Integration in the European Union: Does Widening Make Deepening?

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Integration in the European Union: Does Widening Make Deepening?

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Abstract

Integration of the European Union over the years has continued to be debated, with many theories attempting to explain how the Union has consistently become ever closer. While many theories focus on the role of the individual member states or, on the other hand, the role of the Union’s institutions in driving forward integration, fewer consider the impact of widening, which entails adding more countries to the EU through enlargements. Since the first enlargement in 1973, the EU has grown from six members to its current twenty-eight. Meanwhile, it has transformed from a small community with specific economic purposes to a union of countries that work together in numerous sectors and delegate sovereignty to supranational institutions. I explore the potential connection between enlargement of the Union and deeper integration. While it can be difficult to pinpoint all instances where the addition of new countries led to further integration, my investigation highlights situations in which the relationship holds true. In response to challenges presented by the inclusion of new member states, the Union implements policy reforms or institutional changes. I reveal cases in which the accession of new members prompted institutional or policy changes, thus revealing that widening can act as a cause for deepening.
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I. Introduction

Since its inception, the European Union (EU) and its development have been widely discussed and debated among political scientists and EU scholars. This is largely due to the EU’s characteristic as a unique body in which member states willingly cede sovereignty to the European institutions. Originally concerned with economic integration, the EU has expanded its influence over time to govern policy areas formerly under sole control of national governments through the process of deepening. At the same time, through periods of enlargement, also known as widening, the EU has added more member states and the size of the EU has grown from the original six members to a current twenty-eight. The concepts of widening and deepening are crucial to the understanding of the EU, yet the relationship between the two concepts remains poorly understood. While widening entails the addition of new member states, resulting in the expansion of the Union, deepening is much more complex and difficult to identify and make sense of. I define deepening as the further integration of the EU through the transfer of power from national governments to the governing bodies of the EU. This results in the delegation of sovereignty from the member states to the EU, and the growth of supranational power. In contrast to the periodic inclusion of member states through widening, deepening occurs as a process that continues to develop over time.

Deepening in EU institutions, especially the Council, which represents the member-states, and the European Parliament, which represents the people, is commonly discussed in EU literature; however, debates exist as to what drives this deepening. Some scholars argue that deepening is a self-perpetuating process solely within the institutions themselves, while others suggest that outside factors drive deepening. Policy deepening also appears as a concept yet remains to be poorly defined and investigated. I define policy deepening as the creation of new
policies or the reform of existing policies that result in the expansion of EU power over the member states. So while institutional deepening is a process that occurs within the institutions themselves, policy deepening only occurs through policy creation or reform. Throughout this paper, I aim to highlight the existence of policy deepening and differentiate it from institutional deepening.

This project will seek to clarify how deepening is defined and the conditions under which it has occurred in the EU. I will also separate the concepts of institutional deepening and policy deepening to expand and clarify the understanding of continuous EU development. Furthermore, I investigate the hypothesis that widening has acted as a catalyst for deepening, largely due to disparities that existed between the existing member states and the newcomers. To better understand this relationship between widening and deepening, I study past enlargements, seeking to discover connected instances of integration. Then, I will analyze each occurrence, seeking to understand if it falls into the category of institutional deepening or policy deepening, competence, or none. I argue that characteristics of new member states necessitate deepening in order to ensure the efficient functioning of the Union and make it possible for the EU to achieve its goals. My investigation consists of a discussion of existing theories about EU integration, my own arguments about the causes of deepening and its variation, and the analysis of my findings. To clarify the scholarship on these topics, I pose the following research question: What is the relationship between widening and deepening in the European Union? Throughout this paper, I will use “widening” synonymously with “enlargement”, and “deepening” synonymously with “integration”. My investigation will consist of a discussion of existing theories about EU integration, highlighting the key arguments. Then, I will present my own arguments about the causes of deepening and its variation, focusing on the relationship between widening and
deepening as my basis. Finally, I will present and discuss my findings and the implications they hold.

II. History of the European Union

Since its beginnings in 1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Union (EU) has continuously evolved and grown, leading to its current status as a unique body with 28 member states. The ECSC’s six founding countries Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, West Germany, France, and Italy sought to unite European countries in order to produce peace following the catastrophe of the Second World War. The Treaty of Rome, which entered into force in 1958, further integrated the countries with the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (EurAtom) and the European Economic Community (EEC), which created a Common Market among member states. Following a period of economic growth in the 1960s, the first enlargement occurred in 1973 with the accession of the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, and Ireland to the Community. The addition of three more countries in the following decade brought membership to twelve countries, with Greece joining in 1981, and Portugal and Spain becoming members in 1986. A new treaty, the Single European Act (SEA) was also signed in 1986 and entered into force a year later, creating the Single Market, which organized the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital. money.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet-aligned regime in 1989 resulted in the reunification of Germany and a closer sense of neighborhood among Europeans. Two new treaties entered into force in the 1990’s – the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, also known as the Treaty on European Union, and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. The third enlargement of the Union also occurred in 1995, adding Finland, Austria, and Sweden. Nine years later, the fourth
enlargement resulted in the accession of 10 new member states, including eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), as well as Cyprus and Malta. The CEECs committed to democratization and liberalization following the downfall of Communist rule. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007 and the Lisbon treaty entered into force in 2009, further developing the EU’s bodies and powers. All in all, the EU grew in size fairly quickly and also transformed from the ECSC to a Union of countries linked together in almost all policy areas.

Throughout its history, not only has the EU grown in size by adding and integrating more members, but its institutional bodies have also evolved, playing a large role in the discussion on widening and deepening. While the EU is comprised of many bodies, each with their respective powers, the main institutions responsible for promoting the EU’s agenda and taking measures to advance it are the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament (EP). Acting as the EU’s executive branch, the Commission is supranational in nature, meaning that its power is largely independent and above that of the member states. The Commission is responsible for promoting the general interest of the EU “by proposing and enforcing legislation as well as by implementing policies” (EUROPA, 2018), and suggests the EU budget and allocation of funds. The Council acts as a counterpart to the Commission and is intergovernmental in nature, representing the governments of each member state in the legislative process. As one of the EU’s main decision-making bodies alongside the European Parliament, the Council negotiates, amends, and adopts laws, adopts the EU budget, and coordinates EU policies. Finally, the directly elected European Parliament, representing the people of the EU, acts in co-decision with the Council to pass laws and approve the budget. The EP is also responsible for deciding on international agreements and supervising the EU’s institutions. Although the EU is made up of many more bodies that contribute to the functioning
of the Union, the Commission, Council, and EP are the main decision-making bodies and have also played the largest roles in negotiating and implementing enlargements. Additionally, the power of these three institutions has continuously changed and grown throughout the evolution of the EU, showcasing instances of deepening. As a result of these characteristics, they are the most pertinent to this project.

III. Approaches to Integration

A. Existing Approaches

Integration in the European Union has concerned debates amongst EU scholars as the EU has undergone numerous periods of enlargement since its inception and has grown immensely since its beginnings as the ECSC. Though the scholarship on this topic is vast, our understanding of how and why European integration occurs is still debated. While the occurrence of deepening, increasing the power of the EU relative to national governments, is widely acknowledged, disagreement exists as to what drives deepening. Two major strands of integration theory exist, generally arguing that European integration is the result of either intergovernmental or supranational efforts. On the intergovernmental side, scholars argue that national governments, guided by their own preferences and self-interest, have been the main drivers of EU integration. In contrast, the supranational – or neo-functional – theory on integration emphasizes change driven by supranational institutions as well as the process of spillover where efforts to integrate in one area lead to required integration in a separate area. These intergovernmental/supranational theories align with the exogenous/endogenous aspects of integration. One camp argues that deepening is driven by exogenous factors that exist outside the
realm of the EU and influence change within the EU, while others argue that deepening occurs as an outcome of endogenous factors already present within the EU institutional framework.

National governments are influenced toward integration by changes outside the EU itself, such as the global economy. This means that, in practice, the intergovernmental and exogenous arguments are closely related. Meanwhile, supranational institutions are strictly within the scope of the EU, and therefore endogenous.

In “The Choice for Europe”, Moravscik (1998) focuses on the evolution of integration in Europe and the influence of national preferences and interdependence. Utilizing his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravscik’s central argument disputes the neo-functionalist view that the self-reinforcing consequences of integration have led to deepening over time. Instead, his argument falls into the intergovernmental camp, favoring the view that integration is a result of efforts by national executives motivated by their own self-interest. He argues that national leaders make choices in response to “constraints and opportunities stemming from economic interests, the relative power of each state, and the role that institutions have in supporting credible commitments (Moravscik, 1998, pp. 18). He proposes a three-step process that consists of 1) preference formation by national leaders, 2) interstate bargaining that stresses the influence of asymmetric interdependence, and 3) institutional choice based on credible commitments. First, Moravscik finds that commercial economic interests, especially producer groups, have been the most powerful influence driving national leaders toward integration (Moravscik, 1998, pp. 473). He finds that the demands made by national leaders were mainly economic in nature, but also qualifies that geopolitical interests, concerning potential threats to sovereignty or territory, played a secondary role. Moravscik argues that economic and geopolitical interests are linked
because security externalities arise as indirect consequences of economic integration (Moravscik, 1998, pp. 27).

