Disappearing Injustices: The Invisibility of Gender and Racial Injustice In Thomas Pogge’s Analysis of Severe Poverty and Human Rights

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Disappearing Injustices: The Invisibility of Gender and Racial Injustice In Thomas Pogge’s Analysis of Severe Poverty and Human Rights

by

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This dissertation entitled:
Disappearing injustices: The Invisibility of Gender and Racial Injustice in
Pogge’s Analysis of Severe Poverty and Human Rights
written by April Elizabeth Shaw
has been approved for the Department of Philosophy

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Date_____________________

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we
Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards
Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
Thomas Pogge’s argument that the global economic order is harming the poor by causing severe poverty problematically ignores gender and race. I argue that it is only on the surface that his work is gender and race neutral and that a deeper examination reveals a covert gender and race bias that erases the gender and racial injustices committed by global economic institutions.

I first argue that the feminization of poverty should be a conceptual starting point for assessing severe poverty. I use SAPs and microcredit to show that women are being disproportionately harmed by the economic policies of transnational economic institutions.

Similarly, Pogge misses the salience of race to the structure of current transnational economic institutions, which are shaped by past racism and colonization. Rather than emphasize national inequalities, as Pogge does, it is necessary to look at how such inequalities are racially structured in order to grasp the nature of the moral ills producing severe poverty. Here, I draw upon Charles Mills’ *The Racial Contract*.

I then assess Pogge’s institutional theory of human rights, arguing that there is a gender bias in his theory, which ignores the systematic nature of gender violence, especially domestic
violence. I suggest that his theory can be modified and that reflection on the nature of gender violence points the way to a gender inclusive institutional account of human rights.

Finally, I argue that Pogge’s theory is blind to institutional racism as a feature of the current global economic order. Institutional racism constitutes a serious human rights violation by perpetuating severe poverty and violating individuals’ rights to be free from racial discrimination. I build upon Gertrude Ezorsky’s definition of institutional racism to support my claim.

My project is to uncover gender and race bias in order show the moral salience of race and gender to severe poverty and human rights.
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Chapter 1: Underlying Concepts In Analyzing Severe Poverty and Human Rights

Severe global poverty and human rights are increasingly issues of concern for international agents, academics, and ordinary people. High rates of global poverty and the instability, or absence, of human rights security throughout the globe directly impact lives of individuals everyday causing deprivations due to malnutrition, disease, and the daily strife against forces that would take life itself. Thomas Pogge, who puts the number of poverty-related deaths at about 18 million deaths a year, one-third of all human deaths, (2008b, 2) is one philosopher who has taken up the task of addressing global poverty and human rights. His work has become an important reading for philosophers working on global justice and poverty. His analysis challenges the factual claim, commonly accepted by many, that the current global economic order is not harming the severely poor. He powerfully argues that minimal negative duties (duties not to harm) apply to the global economic order and for those living under its coercive force and that the affluent, in imposing this order, bear some moral culpability for severe poverty. Pogge’s claim is that severe poverty constitutes a human rights violation when it is both a foreseeable and avoidable product of a coercive global institutional order. Thus, affluent nations and those who uphold these institutions have a moral obligation to help eradicate severe poverty since they primarily control these global economic institutions that are contributing to severe poverty. What is distinctive about Pogge’s argument is that he builds his case on the basis of negative duties not to harm, in contrast to the more typical approach in mainstream philosophy, which construes duties to the poor in terms of positive duties to assist.

I accept the basic premise of Pogge’s argument that the arrangement of the current global economic order is harming the poor by contributing to severe poverty. The critical assessment
that I develop is based on a gender and race analysis, a framework that is lacking in Pogge’s work. My central claim is that Pogge’s work contains a covert gender and race bias that arises from a lack of serious consideration of how gender and race operate within the global context. This bias occurs in two general areas. First, his account of severe poverty renders the gendered and racial nature of the harms committed against the poor morally invisible. This is in large part because Pogge unjustifiably treats the harms of transnational institutions as gender and race neutral in their impact. Second, his institutional account of human rights misses out on the opportunity to be responsive to gender and racial injustice, again causing a moral blindness to these dimensions of current global institutional injustices. On gender, I argue that Pogge fails to recognize systemic harms against women as human rights violations due to a lack of recognition of the historical and official nature of much of the violence against women. On race, I argue that institutional racism is a core feature of the human rights violations by the global order. These features of Pogge’s work generate a bias since his analysis illegitimately erases the injustices occurring on racial and gender dimensions.

Gender and racial injustice are not additional or incidental to the harms being produced by a global order: they are intimately linked to the very structure of the current global economic order, because this structure relies on these social categories, for instance, structures that take advantage of women’s unpaid labor, for success. This success is often defined in terms of enriching the global North,¹ who are significant beneficiaries of the current global economic order. The persistence of severe poverty for women and people of color and the continued subjugation and overrepresentation of these individuals to human rights violations are no

¹ This is not to say that everyone in the North benefits from this arrangement. There are, of course, very poor and disadvantaged people living within the “affluent” North, with places such as the U.S. exhibiting massive economic inequalities. So although I will point to the global North, as Pogge does, it is with recognition of these important exceptions in mind. However, inequality in wealth and power are so normalized in the U.S. it may be more appropriate to say with these important social norms, as opposed to exceptions, in mind.
historical accidents, but, I will argue, the result of racism and gender ideology manifested through the current machinery of the global economic order. Each local context has its variations of how gender and/or race are articulated and practiced. This does not preclude a macro-perspective examination of how global institutions produce different outcomes delineated along axes of gender and race. The problem is that Pogge’s approach ignores the diverse identities of the poor and treats them as equally situated and ignores differences among them, an approach that Pogge himself warns against (2008b, 49-50). The moral salience of the differential racial and gender impact that the current global economic institutions are perpetuating is buried within Pogge’s theory.

This descriptive inaccuracy suggests an inaccurate analysis, namely, that global economic institutions are free of gender and race bias and that national factors are to blame for the fact women and people of color happen to be severely poor, even as global economic institutions are in part responsible for severe poverty. Without recognition of the moral saliency of gender and race on a global scale, it is impossible to fully evaluate the moral and socio-political realities of global economic institutions and their impact on the poor. This is also the case with respect to Pogge’s proposal for the Global Resources Dividend (GRD) as a vehicle for eradicating severe poverty that also discharges the moral obligations of the global North. As conceived of by Pogge, the GRD is fundamentally flawed because it maintains the status quo of race and gender privilege.

My goal is to build upon Pogge’s work through bringing theoretical clarity to the problem of severe global poverty and the under-fulfillment of human rights by showing that gender and race are interconnected with harms being committed against the severely poor. In some cases, my critiques stand as amendments, factors to be included in Pogge’s theory. Ultimately, I take the
real world differences among men, women, white, brown, black, North, South, poor, and rich to be a starting point for theorizing since such divisions reflect how the world is currently organized in terms of poverty, affluence, and power. Recognizing and understanding how these factors and current global structures mutually impact one another provides a stronger and more complete account of the circumstances of injustice that such institutions are creating. The consideration that Pogge gives to the poor is incomplete—mirroring a long tradition in philosophy of treating race and gender as marginal or incidental and not bearing central relevance to philosophical issues outside of the scope of feminist or critical race theory. In sum, race and gender neutrality often equals race and gendered bias to the detriment of people of color and women, a bias that is reflected throughout Pogge’s work.

1. Transnational Economic Institutions and the Structures That Bind

Global economic institutions have gained relevance to the problems of poverty and human rights because they stand as powerful forces affecting national economies and the lives of millions. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are institutions that represent the steady rise of global economic giants. They function on a global level, negotiating among markets, space, and peoples through the movement of capital, debt, and, to a much more limited extent, labor. The power of these institutions is illustrated by their ability significantly to transform economic and social conditions within poor nations. The World Bank and IMF have the capacity to forgive the staggering debt that is currently weighing down some of the poorest nations in the world (Gershman and Irwin 2000, 24-25). Even private institutions, largely represented by Western corporations, have become global giants in their own rights, as they are capable of economically destabilizing
countries by moving billions of dollars of “hot money” out of one country and into another in a matter of seconds (Ibid, 39). Global institutions, public and private, international and multinational, are as relevant to the economy of poor countries as their own national institutions. For such reasons, Pogge is right in his claim that the domain of justice, and the scope of the duty not to harm by imposing a coercive institutional order that causes foreseeable and avoidable poverty, is global. Clearly, global economic institutions bear a central role in the justice and injustices of those residing in poorer countries, who hold less power and less of an ability to resist the might of these institutions.

Another global force that is often overlooked is what Iris Young calls “structures,” which are unintended and uncoordinated processes that, nonetheless, situate individuals within global, local, national contexts. Structures can be interconnected with institutions, though they are much broader (Young 2007). Their significance lies in the power that they hold as an organizing structure impacting the life opportunities of individuals, often caught up on a web of transnational forces. I will, first, give a brief overview of how institutions are conceived and then turn to the issue of structures, which I hold, can be used to identify an important gap in Pogge’s theory.

The work of John Rawls brought the attention of philosophers back to the arena of political philosophy and also provided a framework for describing the centrality of institutions with regards to justice. At the center of Rawls’ theory is the claim that the basic structure of society is the sphere in which principles of justice apply (1999, 3-10). The organization of coercive institutions and the opportunities produced or denied, liberties granted or withheld, is for Rawls the realm where justice has its relevance, not in the actions of individuals. This model is not without its problems. For instance, G.A. Cohen argues that there is an inconsistency in
Rawls’ theory where on the one hand, Rawls defines the basic structure (institutions) as coercive (legal) institutions, and on the other hand, sometimes includes in the basic structure major social institutions such as the family. Cohen argues that it is the latter model that Rawls must commit to because the centrality of the basic structure as the site of justice in Rawls’ theory is often justified on the grounds that the basic structure has such a profound and primary effect on those living under it. The central justification for why Rawls’ makes the basic structure the site of justice is due to its “profundity of effect” and its coerciveness (Cohen 1997). Thus, Cohen resolves what he sees as an ambiguity in Rawls’ theory and argues that focusing on the profundity of effect opens the door for other non-coercive structures and personal choices as the site of justice.

Setting aside the issue of personal choice, an important insight in Cohen’s argument is that the basic structure should not be limited to coercive institutions, defined as legal institutions, because other arenas, such as conventions, have as significant or even more of an impact on individuals living under those institutions.

Pogge adopts the Rawlsian framework, in part, and points out that justice is now widely understood to apply to social rules and not to individual conduct (2008a, xx). Although Pogge’s account of the basic structure incorporates some of Cohen’s conclusions, that legal structures do not sufficiently account for the whole of the basic structure, Pogge holds that the social structure is best understood as the “…rules of the game,’ which govern interactions among individuals and collective agents as well as their access to material resources” (2008b, 37) in which he includes “laws, practices, social conventions, and, institutions (2008a, xx). Another important point of difference between Rawls and Pogge is that, for Pogge, the institutional design expands
beyond national boundaries and is global.\footnote{\textcite{4} Pogge argues that the economic and social institutions of the global order fall within the scope of justice and that looking at national institutions is inadequate for assessing the justness of the institutional order (Pogge 2008b, 39). Pogge’s application of justice to global institutions is better aligned with the realities of global power distribution, inequalities, and their impacts. The impact of economic institutions cannot be disregarded if the goal is to develop a morally accurate account of the injustices occurring right now against the poor. The “rules of the game” are global and are rightly the focus of justice as they, to use Cohen’s language, bear a profound effect on individuals living under this system.

Iris Young provides a similar argument to Cohen’s in that both argue that the basic structure should not be limited to coercive formally written rules, due to the impact that unwritten “rules” also possess. What Young has to offer that is missing in Cohen’s analysis is a more inclusive and global way for thinking about how these unwritten rules operate on a transnational scale through her concept of social structures, which can include, but is not limited to, personal choice. On the nature of social structures, Young states that “social structures serve as background conditions for individual actions by presenting actors with options; they provide “channels” that both enable and constrain” (2007, 168). Structures are not necessarily intentionally produced; they can come about as the unintended product of collective action. They represent dynamic processes that are never static (2007, 167-171). Gender, race, and class are categories that fit within Young’s concept of structures since they are deeply enabling and constraining in regard to individuals’ positions in the structure. They are the unwritten and sometimes unintended rules of the game that operate as social norms often occurring as informal

\footnote{John Rawls has received widespread criticism for his refusal to expand principles of justice to include the global institutional order. For criticisms of Rawls in this regard see Álvaro de Vita (2007). de Vita also provides a critical overview of other theorists who have attempted to defend such a move on different grounds: (Pogge 1989) especially, (Beitz 2000). Also see Iris Young (2007), to name a few of Rawls’ critics on this topic.}
practices. One example of this is found in the ethnocentric identity of the “Third-World” narratives that posit individuals in poor countries as un-modern and underdeveloped. This positioning does not necessarily represent the intentional design of collective agents, it is the product of past colonization, racial ideology, and lack of knowledge about how the affluent and poor nations relate. Structures cannot be ignored if justice is to be achieved, or even assessed in the global ordering. Pogge notes that social conventions are a part of the basic global structure. As Young’s theory shows, these conventions may or may not be formal or intended, but this does not diminish the force by which they can shape individuals’ lives. Though Pogge acknowledges to some degree the significance of social conventions, his theory does not go far enough since the role of unwritten social conventions is absent in Pogge’s theory.

Since not all social structures and processes are intended and since they can still have a “profundity of effect,” that Cohen identifies, they must remain central to theorizing about global injustices. Ignoring race, gender, and other social structures means that these structures are left unchallenged and in place.

Structures are different than institutions in that they are much broader than institutions. One central difference is that institutions are formally designed entities. On a global transnational scale this would include, at the least: governments, multi-government-backed transnational organizations, and private corporations, although there are other transnational entities that remain ambiguous under this account, such as transnational women’s networks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The latter two have features of formal design, but, for instance, transnational women’s networks might in some ways defy easy categorization since they often constitute multi-level organizing and agendas some of which are represented by the United Nations and National Governments and other aspects grounded in small-scale grass roots
movements. The World Bank and IMF easily fit the criteria of an institution since they have been designed by affluent nations to regulate and shape the global economy. It is clear, as Young argues, that structures and institutions are interconnected. Gender norms shape and influence economic agendas, even as agents may consciously, as with microcredit, or unconsciously enact various policies. Once we acknowledge all of the complexities of the global order, it is clear that no one institution or structure stands alone unaffected by others. I will later argue that gender and race represent two global structures that deeply affect individuals’ positioning within the global economic and social structures. At the heart of this problem lies a lack of recognition and analysis of how these structures function, by theorists such as Pogge. Additionally, global economic institutions are often perceived by their proponents as pure economic machinery detached from the political and social spheres, including the realities of diversity, gender, race, and class struggles. This view on the purity of the economics sphere does not stand up to scrutiny: race, gender, structures are features of every aspect of life, especially with respect to the distribution and denial of the basic necessities.

2. Theorizing About Gender on a Global Scale: Meaning and Context

Any critical exploration of gender justice, or injustice, on a global scale is complicated by the fact that individuals possess complex identities demarcated by race, class, nationality, religion, sexuality, and other factors. Gender justice requires sensitivity to these differences, while at the same time maintaining conceptual clarity on how gender is constructed. Sally Haslanger points out that even among feminists there exists no one shared meaning of “gender,” although, in general terms, gender has often been articulated as “the social meaning of sex” (Haslanger 2000, 37). Part of what it means to state that gender is the social meaning of sex is to
indicate that one’s gender, which dictates norms of dress, speech, sexual expression, eating habits, and almost all dimensions of human life, is not a natural category defined as some fundamental human nature predetermined by an individual’s biological sex. Those who deny this point might regard women’s labor within the household as a “natural” role determined by biological destiny, a destiny that equally places men as the “natural” breadwinners within the “conventional” traditional heterosexual household. Highlighting a distinction between sex and gender, then, consists in challenging the seeming normalcy of the division of labor, opportunities, and obligations generated by seeming sexual differences between men and women, which have social significance. The global sex-trade represents one example where Carole Pateman has argued that prostitution is a publicly sanctioned form of sexual slavery—legitimated by the capitalist market, which provides access for men’s sexual dominance over women’s bodies. That it is primarily women and not men whose bodies are up for consumption and that it is men who are the consumers is no historical accident (1994; 2005).

In developing gender as a category of analysis, feminists seek to give voice to accounts of gender that denaturalize problematic social roles frequently assumed to reflect innate differences between men and women. For instance, prostitution is often naturalized as “the oldest profession,” implying that it is inevitable. In this way, gender roles have often been misperceived as solely “natural” properties i.e., god or nature-given based on biology (understood as one’s sex). Such views are commonly consistent with what Alison Jaggar has identified as political fatalism given that they tend to preclude social and political reforms to correct for inequalities resulting from the purported differences between men and women (2008, 105). Jaggar argues that it would be a mistake to view gender and human biology as anything but mutually constitutive: our bodies and biological needs adapt to our social circumstances just as social
organization is impacted by biological factors. For instance, Jaggar points out that the act of breastfeeding (or not) is determined by material conditions (that can increase or decrease the necessity), as well as biological constitution (Ibid, 107). In light of this complexity gender/sex are not simple categories, but it remains essential that they be evaluated, challenged, reworked or even abandoned when they are the basis by which injustice and inequalities are generated.

What has been central to accounts of gender is the concept of hierarchy. For instance, Haslanger argues that what it means to be a “woman” is to be positioned as hierarchically inferior to men (2000, 37-39). This account, Haslanger argues, illustrates the fact that gender roles often function to the disadvantage of women. What makes gender roles bad for many women is not just that they falsely perpetuate socially influenced differences between men and women as natural. The problem is ensuing inequalities and injustices largely due to different life opportunities/expectations that are often afforded to women on the basis of their “gender.” The “social meaning of sex” does not neutrally point to the social influences that go into constructing gender, it also designates gender as hierarchical organization of human life. Gender functions to disadvantage many women on a global scale with respect to poverty and violence, although women’s “gender” and hierarchical positioning will vary according to context and circumstance.

The “rules” of the game with respect to gender are both written and unwritten. It is not by law that the sale of women’s bodies for sexual services for men is a global phenomenon, but by hierarchically structured social norms. There are also formalized aspects of gender. For instance, Susan Okin defines gender as the institutionalization of sexual difference (1989, 5-6). This definition points to the aspects of gender that are solidified in law, such as in marriage and divorce laws. In this way, gender is a social structure that is informal and should not be conflated with official rules of societies, while, at the same time, official rules can reinforce women’s
vulnerability and hierarchically lower social positioning. The same is true globally: gender is a structure that is operative within global economic institutions and so the coercive and hierarchical force of gender norms is also operative. Theorizing about gender on a global scale requires picking out the tacit and conventional norms hidden within gender structures.

3. Theorizing Race on a Global Scale: The Invention of Race

Theorists largely agree that race is a modern concept invented by the Europeans (Boxill 2003). In chapter five, I will provide a more detailed account of the history of the concept of race. Here, I will give a brief context to ground how I employ the concept. Race is a modern concept that posits the existence of biological differences grounded in biological “essences.” According to Bernard Boxill, this endeavor was a scientific project that aimed to explain perceived differences between Europeans and Africans (Ibid). Whatever the original intent of the invention of race, the project of constructing “scientific” categories of supposed racial differences quickly became a tool of white domination utilized by the slave trade. Science purported to show the existence of unchangeable differences between Africans and Europeans (differences that were hierarchically structured). Thus, with regard to the modern concept of “race,” pseudo science went hand in hand with hierarchy to establish an “objective” and innate human hierarchy that posited whites as supremely superior to dark-skinned peoples.

The modern concept of race as biologically based difference was upended due to a lack of empirical validation. That is, no objective mapping could be found to match up with the racist biological theories of “science.” Unfortunately, the demise of such biologically based racial categories (as “essence” and natural kinds) has not prevented the pursuit of other scientific searches for biological based differences between the “races,” that are hierarchically structured in
such a way that the darker peoples remain positioned at the bottom of moral, social, and intellectual standing. Most likely this is because biology is only one feature of what race has been about and has repeatedly been accompanied by hierarchical ordering of “races” that has been at the heart of racial ideology for several centuries. On this point, Thomas McCarthy states that:

“Race” was never a purely biological construction. It always comprised a congeries of elements, including not only other “material” factors such as geographical origin and genealogical descent, but also a shifting array of “mental” characteristics such as cognitive ability and moral character, as well as a mobile host of cultural and behavioral traits. (2009, 6)

McCarthy identifies the social significance of race and why it continues to persist, despite the fact that on an ontological level there exists no category of races. Race is meant to convey who we are, what we are capable of, and what society owes to us. This is clearly the case with slavery in which social institutions functioned as a coercive force against slaves. Given that race contains a normative aspect, which attributes a host of attributes based on one’s race, it makes sense to conceive of race in terms of racialization, which highlights the constructive aspect described by McCarthy. To be racialized is not to be put into an objective biological category, but to be put into categories that are arbitrarily assigned, yet nonetheless are attached to certain attributes that tend to be undervalued and seen as negative by the dominant society as a whole. Thus, while the early modern concept of race has changed, what has remained is the arbitrarily assigned attributes to so-called races, which have a significant impact on people’s opportunities within society.

Many critical race theorists now largely regard race as a social construct (Boxill 2003; Outlaw 2003; Zack 2006). The “reality” of race is defined by social contexts. It is not static; its meanings and boundaries can vary from location. That is, the social meaning of race changes and does not remain the same in all places. What it means to be “black” in America or “Hispanic” in
Mexico is not the same as what it means to be “black” in Africa or “Hispanic” in America. Different cultural markers are applied and different spaces may have different pathologies regarding non-whites.

Race is not a neutral social construct. It is rooted in an invention that carries a purpose, which is to legitimize the inferiority and superiority of whites over non-whites. Currently, race continues to function as a marker of difference that is often configured as a racial hierarchy. If there is no biological reality marked out by race, then the saliency of the moral, social, and political functions of race are brought out since it is these features that continue to have importance for the lives of so many individuals. For instance, as I will later discuss, a racial hierarchy accompanies much of the development processes that occur between the global North and the South. This hierarchy, like its modern predecessor, tends to place whites at the top and darker skinned peoples at the bottom. This portrait should not be oversimplified. As McCarthy points out, there is always a mixture of elements that go into constructing the races besides skin color, cognitive abilities, moral standing and space. Skin color is one marker of “race,” but it is not the only one. In adopting race as a category of analysis, my aim is not to reify its existence, but rather to challenge the status quo of categories of persons as composing “races.”


I have claimed that gender and race both contain social dimensions that arbitrarily assign particular roles, attributes, and status on the basis of “biology.” Thus, although they are not real
in an objective sense, they are real in terms of life opportunities that are afforded or withheld. This is the case even though different factors, often mediated by various facets of an individual’s identity, impact the embodied experience of gender and race as discrimination and privilege.

One objection that might be raised is that using gender and race as a lens of critical analysis on a global scale will lead to under-theorizing and marginalizing the morally important complexities of individuals’ identities. Using race and gender as primary categories of analysis misses other operative parts of individuals’ identities that are significant to their social positioning relative to the transnational institutions of the global economy. Kimberle Crenshaw has argued that the experience of oppression cannot be separated into distinct categories neatly divided by categories of race, class, gender, or other features of our identities. For instance, William I. Robinson argues that the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is a significant category of analysis that complicates traditional analyses of the global order that typically focus on race and gender (Robinson 2006, 82-83). Robinson’s point is supported by the recent passage of SB 1070 in Arizona into law. SB 1070 holds that the Arizona police force must check individuals’ immigration status if there is “reasonable suspicion” that they are illegal. This bill represents the official sanctioning of racial profiling by clearly targeting Hispanics. In response to severe protest against SB1070, the bill was modified to state that a legal infraction must accompany the “suspiciously illegal immigrant behavior” to warrant police inquiry of immigrant status (Arizona State Senate Bill 1070). This modification is merely superficial. In practice, the “infraction” criterion (which includes minor transgressions, such as having a cracked windshield) is routinely used in Arizona as a guise for checking the immigration status of Hispanics status,

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3 For instance, studies have show that women and blacks in America with the exact same resume as white males are judged more harshly and judged to be less qualified than their white male counterparts. Employers were also less friendly and spent less time with black applicants than with white applicants who were similarly fashioned to the black applicants. Additionally, the more prestigious the job, the more blacks faced discrimination in the hiring process (Harris and Narayan 1999, 130, 134-135)
anyway. Even with the new modification to SB 1070, the bill contains no real action-guiding criteria to establish what constitutes “suspicious illegal-immigrant” behavior that would legitimize inquiry into an individual’s citizenship status. Within the hostile anti-Hispanic borders of Arizona, the primary “offense” that generates suspicion is “driving while brown.” Although, of course, language and class status will also factor in as well as racial stereotyping, such as how many people are packed into a car.⁴

Hispanics in Arizona, citizens and illegal, will experience oppression that can be both similar and different from the oppression of blacks who have long experienced racism and police harassment, but who also often have the privilege of citizenship. For instance, blacks do not face deportation, separation from their families, and also, in Arizona, jail time just for being in the U.S.⁵

To return to Crenshaw’s argument, she states that like a traffic accident at an intersection, oppression can hit from multiple directions (Crenshaw 1994). This is clearly illustrated by SB 1070. Single-axis frameworks that use a single category as a unit of analysis are problematic because they miss the multidimensional forces that often create the circumstances of oppression. Crenshaw argues that treating women as a homogenous group, or a particular race, ignores the distinct oppression experienced by women of color that can be gendered and race based (Ibid). Consideration of SB1070 shows the validity of Crenshaw’s and Robison’s claims that multiple dimensions of individuals’ identities can function as a source of oppression. Reducing oppression

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⁴ One of the defenders of SB 1070 cited this last factor as one criterion that would contribute to overall circumstances that might grant reasonable suspicion that the occupants are illegal (Kobach, 2010). Race, is not mentioned, but the stereotype of Mexicans packed into a car is typical racial imagery in the U.S.

⁵ This bill also requires the police force and government institutions to be sued if they do not enforce SB 1070. It is also worth noting the gender difference among Hispanics with respect to the impact of this bill. For instance, the bill forbids individuals from gathering in parking lots for day work, standing by the side of the road for work, as well as outlawing employers from picking up these individuals for work (Arizona State Senate Bill 1070). This way of getting work is almost always undertaken by Hispanic men, both legal and not, which means that they are hit hardest by this aspect of the bill.
to a single category misses out on the complexities that are illustrated in the injustice of SB 1070.

In response to the possible objection that my analysis problematically appears to rest on a single-axis framework, I hold that intersectionality is central to my work despite a core focus on gender and race. I do not assume that race or gender are primary sites of oppression. I apply an intersectional approach in assessing the relationship between economic institutions and the disadvantage inflicted upon poor women across the globe who are often forced to carry the weight of current global economic injustice on their shoulders through their undervalued and unpaid labor. Intersecting forces of race, nation, gender, and class cannot be ignored as not all women in poor countries are equally impacted by global economic institutions. The saliency of gender is that it is usually women, and those under their care, who reside on the razor’s edge of poverty and subsistence who are hit hardest by the structure of the global economic order. The recent debate over the feminization of poverty, which I will discuss in chapter two, also makes gender a salient category of analysis for uncovering how multiple factors are intersecting in order to bring about this state of affairs. Current economic institutions are not free from social and political bias. Much of this bias is linked to creating a gendered and racial ordering of the global economy and severe human rights deprivations. It is the structure of the current global economic order and how these institutions operate that makes gender and race matter.

Intersectionality and macroscopic analysis need not be in conflict with one another. In fact, the latter can lend support to developing an intersectional framework. A macroscopic perspective can allow theorists to gain clarity on the multiple factors that inhibit and oppress individuals, which may not be visible on a smaller scale. Marilyn Frye develops this idea in her birdcage metaphor. Looking too closely at a birdcage using a micro perspective makes it mysterious as to why the bird cannot fly away because each bar examined up close does not
seem to prevent the bird from claiming its freedom. Take a step back and it becomes apparent that the bird is trapped, not by any one individual bar, but by the totality of the bars that bind together (Frye 1983, 4-5). In the same way, looking at race as history, as colonialism, as an ongoing racially informed discourse, and as rooted in prevailing racial power inequalities is inseparable from grasping the harms committed by current global economic institutions. Taking a step back to examine race requires the recognition that, globally, race is currently one dimension that has lot of power over who is severely poor.

In conclusion, as Rose Brewer et al. state one way of incorporating intersectionality into one’s work is “to examine how each group is ideologically defined by elements of another’s characteristics; an example of such a definition is Said’s “feminization” of the East” (2002, 13). This macro-perspective enabled Edward Said to make important cross-comparisons between the East and the West that revealed that the West’s definition of itself as masculine was a function of its feminizing of the East (Ibid, 10). Along the same lines, cross-comparisons must be made with regard to the severely poor who are primarily in the global South, and the economic institutions controlled primarily by the global North. The severely global poor are caught up in intersecting forces of power inequalities on national, global, and even an ideological level, as the forces of neoliberalism shape so much of what global economic institutions do. Why should gender and race be given prominence in this scenario? Because the overrepresentation of women and people of color suggests that it is these groups that are being used as grist for the mill of global economic profit, contributing to dead bodies, lives cut short, hunger, disease, and all the concomitant miseries of living in absolute poverty.

5. Overview of Thomas Pogge's Theory: Global Contributors to Severe Global Poverty, The Duty Not to Harm and Institutional Human Rights as Moral Minimums
In this section, I first provide an overview of Thomas Pogge’s argument that current global economic institutions are harming the severely poor. Second, I explain his institutional account of human rights. This section is written in a purely explanatory fashion in order to set the foundation for latter assessment of his theory.

5.1 Transnational Economic Institutions and the Elites Who Control Them: Moral Culpability for Severe Poverty

Much of Thomas Pogge’s work is based in a defense of his claim that the design of current global economic institutions violates negative duties not to harm the poor by contributing to severe global poverty. This is due to the imposition of a coercive global institutional order, primarily on the part of the West, that imposes both foreseeable and avoidable poverty. The innovativeness of Pogge’s work, as he states himself, is that he takes a moral minimum (negative duties) and challenges factual assumptions (that the affluent West is not responsible for severe poverty) to establish his argument that we have a moral obligation to stop harming the global poor—that is, to eradicate severe poverty (Pogge 2005b). Although current economic institutions have a global impact, especially in poor countries, Pogge points out that it is the West that has primary control over these institutions and that Western interests are being propped up through the manipulation of these institutions. It follows that the harm being inflicted against the severely poor through these coercive institutions can be traced to the affluent West and those who support these institutions and that this generates moral responsibility to undo the harm inflicted upon the severely poor. This responsibility also includes citizens of the West because these institutions represent us and speak in our name (Pogge 2008b, 25-26).

There are several features of the current global order that Pogge identifies as harming the poor: inequality in bargaining power, international borrowing privilege, international resource
privilege, and intellectual property rights (2008b). I will outline Pogge’s arguments on bargaining power, borrowing privilege, and resource privilege in order to illustrate the groundwork of Pogge’s challenges to the “factual” assumption that the West is not exacerbating severe global poverty.

