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Revolution and Restoration: Mediating the Experience of the Red Brigades.

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REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION:
MEDIATING THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RED BRIGADES

by
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A thesis submitted to the
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Revolution and Restoration: Mediating the Experience of the Red Brigades
written by Marco Briziarelli
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Briziarelli, Marco (Ph.D., Communication, Journalism and Mass Communication)

Revolution and Restoration: Mediating the Experience of the Red Brigades.
Thesis directed by Professor Andrew Calabrese

The study explores the communicative practices of the Italian radical group Red Brigades (BR), the relationship the group established with the Italian press, and the specific social historical context in which the BR developed both its own self-understanding and the complex dialectical connection with the social whole. I provide an interpretation of the experience of the BR as a group that wanted to make history and ended up being subjected to it.

In relation to both scholarly treatment and popular perceptions, which tend for the most part to depict the BR as an “absolute negation” of the constitutive values of the Italian society, I suggest that the BR represented only a “determinate negation” of their historical conditions, a dialectical product of the very dominant ideology they attacked. This will be mainly exemplified by the contradictory relationship the group came to establish with the state, which represented both the “absolute enemy” and the ultimate source of political recognition and legitimation.

I try to historically ground the specific reasons and circumstances that determined such dialectics between “revolution” and “restoration.” The main claim of this study is that the BR’s worldview and the dominant ideology(s) mediated by the press represented competing responses to issues that had been haunting Italy since its modern constitution: the structural weakness of the nation state, the contradictions of an uneven development within the capitalist mode of production, and the consequent struggle of the bourgeois class to achieve hegemonic ruling. I suggest a link between a never completely successful process of constitution of the nation-state,
a never completely successful class hegemony attainment, and a never completely successful revolutionary elaboration in Italy.

This idea translates more concretely in following the general framework provided by Sartre’s progressive regressive method (1968): a method for historical investigation that tries to reconcile the dialectical unity between, on the one hand, the existential/individual motivation, and on the other, the dimension of collective and structural causality. The outcome is an account of the group that resembles a musical counterpoint made up by the analysis of concrete episodes of the BR’s experience and the Braudelian *longue durée* historical context in which those emerge.


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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 A Normal Country

To every generation is associated a deficit of memory, an always incomplete process of information turn over in which some myths remain to be overcome and some to be conserved. In this liminal space between continuity and epochal factures, the qualitative intervention of cultural institutions such as the academy and media intervene by analyzing, purifying and reconstructing the generational paths of individual and collective experiences. From such an intricate process, simultaneously systematic and random, deliberate and accidental, emerges the official history of a country, a selective tradition that in any single time, seems to conciliate with the interests of the dominant class.

We are so much socialized to think about social reality as a hypostatic product of the past, that such a cultural enterprise of producing historical narratives, even when theoretically projected into the future, re-assures the reproduction of an eternal present state of things. This may be accomplished by the manipulation and selection of memories, knowledge and ambition of the subaltern and, in Italian case, this also involves the force of habit of a nation which systematically displaces memories into the collective amnesiac. So, for instance if one were to carry out a survey in Italy by asking a simple question such as “were you a fascist during fascism?” no one, absolutely no one, would answer “yes.” Fascism is for most Italians, as Croce once said, just a parenthesis within the history of the country. Similarly if you were to ask:
“Have you ever voted for Berlusconi?” millions of supporters would be reduced to few people admitting a “YES.”

Italy is a very peculiar country that aspires to normality. And more it aspires to the normative side of norms, the more evident becomes the dialectic nature of its own project of modernity: a nation which by prosperity and population belongs to the side of France, Britain and Germany but that, “never played a comparable role in the affairs of the continent, and has rarely been regarded as a diplomatic partner or rival of much significance” (Anderson 2002, p.1). A place that despite the poor score earned in a hypothetical ranking of Weberian rationalization consistently produces wealth, culture and examples of civic virtue.

In the mediated public discourse, Italy has always strongly wanted to become a “normal country” because as Veltri claims (1995, p.12) “no one [in Italy] has the perception of living and working in a condition of normality, everything seems provisional: life, law, rules, the word, commitments” But as an Italian born citizen, sometimes I wonder about our level of performativity thinking at the distance between ideas and action... A perfect example of that was the moral panic created by pressure exerted by the financial markets on the Italian public debt during summer and fall 2011.” The threat of default of the state finance in a neo-corporatist country such Italy created a de facto state of emergency. Such a crisis was so deeply felt and impacted so much public opinion that was able to terminate the “interminable” mandate of Prime Minister Berlusconi.

When Berlusconi abdicated, almost half of the nation felt liberated by a politically and culturally dramatic condition. It was a period of intense days of public self reflection concerned with the structural problems of the nation, the Southern Question, the pension’s reform, the hyper rigid job market, fiscal evasion. Many thought that history was finally
moving again and hoped about the approaching of a cathartic opportunity that would finally lead to the desired normality.

But then, few positive signs from the stock exchange associated to the supposed renewed trust of the markets for Mario Monti’s technical government were more than enough to send everybody back to a condition of the self indulgent oblivious torpor. Therefore, Italy, by the same mysterious self-assurance that leads them to confide about winning soccer world coups by mediocre performances, had found in Mario Monti the miraculous solution of its problems. Since Latinity we cultivated the rhetoric of the “Homo Novus,” a messianism which, translated in the theatrical understanding of life of the peninsula, embodies the “Deus ex Machina“principle because trades human agency for divine intervention.

Thus, as it happened with ”Second Republic“ in mid 1990s and with “First Republic” in late 1940s and Risorgimento in 1860s, everything had to change so that everything could remain the same. Is this really due to the alleged disenchanted national character? Maybe, and maybe this is also a question of historic perspective and how this country tends to envision its agency in that. It is a modus vivendi that combines Manzoni’s ideology of divine “providence” and Lorenzo de Medici’s famous maxim “Whoever wants to be happy, let him be so: about tomorrow there's no knowing.” De Medici and Manzoni relegate us to the present and invite us to neglect both the past circumstances of our action and the future.

History and agency framed by an Italian narrative is also what the narrative about the experience of the Red Brigades I propose here is really all about. I will provide a description of the experience of a group of people that seeing themselves as the inheritors of a revolutionary tradition tracing back from Garibaldi and Mazzini and the partisan Resistenza, aspired to conquer the future without understanding the historic limitations that their past
would provide. The Red Brigades wanted to make history. They did indeed, but also ended up being subjected to it.

1.2 The Communicative Paradox

On May 19th 1978, few days after the retrieval of Moro’s corpse, the Turin Court sentenced Red Brigades (BR) founders Renato Curcio and Alberto Franceschini to 18 months of imprisonment for eulogizing a crime during their trial. They claimed that the killing of Moro “was an act of revolutionary justice, the highest possible act of humanity in this society divided into classes.” Such a statement immediately appeared in capital letters on the front page of almost every newspaper and offered for the general popular perception a definitive answer to the question of political violence posed by the BR: it confirmed in the most eloquent way its fanaticism, the epitome of pathological, irrational behavior and the chronic loss of touch with reality due to an overwhelming ideological mediation.

But, words do not die when pronounced, they actually start living from there. This was certainly true for the words of the two brigatista which would contribute to irremediably seal the historic judgment and interpretation of the experience of their group. It is in fact through statements like the one just mentioned that the representation of the BR was constructed in the media, in the schools and by parents. I was born in Italy in 1977, during one of the most violent phases of the so-called “years of lead,” the intense season of political violence characterizing the 1970s. My childhood was impregnated by the dark brushworks describing the 1970s and the moral panic felt during this period. And if it is true that, as Flaubert suggested, there was no way telling the story of Madame Bovary without telling his own then, in my case, I should say that “the BR c’est moi.”
This is exactly what I will try to argue in this study: the Red Brigades could not tell the story of revolution, of bourgeois domination and proletarian justice without unreflectively telling its own which was essentially about the historic conditions of its own making. Therefore, counter-intuitively enough, I find in their preoccupations and their limitations those of the country. “It was a history which represented a defeat in the people’s consciousness, there was a diffused moral judgment which does not belong only to us [the BR] but to the majority of the Italian people, then…in my view, it is the whole that must be judged” (In Zavoli, 1990, p.217). Those are the words of an ex brigatista, I could not agree more.

It is in fact in the “discourse of the arms” of the Red Brigades, considered so absolutely alienated from the moral values, the aspirations and deeds of a country, that I find both an understanding of the BR’s own project, the reason for its limitation. Right there, in such a moment of alienation in which all of us, audience of dominant narratives of history, seem lost and disoriented, we can actually find a moment of redemption, a chance that prevents from losing ourselves passively and completely in the characters and the dynamic represented in those very narratives.

Such an allegedly alienated condition of the BR was not caused by its absence in the dominant imagery but rather by the closure of interpretation around the group which was so strong to ban any alternative explanation. In fact, for most people of my generation the BR were as ethereally present in our perceptions as Gesu Bambino, or “Baby Jesus,” the catholic based fictional character that brings presents to children during Christmas. In both cases, the subject possessed the status of a myth, ubiquitous enough to constitute an unproblematic matter of conversation but at the same time inaccessible enough to allow a serious dissection of the silenced assumptions about it.
Just like a child should have not disrupted the religious “utopia of value” implied by receiving presents that nobody produced and nobody bought, very few dared to emancipate the BR from being the perfect serious, politically engaged, topic for a sport bar communitarian chat. Or the desiderable cultural commodity sold both by the means of mass communication and by the moral enterprise agency of competing ideologies using the group as the most powerful embodiment of the “red scare.”

This is why I have always felt that speaking and writing about the BR has hardly ever been a controversy unless, as in rare cases, the inquirer questioned the unquestionable aspects. Those were the several scandalous features of the BR: a group ready to spill blood for their ideals, a very romantic commitment which has always been at odds with the half picaresque and half hyper-realist tradition of Italian political theater; the consequent challenge they posed to the monopoly of violence, legality and justice of the state; and finally their “vetero” Communist language considered “politically incorrect” even by the Italian Communist Party.

In such a peculiar status of the BR, as both “accepted” and “disciplinized” topic of social discourse, I find one the main motivations for having conducted this study: the recognition of the existence of a remarkable communicative paradox surrounding the BR. The BR constituted one of the most “obscure-extensively-explored” topics in Italian history. On the one hand, there was something eminently communicative about the experience of the group: its “armed propaganda” objectives, the remarkable literary production offered by the organization, the way it strategically chose to interact with mainstream media and last but not the least, the bulk of studies written on the matter by journalists and scholars. On the other hand, ironically enough, one of the radical groups most concerned with explaining itself, turned out to be one of the most reified and fetishized one isolated and alienated from the rest of civil society’s comprehension. The BR
failed in constructing an adequate audience for its words and this deprived it of the necessary legitimacy for its discourse of violence.

Indicative of such communicative failure is how the name of the group is retained by collective memory. So what is in this particular name? In a preliminary search on the existing literature in academic search engines (such as Jstor, Google Scholar, ERIC and LexisNexis Academic) emerges the consistent association of BR to the word “terrorism.” In a search by “keyword,” out of 350 essays mentioning “Red Brigades” in their text, 320 of them place this name in the same sentence in which they use “terrorism.” The relation between the two names is absolutely unbalanced though, as the overwhelming semantic weight of “terrorism” flattens the history of the BR into a one-dimensional picture echoing the words and the images of our present daily newscasts: Al Qaeda, Afghanistan, Fundamentalism and the “axes of evil” power which must be defeated.

Still, the topic of the BR resonates within the Italian civil society with certain intensity as most Italians are still strongly demanding a clear interpretation of that period (Drake; 2001, p.360). Less than four years ago, during the 30th anniversary of the assassination of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the BR, a commemoration celebrated with solemnity and pathos, many intellectuals incited publicly civil society to keep inquiring about those years of violence in order to preserve a collective memory. In the same year (2008), 15 people were convicted with the charge of belonging to a terrorist group, a self-proclaiming new generation of the BR. Not surprisingly, the Italian media, masters of political opportunity, confronted the alleged resurgence of the BR by embedding the subject within the broader (because psychologically and rhetorically more basic) narrative of 9/11. Again, not surprisingly, the BR question became another banal occasion to talk about then Italy’s Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi.
Another instance of way the BR appears to be remembered in the public mind is to look at the cinema production dealing with the subject. Exemplary is Bellocchio’s movie Buongiorno Notte (2004) recounting the events of the Christian Democrats party leader and ex Prime Minister Aldo Moro kidnapping in 1978. The BR members appear like zombies, isolated, alienated and, as Rizzo argues (2007, p.13), Bellocchio creates a “huge distance between the terrorist and the rest of the society.” The most eloquent scene of the movie is when the director tries to make his anti-dialectical argument\(^1\) most evident: he depicts one of the BR member sitting at the kitchen table, first performing with feverish spirited eyes an apology of the necessity of violence in the struggle against the bourgeois society, then, right before consuming his meal, with no transition what so ever, asking God to bless his food. The contradiction Bellocchio is so determined to point at with his anti dialectical judgmental finger is so caricatural that the movie, for a moment, moves from its intended tragedy to the comical grotesque genre.

Even more radical is Campiotti’s movie Il Sorteggio (2009) The film reconstructs the first trial against the so called “historic nucleolus “ of the BR in Turin through the eye of Tonino, a semi skilled FIAT worker. In Campiotti’s perspective, the protagonist, despite his belonging to what it was supposed to be the social base of consent and enrolment for the BR, assuming the civic duty to becoming member of the popular jury, matures into good responsible citizen. In this film, the BR is represented even more distant, sublimated to an abstract and collective psychological dimension of fear. Thus in the popular perception, the BR, like the images of actor Alberto Sordi eating pasta, the soccer World Cup victory of 1982 and Sofia Loren romancing with Marcello Mastroianni, has ascended to the ‘Hyperuranium’ of the Italian collective imagery.

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\(^1\) The argument is anti dialectical because the binomial Catholicism and violence is far from being a dichotomy and actually found always ways in history to mutually feed each other.
However, as for all shiny plastic-like mediated images, the price for their ethereal, uncorrupted status is their abstraction from material history.

How is that possible? According to Mastromatteo (2007, p.11), the BR are reduced to an “effective brand” and a nation-widely recognized “certificate of quality” for news stories which mix violence, the old fashioned mystique of ideological fundamentalism and conspiracy theories. In Italy, there is actually a field connected to that, it is called Dietrologia (from the Italian “dietro”, behind or back stage) referring to the study or analysis of the perceptually invisible, of what lies behind language, events, actions, processes, and behaviors. The “dietrologist,” the corresponding semi-official profession practiced by journalists, scholars and public intellectuals, earns millions of Euros by writing books with catchy titles which would sound like “The Secrets of Italy,” “The Parallel State” and other numberless combinations of Dietrologia’s keywords.

Such a condition makes the question of understanding the experience of the BR through their communication even more appealing since the inability shown by most of existing literature to comprehend their language reflects the inability to understand the whole period. It is not an accident that several authors (e.g. Della Porta, 1990; Drake, 2001; Franceschini, 1988; Zavoli, 1989) talk about the BR’s language, the “brigatese,” or the brigatist’s language, as an alien idiom which requires a translation by professional experts. Excepts for Dini and Manconi’s powerful treatment of the “Discourse of the Arms” (1980), journalists and scholars tend to consider the words of the BR almost as the colorful expression of an alchemist accessing the anti-modern (because as the BR the alchemist wants to revolutionize the dominant theory of value) obscure science of transforming base metals in gold.

1.3 Mediating Terrorism and Terrorizing Mediation
Within the context just depicted, the BR has become a free floating sign at the mercy of, petty semiotic wars. Like a commodity that loses its bound to the social conditions of its creations, the meaning of the BR loses its frame of reference, its history: its communication becomes interrupted. Such a condition and the consequent incomplete understanding of the phenomenon of the BR derive from many different aspects. Certainly, one of those is the difficulty of preventing the civil society from producing a collective moralized approach on the discourse and deeds of violence of the BR. Secondly, another possible determinant of the BR’s “interrupted communication” was the language of the group that both semantically and jargon wise was deeply rooted in a tradition recognizable by some, familiar to few and certainly resonating with even smaller fraction of its audience.

However, the struggle for the group to find an adequate language for their revolutionary project and the social constraints limiting the existence of an audience available to seriously and constructively engage with such a message was only part of the problem. There always been also a question of mediation, a concern about the specific relationship the BR wanted to construct with the means of mediated communication. Such a rapport was characterized by a pragmatic dilemma for the group: either to preserve the “purity” of its communication by renouncing to the dissemination opportunities offered by main stream media and therefore likely to be relegated itself to the margins or choosing to deal with mass media and exposing itself to the risk of a mediation that was operating with values, logic and standards of production (of news) which would have almost certainly distorted its message.

Violent practices such as the one of the BR were consistently regarded by an extremely ambiguous eye by media. On the one hand, media considered them as pathological and monstrous. In fact, the glorification of violence, the overt attack to the state, the sacrifice of
innocent lives, the will to liquidate a regime of legality, are represented as the sacrilegious barbarian act to undermine what is perceived as an anthropological state of nature and therefore challenging our rationalizing capabilities. But such an irrationality attributed to terrorism can only measure with the irrationality of media which systematically depict and talk about the subject with such a strong feeling of repulsion that any attempt to achieve an explanation of terrorism almost always gets perceived as an attempt to justify it.

On the other hand, the relationship between the press and the BR could not completely be described as oppositional but at least dialectical if not fully symbiotic. As it will become evident in the successive pages, the group was covered by an ambivalent exoticism revealing the tension inhabiting media practices between Eros and Thánatos: at times, faraway enough to become the object of desire of media voyeurism, at times so far away or so close to turn into the fear of indefinite ontological annihilation. As I will suggest, whereas the BR were aware of such interdependence, it failed to extend the reasoning to the more general level of collective experience. In fact, following Negt and kluge’s (1981) definition of public sphere as mediating of space between production site and culture in which social experience emerge, both the BR and the media failed to see the symbiotic relationship between the bourgeois public sphere and the proletarian public sphere.

In this sense, the dilemma lived by the BR was also experience in specular ways lived by the media because the asymmetric warfare practices called “terrorism” demystify the fictional component of novelty in news, the standardization necessitated by the requirements of production. In fact the component of “horror” in crimes, as “sickening realization” (in Varma, 1966, p.130) represents an already occurred event, an already consumed act of terror, an element of the past which can be metabolized by journalistic practices and measures of newsworthiness.
But real terror, as an “awful apprehension” (p.130), implies both an indeterminate anticipation and an anticipated indetermination. In other words, it speaks an idiom requiring exceptional ritual treatments beyond the daily practices of socially constructing news (Tuchman, 1978) and, as we said, exceptionality in news can be an extremely fortunate resource.

In this sense, the relationship between media and the group very much an opportunistic one. On the one hand, because such a sense of apprehension can be effectively capitalized by media as one of the most powerful source of newsworthiness: the incumbency of political violence was a promise of news. On the other hand, what the BR defined as “the servile means of psychological war” (in Zavoli, 1991, p.221) — the media—represented extremely powerful outlets for their “armed propaganda.”

1.4 Some Caveats

In respect to something so ideologically loaded such as asymmetric warfare practices (otherwise defined as “terrorism”), there is always a potential confusion between explanation and justification which leads me to an important caveat which regards the possible reception of this work: under the present political and cultural circumstances, I have the feeling that dealing with the communicative practices of an historic specific group which operated in equally historic specific conditions will not exempt me from being questioned about the general position of this study about violent political practices.

This dissertation is not about terrorism per se but about the historical conditions that determined the self understanding of a given group reflected in their communicative practices and the way such a definition/identity interacted with mainstream media and, indirectly, with the whole society. It is certainly not a moral critique because even if there were in fact a moral judgment involved, it would about the common moralisms that informed both the standpoint of
the “terrorist” and the “terrorized.” As Wellmer (1984) puts it, moral condemnations against violent practices such as terrorism tend to show the same processes of illusory rationalization applied by the terrorists to justify violence. Both live in the wishful thinking illusion of embracing their own respective values in crystalline ways but such transparency, most of the times, reveals troubled presuppositions about the coexistence of human beings, civil society and the state.

It is rather a specific kind of political critique that aims at the evaluation of the relationship between given political objectives and the specific means adopted to achieve them as it tries answering instrumental questions such as: did the BR have legitimation basis for its actions? Did the group succeed in constructing an audience which could provide such legitimacy? Did the group have enough political imagination to make out its desired proletarian public sphere a source of revolution? Therefore, instead of reproducing a “transcendental critique” dictated by common moralisms, I intend to carry out an immanent critique of the BR’s communicative practices, in other words an evaluation of its experience taken in its own terms.

This, concretely speaking means operationalizing an analysis that treats statements such as “the was an act of revolutionary justice, the highest possible act of humanity in this society divided into classes” not as a rejection of human moral norms but rather a reflection of the ideological functions that such norms have in the society. This will mean transforming asymmetric warfare practices from a criminal phenomenon to a political one which will be judged based on articulated knowledge of subject matter defined its phenomenology and general connections. As we will see, understating as political phenomenon means understanding its ground of operations and definitions as mainly political: the confrontation with political parties, the confrontation with state and even more importantly, the BR’s ask of recognition from it.
1.5 The project

Because of the communicative paradox I just described, the study explores the communicative practices of the BR, the relationship the group established with the Italian press and the specific social historical context in which the former developed both its own self understanding and the complex dialectical connection with the social whole. I will provide an interpretation of the experience of a Red Brigades as a group that wanted to make history and ended up being subjected to.

In relation to both scholarly treatment and popular perceptions, which tend for the most part to depict the BR as an absolute “negation” of the constitutive values of the Italian society, I suggest that the BR represented only a determinate negation of their historical conditions, a dialectical product of the very dominant ideology they attacked. This will be mainly exemplified by the contradictory relationship the group came to establish with the state. Such a state represented both the “absolute enemy” and the ultimate source of political recognition and legitimation.

Whereas the general findings of the study aligns with an already existing literature that has explored the tension between social reproduction and social transformation inhabiting the revolutionary projects of radical groups, I will try to historically ground the specific reasons and circumstances that determined the BR’s dialectic between “revolution” and “restoration.” The main claim of this study is that the BR’s worldview and the dominant ideology(s) mediated by the press represented competing responses to issues which had been haunting Italy since its modern constitution: the structural weakness of the nation state, the contradictions of an uneven
development within the capitalist mode of production and the consequent struggle of the bourgeois class to achieve hegemonic ruling. I will suggest a dialectic link between a never completely successful process of constitution of the nation-state, a never completely successful class hegemony attainment and a never completely successful revolutionary elaboration in Italy.

The project of trying reconstruct a historical account of the BR using its words reveals an important assumption of how communication is conceptualized in this study: first and foremost a praxis, a meaningfully oriented behavior which can only be understood in the historic conditions of its creations. As a praxis is considered to be both an act of freedom and a production of necessity which responds to the dialectic principle implicit in the Marxian conceptualization of the historic agent: “People make history but in conditions not of their making.” (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1851 [1907] p.5).

The main current tendency in the existing literature is to deny the historicity of the BR and the legitimacy of their words in order to dismiss the fact that the historical conditions of an entire country contributed to create the ground for the BR’s emergence and adoption of the armed struggle option. In most of such literature, there is a general “heteronomic” prejudice which tends to understand the BR as controlled by ‘power’ or by ‘ideology.’ In contrast to that, I will try to provide a dialectic perspective of their practices as an example of general Marxist condition of human being caught between freedom and necessity. This idea translates more concretely in trying following the general framework provided by Sartre’s progressive regressive method (1968): a method for historical investigation that tries re-concealing the dialectic unity between the existential/individual motivation and responsibility with the dimension of collective and structural causality.

This approach is “regressive” because it takes account of the past and the contradictions
that have featured in its development and it is “progressive” because it looks to the future—the
goals, intentions, ambitions of people, that is, the existential project. Following such a scheme
my study will provide first a macro analysis of the social whole developed both diachronically
and synchronically to the BR’s context.

At the “micro” level I will be looking at two episodes in which the BR specific voice and
motivations emerge in relation, contrast and commonality with other competing voices, the one
represented by three national newspapers. The analysis of the communicative practices of the BR
and the newspaper articles will be articulated at two distinct-but-united levels of abstraction:
ideological and hegemonic. In both cases the aim will be at identifying recurrent themes,
narratives and myths. Ideally I aspire to construct like a musical counterpoint between micro and
macro dimensions, in other words between the concrete episodes of BR’s experience and the
Braudelian longue durée historical context in which they emerge and operate.

Whereas in order to provide definition and consistency for the method of thematization I
draw on Barthes’s mythic analysis (1979), the overarching framework of this paper does not rely
on the anti-historic tendencies of the langue dimension of myth suggested by the French author,
rather on historico-materialist presuppositions. According to Barthes (1979), myths comprise a
twofold structure based on a historic/diachronic level –parole, and on a universal and a-historic-
synchronous level –langue. My understanding of mythic analysis implies the historicization of the
two levels which are treated as representations of shared meanings and practices operating at
different level of abstraction and awareness.

The continuity and distance between the two levels, namely ideology and hegemony,
represents my musical counterpoint. I mean to create a distance between different levels of
awareness and self understanding, between ideology, more immediate and explicit as it was the
overt confrontation between BR and newspapers’ competing representations of Sossi’s kidnapping, and the less accessible hegemony, the implicit content residing in the silence and in the unsaid, as we shall see, like the eminent preoccupation for the state that both the BR and newspapers reflect but also the ambivalent take the BR’s voice have in relation to core principles of the liberal state and Enlightenment values.

At the first level, the communicative practices of the Red Brigades (BR) and the three Italian national newspapers confront each other in defining the meaning of particular events, namely the kidnapping of Judge Mario Sossi by the BR (1974) and former Prime Minister Aldo Moro (1978) and, through perspectives informed by relatively explicit ideologies. At the second level, I will try to make emerge the ‘silenced speech’, that mythic level in which deeply radicated hegemonic assumptions reside, such as the one about the nature of the state. From this hegemonic perspective, the BR will be conceptualized as a dialectical product of the Italian hegemonic order, in other words a determinate-relative negation of the BR’s own historical context.

1.6 Dissertation Overview

After this present introductory chapter, the study comprises other six chapters. Let me briefly describe their contents. In Chapter II, I provide a rationale for a method that draws from two main historiographical traditions. It is, first of all, informed by the general Marxist assumption that human production of history is the result of an articulation of simultaneously separate individual production units unrelated to each other and yet still being inscribed by an unintended structural unity ((Riordan, 1998, p.2). Secondly, I will draw from Braudel’s (1970) concepts of “long durée” and “histoire total” which will help me approaching long slow historic processes defining the macro context in which I want to insert the experience of the BR. In the
second part of chapter II, I will explain how I operationalize such an approach by developing a
tropological analysis that draws both on Barthes (1979) and Jean and John Comaroff’s (1991)
distinction between ideology and hegemony dimensions. I will also explain the rationale for the
selection of the specific episodes and I will analyze and the particular way I treat the
relationship between the BR and the media.

In chapter III, I will first provide a brief introduction of the BR informing the reader of its
origins, its social compositions, its objectives, its ideology and finally its evolution over time. In
this section of the chapter I will particularly focus on the specific way the BR conceptualized the
state. Then, I will then describe the Italian media system in 1970s, its tendency to exclude the
majority of the population from its readership and its collusive relations with the political power
and capital. I will then introduce the three national newspapers that will constitute the three
competing voices and their particular position within the Italian public sphere. Finally I will
provide general consideration of the relationship between the press and the BR. In particular, I
will consider the so called “dilemma of the discourse of violence” and the two kinds of
strabismus media operated with in looking at the BR. I will describe how the political violence of
the BR was understood.

In Chapter IV, I offer a synthetic account of the social historical environment in which
the experience of the BR emerged and were informed by existing collective narratives. This is
my attempt to address the “macro” dimension of historical explanation by providing general and
‘grounded’ accounts of the social whole. The temporal parenthesis on which I will focus on is
comprised between 1943 and 1980 (the period between the end of the fascist regime and the end
of BR experience) but I will start the chapter by framing such a period within a narrative initiated
with process of nation state formation called Risorgimento, passed through WWI, WWII and the
Resistance. Such a narrative can be summarized as it follows: following the Gramscian analysis the process of creation of the Italian nation remained incomplete because failed with the Risorgimento to involve the great masses and create an Italian identity. Under such a perspective both WWI and WWII, with the Fascist experience in between should be considered as an alternative attempt to constitute such a social order for Italy and therefore finish the incomplete process initiated by the Risorgimento.

I will try to demonstrate how the structural issues affecting Italy since its constitution would re-appear under various vestiges such as the experience of the partisan Resistance, the socially, geographically and culturally uneven economic development of 1950s and 1960s (which exacerbated the distance between North and South), the social tensions of late 1960s and 1970s and finally the emergence of the Christian Democrats as the ruling party and the evolution of the PCI from a minority into a mass party and the consequent gradual absorption of the latter in the conventional liberal political of the former.

In Chapter V, I will proceed with the analysis of BR’s texts by considering the kidnapping of Genoa judge Mario Sossi in March 1974. At the ideological level emerged themes that positioned the group in overt opposition to the other three voices: the celebration of the “armed praxis”, the denunciation of the machination of the state instrumentalized by capital like revolutionary means of communication that fully realize the utopian aspects of liberal public sphere, the anti hegemonic concern with make internal contradictions of the Italian society emerge. As far as the three newspapers are concerned, despite the tendency to create an “institutional historic bloc’ of the three newspapers against the BR, there were marked by significant ideological differences in the way the event was framed.
However, if at the ideological level, those differences (both between BR and the press “historic bloc and among the three newspapers) emerge with remarkable definition, when those themes are questioned at the ground of their assumptions, their oppositions, such as the binary opposition between the BR and the three newspapers, start losing definition. The BR revealed an incomplete emancipation from liberal ideology exemplified by the preoccupation to reproduce the idea of a state, with its bureaucratic machine but also in the hardly hidden fascination with the idea of the public sphere (never literally named but the liberal ideology informing the concept was clearly there).

In chapter VI, I proceed examining the second key episode in the BR’s experience, the kidnapping of the former Prime Minister, and DC leader Aldo Moro. Since 1974, the group evolved towards an increasing militarization, from a no deadly “demonstrative armed propaganda, to an explicit objective to physically annihilate the BR’s enemy. Such a change had two important consequences. First of all, it affected BR’s ideology and its own self-understanding and role in the class struggle. It also affected the relationship with the press which passes from one strabismus to another: from underestimating the group and publicly ridiculing as a “fairy tale” for children to the hyperbolic depiction of the group as a dangerous military power ready to seize the control of the country.

At the ideological level, the formerly marked differences between the three newspapers started disappearing. For instance, surprisingly enough, *L’Unita* embraced themes of the celebration of the state institutions (previously explicitly refused) and the *IL Corriere Della Sera* embraced the rhetoric of the masses previously only attributable to *L’Unita*. Important ideological changes happened within the BR’s discourse as well. As they explain in the first communiqués, the configuration of class struggle had dramatically changes producing on the one
hand the SIM, the imperialist state of led by the multinationals and the MPRO the international movement of Communist fighters. Within the analysis offered by the group Aldo Moro was conceived as the transmission belt of the interests of the international (but mainly American) bourgeois class.

However, the configuration of the rhetorical competition between the four voices assumes similar traits compared to Sossi when it comes to the hegemonic assumptions: on the one hand the already compacted ideological position of the three newspapers almost sublimates to the celebration of a state centered civil religion which reflects a powerful attempt to attain cultural hegemony by the dominant class. On the other hand, the BR shows at this level, despite the internationalist rhetoric, to still retain the state as a normative model and as a point of reference. Interestingly enough, even the BR, already having displayed in the previous case ambiguous ideological positions, elevated the dramatic and dramaturgical (Wagner-Pacific, 1986) trial on Moro to a ritual of death. What emerges from the analysis of this case is that the partial success of the ruling elite to symbolically capitalize on the myth of Resistenza is tied to the failure of the BR to do that.

Finally, in Chapter VII, I will first summarize the findings of my analysis. I will try to give a clear perspective of the journey the reader took from its point of departure and its point of arrival. I will show how the reflective limitations of the group in understating the hegemonic assumption informing their action reflects a limit in understanding the historical limitations of the group’s political and social imagination. It is in the conclusions where I finally explicit and articulate my immanent critique of the experience of the BR. I will especially focus on the shortcomings in grasping the dialectic of history, a material conceptualization of language, the
concept of resistance and the tension between a war of maneuver and a war of position strategies.

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Whoever, as the present author, presupposes the existence of a social totality developing both in social space and social time, cannot avoid finding the general in the particular and vice versa. That is accomplished by transforming the particular content of the study into form, into a window to the general, and then the general, from form it becomes the content of the particular. Such a dialectical unity of particular and general and content and form reflects the fundamental tension that inhabits my approach to history: on the one hand considering each historical period and context having its own interpretive and explanatory account (Iggers, 1984) and, on the other hand, the possibility to produce a generalized knowledge in the sense the classic Greek and Roman historiography tradition exemplified by the expression “historia magistra est.”

One fundamental objective of this study is to provide historicity to the understanding of the BR and that means reconnecting its experience to the social and historical totality but also assess the condition of the BR as specific historic subject willing to make history. Paraphrasing Ortner (1984), I will try addressing the question of how actors who are so much the products of their own social and cultural context can ever come to transform the conditions of their own existence, in situation others than a pure accident. This is an operation that first of all implies transforming “BR product,” as a cultural commodity, as hypostatic sclerotization of its meaning, into a “BR-process.”
It is indeed the semantic deficit associated to the dominant understanding of the experience of the group that allows the BR to acquire the condition of “free floating sign” but it is also such semantic deficit that could guarantee a series of thin but clear cut understandings of what the BR “really” were: the “phantomatic BR,” the “crazy BR,” the “evil BR,” the “puppet mastered BR,” the eschatological BR. Thus against the production of a reified historical account of the group, I invite my reader to follow me in this part of my study in which I will try to provide a theoretical support for my description of the BR as subject-object of history.

The chapter is structured into four main sections. In 2.1, I will briefly describe how historical materialism provides the overarching perspective by informing my basic assumptions on history, and historical subjects. I will focus on the concepts of dialectics and contradictions. In 2.2, I will explain how a Braudelian approach can help me addressing the long term historical process within which I intend to insert the interpretation of the BR’s episodes. I will introduce the concept of longue durée, total histoire. In 2.3, I will then show how I operationalize such a theoretical framework that wants to capture both the “past-regressive” and the “future-progressive” in the texts of the Red Brigades. I will use Comaroff’s distinction between hegemony/ideology in order to make visible both the practices, beliefs and values sedimented in the past as hegemonic assumptions and the present ideological positions. Finally in 2.4, moving to the more practical concerns of the analysis, I will provide a rationale behind the selection of the texts/episodes and how Barthes’s myth analysis offers concrete criteria to thematize their content.

2.1 “People make history but in conditions not of their making.”

This study examines the BR as both producer and product of history. This means pursuing an investigation that follows the general conceptualization provided by the historical
materialist method and, more specifically, by Sartre’s (1968) progressive regressive method. That is because I consider latter as a way to empirically engage with one of the main assumptions of the former: “People make history but in conditions not of their making” (Marx, 1851 [1907]p. 5). Sartre offered an examination that comprises considering “the singular enterprises and examining the historical conditions that allow the possibility for such an activity” (Gortz, 1973, p.238). In the context of my project, such a framework implies indentifying the long term structural evolutions that interested modern Italian history and making of such a horizon the stage, the circumstances for the singular enterprises associated to the Sossi and Moro’s kidnappings.

In this section I will not be able to provide an adequate of the richness and complexity of the questions posed (and answered) by such a tradition. Thus instead of trying to impoverish historical materialism through synthesis I here concentrate on two intertwined concepts that seem to me particularly salient for this study: dialectics and contradictions. Historical materialism explores how society produces and reproduces its material being. It is an all embracing kind of political economy that places at its heart social relations and it pays particular attention for the ones describing the social organization of labor. The supposition of such a method is that that people do not live in isolation or fixity but within a society in continuous development. In Grundisse, Marx says that “Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand”(1973, p.265).

Both interconnectedness and movement leads us towards the concept of dialectics. The main assumptions behind dialectical thinking is that there is an integral social reality in which things are interdependent, rather than a mixture of things isolated from each other. Such an interconnected system is always in motion propelled by imperceptible quantitative changes that
lead to fundamental, qualitative changes. Dialectics is a perspective of the concrete reality that ultimately refuses abstractions, because “dialectic is the living logic of my praxis” (Gortz, 1973, p. 245) and the best representation of the historic condition of the subject. That is a condition that is at the same time immanent because there is no external force outside of people, and transcendent because most frequently it does not depend on individual intentions (Riordan, 1998). As Sartre writes, “if history escapes me, this is not because I do not make it but is because the other is making it as well” (1968, p.88).

One way to comprehend this dialectical understanding of making history is through the concept of “determination” understood here as the exemplification of a human condition of being capable of determining and to be determined by the effects of our own determinate resolutions and implications. This twofold understanding of determination synthesizes the Sartrean progressive /regressive method because it considers how the past-regressive circumstances substantially determine the ground where my own progressive determination, i.e. my ensemble of motivations and projected into the future, operates. Determination explains also the ambiguity in the meaning of the term “subject” caught between agency and structure: on the one hand, a free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions, on the other hand a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom.

The link between determination of the individual and its limitation exerted by determination of the past circumstances is not ideal but practical. It is human praxis that produces both. In fact one could reformulate Marx’s famous remark that “men make their own history but not under the condition of their choosing” through the Sartrean “man is ‘mediated’ by
things to the same extent as things are ‘meditated’ by man” (1976, p.79). Sartre, much more clearly than Marx, implies that the even if circumstances are not chosen, they are produced by human praxis in the interaction with the material field and the other praxes.

How can past circumstance limit my positive determination in making my own history? Sartre introduces the concept of practico-inert to describe the distinctive inertial system that can act against our best intentions. The practico-inert is rooted in a history of collective human practices such as the ensemble of rules, laws, and codes of behavior and in the entire social complex that tends to keep us on the social level in which we were born (Flynn, 1984, p.94). The concept of the practico inert helps to explain why the experience of the dialectic is itself dialectical, grounded both in the experience of living with constraints and frustrations and in the rationality of meaningful praxis. As Žižek, replying to Laclau’s’ comments on dialectics, puts it: “totality is really experienced and really exists, precisely in the negative shock of failure, of paying the price of forgetting to include oneself in the situation into which one intervenes” (2000, p.228).

The practico inert reveals the contradictory way human praxis relates with the world (including both the relationship with the material field and other praxes) and this leads us towards a concept that ties praxis and dialectic together: contradictions. Contradictions are the primary cause of a motion of the social whole because that all things contain within themselves internal tensions. Just like dialectics, contradictions as understood by Sartre and by Marx, are not the result of formal logic but by practical one. As a matter fact, praxis represented the first embodiment of contradictions as it negates the limitations given by our field of actions. They do not signify an error in the reasoning that must solved, in material reality they do not cancel each other but mutually define each other and the reality they inhabit.
One powerful example of how Marx understands contradictions can be found in the relationship between use value and exchange value in the commodity form. Marx considered that the commodity was based on a whole complex of contradictory premises, since the fulfillment of one condition depends directly upon the fulfillment of its opposite. In fact, the different dimensions elucidated by use and exchange value are at the same time mutually exclusive and are to be realized combined in the exchange relationship. In relation to the objective of this dissertation the Marxist concerns for contradiction translates in the constraint of the historic subject to have control over his/her own history because such contradictions are never disembodied from social actors. So for instance in phenomena such as alienation the loss of control of the worker over the products he/she makes means literally losing of control over one’s own historic making.

In the concrete ground of analysis of social reality, contradictions are produced by multiple and different practices simultaneously taking places within a given society because the social organization of production is not a homogenous whole. As we will see in chapter IV contradictions can be created by an uneven development across a geographical dimension (e.g. the so called “Southern Question”) and in terms of social strata (e.g. the masses excluded from the “Risorgimento” or the social strata excluded from the benefit of the economic boom of 1960s). When contradictions stem from the social structure of society and inherently lead to class conflict, economic crisis. Because the groups involved have diametrically opposed concerns, their objectives are so dissimilar and contradictory that no mutually acceptable resolution can be found. As we shall see in chapter III, the BR’s perception of antagonistic
irreconcilable contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeois class in Italy will constitute the most important justification for the adoption of the so called “armed struggle.”

As I will show in Chapter IV, in line with Gramsci (1971), I indentify in the development of strong contradictions in the foundation of the Italian nation state and in the dynamic they produce a grand narrative that contributes to explain how the BR dialectically developed from it. As I suggested, a contradictory relation does not imply the absolute negation between the parts but only a determinate/ relative one. This will be the way I will for instance conceptualize the relationship between state and the BR or between bourgeois public sphere and the proletarian one. In both cases, the absolute confrontation the BR wanted to engage with its opponents result to be the product of an idealist and idealized conceptualization of its placement in history. Such a shortcoming and the lack of awareness about it by the group will contribute to explain the failure of its revolutionary project.

So far, I suggested how the historical materialist perspective privileges a view of people interacting with each other and with the material field through praxis. Before we proceed further on, I should to clarify how communicative practices can be placed inside this framework since after all it is mainly from the interpretation of the BR said that I claim I can provide my interpretation of the group’s experience. I draw on Sartre’s (1976) understanding of communication. The concept of signification that Sartre proposes, as Peck puts it, is one in which “people are not purely signified (as passive objects) or purely signifiers (as if a signification were a sole function of meaning making)” (2002, p.31). Sartre conceives signification as the interaction between human praxes and the material field: “Every praxis is unifying and revelatory transcendence of matter, and crystallizes in materiality as a signifying transcendence
of the former, already materialized actions” (1976, p.169). In other words, signification and matter transcend each other through the mediation of praxis.

As Peck explains (2006), signification implies a twofold understanding of mediation in which materiality conditions praxis through the passive unity of pre-fabricated meanings and, in turn, people’s meaning making affects materiality because the pre-fabrication refers to antecedent human productive praxis. As Sartre puts it, “there are not material objects which do not communicate among themselves through the mediation of men: and there is no man who is not born into a world of humanized materiality and material institutions” (1976, p.170). Praxis, in this sense, always signifies because it is a meaningful project of negating a scarce material field aimed at a future reconfiguration of it. This reasoning explains my dualist use of determination which is regarded as the logic behind the progressive /regressive method which comprises both “past” and “future” because people always act with meaning and determinate motivation, expressing a future project (the praxis’s objective), drawing upon past determinations operating in the present as constraining circumstances.

In sum, communication is considered first of all as material production of reality because associated to praxis and labor and because produces understating of reality. As praxis it also always conveys a project for the word that tries to negate the constraints of the past but without never completely transcending them. Thus, treated as a meaningful action, communication must be seen as the tension between historical circumstances or conditions or production and a message, which in virtue of its singularity represents a liberating attempt of the “future.” In other words, following the rationale behind the hermeneutic circle, understating a communicative
practice means creating a never ending movement between a text and its context and a part of the
text and the whole text.

To sum up, so far I tried to tie together a theory of practice and a theory of history because accounting for how social beings, with their diverse motives and their diverse
intentions, make and transform the world in which they live means accounting for history. It is also a theory of mediation because by trying to account for the relative weight of the “past” and the projection into the “future” in the making history of the BR means putting into conversation external and internal forces, objective and subjective conditions, between structuring forces and human agency. Communication is indeed an instance of such mediation because does not simply reflect the “past” nor originates “ex novo” as promise of future but actively, practically mediates the two.

In the next section, drawing on Braudel, I will talk about the concept of *longue durée* and *total histoire*. I consider the notion particularly useful to address another dialectical contradiction describing the tension between continuity and change. Braudel stresses the importance of structural continuity in a still historically developing framework. In the Italian case, the concept of *longue durée* will be used to describe the counterpoint between the recurrent spectacular political upheavals occurring and the fact that they all seem to originate from the same conceptually unvaried original contradictions.

2.2 The Braudelian Configurations of time

Historical materialism is an enterprise informed by political values and aspirations, is a perspective that normatively privileged change and discontinuities, but in order to address this
ideal projection into the “future,” many Marxist historians examine the “past.” The look at the past though is not only concentrated on how change happened but also on how it did not happen, how certain basic structures of the society managed to reproduce themselves behind the appearance erratic episodic changes. In relation to that, even though not necessarily of Marxist lineage, one historiographical tradition that paid particular attention to the continuities of the deep structure of given society is the Annales.

Most famous is Braudel’s insistence on the long term (la longue durée), which can be understood as an attack against both the episodic and the eternal: the event-centered political history and the universalizing generalizations of abstract social science. While there is a tendency among Annalists historian to focus on the enduring quality of social and economic structures, I here focus the attention on slowly-changing basic features of a society. The structural level Braudel has in mind is so deep to encompass much more than a nation-state reaches the “geoecological regions” level. In this case, not due a more limited conceptualization for reason of space and time constraints I will limit the analyst to Italian nation state.

