with the “oh
god” preface and complaint). Another possible reason is that he responds to Lisa’s initial
response with an account rather than an immediate compliance. Furthermore, however, Lisa
seems to upgrading the wrongness of Mike’s error and emphasizing her disinclination to leave
the error uncorrected. Her swift and intense response signals an intersubjective problem. Mike’s
error is treated as serious at least to the extent that he should correct it immediately, without any
“back-talk.”

Intersubjectivity is predicated on a shared world. The assumption seems to be “if we’re
close, we understand each other.” If understanding is taken to be the norm, then
misunderstanding is treated as remarkable. Intersubjectivity is a minimal requirement for
interaction. In interpersonal relationships, its requirement appears greater. An intersubjective
error should be acknowledged immediately and rectified. To try to justify or excuse the error is
not seen merely as face-saving for the error-maker, but as face-threatening to the other. Accounts
for intersubjectivity ruptures needn’t unfold this way. It is a certain type of intersubjectivity which does so, one which is perceived not only as an error, but as being due to some lack of attention. Lisa’s response to Mike has the implication of “you should have known better.” Again, the assumption of shared knowledge is implied, and could have been stated, but was not.

Intersubjectivity is a key problem for moral practice because knowledge is never entirely shared. Thus, practices for demonstrating shared knowledge or a world in common can prove difficult. A common example of this is when one person in a relationship remembers something asserted as special between the two, while the other has forgotten the situation altogether. Rather than attributed to a bad memory or excusable error, this is seen as the result of not taking the relationship seriously enough to know and recall its important moments. An ideal of moral communication thus requires, at the very least, intersubjectivity between participants. People must be recognizable as people and must be able to minimally participate in interaction in order for any sort of morality to be achieved.

**Intimacy.** Chapter five argued that the problem of intimacy for morality constituted the dilemma of potential face-loss due to different judgments when participating in morally questionable practices. One example of such a practice involves topics that implicate the identities and behaviors of participants. An example of this discussed in chapter five involved a group of friends at dinner (chapter five pages 245-246):

Jane: Jim and Nicky were in the kitchen? And I heard Nicky whisper (1.5) “*fuck me*”
(0.5)
John: ha
Jane: ((laughs))
Nicky: what?
Jane: when you were in there=
Nicky: =m:=
Jane: =she was tryin to yank the=
John: =classic Jane taking things out of context
Nora: she’s trying to get people in trouble
In this example, Jane’s comment is not taken as a joke, but is treated as a face-threat that needs to be repaired and accounted for. Though these friends had been making sexual jokes about others and each other all night, this one was perceived as crossing a line. Making jokes about others’ sexuality is tricky. Such jokes can be trivial, funny, or even complimentary, as when joking about someone’s impressive sexual abilities. This joke, however, occupies a different space, in which the joke seemed to say something negative about Nicky. Why exactly it was negative can only be guessed at. But certainly a level of intimacy and comfort was present between Jane and the others such that she produced her initial utterance (and even tried to return to it) without appearing to realize that it would, or did, have negative implications.

An assumption here appears to be “if you’re my friend, you won’t interpret me as being mean.” Again, a sharedness is posited as the normal basis of interacting. Friends are supposed to be charitable to one another, to interpret each other in the best light, and to present positive versions of each other to co-present parties. From Nicky’s perspective, Jane’s joke could be seen as violating this expectation by offering up a morally questionable account as a laughable for the others. From Jane’s perspective, Nicky should perhaps assume that Jane would never seriously threaten her face. Intimacy, then, involves problems of expectation regarding assumptions and communication of the each other’s identity as basically “good.” And yet, ideas of what constitutes a “good identity” or “speaking well of a friend” may not be shared.

The moral communicative ideal, however, seems to be that one should interpret and present friends in the best light possible, based on a shared understanding of what that “best light” could be. The same undoubtedly goes for family members. It is quite likely assumed that
everyone knows what constitutes a “good person,” and that if we love one another, we will assume that the other falls into this “good person” category. Actions should be interpreted in the ways which would best fit one’s idea of oneself as a good person.

**Ideology.** Chapter six argued that the problem of ideology for morality involved the ways in which ideologies can contradict, revealing differences in ostensibly the “same” cultural context. One example of a practice for doing ideology involved espousing fairness expectations regarding household chores. In the following example from chapter six, Carl complains about having to do the dishes all the time (chapter six, pages 265-268):

Carl: I never get any ‘elp washing up  
JR: mm  
Jenny: wha- what ‘ave you done today Carl?  
Carl: well-  
Jenny: you haven’t done nothing today except talk to Peter (,) talk to Roy Parker  
Carl: I’ve been researchin on the internet all day. Sometimes it does- in fact it does take a lot of time

In this example, Carl makes a complaint which signals something unfair (that he always has to wash the dishes, and that he never gets any help) which Jenny then challenges by making a point about Carl’s rather relaxed retired lifestyle. Carl could continue to complain about his situation, but this would be interpreted as unfair given Jenny works and he does not. To manage the competing ideologies (“men don’t do housework” versus “the person who doesn’t work all day should do housework”), Carl acknowledges his lack of out-of-house work, but in a joking way that keeps the conversation unserious. Thus, ideologies are problematic because they can contradict one another, and therefore must be managed through delicate interactional choices.

The assumption involved in this exchange involves a focus on reasserting sharedness. To give voice to either ideology would reveal the contradictions and result in a loss of face. Carl would have to either admit that he is wrong, or change his orientation to housework, neither of
which he appears to be willing to do. Furthermore, changes, even positive ones, would disrupt
the sense of sharedness and closeness which has already been laid down in an interactional
pattern over the last couple decades. Families are created out of patterns of involvement and role
assignment which are reinforced and referenced continually. Any move by Carl to orient to one
ideology or the other would question the status quo out of which the relationship has to this point
been constructed. It seems that sharedness is valued and assumed to be normal; thus, it becomes
correlated with whatever else is assumed to be normal. This is perhaps why, when one person in
a longstanding relationship suddenly develops a new hobby, it is seen as a potential threat. One
change can link to others. And whatever has been happening in the relationship already is taken
as the foundation of sharedness, of the relationship itself. This indicates an ideal of sharedness as
an ideal of continuation of the pattern. It is better to maintain the status quo if it is intimate than
to challenge the status quo and risk disrupting intimacy. Thus, change can be a sort of difference
which implicates other differences. The roles people take on are valued, and a difference—even
if it could be a good one—is not always immediately seen as positive.