Current inequality in bargaining power, as seen in the World Trade Organization (WTO), favors the West by enabling Western affluent nations to use this inequality to try to maximize their own profits at the expense of making severe poverty worse in less powerful nations. This occurs through the imposition of protectionist policies in trade that are meant to ensure that benefits are heavily weighted toward the West, with the foreseeable result that poor countries are significantly adversely impacted. The rhetoric of open markets and free-trade is not consistent with the actual practice of the WTO, which pushes poor countries to lower their tariffs, a move which enables the West to saturate the global market with their goods, thus pushing out the smaller (and politically weaker) markets of poor countries (2008b, 20). Pogge argues that since Western affluent nations have the option of choosing different policies that will still benefit the West, although not maximize those benefits, and will not exacerbate severe poverty, they are violating their duty not to harm the poor in choosing the self-maximizing policies (2008b, 18-23).

International resource privilege, which governs the selling and buying of a country’s natural resources, is marked by parallel problems. Illegitimate leaders are treated as legitimate owners of a country’s natural resources and are allowed to legally to sell off these resources. Pogge states that the impact on a country is, again, devastating, allowing corrupt dictators to become rich from selling a country’s resources, conferring legal ownership of a country’s resources on foreign investors, and dwindling away a country’s natural wealth (Ibid, 118-120).
He illustrates the outrageous nature of such international rules in comparison with our domestic laws on ownership and justice:

This [resource borrowing privilege] is a remarkable feature of our global institutional order. A group that overpowers the guards and takes control of a warehouse may be able to give some of the merchandise to others, accepting money in exchange. But the fence who pays them becomes merely the possessor, not the owner, of the loot. Contrast this with a group that overpowers an elected government and takes control of a country. Such a group, too, can give away some of the country’s natural resources, accepting money in exchange. In this case, however, the purchaser acquires not merely possession, but all the rights and liberties of ownership, which are supposed to be – and actually are – protected and enforced by all other states’ courts and police force. (Ibid, 118)

The effects of international resource privilege on resource rich countries is devastating and long lasting. A nation’s ownership of its resources is lost, military coups are rewarded, and countries are pushed further into the grip of severe poverty.

International borrowing privilege treats illegitimate rulers of a country, such as those who have seized power by military coup, as legitimate rulers by allowing them to borrow large sums of money in their country’s name. Pogge argues that this has a devastating impact on those living under the rule of these dictators. The rules governing international borrowing privilege provide an incentive for military coups since those who enact successful coups will have access to large sums of money with the debt burden being placed on the country. A significant debt burden is placed on a country even after an illegitimate ruler is no longer in power. This debt is treated as legitimate and, thus, binding on poor countries. Another problem is that the money obtained by these illegitimate rulers is frequently used for their own agendas and not to help the people living under their rulership (Ibid, 118-121).

While many believe that pointing to illegitimate dictators is sufficient to explain global poverty solely in terms of domestic factors, Pogge highlights the role of global economic institutions in causing severe poverty through the creation and enforcement of these international rules. On this note, Pogge sums up the key factors that establish that there are global entities that are morally responsibility for eradicating severe poverty. First, human rights deficits are the unit
of measurement by which to measure injustice/justice. Second, the human rights deficits of the severely poor (i.e., malnutrition) are causally linked to social/economic institutions. Third, those that bear moral responsibility for these circumstances are those who maintain and support these institutions. Fourth, human rights deficits must also be foreseeable and avoidable, and participants must know that imposing a different institutional design will better secure human rights (Ibid, 26). As it stands, the current design of global economic institutions and those that uphold them meet the standards of injustice as outlined by these factors.

5.2 Pogge’s Institutional Model of Human Rights:

Pogge develops an institutional account of human rights, which holds that a human right to X entails that “in so far as reasonably possible, any coercive social institutions be so designed that all human beings affected by them have secure access to X” (2008b, 52). Human rights claims, on Pogge’s institutional account, are claims regarding the design of an institutional order, as well as those individuals who uphold the institutional order (Ibid). Social institutions are considered just, on this account, when they provide secure access to basic goods, which for Pogge are human rights, to those living under those institutions (Ibid, 38).

Pogge contrasts his institutional model of human rights with the interactional view of human rights:

On the interactional understanding of human rights, governments and individuals have a responsibility not to violate human rights. On my institutional understanding, by contrast, their responsibility is to work for an institutional order and public culture that ensure that all members of a society have secure access to the objects of their human rights. Thus linking rights fulfillment with insecurity rather than violation can make a difference in cases of two kinds. A person may fully enjoy X even while her access to X is insecure (as when persons relevantly like her, say blacks or vocal government opponents, are beaten or threatened). Conversely, a person may be temporarily deprived of X, through a crime by a rogue government official perhaps, in a society that is very effective in preventing crimes of the relevant type. Opposite to the interactional understanding, my institutional one regards on the first case as a human-rights problem. (Ibid, 71)

The same act may or may not constitute a human rights violation on the basis of whether or not
the overall design generally secures human rights. The duties generated by Pogge’s institutional account apply only to those in a shared social system and consist of a duty to work for a system in which human rights are generally secure by not imposing a coercive institutional order that makes human rights insecure, i.e. violating negative duties (Ibid, 72).

Pogge also differentiates his theory from the juridical concept of human rights, which he rejects. The juridical account of human rights holds that a human right to X is equivalent to a legal right to X. Pogge argues that this concept of human rights is flawed for being too weak since laws do not always secure human rights and too strong in that people’s human rights can be secured in the absence of a legal mandate to secure these rights (Ibid, 50-54). An example that illustrates Pogge’s criticism of the juridical concept of human rights is the increase over the last couple of decades in international treaties signed by many countries committing them to uphold human rights for women, but in reality, frequently resulting in little actual transformation of the major institutional structures and the lives of women living under them.

On Pogge’s institutional model of human rights, human rights protect individuals from official deprivations and only official violations are human rights violations. He defines official as governments, including government agents, agencies, and lower sub-units of governments (Pogge 2008b, 65). Although, as I will discuss in chapter four, his definition is somewhat more expansive, including and excluding entities that render his criteria for what is “official” vague. Pogge argues that “human rights postulates are addressed, in the first instance at least, to those who occupy positions of authority within society (or other comparable social systems)” (Ibid, 64). Official violations occur when those acting in an official capacity, such as government agents acting on government orders, violate human rights. For instance, armies that order the use of rape as a weapon of war would be a paradigm case of a human rights violation. Whereas, an
individual who rapes, but is not acting in an official capacity, e.g. he is following his own desires, would not be committing a human rights violation—although his actions would be morally problematic on other grounds. Recognizing that there may be some ambiguity as to when an act is official or not, Pogge says that, “[h]ere it emerges that moral wrongs committed by an official fit better under the label of “human-rights violation” the more closely they are related to his job and the more tolerated or encouraged they are throughout his officialdom” (Ibid, 65).

Pogge’s theory also includes the concept of official disrespect of human rights, which measures the attitudes and responses of governments under which human rights are insecure, as well as the attitudes and responses of individuals living under those institutions. Official disrespect is determined by “(a) a proper sub-set of the occurring violation of this right, namely the “official” or “human rights” violations, and (b) various facts about the governments and people’s attitudes (commitment and disposition) toward the right and all its occurring violations. Unofficial violations of a right that is on the list of human rights do not constitute human-rights violations, but official indifference toward such violations does constitute official disrespect” (Ibid, 68). On the last point, if women are generally under the threat of rape in a society from “unofficial” agents, this may represent official disrespect for women’s human rights, but not human rights violations insofar as governments and the people living under the shared institution in which this is occurring are complicit or unresponsive. To summarize, Pogge argues that only official violations are human rights violations. Official disrespect for human rights aims to be broader and capture both official and unofficial acts.

Another feature of Pogge’s view of human rights is that there is a hierarchical ordering of injustices in that official violations are considered more unjust than official disrespect and private
wrongs less unjust than both. For example, violence against an individual committed by the state constitutes an official violation of the individual’s human rights and is more unjust than violence against an individual committed by a lone criminal, which would be less unjust because, as Pogge sees it, such an act is unofficial. Speaking on official acts, Pogge says that

> These paradigm cases of official disrespect [by governments] bring out most clearly why, as is widely felt, there is something especially hideous, outrageous, and intolerable about official disrespect, why official moral wrongs are worse than otherwise similar “private” moral wrongs, quite apart from the fact that they often harm more severely, and harm and frighten more people that private wrongs. (2008b, 65)

When it is official, the right itself seems to be under attack, whereas this does not seem to be the case with regard to private wrongs (Ibid, 65). There is built into the theory an injustice hierarchy that puts moral wrongs connected to governments, or government agents, as more unjust than moral wrongs committed by unofficial agents. Pogge offers another example in a hypothetical scenario in which individuals are deprived of vital nutrient V due to direct sanction and enforcement by the government. Pogge holds that these individuals are the recipients of injustice that is greater than deprivation of V that is illegal, but still occurs due to the private actions of individuals through non-enforcement of the law (Ibid, 45-46). In this scenario, injustices are ranked on a 1-6 scale with 1 being the most unjust and 6 being the least unjust. He argues that officially mandated injustices represent 1 and private injustices that are illegal yet tolerated by a government fall to number 4 on the scale. This hierarchy has important implications for gender justice and securing women’s human rights, for as stated above, domestic violence does not constitute a human rights violation, and according to the injustice hierarchy would rank as less unjust than other government-inflicted violence against women. Critics have picked up on Pogge’s exclusion of domestic violence and, as I will show below, have argued in defense of domestic violence as a human rights violation. While I agree with these critics, I will argue that they do not adequately address the gender bias in Pogge’s theory that causes him conceptually to
rule out such violence.

In the next section, I present a critical analysis of his theory from the philosophical literature. This section will include how Pogge has attempted to respond to these critics and my own contribution to the literature.

6. Pogge’s Critics:

The publication of *World Poverty and Human Rights* immediately provoked debate over the nature of the West’s responsibilities and culpability for severe global poverty. I will focus on three types of criticisms raised against Pogge’s work. The first claims that Pogge’s argument is too strong in its empirical claims. The second group of critics holds that Pogge’s work is too weak in its conceptual claims. This latter group of critics is further divided into two groups: those who argue that Pogge’s moral framework of negative duties is too minimal and critics who find his institutional concept of human rights to be unjustifiably exclusive. I will present these criticisms starting with those that challenge Pogge’s empirical claims and then move on to critics who offer conceptual challenges to Pogge’s theory.

6.1 Empirical Challenges

Theorists have argued that Pogge’s conclusion that the affluent West is culpable for severe global poverty is too strong by taking aim at his empirical claim about the role of global economic institutions in causing global poverty. These critics typically call into question whether the global order is actually causing severe poverty (Campbell 2007, 70-71; Risse 2005; Satz 2005). For instance, Debra Satz argues that it is difficult to determine whether or not the global order is causing poverty because there is currently no way to measure, exactly, the influence of
global and domestic factors in relation to a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). She claims that Pogge is defending what can be described as explanatory globalism, which is the view that poverty is caused *solely* by global institutions (2005). Mathias Risse questions whether or not the global order can be said to be harming the poor by arguing that relative to a historical baseline of about 200 years ago there is evidence that poverty seems to have decreased. On this basis, Risse argues that the current global order might actually be said to be *benefiting* the poor (2005).

Since Pogge has already successfully defended himself against these arguments, I will only briefly outline a few of his responses here. First, in response to Satz, Pogge denies that his view reduces to explanatory globalism, arguing that his position is consistent with national and local explanations for severe poverty. As an illustration, he uses the imagery of two factories polluting a stream that harm those living downstream. In one version of the case, Pogge posits that both are releasing non toxic substances on their own, but combined they create a toxic substance. It is clear that both factories are harming those living downstream by continuing to release pollutants into the water. This is analogous to Pogge’s arguments on culpability for severe global poverty. Pogge argues that the claim that the global institutional order is harming the poor is not inconsistent with the claim that domestic factors are also harming the poor (2005a, especially 63; 2007, 45-46).

In response to Risse’s claim that poverty may be decreasing, Pogge responds that his argument does not rely on establishing that the poor are worse off today relative to a historical baseline. Pogge’s baseline is a minimally just institutional order that, in so far is reasonably possible, secures access of those living under these institutions to the objects of their human rights (2005a, 55-56; 2007; 2008). Second, with respect to Risse’s argument that relative to a historical baseline the global order might be benefiting the poor, Pogge argues that Risse relies
heavily on aggregate statistics, such as Gross National Product (GNP), to bolster his claims about the alleged benefit to the poor. The sole use of GNP as an indicator of poverty renders invisible the plight of those who are at the bottom of a society’s economic ladder by measuring the wealth of nations, not individuals.

Finally, Pogge argues that even if poverty is decreasing in both relative and absolute terms, this does not change the moral status of the current global order. Improvement in circumstances does not indicate the absence of injustice, and, as Pogge argues, it does not indicate the absence of harm. For instance, Risse compares the current global order to the previous global order under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to illustrate the progression of said benefits to the poor (Risse 2005, 11). In a compelling analogy, Pogge asks us to consider if we would say that under Jim Crow laws blacks in the U.S. were no longer being harmed by the institutional order because they were better off than they were under the institution of slavery (2007, 40). A global order that achieves improvements in poverty both in absolute and relative terms cannot be assumed not to be harming the poor simply because the poor are better off (2005a especially 57-58; 2007, 39-41). In sum, it is implausible to claim that the current global order is not harming those who are currently suffering from severe poverty on the contested claim that the global order is benefiting the poor by reducing poverty relative to a historical baseline.

In appealing to GDP, Risse not only equates the wealth of a nation with how the average individual is faring within the nation, a move that is highly problematic given increasing evidence of growing inequalities between the rich and the poor within nations, but his approach also has another homogenizing effect as it erases not only class, but other factors such as race and gender. His claim that the global order is benefiting the poor ignores the distribution of
poverty along these lines. Once we begin to dismantle overarching measurements, such as GDP, there is evidence that the current global order is not gender and race blind in its effects and certain groups are disproportionately and especially harmed in comparison to a just global order—a just global order in which, as Pogge defines it, human rights are fulfilled in as much as is reasonably possible through secure access under these institutions (2007). For instance, if we look back 200 years ago as our baseline, as Risse does, using GDP as our measurement, it is not possible to substantiate the claim that poverty is decreasing for women, it may be on the rise even as poverty decreases for other groups—we have no way to measure such supposed occurrences using GDP. Risse claims that, “historically almost everybody was poor, but that is no longer true” (10). Yet the recent debate over the feminization of poverty points to a possible gendered distribution of poverty that disadvantages women. Decreases in poverty, alone, do not address this distribution. Because Risse’s analysis of the supposed benefits to the poor lumps the poor together for all we know the current global order has decreased poverty for only men in the last 200 years and not women.

Satz’s argument that it is too difficult to determine which harms global institutions cause lacks validity. Given the disproportionate amount of wealth that has steadily accumulated for the global elite, especially over the last couple of decades, it appears implausible that the West is capable of grasping only which global structures are wealth producing, but not which are poverty producing. One could argue that those in the West only know what is benefiting them, not what is harming others. But, if this is the case, this raises a further problem. If the West is truly incapable of discovering what features of the global institutional order cause poverty, then the West’s culpability for global poverty might be stronger than Pogge’s thesis suggests. Post-World

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6 I will discuss the feminization of poverty, some of its theoretical issues, and develop a defense of claim that the feminization of poverty represents a real problem, despite some of these issues.
War II, the West has heavily influenced and directed development projects in the global South for the stated purposes of alleviating poverty. If Western institutions are incapable of addressing the global causes of poverty, then one might question under what authority Western institutions have so vigorously imposed their conception of development onto these countries. Critics of development, such as Arturo Escobar, argue that development as imposed by the global institutions of the West has had dire consequences for the so-called “Third-World” (1995). If it is too difficult to identify the causal relationship between poverty and global institutions, then it would seem the West and the global North, are responsible for the harms committed through disastrous development processes. This would especially be the case since the global North has been in a position to allow nations to enact local and domestic cures for poverty. Given the impact of global economic institutions, the claim that it is too difficult to identify what global factors produce poverty is not sufficient to absolve the West from the charge that its global institutions are harming the global poor.

There has been much literature in the recent decades on the impact that global economic institutions have had on the global South in multiple disciplines, which seriously calls into question the tenability of Satz’s position. So much is increasingly known about the effects of these institutions that even the former president of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, has called out the World Bank and IMF for damages that their policies have caused in the global South (2002, 3-22). The existence of this literature generates an epistemic responsibility on the part of Satz, academics, and those in power to investigate the impact of global institutions on the world’s poor. Moreover, the suggestion that the West might simply be attempting to spread the benefits of

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7 Escobar argues for local solutions to poverty in contrast to reforming global institutions.
8 See The Development Dictionary (2010), Dying For Growth (2002) and Water Wars (2002) all of which offer powerful critiques that look at different dimensions of how development and the impact of transnational institutions has been detrimental for many of the poor in the global South.
their global institutions through development projects to other nations cannot be reasonably defended. The abuse of unequal bargaining power, illustrated by Pogge, that the West uses to its advantage in order to gain significant benefits for itself makes this claim insupportable.

6.2 Conceptual Challenges: Positive Duties Versus Negative Duties

Critics have also argued that Pogge’s theory of global justice is too weak conceptually because it conceives of moral obligations to the poor solely in terms of negative duties not to harm, as opposed to positive duties to aid. While these critics all share the position that we have positive duties to the poor, they differ on the question of whether or not the global poor are currently being harmed by the arrangement of the global order with some weighing in against this claim (Satz 2005; Campbell 2007) and others agreeing with Pogge (Cruft 2005; Kreid 2007). Although these critics disagree to what extent, if any, global economic institutions and those who uphold them are violating negative duties not to harm the poor, they agree that Pogge’s theory is problematic because it ignores positive duties to assist the poor irrespective of whether there exists any culpable causal responsibility for poverty.

A central concern of advocates of positive duties to the poor is that conceiving of our duties to the poor only in terms of negative duties excludes some of the poor from moral consideration. Rowan Cruft argues that (what he calls) Pogge’s left-libertarian model of human rights is morally unattractive because it lacks a positive duty to the disabled to secure their access to basic goods. Cruft reads negative duties as simply consisting of duties of non-interference, arguing that Pogge’s left-libertarian conception of human rights as rights to basic goods only “… involves maintaining that every-one has a human right to institutionally grounded control over a share of society’s resources” (2005a, 32). Insofar as the disabled require more than just non-
interference with their share of basic goods, Cruft argues that Pogge’s conception of a human right to basic goods is detrimental to the disabled.

Tom Campbell and Regina Kreid raise similar worries regarding exclusion in Pogge’s conception of duties. Kreid finds Pogge’s institutional account of human rights promising for highlighting the relationship between poverty and global institutions. What is missing for Kreid is a positive duty to help those who are poor in the absence of harm caused by global economic institutions. She argues that Pogge’s theory should be supplemented with what she calls the principle of expediency, which she defines as a moral obligation to help that is generated by expediency and effectiveness to assist. For Kreid, severe poverty itself is a human rights violation. This is because the severely poor are in a state in which they cannot exercise their capacities to meet their basic needs and, thus, are denied the ability to live a basic decent human life. Kreid argues that combining the expediency principle with Pogge’s argument for the casual role of global economic institutions will further help to create a world in which the human right to be free from poverty is fulfilled (2007). On its own, Pogge’s negative duties model of human rights would potentially leave some of the poor without their human right to be free from poverty fulfilled, excluding the poor who are poor not as the consequence of harms caused by institutions.

Tom Campbell points out that in the absence of positive duties to the poor, the suffering of those who are poor due to natural disasters are excluded from moral consideration. Like Kreid, Campbell also considers poverty, in and of itself, to be a human rights violation. For Campbell, though, the human rights violation occurs not simply from being in a state of poverty (Kreid) or from the imposition of a coercive institutional order that produces foreseeable human rights deficits (Pogge), but when those in a position to help refuse to help (Campbell 2007).
Unlike Pogge and Kreid, Campbell is skeptical whether the case can be made that the global economic order bears some responsibility for poverty. He proposes instead a principle of humanity, which sees poverty as an evil due to the immense suffering that it causes, which generates a duty for those who can help to help (Ibid, 63-64). Though Kreid and Campbell differ on certain core issues regarding poverty and human rights, they both agree that Pogge’s concept of human rights as grounded in negative duties is conceptually inadequate.

For these critics, Pogge’s emphasis on negative duties fails to capture the moral claims of the poor. It would be morally unattractive if a theory of justice held that it is perfectly just that the disabled, or any others who needed assistance to access and make use of basic goods, should starve to death due to an inability to utilize their share of the resources. Pogge’s response to such critics has been to argue that his theory of justice, including his theory of human rights, is uncommitted and neutral on the issue of positive duties (2005a, 64, 67, 75). His aim is to set a moral minimum, leaving open the possibility that the fulfillment of human rights sometimes requires more than negative duties. I will follow Pogge’s lead in focusing on negative duties and will also remain neutral on whether or not there are positive duties to assist the global poor.

6.3 Conceptualizing Human Rights

Elizabeth Ashford and John Tasioulas have each argued that Pogge’s institutional model of human rights mistakenly excludes paradigm cases of human rights violations (Ashford 2007; Tasioulas 2007). Recall that, on Pogge’s institutional model, a human right entails that institutions be designed so that those living under the coercive force of these institutions have secure access to the object of their right (Pogge 2008b, 52). Additionally, human rights violations occur only when there are official violations, although official disrespect can occur even in the
A criticism that both Ashford and Tasioulas share against Pogge’s concept of human rights is that it fails to capture seemingly paradigmatic human rights violations by restricting human rights claims to a shared institutional order and official violations. Tasioulas asks: if a woman and her child are repeatedly abused by her husband then, “Why deny that he [the husband] is directly infringing their human rights to physical security? Is it plausible to think that a human rights dimension enters into such a case only if his pattern of abusive behavior can be interpreted as the object of official disregard within a coercively imposed institutional scheme?” (2007, 97). Ashford also raises the issue of domestic violence and adds cases of severe child neglect as another instance of a human rights violation ignored by Pogge’s institutional account of human rights. She argues that conceiving of domestic abuse as a human rights violation, regardless of whether it occurs under shared social institutions, does not appear to over-extend the concept of human rights (2007, 185).

These critics ask why the concept of human rights should be restricted to shared institutions and official violations/disrespect. Their arguments are that Pogge’s concept of human rights is too narrow: some individuals—such as women who are abused in a society where most other women enjoy physical security from their partners, or who are outside of our shared institutions—do not count. Ashford and Tasioulas both recommend that Pogge’s institutional account of human rights should be supplemented with an interactional account of human rights.

The promise of Pogge’s institutional account of human rights is that it builds a direct link between human rights and the state’s accountability to secure people’s basic human rights. As Pogge points out, his theory seems to be especially equipped to capture the moral failings of states when they ignore the interests of particular groups, for instance, when a woman is abused
and there are significant numbers of “persons relevantly like her” (2008b, 71). This is something that the interactional model, on its own, fails to do because its emphasis on individuals does not seem fully equipped to address systemic abuses and relate them to the arrangement of an institutional order and the attitudes of the people living within that order. Yet Pogge’s account seems to suggest that violence against women fully counts only when there are enough “persons relevantly like her.” That is, individuals do not seem to count enough on their own. Violence against women is a human right violation primarily when mandated by states or government officials acting in an official capacity. In many cases, even toleration by the governments of widespread deprivation of human rights may not constitute human rights violations, only official disrespect for human rights.

Elizabeth Ashford and John Tasioulas are primarily responding to Pogge’s first edition of World Poverty and Human Rights (2002) and earlier works, in which he outright rejects the interactional model of human rights. In Pogge’s response to these critics (2005a) and in his most recent publication of World Poverty and Human Rights (2008b), Pogge modifies his position on the interactional account of human rights. He argues that both the institutional and interactional accounts are compatible, but he leaves the question open as to whether or not the interactional model is suited to human rights or some other moral framework. In this way Pogge’s work appears open to the suggestion of supplementing his theory with the interactional model of human rights.

This response falls short of what I think is at the heart of the criticism. Before I explain that point, it is worth noting that given Pogge’s definition of human rights violations as official violations, it is unclear to what extent Pogge’s theory is really compatible with, or neutral, on the interactional model of human rights. Although Pogge updates his position to being neutral on the
interactional model, he also retains his position on domestic violence, maintaining the claim that a violent husband does not violate his wife’s human rights (2008b, 63-64). Despite Pogge’s modification, what remains is the lingering concern that incidences of domestic violence may not constitute human right violations—a concern that I share with his critics. Pogge’s response fails to adequately address the criticism of excluding seeming human rights violations.

Pogge, Ashford, and Tasioulas all share a problematic assumption in categorizing domestic violence as an interactional human rights violation. What is driving much of their intuitive appeals to domestic violence as a human rights violation is the systemic and “official” nature of such violence. That is, the appeal of domestic violence as a paradigm case of human rights violations is not necessarily an argument for the interactional account of human rights, but rather it may show that domestic violence should be construed as official violence and this is why Pogge is wrong to hold that it is not a human rights violation. In chapter four, I will develop this argument in more detail, but for now I will point out that if this is the case, the underlying problem in Pogge’s theory is a covert gender bias that disadvantages women. In claiming that the abuse of violent husbands does not violate human rights, Pogge ignores gender norms that often make women the targets of this type of violence. Evaluating injustices that women in particular experience often requires putting those injustices into context and not simply abstracting or individualizing the issue (Pateman 1994; 2005). Placing domestic abuse solely in the interactional category of human rights violations suggests exactly the sort of individualization that trivializes the nature of this violence as more of a global system of dominance over diverse women and children.

In conclusion, Ashford and Tasioulas hit on an important weakness in Pogge’s theory of human rights, although their assumptions regarding domestic violence also lead them to treat it
as an interactional problem. For this reason, I share some of their concerns, but I am not led toward the interactional account of human rights. Rather, I am interested in a deeper examination of why domestic violence appears to be a paradigm case of human rights violation.

In this next section, I will provide a chapter outlines followed by an overview of my argument that gender and race should be a central focal point in grounding the claim that the current global economic order is harming the poor.

8. Chapter Outline

The purpose of my analysis of Pogge’s work is to develop a more complete account of how the design of the current global economic order is harming the severely poor by situating this claim within the racialized and gendered context in which it is taking place. Unlike the empirical critics, I support Pogge’s argument that the poor are being harmed by current global economic structures and that the interconnectedness between national crisis and global mechanisms is clearly a feature of our world. In many ways, my critical analysis of Pogge’s work is meant to be complementary: once the gendered and racial features of these institutions are made visible, the claim that the poor are being harmed is even stronger by revealing how these harms are structured by gender and race bias.

This will not only provide moral clarity, but also points the way to better solutions to upending this global system of gender and racial oppression. One area where I clearly depart from Pogge is in the assumption that minor modification of implementing a global tax on natural resources (the GRD) is sufficient to eradicate severe poverty because institutional racism and gender injustice are left in place by maintaining the same overall global economic system.

In chapter two, I argue that the harms committed by transnational economic institutions
are gendered in that they disproportionately impact women, as it is women who take up much of the slack for the policies that are enforced upon poor countries. This provides evidence that the feminization of poverty is, in part, a product of the harms being produced by the current global economic order. I will examine Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the recent emergence of microcredit to support my argument. The links between transnational economic institutions and the feminization of poverty should be added to Pogge’s account of how these institutions are harming the poor. Otherwise, the disadvantage of poor women created by these institutions becomes irrelevant, mysterious, or assumed to be solely the product of national/local factors.

Similarly, in chapter three, I take up the issue of race, severe poverty, and global economic institutions. I show that Pogge frames the problem underlying the inequalities within the global economic institutions and poor nations as primarily an economic problem based in power inequalities among nations. This framing is conceptually misleading to the detriment of people of color because it fails to recognize the racial components of global economic structures, as well as who is being harmed. The history of colonialism shows that these institutions have been structured with racially charged hierarchies and this structure has persisted and continues to disadvantage people of color. Drawing on discourses that occurred within feminism on inclusion and difference, I show that the proper lens of analysis is not a national one, but one that also focuses on differences.

In chapter four, I argue that Pogge’s theory of human rights is gender biased. I use the problem of domestic violence to develop my argument both because Pogge asserts that it is not a human rights violation and also because it is representative of widespread violence against women. Rather than reject Pogge’s theory in its entirety, I argue his theory can be improved by
constructing a gender-sensitive account of what constitutes “official” violations. Human rights have powerful normative weight and are currently predominant international norms (Nickel 2007). In Pogge’s theory, women, relative to many men, are denied this international tool for securing their ability to be free from physical violence. Domestic violence affects women’s livelihood not only when it comes to physical violence, but gender violence is also often detrimental to women’s ability to participate in personal development, development projects, and the economic development of their countries (Joachim 1999, 157).

Lastly, in chapter five, I argue that the harms perpetuated against the poor by current global economic institutions are a product of institutional racism. I build on Gertrude Ezorsky’s institutional model of racism (1991), which is grounded in the effects of overtly race-neutral policies. My analysis shows that overt race-neutrality causes Pogge to miss this crucial component of the injustices that are being perpetuated by the current global order.

7. Conclusion: Taking Gender and Race Seriously, Again!

Taking gender and race seriously has been a call by feminist and critical race theorists to “mainstream” academia for several decades. Outside of these “sub”-groups within various disciplines there has been little response by philosophers such as Pogge. This is problematic not only because the moral relevance of race and gender to socio-political analysis is lost, but also because Pogge comes up short when measured against his own theoretical commitments. Pogge often warns his readers that the poor should not be conceived of as one group since they constitute a large and diverse group (2008b, 21). In practice, however, the complexities of who the poor are play no role in his analysis. The following chapters critique Pogge’s theory on precisely these grounds. I present various critiques that show how, in theory and practice, gender
and race cannot justifiably be separated out from Pogge’s analysis, or any analysis of severe poverty and human rights. As Charles Mills states taking gender and race as central starting points for theorizing is not a matter of putting gender and race “in,” it is a matter of showing how they have been taken “out” by theorists such as Pogge in relation to non-ideal circumstances of the world (Mills, forthcoming, 28).

Pogge is very clear that the identity of those who are suffering from severe poverty or injustices is morally important. He explicitly rejects the anonymity condition, which holds that from a justice perspective the identity of the subjects of injustice does not matter. Pogge’s reasoning is that the identity of who is being treated unjustly is morally relevant when a particular group, i.e., women or blacks, is overrepresented among that group (2008b, 50). Thus, overrepresentation is one key criterion for Pogge as to when individuals’ identities become morally salient to analysis. Pogge’s overall analysis is deeply inconsistent with his proclaimed moral commitments in this respect. He is also led to a gender and race “neutral” solution to severe poverty, the Global Resources Dividend, that does nothing to address racial and gender disparities, or even to challenge the institutional design that is helping to produce these disparities.

Gender and race have long remained on the margins of philosophical theorizing, just as many women and people of color remain on the margins of society, especially in the global arena of abject poverty. Visibility of how gender and racial injustice are interconnected with many other injustices is necessary if academia is to be relevant to the lives of those who suffer from these social, political, and economic oppressions. Global poverty represents one of the most severe injustices in history, as is the fact that so many women and people of color are the ones that are hit with the double-burden from the policies of global institutions. Now is not the time
for neutrality, but a time for “bias,” if this means taking as a philosophical starting point the reality of the fact that one’s biological sex, skin color, and location all have historical, social, and global meaning. Without this recognition, true gender and race bias will persist as a lens of philosophical analysis to the detriment of many women and people of color and to the detriment of philosophy.
Chapter 2: Gender and Transnational Economic Institutions

Thomas Pogge’s argument that current global economic institutions are harming the poor by contributing to severe poverty exhibits gender blindness in its non-recognition of the differentially situated conditions of many men and women among the global poor. The result is a gender bias that is produced by an analysis in which the relationship between global economic institutions and the feminization of poverty is conceptually absent. This bias is maintained in Pogge’s proposal for eradicating severe poverty as it consists of a scheme that leaves in place the current global economic order that is structured so as to overburden and economically crush a disproportionate amount of women and those under their care.