Secondly, Moravscik focuses on the importance of interstate bargaining as the second stage of the liberal intergovernmental model of integration. Arguing against the popular view that supranational institutions retain crucial information independent from the individual member states, he says that they in fact fail to influence bargaining outcomes. As a result, intergovernmental bargaining theory explains European integration because states act of their own accord. Furthermore, Moravscik states that this bargaining occurred in an environment of asymmetric bargaining power, shown by “distributional outcomes [that] mirrored the relative bargaining power of governments” (Moravscik, 1998, pp. 482). In this context, the relative bargaining power of a member state is inversely proportional to the value it places on a policy or agreement (Moravscik, 1998, pp. 62) so that the more beneficial a certain outcome will be, the more a member state will be willing to compromise.

Moravscik describes the third and final step of this process as the pooling and delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions as a means of ensuring credible commitments. He finds that governments concede sovereignty in order to signal their own credibility, to raise the cost of non-cooperation, and to pre-commit “governments to greater compromise and thus more efficient decision-making” (Moravscik, 1998, pp. 488). Tsebelis and Garrett back up this argument, viewing the institutional structure of the EU as a dependent variable that changes through the process of treaty bargaining (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001, pp. 386), which is in turn shaped by the interests of member states. Both parties view the member states as in charge, and the institutions as tools disposable for their own interests. Overall, Moravscik provides an exogenous account of European integration, identifying the global economy, which acts outside
the framework of the EU, as the key factor that shapes national preferences and, therefore, the bargaining and cooperation process. The intergovernmental argument presented is logical and national preferences have likely highly influenced integration. Moravscik argues that the role supranational actors have played is insignificant. However, he focuses little on enlargements themselves, and my research will address this issue. Since both supranational institutions and enlargements exist and have been highly involved in the expansion of the EU, their potential influence must not be ignored.

Diverging from the intergovernmental perspective, neofunctionalism is touted by many scholars, including Rosamond (2000) and Pollack (1997), as the key theory on European integration. Unlike intergovernmental theory discussed by Moravscik, neofunctionalism presents an endogenous account of integration, where outside factors and motivations can prompt integration for mutual benefit, but the EU’s supranational institutions are the key drivers of deepening. Rosamond highlights the fact neofunctionalism also recognizes the self-interest of the state as a motivation for initial integration. However, neofunctionalism departs from other theories due to its emphasis on functional linkages and a supranational authority. First, he describes a mechanism where integration in one economic sector often leads to integration in many sectors because “the full advantage of integration will not be achieved unless cognate economic sectors are also drawn into the integrative web” (Rosamond, 2000, pp. 58). This idea, termed ‘spillover’, is a key neofunctionalist concept that emphasizes the self-reinforcing process of integration. Spillover demonstrates how functional linkages between countries are created when integration in one sector prompts further integration in another sector and so on, resulting in an interconnected web. As a result of these linkages, new interest organizations, especially for producer groups, tend to form at the regional level in order to adapt to integration. Additionally,
Rosamond identifies the designated authority, in this case the EU’s supranational institutions, as a driver of integration through its constant advocacy of the advantages of integration. He views “deeper economic integration…and the increased institutionalization of authority at the regional level” (Rosamond, 2000, pp. 58) as the primary goals of these institutions. Thus, he argues that the supranational institutions themselves are drivers of integration as well.

Farrell and Héritier also support the concept of spillover, positing that “institutional change occurs when ambiguities in higher order rules lead to the negotiation of informal rules” (Farrell & Héritier, 2005, pp. 286). They largely focus on the legislative procedure of co-decision between the Council and the European Parliament, and how bargaining and negotiation procedures lead to the development of informal institutions. This development is driven by the interpretation of formal rules, which are written rules of behavior subject to third-party dispute resolution (Farrell & Héritier, 2005, pp. 277). Later, informal rules may be formalized through treaty change. This argument utilizes the spillover theory because it showcases how completion of an agreed upon change requires a different change and so on. In this case, further institutional integration is prompted by existing institutional conditions which continue to evolve as member states bargain, necessitating the reform of previous rules.

Alongside Rosamond’s same view, Pollack (1998) finds that the EU’s supranational institutions have their own preferences and can act as drivers of integration. He finds that a key goal of the Commission is maximization of authority across different areas, such as social policy, competition policy, and external trade policy (Pollack, 1998, pp. 247). Pollack also suggests that the “Commission enjoys considerable autonomy and influence in its implementation of Community policies” (Pollack, 1998, pp. 248), but that its ability to act upon preferences varies greatly depending on issue-areas, the preferences of member states, available information,
alliances with transnational actors, and conflicting Court rulings. So, while intergovernmentalist theory holds that only member governments drive integration forward, others scholars support the idea that supranational institutions have their own preferences that can influence European integration.

The ideas of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz also fall into the supranational/endogenous group. Though they do not acknowledge themselves as neofunctionalists, their ideas are mostly similar in that they recognize the key role that supranational institutions play in European integration. According to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, supranational bodies do not merely respond to tasks delegated by the member states, but “work to enhance their own autonomy and influence” (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, pp. 25). As transnational expansion takes places and influences decision-making, supranational organizations promote integration and create rules to further facilitate the new transnational society (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, pp. 25). In this way, supranational institutions act of their own accord to pursue their interests of growing autonomy and promoting transnational development. The neofunctionalist view more closely aligns with theories on institutional deepening, highlighting the role that the EU itself has played in more closely integrating. However, it places little focus on if and how widening has shaped this process. My research will address this factor, taking into account the following theory presented by Downs.

Downs departs from the endogenous vs. exogenous theories, instead focusing on how the EU formed and has gone about increasing membership. In regard to European integration, Downs analyzes the EU as a multilateral organization and investigates its development, which he deems as having occurred through “sequential formation”. Differing from inclusive formation, which is a sort of “one-shot” development where invitation for membership is extended to all
possible candidates simultaneously, sequential formation admits “potential members sequentially over time based on their preferences for cooperation” (Downs, 1998, pp. 398). Downs further connects this idea to deepening by arguing that organizations that start out small and gradually grow will be able to deepen cooperation more than those that admit many members at the start (Downs, 1998, pp. 398). This is because more “liberal” states – those that favor cooperation – will be admitted before those that oppose integration, which are deemed “conservative”.

Though Downs qualifies that the later addition of conservative entrants can still threaten deeper cooperation, he proposes that, by the time the more conservative states are admitted, their impact on deepening will be minimal because they will have liberalized as the process has unfolded (Downs, 1998, pp. 404). In this process, multilateralism is a function of member state preference and attitudes toward or away from cooperation. Overall, Downs asserts that the implementation of sequential construction and the mitigation of “conservative” members that oppose integration have allowed the EU to become considerably deeper than if it had pursued a more aggressive membership strategy. In this way, Downs’ argument most closely aligns with my own concerning the relationship between widening and deepening, but he fails to include specific analysis of EU enlargements and their effects on deepening.

This discussion demonstrates the conflicting perspectives on European integration that exist in the literature. Most scholars fall into either the intergovernmental or supranational camps, arguing that integration has resulted from the preferences of national governments or the influence of institutions, respectively. Still others, such as Downs, focus on the process by which new member states were added to the EU and how integration was affected as a result. My research will seek to clarify the debate on European integration by digging deeper into the relationship between widening and deepening.
B. Widening and Deepening

To resolve the confusion present in the literature, my research will first seek to more clearly define deepening in the EU. The existing work on European integration often neglects to define exactly what European integration entails, leaving the terms vague and poorly understood. In order to discern how integration has transpired, the terms first have to be clearly fleshed out and defined. Second, I also aim to clarify the causal mechanisms of deepening and its potential relationship with widening, arguing that deepening is often a result of issues, specifically disparities, presented by enlargement. Expanding upon Downs’ theory of multilateral integration in which the sequential addition of member states has enabled closer integration over time, I present a theory relating the endogenous and exogenous aspects of integration.

I argue that each enlargement introduces new countries, and therefore issues and perspectives, to the European framework, and that deepening is a reaction to the disparities introduced by the newcomers. Exogenous logic is utilized because “certain developments create needs to which a system is required to respond” (Pierson, 1994, pp. 20). Because widening introduces new factors which I expect to influence deepening, it represents the X variable in this study, while deepening represents the Y variable. As a result of the addition of more members and their characteristics, I expect that the institutions of the EU must react to efficiently incorporate the new member states. This corresponds to an endogenous argument of integration because deepening would be guided by the institutions themselves. The addition of new countries, each with their own economic, political, and social situations, present an exogenous factor. A problem of integration arises because these differences would impede decision-making and the functioning of the Union. In some cases, if member states are able to make certain changes before accession through the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, the EU’s body of
common rights and laws, or other accession criteria, these issues can be avoided. In response, deepening occurs to ensure that all member states are acting cohesively. However, while most scholars present either endogenous or exogenous theories on European integration, the theory I present is relational, taking into account the relationship between the outsiders, the new member states, and the insiders, the existing member states and the supranational institutions. The theory rests upon regional disparities and how the interplay of the old and new member states results in European integration. In some cases, it may be difficult to discern if enlargement directly caused deepening. However, for the instances in which widening did influence deepening, evidence points to this connection.

