What Unites the States? Examining Modernity and American Nationhood Through the Eyes of The European New Right

Sara Canetto
Sara.Canetto@Colorado.EDU

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses

Part of the American Politics Commons, Comparative Politics Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Models and Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
https://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses/1821

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
What Unites the States? Examining Modernity and American Nationhood Through the Eyes of The European New Right

Sara Canetto

Defense date: April 8, 2019

Advisor: Benjamin Teitelbaum, Ethnomusicology, Affiliate in International Affairs
Honors Council Representative: Douglas Snyder, International Affairs
Committee member: Janet Jacobs, Women and Gender Studies
I owe the completion of this thesis to the people that supported me and pushed me over the course of the last year. I am grateful to my parents, Silvia Canetto and David Wohl, for indulging hours on the phone while I processed my ideas, proofreading the roughest of drafts, and not letting me quit. Thank you to Dr. Doug Snyder for tremendous patience and encouragement. I am grateful to Dr. Snyder and Dr. Janet Jacobs for being onboard this process and advice as seasoned writers and researchers that kept me on the right track. I am also very grateful to my advisor, Ben Teitelbaum, for setting high expectations of me, helping me through chaos to organization, and for teaching the course that inspired this all.
i. Introduction: p. 3

ii. The New Right in Context: p. 14

iii. Individualization: 23

iv. Rationalization: 27

v. Massification: 32
  ○ Are Jews White?: 42

vi. Desacralization: 45
  ○ Cultural Relativism and Critique from the Left: 49

vii. Universalization: 56

viii. Conclusion: Why does this all matter?: 61
Introduction

This thesis analyzes the construction of American nationhood by viewing it through the value system of the nationalist intellectual school of thought of the European New Right. Because the New Right is not part of the status quo of mainstream political conversation, looking at the US through the eyes of the New Right can show us things that we are less likely to see otherwise. Characteristics of the United States that may be taken for granted as “normal” or “good,” are analyzed with a much more critical lens. American individualism, the praise of personal grit and strength, is instead criticized by the New Right as an impetus of alienation as it discredits community. The New Right criticizes the American economic model, propelled by similar individualist rhetoric about hard work, as actually commercializing human existence rather than valuing it. The progressive narrative on immigration and the American Dream, seems inclusive and generous in the notion that anyone can succeed. In response, the New Right asserts that material success should not be the main goal, and that promoting it to encourage immigration actually devalues immigrant populations and their culture. The New Right also challenges the notion of a multicultural society as a bastion of inclusivity. Where the rhetoric that anyone can become American seems like the pinnacle of tolerance of others, the New Right argues that in a misguided quest for unity, this belief actually encourages a homogeneity that opposes different ways of life. Despite the appearance of a hyper-religious society, the New Right insists that American religiosity is hollow and disconnected, and that the moral system upholding it is binary and reductive. The overarching critiques the New Right makes are based on the idea that the systems and narratives that in the US are believed to encourage principles of
freedom and civil liberties, are actually stifling, isolating processes that subdue the population into compliance. In this thesis, I will go into detail into how these “processes of modernity,” may be interpreted in this American context. This investigation will analyze the elusive idea of Americanism itself, as nationalism and its questions about belonging and self-definition reawaken across the globe.

The New Right is a controversial French school of thought initiated in 1968. Seeing itself as distinct from the traditional right and the traditional the left, the New Right is concerned with the defense of culture. The New Right conceptualizes and talks about support for European cultural integrity in a way that can be used to justify racism. Distinguishing itself from the blatant xenophobia often associated with the right and nationalism, the New Right assumed a rebranded, more sophisticated critique of society. However, this “rebranding” has been scrutinized as a repackaging of fascist and racist ideas in such a way as to evade traditional criticism.¹ Henceforth, the ND (Nouvelle Droite) or ENR (European New Right) will simply be referred to as “New Right.”

By working with the ideas of such a controversial school and treating their ideas with a degree of legitimacy, my analysis, too, could be controversial. I choose to focus on the New Right, not despite its controversy, but because of it. My acknowledgement of New Right ideology is less for a goal of establishing the “correctness” of their worldview and prescriptions, and more about treating them as a way to learn about the world. I am treating them as one of many worldviews, that can be as reductionist as its peers, but also thought provoking, confusing, frustrating but also illuminating. So, I am not involved with concluding the ultimate “truth” of

---

New Right ideas, but using an opportunity to engage with them seriously as a way to integrate them into a larger analysis of what nationalism and national identity look like today. The conviction of New Right scholars and their sympathizers makes their worldview a social reality--to most fully understand discourse on nationalism we need to accept that existence of many distinct, diverging, and equally convinced worldviews and value systems around which actors believe one prescription to be ideal over another. We must take these ideas seriously not because they are ultimately true, but because they are taken seriously by those with whom they resonate. As such, I am concerned with uncovering the grounds on which these beliefs may be based, the value systems they uphold, the appeal they might have to certain groups over others, and why. These beliefs, ultimately, are the “truths” that make up the ideological arena we contend with now. To be able to craft an argument about nationalism, immigration, globalization, liberalism, is to understand the contrasting and even--especially--uncomfortable or unexpected positions that exist in our world.

By also picking a group that so starkly diverges from our typical understanding of the ideologies encompassed in “leftist” or “rightist” politics, we have to contend with the fact that ideologies, groups, and motivations can not always be neatly categorized in familiar ways. If we can analyze, in this case, a group that challenges our typical expectations, we can gain perspective on the evolving forms of nationalism and the way nationalist groups categorize themselves and others.

If we accept that there exist a multitude of ideas and motivations and justifications, we can more accurately observe the deeply complicated world we live in, and make sense of the deeply complicated task of trying to understand why things are the way they are. Omitting things
because they are perplexing to us, uncomfortable, dismissible, clearly wrong and therefore irrelevant only limits the scope of our understanding. In addition controversial groups can thrive off of the reluctance or refusal of others to engage with their work. They may treat it as a form of closed mindedness or as an acknowledgement of their speaking the truth. Part of my analysis includes the deconstruction of American exceptionalism, or the idea that the United States is somehow better structured and better run than other countries. Using New Right ideas and taking them seriously is to apply the antithetical lens to this part of America, instead applying the ethos of an ideology that sees the United States as the epitome of everything wrong with modern society. In showing how these competing narratives coexist, I want to catalyze deeper introspection in why we think the way we do. Returning to the idea of a social reality, acknowledging these two opposite perspectives on Americanism show that the character of countries can be dynamic, based on different narratives and values.

In the foreword to “Against Democracy and Equality,” de Benoist laments the use of the label “right,” and explains the difficulty in categorizing the New Right, which has little to do with the traditional political spectrum. The Anglo-American Right, he says, represents everything the New Right has been critical of. According to De Benoist, there are two “rights” in the US. One is mainstream, moderate, and based on middle class aspirations. Its praise for the economic system - capitalism - leads to the destruction of everything the New Right stands for. The other right is populated by radical, extremist groups propelled by nationalism and xenophobia. De Benoist disagrees with the American version of nationalism, in ideology and execution. He says that the New Right does not identify with either of these “rights.”
American nationalism is unique because, as a multicultural country, the United States is technically a state comprised of many ethno-nations. Therefore, any statement defining American nationalism is a statement on what defines nationhood as a whole. So what are Americans? Who are we? According to some, Americans are loud, rude, uneducated, bad mannered. And maybe superficial. Their food is artificial, their cities are bright and shiny. Without a deeply established history, their defining features are new and manufactured, technology, fashion trends, and social media. They export globalization, yet lag behind in speaking any other language but their own. The markers of Americanism are as singular as they are often the subject of mockery. The character of the United States, from its megachurches to its guns to its grandiose displays of patriotism incomparable to almost any other in the world. At the same time, the United States is one of the world’s most prosperous countries and one of its greatest influencers. Its companies, music, and media are known worldwide, but this glamorous superficiality is only covering up, the New Right asserts, a lack of cultural profile and history that is otherwise integral to any country. No amount of wealth or influence can be a substitute for cultural identity.

Through a close reading of the ideas in “Against Democracy and Equality” and “Homo Americanus,” what else can we deduce about the character of American culture, nationhood, and how it might influence the rest of the world? And why focus on these two texts? These two texts provide scathing, detailed critiques of Americanism itself or about the systems that make it up. These are analyses made by a group that defies our typical expectations of a nationalist group or of this kind of rhetoric. The aim of the New Right, through texts such as these, is to disseminate

---

ideas in such a way that they might change “hearts and minds.” They are also lesser known in the United States. If one of the criticisms the New Right makes about the United States is that it lives in its own insulated, self-congratulatory bubble, what better way to address this than to address these analyses head-on? Through my research, I hope to offer a synthetical perspective: that of an American citizen living in America. My perspective might highlight new parts of the conversation on Americanism that may allow us to look through the perspective of another, and a starkly different one at that, in order to illuminate new things about our own pro and anti-nationalist impulses.

With regard to the label New Right, Sunic and de Benoist have repeatedly stated that the use of the term was assigned to them, not chosen. Regarding the title of the book, Against Democracy and Equality, in the foreword, de Benoist remarks:

I suspect the author chose this title out of sheer provocation -- a title that I have always considered inappropriate! It must be emphasized that the ENR has never held positions hostile to equality and democracy. It has been critical of egalitarianism and has highlighted the limits of liberal democracy -- which is quite a different matter.

Both de Benoist and Sunic have voiced their dislike of the misleading implications of the name, and say that they have kept it only because others use it. As such, it is helpful to abandon traditional notions of ‘right-wing’ when trying to understand New Right propositions. Part of the New Right “brand” is their heterogeneous ideology and their rejection of the traditional left-right spectrum of politics. To this end, in this thesis, I also plan on illustrating how some New Right ideas unintentionally illuminate left-associated groups and goals.

In Against Democracy and Equality, Tomislav Sunic lays out a comprehensive manual to the New Right. He also explains, in his view, a fundamental misalignment of the values around

---

which modern societies are constructed. These misguided driving factors are reinforced by both the traditional left and traditional right. He begins by defining terms and dispelling myths, before delving into an explanation of what is wrong with the values upon which modern societies are structured. What Sunic takes issue with is the concept of modernity, a set of disparate ideals that together align sociopolitics with values that disregard what he regards as essential human needs. For the New Right, the society that most clearly exhibits these qualities is the United States, for whom they are in fact the same qualities by which it defines itself. What does a country like this mean for Sunic? Certainly, it paints a bleak picture, especially considering the social influence the U.S. exerts. Modernity takes form in five interlocking, reinforcing processes that together spell the destruction of the values the New Right sees as most worth preserving.

Modernity, as Sunic defines it, is the societal stage that every nation has either arrived at or is moving toward, though Sunic claims it emanates from the West. It is an ideology of progress, that presumes that as time moves on, humanity will always be better. In this model, things are valuable because they are novel and lead to better outcomes, and the past has nothing useful to teach us. A linear conceptualization of time would presume that civilizations necessarily improve as they go on. The “modern,” therefore, is the updated version replacing the antiquated systems that preceded it. In contrast, the New Right instead views time as consisting of cycles; birth, degeneration, death, and rebirth. They use such a model to suggest that perhaps modernity as we experience it today is not an improvement of societies over time, but could instead herald societal collapse, leading to a new world order. With regard to collective

identities, de Benoist states that “modernity is intrinsically antagonistic to collective identities because such identities are an obstacle to the march of progress towards a unitary mankind.”

For the New Right, the biggest threat is the “ideology of sameness,” the institutionalization of the idea that all groups ultimately have the same wants and needs. This idea is propelled by what Sunic calls a “vague belief in universal human rights,” and the idea that organizing society based on unfettered egalitarianism will result in functionality and prosperity. The New Right asserts that this model denies human reality, and would only cause a societal cognitive dissonance. The New Right has journals in France (Nouvelle Ecole, Eléments, Krisis), England (The Scorpion), and Italy (Trasgressioni and Diorama letterario), Germany, Belgium, Holland, Spain and Russia. The New Right also has a solid online presence in English, French, Italian, German and Russian. Despite a degree of heterogeneity among its thinkers, New Right contributors share the Gramscian idea that cultural hegemony is necessary for successful political movements, as well as belief in antiliberalism, antiegalitarianism, and anticapitalism.