On the face of it, Pogge’s work may appear inclusive and responsive to women’s severe global poverty; his target is the severely poor defined as those who fall below the World Bank’s $1 a day poverty line (2008b). Since there is evidence that this group consists primarily of women (UNIFEM)\(^9\), it might be tempting to conclude that his theory is gender sensitive. This seeming gender inclusion is superficial. Since Pogge’s analysis does not disaggregate among different groups that make up the severely poor, groups that can be demarcated along the lines of sex, race, ethnicity, age, and the intersection of multiple factors, it is not sensitive to how current global economic institutions differentially impact each group. A criterion that Pogge holds as a necessary measure of the justness/unjustness of institutions is that “…avoidable shortfalls from secure access to minimally adequate shares of basic goods…must also take into account how social institutions relate to such shortfalls” (2008b, 47). Pogge’s analysis is focused on the

absolute poor. That women appear to be overrepresented among that group does not amount to gender inclusion if a real examination of how women and men are differentially impacted is absent from his analysis. Without this theoretical lens, Pogge’s theory fails to grasp the gendered nature of severe poverty since there is no conceptual or explanatory picture of how global economic institutions are contributing to a global order in which women seem to be faring worse than men among the global poor. Without such an analysis, the explanatory power of Pogge’s theory is unequipped to grasp the global structures contributing to severe poverty in general since gender is a central structure that informs, shapes, and defines many of the features of poverty.

In this chapter, I will argue that Pogge’s gender “neutral” approach to severe poverty generates a gender bias, which makes injustices experienced by women disappear into theoretical anonymity. At the heart of this deficiency in Pogge’s work is his overtly gender-neutral approach to global poverty. By overt neutrality, I mean that his reference to the “severely poor” as a mass category appears inclusive by seeming to count all who fall below $1 a day equally. Nevertheless, when dealing with severe poverty this approach is neither neutral nor inclusive as the global root causes that contribute to severe poverty as a gendered phenomenon are ignored. This both silences women’s disproportionate suffering and leaves the causes of severe poverty not fully explained. The failure to address the feminization of poverty means that the overall problem of poverty will not disappear since the gendered global institutions and structures are unaltered.

The feminization of poverty should pull political philosophers like Pogge to resist the

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10 An analogous case would be examining the injustices of the prison system in the U.S. without taking into account race. The fact that it is overwhelmingly black men in prison is not given equal moral weight by the mere fact that one is looking at the population as a whole. What is necessary in this case is to look at the racial and racist dynamics that define specific injustices that black men are subjected to.
temptation to treat gender as a footnote\textsuperscript{11} to the moral crisis of severe global poverty. Global economic institutions currently operate within a context that is deeply influenced by gendered assumptions about women, women’s work, and women’s general social function in ways that contribute to the feminization of poverty. Pogge calls our attention to how the global order is harming the poor through the abuse of unequal bargaining power, resource privilege, and borrowing privilege, and he is right to do so. But these features of the global order alone render the existence of the feminization of poverty a mystery, or at least, suggest that it is caused by national/local/household factors and not global factors. Such assumptions are deeply misleading, and it is essential that they be directly brought to light and challenged. Gender structures are shaped and impacted by multiple factors: if global transnational institutions are causing severe poverty, then national explanations for women’s overrepresentation as the world’s poorest are no longer sufficient. Gender structures are not confined by national boundaries, by households, or by local communities; I will argue they are transnational.

To illustrate the connection between global economic institutions and gender I will draw on the impact of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which represent lending policies of global economic institutions that require large-scale restructuring of the economies of many poor nations. I will then examine microcredit, an economic model of poverty eradication popularized by the economist Yunus Muhammad, which provides small-scale loans to women as a method of eradicating poverty through providing monetary economic resources for entrepreneurship. Although the scale and scope of these policies are different in important respects, they share important assumptions regarding the centrality of capitalist markets and women’s labor as society’s “safety nets,” in place of government-funded social services pulled back by neoliberal

\textsuperscript{11} Charles Mills uses this expression to refer to replacing analysis of race, where race appears morally significant, with the intermittent reference to race. In this case, Pogge takes the footnoting approach by periodically noting that the poor are primarily women and bypassing its moral implications (1997, 56).
policies. That is, privatization, individualism in place of social responsibilities, and entrepreneurship are all capitalist mechanisms of economic and social regulation exhibited by SAPs and microcredit. At their core both perpetuate a never-ending cycle of credit/debt. Within this context I will argue that the causal harms to the poor generated by current transnational institutions are gendered and are contributing to the feminization of poverty. Although they may not be the sole causes of poverty, the reformation of these institutions or the abandonment of these practices would be an important part of undoing the gender injustice currently sustained by global transnational institutions. I will first turn to the question of whether or not the feminization of poverty is actually occurring, since its status is now being contested.

1. Is There a Feminization of Poverty?

The claim that poverty is feminized has long been regarded as a feature of global poverty, but more recently has become the subject of critical scrutiny. In general terms the feminization of poverty is typically defined as the claim that women compose roughly 70 percent of the world’s poor or at least, that the percentage of women who are poor is increasing, with the gender gap increasing as well (Moghadam 2005, 7; Chant 2007, 78).

One challenge to the feminization of poverty relates to the problem of measuring poverty according to an income metric, typically used by institutions such as the World Bank. The income metric applies to assessing rates of poverty in general and has been identified as seriously deficient in its ability accurately to measure poverty. For instance, Amartya Sen has famously criticized income metrics because they cannot account for individuals’ ability to convert resources into substantive freedoms. That is, such a metric cannot capture what

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individuals can actually do and achieve with their incomes. A person who appears to fare better because of a higher income relative to another individual may actually fare worse than the individual with the lower income because social conditions inhibit her capacity to convert her income into freedoms (Sen 2000). Sen’s criticism illustrates the limitations and misleading nature of income measurements of poverty that do not take into account different dimensions of poverty.

Sen’s critique has implications for the feminization of poverty, a point raised by Sylvia Chant. Chant argues that existing money-metric income measurements do not withstand scrutiny in terms of accurately measuring women’s poverty relative to men’s, i.e., the feminization of poverty, because they exclude non-income factors relevant to women’s incidences of poverty. These factors include women’s unpaid domestic labor and power inequalities in the house that may prevent women from using their earned income (Chant 2007, 79). Chant argues that stronger definitions of the feminization of poverty that state women compose 70 percent of the poor are unsupported by income measurements of poverty. She further argues that a few studies of relative income levels between individual men and women in Latin America show no statistical difference in poverty rates. As for the rest of much of the global South, income-level measurements usually compare households, not individuals, and are thus unable to validate the claim that women, relative to poor men, are faring worse when it comes to poverty (Chant 2007, 82; Wisor 2010).

These criticisms of income-based metrics for measuring poverty reveal that there are serious problems and questions that need to be addressed when measuring poverty in general or in gendered terms (although I hold the position that measuring poverty in general terms requires measuring poverty in gendered terms). Does this mean that the feminization of poverty must be
abandoned as inaccurate and outdated? I think not. The feminization of poverty defined as women’s overrepresentation among the poor relative to men, and/or a growing gender gap, warrants further investigation and an examination of women’s overburden provides a stronger case for what seems likely translatable into a poverty burden. I turn to a few cases in which work on poverty that does not rely on income metrics backs the feminization of poverty, rather than undermining it.

There have increasingly been efforts to begin to go beyond income when measuring poverty and to recognize the multidimensional features of poverty, such as raised by Chant and Sen. The work that has been done in this area establishes both the gendered nature of poverty and the seeming disadvantage that poor women experience relative to similarly situated men. In a World Bank study on poverty, whose goal was to listen to the poor in their own words, one of the strongest conclusions drawn was “[g]ender relations need to become an integral part of all poverty reduction strategies. This needs to be reflected in institutional goals, design, incentives and criteria of success that are monitored and evaluated” (Narayan et al. 2000, 161). This sentiment has also been expressed by feminist academics who disagree over the status of the feminization of poverty, but agree that gender is central to poverty (Wisor 2010). This indicates that there is at least one thing that the feminization of poverty gets right, which is to call to attention the fact that gender is a core feature of poverty and must be accounted for. Of course, it is possible to object that gender is central, but that the feminization of poverty is an outdated and unsubstantiated concept. There are several reasons to resist such a conclusion.

Critics of the feminization of poverty have been successful in casting doubt, but have not overturned the feminized nature of poverty as an accurate portrayal of poverty (with the

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13 Alison Jaggar has helpfully pointed out that even this claim is subject to multiple interpretations and its meaning, just as its measurement, must also further be explored and defined.
exception of the claim that women make of 70 percent of the world’s poor). What they have done is show that more research is required regarding existing gender inequalities among the poor because in the case of income-based measurements, evidence is either ambiguous or shows no real differences (Chant 2007, 80-81). This means that the income metric cannot necessarily justify claims of gender inequities that are worse for women, but not necessarily that the latter claims are unjustified or have no backing from other areas of research. Research that does not rely on income for measuring poverty provides more support for the claim that poor women are disproportionately worse off than poor men than for the alternate claim that the feminization of poverty is a fiction. For instance, Sylvia Chant points out that in the global South, although women earn less of the shared income than men, there have been significant gender gaps in time spent working. Women have spent more time working than men, with differentials ranging from 547 minutes per day for women and 117 for men in Nepal (1970s), to 399 for women to 356 for men in Colombia (1980s) (Chant 2007, 98). Chant says that

The significance of women having lower shares of income is brought into further relief by quantitative data on time-use for a range of countries which point to their overall hours in work exceeding those of men. That women spend more time in non-market than market activities is also important in so far as a large amount of their labor efforts remain unremunerated, and undoubtedly impinge on their scope to earn more income. (83)

Thus, what appear to be small income disparities become much more significant when measured against large gaps in time spent working. Such differences display the double disadvantage mediated through gender—giving women less income, while extracting more labor. Income data alone obscure these differences, but looking deeper can reveal conditions that exacerbate women’s poverty relative to men that are similarly situated. In fact the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has adopted a partial capabilities approach focusing on what individuals can actually do with resources, such as income. Using a Human Development Index (HDI), the UNDP, in addition to income, measures poverty by assessing access to material
resources, such as clean water, education, and health services among other basic necessities (Cagatay 1998, 7). The findings have been that women face a distinct disadvantage in multiple arenas of their lives in that “it is harder for women to transform their income into incomes or well-beings” (Cagatay 1998, 8). Reasons for this rest heavily on women’s limited power in various spheres of life, such as those identified by the UNDP as ranging from gender bias in the labor markets and social exclusion to women’s concentration as unpaid caretakers and subjection to time poverty. Researchers concluded that these circumstances create increased vulnerability for women with respect to poverty (Ibid).

Other factors that lend credence to the feminization of poverty are legal institutions that can operate as a web of obstacles, which impede women’s ability to move out of poverty. This is especially clear in laws of inheritance, in which women’s legal rights to inheritance are rarely enforced, leaving them poorer than they might have been otherwise. Such laws also have the effect of sending resources toward men, which means that “[i]n general, men are the financial winners from divorce, and women are the financial losers” (Narayan et al. 2000, 154). In cases where poor women have legal rights, they might give in to cultural norms that do not allow them equal rights of inheritance or ownership: “even if a woman is given a chicken or a goat by her parents, she cannot own it. It belongs to her husband. A wife may work hard and get a chicken. If it lays eggs, they belong to the husband” (Ibid, 138). These legal institutions operate within the framework of gendered structures, both formal and informal, and adversely affect poor women through the loss of material resources not counted by income. Legal institutions can reinforce and perpetuate power inequalities that have the consequence of worsening women’s economic standing in a way that does not occur for men. This occurrence is missed by income metrics of poverty, but appears to lend legitimacy to the feminization of poverty.
Another arena that lends credence to the feminization of poverty is the high numbers of women working in the informal sector, which is, “largely unregulated and untaxed and exposing women to the dangers of the informal economy that include exploitation, abuse, and lack of legal rights to name a few ” (Ibid, 143). Although the informal sector has been pushed onto poor women as a golden opportunity it carries with it a high price, as the informal economy does not offer protections for women and is one of the most unstable arenas during times of global recession. UNIFEM reports that export manufacturing jobs in which 60 to 80 percent of women are the laborers are shrinking in response to the current global economic crisis. The impact is gender biased since women are often the first to be fired and economic instability often causes children, especially girls, to be pulled from school. Food deprivation is also gendered. UNIFEM reports that in Sri Lanka, women have had to reduce the number of meals that they consume since the cost of basic necessities has risen as wages have declined.\(^{14}\) This suggests that women are especially vulnerable to global instability since the informal sector by its very construction is linked to the waxing and waning of the global economy.

Additionally, research on the identified poor shows a gender difference in dealing with increasing poverty that is especially hard on women. A World Bank study on poverty found that during economic crisis in poor countries men have frequently dealt with the increased poverty, specifically the loss of their status as the primary income earner, “by collapsing into drugs, alcohol, depression, wife-beating or walking away” and a reluctance to take on “demeaning” work (Narayan et al. 2000, 160). In contrast, it has been women who have tended to respond by taking up slack (Ibid). The extra burden of income work, coupled with the continual burden of maintaining the household, unsteady work, increased vulnerability to the ups and downs of the

\(^{14}\) UNIFEM. Facts & Figures on Women, Poverty & Economics. 
global economy, power inequalities in the household, and power inequalities reinforced by legal structures all lend credence to the claim that poverty is in fact feminized.

What these studies show is that measuring poverty must account for the multifaceted and gendered nature of current global poverty. Gender sensitivity clearly requires that researchers go beyond income, and that metrics such as capabilities offer a more comprehensive and accurate portrayal of severe poverty, for both men and women. The criticisms of the sole use of income metrics for assessing poverty are valid, but a wholesale rejection of the feminization of poverty does not follow, as non-income measurements tend to back the feminization of poverty as a legitimate concern, rather than undermine it. There is still a long way to go before alternative accounts/measurements of poverty are available. But what information is available now consistently validates the claim that poverty is experienced in disproportionate rates by women, and those under their care, due to legal, social, and economic constraints.

In the rest of the chapter, I will maintain that poor women are disproportionately worse off than poor men and that this constitutes the feminization of poverty. Additionally, my analysis leans toward a capabilities approach, although I do not hold that this is the only or best way to measure poverty and the wellbeing of the poor. Instead, it is just one alternative way of conceptualizing how gender and poverty intermix to create and recreate the condition of global poverty. Before I develop my claim that SAPs and microcredit are not only harming the poor, but contributing to the feminization of poverty, I will first address the problem of theorizing about women on a global scale given that there exists no one identifiable homogenous group such as “women,” who are equally situated: being neither equally burdened nor equally privileged.

2. Gender and the Global Economic Order: A Note on Diversity, Inequality, and Dominance Among Women
The global causes of severe poverty cannot be abstracted from the complex gender injustice in which it takes place. It is complex to the extent that women cannot be treated as a homogeneous group; differences of race, class, and nation always come into play. How gender is defined for different groups will vary. For instance, Bette Tallen states that initially her identity as a lesbian was taken, by many feminists, to be separate from gender issues (or feminist issues), as some feminists assumed that lesbianism was a gay issue, to be dealt with by lesbians and gay men, rather than a feminist issue about women’s sexuality (210). This exhibits the potential for domination among women, which results from diverse identities embedded in social contexts.

On a global level, current global economic institutions are disproportionately adversely impacting poor women in the global South. Thus, the North/South “divide” is often marked by differences in power and privilege among women, where women in the global North tend to be more privileged due to their socio-economic and national status.

Taking into account the differences among women and the varying relationships that women have to globalization generally, and global economic institutions more specifically, a gendered analysis remains necessary. One reason is that there is an identifiable causal link between global institutions and the conditions of poor women in the global South, whose identities are deeply situated within gendered social roles, as well as racial identities, and national and cultural images. For instance, several theorists that I discuss below show how gender-informed cultural imaginings are used as fuel for microcredit lending flowing from and in turn influencing the agendas of current global economic policies. My analysis does not rest on the assumption that women make up some sort of homogeneous group indicative of a natural kind, which we can easily parse out of nature as a category. It is possible to recognize the complexity of individuals’ identities and also the existence of other structures of domination.
while simultaneously recognizing gender as one important factor that causally influences many poor women to suffer the brute effects of the current global order.

There are deep and far reaching real world consequences to the categorization of the sexes according to gender, with its accompanying social roles. In an economically integrated world, these consequences have implications beyond the local and national; they impact and are impacted by global processes including the processes of dominant transnational economic institutions. I offer a gendered causal and moral analysis on the connection between global economic institutions and poor women, with recognition that due to the arrangement of the global order, the scope of my argument will primarily apply to poor women living in the global South.

3. The “Elephant(s)” in the Room

Two factors at the root of global harms against the poor are Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and microcredit. As I will discuss in more detail below, SAPs are development policies imposed by global economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Microcredit is a monetary lending initiative that provides small loans to poor women for the stated purpose of fostering entrepreneurship as a route out of poverty. Both are casually linked to women’s increased vulnerability to poverty, incidences of severe poverty, and the feminization of poverty. Although there exist important differences between the SAPs and microcredit, they share some of the same capitalist economic assumptions, which are deeply gendered.

David Schweickart has recently criticized Pogge’s analysis of global poverty, claiming that Pogge misses the “elephant” in the room, which is the connection between global capitalism
and global poverty (2008). Schweickart argues that Pogge’s self-labeled modest reforms for eliminating severe poverty fail to take into account four central features of global capitalism: an ever increasing need to expand markets, the continuous pressure to force other countries to lower trade-barriers in order to expand their own capitalist markets, the subsequent deterioration of local avenues of food production and other industries (which cannot compete with strong-arming trade-barrier tactics of institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank), and the inevitable destruction of local industry, which renders millions jobless, forcing them to migrate as they become cheap labor for capitalist institutions. The heart of Schweickart’s critique is that current global economic structures (and institutions), in this case capitalism, are contributing to severe poverty, yet their existence is completely ignored by Pogge (Ibid).

The insight that Schweickart offers is that global phenomena that initially appear unrelated can represent features of the same capitalist economic structures that are institutionalized through the policies of transnational institutions. This relationship is greatly exploitative as unemployment and poverty seem to be direct products of global capitalism. Schweickart makes the case that capitalist ideology and its material demands are driving global economic institutions and that this must be acknowledged in order seriously to address and combat the harms being perpetrated by these institutions.

That economic structures are, in part, the products of particular ideological frameworks is a point that is often missed by many theorists and development practitioners. In many cases economic theories, and especially with capitalism, are taken to be common sense and unbiased objective theories. In contrast, feminists critical of this assumption argue that economic “facts” are often value-laden, although this is often disguised by the language of “rationality,” which feigns an objectivity and inevitability that favor a particular market organization (Jaggar 2008;
Strassmann 2008). This hides the fact that value-laden assumptions underlie all economic theories. As it turns out, values themselves constitute the inevitable characteristics of any economic system, since, as feminists theorists argue, every economic model must necessarily make some value judgments on human well being and social contribution (Jaggar 2008, 71). Without this recognition, gender, as I will show below, and other structures disappear from economic arrangements and norms.

In the following sections, I will argue that, SAPs and microcredit are the products of a gender-capitalist, or neoliberal, paradigm. This is seen in their push for increased privatization of and over public goods, the assumption that the provision of many government social services is not necessary for “growth” or poverty eradication, and the pushing forward of market “solutions” to the problems of growth and poverty. In this way, gender and global capitalism can be read as an informative script for many of the multiple, seemingly distinct actions of global institutions.

4. Structural Adjustment Programs: Subjugating Women to Poverty

Prescribing the nature of the relationship between women and development has been the ongoing subject of debate and disagreement. In consequence, there are multiple ways of defining what development should mean to women, how gender should be conceived, and what women and men’s roles ought to be. For instance, Women in Development (WID) developed in the 1970s in response to the lack of attention given to women in the development process. WID pushed for the inclusion of women in the development process, with little challenge to the dominant economic models of development. This was followed by Women and Development (WAD), which took a more critical stance on development, claiming that the problem was no

15 I will provide a more detailed description of neoliberalism below.
longer that women were being left out, but that women were being included only as instrumental resources for development, instead of development working for women. Finally, Gender and Development (GAD) offered an alternative to both WID and WAD by calling for a focus, not on women exclusively, but on gender (and other social systems) (Connelly et al. 2002). Although these conceptual models of development differ, what they share is an on-the-ground call for taking into account the gendered presuppositions and impacts of development agendas for poverty alleviation. Despite these wide-ranging criticisms by groups studying the relationship between gender and development and drawing attention to the need to take gender into account, philosophers operating within conventional frameworks have paid little attention to the issues raised by these critics. Thus, feminist criticisms of development agendas largely remain relegated to seeming special interests circles.

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) represent one of the largest scale development programs implemented in the global South. SAPs are the product of the global debt crisis that occurred in the late seventies and early eighties in which commercial banks, controlled by the West, feared that failing poor countries would be unable to repay the debts that they had accrued (Gershman and Irwin 2000). The connection between SAPs and development is that the money that global financial institutions, like the (IMF), provided was not “free,” mandating that borrowing countries, as Alison Jaggar has stated, “adjust” their economies (2002, 120). The raison d’etre of SAPs is the global crisis felt by both the commercial banks and the failing economies of poor nations. SAPs always possessed the two-fold goal of ensuring debt repayment and stabilizing poor countries, but in many cases only the former (debt repayment) has been successful, as recipient countries in the global South continue to struggle and face mounting debt. This means that the goal of reducing poverty through development loans from international
financial institutions has been largely a failure (Jaggar 2002, 120; Stiglitz 2002). One thing that has changed is that poor countries are now primarily indebted to transnational economic institutions controlled by various states, i.e., the IMF and the World Bank, in contrast to the late eighties where the primary debt holders were within private industry (Gershman and Irwin 2000, 24).

In order fully to understand the impact of SAPs, it is necessary to examine the economic ideology behind SAPs: neoliberalism. In general terms, neoliberalism is an economic paradigm that arose in the 20th century and received its greatest support during the 1980s under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Given the global reach of neoliberalism, it is in some ways difficult to define if it is one thing for all peoples and all places. Despite this complexity, there are some core characteristics that generally compose the economic ideology of neoliberalism that is born and bred out of, and as a part of, capitalism. These are: market-oriented solutions to poverty that favor privatization (Hawkesworth 2006, 18-22), a reduction in state services (Desai 2002, 16; Okin 2003, 282-283), and the assumption that poverty is an administrative and not a political problem—political in the sense of being value-laden and up for contestation by those subject to its rules (Ferguson and Lohmann 1994). While the first two features highlight the shrinking of the state and the expansion of markets, the last point illustrates what some have identified as the increased role of the state. For instance, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell have argued that this “rolling back” of state services has been accompanied by a “rolling in” of the state through the increased bureaucratization mechanisms of neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002, 338). This adds to the complexity of neoliberalism because it is in part oriented toward reducing the role of government, in terms of services, while at the same time it expands government power through its administrative attitude toward poverty reduction.
The mantra of neoliberal ideology as enacted through SAPs is greater privatization, transference of state services to the private sphere, and the depoliticization of economic policies. This has been particularly harmful to women. Though there are many important effects of SAPs, for my purposes, I will focus on the effect of the privatization of state services on the lives of women in the global South.

SAPs’ policy of rolling back public goods provided by the state may appear to be a gender-neutral economic policy, but this neutrality is merely superficial. The reduction of state social services has been especially devastating for women, who have had to function as “shock absorbers” to fill the gap left by shrinking provisions of public goods such as child care, education, and healthcare (Moghadam 2005, 38-40). Women’s socially assigned responsibilities make them especially reliant on these services. For instance, Mary E. Hawkesworth cites the United Nations Development Project, which has calculated that 70 of unwaged but socially necessary work, such as childcare and care of elderly and sick family members, is performed by women (2006, 20). Women’s socially designated responsibilities in the domestic arena combine with the gender “blind” economic paradigm of SAPs and give rise to gender injustice that is directly linked to the policies of transnational institutions that implement SAPs; poor women’s labor is foreseeably exploited as they cannot afford the cost of privatized goods and so these goods are provided through the cost of poor women’s extra-labor. Through SAPs, global economic institutions restructure the economies of poor countries in a way that adversely impacts women by increasing their burden and in turn making their poverty worse, in a way that does not similarly occur for many similarly situated men.

When SAPs explicitly leave gender out of the equation of poverty reduction, it obscures underlying value-laden assumptions that implicitly rely on certain gender norms regarding work
and productivity. Susan Okin illustrates how this operates, noting that neoliberal economists label much of the work performed by women, such as filling the gap left by SAPs, as non-productive. A reduction in these social goods (despite the adverse impact on poor women) does not register as a negative for economic development (Okin 2003, 285). SAPs do not just miss the mark, they are necessarily incapable of accounting for the harm inflicted upon poor women, including the increased time, energy, and responsibilities of the doubling of duties. Neoliberalism is very much in line with Western capitalist economic models of productivity that have a long history of disregarding and failing to acknowledge women’s productivity. These theories have tended to draw the boundaries of the economic sphere at the doorstep of the household, the sphere of so much of women’s labor (Warring 2008).

Despite the fact that some recent measurements of development, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), have made improvements in recognizing the need to measure women’s status (Warring 2008) gender bias remains in important global policies. In this case the gender bias in SAPs is generated by non-recognition of the differing effects that restructuring has on men and women, including girls and boys. The supposed gender “neutral” economic policies of SAPs continue to tell a different story of how well men and women are faring under the privatization of state services. Susan Okin describes how the increased burden on women occurs and is simultaneously rendered invisible to the global economic eye:

Sometimes the negative impact on women of seemingly neutral economic thinking is less direct. Recent development policies have resulted in the shutting down of some industries and the opening up of others. Since economists regard jobs at the same pay level as fungible, if a male earner loses his job because an automobile factory is converted into a clothing factory, which hires his wife at the same rate, nothing has changed. If she continues to do all the housework, thus working a double-shift while her husband does little or nothing, there is still no change, economically speaking. (2003, 285)

Poor women cannot afford the cost of losing social goods. These costs are rarely recognized and play no role in guiding SAPs. When gender is brought to bear as a lens of analysis, it is apparent
that a disproportionate negative impact on poor women is taking place largely because of
preconceived assumptions regarding the boundaries of economic productivity. These
assumptions are gendered to the extent that what is commonly considered “women’s work” is
also what is typically considered as non-productive. Consequently, as Okin discusses, the
increases in women’s workload carry no negative economic consequences.

But adverse economic differences take place when extra labor burdens are shouldered by
women in conditions that are brought about and exacerbated by the policies of SAPs. Shrinking
state services mean an increase in extra “time-labor” (which can include unpaid work) (Warring
2008) extracted from poor women. When the poor can no longer afford the cost of privatized
goods/services, women are often forced to undertaken the double or triple burdens of work, in
which the boundaries of what is “productive” and “non-productive” are often blurred (Ibid). That
this is not counted as a negative economic consequence of SAPs is unjustifiable. Okin cites a
comprehensive study on poverty in which poor women in the global South frequently pointed to
exhaustion as a core feature of what it means for them to be poor. She quotes one woman from
the study who sums up this feeling by expressing a desire to be able to “sleep until you are no
longer tired” (Okin 2003, 306). The so-claimed gender neutrality of SAPs washes out the
experiences of poor women. On closer examination, poor women’s situations have been made
worse than those of similarly situated men by the restructuring dictated by SAPs.

The privatization of health services also generates a gendered health cost. Since care for
family members is overwhelmingly socially assigned to women, reducing (or eliminating) access
to health services raises poor women’s work-load, threatens their health, and is harmful to those
living under their care, since women’s at-home labor cannot compensate for the care and
treatment provided by hospitals and trained doctors. In this way, the declining welfare of poor
women, due to the feminization of poverty perpetuated by SAPs, significantly harms children. In 2006 a study on the welfare of poor children across the globe estimated that roughly 10.5 million children under the age of five are dying of easily preventable diseases, such as malaria, AIDS, diarrhea, and the measles. One of the most important factors identified for combating this cycle of unnecessary suffering and death is to maintain the health of children and their mothers (UNICEF 2006, 10). SAPs undermine both goals through economic restructuring of goods and services from the public to the private sphere.

The dwindling of state services called for by SAPs is a gendered project that has been disguised by a false gender-neutrality embedded in the language of market rationality that feigns an apolitical and unbiased status. Yet, if it is well documented that women are the world’s domestic laborers, both within and outside of their households, then the harm inflicted upon poor women is both a foreseeable and avoidable gendered harm that is contributing to the feminization of poverty. On a theoretical level, critics of traditional economic models, which largely ignore the domestic sphere, have long pointed out that ignoring the unpaid work that takes place in this sphere particularly undervalues women’s labor (Benería 2008). SAPs rely on an economic logic that overemphasizes growth as increasing GDP. By not accounting for women’s increase in unpaid labor and using such aggregate statistics, GDP may look promising, even as women’s poverty may be worsening relative to that of similarly situated poor men. Such aggregate statistics ignore non-income household activities, and the division of labor along gender lines means that the gender bias (as well as class biases) of SAPs is masked. Poverty measurements that go beyond the doorsteps of the household, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), have began to illuminate the importance of including gender in development measurements. In the absence of any real changes to the economic policies and paradigms
employed by SAPs, these measurements have little relevance to combating the harm inflicted upon many poor women in the global South by SAPs.

The story that SAPs tell is that real gender justice cannot be achieved by formal equality, which claims to treat both sexes equally by recognizing no difference between the two. Failure to account for gender differences in social positioning has harmed poor women whose poverty is exacerbated and sustained when they are positioned to become the “shock absorbers” for the pullback of much needed social services. When global economic institutions turned their gaze towards the global South, issues tied to development and poverty were reduced to issues of markets. This reflects a long history of “commonsense” logic that fails to see its own value judgments in choosing to give no value to women’s domestic labor (Strassmann 2008, 71-75). The result is that the social position of women in the domestic sphere does not come into play, and poverty is construed primarily as a problem of increasing a country’s Gross Domestic Product.

It might be tempting to argue that global policies such as SAPs bear no responsibility for the disparate gender impact. One might object that SAPs are not contributing to the feminization of poverty because if national factors were different, in this case, if women were not already assigned to particular gender roles having to do with domestic labor and caretaking, then SAPs would not have such gendered outcomes. This argument identifies the current gender injustice indicative of severe global poverty in factors internal to a state, not in global factors. If this is the case, then global economic institutions might be harming the poor, as Pogge claims, but not harming poor women in particular. Thus, explanatory nationalism, which blames poor nations for their poverty, may be false, while at the same time domestic explanations for women’s severe poverty (explanatory national genderism?) may be true. The implication of this argument is that
Pogge might not be wrong to ignore the feminization of poverty as impacted by global factors, such as SAPs, because global economic institutions are not responsible for the *feminization* of poverty.