Neither the supranational nor the intergovernmental theory accounts systematically for the influence that enlargements may have had. On a most basic level, some scholars recognize the intuitive thought that enlargement would impede the efficiency of decision making reasons, making reforms necessary. Van der Veen explains that the addition of new member states can make negotiations more difficult due to an increased number of parties participating, the decreased likelihood that preferences will overlap, and the presence of additional veto players (van der Veen, 2014, pp. 762). Accounting for these new factors introduced by enlargement, scholars argue that, in order to prevent “the decision-making paralysis that might result from enlargement…member states introduce institutional reforms in EU treaties that serve to deepen integration” (Kelemen, Menon, & Slapin, 2014, pp. 657). My investigation utilizes this same logic as a basis, but seeks to discover exactly how each individual enlargement has prompted deeper integration. Instead of making blanket statements that widening leads to deepening, I pinpoint what changes took place, and when and why these changes transpired. Furthermore, I
expand to include the potential for non-institutional occurrences of deepening, especially through policy.

In order to achieve this goal, it is first necessary to clarify the pertinent variables. In order for an episode to be considered deepening, growth of the power of supranational institutions relative to national governments must occur. As discussed previously, there is a large debate concerning how deepening has transpired within the EU, which this research will seek to clarify. Deepening is traditionally thought to occur exclusively on the institutional front through measures such as increasing the power of the European Parliament or expanding Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council. These classic examples are considered deepening because they give power to decision-making bodies whose rulings are then delegated to the member states. The EP acts separate from the member states, representing the citizens of the Union. The Council, meanwhile, is made up of members representing each member state government which gives it an intergovernmental quality. However, decisions made under QMV, a voting system utilized by the Council, in opposition to unanimity voting, can be seen as supranational because member states can be outvoted. A qualified majority vote requires the support of 55% of member states, representing at least 65% of the EU’s population.

Through this investigation, I will seek to clarify the concepts of ‘institutional deepening’ and ‘policy deepening’ and their potential relationship to widening. While both are a means of growing the power of the EU’s supranational institutions relative to the member states, the process through which each occurs differs. Institutional deepening involves changing the powers of an EU institution, usually giving it greater ability to act independently of the member states. Policy deepening, on the other hand, occurs through a policy creation or reform that gives more authority to the Union. However, in both types of deepening, I expect disparity to influence
change. This theory rests on the idea that the EU is constantly in pursuit of an “ever closer union”. In order to achieve prosperity, the EU seeks to act cohesively and efficiently. If a member state varies too much economically or politically from the rest of the Union, problems of integration and ability to function are created. Deepening through institutional reform or policy changes serves as a means to counteract these issues and ensure the efficiency of the Union. I will also consider Euroskepticism, skepticism or doubt about European integrations, as a factor of widening that could influence deepening. This would involve high skepticism by the populations of the incoming about becoming an EU member state. On the other hand, I will also take into account skepticism about enlargement present with the populations of EC member states. High skepticism would lead to more deepening so that the EU can maintain control of newcomers. To assess these factors, I present three hypotheses:

**H1:** The greater the political and/or economic disparity between the accession countries and existing member states, the more deepening will occur.

**H2:** The more Euroskeptic an accession country’s population is, the less deepening will occur.

**H3:** The more skeptical about enlargement the populations of existing member states are, the more deepening will occur.

Together, these hypotheses aim to investigate multiple aspects surrounding enlargements that could effect changes in EU integration in the areas of institutional or policy deepening. The first hypothesis explores the disparities that exist between the newcomers and the existing member state as cause for deepening. Political disparity is measured by political stability, specifically time since becoming a democracy. Older democracies are more similar to the founding member states, while newer democracies present greater differences. Economic
disparity is measured by GDP per capita compared to the existing member states. I base this hypothesis on the widely spoken about logic that deepening has occurred as a means to counterbalance differences and ensure efficient functioning. I predict that, in order to minimize dysfunction in decision-making and successfully integrate new member states, deepening will have to occur to ameliorate differences. This hypothesis focuses mainly on the economic sectors because prosperity, especially economically, has always remained a core goal of the Union, and, in order for this to successfully occur, the economies of incoming states need to be somewhat in line with the rest of the Union. The second and third hypotheses I propose are related and focus on Euroscepticism as a factor leading effecting deepening. Euroscepticism is the critique of or lack of confidence in European integration and has been widespread since the inception of the EU. Tied to the concept of sovereignty, these hypotheses are based on the idea that citizens skeptical of the EU and would be less in favor of integration. This would affect deepening because, if existing member-states are skeptical about the integration of new countries, they may try to enforce more deepening before accession in order to ensure efficiency after the full integration of the newcomers. On the other hand, if a non-member states’ population is skeptical about the EU, the country may be less inclined to forfeit sovereignty in some areas of governance and less deepening would occur.

IV. Research Design

Looking to answer the research question “What is the relationship between widening and deepening in the European Union?”, I conduct qualitative, case-study based research. In this project, widening represents the independent variable, and deepening acts as the dependent variable. I argue that these two variables have a positive relationship, such that widening causes
deepening, resulting in further integration of the EU primarily due to disparity between the existing and incoming member states. Using my hypotheses as a guide, I investigate the conditions surrounding each period of enlargement, and how deepening may or may not have occurred as result. I begin by investigating integration that occurred directly prior to, during, or after periods of enlargement and classifying it according to my previous definitions of deepening. In addition to the existing literature, I consult the negotiations that transpired between the Union and the applying countries, as well as the EU’s major founding treaties. Furthermore, I look at the countries involved in each enlargement, compare them to the existing member states, and consider their stances toward European integration over times.

In order to complete this research, my main sources include primary and secondary sources such as information and online records provided by EU websites, newspaper reports or journal articles from the relevant years. These sources include analysis of treaties surrounding each period of enlargement, documentation of negotiation procedures, and any other pertinent documents. In my investigation, I search for instances of deepening surrounding times of enlargement. Although institutional deepening is significant to the discussion on widening and deepening, and to EU integration in general, it will not be the primary focus of my research, mainly because it is widely spoken about and agreed upon in the literature. In regards to my second and third hypotheses concerning Euroscepticism, I utilize Eurobarometer data to study public opinion in the EU around periods of enlargement. I look at public opinion towards the EU during the years prior to enlargement, specifically the opinions of the member states towards enlargement and the opinions of the joining countries (if available). Aside from primary documents and data, I also utilize journal articles, books, and other scholarly sources to learn
about circumstances surrounding each period of enlargement and important characteristics of the acceding countries.

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<tr>
<td>EU Online Sources (Council, Commission, and EP websites; EUR-Lex)</td>
<td>Background info on widening, deepening, and surrounding events</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newspaper Articles</td>
<td>Secondary sources reporting on events at the times of enlargements</td>
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<td>EU Treaty Texts</td>
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<td>Eurobarometer data</td>
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Table 1

V. Evidence and Analysis

In an effort to clearly and logically present my findings, I plan to organize my analysis into four body chapters, each focusing on a specific period of enlargement and any integration that preceded or followed. This chronological approach will help to organize my research and more clearly demonstrate the connection between widening and deepening. Though each enlargement differs in the background of each country and changes that occurred as a result, there are some trends that run throughout each period of widening. Primarily, the expansion of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) instead of unanimity voting, and the increase of European Parliament (EP) power are examples of institutional reform that occur through treaty changes surrounding each enlargement. These are widely acknowledged as examples of deepening, but I will consider them specifically in connection to widening. I will also analyze other outcomes of each enlargement and specify if they can be considered deepening and, if so, what kind.
Expansion of QMV is imperative to the study of deepening of the EU because it involves a degree of forfeit of sovereignty by the member states. Though the Council, a key legislating body of the EU, is made up of representatives of each member state and, therefore, intergovernmental, QMV makes it so that member states must work together under the rules and guidance of the Union. Unlike unanimity voting, where every representative must vote in favor for the vote to pass, a vote taken under QMV requires 55% of member states, representing 65% of the EU’s population in order to pass. Under this condition, member states can be outvoted yet are still required to abide by EU legislation, thus giving more relative power to the EU and highlighting QMV as an example of institutional deepening. Through my research, I discover that QMV has expanded slowly over time and these changes are often related to instances of widening. Likewise, EP power has also grown steadily over time. Deepening especially through an increase in the EP’s role relative to the other institutions, especially the Council, the other legislative body. The key instance of EP deepening I focus on include increase of budgetary powers and growth of legislative role.

A. Northern Enlargement

The first enlargement of the European Union occurred in 1973 and resulted in the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. While joining the Community would benefit each of these countries economically, each one also had its individual motivations for applying, as well as issues in the accession process. At the time of accession in 1973, total GDP in Britain was 7% less than the EC average (Campos & Coricelli, 2015). GDP per capita, meanwhile, was $3,266 in the EC, and $3,426 in Britain, $2,427 in Ireland, and $6,199 in Denmark (World Bank, 2019). This data shows that Britain and the EC were economically similar, while Ireland was much poorer and Denmark much richer.
Britain especially suffered from slow economic growth throughout the 1960s and saw the EC as an opportunity to return to prosperity. Other motivations included the desire to shape the Community’s institutions and play a part in its overall success (Gilbert, 2012, pp. 71). After first applying for membership in 1961, Britain faced major problems during the negotiation process, especially in regards to trade with Commonwealth countries and its contribution to the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), leading to the rejection of its application. A worsening economy led to a second British application in 1967, at which point, GNP per capita in Britain had declined to three-quarters of the average for the six EC members, made Britain desperate to join on any terms (Gilbert, 2012, pp. 93). However, it again faced a turbulent negotiation process, especially surrounding budgetary issues. At this point, member state contributions to the CAP acted as the EEC’s main budget source. As a major importer of non-Community produce, it would have to pay a large portion of the budget while receiving little in return as a result of its small agricultural sector. Unwilling to reform the CAP to adjust to Britain’s requests, negotiations concluded when the EC agreed that the British contribution would start at 9% and rise to 19% over the course of 5 years.