**Culture.** Chapter seven argued that the problem of culture for morality involved
reconciling different ideologies to construct sharedness in a relationship. One example of a way
in which participants could manage this involved mixing different forms of speech associated
with different identities. In an example from chapter seven, Mina attempts this when her
daughter does not comply with a request (chapter seven pages 302-303):

Mina: please (. ) go to your room
Tina: I like it (here)
Mina: =Tina=
Tina: =(in Finnish)=
Mina: go to your room (.) Tina go to your room
Tina: (I think I have to be) here
Mina: Tin- okay
(2.0)
In this example, Mina tries to balance a more permissive or open style of communication in directing Tina (using qualifiers, request directives, nicknames) with a more strict style associated with Finnish child-raising norms (using more direct directives and emphasis). Tina’s response to these attempts continually resists them (and at this point they had been going on for quite some time, beginning with very gentle suggestions and hint directives, and ending with this exchange). Thus, an intercultural problem appears. Tina is fluent in English and Finnish, but has been raised and schooled in the U.S. until about a year ago. Mina has lived a lot in the U.S. and other places, but was born and raised in Finland. They constitute two members of an intercultural family. Tina’s “misunderstandings” appear to be strategic, at least, since they go on for so long, and since they follow direct directives.

Mina’s approach to the problem of reconciling different ideologies in her talk is to go back and forth between them. This does not appear to be successful, however, as it (1) does not get Tina to comply for quite some time and (2) provides Tina with the resources to “misunderstand” the commands. From Tina’s perspective, her attempts to be close and intersubjectively involved in a conversation are rejected. Thus there is already a problem of difference between how Tina should and can participate in adult talk (a common enough problem
for parents and children) and how Mina can affect her daughter’s actions. An assumption appears to be that people should work to share ideologies.

Here, however, ideologies are simply not shared. Tina does not recognize her mother’s attempts at strictness, perhaps partly because her mother includes non-strict language, but also because she was mainly raised in the U.S., and is not treated strictly at all by her U.S. American father. Tina may not be sophisticated enough to engage in moral practices to the extent her mother attempts to, but Mina definitely puts effort in. An ideal of moral communication suggested is that intercultural relationships may require more work to establish sharedness: it is what people have in common, not their differences, which makes them close. A little difference is interesting and even exciting, but too much difference could be taken as anything but.

**Conflict.** Chapter eight argued that the problem of conflict for morality involved the creation of interpersonal distance and difference through divergent communicative patterns. An example of this involved communication aimed at establishing individual effort versus fair rewards in a game. An example of this is demonstrated in the Easter egg hunt between Abraham and his little brother Dennis (chapter eight pages 350-352):

Sam: [Don’t] just follow Abraham Dennis
Mike: ( )
Jilly: WHAT (. ) They’re everywhere yes
Mike: Send him over here then (. ) so he’s not following Abraham=

In this example, Samantha, the older sister of Abraham and Dennis, and Mike, their father, use communication to guide the Easter egg hunt so as to provide the brothers with an (approximately) equal number of eggs. Jilly, on the other hand, keeps out of the situation and explicitly states that Dennis needs to find the eggs on his own. Mike appears to blame Jilly for the unfairness in some way, as when Jilly shouts back at him (“WHAT”) and Mike notably direct
her to direct Dennis to other areas. Later, even after Jilly’s explicit mention that Dennis needs to do it himself, Mike and Sam continue and even upgrade their involvement in getting Dennis eggs—not just telling him where to go, but finding eggs for him and instructing Abraham to hand over his own eggs to Dennis.

This creation of difference indicates the playing out of the problems of intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, and culture. Mike and Jilly employ intersubjectivity not for sharedness, but for difference, but not seeing each other’s actions as intelligible or demonstrating attention or other-orientation. They appear to pursue separate but simultaneous projects with regard to the moral practice of child-raising. Furthermore, their participation in moral practices results in non-intimacy, with criticisms and accounts creating distance rather than closeness. They orient to and construct communication to accomplish different ideologies of fairness, both of which exist in the U.S. culture. And though both were raised in the U.S., they participate in different political cultural communities. All of these construct difference, not sharedness. Difference need not lead to negativity, but it is likely to lead to conflict. In this case, difference accomplishes conflict with no accompanying or answering attempted at finding sharedness.

This implicates by contrast an ideal of moral communication: if difference occurs, address it, and if addressing it involves conflict, reorient to a shared perspective to overcome possible negative outcomes of conflict. That does not happen in this relationship, where differences were instead emphasized more and more, sharedness was not sought, and a rift developed.

These considerations indicate that the relationship between ideals of sharedness and ubiquity of differences is an important dialectic in moral practice. In order to formulate a grounded practical theory based on an ideal, more work would need to be done. However, certain
points of critique and reflection can be suggested, for example, why is sharedness considered to be categorically positive where ideologies are concerned? How is intersubjectivity interpretively linked to ideology? What choices can be made which would orient to sharedness without ignoring difference? In what situations would orienting to sharedness or difference be problematic, and what techniques could be used to address that?

As has been mentioned, difference is not necessarily a negative thing. Differences can draw people together. Differences make getting to know someone interesting. But difference can be tolerated only to a point. Littlejohn and Domenici (2007) note that differences can be problematic and even dangerous, but can coexist and work together. Baxter’s (e.g., 2004a, 2004b) perspective sees difference as normal and inevitable and ultimately productive. But not all differences can work together and not all differences are productive. In literature related to the systems view (e.g., Bateson, 1972; Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967), similarities can cause problems, while differences can be complementary. But the relationship between “difference” and “similarity” is constructed, discursively and even moment to moment, and it is incredibly complex. Take for example Tannen’s (e.g., 1981) and Cameron’s (e.g., 1998) approach to gender. For Tannen, women and men have different communication goals and different communication styles or rituals for achieving them. For Cameron, men and women have different historically-situated expectations for one another’s appropriate roles, and judge one another’s styles accordingly.

Given that the concept of what counts as difference is complicated, the valuing of difference is also complicated. To categorically assert that differences are positive, important and necessary ignores the fact that differences can be irreconcilable in important ways. The different perspective taken by racist people is not likely to be a difference which is valued. Too often
theorists forget that the valuing of difference is itself a contestable position with which others may not agree. Theories of communication may champion difference, and with good reason, but this ignores the practical challenges of dealing with differences in everyday life. Thus, moral communication as an ideal grounded in actual interpersonal interaction is unlikely to make the same assumptions about difference that scholars do. Certain differences would not be seen as valuable.

To summarize, “moral communication” is what, for participants in close interpersonal relationships, would see as their ideals of talk. And though such ideals would rarely overlap, there are some characteristics which are shared at least in the situations and for the data described above. Seeking a common interactional ground, for instance, is an intersubjective ideal. Interpreting close others well and sharing sensitive information which will be believed to be well-received is an intimate ideal. Having a shared understanding despite particular differing moral stances (for instance, a “higher order” ideal that trumps other differences) is an ideological ideal. Discovering and integrating what is shared in common is an intercultural ideal. And managing differences together rather than emphasizing differences to become more apart is a conflict ideal.