This type of argument, with its familiar assumptions about the household causes of gender injustice in the global South by philosophers from the global North, does not withstand scrutiny (see Jaggar 2005). Current global economic institutions exacerbate women’s poverty by taking advantage of existing social and political structures. That a policy is prima facie gender neutral does not entail that it is gender neutral all things considered. Overt gender neutrality may simply be assuming that current unequal gender roles are natural and inevitable, as if by biological destiny women are the world’s caregivers. Yet it is not simply that these global institutions take advantage of domestic structures, but also that they help to maintain these structures by increasing women’s economic vulnerability. For instance, one common consequence of increasing the workload of poor women, labeled both “productive” and “non-productive,” is that girls are pulled from school to assist their mothers (Hawkesworth 2006, 21). This hinders their ability to act as agents of reform to escape poverty and so begins to create the next generation of poverty. Additionally, as Pogge himself argues, the fact that a harm could be avoided if one of two parties had refrained from a particular action does not entail that one party may claim that it is not responsible for the harm caused (2005a). Even if national factors come into play, this does not absolve global economic institutions for their role in exacerbating women’s severe poverty. The claim that domestic factors are solely responsible for the feminization of poverty is untenable. Global economic institutions have their hands deep inside the economic, social, and political spheres of poor nations, and as the outcome suggests, have implicitly counted on the gendered division of labor as a condition for increasing GDP. If women
perform seventy percent of the world’s unwaged work, then it is no mystery who will take up the burden when state services are pulled back.

The purpose of examining SAPs is to show how global economic institutions are specifically harming women, disproportionately to men, by exacerbating their poverty. Pogge would probably not object to what I have said so far regarding SAPs and regarding my rejection of explanatory gender nationalism. This does not mean that his omission of an analysis of the global causes of the feminization of poverty is unproblematic. His silence on the global causes of the feminization of poverty implies that the explanatory gender thesis about women’s severe poverty is correct. That is, on Pogge’s account of the global causes of global poverty (such as unequal bargaining power, resource privilege, and borrowing privilege), there appears to be no relationship between the feminization of poverty and the current global order. As I stated earlier, the feminization of poverty is a mystery on Pogge’s model—one that is too easily solved by domestic theses regarding women’s poverty.

It is a mistake not to make gender central to an analysis of the relationship between the global order and poverty, in the same way that an omission of an analysis of race in studying slavery in the United States would be conceptually incomplete and imply that race and racism are not core features of the problem. Black slavery in the United States could not be properly critiqued without the inclusion of the fact that at the heart of slavery it is an issue about blackness versus whiteness, not simply an issue about legal and social rights. In this case, who is poor matters just as much as asking who was being enslaved during American chattel slavery. Ignoring the fact that it is women disproportionately suffering from severe poverty needs some type of justification, which is often not given and is certainly not offered by Pogge. To take an overtly gender neutral approach is to ignore and marginalize the gender injustice occurring as a
result of the institution of SAPs by global economic institutions. The gender bias in Pogge’s theory is marked by his failure to challenge the global economic structures that are primarily harming women. Thus, the implication is that there is nothing seriously wrong with the fact that the global economic order has such a disparate impact on the basis of gender.

6. Microcredit: A Debt Shackle on Women in the Global South

Microcredit is a global lending policy that aims to reduce poverty by providing small loans to poor women in order to promote entrepreneurship. Microcredit started as a cooperative venture among poor women who pooled their resources. In its current and most popular global form, it is a program undertaken and supported by the World Bank, multiple Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Hawkesworth 2006, 136-139), and commercial banks. In many cases funding for microcredit loans is conditional on the basis that the loans are given to women and not to men (Poster and Salime 2002, 196). Gender targeting as a policy of microcredit is a self-conscious and, as I will discuss below, self-interested act on behalf of the lenders. Not all instantiations of microcredit lending are the same, but the legitimizing rhetoric of many microcredit lenders boasts the power of entrepreneurship and the self-made individual as an important tool for combating poverty. The locus of reform, then, is based in individualism and is not structural.

In this section, I will briefly explain what seems promising about microcredit. Particularly, microcredit initially appears to address problems of gender bias rampant in SAPs. I will then argue that microcredit is a clear example of how global economic institutions function so as to contribute to and sustain the feminization of poverty. Microcredit appear to be inclusive of women in development programs. In reality it often perpetuates the feminization of poverty,
keeping women socially vulnerable, while at the same time claiming to improve their lives. My claim is that microcredit, as institutionalized through current global economic institutions, represents a gendered harm perpetuated by these institutions. I will argue that a central problem with microcredit is that it is part and parcel of a “free-market” enterprise that uses self-help and entrepreneurship as the central means for eradicating poverty. Such a model is unsuitable, both within “developed” and “developing” countries, allowing for the continuation of structural, social, and political problems that create the circumstances of poverty by placing attention on individuals and their ability to pull themselves up by their bootstraps.

### 6.1 The Promise of Inclusion

In 2006, microcredit as a method for eradicating poverty gained global legitimacy when the Nobel Peace Prize was cograded to Muhammad Yunus, the creator of microcredit, and the Grameen Bank, who provided the money for microcredit.\(^\text{16}\) Although microcredit is promoted as a small scale-lending program, it resides in a larger capitalist framework that sees markets as central to wealth production, in contrast to broader structural changes that would bring about institutional reforms in the distribution of goods. For instance, the Grameen Bank promotes microcredit, specifically access to credit, as a human right,\(^\text{17}\) which stands radically outside of a typical human rights framework insofar as it implicitly postulates a human right to fall into debt. Standard human rights doctrines, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, focus on political, social, and economic rights to raise individuals to a certain standing in such a way that the fulfillment of these rights is not accompanied by a debt burden. The Grameen Bank, instead

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of promoting, for example, a right to work in order to secure basic goods such as food, water, and shelter, promotes a human right to borrow money in order to make money to get those basic goods. From this model, it is clear that microcredit is based on a capitalist market ideology, deeply connected with neoliberal ideals of economic markets as a core mechanism for driving development.

The two features of microcredit that have especially been singled out for praise are: its targeting poor women as ideal borrowers and its positioning as a global poverty reduction program that relies on bottom-up, or development from “below,” strategies. The last point is designed to indicate microcredit’s anti-elitist status. The appeal of microcredit is that it seems directly to confront and resolve many of the problems with other global practices that render women invisible to global development agendas, and impose development agendas from “above,” such as SAPs. Directly focusing on poor women and providing these women with access to credit for self-entrepreneurship gives microcredit the appearance of promoting gender equality and gender sensitivity for women.

The granting of the Nobel Peace Prize illustrates the extent to which microcredit is backed by global support. The media, even the “non-mainstream” and what is often identified as the liberal media, such as, National Public Radio (NPR) and Public Broadcasting Services (PBS) gave microcredit their backing. For instance, NPR released an article stating that the “the results [of microcredit] are hard to argue with—the bank says it has a 99% repayment rate” (NPR 2006). Similarly, in a series of cover stories about poverty by PBS, entitled “The New Heroes,” one of which is Yunus Muhammad, the verdict on microcredit is that “its system is largely based on mutual trust and the enterprise and accountability of millions of women villagers” (PBS). The reference to mutual trust hints at the fact that microcredit loans are frequently granted on terms
that call for “solidarity” loans, which means that women can access these loans only as part of a group of borrowers, not as individuals. This means that severely poor women are not only accountable for paying back their own portion of the loan, but are also required to hold each other accountable for ensuring loan repayment (Hawesworth 2006, 14; Narayan 2005, 15; Poster and Salime 2002, 196-197). The high repayment rates suggest that microcredit is working for poor women by successfully reducing poverty one loan at a time, through the development of small businesses, group solidarity among women, and a gender sensitivity that finally takes into account women’s needs and their centrality to economic growth. A deeper examination of microcredit tells a different story.

6.2 Narratives of Empowerment: Cultural Imagination as a Prop for Microcredit

One of the central issues that critics have raised against microcredit is the essentialist discourses that flow from the West and Western-controlled institutions that provide narratives of women’s supposed empowerment through microcredit. This essentialism contains elements of cultural essentialism (placing cultures as static, backwards, and oppressive) as well as gender essentialism (glorifying women’s socially ascribed household responsibilities in a way that portrays women in the global South as representative of contented overworked workers). The intermixing of these essentialisms means that even as women’s poverty conditions are worsened by the debt and market instability of the informal sector, microcredit is glorified as a tool of women’s empowerment, masking the structural causes of poverty and cultural biases of Western advocates of microcredit. I will present two ways in which the essentialism behind the real-world discourse on microcredit takes place.

First, microcredit is promoted as a tool for weakening cultural constraints for women,
mostly in the global South, by breaking cultural shackles regarded as impediments to their
economic viability. For instance, Evan Selinger points out that proponents of this view reference
cellphone programs as one example in which Muslim women are provided money to sell
cellphones on the market. This is said to empower women because it provides women freedom
from “traditional” Muslim cultural constraints by enabling women to talk to male customers
through the phone, as opposed to face to face, which is held be taboo by the culture. Here,
women are “free” to engage in market activity, while at the same time can stay in line with
traditional Muslim customs (Selinger 2008). To be sure, such a program widens women’s access
to economic activity. Although, the extent to which it is freeing is questionable since the program
itself is structured so as to abide by those customs (providing tacit endorsement) since it is a
market activity that maintains women’s place in the “home,” maintaining so-called traditional
boundaries for women.

Claims that poor women are being freed through microcredit lending programs often
amount to the claim that women are being freed from the constraints of their culture, implying
that culture is the root cause of women’s severe poverty. In such discourses empowerment is
equated with participation in a microcredit program and, correspondingly, lack of empowerment
is equated with women who do not. Evan Selinger, a critic of the
empowerment/disempowerment dichotomy used in many microcredit discourses, cites seven
distinct ways in which proponents of microcredit claim that women are empowered by
microcredit. Microcredit is said to empower women: by giving the poorest of the poor (women)
access to wealth; by freeing women from traditional customs by giving them job opportunities
that they would otherwise be unable to utilize; by creating economic opportunities for women
and so boosting respect for women; by offering successful women in the program as positive role
models for their daughters; by promoting the adoption of modern values gained by participation in microcredit programs; by teaching women the virtue of solidarity (through group loans); and by building pride and confidence because microcredit is not charity (Ibid, 29-30). Without denying that there may be some benefits to microcredit, it remains evident that cultural essentialism underlies many of the alleged benefits of microcredit: modernity, status as role models, solidarity, and pride represent a few of the claimed benefits of taking out small loans. But, if gaining these properties is only possible through participation in microcredit and equated with empowerment for poor women, then the implication is that the walls of culture that bind those who do not participate, are what is condemning women to poverty on the basis of cultural constraints.

Such discourses assume that the source of the inaccessibility of economic opportunities for women is culture, whereas the key to their freedom is portrayed as access to global capitalist institutions. “Modern” values are gained and exhibited through participation in global capital programs. The implication is that prior to their participation in microcredit, women lacked “modern” (or non-backwards) values. These assumptions are highly problematic because they ignore other important factors such as structural constraints linked to the organization of economic structures. Additionally, the assumption that poor women who are the recipients of “charity” have low self-esteem is highly problematic. It portrays these women as unaware of global economic constraints that perpetuate their impoverished condition.

Second, the discourse of empowerment has also been centered on a problematic cultural essentialism that digs into the culture for traditional images that serve to justify global economic practices, such as microcredit, as grounded in these cultural histories. This approach is elucidated by Winifred Poster and Zakia Salime’s discussion of “first” world discourses regarding poor
“third” world women and their ability to manage microcredit during the Second International Women’s Business Conference in the Summer of 1999 (2002, 201-202). The image frequently drawn upon in favor of microcredit’s targeting of women is the Bangladesh image of the Goddess Laxmi:

[A] goddess with many hands, each tending to a different task simultaneously: one caring for children, one cooking dinner, one carrying water, one caring for her husband, and yet another running a street vendor business. (Ibid, 200)

The elevation of poor women to such “goddess” stature props up the narrative of empowerment. Uma Narayan argues that we should be wary of such “before” and “after” images about women in developing countries (2005, 8). The ideal promoted by the goddess Laximi is promoted as an ideal by which Western banks and Western NGOs help poor women to actualize their full potential. Yet this ideal is far from desirable and reflects a life of exhaustion—certainly not even close to the life of leisure and contemplation that many Westerner philosophers have held as an ideal, as exemplified by Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia, which posits an abundance of resources as a key component of happiness, as well as ample time for contemplation (Aristotle 1999). On the Laximi model, poverty-stricken women of color are the resource, and the sheer exhaustion of what living such a life would actually entail is masked by the use of cultural images that portray microcredit as a bolster for these women’s culture, providing them with the means to achieve a life that their “culture” aspires to.

The language of empowerment invoked by the proponents of microcredit is highly problematic, whether this occurs through the essentializing and denigrating of “culture,” as is shown in the Selinger’s examples, or by an appeal to culture, discussed by Poster and Salime, that relies on cultural essentialism to delve into a culture in search of an image that justifies a global poverty program that flows from global elites into the laps of poverty-stricken women of color.
6.3 Structural Inequities: Double Standards, Double Burdens

The conditions and constraints of microcredit, as practiced by Western economic institutions, raise further problems that show that microcredit, rather than assisting women, actually contributes to and exacerbates their poverty. As mentioned above, two features of microcredit especially singled out for praise are the high repayment rates and the system of mutual trust signified by women-centered solidarity loans. Yet critics have pointed out that microcredit loans are marked by high interest rates, quick repayment plans that begin within a week of receiving the loan, and that “solidarity” loans cause tension and are inconsistent with Western standards of credit lending (Hawesworth 2006, 14; Narayan 2005, 15; Poster and Salime 2002).

A further problem identified by Winifred Poster and Zakia Salime is that global economic institutions have designed microcredit funding so as to keep women in debt while at the same time boasting high repayment rates. For instance, NGOs, which run the “on the ground lending,” have an interest in keeping women microcredit organizations because their own funding is tied to women’s participation in these programs. This provides an incentive to keep women in microcredit debt for fear that once these women pay off their debt, they will obtain loans from other banks. Such competition among NGOs also perpetuates a system that causes women to incur multiple debts because these NGOs are each competing for their “business” (2002, 215-216). This is linked to quick repayment rates because in many cases the high repayment rate is achieved by paying off one loan with another. This makes the success of microcredit both in terms of reducing poverty and addressing the feminization of poverty highly questionable. By encouraging women to take on multiple debts, microcredit programs are increasingly imposing
debt on individual women, in addition to the debt burdens already experienced by the state from Northern economic institutions (Hawkesworth 2006, 137; Narayan 2005, 18; Poster and Salime 2002, 215-216).

Of course, debt is not in itself bad if one is able to use that credit to improve one’s material conditions. However, this often not the case. Mary Hawkesworth notes that the income generated by microcredit loans is frequently insufficient for women and their families to meet their subsistence needs. Additionally, women are not permitted to use microcredit loans to meet immediate and basic needs.

Unlike the loans made within women’s informal financial solidarity groups, microloans from capitalist lenders are restricted to profit-generating business ventures and cannot be used to cover other expenses that burden the poor, such as the costs of funerals, health care, food, and fuel. (2006, 137)

Rather than alleviating poverty, microcredit often has the consequence of increasing debt without raising severely poor women out of poverty. The relegating of basic needs to the market follows the same storyline of SAPs because it does not really deviate from a neoliberal framework. Although microcredit is presented as gender sensitive and gender inclusive, its philosophy and consequences are parallel to those of SAPs. Increased debt for poor women cannot be the path to women’s freedom from severe poverty.

Finally, there is evidence that micocredit compounds gender inequity. Similar to the effect of SAPs, young girls are called upon to assist their mothers, a phenomenon that Poster and Salime call the “triple” burden, referring to the burden of assisting in entrepreneurial work, domestic labor, and school (2002, 212). This is in addition to the widely recognized “double” burden imposed upon women, a problem addressed by microcredit only to the extent that it seems to exacerbate it by lending only to women.

In conclusion, the relationship between the current global economic order and severe global poverty must directly address gender. Global economic institutions are a major contributor
to gender inequity. The impact of these institutions falls along the intersection of race, gender, and class, as evidenced by the fact that one of the primary tools for poverty reduction is having such an adverse impact on women of color in the global South. One of the central problems with microcredit is not that it rests on an overt claim to gender neutrality, but rather its overt claim to gender sensitivity lacks a proper analysis of how gender impacts poverty in all its complexity. Microcredit reflects one of the main vehicles by which USAID, a U.S.-backed NGO, has attempted to correct for “egregious male bias” in its previous development strategies (Ibid, 194). The result has been a very superficial model for including women that has in many instances made conditions worse for women. What this shows is that it is necessary genuinely to consider the social, political, and economic conditions of women across the globe, rather than simply assume that market solutions are sufficient.

The general problem of simply including women by adding in more numbers to development agendas has bearing on Pogge’s current work on global poverty. Pogge’s analysis leaves women’s severe poverty as a further project to be pursued, perhaps as a practical problem in dispersing the Global Resources Dividend. The feminization of poverty, however, is not simply a practical problem that can be addressed as a last step to eradicating severe global poverty. The shared feature between microcredit’s inclusion of women and Pogge’s overtly gender-neutral analysis is that they are devoid of any serious attempt to critique the underlying global structures that are at the root of the feminization of poverty. Rather, they assume that these structures can remain intact while we simultaneously eradicate women’s severe poverty.

One problem, stated by Marilyn Warring, is that “there is no demarcation for women in the subsistence household between production inside and outside the consumption boundaries [services not counted because they are produced and consumed within the same household]”
The truth in this statement is made stronger by microcredit’s funding structure, which funds women’s productive labor both in the home and outside of the home. This simultaneously ignores, and also glorifies, the double or even triple workday of poor women enrolled in these programs created by the accumulating burden of paid and unpaid labor. Thus, women are counted “in” when they are specifically targeted as ideal loan recipients—though they are counted “out” when their household labor (outside the consumption boundaries) is ignored, even as microcredit loans play upon those boundaries. It has become popular to say that microcredit has evolved (de-volved) from the claim that “microcredit is good for women,” to “women are good for microcredit.” The latter shows the instrumental use of women as grist for the grind of global economic institutions, which, as I will discuss, are the ones largely benefiting from these lending programs.

7. Conclusion

The moral problem plaguing the global economic order is not simply that it violates negative duties to the poor—it is that poor women of color are disproportionately being harmed. Structural adjustment programs and microcredit represent global policies that are producing a global order in which poor women overwhelmingly do not have their rights not to be harmed secured. This reflects a global economic order that is gendered. This means that even on Pogge’s morally minimum framework of negative duties, gender is morally relevant.

I have argued that both SAPs and microcredit are responsible for perpetuating and exacerbating women’s severe global poverty. One of the central problems is that gender has been simultaneously visible and invisible in the eyes of global economic institutions. On the one hand, SAPs operate on terms that seem justifiable because of women’s overt invisibility to global
economic institutions by not accounting for the fact that women primarily take up the cost of the adjustments to their countries’ economies. Here women’s social and political standing have been virtually ignored. On the other hand, SAPs tacitly rely on gender differences and women’s vulnerability. As Susan Okin argues by overtly ignoring women’s social position and the likelihood that they would bear the social and economic costs for structural reforms, SAPs could implicitly rely on precisely these conditions for “success” while claiming to be gender neutral (Okin 2003). This success is frequently defined in terms of increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which notoriously masks gender and wealth inequalities.

Women have become more visible to the poverty-reducing agendas of global economic institutions, but, as I have argued, this visibility is not without its problems. One of the central motivating factors that made women visible to many proponents of microcredit is that poor women have been identified as ideal borrowers and entrepreneurs for poverty alleviation, in contrast to similarly situated men. This is why feminist critics have challenged the notion that microcredit is good for women, as opposed to women being good for microcredit. What this shows is that inclusion and gender sensitivity are not simple processes that consist of raising the number of women involved in any one agenda. Initially, the inclusion of women on the poverty-reducing agenda of microcredit showed some promise and hope for benefiting women. However, microcredit, as a global lending practice, has ignored the structural causes of women’s severe poverty and added to their debt burden.

Global structural factors are culpable with regard to the feminization of poverty. This means that when assessing strategies for eradicating severe poverty, or shielding the poor from the harms of the current global order, gender considerations must come into play. For instance, theorists must ask whether their theories result in a double-burden on women or make existing
double-burdens heavier. Does the theory exacerbate gender roles in a way that makes women more vulnerable to poverty and other social ills? Does the inclusion of women in global programs cause them to be better off? Will global structural harms continue disproportionately to harm women, even if the theory is successfully adopted and implemented? Pogge’s theory fails to address any of these questions. His proposal for eradicating severe poverty, the Global Resources Dividend (GRD), is in many ways consistent with one of the core problem that plagues microcredit: both offer the severely poor a small sum in exchange for keeping the current global economic machinery in working order.
Chapter 3: Race and Transnational Economic Institutions

Pogge is one of the first philosophers working on severe global poverty to develop a real-world account of the injustices inflicted upon the poor by the current arrangement of global economic institutions. Taking a non-idealized theoretical starting point opens up the possibility of developing strategies that have the potential to create a transformed world order in which global economic institutions cease to violate the negative rights of the global poor. Pogge does not make grandstanding claims that thanks to his reforms the next generation of “grandchildren will have to go to museums to know what poverty looks like,”\(^{18}\) such as the claims made by some anti-poverty proponents. What Pogge does offer is a theoretical framework for philosophers to begin theorizing about the injustices that are indicative of current transnational economic institutions. These institutions have “dirty practices” and, as Pogge states, their relationship to the empty hands and bellies of those living under the harshest and most severe conditions of global poverty is one of casual moral culpability.

From a racial perspective, the problem with Pogge’s analysis is that it largely ignores race. His analysis disappears racial injustices by ignoring racial and racist structures of the current global economic order. For instance, Charles Mills points out that global poverty and the global wealth distribution is color-coded, which denotes the disproportionate amount of wealth held by whites globally in contrast to the globally disproportionate amount of poverty experienced by non whites (Mills 1997, 36). I will argue that this distribution is rooted in the racist history of current global economic institutions, which have created unequal power structures among nations, especially poor and dark nations, and have resulted in an excessive

\(^{18}\)This statement is cited in the Boston Globe, was made by Mohammed Yunus regarding his microcredit policy (Bennett 2009).
amount of power by Western institutions to interfere in poor nations through so-called “development” agendas. This structure perpetuates a cycle of severe poverty and is thus relevant to Pogge’s argument that transnational institutions are morally responsible for creating severe poverty. My argument is twofold. After establishing that race is morally relevant and at the center of the harms committed by global economic institutions against the poor, I argue that Pogge’s work contains a conceptual race bias, which erases out this injustice by placing the existence of a violent colonial history on the margins of his theory.

Pogge’s lack of attention to the moral relevance of race implies that the injustices perpetrated by transnational economic institutions are race “neutral”: that the harms inflicted when transnational institutions cause human rights deprivations for the poor that contribute to, say, deaths by dehydration, are free of race bias, or at least, that this bias is not relevant. Pogge’s approach ignores current injustices generated by racial hierarchies that are features of the global economic order that disadvantage of people of color. It is not just the incompleteness of Pogge’s theory that is problematic, but that the marginalization that occurs when the injustices experienced by certain groups are silenced by lack of recognition is significant. My aim is to contribute to Pogge’s work by showing how attention to race and racism provides an unbiased account of how global economic institutions are harming the poor.

I will first show that Pogge’s theoretical lens is too focused on economic inequalities among nations and the injustices that ensue. I will argue that this macro examination misses out on who is poor because the identity of the poor is buried in their membership as citizens of poor nations. Conceptually, then, the poor appear as an undifferentiated mass, despite Pogge’s theoretical commitments that the poor should not be treated as such (2008b, 22).

I then argue that reflection upon some features of global historical racism reveals that
race continues to be significant when assessing current global economic institutions. My argument will not rely on backwards-looking arguments for reparations for past racial injustices. The purpose of examining history is that it makes visible the reality that global economic institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have never been race neutral, in terms of who has power, who is adversely impacted, and the way in which these agendas of these institutions are formulated.¹⁹

I end the chapter by drawing parallels between the theoretical problems feminists of color raised against First and Second Wave feminism and Pogge’s omission of race in his account of severe global poverty. Using this feminist discourse by women of color, which raised concerns of exclusion on a theoretical level against white Western feminists, I will argue that Pogge constructs an image of who the poor are that is theoretically and practically problematic and exclusive. His theory creates an image of the global poor as unraced individuals whose poverty is not linked to racial injustice perpetuated and intensified by current global economic institutions.

It is worth noting that my critique of Pogge is an internal critique and does not impose a yardstick of measurement that is separate from his central project of accounting for the global harms against the poor. As earlier noted, Pogge pointedly rejects the “anonymity condition,” which holds that “permutations of persons over social conditions should make no difference to judgments of justice” (Pogge 2008b, 49). The anonymity condition holds that the circumstance in which people of color are suffering from poverty at a high rate is morally equivalent to the circumstance in which a non-racialized group is suffering at relatively the same high rate of poverty.

¹⁹ I will not argue here that these institutions are institutionally racist. I develop such an argument in chapter five. My claim here is that it is essential that theory reflect reality—the global economic order was born out of racial injustices and has not been freed the structures that are reproduced and upheld today. Thus, current global economic injustices must be situated within their racialized context.
The objection that Pogge raises against the anonymity condition is that it cannot address group injustices, stating that, “[i]t may indeed not matter whether a particular hardship is suffered by a man or a woman, by a white or a black, by a Mormon, or a Jew – but what if women or blacks or Jews are greatly overrepresented among those suffering the hardship? Is this still to be considered morally irrelevant as the anonymity condition requires? It would seem that a morally plausible criterion [of justice] would have to take account of some such correlations”(2008b, 50). Pogge acknowledges the moral salience of race, gender, and class even as he fails to incorporate these factors in his theory. This also illustrates that Pogge is inconsistent on the moral significance of group identity as it relates to justice: despite the fact that people of color are overrepresented among those harmed by current global economic institutions, Pogge’s analysis of global poverty does not account for the correlation between race and severe poverty.\footnote{Pogge does mention race and the existence of a violent history as one cause of the current global injustice. Despite this acknowledgment, this fact plays a marginal role in his theory. It remains grossly insufficient to account for the role of race in severe poverty. For further criticism of Pogge and inconsistencies between his “non-ideal” theoretical commitments expressed in “Realizing Rawls,” e.g., that we ought to incorporate factors such as race and gender, and his, in practice, failure to incorporate these factors see Charles Mills (Mills, Forthcoming).}

Pogge and I would agree that the failure to consider people’s identities and their group membership does not mean that those factors are morally irrelevant. That the Holocaust targeted Jews, that lynch mobs in the American South targeted black men, that those same Southerners raped black women, and that chattel slavery moved vast numbers to sail the oceans blue in search of human slaves all speak out to an injustice committed that goes beyond the human suffering, to the depths of what it means to be Jewish and black living within a particular time and place defined by “racial” hierarchies of injustice. Similarly, current severe poverty that sees millions die each year should be placed within its racial context as one of history’s worst injustices rooted in racial hierarchies. It is on this last point that Pogge diverges from his theoretical commitments and that I will now turn to.
1. Pogge’s Framing of the Causes of Severe Global Poverty Is Misleading Because It Implies That Global Causes of Poverty Are Mostly Due to Inequality in Wealth Among Nations

The global economic causes that Pogge identifies as harming the poor are framed in terms of powerful economic institutions (backed by powerful counties) taking advantage of weaker countries. This framework implies that the central problem regarding global institutions and poverty resides in unequal economic power among nations. Pogge’s core examples of harms committed by the global economic order are: unequal bargaining power between affluent and impoverished nations, resource extraction permitted by the rules set by affluent nations, funding of illegitimate dictators through international borrowing privilege whose rules are set by affluent nations, trade agreements, and more recently on *Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights* (TRIPS) (Pogge 2008). What these practices share is that they comprise a structural system that is rooted in power inequalities among nations. On this point Pogge states:

Our new global economic order is so harsh on the global poor, then, because it is shaped in negotiations where our representatives ruthlessly exploit their vastly superior bargaining power and expertise, as well as any weaknesses, ignorance, or corruptibility they may find in their counterpart negotiators, to tune each agreement for our greatest benefit. In such negotiations, the affluent states will make reciprocal concessions to one another, but rarely to the weak. (2008b, 27)

The weak that Pogge is referring to here are weak nations. Weak nations are weak because of a lack of economic power. Severe poverty is exacerbated in these nations by the actions of economically dominant nations. The theme that global culpability for severe poverty is located primarily in power differentials among nations runs throughout Pogge’s work (Pogge 2002; 2008b; 2005a; 2007). It is the foundation on which his claim that affluent nations are harming the severely poor through abuse of global economic institutions rests.

Using a broad overarching unit of analysis means that injustices that are occurring within nations, as the result of the practices of global economic institutions, fall outside the scope of
Pogge’s macro analysis: his theory renders invisible to the theoretical eye possible injustices marked by overrepresentation of particular groups that Pogge agrees is morally salient. Yet the overrepresentation of people of color among the severely poor suggests that global economic institutions do not function in a way that is race neutral, or at the very least that an examination of race is warranted.

This is a consequence of Pogge’s argument that he cannot, as his theory stands, avoid. In responding to the defenders of the World Trade Organization (WTO) who argue that even though some of the rules of the WTO exacerbate severe poverty this is overridden by the fact that the WTO benefits the poor as a whole, Pogge responds that “the global poor are a very large and diverse group” (2008b, 21) and he goes on to condemn such homogenizing of the poor in which the poor are viewed as “…coffee cream in the office fridge: one must take some out provided that, over time, one takes out no more than one puts in”(Ibid, 22). Although Pogge’s project is the opposite of any defense of the current global order that is causing avoidable and foreseeable poverty, he nevertheless falls into the homogenizing mode of categorizing the poor, despite the fact that the current global economic order is disproportionately harming poor people of color. De-homogenizing the poor means truly recognizing their diversity by incorporating the diversity into an analysis of the injustices occurring. If the anonymity condition is inadequate for its failure to recognize such injustices, then it follows that a theory of severe global poverty that does not recognize these differences is equally problematic.

Pogge might resist this criticism and argue that his project is to establish that the current global economic order fails to meet minimal standards of justice by violating negative duties to the poor, and that this is consistent with recognizing that there may be additional grievances raised by the poor against the global economic order, such as possible racism within the global
economic order that is contributing to poverty. This move does not carry much plausibility and is parallel to analyzing moral injustices of white-on-black murders in the U.S. during Jim Crow without addressing race. Race is intricately tied to those injustices and a theory that renders that factor invisible is not merely incomplete, it is misleading—or false.