In the case of Ireland and Denmark, on the other hand, agriculture played a large role in their economies, making it so that they had fewer issues with the CAP and accession negotiations were simpler. A key motivator for Danish accession was the EEC’s protectionist stance on agriculture, causing the Danish government to prop up farms, which worsened balance of payments in Denmark and inflated welfare costs (Gilbert, 2012, pp. 94). As a result of this situation, entering the EC made economic sense for the Danes. Ireland also stood to benefit from the CAP because it would introduce new markets from which its large agricultural sector would
benefit. Additionally, at the time of accession two-thirds of exports were going to Britain and joining the EC would allow Ireland to escape this economic dependency.

Surrounding the period of the Community’s first enlargement, key institutional change developed in the European Parliament in regards to budgetary power and members of the parliament representing each member state (MEPs). After the Treaty of Luxembourg, which came into force in 1971 and initially increased the budgetary powers of the Assembly, as the EP was then known, through the replacement of Member States’ contributions by “own resources” (European Parliament), the Treaty of Brussels, signed in 1975 and in force 1977, made greater strides toward increasing the EP’s budgetary powers. It gave Parliament the power to “reject the Community budget and to grant…approval to the Commission for its management of the budget” (Europarl, 2018). This reform represents institutional deepening due to the supranational nature of the EP and the expansion of power within the EC’s institutional framework that resulted. Numerous sources cite enlargement, especially the presence of Britain, as a key driver of this change. Sokolska ties the enlargement to parliamentary reforms, stating that “after the first round of enlargement there were calls for greater budgetary rigour” (Sokolska, 2019).

Reports of the time say that, following its accession, Britain “committed itself to strengthening the powers of the European Parliament” (O’Brien, 1973), and “lead moves to give the body more power and closer links” (Los Anegles Times, 1973). These sources show that Britain strongly supported an increase in EP budgetary power at least since the time of its accession, indicating that its encouragement may have been a key factor leading to the reform.

Shortly after, in June of 1979, the first elections of MEPs by universal suffrage instead of by national parliaments took place. Talks between the nine member states concerning the distribution of MEPs began as early as 1973, but final numbers were not agreed upon until 1976,
when it was decided that Britain, Italy, France, and Germany would each be allotted 81 MEPs, the Netherlands would receive 25, Belgium 24, Denmark 16, Ireland 15, and Luxembourg 6 (European Council, 1976). This increase more than doubled the number of total MEPs, rising from 198 prior to elections to a total of 410. Again, sources documenting the events report that the “British in particular…pressed hard for more real power (Pyle, 1973) and were “in favor of increasing parliamentary power: direct election instead of by national parliaments (Oka, 1973)”.

Britain’s key motivations in supporting the change stemmed from its desire to distribute MEPs more proportionally to member state population. News reports document that Scotland and Wales “insisted that they should have at least as many deputies of their own as the less populous countries of Ireland and Denmark” (Lewis, 1976) and “Britain has worked hard for the higher figure so that…Scotland and Wales will not suffer by comparison to smaller states” (Kumpa, 1976). However, deepening relevant to the EP can be found in Britain’s push to have MEPs elected through universal suffrage. While this change does not delegate more power to the supranational institutions, it moves power away from the national governments of the member states because they are no longer in charge of electing their own representatives. Instead, power is moved to the citizens of the EC, who, in a sense, represent the Unions. According to these sources, Britain not only successfully negotiated a high number of MEPs, but also favored MEP election by universal suffrage.

Aside from institutional reform, policy change surrounding the 1973 enlargement also occurred. Due to their suffering economies, all three countries struggled with poor regions that were plagued by economic degeneration, especially in the industrial sector. These weaker areas would exacerbate regional disparities within the EC once the three new members joined (Preston, 1995, pp. 454). Recognizing these imbalances, many sources name the creation of the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) at the Paris Summit in 1973 as a response. The Fund’s initial budget amounted to €1,300 million and was targeted at the correction of regional imbalances arising from predominance of agriculture, industrial change and structural unemployment (European Commission, 2015), and investments were focused on small enterprises, infrastructure, and agriculture. Since the ERDF falls under the EU’s Cohesion Policy, and all Cohesion Policy programs and coordinated by the Commission, allocation of ERDF resources is negotiated, approved, and controlled by the Commission, a supranational institution (European Commission: Programming and implementation). Regional, sub-regional, or non-state actors are only involved in the implementation stage of the program, making the ERDF a distributional policy (Heidbreder, 2005, pp. 39). These qualities designate the creation of the ERDF as an example of policy deepening because the Commission acts as the primary authority and has the power to delegate funds to the member states. Though the member states may apply for funding, they only retain some control over the implementation process. Furthermore, the creation of the ERDF can be tied to a larger goal of European prosperity starting with economic integration. The EEC realized structural and regional balances would have to be corrected, and the ERDF aimed to address this issue area (Gilbert, 2012, pp. 96). The introduction of three new countries with varying “major socio-economic disparities derived from the polarization between areas of concentration” (Grazi, 2012, pp. 5) would make the primary goal of the EC, economic integration, difficult to realize. The GDP per capita data also supports this evidence. Ireland, the least wealthy of the three newcomers, favored economic support. Though GDP per capita in Britain was similar to the EC, it requested additional funding to make up for its net contribution to the budget.
The new member states stood to benefit from the new policy, especially Britain, which was suffering from economic degeneration, and Ireland, which contained poor agricultural regions. Due to these factors, many sources cite Britain as a key driving force in the development of the ERDF, stating it called for an effective regional policy even before its official accession to the EC (Norton-Taylor, 1972). The CAP was the most contentious issue behind British accession, as Britain was reluctant to accept the large portion of the CAP budget that it would have to contribute, even though the population consisted of only a small number of farmers, meaning that Britain would receive a small part of CAP funding (Ruano, 2005, pp. 260). After unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate the CAP, the British were forced to accept the accession deal as it were, and received “a partial compensation after accession…with the introduction of the Social and Regional Fund(Ruano, 2005, pp. 261), which includes the ERDF, in 1975. Preston further expands on the relationship between the CAP and the ERDF, identifying the establishment of the ERDF as “a response to the UK budget problem” (Preston, 1995, pp. 454), and an attempt by the Community to “‘buy off’ the most difficult interests in the applicant state (Preston, 1995, pp. 454). In order to help Britain and the others adjust to the demands of the CAP, the EC agreed to the demands of the newcomers.

Sources at the time of enlargement and adoption of the new policy also tie the ERDF to the addition of the new member states, especially Britain and Ireland. Prior to accession, reports indicate that Britain, as well as Ireland and Norway, which was then a candidate for entry, “consistently spelled out the need for Community regional policy…which concentrates on declining regional areas” (Norton-Taylor, 1972). For Britain especially, creation of a regional policy would “improve its net budgetary balance and recover funds addressed to the Common Agricultural Policy” (Grazi, 2012, pp. 84) A year before their official accession, the three new
members were invited to the EEC’s Summit in Paris where “Ireland, Britain, and Italy had achieved an acceptable commitment [that]…a regional development fund is to be set up before December 31st next year, to be financed from then on from the Community budget” (Kennedy, 1972, pp. 1). Though the Fund would not come into effect until 1975, this evidence shows that two of the countries which would mainly benefit from it, Britain and Ireland, were its key champions” (Kemezis, 1975, pp. 5). Post-accession, Britain and Ireland continued to stand firm on their “demand for a substantial EEC Regional Development Fund” (Norton-Taylor, 1974). Britain in particular expressed concern for the overall size of the Fund, “as its contributions to the EEC budget were increased substantially between [1974] and the end of its transition period in 1978” (Norton-Taylor, 1974). These reports align with scholarly analysis’ that determine the creation of the ERDF was a direct outcome of the Northern enlargement and the subsequent demands by the incoming countries.

The parliamentary institutional changes described, as well as the creation of the ERDF in 1975, indicate instances of integration closely tied to the Northern enlargement in 1973. In the case of the EP’s increase in budgetary power, reports show that Britain in particular encouraged the change, as well as overall expansion of EP power. Furthermore, it argued for an increase of MEPs, direct elections, and more proportional representation, which were achieved in 1979. The budgetary power gained by the EP can be deemed institutional deepening because the power of a supranational institution is expanded. In the case of the MEPs, however, a change in numbers and distribution among member states does not constitute institutional deepening, the change to direct elections does because it takes power away from national governments. In regards to the ERDF, numerous publications of the time document Britain and Ireland’s strong push for the creation of a regional policy, even before their official accession. Scholars and secondary sources
attribute the ERDF’s creation in 1975 to these demands. The new member states struggled with CAP and budget related issues, and argued for regional funding as a way to support weak regions. This can be seen as an instance of policy deepening as a result of enlargement because the newcomers pushed for a change that would benefit them, but in actuality was coordinated and distributed by the EU’s supranational institutions. The presented evidence supports the hypothesis that disparity leads to deepening because change through the ERDF occurred in order to address the issues presented by the new member states.