In *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Epoque de Philippe II* (1970) Braudel argues that there are three discontinuous levels of historical time, each corresponding to a distinct domain of historical reality: event, conjuncture and structure. Traditionally, historians have made political time, the time of discrete events, the basis of all historical chronology. But political history, the primary example of *histoire événementielle*, is by its very nature rapid and episodic, characterized by dramatic happenings and apparent spectacular ruptures. However beneath such level, Braudel explains, lies a level of social time, modulated by the slower pace of everyday life characterized by more continuity rather than ruptures. Finally, even deeper, it lies a
pattern of geographical time, where historical changes appear to be barely perceptible yet nonetheless powerful in shaping the human.

Within the Braudelian imagery there is operating a sort of hermeneutic of suspicion distinguishing surface and deeper levels that makes history visible as the result of an inverse proportionality between pace of time and historical changes: in order to understand historical changes one has discard where more apparently they seem to happen, the surface, and to look instead and where changes seems to not happen at all and time seems to slow down. The "structure" operating underneath the first two more superficial times moves at the pace of a glacier, it is a macrocosm of an entire society conditioned by impersonal forces such as geographic, climatic, biological, productive and so interlocking as to defy alteration for a millennium. The conjuncture, the mid level, corresponds to half- to full-century cycle where technology, price gyrations, cumulative population changes, and even mental or cultural shifts gradually undermine the "structure" and eventually form a new equilibrium. The "events" are mere surface noises, often full of sound and fury but signifying little, indicators at best of the deeper currents of history.

The expression longue durée synthesizes the shift of attention Braudel and his colleagues bring from the ideologically loaded history of the éclatant gestures of men, the political history, to the impersonal more invisible of conjunctural and structural time. The move implied by the introduction of longue durée is significant at several levels. First of all, implies a total understanding of time and space in which the anti dialectical discrete element is replaced by interconnectedness which develops both in the social space and historical space (histoire total). Secondly, in consonance with much of leftist intelligentsia thinking in terms of structures in France, Braudel wanted to remove the hyper-humanist tendency informing the traditional
political history. Finally Braudel, provides a framework that allows the coexistence of multiple scenarios developed at multiple levels: like the multiform Mediterranean Sea in La Méditerranée, there is no only one history but many histories, no one historic explanation but many, not one history determinant but many, no one historic times but multiple paces.

Braudel, thinking about the longue durée, provided the example of Mercantile Capitalism, a coherent societal-level and structural paradigm that both defined and restricted the potential for action of that generation, notwithstanding the "ruptures and reversals" inherent in time. In the same way, DuPont (1959) talked about the form of thought associated with the crusade, a long historical process that produced what Bloch (1990) defined as a “mentalite” not just an idea but a way of thinking about reality, a mindset. The idea of long slow process is a concept that will be extremely useful in inserting the phenomenon associated with the BR into a larger historical picture exceeding the 1970s and finding its lineage in the Resistance and even further back, in the incomplete project of modernity in Italy, the creation of the nation state.

One final remark must be made about the bias that Braudel has about the episodic dimension as being deceiving about the actual development of human history. Even though, I completely agree about the importance of the “telluric” movements of a given society, the sole attention for deep structures and continuity can dangerously tend to reduce the equation between “past” regressive and future progressive as a purely deterministic relationship according to which “people make history” only in the reproduction of the past. Instead mine is a humanist project in which the episodic, in the singular enterprise projected in the future history is a product of history but still produces as well and the two dimensions cannot be superseded.

I do not think Braudel would embrace the false dichotomy between structure and agency, or objective vs. subjective but I think it is safe to say that, in line with the general anti-humanist
tendency of the structuralist tradition, that the focus of the French historian for the impersonal moment risks crippling my project of dialectically uniting the structural and the progressive-personal historic determination. Thus, the individual praxis, even that one taking place in discrete episodes cannot be overlooked. For this reason in the next section, I want to introduce a distinction between hegemony and ideology that can help describing how those two dimensions, the long durée and the episodic may interact in the consciousness and actions (because language is a practical consciousness) of the Red Brigades.

2.3 Hegemony and Ideology

As I mentioned earlier, the dissertation, willing to capture the relative weight of the “past”/regressive and the “future” progressive in the experience of the BR, i.e. as both subject and object of history, tries to explore at the same time the long durée and episodic temporal dimensions as they become visible in the BR’s language. A way to capture those dimensions in the text of the BR can be offered by John and Jean Comaroff’s distinction between hegemony and ideology in terms of how distinct but united systems of representation for practices and modes of thought embodying beliefs can produce different level of awareness which are then reflected on the communicative practices of the BR.

The Comaroffs (1991) define hegemony as it follows”

“We take hegemony to refer to that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies - drawn from a historically situated cultural field - that comes to be taken for granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it. It consists, to paraphrase Bourdieu (1977:167), of things that go without saying because, being axiomatic, they come without saying; things that, being presumptively shared, are not normally the subject of explication or argument. This is why its power has so often been seen to lie in what it silences, what it prevents people from thinking and saying, what it puts beyond the limits of the rational and the credible.
Quite literally, hegemony is habit forming. For once its internal contradictions are revealed, when what seems natural comes to be negotiable, when the ineffable is put into words - then hegemony becomes something other than itself” (pp.23-24).

The utility of such a definition is that expands beyond the limits of the common understanding of hegemony as the intended project of one social group to asserts its dominance over another without exactly explain where consent, in equation force + consent comes from. In doing that, the two authors make visible another understanding of the concept already present in Gramsci (1971) which is to envision it as a general interpretive category but also as a general way to act which explains how something approaching collective will originates. As I will argue later on, both understandings of hegemony will be utilized in order to offer an articulated scenario in which the presence of common general framework to understand social reality does not necessarily translates in the attainment of class based hegemony.

Compared to hegemony, the Comaroffs define ideology as:

“An articulated system of meanings, values and beliefs of a kind that can be abstracted as [the] worldview of any social grouping. Born in manifestos and everyday practices, self-conscious texts and spontaneous images, popular styles and political platforms, this worldview may be more or less internally systematic, more or less assertively coherent in its outward forms. But, as long as it exists, it provides an organizing scheme for collective symbolic production. Obviously to invoke Marx and Engels (1970) once again, the regnant ideology of any period or place will be that of the dominant group. And, while the nature and degree of its preeminence may vary a good deal, it is likely to be protected, even enforced, to the full extent of the power of those who claim it for their own (p. 24).

The basic difference between hegemony and ideology resides, in the level of awareness of the subjects living them. Hegemony embraces the whole political community as share naturalized conventions, ideology instead expresses the word view of particular social group. Hegemony, is then an unquestioned set of assumptions that unless made invisible does not leave
room for political negotiation, ideology instead is always under direct argument, therefore open for contestation. They say “Hegemony homogenizes, ideology articulates. Hegemony, at its most effective, is mute; by contrast, says de Certeau (1984: 46), 'all the while, ideology babbles on.' (1991, p. 24).

The way I understand the difference between hegemony and ideology is also in temporal terms in the sense that I imagine hegemony becoming naturalized mainly through a pace of time in the order of the *longue durée* whereas I consider ideology ideally emerging, in its u-topic message, in its singular message, in the episodic. Both hegemony and ideology operate at the same time, but the latter tends to positions itself as a determinate negation (i.e. a dialectical relative negation) of the former because a given ideology signifies something different than hegemony but cannot do without making reference to the hegemonic.

In trying to make sense of such historical layers of consciousness I find Williams’ (1977) distinction between “dominant,” “residual” and “emergent” cultural elements very useful. In the sense that, in the continuum between hegemonic and ideological is very difficult to draw clear separation between them as much as is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between those (emergent elements) which are really elements of some new phase of the dominant culture...and those which are substantially alternative or oppositional to it: emergent in the strict sense, rather than merely novel' (Williams, 1977, p.123). Through time there is process of incorporation between the emergent components of the ideological and the dominant of the hegemonic that creates Gramscian common sense. This the way I suggest the relationship between longue durée and episodic and hegemony and ideological.
Hegemony, in relation ideology results as part of a dominant worldview which has been naturalized and, having hidden itself in orthodoxy, no more appears as ideology at all’ (1991, p. 25). As it will become evident in Chapter VI, examining the Moro’s kidnapping, there is then a continuum between the silent deceiving transparency hegemony and self crystallized, self aware ideology which resemble the continuum between unconscious and conscious. The continuity between ideology and the hegemonic explains the instability of hegemony because the confrontation between ideologies, by foregrounding their relativity as historic based assumption my foreground the naturalization of hegemony. Ideology then is the language of the class struggle and hegemony is the language of relative pacification of class struggle through the creation of interclass’s alliance, or what Gramsci defines as Historic bloc. However, this is not say that there is a purely class ascribed kind of ideology either. A good example will be given by looking at relationship between the competing ideologies of L’Unita and the BR. In fact, one could safely say that the L’Unita and the BR are at least rhetorically addressing the same class of workers and also share some basic tenets of the Marxist tradition. However, the common ground between the two worldviews based on the communist tradition becomes in fact factor that aggravates the confrontation rather than pacifying it.

The tension between the hegemonic and the ideological reflects the tension that historical materialism identifies between “making history” and “making it not our own circumstances,” which sometimes, as in the case of the BR, translates also in the tension between social production and social re-production. Like the black pilot in Sartre’s Search for a Method (1968), at one level, the BR refused to stay within the structural boundaries provided by the established
social order, the conditions produced by long durée processes but, at the same time, the group could not do so without maintaining reference to a hegemonic worldview:

“Aviation becomes his possibility as a clandestine future. In fact he chooses a possibility already recognized by the colonists as existing in the colonized (simply because they cannot rule it out at the start) - the possibility of rebellion, of risk, of scandal, of repression. This choice allows us to understand simultaneously his individual project and the present stage of the struggle of the colonized against the colonists” (p.96).

To sum up so far I tried to show how in order to operationalize the a historic account that depicts the subject as subject and object of history I decided to articulate a framework comprising different temporal dimensions, such as the long durée and the episodic one but also how those temporal configurations can manifest in the communicative practices of the BR as different level of consciousness. In this sense, I claimed that the Comaroff’s distinction between hegemony and ideology can capture the distance in a continuum between the utopian promise of the future in ideological project of the BR and the weight of past exemplified by the sedimented assumptions within consciousness.

Such a distance will materialize in the overt confrontation between BR and newspapers’ competing representations of Sossi’s and Moro’s kidnapping, and in the implicit content residing in the silence and in the unsaid. The difference between the hegemonic and the ideological is not simply of conscious/subconscious but also represents a diachronic distance from assumptions “inherited” from the past and the way mediate the political imagination for the future. Such a temporal and structural distance, is mainly due to the fact the hegemonic assumptions tend to structures slowly and people tend to lose perspective about the fact that such structures are their creation. Such a lack of awareness of subjective influence over the apparently objective reality is what makes the strength of hegemony.

2.4 The Operationalization of the Framework
Before proceeding briefly resume what I have said so far. The concept of longue durée represents for this study a way to materialize how the past circumstances, the regressive dimensions in Sartre. That constitutes the ground of operations and limitations of the singular enterprise of the progressive dimension in which the two BR’s episodes will be examined. Such a framework will translate into an analysis that tries to combine two temporal dimensions represented by the “past” (Chapter IV) and “future” (Chapters V and Chapter VI) and two levels of signification represented by “hegemony” and “ideology.”

The “past” considers the period between the creation of the Italian nation state, passing through the experience of Fascism, the resistance, the reconstruction period of 1950s, social tension of the 1960 and 1970 and concluded in the early 1980s when the BR’s experience officially terminated. This is the period in which hegemony manifests both in its presence and in its absence: on the one hand, in positive, we assist to the hegemonic emergence of specific preoccupations, a sensibility, a political culture and a specific “grammar of motives” (C.W. Mills, 1940) that become naturalized as the unsaid set of assumptions that will constitute part of the consciousness of Italians thus including the BR; on the other hand, despite the establishment in the common sense of those basic hegemonic assumptions about the social order, this is a period also marked by the frustrated attempts of the ruling class to exert moral and intellectual leadership over the rest of the society.

The second temporal dimension, the episodic one, the “future” considers two specific events, the kidnapping of Genoa judge Mario Sossi in 1974 and the kidnapping of former Prime Minister, DC leader Aldo Moro in 1978. In those two occasions, the enterprise of the group, with its projects-therefore projection into the future of its revolutionary aspirations, translate in concrete worldviews, i.e. ideologies. Both temporal configurations and levels of consciousness
must be seen in a totality that combines the notion of social whole (drawing form historical materialism) and histoire total (drawing from Braudel). In other words, when we will examine the two episodes we will be able to recognize the dialectical unity in the historic present of both “past” and “future” and “hegemony” and “ideology.” It is in such a totality developed both in space and time that materializes then multiple histories, multiples potential venues or what I define as the “historic if.”

The goal of making visible the “historic Ifs” is not to provide a completely revisionist account of the BR or mastering the virtuosity of a counterfactual history with its logical deductions (e.g. “what if the Risorgimento succeeded in national project? What if the Resistenza were able to complete its revolutionary project? What if the BR were able to trigger the conditions of civil war in Italy?”). Rather, my objective is to give voice to existent dilemmas, real alternatives, concrete contradictions that peoples in given times experienced and were affected by. Thus, “historic ifs” constitute actual pieces of reality that developed but not completely actualized. As we shall see in a moment, this is the main reason why the experience of the BR will be understood as a competing worldview together with the three national newspapers.

The importance of addressing the “historic ifs” resides in the fact that, by virtue of their actual existence (thus, again, not being mere hypothesis); those historical alternatives have influenced the history of a country like Italy in extremely significant ways. Such an incomplete realization of those alternatives does not make them disappear, as they remain alive in subterraneous ways and every once in a while they re-emerge and produce important outcomes even opposite to their original trajectory. As Giddens writes, "The escape of human history from
human intentions, and the return of the consequences of that escape as casual influences on human action, is a chronic feature of social life” (1979, p.7).

In many ways, the different attempts to consolidate in Italy a given social order are reflected in the ideological competition between competing worldviews and competing rhetorics such as the one of the BR and the ones of the different positions represented by the three newspapers. Under this perspective, this study stands out from the existing literature on radical politics and media because of the way the relationship between the BR and the press is conceived. Looking at existing literature, such a relationship tends to be depicted in an asymmetric fashion by almost exclusively focusing on ‘how ‘media cover or represent terrorism’ (Gitlin, 1980; Bassiouni, 1983; Midgley and Rice, 1984; Alali and Eke, 1991; Alexander and Picard, 1991, Paletz and Schmid, 1992, Chitty et al. 2003; Hess and Kalb, 2003; Jenkins, 2003; Norris et al. 2003) in other words considering terrorism only as subject matter ready to be rendered by media.

For instance, in Gitlin’s seminal work (1980), the depiction of the relationship between American radical left and the media was described as an unbalanced confrontation between the operations of media reproducing dominant ideology and the radical left contesting it. The power relation was considered so asymmetrical that media were capable of “making and unmaking the left.” In contrast to that, this dissertation examines the BR and three Italian national newspapers as peer perspectives working at the same level of rhetorical competition. In the examination of the two episodes, at the first level of analysis, the BR and the newspapers can be placed almost at the opposite end of binary opposition between institutional power and counter power, but at the hegemonic level, the contestation of dominant ideology becomes more dialectic, showing ambivalences of the BR contestation of the Italian state.
In those two events the activity of the BR became so newsworthy to attract full coverage by national media. The two events, both from the perspective of the BR and the press, could be considered as good example of the episodic time I mentioned previously: parenthetical events which can both stand out on itself and at the same time being connected to a series of larger events. It is at this level that the primary texts for the present study will be examined. The communiqués of the BR and the journal articles represent the individual voices examined in chapter V and VI counter-pointing the long durée dimension of chapter IV.

The Thematization of the Episodes

Among several alternatives to approach a text, I selected the tropological analysis. By tropological analysis I mean the exploration of consistent used of figurative language. My assumption is that allegories are not mere ornaments their study displays how various meanings are linked, integrated, and/or reconstituted apart from their literal sense. For instance, metaphors for Lacan (2005) offer an idea how the unconscious is structured and White (1981) and Burke (1969), both consider topology as a constitutive force in rhetoric and history. In my employment tropes, assume a very similar role that Myths assume in Barthes, play an important role in producing and reproducing power relations, by giving the impression of articulation and systematization. As I will show in the analysis chapters, the examination of tropes reveal the naturalization normative assumptions about the social order.

Barthes found myth consisting in groups of images, ideas emanating from a wide variety of sources including the press, advertising, movies, consumer goods, and cultural events. Myth occurred in fragments, almost never articulated in long fixed narratives. Whenever myth appeared, it replaced a connotated system of meanings for the denoted system already present and for this reason is defined as a second order semiological system (1979, p.196). Thus myths
emptied phenomena of their literal meaning and added their own meanings. Myth is depoliticized speech (1979, p.143), it involves a defaulting excluding any alternative. By doing that, it abolishes the complexity of human acts and it gives them the simplicity of essences.

The examination of recurrences in the use of figurative language will lead to the thematization of both the communicative practices of the Red Brigades and the three national newspapers. Whereas in order to provide definition and consistency for the method of thematization I draw on Barthes’ mythic analysis (1979), the overarching framework of this paper does not rely on the anti-historic tendencies of the langue dimension of myth suggested by the French author, rather on historical-materialist presuppositions I have already mentioned. According to Barthes (1979), myths comprise a twofold structure based on a historic/diachronic level –parole, and on a universal and a-historic-synchronic level –langue. My understanding of mythic analysis implies the historicization of the langue level which is treated as representations of shared meanings and practices operating at different level of abstraction and awareness which corresponds to ideology and hegemony.

Whereas the rationale for carry out the thematization only loosely follow Barthes’ conceptualization of myth, the concrete way in which the recurrent narrative swill be identified follows rather closely the indications of the French author as given in Myth today (1972). In Myth Today, Barthes (1972) provides three characteristics that help identify themes:

1) Themes and Myth are reproduced in repetition: “the first condition for recognizing both themes and myths is their repetition” (MT, 155) and be found in a variety of objects. Myth is recurrent and appears in more than one guise

2) Since myth and themes are repeated in a number of different objects they must possess an essential aspects that does not change, what is repeated (p.120) On top of
varying signs, a secondary invariable signs is superimposed (here is the combination of parole and langue).

3) Something to be inside a myth it must be more than simply connotated, it must figure in an ideological network.

So to sum up, Barthes (1979) provides rather specific guidelines to identify a myth, a myth is repeated, manifesting under different appearance so possessing a second order semiological system which, in essence, conserves underneath and finally that myths tends to be inserted and articulated within an ideological system.

As already mentioned, the episodes selected for our analysis are two. First of all the kidnapping of judge Mario Sossi in 1974, represented a period of passage from two different forms of media distorted perspective dealing with the BR (Mastromatteo, 2007): from considering the BR as the “phantomatic,” the “self styled”, the “professed” communists Red Brigades, “characters of fairy tale for children” (“Il Giorno”, 02/23/1975) to consider the group as “lucid”, “ruthless”, “military super organized” “professional” “cold blooded.” The reason for the selection of the specific episode originated from the will to look for occasions in which the competing rhetorics were confronting each other directly, on the same topic, at the same time, and this only happened when BR’s action were considered grave enough to be consistently covered, as the case of kidnapping of the judge Mario Sossi (or Moro kidnapping in 1978). The second episode concerns the 55 days of dramatic experience of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, inaugurated with the bloody murder of the body guard of the former Prime Minister and ended with the execution of the prisoner.

As far as the selection of newspapers is concerned, I opted for three most important daily press in terms of national circulation and most representative of the different positions inside the
ideological spectrum of the Italian press: La Stampa, a newspaper representing the interests of FIAT group and the Italian confederation of industrialists; Il Corriere dell Sera, traditionally considered as the newspaper of the middle class consistently but also critically aligned with the position of the governing party, the Christian Democrats (DC); finally L’Unita, the newspaper founded by Antonio Gramsci which functioned as the official press of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

For each newspaper, I examined the first page of the daily edition of each day during the duration of the two episodes. The first page of the typical Italian daily newspaper provides both the chronicle articles and the opinion articles. As it will be evident at the moment of the analyses, the highly dramatic context of both happenings tended to blur the classical distinction between, descriptive and normative pure reporting of facts and offering personal opinion/judgment about the occurrence.

If is true that there is an agreement within literature on Italian journalism that such a division between “hard” and “soft” never completely applies to the Italian case (Mancini and Briziarelli, 2005), the lack of definition of the distinction noticeable in ‘regular times, in occasion of moral panic, as in the case of the two examined episodes, turns into a lack of the very distinction. However, the difference is still maintained between reporting and opinion article in the treatment of time. Whereas in news reporting about the most recent happenings time is compartmentalized and self contained in units (12-24 hours), in the leading opinion articles time seems less subjected to reification and hypostatization due to production rhythms.

To conclude this chapter, I here tried to make visible my reasoning and consequently provide a plausible framework to conduct my analysis of the experience of the BR. We are almost ready start such an examination. However, in order to facilitate the task of the reader of
following me I will in the next chapter introduce the BR and the three newspapers and the relationship they come to establish among each others. This will allow the analysis to move more fluidly without making constant reference to the specific context in which the BR and the press operated.

CHAPTER III

THE FOUR VOICES

This chapter is dedicated to the introduction of the BR, the three national newspapers L’Unitá, Il Corriere della Sera and La Stampa and the relationship the group came to establish with the media. I first proceed to familiarize the reader with the Red Brigades’ history (3.1), its specific take on Marxist ideology (3.2), its approach to violence (3.3) its communicative vocation (3.4) and the existing literature on the BR (3.5). I will then proceed to describe the Italian media system in the 1970s and the specific features of the three newspapers (3.6). Finally, I offer a general reflection on the relationship between the press and the “discourse of violence” of the BR (3.7).

3.1 Introducing the BR

The Red Brigades was a group involved in an asymmetric warfare against the Italian state and its political class, active between early Spring 1970 and late Fall 1982. The group social
origin comprised three main components: first of all, the scholastic root, coming from the Sociology department of the University of Trento; secondly, the political component comprising dissident members of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); thirdly, the working class of the Northern sector of the country.

According to Meade (1990, p.1), the Institute of Sociology of Trent was created by the ruling party, the Christian Democrats, in order to form a class of technocrats who would manage the new Italian industrial reality. Paradoxically enough, the institute became the intellectual training ground for historic members of the BR such as Renato Curcio and “Mara” Cagol. From 1967-68 experience of students occupation emerged the so called “negative university” initiative: a Marxist group which had the objective to liquidate the system of higher education as a strategic site of reproduction of power.

The political component originated in the Reggio Emilia area in which emerged a collective of workers and students acting within the framework of dissidence from the Italian Communist Party. From such an experience came from two other historic members of the group: Alberto Franceschini and Prospero Gallinari. Then, the academic component and the dissident wing of the PCI met each other in Milan. There, together with workers and trade unionists of the, Pirelli, Sit Siemens factories, formed the so called Political Metropolitan Collective. From the manufacture environment came from Mario Moretti, another historic leader of the BR. Finally, in August of 1970 the BR was born as a result of a meeting in remote area of the Appeninos. The group aspired to prosecute the political project of the partisan resistance of WWII, with special reference to the Communist “Garibaldi Brigade.”

As I will more extensively consider in the next chapter, the BR emerged in socio-economic context of important contradictions for the country: the recent economic boom (1955-
63) had brought diffused wealth but also created a mass of excluded from its enjoyment such as unskilled and semi skilled factory workers and vast areas of the rural South. Furthermore, the existing structural limitations of Italian capitalism (Salvati, 1972, p.1) in 1970s would meet two important oil shocks resulting into a dramatic economic crisis which dangerously combined with social tensions never completely defused since early 1960s. As Zavoli observes (1991) the structures of the state were not capable to keep the pace with such a profound re-structuration: in a country in which the state represented itself as the most important services provider it failed to make available adequate housing, schooling and health service.

In such a context the BR presented itself as an armed reaction to a total state of crisis of the country. In the first official “Self Interview”, in September 1971, the group described the crisis of Italian capitalism that not being able to maintain its consent in peaceful ways “moves towards reactionary and violent positions” (p.1). The BR (1971) depicted itself as “the embryos of the guerrilla warfare party” (p.1), a revolutionary organization with a military configurations, formed by “proletarians who understood that in order to succumb must organize with intelligence, prudence and secretly. They understood that the words are useless to achieve their political goals” (p.1).

For the BR, capitalism was close to its implosion but such an ending was not going to be pacific and that was why the reformism of the institutional left was useless and even suicidal. In the same document, the BR explained the necessary way such a historic process would take place (1971): “the bourgeois class is obliged to opt for the despotic solution” but at the same time “the proletarian insurrection must be proactively supported otherwise the current crisis will resolve in a victory for the bourgeois as it happened in 1921-22 ” (p.2). The perspective on such
a national re-organization implied two important motives for the BR: the compliance of the institutional left (PCI) and the resurgence of a new form of fascism.

The old fascist form developed in the countryside, the new one in the city, and would be counteracted by a revolutionary guerrilla warfare equally developing in the metropolitan context. If for the imagery of the partisan resistance, the mountain and the forest represented the site of struggle, the new battleground for the BR was almost exclusively urban. In “The Second Self Interview” (1973, p.2) the BR affirmed that its efforts were all concentrated on the city: in both the factories and neighborhoods. In relation to this new fascist re-emergence the BR considered itself as a natural prosecution of the Resistance. However, if the Resistance was only capable to resist, the BR considered itself as an offensive group (rather than defensive) capable of actively attacking capitalism and fascism in Italy. The offensive objectives implied a radical shift form the previous experience of the Political Metropolitan Collective, going fully underground. Clandestinity became both a an existential and tactical condition:

“Clandestinity is a necessary condition for the survival of the military offensive of the political organization that operates within the imperialist metropolis. Operating underground allows a market tactical advantage over the class enemy who is instead exposed in his person and in his installations” (In Soccorso Rosso, 1975, p.125).

A Longitudinal Evolution of the Group.

Caselli and Della Porta (1991) distinguished four main phases in the historical evolution of the group:
- 1970-4, “Armed propaganda;”
- 1974-1976, “Attack at the Heart of the State;”
During the first phase, the BR’s activity was limited to major industrial cities of the North where the contradictions were more manifest and the conflicts more acute. The BR (In Soccorso Rosso, 1978) defined three main objectives of the “armed propaganda:”

— to create the highest number of political contradictions inside the enemy front, in other words dis-articulate it;
— to reinforce the compactness of the movement experimenting on methods;
— to organize the state of class, the party and the fighting organisms.

The main objective of “armed propaganda”, demonstrative actions to expand both its organization and the audience receptive of its message, “the fundamental task is to gain solidarity and support of the proletarian masses for the communist Revolution. (Brigate Rosse, 1971). The BR’s actions revealed a clear intention to maintain and increment the link with the broader movement that was developing in that period both inside (mainly targeting the autonomist trade unions CAB) and outside the factory (the student movement).

The first stroke attributable to the BR dates back to autumn 1970, however, the historic leaders of the group were already active in Milan 1969 in the Collettivo Politico Metropolitano, formed by Milan and Trent University, Pirelli, Sit Siemens and Alfa Romeo worker organizations. The group decided to make an “operational transition” and to turn to armed struggle and clandestine condition. In 1970, the newspaper Sinistra Proletaria wrote (Siji, 1977, p.89) “there is no political power without military power in the fighting proletarian masses, to educate the proletarian and revolutionary left to the resistance through partisan action, to the armed struggle” Such a commentary synthesized many of the BR’s paternalistic assumptions about the proletariat: it needs representations, it needs to be educated to both revolutionary and
armed praxes and such a practical activity had to draw from the historic experience of the partisan resistance.

From Milan, the BR attempted to exert their influence on the national territory. The first move was expanding to Rome by carrying actions against neo fascists during the season 1970-71. In 1972 the BR established the “Turin Column” which was gravitating around FIAT’s activity. Then they, moved to the other major industrial poles of the North East. The BR was able to radicate in industrial realities where there was already a history of autonomous groups forming against the institutionalized trade union and the compromising positions of the PCI.

After the 1972 arrests, the BR had to restructure itself in order to ensure the survival as illegal and criminalized group. The organization acquired various properties which worked as bases accommodating people studying the local situation, gathering information and formulation of the logistics to accomplish missions. Until the 1974, considering the limited size of the BR, the organizational model was still experimental. However, even later one when they achieved a proven organizational configuration, the BR’s structure was always changing trying to adapt as circumstances were changing: in addition to the “colonne” (territorial organizations linked to various “Brigate”), the “fronti” were established with aim of politically centralizing the various sectors of intervention. Finally in 1972-73 a new organism was created: the “Comitato Esecutivo” (executive Committee), responsible for directing and coordinating the activity of the fronte (front) and the colonne (columns). The territorial organization of the group revealed a tendency towards what Dini and Manconi (1980, p.23) called bureaucratic centralism.

When in early 1970s the group opted for the armed struggle it was justified as defensive reaction against the threat of authoritarian reactions as capitalism, facing the rejection of reformism by the proletariat and the contradictions of the economic system, had to reorganize the
entire apparatus of power seeking to regain control over the labor force. In the factory such a re-
structuration meant two kinds of strategies: technical restructuring of production and political
persecution. The BR (1973, p.1) stated that “the crisis represents an instrument used by the
reactionary forces to strike against the working class.”

Such a defensive posture was held during the entire first phase, however, in the second phase,
the violence became offensive aimed at bringing to the heart of the state, as “the violent and
coercive organism of capitalism” (1975, p.2), a fatal attack. The recruitment process of this phase
was still concentrated on the groups of extreme left inside the factories that wanted to be
autonomous from the institutional trade unions. After Sossi’s kidnapping and the arrest of Curcio
and Franceschini (in 1974), the historic founders of the group, the state realized the full force of
the group and started reacting. Such a repressive reaction had the effects to accentuate and
accelerate the militarization of the group.

The accruement of the state reaction implied the BR seeking a national dimension: the targets
were increasingly selected outside the factory (more militarists and political) and the attacks
became more frequent. In order to expand nationally, the BR started to establish regional
committees (but not an actual colonna, so no militarily operative) in Tuscany and the Marche.
The expansive ambitions led to a twofold move: increased centralization of power and increased
compartmentalization of every subsection which had to work as an independent cell.

Terrorist actions were accentuated and perfected. To the already established types of
intervention (attacks on cars, raids on headquarters of political professional organization, were
added heavy use of arms (pistols and machine gun) the BR added with increasing intensity the
objectives of wounding and to killing. The first assassinations occurred in Padua, on January 17
1974, against two right wing militants. The action was defined (in Soccorso Rosso, 1975 p.256) as “the armed justice of the proletariat against fascist brutality.”

As we will see later on, the “qualitative leap” from violence on property to violence on human beings, caused another equivalent “qualitative leap” in the press coverage. Finally the BR, after 4 years of armed propaganda, reached with the Sossi kidnapping and the murders the front pages of national press.

In third phase the BR was aiming at the formation of Partito Comunista Combattente (the Combattant Communist Party, PCC). In April 1977, the organization wrote that within the proletarian a vanguard had developed such a party which had adopted armed struggle as the only possible option. The BR meant to function as guide party for the PCC in order (1977, p.4) in “to transform the oblique process of a diffused and disorganized civil war, into a genera direct offensive of unitary plan, it is necessary to develop and unify the proletarian movement and constructing a fighting party.”

In this phase the organization reinforced and enlarged. While in the previous periods actions were sporadic and followed by long silences between operations, since the beginning 1977, the BR resumed carrying out actions with continuity. The BR officially changed strategy from “armed propaganda” to “unleashing civil war,” its tactics from ”hit and run” to “dislocation of the apparatus” and its form of intervention from “punitive action to “destruction” (Alberti and Caselli, 1980).

In this phase, the enemy was not anymore only the state but included the “collaborationist” trade union leaders and the supporters of Berlinguer and Moro’s project, the so called “Historical Compromise,” the strategic alliance between the PCI and the ruling center right party, the DC. As the BR stated (1978, p.1) “the bourgeois state instrumentalize
alternatively fascism and social democracy” thus including both right and reformist left under their hitting target. Under the social democratic regime the state acted as neo-corporatist agent controlling the working class, the trade unions. The BR approached the Compromesso Storico as a way to explain its political isolation from the institutional left under the rhetoric of “betrayal” of the Italian Communist Party².

Whereas in the previous phases the BR selected meticulously its victims, explaining through the publication of the “curriculum vitae” of misfits/crimes of its targets, in this period, the selection was almost random and explained “a posteriori.” By striking indiscriminately the BR intended to promote a diffused generalized regime of terror. There were two different logics motivating the attacks to the political targets. On the one hand the group wanted to keep dislocating the state apparatus by means of intimidation (the BR created almost a trademark by “kneecapping”, the so called “gambizzazione”). On the other hand, they also chose the direct confrontation by eliminating direct political opponents.

In this phase, the BR acted by the military logic of maximizing the loss of the enemy. This direct confrontation had the objective of pushing the other organizations to raise the level of confrontation and to provoke a climate of civil war. According to both Della Porta (1990) and Tarrow (1991) the spiral of violence indeed created a competing process in which parallel organizations to the BR, such as Prima Linea and Potere Operaio, followed the BR’s example. Especially Tarrow (1991) observes how the so called “spiral of violence” was a product of the

² The rhetoric of betrayal, as we will examine in Chapter IV, constitutes another file rouge that ideally connects the partisan resistance to the BR. That is because just like the PCI leader Togliatti gave away the partisans aspirations to bring socialism to the liberated North so did Berlinguer when betrayed the aspiration of the working class by associating with the neo “fascist” Christina Democrats.
competition between groups. “Such a context created” incentives for some of them (inkling the BR) to outbid one another through the use of even more radical tactics” (p.43).

Given the disproportion of forces in the “battlefield,” the BR failed to obtain any type or recognition from the institutions and the decision to kill Moro created a grave controversy inside the networks of clandestine organization and inside the very BR. In 1978 the group presented a detailed analysis of the allegedly Italian “mature capitalism” in which the organization tried to explain how the radicalization of violence was a necessary step to mobilize the section of the proletariat most propensed to revolution. According to the BR’s analysis the skilled workers sought social reformist solutions and only the unskilled workers would choose the civil war/revolution option. Then, he best allied of the mass worker would be found outside the factory, among the industrial reserve army. It was from the mass worker and the reserve would emerge the members of the revolutionary party.

During this fourth phase, the group experienced its fatal crisis. In spite of the success of military actions and despite the consistent recruitment from survivors of other scattered terrorist groups, the BR was unable to overcome its crisis. The eloquent sign of incurable predicament was the assassination of the trade unionist Guido Rossa in January 1979 which signed the definitive detachment of the group form the factory the factory environment. Furthermore, the state became extremely effective in dis-articulating local organization of the BR and scoring arrest of the BR’s leaders by promoting a new set of laws that favored collaboration with justice and created the phenomenon of “dissocianism” and “pentitismo” according to which convicted member traded information for partial reduction of the prison sentence.

In the last months the attacks to property were limited and the murders increased and become even more random. The sense of lack of trajectory and disorientation of the group
reflected in their last communiqués. In June 1981, the group published the last official self
interview, the sense that one could receive from the words or the organization was of the
presence of contradictory disarticulated positions. In this document, the first question of the self
interview accidentally manages in the same sentence to communicate a profound sense of defeat
and the will to convince its own group that the victory was actually closing in (1981, p.1): “how
is it possible that despite metropolitan warfare extended in many directions, the state sustains to
have achieves important victories against terrorism?”

The whole document is thorn by a palpable tension between the reticence to admit the
doomed existence of the BR and an already “post mortem” examination of the mistakes the
organizations made during its activities. In fact, few months later, in October 1982, the BR state
in a communiqué that their experience was officially concluded. When in 1982 the BR officially
proclaimed the conclusion of their experience the group had carried out 14,000 acts of violence
including 75 assassinations.

3.2 The BR’s “Absolute Enemy”: the Bourgeois State

In this section I briefly describe the main features of the BR’s ideology and the
assumptions that lay behind its worldview. In the existing literature on the BR, there are two
main positions about the ideological nature of the BR: an overwhelmingly dominant one that
considers the BR’s ideology within the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist tradition (e.g. Dini and
Manconi, 1980; Zavoli, 1990; Meade, 2003; Drake, 2002); the other one, essentially represented
by Manconi (1996) that considers the BR’s ideologically closer the concrete historic experience
of the partisan Resistance rather than the theoretical positions within the Marxist tradition itself.
My view acknowledges of the importance of both positions but articulates them according the
distinction I made in chapter II between ideology and hegemony. In other words, both Marxism-
Leninism and the Resistance lineage represented explicit traits of the BR’s ideology, but in substantially different dosages and level of awareness.

I consider the Marxism Leninism being more operative at the ideological level. On the other hand, as I will indicate in Chapter IV, the connection to the resistance is fundamental to understand what motivated the BR and the source of identity of the group but the connection between the BR and the resistance is more subterraneous, is visceral and meaningfully connected to larger narratives of Italy. For this reason, in this section, willing to provide an account of the ideological foundations I will more concentrate on the Marxist and Leninist tradition.

*Marx and Lenin*

When it comes to the armed struggle, the BR regarded the Italian state as its first opponent, as the armored instrument of the dominant class. The modern state in the BR’s view represented a powerful crystallization of a context of class domination and for this reason it stood between the working class and the socialist transformation of society. As Manconi (1991) observes, the general perspective on the state of the BR drew directly from Marx. Marx’s critique of the bourgeois state, first developed out of a critical confrontation with Hegel. In his *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* (1980), the author challenges Hegel’s dialectical justification for the status quo, if for Hegel the state was the site where the universal values of given society could realize, for Marx only the opposite was true.

The assumption was that rather than considering the state determining the social structure, it was the material conditions of production that give rise to the nature of the state. The principal factor in determining the character of the state was not its prevailing form of rule, which can vary greatly from time to time, but the type of property and productive relations that
its institutions and prime beneficiaries protect and promote (Mandel, 2004). In Lenin’s words, (1990, p.2) “The state is a product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class contradictions […] With each succeeding form of class society, this state machine was taken over and perfected as the instrument of the new ruling class.”

The state secures inequality of production under the law of abstract equality (Bonefeld, 2002, p. 129). Thus, the distinctive achievement of the capitalist state, according to Marxism (and in contrast to Hegel’s perspective), is its mystification of equality, creating an 'illusory community of equals' (p.130). Drawing on this Marxist notion, the BR historicized the state and thus relativized the bourgeois morality (including the prejudice against violence). However, if the initial analysis of the BR followed Marx quite closely, the perspective of “what was to be done” for the BR revealed an important influence of Lenin and Mao. The group took from Lenin the idea of the advanced guard and from Mao the specific approach to the armed struggle: guerrilla warfare.

After the experience of the Paris Commune in 1871 Marx and Engels reformulated their understanding of the state in relation to revolutionary objectives: in so far as the state existed would be there to suppress people. For this reason it had been smashed. This was the preliminary condition of every revolution because to transform the state, many Marxists argued, the working class had to seize control of the state but not to reproduce it under a different class regime, but to make it withering away. Lenin interpreted this to mean that the working class had to take over the state and used it to advance the cause of socialism, in a dictatorship of the proletariat (over the bourgeoisie). His strategy was plain: 'by educating a workers' party,
Marxism educates an advance-guard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and of leading the whole community to Socialism' (Lenin, 1960, p.170).

While the capitalists need a state to maintain class rule, the workers need one precisely to end it. Since any state only exists for the suppression of one class by another, the workers state would represent the rule of the majority over the minority, just as bourgeois democracy is the rule of the minority over the majority. Lenin believed that once state power had been seized, the cadre could decentralize power into a system of Soviets, which would be drawn up along radically democratic lines. Taking cue in part from Marx's conception of alienation in part, the lack of social management of work, the Soviets could begin to transform the type and relations of property to favor the working class.

In relation to the ideological critique of the state, the BR (1972, p.1) explained the reasons behind the “armed struggle” claiming that “the proletariat do not have the state, they are subjected by it” thus constructing a normative binary opposition between the value of the social movement against the state, as a violently crystallized state of things. The highly loaded binary opposition between “movement” and “state” reflected the embracement by the BR of the Marxian and Marxist critique of the state. The BR in the “Second Self Interview” (1973, p.3) say that “The experience of the class struggle taught the group that only way to succeed is to violently defeat the state and this is not an opinion, is Marxist law.” Exemplary is the witness of one of the members of the BR:

“I consider democracy a mere formality, a simple legalistic for the system, with traditional political parties, starting with the PCI as co-manager of power, being responsible for the capitalistic crisis and the attempts to resolve it by drastic restructuring. At the time I thought there was no longer any room for unarmed opposition. I was normal for me to think that the class with the state and the Christian Democrats was a
According to Dini and Manconi, (1980), the BR adopted a politically essentialist approach to class struggle. As Bongiovanni observes (1981, p.97) according to Marx “the counter revolution should be never hypostatized as a direct confrontation between two poles, revolution vs. counter revolution  because the two processes are distinguished according to which the proletarian revolution has a social character, whereas the bourgeois counter revolution has a political character. Instead, for the BR, creating a counter-power meant to constitute a force countering the bourgeois power at the political level.

In “Imperialism and Proletariat Internationalism” (in Soccorso Rosso, 1978, p.1) the BR posed for itself two important objectives: “disarticulate the state” and form a proletariat state from “organization of the multiple level of consciousness inside the complex and dis-homogenous reality of the movement.” In the same document, the BR revealed another interesting facet: they state the “general law” of the metropolitan revolutionary war is compartmentalization (both vertical and horizontal). In other words the confrontation with the state inside the cities lead the BR to reproduce one of the most important source of alienation of the worker: a strict division of the labor” “we need to avoid that everybody know everybody, each should know only what concerns his/her job.”

In respect to that vision, the BR could not elaborate as far as Lenin did because the objective conditions of the Italian society did not allow to see any further than only envisioning the conditions of possibility for a revolutionary insurrections, as they claimed in the first political document: they were the embryo of guerrilla, not its development. But it was not just a problem of “stages” of the class struggle, it was also a question of an approach that appeared following
Lenin and Mao on the one hand but, in its deeper implications, was something different and was connected again to how the BR understood its confrontation with the Italian State.

**Guerrilla Warfare or Idealization of the Absolute War?**

Franceschini, one of the founders of the BR, interviewed by Zavoli (1991) stated that the BR were inspired by what Mao did in China during the Cultural Revolution as the most effective example of asymmetric warfare, guerrilla. However, the Italian state, the element that inside the BR’s texts competed for protagonism with the proletariat, was an idealized enemy in the same way Clausewitz (1976) talked about the “absolute enemy.” The same ambiguity that characterized the gaze of media on the BR, based on the tension between attraction and repulsion, newsworthiness and moral sanction, also marked the way the BR regarded the Italian state: the object of both *Eros* and *Thánatos*.

While in the form, jargon and the explicit quotes of the BR made reference to classic text of asymmetric warfare such as Lenin’s *Partisan Warfare* (1990) and Mao’s *Guerrilla Warfare* (1978), the way the BR represented its clash against the state, as Dini and Manconi states (1980), seems to suggest that the state was perceived as the absolute enemy in inter-state war, in other words, a romanticized but conventional enemy. According to Clausewitz, what makes a war “absolute” is the unconstrained (by political, moral mediations or limited in time and space) confrontation between two states that reaches its logical extremes. However, the asymmetrical warfare between the BR and the Italian state never really met the definitional criteria of a war between states: a war which is “waged between states, between regular state armies, and between
sovereign bearers of a jus belli, who also in war respected each other as enemies, and did not discriminate against each other as criminals” (Schmitt, 2002, p.9).

In its ideologically informed rhetoric, the strategic choice of engaging the state by guerrilla was explicitly recognized by the BR. However, whereas in Mao Tse-Tung the mobilization of the masses was an a-priori condition for the guerrilla warfare, “because guerilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation” (1978, p.41) for the BR, the masses represented a far aspiration, an intellectual inference or deduction. The BR was in part aware of this problem: “it is therefore necessary to pay the utmost attention so that he BR do not tend to constitute themselves as the “military wings of the masses,” [so that] they do not substitute themselves for them [the masses]” (Brigate Rosse, 1971, p.2). But in the end, it did not prevent to fulfill its negative prophecy. Thus, as I will address in the conclusions, a revolution without masses produced by the bureaucratically centralist” position of the BR (Manconi and Dini, 1980) was in the end, a passive revolution, a top down process.

To sum up, the BR conceptualized the revolution as a politically driven process in which the representation and the bureaucratic leadership of the advanced guard de facto, replaced the social base of the revolutionary process: the masses.(as opposed to a social/ popular one). The BR, to put in Mao’s words (1978, p.1), imagined the confrontation between classes in terms of “states rather than nations.”