Pogge identifies the poor using the World Bank poverty line of those living below $1 a day counted as living under extreme poverty and those living under $2 a day counted as living in severe poverty (2008b, 2, 265-266). Despite the important statistics that he provides: 39.7 percent of the world’s population is severely poor with many falling 41 percent below this line (Ibid, 2), these statistics do not tell us who the poor are, aside from being citizens in weak nations. Group injustices are buried under broad overarching generalizations as if injustices perpetrated by the current global economic order exist in a void stripped of all identity and history. Such an analysis is incomplete and insufficient for grasping the root causes of suffering inflicted upon the poor. For example, Hye-ryoung Kang criticizes Pogge, and similar cosmopolitan theorists, for adopting a theoretical framework that relies on a view of the world as “a single human community” that views features of individuals’ identities as morally irrelevant (Kang 2008, 365). Kang uses the example of export processing zones (EPZs) in which women are currently overburdened due, in large part, to the current global economic institutions that have helped to create the feminization of the labor force, which often amounts to increasingly poor working conditions within a feminized sphere of labor. Kang concludes that the “single humanity” framework entails that Pogge cannot account for such systemic injustices, as experienced by women working in EPZs, because this framework is not able to perceive that it is the intersection of gender, the economy, and nation, among other things, that renders these women vulnerable at the hands of the global economy (Ibid, 367). Kang’s criticism articulates
the general problem with Pogge’s theoretical commitments of stripping down individual and group identities as they are reduced to human beings. But it is not as “human beings” that the severely poor are suffering from the effects of global economic practices. The injustices occurring within the global economic must be assessed from a standpoint that takes race, gender, class and other relevant factors seriously. Charles Mills argues that taking this step would require Pogge to “radicalize” his work by finally living up to his own theoretical commitments to non-ideal theory, such as Pogge expresses in his work *Realizing Rawls*. These commitments, Mills argues, necessitate using race and gender as a starting point since these factors frequently function as systems of oppression (Mills, forthcoming).

Charles Mills has also argued that in understanding how race operates the concept of white supremacy can provide theorists with a conceptual tool for assessing oppression, much the same way that feminists have utilized male dominance as a conceptual apparatus for articulating the nature of gender oppression (2006, 271-272). Such a conceptual apparatus is unavailable to Pogge for assessing the racialized nature of severe poverty since he takes a “color-blind” approach that cannot even begin to unravel the systemic and differential suffering that is inflicted upon groups. Likewise, Hye-ryoung Kang’s criticism shows that Pogge also possesses theoretical leanings that support a universalizing tendency that treats all human beings as equally situated. As such, my critique of his nation-to-nation lens may be understood in the same spirit of Kang’s call to abandon the “one-humanity” lens, and recognize the situatedness of the poor.

In conclusion, if there is a question why race is relevant, that is, why our theories of global economic justice should take race into account, the answer is that race is relevant because global economic institutions have made it so. Pogge has argued persuasively that it is necessary to make a distinction between a country’s GDP and individuals’ economic status when measuring
wealth and poverty levels (2005a, reply to Risse). Along the same lines, broad-scale analyses that are blind to the racial dimension of severe poverty are as problematic as large-scale measures of poverty that do not look further than a country’s GDP. In both cases aggregates are the focus with a lack of regard for differences in distribution within the aggregate sums.

In the following section, I will argue that race is morally salient with regard to the harms committed by current transnational economic institutions against the severely poor. Standing alone, the overrepresentation of people of color among the severely poor is in itself insufficient to establish racial bias or racism, although it is a condition that should draw theorists’ attention. To show why it matters morally (as a global economic injustice), I will argue that it is necessary to examine how these conditions came about. I will argue that past global racism exemplified in colonization and slavery impacted the formation and structure of the current global economic order by creating unequal and racialized power structures that continue to operate today. This past is relevant to present racial injustices because it has enabled increased accumulation of power on the part of the global North that has served to solidify the power structures within global institutions at the expense of the global South. Thus, there exists a continuous racial hierarchy around which the global economic order is currently designed. I will also argue that the development agendas developed by these institutions continue to perpetuate earlier patterns of racism. For these reasons, development systematically tends disadvantage people of color. I conclude that current global economic institutions have never functioned as race-neutral institutions. Drawing on this argument, I will critique Pogge’s proposal for a Global Resources Dividend, arguing that it is ill equipped to address the racial bias intertwined with the harms committed by current economic institutions and to eradicate severe poverty.
2. The Relevance of a Racist History: Linking Past and Present

The world has been marred by a history of colonialism, slavery, and imperialism. What arose in the modern period was a new kind of slavery and domination that occurred as a normative project that systematically attached negative and virtuous properties to “skin color.” To understand the modern concept of race means, for one, grasping that whiteness is not just about skin color, but denotes a set of power relations (Mills 2007, 127). This racial hierarchy represented a new type of injustice, added to slavery and other similar acts of conquest. The birth of the modern concept of race signaled the birth of a type of hell for Africans and other racialized groups forced to submit to the so-called moral, intellectual, and emotional superiority that justified European and American savagery. Given the overtly racist nature of the modern concept of race and its utilization in global domination projects, it may be tempting to dislodge this history from the racial disparities representative of the current global economic order as seen in the overrepresentation of people of color among the severely poor. One might assume that our current global structures lack the overt racism of the past and the concomitant violence and brutality that was part of the everyday subjugation project of colonial and slave powers. I argue that such a delinking should not occur and that the harms presently committed against the severely poor are causally linked to transnational economic institutions and the racism of the past. By past, I mean the time from the modern origins of race up until the end of World War II. I will argue that in practice, global economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have never been race neutral. They operate within a paradigm of racial bias that continually mobilizes its power and influence to secure a world order that systematically disadvantages people of color.
2.1 Piecing Together History

If one assesses the structure of current transnational economic institutions, it is clear that these institutions are largely dominated by the global North and former colonial powers (Mills 1997, 36; Stiglitz 2002, 19). How did this come to be? For one, the end of colonialism, among other factors, opened an opportunity for a new type of expansionism and control. The “newness” of this opportunity for global powers, such as the United States, lay largely in the appearance that the “old ways” of racism and domination that marked slavery and colonization were a thing of the past. What transpired after World War II was a paradigm shift by which the United States moved from conqueror to benevolent rescuer. Development theorists and critics have pinpointed this “transformation” to 1949 when Harry Truman proclaimed 2 billion people in the global South to be underdeveloped (Esteva 2010, 1-3; Sachs 2010, xvi). When on the question of development Truman declared:

The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealings. (Truman 1949)

Post World War II, the United States represented the new world power. What the shift from colonizer/colonized and slave-owner/slave to developed/underdeveloped did was to allow the United States to continue its interventionism and global mechanisms of control. This new paradigm initially seems full of promise, but upon deeper reflection embodies the same old master-slave relation to the extent that one people (nations) is held to be superior to another nation(s) and all its peoples. While initially many in the global South, who had been freed from the shackle of colonization, were willing to participate in “development,” today there is significant resistance and challenge to the ideological underpinnings and promises of development, with some rejecting any type of development assistance at all (Sachs 2010, xv).

It is within this global power structure that the world saw the emergence of global
economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), occurring after the Bretton Woods Conference (Stiglitz 2002, 11). While the agendas of these institutions were initially limited in scope, they emerged in a multitude of development projects, the most infamous of these taking shape as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The relationship between developed and underdeveloped then became solidified through a series of institutional policies that enabled more powerful countries (post-colonizers) to “assist” poor countries into development. The structure of this relationship (one that is currently operative) has been shaped by the racism of colonizers and the global opportunity gap that a receding colonialism left open for these powers to introduce new forms of domination and control over poor countries. Race has been a key factor in shaping the current global economic order because it has impacted the power structures and agendas of institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.

Through the newfound language of development, the United States shifted to the language of care and benevolence. But, as Uma Narayan points out, care discourses can often conceal power relations, as was seen in some colonizers who invoked such a discourse to justify colonization (Narayan 1995). Narayan’s point is relevant when applied to current transnational economic institutions. It is precisely such unequal power relations that enable transnational institutions to institute mechanisms of domination within the global South. These institutions must possess some mechanism for justifying the imposition of invasive and demanding conditions. An area of growing criticism against the World Bank and the IMF is the disproportionate effect that the institutions have on the lives of individuals, especially the poor, in contrast to the ability of these individuals to have a voice with respect to the functioning and policies of these institutions (Stiglitz 2002, 18-22; Ngaire Woods 2005). The breadth and power
of these institutions is so strong that the former head of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, has referred to it as a case of “global governance without global government” (Stiglitz 2002, 21). This especially applies to poor countries, whose members are not adequately represented because of racialized power structures put in place by the dominant countries, such as the United States.

The colonial global power structure remains largely intact. To conceive of current transnational institutions as free of race bias is counterintuitive given their history and the current racialized nature of severe poverty. The aptness of Patricia Hill Collins’ article, in part, entitled “The Past Is Ever Present” (2005) is seen in the continued exclusion of poor countries from the global South from equal influence and voice within global economic institutions. Thomas McCarthy states that under colonization, principles of non-intervention into the affairs of sovereign countries were applied only to countries deemed civilized and not to countries who were regarded as non-civilized. John Stuart Mill and his father James Mill both saw intervention towards less culturally “enlightened” peoples as justified, restricting the scope of moral equality of persons to exclude the so-called backwards individuals in much need of the Northern hand of development and salvation (McCarthy 2009). Today interventionism within national and local arenas regarding governance and economic policies is one of the prime aims of SAPs. Again, this represents what McCarthy calls neocolonialism, which consists of subjugation without direct rule (2009, 2). Like McCarthy and Stiglitz, what critics of institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF often point to is the powerlessness and the oppression that the global South has in relation to these institutions.

To see how the past is present is to rethink the assumption that because race has dropped out of the official discourse it is no longer relevant to the assessment of the impact that global financial institutions are having in the global South. The rhetoric of care, espoused by Truman
and then by so many Northerners, can mask the continued race bias that informs these institutions: when the poor have no voice it is because they were given no voice to begin with, when race was an overtly used tool of suppression. For instance, consider Charles Mills’ category of sub-persons—those persons who are deemed not fully human—created by a racial contract that privileges whites at the expense of non-whites, once legislated by law and now transformed into practice (Mills 1997). The racial contract is defined by Mills as a moral, political, and epistemological contract, the purpose of which is to privilege whites at the expense of non-whites (1997). It exists as a contract in terms of its historical descriptive power (in contrast to other social contrast theories that exclude race and, thus, cannot account for racism as the norm, by which much of history since the modern period has been taken place) and its normative power to reveal racial ills and how we ought to address them (Ibid).

Mills’ analysis offers conceptual explanatory power for the effects of global economic institutions that are disproportionately harmful to people of color. Sub-persons have no right to equal governance, to self-governance, and to have their voices heard. As Mills argues, sub-persons were created by racist societies. In practice, they continue to exist as the poorest of the poor, and it is by no accident or random misfortune that they are brown skinned.

Thus, the colonialist history of the current global economy reveals a persistent pattern. The global South is subjected to invasive rules and conditions—the modern day version particularly represented by SAPs. People of color are overwhelmingly represented among the disadvantaged under institutional structures. The “subjects” of development do not have a voice and are denied equal participation. Lastly, there exists a paradigm in which the North is “developed” and the South is “underdeveloped.” Examining history shows that in practice current global economic institutions are not race “neutral” in terms of being able to assess the
harm perpetrated without drawing on race as a conceptual tool of analysis. Race has played an important role in shaping global power structures and in justifying the institutional arrangement and operations of these institutions, and this race bias is rooted in a racist history that shaped these institutions.

One might object to my claim that the past is morally relevant to the plight of the severely poor on the grounds that even though the past had a racially biased impact on the formation of global economic institutions, this bias is not maintained today. That is, there is no systemic bias that is currently disadvantaging people of color. In response, it is unlikely that such momentous events, i.e., slavery and colonialism, are irrelevant to present circumstances even if it is the case that these events are in the past and do not appear to perpetuate more injustices. On this point, I appeal to Randall Robinson who argues that institutions do not die with those who represent those institutions and each generation starts where its parents left off (2005). Recognizing the truth in these statements reveals that any seeming discontinuity between the injustices of chattel slavery and present racial inequalities in the United States is an illusion. It is unlikely that such severe injustices and the accompanying harms die out on their own without any efforts to reform our institutions and correct for the injustice; in this sense, the past is ever present, a point to which I will now turn.

2.2 Current Transnational Economic Institutions Systemically Disadvantage People of Color

The relevance of past racism is made visible by the reality that many of the agendas of global economic institutions have been influenced and justified by ethnocentrism (Escobar 1995). By ethnocentrism I mean the comparison between the North and the South, in which the North is deemed categorically superior: much like John Stuart Mill’s hierarchical ranking of
societies, a ranking that included all aspects of society and was construed as a fixed and objective measure of culture (McCarthy 174). Within this framework, Arturo Escobar notes that there arose a “dream” during the early days of current economic institutions to assist the newly created “underdeveloped.” This dream, Escobar argues, has become a nightmare for the “assisted” countries (Escobar 1995), a point backed by rising economic inequalities between the North and the South. In what follows, I will first evaluate problematic dichotomies generated by the developed/developing paradigm and how this framework harms the poor and also functions as a justificatory tool for reinforcing power and economic inequalities between the North and the South. I will argue that people of color are systematically being harmed by transnational economic institutions and that this harm is situated within the broader colonizing discourse generated by the North.

Ethnocentrism by those who first controlled the global economic institutions is evidenced by construction of the so-called Third World as a child that requires the adult guidance of the West to bring the Third World into modernization (Escobar 1995, 3-4, 30). For instance, Gustavo Estevas argues that very concept of development implies a linear process by which individuals go from worse to better. For the global South to be undeveloped in contrast to the so-called developed North is an indictment by the North of “what they [the global South] are not,” that is, deficient in the evolutionary growth embodied by those who are “developed” (Esteva 2010, 6). Such linear thinking, as applied to whole nations and peoples, is misleading. As Esteva states, “[n]either in nature nor in society does there exist an evolution that imposes transformation towards ‘ever more perfect forms’ as a law” (2010, 20). This ideological framework imposed upon the global South by the North reconstructs the colonizing relationship into a rhetoric of assistance and aid, but does not abandon the racism and ethnocentrism of its
earlier racist history that sees the South as incomplete and inferior.

The problem raised is not just ideological and historical, but has also led to material consequences that currently persist. Similar to the critics above, in her critique of development Maria Mies identifies development as a project of “catching-up development,” by which the expectation is set for the “undeveloped” to catch up to the developed countries (2005). Mies points out that this model has been criticized since the 1970s when theorists argued that the problem is not that poor countries are “lagging behind,” it is that the so-called developed countries are over-consuming the world’s natural resources (Ibid, 151). According to Mies, the unequal economic standing between the North/South represents colonial structure largely based in the over-consumption of current “developed” countries and the exporting of costs to poor countries (i.e., pollution, exploitation of cheap labor). Dangling the promise of development, which entails a high material standard of living, presents a false hope: on practical grounds, it is impossible for the South to consume the same level of resources that enable the North’s standard of living, given the North’s extreme over-consumption of the world’s resources (Mies 2005), not to mention the un-desirability of bringing about a world of over-consumers. Thus, the development paradigm not only posits the global South as incomplete and inferior, but it justifies development projects based on promises that can never be fulfilled. Also, the closer they come to being fulfilled, the more this would bring about massive ecological destruction. As Mies argues, “catching-up” is one of the biggest myths of development, but this has not stopped transnational institutions from invading the infrastructure of poor countries in the name of development. If the aim of development is to be like the global North, then either global institutions like the World Bank and the IMF know that the reality of this goal is a lie (Ibid) or they are extremely short-sighted, to say the least.
A common theme that these critics share is that “developing” the global South opens the door of opportunity, but the door that it opens is for the expansion of Northern markets (Escobar 2005, 33; Mies 2005). This is seen in the privatization of public goods, one of the most consistent and primary conditions of SAPs. I will give two examples of how this harm is occurring: the privatization of health care and of water.

Sacrificing the health of the poor through the privatization of health care is one way that Northern markets are expanding. For instance, in Haiti, an examination of the factors that have led to the poor health of the Haitian people, reveals multiple internal and external influences, but one of the central factors found was the influence of transnational forces (Farmer & Bertrand, 2000). Paul Farmer and Didi Bertrand note that despite the fact that Haiti is among one of the leading recipients of development aid, it has faced worsening conditions including staggering increases in debt ranging from $73-$366 million over the course of seven years. Also, so-called development assistance from transnational corporations in the United states has really only served the functioning of using Haitians as a cheap labor source and the displacement of a whole community from sustainable land to non-sustainable land for the purpose of building a dam backed by Americans as a development project (Ibid, 68-69, 71-76). Privatization has included health services, and although health services were not previously strong in Haiti, Haitians understand that there is a significant difference between health as a public good and health as a private good to be purchased, since in the former case health care is still conceived of as a right, whereas in the latter there exists no moral requirements to provide health care to the poor and sick (Ibid, 84). As these theorists point out

…decisions taken by the powerful directly affect the fates of the poor. In fact, fluctuations in the health status of the poor are among the most sensitive indices of harmful policies. In this manner, the economically oppressed continue to serve as the “sentinel chickens” or “mine shaft canaries” of the global economy.” (Ibid, 87)

It is under the guise of development that markets are spread through increased privatization that
simultaneously harms the poor. Lack of access to health care is one of the biggest contributors to assured death. The story of Haiti is not just about Haiti, but illustrates a larger point regarding the world’s poorest and the effect of “development” as it is currently practiced. Since privatization of public goods is a systemic feature of development and since health care is one of the public goods targeted, it is reasonable to conclude that poor people of color are overwhelmingly and continuously disadvantaged by current transnational institutions—as the poorest of the poor do not have the resources to pay for medications and treatments needed to preserve life itself.

Transnational economic institutions are also harming the poor via “development” through the privatizing of water. Focusing particularly on Asia, Vandana Shiva notes that many of the privatization projects that take place occur under the heading of “public-private” partnerships, which usually amount to the public funding of the privatization of previously public goods. This has taken place under the leadership of the World Bank, which has been one of the biggest proponents of water privatization and has frequently imposed water deregulation as a loan condition (2002, 89-99). The effects on the poor are, of course, the inability to obtain water, but Shiva points out that there are also other impacts such as the overthrowing of people’s democratic right to control water, i.e., community access and control over corporate profit and ownership (Ibid, 91). In one of the most salient instances of how privatizing water not only harms the poor, but seems to be a part of a pernicious agenda to increase profits of the “developers,” Shiva quotes a report by Coca-Cola that, after observing that everyone in the world will experience thirst at least at one point in the day, states that: “…if we make it impossible for these…people to escape Coca-Cola, then we assure our future success for many years to come...” (Ibid, 99).

What these two cases illustrate is that disadvantaging people of color through
“development” is a routine practice of current transnational institutions. It is also one that enriches these institutions—namely the World Bank, the IMF, and transnational corporations. These harms are not color-blind, but rest on a history of ethnocentrism that continues today.

The philosopher Uma Narayan states that colonialist representations perpetuate misrepresentations of the “Third World” that are rooted in colonialism (Narayan 1997, 45). Historically, these images are easily identifiable and condemnable for their notorious claims of backwardness and savagery of the so-called Third World: the classic novel *Heart of Darkness* (Conrad 1902) epitomizes the image of the Third World as desolate, despicable, dark, and ignorant. As new global agendas were being developed, race (non-white) and place (the “Third World”) were used to essentialize entire groups as inherently inferior and childlike in comparison to the North. Colonialism, then, was intricately tied to “race,” as well as place and used these factors to draw a distinction between the North and “the rest.”

Currently, such representations are less obvious and discreetly disguised by the language of progress, modernization, and development. What makes such discursive representations problematic is not simply that they provide an inaccurate portrayal of poor people of color in the global South, but because they serve to dictate how global economic institutions will relate to these groups—using them as a tool of domination. As Chandra Mohanty points out, a central feature of colonization is structural domination (Mohanty 1991, 52). Such domination is apparent not only in development frameworks that take a linear view of development, but also in the “development” projects themselves that leave the poor sick and thirsty, while transnational financial institutions increase the reign of control through the mounting debt burden. At the same time, “public-private” projects ensure a profit space for transnational corporations to exploit.

3. Objections to the Relevance of a Racist History in Assessing Severe Global Poverty
I will address two possible objections that Pogge might raise to my analysis of a global racist history. A first objection that Pogge might raise is that he acknowledges the racist and violent history and the role that it has played in the current global economic order (2008b, 205, 209-210). That it does not play a central role in his work, however, does not represent a race-bias that causes the further marginalization of people of color because his aim is to provide a forward looking argument. Second, his recommendation for a Global Resource Dividend (GRD) will treat the world’s natural resources as commonly owned and will generate funds for their usage—to eradicate severe global poverty and benefit all of the poor, including to a disproportionate extent people of color, as they are overrepresented among the severely poor. I will address the second objection in more detail in chapter five.

As mentioned earlier, my argument is not backwards looking. Situating the harms of current transnational institutions within their racist history provides the theoretical grounding for seeing why race is salient now: it shows the harms as systematic and the harming institutions as embedded within a racial context. It is informative as to why the overrepresentation of people of color is not accidental and is the result of global forces that narrate structures of racial inequality.

Second, because I will address the GRD in a more comprehensive way in chapter five, I will only highlight one response here. On the face of it, the GRD is straightforward: a global tax on natural resources that is to be given to poor countries to alleviate poverty. But this is merely an illusion. A significant problem is that there are no mechanisms in place for coping with the racially informed power inequalities that exist between the global North and the global South. Issues of exclusion, domination, and ideological colonialism are not even considered. Pogge proposes a panel of experts as the determining body for how funds are distributed either to poor countries, or in the case of bad governments, to Non-Governmental Organizations (Ibid, 212).
This schema leaves several important questions unanswered. For instance, who counts as an expert? Uma Kothari argues that in a space where development is increasingly construed as a technical (as opposed to social/political) problem, development has become inundated with “experts,” or ‘professionals,” defined in such a way as to push out local knowledge and skills (Kothari 2005). This recreates the inequalities discussed above, as local knowledge is not counted as expert or professional knowledge (having value only in sharing in the local know-how). Thus, the racial and colonial dynamics that are made visible by situating severe poverty within its racial context are not accounted for.

Several other questions remain. What NGOs will best serve the poor: Western NGOs that usually possess greater funding and power or local NGOs that potentially have more local knowledge of the problems? What if NGOs disagree? How are the power inequalities between the global North and South to be dealt with when constructing this panel? How is the GRD expert relevantly different from the development “expert” for poor people of color? That Pogge lacks any recognition of such problems entails that the GRD contains a race bias that ignores the racial injustice connected to severe poverty and many current development projects. In addition, the GRD is compatible with a global economic order that leaves people of color at the bottom of the global economy, hardly a theory that is race neutral.

A final objection to my claim that a racist history matters is that overt racism no longer exists. That is, race-neutrality is the appropriate lens for critiquing global economic institutions because there are no culpable agents that we can point to as racist, in terms of individual racism. In the absence of such racism, historical racism has no bearing upon our moral assessment of current global economic institutions. I will give only a brief response here, as I will discuss this sort of argument in more detail in chapter five. Given the interconnectedness and complexity of
global economic institutions, such a model of racism is problematic for assessing institutions because of its inability to account for the breadth and scope of global economic institutions. Although overt racism may not be widely present within the global economic order, the inability to see how race operates on a global scale speaks to the inadequacy of the intentional model for assessing global economic institutions and not to the moral saliency of race.

I will now examine theoretical problems of first and second wave feminism for the purpose of illustrating how similar problems arise for Pogge’s theory. The problem in general terms has to do with the seeming inclusiveness of theories that prove to be exclusive in their theoretical construction on the identities of the subjects of analysis.

4. Theory That Takes Differences Seriously: Or Lessons Learned from a Failed “Sisterhood”

In failing to give theoretical significance to race by dislocating its place in the global economic order, Pogge’s theory contains some of the same core problems that arose in early feminism in the United States, especially second wave feminism. What has been labeled as first wave feminism focused primarily on education, economic opportunities, and voting rights for women (Tong 1998, 12-22). Second wave feminism encompassed a much broader range of issues centered on a more comprehensive account of equality. For instance, some second wave feminists understood equality to mean blindness before the law to sexual differences—a conception of equality that highlighted how men and women are the same. Alternatively, some held equality to entail the recognition of sexual differences that necessitated “unequal treatment” for the purposes of achieving substantive equality. Both conceptions have their strengths and weaknesses, but reflect the complexity in achieving true gender equality and the need to examine biological and social circumstances, as well as the need to think creatively about multiple
strategies (Jaggar 1994). Other important issues addressed by second wave feminism were equal pay for equal work (Tong 22-25) and sexual equality as equal sexual satisfaction. Anne Koedt raised the issue that conventional or “standard” model of sex i.e., the missionary position, is biased toward men’s sexual pleasure since on a physical level it is satisfying to men, but is not mutually satisfying to women, because of its lack of clitoral stimulation and, thus, our conception of what is sexually normal should be altered to reflect sex that is mutually satisfying (Koedt 1970). While second wave feminism challenged gender assumptions within multiple arenas of life, it still came under fire by later feminists who raised questions about the inclusivity of second wave feminism, including the charge that second wave feminists assumed that they were speaking for all women.

In this section, I will examine this criticism as a type of criticism that has academic and theoretical significance even if not all charges lobbied against second wave feminists were legitimate critiques. The primary feminist critics that I will examine are feminist women of color who raised the charge of elitism and exclusion. I focus on two central criticisms against second wave feminism for the purpose of drawing parallels between these feminist critiques and similar criticisms that apply to Pogge’s account of the poor. First, in both cases the groups represented are constructed in such a way as to create an inaccurate norm of who these individuals are (white) and a superficial neutrality in their theories masks this norm. Second, the bias in their theories has the consequence of making the theories incomplete to the extent that they capture only one aspect of the problem they are attempting to address, while ignoring other salient factors. I will illustrate this point with Kimberle Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality, which

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21 Alison Jaggar gives the example of employment schemes in which disability plans did not cover women’s special needs generated by pregnancy and childbirth. Strict equality before the law holds this to be just if men do not have these benefits as well. The call for recognition for differences realizes that women have unique needs that are different from those of men (as men do as well) and that true equality would meet these needs, that in failing to do so can cause disadvantage and inequality of opportunity for women (1994).
holds that theorists should consider multiple axes of oppression in order conceptually to grasp how intersecting factors function to oppress individuals in distinct ways (Crenshaw 1994).

The critics of second wave feminism that I am about to address, on exclusion and elitism, are contested, and in recognition of the contested status of the inclusivity or exclusivity of second wave feminism, I will state that what I am about to discuss should be taken in light of an important critique that is worth reflection in terms of content, even if some of its direct claims are contested by second wave feminists. Marilyn Frye has highlighted several problems with what she sees as a “myth” coming out of third wave feminism (a label that she rejects), including a disowning/contempt for the founders of feminism, homogenization of the “other” (for instance, feminists of color), downplaying of the courage of early feminists and the obstacles they overcame to reach their goals, and the perpetuation of a false portrait of second wave feminism as not including any working class, poor, or women of color (Frye 2005). In consideration of these problems, my analysis is an act of reflection in order to draw out the relevance of these criticisms to Pogge’s analytical framework.

One of the primary critiques raised against early mainstream feminism, particularly of second wave feminism, was that gender was utilized as an exclusive category for analyzing women’s oppression at the expense of ignoring other aspects of women’s identities, such as race and class (Collins 2000; hooks 2000; Spelman 2001; Zinn et al. 2008). Critics argued that one reason this was occurring was that it was primarily economically comfortable white women who were doing the theorizing. This meant that the partitioning off of gender as the sole category of analysis of women’s oppression was a reflection of their own lives and experiences, intentional or not, under the guise of gender “universality.” Perhaps the most infamous example of this was in Betty Friedan’s work *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), which detailed the alienation and
drudgery that “women” faced as housewives—a luxury that many working class women could not afford! At any rate, critics such as bell hooks argued that the norming of the experiences of a select group of middle class white women was masked under the rhetoric of inclusion, bolstered by claims the claim that all women are oppressed (hooks 2000, 5).

María Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman state that, “it is only possible for a woman who does not feel vulnerable with respect to other parts of her identity to claim women, as women are silenced…” (1998). The assumption that women’s oppression is uniquely defined by gender relies on a “universal” image of a woman whose daily life is not significantly negatively impacted by her race (typically white) or class (middle or upper class). These dimensions, however, affect all aspects of individuals’ lives in multiple and diverse ways. For instance, Elizabeth Spelman argues,

> It is highly misleading to say, without further explanation, that Black women experience ‘sexism and racism.’ For to say merely that suggests that Black women experience once form of oppression, as Blacks (the same thing Black men experience) and that they experience another form of oppression, as women (The same thing white women experience). (2001, 79)

The criticism is that treating race and gender as separate issues and insignificant to women’s oppression qua *feminist* concerns rendered the gender oppression of poor women and women of color invisible in several ways. For instance, Chandra Mohanty argues that early mainstream feminists’ discourse over women’s reproductive rights lacked a real recognition of mediating factors relevant to the debate such as race and class. This lead some white western feminists to emphasize the right to abortion, whereas reproductive issues that economically marginalized black women faced, such as forced sterilization, were initially ignored (Mohanty 1991, 11-1) and only eventually came to be recognized as a feminist issue. Sterilization is a policy forced largely upon *poor black women* and, as such, a policy born out of the intermixing of gender, race, and class bias (Carby 1982, 219).
Other examples include what Patricia Hill Collins calls controlling images of black
cwomen, not shared by white middle class women:

From the mammies, jezebels, and breeder women of slavery to the smiling Aunt Jemimas on pancake mix
boxes, ubiquitous Black prostitutes, and ever-present welfare mothers of contemporary popular culture, negative
stereotypes applied to African-American women have been fundamental to Black women’s oppression. (Collins
2000, 7)

Collins defines controlling images as ideologies that function as a tool of social control over a
group to subordinate that group, while at the same time norming the images so that these images
seem natural and to represent reality (Ibid). The controlling images constructed regarding black
women lie, at the very least, in the intermixing of gender and race—the intersection of the two,
not in one or the other. To identify gender as the primary category of analysis for women’s
oppression is to expose a race and class privilege because if it is not a site of oppression then one
must be privileged with respect to those features of one’s identity. Just as many men within the
communist movement saw gender equality as secondary to class equality (Tong 1998, 118-119)
—because they did not regard gender as the main source of oppression—early mainstream
feminists marginalized the experiences of women of color and poor women by taking gender to
be the primary category of analysis for women’s oppression. Whereas some would argue that the
goal of second wave feminism was to draw out gender as a legitimate category for analyzing
oppression and not necessarily as an essentializing category, it is clear that some feminist critics
regarded the project as essentialist, whether that was the intended goal or not.

On the one hand, second wave feminism was a movement that contributed a significant
amount to theorizing about gender oppression. On the other hand, there existed questions and
challenges regarding, for instance, the race and class neutrality of such projects, especially within
those arenas that claimed to be representative of all women. The important theoretical and
practical point that critics raised against second wave feminism was the underlying norming of

22 Thanks to Alison Jaggar for pointing this out.
the everyday experiences of white women of privilege that they argued was conceptually built into the theoretical framework of early mainstream feminism. They argued that a lack of regard for multiple aspects of women’s identities and how these features interacted with gender oppression did not make these theories neutral with respect to race, class, and other facets of women’s identities—it made the definition of what it means to be a woman and suffer from gender oppression exclusive and inaccurate.

One important lesson to be learned from the critics of second wave feminism is that the viability of successfully theorizing about the marginalized, oppressed, exploited, or those being harmed by the global economic order rests, at least in part, on one’s account of who the poor are. Taking the criticisms of early feminism seriously entails that if a theory excludes multiple aspects of their subjects’ identities, then this calls for critical reflection. Applying this point to Pogge, one should not assume that because Pogge’s theory is meant to include the severely poor that it really is inclusive and contains no underlying bias. Conceptually, Pogge constructs the severely poor as raceless and sexless individuals who are being harmed by the current global economic order. His emphasis on economic inequality between nations with scant attention to race reveals a race-privileged framework since race is assumed not to be a factor in the current harms experienced by the poor. In treating race as theoretically marginal, Pogge implicitly assumes a type of racial privilege which can occur when race is not operative as a site of oppression or does not serve as source of disadvantage. It is not that Pogge is assuming a privilege in terms of gaining some benefit, but rather that the “neutrality” and seeming “universality” in his approach to poverty covers up deeper theoretical assumptions that rely on a particular constructed identity.