No Eurobarometer data exists for the Northern enlargement is available because the surveys did not begin until 1974, after the enlargement had taken place.

**B. Southern Enlargement**

The second instance of widening took place in the 1980s with the accession of Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal following in 1986. Similar to the first enlargement, regions in Greece, Spain, and Portugal also struggled from weak economies, with an underdeveloped industrial sector and poor agricultural regions. The average GDP of Greece, Spain, and Portugal in 1980 amounted to about 14% of the EC-9 at the time and GDP per capita stood at 66% (Mira, 2001, pp. 2). In addition, GDP per capita of Spain, Greece, and Portugal in 1986 amounted to $6,495, $5,656, and $3,862 respectively, compared to the EC’s average $9,183 (World Bank, 2019). These values show that the EC countries were significantly richer than the Southern newcomers. However, unlike the three countries of the Northern enlargement, the Mediterranean countries had also been struggling politically. While Portugal completed its democratic transition just before applying for membership in 1977, Greece’s military dictatorship crumbled in 1974, just a year before its application in June of 1975. Likewise, Spain applied for membership in 1977, but continued to suffer political instability throughout the course of the negotiation
process. Greece, the first to enter, looked to the institutional framework of the EC to provide political stability, and to the Community’s growing economy to contribute to the development and modernization of Greece’s own economy (Hellenic Republic, 2018). Compared to Greece’s 6-year accession period, Spanish and Portuguese accession negotiations lasted nearly ten years due to the fear that produce surpluses would result when the countries’ large agricultural sectors joined the EC economy.

Following the accession of the Mediterranean countries, the Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1986, introduced institutional reforms and new policy areas. Firstly, perhaps the most significant institutional change was the expansion of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council. Before the reform, “major policy initiatives…required a unanimous vote by the EEC members, thus slowing the decision-making process and watering down final policies” (OxResearch, 1986). Under the SEA, voting procedure for all matters regarding the establishment of the single market “with the exception of measures concerning taxation, the free movement of persons and the rights and interests of employed persons” (EUR-Lex, 2018), would now take place under QMV instead of the former unanimity voting. Sources including scholars, EU resources, and secondary reports indicate that the key motivation for this change was the desire to “enable the creation of the Single Market by 1993” (EUR-Lex, 2018) and that “the EEC's attempts at harmonisation have been held up by the practice of seeking unanimity among all the member governments” (OxResearch, 1986). By the mid-eighties, member states expressed “frustration at the old consensus-based system” (Widgrén, 1994, pp. 1156), which was increasingly causing decision-making delays. Looking forward, the community would struggle even more once Spain and Portugal became members (The Economist, 1984, pp. 83). By implementing more QMV, the EC would be able to avoid the “frequent delays inherent to the
search for a unanimous agreement among the then 12 member countries” (EUR-Lex, 2018). This shows the Union’s commitment to continue economic integration, and the desire to prevent voting blockages that are increasingly likely to occur with the presence of more member states. The entrance of more member-states that would impede decision-making, and therefore the Union’s goals, motivated the QMV reform.

Increasing QMV use qualifies as an example of institutional deepening because it means that one country can no longer prevent a decision from passing through a national veto. The result is a loss of sovereignty and greater power delegated to the institutions of the EU. The expansion of QMV is commonly cited as a result of the desire to prevent voting blockages through the history of the EU and evidence suggests that, in the case of the 1986 change, the reform was spurred by the accession of three new member states. The prospect of the accession of Spain and Portugal in the mid-1980s enhanced the pressure on existing member states to make provision for greater use of QMV in the Single European Act (Kelemen et al., 2014, pp. 657) in order to ensure that voting would continue efficiently. Though the structural funds and the ERDF had been previously agreed upon, the SEA marked the first time that structural and cohesion policy were introduced into the treaties. This change constitutes an example of policy deepening because the EU is adding new issue areas to the agenda and receiving wider authority.

Key institutional changes that can be considered institutional deepening also occurred by the expansion of the European Parliament’s power. Article 6 of the SEA allowed for cooperation procedure between the Council and the Parliament, increasing the EP’s legislative powers from powers of consultation to cooperation. This gave the EP the possibility for two readings of draft laws after the Council has given its position in which it can approve, amend, or reject the proposal (Scott, 1986). Though incremental, this change was a step “paving the way towards
Parliament’s future role as co-legislator with the Council” (EUR-Lex, 2018). Furthermore, parliamentary assent was now required for the conclusion of enlargement and association agreements. These changes constitute institutional deepening because the role of the EP was further expanded to include greater powers of legislation in conjunction with the Council, and powers of assent for certain agreements. Thus, a supranational EU institution gained more power over decisions that would affect all member states. However, while “the leaders agreed to give a modest boost to the parliament’s consultative role” (Maass, 1985), there is no evidence to suggest that this instance of integration occurred as a result of enlargement. Both of these changes fall in to the category of institutional deepening because they strengthen the supranational decision making powers of the Union, but were not necessarily connected to enlargement.

Aside from institutional changes, the period following Mediterranean enlargement also brought about changes to regional and cohesion policy. Though each country posed issues, Spain and Portugal are regarded as the most difficult to integrate mostly due to their lower levels of industrialization “as well as low productivity per worker in the agricultural sector” (Botsas, 1996, pp. 40). Like the Northern enlargement, this was worsened by the CAP, which did little to benefit the products coming from these countries. At the time of accession, per capita incomes of Spain and Portugal amounted to about a half and a quarter respectively compared with the rest of the EEC (Brown, 1985). The situation would be worsened by “the relative bias of the CAP against southern agricultural products which was…expected to accentuate these problems” (Tsoukalis, 1991, pp 215). Recognizing these differences, both of the newcomers had a stake in promoting changes for the alleviation of regional poverty (Brown, 1985, pp. 4) through the implementation of structural funds.
Primarily, the SEA included the ERDF in treaty text for the first time, stating that the fund is “intended to help redress the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions” (SEA, 1987, Art. 130C). More generally, the treaty makes reference to the structural funds and their purpose to support the “objective of economic coordination and overall harmonious development” (SEA, 1987, Art. 130a-130b). These articles reference the EC’s recognition that, in order to achieve its greater goal of full economic integration, economic and regional disparities between member states had to be corrected. In pursuit of this goal, aspects of regional policy including the ERDF and structural funds were expanded in response to “the larger problem of economic growth” (Behrens & Smyrl, 1999, pp. 422) faced by these Southern regions. In order to help these issues and more closely align the economics of the newcomers with that of the EC, resources for regions lagging behind would be doubled between 1987 and 1992 (European Commission Press Release, 2018). Unlike the Northern enlargement, records fail to show that the new member states pushed for funding. Instead, the evidence suggests that changes occurred because the EC recognized that regional disparities would make economic integration more difficult.

In addition to the expansion of the structural funds and the ERDF, the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, which were agreed upon in 1985 and committed 1.6 billion ECU under a specific budget towards the development of Greek, Italian, and French regions in order to prevent worsening of regional imbalance that would result from the accession of Spain and Portugal (European Commission Press Release, 2018). Similar to the ERDF, the IMPs are part of the EC’s structural funds and are a distributive policy, making their creation an example of policy deepening. The major issue of the Spanish and Portuguese enlargement arose due to
Greece’s persistent demands for greater development assistance, where it threatened to veto the accession of the two newcomers, making “its ‘yes’ to enlargement conditional upon the institution of “integrated Mediterranean programs” (Gilbert, 2012, pp. 129). As a means to buy off the hostility toward Spanish accession, the Commission agreed to provide funding “to help modernise the rural economies of southern Europe” (The Economist, 1984, pp. 62). The Greek government, led by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, was chiefly concerned that Spanish and Portuguese agricultural imports would threaten Greece’s fragile industry and small-scale farming community on which it relied (Tonge, 1982), leading it to demand the funds as financial aid to cushion Greece against the competition (Seattle Times, 1985). At the conclusion of EC’s 1982 summit, “the government leaders approved a $2.87 billion, seven-year aid package to help Greece, Italy and France cope with the problems of Spanish and Portuguese entry” (Seattle Times, 1985). While the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes that resulted also benefitted France and Italy, who would also suffer agriculturally from Spanish and Portuguese entry, Greece acted as the key driver.

To sum up, some of the changes discussed are evidently linked with the Southern enlargement while others are less clear. The expansion of QMV in the Council to cover areas previously under unanimity voting is tied to the accession of the three southern countries mainly as a desire by the EC to speed up voting in order to complete its goal of economic integration. Meanwhile, deepening clearly occurs through the expansion of the EP’s legislative powers, but no evidence suggests that this occurred as a result of Southern expansion. On the other hand, the expansion of the structural funds and the creation of the IMPs came as a result of enlargement, which supports my first hypothesis. Recognizing the increased regional disparities introduced with the accession of the three poor Mediterranean countries, and expansion of the structural
funds was implemented to correct these imbalances. In the case of the IMPs, the program was created in response to Greece’s demand for more funding and threats that it would veto Spanish and Portuguese accession if the EC did not comply.