3.3 The discourse of the arms: State of Necessity VS. Necessity of the State

“We would be deceiving both ourselves and the people if we concealed from the masses the necessity of a desperate, bloody war of extermination, the immediate task of the coming revolutionary action.” (Lenin, The Lesson of the Moscow Uprising, 1966).
One of the most distinctive characteristic of the BR as radical group in its maturity was not the adoption of political violence per se but the way violence was rationalized. Many groups during 1970s in Italy recurred to violence (the NAR, XXII of October, National Vanguard, New Order, Prima Linea) but most of the times it was defensive kind against state repression. Compared to that, an already step further was the pedagogical use of violence of groups such as Prima Linea and the “young” BR which aimed at the so called “armed propaganda.” Exemplary of the mostly demonstrative use of violence was the slogan appearing in the first communiqués during the period 1970-72: “hit one to educate hundreds.” But then, what made the BR exceptional was the so called “qualitative development“of the armed struggled of the following years. No other group celebrated and produced such an articulated “discourse of the arms“ as the Red Brigades. In this section I reflect on the significance of political violence for the BR.

According to Tarrow (1998), there is something systemic in the adoption of political violence by radical groups, he defined such phenomena as “protest cycles:” as a phase of “heightened conflict across the social system,” with ”intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution“ (p.2). However if the cyclical openings in political opportunity create incentives for collective action this does not completely explain the “armed struggle” option. In the specific case of the decision for the group to move from “violence on property” to “violence on people” represented a consequence of a necessary tactical shift to move the “battleground” outside the factory. It is in such a sense of necessity that I see the biggest incentive to the adoption of political violence:

“[…]the forces of the counter revolution tend to shift the main contradictions outside the factory. One must respond to strategic encircling of the workers’ struggle by extending the revolutionary initiative to the vital centers of the state; this is not a voluntary choice,
but an indispensable choice to maintain the offensive in the factory too” (Brigate Rosse, 1974).

Calabrese (2010, p.111) claims that political violence is, by design and by default, a set of signifying practices involving elaborate cultural codes serving as illustration for the “discourse of theory of political violence.” The importance of violence as a political instrument in its own right seems confirmed by “militant” thinkers such as Clausewitz (1976, p.56) claiming that “War is merely the continuation of politics by other means,” Marx (1971) affirming that in some form or another violence is ineluctably present in human affairs, Lenin famously stating that “you cannot make an omelet without breaking the eggs” and Mao (1938) arguing that “political power grows out of barrel of gun.”

However, whereas, many would subscribe in considering violence as a continuation of the political intercourse, violence has never been traditionally treated as an end in itself but as a means that must be utilized to attain legitimate enough goals. The fact that violence as a political tool cannot be used unconditionally becomes especially clear if one considers its incompatibility with two of the most important political concepts of modern political life: the state and the civil society.

In fact, state and civil society represent two distinct projects of modern pacification of social life. On the one hand, behind the concepts such as “civitas” “burgerliche” “Gessellschaft” reside the goal of overcoming the state of incivility, i.e. violence. As Keane observes (1996) civilization “was normally understood as a project charged with resolving the permanent problem of discharging, defusing, sublimating violence: incivility was the permanent enemy of civil society (p.16). On the other hand, one finds Hobbes’ model of the state which is supposed to replace the state of nature of “Bellum omnium contra omnes” the war of all against
all. According to Hobbes, the state is the result of the rational decision of people to enter a social contract, giving up some of their liberties in order to enjoy peace.

However, both projects have historically proven to not be completely successful because for instance in the civil society project, internal forces such as the market by its Shumpeterian “destructive constriction” and “constructive destruction” produces the conditions for the resurgence of violence (e.g. crime, sense of injustice, class struggle). On the other hand, in the state civility project, the social contract between the state and the citizens presents higher costs than the partial giving up of liberties Hobbes talked about: the state requires violence and coercion to function both in its “state of law” and its “state of emergency.”

The failure of those two civility projects (Keane, 1996) may explain the reason why several leading intellectuals of the of the twentieth century, including Sartre (1976), Arendt (1969), Fanon (1963), considered the use of violence as appropriate and legitimate in determinate circumstances. One of the most famous modern treatments of the concept of violence comes from Arendt (1969) who notes that most scholars and intellectuals see violence as a manifestation of power but violence is the recourse of who cannot exercise power because power always involves a level of consent of the governed.

While violence as a means always needs to be justified in relation to the ends it serves, power is an end of itself, requiring no justification but legitimacy, since power is inherent in the very existence of political communities. Therefore legitimacy of power is the past, form the original human act of forming societies, where the justification of violence is in the future of the end thus the further the future less justify plausible is the justification. For this reason Arendt conceived violence as a means that should be used only for extremely limited amount of time before the means could overwhelm the ends.
Compared to Arendt, much closer to the position on violence of the BR were Fanon and Sartre who spoke from a Marxist point of view. Fanon (1964), in his analysis of the process of decolonization of Algeria, considers violence necessary for several reasons. Firstly, “decolonization is always a violent phenomenon” (p.99) because violence is needed to liberate the territory and liberate consciousness of the colonized from the condition of the alienation (p.102). Furthermore, in such a cathartic moment, the colonized finds an important opportunity to bond as a nation: “individualism is the first [value] to disappear […] the practice of violence binds men together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upward” (p.93).

Sartre is equally rather explicit and persuaded of the circumstantial legitimacy of violence. In the Preface of Fanon’s “The Wretched of the Earth”(1964), he claims that “Sons of violence, at every instant they draw their humanity from it.” According to Santoni (2003) Sartre’s reasoning was that if nonviolence against oppression equaled passivity, and passivity in this historical context places one in the “ranks of the oppressors” then counter-violence against the oppressors is morally justified as well as liberating and humanizing. In the same essay, Sartre outlined four criteria for assessing whether terrorist violence can be excused: similarly to Arendt Sartre states that terror must not become a system itself but remain a provisional expedient; secondly terror must not become an “ideology of terror” and a ‘morality of suspicion’ must be avoided; thirdly terror must be used only when necessary; finally terror is acceptable only if ‘it issues from the people.

State of Necessity and the Necessity of the State

In many interviews the ex BR gave during the years (e.g. Zavoli, 1991) confirmed how important figures such as Fanon and Sartre were for their political formation. However, in the
texts in which the BR talk about violence one can also finds a distinctive approach to violence which I think is very much connected to the groups’ understanding of the Marxist concept of contradiction (see Chapter II). In the BR’s writings there is a sense of necessity equal and contrary to the one perceived in the logic of action of the state. In other words, the BR felt violence as the result of a state of necessity primarily caused by the violence, sovereignty, authoritarianism of the state, i.e. the necessity of the state. In other words if the state justifies violence for a “raison d’état”, the BR justified violence for a “raison d’être” in such a state.

On the one hand, as already mentioned, the BR regarded the principle of sovereignty of the state as being both highly arbitrary and highly inequitable. The state, symbolically opposing movement, involved accepting the permanent freezing of the world pattern of states in its current form. Then, the state represented a contradiction of history. For the BR, it was the highest exemplification of what Gramsci would have defined as “historic bloc.” To such a blockage, the BR, by adopting the armed struggle, saw posing itself in contradiction by challenging the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.” Thus, by breaking the monopoly of violence of the state the BR could realize the contradiction of the contradiction that liberated society as well as history.

From the BR’s perspective, political violence exemplified the purest action, because as Sartre (1976) would put, violence was the negation of the constraining forces of the state, i.e. the negation of the negation. Furthermore, in such an “armed praxis” the group found the reconciliation between freedom and necessity. It was a choice, existentially and morally felt and consciously adopted, and at the same time, it was also a necessity of the irreconcilable contradiction that the bourgeois (and its instrument, the state) posed to the class struggle. As Mario Moretti (2007, p.31), one of the leaders of the BR, observed “we chose the armed struggle
because every other road was closed.” But at the same time the armed struggle was not a profession or a free choice but it was a mission because the brigatista was force to violence by the circumstances (Bianconi, 2003, p.74) “it is system that imposes violence.”

Following Mao, the BR regarded the “necessity of the state” as diametrically opposed to its “state of necessity” and that could not be resolved through mere debate, or conventional politics but through struggle. In the pamphlets published in the first months of activity of the group (1970 p.75) it was claimed that “no negotiation was possible. The enemy has to be eliminated.” In the communiqués no. 8 (April, 1974, p.1) of Sossi’s kidnapping the BR would declare that they wanted all the power because “there is no possibility for cooperation. Our interests are conflicting.”

3.4 The BR’s Communicative Mode

BR’s Communicative Praxes

The contextualization so far given about the group was also meant to start (and it will continue in the next chapter) making visible the historical conditions in which communication as signifying praxis takes places both as a negation and assertion of its own circumstances of production (see chapter II).

If it is true that one of most distinctive aspect of the group was its approach to political violence, such an approach was eminently communicative. It seems almost common-sensical to think that even in the most distortive connotations given to the word ‘terrorism’ there is connected an inherent communicative mission: to produce both promises and demonstrative actions that display the concrete and materially violent alternative to the constituted order.

The display of this overwhelming feeling of fear, considered here as only one specific instance of the activity of a group engaged in asymmetric warfare against the institutions of a
state, is not only a communicative act (the display) but also of a mediated kind. The brigatist’s were just like media effect researchers which expected from a primordial act of destruction both mediation and its negation. They assumed mediation because the BR, first of all, counted on technological mediation of the means of communication in order to maximize the resonance of their acts. Secondly, they were also aware that attacking the state was an action symbolically heavily loaded because it was exactly like a patricide committed against the ‘fatherland’ (in Italian, ‘motherland’ is actually translated in patria, which comes from the Latin word pater).

At the same time, the BR meant to eliminate mediation as their plan to dis-articulate ideological mediation through a primordial act which, due to its alleged immediacy, would have an enormous communicative potential. This was certainly a fiction since the very reasons that make an act of violence a ‘spectacular’ one betrays the mediation of social and cultural values and this represent another aspect of my main argument: the allegedly immediacy of BR’s discourse of the arms was in fact mediated by hegemonic political values. Thus asymmetric warfare, as a display of the fragility of the institutions, can be considered a fundamental aspect of the BR communication. The power of such a resource, however, did not make it immune to attempts of re-signification from the media and the military industrial complex which evidently was fighting it. As a matter of fact, once the BR decided to act in the public realm they had to engage in a semiotic war against competing voices and varieties of subjects such as the media.

Two Main Types of Documents

As far as the more traditionally considered communicative acts, the BR very explicitly described their first stage of struggle as “armed propaganda.” In their first official political document, the Resolution of the Strategic Leadership of April 1975 (in www.Brigaterosse.it) they defined three main objectives of the “armed propaganda:” to make emerge contradictions

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inside the ruling political bloc, to (rhetorically) create new terrains for battleground or make visible previously unknown ones, and finally to organize the avant-garde of the working class.

The BR produced two main types of texts: one which is represented by bulletins or “comunicati” (C), emitted to comment of BR’s actions such as kidnapping or other kinds of attacks, a third party action such as commenting the policies of capital and state. The second kind of text could be defined as political: the BR switched to a self referential mode, producing documents (from 2 to 40 pages) in which they reflected on their own agency in larger perspectives (against the alleged neo-Gaullist plans of the Christian Democrats governments, the SIM, the Imperialistic State of the Multinationals). Examples of the political documents are the “self interviews” (“Intervista a se Stessi”) and the Strategic Resolutions (1974, 1975, 1978, 1980).

The substantial difference between the two kinds of communication resides in the rhetorical mode. The Comunicati were written with the situationist idea of the hic et nunc (here and now), the recording of a condition permeated by contemporary discussions, events. In most cases those bulletins were responding to those events with the sistematicity of argumented dialogue. The second kind of documents is written with more technical language, and they have very few references to name, date and places. Compared to the first kind, as I mentioned, dedicated to account for a concrete historical situation, the second did not want to be abstracted either. The tone is different, it does not have the exhortative style of the Comunicati. Certainly, as I will show, the political documents contain a remarkable amount of interesting elements in order to understand until what extent the BR activity was conceptualized in communicative terms. However, even more eloquent are the bulletins/fliers distributed in the first months of their emergence.
The experience of the BR both inaugurated in the spring 1970 sand ended during fall 1982 with the dissemination of an official communiqué. The typical comunicato was a short typed A4 sheet always having a big 5 sided star standing out. The content was consistently organized as follows: short introduction, the core of the message and then an exhortative slogan. In the comunicati the BR depict themselves as public denunciators but also as public vindicators.

Compared to the comunicati, appearance and content wise, the political documents exemplified the move from a vernacular rhetoric to an academic one. In terms of content, the political documents comprise at least three different kinds of tests: the first two, “Self-Interviews,” (1971 and 1973) “the Strategic Resolutions,” have been produced with certain regularity, especially the Resolutions which came out every 2-3 years; finally there is a significant set of heterogeneous and unique documents among which stands out “Le Venti Tesi Finali” (“The Twenty Final Thesis”) which appeared in the magazine “L’ape ed il Comunista” (n° 16-17, Ottobre-Dicembre 1980) in December 1980.

The Political documents represent the theoretical and the analytical approach of the BR but also the self-reflective one like in the Self–Interviews. Compared to the Comunicati, which always refer to a commonsensical understanding of time, always associated to specific events of specific dates, with numerals references to names and places, the political documents seem to be written having in mind the ‘structural time,’ a more abstract sense of times geared around structural changes of the society like pre-capitalism, early, contemporary capitalism and finally the phase of the Revolutions.

Another significant aspect is the need to constantly remind the reader (including themselves) of “what the BR is.” Especially the first years the question is constant. Not
accidentally, the first document, distributed in April 1971, “Many Comrades or Groups of the Revolutionary Left …” the BR respond to questions that they perceive have been formulated inside the left circle: are the BR the revolutionary army? Are they an army? What are the BR?

So far I spent a substantial part of other chapter by exploring different aspect of the BR. One question that is implicit in the perspective suggested so far is that if we grant, as Arendt argues, the violence requires legitimation, under the communicative practices of the BR’s discourse of violence this should translate in a question of audience: were the BR capable to constructing or finding an adequate audience, vast enough, to provide for the group social legitimation, understating, support? This should be considered one the most important question of my “political/immanent critique of the BR” which I will try to answer in the conclusions.

3.5 The Scholarly Representation of the BR and the Heteronomic Prejudice.

However, most of such literature tends to alienate men and women who belonged to this group from history by subsuming their experience to either a farce in the context of larger conspiration schemas or to the result of an ideological detachment from reality. If it is true, as Sartre (1976) notices, that the dialectic of freedom and determination has been frequently treated as a dualism in which alternatively one element supersedes the other, in the case of the BR, the dualism transforms almost into a monistic theory of absolute determination with mere differentiation concerned with “what” or “who” controlled the group.

One could indentify two distinct tendencies in those studies: the ones who consider the BR as subjects inserted in a plot and enacted by forces above themselves, thus inserting the phenomenon within a conspiracy theory (Bartali, 2007; Cipriani, 2002; De Lutiis, Donno, 2001; 1993; Franceschini and Fassanella, 2004; Flamigni, 1998; Katz, 1980; Meade, 1990; Pelizzaro, 1997; Sechi, 2000; Zupo and Recchia, 1984; Wagner Pacifici, 1986; Turi, 2004); and the ones who depict the BR under the privileged master narrative of ideological alienation (Della Porta, 1990; Drake, 2001; Fenzi, 1987; Franceschini, 1988; Zavoli, 1989).

The first category groups together authors who tend to depict the BR as remote-controlled by several powerful national (such as the mighty figure of Andreotti, the Christian Democrat governments, the Italian Secret Services or Licio Gelli`s secret Masonic association, the so called P2) and international (the CIA, the Israeli Secret Service Mossad or Kissinger alone) actors. Very much cited in this literature is the famous comment that Moretti (1994, p.24) reports about Mossad agents conversing with Curcio (historic leader of the BR): “for us it is

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³ One important exception is represented by Bocca (1978, 1985), a left wing journalist who tries to establish a strong link between the BR and Italian history. As Rizzo et al notice (2007, p.12), Bocca identifies five main links: catholic-communist culture dominating post WWII Italy, the Italian anarchic and revolutionary workers culture, the bureaucratization of the Italian Communist Party and the antifascist militancy during WWII.
enough that you BR exist.” The second category groups together authors who consider the BR caught within the schizophrenic tension between ideology and reality. As Franceschini (1988, p.204) puts it “they were drug addicts of a particular type of ideology. A murderous drug, worse than heroin.”

The tendencies mentioned above about the existing literature represent variations of an essentially heteronomic prejudice: the ‘conspiracyist’s take denies history of people as determined by ‘stronger others,’ falling in the end into treaties about the mystique of power; on the other hand, the “ideologists” faction, by reducing reality into ideas, produces treaties about the mystique of ideology. As I will hope to show, my treatment of the BR is characterized by a dialectical approach, in other words fighting the tendency to privilege both the heteronomic and the autonomic prejudice and to treat the BR as Lukacs treats the proletariat (1971) and Sartre (1976) treats people: as a subject and object of history.

It is time to introduce both the other three competing ideologies represented by three national newspapers and the relationship between them and the BR.

3.6 Contextualizing the 1970s Italian Press: Media, State and Capital.

In 1970s, there were two kinds of daily newspapers: a commercial press reaching out the wider reading audience; and a press that provided an overtly partisan news reporting and a public platform for internal party debates. To the first category belonged newspapers such as Il Corriere della Sera, Il Mattino, Il Messaggero, and La Stampa. To the second category belonged newspapers such as L’Unità, representing the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Il Popolo, representing the Christina Democrats (DC), L’Avanti, representing Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and La Voce Repubblicana representing the Italian Republican party (PRI). Such a system has been described as a “polarized pluralism,” being characterized by strong government

In this period, as Mazzoleni observes (1987, p.82), the partisan tendencies of newspapers heavily shaped the professional practices of journalists, who could be described “as news reporters and party ‘spokespersons.’” An important outcome of the strong party affiliation was the permeability of the press and the political field: in other words the move of journalists to high-level politicians and vice versa. Giovanni Spadolini’s career path provided a good example: from editor of *Il Corriere della Sera* to leader of the Republican Party and then to prime minister.

Such a link between political power and media was evident in the ambiguous framing of the freedom of press provided by the Italian Constitution:

> “Anyone has the right to freely express their thoughts in speech, writing, or any other form of communication. The press may not be subjected to any authorization or censorship. Seizure may be permitted only by judicial order stating the reason and only for offences expressly determined by the law on the press or in case of violation of the obligation to identify the persons responsible for such offences” (Art. 21).

As one can notice, the constitutional principle of freedom of individual expression is characterized both by “guarantism” and coercion. It guarantees that all persons have the right to express their thoughts freely; however, such a broad liberty is then constrained by forbidding the press to act against morality and it is evident that the concept of morality is flexible enough to be instrumentalized by power interests. Furthermore, under the specific circumstances of the 1970s (such as those during the legal court proceedings against members of the BR), judicial authorities may order restraints in order to prevent the press from publishing sensitive information.
The 1948 republican constitution shows the link between political power and the link between the political power and the press was already present. However, during the stagflation period of 1970s, the government started subsidizing the press which was chronically in financial trouble. Such a dependence on government assistance and favorable legislation increased the political subservience of newspaper editors. Furthermore, the journalism profession itself was molded by the political power as the government had control over albo dei giornalisti (the journalists’ professional register). Therefore, politicians could de facto decide who could and who could not become a professional journalist.

Political power was not the only influence factor though: while this period can certainly be characterized as one where the press was largely beholden to government (Lumley 1991, p.7), many of the wide-circulation newspapers were molded by industrial owners which used the media to gain access to the public political sphere. La Stampa exemplifies very eloquently such a situation: owned by FIAT industrial group and, as the owner of FIAT was appointed as the leader of Confindustria (the Italian, industrialist/employers federation) the newspaper became the strongest voice of capital.

Another distinctive feature of the Italian press was its sectarianism, as the genre of journalism that historically developed in Italy stemmed from the exclusive literary gazettes tradition. Such journalism could be characterized by a literary and inaccessible style, never concerned with explaining unfamiliar words or complex subjects. This type of journalism has traditionally specialized in interpretation, intricate commentary, and complex analysis rather than direct news reporting and detailed descriptions of events. As Lumley notices (1991), Italian journalists are experts at the so called inchiesta giornalistica, the investigative in-depth report.
Analysts of the Italian daily newspapers note the irony of highly skilled journalists who face an audience that does not read daily newspapers in significant numbers and hardly understands them. Six decades ago, Forcella (1959) wrote a very influential essay that explains eloquently the situation: *Millecinquecento Lettori* (1500 readers) argued that a journalist tried to reach 1,500 privileged readers, in other words the Italian political class made by MPs, ministers, trade-union and party representatives, and high levels of the Catholic Church. According to Forcella (1959, 512): “The rest don't count.”

Partly, a consequence of its intellectual exclusionary attitude there was also another distinctive characteristic that set apart Italian press from the rest of Western Europe: historically low levels of readership as only around 10% of the entire population reads newspapers (Mancini, 1999). In order to explain such a datum, the key word is “accessibility.” First of all, there were bureaucratic impediments preventing an effective distribution contributing to keep the sale prices of newspapers very high. Second, as I mentioned earlier, the elitist style of Italian journalism excludes the larger audience. Finally there is also a problem connected to the specific history of the Italian language which is still in the process of becoming a tongue that every Italian is comfortable with, as in many areas the local dialects still prevails.

Lumley (1996) considers the predominance of regional based over national based newspapers being connected to the lack of national language consolidation. Geopolitically, the nation does not gravitate around Rome but is decentered in regional poles such as Milan, Turin, Bologna, Naples or Bari. The presence of those poles implies that even nationwide circulating newspapers tend to reproduce regional biases: this is the case for *Il Corriere della Sera*, whose
owners have long imposed their own Milanese bias; for La Stampa, owned by the Agnelli family of Turin, Il Messaggero gravitating around Rome and, Il Mattino gravitating around Naples.

In sum the Italian press during the 1970s could be described as one strongly connected to political power, divided by ideological affiliations, lacking independence from ownership, elitist, and characterized by low readership. In the next section I will give a brief description of the three national newspaper selected. As we will be able to notice, the general characteristic of the Italian press the specific interests and ideological orientation of the three national newspapers played an important role in determining the approach the media would adopt to cover the BR.

Il Corriere della Sera

Il Corriere della Sera was at the time (actually still is) considered as one of the most well regarded newspaper in Italy and in EU. The Corriere has always been voicing the opinions of the industrial bourgeoisie from the North. It is characterized by a serious and literary style. It was founded in Milan in 1876 and the leading column of the first publication still defines rather accurately the aspiration of the daily publication: a national newspaper, reaching its audience with “mature political ideas which is not easily deceived by the political rhetoric”(1876, March 5, A1) “moderately conservative” and embodying the “liberal ideology […] which prefers to scandals and gossip, ponderate discussion.”

When, in late nineteen century, Milan experienced a rapid and social economic transformation, a new emerging class of merchants and industrials affirmed itself as leading class of the city and the nation. The Corriere was able since then to attract its intended public and channel its voice. By the turn of the century, under the leadership of Albertini the newspaper
became the most important daily publication of Italy with 150,000, 275,000 in 1911 and 600,000 in 1920) copies always increasing the number of pages, of sections diversified content. During WWI the newspaper backed up the political coalition, which wanted, to enter into war against Austria. In the so called “Third Page “ a section entirely dedicated to literary and cultural discussion the most prestigious names of the period signed the articles (Croce, Carducci, D’Annunzio, and Pirandello).

By the time the Fascist party seized power, the regime was bothered by the independence of the newspaper. There were acts of intimidations and after that senator Matteotti was killed the headquarters of the newspaper was assaulted by Fascist squads, censored and threaten to be shut down. During the twenty years of fascist rule, the newspaper consistently tried to resist the “fascistization.” After a brief suspension of the activities imposed by the National Liberation Committee in 1945, the pamphlet, managed by Mario Borsa published bold leading columns demanding the country to confront the historic reasonability of the fascist regime and to make a referendum to terminate the monarchy.

In the period after WWII and 1970 the newspaper assumed a posture of equidistance between the ruling party the DC and the opposition party, the PCI. During the 1960s, when lead by the director Alfio Russo, Il Corriere was subject to new changes, try into modernizing and compete. The political orientation can be still defined as moderate, but particularly critical of the left but not necessarily against. By the end of the 1960s, the new director Spadolini (under which the paper reaches 710,000 copies, then would become prime minister) moved the orientation of the newspaper towards center right, with the reformist left, the Socialist party but
against the entering of the Communist according the Moro-Berlinguer project of political alliance called Historic compromise.

After the bloody attempt of 1969 Piazza Fontana, the newspaper started to further form the political debate and returned to the role of “distant observatory.” Such a detachment and lack of sensibility for the social movements of 1968 and 1969 made the newspaper unpopular among the youth. Ottone, the new director, was accused to have moved to much the newspaper towards the left and for this reason quickly replaced. In 1974, the property passed from Crespi family (who owned the Corriere since 1924) to Rizzoli group, with an important share participation of Agnelli family, the owner of FIAT. In the period of our narration, because of its conservative positions and liaison with FIAT, the Corriere, became considered as one of the most important target of the BR. In June 1977, one of his most important journalist, Indro Montannelli was harmed by a shot gun, then, the reporter, Walter Tobagi, was murdered by a group associated with the BR.

La Stampa

La Stampa was founded in 1856 in Turin by journalist Vittorio Bersezio. When in 1894 the entrepreneur Frassati became co-owner. He renewed the newspaper: the new technology to press, new design and journalists. The newspaper passed from being a local publication to become a regional point of reference (from 7000 to 50000 in few years of activity). The newspaper framed itself as a liberal and overt sustainer of the entrepreneurial class. In 1915 the newspaper reached the 300.000 copies, the newspaper remained neutral as far as the intervention to WWI. Initially, La Stampa assumed an anti fascist position and for this reason was suspended in 1925. However, when the original property passed to Agnelli family (the owner of the FIAT)
the newspaper was could go back to business and moved back to line of the Fascist regime. After the war, because of its collaborationist position with Fascism the CNL suspended temporarily the newspaper. However, the Allies politically pressed the CNL to reestablish the publication which retuned by 1946 under the control of the Agnelli family.

The post WWII period between 1948 and 1968 was dominated by the figure of Giulio De Benedetti, a charismatic director who increased the popularity of the newspaper and pushed towards the national dimension. The objective of the newspaper was to conquer the workers of the FIAT (which were for the most part L’Unita readers) and pass its competitor, La Gazzetta del Popolo. De Benedetti, despite the restriction in budget created a journal in which was paying foreign reporters to write for La Stampa and other important contributors for the cultural “third page.” This allowed De Benedetti become the first newspaper in the Turin industrial pole, and one of the first in Italy with almost 400.000 copies (plus 180000 of the night edition).

During when by 1968 Rochey replaced De Benedetti and the newspaper continued its tradition of following a kind of Anglo-Saxon journalism concentrated on facts rather than opinions. In its effort to remain outside the political debate between the two major parties the DC and PCI, La Stampa represented more the interest of the big industrials of the North West. And, in to de-provincialize the audience of its newspaper, under Ronchey the newspaper started concentrating more on economic facts and geopolitical happening in the North Atlantic area.

During the early 1970s, when Il Corriere della Sera temporally moved to the left, La Stampa consolidated its representation of the moderate right electorate. In 1977, La Stampa was
victim of violent attack by BR as 16 of November, Carlo Casalegno was murdered by the group for its “pro regime” articles.

*L’Unita*

*L’Unità* was founded by Antonio Gramsci on 12 February 1924, as the *newspaper of workers and peasants*, the official newspaper of Italian Communist Party (PCI) and remained such until the dissolution of the PCI in 1991. Gramsci wanted a Communist daily publication independent from the directive of the PCI. It was printed in Milan with a circulation of 20,000 to 30,000 and reached 34000 copies just prior to Matteotti MP murder. On 8 November 1925, the publications were temporarily blocked by the fascist and then completely suppressed. A clandestine edition was resumed in France on the first day of 1927, with irregular circulation in Milan, Turin, Rome, and in France. In 1942 the publication of the newspaper secretly returns in Italy. Publication was officially resumed after the Allied conquest of Rome on 6 June 1944, the new editor-in-chief being Celeste Negarville.

After the liberation from the German occupation, in 1945, new local editions were started in Milan, Genoa and Turin. The newspaper's contributors included the major name of the Europeans left intelligentsia Davide Layolo, Luigi Cavallo, Ada Gobetti Cesare Pavese, Italo Calvino, Alfonso Gatto, Elio Vittorini, Aldo Tortorella and Paolo Spriano. In the same year the Festa del' Unità was launched in most Italian cities. The newspaper, during the days of celebration of the April 25th and May 1st that reached the 1 million copies sold.

In 1969, because of their position about the youth movements the journalist Magri, Pintor and Rossanda were expelled from the party and would found the other Communist newspaper, Il
Manifesto. In 1974 daily circulation of *L’Unitá* amounted to 239,000 copies, but this number dropped considerably starting from early 1980s, mostly from the competition with the new, left-oriented, *La Repubblica*: the 100 million copies sold in 1981 decreased to 60 million, in 1982. During the “years of lead” *L’Unità* receives several intimidations form left radical group, included the BR. The BR blamed the newspaper to reflect the reformist and DC collaborationist position of the PCI. During the Aldo Moro kidnapping the newspaper would make extremely explicit both social liberal position and the opposition to the BR.

3.7 The BR and the Media: The Dilemma of the Discourse of Violence

In the existing literature, the relationship between media and political violence of radical groups tends to be depicted in an asymmetric fashion by focusing on “how media cover or represent “political violence” in other words considering that only as subject matter ready to be rendered by media (Gitlin, 1980; Bassiouni, 1983; Midgley and Rice, 1984; Alali and Eke, 1991; Alexander and Picard, 1991, Paletz and Schmid, 1992, Chitty et al. 2003; Hess and Kalb, 2003; Jenkins, 2003; Norris et al. 2003). In contrast to that, this work will examine the BR and three Italian national newspapers as peer perspectives working at the same level of rhetorical rivalry, competing to frame occurring events according to their political and ideological agendas.

Gitlin, talking about the relationship between the New Left and American media, argued that “In a floodlit society, it becomes extremely difficult, perhaps unimaginable, for an opposition movement to define itself and its worldview” (1980, p.3). The description of the author can be considered as good starting point to assess the relationship between BR and the media. However, such a description can only partially apply to the Italian case, in which the media and the BR came to establish a more dialectical relationship. On the one hand, there was a
symbiotic and opportunistic relationship between the two, because if mainstream media constituted the biggest amplifying factor for the BR, the BR constituted a newsworthy subject for newspapers by systematically providing material for filling the front page. On the other hand, as Laquer (1978) observes, it was also true that the media served as the most important distorting agent, preventing civil society from being more permeable to BR’s ‘armed propaganda.” Additionally, the tendency by the media to sensationalize BR’s activity created a historic deontological crisis of consciousness among journalists (Mastromatteo, 2007).

Such a situation certainly produced for radical groups such as the BR a fundamental and inescapable dilemma for their communicative strategies: because if the BR stood outside the dominant realm of discourse, its message would have been consigned to marginality and political irrelevance; if, on the other hand, they decided to seek coverage from mainstream media they ran the risk to have their content either distorted, manipulated or, as in the case of the American New Left described by Gitlin, domesticated and defused. In the case of the BR, considering the repulsion that media showed for the challenging acts performed by the group, the problem was not domestication but rather distortion and misunderstanding.

Indeed, the BR chose to deal with mass media and this produced specific kinds of mediation linked to the politico economy process behind news. The news value of “novelty” synthesizes much of the way the social time and space of the BR was manipulated: every time some news on the BR was produced, the event tended to be represented as novel, so no connection with history was possible; it was episodic, so no explanation in relation to the socials structure was possible; finally in its interruption of the eternal present of media news, the vent
needed by definition to be depicted as negative. BR’s experience came to be manipulated by the logic, the aesthetic and the pace of time of news production.

As Debord (1970) observes, media have contributed to replace social life with its representation in which “the commodity completes its colonization of social life” (p.42). Such a process of commodification meant in the case of the BR a colonization of its time and space which was rendered into compartmentalized episodes, disjoint from one another and reshaped according to criteria of newsworthiness. Thus, the configuration of time and space within news production implied the breaking up of the history of the BR into compartmentalized units of time impeding both the reconnection of the given new story with the larger pictures and the connections to other events. Thus, paradoxically enough, the mediation of mass media created an immediate image of the BR dictated by criteria of newsworthiness.

In the specific case of the BR, media also tended to construct a dominant narrative about the group. In the first case selected for our analysis (chapter V) – the kidnapping of Judge Mario Sossi in 1974 – represented a transition between two mediated approaches concerning the BR (Mastromatteo, 2007): from viewing the BR as the “phantomatic,” the “self styled,” the “professed” communist Red Brigades who are “characters of fairy tales for children” (“Il Giorno”, 2/23/1975), to later viewing the group as “lucid,” “ruthless,” “military super-organized,” “professional,” and “cold blooded.” This particular episode serves as a first useful example of the situation of competing rhetorics which confronted each other directly, on the same topic, and at the same time. This occurred only when the media considered the BR’s actions to be grave enough, to be newsworthy enough, to deserve consistent coverage, as it appeared following the case of the kidnapping of Judge Mario Sossi and, later on, during the Moro kidnapping in 1978.
The most important variable for such an important shift in media coverage was the BR progressive militarization and accruing of violence as after the kidnapping of Sossi the BR started using more consistently weapons to harm and to kill. As we shall see in the next chapter, the BR in 1978 had made a “quality leap” (as they used to say) in terms of military operations, the political relevance of their targets, and finally the determination in ‘bringing justice’ to those targets. Moro’s kidnapping will exemplify such a ‘qualitative leap’: the BR were able to capture an ex Prime Minister, the leader of the ruling party, DC, and the author of the hegemonic historic bloc called “Historic Compromise,” which incorporated the PCI in the governing alliance.

As we mentioned, during the capture of Moro, the national media system was so impacted by the success of the BR’s military ambush that they started looking at them with a magnifying lens: a very limited number of BR members seemed then an entire army ready to strike against the country. Furthermore, the media experienced the surfacing of an internal deontological debate concerned with whether to give or not coverage to the BR. The media scholar M. McLuhan suggested then to “pull out the plugs of media coverage.” Some media followed the suggestion, others continued covering justifying themselves in the name of freedom of press.

Such a consciousness debate among journalist was also caused by the objectively difficult position of reporters covering terrorism, caught between different exigencies: competing ideologies, editorial lines, and the will to understand but also to sensationalize. Exemplary in this sense was the experience of the journalist of Espresso magazine Mario Scajola, who specialized in reporting terrorism: he was both inside the BR list of journalists that had to be punished and under the investigation of the police for alleged complicities with the
same armed group. Because of this dangerous exposure many journalists, as we shall see, wrote articles anonymously or using pseudonym or initials.

If the three national newspapers represent rhetorics in competition, I think we need to also to briefly address their compound set of motivations: trying to define at the same time their distinct point if view, as we have seen, but also addressing the more general question of the Italian social order. From this point of view, media were also contributing to establish a hegemonic

*Media as ISA*

As mentioned in chapter II, hegemony, understood in Gramscian terms, concerns the combination of force can consent exerted by the state and, in any given time, one of two components might feature more predominantly. In contemporary capitalist countries force, violence and coercion must be considered as the least efficient resort because it diminished the capability of mediating conflict between social classes and gain support form all. In this sense, cultural agencies such as mass media legitimate the social order in the consciousness and in the actions of the ruled. As the analysis will display rather clearly, in this study media are assumed operating under a logic that could be compared to the Ideological State Apparati conceived by Althusser.

According to Althusser (1971), societal control is exerted through repression, Repressive State Apparati (RSA), and through Ideology, Ideological State Apparati, and (ISA). Ideology for Althusser represents “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1998, p.303). Media as ISA transform human beings into subjects, leading them to see themselves as self-determining agents when ideological processes in fact shape them.
For Althusser, individuals do not realize their subjection, believing that they freely form or recognize ideas and participate in ritual practices in order to “act according to their ideas” (Althusser, 1998; p.297). They are recruited by hailing of particular ideologies which interpellates one like “common everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’” (p.301).

Under this view, the operation of media as ISA work as recruiting viewers for a certain ideology, just like the PCI for the L’Unita, of moderate liberals for Il Corriere della Sera, but also, under certain historic circumstances, the level of diversity of the ideologies is only superficial as they stem from the same hegemonic ground. The hegemony in question is that of the state, that people are normalized into “subjects” civil society institutions in order to conform to the ideological and material needs of the dominant state structure. In sum, by combining this perspective with the distinction I made in Chapter II between Hegemony and ideology, I consider media being involved in two signifying enterprises: one connected to the specific ideological positions those newspapers hold but also addressing with consistently an existing hegemonic order.

Media and the BR: The Bourgeois Public Sphere and Proletarian Public Sphere

As I have already suggested and will show in my analysis how, I tend to consider the positions represented by media as a representative of several opposing internal positions taken by an entire societies. The reason for such an assumption derives from an understating of media as one of the many manifestations of a much more expansive understanding of the bourgeois public sphere. Negt and Kluge (1972) considered the public sphere as central organizer of human experience, mediating between the changing forms of capitalist production on the one hand and the cultural organization of human experience on the other. In their response to Habermas and
the social movements of the late 1960s, the two authors also provide a useful conceptualization to understand the relationship of the BR and the mainstreams media in more dialectical way.

According to the authors, the bourgeois public sphere aspires to become a totalitarian experience of the social which is contrasted by the proletarian public sphere. The authors claim that the proletarian public sphere, could potentially oppose the organized interests of the bourgeois public sphere by providing the foundation for the potential formation of class consciousness. According to Fuchs (1996) the critical function of a proletarian public sphere is to contribute intellectual means to class struggles, as an expression of the degree of emancipation of the working class (Negt and Kluge, 1972, p.66).

However, the capability of the proletarian public sphere to counteract the bourgeois one must be seen in dialectical terms because the proletariat public sphere, as much as the proletarian class in relation to the bourgeois class, finds its conditions of existence in its counterpart. At the same time, the proletarian public sphere can produce class consciousness and this new mediation of the social experience only in so far as it can emancipate from the other in terms of sociological and political imagination. Thus, the bourgeois and proletarian public spheres are mutually defining: the proletarian public sphere carries the "left-overs" from the bourgeois public sphere, while the bourgeois public is based upon the productive forces of the underlying resentment:

"In this respect, they " [i.e. the proletarian public spheres] " have two characteristics: in their defensive attitude toward society, their conservatism, and their sub-cultural character, they are once again mere objects; but they are, at the same time, the block of real life that goes against the valorization interest. As long as capital is dependent on living labor as a source of wealth, this element of the proletarian context of living cannot be extinguished through repression” (p.99).
The question then, assumes again, a communicative flavor: how could the BR assert the proletarian public sphere, by creating a new language, new grammar of motives, a new Weltanschauung without dialectically incorporating aspect of the dominant opposing culture?

CHAPTER IV

AN ITALIAN NARRATIVE (1943-80)

“In the middle of the journey of our life I found myself in a dark wood, for the straightway was lost.” (Alighieri, 1991 p.1)

In this chapter I will provide a social historical contextualization for Italy, paying particular attention to events that would mark the story recounted by the BR. I will try to insert the experience of the group within the long durée historical processes associated to two interconnected incomplete projects: the Risorgimento as incomplete creation of the Italian nation state and the attainment of hegemony by the bourgeois class.

In section 4.1, I will draw on Gramsci (1971) in order to provide a theoretical framework that starts from the Risorgimento, and cuts across through the post WWI revolutionary attempts of Biennio Rosso, the Fascist experience, the partisan Resistance, the post war period and finally reaches the emergence of social movements of 1960s and 1970s. In section 4.2 I will describe the post War settlement period, with an examination of the most pressing issues, the activity of national unity governments (the transitional common effort of political parties) and the early 1950s social protests. In section 4.3, I will talk about the so called “economic miracle,” particularly stressing its unbalances and the failure of the bourgeois class to achieve hegemony.
and its impact on the society and the characterization of the Italian state as relatively autonomous to capital. In section 4.4, I will describe the collective Action of 1960s-70s. I will claim that the experience of dissent and protests of those years represents another dialectical product of the lack of a hegemonic class. In section 4.5, I will account for the so called "Historic Compromise" as the most serious attempt of the ruling class to create an historic bloc. Finally, in section 4.6 I will recapitulate and advance some considerations concerning the conclusion of the experience of the BR in early 1980s.

4.1 The Incomplete Project of Risorgimento and the Structural Weakness of the Italian State

In this section, I briefly summarize the Gramscian argument about the incomplete Italian project of modernity represented by failure of Risorgimento. I will then I show how the same historical interpretation can be applied to the period considered in this chapter especially providing a reading for the attempts to create a hegemonic based "national popular will" in the so called Biennio Rosso (1918-20), Fascism (1926-44), the Resistance (1943-45), the economic boom (1958-163) and the social moments of late 1960s (1967-69).

According to Gramsci’s reflection in the Prison Notebooks (here and after SPN, 1971), drawing on Sorel’s concept of myth and The Prince of Machiavelli, the emergence of modern nation-states in Europe represented the result of a popular revolution that provided common myths and the conditions for national unity under the leadership of the bourgeois class hegemony. Gramsci explains how, compared to examples such as the Glorious Revolution in UK or the French Revolution in France, Italy represented an anomaly because missed its own chance of creating a national popular dimension under the intellectual and moral leadership of a class.
For Gramsci, there are two main preconditions for the emergence of a national-popular collective will. Firstly, it needs to have the greatest social base, formed by both proletariat and peasantry since “any formation of a national-popular collective will is impossible, unless the great mass of peasant farmers bursts simultaneously into political life” (SPN p.125). Secondly, the participation of the masses had to be coupled with “Jacobin force,” the coercive dimensions that facilitate the task of creating out of heterogeneous masses a homogenous bloc (SPN, p.229).

In the Italian case, the Risorgimento lacked both conditions “because great masses, previously passive, entered into movement – but into a chaotic and disorganized movement, without leadership, i.e. without any precise collective political will,” secondly, “because the middle classes, who during the war held positions of command and responsibility, when peace came were deprived of these and left unemployed” (SPN, pp. 228-29). In Italy, the Jacobin coercion would have play an important role in order to win the traditional apoliticism and passivity of the great popular masses. From such a perspective, then the Risorgimento represented a “passive revolution” because did not succeed in involving the masses and created instead the basis for internal contradictions which played an important role in impeding the consolidation of an Italian national identity and sense of unity (Brierley and Giacometti, 1996, p. 172).

The idea of passive revolution exemplifies for Gramsci the incomplete dialectic between the two main competing views on Risorgimento, represented by Cavour on one side and Mazzini/Garibaldi on the other. Gramsci explains that

"the theoreticians of 'passive revolution or revolution/restoration'...expressed in practice the necessity for the 'thesis' to achieve its full development, up to the point where it
would even succeed in incorporating a part of the antithesis itself -- in order, that is, not to allow itself to be 'transcended' in the dialectical opposition” (SPN, 109-110).

Thus passive revolution meant the contradiction between revolutionary and restoration elements of Risorgimento which, instead of resolving in hegemony, ergo the combination of Jacobin-force and national-popular/consent, resulted in outweighing of domination over consent and leadership.

Such a lack of hegemony meant for Italy an always compromised possibility of a compact social and political bloc so that the newly founded Italian state was crippled since its inauguration by an extremely restricted hegemonic base. Accordingly, rather than the exerting hegemony of a whole class over the rest of society, the moderates represented by Cavour could only lead only a part of a class over the rest of that class (SPN, 104) and such a weak political unity was “both a result and a cause of a weak economic transformation of society “(SPN p. 116). This was an example of the corporativist attitude of the ruling class.

Another powerful example is provided by the historical account by Lampedusa in Leopard (1964) which offers an eloquent depiction of the attitude of the bourgeois class attitude during the Italian unification. The reign of Piedmont, one conquered the South, starts a process of massive land expropriation, which consisted on estates taken away from the local nobility and ecclesiasts who were never able to efficiently exploit their assets under the latifundium economic regime. But the absenteeism of the southern nobility, as Lampedusa notices, was replaced by the appropriation of the land by the emerging class of lawyers, accouters, small medium merchants who wanted the land not to produce but only to carry out speculative operations which evidently did not affected the property relations for the peasants.
As Chiochi stated (1997), the Italian bourgeois class has always been a speculative agent rather than a productive agent. Thanks to the process of unification of Italy, the Italian bourgeois was able to financially benefit from the historic event but without involving any other class. Once again, the class acted as a corporation driven by particularistic interests. Thus in the end, the Italian “liberal revolution” liberated lands but restored property relations and social relations.