Grounded practical theory ends with a theoretical reconstruction of the ideals of a practice. Here, I have discussed some of the ideals of morality as a practice. Though some of the ideals are specific to the context of interpersonal relationships and should be understood to be grounded empirically in particular data, the underlying ideal around managing difference is potentially more generalizable. Good practice, or moral communication, constitutes a coordination on the basis of certain critical ideologies in common. This ideal should not be taken to imply that coordination means something positive or cooperative in the helpful sense, nor that
difference is not valuable. Rather, the ideal is a practical one, signifying the ways in which people must be minimally oriented and ideologically intelligible in some ways.

The ideals summarized above demonstrate that in many close relationships, there are some differences which will not be tolerable no matter how much differences and disagreement is valued. This is a practical ideal because without something in common, people in close relationships may find it hard to carry on in a variety of ways. And morality is, at the end of the way, a way in which people carry on together. As Littlejohn and Domenici (2007) note, differences are positive in the abstract, but practically challenging.

Morality is a practice which involves deeply held ideologies which are considered too consequential to be different in close relationships. Moral communication could aim at establishing sharedness on the accomplishment of important ideologies. Such sharedness is not about being “in agreement” all the time (either topically or interactionally), but about managing what difference means for a relationship. It is a question of discourse and interaction rather than beliefs. The ideals of close relational participants engaged in moral practices will often be working at creating this kind of sharedness, even as the points or extent of convergence are unarticulated. Where the ideal of sharedness is abandoned, the relationship could very well be threatened, and may not even survive.

The next section discusses important considerations for morality that cut across the problems already described. These provide analytical means by which researchers and participants can begin to garner what and how people reveal and practice interaction in a moral way. These are communicative considerations which provide a starting point for uncovering moral problems and techniques through a grounded practical theory approach.
Other general considerations. In this section I discuss, taking several angles to a single excerpt ([frn.calls08.3.E4.2]), six considerations that cut across the problems of morality which are more general problems of communication and which are relevant to moral practice. These considerations, like the many practices for morality themselves (as outlined in chapter two) arise in relation to intersubjectivity, intimacy, ideology, culture, and conflict. The first important point involves context. For example, in chapter five, sexual topics of conversation had to be handled differently in different relational and situational contexts; and in chapters six and seven, cultural context was noted in a specific way as being important for moral practice. The second point involves symbolic resources: for example, chapter four looked specifically at how gesture, facial expression, gaze, and manipulation of objects could all be marshaled to orient to others. Third, the notion of difference implies that sometimes, different ideologies, values and goals can compete or constitute dilemmas, as in chapters five and six.

Fourthly, vocabularies and espoused norms can indicate the ways in which participants locally understand, explain, and express morality, and this turned out to be relevant in various ways throughout the analysis. Fifth, motive is an important concept not because it is always appealed to—though in Western cultures, which focus on individual choice, it often is—but because it can frame how people reflect on their own moral practices as being directed toward particular reasons. In chapter eight, for instance, participants appealed to the idea of intention as guiding the production of their particular moral practices. Sixth and finally, the nature of interpretation and the many interpretations available in the performance of any practice ensures difficulty in managing the meanings of moral practices.

In looking for the presence of action identifiable as “morality,” the definition used in this project suggests that, for interpersonal relationships, moral discursive practices are those which
enact commitment, ideology, and the management of difference. In order to identify a situated ideal of moral communication, then, one must take account of various contexts, symbolic resources, competing goals, vocabularies and espoused norms, invocations of motive, and multiplicities of interpretability.

Though context may not always be relevant to interactional practices, it is always potentially relevant—and of course, it depends on what type and level of context is involved. Context can refer to the prior and next utterances, as in traditional conversation analysis. Current utterances are always shaped by prior ones, and shaping subsequent ones. Context can also refer to the situation—whether interaction is occurring in private or in public, in casual or formal situations, at work or at home, in a story at a coffee shop or in a phone call to the pharmacy, etc. Context can also refer to relationships, and whether one is interacting with strangers, friends, family or lovers. Context can also refer to the cultural communities, practices, geographies and nations with which people may identify themselves as coming from a shared background.

In the example below, for instance, Jill narrates an argument she had with her boyfriend about the manner in which he had previously said something to her:

JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took) it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im
JR: WHAT ((laughs)) was that the last time you talked?
JILL: I called him last night
JR: oh alright- I was like oh no
JILL: I called him last night (xx) he was like “well I thought you were mad at me” and I was like “yeah I kinda was you know you need to take responsibility for being an ass” (xx x) then he- I was like when you were being mean and you were like “I’m sorry you- you thought you heard it that way”

In this example, there are only two present participants (Jill and JR) but Jill’s boyfriend, Pete, is also a relevant character. In order to understand the meaning of this conversation for the
participants, the relationship between Jill and JR, and Jill and Pete (and potentially JR and Pete) is important as relational context for the framing of the conversation: why this story is newsworthy or being told in the first place, what its implications are for the relationship between Jill and Pete, why Jill is upset, etc. It also helps to understand that this is a phone conversation rather than face-to-face, so as to know that nonverbal information has not been left out of the transcript, but rather for the most part was not there (visible to the participants).

As a moral discursive practice, the story Jill tells situates her own moral identity in relation to Pete’s as an account for her being upset, and perhaps in the larger picture for her justification in any complaints she might make about him. JR’s participation in the conversation situates her role as a friend to Jill by responding with the expected level of indignation at the complaint-worthy remarks (“WHAT”) and simultaneously a concern for the relationship itself (“I was like oh no”). In order for participants to formulate their actions for moral practice, and design techniques to address interactional problems, context must be taken into account. This is as true for researchers as it is for participants. An example of this from chapter four involved Raymond’s use of the magazine to attend to his brother. By accounting for the problematic nature of magazines as signaling personal reading rather than social interaction, Raymond was able to use the magazine in a different way to signal continued interaction with Jeff.

*Resources* for communication can involve many things. Mental states, for example, can become a resource—using one’s feeling as a way of accounting for or enacting certain situations. Talk can be a resource, not just the content, but also the way in which something is said. “Nice jacket” can be a compliment or an insult, depending on its intonation. There are also spatial resources—ways of configuring people’s physical stance and configuration, ways of organizing rooms and how and where people stand, orders of sitting that can indicate status. The use of
objects in spaces also matter, being used to accomplish a number of interactional tasks, or as a supplement to other interactional practices. And even the smallest raise of an eyebrow, flick of hand, aversion of gaze or alteration of facial expression can be meaningful and treated as relevant in interaction.