In this thesis, I will examine how each of the processes of modernity may be understood in the context of the United States. In the New Right model of modernity, the very features by which the United States defines itself are the same ones that threaten to destroy it. Americanness, relative to other identities, defines itself more so by what it is not, than by what it is. According to the New Right, this is an illusion of an identity, and ultimately unsustainable if the goal is harmony. The New Right criticizes both “racist and anti-racist” rhetoric for the same reason.

---

8 Ibid, 5.
9 Ibid, 7
Alain De Benoist is an intellectual, philosopher, journalist, and political commentator, and the de facto father of the New Right. De Benoist has criticized colonialism and mass migration as both threatening organic culture. He also criticized American Islamophobia, which he sees as the successor of Communist “othering” after its fall, serving the need for a new foreign specter to defend against. His views also highlight the phenomenon of difference, wherein American identity relies disproportionately on othering to define itself. In line with claims of not falling on the traditional political spectrum, de Benoist’s works have been published by the New Left journal, Telos.

Criticism of the New Right

Scholars like Tamir Bar-On are skeptical of the New Right shedding accusations of fascism due to their still unbroken associations with fascist and Nazi sympathizers. Notable in this direction is the decision to include Kevin MacDonald in the foreword of Homo Americanus. MacDonald has been particularly vocal about pseudoscientific race theory and Jewish conspiracy, and is included on the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Hateful watch page. MacDonald’s inclusion in the book, gives credence to the accusations of radicalism and racism against the New Right and its members. Professor Bar-On has written two books analyzing New Right ideology: Where Have All the Fascists Gone and Rethinking the French New Right: Alternatives to Modernity. He has analyzed the New Right’s ideological evolution to showcase that while their rhetoric has become more apologetic and justifiable, their roots are steeped in xenophobic, far-right fascism. Bar-On has criticized the 1980s-onward turn of the New Right as

---

10 Bar-On, T. Where Have All the Fascists Gone? 2007
“cultural racism,” and that the New Right uses the pretext of preserving authentic European
difference to justify the exclusionism of foreigners. He has argued that this different, almost
counterintuitive version of racism is merely the same stringent ethno-nationalism under a
deceptively altruistic banner. By saying that they want to defend all cultures, but relegated to
their original territories, the New Right may sound more tolerant and reasoned, but in fact
promotes the same ideas as more overtly racist and fascist parties. Since its conception, the New
Right has been mainly concerned with the publication of intellectual journals and participation in
debates and conferences within Europe.

The New Right is critical of models of liberal democracies focused on what they see as
an illusion of equality predicated on ignoring cultural difference. De Benoist notes that “liberal”
in US means what in Europe is called “progressive.” In his view, a liberal is someone who
supports individualism, free trade, and is an opponent of the state. Liberalism, as it will be used
here, does not refer to a segment of the American political spectrum. Within the context of the
United States political system, for example, both Republicans and Democrats are liberals,
because they uphold the same fundamental world order. Instead, the liberalism I will be referring
to here is that which Sunic defines as the ideology of modernity. According to the New Right,
liberalism is what has turned commercial value into the essence of communal life. Market
economies have led to market societies. The New Right describes liberalism as something that
promotes a Darwinian social vision, reduces life to generalized competition, and leads to an
overall disillusionment of world. Under liberalism, Sunic argues, traditional culture and
collective identity are eradicated. The value system of the New Right thus poses cultural

---

integrity and community as most important, not arbitrary ideas of progress. For this reason, they favor the concept of a “pluriversum”, or cultures existing separately and allowed to thrive in a what they sometimes call a cultural ecosystem, without being eroded or overtaken by one another. New Right theory holds that human diversity is paramount and must be protected by recognizing, rather than muting, what they call the “right do difference” in the name of equality. Despite this “tamer” rhetoric in contrast to other hyper-militant styles of nationalism, the New Right has been accused of racism along the lines of its ‘separate-but-equal’ model of thinking. What makes the New Right a nationalist school is its advocacy for the “protection” of culture and cultural identity--which it claims applies both to European and non-Europeans.

It is easy to say that you are for the “protection” of other cultures when that protection requires they stay away from your own. Exclusionary definitions of nationhood, racism, and xenophobia persist in this model under the guise of having the cultural and economic interests of immigrants at heart. The intellectualism espoused by the New Right is a point of distinction, but critics like Bar-On have commented that it is little more than a distraction: the same ideas packaged as lofty and high-brow, so as to be taken seriously. While on the surface condemning fascist regimes, Bar-On says, these ideas in fact share similarities with the fascist worldview and its sympathy for elitist authoritarian-style government, ethnically based, homogenous communities, and their goal of a revolutionary political system to supplant conservatism, liberalism, and socialism.¹⁴ Very few want to be associated with torch-bearing skinheads; mainstream actors would be far more likely to accept right-wing, cultural segregationist rhetoric when encased in philosophical, academic--and even seemingly altruistic--language.

When criticizing advocates of exclusive nationalism, critics are often quick to point out that these nationalists are oversimplifying the world in “us vs. them” and “other” categories that make easy and broadly drawn scapegoats. In the introduction to *Homo Americanus*, Sunic seems to acknowledge the instinctive hypocrisy of this “us vs them” mentality that contextualizes nationalism. He acknowledges that while it is common for people to stereotype about those different from them, no individual likes hearing jokes or criticism made about their own group. He comments that in this model, it must always be the “other” who is wrong and evil, while presuming oneself to be “right.” Sunic apparently acknowledges the shortcomings of human classification, conceding that by nature, human beings are prone to giving themselves the benefit of the doubt where they would not give it to others. And, that it is often easiest to perceive ‘flaws’ of the other but become defensive when those of one’s own group or country are pointed out.\(^\text{15}\)

**The New Right in Context**

More frequently, as a result of the Trump presidency, news outlets and other sources of colloquial discourse have started invoking the term “nationalism” to refer to movements that are concerned with nationhood and the groups who mobilize around them. The New Right is a nationalist group among many, that have arisen in the United States and Europe, which differ wildly in their motivations, designated “outsiders,” and prescriptions for how to repair the perceived damage to society. Like many of their peers, the New Right’s vocal support for ‘authentic European identity and values’ raises eyebrows and levels accusations of fascism, or at

least fascist nostalgia towards them. In the New Right’s view, this leads to a lack of familiarity with their actual rhetoric in favor of shutting down an argument, and the unchecked use of “neo-Nazi” and “fascist,” gives rise to what Sunic criticizes as “reductio ad hitlerum.” The verbiage of mainstream political conversation becomes saturated with inaccurate definitions and strong words lose much of their meaning.\(^{16}\) In order for us to understand ideas, we must be able to name them. The kind of nationalism I will be analyzing is that of actors who share the belief that the compelling outsiders to the nation are domestic minorities. As outlined in Benjamin Teitelbaum’s “Lions of the North,” we can generally divide these into race revolutionaries, cultural nationalists, and identitarians.

Sometimes defined as “race revolutionaries,” ethno-nationalists tend to be the extreme, easily identifiable iteration of nationalism that tends to permeate the mainstream image of it. Often clad in Nazi-fetishist iconography, they are few in number and politically ostracized. Their flashy tactics and inflammatory rhetoric make them often the subject for documentaries, Hollywood movies, and easy targets for political condemnation. Most of the well-known nationalist political parties--such as the National Front, Lega Nord--in Europe would fall under this category. As the name implies, cultural nationalists are--at least allegedly--not as concerned with ideas of “blood” or “race.” They assert that belonging to a nation underlies the adherence to certain shared values and practices. A common cultural script or social contract dictates one’s belonging to a group. Cultural nationalists would argue that anyone can become a part of their country so long as they accept and adopt certain standards--and by extension, abandon others. The narrative is centered around “becoming,” as opposed to “being.” Critics of this kind of

nationalism would say that it is antithetical to true acceptance, because it forces--an often racist, colonially reminiscent--model of behavior to snuff out undesirable immigrants and make them assimilate.

Identitarianism is a “third camp.” Descended from New Right ideology, it is the most representative of its philosophy. Its main tenant is the New Right two-pronged, paradoxical ideology of ethnopluralism, or the “pluriversum.” This is the idea that ethnic or cultural groups are not better than each other, but are simply distinct, and that their value lies in their difference. Whether these groups are biologically distinct or not is irrelevant; identitarians are not concerned with race in the pseudoscientific sense that race revolutionaries may be. Instead, they argue that the greatest values of humanity lie in their diversity, and that this diversity needs to be allowed to thrive separately and independently. As such, while immigration itself is not discouraged, mass, unfiltered immigration is viewed as posing a threat to the ability of the host culture to thrive.

How does the New Right aim to spread its ideology, without being an outright political movement? Its influence, attributed to the success of identitarianism in Europe among other things, is attributed to something called metapolitics. The roots of metapolitics are based on the ideas of Italian neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci proposed that any political or economic transformation, in order to be successful and to last, had to effect cultural change first. An American nationalist branch, popularly known as the “alt-right” is notable for its metapolitical tactics. Its capitalization on twitter culture, as well as the usage and popularization of memes, have allowed it to spread its influence, particularly among young people. The success of alt-right metapolitics is one of its most acknowledged accomplishment, even among its critics.
In “Against Democracy and Equality,” the influence of culture on politics is emphasized not as some ancillary element, but as the “most effective carrier of political ideas.”

Culture is not just an ornament or a superstructure, to be delivered piecemeal to the people, it is a vital and indispensable part of human development capable of inducing social consensus and providing a ruling elite with lasting political legitimacy.

What sticks out in the American brand is the especially effective use of metapolitics in the form of memes, social media, and the development of an authentic subculture. For this reason, scholars like Benjamin Teitelbaum have suggested that “alt-right” itself refers more accurately to a methodology rather than a coherent ideology. Metapolitics offers two propositions to effect this cultural change. One is to infiltrate popular consciousness and build a network of people integrated into the mainstream, and allow those messages to spread beneath the surface. The other is to create an entirely separate counter-culture that exists parallel, but distinct and isolated from the mainstream. Each of these “options” has a tradeoff. A separate, parallel subculture would be more cohesive and centralized, but less likely to infiltrate the mainstream. A sub-superficial subculture may be more scattered, but it could have more direct dialogue with the mainstream world. Because groups like identitarians and the New Right operate metapolitically, they traffic in ideas--and that is where my research is centered. Their concerns are the paradigms that govern basic social interaction and organization. The way socio-political discourse plays out in colloquial, informal ways is not ancillary but, for the purposes of the New Right and its allies, the center of focus. This kind of movement of ideas is, for them, the most important force for

---

18 Ibid, 69
effecting change. As such, I will focus greatly on this kind of engagement, both as it supports 
and opposes New Right ideas.

To reconcile contrasting takes such as our mainstream narrative and that of the New 
Right means to grapple with the idiosyncrasies of Americanism--like in any other country--and 
be at peace with them. If we can understand that identities under real or perceived threat become 
bolstered, we can see how this may be the case for those in minority ideological camps as well. 
That is, perceived pushback against dialogue may only strengthen the feelings of “not being 
heard” that fuel social fractures, antagonism, and violence. This does not mean that ethnic and 
religious minorities are on par with those in a less popular ideological camp, or who those who 
engage in outright hate speech. It is also not to say that minorities are somehow responsible for 
their own persecution. What we can take away is that the less space there is in the mainstream 
for open discussion, the more nationalist parties can isolate and potentially radicalize.