But for Gramsci, the failure of the ruling class comprised much more than an economist explanation because another great limitation of its hegemonic project was its incapability to incorporate in their project the intellectual and literary elite. As Veneziani (1994, p. 8) remarks, Italian intellectuals were idealist and cosmopolitan in their attitudes and promoted the Risorgimento as a counter-reform re-discovering tradition through change, linking revolution with restoration. The ruling class failed in transforming such a traditional intelligentsia into an organic one to its cause, thus instead of elaborating an ideology functional to the interests of the bourgeoisie the intellectuals *de facto* preventing the development of a strong national bourgeois class and the spreading of a secular and scientific ideology, as happened in the rest of western Europe.

Furthermore, such a division between the producing class and the intellectuals perpetuated the existence of a literary culture and popular culture fragmented into regional habits and dialects. This duality impeded the spreading of a common Italian vernacular culture which would allow for the linguistic and cultural homogenization of the rural population and could compensate for the absence of a romantic nationalist movement in Italy in the nineteenth
century. Eventually, Italian identity remained confined at the legal and idealist level and still remains.4

In conclusion, the unification process was experienced by a large part of the population, both the working class of the north and the southern peasants, as a civil war, or as a war for the conquest of the central and southern parts of Italy by the Piedmont region, certainly not a for national liberation (Duggan 1994, p. 133). The opposite interests of the northern bourgeoisie and the southern landowners prevented the new state from tackling effectively its main social problems such as the low level of literacy, poor transport and communications and land reform and inculcating a national consciousness to the masses (Brierley and Giacometti, 1996, p. 174). Those issues, as we shall see, would become determinant for the future of the country, emerging more or less explicitly in every significant Italian historical event as similar dynamic would dialectically develop throughout time.

As a matter of fact, in Gramsci’s view, the lacunas of Risorgimento created the fundamental conditions for the failure of revolutionary attempts that took place in the aftermath of WWI, the two years known as Biennio Rosso (The Two Red Years of 1918-1920), and for the emergence of Fascism. In the two years following the “Great War,” in a context of economic crisis, high unemployment and political instability, Northern Italy experienced an intense period of mass strikes, worker manifestations as well as self-management experiments through land and factories occupations. As Laclau (1972) explained it, Italy experienced a genuinely

4 Lega Lombarda as social and cultural phenomenon should be read under this perspective. More generally, a clear element of such an incomplete creation of a nation state was regionalism both as a political-administrative reality and as a civic tradition including cultural and linguistic traits. The division between North and South is not a mere matter of geography that can be attributed to environmental differences or to supposed ethno-biological features which distinguish northern from southern Italians. The origins of this division lie in the past, in the different economic, social and political experiences that each region has had (Putnam, 1993; Diamanti 1999).
revolutionary crisis as earlier modes of dominance dissolved in the wake of World War I, but the crisis could not be understood in conventional Marxist terms. The working class of Northern Italy regarded itself as the realized of the uncompleted task of Risorgimento. However, the proletariat, as the bourgeois class during the Risorgimento, had proven too sectarian, too corporatist to translate its interests in the wider national concerns and aspirations and the revolutionary momentum failed in expanding in the rest of the country.

Again, dialectic operates in Gramsci’s interpretation of Italian history: the incomplete realization of Biennio Rosso contributed to explain Fascism which is regarded as its dialectic product. It was in many ways the abandoning of the potential national popular dimension of the proletariat during 1918-19 period that for Gramsci made possible the reactionary emergence of Fascism. Fascism represented one way to articulate the popular interpellation into political discourse initiated by the post WWI period one way in which the bourgeoisie reacted against the fears of revolution by producing regime capable of repressing the working class. In this sense, David (2011) and Morgan (2003) observe how fascism was not some revolt against modernity but the quest for an alternative modernity a way to constitute the Italian nation.

Fascism, like Risorgimento and Biennio Rosso before, represented the frustrated corporatist attempts of a class to exert hegemony on the whole society. Gramsci explains that in Fascism in fact "there is a passive revolution involved in the fact that -- through the legislative intervention of the State, and by means of the corporative organization -- relatively far reaching modifications are being introduced into the country's economic structure in order to accentuate the 'plan of production' element; in other words, that socialization and co-operation in the sphere of production are being increased, without however touching...individual and group appropriation of profit.' " (Gramsci, SPN: 119-120). As Gramsci saw it, corporativism was a kind
of halfway house, typical of passive revolution. It was as far as Italy could go in departing from liberalism toward more advanced economic, political and cultural forms without some destructive cataclysm. Through corporativism, fascism aimed to intensify the socialization and cooperation of production but only in a mild way, limited to regulating profit.

To sum up, so far I provided a general Gramscian analyst that identifies a file rouge in the Italian history departing from the Risorgimento and meeting several key moments of the twenty century all originating from the structural weakness of the Italian state which derives from an incomplete process of constitution of the national popular and the failure of the bourgeois class to emancipate through corporativism and extend its hegemony to the rest of the society. The rest of the chapter will represent my attempt to further the Gramscian analysis to the second part of the century, the most immediate historical context in which the BR emerged and operated.

4.2 Exiting Fascism: The contested ground of Collective Memory

The events in the late summer 1943 frantically followed one another as history could suddenly accelerate. The 23 of July the Allies landed on Sicily. Two days later Mussolini was arrested. After 45 days of chaotic institutional vacuum (which the historians are still not completely able to fill), the 8 of September Marshal Badoglio called for the Armistice and thus leading (a part of) Italy out the war. The 12 of September, Mussolini was liberated by a Nazi team and established the Italian Social Republic (also known as the Republic of Salo), a puppet state providing a veil of legality to the Nazi occupation of Italy.

By the time of the constitution of the Italian Social Republic, Italy was cut in two: Salo Republic in the North, and the Allied in the South. There were also three different governments:
The Salo Republic, the Kingdom of the South (formed by the King of Italy exiled in the South) and the National Committee of the Liberation of Upper Italy (CNLAI) formed by the Resistenza the day after the Armistice. If it is true that Fascism in its first stage possessed a significant social base (DeFelice, 1977), it is also equally true that Mussolini’s political movement had since its constitution faced a significant opposition though promptly repressed. However, as soon as the regime started showing signs of weakening, the diverse and scattered collective of anti-fascists managed to compact itself and get armed: brigades of partisans formed in the center-northern sector of the country.

Dondi (2007, p.232) claims that the Resistenza was characterized by three phases: “the initial phase of improvised rebellion; that of the summer of 1944, which marked the start of a process of institutionalization; and the final phase of insurrection against the Nazi–Fascists. When the Committee for National Liberation (CNLAI) established itself in September 1943, the “Resistenza” counted with less than 9000 members, however, the number was destined to sharply rise as the confrontation against the Nazi/fascist intensified: 30.000 in Spring 1944, 80.000 during fall 1944, and 100.000 in early 1945. The political/ideological composition of the Resistenza had a distinctive Communist core but also comprised representatives of other political traditions (Quazza, 1976).

In April 1945, the Resistance, organized a national insurrection which succeeded to liberate the North from the Nazis occupation. On May 1st 1945, Northern Italy was freed and Mussolini executed. But what was perceived by the partisans and the subaltern class as the beginning of radical social changes, as the Risorgimento before, turned out to be a restoration. The Allies were extremely concerned for the situation of Northern Italy as they thought there were all the conditions for a revolutionary insurrection: mass unemployment, inflation, the
widespread diffusion of arms (the Resistenza had accumulated 250,000 rifle, 12,000 submachine guns, 5000 machine guns, 760 antitank weapons, 217 cannon, 12 armored car and 5000 pistols). The situation in the rural South was equally unstable and uncertain. The formation of the Italian state (1861) never provided justice for the South which was eagerly awaiting for a land reform. The southern economic was still operating with the pre-modern principle of the latifondo (Tarrow, 1967): a system of large estate owned by the nobility which were inefficiently cultivated. However, the arrival of the Allied restored old power and the old property relations without bringing any reform as Ginsborg notices (1990).

In conclusion, at the end of the Resistance experience, out of 100,000 members (in its highest point), 35000 died, 21000 were mutilated and 9000 were deported in Germany. Both the liberation and the bloody price of the Resistance would contribute to create in the collective memory a selective myth of the “Resistenza” which would for long time affect the way the whole period would be interpreted. The liberation though was not lived as an experience of unity of Italian people but as a fragmented experience according to class extraction: on the one hand, the peasantry and the proletariat classes were celebrating it as the inauguration of a new epoch; on the other hand, the capitalist of the North wanted the Allies to take control of the country in order to defuse the potential socialist insurrection and to preserve the older relation of production.

*Competing Memories: the Resistenza and Toto’s movies*

Nora (1984) states that collective memory is a full scale historic factor in which the political and the symbolic sides of social life meet each other in such a way to crystallize fundamental social values. This is certainly the case of Italy post WWII when people tried to make sense of the past years. In fact, at the end of the traumatic Fascist experience, Italian civil
society felt a urge to communicate its experience, a complex experience that presented competing voices, as Calvino magisterially describes:

“The literary explosion of those years in Italy was not so much an artistic phenomenon, more a physical, existential collective need. We had come through the war, and those of us of the younger generation- who has just old enough to be partisans- did not feel crushed or defeated or damaged by the experience; rather we were victors, carried onward by the forwards thrust of the battle which we has just won, the exclusive guardian of its legacy. This was not facile optimism, however, or gratuitous euphoria; quite the opposite: what we felt ourselves to be the heirs of, was a sense of life being something which could begin again from scratch, a feeling of public outrage against injustice, even a kind of flair of surviving danger and slaughter. […] The fact of having emerged from an experience- a war, a civil war- which had spare no one, established an immediacy of communication between the write and his public: we were face to face, on equal terms, bursting with stories to tell; everyone had experience through own drama, had lived a chaotic, exciting, adventurous existence; we took the words from each other’s mouth. (Calvino, 1998, p.i).

Such a “multicolored world of stories” comprised two main narratives/attitudes: the one who rationalized the Fascist experience through the moral restoration/mediation of the Resistance and the one who decided to simply forget the past and consider the Ventennio Fascista (Fascist 20 years) as a mere parenthesis in otherwise Italian historic continuum. Let us briefly examined them.

Roy (1999, p.55) claims that there are several interpretations that have developed to explain the Resistance struggle against the Fascists and Nazis. First, the Resistance constituted Italy's war of liberation from the Third Reich and the Salo Republic. Second, it was considered a civil war between Fascists and anti-Fascists The Third interpretation portrays the Resistance as a heroic but it also maintains that the Resistance did not bring democracy to Italy as: it arrived borne on Anglo-American tanks. In this chapter I will focus on the one that would mark more the imagery of the BR, the idea of confrontation not just between fascist and anti fascist but framed as class struggle between bourgeois and proletariat. Such a theme implicitly and explicitly
would be consistently lurking behind the revolutionary words of the BR as the narrative of “Resistenza Tradita,” the Resistenza betrayed in revolutionary aspirations by the restoration objectives of the Italian capitalist class, supported by the Allies and also supported by the accommodating opportunism of leader of the PCI, Togliatti.

In 1944 Togliatti returned to Italy from a long exile in Soviet Union but he did not intended to bring any revolution rather only supporting the Allied military liberation. The revolution was considered impracticable as the Allied would have immediately crushed it. Furthermore, Togliatti, as Marsili notices (1998), following Gramsci’s theories of the Quaderni (1971), privileged the perspective of slow process of an ideology deeply integrating within the civil society (represented by the concept of the “war of position”) rather than the immediate and open confrontation (“the ‘war of movement”). This translated in the signing of the Protocol of Rome (1944), the negotiation between the Allies and the CNLAI that would guarantee the disarming of the partisans once the insurrection would have been completed.

The Protocol inaugurated a very special period for the PCI characterized by doppiezza a double political attitude: on the one hand, compliant to western capitalist democracy, still aspiring to bring a socialist revolution on the other. Such an opportunistic strategy, allowed the PCI, the major inheritor of the “Resistenza,” to politically capitalize on the Partisan narrative and succeeded to transform a small elite group of intellectuals into a mass party (counting two million of members in 1954) and with a culture that deeply rooted in the Italian civil society. However, at the same time, the PCI led by Togliatti failed in not taking advantage of the remarkable social support to oblige the postwar governments to adopt radical social reforms thus dissipating the partisan-factory workers-peasants momentum.
Since 1945, April 25 Italy celebrated the partisan liberation of the country. Guaiana (2009, p.333) argues that “The communists considered Liberation Day as a celebration to match the epos of a fighting people guided by a partisan vanguard who wanted to free their own country. “ This celebratory mode favored a militant memory which considered the Resistance as an ethical choice to be made over and over again because the mission was still to be accomplished. The BR, more than any other radical left group, saw themselves as a natural continuation of the Resistance as their name “Brigate” was inspired by the most Communist Brigata of the partisans: Brigata Garibaldi. They regarded the experience of the Resistance not only formative one but also a betrayed one because the PCI negotiated with the Allies instead of satisfying the expectations of most (northern) Italians to bring radical social and political reforms.

As Manconi argues (1991, p.113), in the context in which the BR emerged there was the “this widespread perception evolved into a new strategic hypothesis called the line of resistance” according to which the partisan Resistance had to be mobilized again since the a new fascist dictatorship was developing. Such a line of resistance had developed its partisan operations inside and outside the factory. The “new Resistance” played such a central role in the political landscape of the as it dominated the imagery the iconography, the literature and the mythology of the BR. One of the member of the BR makes this volition of lineage clear:

I remember that we related to the partisan experience of the left, and to the salvaging of the values of anti-fascism and anti-imperialism […] this rather mythological thing about people without many means yet capable of rebelling […] At the beginning, Che Guevara was the person who played the greatest role, there is no doubt about it… then later it switched to the Italians: Pietro Secchia, Vittorio Vidali” (In Manconi, 1991, p.114).
Almost precisely after one year of activity the BR published a document which expressed in very explicit way the interpretation of its emergence through a narrative that constructed the lineage between the BR and the partisans. The story that the BR referred was about the frustration of the proletariat due to the incomplete socialist project started in the 1945 by the partisan liberation from Nazi-Fascism. In the document titled as “A Perfidious Destiny” (1971), the BR recounted how the communist resistance deposed the arms, mal posing faith in the collaborationist position of the PCI. Under such a perspective, the “BR intend to prosecute the social trial against neo-fascism” (p.1).

According to the BR (1971) the bourgeois was reorganizing itself after the failure of fascist regime attempt. The postwar-reconstruction phase was expected to bring social ameliorant but instead the capital and the state decided to embark in the same fascist project of class domination: disciplinizing the working class through repression by establishing a regime of terror. In fact, the BR suggested that the real terrorism was the one carried on by the state, aside the one which was reinvigorating of the far right, their coup attempts. According to the group (1971, p.2) “Fascism was able to regenerate because never completely destroyed,” and the clash of 1967-69 of the student-workers movement were able to put in display the level of re-fascistization of the society.

In strident opposition to the collective memory of Resistenza, there was the self indulging euphoria of who wanted to think of the post war era as tabula rasa of the so called ventennio fascista (Fascist twenty years). Mussolini, the Black Squads raids and the war became a blurred memory in the amnesiac collective imagery and under the weight of a “myth of moral
regeneration (Acanfora, 2007, p.313). Such an attitude was extremely evident in the popular movies of the Toto series in which the protagonists moved around early 1950s with no reference what so ever of previous years and inaugurated what in cinema history is often defined as “commedia all’Italiana” (Italian comedy), facile self-indulgent laugh to history.

4.3 The Postwar Settlement: The Republic and the Reconstruction

Lampedusa, in his “The Leopard” (1960, p.79) found a perfect phrase to describe the Bergsonian “illusion of movement” which often has characterized Italian history: “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” This is also a way to understand the ambivalent political project of the post war governments: devoted at the same time to great changes and great restorations. The first of this “visual effect” is the transition from monarchy to republic.

The Italian monarchic state, after less 84 years of ruling, was abolished by a popular referendum held on 2 June 1946 and it was replaced by a Republic. The new political environment was dominated by three main political parties: The Christian Democrats (DC), the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSIPU soon renamed PSI) which were elected through a proportional electoral system. The DC, in 1946 general election, received 35.2 %, the PSIPU received the 20.6 %, the PCI 18.9 %. The PSI and the PCI received some ministerial posts in a Christian Democrat–led coalition cabinet as the three groups, temporally

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5 As Guiana (2009, p.330) observes, “after the collapse of Italy’s fascist regime, not only did the country’s entire political and economic system need to be rebuilt, but the form and content of the representation of power had to be reshaped too. The consequent need to reinvent and purge Italian symbology and liturgy of their fascist connotations, so as to provide the citizens of the post-war Republic with a shareable cultural and symbolic horizon, was fulfilled by creating a new liturgical calendar.”
gave up their ideological differences and formed a coalition in order to facilitate the transition
to the Republican system and favor the reconstruction of the country.

The fact that members of the resistance acquired political power alimented for a short
period of time the hopes of important social change but the political victory of the Resistance
was only apparent. De Gasperi, the leader of the newly formed Christian Democrats party
government, had in mind rather conservative policies and by May 1947, the PCI was finally
excluded by the governing coalition and the radical social reforms auspicated by the partisans
did not take place. Salvati (1972, p. 1) claims that in the years immediately following the Italian
surrender, from 1943 to 1948, the DC allied with “US and British imperialism which exerted
their greatest efforts to re-stabilize bourgeois society in Italy and to crush the revolutionary
movement that had arisen in the anti-fascist struggle.”

Whether or not the Resistenza could be considered as a Second Risorgimento, both in its
liberatory role and its constructive role of the Italian nation, the way Resistenza experience gave
away to the Republican era presented the same dialectic logic of the incomplete project of the
unification of the country 80 years earlier. Pavone (1995) claims that the “Resistenza” was not
a lost opportunity to make Italy because it produced the Italian republican constitution but at the
same time the bill of right written between 1946 and 1948 is marked by the same lack of
hegemony. In fact, even before the completion of the redaction of the constitution, just like 80
years earlier with moderates and revolutionary, the leading party “decapitated” its enemy
relegating the PCI from the majority to the opposition.

As Chiocchi (1997) observes the Italian constitutional model relies on consociative logic
of the different political forces that shared the experience of partisan struggle against the fascist
regime but that never completely produced a cohesive political class which never found
common model for the political economy development of the country. This is evident in the way the constitution has been formed: a diverse ensemble of political and cultural traditions, the liberal tradition, the catholic paternalistic solidarism, the egalitarianism of the socialist and communist tradition. And such a heterogeneity of the political forces that created the constitution reproduced the heterogeneity of their distinct political formulations. The constitution does not have a central nucleon, it presents strong hybrid forms that revealed the “original sign” of the Italian project of modernity: an unresolved stall between conservation and change, archaic and progressive. It looks just like Jules Verne’s Nautilus: a machinery that combines 19th century mechanics with futurible electrified features of the 20th century.

The Italian Constitution was made out of political pact among parties which never fused together. Such inter-party logic created framework for the political and social life in Italy in which the interests of the singular parties prevailed over the common wealth. The way the constitution functions indicates again the structural weakness of the Italian state which always privileged the aggregative functions of party at loss of the integrative functions of the state. Parties unite individuals in separated collectives but without ever providing the basis for a common ground for the entire civil society. The trade off of party aggregation system for democratic integration has had extremely serious consequences.

As Tarrow (1990) argues, the mechanism of political of alignment to party positions made the Italian state institutions driven by particularistic interests creating clientelism. In Italy this is a reality represented by the so called “voto di scambio” a “vote buying” that gives the simulacrum of legitimation. In fact the aggregative mechanism, a supposed to the integration system, produces more consent than legitimation because consent comes from a clientelistic electoral support, the “voto di scambio” and produces incredibly elevated costs of maintenance
due the capital necessary to buy the vote-consent. Consent to particularistic positions of parties creates a powerful disaggregating mechanism.

To sum up, the Resistenza Constitution project may be considered as another example of passive revolution. The state becomes arena of particularistic interests, instead of easing the conflict in the civil society becomes the privilege site for that. The state becomes an asset of the state middle class.

*The Christian Democrats at Power.*

The immediate post war was characterized by concerning social circumstances: high inflation, massive unemployment (1 million in 1945, 2 million in 1951), and social unrest (ex partisans protesting for the amnesty decreed to most of ex-fascists and Southern peasants demanding agrarian reform). The recovering process of the country was also an international concern and this would profoundly impact the domestic politics. After the Soviet-inspired February 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia the US became alarmed about Soviet intentions and feared that the PCI would draw Italy into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence if the leftist coalition were to win the elections.

Those fears of a possible Communist takeover proved crucial for the electoral success of DC, under the leadership of De Gasperi won a resounding victory with 48 percent of the vote (while the PCI and the PSI only received together 31 percent of the votes). The DC’s main support areas came from the rural areas in South, the North-East and part of the center Italy. De Gasperi stressed industrial growth, agricultural reform, and close cooperation with the United States and the Vatican. In the 1950s, during the DC government Italy became a founding member of the NATO alliance (1949), a member of the United Nations (1955) and an ally of the
United States, which helped to revive the Italian economy through the Marshall Plan. In the 1952, Italy also became a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and of the European Economic Community (1957), later developed into the European Union.

In the domestic ‘front’, the Vatican actively supported the Christian Democracy, claiming it would be a "mortal and unforgivable" sin for a Catholic to vote for the Communist party and excommunicating outright all its supporters. Italy was ideologically fractured between the Christian and the Communist pole. The writer Giovanni Guareschi (1948) provided a powerful representation of such a confrontation in his novels about Don Camillo describing a small town whose inhabitants were divided by the fierce rivalry of priest Camillo and Communist mayor Giuseppe.

In this period Italy significant demographic changes. First of all, despite the achievement in reducing mortality, the growth rate of the population gradually slowed down until birth rates and death rates became virtually identical. Second, it took place a massive population transfer, from the impoverished South to the soon booming industrial North. As we shall see, the rapid industrialization in the urban Northern centers acted as a strong “pull” factor, encouraging rural workers to abandon the land and head for the cities. The disparity of wealth and of employment between urban and rural areas triggered a period of intense rural depopulation from the uplands in the Alps, the Apennines, Sicily, and Calabria and an influx of migrants to Rome, Milan, Turin, and Genoa (in the period between 1876 and 1970, an estimated 9 million moved internally). The percentage of urbanization grew steadily, 35.5% in 1936, 41.1% in 1951, 47.7% in 1961, 52.0% in 1971 and 55.0% 1981.
The migration to the urban environment, as we shall see, would mark the BR a great deal. In its imaginary, the move to the urban environment became the quintessential component of the revolutionary experience which by no accident was consistently present in the names of many organizations around the BR’s experience: see for instance the name of organization which would be then renamed as BR, “Collettivo Politico Metropolitano” (Metropolitan, Political Collective), “L’appartamento” (the Apartment), Metropolitan Indians (Metropolitan Indians).

4.4 The “sinful” Economic Miracle: The lost appointment with Fordism and another Passive Revolution.

The economic reconstruction was followed by an unprecedented economic growth between 1958 and 1963 (Allen and Stevenson, 1975) which would be defined as the “Economic Miracle.” Malanima and Vera (2010) claimed that the success was partially due to the decision to foster free market policies and to open up international trade and this was reflected in the modification of pattern of Italian export: from textile and food based economy to consumer products. According to Del Panta (1996) and Fenoaltea (2003), both per capita GDP and GDP in Italy have started to grow steadily respectively with an average of 1.86% and 2.42% per year since the unification of the country in 1861 but in late 1950s such a rate rose dramatically: the gross domestic product (GDP) rose by an average of 5.9% percent annually during this time, reaching a peak of 8.3 percent in 1961. The growth in industrial output peaked at over 10 percent per year during this period, a rate surpassed only by Japan and West Germany.

The Italian boom was of an explosive type, intense and realizing in short period of time. Such a kind of development constituted a favorable environment to accrue the already existing
economic unbalances (Ciocca, 2007). First of all, it was no distributed along the whole society as created a mass of “excluded:” the semi skilled workers and the Southern Peasantry. According to Stern (1967), production and productivity doubled in few years a consequence of the rising capital–labor ratio but wages actually diminished (this will constitute an important precedent for working class struggles of late 1960s). Let us examine this reality in more detail.

D’Antonio (1974) and Chiocchi (1997) state the Italian industrial boom was propelled by manufacture production which constitutes the 70% of the GDP produced by the industry (ISTAT, 1960) and among the manufacture the metal and mechanic sector played the leading role. Such a boom was mainly due to the intensification of the exploitation of labor power which was far superior to the exploitation of capital. It is high intensity labor and low intensity capital model of development which replaces investment on modernizing the production technology and organization with the exploitation of the worker. D’Antonio (1974, p.125) reports comparative data about the labor + capital composition of development in the 1950-60 period in Italy, Europe and USA which depicts Italy as country with the most marked unbalance between the two assets.

Such a regime of exploitation coupled with the existence of conspicuous reserve army of workers in the country side allowed for prolonged regime of salary freezing. Not accidentally, as Chiocchi (1997) remarks the salary blockage produced an underdeveloped internal market so that the increased production of this period led to massive exportations. D’antonio (1974, p.83) notices in fact that in a country in which the wealth per capita was nominally increasingly in significant ways the unbalanced ratio between imports/exports of good indicated the exiguity of the internal market. What D’Antonio suggested is that those all factors indicated the extremely limited experience of Fordism and its inducted hegemony in Italy. If the notion of Fordism
describes a model of economic development that characterized both by mass production and high enough salaries to create mass consumption then Italy, in a period of remarkable industrialization lost his “appointment” with Fordism which, according to Gramsci (1971) and Jessop (1992), plays a decisive role in the construction of a socially extended hegemony.

The partial re-distribution of wealth along society implied by the Fordist model would have created a level of consent which would have possibly avoided the violent reactions of late 1960s. Instead, a number of factors that would start producing or accruing unbalances at the social and territorial level: high intensity labor cycles; low salary regimes, accumulation of capital with high margin of profit, focalization of the system of good production towards the international market because of the low domestic demand. Those factors tended to create a significant differential between the dynamic industries located in the north (in the so called industrial “triangle” Turin-Milan-Genoa) oriented towards the external markets and the stagnant industries located in the center and south industry oriented towards the undeveloped internal market.

Such a situation created a self feeding process of “dualization” of the Italian economic system because the distance in terms of capabilities of capitalization and modernization of the productive system employed in the North and in the South increased every year more. As a consequence, the north started draining labor and cultural resources form the South. The gap in economic-productive terms translated in gap social and territorial realities, localized in the south and the social class marginalized from the industrial development which shared in gradually smaller measures the flow of incomes and wealth.
Besides the industrialist, the class fractions that in mass seemed to have benefited from the boom were the ones employed in the so called state holdings: the white collars working for the state administration and the managerial class leading such a “state capitalism.” White collars who represents the category that keep the internal consumption alive. The white collars represented the most important group that kept the internal demand alive. The other social group that benefited was the part of bourgeoisie who decided to invest on state-participation business, the so called ”state bourgeois” (Ginsborg, 1990) This class exemplified anybody else in Italy the collusion between political power and capital and which explains the general Italian phenomenon of the “political clientelism.” The complicity between capital and political power became also evident in private economic actors such as FIAT. Muraro (1961) claims that FIAT during the 1950-60s was able to influence the state policy of transportation forcing unnaturally a market: Italian had many cars, many highways but not high enough incomes to sustain those expenses.

The economic system so structured de facto lead to subalternization of the masses instead of winning their consent and therefore allowing the emergence of the Fordist hegemony. In the north the mass worker finds its valorization, its humiliation, its alienation but most of all its interchangeability in the production line. The condition of illiberty inside the production environment becomes also a condition of illiberty outside work because simply there is no time, money and energy for anything else.

A second important category of “excluded” were the peasants of the South which, in virtues of its exclusion migrates to North only to become part of the first category of excluded: the semi skilled worker. Instead of filling the gap between developed and underdeveloped regions the
boom accentuated the inequalities between North and South. The South and significant part of the Italian working class were still awaiting the construction in their areas of houses (the absence of housing programs, 1949 INA–casa a failure that explained “abusivismo”, the tendency to raise building without permit), schools, and hospitals. The realization that the South had been slipping back so much prompted the formation of an agency in 1951 (the “Cassa per il Mezzogiorno”) which devised additional investments in that area, with the aim of creating an industrial surge. The Southern development funds supported early land reform—including land reclamation, irrigation work, infrastructure building, and provision of electricity and water to rural areas—but did little to stimulate the economy (Rota, 2008).

The DC was both ideologically and electorally committed to the emerging class located in the structural limb between labor and capital: the petty bourgeois and white collars. As Tarrow observes (1989), during the boom, the DC government favored these strata in part through a tax system that failed to tap their incomes” (p.49) in part through a legal system which favored them in terms of acquiring property and access to credit. One the one hand, according to Labini (1975, p.156), in the period between 1950-1970, the petite bourgeoisie increased from 10% to 17% as the DC governments consistently subsidized small business impeding the growth of bigger firms. On the other hand, connected to bureaucratization and the important role played by state owned holding such IRI and ENI, also the white collars stratum grew rapidly: 1,9 million in 1951, 2,6 million in 1961 and 3,3 millions 1971.

In extreme poverty men and women from Southern Italy moved to the industrial poles of the north. They found themselves in a condition of traumatic disaggregation of their values, family bonds. In a country of 40 million, from 1958 to 1963 the migration from the South totaled 1,7 millions (In Orsini2009, p.97). In the same period cities such as Turin and Milan increased
their sizes of almost 40% (in Meneghetti, 1971). Once arrived in the Northern cities many
migrants recurred to the so called “Koreas” illegal housing erected by night that looked like the
provisional shelter of Koreans after the US bombardments.

The brigatista (in Grandi, 2007, pp.50-1) Fiore described the living conditions of the
army of southerners as particularly dramatic:

“The big cities of the north were full of men and women migrating from the southern
regions. The people had left the south because there was huge demand for labor, with big
factories in particular needing great numbers of unskilled workers. The assembly line
standardized the workers. Immigration started as always with a flow of men, with women
coming later. They all had different values, closely bound to the rural life, with
paternalist concept of the family in a dimension of time linked to the season and the
southern heat. None of them had experience the skilled-worker phase, the struggle to
become trained, with women moving from the land to the factories. These are some of
the issues behind the great conflict between Northern and southern communities. Only a
few family from the north were squatters, and those few were terrorized by the
southerners lifestyle, with noisy, half naked children playing in the dusty courtyards
among the garbage, the women’s vulgar language, their welfare state mentality…The
southerners also started to send their women to work in the factories, first their daughters
and then also their wives. The social transformations in those years were the result of a
cultural melting pot that had vomited out a new magma.”

The industrial working class grew as well 3.4 millions in 1951; 4.2 millions in 1961 and
5 millions in 1971 but its conditions were not actually representing the social amelioration
brought by the boom, it represented instead the repressed narrative of the “miracle.” On the one
hand, there was the iconic representation of prosperity depicted by the extremely popular TV
advertising concentrated program called Carosello advertising the first popular car, the FIAT
500, the refrigerator\(^6\), on the other hand, in the “dark side of the moon,” the “repressive
development based on hyper-taylorization and exploitation of labor and political repression.
(Salvati, 1972, p.1). In fact, despite the conditions of full employment of the North, the industrial

\(^6\) In 1958 12% of the population owned a TV sets, 13% refrigerators and there were less than half a million of cars, by 1965 49% of the population owned a TV sets, 55% refrigerators and there were 4.6 millions.
part of the country, the negotiating capabilities of labor were kept at the minimum because the industries could count on the immense reserve of army labor continuously alimented by southern immigration.

*Another Passive Revolution*

Almost hundred years after the Risorgimento and almost hundred years in retard in respect to the process of industrialization that interested the rest of developed Europe, Italy experienced its “industrial revolution” accompanied by a marked modernization of production processes, by the urban demographic transition and by a general improvement of the conditions of the population but also, as we mentioned, by dramatic unbalances. I consider the period between the “reconstruction” and the “economic boom” another Gramscian example of passive revolution in which the Italian ruling class achieved superimposing domination over consent, in other words, without exerting hegemony on the whole society.

Once again, the ruling class was incapable of constructing the historic bloc which would have allowed it to morally and culturally lead the country. First of all, at the political level, just like the “moderates” represented by Cavour “decapitated” their radical opponents, Mazzini and Garibaldi, the post war DC governments, instead of making of the initial national political unity with the PCI the basis for a historic bloc, since 1947, excluded the Communist from the ruling majority thus creating the conditions for deep ideological fractures inside the civil society. As Amyot observes (1995), the ruling class was facing one popular subculture that, the Marxist, which did not share its commitment to liberalism. Furthermore, the masses of the South, too, even though they did not support these two movements in large numbers, had a fundamentally
pre-modern world-view. Hence, just like during Fascism, emerged the need arose to use repression or corruption and fraud to secure political control.

At the political economic level, the DC governments wasted the chance represented by the economic boom to suture the lacunas interesting the Italian nation state since its constitution. Instead of socializing the increased wealth, Italy chose the venues of what Salvati (1972, p.1) defined as repressive development, a development boosted by the increased crude extraction of value from the worker: by augmenting working hours, and keeping the salary at the lowest level in the whole Europe. Secondly, inside this category of excluded together with a working class of the north there was the land-less peasantry of the South condemned to live the medieval condition of mezzadria (share-cropping). Prospero Gallinari, one of the leader of the BR described his family economic situation (Gallinari, 2008, p.18):

“In the mezzadria system the landowner got half of everything. So killing chicken or a rabbit meant you had to share it with the landowner, as well as eggs, milk and anything else produces on the farm. In the end not much remained, and we often at polenta and vegetables, a lot of vegetables […] we were in a wretched conditions.”

During the years of the boom, the coalitions led by Moro procrastinated the reforms and kept Italy in a kind of immobile torpor blocking the reform on regional development (which would have allowed a more efficient decentralization and delegation), reform on town planning which would have eliminated the savaged speculation on urbanization land and the reform of the fiscal system proposing to abandon the distinction between ownership of property and ownership of land. Meanwhile other countries experiencing similar economic growth, for
instance France and Austria, took advantage of the positive trend to deeply reform the country. Italy stood still. The result at both politico and economic level were evident (Ginsborg, 1991): the DC rule suffered of a permanent lack of stable majorities and therefore not capable of carrying out the structural reorganization that the country needed and the Industry, incapable of reaching a satisfactory negotiation with labor was affected by constant conflicts with the workers since the capitalist were concerned for the days lost for strikes: 46 million of days in 1960, 79 millions in 1961 and 182 million in 1962.

The result of the combination of lack of a hegemonic vision at the politico and economic level or the ruling class and the emergence of the white collars stratum in this period in Italy could be explained in terms of Poulantzas’ concept of “state’s relative autonomy (1978). Poulantzas’ theory of the state was reacting against an instrumentalist Marxist account that held that the state was simply an instrument in the hands of a particular class. Instead, according to Poulantzas the state as an ensemble of institutions had a specific could have a differential impact on the ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies. Applying such a perspective to the Italian case, means looking at the state as the reflection of a lack of hegemony and the presence of class contradictions that are inscribed in the very structure of the State. The Italian capitalist class was too corporativist, as too focused on their individual short term profit, rather than on maintaining the class's power as a whole, to simply exercise the whole of state power in its own interest.

Poulantzas offered a relational conceptualization of the state drawing on the Gramscian expansive definition of the state as the ensemble of political and civil society (in other words

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7 It is not an accident that the BR always regarded the social democracy as one of the worst enemy of the revolution as social reforms would substantially contribute to defuse the critical situations.
hegemony armored with coercion): the State was "relation of forces between classes and fractions of classes as they are expressed in a specific manner ... at the very heart of the State" (Poulantzas 1979, p. 375) In this scenario, the Italian petty bourgeoisie fraction of white collars did not contribute in both consolidating the ruling classes hegemony but, by pursuing their own interested in the state bureaucracy environment, occupied a contradictory class position not favoring the subaltern proletariat nor the ruling class. As we shall see, in the next section another by-product of such a lack of hegemony are the social agitations of 1960s and 1970s.

4.5 The collective actions and Social Unrest of 1960s and 1970s

Dialectics seems again to dominate Italian history: the petty bourgeoisie, a social group whose development almost completely depended on the ruling class support, in general social environment characterized by lack of hegemony, produced the most violent reaction against the status quo.

By mid 1960s, the positive momentum of the boom was exhausted, unemployment started raising again, all the unbalances connected to the earlier years of development were now evolved in pressing issues which like a time bomb were ready to deflagrate. Such a stage of Italian economy is defined by Salvati (1972, p.5) as “precocious maturity” referring to refers to problems of economic policy which have arisen during these years (inflation, credit restriction, depression, economic revival, renewed inflation, etc); problems typical of industrial economies which have achieved a high level of utilization of all the nation’s productive resources, which is certainly not the case for Italy.

As previously mentioned the Italian model of economic development was based on the exploitation of cheap labor. When the positive economic cycle started exhausting, the Italian
capitalist instead of investing the capital accumulated in the previous years increased the process of exploitation through the speeding up of the productive rhythms, overloading of the tasks, incentives to production, increased control over labor. Thus, Italian capitalism, rather than investing capital in modernizing in research, recurs to its classic strategies: intensifying the exploitation, cutting the cost of labor, reduction of the bargaining power of workers. And the more the economic system dropped into the state of crisis the tighter became the salary policy of the industry. Here again, the lack of vision of the dominant class reveals itself in its crudeness which instead to re-distribute wealth to pauperized social strata consistently channeled resources towards the higher cadres in the productive systems, the ones who were supposed to manage the exploitation of the first category.

To sum up, the situation preceding the social unrest of late 1960s in Italy was a country in which, as we noted before with the political framework produced by the constitution, democracy functioning only at the formal-legal level and Italian economic system failed as well in democratizing capitalism. Democratizing capitalism in Italy would have meant reducing the profit share of the capitalists at gain of the general worker which meant asking to the very responsible of the boom to reject their own development strategies. The deficit of large spectrum political strategy couples with the corporativism of entrepreneurial class. Maximum profit and minimum democracy will become the two most important targets of the workers contestation of 1969 and early 1970s.

The economic aggravation was coupled with the lack of initiative of the DC governments which were most interested in changing a situation which gave the party its power. (especially under Moro leadership) and the reticence in passing serious reforms as “the Centre Left was no more than an empty parliamentary formula which could not discipline the actions of the various
social forces, including the trade unions” (Salvati, 1972, p.18). Between 1962 and 1968 the centre left government failed to respond to the multiple needs of a rapidly changing Italy and, as a matter of fact, the paralysis from above gave away to movement from below.

During this period the organization of the society was challenged at every possible level. It did not have the intensity and the revolutionary potential of May 1968 in France, but it was the most profound and long lasting in Europe. The protest characterized by heterogeneous events as revolts by jobless farm workers (Avola and Battipaglia, 1969), occupations of Universities by students, social unrest in the large Northern factories (especially during the 1969 autunno caldo, hot autumn). While conservative forces tried to roll back some of the social advances of the sixties, and part of the military indulged in "sabre rattling" in order to intimidate progressive political forces, numerous left-wing activists became increasingly frustrated at social inequalities, while the myth of guerrilla (Che Guevara, the Uruguayan Tupamaros) and of the Chinese Maoist "cultural revolution" increasingly inspired extreme left-wing violent movements.

The revolt started in the schools due to the (the lack of) education reform of the 1960s (the last serious reform of the university dated back to 1923). With the introduction of compulsory secondary education, the number of students between 1959 and 1969 doubled but the Italian education system was not prepared in terms of structure, curricula and teaching training. The access to universities was facilitated and between 1960 and 1968 the number of university students almost doubled but the structure were absolutely inadequate and the job market could only absorb a minimal fraction of the graduated population.

The cultural climate also constituted a fertile terrain for cultivating the discontent: the generation of Italian students were reading Camus, Sartre, Pavese, Baudelaire, Marx’s “Manuscripts of 1844,” (the earlier Marx who was stressing more role played by subjective
consciousness and praxis) Marcuse and Mao’s “Red Book”. Furthermore the two dominant ideologies in Italy, Catholicism and Marxism contributed to support the sense of rejection. On the one hand both Pope John XXIII showed positive opening for the new students ferment, in 1967 a priest, Don Milani, published “A Letter to a Professor” in which students criticized the class bias of the educational system: “You care nothing for the society. On the other hand there was a revival of Marxism which was adding to the ethical revolt. Panzieri started publishing during those years: “Quaderni Rossi.”

Not accidentally the revolt started where both Catholicism and Marxism met each other: in the catholic universities of Trento and Milano. Especially in Trento, sociology students (among them, Renato Curcio, one of the founder of the BR) wrote a document The Negative University in which they were condemning the ideological role of the university, the instrumentalization of state apparatuses by the capital, concluding with these words “we formulate a general hypothesis of the concrete possibility for a radical transformation of the system with new forms of social struggles [...] this is a pre-revolutionary moment” (In Soccorso Rosso, 1976, p.9)

The students proposed direct democracy, decision making through mass assembly, the model was the 1871 Commune of Paris. It was a collectivist and libertarian movement, against the sexual taboos and all sorts of oppressive power. In this sense, the international scenario offered both negative and positive examples. On the one hand, the Vietnam war changed the perception Italian have about the United States, not anymore as the dream of immigration but as imperialist nation oppressing populations around the world. On the other, the Chinese Cultural Revolution represented the next model of achieved socialism, replacing Stalinist Russia.
The movement was originally peaceful then police’s repression pushed the movement to get armed: a normative distinction between wrong violence by the police and the right violence (revolutionary like Che, Vietnamese or Mao). The situation in 1968 produced what Cohen (1973; p.9) would define as “moral panics,” “condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests,” amplified by the European dimension of the movements just like in 1848-49 and 1918-20.

Despite the important leftist component of the protest, the protest was opposed by the PCI who was striving to detach itself for the radicalism of the protests, and by intellectuals who condemned the movement for not being about the people but about a petty bourgeoisie young students. For instance, Habermas (in Hohendahl, 1991) feared the so called “fascism of the left,” or Pasolini who wrote a letter published 16 June 1968, in the Espresso magazine after the first confrontation at Villa Giulia:

“now the journalist of all the world (including those of television) are licking your asses (as one still say in students slang). Not me my dears, you have the faces of spoilt rich brats…You are cowardly uncertain, and desperate… when the other day, at Villa Giulia, you fought, the police I can tell you were on the other side. Because the police are the sons of the poor, they come from the subtopias, in the cities and country side…”

The Villa Giulia battle represented a qualitative step towards an overt and physical confrontation between the movements and the police. Since that occasion, the general attitude of both police and demonstrators changed radically: during parades, protests or strikes, the police responded with the intervention of special forces and the representatives of the “ultra left” carried arsenals of metal bars, Molotov cocktails and fire arms. After the confrontation of Villa Giulia, the general slogan of those demonstrations was rather eloquent: “the system cannot be changed, it must be destroyed.”
The Italian students were not so Utopian as the German who dismissed the working class as already integrated (but in effect in Germany maybe the working class was actually already integrated) but the Italian students movement soon realized that the real revolutionary class was the working class. For this reason, the movement left the universities classroom and moved to the factories.

*Factories Struggles, 1968-73*

As I mentioned, the student revolt represented a dialectical facet deriving from an incomplete hegemonic project of the ruling class. The factories struggles represented another one deriving from a management of labor by capital that instead of leading with consent and socialization of the economic boom dominated with underpaid, over taylorized labor and accrued repression. A worker in FIAT manufactory plant in Turin describes as it follows the condition of the average workers (in Polo, 1989):

“those who entered FIAT could give up all hope, because when you work on an assembly line, you have no possibility of doing anything else…90% of slept on the tram, arrived home, and prepare for work the next day…we felt fear…there was the desert in FIAT during the sixties and you were there alone, abandoned. Either you left or you gave up all hope, you had everyone against you, you could not even trust your workmates” (p.57).

The conditions that facilitated the workers protest were already present in Italy even prior to the student revolts. First of all, since mid 1960s the production generally experienced an increase in mechanization and speeding up of the production lines. Furthermore, as Paci (1975) claims, Italian management in early 1960s failed to re-capitalize by following up with new investment in new plants and equipment tried to get more out of the existing resources. The spread of piece rate working had created further difference between workers causing alienation both among workers and among different type of workers plus, management and
control of work increased under a radicalization of Taylorism. Secondly, Southern immigrants were moving to the Northern cities with an average influx of 120,000 per year and the process of social assimilation was hard creating at the same time rage and frustration. Such a dissatisfaction made of the working environment and the partnership with their workmates the only chance of exit a state of isolation for the immigrants.

Thirdly, in 1967-68 the supply of labor in Lombardy and Piedmont was drying up thus adding unemployed to the mass of discontent. Fourthly, the increase in educational opportunities in 1960 had a twofold effect: on the one hand it had taken increasing numbers of young people out of the factories, thus increasing the rigidity of the supply, on the other hand, it meant that those who did go into the factories were more literate and aware and therefore facilitating the arising of class consciousness. Finally, all those circumstances met each other in 1969, when almost 25% of the Italian workforce (around 5 million, according to Italian statistics office, ISTAT) were involved in the renewal of 32 collective contracts.