In the excerpt from Jill’s story, there is not a lot of information other than the talk:

JR: WHAT ((laughs)) was that the last time you talked?
JILL: I called him last night
JR: oh alright- I was like oh no
JILL: I called him last night (xx) he was like “well I thought you were mad at me” and I was like “yeah I kinda was you know you need to take responsibility for being an ass” (xx x) then he- I was like when you were being mean and you were like “I’m sorry you- you thought you heard it that way”

Because this conversation took place on the phone, the participants themselves did not have access to displaying certain nonverbal behaviors such as eye contact, facial expressions, or gestures. However, they still had talk and paralanguage at their disposal. Though there are not a lot of details in the transcript, even knowing that JR’s “WHAT” was spoken in louder tone and followed by a laugh adds meaning to her response. Verbally, Jill’s use of quotation (reported speech) frames the story as a dialogue which unfolded in a certain way. Even Jill’s use of the word “ass” demonstrates the use of a resource—expletives—which can upgrade the emotional content of a story. Here it also works to position Pete as the “bad guy.” As mentioned regarding context, resources are a part of context. Raymond’s use of the magazine, for instance, was the use of a resource. The chapter five example of Nicky, Jane and the “fuck me” comment also provides an example of resource use. Nicky uses emphasis to repair the sexual meaning of “fuck me” as a disappointment meaning in “fuck me.”

There are potentially multiple and competing goals to be handled in any conversation, but this is a particularly sensitive fact of moral interaction because part of what makes interaction
moral is that it is potentially significantly consequential for the people involved. Not only can ideologies conflict, but so can the ideology and its explicit espousal; the values of particular people; the face wants of participants; and scores of other elements. Furthermore, goals are constructed in interaction, and because interaction can change situations moment to moment, it can also change the goals. This flux is part of what makes communicating in sensitive situations a little like moving through a minefield.

This example, from Jill’s story, evinces at least two goals:

JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took) it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im
JR: WHAT ((laughs)) was that the last time you talked?
JILL: I called him last night
JR: oh alright- I was like oh no

From Jill’s perspective, her story has to do two things: it has to position herself as the morally correct person in the argument, but it also cannot lambast Pete to the extent that Jill would side against the relationship, as it seems clear at least at this point that Jill’s annoyance with this one action is not perceived as a threat to the entire relationship. JR seems to pick up on this tension by displaying a sort of incredulity or exasperation (“WHAT”) while also making sure that the argument Jill had with Pete wasn’t their last (a resolution story appears to be being sought), hence the “oh alright- I was like oh no” that follows. In this way, Jill and JR negotiate the meaning of the fight to the relationship, constructing the incident as an important and complaint-worthy one, but not a relationally fatal mark against Pete. People often have multiple and even competing or dilemmatic goals in conversation. In the example of Ameliah’s error regarding JR’s film preferences in chapter five, for example, Ameliah faced a dilemma of complimenting
JR’s tastes while proffering an untruth that belied lack of knowledge. Ameliah chose to
compliment as a higher moral practice than displaying intimate knowledge.

People’s language for, talk about, and explicit values regarding morality cannot always
be relied upon to indicate how they accomplish moral practices or what those practices are for.
These *vocabularies* and metadiscourses are important, however, for understanding how people
formulate morality and how they understand what they are doing. People’s explanations of
morality are always important for understanding some aspect of practice, though sometimes it
reveals more of an angle on the practice than explaining the whole of it.

Jill’s story includes metadiscourse about certain ways of talking:

JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said
that” like- like that’s just not nice

. (5 lines deleted)

JILL: like “yeah I kinda was you know you need to take responsibility for being an ass” (xx x)
then he- I was like when you were being mean

Though Jill does not spell out in detail how Pete’s utterance “sounded,” she gives a number of
descriptions for it, including “wasn’t very nice,” “just not nice,” “being an ass,” and “being
mean.” This indicates an explicit norm regarding how people should say things to one another.
Jill holds Pete accountable for the format of his utterance, and not only the content. The fact that
there are here multiple constructed dialogues within constructed dialogues indicates that there is
a strong metadiscursive element to this story—the story is in large part a means of conveying an
assessment regarding Pete’s criticizeable behavior. Metadiscourse is employed in a conversation
between Ameliah and JR in chapter seven, for instance, in which Ameliah mitigates a non-U.S.
American (and thus assumedly one JR would espouse) ideology with explicit comments of what
she is saying as “stupid” and “terrible.”
The claim to motives is a rhetorical one. Practical logic involves the formulation of practices and their ostensible reasons. Motives, in addition to legitimizing the moral practices people do, can also be a way of disclaiming responsibility for how a practice “turns out,” as when someone can say “I didn’t mean to do that.” The language of motives is, as Burke (1935) noted, an abbreviation for a very complex situation that attempts to “boil down” to a single driving force, often one supposed to be categorically valued, such as “love,” “duty,” or “honesty.” The claim to motive is intention-focused, situating communication within the purposeful mind rather than the produced utterance.

Jill’s story, for instance, involves a reasoning around actions and why they were taken:

JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said that” like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took) it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im
JR: WHAT ((laughs)) was that the last time you talked?
JILL: I called him last night
JR: oh alright- I was like oh no
JILL: I called him last night (xx) he was like “well I thought you were mad at me” and I was like “yeah I kinda was you know you need to take responsibility for being an ass” (xx x) then he- I was like when you were being mean and you were like “I’m sorry you- you thought you heard it that way”

Though the whole argument does not get replayed, Jill does describe what the issue was about (how her boyfriend’s utterance sounded mean) and why she was upset. She gives reasons for her feelings in relation to the interpretation of what was said, and it can be assumed that her boyfriend probably did the same. Thus, Jill provides motives for her feelings based on what Pete said, identifying his utterance as the trouble source; whereas, when she first brought her reaction up to Pete, he located her interpretation as the trouble source and motivation for her feelings. Motives are an important ideological referent. In chapter eight for instance, when Mike criticizes Jilly’s lack of attention to Dennis, he labels his motive as not wanting Dennis’s sandy hands in a
pretzel bag. His criticism is thus framed as merely correcting the negative result of sandy pretzels rather than as holding Jilly accountable for the children’s behavior.

Almost any utterance spoken can be interpreted in many ways. Unlike the claim to motives, a focus on interpretability entails a focus on the way in which an utterance is produced and the ways in which it can be taken to mean. This makes visible the tensions between different goals and contexts, as when someone says “I would have said it differently if I’d known she was your grandmother,” or “you know that means something incredibly bad in this country.” Of course, these examples make the interpretation focus, when negative, a matter of mental knowledge; however, interpretability can be rhetorically exploited.