Modernity and multiculturalism

“Modernity positions politics as ‘neutral. Power is equated with managerial efficiency, and 
“good” precedes the idea of ‘just. 21’”

--Tomislav Sunic, Against Democracy and Equality

In Sunic’s view, modernity has a damaging effect on community. Community is based in 
reciprocity, while, modernity has submitted humans to harsher, impersonal constraints. In this 
way, people become disconnected from meaning, with no way to understand their place in the 
social whole. Individualism leads to disaffiliation, so modern societies cause individuals to 
experience each other as strangers. 22 Thus, multicultural societies like the United States must

---

22Ibid, 125
operate as an ongoing blank slate. Otherwise, the dominant or original culture will feel overtaken by the new and the foreign. While the de facto ‘original’ culture of the United States is Anglo European, the new discourse denies this, according to Anglo purists like Andrew Fraser in his book “The Wasp Question.”

Fraser, a sympathizer to the New Right, is one of the most ethno-purists in the American camp, meaning he is most focused on Anglo-Saxon bio-culture as the causal agent in the evolution of the United States. He argues that there is something innate the relationship of Anglo Saxons to the United States. Drawing from identitarian ideas, he expresses dismay over the homogenization of white identity, because it sidelines the reality of the explicitly Anglo-Saxon Protestant contribution to American culture and its success. It would thus be an insult to include them alongside Catholics, Poles, or Italians. In Fraser’s view, the organic values of Anglo-Europeans (and other Europeans) paradoxically facilitate their demise. The inherent European cultural generosity, according to Sunic--an emphasis on diversity and acceptance of others-- amounts to a voluntary form of cultural suicide.

Fraser’s argument goes, if multicultural leftists defend indigenous rights in the United States as a result of their “being there first,” why does the same not apply to Europeans in Europe? This, in turn, makes room for the argument that though Anglo-Europeans may have founded the state in its modern form, the country has become, and should aspire to be, an amalgamation of as many cultures and ethnicities as possible. The value of American character as a multicultural society based on ideals is precisely its ability to be malleable. How does the ideology of sameness prevail, if the United States is home to, and encourages, more and more diversity in its politics and media? Is this not contradictory? Couldn’t various cultures and practices continue unimpeded, and people

---

23 Fraser, A. (2011). *The WASP Question*. p.18
24 Ibid, 18.
still see themselves as wholly American? Certainly, but we must keep in mind the primacy of national cohesion for the New Right. In order to retain its core character and values, a nation must be able to define itself.

The United States has always presented a particularly unique conundrum for anyone speaking on nationhood, culture, and individual and group identity. It is a country defined by its undefineableness, built on egalitarian rhetoric. But the U.S. reality of deep ethnic divisions, the proud “melting pot,” embody more than a few contradictions. The New Right model potentially leaves us with two scenarios regarding American unity: either, people maintain loyalty to their own ethnic or religious bonds, and forfeit communal ones with their neighbors. Or, Americanism prevails, and people’s belonging to the United States comes first, in which case original languages, practices, and communities become secondary, before disappearing entirely. In other words: cultural integrity at the cost of peace and national cohesion, or national cohesion at the cost of authenticity.

“Finally, there is no doubt that criticism of the United States and of the Americanisation of the world [...] could hardly seduce Americans who perceive their country, not only as the ‘Promised Land’ and the incarnation of the best of all possible worlds, but also, and precisely for that reason, a model way of life that merits to be exported worldwide. It is significant that very few texts by ENR authors have been translated into English. [...] The ENR remains terra incognita for the vast majority of Americans.”

--Alain de Benoist

To dive further into New Right ideology, we must familiarize ourselves with each of the processes of modernity. If the New Right rejects modernity and seeks an alternative, we must

---

understand the forces that characterize it. Each of these is an element of modern society, and American society, that in their sum lead to a disaffection, meaninglessness, and isolation.

**The five processes of modernity**

1. **Individualization**, or the destruction of old forms of communal life.

2. **Massification**, or the adoption of standardized behavior and lifestyles. One common consumerist culture is exported to rest of world. Anti-Other rhetoric is replaced by the “we are all the same” rhetoric, which the New Right sees as equally damaging in a different direction. Countries begin to erase distinctions, for fear of conflict.

3. **Desacralization**, or “displacing great religious narratives by scientific interpretation.” The body, the physical, and the material become paramount. People are reduced to their physical capacity-- bodies that can be moved and exchanged across borders.

4. **Rationalization**. Desacralization structured into an economic philosophy. Instrumental reason, free market, and technical efficiency become paramount. Immigrants are brought in based on their usefulness, and the rhetoric that supports immigration is more focused on the benefits of immigrant economic contribution than upon the compatibility of cultures. This, in turn, harms both the incoming and the native culture.

5. **Universalization**. The most fatalistic process. Universalization refers to the planetary extension of a model of society as the only rational outcome, presumed to be superior to all others. According the New Right, universalism aims to reduce diversity of cultures and value systems to one uniform model, the American model. To this end, the New
Right criticizes both the proselytisation of Christianity and colonization. Even if the New Right had no stake in the perceived downward spiral of the United States, universalization hypothetically presents a threat to the rest of world civilizations, and thus why U.S. influence must not be taken for granted.

What sets the United States apart from nearly any other nation state is the construction of its internal hierarchy. Class distinctions exist in every society, but an explicitly multi-cultural version is most heavily stratified by ‘race’ and ethnicity. Built on centuries of institutionalized racism and segregation, this is now part of the dialogue around which Americans view themselves. As mentioned before, unscientific or social constructions become real by virtue of their treatment as real, making them a social reality. While race as a genetic reality has been discredited, its arbitrary construction becomes real when a society is built upon its reinforcement. According to Sunic, the American conception of identity rests more and more with the individual rather than with groups. The identity forged under these circumstances, therefore, becomes a far cry from the grounded, reciprocal one favored by the New Right.

Defining the nationalism of a multi-national country also implicitly defines the culture and nationhood on the whole. A meritocratic Americanism has specific implications for cultural identity at large; namely, the way in which the multiculturalist argument is supported or rejected in the U.S. context can suggest implications for its implementation worldwide. That is, if the world is increasingly globalized, then what is happening in the U.S could eventually become the international model. The United States may well embody everything that could make this theoretical step a possibility.
I. Individualization in the United States

Americanism tends to put a pronounced focus on individual rights and identity as opposed to communal ones. In New Right model, this is both the cause and the effect of country which struggles to conceptualize itself as a whole. In the way it promotes individualization, the United States supposedly systemically prevents itself from achieving real unity--something highlighted by its internal conflicts on what defines American oneness. Individualization, as defined by the New Right, is the breakdown of communal bonds. In modern societies, this leads people begin to increasingly experience each other as strangers. Edward T. Hall’s breakdown of high versus low context societies illustrates what this may look like. In high context societies, there is a greater shared cultural context between individuals. As such, commonalities between people are implicit, and are the result of years of cultural development. In these kinds of societies, it is incredibly difficult for a foreigner to fit in. In a low context society, the opposite is true. With this in mind, multicultural societies tend to be low-context, as they are comprised of people who have the potential to have very different upbringings.

The New Right’s main concern is not only that modernity creates societies whose members have less and less in common with one another, but also that they are not taught to depend on or need each other. High context societies carry implicit understanding among its

---

members-- not due to ethnicity or blood, but to long-standing traditions and habituated culture. This creates a framework of reciprocity that is built into the language and behaviors themselves.

The often overbearing nature of American patriotism could even be interpreted as an expression of anxiety of its low context status. American symbols of nationhood-- the flag, the anthem, the pledge of allegiance-- are often mocked for their pervasiveness and vulgar sensationalism compared to other countries. A New Right perspective might argue that this is compensation for not having a proper cultural profile at all, sometime that is at the heart of the major problems plaguing the US.

So far, I have discussed how a country might form--or struggle to form--a sense of identity. This all brings us to the concept of identity, or how one sees oneself in the midst of various acting forces. The use of the word “identity” itself has now become a staple of American socio-politics. In the United States, identity signals an internal, subjective definition of oneself in contrast with a communal, objective one. By Sunic's definition of individualization, the operation of “identity” in the United States is a prime example of this process of modernity.

If individualization is the destruction of forms of communal life, then the increasing focus on “identity” in the United States is the herald of individualization. The New Right is focused on the value and the preservation of culture, not of spliced identification with one. Diversity of cultures is desirable. But a large part of the American discourse on diversity is instead framed in terms of diversity of identities. What is the main difference, here? It is not just diversity in general that the New Right supports, but the plurality of communities. Culture is not an identity, it is a participatory state of being. In *Homo Americanus*, Sunic proclaims that
There is a heightened focus on “identification,” or internal subjectivity, rather than the communal nature of what makes up culture. By reducing identity to its smallest, least threatening form, identity becomes more convenient in a multicultural context. If the focus becomes identity, and identity becomes valuable, a society can maintain the ‘illusion’ of promoting difference while in fact doing the opposite. Identity also shifts the idea of culture as something internally felt rather than externally expressed. The U.S. wants diversity in superficial, non-threatening ways: different-looking people, but not large-scale differences in behavior and culture. Traditional dress, food, music—all the basic, surface level, *performative* elements of culture are encouraged. Diversity in politics and in media, work on changing the way America “looks,” rather than changing the whole culture itself.

This is easier, and less threatening to American uniformity. While this view seems to send a message of acceptance, it does not actually challenge the larger culture promoting it.

One could tout the American fascination with firearms as another example of this fixation on individualism. It feeds into an idea of power; a prominent argument supporting gun ownership being that it is an individual right. It also could be interpreted as a sign of fundamental mistrust. A society in which it is a mark of pride to own a weapon, for alleged fear of sudden attack on oneself or one’s family, certainly does not seem like a sign of a tightly knit community—or at least one based on strong feelings of security or solidarity. Finally, firearms, an ubiquitous

---

30 See Fish, 1997 for a comparable argument
symbol of Americanism are notoriously funded by a powerful lobby that has withstood the heaviest of legal and social trials.\footnote{Editorial Board, Washington Post. December 13, 2017. \textit{Sandy Hook was five years ago. Congress has still done nothing.}} One of the great symbols of Americanism, for better or for worse, is the highly profitable market of a weapon that gives power to the individual, and is sold on the narrative of self-defense.

Diversity does not start and end with the individual. It is a communal activity, a dialogue. The kind of diversity the New Right aspires to is a nurtured one, and that is able to thrive. The pluriversum accounts for this; that culture is not an individual trait, rather a conversation that requires something akin to a nation-state. According to the New Right model, collective belonging is not contingent on saying that “we are one,” and “we are a group,” but knowing it. The focus on identity also turns culture into something passive rather than active. Of course, people can interact with families and with other members of their community to create a culture within a culture. But ultimately, all of this will still be going on within a the larger whole of the United States that encompasses more people who are different than are the same. “Identities” themselves can be also made active or passive; self-identification with a group might arise when the person is made to be aware of themselves by contrast with another group or groups.

In this, a sort of marketplace for identity begins to flourish. When in need, identity becomes a source of power, a way to mobilize within a minority or disenfranchised groups. For this reason, dominant groups tend to have less salient markers of identity, because they are presumed to be the default. Maleness, whiteness, and straightness are rarely loud markers of identification because they do not need to be. As Jackson Katz points out in his analysis of why male violence is rarely labeled as such, “we always focus on the subordinated group and not the
dominant one, and that’s one of the ways the power of dominant groups isn’t questioned – by remaining invisible. In this sense, invisibility is actually a marker of privilege; not having to announce your ‘identity’ means that it is already considered, and favored, by social and cultural structures. Visibility, on the other hand, is a way for groups not part of dominating classes to attempt, and often struggle, to have their existence and grievances addressed. This idea is central to a population that embodies the contradiction between invisibility and power: that is, white Americans.

One of the main points of the New Right is that no material or self-serving acquisitions can substitute the human need for authentic community. This claim of Sunic’s might find support by the fact that despite having political and economic power, white Americans feel they are missing something, and rally along those lines. Clearly, power is not enough to completely mitigate the loss of community and recognition because American white people do not feel “recognized.” So, certainly, white nationalist catchphrases like “it’s okay to be white” and complaints to include a “white history month” seem silly and hypocritical, and are structurally misguided at best and violent at worst. But the need for recognition, exacerbated by liberalism, supersedes even the most privileged slice of society.