At Pirelli factories, in 1968 workers formed a CUB, Comitato Unitario di Base (United base committee) in order to continue the struggle at the factory level. The CUB became a model for many other factories, especially in Milan. They insisted in slowing down the production line, diminish gap between white and blue collars, solidarity with other workers who were paid much less for the same job, especially in the South. They demanded the wage to become an autonomous factor independent from the company profits of economic situation. The workers invented all sort new forms of coordination and struggle: mass assemblies major vehicle for decision making, ‘hiccup’ strikes alternating strike and work, chessboard strikes mobilizing different part of the assembly line in different times.
In all cases, the emphasis was on the decentralization of the strike action. During the so-called “Hot Autumn” of 1969, the trade unions won a partial independence from political parties (the CGIL of Lama and Trentin and CISL) but also in turn the workers won a partial independence from the trade unions: they developed an autonomous response to 1968-69 (this is the circumstance that gave so much popularity to the word “autonomy”). The agitation extended among most metal workers. In December 1969 a new national contract was signed with some important accomplishment: raise in wages, less hours per week, the right to organize mass assemblies. According to Grisoni and Porterli (1981, p.11), during 1969 7.5 million of workers joined general strikes.

In 1970-71 the social struggle spread beyond the metal worker and interested chemical workers, railway men, textile and white collars, public workers (teachers, postmen, hospital workers and civil servants). Whereas in rest of Europe the firsts strikes as in France gave away to managerial power in Italy the struggle continued, the workers initiative now started from the plant and not passively organized by national committees. Plant bargaining was more effective as the union were much more responsive in react to the management tactics.

Meanwhile, the movement extended even outside the workplace the movement. Lotta Continua, one of the radical group emerging form 1968 movement, was aiming at the military service and prisons (in the newspaper Lotta Continua there were supplements such Proletari in Divisa and Dannati della Terra). In the civil society as well there all sorts of ‘autonomous’ initiatives: red markets, red kindergartens, alternative restaurants, surgeries, social clubs. Especially big was the social movement for housing as they were trying to fight in the periphery by ‘rent strikes’ to reduce and stabilize the price.
Historians (Zavoli, 1991; Marchiorre, 1993 Ginsborg, 1991), tend to agree on the beginning of the period of unclaimed terroristic bombings which obliged an entire society to live in a permanent state of tension: the 1969 bombing in Piazza Fontana, Milan inaugurated the so-called “Strategy of Tension”. However, there are at least two specific events which earlier that certainly, once publicly known, contributed to create such a tension. During Moro’s second Government 1964-66 took place the General De Lorenzo coup d’état attempt and in 1969 the coup d’état attempt of Junio Valerio Borghese.

General DeLorenzo became commander in chief of Carabinieri in 1962, he had formed his own private army, superior in discipline and efficiency than the rest of armed forces. In 1964 evolved his “Solo” plan, very similar to “Prometheus” plan was carried out by general Papadopoulos in Greece in 1967. The Solo plan was a counter insurgency plan which was insurgent itself by making arrests to all leaders of Communist, Socialists and trade unionist, prefectures, all media and head quarters of political parties were to be occupied. The other coup took place during the night of 7-8 December 1969 when Junio Valerio Borghese tried to enact his plan with corps of forest guard and connection with secret services. They occupied for two hours the Ministry of Interior but then they mysteriously withdrew. The incident became public only in March 1970. To those two concrete attempts must also be added the plans of the secret Masonic society Propoganda 2 (widely known in Italy as “P2”) whose network was spread inside the state, the secret service and army.

The coups did not succeeded but, once become public, contributed substantially to corroborate and aliment the fears of right wing conspiration. This would lead groups such as the
BR to reinforce the narrative of still enduring confrontation between “fascists’ and “anti fascist” as Bermani (1997) and Pavone (1991) observe and accordingly the BR would regard themselves as natural prosecutors of the partisans’ legacy.

The bombs certainly contributed to radicalize the groups involved in their armed struggles but then in 1973, the Italian left was impacted by happenings taking place internationally. The Pinochet coup in Chile of 1973 would propel a series of events which will has profound impact on both the BR and Italian civil society as it alimented the fear (justified by the coup attempts of 1970 by Neo Fascists and P2 secret Masonic associations) of right wing coup in Italy. The Chile event led to either abandon the political struggle or to radicalize it. Symbol of the crisis was after the Chilean Coup of the dissolution of Lotta Continua which had emerges in 1968 as the largest group.

Furthermore, the Chilean coup lead the PCI to realize that a left government would have implied a very large spectrum coalition of political forces (in order to avoid coup from the right). This will lead the PCI’s leader Berlinguer to start working with Moro (the Christian Democrats leader) towards the so called “historic compromise”. Such a alliance between PCI and the main center right party would cause a permanent detachment of the extra parliamentary left and the PCI.

The 1973 the Chilean Coup signs the crisis of the 1968 movements and frustrates the strategy of many extra parliamentary groups of sending the PCI to the government and then reform from the left, in order to radicalize it. The Chile event led to either abandon the political struggle or to radicalize it. Symbol of the crisis is the dissolution of Lotta Continua (the most
known radical group led by Adriano Sofri) who was the first one of talking about sending the PCI to rule in the parliament which has great impact on the masses.

Zavoli (1991, p.73) argues that from 1968 movements departed two main branches of radicalism. The Marxist-Leninist based on Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution such as “Unione dei Marxisti Leninisti Italiani” which represented the most extreme wing of the student movement. The other branch was coming from the factory, from the FIAT factory councils emerged *Lotta Continua* and *Potere Operaio*, the most radical group which maintained that only within the factory the existing oppressive social relations of production could be challenged and renewed. From the factory movement, a great number of revolutionary groups sprang up: *Maoisti che Servono il Popolo* (Maoists Serving the People), *Avanguardia Operaia* (Workers Vanguard), *Lotta Continua* (Unceasing Struggle), *Potere Operaio* (Workers Power) and *Il Manifesto* a small breakaway from the PCI who found a newspaper of the same title. As we mentioned in Chapter III, the BR represent a synthesis both environment, the academic and the factory one.

The Italian revolutionary groups were the largest in Europe but they were also divided, competing via ideology to establish the greater theoretical correctness of a group’s political line over the other. Interestingly enough, despite the “autonomista” aspirations of most of them, they tended to mimic the hierarchical organizational structure of the institutionalized political parties. “Autonomy” according to Tarrow (1989, p.131) had two overlapping meanings: first the autonomy of the workers form the trade unions that dictated the platforms without consulting them; the second the autonomy of the unions form their respective political parties affiliates. In this sense, the political culture of the post WWII Italy could hardly understand public
manifestations of societal discomfort without trying to tracing back to party politics logic because in Italy the assumption was that every class or definable class partition had a political representative in form of a party or at least a trade union organization. Thus, even if the tendency to radicalism among students and factory workers was remarkably high could not compete with the centripetal force of attraction of the PCI and the main trade union, the CGIL.

In conclusion, according to the Gramscian dialectical framework I explained earlier, one can view the emergence of the social movements and radical groups not as a mere opposition to the status quo but rather as an alternative competing view to the Italian social order. In other words, the lack of hegemony of the ruling class opened up a space in which views in which the residual, the dominant and emergent elements of a given culture could combine to produce something new but at the same not completely opposed to the dominant culture. Thus for instance dominant and the allegedly counter-cultural worldview of the movements represented competing views which did construct a binary opposition because for instance, even the most radical group such as *Prima Linea* and the *Brigate Rosse*, contained element of Catholicism, a political a culture that could transcend the political party logic.

4.6 The Strategy of Tension, and The Historic Compromise: Towards an Hegemonic Historic Bloc

Gramsci (1971) affirmed that one of the reasons why the Risorgimento failed in Italy was the lack of Jacobinism, or the coercive force capable of organizing and uniting the masses. But force historically in Italy demonstrated to be not an unconditional recipe for success. The most negative example that is in marked in the Italian collective memory was Fascism even though there are historians such as DeFelice (1971) who distinguishes in Fascism a first period (1922-
36) in which Fascism was a mass movement and then a fascism that was a regime (1936-44), with much more limited social base. On the other hand there have been also occasions in which the presence of a common enemy united Italians such as Nazi-fascist occupation in relation to the partisan experience.

In this section, I suggest that if so far the narrative I constructed here display several frustrations of a class to become hegemonic, in one of the most dramatic and dangerous moment for the Italian democratic life, so called “years of lead,” the historic present of the BR, Italy seems to find a unity under the moral and intellectual leadership of its ruling class under the Jacobin force of fear which like in Sartre’s example of the siege of Paris during the French Revolution (1976) made out of series a fused group. Thus, if lack of hegemony created competing views and competing social praxes capable of creating general; diffuses sense of moral panic such as the kidnapping of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, such a dangerous circumstance in turn provide the condition that facilitated the unity of the country under the leadership of the ruling class.

*The strategy of Tension and the Bombs.*

The 1970s came to be known as of the *Opposti Estremismi*, (from left-wing and right-wing extremists riots) but as of *Anni di piombo* ("years of lead ") because of a wave of bombings and shootings. In 12 December 1969, four bombings struck in Rome the Monument of Vittorio Emanuele II (Altare della Patria), the *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, and in Milan the *Banca Commerciale* and the *Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura*. The later bombing, known as the Piazza Fontana bombing of 12 December 1969 at 16:37, killed 16 and injured 90. The Piazza Fontana bombing was initially attributed to anarchists.
Manconi (In Catanzaro 1992, p.119) claims that the Piazza Fontana bomb created in the mind of the extremists a tight theorem: there was an integration of state power, Christian Democrats, economic power and fascists. As we shall see, Calabresi and his alleged responsibilities of Pinelli’s death will be considered by most of the radical left as the symbol of this strong link between state, political and economic power but also the explicit will to violently repress groups like the anarchists who were challenged the constituted power. And the historical demonstration of such reactionary alliance was provided by the Chilean coup which transmitted a sense of emergency and urgency in the radical groups and extra motivation for their adoption to the armed struggle.

However, the sense of urgency and emergency that those groups felt could only compare with the general stress that the whole civil society was living under the pressure of cultural contestations, social protests, strikes, unclaimed bombing attempts and the actions of groups such as the BR. In the period of terror attacks of the late 70s and early 80s, the parliamentary majority was composed by the parties of the "Arco costituzionale", i.e. all parties supporting the Constitution, including the Communists (who in fact took a very strong stance against the Red Brigades and other terrorist groups). However, the Communists never took part in the Government itself, which was composed by the "Pentapartito" (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats, Liberals, Republicans

However, the “historic compromise” was not the culmination of those chain of events, the actual apogee of the confrontation between the BR and the state was reached when Christian democrat Aldo Moro was assassinated in May 1978 by the Red Brigades. Before his murder, Aldo Moro, a central figure in the Christian Democrat Party, several times Prime
minister, was trying to include the Communist Party, headed by Enrico Berlinguer, in the parliamentary majority, an operation called the *historic compromise*. At this point, the PCI was the largest communist party in Western Europe; this was largely due to its reformist orientation, to its growing independence from Moscow and to the new Euro communism doctrine. The PCI was especially strong in Central Italy, in the three "red regions" (Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Umbria) which it had administered rather efficiently, as well as other local administrations, since the post-war years.

Extremely eloquent was the even when the PCI and trade union representative Lama, came in 17 February to talk to occupied university of Rome was violently contested by the movement. This episode will make realize the PCI and the national trade union the need to de-associate completely themselves from the “movement.” Certainly groups such a the Brigate Rosse or Lotta Continua since their beginning had overtly expressed their distrust for the “institutional left” but for the less radical leftist groups both trade union and the PCI represented important mediators between the movement and the state. The 1977 period (actually enduring until 1979) represented a moment in which the PCI was caught in particular situation: on the one hand, in 1976 had reached its highest historic electrical consent reaching almost 35% of votes in the general elections and, on the other fathering more and more its position to the grassroots movements, those allegedly mode determined to bring a socialist revolution.

Historians agree that at least two different strategic designs were present in the ‘opening to the left’ in Italy represented by the historic compromise. The first aimed at reforming the ‘pattern of development’ in order to make the accumulation process less dependent upon exports and low salaries. In the political field, this meant undermining the strength of the orthodox
faction of the PCI, and promoting the emergence of a pro-Western, democratic left, which would pave the way for a bipolar political system. The second design aimed at cushioning the impact of the ‘economic miracle’—which had reduced unemployment and brought about increased wages—on the economy, in order to prevent a reform of its underlying traits. In political terms, this meant keeping the socialists in a subordinate role and preserving the declining centrality of the DC, thus transforming the center—left into a sort of ‘widened centrism.’

In May 1978, Aldo Moro would be murdered by the BR but what was considered for the group a victory against the Italian state actually created the conditions for an entire society to unite against what the BR represented. Thus, ironically enough, the success of the most audacious action perpetrated by a radical group against the status quo provided the common myth, the common enemy through which the closest level to an historic bloc could be formed in Italy.

A Conclusion of an Experience

Due to the prolonged economic crisis started in 1973, Italy experienced a period of stagflation that lasted until early 1980s. As a consequence of that FIAT, the biggest company in the country, decided to lay off 15000 workers. The 30 of September 1980, factory workers organized a massive a protest which gathered more than 40.000 participants on the streets of Turin. The strike and its partially accomplished objectives, represented the last act of the season of collective action as signed the decline of the workers’ struggle.

The conclusion of the season of struggles in 1980s, not surprisingly coincided also with the conclusion of the experience of BR. The energy and the social reservoir for recruitment of the
members of the radical group always relied on the ‘movement,’ the collective action started in mid 1960s which two decades later was almost completely exhausted. The drying up of social collective energies, translated into a clear decline of the capabilities of the BR to obtain even a minimum social understanding of their action, a public for their communicative practices, and this constitutes one of the reason why the posterior literature appears as hardly intelligible.

But it was not simply question of changes in the political sensibility of the civil society, there were indeed fundamental changes in the way economic production was organized. According to Harvey’s (1991) principle of flexible accumulation, capital was available and capable of quickly defuse the negotiation with labor thanks to its flexibility. This is how Moretti, one of the leaders of the BR, talks about it (A.A.V.V., 1999):

“a strike during the late 1970s meant to defend something that Agnelli [the president of the industrial group FIAT] had already taken away as he moved the production elsewhere, therefore undermining the structural base of everything we planned and dreamed. We were not at the offensive stage of labor negotiation but at its end” (p.45)

To conclude, the file rouge that this chapter has tried to identify in the considered portion of Italian history constructs a narrative of several incomplete attempts of a society to come to terms with issues that since its unification have affected the life of Italy and how such incompleteness dialectically produced both new attempts and part of the reasons for their failure.

As we mentioned in chapter II, praxis is a historic moment in which “past” and “future” meet each other. In this chapter, we have finally concluded the journey in the “past.” I hope to have offered the reader at least a sample of how the weight of those particular circumstances may

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8 For an analysis of the effects produced by the new structuration of production on labor conflicts I will look during the work for the dissertation more carefully at L. Bobbio (1979) Lotta continua. Storia di un’Organizzazione Rivoluzionaria.
have affected the BR in its quest for the “future.” In the next two chapters, we will see and evaluate how the BR tried to negate those conditions and affirm its project for the world.

CHAPTER V
OPERATION SUNFLOWER

Introduction

As I mentioned both in Chapter I and II, the general framework that informs my interpretation of the group, relies on the historical materialist assumption that men make history but not under their own circumstances. For this reason, the dissertation tries to simultaneously acknowledge the “regressive” weight of the past circumstances and the progressive momentum created by individual projects. Accordingly, Chapter IV provided a historical interpretation of the Italian historical context trying to make visible a long durée process at work moved by structural issues that affected the Italian state since its constitution and frustrated attempts of the ruling class to attain an extended hegemony. Therefore offering an account that does not simply contextualize the BR but, more importantly, describes the forces and force field that contribute to determine the conditions in which the BR emerged and acted.

With chapter V, I inaugurate the analysis of the episodic dimension of my study that counterpoints the long term-anonymous structural time with individuals voices, motivations and actions by examining the BR’s kidnapping of Judge Mario Sossi. In 5.1 I will briefly describe how the Sossi’s kidnapping took place and how was “covered” by the four voices, the BR and three newspapers. In 5.2 I indentify themes in the different attempts to define the meaning of the event. In 5.3 I analyze those themes at the ideological level and in 5.4 I analyze them from at the hegemonic level.
5.1 Operation Sunflower

On April 18th 1974, Genoa judge Mario Sossi was kidnapped by the BR who pretended to exchange his release with the liberation of the convicted members of the group XXII October, (an organization with similar revolutionary heritage of the BR). The judge would be liberated by the BR on May 23 1974. At first, the BR assumed they have obtained the release of the XXII October members by the local judge but then, Genoa jurisdiction was overridden by the Ministry of Interior which in the end prevented the October XXII members from being set free. During the detention of the judge, the BR produced eight communiqués (C) which interacted with the media coverage of the event. I try to identify recurrent themes in the communiqués and the front pages and leading opinion articles published by the three newspapers during those thirty five days.

Let me first summarize the content of the BR’s messages. In C1 (4/19/1974), the lengthiest of all Cs (circa 750 words), the BR provided a detailed resume of Sossi’s life, highlighting his consistent reactionary and “fascist character, “the suspicious contacts with the secret services,” and the “collusion with local criminality.” For this reason he was going to be tried by a “Tribunale Rivoluzionario” (a revolutionary court). In addition, they explained the political meaning of the kidnapping and its relations with the revolutionary strategy against “neogaullism”\(^9\): “Comrades, we are entering into a new phase of the class struggle” and an exhortation to the proletariat to “transform the crisis of the regime in a revolutionary opportunity.”

\(^9\) NeoGaullism generally referred to the conservative political model offered by Charles DeGaulle to right wing governments of the 1970s. In relation to that, the BR’s use of the term was more specific and ideology loaded: neogaullism was fascism dressed up as liberal democracy.
In C2 (04/23/1974), the group showed extreme attention paid to media and the so-called “psychological war” the latter were allegedly conducting against the BR. The group maintained that in order to fight the machinations and ‘false communication” that media had unproblematically published, was going to provide a recognizable sign to determine the authenticity of the group’s message: “only the communiqués typed with the same typewriter used for the first Communiqué are authentic.” They also enclosed a picture and few lines written by the prisoner who reassured the family of his conditions, and invited the police to suspend the manhunt.

In C3 (04/26/1974) the BR started disclosing the confession that Sossi had released during the interrogations: the complicity between police and Genoa criminality, the contact that Sossi had with the Italian Secret Service (SID). The BR stated to consider Sossi as a “political prisoner” who would be exchanged for the comrades of XXII October group. The BR affirmed that the XXII October were not criminals but political prisoners. The group also made reference to their partisan lineage of “Resistenza”: “more and more comrades who took back the arms were joining the BR’s project by breaking with the paralyzing pacifist strategy of revisionism.” Even in this message there is a reference to the media as the BR commented on the media suspicion about the authenticity of Sossi’s message in C2: “whoever mistook Sossi’s will for ours demonstrates scarce capability to understand what the political problem consists of here: the question of the political prisoners.”

In C4 (05/04/1974), the BR kept reporting on the outcomes of the interrogation of “prisoner Sossi” who was being treated “with no sadism and tortures,” according to the international law for the humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war, the Geneva Convention.
According to the BR, Sossi admitted the illegal machinations orchestrated in order to arrest the XXII group members, and pointed to Minister of Interior Coco as the chief executioner of the “counter revolutionary plan.” The BR also provided the details for the exchange between Sossi and the XXII October. They explicitly stated that such negotiations, despite the attempt of the state, could not be concealed from the people.

In C5 (05/09/1974), the BR accused the government of being ready to sacrifice Sossi as heroic martyr and not following the state’s own sense of legality which was sacrificed for mere political interests: “behind the defense of the democratic state there were not moral or political motives but petty criminal ones.” The BR called the state to “assume its own responsibility” and invoke the state to function democratically.” They also kept disclosing secret connections between the police and criminality in order to frame the XXII October comrades.

In C6 (05/18/1974), the BR stated of being in possession of evidence of the machinations in which Sossi was involved. Once again, the BR engaged with the press accusing the newspapers of being servile to power and the state of trying to instrumentalize the media in order to hide the name of the state officials that Sossi considered being connected to criminality. The BR launched an ultimatum according to which if the XXII members were not set free, as per C4 conditions in 48 hours, Sossi would have been executed. The group stated that they did not believe in the Italian Law system which was defined as “illusions for the democrats” and to the violent force of the state they were going to respond with “reason and force.”
In C7 (05/23/1974), as per C2, the BR turned into a multimodal platform where both Sossi and the BR could communicate separately: on the one hand, Sossi sent four lines assuring his family about his good health conditions; on the other hand, the BR, assuming the XXII members were set free, recommended the released men to find asylum at the Vatican or the Cuban embassy. The group declared that only after having made sure the state complied with the agreement, they would have guaranteed Sossi’s liberation within the following 24 hours. In the same C, there is also reference to the continuous interaction between the BR and the media: in a context of anxiety and confusion in which false messages (allegedly sent by the BR) were published by the newspapers, the BR concluded their message of authenticity and clarification by saying “This is our word.”

Finally, in C8 (05/23/1974), we find the only C with a title which explains the BR’s rationale: “Why we release Mario Sossi.” Despite the fact that the XXII members at the end were not released, the BR considered themselves satisfied by the “level of contradiction” displayed inside the government during the kidnapping. In fact, the BR concluded the experience with a statement about the fruitfulness and instructiveness of the episode which uncover the face of its enemy (the state): “its democratic mask and its fascist face” and how the main contradiction of “the society is constructed around power relations.”

5.2 The Thematization of the BR’s Comuniques

In this section, I examine the texts of the BR and of the newspapers’ articles commenting on Sossi’s kidnapping, looking for recurrent themes. Then, in the last part of the chapter, I will consider the relations among those themes at the ideological level—consisting of the overt confrontation between different worldviews—and at the hegemonic level—consisting
of the implicit and unquestioned assumptions that the different voices seem to rely on in their rhetorical constructs.

As previously mentioned in chapter II, in order to give consistency to the criteria of thematization, I draw on Barthes’s observations (1979) on how to identify themes: the first condition is “their repetition” and the fact that a theme can be found in a variety of objects (p. 155). Second, if themes are recurrent and repeated in a number of different objects, therefore they must possess a common essential aspect that does not change (p.120). Thirdly, even though themes tend to appear in fragmentary ways, they are frequently organized in ideological networks (p. 122).

Let us start now examining the BR’s communiqués. The first theme emerging is the idea of an “Alternative State”, intended as a substitutive ensemble of legal, civic-moral and military apparati produced by class struggle, and specifically created by and for the ideal replacement of the bourgeois inhabitants of the state with the proletariat. However, if class struggle may change the social class who controls the state, the state implied by “Alternative State” is still constructed around very similar institutions compared to the bourgeois state: the existence of a judiciary system constituted by the “people’s Court of Justice;” an executive power which carries out the “people’s will;” and an armed force constituted by organizations such as the BR who have embraced the “armed struggle” and will enforce the new the social order.

According to Marxism Leninist strategies (see chapter II), the proletariat dictatorship represents a momentary and transitional instrumentalization of the state in order to liquidate or wither away the state as Lefvre (2009). This necessary moment of adoption of the state logic takes place conceptually long before the group could have potentially claimed to have gained control of the state. The BR then subverted the revolutionary “schedule” because envisioned the
emergence of all sort of para-state institutions which in the present conditions of the Sossi’s kidnapping not actually replacing the one of the Italian state but confronting them. When in C1 the BR inaugurates the Sunflower operation communication campaign, the group uses the following expression “An armed nucleus of the BR arrested and jailed in the people’s prison the infamous Mario Sossi.” The sense that one can take from such a sentence is not only the emergence of those counter-institutionalized loci of the Alternative State but their perfect operativity.

The term used in C1 “arresting” seems to me particularly significant. A legal dictionaries define arrest as a “A seizure or forcible restraint; an exercise of the power to deprive a person of his or her liberty; the taking or keeping of a person in custody by legal authority, especially, in response to a criminal charge.” Whereas its is understandable that the frontal attack of the BR to the state requires an exercise of power, the idea of custody by a sort of people’s “legal authority,” followed by listing of criminal acts that Sossi protracted in his life revealed a use of power with limited political sociological imagination and deprived of dialectics. It is in fact a counter power of a counter state, mimicking in specular way the morphology that for the BR seems to give its legitimation. Thus, in this reasoning, the “fundamental contradiction that today opposes the working class and revolutionary movement to the dark forces of the counter revolution” is not one dialectic but one manic heist, made by binary logic that class struggle is made by equal in form and logic but contrary forces such as “light” and “dark”: and therefore “no compromise is possible with the butcher of freedom” (C1).

The symbolic power of this counter-power alternative state notion seems so powerful that in C2 the positions between “state institutions” and “criminals” are not only subverted but,
more interestingly, inverted. “We don’t deal with criminals” the BR exlamated at the beginning of C5. The BR exhorted the state and their servile media to not play any machinations because “this is not a game and those machinations could aggravate the position of the prisoner.” In C3 the BR continued constructing a parallelism between the state of political prisoner of Sossi and the BR comrade in prison and for this reason is they will have to be subjected to a “political trial so Sossi will be.” In fact in C4 the interrogation of the prisoner and itself defense ended and “now it’s time of people ‘court decisions.’”

Furthermore, through “Alternative State” the BR frames the conflict with the Italian state as an asymmetrical confrontation between peer states: just like in the absolute war of Clausewitz in C3 and C4 the BR explicitly insisted on considering both their convicted BR comrades, the ones of XXII October and Sossi as “political prisoners,” who must be “treated according to Geneva Convection.” Then again, the BR seemed to follow the Westphalian principles of international relations: the principle of the sovereignty of states and the right of political self-determination, and the principle of (legal) equality between states (in Leurdijk, 1986). In such a dimension of the absolute enemy, also emerges an anthropoformization of the state which for the BR is embodied in the ruling party DC, its “pawns” such as Sossi, in constant interpellating the state with a plural “you” (in C2, C3, C4, C5, C8).

The level of symbolic articulation of the anti dialectic binary code between the BR and its enemy is further demonstrated in the second theme I found is named “Arcana Imperii” (secretive state). There are two intertwined aspects connected to such a theme: the general impact of unclaimed terroristic bombings and, more specifically, how radical groups such as the BR interpreted them; and the distinctive modus operandi of the “bourgeois state.” First of all, the
BR, as much of the whole 1968 movement, was extremely impacted by a series of traumatizing events which occurred during the period of 1969-84, when Italy suffered of numerous bloody bomb attempts: Milan in 1969, Peteano in 1972, a Bologna-Florence train in 1974, Brescia in 1974, Bologna in 1980, and Val di Sambro in 1984. Those bombs and their unclear origins substantially aggravated the situation of social tension by radicalizing the action of the extra parliamentary left that interpreted the bombs as repressive messages sent by the state.

The suspicion of “state terrorism” was at least in part justified. For instance, during the 1969 “Piazza Fontana Bomb” in Milan, after an initial and hardly credible anarchic trail, the investigation led the inquisitors to follow the so called “black trail” which proved the involvement of the Italian secret services with neo-fascist groups. The bomb in Milan was regarded by the radical left movement as the “loss of innocence” of the confrontation against power. In fact, after relatively non-violent demonstrations which characterized the 1968 movements, the Piazza Fontana bomb contributed to lead many ultra left groups towards the option of the armed struggle because ‘violence could only be fought by violence’.

The qualification of official politics as “Arcana Imperii” was also linked to the well-grounded concerns about the revival of Fascism. First of all, as Zavoli notices (1991), despite the political and military defeat of Fascism in 1945, much of the military high ranks and key figures of the administration of the old dictatorial regime managed to recycle in the Republican era. Moreover, the connection between the radical right and elements of the state was also confirmed by the coup d’etat attempts organized by ultra right military officers as in the case of the so

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10 Indicative of the new approach to violence were the slogans appearing in the street manifestations by early 1970s such as “Mai piu senza fucile” (“no more without rifles”) or “il potere non si cambia, si abbatte” (“power cannot be changed but only assaulted”). Equally eloquent were the articles published by autonomist newspaper Lotta continua which started writing articles celebrating violence as the highest form of political struggle.
called “Tora Tora’ plan. It was an attempt to seize power enacted by military battalions led by the Fascist ex Officer Junio Valerio Borghese, who, during the night of December 1970, occupied several governmental sites. In addition, a very powerful right wing mason organization linked to the ruling class called Propaganda 2 (popularly known as P 2) had a plan for a “democratic re-birth” synthesized in a document which had concrete objectives: to transform the constitutional regime into a presidential Republic, restrictions to the constitutional rights, to augment the policing actions, to re-establish capital penalty, to abolish strike rights, and to reform labor rights in authoritative terms.

The other aspect of the “Arcana Imperii” theme is associated with a critique that the BR systematically carried out against the bourgeois state and its particular way of functioning characterized by secrecy and the lack of transparency. “Arcana Imperii” describes a state acting behind the people, against the people (in the Sossi’s “communiqué “the BR denounced and provided proofs of connection between the police and local criminalities). According to the BR, the bourgeois secretive state exemplified a conception of power made of cowardice, petty interests and avarice. In all messages, the BR addressed the state with terms such as “counterrevolutionary plan of the state “ (C1), the “intrigues” (C1), “obscure forces of counterrevolutions” (C1), “falsified messages” (C2), “the game of mis-information” (C2) “complicity [of the state] with criminality” (C3), “strategy [of the state]” (C3), “the frame up” (C4), “secret negotiations,” (C4) “the artisans of the provocation” (C4) “dirty money” (C4), “criminals” (C5), “morally poor motives of criminality” (C5) “the censorship of the media just like in the worst fascist times” (C6)“the democratic mask” (C8)”bloody fascist face” (C8)

What the Aracana Imperii theme helps clarifying is that the opposition create by the class struggles is social, political and moral in a very profound sense. As we will see in a moment, in
a context of consistent lacking of political recognition from the government and the media is
morality seems the other leverage to legitimate the BR’s activity that sides the notion of
alternative state as binomial mutually feeding each other legitimacy.

The shady nature of “Arcana Imperii”, is juxtaposed to the third theme, “Public Sphere,”
or the BR’s effort to produce and maintain a political system characterized by transparency and
the Enlightenment principle of publicity (e.g. Habermas, 1991). The BR, in several occasions,
were trying to uncover the “machinations” of the state performing like a sort of investigative
journalism, making the state and its “Arcana Imperii” mode accountable. In C1, for instance,
they provided an extremely detailed resume of Sossi’s “fascist deeds” (C1). Furthermore, the BR
were eager to show the outcomes of Sossi’s interrogation and denounced his connections with
“Genoa criminality” (C4), and “secret service intrigues” (C4), and so shed light on the “big
shady power [of the state]” (C4).

The preoccupation of the BR to enter in the public sphere, and shape public opinion
through the so called “armed propaganda” was a twofold one as its voice struggled between
inclusive and exclusive objectives. On the one hand, there was the need of complying with the
ideologically informed expectations of its sectarian audience (BR’s members and other
ideological affine radical groups), on the other, the group was trying to appeal to the larger
audience by conveying ideas and values which could potentially represent the whole society.
For this reason, the BR’s texts comprised at least two communicative modes: one rich in
technicalisms drawing from the Marxist tradition idiomatic expression (but also mediated by the
Italian Marxist tradition) and one more divulging which resembled an offensive kind of
investigative journalism.
The communicative exigencies of the BR’s voice also reflected the general political problem of the ultra left during those years: the lack of representation. The Italian Communist Party (also known in Italy as PCI) had always been suspicious of the extra parliamentary left and never tried to act as the mediating interlocutor between those movementist groups and the institutions. Not accidentally, most BR members were dissidents and rejected member of the PCI. Such a reticence of the PCI to mediate was evident in the attitude of *L’Unita* (PCI’s official party newspaper).

Just like with the “Alternative State” theme, the way “Public Sphere” constructs the opposition between BR and its enemy is, to say the least ambiguous. As we mentioned in Chapter III, an interesting way to frame the opposition between the proletariat and the bourgeois at the level of knowledge and experience is through the definition provided by Negt and Kluge (1972) of the public sphere and the potential opposition of the bourgeois public sphere created by the proletarian one. According to the two authors, the proletarian public sphere has the potential to create an alternative new view of the social experience, in other words a new mediation between the sphere of production and culture. Certainly Negt and Kluge talks about the mutual constitution and opposition of the two public spheres in terms of dialectical relationship but this does not seem to completely describe what the BR were after.

The BR by contrast seemed more concerned to make an immanent critique of the bourgeois public sphere not to make visible the contradictions of a general model of social experience but only to attack a specific historic manifestation of it (i.e. the Italian public sphere

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11 The political project associated to the resistance was perceived as being betrayed not only by the institutionalization of the communist ideology through the PCI, but also by the increasing level of compromise that the Communist party was entertaining with the Christian Democrats (which resolved in 1976 with a governmental alliance between the two parties symbolized by the so called “historic compromise,” considered by the non institutional left as the apogee of the betrayal of the Resistance’s project).
ruled). In other words, the BR, with its investigative journalism asserted implicitly the potential for a perfect bourgeois model rather than one replacing it. The “transparency” of the BR is not alternative to Kant’s concept of publicity. In the same way, the light that is supposed to contrast the shady “Aracana Imperii” is not so different from the “Enlightenment” that was supposed to end the dark middle age. One wonders whether the BR were simply after a completion of the so called “modernity project” in Italy.

Compared to the ambiguous cultural lineage of “Alternative State” and “Public Sphere,” one theme which seems to stand out for its apparent revolutionary ‘purity’ is “Armed Praxis.” As examined in chapter III, the Armed Praxis is regarded as the most pure, most immediate and unmediated form for the BR to contradict the status quo. It is indeed in the violent praxis that the BR makes of its self the contradiction that liberates history form the historic blockage constructed by the Italian state. It in such a Sartrean “negation of the negation” that the BR sees the origin of the absolute positive: Socialism.

Armed Praxis expresses at least two different aspects of BR’s rhetoric of militarism: one connected to the BR’s class/state struggle and one aimed at substantiating with militarist symbolic values the otherwise ethereal idea of Communism. The most immediate purpose of the armed struggle is to overthrown the ethic-political, historical social universe of the bourgeois order. But its valence is much more extended. “Armed Praxis” first served the purpose of reinforcing the ideological binary opposition between “Alternative States” (the proletarian state) and “Arcana Imperii” (the bourgeois state), in other words, “Armed Praxis” aimed at persuading the bourgeois state to be facing a real, concrete and, most of all, a respectable enemy: the BR as the military advanced guard of the proletarian state. Indicative of
such a standpoint was first of all the very name of the group, “Red brigades” in all C\(^1\), self-
qualification as “armed nucleus” (C1), the continuous reference to “prisoners” in all Cs, the
reference to “Geneva Convention” (C4) and the obsessive reiteration of the military distinction
between “tactic” and “strategy” (C1).

The second aspect concerns the semantic potential of armed struggle to ease the lack of
concrete historic content for the project to establish a Communist society: the potential to stuff
an idea with praxis. If praxis in Sartre’s terms (1976) I contain always a component future, the
armed praxis of the BR represents a way to access the discursive universe of the future: the
“Communist liberation\(^{{13}}\).” Such reification through militarism relates to the communicative
strategy of the BR: a combination of words and action in which one aspect informed the other.
The BR, as many Marxists of that time, by not considering the Soviet Union as an example of a
viable model for the transition to Communism\(^{14}\), did not really have any consistent historic
referent for how the communist society looked.

The BR, as many Marxists of that time, by not considering the Soviet Union as an
element of a viable model for the transition to Communism\(^{1}\), did not really have any consistent
historic referent for how the communist society looked. Communism remained an idea limited to
the status of a linguistic sign without social and historic reference. It was from such an abstract
idea that the BR derived substantial aspects of their project such as their consistent distinction
between “tactic” and “strategy,” in other words, distinguishing between short-term intermediary

\(^{12}\) The historic lineage of the term brigade is extremely significant to understand the BR’s motivations: the name
derives from from the Partisan brigades and in particular one, the Garibaldi Brigade (Brigata Garibaldi). The
reference that directly make to the Partisan Resistance and indirectly to the Risorgimento, as we shall see, possibly
reveals the internalization by the BR of the bourgeois’ preoccupation to finish the incomplete Risorgimental project
of construct a nation-state.

\(^{14}\) BR considered the USSR as the US, as particular forms of imperialisms, even the Maoism represented for them
more a means to achieve Communism rather than Communism itself.
and long-term ultimate objectives. At the tactic level, the BR produced a concrete analysis of the Italian situation and “what was to be done” (such as “bringing the attack to the heart of the state, “of the first years or “unleashing a civil war, “later on). At the strategic level the only element which seemed clear was the dialectical telos of history. In fact according to an embracement of a rather rigid dialectical materialism, the BR expected history inevitably unfolding, but that could not actually fill the content of the communist idea only the promise of its realization.

This profound epistemological asymmetry characterizing “Armed Praxis” between the “idealized unknown” (Communism) and the “demonized known” (the bourgeois order), derives what Aquinas (Summa Theological, 1989, III, 63 p. 3) called “the ecstasies of the soldier.” This is the sacramental character of the armed struggle which consists of the unconditioned emotional participation to the future, and translates into the rebellion against the present as an overwhelming reflection of the past. This condition creates the basis for a sort of “leap of faith” between the known of the present and the unknown of the future.

Finally, in connection to the strategic sense of the BR, the last theme I identified is Telos, or the presence of a teleological conception of history emerging from BR’s comments such as “comrades we are entering in the next phase of the class struggle “(C1), and “the strategic sense of our choice [about the future].” On the one hand, they seem to follow a dialectic-materialist idea according to which history develops through emerging contradictions; on the other hand, those contradictions were not self evident but required human agency to be fully developed, displayed and acted upon. This is the dimension of agency where the BR members pictured themselves. In C4 the BR continues pointing at the “necessary ways the bourgeois class develops its project of repression against the proletariat.” Finally in C8, the
group talks about that one of the positive outcomes of the Sunflower operation was to have made visible the contradictions which will bring down the system.

Connected to “Telos” and the relevance of contradictions is the way BR understood the concept of crisis in the capitalist system. The rationale that groups such as the BR could be phrased as it follows “we are going to aggravate the already present level of antagonism between ruling and subaltern class by increasing the level of contradictions inside the social system (the idea of the critical mass or the pressure cooking pot principle of dialectical materialism).”

The detecting of a profound crisis by the BR was correct: crisis of the representative democracy, crisis of the institutional left, crisis of a model of accumulation of capital, and cultural crisis triggered by the 1968 social movements. As Wagner-Pacific (1980, p.22) observed, the idea of crisis was a “topos of Italian political consciousness” of the 1970s. Where the analysis was more hazardous was in the intensity of the reaction of the state. Longo (1969), a *Le Monde* journalist described the one of the many case social unrest occurred on April 1969:

“It seemed to presage civil war […] an authentic revolt: two dead, hundreds of wounded, the town hall in flames, the station cut off, the main roads impassable, the autostrada del Sole [the most important Italian highway] blocked by tree trunks and iron girders, hundreds of police fleeing, disarmed, besieged in the barracks, dozens of coaches and buses lying across the streets downtown, fifteen police cars overturned and set on fire”

Those episodes were understood by the BR as manifestation of telluric movements of the society. In its first articulated political reflection (The “Self interview of the 1971”) the BR abstractly connected capital and state through an uncritical adoption of the theory of reflection, which makes the state derivative of capital, therefore an economic crisis would have implied a crisis of the state as well. According to the BR, the state in crisis would have reacted by
establishing a so-called “bloc of reactionary order” (an analysis present in several BR political texts); in other words, the state losing consent would have disciplinized civil society through pure repression.

In reality, since the Sossi’s kidnapping, the state governed by the DC showed the capability to establish consent based on the so-called “national solidarity,” a sense of common condition facing the economic crises, an austerity policy, the moral panic connected to the Cold War, the political violence and the bombs. BR had initial destabilizing effects on the state, but the BR’s objective of dis-articulation of the state almost produced the opposite effect: the emergency state condition produced (even if not entirely and solely) by the BR obliged the political power to find more stable agreements and negotiations among all the institutional political forces. The “historical compromise” in 1976 between Moro (the leader of the Christian democrats who would be punished for this reactionary political success) and Togliatti (leader of the PCI) display this hegemonic capability.

Connected to the mis-interpretation of the signs of an epochal crisis, there was also the adoption of politically essentialist perspective. First of all, according to Marx revolution-counter revolution can never be hypostatized as direct confrontation between two poles (in Bongiovanni, 1981, p.97) or “bourgeois state” vs. “proletariat state” as the BR suggested. In fact, the two processes operate at different levels: the proletarian revolution has a social character, whereas the bourgeois counter revolution has a political character. Second, the BR overestimated the level of escalation of the antagonism which, according to the radical group, should have reached the level of civil war, and, in reality, such an antagonism contributed to compact the majority of population under a hegemonic order.
Finally, another aspect of “Telos” regards the idea of contradiction, as the concept in which more clearly the BR recombined the dimension of agency and structure. If it is true that according to dialectical materialism history progress through contradictions in episode such as Sossi and Moro’s kidnapping, the BR were very concerned in communicating how one fundamental objective of its struggle was to make emerge the internal contradictions inside the bourgeois state, thus the credit of making the telos for the Italian history visible.

To sum up, the analysis of the BR’s communiqués reveals indeed the presence of recurrent themes such as “Alternative State,” “Arcana Imperii,” “Armed Praxis,” and “Telos.” We proceed now to examine the front-page articles of the three newspapers. As we shall see, at the ideological level, those newspapers appeared to have in common a marked rejection of both the BR’s project and their means used to achieve that, however will also reveal significant distances between one another.

5.3 The Rhetorics of Il Corriere della Sera, La Stampa and L’Unita.

As already mentioned, the press, in occasion of Sossi’s kidnapping, struggled to understand what the BR were really about. However, this common myopia did not prevent the three newspapers from assuming substantially different positions in regard to the BR. Il Corriere della Sera was consistently more preoccupied with the state’s adequate response to terrorism rather than wondering about the nature of the BR; La Stampa explicitly criminalized rather than politicizing the group; finally L’Unita defined the group as the protagonists of the so-called “strategy of tension,” and possibly “right wing provocateurs.”

In terms of identifiable themes, since we are looking at three different newspapers led by different editorial lines, ownership interests and political power affiliations (see chapter III), it is
important to distinguish between themes recurring consistently inside a given newspaper and those which could be considered as common to all of them. Among individual newspaper based themes, during the Sossi kidnapping emerged in L’Unita a populist conceptualization of the civil society theme preoccupied with framing the working class movement as the quintessence of Italian democratic movements and therefore the quintessence of societal civic virtue.

L’Unita was concerned with capitalizing on the Communist heritage of the antifascist partisan ‘resistance’ during WWII and with the democratic transition from dictatorship to constitutional Republic (1945-47). The Newspaper reflected the PCI’s objective to insert its Communist lineage into the narrative of democratic achievements of Post-fascist Italy. The most representative example of such a political goal is provided by the leading opinion articles published on the International Workers’ day of 1974 (May 1st), when the PCI leader, Berlinguer, stated that the masses of workers represented the “pillar of Italian democracy” (5/01/1974).

Despite L’Unita’s effort to deny a common ideological ground with the BR, the Marxist tradition embedded in “Civil Society” produced similar motives found in the BR’s “Telos”: the idea of a democratic/proletariat movement was represented by the image of a mass of people marching towards the future, literally progressing and thus revealing a purposeful sense of history. A marked distance could be found though in the nature of such a teleological movement: the PCI’s position, represented by L’Unita, once accepted the idea of social democratic reform of capitalism, tended to a progressively linear understanding of historic development; the BR instead still retained the contradictory movement according to dialectic materialism and aimed at the revolution.

Another theme individually developed can be found in Il Corriere della Sera’s preoccupation for a “Rational Response” to terrorism. This specific newspaper seemed to act as a
critical and self reflective vigilant of the state institutions. Whereas, La Stampa was concerned with the regular and functional operations of the society (revealing the instrumental preoccupations to maintain ideal political economic conditions for the reproduction of capital) and L’Unita was fighting a double front war in order to gain (or not loose) electorate in institutional politics and to distance itself from the wing extremisms, Il Corriere della Sera seemed to almost speak from inside the state institutions. For instance, Durand described the events connected to Sossi as the state insider view and such commenting on the “rationale of the state’s strategy” (05/06/1974). Il Corriere della Sera demanded through several leading opinion articles the state “to prepare a coherent program of response to terrorism” (04/21/1974), or evaluating the “seriousness of the government” (04/23/1974), proposed to give “more room for action to the executive power” (04/20/1974).