In the example we have been examining, for instance, Jill narrates an argument she had with her boyfriend about the manner in which he had previously said something to her:

JILL: yeah so I was like “you know what?” I was like “that wasn’t very nice how you said that” like- like that’s just not nice (like sorry) and he was like “I’m sorry you (heard/took) it that way” and I was like “I’m sorry you said it that way” and I hung up on ‘im

Pete has made a statement which is interpretable. From Jill’s point of view, he should be able to anticipate her interpretation of what he said; from Pete’s point of view, Jill is at fault for having heard it as such. The possible argument would never have happened if there hadn’t at least been the possibility for the boyfriend’s utterance to be taken in various ways—though this very interpretability can also be exploited. Thus, it is not entirely clear what the “reality” of the situation is: has Jill misheard, heard what she expected, or is she using the possibility of interpretation as an invitation for an argument? Has Pete intended to be mean, was mistakenly mean, or is he just using Jill’s interpretation as a way to disclaim responsibility either way? This ambiguity is similar to the ambiguity involved in the “fuck me” situation in chapter five. Was Jane threatening Nicky’s face for the purpose of humor, or did she just want to make a joke?
Knowing the answers to these questions is not really what is important about analyzing this sequence as moral discursive practice. Instead, it allows insight into the moral angles of this interaction. Jill’s commitment to JR is displayed through her confiding, and her commitment to Pete is implied by her lack of mentioning the instance as a threat to the relationship. Ideologically, Jill constructs a problem around ways of speaking to one’s loved one. She achieves an interaction with JR (well, re-achieves, since she is relating her achievement with Pete) which does a particular belief regarding what romantic relationships are like and how they are communicated within the partnership. The difference of interpretability with Pete is managed through the story simultaneously to the possible different read on the situation which could be given by JR. These differences are worked through to produce a situation in which JR and Jill ostensibly share an orientation to the situation and Jill’s relationship with Pete can be seen as relatively stable (or at least not in trouble) despite such quarrels. Similarly, in chapter five’s “fuck me” faux pas, all the dinner participants work to downplay Jane’s comment, save Nicky’s face, and move the conversation out of the danger zone.

Researchers can use these concepts for determining participants’ local ideals for good moral practice. It generally matters to participants where moral practice takes place—and if it does not, then that too is a sort of ideal (consistency across, over adaptability to, situations). The resources at participants’ disposal will indicate what is usable for and relevant to interaction. Norms demonstrate the extent to which participants have an explicit vocabulary and expectation for practice, or at least, whether those discourses are available for use in formulating what goes on in moral interaction. Motives and interpretability become languages to draw on and ways in which participants enact a theory of communication for morality.
Any participant can reflect on these ideas in interaction in order to potentially improve their moral discursive practices. Some of these concepts are in fact ones people do regularly reflect on. However, I did recently discuss the concept of “interpretability” with the friend in these examples: I suggested that next time that someone did or said something that annoyed her, she might think about how she was interpreting the action as annoying, consider why, and then try to come up with alternative explanations. She found it an interesting exercise, but I also cautioned her against applying it categorically. Sometimes people do exploit interpretability, and, as she did in her conversation with Pete, some people should be held responsible for the interpretability of what they say.

This section began with a review of results of analysis to propose potential implications for an ideal of moral communication. Following that, this section offered some more general concerns related to broader problems of analyzing and doing morality—problems which are critical to almost any communicative enterprise, but which pose special considerations when linked to the problems of morality. The next section considers the implications of these results for work in communication and morality.

**Implications for Communicative Approaches to Morality**

Though this project considered and addressed many potential literatures in LSI and communication research, as mentioned in chapter two, the primary audiences addressed are in discourse analysis and interpersonal communication research. Discourse analytic and interpersonal approaches to morality are numerous. In chapter two, I discussed discourse literature related to the proto-morality approach, and discourse and interpersonal literature related to what I called more “ideological” approaches, and cultural approaches. In this section I
discuss what some of the results and implications described above contribute to work on morality.

The proto-morality approach is based in work by Garfinkel (1967) and conversation analyses which see morality as omnirelevant. This work conceptualizes morality as the accountability, responsibility, and commitment to maintaining the interaction order. Interaction is always moral because it demands certain expectations and implicates judgment if such expectations are violated. Chapter four provided analysis largely within this perspective through an investigation into intersubjectivity practices. The analysis joined work on intersubjectivity and embodiment to show that intersubjectivity is accomplished through many interactional practices, including the use of objects and nonverbal communication. Most conversation analytic work on intersubjectivity has focused on talk (such as repair, Schegloff 1992, and tag questions, Hepburn & Potter, 2010). The analysis also demonstrated that intersubjectivity can be marshaled in particular ways to indicate the relevance of relationships with certain others. This demonstrates a way in which identities are oriented to in interaction.

The proto-morality perspective, while acknowledged as underlying more complex interactions, does not account for other valid meanings of morality indicated by work in many areas of the field such as interpersonal communication, as well as many discourse analytic studies. Thus, chapter five moved to consider the relational level, where ideologies of how to be and do good are grounded in expectations for relationships between people. Chapter five demonstrated that the proto-morality approach is important and valid as a way of looking at how people demonstrate through communication that they are intimate with one another. But chapter five also built on that to look at moral rituals and topics as important morality practices. Thus, rather than in most interpersonal research where morality is linked only to espoused values, the
discourse approach employed in this project demonstrated that values can be grounded in interaction—in the choices people make and the labels they attribute.

Furthermore, chapter five demonstrated how intimacy makes difference, and thus morality, more consequential. Being close is not just about sharing values, but about sharing meanings for actions and assumptions for treating one another a certain way. Rather than relying on friends’ reports that they should support one another, analysis showed how support gets done in interaction and what happens when it goes awry. Furthermore, support was shown to be a tricky process—not just a matter of displaying empathy or kindness (which is itself not necessarily easy) but a delicate process of balancing assumptions about the other person with assumptions about goodness in the social world.

As mentioned in chapter two, research on ideology often looks at it as a negative thing. And although, as many have noted, ideologies are accomplished in everyday practice, most ideological analyses focus on the societal level rather than situated interaction. Chapter six demonstrated how participants can be “doing things with gender” even if the topic of conversation never explicitly discusses gender ideologies. This extends work which grounds gender in talk (e.g., Cameron, 2006) and work which looks at relational ideals (e.g., Baxter, 2004b) while taking details of cultural context and embodied, sequential interaction seriously.

Chapter six also looks at difference, something many cultural perspectives tend to ignore, which is understandable—culture becomes coherent when practices for achieving it are shared in a visible way. Chapter seven focused on the more typical context for looking at cultural difference, which is in regard to intercultural context. Following Fitch (e.g., 1998), chapters six and seven contextualized relationships in their cultural context to understand how people orient to notions of culture through their moral practices. Chapter seven looked at the work people do
in intercultural relationships to practice morality in intelligible ways with their close others. In this context, difference was more explicit. Though stylistic differences were marked, as attested in much intercultural research in discourse and interpersonal studies, the ideological assumptions linked to stylistic differences proved salient even when they weren’t referenced outright.