23 Race privilege as I define it is meant to be contextual. For instance, in one context race may serve as no disadvantage, say, when an immigrant returns to his or her native land. In another context, when he or she returns to the country immigrated to, then race may be a site of oppression.
On Pogge’s account, the racialized nature of severe global poverty is a mystery. Pogge claims that the global economic order is causing millions to die each year. Yet there are no global causes identified to explain why it is that the majority of the world’s poorest are not white and that the majority of those forced by dire poverty to live in garbage heaps dying from lack of food, shelter, medicine, water, and other treatable conditions are people of color. People of color are suffering the harshest realities of all—a fact that calls out for recognition.

Patricia Hill Collins’ concept of controlling images offers an illustration of how the inadvertent, or unconscious, positing of race privilege creates theoretical gaps, which cannot account for the experiences of people of color. As I have already argued, the framework and the agendas of global economic institutions have been built around racially charged images of the so-called Third World. Just as stories about black welfare queens abound in the United States, NPR reports that stories about the global poor and colonial images of poor nations as children persist in discourses regarding poor nations (NPR 2009). These images must be identified, if they are to be challenged. It is not possible to unravel the structures of race and how it is operative in different contexts if the theoretical starting point is the universal “poor” person.

The second problem with Pogge’s theory is that it only captures one aspect of the problem of global poverty, leaving out other salient features. This is because Pogge uses a single axis framework, inequalities between nations, in his analysis and largely drops race from the equation. Against a single axis framework, in which only one lens is used, i.e., gender in the case of much of feminism, Kimberle Crenshaw argues that oppression should be conceived in terms of the multiple axis framework of intersectionality, which can account for how intersecting aspects of individuals’ identities, such as race, class, and gender function in order to create oppressive circumstances. Without the concept of intersectionality, certain individuals who are
marginalized in various ways fall through the cracks such as when a company appears to be gender inclusive and racially sensitive because it possesses high rates of white women and black men. Such a distribution would satisfy a single axis framework, which looks at race and gender separately, appearing to be gender and racially inclusive. In contrast, Crenshaw argues that on an intersectionality model, such a company’s claim to gender and race sensitivity would fall short due to the obvious exclusion and marginalization of black women (1994). What Crenshaw’s model of intersectionality illustrates is that theories can function so as to further marginalize certain groups, by using only one dimension as the starting and ending point for theorizing about injustices.

Pogge’s theory contains a conceptual blindness and, in turn, bias due to the centrality of a single axis framework in his analysis of severe global poverty. Examining power inequalities between nations provides one axis of analysis and identifying bargaining inequalities or resource borrowing privileges is an important contribution by Pogge, but it is a mistake to rely on this axis alone because it decontextualizes the gendered and racial structures in which transnational economic institutions function to harm the poor. Multiple facets of individuals’ identities can operate as a basis for their oppression; ignoring this fact silences these injustices. As I have already argued above, Pogge’s primary prescriptive recommendation on the part of the affluent for eradicating severe poverty cannot even begin to address the link between race and poverty. Even if the GRD were capable of bringing the severely poor above the severe poverty line of $1 a day, or even $2 a day, does the fact that it is overwhelmingly people of color who are left hovering closest to the poverty line not warrant moral attention? Even above $2 a day, race and poverty would continue to be interlinked. In short, the lack of attention to intersectionality is not inclusion; in terms of being more universal, it is just ignoring the problem.
In conclusion, the lessons to be learned from the misguided search for a “sisterhood” among feminist theorists is that theorizing must start from reflection on the experiences of the subjects of analysis, as well as be aware of the theorist’s own positioning in relation to such subjects. As many feminist women of color argued, this lack of awareness led some mainstream feminists to construct an image of women that merely reflected their own images, as opposed to being representative of all women. This lack of awareness, or inclusion, led many to problematic theories that failed to capture the experiences of many women of color and consequently silenced their oppression. While many feminists have incorporated the lessons of these failures, mainstream philosophy has not yet caught up. There is much to be hailed in Pogge’s work. His minimalist approach to the problem of severe global poverty lends itself to the possibility of a broad appeal. The problem, however, is that his account fails to account for the experiences of the poor, particularly the racialized nature of severe poverty, and thus treats the average poor person as race privileged to the degree that race is not recognized as an axis of harm. I have argued for the importance of incorporating intersectionality into one’s theorizing. Universality and inclusion should not be equated with lack of regard for the diverse experiences of individuals—inclusion is better conceived in terms of recognition of difference: in this case, the recognition that people of color are disproportionately being harmed by the current global economic order must carry moral weight.
Chapter 4: Gender and Human Rights

In this chapter, I propose that Pogge’s theory of human rights should be amended in order to make his theory gender inclusive of the experiences of women. Using domestic violence as a locus point, I argue that Pogge’s institutional account of human rights violations, as officially sanctioned actions, has the potential to account for women’s experiences, but misses the mark when domestic violence is explicitly ruled out as a human rights violation. Rather than reject Pogge’s account of human rights, I argue that the properties that define what is official, in Pogge’s view, can also be exhibited in the violent behavior and social status of domestic abusers. When gender structures are closely examined as operative social norms that are often solidified in institutional structures, the dominant status of many men over women, or husbands over wives, becomes readily apparent. Without attention to existing gender structures that reinforce the subjugation of women, Pogge’s theory of human rights is covertly gender biased because it unjustifiably ignores the disproportionate suffering that women experience at the hands of non-state agents, such as violent husbands. Thus, an arena of violence and terror for many women that takes place on a global scale is marginalized and deprived of the moral status and international force that human rights have gained on the political-socio-international scale. Human rights possess an international normative force, what Charles Beitz refers to as an “elaborate international practice,” (Beitz 209, 1-2) that takes places on multi-level dimensions and is not comparable to any other moral or justice scales The inability to recognize domestic
violence as a human rights violation, then, is not a trivial matter.

State violence against women represents a serious threat to securing the human rights of women, and it is a type of violence that Pogge’s theory is well equipped to address. But when Pogge outright rejects domestic violence as a human rights violation (2008b, 63-64), this illustrates not only gender insensitivity by not recognizing the moral relevance of women overrepresented among the victims of domestic violence, it also reflects a sphere in which Pogge ignores his own criterion that such features are morally salient and should be incorporated in accounting for injustices. Women’s overrepresentation as victims of domestic violence, and the persistence of domestic violence as a global phenomenon are the starting points for recognizing that even though domestic violence is not an official policy of any state, or state agents, it is still something that has an official nature.24

I argue that there are several problems with Pogge’s gender “neutral” approach. First, Pogge is vague on what counts as official or unofficial. In claiming, for instance, that abusive husbands do not violate human rights, Pogge fails to provide any reasons to support this claim, a move that is unjustified given that the existence of multiple gender norms that often make women the targets of this type of violence, at the very least, merits a serious look into the authoritative and official nature of such norms. Making gender visible means that evaluating injustices that women experience often requires putting those injustices into their social and political contexts, rather than abstracting from or individualizing the issue; otherwise broader patterns of domination and subjugation are rendered invisible (Pateman 1994; 2005). I argue that contextualizing domestic violence, in all its global diversity, makes it readily apparent that it is

24 The World Health Organization (WHO) cites several disturbing trends on the nature of violence against women. The WHO states that violence against women currently poses a significant public health threat for its victims. Violence committed by women’s intimate partners is also identified as one of the most common forms of violence inflicted upon women. The WHO conducted a ten country study, which revealed that 15% - 71% of women reported having experienced physical and sexual abuse by their intimate partner (World Health Organization 2009).
official given its systemic and widespread qualities.

Second, ruling out domestic violence as a human rights violation is a consequence of Pogge’s portrayal of domestic violence as the non-systemic acts of individuals acting in isolation. This is especially evident in Pogge’s classification of violent husbands as being similar to petty thieves. This categorization illustrates a male bias within his theory.

Finally, I argue that human rights theories must be connected to practice and this is particularly important when it comes to securing the human rights of women. Women’s activism has been key to gaining international recognition of women’s human rights, even though a vast amount of work remains to be done. During what came to be known as “The U.N. Decade for Women” spanning from 1975-1985, several global conferences were held with the purpose of bringing women together to discuss issues that seemed particularly to affect women. These conferences were riddled with conflict as participants from diverse locations, situations, and interests debated and contested problems and priorities connected to securing the rights of women. Despite these conflicts, one issue that seemed to gain the most consensus as a shared global crisis was the issue of violence against women, including domestic violence (Joachim 1999; West 1999). In this chapter, I focus on the example of domestic violence in part because I think that that is where the gender bias in Pogge’s theory of human rights is most apparent. Furthermore, the issue of domestic violence is important because examining how securing women’s human rights from violence has unfolded through the practical struggles marked by both progress and setbacks will show why seeming gender-neutral theories of human rights, such as Pogge’s, are an inadequate basis for securing the human rights of women.

Pogge’s exclusion of domestic violence as a human rights violation counters the lived

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25 Pogge might grant that domestic violence is a human rights violation in the interactional sense, but my claim is that whether or not this is the case, domestic violence should be recognized as constituting a human rights violation in his institutional account because it meets the criteria for official status.
experiences of many women whose subjection to violence reveals a systemic global problem. Progress in securing the human rights of women has been made by recognizing domestic violence as a human rights violation, recognizing that the boundaries are often blurred between domestic violence and other types of physical and sexual violence against women, and focusing on the state’s role in condemning, condoning, and allowing such violence to continue. The boundaries of domestic and non-domestic violence are blurred, and a core feature that is frequently shared by both is the gendered norm of women’s social positioning as sub-human and unworthy of the respect and dignity that human rights postulate for all human beings. It is in the interest of drawing into the light such structural and institutionalized norms of oppression that I propose a gender-inclusive modification to Pogge’s institutional account of human rights. Otherwise, progress gained through activism that has challenged the conceptual and legal barriers to including the interests of women is pushed back by the claim that such ubiquitous violations of the physical, psychological, emotional, and sexual well-being of women are not protected under the strongest international moral norms the global order has ever known: human rights.

1. Deconstructing the Concept of Authority in Pogge’s Account of Human Rights

   Central to Pogge’s concept of human rights is that human rights violations are official violations and, as such, human rights protect individuals from official deprivations. Pogge’s definition of “officialness” is given through his paradigm case of governments, including government agents, agencies, and lower sub-units of governments violating human rights (Pogge 2008, 65). Pogge leaves open the possibility that entities aside from those that are government related may be official, depending on the degree of their authoritative status, but, as I will discuss
below, his criterion for what other entities would fall into this category is vague. Coupled with this model of human rights is Pogge’s concept of official disrespect for human rights, which measures the attitudes and responses of governments to human rights violations and insecurity, as well as the attitudes and responses of citizens living under those institutions (2008b, 69).

Like many human rights advocates and theorists, Pogge maintains that human rights violations accompanied by official disrespect constitute some of the most horrible injustices that the world has seen. Pogge says that what makes such incidences “especially hideous” is that:

> Official moral wrongs masquerade under the name of law and justice and they are generally committed quite openly for all to see: laid down in statutes and regulations, called for by orders and verdicts, and adorned with official seals, stamps, and signatures. Such wrongs do not merely deprive their victims of the objects of their rights but attack those very rights themselves (2008b, 65)

Contemplation of genocide, systemic death marches, organized terror, and mass murder show why human rights have been one of the only successful normative models that have gained international credence. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights strives to protect the rights of all human beings, a category that is laden with theoretical problems, but speaks to the spirit of the UDHR.

What this illustrates is the significance of correcting any gender bias in Pogge’s institutional account of human rights that leaves out some of women’s vital interests. The claim that domestic violence is not a human rights violation, in the institutional sense of official violations, means that domestic violence is not an injustice against women that attacks the very right of physical integrity set out in Article 5 of the UDHR, which holds that “no one should be subject to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.”

When Pogge asserts that domestic violence is not a human rights violation there is gender bias made evident by the lack of argumentation to support this claim. His account of what is official versus what is unofficial takes for granted certain gender structures since it does not
examine the gendered nature of domestic violence. The result is that Pogge ultimately marginalizes women’s experience and norms men’s experiences as paradigmatic instances of human rights violations.

Pogge’s definition of what is official versus what is unofficial is problematically vague. In addition to governments and their agents Pogge allows that there can be other “official” entities. He even tells us what other entities might be official, as well as what entities are not official.

Human rights can be violated by governments, and by government agencies and officials, by the general staff of an army at war, and probably also by the leaders of a guerrilla movement or of a large corporation — but not by a petty criminal or by a violent husband. We capture this idea by conceiving it to be implicit in the concept of human rights that human rights postulates are addressed, in the first instance at least, to those who occupy positions of authority within a society (or other comparable social system). [2008b, 64; emphasis added]

A core criterion driving Pogge’s categorizations is that the individual, or entity, is situated within a position of authority, or acting on behalf of those with authority. The problem with Pogge’s argument is not in the criterion itself, but with its application and conceptualization of what it means to occupy a position of authority in a society that is deeply divided by hierarchical structures of gender, race, class, sexuality, etc.

Pogge’s claim that a guerrilla army can probably violate human rights and that violent husbands do not raises questions about the tenability of such distinctions once violent husbands and guerrilla armies are placed within their social/political contexts. Such contextualization reveals that this distinction (the “official”/“unofficial”) rests on ambiguous and arbitrary grounds. It is ambiguous to the extent that Pogge fails to develop what constitutes the relevant authoritative difference between guerrilla armies and corporations versus violent husbands. In what capacity is a violent guerrilla army that targets and terrorizes women acting in an official and authoritative manner to a greater degree than men that abuse women? Critics have pointed out that counting domestic violence as a human rights violation does not appear to abuse the
concept of human rights (Ashford 2007, 185; Tasioulas 2007, 97). Though these critics present this argument in favor of a non-institutional account of human rights, there is another direction that can be taken which is that there exist features of domestic violence, as well as other types of gender violence, that shows the concept of authority is meaningful to the perpetrator-victim relationship that defines the gendered nature of domestic violence.

Comparing various social systems reveals the pervasiveness of gender hierarchies that generate troubling statistics about violence against women and indicate that the assumption that violent husbands lack a relevant socially recognized authoritative status must be argued for and not assumed. For instance, The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) reports on its website on Violence Against Women that “[i]n 1994, a World Bank study on ten selected risk factors facing girls and women in this age group [16-44], found rape and domestic violence more dangerous than cancer, motor vehicle accidents, war and malaria.” Additionally, UNIFEM notes that 102 countries currently lack legal provisions for victims of domestic violence and in 53 nations marital rape is non-prosecutable. The ambiguousness of Pogge’s concept of occupying positions of authority within society is not benign as it disregards the gendered and systemic nature of domestic violence.

When Pogge rules out violent husbands this is not merely contingent or accidental, but reflective of a gender bias generated by a failure to consider the gender inequalities described above. The bestowing of authoritative status on entities like guerilla armies seems highly arbitrary considering the systemic and often institutionally sanctioned status that is granted to domestic abusers, in contrast to guerilla armies. Such gendered structures cross global boundaries in a far more pervasive way than any guerilla army has managed to achieve.

An analysis of Pogge’s boundaries of what is official indicates that authority consists of
individuals or entities that primarily operate in the public or political sphere along with some level of organization. This represents one the most obvious shared feature of governments, guerilla armies, and corporations. In contrast, domestic violence may initially seem disorganized and “private,” lacking the public features of socially recognized power and organization that governments, guerilla armies, and corporations might possess. This is a reasonable reading of Pogge’s framework given that governments represent the paradigm of officialness—meaning that it is the public nature of institutions or groups that largely generates official status. This is further backed by Pogge’s claim that when a government agent commits a harm, the further it is from his official status, the less it counts as a human rights violation (2008b, 65).

Pogge’s institutional account of human rights then, operates on a spectrum. The more a government agent’s actions move away from his identity as a government agent, the more that this agent acts as a private citizen, with diminished or no capacity to violate human rights. The degree to which this spectrum is helpful for delineating who or what possesses authoritative status is debatable. It is not always clear when an agent is acting in an official capacity or not. In Okinawa, a series of rapes committed against Okinawan women and girls by members of the U.S. army resides in this ambiguity. These soldiers were not ordered to rape, yet protesters argue that the very presence of a military base has created and perpetuated conditions of human insecurity (as opposed to national security) for the women and girls of Okinawa (2002). The question is, in continuing to keep the base open, is the military providing official sanction for the rapes and, if so, do these rapes contain the necessary authorititative status to count as human rights violations against these women? Pogge’s account of authority provides no clear guidelines for discerning the status of such cases and their placement in one category or another.

The ambiguity is a consequence of a gender bias in Pogge’s account of officialness. The
failure to consider how gender operates on a social, political level is evident in the inability of Pogge’s concept of authority to establish a relevant difference between violent husbands and guerilla armies or corporations. Along similar lines, Susan Okin points out that a flawed assumption theorists frequently make is that systemic power does not operate in the private sphere as it does in the public sphere and, as one consequence, all inequalities within the family are assumed as natural (1989, 128). Okin’s point is backed by the marital laws discussed above, which reinforce and sanction women’s subjugation to their husbands when they uphold a legal system that does not recognize women’s equal rights to have others respect their consent or non-consent regarding the actions of others upon their physical bodies.

The assumption that violent husbands are not human rights violators further naturalizes domestic violence because it buries the global systematic authority by which so much of this violence occurs. Such a framework fails to recognize the systemic power inequalities that are detrimental to the physical, psychological, and social welfare of women. Jutta Joachim observes that “data suggests that throughout the world, the home is by far the most dangerous places for women and frequently the site of cruelty and torture” (Joachim 2007, 104). The collective, systemic nature of such household violence illustrates that ruling out violent husbands as human rights violators is arbitrary and cannot be justified by Pogge’s own criterion of possessing a socially recognized position of authority.

Guerilla armies might possess significant power to terrorize and assault women, yet the pervasive violence that women experience at the hands of men that they know can be as great as or at least equivalent to the threat that women face from guerilla armies. This is not to say that all women experience the same types of domestic violence in the same context. Violence is informed by factors such as gender, culture(s), social norms, history, and even practical factors,
such as the ease and accessibility of different tools for murder and torture (Narayan 1997). Such diversity has not made gender violence against women, including domestic violence, any less of a core, shared issue: women from diverse locations, interests, and agendas have agreed it is a global crisis that demands recognition that, among other things, offenders are guilty of human rights violations (Joachim 1999, 153-158). Such consensus has been solidified in human rights documents like CEDAW (The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). It is not in spite of diversity among women that domestic violence ought to be recognized as a human rights violation, but in light of diversity that any claim to reduce domestic violence to a lesser moral wrong, as compared to rape or torture by military officials, fails. To do so is to perpetuate a global order that normalizes this violence.

Henry Shue argues that basic rights such as physical security are necessary for the exercise of any other rights (Shue 1996). One need not go as far as positing basic rights to see that human rights are frequently interdependent, as recognized in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and later in the 1993 Vienna Declaration (Donnelly 2003, 27). Securing the physical security of women includes recognizing that the deprivations that women experience at the hands of their husbands or boyfriends constitute severe human rights violations, even when defined in terms of socially positioned authoritative status. The public face of domestic violence can be seen in the blurring of boundaries that takes place through honor killings. These are murders frequently sanctioned by husbands and family members and by broader social structures and institutions, made especially clear when these executions take place for the public to witness. Such considerations are not intended to challenge Pogge’s claim that human rights are conceptually linked to official violations, deprivations, or security. Rather, by gendering the concept, the boundaries of what is official must be redrawn to include domestic violence and
other gendered structures of inequality that prop up a gender hierarchy, which grants men socially recognized positions of authority over women.

2. Are Violent Husbands Like Petty Thieves?: Male Bias in Pogge’s Theory of Human Rights

I now explore and critique the individualist concept of domestic violence underlying Pogge’s theory of human rights. By individualist, I mean the treatment of domestic violence as the unorganized, random acts of individuals. I develop the argument that Pogge’s failure to contextualize and situate domestic violence within a gender perspective is indicative of a male bias that treats violence that particularly affects women as less serious than violence that more typically affects men.

Pogge regards domestic violence, in terms of not counting as a human rights violation, as similar to the crimes committed by petty thieves. For Pogge, domestic violence is like petty crime in that it takes place through the volition of individuals, acting in an unorganized and random manner. This is not because Pogge underestimates the gravity by which such acts can threaten a person’s livelihood. He states that the random theft of one’s car by a petty criminal may pose a serious threat, yet because such a theft lacks the necessary official status, it cannot constitute a human rights violation (2008b, 63-64). Though Pogge is able to recognize the gravity of such deprivations, he fails to recognize a relevant dissimilarity between car thefts and domestic violence. Part of what makes petty crime and car theft lack an official status is that such crimes frequently have a random and arbitrary nature. For example, there is no one particular group in society, singled out who are consistently the victims of car theft. Petty criminals do not represent a privileged group within society that target traditionally disadvantaged groups. This generates a non-collective, non-systematic, and arbitrary feel to petty
crimes, which lends credence to Pogge’s claim that such crimes do not constitute human rights violations. The same cannot be said about domestic violence.

If domestic violence were arbitrary, unsystematic, and not officially sanctioned, then one would expect to see relatively equal numbers of men and women victimized by domestic violence. Yet the opposite is true: global analysis of violence against women, including domestic violence, reveals that domestic violence is a global epidemic that takes a variety of forms including: psychological abuse, acid burning, dowry murders, battery, and rape (Amnesty International). Amnesty International has stated that the greatest threat to a woman, in terms of violence, comes from someone that she knows. Despite these findings, theorists, including Pogge, have been slow to recognize the extent to which women are abused as a group. Even feminists have not always recognized the global scope of domestic violence, condemning dowry murders and sati as culturally oppressive and backwards practice, while ignoring the cultural underpinnings of high rates of domestic murder by gun violence of women, experienced in the West. Though there are contextual differences, gun murders, sati, and dowry murders can all represent incidences of domestic violence (Narayan 1997, 83-117). Analysis of the lived experiences of women across the globe shows an alarming consistency in the threat that domestic violence poses to women’s well being. It is not in spite of differences between women, in terms of location, race, age, etc., but in view of this diversity that the seeming “individualism” of domestic violence is revealed as a globally operative systematic structure that reinforces the domination and subordination of women. The diversity among women and in the forms of torture and abuse they experience is what makes domestic violence, both in its scope and depth, a testament to the official status that violence against women currently has.

This is why Pogge is simply mistaken to approach human rights theory as a gender-
neutral concept. The violence and deprivations that human beings face are often divided along the lines of gender, race, class, sexuality, etc. When Pogge places domestic violence on the level of petty thievery, he fails to recognize that gender inequality in terms of domestic violence permeates all societies.

Gender violence against women knows no boundaries, moving freely between public and private sphere. The public face of “private” violence is a woman’s face. By failing to incorporate the moral relevance of gender norms that operate to the disadvantage of women, Pogge’s theory of human rights reflects an underlying norming of men’s experiences: men are rarely the subjects of domestic violence. In her critique of the dominant state-centric conceptions of human rights, Catharine MacKinnon states that the more a violation shifts to the “home” and is thus “feminized,” the less likely it will be regarded as a human rights violation. For instance, rape is more likely to be seen as a human rights violation in war than when it occurs on a daily basis within societies. Yet MacKinnon notes that “[M]en do in war what they do in peace” (2007, 39, 148), calling into question the coherence of labeling such violence as a non-human rights violation. Pogge’s concept of human rights mirrors the state-centric models of human rights that MacKinnon criticizes, erasing all gendered structures and norming men’s experiences as they are more likely to experience violence at the hands of a state or governmental institutions/agents than they are at the hands of their wives, girlfriends, sisters, aunts, or mothers.

The individualism and randomness that Pogge attributes to domestic violence (specifically by violent husbands) is a failure to recognize the institutionalized features of this violent behavior. For instance, to be a husband is currently and historically a legal category that often grants rights and privileges that reinforce the inferior and sub-status of women, such as when husbands were permitted to beat their wives with a rod so long the rod was not bigger than
their thumbs. A 2004 report by Human Rights Watch on Jordan documents how Jordanian courts allow male members of families to monitor the sexual morality of women in their families and punish perceived immorality with invasive virginity examinations. In many cases, these courts knowingly sanction women’s death sentences, since women who have been imprisoned for sexual immorality are often only allowed to be release to the very family members who attempted to kill them. Marital rape was long recognized as the right of husbands in most countries. Rights of inheritance and to equal political participation have historically favored men in comparison to women. Denial of these rights is a tool of political and social power since it leaves women without political voice or material resources. Gender norms are structures that situate men and women in different places within society, but these structures are reinforced through laws and regulations that institutionalize and solidify inequalities between men and women. Across the globe to be a husband is not just to be a married man: it is too commonly to be endowed with the right of authority and power that systematically enables the abuse and torture of women. Pogge implicitly recognizes the gendered dimensions of domestic violence when he proclaims that violent husbands do not commit human rights violations. In this proclamation there is both a recognition and denial of the gendered nature of violence in the home.

Susan Okin argues that in order to achieve gender inclusiveness more is needed than the use of gender-inclusive language. Such language can allow theories to appear gender inclusive, while at the same time lacking any real effort to engage in a gender analysis (Okin 1998, 10-12). The gender “neutrality” by which Pogge approaches the concept of human rights is indicative of such an approach. Because there is no real attempt to engage gender, it is easy for Pogge to acknowledge the gendered structure of domestic violence and simultaneously place violent

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26 Thanks to Alison Jaggar for providing this important historical example.
husbands and petty thieves within the same category of non-official entities. This generates a
gender bias that causes the moral relevance of hierarchical gender structures to disappear and
individualizes and randomizes what is in fact a global systemic crisis.

Gender inclusiveness on the issue of human rights is best achieved by a theory of human
rights grounded in a real examination of the social and political differences that permeate the
lives of men and women. I have argued that domestic violence is unlike petty thievery and that
global monitoring of women’s well-being backs such a claim. Furthermore, neglect of an
analysis of gender renders Pogge’s account of human rights biased to the extent that it reflects
the experiences of men and renders the most powerful threat to the physical security of women
as lacking the moral status of a human rights violation. I will now turn to the practical and
political efforts of women activists and theorists in order to give a practical illustration of how
Pogge’s theory of human rights pushes against progress in legitimating women’s claims to
human rights.

3. Women’s Activism: Securing a Global Space for Women’s Rights as Human Rights

After World War II, human rights emerged onto the international political sphere with the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The recognition of women’s rights as human
rights has been much slower, only gradually making its mark in the last couple of decades. To
say that women’s rights are human rights does not entail that women have fundamentally
different rights from men. Such proclamations draw attention to the fact that many of the threats
to human rights security are gendered. They also highlight that these threats, such as domestic
violence, are often deemed less important and outside of the scope of human rights by both states
and international institutions. Because human rights typically enjoy a higher, though not always
absolute, moral status than other rights or moral claims (Nickel 2007; Donnelly 2003), what is at stake for the recognition of women’s rights as human rights is significant. Women have had to bootstrap the legitimacy of their rights claims through a process that did not have any real force until roughly thirty years after the initial Declaration. What success this movement has had in important ways rests on the preceding global acceptance of human rights (Berkovitch, 1999). In this section, I will discuss the history and transformation, within international institutions, of domestic violence from a “private” matter to a human rights violation. I outline how this process was informed and shaped by women’s advocacy groups in international institutional settings. I will then argue that Pogge’s theory of human rights works against this progress by denying that domestic violence is a human rights violation.

The United Nations and the United Nations Women’s Conferences have been vital institutional mechanisms for developing and legitimating women’s rights as human rights. Starting in the mid-seventies, The United Nations Women’s Conferences brought together women from across the globe to discuss issues directly affecting women. These conferences took place in Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1980), and Nairobi (1985) in what came to be known as the U.N. Decade for Women. They facilitated a forum for organizing women both within the formal institutional conference settings of the U.N., as well as outside of these settings—as informal platforms for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) also sprang up, coinciding with the official U.N. women’s conferences (West 1999). Although the conferences dealt with issues regarding women, they were by no means homogeneous or harmonious in their direction or interests, especially in the earliest conferences where women were split by factors such as nationalist loyalties and disproportionate representation of Western as compared to Third World Women (West 1999; Joachim 1999).
To be sure, though the process of internationalizing women’s rights has had many beneficial consequences, it is ongoing, complex, and continually marked by diversity and difference even as agendas are pushed forward. As an example, women’s advocacy groups, especially at the local and national level of NGOs, continue to question the desirability of subsuming their agendas within the institutional body of the U.N. Alice Miller points out that critics argue that the politically driven and often bureaucratic structure of the U.N. effectively means that mainstreaming women’s rights movements simply weakens such movements. They see submersion into the bureaucratic machinery as counterproductive. On the other hand, proponents argue that there are important benefits to participation, such as the two-way transfer of much needed information between national/local NGOs and international institutions and NGOs. National and local NGOs can benefit from receiving training and information from international NGOs on how to effectively advocate on an international level. International NGOs can benefit from receiving much needed on-the-ground information that is often better obtained by NGOs at the local and national levels (Miller 1999). In this mutual exchange of resources local, national, and international organizations can serve to legitimize and support one another.

As debates on the desirability of utilizing the U.N. and other international institutions continues, one thing that is clear is that, at minimum, the U.N. conferences during the Decade for Women provided a platform for women in which to debate, contest, and develop agendas for addressing the needs of women, in all their diversity. This discourse continues as women’s advocacy groups have struggled to define and mark out what their relationship is, or should be, with the U.N. Whatever conclusions are drawn, undoubtedly the continuation of such discourses is crucial for keeping the variety of women’s interests in the spotlight of national, international, and local agendas. Additionally, concrete resolutions and agendas have already arisen in the
women’s rights as human rights framework. Applying the human rights framework to supporting women’s interests has come to be seen as essential and appropriate for furthering women’s rights. This is especially the case with the issue of domestic violence, which has garnered much needed attention and legitimacy in large part because of the institutional platforms created by the U.N.. Thus, women’s advocates both within and outside of U.N. conferences have not been without success in identifying and pushing for transformation.

Among the most important conferences for the advancement of women’s human rights have been the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (1993) and the Beijing Conference (1995). To claim that women’s rights are human rights is to call attention to the fact that the human rights framework had long neglected human rights violations that particularly affect women. Both the Vienna World Conference and the Beijing Conference raised the issue of gender violence, especially domestic violence as a human rights violation. In Vienna, feminists challenged rigid distinctions between the public and private sphere in order to establish domestic violence as falling within the scope of human rights. Prior to the Vienna Conference, both international institutions and governments had delegitimized women’s rights as human rights on claims that violence against women is frequently a “private” issue because it is not committed by states. Since human rights were taken to be oriented toward state actions, this left domestic violence outside of the realm of human rights. Other challenged assumptions were that domestic violence is an inevitable and immutable feature of societies (Bunch 1990), entailing that domestic violence was not the appropriate subject of political obligations by states since reforms/abolishment were not realistic.