The last individual theme that I identified, it is mainly produced by La Stampa’s reporter Barbato, the journalist inside La Stampa specialized in covering terrorism who paid particular attention to the “Human Drama” lived by Sossi, his families and Sossi’s colleagues. Among the recurrent themes that I indentified in my analysis of the three newspapers, this is the one most prone to sensationalism and least prone to interpretation. For instance, every time Sossi sent a message trough the BR’s communiqué, La Stampa would fill the front page with comments of Sossi’s family (especially Sossi’s wife, Grazia Sossi) and colleagues or the friends of the judge who offer gather funds to help the Sossi family (05/10/1974). In other occasions, Barbato reported the words of solidarity of the president of the Republic Leone (in La Stampa, 16/05/1974). Finally, the day of the liberation Barbato described with many details the reconjunction of the judge with his family, quoting part of their dialogues of pathos. (in La Stampa, 5/24/1974).
The first theme which was fully embraced by L’Unita, La Stampa and by “Il Corriere della Sera” is “The Strategy of Tension.” Strategy of Tension referred to a theory describing how powerful subjects divided, manipulated, and controlled public opinion using fear, propaganda, disinformation, psychological warfare, agents provocateurs, and false flag terrorist actions. This was a theme that strongly resonated with BR’s “Arcana Imperii,” referring in both cases to a reactionary strategy to create a state of emergency and moral panics in Italy. The important difference is that for the BR, the newspapers participated as partner in crime of such a plot again the proletariat. As for the previous theme “Civil Society,” L’Unita, by reproducing this theme, was determined to depict the group as “provocateurs” which act as regressive force for the democratic institutions (20/04/1974) and therefore creating ideological markers to discriminate between L’Unita’s Communism and the BR’s one.

The three newspapers understood “Strategy of Tension” differently. For L’Unita, that consisted of machinations orchestrated by a presumed radical right wing group masked as a Leninist group possibly associated to the reactionary objectives of the ruling party DC: Paolucci asserted (L’Unita, 04/20/1974) “the Red Brigades only strike when the right decides it,” or Tortorella (L’Unita, 04/24/1974) who defined the BR’s action as “provocation from the right wing.” La Stampa and Il Corriere della Sera, reproduced a similar characterization but with an important variation compared to L’Unita: the Communist newspaper was certain that the so called Strategy of Tension was a product of the right wing radical groups (possibly associated with the state’s secret service), whereas Il Corriere and La Stampa, tended to point their finger towards left radical groups.

As Colombo wrote (in La Stampa, 04/28/1974) “the BR consistently mobilize in the most critical moments.” In another article, Barbato (in La Stampa 05/04/1974) suggested that behind
the BR there is “political maneuver” especially during electoral campaigns. In the Corriere della Sera, Pansa talked about “enigma and perplexities about the BR” (Il Corriere della Sera, 04/20/1974). Durand also suggested that Sossi’s words were somehow manipulated, especially when the judge allegedly recognized of having committed mistakes’ (Il Corriere della Sera 05/03/1974) or when Sossi writes to Leone, the President of the Republic (In Pansa, Il Corriere della Sera, 05/06/1974).

Finally, another powerful theme which recurrent on all the three newspapers with remarkable consistence was “Raison d'État”, in other words the faith in state institutions and the conviction that the state existence in itself represented a reason to defend it because a society without a state would look like Hobbes’s “war of all against all.” Certainly, the most consistent supporter of this theme was Il Corriere della Sera which almost every day during the kidnapping published front page leading opinion articles inciting to maintain the “integrity of the state against provocation” of the BR (Il Corriere della Sera, 05/03/1974). Durand incited the state to not negotiate with the BR (Il Corriere della Sera, 04/28/1974), Sensini talked about “another challenge to the state” (Il Corriere della Sera, 04/20/1974) and appealed to “the unity of the state” (04/22/1974), demanding “an adequate state response to terrorism” (04/24/1974), and celebrating the “importance of public order” (05/10/1974). Il Corriere was less concentrated to debate on the BR’s ideological affiliation rather on the nature of their attack against the established state institutions, e “state’s self defense” and the “dignity of the state that must be defended” (Durand, in Il Corriere della Sera, 05/22/1974).

15 The timing several journalists referred about was the occasion of the imminent referendum to legalize divorce which, in catholic country as Italy, represented a prime occasion for political contention between conservatory and filo-catholic parties and progressive-laic parties.
La Stampa frequently addressed the same question, with incitements such as the “the state does not have to succumb to fear” (La Stampa, 04/21/1974) or “ultimate challenge to the state and to civility” (05/19/1974) and “why we must say no (to negotiations)” (La Stampa, 05/28/1974). “Raison d'État” also implies giving particular authority to the words of political charges, Pansa for instance cites frequently the words of the President of the Italian Republic Leone (Corriere dell Sera, 04/22/1974): ”the country will let not itself be terrorized,” the president of the constitutional court Saragat who incites “defend the law” (La Stampa 05/28/1974). Even La Stampa (05/15/1974) pays a lot of attention to institutional charges declaration but the tone is also less institutions centers rather more focused on the humanity of the message possibly mediated by the presence in La Stampa of the theme “Human Drama.”

L’Unita reproduced “Raison d'État” by comments such as Napolitano wrote in the appealing to conserve the “democratic and laic institutions of the state” (L’Unita, 04/21/1974). However, the relevance of this theme in the Communist newspaper should be considered secondary especially because mediated by its own individual theme, “Civil Society.” For instance, in the occasion of the liberation of Sossi, the three newspapers all dedicated considerable space to opinion leading columns in which they show rather clearly the main frames used to understand the event. Let us see in more detail how the three newspapers framed the epilogue for Sossi’s kidnapping.

Il Corriere della Sera and La Stampa quite predictably celebrated the strategy of the state, it strength to not have conceded a political victory to the BR. When Sossi is liberated Pansa and Durand co-author a piece in which they explain why the state’s strategy was the right one (in Il Corriere della Sera, 05/24/1974) about the importance of not undermining the state’s credibility.” Instead, L’Unita celebrated the moral strength of the civil society to not have
succumbed to terror and to have reacted in profoundly democratic ways. Comparing how the three newspapers reproduce the RE theme, certainly L’Unita represents the newspapers less involved in reproducing such a theme.

In the specific editorial line of the L’Unita, when one confronts the themes of “Raison d'État” and “Civil Society” one can easily appreciate how the L’Unita, informed by the Marxist tradition, reflects an explicit distinction between ‘state’ and ‘government’ and such distinction possesses the same qualitative distance between BR’s “Alternative State” and “Arcana Imperii” themes: both the L’Unita and the BR seem more concerned or contest the specific inhabitants of the state under the form of a temporary government but not necessarily totally contesting the idea of the state (especially seen as ensemble of democratic institutions).

5.4 The Red and the Black: The Open Confrontations of the Ideological level.

Like in Stendhal’s famous romance (1947 [1830]), the context of rhetorical competition between the different voices at the ideological level seemed dominated by binary oppositions between worldviews. Those dichotomies were reproduced by singular themes and by the articulation of themes or what Barthes (1979, p.249) defined as “ideological construct.” At this level the most evident confrontation is between the BR’s “Alternative State,” “Armed Praxis,” “Arcana Imperii” and “Telos” against the three newspapers “Raison d’état,” “Strategy of Tension,” “Rational Response,” “Human Drama” and “Civil Society” as two different worldviews. The former radically contrasting with the principle of state of right and peaceful civil coexistence and the latter was representing the established principles of legality and morality. But at the ideological level, the three newspapers alignment is more externally constructed in their opposition to the BR rather than being based on ideological commonalities.
Only from the common perspective of “Raison d’Etat,” possibly the strongest common theme, the three newspapers appear almost as a homogenous bloc opposing the BR. Such a bloc confronted the group not in defensive ways but actually by attacking it at several levels: under such a theme’s communicative mode, the BR was depicted as first of all ridiculous and pathetic in its objectives and modus operandi. Furthermore, at the specific level of “Raison d'État” the three newspapers assumed a position of institutional superiority more preoccupied to defend an idea of the state and its axiomatic raison d’être rather than its concrete agent (such as Sossi). Thus, whereas the BR were considered capable of rhetorically challenging “Raison d’état “by its acts and words, the group was considered in fact incapable of actually harming the idealization of the state implied by “Raison d'État.”

However, as we already noticed, except for the powerful “Raison d'État,” the examination of the newspapers revealed relevant internal differences in the way each rhetoric was informed by its particular interests and ideology. This is evident in the different takes on “Strategy of Tension” and also how specific newspaper themes (such as “Civil Society” for L’Unita and “Human Drama” for La Stampa) interacted with the preponderant theme “Raison d’État.” The most outstanding example was L’Unita’s celebratory theme of the moral and civic strength of the people, “Civil Society,” which tended to down-play the embracement of the PCI’s newspaper of Raison d’État” and its subsequent ideological assumptions. This was also true for La Stampa’s “Human drama” according to which subjective dramatic feelings (of the protagonists of the event) were privileged over the impersonal institution of the state.

The ‘ideological’ dimension of our analysis provides a clear opportunity to observe how the different framing of the kidnapping displayed rather overtly the ideological distance between
the four perspectives. As we have already mentioned in chapter III, the BR, following the Marxist traditional critique considered the state as a “mystification of equality” (Bonefeld, 2002: p.130), as an agent securing inequality of production and the property of those who have it from attacks by the masses who only possess their labor power). Such a view was opposed first of all by the voice of the institutionalized Euro-Communism of the L’Unita, which, being ideologically the closest to the BR, was also the one most strongly opposing it at both the level of theory and praxis.

Whereas La Stampa and Il Corriere della Sera, opposition was visceral and did not even try to enter in to the level of an immanent critique of the BR, L’Unita felt more compelled for obvious reasons to engage on what Communism really was and who could claim it. As we mentioned in Chapter IV, the PCI led by Togliatti and then by Berlinguer tried in the post war years to gain recognition inside institutional politics and through the Communist trade union, the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) advance a reformist strategy of capitalism rather than bringing the revolution L’Unita, representing the position of the PCI, interpreted Gramsci’s consideration on western civil society and the so called “war of position” (1971) to mean a slow and long way to socialism from within the liberal democratic institutions.

This perspective implied a struggle carried out first of all at the level of conventional politics, thus supporting the indirect democratic principle of political representativeness. At socially prosecuted by the civil society manifesting its will with public demonstration in the public sphere space of the square and inside the factory by organizing strikes. L’Unita, then conceptualized politics as mediation: the political mediation of the party inside the parliament but also the social and political mediation in the factories and squares of the powerful communist
trade union, the CGIL. In contrast to that, the BR apparently aspired to immediacy embodied in
the crudeness of its words and actions, in their synthesis, in what they considered the most
elloquent rhetoric, the armed praxis. The meaning of mediation was for the group synonymous of
compromise in the action and malice and ambiguousness in the word. In other words, mediation
was the way of “Arcana imperii.”

Then, we find the positions of La Stampa and Il Corriere della Sera which were
representing two different kinds of preoccupation of the Italian bourgeois class. La Stampa’s
interlocutors were the Northen Italian Capitalists represent by the Employers Federation (the
Confindustria led not accidentally by the owner of La Stampa, G. Agnelli) and the small
employers of the industrious Piedmont region. As mentioned before, in La Stampa the
ideological dimension was, from a Marxist point of view, at the same time concealed and
displayed at the highest level. It was concealed in the apparently neutral concerns on the
effective functioning of the society but it was also displayed in its purely instrumental and
biggest concern: the reproduction of capital.

Whereas La Stampa had as intended ideal reader the productive entrepreneurial heart of
the country, Il Corriere della Sera aimed at two other strata: to the high bourgeois class fraction
who was powerful and (materially) motivated enough to be interested in the state institutions in
the same measure as it intended to affect their policy; the second stratum comprised the mid-high
cadres of the white collars. In relation to La Stampa, we find the bourgeois quasi-institutional
voice of Il Corriere della Sera certainly appears even more inclusive than the Turin newspaper
especially considering the remarkable weight of white collars in the Italian class structure
In the Italian context of mid.1970s those perspectives also represented the fragmentation of the national public sphere into ideologically compartmentalized and self referential publics which impeded the perspectives of the newspapers to really converse with one another. This certainly confirms the diagnosis made in Chapter IV about the aggregative as opposed to integrative nature of the Italian political model. Thus, if the interaction between the newspapers was to say the least, very limited, and the ideological characterization very pronounced, one should wonder what was the common ground from which they developed similar positions such as the recurrence and consistency of the theme of the state integrity. Possibly due to the deep sentiments of rejection for terrorism, one should have expected the three newspapers to align rather closely against the BR’s oppositional voice.

To conclude this section, at the ideological level, the four rhetorics can be seen in competing with one another but also, looking at the three newspapers, aligned against the BR when core constitutive principles of democratic and peaceful coexistence are challenged by the radical group. It is clear that the BR were extremely far from leading morally and intellectually Italian civil society. On the one hand the BR seemed to acknowledge about the need to expand their ideas in the civil society when one thinks at their “armed propaganda objective. On the other hand, they did not seem to recognize the value of the Gramscian lesson about the impracticability of a “frontal attack” to the institutions. At the ideological level, phrasing it in Negt and Kluge’s terms (1972), the BR idealized the confrontation between the bourgeois and proletarian public sphere as two independent, distinct and legitimate horizons of meanings instead of seeing hem dialectically related.

Such an assumptions on the “proletarian public sphere” leads the BR to refuse the “mediating doctrine” of the PCI represented by L’Unita, because it would have compromised the
purity of the proletarian experience. But even assuming the possibility of preserving the authenticity of the proletariat experience the group underestimated the “fortified entrenchment” of the civil society (in Gramsci, SPN, p.238) which "is not, in reality, constituted simply by the actual trenches, but by the whole organizational and industrial system of the territory which lies to the rear of the army in the field" (SPN, p. 234). The objective of the BR was to destroy the Italian state but in a society such as the Italian, in which the welfare state mediated capital and labor the link between state and civil society was incredibly strong: welfare state, the mediation of mass political parties and trade union, the link between the state and the church. Thus, the three newspapers formed ideological articulation against the BR represents such an entrenchment that “a fierce artillery attack seemed to have destroyed the enemy’s entire defensive system, whereas in fact it had only destroyed the outer perimeter (SPN, p. 235).

However, what separates the BR from the press I examined, this entrenchment constructed along principles of legality, faith in the democracy and established institutions, at a closer look, looses definition. In the next section, moving towards the hegemonic dimension, I will show how the themes conveyed by the BR, so overtly opposing and contesting the Italian social order, at the ideological level, start revealing important commonalities which will place them more and more proximity to the field ruled by common primordial assumptions about the social order.

5.5 The Common Ground: the Struggle over the State Inhabitants.

The great lesson of Bloch’s The Principle of Hope (1986) is that ideology critique should comprise both the assessment of the deceptive and illusory aspects as well as the emancipatory-utopian elements of all living ideologies. In many ways, all the four ideologies just examined are projects for the future as they contain an anticipatory dimension producing images of a better
world. BR’s ideology was no exception: as we analyzed in chapter II and III it was a liberating promise from death, exploitation, pain and inequality. But if ideology according to Bloch must be read dialectically because of its utopian content, another constitutive aspect of its u-topos condition is also the myth of ideal and moral “purity” and this was a serious problem of the group’s worldview.

Dealing with the social system is an “impure” business, as the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1968) showed. Modern social universe is ideologically and rhetorically constructed on the utopia of perfect margins, sealed compartments but in reality is made of permeable borders, osmotic fields and liminalities. It is in chaos that we find change and production of history: it is from the liminal condition of being product and producer that the proletariat according to can produce its superior epistemological standpoint (Lukacs, 1971), it was in the liminal condition of the Italian petty bourgeois class that one finds one of the main cause for 1968’s movements. In that respect, the BR and the three newspapers imagined the distance between each other in terms of binary oppositions. But especially for the radical project of social change the relationship between state and civil should have been conceived more dialectically.

As we mentioned, at the ideological level, the BR constructed a clear binary opposition between two conceptualizations of the state: “Alternative State”+ “Public sphere” + “Telos” and “Armed Praxis” opposed to “Arcana Imperii,” the definition the BR attributed to the bourgeois state. At this level, the political philosophy informing the BR had a distinctive Marxian and Leninist character. However, if at the ideological level the BR’s position seemed clear, what also was implicit and implied in the BR’s themes was an incomplete emancipation from the conceptualization of the liberal state and the very idea of state. In other words, the BR seemed to
struggle to be able to contest the hegemonic naturalization of the state in its core values. As Bakunin (2005, p.178) observed “who ever says State says, a State” a particular historic specific state. “What tends to group together different conceptualizations of the state is an eminently theological, metaphysical and political idea of authority” and this idea seemed to be still retained in the BR’s project.

From this point of view, the apparent rigid divisions between opposing historic subjects/classes (bourgeois and proletariat) starts blurring as the BR, in “Alternative State” and “Public Sphere” and “Armed Praxis” display an ambivalent embracement of the very values founding the modern liberal state: a principle of mutual legitimation/recognition (because BR in “Alternative State” mode seek recognition from the bourgeois state), state of right (both in “Alternative State” and “Public Sphere” mode the BR demand justice), the division of power (the denouncing of the machinations of “Arcana Imperii” is carried out through an almost sympathetic immanent critique of the liberal state in which power is structured according to a political divisions of labor that allows the ideal “check and balance”), the Habermasian principle of publicity (because in “Public Sphere” mode BR performed very much as member of the bourgeois public sphere demanding transparency and accountability of the governing institutions), the international relations ‘etiquette’ policing the war confrontation between states (in the “Alternative State” mode BR recognize the Westphalian logic behind the Genève Convention on war prisoners).

Moreover, “Public Sphere” relates to “Arcana Imperii” as two understanding of the political and the public sphere, as the former retains power by hiding its activity where as the latter shares power (with the people) by always displaying its logic and the will behind it (the
people). More specifically, “Alternative State” is characterized by an internal tension between self-affirmation and social recognition: this theme is consistently expressed by a standpoint disowning the legality of the Italian state but, at the same time, the BR strived for the institutional recognition granted from the very state they wanted to demystify its legitimacy. Legality and legitimation are used by the BR’s rhetoric both as tool for both a transcendental and immanent critique. Transcendently, those ideals use to evaluate the Italian state are externals and deduced by their alternative conceptualization of the proletariat “Alternative State.” But such transcendence does not overcome the limits of political culture which in Italy, since middles ages gravitated around the concept of party as a parliamentary mediation of civil society.

Immanently, the BR denounced in C6 how “the state is contradicting its alleged democratic institutionalization and principles” and in C5 claim that “it is a shame for democratic institutions to collude with street criminality.” As in the case of “Alternative State,” “Public Sphere” implies a contradictory relationship of BR’s standpoint with the existing institutions: there is an erratic going back and forth between entering and exiting the sphere of liberal publicity (Habermas, 1991) therefore revealing a not completely rejection of bourgeois culture.

Manconi (1986) asserts there is a close connection between the the clandestine organization’s oversimplified definition of the state with its functioning, its political system, its apparatus, the mirrored representation of a counetrstate, its apparatus and its functions the overturning of bourgeois morality with the consequent definition of an alternative law and justice. The connection is itself an idea of the state which in itself is nevrr really historicized as a bourgeois institution. The word “justice, the porletarian justice” which is consistently repeated in all BR’s documents works with the same logic of the bourgeois logic: it assolves, condemens,
decides on the basis of a legal right. There is a tendency in the BR to institutionalize justice because they believed that the only way to fight the Italian the state was to produce an equal and opposite machinery. The BR mimicked the state in perfect inverse mirror image, a specular state, with authority, power and generosity. A state morally founded.

At this level of analysis the dialectic convergence between “Alternative State” and “Arcana Imperii” in the BR’s communicative practices also homologically corresponded to the convergence of BR’s overall position to the most preponderant theme emerging from the examination of the newspapers: “Raison d’État,” i.e. the realpolitik rationale that leads to defend the state institution against the threat of chaos and conflict (see chapter III). Under this same perspective Il Corriere della Sera, La Stampa and L’Unita represented not absolute different positions inside the ideological spectrum of Italian press but relative variations. Positions articulated by a hegemonic order as the components of Italian neo-corporatist capitalism, the components of coercion and consent of Italian hegemonic order (Gramsci, 1971). The alliance between state, capital and labor. Schumpeter’s (1942, p.90) notion of “corespective competition” may be used to describe both the nature of state and the relations it entertains with capital and labor: the state is instrumentalized by the ruling class in order to mediate the tensions between capital and labor, it is “a centralized form of ruling in which state, capital and labor negotiate every economic and social aspect of the country” (Slomp; 2000, p.81).

As we observed in Chapter IV, in 1930s Gramsci (1971) claimed that Italian bourgeois class was never able to bring the moral and intellectual reform capable of establishing its hegemony. However, the situation by mid 1970s in Italy was significantly different. Thanks to a conjunction of factors, also including political extremism of the ultra right and left, the DC via
the so called “Historic compromise” was approaching what Gramsci defined as “historic bloc, an interclass’s alliance” (1971, p.23). Through the Catholic Church parishes and schools, the ruling party DC was capable to penetrate capillary into the Italian society fabric.

Furthermore, despite the overwhelming Communist component of the Partisan anti-fascist Resistance of the last years of WWII, the DC was able to capitalize on the powerful myth of the partisan resistance and making of the Italian transition to republicanism as sort of moral intellectual reform (Gramsci, 1971). Moreover, the DC created a state functioning as a powerful mediator, playing both as coercive and repressive agent (especially against labor, see episodes in 1947, 1949, 1954, 1960) and defusing mediator of social tensions: on the one hand securing the interests and mechanisms of exploitation of the bourgeois class, on the other hand, acting as de-commodifying agent (Esping-Andersen, 1990) by providing unemployment, sickness insurance and pensions. In fact the factories struggles of 1969 and 1970 resulted in a sensible improvement of working conditions achieving part of the socialization of the wealth that the ruling class wants able to achieve during the economic boom.

Such a process of hegemony construction would actually reach its apex starting by the years after Sossi kidnapping with the so called ‘historic compromise’ i.e. The accommodation of the PCI within the ruling collation of the DC which essentially meant the incorporation of the Italian Communist party‘s Euro-Communism inside the bourgeois hegemony. In fairness, the BR were perfectly aware of such a process of integration of the PCI within the institutional games of power ( and that is why the BR as other radical left wing felt betrayed by the PCI) but as I tried to show, their contestation of the hegemonic order was never complete. From this point of view, the examination of the rhetorical struggle for the closing the meaninga round Sossi’s struggle
already proved that the BR, with its action, with its signifying practices indeed made history but not under the conditions of its own making.

Finally, if at the ideological level, the BR contested the legitimation of the inhabitants of the state, at the hegemonic level seemed still to retain in part the logic of the state as Bakunin described it and therefore never completely questions the hegemonic idea of the state as a (historic specific) state. As I will argue in the conclusion, the mimicking of state institutions meant reproducing the very logic founding the social relations that the BR wanted to desperately revolutionize. In other words, the myth of the state remained at least partially intact, silent, uncovered. The gap in term of awareness between what I defined as ideological and what I defined as hegemonic begins already offering material for a critique of the group’s understating for its own agency. Because if it is true, as Bloch says (1984) that ideology expresses the progressive aspect of praxis, that projects into the future its aspirations and projects, hegemony as understood by the Comaroff, represents the weight of the past circumstances. Thus, what Sartre defines as praxis, the negation of the negation, in other words the negation of the given coming from the past by means of future cannot be done unreflectively without pondering how the past informs the presents affects the political imagination of an alternative future.
CHAPTER VI

OPERATION FRITZ

In this chapter I examine how the four rhetorics, i.e. BR’s communicative practices (6.1) and the three national newspapers (6.2), have narrated the kidnapping of former Prime Minister and Christian Democrats leader Aldo Moro in March 1978. Following the same distinction of levels of analysis employed in chapter V, I evaluate the relationship between the emerging themes at the ideological level (6.3) and at the hegemonic level (6.4). At the ideological level, I will argue that the confrontation intensified its polarization as in this second episode the three newspapers, have overcome most of their ideological difference, and formed a compact bloc against the BR. At the hegemonic level, I will argue that the episode provides further demonstration of the definition of the BR as dialectical product of the structural issues affecting the Italian state since constitution.

On the one hand, the group still retained a party logic drawing on the traditional Italian political culture. On the other hand, both the BR and the three national newspapers found
themselves as the enactors of rituals and liturgies of a civic religion which can be considered competing responses to the incomplete project of creation of the Italian nation state. The substantial difference, as I will argue in last paragraph is that the BR’s attempt instead of undermining its opponent contributes to its crystallization.

*From Sossi to Moro*

The examination of this episode will make a constant reference to the previous case study by both considering the analogies and pointing out to the differences. In fact, as I will claim in the last section of the chapter, the two episodes can be placed in a historic continuum framed by the gradual process of hegemonic consolidation of the Italian bourgeois class. However, in terms of social context of the country and evolution of the BR’s strategies, the distance between the kidnapping of Mario Sossi in 1974 and the kidnapping of Aldo Moro in 1978 seems to exceed the actual four years segment of time.

It suffices to look at the different outcomes of the two episodes: the politics of violence of the BR passed from the demonstrative stage of Sossi’s kidnapping to the military pragmatic approach of Moro’s case. In part as a consequence of that, the press passed from ridiculing the BR as a negligible threat to construct a national moral panic which would be capitalized to both create a state of emergency and to consolidate the ruling class hegemony. According to Catanzaro (1991), the BR, at the time of Moro’s kidnapping, was experiencing their third developmental phase, the so-called “strategy of destruction” stage. Such a stage, compared to the period in which Judge Sossi’s kidnapping took place four years earlier, was characterized by a much more marked militarization aiming at physical annihilation of its enemy.

The intensification of violence associated to this period was also accompanied by a theoretical evolution of the BR’s ideology. Few weeks prior to Moro’s ambush, the BR produced
the “Resolution of the Strategic Direction of February 1978” a quite lengthy political document in which the group introduced several new concepts which will be consistently mentioned in the communiqués written during the Moro’s detention. Among them, the most preponderant was the idea of the SIM, the Imperialist State of the Multinationals, an interpretation of the Italian state considered to be instrumentalized by both a national bourgeois class and an international one, composed by the CEOs of multinationals. A second key concept which will heavily informed this new series of Cs was the “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” which was supposed to produce the more institutionalized “Fighting Communist Party” which was seeking recognition at the level of institutional politics.

6.1 Moro and the Proletariat Justice: The BR’s Narration

The kidnapping and execution of Aldo Moro certainly represented one of the most fetishized episodes associated to the BR. According to Drake (2000), every Italian would relate the BR to the picture published few days after the kidnapping: a physically proved Moro holding a newspaper back grounded by the BR’s asymmetric red star. Every aspect of the kidnapping possessed the potential to make of this event something mediatically spectacular. It was not just the bold objective to capture one of the most powerful figures of the state. The spectacle actually started by the ambush successfully perpetrated by the group against Moro’s body guards. As Wagner-Pacifici (1986, p.62) observes, Moro was a “man of rigorous habits,” he would exit his house at 9 o’clock, then stop at the church of Santa Chiara and then move to the site of the Italian Parliament. On the morning of March 16 1978, in Via Fani, half a way between the church and the Parliament, there was a commando of ten men and women waiting for Moro’s two escort cars. In a minute of machine gun firing all the body guards were killed and Moro was transferred inside an ambulance-like van that quickly sped off.
In the same day of the kidnapping, few minutes after 10 am, the most important newspapers of the country received phone calls informing about the BR’s action. Since that announcement, during the 55 days of detention of Moro, the BR would write 9 communiqués which, as we shall see, would consistently fill the front page of any national newspapers during the whole period.

In C1 (1978, March 16), as in the previous case of Mario Sossi, after few lines describing the events of the ambush, the BR provided a detailed resume of Aldo Moro by asking the rhetorical question “who is Aldo Moro?” He is defined as the “theoretician and the undisputed strategist of the Christian Democrats regime,” “the political godfather and faithful executioner of the Imperialist centrals who plots in the shade.” After the brief summary of Moro’s political life, the BR contextualized the kidnapping inside the “irreversible crisis of Imperialism” and its reactionary measures against the proletariat. According to the BR’s geopolitical analysis, the state nations were being transformed into the Imperialist State of the Multinationals (also known as SIM) as a national based executioner of the imperialist plans of multinational corporations, the new international capitalist class. Aldo Moro, as the leader of the Christian Democrats, represented the main guarantor of those interests and that was why Aldo Moro was going to be tried by the People’s court as an individual politician but also as a quintessential representative of the whole Christian Democrats order.

In C2 (1978, March 25), the BR celebrated how the political crisis caused by Moro’s kidnapping uncovered the authoritarian mode of the Christian Democrats government: “Andreotti [the Christian Democrats Prime Minister] emptied the parliament of any power and approved special laws to repress the proletariat.” Furthermore, the BR tried to clarify the conceptual role of the Italian state as servile agent of International imperialism: “The state is also
mobilizing the population against the revolution and the capture of Aldo Moro reveals the machination of SIM which was planning to elect Moro as the President of Republic in order to concentrate on him all the powers,” the BR went on. Such an imperialist project of counterrevolution was military managed by NATO at the global level, policed by the CEE (European Economic Community) at the regional level. To this project the proletariat was going to respond by trying to coordinate all the communist forces in Europe.

In C3 (1978, March 29), the BR described the trial in progress against “Prisoner Aldo Moro” who was helping clarifying the “specific features of the regime” under the SIM process of restructuration. Moro, according to the BR, is “perfectly aware of being the most important agent of such a restructuration” and for this reason “he will respond for his responsibilities in front of people’s court. But Moro was not alone in his machinations; he requested to write a secret letters to the government.”

As per precedent messages, the group dedicates the last paragraph of the communiqué to interpret the happening through their vision. The BR stated that in this historic phase the “political violence” is the only option for the revolutionary advanced guards. The armed struggle of the BR served to display the “real nature of the Imperialism” violent, terroristic and above all counter-revolutionary. Despite such a repression, the BR asserted that “proletarian initiative did not stop but actually enlarged in the so called MPRO [Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat].” The MPRO had the objective of creating the fighting Communist Party.

In C4 (1978, April 4), the BR continued reporting from Aldo Moro’s proceeding: “the trial will go on despite the specialist of the psychology war [the media]. “The group accused the media of deliberately discrediting Moro’s deploring words against his party colleagues for not is willing to help him. The BR gave for the first time the terms of a possible liberation: “Aldo
Moro, as he says in his letters, is a political prisoner” who could be released only when all BR’s comrade would have been liberated. As in other occasions, the BR dedicated the last paragraph to an exhortation: “The imperialism is in crisis because of the loss of its consent and only can function through brute force […] in order to solve the crisis, the communist must deal with the question of power […] the productive forces have developed well enough to solve this crisis and to liberate men and women from exploitation and imperialist repression.”

In C5 (1978, April 10), the BR stated that “soon Moro’s revelations would be disclosed to the people.” In contrast to Minister Emilio Taviani and other government officers involved in secret machinations, the BR affirmed that ”no secret negotiations will concealed to the people” The BR reiterated that the Imperialist State of the Multinationals is incapable of providing political responses to the revolutionary movement and therefore opted for the only remained option: ”the bloody force.” In this counterrevolutionary plot the revisionist member of Italian Communist Party are direct accomplices and “the collaborationist policy of Berlinguer [Italian communist Party’s leader] will not suffocate the MPRO and its objective to construct the fighting Communist party.” The BR incited the MPRO to respond to the state violence by concentrating the attack on “the men and the structure of the SIM.”

In C6 (1978, April 15), the BR announced the end of the trial and its final outcome: “Aldo Moro is sentenced to death.” The group commented about the difficulty of evaluating 30 years of activity, “trying to understand the machinations.” The BR accused the Christian Democrats regime of having protracted a “terrorism of state in order to extend a layer of fear to the whole society but, most of all, over the proletariat.” The trial against Moro represents a proceeding against an entire regime and must be interpreted as class struggle against the Imperialism: “the guiltiness of Aldo Moro is the guiltiness of an entire regime.” As in
precedence, the group accused the media of censoring and manipulating messages in “continuous attempts to create confusions.”

In C7 (1978, April 20), the BR first summarized what happened in this first month of Moro’s captivity. During this period the BR could appreciate the “real face” of Christian Democrats, his “complicity with Imperialist state.” The BR also insisted on the question of the political prisoners: “despite the lies of media, Moro has been treated as a political prisoner, without tortures […] the time has come for the Christian Democrats to take its responsibilities and has 8 hours to release all prisoners.” The second part of the C is dedicated to the media and their psychological war carried out through publishing false communiqués, censorship, omissions: “despite the powerful means of mass media, they cannot trick the popular consciousness.” Finally the BR, as in Sossi’s case, denounced the Christian Democrats plan to capitalize on the eventual death of Moro to make it “a good business” as the very Moro defines it in its accusations.

In C8 (1978, April, 24), the BR provided a list of names of the “political prisoners” that had to be released. The BR also commented on the numerous “humanitarian appeals” by saying that all sound suspicious as simple signs of support to the Christian Democrats’ plans. Finally in C9 (1978, May 5), the BR affirmed that “the battle started March 16 is now concluded […] after useless negotiations with the Christian Democrats about the release of 13 Communist fighters, the political prisoner Aldo Moro will be executed.” The group noted how the response of the state had been to raid the proletariat neighborhood like “the SS squads” and doing so the “SIM revealed his real face.”). Finally the BR reiterated that all documents of the interrogation and material provide by the political prisoner will be published by “clandestine propaganda media.”

The Thematization
The first theme I identified is “Alternative State,” a theme that was already present in the Sossi’s kidnapping. The “Alternative State” emerges right in the first line of C1 (1978, March 16), as the BR announced Aldo Moro being “convicted in the People’s prison” who will be tried by the “people’s court.” In C3 (1978, March 29) and in the following messages (C4 and C5 and C6) the BR kept informing about the interrogatory of the Prison Moro who, as in Sossi’s case, is explicitly repeated about his condition of political prisoner. Interestingly enough, whereas “Alternative State” was overwhelmingly present in Sossi’s case, in Moro’s case the theme intensifies only later one, when it came to Moro’s trial and then producing the death sentence. As we shall see in a moment, this reflects the emergence of a new class struggle subjects, the MPRO and the Communist Fighting Party.

In the first Cs the minor presence of “Alternative State” is explained by the expansion of BR’s analysis to international level. The state seems to be subsumed as an instrument of International imperialism, as an Imperialist State of the Multinationals. Interestingly enough, confirming the evaluations of the Sossi’s episode, the decrease relevance attributed to the Italian state explains the less relevance of its specular image the proletariat alternative state. In C2 (1978, March 25) the BR established the new aesthetic symmetry (required by the idealized total war, see chapter II) between the “Imperialist/Terrorist International” and the “Proletariat International.” What this evolution seems to suggest that such a theme has never been about the specific feature of the BR’s enemy or the specific features of its opponent (the BR, the proletariat class etc…) but about the structural parallelism that the BR always intend to maintain between the levels of legitimacy of the opponents in such class struggle. This explains why the BR’s enemy has unproblematically become a “moving target “assuming diverse vestiges: the state, the Christian Democrats, the SIM, the regime, the “Imperialist/Terrorist International.”
Then, in the second part of the captivity the theme “Alternative State” regains momentum. For instance in C6 (1978, April, 15) the symmetry between was opponents, the mirroring finally more definition when the BR prepared to consumed the death sentence of Moro which become the body of the state. The sentence of death pronounced in the last line of the communiqués fills with content, reality, institutional legitimacy the organs of the alternative state; the people’s court, the people’s will, the people’s prison: “Aldo Moro is guilty and therefore condemned to death penalty.” This is confirmed in C7 (1978, April 20) by the way the group’s state seems legitimated by the humanitarian appeals coming from the media, the victim’s family, and international figures. But the appeals the BR appreciates the most are the ones of the “state’s Christian Democrats’ leaders Andreotti, Fanfani, Leone, Piccoli…” Similarly in C4 (1978, April 4) the BR claims that “the mystification of the psychological counter guerilla warfare [the media] would not be able to affect the issue of the final judgment of Moro.” Finally, in C8 (1978, April 24), the BR depict themselves as the serious institutionally legitimated players which have to deal with game and machinations, “lack of clarity” of the state and its servile media.

The second theme I found is “Armed Praxis.” If in Sossi’s episode, “Armed Praxis” was more discursive than material, in this case the theme is celebrated in its concrete implications. For instance, in order to display the military capabilities of the BR, “Armed Praxis” makes the first appearance in C1 (1978, March 16), when the BR congratulated itself to have “completely annihilated Moro’s escort.” In the same document, the BR invited the people to take action and to hunt the representative of the Imperialist State of the Multinationals and exhorted to attack the it, attack its men and dis-articulate its structure. In C2 (1978, March 25) “Armed Praxis” reappears again at the conclusive call of BR to “intensify the armed attack against eh regime.” In
both examples, the objective is not dis-articulating the enemy by displaying its modus operandi or opus operatum but to physically eliminate it.

Such a change in “Armed Praxis” from a rhetorical weapon to an actual military practice reflects Catanzaro’s move of the BR to the so called “strategy of destruction” a move which the group justifies in order adequate the development of class struggle: “the class struggle imposed the option of armed struggle” (1978, March 29, C3). This adaptation of both strategies and tactics to the changing phases in the class struggle ha, interestingly enough, always a reactionary flavor in the sense that the BR always reacts to changes they perceive are happening in bourgeois state. In other words, the group seems always to seek a perfect confrontational symmetry with its enemy: so for instance the enemy is organizing internationally therefore the BR moves from the idea of an alternative proletariat state to a a much more fluid and movimentist MPRO; again the capitalist, as in the BR states in order to justify the death of Moro in C9 (1978, May 5) kill the communist fighters therefore the communist fighters can kill their enemies.

“Armed Praxis” does not only intensify because of the increase militarization. There is also an intertwined aspect to the militarization tendency connected to the need of “purity.” As I have already mentioned, the BR despised mediation in all its facets, conceptual, moral, and political. Still the group seemed incapable to avoid it: in the “Fritz operation” experience the group all sort of theoretical mediation in order to explain the “new class struggle phase,” the enemies, as I mention earlier has become a moving target so the revolutionary forces of the proletariat which alternatively are the very proletariat, the advanced guard of the BR, the “Proletariat Movement,” the “Communist Fighting party.” In such a situation the militarization, as intensification of the armed praxis seems a compensating reactionary move to fill the purity
the impure. As we shall see this will lead to the elimination of the most powerful embodiment of impurity and mediation: Moro.

The next theme identified is “Public Sphere” which, as per “Alternative State” and “Armed Praxis,” I have already encountered in the texts of the previous episode. If in Sossi’s texts “Public Sphere” represented a very important theme, in Moro’s case becomes even more present as the confrontation between bourgeois public sphere and the proletarian public sphere radicalized. For instance, the whole text of C1 is almost entirely dedicated to provide the people with a dossier and reconstruction of the events connected to the 30 years of Moro’s career. In C2 (1978, March 25) the BR continued reconstructing Moro’s resume with even more details and stating that such a document “served to clarify the imperialist machinations” to “identify and disclose” all the personnel involved. In C3, according to the BR, the most important objective of the interrogation of the prisoner was to clarify past events, plans and machinations and then revealing them to the people.

In C3 the investigative journalism mode characterizing the BR assumes almost literal semblances when the BR affirmed that “before making public aware of all the secretive revealed by Moro group would double check all facts because “nothing must be concealed to the people” (1978, March 29). Finally, in C4 (1978, April 4) the BR stated how Moro’s revelations and the secret letter written to Cossiga (then Minister of interior) clarified plots of the government distributed responsibilities to all cadres of the Christian Democrats. By the same approach, in C5 (1978, April 10) the BR almost congratulated Moro’s strong memory in providing detailed reconstructions which would have provided the BR with useful information.

Under “Public Sphere” mode, a special mention should be made when the BR confront their “revelatory communicative practices” with the manipulatory ones of mainstream media. For
instance, in C5 (1978, April 10), “Public Sphere” reaches its highest examples when the BR confronted its “Public Sphere” communicative mode with the media being “servile power” and their “demystification function” by which constantly tried to manipulate information and public opinion. The mainstream media are “tools of class struggle” as much as the BR’s own “media” (1978, April 15, C6). The difference between the two “class based media” resided in the fact that the bourgeois press worked by mystification, by “imprisoning people’s consciousness”, whereas the proletariat press (as frequently happened, the BR uncritically made coinciding its group with the whole proletarian class) worked by demystification or “unmasking” (1978, May 5, C9) and unveiled the “real face of power” (1978, April 24, C7).

In the idealized confrontation between the bourgeois public sphere (represented by the media) and the proletarian one re-emerges the motives of purity, publicity and immediacy. The spheres became what Mao would have defined as the poles of an irreconcilable contradiction between of dark and light, unjust and just, mediation-unmediated, lie and truth.

Another theme present in both Sossi’s and Moro’s case is “Arcana Imperii,” referring to the secretive and plotting modus operandi of the Italian bourgeois state, standing in juxtaposition to PS. In C1 (1978, March 16), the BR, when talking about Moro’s life described him as “plotting in the shade”, or “being a masked counter-revolutionary agent.” In similar ways, in C2 (1978, March 25), the BR accused the secret service and the special police squads of playing a fundamental role in the international project of repression of the proletariat (under the so called SIM restructuration). In C3 (1978, March 29), the BR reports about Moro’s desire to write a secret letter to the government which appeared to the group as the distinctive secretive mode of the Christian Democrats’ way of ruling. In C5 (1978, April 10), the BR stated their refusal to
“negotiate secretly with state because nothing must be concealed to the people” especially with a state that keeps consistently producing “bloody plots” against the people.

As already suggested previously, in the critical comparison between the BR’s and the bourgeois media function is where “Public Sphere” and “Arcana Imperii” most explicitly confront themselves (at the ideological level). In C7, (1978, April 24) the BR accused the media to be accomplishes of such a power by performing their “psychological war.” In C6, C7, C8 and C9 “Public Sphere” acquires special intensity constituting the dominant theme of those messages. Exemplary is C8 (1978, April 24) in which the BR explained in detailed all the “special laws “passed by Christian Democrats and how instead of enhancing democracy and the people’ welfare express the will to secretly establish a “state of police” masked by “ambiguous press conferences.”

Compared to Sossi’s depiction of the theme which was mainly characterized by its modus operating though machinations, ”Arcana Imperii” in Moro also includes all adjectives gravitating around the semantic field of death. The move seems to be explained by the same logic of structural parallelism already mentioned in “Alternative State.” In other words associating Arcana Imperii with death appears as a way to legitimize the death sentence the BR was going to pronounce. I will focus more in detail on this aspect later on linked to another theme.

The next theme which can be found in the BR’s texts is “Telos.” The reference to “Telos” is present in all Cs but especially in the earlier ones. For example, in C1 (1978, March 16) the BR explained the political significance of Moro’s kidnapping in relation to their teleological conception of history and development of class struggle. In the paragraphs in which they described the restructuration of the state into an Imperialist State of the Multinationals was necessary because of the “irreversible crisis” of the old imperialist regime which used to rely on
the agency of “state nations.” In C2 (1978, March 25), the BR went back to the subject matter of the state restructuration describing how from a historic phase in which the state was “the expression of political parties” to a phase in which the political parties become a “pure expression of the state’s interests.”

In C4 (1978, April 4), the BR’s “Telos” theme emerges again in the claims such as “to exit from the present crisis means to establish Communism” In C5 (1978, April 10) the same conclusion of C4 are reported: given the present phase of class struggle “it is necessary to realize political and organizational quality leaps imposed by the class struggle.” Furthermore, in C3 (1978, March 29), “Telos” is almost explicitly expressed in the phrasing a “new phase of the class struggle” and “the timing of Moro’s kidnapping was the right one to display the contradictions of this new phases.” Such a new phase produced also a new historic subject: the MPRO, “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat.”

The “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat,” in Moro’s detention Cs, becomes a very recurrent theme since, according to the BR, it had to be considered as the new revolutionary subject which emerged as a reaction to the restructuration of the Italian state into the “Imperialist State of the Multinationals.” As already suggested, this particular aspect of “Telos,” the “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat,” replaced the preponderance that “Alternative State” had in Sossi’s Cs representing the alternative to the status quo. The “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat.” was implicitly introduced in C2 (1978, March 25) when the BR explained that”the proletariat had to become a fluid international movement” “because the “Imperialist monster had be fought in its continental dimension.”

Another important clarification of the role of the “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” is offered in C4 (1978, April 4) when the BR explained that in Italy the
class confrontation “was dispersed and dis-organized” and the “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” served to unify the collective effort against the bourgeois-Christian Democrats’ government-SIM networks. The “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” aimed at organizing an advanced guard of the movement which “recollects and interprets the impulses from the moment,” in other words, the Fighting Communist Party and as in C5 the group asserts (1978, April 10) “the MPRO must assumes the responsibility to construct the guide the Fighting Communist Party.”