II. Rationalization: American consumerism

“Modernity is not only a body of ideas, it is also a mode of action, it attempts by every available means to uproot individuals from their individual communities, to subject them to a universal mode of association. In practice, the most efficient means for doing this has been the marketplace.”


If these “actual” bonds between different groups in America might be precarious, what might be the glue connecting American identity? In the United States, Sunic argues, economic prosperity (or the promise of it) is the only thing holding together a fundamentally unstable society. The very definition of Americanness is tied with the idea of prosperity. One is an American, the adage goes, if one moves to the country for a better life and is willing to work for it. This prosaic sentimentality, however, Sunic points out, is a poor way to unify a country. After all, who doesn’t want prosperity and a “better life?” The American focus on prosperity and productivity exports materialism and superficiality and sells the idea that the “best” model of a nation is the one that is wealthiest. In this way, the New Right asserts, meaning and connection are replaced with “generalized competition” that the New Right warns so strongly against, reducing human beings to their profitability. Sunic also criticizes liberalism’s inherent ties to the rise and growth of welfare state. Communal bonds are eroded due to an increasingly commercialized social life. Thus, wealth distribution is just a way to mitigate the “failures of solidarity.” It is wrong to assume, Sunic says, that “in a so-called market democracy, American and Americanized citizens automatically develop an organic and fraternal relationship to each other.” This creates a vicious cycle in which liberalism--with all its dangers--is allowed to survive. In Sunic’s view, the welfare state is “nothing but an abstract structure that transforms people into recipients of public help so that they no longer want to overthrow liberal system.”

One cannot talk about nationalism without talking about immigration. If the New Right is concerned with human beings being valued for productivity, what group exemplifies this more than immigrants? Nationalist rhetoric is typically associated with rigid anti-immigrant notions,

---

and is selective in the people it does accept. The justification for this can range from xenophobia and scare tactics to more mild appeals to economic instability or cultural unfavorability. In Europe, the nationalist rhetoric often comes in the form of “we were here first,” ergo, we must take care of our people first and foremost, and prioritize the culture that grew organically here. Those supporting limits on immigration do so based on the idea that an outside group is coming into an established society with long standing character and values and, especially if the people in the country are struggling, that those people’s needs be addressed before expending resources to house another population.\textsuperscript{36} In the United States, that exact same argument is flipped on its head—you cannot reject any immigrant or deny anyone’s claim to being an American, because the United States is built on stolen, colonized land. These definitions of the nations and of their nationalisms are almost inverses of each other. How can Americans feel connected to each other in a country where differences are emphasized within a supposedly single entity? People’s backgrounds highlight what they do not have in common, and what they \textit{do} have in common--Americanness--is allegedly fabricated and superficial.

Sunic lays out the New Right position on immigration as a synthesis of these elements as well as something different. The main attraction of Western civilization, the New Right believes, is the appeal of a consumer-oriented way of life. The New Right views mass immigration as undesirable on two levels. On one hand, it is bad for immigrants, because they are forced to abandon their own homes, cultures, and cannot aid their co-nationals. On the other hand, mass immigration is a problem for the host country, because it creates a cultural schism. As per the idea of low and high context societies, mass immigration to a high context society would

\textsuperscript{36}D’Amato, A. September 3, 2018. \textit{Prima gli italiani: il nuovo partito di Salvini}. Next Quotidiano.
introduce large groups of people from typically high context societies into low context (multicultural) ones. Even without being bound together by minority status, immigrants from non-multicultural countries would already have stronger ties among themselves by virtue of coming from low context societies.

It is worth pausing to note that elements of this thinking are not foreign to mainstream right-wing thinking in the U.S. American conservative, Reihan Salam, has expressed a similar opinion. Salam is not a New Righter. While his goals and view of the United States differs from theirs, his critiques of American nationhood share some ground. Son of Bangladeshi immigrants, he hopes for a curb to mass immigration and a reform of American identity to strengthen what he sees as increasingly frail and superficial ties holding the country together. He would agree that, in its current form, the United States lacks a cohesive cultural “glue,” but does believe that there are ways to strengthen this, eventually. For people to choose the American political system and promise of wealth over their home culture is an inversion of the values the New Right supports as conducive to a peaceful society. Salam outlines two potential “versions” of American nationalism. The first presumes the United States to be a universal nation open to all people of the world. The United States touts itself as the most successful and prosperous nation, precisely due to its openness, and its successful political system and constitution. If wealth and power are the goal, then the United States’ ideals must be the right ones. As such, the United States would be positioned to guide the rest of the world towards where it “should be” going. This, Salam argues, is the most inclusive version of American nationalism. The triumph of American prosperity is that people--despite their differences, despite connection to another country and culture--want to come to the US. However, from another angle, this might be a jingoistic,
imperialistic perspective that implies that the United States is superior, and is the natural leader of the world.

The second “kind” of nationalism Salam proposes is an “exclusive” one. This would be the perspective that the United States is not, in fact, qualitatively better than other countries, because not every country should be the same. Every nation has traditions rooted in a certain history and certain sensibilities, and these are not universal. Salam believes that the United States cannot absorb everyone who has their own commitments to their own traditions--but that that is not a fault in and of itself. For a nation to be richer does not necessarily mean its culture is “better” than the culture of another. We implicitly assume, Salam says, that the U.S. is better because richer equals better, thereby proving U.S.-style inclusivity to be the ideal. Because of this American pride in its own success, it might be “uncomfortable for people to confront” that others might choose their own culture over the American promise of prosperity. In efforts to create ‘inclusive’ society, it can actually force some people back to “primary” identities. Thus, in a way, Americanism is an incentivized nationality. When the incentive fails, or, should another incentive prove more powerful, what becomes of Americanism?

“The New Right concludes that the economic reductionism of liberalism leads to the exclusion of practically all other spheres of human activities and particularly those which lie in the realm of cultural and spiritual endeavors.”

The idea of the “American Dream” encapsulates this phenomenon. The archetypal, rhetorical device used to define Americanism and incentivize people to aspire towards it takes the form of a nationalism of ideals. Specifically, you are American if you believe in liberty,

---

freedom, and want to work hard and make a better life for yourself. This nebulous set of values, that supposedly define Americanism, are directly linked to economic prosperity, and not for any particular group, just in general. To this end, this looks like a nation state aiming for economic growth not to help its people, but instead, offering prosperity to the highest bidder or shrewdest person. If the only thing one needs not just to become an American citizen, but to be considered an American, is some combination of “hard work” and “dream of a better life,” what does that leave us with? Rationalization as a process of modernity, thus, does exactly what the name implies. It attempts to satiate the “denial of reality” that modernity proposes by offering compensation in return. After all, if the result is a more comfortable life, the “problems” with modernity must be justified.

III. Massification

As the name suggests, massification is the consolidation of human beings into an undifferentiated mass, or the “homogenization of ways of life.” As previously mentioned, some segments of nationalism are centered around ‘inherent’ versus meritocratic belonging to a group. The value of humanity, the New Right holds, is in its differences. The opponent of this, therefore, is group belonging that has less and less meaning. To unpack massification in the United States, we can look to a particular phenomenon: the creation of “white” identity. Andrew Fraser views the concept of American whiteness as the utmost “flattening” of culture and community, since the definition of whiteness is describing physical features, not an origin. Between this “flattened” culture and being the most powerful segment of racially stratified

---

American society white Americans are a useful group to analyze to uncover the implications of the way groups are classified.

Without a proper unifying cultural profile, white Americans are reduced to their appearance. The way the idea of “whiteness” functions socially and metapolitically might highlight for a New Right model the effects of homogenization on a population in a society that also claims to champion diversity. The word white is used colloquially in the United States to describe a certain group of people, generally those of “European ancestry.” There are two basic conceptualizations of “privilege” and white hegemony. One describes the benefit one experiences in the present; the other is inherited power structures. That is, a “white” person in the United States is defined by their advantageous treatment as well as their participation in institutions. Examples of the former are preferred treatment, or presumed innocence by law enforcement, and being seen in a favorable light by potential employers—or by strangers on the street. The latter would refer to white wealth basing itself in historical systems of discrimination, perhaps reaching back to laws such as the 1862 Homestead Act, or the process of redlining housing districts, for example.\textsuperscript{40} To this end, the argument for white power derives from present and accumulated benefit, from a system created by Anglo-Saxon Protestants to benefit them and, eventually, their phenotypic familiars. White wealth and power in the present day is ultimately derived from white hegemony since the founding of the United States. This would include land distribution, suffrage, segregation, housing discrimination, the prevention of passing on wealth, higher education quotas, and so on. An entire population in the United States today was built on

systemically awarded advantages throughout centuries that compounded to create the elevated, still dominating, class today. ⁴¹

We can understand the implications of phenotype-based privilege with the concept of passing. Passing is a term used to refer to non-white people who are either mixed or lighter skinned/European featured enough, as to walk in the United States as though they were a white person. A non-white person passing as white, therefore, would reap the benefits of white privilege despite their inherited status, upbringing, and cultural background as being distinct. Here we can see one power as the active element of power, while the other, culture, is inapplicable. On the other side of this, a European immigrant would benefit from white identification in daily life, but they (and their potential children) would not have the same relationship to the exploitation of black Americans, nor would their culture resemble that of the rest of white America. A white-passing Ashkenazi Jew or a white Latino would not have much to do with the colonization of indigenous people in North America nor would their family history have benefited from slavery or 60s segregation. ⁴² But in popular discourse, they are as culpable for reparations as their “WASP” counterparts. In fact, Andrew Fraser himself makes this distinction in a scathing analysis of how Jews were complicit in the downfall of WASP birthright to their American ethnostate. Someone like Fraser would take issue with phenotypic identification because it posits Italians, Slavs, white-passing Jews, and Middle-Eastern

---


⁴² This is true as regards the millions of Jews (and their offspring) who immigrated from Eastern Europe and Western Europe, in the late 1800s/early 20th Century. But, there were also prominent Jews in the Confederate South, e.g., Judah Benjamin. Jews also had house slaves, before the Civil War. It was Jews of Spanish, Dutch (formerly from Spain), and Portuguese background who were there at the founding of the U.S. Not a large population, to be sure. (Rodriguez, Junius. The Historical encyclopedia of world slavery, Volume 1, ABC-CLIO, 1997)
people—who he sees as different if not inferior—as fundamentally the same as the bio-culturally
distinct Anglo-Saxons. For him, this is a problem because it fails to acknowledge both difference
and reality, and denies the hard work of the Anglo Saxon people.

In sum: the word “white” is effective in addressing issues that apply to phenotypic
identification. Its effectiveness is more complicated when it comes to sorting individuals into
cultural groups. Not only is an Italian, for example, culturally different from a Jew, a Russian, or
a Latino of European descent. Their experiences, historical treatment, and historical “privilege”
are *entirely distinct*. So, what does this conflation lead to? In a country where multiple,
phenotypically similar cultural groups become homogenized, what happens? They are grouped
together due to shared belonging to the most powerful class, but in doing so, are stripped of their
distinguishing characteristics, meaningful ties, and cultural substance. The relationship of
whiteness to power follows a relatively linear path. But what about how whiteness operates
culturally? If Americanness is mocked for its perceived eccentricities, American whiteness is
often at the center of these kinds of criticisms. Comments like: “white people don’t season their
food,” “white people can’t dance,” and “white people have no culture” are incredibly common.
Some of the most popular posts that make the rounds of sites like Twitter or Tumblr poke fun at
white culture (or lack thereof).