Eurobarometer results:

Figure 1

Eurbarometer survey data shows the attitudes from citizens in EC member states about the enlargement of the EC to include Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Polls were taken in 1977, four years prior to Greek accession and 9 years prior to Spanish and Portuguese accession. Spain received the most support at 39%, with Greece and Spain close behind at 32% and 33% respectively. A large proportion of voters also indicated that accession would be neither a good thing or a bad thing or that they were unsure. This data shows ambivalence toward accession of the newcomers, with only 40%-60% of voters expressing an explicit opinion on membership, and the rest stating their lack of opinion or insufficient knowledge.
In a different survey in 1980, citizens of EC countries and Greek citizens were asked if Greek accession would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither. While about the same percentage of people responded that it would be either a good thing or neither good nor bad, more Greek citizens than EC voters think membership would be a bad thing by 10%. This survey shows uncertainty on both sides of the accession, amongst the Greeks and the EC citizens.

Both sets of data show that at least 30% of voters favored the accession of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. However, at least another cumulative 30% responded that membership would be neither good nor bad, or were unsure of their opinion. On the newcomers side, poor views on membership could have been due to the financial situation and skepticism that EC membership would help, especially in the case of Greece. On the EC side, uncertainty likely existed because of lack of knowledge on the situation. Overall, the data shows that neither the newcomers nor EC citizens were steadfastly against enlargement, though some skepticism did exist. While no serious opposition to enlargement resulted, skepticism would align with some concessions to appease citizens and national governments such as the IMPs.
C. 1995 Enlargement

Also termed the “EFTA” enlargement, 1995 saw the entry of three more countries to the Union, bringing the membership total to 15 with the addition of Austria, Sweden, and Finland. Though wealthier than the countries of the Northern and Southern enlargement, the application of Austria, Sweden, and Finland was still largely motivated by economics. With the completion of the Single Market in 1992, these countries felt marginalized from Europe economically. Despite the attempt to construct a European Economic Area (EEA), which would allow for some access to the Single Market, they still felt isolated and instead opted to apply for full membership. Furthermore, the applicant countries wanted to take part in the shaping and construction of the growing union. On the EC side, the accession of these three newcomers was favorable to the Community. Unlike previous enlargements, which posed issues of political instability, economic weakness and disparity, or both, Austria, Sweden, and Finland were more similar to the original members of the Community. With stable economies, the three were all economically advanced enough to fit in with the existing member states (Pederson, 1994), and, furthermore, would be net contributors to the budget. The Commission felt that the newcomers, especially Austria, would widen the group of countries that would speed up economic and monetary union through their relatively high performance (Luxton, 1994, pp. 307). At the time of accession in 1995, GDP per capita in the three joining countries was $30,325 in Austria, $29,914 in Sweden, and $26,273 in Finland (World Bank, 2019). In comparison to the EU’s GDP per capita at $19,860 (World Bank, 2019), and the countries of the Northern and Southern enlargements, the newcomers exhibited strong and stable economies. Small countries, such as Ireland were in favor of the inclusion of Austria and the two Nordic countries, mainly because negotiations would begin in “1996 on reforming the EU’s decision-making and security structures in which the
larger states will be seeing a framework more favourable to their own interests” (Irish Times, 1994, pp. 17). The inclusion of three relatively smaller countries would boost the representation of small countries relative to larger member states.

Around the period of the third enlargement, changes to the Union’s structure were made under the Maastricht Treaty which came into force in 1993. The Maastricht Treaty, also termed the Treaty on European Union, officially established the European Union and sought to further strengthen expand the economic goals set forward by the SEA. Key changes included the foundations for the single currency, the establishment of European citizenship, expansion of EP power through co-decision procedure, and discussion of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). It also called for greater cooperation in other policy areas, such as research and development, the environment, and police matters. While negotiations for Austrian, Finnish, and Swedish accession occurred around the same time as Maastricht discussions, reports indicate that the newcomers had little effect on the content of the treaty. They agreed to accept the treaty, “including the provisions for a single currency; common foreign and defense policies; European citizenship; and increased cooperation on judicial, immigration and police matters” (Business Insights, 1993) as part of the accession requirements.

Reports over the negotiation and accession processes express that the applicant countries had certain concerns over accession to the EU, but, aside from a few concessions made concerning areas sensitive to each country, evidence describing any explicit demands or outcomes is lacking. As a result of their existing stability, the Nordic countries were in a much more flexible position, as they were not reliant on membership “in order to tie their fragile economies and newly established democracies to a strong Western anchor” (Friis, 1998, pp. 95), such as the Southern countries previously discussed or the Eastern countries that were soon to come. As a result, this
made it so that they were in a better position to negotiate and make concessions, and integration was possible without any necessary institutional changes (Pederson, 1994). Though the newcomers still had to accept the *acquis communautaire*, the Community’s binding rights and obligations, in whole, some concessions were able to be made at the time of enlargement. A key issue for Austria concerned the right of EC trucks to use the Austrian alpine roads on routes to Greece and Eastern Europe (Business Europe, 1993). Austria demanded a 12% reduction in truck emissions over twelve years, and this agreement was successfully reached. Meanwhile the “Nordic countries were allowed to support their so-called Arctic agriculture and to receive structural funds for regions with populations less than eight inhabitants per square kilometer” (Friis, 1998, pp. 94). Neither of these changes grew EU power and therefore do not constitute deepening. The 1995 enlargement of the Union differed from the rest, primarily because the newcomers were economically and politically similar to the existing member states prior to enlargement. As a result, accession to the EU occurred easily, and less adjustments to make the integration process easier were necessary. Because of the lack of institutional reforms or new policies, no evidence suggests that deepening occurred in response to the 1995 enlargement.

Eurobarometer data:
Survey data from 1992 and 1994 in Figure 3 shows strong support by the population of the EC for the accessions of all three entrants before enlargement in 1995. The results support my hypothesis because support for accession was high and little to no deepening occurred surrounding the enlargement. Little data concerning the 1995 enlargement exists. Almost all enlargement data between the late 1980s and the early 1990s instead focused on the situation unfolding in Central and Eastern Europe. This lack of data could be because there was little debate over the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden so the enlargement was not a focus of Eurobarometer surveys, because the issue of the CEECs was more contentious and therefore more of a focus, or for a different reason. Due to the scarce data, it cannot be determined how much of an effect public opinion had on accession; however, because support is high, it can be extrapolated that there was little impact.

D. Eastern Enlargement

Following the collapse of Communism in 1989, Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) formerly under Soviet control sought to westernize and become EU member states. After a long negotiation period between the EU and the applying countries, 10 countries became
EU members in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007, and Croatia in 2013, bringing the EU to its current 28 members. The Eastern enlargement posed possibly the greatest integration challenge primarily because, following their liberation from the Soviet Union, these countries were undergoing a dual transition to a democratic state and a liberal economy.

Compared to the EU’s GDP per capita in the year 2000 at $18,243, the GDP per capita in three of the acceding countries, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, was $4,633, $4,492, and $1,668, respectively (World Bank, 2019). This shows the extreme economic disparity between the potential new member states and the existing member states. Due to this transition, CEECs were in many ways least similar to the existing member states compared with previous enlargements.

In efforts to groom the applying countries for membership and ensure a smooth transition, changes occurred through treaty change, institutional reform, and policy implementation. Furthermore, most scholars recognize the desire of the EU to pursue eastern enlargement as a tactic to ensure stability in its own neighborhood and to guide the CEEC’s toward liberal democracy (Schimmelfennig, 2005, pp. 142).

The first key change that many sources cite as a direct result of the anticipation of enlargement is an addition to the accession process with the creation of the Copenhagen Criteria. Unlike in other enlargements, the EU employed a ‘pre-accession strategy’ with the goal to begin integration before full membership. Originally, the EU required that new members must totally accept the acquis communautaire, which dictates common rights and obligations binding on all member states (European Commission, 2016), before being admitted. It includes the objectives and principles of the Treaties, adopted legislation, declarations, resolutions, and international agreements. In 1993, the Copenhagen Criteria were established in addition to the existing
requirements to ensure that these countries could fit in politically and economically with the existing member states and the standards of the EU in general. The significance of the Copenhagen declaration regarding EU policy towards Eastern expansion is emphasized as “the key expression of the EU’s commitment to Eastern enlargement” (Sedelmeier, 2005, pp. 133). In contrast to previous accession processes, the new approach was a longer adaptation period prior to accession instead of quick adhesion to Unions rules to ensure necessary reform.