The objective of “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” to constitute the Fighting Communist Party was quite ambiguous because instead of preserving the feature of fluidity of the movement it returned to the state/institutional logic by considering the political party and interestingly enough, the “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” was described as a movement but it also retained the institutional characteristics of “Alternative State,” such as the judiciary, executive and legislative functions.

Another theme emerged in the Moro’s kidnapping Cs is the “Imperialist State of the Multinational” or the SIM. The “Imperialist State of the Multinational” contributed to enlarge the perspective of class struggle outside the national borders. In Sossi’s case, the Italian state was mainly considered under the perspective of the Marxist conceptualization: as an ensemble of Apparati instrumentalized by the Italian dominant class. In Moro’s case the whole logic of instrumentalization becomes international: supranational is the ruling group and supra national are the first tier of agents that guarantee the interests of such a ruling group such as CEE (the organization preceding EU), the NATO.

The “Imperialist State of the Multinational” was introduced in C1 (1978, March 16) when Moro was depicted as the representative of its interests: “the liberal nation-states are surpassed as
reality and integrated in an international imperialist project and Moro was designed to become the SIM agent.” It was also the “Imperialist State of the Multinational” that according to the BR provoked the proletariat response by organizing the “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” and the “Fighting Communist Party.” In C3 (1978, March 29), the BR stated that the interrogation of Moro was helping to clarify how the Christian Democrats contributed to the restructuration of Italy as a SIM country. In C4 (1978, April 4) the BR clarified how the trial to Moro, in facts exceeded Moro’s responsibilities but also the Christian Democrats’ responsibilities as it represents a judgment of the people against the “the whole counter revolutionary plan of the multinationals”

The references to “Imperialist State of the Multinationals” continued until the last message (C9), however as the negotiation effort with the state intensified, the “Imperialist State of the Multinationals” theme seemed to be gradually re-incorporated in the AI theme, as to say in old plotting habit of the Italian state governed by the Christian Democrats. For instance in C7 (1978, April 24) the reference to the “Imperialist State of the Multinationals” is contextualized in larger frame of “Arcana Imperii” mode of Christian Democrats since “power games have always been non-renounceable aspect of Christian Democrats’ ruling.”

Finally, the last theme which emerges seems to represent this new phase of the BR dedicated to annihilate the enemy, but also exorcize the irreducible presence of mediation and “impurity: in this sense the “Cult of Death” should be considered as the synthesis of the evolution of already present themes. “Cult of Death” certainly found its lineage in “Armed Praxis”, the celebration the armed struggle as it represents the logical conclusion of it, with death. Such a death is also the logical conclusion of the confrontation between “Alternative State” and “Arcana Imperii,” in other words the death of the absolute enemy. It is a cult because
it is symbolically cultivated. As I mentioned earlier, one sense a kind of symbolic preparation that implicitly announces the execution of Moro before actually reading BR pronouncing its sentence.

Such a laying the groundwork for death operates with the anti dialectic reasoning that if the BR’s enemy produces death only by death the group would be able to defeat it. Thus one finds since C1 (1978, March 16) qualifications speaking of death: “bloody policies” and “baleful maneuver,” “lugubriously efficient.” In C2 (1978, March 25) the BR talked about “dead proletarians, massacred by the police,” “macabrous efficiency, in C3 (1978, March 29) “the state violence and the state terrorism.” In C5 (1978, April 10) the BR talked about “repressive ferociousness of the state,” in C6 (1978, April 15) the BR defined the actions of the state as “massacres of the Fascist killers” and the “political genocide of the Communist avant-gardes,” “the concentration camps.” In C8 (1978, April 24) the “barbarous acts of the state that condemn to “slow death” in their concentration camps,” and in C9 (1978, May 5) “the regime bloody violence against the proletariat” and the “assassins led by [Prime Minister] Andreotti.” To such murderous condition created by its enemy the BR would respond by “hunting them down” in C1 (1978, March 16), “liquidate the filthy and corrupted regime of the Christian Democrats” and “hit to death the beast” in C3 (1978, March 29). In C5 (1978, April 10) the BR invited to “concentrate the attack on both the structure and the men of the regime,” in C6 (1978, April 15) in capital letters “ALDO MORO IS GUILTY AND THEREFORE IS CONDEMNED TO THE DEATH PENALTY.”

There are at least three key moments in which “Cult of Death” emerges and is celebrated. In C1 (1978, March 16), when the BR celebrated the killing of the body guards, the attack to the state is concrete and military not only constituted by its disarticulation through he
display of contradictions. Indicative in C1 is the fact that the BR replaced expression such as “class confrontation” or “class struggle” with “class war” which is consistently used in all Cs of Moro’s episode. The second occasion is when the BR in C2 and C3 talked about the “genocide” of communist fighters which sacrificed their lives for the victory of the proletariat and their commemoration. For instance in C2(1978, March 25), the BR embrace “Cult of Death” in the ending sentence of the message “Honor to the comrades Lorenzo Jannucci e Fausto Tinelli assassinated by regime killers.” Again “Cult of Death” appears in C3 (1978, March 29) when the BR explained that “the practice of the revolutionary violence pushes the enemy to confront us on the over war terrain” or in C4 when the BR explained the passage “from the armed peace to war.”

Finally the most important moment is the anticipation, the official announcement and the commentary that the BR made about the death sentenced decided for Moro. There is fine rhetorical crescendo in the first 5 Cs about the grave responsibilities attributed to Moro which anticipates an equally grave “sentence.” The solution is implicitly suggested since the beginning; in the “war of class” death is for death. The equation is repeated over and over but never explicate until C6 (1978, April 15). The message inaugurates by saying that the interrogatory of Aldo Moro is terminated and in the bureaucratic modus operandi of the BR this only meant the pronunciation of a sentence. But the sentence came only at the end, in the last sentence. The corpus of the message plays with the reader building up suspense. In C7 (1978, April 20) CD in relation to Moro’s sentence became the new line of confrontation between the BR and the three newspapers, the BR anticipated correctly what was going to happen: the new terrain of competition is the interpretation of Moro’s death and its capitalization.
“Cult of Death” embodies the linear and therefore anti-dialectical understating of class confrontation according to which the confrontation between the BR and its enemy was linearly defined by a Manichean opposition and therefore the solution is equally linear: by annihilating the enemy, the source of the unjust and evil, the just and the good will triumph.

To conclude this section, looking at the recurrent themes present in the BR’s communiqués of Moro’s kidnapping one can notice both lines of continuity and discontinuities compared to Sossi’s. On the one hand, we can find the confirmation of the significance across time of themes such as “Arcana Imperii,” “Public Sphere” and “Telos;” on the other hand some new thematic aspects (in my taxonomy it belongs to “Telos”) emerge as well such as “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” and others already present in the previous case, such as “Alternative State” and “Armed Praxis” represent and imply different meanings.

6.2 The Rhetorics of the Il Corriere della Sera, La Stampa and L’Unitá.

As mentioned earlier, Moro’s kidnapping was spectacular in every possible way and certainly, for almost two months, produced the most newsworthy events taking place in the Italian and, frequently enough, in the international public arena. During the 55 days of detention, the attention of all media was on the BR, Moro and on the media themselves, as the self reflective debate on media coverage of terrorism demonstrated.

As for the BR’s communication, the comparison of Moro’s episode with Sossi’s seems very useful to evaluate the both continuities and discontinuities between the segments 1974-1978. One important difference, as I will address more in detail later on, is that despite the remarkable ideological differences displayed in Sossi’s case between newspapers, in this case were flatten. If in Sossi’s coverage one could identify distinctive themes associated to a given
newspaper, in this present case, the variation is mostly limited to the different weight that one given aspects may play in a given theme.

Chronologically wise, the first theme emerging is one connected to the “Militarist Efficiency” of the BR displayed in the ambush against Moro and his escort: within less then 5 minutes the escort was killed and Moro already transferred to a safe place. Such a daring operation was executed by a group which until few months prior to action was considered a band of simple criminals, ridiculed by the press, only a scary fairy tale for children. That 16 of March 1978 the press, as we mentioned in chapter IV, passed from the distorted view of underestimation of the BR to the distorted view of overestimation of BR, from a ridicule bunch the BR became an army assaulting the Italian society.

“Militarist Efficiency” was a theme embraced by the three newspapers especially in the first days after the kidnapping. Posterior to that, it would not disappear but it would be incorporated into other themes which differed from newspaper to newspaper. For instance L’Unitá would connect that to a “Human Drama” theme, so it did La Stampa. Il Corriere della Sera would incorporate “Militarist Efficiency” to the imperative motive for the state to provide a “Rational Response” to terrorism.

For L’Unitá framing the BR through “Militarist Efficiency” meant unleashing the anxiety about the revival of Fascism: the BR became a super trained military group compatible to military Special Forces and paramilitary extreme right groups. Indicative of that was for instance the article published the day after the ambush (1978, March 17: p. A1) that “one of the kidnapper spoke German.” The article suggested that such a professionalism and precision displayed in the
ambush could only be German and certainly not Italian. For the Communist newspaper such efficiency also revealed the Fascists component of the BR (L’Unitá, 1978, March 21: p. A1): “the perfectionism of the BR is nothing other than the consequence of their belonging to the reactionary logic.” Siji wrote that the “the BR speak the same language of the neo fascists like Freda” (L’Unitá, 1978, March 19: p. A1). For L’Unitá the BR were not “comrades in errors” but fascist criminals. Rather clearly, the newspaper, with even stronger intensity compared to the Sossi’s case, tried to distance itself from the possible association with BR via Marxist ideology.

La Stampa employed “Militarist Efficiency” in order to show the inhumanity of the BR, their violence and ferociousness. The day after the kidnapping, the newspaper titles the article describing the scene as a “Bloody Massacre” (La Stampa, 1978, March 17: p. A1). In many occasions such as the publication of BR’s message the newspaper used adjectives such as “tremendous” or “nightmare,” “atrocious” in order to describe the BR and its modus operandi (La Stampa, 1978, March 17: p. A1). La Stampa in this respect remained faithful to its powerful rhetoric of criminalization and therefore de-politicization of the BR inaugurated with the coverage of Sossi’s kidnapping. Finally in Il Corriere della Sera, “Militarist Efficiency” was consistently present but only as a component of another theme describing the exigency of the state’s to react by an adequate response to terrorism (the theme I will be mentioning later on as “Rational Response”).

As already mentioned, connected to “Militarist Efficiency,” another theme emerged: the wishful thinking idea of “Rational Response” of the state which could be consistently found in Il Corriere della Sera and La Stampa and, with much less intensity, in l’Unitá. Exemplary is the

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16 The reference of the article was the German *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF), group the BR were consistently in contact with and that in Germany carried similar operation of urban guerrilla. Especially in 1977, during the so-called ‘German autumn,’’ RAF carried killed 34 peoples.
leading opinion article published in Il Corriere della Sera (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978, March 17: p. A1) the day after the kidnapping titled with the imperative “React with force” in which the journalist incited the state to response with strongest available resources. In the same edition, Manfellotto and Martinelli reassured the country about how the newly elected government accelerated the whole process of installment in order to activate the “emergency plan” (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978, March 17: p. A1). As it did during Sossi’s kidnapping, the newspaper operated as a quasi agency checking the state from the inside, representing an inquiring and critical voice which analyzed the “transcendental” conditions for the state to be able to react adequately. In the leading opinion article titled “Two Weaknesses” (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978, March 18: p. A1) Ronchey displayed such a mode by arguing that the state Apparati were still completely inefficient in counteract and understand terrorism.

In the same “Rational Response” mode, but by a more positive approach, Acciari and Purgatori seemed satisfied with the decision of the government to employ the army to haunt the terrorists. The title seemed rhetorically constructed to perfectly exemplify RR:”the BR announce the beginning of Moro’s trial. [Then the state’s response] The army joins the forces to haunt down the terrorists” (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978, March 19: p. A1).Few days later (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978, March 21: p. A1) Monfellotto dedicates another article explaining in detail the package of emergency measure approved by the government to face the “Moro’s crisis.”

Compared to Il Corriere della Sera, La Stampa, similarly to the way it treated the event of judge Sossi’s kidnapping, embraced “Rational Response” from a functionalist standpoint, concerned with the proper politico-economic functioning of the country. For instance, only two days after the breaking news about Moro, the newspaper published a front page article talking about how “the stock exchange reacted positively and with responsibility to Moro’s kidnapping
“(La Stampa 1978, March 19: p. A1). La Stampa is concentrated as well as Il Corriere della Sera on defending the institutions and their proper working and therefore it remarked “that despite the sense of tragedy and emergency of the country, the trial in progress against the captured BR members had to continue (La Stampa, 1978, March 21: p. A1), but also with whole society “the country is an state of emergency, this is evident and the problem does not invest only the state but the entire Italian society (La Stampa, 1978, March 28, p. A1). La Stampa also rhetorically constructed an association of RR with the use of technology employed to fight terrorism: “the German super computer indicate Moro could be detained around Maggiore Lake” (La Stampa, April 7: p. A1) or frequent mentions to the police analysts. In “Rational Response” one finds the way the newspapers reflected the anxiety to depict Italy as a modern country and therefore, compared to the other industrialized countries, a “normal country.”

Finally, L’Unitá embraced “Rational Response” but only in connection to other themes: it appeared sometimes combined to other themes such as “Raison d’état” or “Civil Society.” For instance, Reichlin wrote an article titled “the Country’s response to terrorism” in which combined the required efforts of the “State’s instruments” and the “civil society’s moral strength” thus proposing “Rational Response” combining “Raison d’Etat” and “Civil Society”(L’Unitá, 1978, March 22: p. A1). Compared to Sossi’s case, L’Unitá by reproducing “Rational Response” displayed a surprisingly devoted state-centered and establishment centered perspective. For instance Criscuoli (L’Unitá, 1978, April 11: p. A1; April 12: p. A1; April 14: p. A1) reproduced “Rational Response” by reporting on the debates, comments and decision taken

17 In Sossi’s case, the protagonist for L’Unitá was the people represented by CS which powerfully mediated the general perspective of the newspaper so that state-centered themes such as RE were played down.
by the ruling group Christian Democrats, their MP or as Pi.S. Reports (L’Unitá, 1978, April 14: p. A1) when the senate approves the police measures under the name of the “Reale Law.”

Another theme that emerged in the newspapers articles was “Human Drama.” The newspaper which recurred the most to this theme was certainly La Stampa. Nevertheless, surprising enough, compared to the previous case of Sossi, L’Unitá stood out as well for its consistent embracement of such a theme. Let us first examine the Turin newspaper. La Stampa almost immediately assumed a celebrative and commemorative mode about Moro. Few days after the kidnapping, when Moro was known to be in good life conditions, the newspaper already adopted a quasi mortuary tone recalling the last occasion in which the then Prime Minister Moro visited the city (La Stampa, 1978, March 18: p. A1). Another aspect of “Human Drama” as approached by La Stampa was the focus on the comments of Christian Democrats leaders and colleagues of Moro. For instance, Zaccagnini as F.M. reported (La Stampa, 1978, March 19: p. A1), the second most important leader of Christian Democrats after Moro, empathically said: “Moro will come out of this exalted and victorious.” In another occasion, Zucconi (La Stampa, 1978, April 6: p. A1) described the “painful meeting” of Zaccagnini with Moro’s family.

Another aspect that La Stampa emphasized in “Human Drama” mode was the psychological condition of Moro during his detention and allegedly emerging from his letters. According to this newspaper Moro wrote those letters to his family and political colleagues conditioned by drugs (La Stampa 1978, March 22: p. A1). La Stampa published several articles citing doctors and psychologist who offered their analyses on the subject matter (La Stampa, 1978, March 31: p.A1; 1978, April 12: p. A1). Then, when the BR announced the death sentence for Moro, the attention of the newspapers moved to Moro’s family (La Stampa, 1978, April 8: p.A1), the appeals of the Pope (La Stampa, 1978, April 23: p. A1), important political figures (La

In Il Corriere della Sera “Human Drama” became a strong theme which was consistently present in the front page. Lietta and Tornabuoni dedicated one of the first commentaries to the capital city where the kidnapping took place: Rome first incredulous then consternated” (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978 March 17: p. A1). The newspaper celebrated the “firmness” of Moro’s himself which was described as assuming “Stoic dignity” (Il Corriere della Sera, Piazzesi, March 19: p. A1). In connection to the RR theme and the fact that trial against the BR had to carry one, Il Corriere della Sera also reported the exultations of Curcio about the kidnapping (Il Corriere della Sera 1978 March 21: p. A1) with dramaticity. Not surprisingly, as the other two newspapers, the Milan newspaper intensified the presence of the HD theme the day of Moro’s corpse was found when also “Human Drama” blends with Raison d’état” resulting in a process of martyrization: Bella wrote “Moro died for this Republic” (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978, May 10, p.A1); Purgatori in the same edition wrote “they killed him by a round of machine gun to his heart” (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978 May 10: p. A1).

Il Corriere della Sera joined La Stampa in the personalization of the drama by publishing articles in which the newspaper described the moral dilemma of the Christian Democrats’ leader Zaccagnini. Il Corriere della Sera consistently suggested that Moro’s words were not necessarily manipulated but were the outcome of psychological state in which the Moro almost identifies with his kidnappers, (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978, March 30: p. A1) Moro was considered in state of total psychological introjections that contained his words.

The aspect of authoritative voices of “Raison d’état” we found in Sossi’s case is actually present as incorporated in “Human Drama” in Moro’s case. For instance, La Stampa published
several articles reporting about appeals full of pathos of figures such as the Pope Paul VI (La Stampa F.P. April, 19: p. A1 and April 27: p. A1), Ministers such as Spadolini (Il Corriere della Sera, April, 27: p. A1) or numerous messages from the President of Republic G. Leone (Turno, La Stampa, 1978 April 26: p. A1). Equally received with dramatic and sensationalistic titles were the letters of Moro especially when directed to President Leone or Pope Paul VI (La Stampa, 1978 May 04: p. A1) or to the family (Fedi, 1978 La Stampa May 03: p. A1).

“Human Drama” in this dramatic and exceptional event was also embrace by l’Unitá, however, interestingly enough, compared to the other two newspapers, the communist medium instead of only stressing of the human drama of Moro or his family, focused on the lack of humanity and craziness of the BR. 10 days after the kidnapping L’Unitá spoke of the grotesque chasm inhabiting the BR: the “lucid craziness” (L’Unitá, 1978 March 26: p. A1). At the same time every time Moro sent a letter l’Unitá would always comment with dramatic titles such as “a Tragic Letter” (L’Unitá, 1978 March 26: p. A1). 1978 March 30: p. A1) also discrediting the genuinely of the heavy accusations that Moro made in those letters "which were not morally ascribable to Moro " (L’Unitá, 1978 April 05: p. A1). Equally systematic was the way the newspaper would frame the BR’s comments "Another inhuman document by the BR” (L’Unitá, Criscuoli, 1978 April 05: p.A1) or "the assassins condemned to death Moro" (L’Unitá Gambescia 1978 n April 29: p. A1) or “the abominable blackmail of the BR (L’Unitá, Gambescia 1978 n April 29: p. A1), Criscuoli, 1978 April 21: p. A1) or "the BR are wild beast" (L’Unitá, Gambescia, April 20: p. A1) finally the “the bloody hurdling exaltation of Moro’s assassination (L’Unitá, Gambescia, 1978, May11: p. A1). “Human Drama” in also get intertwined with “Raison d’état” when l’Unitá speaks about “drama of the Christian Democrats party comrade of Moro (L’Unitá, Caprarica, 1978 May 10: p. A1).
Among the themes more distinctly associated to one single newspaper “Civil Society” by l’Unità is the one standing out the most. As I noticed in the previous chapter, “Civil Society” in Sossi’s case mediated the embracement of “Raison d’état” by the Communist newspaper by downplaying the relevance of the latter. In this second case, “Civil Society” remains extremely important but it did not really prevent other more state centric-themes (e.g. “Raison d’état” and “Rational Response”) to emerge. Instead they all seem to work in synergetic ways, by enhancing each other. In the day immediately following Moro’s kidnapping L’Unitá described the BR as the “enemies of the democracy” and “the democratic regime and Italian constitution are decisive and non renounceable conquests of the popular movements” (L’Unitá, 1978, March 19: p. A1).

“Civil Society” in l’Unitá had two different specific rhetorical constructions: one associating people and democracy (in similar ways as we could observe in Sossi’s), one more specifically associated with the WWII Italian partisan resistance. In the first case, the mobilization of working people represented the most eloquent sign of democracy like in the case of the general strike that Lama reported (L’Unitá, 1978, April 30: p. A1) against terrorism or when Moro was found dead Criscuoli talked about “people’s manifestation” (L’Unitá, 1978 May 11: p. A1). The second rhetorical construction of “Civil Society” is associated with the narrative that the “people” who had fought only decades ago against fascism and Nazism (The partisan resistance) which in then in late 1970 were ready to fight again to save democracy. This discourse also implied that the members of the PCI (and the reader of l’Unitá) were the real communist and, therefore, by homology, the BR was just like the fascist as Crisuoli noticed (L’Unitá, 1978 April 22: p. A1). The resistance as depicted in “Now and Forever (L’Unitá, 1978, May 9: p. A1) represented a “historic wealth” (L’Unitá Longo, 1978,, April 25: p. A1) which l’Unitá always tried to maintain as communist cultural and political capital.
“Civil Society,” appeared in L’Unitá also in combination with other themes. For instance, one could find “Civil Society” frequently intertwined to “Raison d’état” as Spina’s article eloquently shows:”Never in thirty years we saw the country and the parliament so united” (L’Unitá, 1978, March 18: p. A1). The reaction to Moro’s kidnapping was framed as an “extraordinary popular reaction” (L’Unitá, 1978, March 17: p. A1). Another clear example of the association of “Civil Society” and “Raison d’état” was the article titled “the square and the State” (L’Unitá, Spriano, 1978, March 18: p.A1). The “Civil Society” theme represented the way the newspaper embraced “Rational Response” because for L’Unitá ideological position the only effective response to terrorism must come from the unity of civil society and the state. The “unity and Rigor” article that Berlinguer wrote (L’Unitá, March 19: p.A1) showed how L’Unitá merged state and people in one unitary whole.

Finally, last not the least, “Raison d’état” a theme that appeared as the most preponderant one in the Judge Sossi’s case as well as in Moro’s case. There is however a considerable difference that must be noticed: whereas in Sossi’s case “Raison d’état” appeared as a theme with a distinctive features compared to the other themes, in this case “Raison d’état” emerged as a “summa” theme, one that under its semantic umbrella incorporated the other themes like in a choral ensemble. The most spectacular case can be seen in l’Unitá and the way the newspaper links “Civil Society” and “Raison d’état.” If in Sossi’s case the two themes were distinguishable and even conceptually opposed, in Moro’s case they enhanced each other as a total reconciliation of the public and political sphere. Less outstaying but equally extremely significant is the opposite example. If in Sossi’s case Il Corriere della Sera proposed “Raison d’état” with such an intensity that it could obscure almost completely the presence of “Civil Society,” in Moro’s case “Civil Society” appears in Il Corriere della Sera in the most topical moments of the
Moro’s kidnapping such as when commenting on the assassination of the Christian Democrats leader.

Compared to the previous case of Judge Sossi, one of the most remarkable differences in the newspapers coverage is the alignment of L’Unità to the other three newspapers in the consistent reproduction of the “Raison d’état” theme. If in the previous case “Civil Society” contributed to down play the “Raison d’état” theme, in this case they both coexist as a dialectical unity, as very powerful and distinctive ideological articulation of the euro communism embraced by the PCI. Outstanding is in this sense is the article of Spriano in which (L’Unitá, 1978 March 29: p. A1) titled “The State is not an Empty Shell” in which the journalist defended the state institutions as institution made by the people.

“Raison d’état” in La Stampa was presented more oriented on authoritative voices rather than on the abstract state institutions like in Il Corriere della sera. Similarly to the other two newspapers, La Stampa now depicted all main political leaders Zaccagnini and Andreotti, Craxi Berlinguer as united and involved in the effort (Il Corriere della sera, 1978 March 26: p. A1). Numerous articles, like in the other two newspapers, were dedicated to celebrate the policy of firmness. La Stampa also intertwines “Raison d’état” with the dramatic “Human Drama” theme by reporting the voices also of statesmen at the supranational level (Il Corriere della sera, 1978 April 06, p.A1) when it reported how the European countries showed solidarity to the Italian Government.

6.3 Ideological Polarization

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the comparison with Sossi’s can help us approaching the examination of Moro’s event. The first important consideration that should be made is about how time affected the ideological position of the four voices. First of all, since the kidnapping of Sossi in 1974 four years have passed and such a lap of time was more than enough to witness substantial changes in perspective in the four voices.

On the one hand, the worldview of the BR significantly evolved: the two protagonists of class struggle identified by the BR at the time of Sossi’s kidnapping, the proletarian state and the bourgeois state, were in 1978 replaced by the Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” and the “Imperialist State of the Multinationals.” Such a move reflected the strategic shift from the localized battle against the Italian state and Italian bourgeois class to the supranational level of the “International of Imperialism/Terrorism.” In this new scenario, the BR perceived the multilayered nature of the confrontation, its increased fluidity but also its much
more explicit militarist fashion. As the BR explained in C1 the “international organization of capital and its repressive objectives leads the proletariat to organize internationally.”

On the other hand, the three newspapers editorial lines reflected the remarkable political tectonic movement represented the so called “historic compromise” (the alliance between Christian Democrats and Italian Communist Party and the re-incorporation of the latter in the governing coalition) and the inter-party alliance against terrorism defined as “Constitutional Arch.” As I observed in Chapter IV, both political projects reflected a remarkable ideological convergence to a the centrist position. The incorporation into a centrist bloc implied a twofold negotiating move: first of all, the ruling party Christian Democrats leaned towards both socialist and communist conceding important social reforms party; secondly the very dramatic move of the Socialists and Communists towards the center.

Such an establishment of a historic bloc reflected almost directly into the press. Looking at the three newspapers, the most indicative sign of the consolidation of a middle ground characterized by an inter-classist and inter-ideological consent, was the abandoning of strongly marked individual editorial lines (compared to Sossi’s) and the converging to very similar positions and very similar themes. Eloquent of that was the fact that on the one hand, Il Corriere della Sera could adopt rhetoric of people/mass movements associated to “Civil Society” (previously such a theme was embraced only by L’Unita and deriving from the embracement of Marxist ideas”).

On the other hand, equally remarkable was the fact that L’Unita could adopt the theme that most fetishized the “bourgeois” state, “Raison d’état” (previously overwhelmingly present

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18 The “Constitutional Arch” represented an ideal re-unification echoing WWII ample political coalition which produced the Italian Constitution.
only in Il Corriere della Sera). Furthermore, coming along with “Raison d’état,” L’Unita also adopted the associated conservatory rhetoric of the state as the only possible democratic institution which also constituted the base for the adoption of “Rational Response.”

The move towards the liberal center for the communist newspaper meant also replacing iconic expression of Marxist jargon such as “revolution” which became “democratic transition” and “class struggle” became “interclass dialogue” Despite the toning down of the radical position of the Italian Communist Party, still it is important to remark how L’Unitá never gave up its individual ideological confrontation with the BR at least on three main fronts: first of all defining who between the two was the “the real communist;” secondly who was the “real inheritor of the Resistance” therefore the “real partisan,” thirdly who was “the real fascist.”

Equally indicative was the emerging in all three newspapers of themes such as “Human Drama” and the martyrization of Moro (the secular equivalent of sanctification) which revealed a tendency to focus on the drama of individuals (such as Moro, his family, important political figures) as opposed to the larger political implications. “Human Drama” and Moro martyrization contributed to depoliticize the rhetoric on the BR and treating it instead as an absolute act of violence, incivility and, in the end, sacrilege which, as I will suggest in the section, seem to manifest the presence of a powerful myth.

To sum up, the examination the emerging themes at the ideological level of the Moro’s case meant above all highlighting a mutually fed tendency to ideologically polarize as the four voices positions around two field forces: democratic politics versus violent terrorism. Both the radicalization of the BR and the alliance of all institutional parties translated into an impressive ideological polarization compacting the three newspapers together and opposing them in absolute terms to the BR. Such a polarization, compared to Sossi’s episode, intensified a great
deal and the more it did stronger was the confirmation for the BR that absolute irreconcilability of the position could only be resolved through the armed struggle. And the more the incited the armed struggle the farther was the group’s messages from the rest of the society compression. The paradox that in few instant will become apparent is that right when the ideological confrontation becomes fiercer the silenced ground of hegemonic assumptions, beliefs, values between the BR and the three newspapers become more extended.

6.4 Hegemonic convergence into the Myth of the regeneration of Italian Nation-state

In Sossi’s case, the examination of the themes at ideological and at the hegemonic level revealed a passage from a confrontation between two apparently diametrically opposed worldviews to a partial re-conciliation through the sharing of liberal state and publish sphere ideology which eroded the definition and the ground of separation of the BR and the three newspapers. In Moro’s case, as far as the three newspapers are concerned, such a convergence which previously seemed to be operating only at the mythic/hegemonic level of the unsaid became more explicit to the extent to permeate the ideology.

Such a phenomenon could be explained in the Gramscian terms as the naturalization of hegemony into common sense: the embracement of ideas and practices which are at the same time on overt display but whose rationale never seems to require an explanation. For Gramsci, common sense comprised the "diffuse, uncoordinated features of a general form of thought common to a particular period and a particular popular environment" (1971, p.330). The translation of hegemony into common sense implies a permeation of common naturalized
assumptions of this common ground that fill the distance of the ideological confrontation the three newspapers of Sossi’s case: the ideological distance which was previously (Sossi’s case) determined by the adoption of “Raison d’état,” “Rational Response,” “Civil Society” and “Human Drama,” in this second case, was significantly reduced by the very content of those themes now blending together.

The distance between the ideological and the hegemonic is still present in Moro’s case through: as the confrontation between the BR and the institutional bloc assumes a new semantic level one which is more symbolic and culminates in both cases with a cult of death. From the BR’s perspective, the death sentence represents the logic conclusion of their hypostatic dialectic: the unjust created by the existence of an absolute nemesis of the proletariat can only be counteracted by the destruction of the enemy. From the perspective of the three newspapers, the cult of death translated into the religious ritual of anticipation of Moro’s death which will become a martyr dying to both consolidate and save the fatherland. In the following two subsections I will examine the two perspectives.

BR’s anti-dialectic and the bureaucratic death

Like in the variations of popular fairy tales, the protagonists, their names, their appearances may change but their structural relations tend to reproduce analogous narratives. Similarly, the replacement of the protagonists of the class struggles, bourgeois state/proletariat alternative state (in Sossi’s case) with the Imperialist State of the Multination/Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat did not really change their structural distance and relations. In fact, the Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat was supposed to represent the response of the proletariat to the re-structuration of the nation state into the
Imperialist State of the Multinationals and therefore the going beyond the Westphalian logic of struggle, in the end the came down to a nominal (rather than substantial) replacement of the “Alternative proletariat State for the Revolutionary party.” Such a move did not really bring any conceptual difference: they represented two models of totalitarian organization still irremediably connected to the institutional politics that the very BR opposed ideologically (against the Christian Democrats’ ruling) but also strategically (in the sense that the BR reproached the Italian Communist Party to have gave up the socialist project for the reformism of conventional politics).

The level of reproduction of the party logic by the BR is really deep. In chapter IV, in the analysis of the Italian social historical context, I claimed that in the Italian model of politics the civil society colonizes with its particularistic interests the Italian state and such a situation produced an aggregative system moved by a party logic (as opposed to the integrative logic of an actual democratic system). In doing that, the group does not only fail in political and sociological imagination but actually “regresses” by drawing from an Italian political tradition dating the middles ages. As Ward (1999) argues, the influence of mass parties politics in Italy as a form distinct from the state derived from their common roots in the historical contrast which, since the Middle Ages, had opposed the pope (identified with the common people) and the emperor. In such a context, the party represented the “anti-state” or more precisely an alternative to the state.

In many ways, this drawing form the political party tradition represents another attempt to answer the question of establishing a social order in Italy because as Orsini claims (2009) behind the BR as a group there is also desire to fund a new community. Schmalenbach (2006) along Tönnies’ distinction between “Gemeinschaft” and “Gessellschaft” introduces the “Bund” an elective association based on a common goal or a common ritual experience of communion.
typical religious community. When one joins the bund, by becoming a believer one establishes fraternal relationship, a body in fusion. This is maybe representing for the BR the new form of the social experience and new political ethic the proletarian public sphere can produce and for this reason is rejected and attacked by its counterpart the bourgeois public sphere.

Under the perspective of the persistence of binary oppositions the moves of the BR translates from confrontation between states/estates and then between different international political projects of different international organizations. According to Dini and Manconi (1981), from this primordial binary opposition the BR derived a normative system according to which the concept of “humanity” “justice” and “liberty” are intended by the BR not as universally attainable concepts but only relative to the class struggle. For instance, assuming the condition of no liberty determined by the existing class relations it led to consider legality as the act of freedom against the dominant legality dominating the oppressed. This was the rationale that informed Curcio crying during his trial that having killed Moro represented the highest act of humanity” because someone giving death sentence outside the wrong state of things may be then legitimated.

Violence is not simply justified by the brigatista because the other political forms have been taken away, it actually becomes re-signified in the most radical way: from the immoral to the most moral. The breaking of the capitalist regime, the machine of oppression, is for the BR simply following the dialectic of history. But its dialectic is actually quite anti dialectical because renders social relations hypostatic thus creating persona out of people (Moro as the leader of the bourgeois coalition) and out of institutions (e.g. the anthropomorphic embodiment of the state as the enemy).
Thus, death is not only a state of necessity of the BR’s primitive dialectical sense of history but also the false proof of their proper functioning as a bureaucratic morality. Then in C8 the BR celebrates the death sentence as a sign of firmness, the same firmness the Italian state was so much publicizing. It is a symbolic message meant to express the firmness of the BR’s policy and in doing that, it reveals the ethereal nature of such a policy because it is a performance dedicated ad persona as it requires the recognition of the Italian state to acquire value. In other words, again, as per Sossi’s case, the armed propaganda of the BR seems almost exclusively constructed on the same rhetorical base of the state it wants to combat: the firmness of a constituted order of things such as the people jury. This is clear when the BR in C7 the BR said: whoever hopes for Moro an analogous solution to the one of Sossi trial is mistaken. At this point our positions are well defined and only a clear response will allow the release of prisoner Moro.”

Moro would be a bureaucratic victory but what seems petty is the fact that Moro’s death is justified by the of bureaucratic firmness instead of being a political maneuver. The evolution between Sossi and Moro’s case seems really to rest on the progression on the same line: with or without the post-florist rhetoric of the “Imperialist State of the Multinationals” and the “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat,” the BR aspired to the same state constitution that characterized with Sossi, and as a matter of fact, the “leap of quality” for the BR is to honor their bureaucracy by respecting its “legal” decision.

The BR concluded the experience celebrating what the group considered an extremely important victory in the class struggle. At this point the paradox surrounding the BR as historic agent becomes clear: right when the group felt the final victory was close, the hijacked future was going the liberated, they were actually witnessing the emergence of an extended class hegemony that would sign its defeat, and in doing so meaning a fatal “retaliation” of the past
circumstances over the future. In the next section, I will show indexes of such a hegemonic emergence could be found in the so called cult of the state and this emerges in the newspapers.

As I mentioned the BR, party-bund logic was still aggregative, in the sense, it would have created internal cohesion by creating external divisions, in other words was not so far from the corporatist limited hegemonic aspirations that the moderates party during Risorgimento. Paradoxically enough, the bourgeois public sphere, these assemble of egoisms and petty interests, from the BR’s point of view, were in the same period after a much larger hegemony. A project that, again, dialectically enough, would not have been possible without the active opposition of the BR.

Cult of the Nation state

At the ideological level we observed how the emerging of themes in the newspapers indicated a convergence to a middle common ground in which the populist sentiments of the L’Unita blended with the pledge of royalty to the state of the Il Corriere della Sera and the criminalizing treatment of La Stampa. At the hegemonic level, I would claim that such a middle ground sublimates into a sort of civic religion based on the cult of the state. This is displayed in the way the newspapers had approached the kidnapping of the state man Aldo Moro, especially in its morals facets.

First of all, one should interrogate the source from the consistent tendency of those newspapers to produce moral judgments. Certainly, part of the moralism derived from the opportunistic tendency to sensationalism of the Italian press (see chapter III). However, sensationalism alone could not explain the specific frame informing the moral judgments, its consistency both along the duration of the kidnapping and across the three newspapers. By looking at the semantic field of reference for those judgments against BR and celebrating Moro,
the contraposition in fact does not rest on classic catholic binary oppositions such as good or bad or “pious” and “sinner” but one originating in the nature vs. culture as the most used adjectives across the three newspapers was “barbarian,” “atrocious,” “beast,” “bloody.” In other words, the opposition is between a T.I.N.A. (There Is No Alternative) civilization and the BR’s scandalous alternative. What is at stake then is a project of “civility,” that promise pacification, wealth and happiness under the leadership of the state. This was both an aspiration and a promise compensating for what the Italian never actually was.

In fact, if we combine the fatherland pathos and the cult of the person of “Human Drama,” with the paradigmatic and axiomatic defense of the state institutions (thus assuming the equation the current state of things equaled democracy and liberal regime) of “Raison d’état,” and populism of “Civil Society” the outcomes provide the potential conditions for a state centered theocracy. Together with the adjectives qualifying the BR’s actions, another cue of such a civic religion of the Italian state is given by the continuous reference made by the three newspapers to the president of republic. In this republican liturgy, the president of the Republic represented at the same time the first real attempt to create a secularized Italian icon (because emancipated from the Vatican institutions) but also a new religiosity because he represented the minister of such a republican cult. Moro is framed by the three newspapers in the same way as the president: a homo republicanus. Thus his martyrization can be capitalized in terms of nation state cohesion.

Such a seeking of legitimation through symbols, rituals and myths in order to capitalize on the integrative mechanisms of creation of a community seems to inhabit all modern states not just Italy. The question one should ask is where the symbolic capital for such a project came
from. According to Gundle (2010, p.113) there are four historical movements or processes which can produce civic religions: nationalism, industrialization, revolution and war:

“The emergence of the nation state produced a new type of political faith and an expansion in secular authority that, to render it meaningful, acquired symbols, heroes, rituals and myths. Industrialization undermined all traditional forms of authority and belief systems […] and created new demands for integration and belonging. Revolution gave violent shape to these demands on the political plane and signaled the decline of old forms of elite political mobilization. War created in its aftermath feelings of loss, displacement, anger and frustration that were frequently expressed and mediated through commemorations and collective rituals that, in determinate circumstances, could be manipulated or politicized.”

In the specific Italian political and social discourse of the post WWII there were present aspects of all four sources of civic religion: Italy experienced the transition from a monarchy and a 20 years dictatorship to a constitutional republic; the country just exited disastrous war which implied loss of lives, infrastructures and produced a grave economic crisis. Connected to that, since its emergence, the Resistance was framed by the left (and successively by all political parties) as a sort of moral revolution, a powerful experience of moral and intellectual regeneration of an entire country after Fascism. Finally since early 1950s, Italy started the process of modernization of its economy extending the process of industrialization for isolated poles of the North to entire regions.

Among those potential sources of civic religion there is an overarching one which articulates the others: the sense of urgency of completing the process of constitution of the Italian nation state. Such a process started with the so called Risorgimento, continued with WWI which was considered as a national war independence from the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the fourth
war of independence. Then continued with the Biennio Rosso, then the Ventennio Fascista (20 years of Fascist regime) which was supposed to “forge” a new old Italian by re-exuhmating the glorious roman past. It prosecuted with the Resistance and finally culminated with emergence of the Republic and the constitutional regime. And as I showed in chapter IV every stage developed as dialectical product of its precedent. Let us concentrate in the most recent self aware attempt to complete the Risorgimento: the Resistance.

The Resistance was not a simple national war like the First World War. It was also, as Pavone (1991) has underlined a class war and a civil war and also war of the demos, as Ginsborg (1992) has argued. After the collapse of Italy’s fascist regime, not only did the country’s entire political and economic system need to be rebuilt, but the form and content of the representation of power had to be reshaped too. The consequent need to reinvent and purge Italian symbology and liturgy of their fascist connotations, so as to provide the citizens of the post-war Republic with a shareable cultural and symbolic horizon, was fulfilled by creating a new liturgical calendar.

As Salvati (2001, p. 557) notices, at the end of the war a new political elite entered the Italian parliament. These new leaders (ranging from the non-Fascist right wing to the left) shared at least two significant features: first, the experience (or forced choice) of anti-Fascism; second, the political ‘void’ behind them, the void created by Fascism in the history of Italian democracy. Void here means the lack of a political tradition of democracy (party pluralism and freedom of the press and associations were all suppressed in 1925), and of influential leaders and theorists who might have contributed to their democratic

Like in the past Italian attempts to complete the Risorgimento, the Italian social order became the battle ground for competing views. As I mentioned in Chapter IV, the meaning of the
Resistance, the recognition of its successes and failures, the ideological characterization of its militants represented a ground of confrontation and dispute. The struggle over the myth of the nation in the years following World War II in Italy, in fact, constituted one of the most important tools of the political struggle, particularly between the two leading mass political parties (Gentile 1994: 65 – 124) and between diverse factions of the same pole as the distance between the triumphant framing of resistance by the Italian Communist Party and “Resistenza Tradita” framing by the BR demonstrates.

Now, in relation to that, the way all the three newspapers dealt with Moro’s kidnapping seems to reveal the reduction of such a struggle to a consensual hegemonic ground. For instance, during the kidnapping one can find two powerful examples of that April 25 and May 1st celebrations. Traditionally, April 25 was “liberation day,” a celebration especially relevant for the PCI which considered liberation as a celebration to match the epos of a fighting people guided by a partisan vanguard who wanted to free their own country. In other words for the communist tradition the liberation was the historic proof of the possibility popular uprising, an ethical choice which could have been made over and over again. In contrast, for the Christian Democrats even if the fight for liberation had an essential ideal value, it reached its aims and concluded its course by freeing the country from the Nazis and giving it a chance for democracy. Consequently they commemorated rather than celebrated the Resistance, retaining the utmost composure and trying to reconcile the nation by honoring the common sacrifice made by all servicemen (Chairing 2005: pp.96–101).

In relation to that, the April 25 1978 was lived as “national revolt against the new fascism’ represents by the BR (L’Unita, Criscuoli, 1978, April 25:A1). The front page also presents another article titled “the government and the parties reject the black mail: immediate and
compact reaction of democratic forces” (Il Corriere della Sera, 1978, April 25: A1) with an interview of Christian Democrats leader Zaccagnini. Finally one also finds an article dedicated to Resistenza, “the wealth of the Resistenza (Longo, 1978 April 25:A1) in which Longo trades the Communist framing of the partisan experience for an a-political celebration of the democratic forces (thereof including he future member of the Christian Democrats).

If for L’Unita the celebration the Resistenza becomes democratic celebration, for La Stampa and Il Corriere della Sera meant a “celebration of national unity” as Barbato (La Stampa, 1978, April 25:A1) claims and the “ethical strength of the state that does not abdicate facing the BR’s black mailing.” Another eloquent sign of the institutionalization of the Resistance as a national popular celebration of the Christian Democrats ruling (as opposed to a Communist one) was the link that was made between the celebration of the resistance on April 25 and the celebration of the armed forces on with 4 November. The red Resistance was “bleached” and “re-channeled ‘into the well-established forms of the cult of the fallen soldier turned into a national cult. The “fallen partisan” was extended to become the “fallen Italian soldier” thus allowing the integration of the war of liberation in the national history continuum, as a decisive step towards the regaining of freedom and democracy.

Even Labor Day (May 1st), the most Communist holydays officially recognized in Italy, became incorporated in this new liturgy. From a commemoration of a fighting moment of “labor” against capital became the labor celebrated by capital as a work public holiday ethic day, therefore disciplinized. All public holidays founded the new Italy on a system of multivalent symbols that allowed crossed identification and complex identity. It can also be seen as a basic agreement, within the ruling class, on considering some celebrations as a proper safety valve for
those who had been defeated in the elections. Therefore, thanks to some rituals, political opposition was transformed into complementary forces.

Such a struggle was also present in the BR’s experience of the kidnapping. It was not an accident that the most dramatic contested space during the kidnapping was Moro’s voice. On the one hand, the press was so facile in celebrating Moro as a martyr so well advance his actual death. On the other hand, the BR allowed the publication of Moro’s letters as a counter maneuver to the Moro martyrization frame (a process that himself recognizes by the very first days of the kidnapping, so well before his death sentenced was pronounced). But then, when Moro attacked the rhetoric of his colleagues at power, challenging the unity and the sacrality of the state institutions, Moro’s words were systemically discredited by the newspapers as words written under substances or under heavy psychological condition.