Chapter eight’s analysis of an ongoing conflict took some of the ideas of scholars such as Cameron (1998) and Bailey (2004, 2000a) and situated them within a single family over time. This analysis joined many of the conceptualizations of conflict from discourse analysis (through interactional preference, alignment, convergence, hostility markers) with interpersonal conceptions of conflict as disagreement over values or ideas. The interactional dilemmas and practices involved in raising children were shown to be linked to cultural and social ideologies regarding fairness, individuality, and appropriateness. Difference was demonstrated to be resource for accomplishing and exacerbating conflict, even while the “disagreement” itself was avoided. As Bonito and Sanders (2002) have noted, conflict can be avoided while addressing disagreement; in this case, conflict was accomplished by avoiding addressing disagreement. Rather than seeing conflict as the result of certain styles of interacting, chapter eight proposed seeing conflict as an accomplishment, not as a reaction. Conflict does not happen outside of people and their relationship, but is constructed through ways of interacting. Though conflict can be managed to bring people closer or to overcome difference, it can also serve to emphasize difference.

These contributions to particular communicative approaches to and theories of morality also provide an approach amenable to discourse analysis and interpersonal communication scholarship. The analyses undertaken in the previous chapters sough to ground morality in discourse as well as understand the importance of morality to relationships. In doing so, analyses
attended to empirical details of discourse and to relational contexts and concerns. Discourse was not seen to merely reflect moral attitudes, and relational concerns were treated as relevant to moral interactions. Thus, morality is a concept of interest to discourse and interpersonal (and many other) areas of the communication field, and the analyses employed herein demonstrate an approach which values both.

Furthermore, this work incorporates grounded practical theory in a way that offers a unique angle on morality for discourse in interpersonal relationships. In doing so, this project provides a normative perspective not always (or even often) taken in discourse and interpersonal studies, while providing a new kind of context and practice for GPT. Seeing morality as a practice pushes the limits of GPT and the concept of practice. Morality is a dispersed practice which applies to individuals, relational units, and groups. It incorporates so-called “micro” intersubjective practices as well as more “macro” ideological and cultural practices. It is a practice which is embodied and tacit, but nonetheless identifiable and analyzable.

The analyses in this project thus bring many perspectives together to account for many of the important practices and problems involved in moral interaction. On one hand, this project demonstrates how discourse analysis must consider embodiment and environment as an important component of interaction. On the other hand, this project proposes that the relationships, ideologies and cultural contexts often eschewed in close studies of talk are quite relevant to participants’ doings of morality. Furthermore, notions of value, belief and ideology provide participants sense-making logics for their interactional choices, but do not require analysts to see beliefs as “in the mind” or ideologies as negative or “above” interaction. Finally, conflict is advanced as a crucial component of morality through its link to difference. Because morality is a way of dealing with difference, and difference is inherently potentially conflictual,
morality makes conflict relevant. The next section discusses the limitations and possible directions of this project.

**Limitations and Directions in the Communicative Study of Morality**

This project constituted an almost overwhelming undertaking. “Morality” is a weighty and consequential concept which has been studied in many ways across many literatures. A literature review could have taken a lifetime in itself; to conduct the research and analyze the data could have taken even longer. But this work of course represents only a small step and a complementary voice to the current and future research on morality. In this section I discuss some limitations, and potential future directions, of this project.

**Limitations**

Because this research drew from so many literatures, each with its own assumptions and modes of inquiry, there will be areas where there is not as much depth, or certain work was left out. There is always potentially more reading to be done on a topic—every time I revised this dissertation, I found more to read than ever before, all of which seemed absolutely critical to include. Thus, the scope of the work reviewed herein really only touches on some of the relevant and interesting research that is out there. There is much more potentially to be discovered, or investigated more fully. Almost anything to be read in the communication field probably has something to offer to a study of morality. Furthermore, even taking that admission into consideration, it will have been apparent by now that, based on my metatheoretical leanings, I devoted more space to certain bodies of literature over others. However, each set of literature was attended to with care and does provide representative work in those areas. And by offering these glimpses into illustrative scholarship on morality, it provides an entry point for future research which will investigate particular areas more fully.
The method of analysis could be faulted for not being more faithful to a particular well-established tradition, but I hope it has been clear throughout that on particular tradition would not have accounted for all of the situated moral practices involved in this study. Conversation analysis does not often look at embodiment, and when it does, does not attend to the relational level demanded by an interest in interpersonal interaction, nor cultural context. And while action implicative discourse analysis employs a similar grounded practical theory orientation, it is designed more for institutional rather than everyday interaction. Thus these, and other methods, were joined to attend to many important concerns of the project.

The most challenging aspect of this project, by far, involved the data collection and analysis. The data collection yielded many hours of video, with even more hours of audio to supplement it, but most of the video involved snippets from particular interactants. This was fine for earlier chapters, but by the time chapter eight arrived, it became clear that conflict could not be studied by looking at a 15-minute video; it required a lot of data over time of the same people. Luckily the home movies allowed this, and is part of why chapter eight only focuses on one set of participants. As it turns out, conflict is a long-term accomplishment. It can be pointed to in instances, but is harder to confirm.

Regarding the format of data, though I believe all data is useful and legitimate in some way, it is important to acknowledge that there is a significant difference between (1) participants who know they are being filmed for research, but also know to “be natural” and can do so without a researcher present; (2) participants who know they are being filmed for research, and know to be “natural,” but are being filmed by a present researcher; (3) participants who are filmed for private purposes, but also want to “perform” their posterity; and (4) participants who know they are being recorded for research, but that no one will “see” them because it is audio-
only. This project included these and other recording formats, and differences and implications of that have been noted throughout.

Furthermore, many of the participants featured in these data were known to me, were in fact quite close to me. It helps that much of the data which included my presence was rather old, but nonetheless, I was in a sense “close” to much of the data. This could be seen as problematic. However, I have been analyzing data, and data which includes myself, for more than four years at this point. I have been used to seeing myself, to some extent, as “a participant.” Possibly no analysis of one’s self and known others could ever be as fresh and bias-free as an analysis of total strangers, but all analysis involves interpretation, and interpretation is always attached to a perspective.

Finally, the analyses bring together a lot of angles—sequential actions, embodiment, relationships, cultural context, ideologies—and a lot of concomitant practices, from smiles and dispreferreds to gossip and conflict. Thus, they are in a sense complex, but also chock-full of interesting details. They attempt to bridge interactional details with social ideals. In that way, they are a bit like the project as a whole. The analyses provide starting points, questions to be delved into and systematically unpacked in future work. The analyses also show how, though future work would benefit from studying single practices in-depth, it is nonetheless a conceit to assume morality involves isolable practices. To simplify the analysis of morality as a practice may be desirable for specific projects, but the presentation of morality as a whole demands that analysis acknowledge that moral interactions are messy and challenging.