---

43“21 Tweets that Prove White People Have No Culture” retrieved from https://tfln.co/white-people-have-no-culture/
Each of these likes and retweets are part of a dialogue and common understanding. In contrast to broad generalizations about other groups, however, the plethora of meme-worthy content does not descend from violent roots nor does it exist within a context of persecution and dehumanization. When so-called “pro-white” individuals take offense at these sorts of comments, others are quick to point out that the jokes are completely harmless and in fact, poking fun at the idiosyncrasies of the most privileged group is, at minimum, only fair, and a way for ethnic minorities to channel justified anger with humor. Instead, these jokes target
everything from cuisine to home decor to baby names to haircuts, painting the picture colloquial of the white American as sheltered, stilted, and most of all, cultureless in every sense of the word.

With the understanding that these kinds of jokes do not result in actual harm to the population they target, what does this humorous, usually lighthearted consensus imply? Metapolitically speaking, the cultural agreement in the shape of memes on things like these showcases something powerful about how Americans--white or non-white--see themselves. These kinds of statements and jokes are lighthearted, surely, but if there is anything we have learned about metapolitics is that informal communication cannot be overlooked. Beneath the jokes is the expression of something deeper. What phenomena do statements like these hit on? Do these statements, about fashion choices or Monster Energy flavored ham apply to a Swede in Sweden? An Italian in Italy? De Benoist and Sunic would answer with a firm no. This highlights how these comments are not actually directed towards a phenotype, rather, towards a very localized section of (usually upper-middle class) white American society, or, if we take it even further, white Americans as severed Europeans. This is the white “cultural group” on the other side of the coin of the white power class. In many cases, a legacy of European--usually French, English, Spanish being the most commonly referenced--colonialism is used to posit today’s Europeans as equally culpable for non-European strife as their American counterparts. Whether the racialized construct is exercised through a racial hierarchy, or from without a racial hierarchy through colonialism, the argument goes, the effect is the same. Both the New Right and Andrew

44 An archive of dozens of screenshots of internet memes. “Know Your Meme: White People Have No Culture.” The description of the page reads: “White People Have No Culture” is an expression claiming that people belonging to the white racial classification do not have a unified cultural history. Online, the phrase is often used to caption photographs of white people in a variety of humorous contexts, accompanied by the phrase “like um try again sweetie.” Retrieved from https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/white-people-have-no-culture/photos
Fraser cite a belief that feelings of guilt motivate the prevailing European and American embracing of diversity.

As a result, one sees the spread of concerning and misappropriated questions such as “why isn’t there a white pride” to the slogan “it’s okay to be white.” Within the context of the white power class, statements like these showcase a major failure to understand power dynamics. With white political hegemony and European culture being conflated in the one word, untangling the implications of this cultural dialogue is a hefty endeavor. Asking why there isn’t a celebration of white pride is to misinterpret minority pride movements as an expression of power rather than a reaction to oppression. When Europeans “become” white, they lose their difference. When white culture becomes power, it becomes indistinguishable from the hierarchical construct that built it. With the single word “white,” one cannot distinguish between the power class and the now melded-together European cultures once associated with this group. Thus, from the outside, white culture and white power are synonymous. By now a stance criticized for being tone-deaf and offensive, some white people in the United States have taken to expressing that because of their powerful place in society, they are now unable to talk about or feel pride for their ancestral culture, despite minority groups being able to.

This analysis of European colonialism, and responsibility for group and ancestral colonization and violence, is not similarly expected of other groups. What if one’s history isn’t related to the oppression of the ancestors of one’s neighbors? How would a French-born Frenchman factor into American politics? One might say that they do not have the same

---

45 Wilson, Jason. October 15, 2018. *It’s OK to be white’ is not a joke, it’s careless politicians helping the far right.* The Guardian.
relationship to American minorities, but are responsible in a parallel sense for French colonialism. While European colonization is justifiably used to reprimand European countries as a whole, including individuals, it is rarely the case that a Chinese person be asked to bear the guilt and reparations over, say, Tibet, or a person from Myanmar for the Rohingya massacres, or an Indian for the invasion of Pakistan. This is not to say that awareness of inherited benefit from the exploitation of others is somehow wrong. Rather, that in the context of American multiculturalism, Andrew Fraser asserts that Anglo, and consequently, white Americans, are trying to alleviate the burden of their (collective) guilt by encouraging more immigration, and thus more diversity.\footnote{Sunic, T. (2011) \textit{Homo Americanus}. p.73} According to Sunic, “intellectual self-denial” leads to this guilt which refuses the expectation of the same self-reflection and cultural critique of any immigrant groups, regardless of their power status before entry into the country. Fraser, moreover, takes it a step further, and argues that this willful accepting of guilt is a uniquely WASP trait, but by indulging it, it will only erode WASP people and WASP values until there is nothing left.

Divorcing identity and culture from power is essential to understanding why white nationalism has been able to appeal to a victim narrative while mobilizing the most empowered ethnicity-based group. Still, does this lead to a conceptualization of identity in which it is distasteful to identify with any nation with a legacy of mistreatment of minorities or colonization? For example, for underprivileged, lower class white Americans, it can be difficult to reconcile being told they are powerful when they do not feel it, regardless of how true it might be, by some criteria. The idea of white privilege does not mean that a “white” person’s life is without strife, only that their ethnic classification does not play a part in those difficulties. As
such, they may turn to a sort of marketplace of identity. The radicalized, white nationalism in the United States, therefore, could be a result of a group rallying around the only thing they have left: their concept of race. This could explain, in part, why certain American nationalists like Richard Spencer and Greg Johnson, are more concerned with pan-European unity rather than any specific culture. The invisibility of the default class--male, white, heterosexual--has to do with power. To not have to define oneself means to live in a society built with one’s own group in mind. Power has in some ways become, or replaced culture for white Americans. They are the dominating class, but because of this power, they are unable to talk about their ‘group identity. There is little to be proud of in belonging to this group, because whiteness has become identified with colonialism, violence, and genocide. But when the idea of “identity” receives more and more of the spotlight, paradoxically, these invisible power classes may feel as though they are missing something the others are not. What started as a need to define oneself to advocate for one’s rights as a marginalized group can also become a source of pride.

If you can’t define yourself, how do you know you exist? For a school like the New Right, belonging and meaning are thus the prominent need that requires fulfillment, and are the reasons for which we usually organize ourselves into groups. However, the American context now sees belonging being invoked along combative lines in a sort of zero-sum game. That is, no one can put boundaries on the meaning of Americanism, because that would take the definition of American identity from someone else--the opposite of a country supposedly made for

---

everybody. If Americanism belongs to everybody, then it defines nobody. Within this context, a sense of belonging thrives on this conflict, because it highlights power and political differences, rather than seeking authentic cultural common ground. Therefore, Americans may find themselves trapped in a fight that keeps them all hostage. In an article in “CounterCurrents,” Greg Johnson writes:

“When different peoples are forced to live together in the same system, frictions are inevitable. These frictions give rise to misunderstandings, distrust, alienation, and long-simmering resentments, which flare up into hatred, violence, and social upheaval.”

This implies that identities within a multicultural society become doubly enhanced by close proximity with one another. This looks like a paradox of difference: the more diverse a society, the more people will realize their distinctions. This fragmentation in the United States, he argues, becomes part of their identity as ethnic groups and specifically as ethnic groups within an American context. Difference struggle, and fight for recognition becomes part of the group identity itself. Therefore, according to this model, American identity is fragmentation. This goes for everyone, and especially for white Americans who have nothing else to rest on. This creates a double-bind, in which American unity would mean homogenization, which would mean everybody abandoning their true communities. Superficial unity over authenticity is the looming specter of modernity that Sunic warns against. Perhaps, the United States seeks homogeneity, but in facts settle for a “difference struggle.” If we can understand how different populations can relate to the axes of power and culture, we can better understand how “massification” might look in the United States.

49 Greg Johnson. Understanding the Pittsburgh Synagogue Massacre. Counter Currents Publishing. October 29, 2018
Are Jews White?

Massification, in this case as it applies to white people in the United States, can also envelop groups that may or may not be associated with societal power. The case of Jews is an illuminates potential contradictions, pitfalls, or a need for further clarification of terms, in how we talk about and categorize groups. Jews are singled out in this paper because the complexity of Jewish group identity highlights the divide between power and culture. The same way that defining “Americanness” is to make a bold statement about the character of a nation, the act of defining Jews in a given scenario can make a statement about how we can prioritize certain elements of a group over others. In fact, precisely by understanding how the Jewish relationship to identity and privilege can vary based on circumstance that we can start to see these axes as more dynamic than fixed. If we can understand how Jewish identity and privilege may fluctuate, we can understand how it may do the same for other groups, and illuminate how different elements of definition can be active in different scenarios.

Whether s pro- or anti- American, cultural or ethnic nationalist, white and European, the nationalist perspective on Jews and Jewishness can range anywhere from dismissive apathy to virulent anti-Semitism. When we talk about responsibility for the hierarchical power structures erected and maintained by our forebears, we understand that although we may not have built them ourselves, they were designed by our ancestors with their progeny in mind, and we cannot disentangle ourselves from the generational gain we have accumulated because of them. So, in the case of the phenotypic white power class, what of the people who may benefit from it, but who did not build it? The concept of “passing” touches on this, but tends to apply to an individual who stands out--either due to phenotypic happenstance or mixed parentage. Ashkenazi
Jews, however, present a paradox of privilege, if you will, when one tries to understand their status in the United States. Jews and their historical persecution have eluded a single definition of their status; as they exist as a people at the intersection of ethnicity, race, and religion—depending on where and when one focuses on them. Jewishness, in fact, is a combination of these factors: Jews are an ethno-religious group with roots in the Levant, with a diasporic population that has extended for many centuries throughout Northern and Eastern Africa, historical Persia, Eastern and Southern Europe, among others. Each of these populations remains distinct in their variations on Jewish practice and tradition, but also remain linked culturally as well as genetically. Across diaspora populations, Jews share more genetic similarities with each other than to their host populations.50,51 This is not to essentialize Jewishness, but rather to distinguish it in the context of talking about religions. If one were to define Judaism as solely a religion, on par with Christianity or Islam, it would be an incomplete understanding of Jewish existence. Where Christianity was a religion that crossed borders by way of conversions, Jews were a people that crossed borders during various periods of exile from their places of residence. This is useful to keep in mind when considering Jews; to view them, with their many variations, as a people, rather than the active spread of a belief system. Even Sunic, in his criticism of Jewish influence and their narrative of victimhood, states that “Judaism is strictly an ethnic religion of the Jewish people,” in contrast with Christianity as a methodically spread religion52.

52 Sunic, T. (2008) Against Democracy and Equality. p.113
So why does this matter? Ashkenazi Jews, the most widely understood in the US, are often the center of debate as to whether they are white or not. On the one hand, Jews are a historically and presently persecuted group, bound by a shared history, cultural characteristics, and language. On the other, Ashkenazi Jews can be phenotypically indistinguishable from “white” Americans. Therefore, if we understand white to mean “power class,” the question, “are Jews white,” amounts to an attempt to understand what relationship Jews have to power. The findings may vary depending on whom you ask. American Jews stand out against other minorities, Sunic and others suggest, in both their political and economic success and their ability to assimilate. While anti-Semitic violence in the US (and particularly Europe) is on the rise, it is also true that Ashkenazi Jews have the ability to blend in with white America in a way that other minorities cannot. As such, more often than not, Ashkenazi Jews can circumvent the ‘present benefit’ of stratified racial hierarchy and be absorbed into whiteness. People like Andrew Fraser would consider this a tragic clerical error, allowing Jews to be falsely recognized for both the accomplishments of WASPs, while inaccurately being recognized as co-ethnics under the label of whiteness.

This is the paradox: Ashkenazi Jews in the US can avoid phenotypic discrimination that other groups cannot, and are thus privileged. However, this assimilation into white society can lead to anti-Semitic claims that Jews are infiltrating, corrupting, and manipulating the (white) world order from the inside: appealing to one of the oldest forms of anti-Semitic belief. Sunic himself says that, without the illusory specter of anti-Semitism, Jews would likely “assimilate

quickly and thus disappear." This tells us two things. First, he presumes that, aside from fabricated anti Semitic paranoia, Jews have no unifying characteristics that would be enough to hold them together. Second, he identifies the role that real or perceived threat has in the development of minority identity. In this case, a threat of violence from an anti Semitic “boogeyman,” as he calls it, makes Jewishness threatened, and therefore real--and valuable. It is the protection of Jewishness, rather than the value of Jewishness itself, that makes it worth preserving.