But still there was in common was the myth of a moral regeneration (a catholic legit motif) frame as a second Risorgimento. The main difference that for the Christian Democrats the Risorgimento was accomplished as ritualistically re-enacted with Republican liturgy, for the BR the Second Risorgimento was yet to come. But dialectically enough, the BR’s proposition to how complete such a process turned out to be another frustrated passive revolution in which the masses were not involved.

In conclusion, the examination of the themes inhabiting the Moro’s kidnapping displayed a complex dynamic. On the one hand, the BR by adopting the new cardinal concepts of “Movement of Resistance of the Offensive Proletariat” and the Imperialist State of the Multinationals” seemed to not gravitate anymore around the idea of “Alternative State.” However, the evolution seemed more jargon driven than conceptually as the BR returned to the state logic in the objective of building the Communist Fighters Party. On the other hand, the
three newspapers sophisticate their embracement of the state by transforming almost into the celebration of sort of civil religion founded on liturgies, rituals and myths of the nation, the sublimation of a hegemonic order, its sacralization.

The sacralization of politics and the cult of the state we are observing here though are far from being the Hegelian political and ethical community in which the individual interests are reconciled with the collective ethic, it is the naturalization of class based interested. Thus, paradoxically works like Hegel ethical state because the contradictions find a solution but approaches the “universal” is the degree of extension of hegemony, in other words a development of the particular.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

*The bourgeois was hidden in the citoyen and “God spare us what's in the comrade”*  

*Bloch (1969, p.30)*

Everybody, but especially the media, waited impatiently for a phone call that day. The BR since 1970s had established a ritual, a strictly followed modus operandi which implied claiming promptly the violent act followed by a long written message prepared well in advance for a timely release. The group always wrote first then killed later. After twenty long hours a phone call reached the newspaper Il Resto del Carlino saying “we are the Red Brigades, we claim responsibility for the death of professor Antonio Biagi,” Then, two days later, a hard copy 26 pages communiqué was sent to L’Unita and to 500 web addresses via email.

So much changed since the dissolution of the “original” BR and so much remained the same. The Italian Communist Party and the Christian Democrats party had dissolved, the Cold War ended, Italy was now part of the EU and the president of F.C. Milan was the new Prime Minister. But there was still room for a Déjà vu. After having published the excerpts from the communiqué, written in “authentic brigatese,” just like old times, a moral drama (Wagner-Pacifici, 1986) was enacted by new protagonists but by the same personas: a left wing politician calling for a general strike to show both the BR and right wing Prime Minister an expression of popular protest; the same right wing Prime Minister responding that the so called “Red Scare” was not over; finally the media, always generous with impressionism. Cipriani from L’Unita defined the group “insane “( 2002, March 22: p.A4), Rondolino from La Stampa, “mad criminals (2002, March 22, p. A1) and the Italian correspondent for BBC International falsely stated that the BR wanted to ally with Al-Qaeda.

But something had also changed. Understanding the BR, in 1970s meant for this study asking very broad questions about the “discourse of political violence,” the quest for transformative praxis, the way power can be reached and be destroyed and Schumpeter’s
question (1964) how an economic system that has generated an unprecedented wealth and freedom for the working class has aroused such hatred. Asking the same question in 2002 seemed like reviewing a dubious twenty-first century Hollywood re-enactment of an old classic movie. Not because the new red brigades were not serious enough but the social historic context in which they reproduced the BR’s ritualist communication was so different that the more they tried to make authentic the more estranged it appeared.

The episode just described seemed to confirm at least the good proposition of this dissertation: the importance of socially and historically situating communication, in other words, a historical interpretation of the Red Brigades through the examination of its communicative practices, its rhetorical confrontation with competing ideologies and its meaning within the larger social historical context. In respect to most of the existing literature and popular perception that tend to externalize the BR from the reality of the country, I meant to re-historicize the group by inserting its experience into an Italian grand narrative. One narrative without a grand design or a grand designer, though: a totalization without a totalizer.

The study followed the historical materialist assumption embedded in Sartre’s progressive-regressive method according to which history results from the tension between future and past: the “future,” represented by the individual and collective projects of social transformation which negate the “past,” the ensemble of circumstances produced by previous human praxis crystallized into institutions, systemic forces, a Zeit Geist, hegemonic assumptions, in other words the humus of the very ground on which the future negations are envisioned and realized.
Consequently, the strategy I adopted was to combine two levels of analysis and two different temporal dimensions, the Braudelian “long durée” and its apparent opposite, the episodic history made by singular events. Those two historical levels are then recombined in the fluid continuum offered by the tropological analysis of the ideological and the hegemonic. At the first macro and long historical process level, I provided a Gramscian narrative dominated by one main motive: the several attempts through history of different classes (or class fractions) to attain an extended hegemony and how the failure of such projects created a dialectical movement from one class’s attempt to another.

In other words, the failure of one hegemonic project provided the condition of possibility for another one. Such a fundamental incapacity of the elite to establish its hegemony played a fundamental role in producing several salient Italian historical phenomena/events: the structural weakness of the state, the strength of catholic church, the dominant presence of a corporativist consciousness which never completely reached the class level, the Southern question, Fascism, the Resistance and Historic Compromise and the political violence of 1970s.

Then, at the micro progressive-future level, I analyzed two episodes involving the BR and the media coverage of the group’s activity. The four voices examined, the BR and three national newspapers, have been considered as competing alternative ideological responses to the quest for a hegemonic social order in a period of profound contestation of the already weak Christian Democrats hegemony. More in detail, I examined the way the BR and the three national newspapers, Il Corriere della Sera, La Stampa and L’Unita, have tried to defined the meaning of the BR’s kidnapping of Judge Mario Sossi and the kidnapping of the Christian Democrats leader Aldo Moro. I carried out a tropological analysis that distinguished between
ideological and hegemonic level. At the first level, I intended to capture the explicit formulation of a given worldview, its utopian-future projection and, at the second level, I intended to capture both the implicit implications of those worldviews and the cues pointing to the silenced assumptions behind those ideas which mostly come from an unchecked past.

In both examined cases, it emerged a consistent distance between what appears at the ideological level and what is implied at the hegemonic one. Whereas at ideological level, especially in Sossi’s episode, the four voices confronted each other, at the hegemonic level both the institutionalized voices of the press and the BR met each other in common concerns for the liberal state expressed by the BR’s Alternative State theme and the consistent presence along the three newspapers of a Raison d’Etat theme.

In the second case, in the dramatic episode of Aldo Moro’s kidnapping, at the ideological level, the confrontation polarized into a solid front formed on the one hand by the BR and on the other by the three newspapers which act as a hegemonic historic bloc. The previous ideological differences among the three newspapers observed in Sossi’s case, in Moro’s episode, lose definition. At the ideological level, the increased militarization of the BR and the increased preoccupation of the newspapers for the impact of the group on the democratic institutions made the confrontation almost Manichean. Interestingly enough, the themes previously distinctively present only in particular newspapers, reflecting particular ideological positions, became adopted by all three as supplementary arguments, or as in the case of “Raison d’Etat” for l’Unità and “Civil Society” for Il Corriere della Sera became central.
At the hegemonic level, similarly to Sossi’s case, the BR re-joined both the bureaucratic logic of institutional politics characterizing the Italian state and the ritualistic celebration of it. In fact, on the one hand the newspapers celebrated a liturgy of civic religion centered on the sacrality of the state and the fatherland. On the other hand, the BR, by the enactment of ritual constructed around the promised first and the realized Moro’s death, seemed to involuntarily comply with it. In fact, the celebration of Moro’s trial, his interrogation, the pronouncement of his sentence and then his execution suggested that violence, under the “proletarian justice” was a product of internalization of the concept of bourgeois law. As Benjamin (1999, p.287) argued “All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law preserving. If it lays claim to neither of those two predicates, it forfeits all validity.”

The tension revealed in the two episodes between the ideological and the hegemonic level revealed the tension between social transformation and social reproduction that characterized the BR as historic subject. As the analysis of the two episodes showed, ideological and hegemonic are fluid categories and not separated compartments and certainly were not treated as epiphenomenon and phenomenon: as per the mediation relationship that links the whole and the instance and the long durée and the episodic, a given existing ideology always mediates the hegemonic as much as the hegemonic always mediates the ideological. This was particularly displayed by Moro’s case in which the implicit common ground found in Sossi’s case at the hegemonic, in the second case, permeated explicitly the Gramscian common sense, uniting ideologies of “national unity,” “historic compromise.”

The comparative analysis of the two episodes revealed a substantial distance between the 1974’and 1978’ episodes. Based on the historic analysis carried out in Chapter IV, the BR has
been defined as a mediated response, (i.e. dialectical product) of the absence of an extended hegemony following the fall of Fascism, the frustration of the failed political project of the Resistance and the missed Fordist opportunity in the 1960s. However, as it happened in the past, the failure of one hegemonic attempt created the conditions of possibility for another one. In this case, if the BR could be considered as the dialectical product of absence of hegemony, the BR, as one of the most extreme embodiments of such absence, created the possibility for creation of much more consolidated leadership by the ruling class. This was evident in 1978’s case revealed by the way remarkable flattening of ideological difference under the project of “national unity” and “historic compromise.”

Summing up, the study was able to provide satisfactory initial response to the research question about identifying narratives in the BR’s communication practices and confronting them with the ones present in the three national newspapers and the ones more generally framing modern Italian history. In doing that, the study went beyond a purely descriptive stage but actually provided both a dialectical explanatory framework which offered a contextualization of the group within an Italian grand narrative that resisted structuralist, humanist and teleological tendencies and the ground for an immanent critique of the group.

In the next sections, after briefly discussing the theoretical implications of my findings, I will dedicate the rest of the conclusion trying to assess a political evaluation of the BR especially focusing on dialectic interpretation of history, a materialist theorization of language, the concept of resistance and revolutionary strategies.

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19 Following Gramsci, the index of hegemony accomplishment is always relative, because hegemony is by definition never completely attained.
7.1 Discussion of the findings

*Dialectic and History*

At the theoretical level, the findings of my study have several implications. First of all, they confirmed but also problematized one of the main theoretical assumptions of this work about a dialectical development of history. Nowadays more than ever we experience an epistemological impasse according to which highly developed division of labor leads to imagine society neatly divided in sealed compartments: such a view at the same time illuminates the surface social phenomena and obscures their deep connection with the rest of the social whole. In relation to that, the dissertation was propelled by a “suspicious” hermeneutic of suspicion that tried to dialectically recombine the tendency to go underneath the surface of historical phenomena without necessarily trying make of the deeper level a metaphysical ground (this is why the epistemological relationship between hegemony and ideology has not been treated along the lines of phenomenon-epiphenomenon).

However, if is true that the mediation logic behind dialectical thinking helps prevent theological-like explanations, that does not necessarily mean that the elements in dialectical relationship can pacify different forces or “moderate all claims” (in Wander; 1984, 205). In fact, the outcomes of my research lead to recognize in the dialectics of “past” and “future,” “structure” and “agency” and “necessity” and “freedom” of the BR’s experience an articulated but still strong level of determination. It is the asymmetric balance between elements of different determining weight that keeps the dialectic moving incessantly therefore producing historic change. Such an imbalance of forces represents in fact one of the main aspects of the BR’s narrative as the group could not completely overcome the heavy conditioning of the “past”
because of the in-escaped—not necessarily inescapable—tendency of the BR to reject a given social order at one level and re-affirm it at another.

And such dynamic seemed to me the reflection of larger contradictions of a given society that has always experienced modernity as a paradox because under such a perspective the BR is depicted as a mediated reaction to the failed project of Resistance as a second Risorgimento and the missed chance of the ruling group represented by the DC to make out of the economic development of the 1960s a process of national consolidation.

But the BR did not represent a mere reproduction of the past either; they were not a simple reflection of the iron law of history determined by the “base” or any other abstract force, such as “power.” Ironically and dialectically enough, the most significant demonstration of the BR’s making history must be found in its revolutionary defeat. Its collective projects, its future embodied in the projection of its determination created historical change, something new: it provided a *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of a more extended hegemonic order. Under this perspective the BR’s praxis was at the same time a dialectical product of the past and dialectical surpassing of that given past. The BR’s praxis, as a negation of such a given, as we tried to demonstrate, was still a relative negation (not an absolute one) but this did not prevent the group from making history.

There are several elements that indicate the BR’s production of history. First of all, as just mentioned, the BR (in conjunction with other groups such as Prima Linea) provided the Italian society more solid conditions for the establishment of hegemony (relatively more extent but necessarily completed because hegemony is never complete, and the Italian historical example always witness that more ant other western country): the group killed Moro, the
protagonist of the political project of the “Historic Compromise,” and by doing that, the group allowed the state to consolidate for several years a historic bloc.

In the mid 1970s, the radicalization of the BR (but also of the groups such as Prima Linea), consumed its social base by pushing much of the remaining social energies of the 1968s movements towards the more institutional position of the Italian Communist Party (the party in mid 1970s counted almost 2 million members and reached 34.4% of votes in 1976 general election). The empowerment of the Italian Communist Party and its entrance into the ruling coalition signified two important things: firstly, an important mediation between the government and the working class which played a fundamental role in the working class reformist victories of the 1970s; however the reformist success in so much as they also represented “concessions” of the ruling elite contributed to establishment of the social pacification required by an extended hegemony as interclass alliance and this meant the definitive abandonment of the revolutionary project of the Italian Communist Party.

The BR produced history then, but certainly not under the condition of their own making. By historic irony, and paradoxically enough, the BR sought to catalyzed by its praxis a movement of protest against a state of things, making of the state or the DC, or Aldo Moro a common nemesis which could unite the Italian civil society under a revolutionary project. Again, ironic was the fact that the BR was to provide a moment of “external unity” to the rest of Italian society much more than the capitalist state repression was able to provide for the proletariat.

To sum up, the study was able to provide an interpretation of the BR as both producer and product of history thus going beyond the heteronomic prejudice of most existing literature
but without moving to an autonomic prejudice. Therefore BR has been treated as the historic subject whose condition is at the same time immanent because there is no external force outside of people, and transcendental because most frequently it does not depend on individual intentions (Riordan, 1998). However, such as dialectic treatment did not imply a “balance” between “past and “future” but a relatively higher determining weight of the past over the future. In the end, the BR, whether victorious or not in its intents, made history in a very profound way: even when not completely being able to transcend its “past”, the discourse of the violence of the BR, demonstrated that the social is not only the past, cannot be taken always as formed. The group showed the need to find new terms to the undeniable experience of the present and its projection into the future.

The conceptualization of dialectic described above also contributes to explain how mediation materializes in communication. The link between dialectical thinking just described and the materialist approach to language that follows resides in the common rejection of fetishizations (of the BR), the hypostatic views that transforms social processes into substances.

*Materialist Communication*

In the introductory chapter I talked about the intriguing presence of a communication paradox surrounding the history of the group: the communicative practices of the BR reflected the explicit intention of the group to share with the world the group’s project and, at the same, contribute to reinforce its condition of alienation and unintelligibility. In this sense, the dissertation tried to solve the paradox by de-fetishizing the BR’s language, by treating it as historically specific social process rather than a product. As Williams argues (1977), "[T]he strongest barrier to the recognition of human cultural activity is this immediate and regular
conversion of experience into finished products... relationships, institutions and formations in which we are still actively involved are converted, by this procedural mode, into formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes” (p.128).

The general assumption that informed this study was that communication has not a fixed meaning in itself, but just like a sign, it acquires signification only when related to the social historical conditions in which it occurs and that, in part, always intends to negate. That was why I considered the condition of the BR as a free floating sign something like an incomplete or an “interrupted communication.” Thus, by uncovering a significant portion of the social and historical conditions of production of the BR’s language praxis, the study also contributed to a materialist understanding of language.

Communication concerns the production and sharing of meaning which are actively lived and felt. Such a process of signification of the world is material because it involves practical consciousness as not being simply a “consciousness of something” but rather “consciousness of doing something.” If communication is praxis then, under a historico materialist framework, should be treated as an instance of history making, therefore produced by the tension between the projection of into “future” of the historic subject’s intension that tries to negate the constrains derived by the given circumstance coming from the “past” In the case of the BR’s communicative practices this meant understanding that group’s text, as project of the world of what “would be” entering the world of what “is” and what “was.”

In order to make sense of such communicative practices the study had to move back and forth between the internal semiotic of the text to the social semiotic arising from the historical conditions of production of the text because communication, even when considered in the
individual practice, is always mediation between the individual and the general. Communication implies always a social commentary.

Another aspect both implied and resulted from the study is that if terrorism is communication and communication is practice which ought to be understood in its own historical conditions of production it means rejecting an understanding of phenomena of violence defined as terrorism informed by an essentially idealistic position. In fact, terrorism seems to be consistently explained as the result of the embrace of violent ideas and this prevents a more comprehensive understanding of it. Terrorism as language appears then to be the victim of the same intellectual/philosophical compartmentalization or division of labor that reproduces the Cartesian dualism between ideas and matter. As Peck (2006) remarks, treating thought and language as practical activity means rejecting the separation of the material and the symbolic by which culture is made either a dependent reflection of a primary economic process or the privileged space of ideas that generate social reality.

Since the study explicitly draw on the Marxist tradition, it is important to remark how by considering language as a materialist mediation means transcending the simplistic terms of base and superstructure (Williams, 1977), upgrading language form the epiphenomenal dimension of the “superstructure” without necessarily the unilateral determination of the “base.” I align therefore with that body of literature within the Marxist tradition (Gramsci, 1971, Williams, 1977, Bettelheim, 1976, Peck, 2006) which rejects “monotheistic” explanations the implied existence of a unfolding law of nature that make history indifferently form human praxis. Gramsci (1971) points out that idealism and crude materialism represent two conceptually similar idealist phenomena. Under such an idealist approach the “base” becomes a Kantian
“thing in itself” possessing an elective affinity to theological explanation. Gramsci argues that "The claim, presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism, that every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism (1971, p.407).

Thus, just like we cannot find an explanation of terrorism in its linguistic sign, we cannot find an explanation of language solely in idea of language but in the indissoluble unity of ideas and praxis, in the relation between praxes. If language never contains itself, the social relations never contains completely language either since they both mediate each other in social material process.

Language under a materialist guise is a history making factor the meanings created by communicative actions can also be diversely sedimented. Accordingly, some meanings tend to be more accessible than others, or more consciously embraced as the ideology/hegemony distinction shows. In fact, such an approach to language motivated both the strategy of thematization and the distinction between ideology and hegemony since reflected the intention to combine the unique project of a given text negating the given with the determining forces of its context. Under such a perspective, the social meaning of the BR’s practices and the other three voices could not be completely found in its ideological nor its hegemonic level but in the dialectical unity of the two.

The combination of the two levels meant also going beyond the alleged dichotomy of mythos and logos as the idealized opposition of irrationality and reason, of fiction and reality. Because logos always presupposes a level of mythos as representing in part its ground of
meanings. In other words, when we understand "Myth" in this way, we are not speaking of something that is "false" or "untrue," but rather, we are speaking of that which is the meaning and ground which is taken up into language with our everyday discourse or Logos.

Another significant implication of treating language as a history making agent is the recognition of collective memory as a full scale historic factor, as Nora puts it (Nora 1984: xviii) “a meeting point between the political and social sides of life, between lived experience and the reordering of it that takes place in subsequent accounts, a means of defining and consolidating identity to the extent that it ‘conserves and transmits values. Collective memory does not simply constitute an important part of the whole society’s culture (Oppenheimer & Hakvoort 2003, p. 94) but as in the Italian case of the Resistance, contributes to determine society own understanding in history.

In this sense, interpreting the BR meant also explaining the existence of a multiplicity of memories and assessing their impact on the national history. It meant materializing what in Chapter II I defined as the “historic if” In the particular case of the BR and the rhetorical voices in competition with the group, the ideologies represented by the national newspapers, what was at stake was the attribution of the symbolic capital represented by the glorious past of the resistance. The fact that the resistance represented a “divided memory (Yerushalmi 1990: p.14) is another symptom of hegemony deficit in the sense that a class was not able to naturalize its own views, especially about something so constitutive for the Republican era such a the Anti fascist struggle. The objective of creating a collective could be read as a way to compensate for leadership deficit, because it connects the field of governance to that of citizenship, because citizenship means ‘the full acceptance of a common political culture, of the language and rules
that allow for the resolution of the tensions of civil society within the political system’ (Salvati 1997: 24).

Thus as Storchi (2007 p.241) observes “The memory of the Resistance is strongly influenced by the structural weaknesses of the Italian Resistance itself. “ For this reason until 1970s the resistance never really became considered as national narrative. But in 1970s, right when the BR emerged as a dialectic la product of such a lack of hegemony, not accidentally, the resistance become an established and controlled narrative that re-conciliated Communist Resistance and Christina Democrats republicanism in the same story. Not accidentally all the most important civil liturgies of post war Italy, especially the one of communist origin become excuses for national patriotism. Not accidentally, as I suggested in Chapter VI, only in moment in which at socio-economic (through the powerful mediation of the welfare state) and political level the ruling class was able to create an amply extended hegemony being capable to include under its coalition moderate right wing and the PCI.

7.2 The Immanent Critique of the BR

“Immanent criticism holds in evidence the fact that the mind has always been under a spell. On its own it is unable to resolve the contradictions under which it labours. Even the most radical reflection of the mind on its own failure is limited by the fact that it remains only reflection, without altering the existence to which its failure bears witness. Hence immanent criticism cannot take comfort in its own idea. It can neither be vain enough to believe that it can liberate the mind directly by immersing itself in it, nor naïve enough to believe that unflinching immersion in the object will inevitably lead to truth.

(Adorno, 1967, p.49)

In the final paragraphs of the introduction I mentioned that if this dissertation had to be associated to the general practices of asymmetric warfare commonly defined as terrorism it
would have been for the purpose of providing an immanent critique of a particular historicized instance in order to assess an evaluation of the action of a group according to its own terms, values, objectives. At the end of this journey, I think I produced enough material to present in this section several critical points of reflection produced: the problem of the state, the tension between “war of maneuver” and “war of position,” and finally how the BR understood dialectic and language.

The Problem of the State and Bureaucratic Centralism

The examination of the BR’s communicative practices revealed the eminent preoccupation of the group for the state which became both Clausewitz’s absolute enemy and an unreflective object of desire. In fact, the Italian state was perceived as the highest example of the BR’s existential enemy, literally positing the constant threat of terminating the existence of the group (and for this reason had to be destroyed). At the same time, it also represented a model of emulation and considered the most powerful source of recognition and legitimation. Thus, as I tried to show, the more the BR wanted to substantiate its “proletariat state” against the bourgeois state, the stronger was the reference to the Italian state with its aggregative–party logic.

The BR had adopted an elementary understanding of dialectics that assumed that given that capitalism provided death and illiberty, the group believed that by eliminating the instruments of capitalism, such as the state, it could eliminate the regime of illiberty. If it is true that this study tried to counteract the common perception mistake of seeing the BR as an “absolute negation” of the Italian context, the same mistake could be attributed to the very BR in its antidialectical understaing of its enemy.

Certainly in the BR’s position one can identify the ideological mediation of Leninism. As Schmitt (1964) asserts, Lenin moved the conceptual center of gravity of the war to the political
dimension and pushed for the identification of what was a concrete enemy into an absolute
enemy, the class adversary because if the struggle could not produce absolute enemies then it
remained a conventional game. Accordingly, the brigatsista was a partisan in the sense that took
parts (and a party) and the more he/she dis in absolutist ways the more faithful was to his/her
cause.

But Leninism does not completely exhaust the horizons of meanings of the BR. Gitlin
(1980, p.240) talking about the American left explains the adoption of Leninism as an
“ingenious solution” to allow the self understanding of the student movement as the advanced
guard of an otherwise not aware working class. However, in the Italian case, the adoption of
Leninism seemed much less strategic and displaying the intersection of the elective affinities of
a given ideology and the historic idiosyncrasies of a country which was still striving to make out
itself a nation state. In other words, such a mixed attitudes of the BR showed for the Italian state,
a combination of Eros and Thánatos, seems to suggest that the BR were more responding to
Italian issues rather than following the Marxist tradition. Orsini (2009) argues that the BR’s
tendency towards obsession for the rules and its abiding made the group just like a religious
fanatic but the BR actually they were simply mimicking the conception of power of the state i.e.
absolute allegiance, absolute sovereignty, legitimate monopoly of violence.

As we have already observed in Chapter III, the state for the Marxist tradition is
machinery created by a society structured in classes functioning in order to secure the
reproduction of those existing class divisions. The state for Marx breaks human solidarity and, as
a matter of fact, the very scope behind the Socialist International organization was to push back
against the localized ideology of the state and patriotism. Instead, the BR sought in the Italian
state and its general abstraction, the base for authority and legitimation. The state represented for the BR a model for structure, direction and action.

A proof of such tendency can be found in the historical development of the BR’s organization. Whereas Marxism has traditionally considered bureaucracy as one of the most insidious aspects of states because it tendency to produce a detached-alienated political power, the BR developed “bureaucratic centralism” (Dini and Manconi, 1980, p.22) which stands as the ideal opposite of the desiderable democratic centralism. According to Seventeenth Congress of the ACP (Bolshevik; 1934) democratic centralism implies the election of all the directing bodies of the party, from top to bottom; the periodic accountability of party bodies to their party organizations and to higher bodies. On the other hand, the bureaucratic centralism implies a strict party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority; the unconditionally binding nature of the decisions of higher bodies for lower bodies.

If democratic centralism envisions a political decision-making system based on the free-sharing of ideas and strategies within the party which results in the election of both officials and strategies and the self-adherence to disciplined action, the BR envisioned a decision-making system that is dependent on the position within political hierarchy and the cold hand of Party discipline from above. In this sense, the gradual emergence and then imposition of the BR’s central committee seems to confirm this. Another aspect bureaucratic aspect was the fact that the structure of the BR tended to fraction the group in section that had to follow the order of the committee but without communicating one another.

To sum up, the BR through bureaucratic centralism fettered the creative initiative of the masses by pure rhetoric: the "people's will" "people's trial", the "people prison." Nota bene, the problem I see in bureaucratic centralism does not reside in the question of rejecting the modern
(and enlightenment) principle of representativeness because direct democracy, unless operating in micro realities supposedly created by a radical reconfiguration of the society, under present circumstances, would be logistically impossible. Plus as, I tried to show in this study, rejecting tout court one’s social historical back ground (thus including Enlightenment values and bourgeois culture) is simply a-historical. My concern, again is political, it is more connected to the paradox of fighting and willing to replace a “degenerated system” by similar degenerations. In other words, reproducing a bureaucratic thinking means reproducing an undemocratic ruling in which the masses are inferred rather than materially included in the revolutionary process.

*The Relational Limitation and the War of Position and War of Maneuver*

In chapter III, I stated that the BR’s conceptualization of the struggle was a romantic one because based on hypostatic imagery according to which two opponents, just like in a noble gentlemen duel find a solution through the symbolic or physical annihilation. The problem with such a conceptualization is not just about the lack of awareness of the mutual constitution of one’s own enemy as Hegel’s Lordship and Bondage (1976) or Negt and Kluge’s (1972) dialectical relationship between bourgeois and proletarian public sphere revealed. It has to do with a more general understanding of the relational nature of society.

In Moro’s kidnapping C4 (1978, April 4), the BR stated that was “possible to utilize the enormous forces developed by the productive forces to liberate proletariat from beastly exploitation, salariat work, misery and social degradation […] replacing the exchange value of people, with their use value.” But exchange value is not an intrinsic feature of products, it rather mirrors the social relations that produced it. There is then a structural parallelism between the
present immanent critique of the group’s practices and Bettelheim’s critique about the
development of class struggle in USSR (1976). In both cases the shortcoming of the two
projects was the overestimation of role played by the development of productive forces and the
underestimation of the role played by dominant social relations which represent the primary
social condition of reproduction of the very system the “developed “ proletariat want to change
As Bettelheim observes (1976, p.16)” the development of productive force can never, by itself,
cause capitalist forms of division of labor, or the bourgeois social relations, to disappear.

The limits of the group in understanding the relational aspect of the society leads us to
another point of critique. As we mentioned, the study offers a depiction of the Red Brigades
catched in the dialectic between “past” and “future,” between the determining weight of past
circumstance and the volition of the BR’s praxis to negate those circumstances in revolutionary
terms. In such a negating enterprise of the status quo, the BR found itself in a competition with
other social projects such as the one offered by the Italian Communist Party (directly reflected on
the editorial line of L’Unita). As I mentioned repeatedly in Chapter III, IV and V, the common
lineage of the BR and the PCI made the two apparently closest positions diverge dramatically. In
this sense, this study provides the material to critically discuss those two competing views in
terms that may potentially advance our understanding of the Gramscian (1971) distinction
between war of position and war of maneuver.

As it is well known, Gramsci theorized historical changes in modes of political struggle
by using the military war metaphor, especially drawing form the experience of World War I.
Such a conflict staged a transition from a war (characterized by relatively rapid movements of
troops) (1971, p. 238), to a war involving relatively immobile troops who dig and fortify
relatively fixed lines of trenches. According to Gramsci, in countries in which civil society is developed and articulated the frontal attack that characterizes the war of maneuver increasingly gives way to war of position because a developed civil society “is not, in reality, constituted simply by the actual trenches, but by the whole organizational and industrial system of the territory which lies to the rear of the army in the field” (p. 234).

Even in a society like in the Italian in which capitalism and the capitalist class rule established in very problematic ways, civil society developed with increasing complexity inhabited by social mediators such as mass political parties and economic trade unions that created a continuum between state and civil society. Drawing on such a distinction one can identify the distance between the position of the BR which represented an example of the frontal attack against the state and the position of the Italian Communist Party which represented a war of position working within the institutions of the civil society. And by doing that, this study provided a potential occasion to problematize the faith that now days consistently posed on “war of position” by most of critical and cultural studies.

According to a Gramscian reading, one of the reasons of the failure of the BR’s revolutionary project can be explained in the way they conceptualized its confrontation with Italian state. In other words the BR’s frontal attack against the state underrated the defensive mechanism lay behind the fortification of the state, the civil society. Paradoxically enough, the group matured through time by abandoning its initial awareness of it.

BR started their activity by the so called armed propaganda, having as both ground of operation and audience the civil society, but in its successive development, the group radicalized its frontal attack, by maneuvering against the state. But, the State, as Gramsci observed, “was
only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks" (p. 238). When the BR assumed that civil society was in the highest stage of vulnerability, under the pressure of multiple crisis, economic, cultural, civil society demonstrated to be resistant to the catastrophic ‘incursions’ of the immediate economic element or extremization of the element of violence and coercion exerted by the state. Thus to sum up, in the apogee of the confrontation between the BR and its nemesis, during the kidnapping and then execution of Aldo Moro, when the group assumed that its “fierce artillery attack” seemed to have destroyed the enemy's entire defensive system (or more precisely, one of its army general) in fact, in Gramsci’s words it had only destroyed the outer perimeter (p. 235).

In relation to that, the Italian Communist Party, led first by Togliatti and then by Berlinguer, with its embrace of social liberal democracy reflected the Gramscian acknowledgement about the power structures of Western European States and the consequential kind of Communist revolution that might succeed in such States as Italy. The Italian Communist Party, one of the most powerful example of the so called Euro-Communism hold against a view that economic forces and crises will in themselves suffice to bring about the overthrow of capitalist relations of production and the installation of the proletariat as controllers of the means of production. The party was convinced that only a long process of radication of the communist social and political culture in the Italian civil society could create the condition to mobilize the working class and dishearten the defenses of the capitalist system. Political struggle for Gramsci necessarily involved a struggle for hegemony, a class's struggle to become a State and take up the role of State as educator, thus the war of position.

Certainly the war of position has been received by contemporary cultural and critical studies as the metaphor of a realistic intervention in modern western societies. In the end, the
prominence of concepts such as identity politics, representation, resistance, the role of the
intellectual bridging class consciousness and class experience, critical pedagogy seemed all to be
framed under the grand narrative of the war of position. In this sense, the experience of the
Italian Communist Party in its post World War II since its exclusion from the coalition
governments in 1947 and its re-inclusion under the project of the “Historic Compromise” in late
1970s represents an interesting problematization of the war of position strategy. Now, in the
twenty first century, it does not take a Marxian theory of revolution to say that the party failed in
its strategy and I would claim that an important factor for such a defeat was its particular way to
operationalize a war of position approach. And, more precisely, such a strategy coincided with
party re-integration in the ruling coalition under the Historic compromise”

The Italian Communist Party, with its proactive position in favor to historic compromise
and political mediation contributed to establish a centrist hegemony and created a historic bloc
that by the same measure included the PCI in ruling institutional politics emptied the Communist
party until its exhaustion of its original political agenda of radical transformation of the Italian
society. The historic experience of the PCI seems to me to point to a critical re-evaluation of the
war of position because it indicates that without a strong element of Jacobinism, coercion and
violence, the patient working from the inside aspiring to establish cultural hegemony can
dialectally turn into what Barthes (1972) called inoculation.

Barthes describes inoculation as follows: "take the established value which you want to
restore or develop, and first lavishly display its pettiness, the injustices which it produces, and
the vexations, to which it gives rise... then, at the last moment, save it in spite of, or rather by the
heavy curse of its blemishes" (p. 41). One cures doubts by the very ills which cause them; "One
inoculates the public with a contingent evil to prevent or cure an essential one... A little
'confessed' evil saves one from admitting a lot of hidden evil" (p. 42). "One immunizes the contents of the collective imagination by means of a small inoculation of acknowledged evil; one thus protects it from the risk of a generalized subversion" (p. 150).

By the same logic, the small dosage of challenge and heavy dosage of reformism produced by the party, functioning both as opposition and a ruling coalition party contributes to insert its content in the opposite logic of its normative thrust, thus giving them an opportunity to establish an even more stable historic bloc. Under this perspective, the party and its trade union CGIL (the most powerful in Italy), acted as pacificator and mediator of social contradictions in the same way as the welfare state operates through de-commodification of labor acts more as a pacifier rather than change factor.

To sum up, the present study offered the chance to relativize the “received” in literature negative understanding of the “war of maneuver” of the BR and the “war of position” of the Italian communist Party. On the one hand, just like the Moderate Party during the Risorgimento, the fascist party and the DC in the immediate post war when “decapitated the PCI” by frontally attacked its opponent, the BR was not capable of understanding its dialectical connection with its nemesis as a source of an extended hegemony. As Gramsci observed (1971, p.106) in a "partisan-state (or even a party-state), hegemony is restricted not only in its mass basis, but also within the class itself: ‘the hegemony will be exercised by a part of the social group over the entire group and not by the latter over other forces in order to give power to the movement. This loss of hegemony, which is typical of passive and statist transitions, led the group to the introduction of bureaucratic=elitist mechanisms of social reproduction, to forms of “bureaucratic
centralism” which treat social support (just like the one the proletariat for the BR) as and artifact inference.

On the other hand, the Italian Communist Party allowed the decapitation of the working class movement and radical left through reformism so that these leaders remain on a non-hegemonic terrain defending the corporate interests of the working class, but not challenging the logic of capitalist social relations. The war of position proposed by Gramsci was project to act on the entirety of the social whole, the PCI instead adopted the war of position in a much more reductive way, transforming it in a synominous of reformism. Thus Sassoon claims that (1989 p.140) ”Reformism or any other version of the passive revolution cannot be a suitable strategy for the proletariat.” Passive revolution is based on a weak hegemony; the proletariat, before taking power, must have a strong hegemony. In addition, passive revolution integrates old forms of exploitation into new forms of exploitation; the proletariat, in taking state power, abolishes all forms of exploitation. (p.141). Politics of working class must be ”anti-passive revolution” (p.145).

Thus, if the BR’s experience provides an historic example of the shortcoming of a war of maneuver, the PCI provides a historic example that problematizes the war of position intended as reformism because the reformist strategy can provide the victory on battles but in so much as it gains in those battles it may looses the overall “war” as the battles may function as inoculating agent for the overall system.

*Critique of BR understands dialectic and language*
The dialectic of the BR is primordial in the sense that conceptualizes the opposition between the group and its enemy, as well its ideology and the ideology of its enemy as mutually exclusive: “power” and “counter power”, “bourgeois state” and “proletarian state”, ” bourgeois morality” and the “proletarian morality”, and ultimately phrased in the Sartrean words, “past” and “future.” It is the refusal of mediation which is seen as impure that troubles the group which leads the BR to develop a dichotomous kind of thinking and the highest example of maximalization is the armed struggle “to fight you need and easily identifiable enemy, without fine distinctions and without having to follow circuitous paths to find it (Morucci 2004, p.130).

Conceptually, this is a problem of understanding the moment of sublation in the dialectics of praxis, the practical dealing with what I defined as “past” and “future” or “necessity” and “freedom” The past cannot be absolutely negated by the future because it is only a determinate negation of the former. The “Aufhebung” moment comprises both destroying (“tollere” in Latin) and elevating (“elevare” in Latin): the BR, in its negation of the given, were content with the former and forgot the latter.

Connected to the conceptualization of the BR caught between necessity and freedom is the idea of resistance. As the comparative examination of the two cases demonstrated, hegemony and ideology are not two sealed compartment of consciousness and in fact the unaware hegemonic and the aware ideological never saturates consciousness and thus resistance may occur at both levels. Ideas and practices move across the two level of awareness constantly. An individual may have experiences that make him/her aware of hegemonic relations of power, which then immediately become contested. Such transformations in consciousness contribute to
practices of resistance. Indeed, perhaps the very act of reading these text shifts hegemonic understandings to ideological ones, opening them to challenge.

Accordingly resistance can concretize as tacit and sullen when closer to the hegemonic level and overt and political when closer to the ideological. The resistance of the BR takes place mostly close to the ideological pole. But as mentioned, there is a continuum, so that if consciousness is not compartmentalized at one level so is resistance. Thus resistance at ideological dimension can start giving voice to contradictions that “hegemony can no longer conceal. But the experience of the BR also demonstrates substantial difference and not guaranteed linked between the “existence of contradictions in consciousness,” the “consciousness of contradictions “and the “pro-active praxis find a solution of those contradictions.”

The other aspect that falls into the maximalist trap of the BR related not accidentally to another meaning of mediation: as communication. As Croci (2001) observes the BR hated the hyper mediating language of the typical Italian politician. The BR’s language was one characterized by light and darkness, positive and negative, “yes” and “no,” direct, crude, almost scientifically exact. By contrast, the typical Christian Democrats politician did not wish to choose, detested clear-cut statements, cultivated caution, perplexity, uncertainty, which they regarded as positive and fertile. And the best examples of this kind of prose can be found in the writings and speeches of one of the most important DC leaders, Aldo Moro. Indeed, the term Morotese was coined to denote not only the language of Moro, but also the most abstruse examples of politicians in Italy. Compared to the “Morotese,” the “brigatese,” the language of
the BR, meant to signify a strong and clear thought instead it became another aesthetic variation of the bureaucratic power.

The BR underestimated and overestimated at the same time language. It was overrated because the BR assumed that the allegedly clarity of its enunciation in Marxist jargon could penetrate all consciousnesses. As Gramsci argued (1971, p.128) “the unitary elaboration of a collective consciousness requires manifold conditions and initiatives. The diffusion from a homogenous center of homogeneous way of thinking and acting is the principal condition but it cannot be the only one. In other words the BR embraced the enlightenment illusion that clear, well propagated ideas could enter diverse consciousness.”

Communication was also underrated because in the same measure the BR underrated mediation and its value in Marxist theory. Mediation for the BR was synonymous with weak dialectics, deprived of social determination. I agree with the BR and with Williams (1977), a dialectic without social determination can be only abstract but we also mentioned that dialectics does not have to be conceptualized as a pacifications of contradictions. In the same way, mediation as communication, was not given the right weight in relation to formation of class consciousness. The BR could have played the role of organic intellectual for the proletarian public sphere, bridging theoretical consciousness and living experience and this where communication could have played a role of social determinant. The group assumed the existence of class consciousness which was not at all given, especially in political culture such as the Italian in which class are always traditionally disaggregated by particularistic interests (Ginsborg, 1990).
Class is not a spontaneous phenomenon and certainly is not a self evident one. Even when class exists, it represents a shared experience of structural social relations that does not always reach an identity status for its members. In addition, Lukacs (1971) provides a dialectical understanding of the relationship between social position and consciousness which clarifies the non automatic passage from class in se to class per se. Lukacs (1971) claims that if it is true that the standpoint of the working class constitutes an epistemologically advantageous position since "the self understanding of the proletariat is [...] the objective understanding of the nature of society" (149), it is also true that the working class possesses "the repertoires of reification in its acutest and direst form" (149).

This is not a secondary problem for a group whose original objective was to carry out "armed propaganda." In this sense, the BR failed in constructing/finding an audience large enough and receptive enough for its discourse of violence and revolution. The group wanted to create Communist Combatant Party considering the most efficient way to reach power. Gramsci apparently thought alike with the idea of the “Modern Prince,” but there is actual substantial difference. The “Modern Prince” is collective myth emerging in the civil society and from there politically colonizing the state. Instead the BR failed to see that the party system was not the expression of the state, but it was instead the colonization of the state by the civil society. Accordingly, instead of targeting the proletariat it chose as ultimate interlocutor the state and that was lost cause since it beginning because the BR relied for political and moral recognitions and legitimation on a subject, the state, that would never had granted that to the group that because it would have meant giving up its legal, moral political monopoly.

7.3 What Is (Still) To Be Done
The dissertation intended to study the BR’s experience through its “armed propaganda” and how it mediated and was mediated by the social whole. Such a project evidently presents a never achieved unbalance between what ideally aspired and promised and what realistically and materially could deliver because in the end, only a never ending and all embracing thought process can reach that ideal level of totality implied by dialectical thinking. But I do not operate at the ideal level and I do not have the privilege of a member of the bourgeois public sphere which can transcend material need, the particularistic interest in order to achieve the universally just and the true.

As I tried to demonstrate with this work, no one can tell a story without telling his/her own. This was true for the BR, this is true for myself. As a matter of fact, the material/legal/intellectual constraints of my conditions as embodied writer with scarce resources, in its scandalous opposing of the academic idealization of the writer as rhetorical artificium, created evident limitations. Just like an impressionistic painting that can be appreciated only from a certain distance, I think this study was able to provide an image delivered by ample brushworks and presents levels of incompleteness, inaccuracy and superficiality.

First of all, as far as communicative practices of the BR are concerned, assuming the validity of my approach, a thematic study is needed covering the whole opus operatum of the BR. Partially this was done, as the consistent references to BR’s text beyond the two episodes shows. This still remains as an important limitation because if it is true that according to both the historic materialist assumption of this dissertation and the principle of hermeneutic circle, in order to achieve a good balance between subjective interpretive work and more objective
explanatory capabilities, one has to go back and forth between text and context, particular instance the whole.

Another aspect that requires further development is about the reception of the communicative practices of the BR. In this study I focused on messages of the BR and the media representations of the BR, neglecting the audience of such media and audience reception cannot be assumed to match with the intended encoding of a given medium (Hall, 1980). Finally another venue that should be explored is the comparative one, in other words juxtaposing the BR’s experience with eh one of similar Italian grouse such as Prima Linea and international example such as the German RAF or Irish Ira and Spanish ETA.

7.4 An Attemptive Epilogue

The examination of the BR’s “discourse of the arms” revealed the difficulty in preventing “discourse” from being “armless” and the “arms” from being “illiterate.” This evaluation applies to the BR as much as to me as a scholar. I reiterate what I mentioned in Chapter I, the “BR c’est moi,” not just in terms social historical lineage but also in a more existential way. I would not be honest if I did not say that I am deeply sympathetic with what the group had tried to accomplish, engaging courageously with an asymmetric warfare not just against the state but against life constraining circumstances. A struggle that should resonate with anybody.

It is more than that actually. The BR represents the other side of what I feel being my Janus-faced condition as a scholar: because if I suggested that at times the armed praxis of the group tended to be “illiterate” (in the sense of being not enough self reflective), I feel my discourse as a scholar tends to be at times, armless, a spell more rehearsed than cast for our self
complacent community of academicians. During the long process of writing, I could not help sometimes to think about this dissertation in those terms, as another example of the “rhetoric of Critique” replacing the “critique of rhetoric.”

But then I promptly consolate myself because the most important reason—unmentioned in the introduction—for having written this work was to embark a very personal journey trying to understand what it means to be an organic intellectual or, more generally, trying to exorcize the little voice in my head that kept saying that all this enterprise was more a tour de farce rather than a tour de force.

So what is being an intellectual? Honestly, at the end of this dissertation, at the end of this PhD, I have not figured that out yet. But the critique that I tried to carry out here still served its purpose because certainly confirmed Adorno’s reflection in Prisms (1967) about the condition of the intellectual caught in the tension between detachment and contact, between a revealing Brechtian estrangement and necessary grounding in order to not make the former redundant. The BR found that grounding in the armed praxis and it failed in its revolutionary objectives, I do not know where to ground mine and for this reason I fail as well. But this is not a “sad epilogue” so I keep saying myself: “Try again. Fail again. Fail better.”
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