The problem with the first assumption is that the claim that human rights are only secured and violated by governments ignores the role of institutional structures, developed by Pogge,
and, additionally how the scope of socially legitimized authority is informed by factors of
gender, race, and class. Second, naturalizing any one particular type of violence is arbitrary and
unjustified. To hold domestic violence as a fixed part of society is no more coherent than to
claim that state inflicted violence of genocide is an inevitable, fixed part of all societies. No
social, cultural, or biological destiny marks out any one group for abuse and murder. The Vienna
conference proved to be key in shifting attitudes within international institutions, such as the
U.N., on gender violence as a human rights violation.

The shift from domestic violence as a private matter to domestic violence as a human
rights violation has had real consequences on the lives of women and is not just a theoretical
matter. There is a whole realm of barriers to women’s achieving security from domestic violence
for which human rights hold a promise of transformation. For instance, Cheryl Thomas has
illustrated that legal institutions across the globe have allowed domestic violence to flourish in
several ways: by failing to offer adequate police protection to victims, through non-enforcement
of laws regarding violent actions when it involves domestic abuse, blaming the victims for
provoking attacks by “letting themselves go,” medical exams with the intended purpose of
disproving the victim’s claim, and the requirement of a medical certificate of injury as a
prerequisite for legal actions even though patients may not receive medical appointments until
days after the attack, thus masking the severity of the harm. Such failings of legal systems have
not been restricted to one or two areas of the globe—they are reflective of global practices. These
problems are at least partly addressed by the setting up of international legal norms by which to
condemn domestic violence (Thomas 1999). Without the human rights framework, and the
coinciding recognition that domestic violence violates human rights, women would have no
recourse to the moral and legal standards that human rights offer. Though human rights treaties
often lack any real legal force, what they do offer women is a powerful normative tool that
rightly identifies domestic violence as a global problem and challenges the notion that what
happens in the home stays in the home: at least to the international eye.

It was in Vienna, due to the ongoing advocacy by many NGOs, that the groundwork for
change was set with the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women (Joachim 1999; Thomas 1999), which equally condemned violence enacted by the state
and in the home. Following relatively quickly thereafter in Beijing, the Beijing Platform for
action was created, which proclaimed that domestic violence is a human rights violation. Gender
violence was specifically defined so as to include violence against women regardless of whether
inflicted by state officials, “private citizens,” or in the home or outside of it (Merry 2006, 21-24).
Cheryl Thomas states that:

> With these developments, which occurred between 1993 and 1995, the United Nations ended any debate on
whether domestic violence could be classified as a human rights violation. This violence was clearly identified
as a violation of international law and named a top national and international priority. (1999, 252)

One of the central obstacles to getting gender violence, especially domestic violence, recognized
as a human rights issue had rested on the state-centrism of human rights doctrines and the lack of
evaluation of how gender norms function to create human rights insecurity or deprivations. Such
norms are enacted through official state entities, such as wartime ordered rape, but the abusive
and violent behavior of non-state agents can be authoritative when it is through laws and
customs. In winning recognition of domestic violence as a human rights violation, gender-biased
conceptions of human rights within the international political sphere have been weakened. The
result is that through the language of human rights women across the globe have a normative and
internationally recognized tool to combat the gender violence condoned by cultural practices,
legal insensitivity, and outright disrespect for the equal status of women.

Securing women’s human right to be free from domestic violence continues to be a work
in progress. It might be tempting to take the existence of conventions and treaties that proclaim a commitment to women’s human rights as evidence of gender equality. The reality is that these conventions are often among the most contested, with many states either refusing to sign, or signing with reservations, as in the case of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, a convention yet to be signed by the United States (Amnesty International USA). The significance of international recognition of women’s rights as human rights, especially in the case of domestic violence, is not diminished by the unwillingness of countries to commit to CEDAW or other similar documents. Countries that refuse to participate, or that choose to participate but do not live up to their commitments, can be shamed by the international community. What is most important is that a new moral minimum was set that recognizes the saliency of gender. Women are being murdered and tortured across the globe, many at the hands of “loved” ones. Recognition of this violence by the international gatekeepers of human rights as a human rights violations means that domestic violence is recognized as the global pandemic that it is: challenging the norms and structures that legitimize and instruct individuals on the legally “correct” way to beat their wives.

The history of the movement to establish women’s rights as human rights, especially with respect to gendered domestic violence, illustrates how Pogge’s theory resists important changes that have occurred on an international institutional level with regard to the women’s rights movement as a human rights movement. This move is problematic by Pogge’s own standards since he claims to give an account of human rights that fits with ordinary usage (2008b, 64). Struggles to legitimize women’s human rights reveal that how human rights are conceptualized has real world implications that affect women. Additionally, achieving gender inclusion in the concept of human rights has not taken place by ignoring gender; rather, a gendered analysis has
proved to be crucial. As Alice Miller points out, part of what it means to gender the concept of human rights is to look at “classic” human rights, such as the right to be free from torture, through the lens of gender (Miller 1999, 168). Acid burnings, death by fire, rape, and gun murders to name but a few forms of violence against women undoubtedly call into question the reasonableness of the claim that women’s human right to be free from torture is not being violated by, for instance, violent husbands.

I have argued that Pogge’s theory of human rights is ultimately flawed because it fails to account for gender structures that impact what counts as official and unofficial. It is the seeming gender-neutral approach that generates this problem because structural inequalities marked by domination and subordination that have been socially sanctified through customs, tradition, laziness, and law are completely ignored by Pogge. Reflection upon the achievements and transformations that have taken place with respect to human rights and women shows that putting gender in the center as a core theoretical starting point is the method that has helped to bring about the inclusion of women and the raising up of the morally abhorrent nature of domestic violence, as an attack not just on individual women, but an attack on the very right of women to physical security.

Pogge’s institutional account of human rights is highly inadequate for addressing the human rights of women so long as the concept of what is official ignores gender structures and norms that disadvantage women. Rather than reject Pogge’s theory of human rights I hold that his theory can be modified. This requires redefining what is official in terms that take into account gender hierarchical structures, and other similar structures of race, class etc., that function as organizing principles in societies and across the globe. Gender violence is too often officially sanctioned by norms, laws, and practices\(^27\) that, in consequence, generate a link

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\(^27\) Even when legal guidelines are put into place to protect the victims, the actual practices of those charged with
between the “exotic” practices of acid burning and the “mundane” gun murders of the West.

It might be tempting to reject Pogge’s theory outright and adopt what he calls an interactional account of human rights that posits that all individuals can violate human rights (regardless of their official status) (2008b, 70-71). To do so, though, would entail losing the powerful normative force behind the official/unofficial distinction in Pogge’s institutional model of human rights. Although the interactional model of human rights easily identifies domestic abuse as a human rights violation, it is no longer able to recognize the systemic nature of this violence. On the interactional model of human rights a husband beating his wife is no different, as a human rights injustice, from a wife who beats her husband. This is deeply counterintuitive, given its anti-contextualism.

In conclusion, I have used domestic violence as a primary example to illustrate a gender bias in Pogge’s theory, but this bias is not a problem only with regards to domestic violence. Women’s social roles make them especially vulnerable to deprivations that are seemingly committed by “private citizens,” such as when women and girls are required to take less food than the men and boys in their families, or when girls, and not boys, are disproportionately pulled from school to help with the domestic and income-generating labor. Such circumstances are widely systemic among the global poor, who must struggle with the difficulties of not having enough. Without examining gender norms, the routine nature of this social ordering disappears.

Taking gender seriously calls for asking why it is so normal for Pogge to claim that violent husbands as opposed to violent wives do not violate human rights (though the implication of course is that both do not). Incorporating gender and recognizing that it is an organizing structure, frequently solidified and redefined by law, shows that gender is one of the most enforcing those guidelines can remain the same. Such is the case when women are asked in front of their male partners, by those in acting in an official capacity, if they feel safe at home only to be told by such agents that they are “required” by law to ask, thus revealing the indifference, and lack of understanding by official agents.
powerful official forces that operate within and across societies. A theory of human rights should not disproportionately ignore the types of human rights violations that are experienced by women.

For these reasons, Pogge’s theory of human rights should be modified to recognize that gender and other salient factors carry an official status as they represent structural hierarchies with real meaning that continue to represent some of the worst human rights injustices today.
Chapter 5: Race and Human Rights

In this chapter, I argue that severe global poverty is in part the outcome of institutional racism within current global economic institutions. Pogge’s claim that global poverty is a human rights violation ought to be placed within the racialized context in which it takes place. The problem is that Pogge employs an overtly race-neutral account of severe poverty as a human rights violation, neglecting the race bias, harmful to people of color, that underlies many of the practices and policies of current global economic institutions. As such, his theory misses a core injustice, namely racial injustice, interlinked with the global causes of severe poverty. First, I will examine the concept of race as a historically constructed concept. I then argue that institutional racism in the global economic order occurs through structural adjustment programs and borrowing privilege. I will also argue that global institutional racism is especially harsh in that it not only functions to disadvantage people of color in the global South, it also perpetuates and exacerbates racism in the form of racist narratives. I conclude that the minimal global reforms prescribed by Pogge in his proposal for a Global Resources Dividend are too minimal. Recognizing racism in the global economic order shows that more comprehensive reforms are necessary in order to account for this racism as it is interlinked with human rights violations perpetrated by current global economic institutions.

1. Accounts of Poverty: The Promise of Pogge’s Global Institutional Account

Pogge’s analysis is ultimately lacking when it comes to recognizing the centrality of race and racism to global poverty, although his work contains more promise than many other well-known accounts of global poverty. For instance, his claim that severe poverty is a human rights
violation perpetrated by the current design of the global economic order has broader implications for thinking about race and racism in the global context. In highlighting the relationship between the practices of global economic institutions and severe poverty, as reflected in the manipulation of unequal bargaining power, resource privilege, borrowing privilege, and TRIPs (2008b), Pogge provides a minimal framework for thinking about the reach of global structures of power. He rejects “explanatory nationalism,” a theory that appeals solely to domestic features of poor countries to explain severe poverty (2007; 2008b), offering instead a concept of human rights, which asserts human rights claims as claims on the design of the institutional order. Since global institutions have far-reaching effects, this generates the grounding for a global account of the suffering of the severely poor as a human rights violation. In these respects, Pogge’s account offers a minimal conceptual and normative framework for thinking about race and racism on a world scale in relation to global economic structures and their impact on the poor.

This type of framework is lacking in other popular assessments of poverty. For instance, Garrett Hardin claims that global poverty is the result of incompetent governments. Hardin also claims that famine in the “Third World” does not represent a moral tragedy. Instead, he compares assisting the global poor to feeding a cancerous growth (Hardin 2008). Pogge’s argument fills in what is wrong with Hardin’s callous account of poverty by pointing to the moral saliency of the global interconnectedness generating current global economic institutions in which harms and benefits seem to flow two different ways. Pogge’s theory also fills the gap in Singer-type arguments that call for assistance to the global poor (Singer 1972), but do not provide the conceptual apparatus to challenge assumptions that global poverty is caused by bad governments and “Third World” corruption. In most respects, Hardin’s and Singer’s accounts of global poverty reside on opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their moral assessments of poverty.
What their analyses of global poverty have in common is that they do not recognize any type of causal relationship between severe poverty and the affluent West and global economic institutions. This leaves no institutional grounding for assessing the racialized nature of poverty, one feature of which is that the global poor tend to be non-white, whereas the affluent tend to be white. Both theories leave the “corrupt” governments theories intact as a plausible account of the main causes for poverty in poor countries.

The important difference in Pogge’s assessment of severe poverty is that he argues that much severe global poverty is a human rights violation because wealthy countries are harming the poor by imposing a coercive institutional order that causes foreseeable and avoidable human right deficits (2002; 2005b; 2007; 2008b). The problem is that despite Pogge’s argument for the moral relevance of the global economic institutional order, he ignores what is a glaring feature of poverty: that the majority of the severely poor are people of color. The racially stratified structure of severe poverty and wealth raises the issue of how institutions factor into the problem. Pogge holds that, “in the modern world, the rules governing economic transactions—both nationally and internationally—are the most important causal determinants of the incidence and depth of poverty” (2007, 260). If this is the case, then it is clearly morally relevant to ask why the global economic order seems to be producing a system that is so highly racialized.

Global ills such as slavery and colonialism have long been regarded as implicated in severe human rights violations. Yet global practices, at least emanating from the West, that perpetuate human rights violations have also been viewed as a thing of the past: something for history books to look back upon with regret, reminding the West of its moral progress forward since those darker times. The global North is often not regarded as responsible for mass suffering and concomitant human rights deprivations that take place among the poorest people living in
some of the poorest countries. Pogge’s account of global poverty shifts emphasis off the poor and onto affluent nations. The problem is that Pogge’s work continues to perpetuate an interpretation of the global economic order that is decontextualized through its deracialization of the issues, a serious deficit in his theory.

2. On Race

In order to assess how racism functions within the current global economic order, it is helpful to clarify what is meant by the term “race.” Some will argue that race no longer exists, meaning that they no longer see race when they look out into the world. Race, as I will examine it in this section, pertains more to questions regarding the “reality” of race as theorists have probed the question of whether or not there is any “real” biological grounding behind the concept or whether it is a mere construct. I will provide an overview of this debate and its implications for the concept of racism.

To speak about race requires an exploration into history. One problem that theorists confront today is that there is no agreement about what race is. The question of what races are is often framed in terms of whether races are a fact or a fiction. At the center of this question is the issue of whether there exists some sort of objective reality that is captured by the concept of race or whether races are simply a socially constructed fiction. Many theorists agree that the concept of race is relatively new in human history. Race was created as a biological category, primarily centered on theories of racial essences, generated by early Europeans around the time of slavery as a way of understanding and classifying physiological differences (Boxill 2003; Outlaw 2003). Initially, Europeans appealed to environmental causes to explain the physical differences between themselves and Africans. This did not last, however, and theories of biological essences
in one form or another became the popular explanatory mechanism accounting for perceived physical differences (Boxill 2003). Some have argued that from its inception the creation of “races” was motivated by malevolent intentions, tied up in the justification and rationalization of slavery. Theorists such as Bernard Boxill disagree, arguing that the “birth” of the races was motivated by scientific inquiry (Ibid). What is clear is that whether European intentions were corrupt or pure, such classifications quickly became the tool of a racial typecasting detrimental to people of color. These projects were propped up by well-known philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and David Hume, who both developed theories of racial “essences” that held whites to be inherently superior to non-whites (Zack 2006, 242-244). What is important about the historical European construction of race is that it was not just a project of classifications, but quickly became a project of typological hierarchy built upon flawed scientific theories of essences in which skin color, among other things, signified all that was needed to know about a person: to identify superior or inferior status, in order to deem him or her worthy of being a human being or the object of subjugation.

During the mid to late 1900s, biological theories of racial essences lost plausibility due to lack of empirical evidence and new theories that challenged essentialist thinking in general, such as Darwin’s theory of evolution (Outlaw 2003). Yet the racial project in more general terms did not end, despite this lack of scientific validation. Especially in places such as the United States, a racial paradigm continued to operate in which values, intelligence, and so-called “cultural” characteristics continued to be regarded as inherent features of one’s “race.” The early twentieth century in the United States continued to support a racial hierarchy on both the domestic front through Jim Crow and on the global front through its imposition of racial segregation abroad. As Howard Winant puts it, the U.S. took its racial system wherever it went, establishing both
internal colonies “at home” through laws like Jim Crow and external colonies outside of its
borders (Winant 2004, 7-8). Such practices relied heavily still on the presupposition that race had
a biological aspect, a belief exemplified by the “one drop” rule that held that one is black so long
as one has one ancestor who is black (Zack 2006; Boxill 2003). Perhaps the best account that
captures this view is presented by Bernard Boxill who says that, “a person is black if he would
have to ride Jim Crow in Georgia were his ancestry known to the conductors” (2003, 33),
pointing to the relationship between quasi-biological accounts of race and social agendas.

“Race,” as a scientific and biological project, has been a largely arbitrary form of
classification and has revealed itself to be motivated by bias, rather than science. This is
supported by the fact that as scientific theories of racial superiority/inferiority have lost
credibility, race has remained as a concept that functions to keep in place the racial hierarchies
initially put in place by the Europeans. Race, as a tool of classification, is centrally a political
project.

Racial typecasting as supposedly grounded in a racial biology has continued to persist in
contemporary times as represented by the 1994 book The Bell Curve, which attempted to
establish a genetically based black intellectual inferiority relative to whites (Block, 2003).
Theorists have challenged such race thinking and its implications that “biology is destiny.” Ned
Block has argued that even if there is some minimal biological entity that constitutes one’s
“race,” the so-called genetic intellectual inferiority of blacks cannot be justified because it is not
possible to rule out environmental factors, which are known to have a significant effect on I.Q.
and are currently unquantifiable (Ibid, especially p. 24-25). What projects like the Bell Curve
demonstrate is that establishing a biological category of races, even detached from the
institutions of slavery and Jim Crow, is not necessarily likely to be a benign project given that
racialization is by historical fact a tool of social hierarchy for European and Western nations. This explains why the retreat of theories of racial essences did not signal the retreat of racial stereotyping and typecasting that put whites at the top of the social ordering and brown people at the bottom.

As a result of the obvious social and political agendas of racial hierarchy, as well as lack of solid empirical verification, theorists have rejected race as a biological reality, holding it to be a pure social construct (Zack 2006). Other theorists maintain that even if some biological basis were to be found that established the existence of “races,” such as genetic differences, it is unlikely to have any social significance since the manifest impact is likely to be small (Boxill 2003). Given that scientists have been hard pressed to find any biological grounding that would justify carving up people into “races,” this is strongly supported by scientific research. What these theorists agree upon is that whether biology plays any role or not, environmental influences such as cultural, social, and political factors cannot be ignored when analyzing “race” (Boxill 2003; Outlaw 2003; Zack 2006). The racialization project is centrally a project of assigning values based on “race” that are often arbitrary and work to the disadvantage of people of color. To set out to establish that whites are intellectually superior to Hispanics and blacks is to strip away history and socio-political contexts that consists of an unequal education system and multiple other social inequalities in hopes of reaffirming a “natural” social hierarchy carved out by nature itself. Such endeavors are value-laden and have little to do with “objective” science.28

Thus, in the context of securing human rights within the global economic order, “race”

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28 Thomas Kuhn has demonstrated that science is never a value-free practice and that scientific criteria for evaluating a hypothesis, such as fruitfulness or explanatory power, function as values that scientists can rationally disagree on in terms of their weight/relevance when evaluating a theory (Kuhn, 1998). Kuhn’s insight is pertinent to the race question since it refutes the purely objective science stance (that assumes itself to be value free). Later theorists have also shown that value-laden background assumptions are always operative in the investigation of scientific hypothesis (Okruhlik, 1998). These points are relevant to the race question and science since it challenges the very idea of race as a “pure” mode of scientific inquiry that is easily detached from a racist history.
matters regardless of its ontological status. It has never (or at least almost never) existed as a concept devoid of hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and fantasy about racial superiority and inferiority. What follows from this is that examining the problem of global institutional racism need not rest on the presupposition that races exist. So long as race is treated as real and the European and American racial values system is influential worldwide, then “race” has moral significance. So long as global institutional schemes continue to produce human rights violations in identifiable and consistent patterns that map onto “racial” groups, then institutional racism is morally relevant; as millions who have toiled and perished under the weight of current global economic institutions might have attested to, had their voices been heard.

3. Institutional Racism in the Global Economy

In this section, I argue that the global economic order, as particularly represented by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), is implicated in institutional racism. I support this argument through a critical assessment of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and what Pogge identifies as borrowing privilege. I will argue that Pogge’s theoretical failure to grasp the connection between global institutional racism and human rights violations against the poor is morally problematic and comparable to erasing race from the human rights violations that occurred under Jim Crow. I will now turn to the question of how institutional racism should be conceived as it occurs on a complex global scale.

Two obstacles may appear to stand in the way of the claim that institutional racism in the global economic order is partly responsible for human rights violations against the poor. First, the question of what constitutes racism is a contested matter. Second, the sheer magnitude and depth of the global economic order would seem to defy any susceptibility to the charge of
racism. The two problems are related. How one answers the former will directly impact one’s ability to assess institutional racism on a global scale. Some schools of thought rest on the presupposition that it is necessary to look deeply into individuals’ minds or hearts in order to establish the presence of racism. These theorists maintain that racism occurs only if one is motivated by racial inferiorization or antipathy (Blum 2002, 1-32), one’s “heart” holds ill-will/antipathy or hatred toward certain races (Garcia 1996), or one holds certain ideological beliefs that reinforce structures of oppression, in this case, structures of racial oppression (Shelby 2002). While there are important differences among these theorists, what they have in common is an internal definition of racism that necessitates an examination of individuals’ motives, hearts, or belief systems in order to establish the presence of racism. Such accounts of racism are plausible especially when considering such things as cross-burnings in the U.S. South and hate crimes. The problem with these theories is that their theoretical frameworks provide limited scope by which to assess racism, which makes them inappropriate for analyzing racism on a global scale. The global economic order is a complex entity consisting of different institutions and various agents working within these institutions, with varying levels of power. These agents, it would be reasonable to conclude, probably differ in what their “hearts” hold.

Lawrence Blum and J.L.A. Garcia do offer accounts of institutional racism, but their definitions of institutional racism are based on their original definitions of racism as motive (Blum) and attitudes (Garcia). The problem is not just that it would be difficult to give an account of institutional racism on a global scale, even one restricted to economic institutions, but that the psychological evaluative approach is not well equipped for assessing institutions on a global scale. This is not to say that such a project is not possible. Rather, if such accounts are taken as the definitive accounts of what constitutes racism, then by its very definition, racism
will be hardly measurable on a global scale. Take for instance the moral problem of sweatshops often filled with women of color. Iris Marion Young identifies many of the typical conditions of sweatshops including: 16 hour work days, limited breaks, unsanitary conditions, inadequate ventilation, lack of access to clean drinking water, no sick leave, and threats or even death when laborers attempt organize for better conditions (Young 2007, 165). There are multiple levels on which it would be necessary to examine the “hearts” that support this system. There are the manufacturers who contract out, the managers of the factories, the individuals in affluent nations who knowingly buy sweatshop products, the superstars who endorse these products, and the governments that allow for corporations to take advantage of poor regulations, to name but a few. Given the growing impact and influence that global institutions have on the world, the degree to which such internal accounts face difficulties with such global issues represents a problem.

This is not to say that these accounts of racism are wrong or have no place in the realm of global justice. I hold a multidimensional view of racism, which means that racism occurs in various ways and is not always the same: context matters. For instance, Linda Alcoff argues that racism is not only about skin color (Alcoff 2003). In addition to skin color, racism is also frequently about racialized and cultural features that make no reference to skin color, such as the shape of one’s eyes, country of origin (“wetback”) 29, and even language. Racism contains different axes of oppression grounded in skin color, racialized features, and even individuals’ geography in terms of their home countries (Ibid). Racism is experienced differently by different groups and what one experiences depends largely on where one falls on the racial spectrum, a spectrum that is constantly shifting and stretching in multiple directions.

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29 Alcoff connects this to country of origin because it is a derogatory term against Hispanics that makes reference to the fact that they often get to the United States through water.
Racism manifests itself in multiple ways, and the concept should not be bound by any one simple definition. One theorist has convincingly argued that racism falls under Wittengstein’s family resemblance concept (Headley 2000). For instance, even though badminton, UNO, and basketball are very different, none of these activities seems to violate the concept of a game. Similarly, diverse individuals will not experience racism in the same way, or for the same reasons. Just as who or what race refers to has not remained constant and has been very much tied to social and political projects (Outlaw 2003, 62), the concept of racism should also reflect that reality. Even the same individual may have different experiences of racism depending on factors such as region, economic status, gender, perceived “ethnicity,” and shifting social locations. What constitutes racism will vary and will be best captured by different accounts. This is why racism should be construed as a family resemblance concept that is not restricted to one core definition that would imply a universal fixed essence for all times and places.

My claim that current global economic institutions contain institutional racism is based on a modified and expanded version of Gertrude Ezrosky’s account of institutional racism (Ezorsky 1991). The scope of Ezorsky’s analysis is within the bounds of the U.S. as it applies to blacks. Ezorsky defines institutional racism as an overtly race-neutral practice that systematically has an adverse impact on blacks. Such practices have a racist impact when the adverse impact occurs as a result of past overt racism, or if the adverse impact perpetuates racism. For instance, she points to the practice of word-of-mouth hiring as one such case since blacks are typically outside of white social circles due to a history of housing discrimination against blacks. This problem is compounded by the fact that whites tend to have high-paying and prestigious jobs. Thus, word-of-mouth hiring represents an overtly race-neutral policy that adversely impacts
blacks by denying them the opportunity even to apply for these jobs. It is clear that Ezorsky’s account of institutional racism is readily relevant to other groups of color, such as Latinos.

A strength of Ezorksy’s concept of institutional racism is that it lends itself to application on a global scale. It is capable of addressing the question of racism within global economic institutions since many of the policies of these institutions are formulated in overtly race neutral terms. It does not demand an evaluation of present motives and intentions in order to establish racism. Finally, this concept of institutional racism is not completely detached from more internal perspectives, as represented by the theorists above; institutional racism, which carries a racist impact, is directly linked to past overt racism and the perpetuation of racist attitudes by such overtly race-neutral policies.

Lawrence Blum has objected to Ezorsky’s account of institutional racism on the grounds that it implies that practices identified as institutionally racist, such as seniority systems and word-of-mouth hiring, are motivated by racial bias, in cases where none exists. Blum states that Ezorsky’s definition of institutional racism “…does not seem a helpful description, either in implying racist motivations infect the working of processes that are in fact free of racial bias or in generating a judgment of overall moral opprobrium prior to examining the ethical pros and cons” (Blum 2002, 24). If something is racist, Blum argues, then it should be abolished. He objects that so long as no racist motives underlie these practices they may, in some cases, be retained with some modification. For instance, he argues that seniority systems have many benefits, such as providing job security and can be worth preserving with appropriate changes to correct for any racial injustice.

In response, there is nothing in the definition of institutional racism as an overtly race-neutral policy that adversely impacts blacks, or people of color that implies that the motives of
individuals are morally irrelevant to the establishment of racism. What Blum fails to recognize is the contextual nature of the definition of racism that situates the practices within a particular social context that includes history, social and economic relations, and race-relations in order to assess particular practices. Blum suggests that Ezorsky’s concept condemns certain practices for all times, in all places, for all peoples. This is simply not the case. Ezorsky’s analysis assumes the moral significance of social context, such as: past overt racism that resulted in housing segregation, lower quality of education, and the general segregation of blacks and whites. Another factor of moral relevance is the potential of a practice to perpetuate racism. All of the factors carry significance in assessing policies and whether or not they are institutionally racist.

As Ezorsky states, seniority systems are implicated in institutional racism partly because of past overt racism that caused blacks to be the last hired and, thus, first fired. Job segregation also had an impact on seniority systems since blacks who were eventually able to transfer jobs automatically lost their seniority status once they transferred. These historical features of a society organized along racial bias and prejudice compose the contextual data relevant to identifying what constitutes institutional racism. Such an account by no means implies that every practice that is currently identified as institutional racism is necessarily inherently morally wrong in all contexts: if social and political circumstances change in such a way as to reflect a more equal social and educational system, then the practices may lose their morally problematic status as institutionally racist.

J.L.A. Garcia raises two objections to Ezorsky’s account of institutional racism. First, he downplays Ezorsky’s appeal to institutional racism by questioning whether or not something such as word-of-mouth hiring can be properly called an institution. The reason is that he construes word-of-mouth hiring as an informal practice by individuals in which F merely gets G
a job through the “old-boys” network. This portrayal of word-of-mouth hiring does not do justice to the significance of this practice in society. Garcia ignores the fact that the majority of hiring in the U.S. is done through word-of-mouth hiring. Everyday word-of-mouth hiring has a significant effect on thousands of individuals and their opportunity to access jobs. Institutions are reflected in the basic rules and organization of society. A practice that has such a deep impact on individuals’ livelihoods and causes a portion of the population, blacks, disproportionately to lose out on equal access to jobs reflects an institutional practice that comes at a high cost to these groups. It is not an abuse of the concept of institutions to count word-of-mouth hiring as an institutional practice.

Second, Garcia states that blacks experience all sort of disadvantages that are not necessarily about race. This claim is meant to challenge the idea that a race-free practice is institutionally racist simply because it disadvantages blacks given that, “in our society, with our history of racism, Black people can be disadvantaged by many things other than race-based factors” (1996, 25). Garcia is right to point out that not all disadvantage is race based, but it does not follow that every policy that disproportionately and systematically adversely affects blacks is not institutionally racist. Like Blum, Garcia fails to take into account the historical aspect of Ezorsky’s account of racism, by which it is clear that history has made race a relevant factor.

I will focus on two overtly race-neutral practices upheld by global economic institutions that are indicative of institutional racism. The first is structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The second is borrowing privilege.

Structural adjustment programs arrived on the global scene as a response by the World Bank and IMF to the global debt crisis in the 1980s as a way to promote economic growth to ensure that poor countries that appeared to be on the brink of defaulting on their loan payments
would be able to repay their debts to commercial banks of wealthy countries (Gershman and Irwin 2000). SAPs are lending conditions typically imposed upon poorer countries, regarded as the “Third World,” in exchange for loans from the World Bank and the IMF. They called for a restructuring of the borrowing countries’ economies so as to reduce the government’s role by decreasing social services, increasing privatization, and reorienting national economies toward greater immersion into the global market, to list a few (Ibid). In short, SAPs represent the reorganization of the material distribution of goods and services under the umbrella of neoliberal ideology. The core justification for these invasive reforms is that they are said to produce growth that brings economic and social benefits (in addition to securing debt repayment). On the alleged social benefits, M. Rodwan Abouharb and David L. Cingranelli state that advocates of SAPs claim:

Limited government empowers individuals by giving them more personal freedom, making it more likely that all individuals will realize their potential. The ability to realize one’s potential, according to this line of reasoning, leads to individual responsibility and self-reliance. Limited government maximizes individual opportunities, limits the opportunity for corruption and releases talented people into the more efficient private sector. (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 236)

Critical scrutiny by theorists has revealed a lack of evidence to support the claims that SAPs create economic growth for societies, as a whole, and bring forth the social development described above (Ibid). Thus, the rationale offered by proponents of SAPs show them to be seriously deficient.

Who pays the price? People of color are paying the price, especially those among the world’s poorest. Institutional racism must be considered as a factor even if SAPs are articulated in race-neutral terms. It is not simply that SAPs fails to impart some benefit; rather, a significant racialized harm is occurring that is being felt disproportionately by people of color. This harm represents moral culpability on behalf of those upholding and primarily controlling current transnational economic institutions. In what follows, I offer a few reasons for thinking that SAPs
represent an institutionally racist policy that has a racist impact.

Howard Winant states that the current global economic structure consists of a system of indirect rule by the global North over the global South, what he calls imperialism through economic institutions (2004, 19). An examination of SAPs lends support to this analysis. A typical mandate of SAPs requires countries to abandon subsistence farming in exchange for export farming of goods in the global market. One adverse consequence of this market reorientation is that poorer countries in the global South become locked into the whims of the global market, making these countries more vulnerable to global changes in the market. It has also created increased dependency on foreign technology and machinery in the South and provided access to cheap labor for the North (Jaggar 2002, 120). This system very much mirrors old imperialist and racist systems of the past, where brown bodies were at the mercy of financial institutions controlled primarily by white Westerners and their economic agendas.