The Copenhagen Criteria created three core rules for accession – the new member states must accept the acquis communautaire in full, must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, and must have a functioning market economy (European Commission, 2016). The framework also established new policy instruments in the key issue areas of administrative capacity, cross-border cooperation, minority protection, nuclear safety, anti-corruption. Though the member states did not initially aim to address these policy areas, they “felt the strong need to react to perceived problems in the candidate states” (Heidbreder, 2014, pp. 751). The Commission directed these issue areas through monitoring and assistance. More direct involvement in the adaptation and accession process “equipped the Commission with decisively wider authority over the candidate states than it possessed under the regular acquis communautaire” (Heidbreder, 2014, pp. 750), expanding its control over the newcomers even before their official status as member states. The creation of the Copenhagen Criteria represents a key reform in connection to the Eastern enlargement, but whether the change qualifies as deepening is unclear. The new framework constituted an expansion of supranational power over soon-to-be member states through policy creation, which aligns with the previous definition of policy deepening. However, the Criteria act as a tool of accession and is no longer necessarily in play post-accession.
As discussed, these criteria were especially aimed at the CEECs because they were undergoing drastic changes and needed to be able to conform politically and economically to EU norms. Primary and secondary sources do corroborate that the Copenhagen Criteria were created as a reaction to the impending application and membership of the CEECs to the Union. The official document, published by the Council in 1993, specifies that the Criteria are aimed at CEECs, stating that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe…that so desire shall become members of the European Union…as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership” (European Council, 1993, pp. 13). The Union also highlighted that its primary goal of creating the Criteria was to ensure “the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration” (European Council, 1993, pp. 13). These statements clarify the Union’s positive attitude towards the newcomers, but weariness on its ability to efficiently include them, leading to the Copenhagen Criteria as a response. Other reports of the time confirm this connection, highlighting that the Copenhagen summit was the first time that the principle of membership was explicitly agreed upon (OxResearch, 1993), and mentioning the Criteria and a signal of the Union’s commitment to open doors to the former Communist states (Webster, 1993). Thus, the creation of the Copenhagen Criteria as a pre-accession strategy for the CEECs is a clear example of a policy that was prompted by the prospect of enlargement.

In addition, smaller, more targeted pre-accession programs were established in attempts to organize the CEECs prior to enlargement. The most well-known of these is the PHARE program, which was set in motion in 1989. Originally created as “Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies”, the program later expanded to include other countries. Programs like the PHARE are similar to the Copenhagen Criteria because they aim to address differences
between the existing member states and newcomers in order to make the transition smoother. However, the PHARE and related programs and more specialized, designed to target specific areas that need adjustments. Launched as a specific EC program by the Council, its core purpose was to implement measures that would strengthen areas of public finance, agriculture, the environment, and privatization (Bailey & Propis, 2004, p. 79). Reports of the time indicate the Community pledged a total £230 million to both countries and that funds would be primarily directed to vocational training and the development of agricultural infrastructure” (Flynn, 1989, pp.6). While focus on agriculture would help Poland and Hungary address food shortages and boost their economies, professional training aimed to help managers adjust to the demands of a market economy (Irish Times, 1989, pp. 6). Though early efforts focused primarily on institutional reform and critical aid, the scope of the program widened as the transition process progressed (European Parliament, 1998). It planned to accomplish these goals through strategies such as “twinning”, which matched civil servants from member states and from CEECs together for the purpose of knowledge transfer, the EU aimed to familiarize the applying countries with the procedures and practices of the EU. The program was organized and implemented by the supranational institutions of the Union, with the budget established by the EP and the Council, and managed by the Commission (European Parliament, 1998). The PHARE can be seen as an effort led by the EU to minimize issues that would arise during integration beforehand.

In addition to harmonization strategies such as the Copenhagen Criteria and aid programs, treaty changes occurred in anticipation and of and reaction to enlargement throughout the next two decades. These treaties include the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) in 1993, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the Treaty of Nice in 2003, and finally the Treaty of Lisbon in
2009. Because each of these is so comprehensive, I will focus on key reforms that further integrated the Union.

The first of these successive treaties, the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), is commonly discussed as a treaty that implemented reforms to prepare for future changes that would be required with the inclusion of the CEECs that were beginning to turn toward Europe. The treaty can be seen as a preemptive device whereby the EU sought to ‘deepen before it widened, compelling later members to accept the new changes as part of the acquis communautaire” (Croft et al., 1999, pp. 27). Key institutional changes included the expansion of parliamentary power, introducing co-decision procedure, which puts the Parliament on equal footing with Council so that they jointly adopt legislation. Article 189(b) of the Treaty allows the EP to veto, delay, or derail legislation. Though it would later be expanded, under Maastricht, co-decision applied mainly to legislation concerning the internal market, as well as education, health, and environmental programs. Commentators of the Maastricht treaty have deemed the EP as the greatest beneficiary of the institutional changes that took place – EP transformed into the first legislative chamber with the Council as a secondary chamber obliged to act from time to time (Wessels et al., pp. 36).

Maastricht also made changes to the Council’s use of QMV, expanding it to cover most environmental legislation, labor laws, and public health. Lastly, the Maastricht Treaty also introduced a number of new policy areas to the agenda, including a large focus on social policy and introduction of cooperation in justice and home affairs. Article 123 established the European Social Fund, aimed to “render the employment of workers easier and to increase their geographical and occupational mobility…to facilitate their adaptation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems through vocational training and retraining” (Maastricht, 1992, art. 123). Titles V and VI of the Treaty set objectives and defined areas of cooperation for
foreign policy (CFSP) and justice and home affairs (JHA). Maastricht also called for cooperation in EU transportation, aid to developing countries, industrial policy, and energy. Through these changes, the EU gained more authority over policy areas that apply to all member states.

Six years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam followed up on the changes made by Maastricht. On the institutional front, it expanded co-decision between the Council and the EP to cover most policy areas. Amsterdam also made great strides towards the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), allowing for “common strategies, joint actions, common positions, and more systematic cooperation between EU countries”. Because the focus was on cooperation and no direct requirements were established, this change does not constitute an instance of deepening. However, in Articles 73i-k, policies concerning visas, asylum, immigration, and free movement of persons became part of EU decision-making instead of intergovernmental cooperation. This change does qualify as policy deepening because the EU gained authority over a policy area previously governed by each member state, growing its relative power.

Following the Amsterdam Treaty, the Treaty of Nice, entered into force in 2003, and primarily amended the institutional structure of the EU “to withstand the challenges of the new enlargement” (European Parliament). Again, the treaty saw an expansion of the EP’s powers through “broadening of the scope of the co-decision procedure and by requiring Parliament’s assent for the establishment of enhanced cooperation in areas covered by co-decision” (Sokolska, 2018). The EP was also granted the power to challenge the other institutions on the grounds of infringement of EU treaties, laws, or regulations, or misuse of powers. These changes further grew the EP’s powers, giving it teeth within the institutional framework of the EU. In the Council, use of QMV was extended to 27 more policy areas, and the weight of votes was
changed to give larger states more power in anticipation of the entrance of 10 relatively smaller states. Previously, votes were allocated on the basis of population and weighted in favor of less populated states. However with the entrance of many small states, voting power would swing in their favor so that member states representing a small portion of the Union’s population could block a vote. Under the new procedure laid out in Article 3 of “The Protocols”, the larger member states now have 60% of the votes, compared to the previous 55% (Nice, 2001, 80/49).

Additionally, in order for a qualified majority to be obtained, a decision must receive a specified number of votes and be approved by a majority of the member states. Expansion of QMV to cover more policies and extension of parliamentary co-decision constitute expansion of supranational power, and, therefore, institutional deepening. The redistribution of voting weights in the Council, whole an institutional reform, did not result in deeper integration.

Following enlargement, the Treaty of Lisbon, also known as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), aimed to reassess the EU’s goals and clarify its powers. In regards to major changes, the EP’s legislative powers were once again increased in Article 294 of the TFEU. Previously named the co-decision procedure, the new Ordinary Legislative Procedure was applied to more than 40 new areas, totaling 73. The EP also retained its powers of consultation and assent, now termed ‘consent’. In addition, the EP and the Council are now equally responsible for approving the budget. Once again, a strengthening of the EP’s relative power can be seen. The Lisbon Treaty also called for solidarity between member states in times of crisis, and notably made the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding on member states. Article 2 of the Lisbon treaty identifies the key values of the EU as “human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (Lisbon Treaty, 2007, Art. 1a). Likewise, the Copenhagen Criteria
introduced stable democracy as one of the required conditions for entry. These two related requirements had previously never been legally enforced,

In general, all four of these treaties surrounding this fourth period of enlargement acted to respond to the accession of 12 countries to the Union, while simultaneously expanding the Union’s powers. Institutional deepening is present in all treaties through the expansion of QMV, giving more power to the EP, or both. However, because the enlargement is so expansive and so many changes were made in a short period of time, individual changes that qualify as deepening, especially in regards to policy, are difficult to pinpoint. The Copenhagen Criteria and the new requirements they introduced were a direct response to widening.

Eurobarometer data:

Figure 4 shows the results of a survey taken in 1990, which asked the EC member states if and when three Eastern European countries – Czechoslovakia (soon to be Czech Republic), Hungary, and Poland – should become full EC member states. Hungary and Poland received the strongest support for immediate membership, at 51% and 55%, respectively, and only 25% of
voters in favor of Czechoslovakia joining immediately. For each country, only 2% of voters never wanted the countries to become members, and a small percentage voted that they should be admitted in 10 years, or in the year 2000.

A similar question, asked in surveys between 1989 and 2003, asked if EC member state citizens supported the accession of CEECs in general. While support was initially high at 74% in 1989 right after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, it dropped throughout the next ten years, reaching a low of 42% in 1999 before increasing slightly before enlargement in 2001 and 2003. However, support remained relatively strong, at above 40% throughout the years shown. Connection to deepening in this case is more difficult to discern, as the EU implemented
major changes prior to enlargement itself through the Copenhagen Criteria.

