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Democracy in Crisis? An Examination of the Effectiveness of Framing Upon Willingness to Tolerate Hate Speech

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Existing research surrounding political tolerance has determined that framing may affect the level of political tolerance individuals express. Yet, there still remains considerable debate regarding the effectiveness of framing upon political tolerance decision-making. Specifically, there remains ambiguity as to whether the presence of certain frames can affect an individual’s willingness to tolerate hateful or offensive speech. This study serves to clarify that ambiguity by determining if framing manipulations can significantly affect individuals’ willingness to tolerate hate speech. To determine if framing can significantly affect willingness to tolerate hate speech, I conducted an original survey experiment on Mechanical Turk. I find framing produced virtually no significant effects upon individuals’ willingness to tolerate hate speech. Contrary to previous findings demonstrating significant effects of framing upon respondents’ expressions of political tolerance, this study exhibited widespread ineffectiveness of framing manipulations designed to influence the toleration of hateful and offensive speech.
Introduction

At a time when the American political landscape is starved for tolerance while bloated with contempt, anger, polarization, and distrust, there may be reason to worry. One must recognize that political tolerance is essential in order for the survival and continued functioning of a democratic society. As anger, distrust, and partisan animosity are at the highest levels in modern history and continue to rise, it may be wise for forward thinking individuals to express concern regarding the future of our democracy. In order for the United States’ democracy to survive the challenges in our future, our society must be willing to tolerate a diverse range of viewpoints and ideas that may seem wholly unfamiliar, wrong, distasteful, or even unjust. At the most rudimentary level, political tolerance is one of the components required to maintain a stable and functioning democratic state. Without political tolerance, democratic discussion, debate, and learning cannot be achieved. Thus, it is of the utmost importance to examine the determinants of political tolerance.

It is critical to recognize that the willingness to tolerate hateful and offensive speech is central to the existence of political tolerance. Without robust First Amendment protections for all types of speech, including hate speech, political tolerance cannot exist. Yet, violent and deadly confrontations regarding the presence of hate speech have become all too familiar. Given the rise in violent confrontations, protests, and clashes over the presence of hate speech, it is necessary that researchers explore the mechanisms that may explain peaceful toleration of hateful and offensive speech.

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1 According to the Pew Research Center, “more than half of Democrats (55%) say the Republican Party makes them “afraid,” while 49% of Republicans say the same about the Democratic Party,” and “among those highly engaged in politics – those who say they vote regularly and either volunteer for or donate to campaigns – fully 70% of Democrats and 62% of Republicans say they are afraid of the other party” (Pew Research, 2016; 1).
2 The Pew Research Center reports, “81% of Republicans and Republican leaners have an unfavorable impression of the Democratic Party, with 45% taking a very unfavorable view...In 1994, 68% of Republicans had a negative view of the Democratic Party; just 17% had a very unfavorable opinion. (Pew Research Center 2016; 66).
Considering the truly astounding levels of political polarization and disagreement within the United States (Crawford and Pilansky, 2014; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015), it is critical to understand the factors that influence political tolerance judgments. If we want to protect diversity and democracy, we must first understand the etiology of political tolerance. Recognizing political intolerance towards disliked and controversial groups is deeply ingrained in the American psyche (Marcus et al., 1995; Gibson, 2006; Gibson, 2008; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Peffley et al., 2001; Schwadel and Garneau, 2014), determining the causality of political tolerance is important. Intolerance, if persistent and unaddressed, poses a grave threat to democracy (Gibson, 2008). Intolerance threatens democracy not because of the policies it spurs, but from the destructive public norms it invokes (Gibson, 2008). As clashes over the presence of hate speech have become deadly, it is critical that scholars determine what affects individuals’ willingness to engage in peaceful toleration of hateful speech.

Recognizing the need for further inquiry into the causality of hate speech toleration, this paper will explore if framing manipulations can be effective at encouraging more tolerant or intolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech on a college campus. Can the presence of frames about First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights encourage tolerance of hateful speech? Or, do framing manipulations prove ineffective at motivating individuals to give more or less tolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech? This study will explore these questions. By determining if framing manipulations with information about First and Fourteenth Amendment rights can be successful at affecting toleration of hateful and offensive speech on a college campus, my study will contribute to the literature by providing new and insightful evidence regarding the use of framing political tolerance decision-making.

Specifically, in this paper, I examine the effectiveness of positive and negative frames about the First and Fourteenth Amendment. By framing a scenario of hate speech with positive and negative frames

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5 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”

6 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
about the right to the freedom of speech and the right to equal protection, I explore the effectiveness of framing upon individuals’ toleration of hateful and offensive speech. I find that both positive, negative, and neutral framing manipulations regarding First and Fourteenth Amendment rights designed to affect individuals’ reaction to and toleration of hate speech were ineffective. This study revealed that both positive, negative, a neutral framing of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights did not produce any significant effects with regards to the reaction to or toleration of hate speech. Contrary to the results of previous research, my study provides new findings that the presence of framing manipulations had no effect upon toleration of hate speech on a college campus. Further, I find that the toleration of hate speech is strongly predicted by other individual-level factors including partisanship, ideology, gender, and the presence of anxiety. Finally, the findings in this study suggest that future research should continue to explore and potentially reevaluate the effects of framing on individual’s reaction to hateful speech.

**Previous Literature**

While existing research has determined some of the broader mechanisms that influence political tolerance, research regarding individual willingness to tolerance hate speech is relatively slim. In fact, there is considerable disagreement about the mechanisms by which political tolerance judgments and attitudes are affected (Gibson, 2006). By discussing relevant research concerning political tolerance and the factors that affect tolerance decision-making, I hope to demonstrate how my study provides new and exciting insight into the effects of framing within individual-level political tolerance for hate speech.