Problems also arise with the importing of foreign technologies to the poor. The shift from local technologies to dependency on foreign technologies in the debtor countries not only displaces local knowledge, it often creates new problems generated by lack of knowledge on the part of foreign Northern industries, which is often invisible to foreign experts since they assume a superior position relative to the “locals.” Timothy Mitchell has illustrated the harmful effects of the North’s imposition of foreign technological “innovations” upon Egyptian communities. For instance, in one case new technology was introduced to build traditional mud houses that not only came at an economic cost to the Egyptian community but also disregarded local knowledge on how to properly build these houses, and finally had disastrous results as the houses quickly began to fall apart due to the ineptness and inadequacy of the supposed advanced technology (Mitchell 2002, 41-42).
The development “expert” is another tool by which the North exerts its one way, hierarchic, relationship with the South. Uma Kothari notes that while there are numerous experts flowing from the North to the South, international agencies seldom fund experts from the South to advise the North:

The idea that British NGOs might learn from people from those regions is novel to many and unconvincing to some. This has led to a failure on the part of most development workers to recognize the ability of “recipients” of aid to identify the issues that concern them and to manage their own resources. (Kothari 2005, 429)

The construction of “problems” suggests the need for new “solutions” to be implemented by the supposed technologically superior industries of the North. Importing technology as a vehicle for growth and development can also function to expand the power of global economic institutions within poor countries through what Ferguson and Lohmann have identified as a process of “depoliticizing the political” by treating what are undoubtedly social/political problems associated with poverty as merely technical problems, i.e., non-political (Ferguson and Lohmann 1994). Not only is local knowledge and self-reliance displaced, but also the West’s grip on the national structures of poor countries is tightened by SAPs.

SAPs, in some cases, also undermine certain human rights that protect individuals from bodily harm. One study that examined the human rights impact of SAPs given by the World Bank from 1981-2000 showed that in poor countries SAPs have an adverse human rights impact during the implementation years. SAPs caused governments to worsen in their respect for physical security rights such as torture and political imprisonment. Although theories differ on why this occurs, such as increased domestic unrest due to the shrinking of state provisions that then incites government repression. What the studies showed was a direct correlation between increased violations of physical security rights in countries obtaining SAPs during the implementation phase (Abouharb and Cingrandelli 2006). Not only are poor people of color subjected to loss of their control of their economies, invasion of Northern technologies, and
disregard for local knowledge, they are also the victims of structural adjustment programs that bring about conditions in which freedom from torture and political imprisonment are less secure. This has further implications on a global scale since it indicates that people of color have less of a voice to protest, including protesting global policies like SAPs, since the implementation phase of SAPs can mean that individuals are more likely to face violations of their human rights via the increase in torture and political imprisonment.

The racist impact of SAPs is grounded in a past racism that locked the global South out of the financial institutions that would come to control the world economy. This is true on both a global and national scale. The United States is one of the most powerful countries controlling current global economic structures. These global institutions were created in a time of severe racism, which prevented people of color from being included in the management of these institutions. On a global scale, racism carved up the world into categories of competent vs. incompetent, knowledgeable vs. ignorant, thus setting the stage for the global North, which had accumulated wealth through slavery and colonialism, to create a global economic order structured along such an axis.

Borrowing privilege, or what might be called borrowing “dis-privilege,” refers to the lending of large sums of money by global economic institutions such as the IMF to various countries. In theory, this global practice is race neutral, but in practice it is not, as most of the countries that receive these funds are poor and primarily consist of people of color. On the other hand, the lenders are primarily white and set up harsh conditions through high debt repayment. Some of the adverse affects on countries that have had the dis-privilege of needing to partake in this global lending/borrowing scheme are identified by Howard Winant, who holds that current global economic institutions are a post-colonialist regime grounded in a web of global debt. He
states that:

Just as in the days of African Slavery, when dark-skinned workers labored in chains to subsidize their white “owners” and “masters,” so now in the twenty-first century Africans labored in the chains of transnational debt peonage to subsidize the great banks, securities markets, and “developed” nations that were their creditors, or perhaps one should say their modern slave masters. (2004, 19)

Winant’s critique is not limited to Africa and applies to Latin America and Asia as well (Ibid). Structural power inequalities within global economic institutions are embedded and implicated in worldwide racial inequalities as manifested between affluent and poor nations. The global lending of borrowing privilege benefits those whose interests are primarily represented within the global economic institutions, namely whites and countries that tend to be predominantly white. In fact, global economic institutions have explicitly shown favoritism toward predominantly white countries with regard to debt that they have not shown towards predominant non-white countries. After WWII, Germany was granted an 80 percent reduction in its war debt. This is in sharp contrast to the debt of many non-white countries in the late 1990s, which equaled 50 percent of their state revenues (Ibid, 20). In short, borrowing privilege and its subsequent debt bondage is not race neutral, but adversely impacts people of color by keeping poor countries at the mercy of a core of predominantly affluent and white countries that possess primary control over economic institutions and the distribution of their benefits and burdens.

Not only does borrowing privilege have an adverse effect, but it also results in a racist impact. The racist impact is based in past overt racism of slavery and colonialism. As I previously argued in chapter three, colonial powers were able to shift from their overtly racist agendas into a new global structure eventually transformed into global mechanisms for economic development (Stiglitz 2002, 17-18). The current debt bondage that people of color face is based in colonialism to the extent that colonialism enabled global economic institutions to be constituted so that affluent nations (former colonizers and slave traders) held a disproportionate
amount of power. In enabling this structure, former colonizers stood at the helm of global economic institutions and, consequently, at the helm of all global economic pursuits. Some of the harmful effects of colonization are identified by Alison Jaggar: damaged economies due to the sucking out of human and non-human resources, the diaspora in Africa as a consequence of slavery, and ethnic conflict bred out of the creation and imposition of new state boundaries on colonized nations (Jaggar 2002, 131). It is not by some stroke of luck that the World Bank and the IMF are primarily controlled and represented by Western nations. Neither is this structure born out of necessity. It is the product of a racist world system put in place during the era of global overt racism and then remanufactured and reproduced by human choice and vision: neither the mandate of history, economic “rationality,” nor the hand of objectivity has created this global institutional scheme. The adverse impact of borrowing privilege on people of color rests largely in past overt racism, which enabled current global economic institutions to set biased and unfair conditions. If the global South had equal power within global economic institutions, it is unlikely that they would impose on their countries high debt repayment plans, in contrast to more lenience and debt forgiveness for the global North, or that they would adopt development plans constructed by the global North that continue to bring more disaster and uncertainty.

Structural adjustment programs and borrowing privilege are overtly race-neutral global policies that represent institutional racism as a feature of current global economic institutions. Theses policies have a disproportionate adverse impact on people of color and have a racist impact due to the effects of past racism embedded in colonialism. Below I will argue that the failures of SAPs and borrowing privilege, in terms of perpetuating worsening economic and social conditions, have a further racist impact in that such failures perpetuate racism. On a global
scale, both SAPs and borrowing privilege function to perpetuate racism by reinforcing narratives regarding poor nations, predominantly composed of people of color, as backwards, incompetent, and eternally doomed to wallow in the abyss of failure. Such narratives flow from the global North to the global South and are detrimental because they obscure the true relationship between severe poverty, human rights deprivations, and global economic institutions.

4. Explanatory Nationalism: Narratives, Race, and Global Human Rights Violations Against the Severely Poor

In this section, I will examine how racism is perpetuated against the global South through explanatory nationalism. Pogge explains that a central tenet of explanatory nationalism is the belief that global poverty is the consequence of “national phenomena explainable mainly by bad domestic policies and institutions that stifle, or fail to stimulate, national economic growth and engender national economic justice” (2008b, 145-146). I will argue that such approaches contain racist narratives that are reinforced and sustained by global institutional racism.

Structural adjustment programs and borrowing privilege perpetuate racism by functioning as global mechanisms that reinforce and exacerbate severe poverty and human rights deprivations as a permanent unchangeable norm for the global South. Howard Winant’s account of racism best captures the core issues of how such practices manifest racism on a global level. Winant holds that “a racial project can be defined as racist if it creates or reproduces hierarchical social structures based on essentialized and racial categories.” This means that racial essentialization (such as the attribution of certain characteristics to particular “races”) and subordination must both occur in order for racism to be present (2004, 45-46). When SAPs and borrowing privilege fail by bringing about worsening conditions, people of color are frequently

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30 Winant presents this definition of racism for how it should be understood at this point in history. He does not think that there is one absolute definition of racism for all times and for all places.
blamed and regarded as perpetually incompetent. That is, incompetence and corruption are seen as intractable features of the South and of the brown, and black-skinned people who inhabit that space. The question is whether or not this consists of subordination and essentialism in a way that is racist.

Subordination occurs because the race “neutral” practices of SAPs and borrowing privilege result in a diminished capacity to bring about reform. This handicaps countries from trying to shift current power structures in which benefits flow to the North and burdens flow toward the South. Even when neoliberal projects are said to succeed, they often serve to further widen economic inequalities both within poorer nations and between affluent and poor nations. For instance, the use of health as a yardstick for substantively measuring the success of development, as defined by neoliberalism, has shown increased inequalities in health status as well as exacerbation of the deteriorating health of the poorest (Millen, Irwin, and Kim 2000). Debt repayment is particularly linked with this human rights crisis, as countries stagger under the first goal of SAPs (ensuring debt repayment) at the expense of the other said goals (reducing poverty and increasing development) (Gershman and Irwin 2000, 24). John Gershman and Alec Irwin note the direct adverse impact on health caused by official debt owed to transnational economic institutions that is crippling poor countries: Africa has faced four times the amount of debt to the North than the amount of money available to spend on health; in 1996 Mozambique faced twice the debt owed than what was available for spending on health and education; Niger faced similar conditions as debt owed to the North was greater than money available for health and education; in Nicaragua, the social sector budget was less than debt owed, even in the face of severe nutritional deficiency for children under the age of five; and in Bolivia, the debt owed in 1997 was three times greater than what was available to combat poverty, despite widespread
and high rates of poverty (Ibid, 24-25). The systemic threat to the health of the poor has not only increased absolute poverty in terms of health indicators, but also produces a growing inequality gap between the severely poor and the privileged (Millen, Irwin, and Kim 2000). These dismal effects are too often obscured by aggregate figures such as GDP, a metric often used to measure the success or failure of development projects. The subordination of the global South resides largely in such increased inequalities and subsequent increased inabilities to affect global structures that might turn the tide of fortune. Increases in sickness, malnutrition, and deaths of children are ingredients for anti-reformist conditions. Despite such circumstances, those that sustain the current global economic order also maintain a system that perpetuates the view that poor countries are destined to fail due to their own mishaps and ineptness.

This subordination is linked with essentialism. In order to see how this occurs, it is necessary to examine some of the narratives within the North. For instance, two common reasons that people in the West give as a justification for ignoring poverty are that reducing poverty deaths will be counterproductive because it will lead to overpopulation and thus to more poverty deaths and that failed development projects illustrate that severe poverty cannot be solved (Pogge 2008b, 7,10). The subordinating function of these claims is that many affluent Westerners do not feel the pull to respond to the fact that millions are dying from severe poverty each year. This helps to secure the global North’s domination of the global economic structure.

The problematic, essentializing nature of such claims becomes apparent upon consideration of the fact that the rhetoric of overpopulation and social/economic projects that are doomed to fail mirrors racially charged narratives about people of color living within affluent countries like the United States. On the one hand, there is the concept of people in the “Third World” as perpetual over-breeders. Such narratives are analogous to those regarding so-called
black “welfare queens,” and black women as “breeders” during the time of slavery. This is what Patricia Hill Collins identifies as controlling images that function as a subordinating mechanism, justifying various types of exploitation (Collins 2005, 57). The image of the “welfare queen” and “breeder” are meant to convey who/what a person is based on their “race,” as well as their socio-economic status and what can be done to them (or not) and by whom. These narratives justify indifference and blame the subjects of hardship for their circumstances. Essentialization against a group that is socially and/or economically subordinate is often a project that entails endowing certain individuals with inherent characteristics that are demeaning.31

The claim that nothing can be done due to the history of failed development projects not only reveals a remarkable lack of knowledge about the global order, but also bears a strikingly parallel resemblance to the harmful essentialism about people of color within the United States. What I call explanatory culturalism consists of attributing the racialized nature of poverty, with people of color at the bottom, especially blacks and Hispanics, to a “culture” that is marked by poor work habits, laziness, and lack of motivation. Explanatory culturalism is on the face of it a race-neutral theory that uses culture as the locus of social problems of poor people of color instead of race. In fact, explanatory culturalism is inseparable from race, despite its appeal to culture, since its referents are overwhelmingly black and Hispanic. Explanatory culturalism is often a racist theory about poverty that disconnects poverty from broader institutional structures and allows more privileged members of society to enjoy their privilege while maintaining institutions, such as the current education system, that disproportionately negatively affect people of color. Despite the abundance of evidence that the education system is structurally set up to

31The problem of indifference persists for many black people living in the United States. Despite the affluence abounding in this country 90 percent of all black children have, at one point in their lives, lived in households that required food stamps (Plotkin 2009). This has not been seen as a crisis, as illustrated by lack of interest in reform and the black “welfare queen” as a poster image for why such circumstances are occurring. As in the case of global poverty, such phenomena are treated as the status quo and culture-blaming functions as a tool of the status quo.
disadvantage non-whites, especially in urban areas, explanatory culturalism persists as a popular myth about why blacks and Hispanics cannot succeed. For instance, Jonathan Kozol does an excellent job of tracking these issues in the American public education system. The two-track education system represents one institutionalized mechanism for ensuring racial segregation will persist. This system puts in place low-skilled, low-paying labor training as “career” courses in inner-city schools, with no courses that would offer professional training. In contrast, affluent schools often offer training for professional jobs that are high paying and involve socially valued skills. This two-track system sets up a clear disadvantage for inner-city kids relative to affluent students (Kozol 1992).

Global and national narratives regarding people of color illustrate how essentialism persists as a racially harmful project. When global policies fail, explanatory nationalism serves as a theoretical justification for “culture” blaming, which is a cover for race blaming. The location of people of color at the bottom of society in the U.S., one of the most powerful countries running global economic institutions, and, largely, at the bottom of the current global order is non-coincidental. It results from a racist history and institutional structures that maintain a racial hierarchy. This structure is justified through global mechanisms that help to construct narratives by which the current global racial hierarchy is produced by the incompetence and corruption of the global South. As discussed above, in the early days of race formation, essentialism was a project built upon racial hierarchy. The harmful impact of global policies has perpetuated a similar form of essentialism, not built directly on biological essences, but built upon “culture.” For instance, on a global level, when the debt crisis hit many poor countries in the late seventies and mid-eighties, the global factors that contributed to this state of affairs were widely ignored and mismanagement and corruption within poor countries were blamed as the culprits.
(Gershman and Irwin 2000, 20). As Pogge shows, this type of “explanatory nationalism” continues to be a popular explanation for severe poverty (2008b, 145-150). Theorists like Garret Hardin finds no disconcernment in stating that the poor should be left to “drown” in their own corruption and mismanagement as we, the smart and resourceful, ideally drift by in our lifeboat (2008). Hardin’s article is often read as part of the canon of philosophical literature presented to students in the global North.\(^\text{32}\) The thread of mismanagement and corruption is part of the historical and current narrative of the global North and the global South.

Such dichotomous narratives can also be found in the misperceptions on the nature of the relationship between the U.S. and poor countries. Aaron Shakow and Alec Irwin found that individuals in the U.S. possessed an exaggerated perception of how much the U.S. contributes in aid to poor countries, believing that the U.S. donated significantly more than it actually did. In fact not only did the U.S. donate significantly less than what was thought to be the case, but the U.S. is one of the stingiest of the wealthiest countries when it comes to contributing aid; which also often came with strings attached (Shakow and Irwin 2000, 51). Whereas the U.S. is one of the most powerful actors in creating severe poverty, it is perceived as one of the greatest combaters of severe poverty. Yet this stinginess is masked by a discourse that posits a fictional generosity at the expense of recognizing current global injustices committed against poor countries. Even language, the act of labeling, reveals essentialism that is demeaning and reflective of the assumed superiority of the North as theorists have long noted in the First world versus Third World rhetoric, which in its more contemporary form has translated into developed versus underdeveloped (Ibid, 47-49). These examples reveal an essentialism that is not only false and harmful to people of color but functions to maintain the status quo of severe economic and power inequalities.

\(^{32}\) This can be inferred from the fact that it is in many philosophical textbooks for teaching undergraduate courses.
It might be tempting to reject the claim that global essentialism is occurring on a *racial* dimension. One might claim that even if essentialism is taking place, it is based on culture, nationality, or some other non-racial factors. If this is the case, the charge of racism is not supported by the presence of global narratives regarding the poor. But that there exists such a racial dimension is apparent when these narratives are put within the context of Charles Mills’ racial contract. For my purposes, I will focus here on the epistemological dimension of the racial contract because it provides a context that makes sense of seemingly arbitrary but persistent narratives regarding the poor. For Mills, the epistemological core of the racial contract is its demand for a misinterpretation of the world, which “prescribes… an epistemology of ignorance…” (1997, 17). This misinterpretation is what constructs both whiteness and non-whiteness. Such epistemological ignorance means that:

There will be white mythologies, invented Orients, invented Africas, invented Americas, with a correspondingly fabricated population, countries that never were, inhabited by peoples who never were—Calibans, and Tontos, Man Fridays and Sambos—but who attain virtual reality through their existence in travelers’ tales, folk myth popular and highbrow fiction, colonial reports, scholarly theory, Hollywood cinema, living in the white imagination and determinedly imposed on the alarmed-real life counterparts. (Ibid, 18-19)

The epistemological contract is a conceptual tool that explains why narratives of the corrupt or “lesser” nature of poor countries continue to abound. When the poor are blamed for their own poverty this is reflective of an epistemology of ignorance that refuses to acknowledge the global power structures that have organized such a grossly unequal racial world order. To be non-white in the “Third World” is to be hungry because of mismanagement and depravity. These characteristics seem to coincide easily in the narratives of the global North. Such narratives parallel overtly racist discourses in history. Charles Mills points to the connection between the early European norming of space and racialization of peoples, which relied upon racing both space and peoples, treating ‘civilized’ as a property of both space (Europe) and people (Europeans) in contrast to the savagery of both space and peoples of other lands (Ibid, 41-42).
Such *Apocalypse Now* perspectives took non-white to be a signifier for savagery and backwardness and played an important role in European conquest and colonization. History shows that essentialism is a complex task that can take on multiple features binding race, place, space, gender, and other features. Narratives about who and what a people are play an important function in the pursuit of conquest and in domination/subordination, which are reinforced by racism.

Narratives based in racial essentialism did not die with the past, but are propped up and mutually reinforced by the material effects of policies like structural adjustment programs and borrowing privilege. Arturo Escobar argues that it was Western discourses by Western leaders that created the “Third World” and the “need” for “development.” He draws a connection between the problems inherent in Western discourses on development and Chandra Mohanty’s critique of the representation of “Third World” women in feminist literature as needy in contrast to Western women, who are endowed with agency and choices:

> Needless to say, Mohanty’s critique applies with greater pertinence to mainstream development literature, in which there exists a veritable under developed subjectivity endowed with features such as powerlessness, passivity, poverty and ignorance, usually dark and lacking in historical agency as if waiting for the (white) Western hand to help subjects along and not infrequently hungry, illiterate, needy, and oppressed by its own stubbornness, lack of initiative and traditions… (Escobar 1995, 8)

Discourses of development have often adopted the “white-man’s burden” model of development. Even peacekeeping efforts by Western nations in poor non-white nations have not been without racial assumptions that have incited violence and humiliation to those whom the peacekeepers meant to assist. This is due to the peacekeepers’ inability to see the people they were meant to protect as equals and to their tendency to view themselves as “saviors” only to find “ungrateful” subjects (Razack 2004). Explanatory nationalism, with its orientation toward domestic factors, is much in line with the narrative regarding the poor. In sustaining a global economic order that keeps people of color at the bottom, structural adjustments programs and borrowing privilege
only serve to reinforce such narratives. The culpability of global economic institutions is masked by seemingly benevolent policies aimed to drag poor countries out of the abyss of their own self-created misery. The reality is that when these global policies fail, they reinforce narratives that link space and “race” where the backwardness and incompetence of brown and black people in poor countries appear to be an inevitable feature of both the old and the new-world order.

I have argued that structural adjustment programs and borrowing privilege both perpetuate racism. On a global scale, their failures reinforce the subordination of people of color, making them worse-off through increased poverty and human rights violations. This reinforces racially infused narratives that are apparent in the act of labeling and accompanying connotations of a space/peoples being a “Third” in contrast to “First” world. It is present in the all too common assumption that national corruption and incompetence is at the root of severe poverty. It is seen in the story that too many Americans adopt on the supposed generosity of their country—much like the benevolent antebellum slave holder who simply cannot pull his slaves out of their ignorance; a story that hides the self-interested and dominant status of those with power. It is especially seen in the fact that current racial narratives do not differ much from historical overtly racist narratives in which the North stands as the superior entity in relation to the dark, ignorant, and corrupt desolation of the global South. These parallels are best conceptually captured by reference to Mills’ epistemological contract representing a discourse that props up a racialized power structure that is self-perpetuating whose function is to create a vision of the world in which incompetence, corruption, and laziness are inherently tied to non-whites including those that reside in the global South. The appeal to domestic factors as the sole explanation for poverty and human rights deprivations serves as a justificatory tool for interventions in the name of “development” that undo national economies, halting subsistence farming and pulling them
deeper into the global market—a transformation which has shown itself to be lucrative for
Northern countries and harmful for the South, and by further casting the net of debt bondage
through borrowing “dis-privilege,” both of which have ultimately made many countries worse-
off. This, in turn, fosters further interventions and a cycle of doomed processes at the expense of
the global South and marked by racism.

In the next section, I will argue that the minimal reforms proposed by Pogge for
remedying human rights violations committed by the West are deeply inadequate for dealing
with the harms inflicted by current global economic structures. Institutional racism within the
global economic structure necessitates more substantive reforms.

5. Moving Forward: Are Minimal Reforms Enough?

Institutional racism in the global economic order suggests that more comprehensive
reforms than Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend (GRD) are necessary. The central issue is that
the GRD leaves in place global economic structures that produce massive social and economic
inequalities that will continue to harm people of color. If the GRD were implemented, human
rights violations that are associated with lack of economic rights would continue to be a
racialized and racist consequence of the current global order. I will also argue that the GRD
contains many of the same problems that have plagued “development” and “growth” strategies.
Pogge’s conceptual scheme fails to account for well-documented problems raised about the
implementation and enforcement of poverty solutions that are overwhelmingly developed by the
global North. These issues include: who has a voice/who does not, who are construed as the
knowledge bearers/who lacks knowledge, when do conditions set for receiving funds from the
GRD become coercive, and what NGOs are best situated to gain access to the funds of the GRD
if governments do not meet the set standards. The tensions that arise within development projects as reflected in these contentious issues are problematically left unaddressed by the GRD and leave unchecked a problematic racial dynamic that includes national and gendered factors among others. In conclusion, I will argue that the GRD will perpetuate racism against the global poor.

According to Pogge, undertaking minimal global reforms would be a significant step toward justice. He claims that this holds for those concerned with injustices caused by the following factors: the effects of shared social institutions, the effects of uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources, and the effects of a common and violent history (Pogge 2008b, 204-209). As noted previously, the global resources dividend (GRD) is the primary vehicle by which Pogge envisions this reform taking place. The GRD focus on the problem of natural resources and holds that “…those who make more extensive use of our planet’s resources should compensate those who, involuntarily, use very little” (Ibid, 210). The funds of the GRD are to be dispersed to the global poor, in particular, to those who are severely poor in terms of falling under the World Bank’s $1 a day poverty line. Pogge claims that within a few years, especially given the current radical global economic inequality, severe poverty can be eradicated at a bearable cost. One feature that Pogge finds to be important about the GRD is that it ought to be modest (keeping the current global structure intact as much as possible) for the purposes of gaining international support (Ibid, 213).

Pogge does offer other international reforms such as modifying the constitutions of national governments so that dictators may no longer legitimately borrow money from global financial institutions and leave their countries in debt to global institutions, and changing intellectual property rights as they pertain to medical patents to reduce the global disease burden (2008b). The GRD, however, is Pogge’s centerpiece for reform because he claims that it is
capable of eliminating severe poverty. For this reason, I will focus my attention on the GRD and its merits.

In order to understand why the GRD is problematic, from a racially sensitive analysis, it is necessary to consider what it means to place an issue within a racial context. Consideration of overt racism as manifested in the history of the U.S. reveals significant differences and outcomes between “color-blind” approaches to a problem that disproportionately affects people of color and approaches that recognize race as morally significant. For example, a “color-blind” assessment of the injustices of Jim Crow laws might identify the moral issues simply as a rights problem. That is, lift the social and legal rules that are violating the rights of those subjected to Jim Crow and an injustice has been rectified and addressed. In contrast, a racial analysis of the problem would recognize that Jim Crow was not simply about rights violations. The rights violations under Jim Crow targeted and damaged a particular group (blacks), causing this group to be differently situated relative to whites on an economic, social, and political level, to name but a few. Violations of individuals’ rights that occurred under Jim Crow are inseparable from racism. Racism contains multiple dimensions, from material deprivations to a sense of one’s self and one’s place in the world. It is not experienced as simply a legal-rights problem since racism permeates almost all aspects of individuals’ lives. The abolition of Jim Crow, by itself, would not be sufficient forremedying such constraints and disadvantages. A race-sensitive perspective entails that justice requires much more than simply ending the legal structures that sanctioned the rights violations. In this case, justice would require race-based policies such as affirmative action and reparations for a multitude of factors including: the disadvantage of blacks in terms of access to political/social power, psychological disadvantages, and the failure to provide access to property and potential prosperity through the broken promise of forty-acres and a mule
Thinking about Jim Crow through a race-sensitive lens reveals that insufficient reforms can cause significant problems because they lend credence to “culture” blaming, which tends to mask broader structural factors contributing to particular problems. The “color-blind” approach to Jim Crow supported only modest reforms. This consisted of taking the abolition of the legal structures of slavery or Jim Crow to be sufficient for achieving equality or justice. The two different paradigms for assessing Jim Crow, one sensitive to the full harms of racism, the other not, offer two different prescriptions that have radically different implications both for its subjects and for whites looking from the “outside” and “into” black communities. Ignoring race can not only lead to bad policies, but can do more harm by superficially addressing the problem, even while the core issues of racism and the effects of racism continue to persist and create a cycle of disadvantage.

The GRD does not address the problem of institutional racism within the policies of current global economic institutions, which means that the racist dimensions of the harms perpetuated by these institutions go unchecked. Pogge envisions that a transfer of money to the severely poor over the course of a few years would pull the severely poor out of their misery by bringing them above $1 or $2 day. Severe poverty as a human rights violation inflicted by the rules of the global economic order would then seem to be solved for all the global poor. This would seem to account for the current institutional racism against poor people of color because severe poverty would be redressed. In reality, there is little evidence that this would occur because the GRD is a color-blind policy, which makes it blind to the institutional racism of the global policies like SAPs and borrowing privilege. These policies would continue to disproportionately harm people of color who reside at the bottom of their countries’ economic
stratum by weighing down poor countries with debt and demanding invasive reforms that continue to contribute to the poverty of many poor countries and to human rights violations.

Institutional racism, which functions to keep people of color overrepresented among the global poor, will remain intact even if the GRD achieves its stated goal. Simply raising the poor to a few more dollars a day does not address the human rights issues of poverty that are currently inseparable from race. David Schweickart presents a similar criticism of Pogge, pointing out that even if we achieved a global order in which the poor were living on $3 a day, there may be fewer poverty related deaths, but there would be more suffering from pathologies associated with poverty (2008, 482). Putting Schweickart’s insight within the context of race, it is evident that the status quo of people of color suffering disproportionately from the effects of global economic institutions is left in place even if the GRD achieves “success.” Global economic institutions will continue to violate the human rights of the severely poor due the continuation of institutional racism that is linked to poverty. Racial discrimination is identified as a human rights violation in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which along with the UDHR is internationally recognized as one of the core human rights doctrines (Beitz 2009, 26). Article 1 of CERD defines racial discrimination as:

Any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. (UN 1965)

Current global economic institutions violate Article 1 in their unequal impact on people of color, which has contributed to the deaths of millions. Assessing the harms committed by the global economic order from a perspective that recognizes the racial nature of the problem uncovers that the GRD does not really address how current global economic institutions are harming the poor. From a moral point of view, the GRD is grossly insufficient for dealing with racism as it is
connected to the poorest in the global economic order, and this makes the GRD a bad solution for eradicating poverty. Raising the severely poor above the $2 a day poverty line is much like the formal rights approach, which demands the abolition of Jim Crow laws to meet the demands of justice, but often keeps intact the status quo. This is because it is equality understood as treating all equally before the law; if whites and blacks are not subject to Jim Crow, then this is just, despite the fact that a drastically different history made the social positioning of blacks and whites drastically different, unfair, and unequal. In contrast, what is needed is substantive equality, which calls for “unequal” treatment for the purposes of creating true equality within society, in the case of Jim Crow recognizing the need to be race-conscious in formulating law and policies. To bring about a new world order in which the poor hover above the World Bank’s poverty line is to ignore how global institutional racism continues to impair the ability of poor people of color to enjoy the fulfillment of their human rights, since their race is a function of their oppressive circumstances.

Pogge is forthright in his belief that reform of the global economic order should largely leave in place the status quo. He says, “I hope that the GRD satisfies these two desiderata [maintaining a system of government control over its natural resources and modesty] by staying close to the global order now in place…” (2008b, 210; emphasis added). Maintaining the status quo means maintaining a global economic system that sustains a global system of racial domination and subjugation. Pogge claims that those concerned with current injustices linked with a violent history of colonialism and slavery will agree that the GRD is a step toward justice (2008b). It may appear to be a step toward justice only if all are stripped of their identities so that no groups are recognized as being overrepresented among those being harmed. It is more likely the case that the GRD would be two steps back from justice due to a lack of recognition and
redress of the fact that it is largely the suffering of bodies marked as inferior, less than, and dark. That one of the aims of the GRD is to stay as close to the status quo as possible leaves an uncertainty as to which direction in relation to justice such a schema represents.

If the GRD cannot adequately address institutional racism, then a likely consequence is that, like many failed development projects, the GRD will also will serve to perpetuate racism, keeping in place a global economic order in which the world’s poorest of the poor (even with their $2 a day) continue to be disproportionately people of color. The GRD fails to challenge and so reinforces the notion that non-whites belong at the bottom, thus constructing the illusion that such a hierarchy is natural when in actuality it has been created by socio-political activities and decisions under the hand of neoliberalism. Just as the failure of development projects further deepens the view that people of color are destined to flounder at the bottom of the global hierarchy of power and wealth, the same cycle gets repeated when “solutions” to severe poverty fail to recognize the moral importance of the racialized nature of severe poverty.

Pogge claims that one of the problems with development assistance is that it is seen as charity, and if replaced by the GRD, the world would understand it to be a moral right of the poor, not charity (2008b, 213). This optimism is unfounded. The failure to acknowledge institutional racism and the effects of the global economic order is not due to the lack of access to such knowledge—it reflects an unwillingness to confront the racism that has marked the global order since the construction of races. Leaving in place global institutional racism as a part of the solution to poverty only lends credence to narratives about the destiny of the “Third World.”
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