Directions for Future Research

Seeing as this project was but one step in an ongoing program, the potential future research that could come out if it is substantial. One possibility is a methodological one: to
formulate a specific methodology for investigating morality as a practice. Another possibility involves a deeper investigation of literature, and potentially developing a theoretical framework, based in grounded practical theory, for morality in communication. Different data could also be involved. This project focused on video of friend and family interaction. Other research could focus in more detail on friendships or family; romantic relationships; public encounters between strangers; institutional situations in education, health, politics; or in mediated communication.

There are also several concepts which could be explored in detail. Any particular practice—for example humor, or criticism—could be analyzed in different moral interactions. Each of the problems of morality could also be attended to in different situations or contexts. Many more cultural sites could potentially involve different moral practices or different meanings for moral problems. And developing a grounded practical theory of moral communication as an ideal for practice is an important next step of this project.

This project has offered a reconstruction of problems and practices of morality, influenced by a particular communicative perspective (chapter one), based in literatures from across the communication field (chapter two), derived from a discourse analytic approach (chapter three) and grounded in empirical data (chapters four through eight). In this chapter, the implications of this project have been organized into a grounded practical theory of moral communication which explains points of reflection for normative ideals regarding moral discursive practices.

In chapter two I described morality as “a complex construct which can describe situations, judgments, ethics, problems, orientations, rituals, identities, and indeed any aspect of social life where people pursue valued ideologies in contexts of difference.” It may seem strange to say morality is about difference when most commonplace ideas of morality are linked to
systems or orders—religions, ethical guidelines, cultural assumptions and political beliefs come to mind as characterizing morality. Morality is often assumed not just to be shared, but nearly universal. Surely “love” is an international value? Is not “thall shalt not kill” true in all but the most extreme cases? Do not we all want to get along and respect one another?

But once one considers the cases presented herein, contradictions and complications immediately arise. The difficulty of morality is not so much in formulating what is right or wrong, but in making choices with others in everyday life. It is precisely then that differences become apparent, and the expectations of shared moralities are cast into doubt. Garfinkel’s (1967) work offered a glimpse behind the unspoken assumptions of interaction, revealing that it carried on precisely because people take for granted common understandings. This work sees the difference that belies such assumptions as at the heart of morality. Such difference does not only rest in what is required to interact, but is linked in practice to everything human beings do together, from raising children to building communities.

Sacks (1975) suggested that “everyone has to lie.” In other words, everyone has to at some point provide accounts of themselves (as to for instance the question “how are you?”) which are necessarily at odds with the format of certain actions (a question which appears to be a request for information) by supplying a socially appropriate yet “untrue” (or unfitted) response (one which does not provide the requested information). Similarly, moral practice involves pretenses with regard to minimally shared orientation on crucial ideological stances. This does not mean that difference is bad, never occasioned or always avoided. Rather, difference must be negotiated for what it means to the interactional moment in particular, and the relational trajectory in general. It is treated as significant, and yet accomplishing “ordinariness” in
relationships requires not over-attending to it. To attend is to potentially emphasize, and to emphasize is potentially to create distance.

If living with difference requires at various points not noticing it, then the task of managing the problems of moral difference becomes difficult indeed. On the other hand, if difference often leads to conflict (whether explicitly noted or not) then conflict becomes an important site for communicatively constructing what morality should be, and in the process, who we should be to each other.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Survey, Questionnaire, Interview Schedules

Survey

Survey. The following is a brief survey about communication in your life. The purpose of this survey is to understand the importance of communication, and communication problems, in everyday life. This survey should take 10 minutes or less to complete. Thank you very much for your participation.

Please answer the following questions as best you can.

1. How important is communication in your everyday life?
   - Very important
   - Somewhat important
   - Important
   - Not so important
   - Not important

2. In what context do you feel your communication is MOST problematic? In other words, in what area of your life do you most wish you could improve communication?
   - Work environment/coworkers or boss
   - Family
   - Significant other (person you are dating/married to)
   - Casual interactions (i.e. service encounters)
   - Friends

3. Please choose the following statement that BEST describes how you feel about the miscommunication in your personal life, in reference to the above question.
   When I experience miscommunication...
   - it is often because people I talk to have different opinions (religious, political, personal) than I.
   - it is often because people I talk to are in a different economic status than I am.
   - it is often because people I talk to are of a different sex than I am.
   - it is often because people I talk to are of a different generation than I am.
   - it is often because people I talk to are not very intelligent.
   - it is often because people I talk to do not listen to me.
   - it is often because people I talk to are of a different cultural background than I am.
4. In the following space, please describe the most recent problem you have had with another person or people in which you feel communication or miscommunication played a major role. What happened? Did the other person say anything specific that you remember? Why do you think the situation went the way it did?

Please enter some basic information about yourself.

1. Please enter your age or age range

2. Please enter your occupation, jobs, or how you primarily identify yourself

3. Please choose the highest level of education you have completed.
   - Elementary school
   - High school
   - Some college, technical training, or associate's degree
   - College degree (BA, BS)
   - Graduate degree (MA, PhD)

4. Please choose which best describes your family situation
   - Single
   - Single, with children
   - Partnered
   - Partnered, with children
   - Married, no children
   - Married, with children
   - Divorced, no children
   - Divorced, with children

5. (Optional) if you would like to be an anonymous participant in research about communication, please type in your email address here, and check how you would like to participate in the next question.

6. If you would like to participate in research about communication, please indicate in which ways you would be comfortable doing so. All research is completely anonymous and poses no or little personal risk. Your responses in this survey are not at all binding. You may withdraw your participation at any time. If you indicate interest in further participation, a researcher will contact you by the email address you provided within a couple days.
   - complete a longer questionnaire about communication
   - Participate in a short phone, instant message, or in-person interview (15-30 minutes)
   - Participate in an in-depth in-person interview (30 minutes to one hour)
   - Participate in a focus group interview with a small group (30-40 minutes)
• Carry an audio or video recorder for any length of time and/or video tape special work, home or social occasions; or submit a copy of any videos already made

Questionnaire

1. Describe a vivid memory in your life in which you had to discuss a problem with someone and it went well. If you can, focus on what aspects of the communication, or what you or the other person said, contributed to a positive outcome.
   a. What led to the confrontation?
   b. What was the situation in which the confrontation occurred?
   c. What kinds of things did you say to the person? How did the person respond?
   d. What about the conversation went well? What happened at the time of the conversation? What was the result that happened later?
   e. Why do you think it went well?

2. Can you think of any “memorable messages” or specific sayings that you recall from your family or a specific family member? If so, describe what impact you think this message had on your life.

3. Think of a person in your life with whom talking is or once was difficult. Why do you think it was difficult? Was it to do with personalities? Speaking styles? Backgrounds?