![EC ATTITUDE TOWARD FULL MEMBERSHIP](image)

**Figure 6**

Surveys also asked support for membership of individual countries that appeared to be possible future member states. Similar to the previous survey, support for all countries was high in 1994, with at least 72% of citizens supporting accession for each country. Between 1996 and 2002, however, accession was less favorable across all states, typically ranging between 30% and 50%. Between the 11 countries, Poland and Hungary consistently received the greatest support, with the Czech Republic close behind. The countries that typically received the lowest support are Romania and Slovenia. The data shows that EU citizens were split in their opinion towards Eastern membership, and skepticism varied country to country.

Results of the polls show that support for CEEC entry by EU citizens varied country to country but was typically moderate, meaning that skepticism was still largely present. The implementation of the pre-accession criteria such as the Copenhagen framework or individualized programs can be considered as aligning with my hypothesis that skepticism would lead to more EU control. Especially in the case of the CEECs, who varied greatly from the
original EC members both economically and politically, high skepticism about the prospect of enlargement makes sense. Overall, the data tells us that public opinion was likely not a factor in admitting the CEECs because skepticism remained high, but, with the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria and other measures, the countries were still admitted.

E. Discussion of Findings

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Dependent Variable (deepening)</th>
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<td>Southern Enlargement</td>
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Table 2

Across all enlargements, forms of integration occurred before, during, and/or after the accession of new member states. While various forms of integration appeared, I have focused on either policies or institutional changes that stand out as key changes. The Northern and Southern enlargements were significantly characterized by a focus on structural and cohesion funds in order to correct economic regional imbalances. Specifically, the ERDF in the Northern and the
IMPs in the Southern were created as direct outcomes of each of these enlargements, pushed for by acceding countries. The distributive characteristic of each of these funding programs and the fact that they are controlled by EC supranational institutions qualify them as policy deepening. Furthermore, the distributive aspect of these policies relate to my first hypothesis because distribution is based upon disparity. Though they were pushed for by member states, they were primarily decided on by the Community for its own long-term economic motivations. Similarly, the expansion of structural funds like the ERDF in the Maastricht Treaty during the Eastern Enlargement was also directed at the correction of regional imbalances; however, it differs in that it was not necessarily demanded by the entering countries, but led by the EU institutions themselves. As a result of these factors, each of these changes in funding for regional development signifies integration as a result of widening of the EC.

The creation of policies to address certain issue areas also appeared in the Eastern enlargement through the creation of the Copenhagen Criteria and development programs like the PHARE. These programs were implemented by the Union’s institutions, chiefly the Commission, as a means to direct the modernization of institutions and prepare them for membership. Since they were implemented before enlargement, they do not necessarily constitute integration of the Union itself. However, some changes that introduced new requirements for member states, such as democracy and attention to human rights, can be seen as policy deepening because the EU gained more authority over member states.

In addition to policy changes aimed at correcting troubled economies, a large proportion of evidence of deepening concerned the reform of EC institutions, specifically the Council and the European Parliament. Expansion of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to replace unanimity voting in the Council trends throughout the EC treaties, continually growing over time and after
each enlargement. Integration through QMV reform constitutes institutional deepening because countries lose the ability to veto any action they oppose, and, consequently, must abide by the majority vote. This process thus delegates more power to the supranational nature of the Council, growing the power of the EU relative to the power retained by the member states. While it is impossible to know if this change would have occurred had enlargements not taken place, scholars and sources suggest that reforms of the Council’s voting procedure directly correlate to widening. Evidence also suggests that, while the newcomers associated with each instance of change did not push for the reform themselves, expansion of QMV did come as a result of widening because the EC sought to ensure the efficiency of decision-making and prevent any voting blockages that may occur with the addition of more members.

A similar trend also occurred in the EP, with the supranational legislative body consistently gaining power relative to the Council. Beginning as an Assembly with few powers, the first major parliamentary change occurred following the Northern enlargement when the EP gained budgetary powers and also changed election systems so that MEPS were voted on through direct elections. The increase in budgetary powers represents institutional powers because it gives the EP control on how EC resources are spent. In contrast, switching to direct elections, while an institutional reform, did not change the relative power of the EC. However, EP power was again expanded through the Single European Act, granting it the powers of cooperation with the Council and consultation on legislation. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the EP’s power of cooperation transformed to co-decision with the Council, and later changed to be called Ordinary Legislative Procedure and to include power of assent under the Nice and Lisbon Treaty’s. Unlike the change in the Northern enlargement, no evidence suggests that the growth in EP power that followed was chiefly driven or supported by incoming member states.
Overall, evidence accumulated in all four enlargements largely confirms my first hypothesis. In most cases, policy reforms took place as a reaction to the disparities between the incoming countries and the existing member states. The Union recognized that, in order to continue integration and achieve certain goals, especially economic and monetary union, the incoming countries would need to be brought up to the level of the rest of the EU. The same logic also applies to cases in which the applicant countries lagged politically. The more different a newcomer was from the rest of the Union, the more that EU institutions worked to bring it up to EU standards, as in the case of the Eastern enlargement. However, my hypothesis does not account for institutional reforms, which were not economically motivated, but motivated by the necessity to ensure the efficient functioning of the Union. This shows that various motivations for deepening exist, and one single X-Y relationship is unlikely to exist. In regards to my second and third hypotheses concerning Eurobarometer survey data and deepening, results are difficult to see. In the case of the Northern Enlargement, no data exists because polling did not begin until 1974. In the case of the Southern enlargement, EC support for the accession of Greece, Spain, and Portugal hovered between 30% and 40% for the tested years. I was unable to find data regarding the attitudes of Spanish and Portuguese citizens toward accession, but in 1980, 38% of Greeks favored accession, compared to 36% of EC citizens. Across all results, there was a large proportion of voters who answered that either that enlargement would be neither good nor bad or “don’t know” leaving results unclear.

In the set of data I was able to gather from the 1995 enlargement, EC citizens strongly supported the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. This result aligns with H3 because the population of the EC was not very skeptical about the enlargement and, as discussed, we see little deepening occurring at the time of the 1995 enlargement. However, once again, little data is
provided, making it difficult to determine a result. Data for the Eastern enlargement shows that, despite initially high EU attitudes towards enlargement, the percentage of voters favoring the accession of the CEECs fell to consistently below 50% by the last half of the 1990s, both for the CEECs collectively and for individual countries. According to this relatively low support for enlargement by EU citizens, according to my hypothesis we should see high amounts of deepening. Considering attempts to modernize and reform the CEECs like the Copenhagen Criteria and specific adjustment programs, the hypothesis holds true in that the EU sought to control the development of these countries and more efficiently integrate them. However, as previously discussed, it remains doubtful that these pre-accession changes qualify as examples of deepening. In terms of institutional reform, while changes did occur most likely as a result of deepening, it is unlikely that public opinion had an effect because the reforms concerned the number of members in the Union, not the specific incoming members.

VI. Conclusion

Through the discussion of my research and the presentation of my findings, I have expanded upon theories of European Union integration and presented my own based on the concepts of widening and deepening. Aligning with Downs’ theory of multilateralism, marked periods of enlargement suggest that the EU has integrated sequentially, periodically adding member states based on their eagerness or readiness to join. Through four major stages of enlargement, we see that the EU added member states that often prompted or demanded different forms of integration to better adjust to the widening of the Union. Many of these reforms took place in the European Parliament or the Council through the expansion of powers or voting procedure. These changes constitute institutional deepening, growing the power of the EU’s supranational institutions relative to the individual member states. I have also differentiated the main types of integration
and presented the possibility of a new type of deepening which occurs through policy addition or reform that also results in the growth of supranational power. So far, cases of policy deepening seem to appear as result of enlargement such as with the ERDF, IMPs, and possibly methods of integration like the Copenhagen Criteria. Though I narrowly investigated the possibility of policy deepening within the context of enlargement, it possibly exists in other cases as well.

The evidence presented indicates connections between enlargement and some aspects of European integration. While clear links appear in some cases, the connection falters in other cases where deepening occurs yet is not driven by enlargement. This suggests that widening can sometimes act to prompt or encourage deepening, but deepening also occurs through other means as well. Further research concerning the relationship between widening and deepening, especially focusing on the negotiation processes, could be conducted to continue flushing out to what extent the two are related. EU integration continues to grow. To continue discovering the relationship between widening and deepening, it would be beneficial to compare deepening that is correlated with widening to integration that occurred outside of the scope of enlargement.

This discussion is significant to discussions on European integration because it presents an alternative view on how the EU has come to be what it is today. The widening and deepening theory rests not on sole theories of supranationalism or intergovernmentalism, but on how the institutions of the EU react to enlargement and interact with newcomers. The key driver of integration highlighted by my research is twofold: First, reforms address disparities between new member states and the norm of the Union. Second, institutions reform due to the need to adapt to the difficulties of a larger Union in order to ensure efficient functioning. Integration may also occur in cases where member states push for certain changes or make demands. However, concession is often still in the interest of the Union and its desire to reach certain goals. Unlike
the intergovernmental or neo-functional argument, widening and deepening as a theory to explain integration takes into account the member states and the supranational institutions. Overall, these investigations shed light on EU enlargement and integration. Deepening is a process that has various causes, and cannot be tied to one sole explanation of integration. While deepening certainly can occur outside of the context of enlargement, scholars must not neglect the influence that enlargements have had on EU integration.
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