Since other ethnic minority groups could not assimilate on a phenotypic basis in this way, their group identity is under less threat of assimilation in the same way. Constant threat keeps the culture and its unity alive. Misgivings between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims, for example, is set aside when there is a shared sense of Islamophobia. Discrimination towards Arab and Muslim people in the United States does not distinguish between these two categories, because the context of the United States makes them negligible. This does not mean, of course, that these disagreements are not felt or manifested by Shi’a or Sunni Muslims living in the US. Rather, it simply means that that an axis of difference is not part of the American framework. Therefore, existence is difference for groups living in a society composed of many contrasting cultures.

IV. Desacralization

“For the New Right, the chaos of modern society has primarily been caused by Biblical monotheism.”

55 Ibid, p. 97
Sunic describes de-sacralization as an erosion of spirituality, which he criticizes for the overall secularization of society, and the materialism this begets. For the New Right, the chaos of modern society has primarily been caused by Biblical monotheism. Judeo-Christian values actually desacralized the pagan world by supplanting the reign of law. European paganism and polytheism underscores the rest of the New Right’s criticism of social and political systems.\textsuperscript{58} The New Right’s preoccupation with paganism and with Christianity is as much about religion as it is ways to conceptualize, and make meaning of, the world. The main ideological pitfall of Judeo-Christianity is how it altered the European approach to social sciences by categorizing the world into binaries: either/or, true and false, good and evil--categorizing the world in an unsustainable, overly simplistic way. By framing the world as a battle between absolute good vs. absolute evil, any “enemies” would be identified with the concept of evil, and must be exterminated.\textsuperscript{59}

According to Sunic, Christianity introduced the spread of egalitarian mass society in Europe as a proselytizing religion of a set of values. Jews, for their part, adopted the belief that good people--who suffer--will be rewarded.\textsuperscript{60} In this model of belief, suffering becomes desirable, or tolerable. If one is a victim, one cannot be the perpetrator. Christianity focused on the ‘equality of souls,’ and the importance of spreading the gospel to all people, regardless of difference. That is, Christian theology presumed, as well, that the social and moral organization within it would be ideal for everyone. If religion is just an element of culture, then the mass spread of Christianity was also the installation of reciprocally enforced norms. The contribution of Judaism, according to the New Right is how it rationalizes all aspects of life through laws,

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid. p.112
\textsuperscript{59}Sunic, T. (2008) \textit{Against Democracy and Equality}. P. 112
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, 118
prescriptions. Religion as a vehicle for social organization also carries a heavy eschatological weight. The way that people believe in life after death directly informs how they live. Religion, therefore, has the capacity to restructure, for people en masse, the entire framework for what constitutes a meaningful life. Alain De Benoist writes how the egalitarian theme entered culture from stage of myth, then to ideology (equality before people), then to the “scientific pretension of egalitarian fact.” Here, religion itself is metapolitical, transforming values by way of myth, reinforced through religious ritual. In de Benoist’s view, this illustrates the progression of Christianity, to democracy, to socialism, and then to Marxism. If there is only one god, there is only one truth; a one dimensional world, history, and logic.

While the omnipresence of Christianity of the United States is one of its defining (and often ridiculed), characteristics, it might seem the least likely candidate to have succumbed to “desacralization.” However, the kind of spiritual traditions from the U.S., as well as Christianity itself, are according to the New Right, undesirable. In fact, a great deal of American patriotic symbols and gestures are directly linked to Christianity. From “In God we trust,” to the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, these hallmarks of Christianity are very present in the iconography of Americanism. This “one truth” sounds a great deal like the “ideology of sameness,” or more specifically:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal.”

This phrase, however hypocritical, is at the base of the ideological American foundation. Because it is a phrase that is often repeated to assert the ultimate nature of America, its phrasing
should not be taken for granted. By way of the essentialist critique of Judeo-Christianity, the word “truth” stands out. The founding document of the United States and one of its most revered lines as it defines Americanism speaks about the apparent “truths” of a principle. If we have understood New Right analysis to be critical of ultimate conceptualizations of “truth”, then a country based on accepting one would not bode well. Regarding the ‘truth’ itself, Sunic himself, in *Homo Americanus*, states: “Is it not self-evident that people are different?” Certainly, the Declaration of Independence is hypocritical at best, as at the time of its creation, by no means were all new Americans equal in status or opportunity. Finally, the appeal to a higher power in the word “created,” the New Right might say, is a thinly veiled example of how the Abrahamic god is invoked to confirm this “self evident truth.”

The New Right also sees ideologies like communism and liberalism as direct results of this moral schema. These “secular progenies” beget the obsession with the material. American belonging, as critiques of rationalization explain, is material, worldly, exploitative, and hedonistic. The New Right views paganism, the alternative, not as a “religion” but a “spiritual equipment.”  

If religion is a vessel for societal values, and plurality of values is the most important thing, then monotheism must be replaced with polytheism. In contrast to Christian determinism, paganism sees the individual assuming responsibility for their own life as an agent, rather than a passive subject to whom life happens. Christianity is deterministic, and emphasizes guilt and a fear of God. Where the New Right asserts that the monotheism of the Bible attempts to create divisions, paganism favors organic solidarity and communal ties—the driving values of the New Right. A system that accepts a limitless number of gods accepts

---

62 Ibid, 120.
63 Ibid, 121
plurality of forms of worship that address them, and by extension, the conceptions of the world for which these gods are expressions. Therefore pagans, by rejecting Judeo-Christian dualism, are less inclined to intolerance, according to this logic.

Monotheism, according to the New Right, also excludes the possibility of historical return. This means that the fatalistic nature of Christian theology implies that history unfolds in a predetermined way. In other words, history unfolds progressively. If modernity is the idea that humanity progresses towards improvement over time, this is what the New Right also refers to as ‘Christian time,’ with everything moving towards a final goal. For pagans, however, time is nonlinear, with no clear beginning or end; the past, present, and future are “dimensions of each actuality.” The concept of Christian time also supports the idea that all of humanity is pursuing the same goal in the same way. One could argue that an oblique manifestation of this today is the assumption that wealth is humanity’s ultimate goal. Therefore, the “correct” model for any nation’s success is oriented in this direction. For the United States, this goal might be the nebulous boon of the American Dream. In Judeo Christian belief, relative, different, or contradictory truths cannot exist. Everything that is not compatible with the good/evil division central to Judeo-Christian morality is excluded. For Sunic, this means that today, those who have not taken sides or “refuse modern political eschatologies” actually become targets for persecution.

Cultural Relativism and Critique From the Left

---

What happens if protecting human rights under multiculturalism impedes the rights and needs of another group? Which group does liberal egalitarianism protect? Here, I will deconstruct anti-Muslim prejudice and disentangling ideology from ethnicity. Borrowing from Sarah Haider’s comments on the racialization of Islam and the damage to multiple communities, I will look at the roots of, and implications for, anti Muslim/anti-Arab prejudice.\

Many of the fears of mass Muslim immigration in Europe come both from race-based arguments, as well as from questions about cultural compatibility. Islam is a religion and ideology with sects and variations, and is the majority religion in large parts of North Africa, the Middle East, and in west and south Asia. As a religion that has crossed borders, the ethnic and racial groups that live in majority-Muslim countries is quite broad. However, in the United States, the term “Islamophobia,” which involves the name of the religion, is often used synonymously with racism. Why might this be, and what might this imply? To understand this, we must once again untangle power dynamics from culture.

The vast majority of people from Muslim majority countries would be considered, in the U.S., to be non-white. Any non-white person’s experience in the United States is inevitably wrapped up in a combination of racial stereotyping along with general xenophobia. If we understand how the New Right sees religion is a vessel of culture, then Islam is the container, so to speak, for sets of values and rituals that make up the societies it pervades. The influence of Islam may be in the legal code or in common law, or the implicit social contract/behaviors in these countries. In Europe, most notably in France, French secularism, or

---

“laicite,” has come into conflict with the question of respecting the rights of its Muslim immigrants. Many of these immigrants also come from French ex-colonies, such as Algeria. Many suggest that if France were to impose its cultural will on them, it would further perpetuate colonialism.

In the United States, Muslim immigrants come from a wider variety of countries and do not have the ex-colonial relationship as they do in France. However, the US has militarily intervened in many Muslim-majority countries, often to the point of destabilization, leading to a similar argument as with France, that the US is culpable, and therefore responsible for the protection of these communities as the smallest act of reparation--especially as a country that advertises acceptance.

Ex-Muslims of North America is a non-profit organization that aims to promote secular and liberal values and reduce discrimination against those who leave Islam. It is reportedly the “first organization of its kind,” fielding xenophobia and racism from the right and ostracization from the left for their critiques of Islam.67 With 24,000 members, the organization is small but growing, as more turn to it as a refuge of solidarity in a political environment that does not know what to make of them.68 Their goal is to “normalize dissent,” facilitate discussion between ex-Muslims, Muslims, and non-Muslims. They aim to shed light on the difficulty they face for criticizing cultural relativism in the name of human rights, and the harm it can do to vulnerable communities. Despite many of its members being immigrants and all having grown up in Muslim communities, they are often targeted with accusations of racism. Sarah Haider, the Executive Director of EXMNA responds to this:

68 Amos, Owen (December 29, 2017). "They left Islam and now tour the US to talk about it". BBC News.
“They’re barring the gate, telling us we’re ‘Islamophobic’ or spurring hatred toward Muslims or contributing to a hostile atmosphere for them. They even say we’re contributing to Western imperialism. This is nonsense and is appalling to us.”

Now, what happens when someone who is a majority in one country emigrates to another, and becomes a minority? We have two cases here. First, the discrimination and xenophobia one would face for being an ethnic and racial minority in the United States. This is based on visual cues--general appearance and (perhaps) religious or regional dress. This is why apparently anti-Muslim hate crimes have occurred towards Sikh men, not because they embodied a certain set of beliefs, but because they looked, in the minds of their aggressors, like the people who did.

“When I read a news article about how a woman’s hijab was pulled off or how a stewardess refuses to give a Muslim woman an unopened can of Coke, it’s national news. But no one covers what we’re going through, no one covers our persecution. Of course we know there’s anti-Muslim bigotry, and that’s being covered. But our struggle should be covered as well. It’s appalling that our pain isn’t worth discussing. In fact, we’re often painted as the victimizers.”

The pain that is being referenced here is the kind that can fall through the cracks of the way cultural and human rights are tackled by a segment of United States liberalism. This is the struggles of people for whom the This results in double harm for these communities: they still experience anti-Muslim prejudice based on their appearance, but find themselves subject to alienation when they try to speak about their concerns within their communities. Here, we see the binary model of thinking harming a group with very different ideals and agenda than the New

---

69 Tayler, J. *On Betrayal by the Left*. 2017

70 Basu, Moni. September 15, 2016. *15 years after 9/11, Sikhs still victims of anti-Muslim hate crimes*. CNN.

Right, but the ideological symptom is the same. The defense of a certain ideology for the sake of egalitarianism backfires when it cannot defend minorities within those minorities. The idea of a “single truth” and the marketability of identity create a space in which being vocal and protective of identities in the name of diversity and equality.