4. What do you think about the role of communication in your life and in society?

5. If you had to change one thing about your own communication style, what would it be and why?

The following questions are optional, and are for background purposes only.

A. Please give your nationality _________________________

B. Please describe how you identify your primary cultural, ethnic, or racial background.

C. Please fill in your gender _________________________

D. Do you live in a rural, urban, suburban area? Other?

E. Do you practice a religion or consider yourself spiritual? Please specify.

F. Have you ever taken a communication course in college? Please specify.
Interview Schedules

**Short Interview Schedule.** This open-ended questionnaire is about the role of communication in your everyday life. It should take no more than 15-30 minutes to complete. Your participation is greatly appreciated.

6. Describe a vivid memory in your life in which you had to discuss a problem with someone and it went well. If you can, focus on what aspects of the communication, or what you or the other person said, contributed to a positive outcome.
   a. What led to the confrontation?
   b. What was the situation in which the confrontation occurred?
   c. What kinds of things did you say to the person? How did the person respond?
   d. What about the conversation went well? What happened at the time of the conversation? What was the result that happened later?
   e. Why do you think it went well?

7. Can you think of any “memorable messages” or specific sayings that you recall from your family or a specific family member? If so, describe what impact you think this message had on your life.
   a. What was or were the messages, and what is your relationship to that person (please do not name)?
   b. How did you interpret the messages when you heard them? Do you interpret them differently now? How so?
   c. Have these messages had an impact on your life or the kind of person you think you are or want to be? How so?

8. Think of a person in your life with whom talking is or once was difficult. Why do you think it was difficult? Was it to do with personalities? Speaking styles? Backgrounds?
   a. What is your relation to the person (please do not name)?
   b. Is this person still in your life? If so, are they still difficult to talk to?
   c. In what situations is the person difficult to talk to, if not all the time?
   d. What about talking to this person is difficult?
   e. Why do you think talking to this person is difficult?

9. What do you think about the role of communication in your life and in society?
   a. What makes good communication and what makes it go wrong, based on your experience or from your point of view?
   b. Why is communication important or not?
   c. How often do you think about communication—about what you say or what others say, or about how you interact with others?
   d. How do you think communication can or should address problems?
10. If you had to change one thing about your own communication style, what would it be and why?
   a. What changes in your life do you think would result from this change?
   b. Why do you think this aspect of style is causing you problems or holding you back?
   c. What steps have you taken, or could to take, to change your communication style?

The following questions are optional, and are for background purposes only.

A. Please give your nationality _________________________

B. Please describe how you identify your primary cultural, ethnic, or racial background.

C. Please fill in your gender _________________________

D. Do you live in a rural, urban, suburban area? Other?

E. Do you practice a religion or consider yourself spiritual? Please specify.

F. Have you ever taken a communication course in college? Please specify.

Long Interview and Focus Group Interview Schedule. This open-ended interview is about the role of communication in your everyday life. It should take no more than 30 minutes to an hour. Your participation is greatly appreciated.

11. Describe a vivid memory in your life in which you had to discuss a problem with someone and it went well. If you can, focus on what aspects of the communication, or what you or the other person said, contributed to a positive outcome.
   a. What was the situation—what led up to it and how did you confront the other person about it?
   b. How did the person react to being confronted? How did this affect the conversation?
   c. What were specific things you remember saying? How did the person respond? Do you remember anything specific the other person said? And how you responded?
   d. Were there any turning points in the conversation, where it went from positive to negative or negative to positive in tone? Can you recall what might have precipitated this change, or did it seem to come out of nowhere? Looking back, can you make a guess as to what happened?

12. Can you think of any “memorable messages” or specific sayings that you recall from your family or a specific family member? If so, describe what impact you think this message had on your life.
a. What was or were the messages, and who said them? In what situations did the person typically say these things—in response to what kinds of events, for example?
b. How did you interpret the messages when you heard them? Do you interpret them differently now? How so?
c. Have these messages had an impact on your life or the kind of person you think you are or want to be? How so?

13. Think of a person in your life with whom talking is or once was difficult. Why do you think it was difficult? Was it to do with personalities? Speaking styles? Backgrounds?
   a. What is your relation to the person (please do not name)? Have you been close or distant? Did or do you see the person often?
b. Is this person still in your life? If so, are she or he still difficult to talk to? Do you ever avoid talking to that person?
c. In what situations is the person difficult to talk to, if not all the time? Can you give specific examples?
d. What about talking to this person is difficult? Can you give specific examples?
e. Why do you think talking to this person is difficult?

14. What do you think about the role of communication in your life and in society?
   a. What makes good communication and what makes it go wrong, based on your experience or from your point of view?
b. Why is communication important or not?
c. How often do you think about communication—about what you say or what others say, or about how you interact with others?
d. How do you think communication can or should address problems?

15. If you had to change one thing about your own communication style, what would it be and why?
   a. What changes in your life do you think would result from this change?
b. Why do you think this aspect of style is causing you problems or holding you back?
c. What steps have you taken, or could to take, to change your communication style?

The following questions are optional, and are for background purposes only.

A. How would you describe your nationality or the country you call home?

B. How would you describe your primary cultural, ethnic, or racial background?

D. Do you live in a rural, urban, suburban area? Other?

F. Do you practice a religion or consider yourself spiritual? Please specify.

G. Have you ever taken a communication course in college? Please specify.
Appendix B: Data Description

Below is the entire corpus from which analysis in this project was drawn. The table in chapter three is an abbreviated version showing only what was directly used in the analysis chapters. Below is a chart with a list of the examples used in this dissertation. “Corpus” refers to the whole set of recordings. “Year” is the time frame in which recordings took place. “Hours” is total number of hours of recordings, and may be a greater number than what was presented in chapter three (particularly if it includes audio) since the analytical project focused on video (and thus only a certain number of hours from corpora containing audio and video). “Format” states whether the corpus was video or audio only. “Place” refers to the location of the recording. “Language” refers to the primary language(s) spoken in the recording. “Recordings” involve the total number of separate video or audio files (same number as in chapter three, since analysis was done across recordings even if fewer hours were transcribed).

Whole Corpus

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List of Examples

The examples used in this project are of two types: (1) those used (in chapters three and nine) which are not studied in detail as part of the primary argument, or are reproduced from an earlier/later detailed analysis; and (2) those used in chapters three through nine which are part of the argument of the project (and analyzed in detail) and which are also given a name and excerpt number.

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### Appendix C: Transcription

#### Transcript Notations

(0.0)  a pause in seconds/milliseconds
-
“ “  quoted speech
* *  different vocal style
(( ))  vocal nonverbals
:  extension of sound
=  no discernable pause between utterances
xxx  emphasis
XX  shouted
.  intonation drops
?  intonation rises
,  sustained intonation