“This is dehumanizing, it’s as if Eastern peoples have no agency, we’re just acted upon. But I can tell you about Islamic cruelty and how they treated women and homosexuals long before the West was even in the picture. [For those leftists] it’s as if history started in colonized countries when the West came”

The complaint that Muslims are treated as though life “happens to them” rather than agents recalls the New Right criticism of Judeo-Christian determinism. Haider, of course, is not trying to promote the alleged pagan empowering of individual agency, but the general concept here is the same. The New Right opposes the treatment of people as passive objects because it rejects deterministic Judeo-Christian morals, and groups like EXMNA oppose this because it limits the ability to advocate for their needs, as an insidious form of racism. Here, Haider also points out the same criticism of the reductionism of Western-centric history, but to a different end:

“They believe it is bigotry to even acknowledge that there are problems in certain cultures, unless of course you’re talking about Western culture, in which case I can acknowledge whatever I want. [...] I can’t even acknowledge that there’s a problem and that it’s at a much more extreme level [in Islamic countries] than anything we have in the West, when saying that in itself is [considered] a form of racism, a form of bigotry.”

Haider asserts that to subordinate women’s rights, for example, to cultural rights is to declare that civil liberties necessarily belong to Western culture. Challenging accusations of racism that people like her typically field, she instead suggests that the true racism is to imply,

---

through this reasoning, “non-Western women have no need of human dignity.\(^{73}\)” Protecting, in this case, traditions and ideology are enough for multiculturalism, posits the individual as secondary. Or, in other words, leaves the power system of another ideology intact, prioritizes the traditions maintained by the controlling class--whether male, dominating ethnic/religious group, etc. To offer critique only to one’s own culture means to ignore the equally scrutinizable power systems in others, and treat them as their own entity in need of protection as a minority culture. As Haider’s comments highlight, both these things can be true, but it is often the former that is overlooked.

As we earlier acknowledged the possibility of looking at American whiteness through two lenses, we can consider a similar model that distinguishes anti-Muslim prejudice from critique of the religion. Haider asserts that, in fact, “religions are just ideas and don’t have rights,” and that it feels like a betrayal to pose them above people--who do have rights. One might argue that a religion, which embodies an ideology, may be an integral part of a person/group’s identity, and by criticizing it, this is on par with discriminating against the person themselves. In a 2017 speech, Haider cautions against this kind of reasoning on the grounds that other ideologies--religious, spiritual, political--have and must continue to be critiqued freely. With regards to the term “Islamophobia” itself, Haider, Yasmine Mohammed, and Ali A. Rizvi have remarked on the shortcomings of the term as it “muddles two very different forms of intolerance, based on two very different reasons,” and, in their eyes, can obscure the very real challenges faced by those within Muslim communities. To this end, many in their camp have

\(^{73}\) Ibid
proposed using the term “anti-Muslim bigotry” instead, as a term that is “stronger, more accurate, and doesn’t diminish the efforts of reformers and dissidents risking their lives.”

“They paint us as a self-hating, traitorous group of people. They believe religion’s inherent to Muslims, so they think insulting religion is like ridiculing their skin color. They’re racializing religion and conflating people with their religion.”

Here, we see conflict between imported culture values, adopted cultural values (what one perceives to be, or what people think is) American, and values that are conferred upon the newcomer, whether they accept them or not. Independent of what the individual may or may not adopt, someone will confer on them a certain identity, or values that they may or may not hold. The same culture that is under threat in one context may be the dominating majority in another; both of these things can be true. This might be another instance of the Judeo-Christian conceptualization of society that the New Right criticizes. The kind of egalitarianism that the United States encourages does not allow for “multiple truths” but instead favors a black-and-white view. In this model, if one is a victim, one cannot have power on any other axis. People may be a majority in their home country, and then become a minority in another country. They may enter minority status in their new country, but the values they bring are of a dominating culture.

Why does this matter? What does a left-associated organization advocating for the safety and interests of individuals leaving Islam have to do with a controversial European anti-liberal school of thought? It is crucial to note the convergence of Haider and Sunic’s points, as well as where they diverge. Two entirely distinct groups with entirely different ideas about Americanism.

---

74 Aliamjadrizi (2019, March 17) Retrieved from Twitter.com
75 Tayler, J. On Betrayal By the Left. 2017
are voicing criticisms of the same phenomenon. To different ends, both comment on the unsoundness of neo-liberal egalitarianism. Sunic criticizes neoliberal egalitarianism as an erroneous setup of society which only fills in the gaps of its unsteady ideological foundation by silencing dissidents. Haider and her associates would critique neoliberal egalitarianism for failing to actually promote human rights, which is a noble aim in practice, in favor of maintaining its rhetoric. The overlap is the recognition that modern liberal multiculturalism prioritizes rhetoric over practicality. Sunic, because liberalism itself is unsustainable--and Haider, because liberalism is being co-opted to maintain a status quo rather than protect human rights. From the perspective of members of EXMNA, the very system that aims to promote diversity and human rights is restricting their rights, speech, and even safety on those same grounds.76

V. Universalization

All of these critiques of American liberalism and modernity might just come across as an intellectual exercise. But the reason for New Right’s investment in the American system is also allegedly out of fear. If the United States represents the worst and most damaging values of a society, New Right thinkers fear a “global civilization” where every country, in the name of liberalism and democracy, begins to resemble the United States. Universalization involves the application of the liberal model to the rest of the world --presumed to be the best, and only, version. Accusations that the U.S. is trying to “change” the rest of world are not new, and can manifest in more ways in one. While American culture is, allegedly, being forcefully spread throughout the world, American military intervention in the rest of the world would also qualify

as universalization. The attempt to spread the American version of a democratic state is no less
damaging than outright colonialism or mass-immigration.

The power of American media functions, in other words, as the metapolitical arm of
universalization:

“First comes the American virtual icon, most likely by the means of a movie, TV show, or a
computer game; then the masses start using this image in the implementation of their own reality.”

In addition to economic and military intervention, the US can exert influence through
film, TV, news, and popular culture. One particular qualm the New Right has with globalization
is that it does not entail an equal exchange of culture. While American movies, music, and
popular culture is ever-present in other countries, the opposite is not true to the same degree. As
such, globalization is less of a collective mix of ideas, but a distinctly (nearly) unilateral
influence of one actor on the rest of the world. In particular, the ideological application of U.S.
inner-politics to the rest of the world can pose difficulties for groups concerned with the
shortcomings of U.S.-focused cultural relativism. The construct of individual and group identity
in the United States is centered around a particular group’s relationship to the racialized power
hierarchy. This means that minority status, in number or in influence, becomes a major
component of identity in a multicultural society. However, the rest of the world does not always
follow that same structure; there are entire countries in which these same rules of power do not
apply. Someone may be a minority in a stratified multicultural society, but be part of the majority
elsewhere. Failure to reconcile these two statuses leads to a massive misidentification of both
power and cultural dynamics within non-American countries. Horizontal/lateral dynamics,
prejudice, are misunderstood if not entirely ignored.

77 Sunic, T. *Homo Americanus*. p.152
Ergo, the essence of Americanism is the processes of modernity themselves. In the American case, modernity is not replacing an authentic culture. It is the natural result of a country of this character. American modernity is the only way to reconcile a paradoxically multi-cultural, cultureless state. Every other culture is imported into the U.S. via immigration, and is honored via hyphenated identities, identity politics, and a celebration of diversity. However, a disservice is also done to each of these, as they are fundamentally characterized as equal to one another, and none can dominate the other enough to institutionalize a particular culture’s unique values. For example, an Iraqi-American and Mexican-American may be neighbors, but neither will ever live in an America in which their ethnicity or culture is the majority one. The only culture excluded from this celebration, Fraser and Johnson would argue, is the “white,” or Euro-American, “flattened” culture. A clear counter argument is that white Americans are, and have been, the dominating power class since the country’s founding, and thus, any complaints about those not celebrating Europeanness are tone deaf at best, or violent, at worst. Why would a group who has enjoyed disproportionate power and success ever be justified in feeling unseen? Whatever the multicultural veneer, Fraser says, the fact stands that the values and structures that the US is built on are explicitly European, specifically Anglo-European.

The system that seems to uphold these hypocrisies, in the eyes of the New Right, is the ideology of liberalism. Typically, the word liberalism is associated with freedom: of expression, of belief, of thought. However, The New Right proposes that in fact, liberalism might be its own form of totalitarianism. Even regarding its critique of Christianity, the New Right primarily criticizes its totalitarian character, which is responsible for the underlying idea of universalism.

---

According to the New Right, economism and egalitarianism constitute main vectors of totalitarianism. These are the subordination of every aspect of human life to a single economic sphere of social activity.”\(^{79}\) To maintain this, egalitarianism maintains that everyone is equal in the eyes of the market.

Liberal totalitarianism ensures compliance through what Sunic calls soft conditioning—opposed to violent conditioning. The result of this kind of totalitarianism is feelings of superfluousness and loneliness. Again extrapolating from alleged Biblical binarism, De Benoist claims that “all countries that are attached to the Biblical message show a latent proto-totalitarian bent.”

“Totalitarianism is an inevitable outcome of contemporary social and political atomisation, followed by the individualization and rationalization of economic production, which in turn breeds alienation and reciprocal social resentment”

Totalitarian systems would typically ensure compliance with violence. Instead, from the perspective of the New Right, liberalism in its totalitarian form replaces physical violence with a “cool” ideology such as consumerism and the cult of money. Not only is this dangerous, it is also subdues that population into facilitating its own loss of control, creating what de Benoist refers to as a society of “happy robots.”\(^{80}\) The New Right also criticizes liberalism as a system that gives in to narcissism “incessant search for pleasure.” Liberty, then, becomes undermined by the totalitarian obsession with the self and the constant need to accumulate.\(^{81}\) In totalitarian liberalism, the only social avenue becomes one of “equality in poverty,” Sunic argues, in which “everyone will have an equal share of power and where nobody will have more power than his


fellow citizen.” Sunic asserts that the liberalism operates in such a way that its flaws are not viewed as a reason for the system to change, but as a sign that “more” liberalization needs to take place.

“A typical example of American hyperreality occurs when the American political class assumes that every error in its multicultural universe [...] can be repaired by bringing in more foreign immigrants, by adding more racial quotas, or by further liberalizing its already liberal laws”

Like everything else in the United States, liberalism becomes a system of production. According to the New Right, it will continue to produce new ways of classification, of differentiation, as long as they are politically and socially useful. Liberalism will continue to create needs for the population to keep them dependent and to distract them from their more ‘essential’ cultural needs that are being neglected.

The over reliance on “principles” and laws as a binding force can lead to a hollow connection with the country and co-nationals, Sunic says, “Multiculturalism has replaced Germans with citizens who do not regard Germany as their homeland, but as an imaginary “Basic Law Land.” If a country is valued for its principles, rather than its character and culture, that culture might take a backseat to principles (of democracy, of ideas of equality). It is liberalism’s favoring of legal codes, prescriptions, and superstructures that render them ultimately useless. The greatest “wealth” and value of the country become secondary to upholding liberal rationalization of life. The allegedly soft liberal totalitarianism ostracizes and marginalizes dissenters and uses public disgrace as a silencing tactic. By restricting the “acceptable” opinions to have, and magnifying others, this kind of liberalism is maintained by a

---

82 Sunic, T. *Homo Americanus*, p. 72
sense of intellectual legitimacy, which is upheld by major media and corroborated by college professors.\textsuperscript{83}

**Conclusion: Why does this matter?**

Why should we care about a foreign, relatively unknown, ideology that has a completely different value system? For as much as the New Right ideology condemns American binarism, many of the claims it makes are just as broad and extreme. The United States espouses the idea, implicitly and explicitly, is that it is the best country in the world\textsuperscript{84}. The New Right’s model, on the other hand, presents the US as the most cataclysmic, alienating, almost apocalyptic design of a country. By coming from the American standpoint of the greatness of the American model and then engaging with something that is so severely critical, perhaps we can find something in the middle. Americanism, perhaps, finds itself between the two. Reading into ideas like these seriously has less to do with determining whether they are “right,” and instead to try and understand what feeling they are expressing. This is not to give credit to overtly violent rhetoric. But it is possible, and indeed, necessary, if the goal is self-reflection, to uncover what fears, concerns, and phenomena the authors are trying, however imperfectly, to address. What do the critiques of implicit and explicit Americanism say about American national character and identity? When you define the oneness of a multicultural country, you make a subjective statement on the value of its parts? To inquire what American nationalism is, is to ask, “what is our oneness?”

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, XXII  
In *Homo Americanus*, Sunic paints a bleak picture of the future of the United States, stating that “in a country that is [...] increasingly turning into a mega-system of diverse and contradictory ethnic, racial, and economic interests with competing narratives, there is a distinct possibility of the country’s breakup.” Sunic alludes further to how identities under threat or whom are persecuted, are reinforced. Understandably, marginalization leads to defensiveness. It also strengthens bonds between members of a group. In addition to their similarities, they now unite against real and perceived threats. Therefore, if the United States is the most vocal proponent of difference, then each identity must be under constant competitive threat. Within a single country, this might look like an ethnocultural stalemate. Perhaps that tension will always be there, and individuals will have to decide whether the integrity of their culture is worth sacrificing, at least in part, or sharing with another. Peoples have never been defined along clean-cut lines. Certainly now more than ever, either due to parentage or migration, there may be multiple “cultures” at once which an individual considers theirs. Understanding the differences between these, there can certainly be tension for individuals feeling like they have to “choose.” Maybe sometimes people will choose. Maybe sometimes, they won’t have to. The integrity of cultures, ultimately, is more likely to be “preserved” by the people who belong to them as opposed to the urging by an outside force like the New Right. While it might be more convenient to look at cultures as entirely distinct, for the argument of the *pluriversum*, the evolution of cultures is also far from linear or self-contained. Civilizations have informed each other, borrowed and adapted traditions, myths, dress, language, and so forth. There are certainly as many variations within cultures as between them. Difference exists. But the organic, “authentic”

---

85 Sunic, T. *Homo Americanus*, 186
86 Ibid.
cultures that the New Right proposes that we protect today exist in their current form only due to
the influences on each other.

One of the most common praises offered to Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential
campaign is that he “speaks his mind” and “tells it like it is.” This does not mean, necessarily,
that the Trump himself was delivering revolutionary ideas, but that a vast population in the
United States feels as though they cannot acknowledge what they perceive as the obvious. When
engaging with texts and ideas like these, it is easy to be entranced by radical, provocative
claims—that because it is something critical, and it is challenging, it has credibility. Indeed, while
not explicitly New Right ideas, pushback against multiculturalism has come with a degree of
appeal for parts of the American population. There is a line—at which hate speech and violence
must not be given a platform. But without seriously confronting the fact that certain perspectives
resonate with so many people, it leaves no middle ground for those who might be feel their
observations, and their perceived needs, as ignored by the mainstream narrative. In fact, in their
more extreme iterations, reactionary ideologies thrive off of the alleged ignorance of their
opposition. These kinds of movements can capitalize on feelings of disillusionment that make
nationalist rhetoric and their spokespeople seem “enlightened,” by comparison with “liberal
totalitarianism.” It passes the baton on to others—including varying degrees of extreme
nationalists—to appear to be saying the truths that no one else will.

After the election of Donald Trump, multiple polls suggested that cultural insecurity, far
more than economic insecurity, was a factor in Trump’s victory. It was something that had real,
large scale effects. This leads us to the point that it is not the “truth” of Trumpian rhetoric that
matters. It is enough that millions of people thought he was saying the truth, and felt heard by
him. In a 2017 poll, half of respondents agreed with the statement that “things have changed so much that I feel like a stranger in my own country.” 68% said that “America is in danger of losing its identity.” Statements like these reflect, in far more basic terms, many of the arguments Sunic makes. Once again, in a world where beliefs unite people, translate to protests and votes and influence election results, it is enough that people feel things to be true.

The question is, then, what we do with this understanding. We need to grapple with seemingly contradictory, confusing ideas. Yes, white people in the United States are the most powerful and privileged sect of society. Their position in society results directly from the historical exploitation and subjugation of black and other ethnic minorities. Yes, some white Americans also perceive a missing element, or loss, as a group, as a result of being the “unrecognized,” “default” group, in a society that increasingly values uniqueness and diversity. Yes, real people have rallied around this sentiment, however “wrong”, and started real movements, and elected a President who expressed rhetoric that made them feel validated. We must be able to simultaneously recognize the fallibility and intolerance of movements that arise out of these ideas, and understand why they appeal to so many people. When ideas have real-world effects, and are real in the eyes of those who believe them, we must consider them just as seriously. By acting as though these ideas are true—white discrimination or outright “genocide”-- we must contend with them and offer an alternative analysis. Charles Taylor calls recognition one of the “driving forces” behind nationalist movements in politics. We can understand the ludicrous inaccuracy of claims of white oppression in the United States and

---

89Taylor, Charles. The Politics of Recognition. p.1
simultaneously understand how a group privileged with invisibility might go about searching for this kind of recognition.

The “white race” or “European culture” doesn’t have to be under “threat of genocide.” It is enough that people believe that it is. If we take New Right critiques of Americanism like these seriously, where does that leave us? We do live in a multicultural country. To a degree, existing in this kind of society does make identities more salient and give them the potential to clash. In the middle of all of this, we have people still searching for meaning, for definition, for purpose and belonging. Whether it is the liberal ‘system of production’ that commodifies human existence, whether it is the invisibility of being the powerful default, there are idiosyncratic stops on the way to finding one’s place and finding that purpose and belonging that the New Right values so much. People in the United States, as in any country, are trying to do this with the tools and the discourse that they see available to them. If the tool for meaning, for belonging, is hearing one’s fears addressed by reactionary groups based in fear tactics and racism, the appeal can be strong. White people in the United States are not the victim. They are not disenfranchised by ethnic minorities speaking up for their own equality. But, if they see their confusion, or anger, or loneliness echoed by only a handful of parties, even ones we would consider extreme, and these parties are the only ones apparently “getting” how they are feeling, that becomes the only route for whites to receive the acknowledgement they seek. As such, changing the discourse starts with offering-- creating-- other routes for a serious, controversial, uncomfortable discussion. That lack of space has also led to the disenchantment of non-white minority groups, such as EXMNA, to not also having an avenue to recognition: not just recognition of existence, but recognition of their particular aims, and needs.
Whether under the banner of “nation,” religious group, or ethnicity, these are, on their most basic level, ways of classifying people. Because no “group” is homogenous, every attempt to classify people will have shortcomings in some form. Humans are social animals. We organize people, and ourselves, to make meaning. We are constantly looking for ways to identify those we see as “our own,” which inevitably also hinges on who we see as “other.” Neither of these phenomena will go away. For all of the scathing, in-depth criticisms of the United States model, to debate its depravity or the exceptionalism of its origin and development is a moot point. The fact stands: with its legacy, its crimes, and its ills, the United States is a country that a diversity of individuals and groups calls home. So, if we are to want the best for this state that defines us as much as we define it, we need to come up with a new concept of community.

The purpose of this paper has not been to determine that principles of democracy and egalitarianism are wrong and that Against Democracy and Equality and Homo Americanus are the truth and way forward. It is neither pragmatic nor realistic to presume that a “pluriversum” would arise any time soon, nor a white ethno-state as Richard Spencer and his followers might insist. Even if we condemn materialism and wealth as incentives for globalization and migration, this does not change the fact that these are real motivators.

While the United States may not have a strong collective culture as the New Right would define it, culture is something that develops over time. While there are, perhaps, unique struggles for unity that a multi-cultural country may experience, it is also true that people of different backgrounds do form communities at school, work, university, around common interests, passions, hobbies, ways of life. Perhaps the New Right would argue that they have done so at the cost of something integral to themselves. Perhaps, as they would insist, “cultures” as they exist in
multicultural countries will never be as “strong” or “authentic” as they would be in their home countries. If culture has a strong participatory element, it would be difficult to maintain the same kind of community when surrounded by a completely different cultural context. Even something as basic as language is a carrier of cultural norms, references, and ways of thinking. To share one nation, then, would also require a shared language. While ethnic or immigrant communities might speak their own language among family and within their community, it would be informal and secondary as compared to the lingua franca which would not be their own. If we concede this, even in part, then we can contend with what does bind people together in this kind of society. The New Right would say these are the largely superfluous, materialistic bonds that only go skin deep. But one could also suggest that communities arising within multicultural countries are powerful precisely because they formed “despite” these cultural differences. Maybe a multicultural country will give more space to communities built around ideals, politics, activism, and value systems. And if this is the case, and we live in a state that has to care for its citizens, advocate for their rights and aspirations, we need to integrate all of these “truths” about Americanism.

British Pakistani activist Maajid Nawaz coined the term “regressive left” to refer to these gaps in liberalism in theory versus in practice.  

Organizations like EXMNA-- a single example of a larger phenomenon-- are born out of the limits and dissatisfaction with this model. I used their example precisely to highlight a population that struggles to advocate for its rights and freedoms from the system that claimed to do so. EXMNA was able to organize to do so, but there are almost certainly other individuals and communities finding themselves in a similar

---

space that have not been able to organize themselves as successfully. The fact that EXMNA has not significantly breached the mainstream and experiences alienation not just from the traditional right but from the traditional left means that despite good intentions, popular liberalism has not done what it set out to do. In almost an inverted place as the New Right, the liberal-valued EXMNA has had to carve out its own space because there is no place for their discussions on either the traditional right or left. Paradoxically, people of minority status may not find themselves able to advocate for their own interests for fear of ostracization from the same system that claimed to advocate for them.

Whether or not it is idealistic or imperfect, the United States is, at least in part, a country based on principles of freedom and equality. People can critique the “efficiency” or feasibility of a multicultural model, but it exists. If the value-based system that binds multicultural societies can work to address these gaps and perceived double standards, it can create an alternative to the more visible reactionary, far right, nationalist movements. If one of the greatest dissatisfactions is a seemingly dogmatic model and the ostracization of those who say anything different, the antidote is not more polarization. Instead of leaving the loudest voices to be those advocating for separatism, isolationism, xenophobia and even ethno states, those committed to the idea of a value-based, human-rights based United States can also acknowledge critiques of the implementation of liberalism and instead, propose something else. Maybe people in multicultural societies will not be as connected by shared history or practices like in a low context society, but they can affirm a commitment to human rights, and perhaps that is the greatest solidarity. We have to offer an alternative: an acknowledgement of legitimate critiques of the liberal model, but not to the conclusion that liberalism itself is a failure by design, or that a country based on
human rights is doomed to fail. Instead, we can offer an avenue that looks honestly at the strengths as well as flaws in the discursive model, and proposes to reevaluate them in the name of the values that the United States purportedly stands for. Both the New Right and progressives critical of the “regressive left” have noticed points of dissonance or confusion in the liberal discursive model, but for different reasons and towards different ends. If the U.S. does believe, however idealistically, in freedom and equality, we must acknowledge the possibility of this self-reflection and critique in the name of these same principles.

In conclusion, New Right intellectualism aspires to usher in a new era of nationalism predicated on dignified logos and ethos. If the left, proponent of human rights and civil liberties, is also able to acknowledge and take a hold of this rhetoric, it can also acknowledge and critique the flaws, and propose a remedy that does not lead to cultural segregationism or exclusionism. This alternative, this third path between the radical right and the regressive left, is one where we can synthesize liberal values with the ability to be critical of a system without advocating for its dismantling.
Bibliography


Basu, Moni. September 15, 2016. 15 years after 9/11, Sikhs still victims of anti-Muslim hate crimes. CNN.


Editorial Board, Washington Post. December 13, 2017. Sandy Hook was five years ago. Congress has still done nothing


Johnson, Greg. Understanding the Pittsburgh Synagogue Massacre. Counter Currents Publishing. October 29, 2018


Rubin, Dave (2 October 2015). "*Maajid Nawaz and Dave Rubin Discuss the Regressive Left and Political Correctness*". Rubin Report.


Wilson, Jason. October 15, 2018 *It’s OK to be white’ is not a joke, it’s careless politicians helping the far right*. The Guardian.