**Political Tolerance within the United States**

Generally speaking, political tolerance can be defined as an individual’s willingness to grant fundamental rights and liberties, including the right to speak, organize, and run for office, to groups and individuals that may be widely hated or controversial (Cowan et al., 2002). Because I will focus my research on individual-level willingness to tolerate hate speech, for the purposes of this study, political
tolerance can be defined as an individual’s willingness to grant First Amendment protections to speakers, groups, and figures that elicit hateful and offensive remarks.

While American citizens strongly value the right to free speech in the abstract (Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al., 2001; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003), Americans are significantly less likely to grant similar civil liberties protections to threatening, hated, controversial, or disliked groups (Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al. 2001; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Green et al., 2011; Linder and Nozek, 2009; Schwadel and Garneau, 2014). While it is important to recognize that each individual may have different motivations for choosing not to tolerate a certain group or individual, there are several factors that one must take into account when attempting to explain the difference between abstract and actual tolerance for controversial groups.

In addition, it is valuable to consider that over the past thirty or so years, political tolerance has dramatically increased towards lesbians and gays (Schwadel and Garneau, 2014). Although there have been moderate increases in tolerance towards communists and non-religious figures, racists have not been met with any increase in tolerance (Schwadel and Garneau, 2014). In addition, Americans are also increasingly concerned about racism in our society. According to recent polling, Americans’ concerns over racism and race relations have reached an all-time high (Neal, 2017). Currently, 50% of U.S. citizens perceive racism to be a “big problem” within the United States, and it is important to note that only 3% of U.S. citizens perceive racism as “not a problem” within the United States (Neal, 2017). Such high levels of perceived racial intolerance are significant, and it warrants the need for further inquiry in current models of political tolerance decision-making.

Interestingly, the majority of Americans hold highly contradictory attitudes about political tolerance. While an overwhelming majority of Americans will support political tolerance in the abstract, extremely few will express tolerant attitudes when asked to apply them to controversial or disliked groups (Marcus et al., 1995; Gibson, 2006; Peffley et al., 2001; Gibson, 2008; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003). While almost all Americans would agree with statements like, “I believe in free speech for everyone, no
matter their view,” a minority would endorse the right to speech for controversial and highly disliked groups like the (Marcus et al. 1995, Gibson, 2008; Gibson, 1987).

In addition, it is important to consider Americans’ willingness to tolerate hate speech in particular. Despite First Amendment protections on virtually all types of speech, nearly half of Americans support restrictions and government intervention to prevent hate speech in public (Elkins, 2017). One must also take into account that support for free speech has begun to decline among younger generations (Villasenor, 2017). Currently, the majority of college age Americans express extremely limited beliefs about the freedom of expression within the United States. Consider, more than half of current college students, approximately 53%, believe that colleges should prohibit the instance of hateful, derogatory, disagreeable, or offensive speech (Villasenor, 2017).

Further, new research has revealed that approximately 19% of current college students support the use of violence to silence speech that is offensive, controversial, or hateful (Villasenor, 2017). Evidently, there is significant gap between abstract political tolerance and actual political tolerance when individuals are asked to apply them to hateful groups. Considering the gap between abstract and actual support for political tolerance, what factors influence decision-making when individuals are making political tolerance judgments regarding the presence of hate speech?

**Prior Considerations and Biases**

As Zaller’s work has established, individual decisions are far from stable or concrete (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Instead, individual decision-making is a complex process in which prior beliefs, considerations, biases, and influences, among other factors, affect the decision that is made (Marcus et al., 1995; Marcus and MacKuen, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000). When developing a successful model of political tolerance decision-making, one must consider the role of predispositions and prior considerations. Predispositions can be thought of as the tendency to consistently think or behave in a manner that is influenced by your previous experiences (Marcus et al., 1995). For example, one’s individual personality characteristics are considered predispositions (Marcus et al., 1995). Because personality has significant and measurable effects upon political tolerance and political attitudes in general (Marcus et al., 1995;
Marcus et al., 2005; Wolak and Marcus, 2007), one must consider the role of personality characteristics when studying the causality of political tolerance.

While individual personality is multidimensional and highly complicated, research has determined that some personality characteristics affect political tolerance attitudes including: cognitive need, openness to new experiences, extraversion, anxiety, authoritarianism, and the level of neuroticism affect political tolerance (Marcus et al., 1995; Marcus et al., 2005; Wolak and Marcus, 2007; Halperin et al., 2014). Specifically, research has shown that individuals who display higher levels of neuroticism and extraverted tendencies are less tolerant, while individuals with greater need for cognition and openness to try new experiences are much more politically tolerant (Marcus et al., 1995; Marcus et al., 2005). In addition, individuals who display higher levels of authoritarianism tend to be less tolerant (Marcus et al., 1995; Halperin et al., 2014). As such, each political tolerance decision is made differently, as each person contains a unique combination of predispositions and personality characteristics.

Further, it is important to consider the role of standing decisions upon tolerance judgments. Drawing upon Marcus et al., standing decisions can be conceptualized as the process in which an individual’s previously acquired opinions are activated when considering a specific situation or realm (Marcus et al., 1995). It is critical to recognize that an individual’s standing decisions are highly influenced by the individual’s predispositions. In fact, standing decisions are the mechanism by which predispositions influence individual-level political tolerance judgments (Marcus et al., 1995).

Predispositions affect standing decisions because each time an individual makes a standing decision, like whether to tolerate a disliked group, they are relying upon their predispositions in order to guide them to the most appropriate conclusion in the specific circumstance (Marcus et al. 1995).

For example, consider Anne Coulter’s visit to the University of Colorado Boulder’s campus. If I am asked to make a standing decision regarding my willingness to tolerate a speech from Ann Coulter on my college campus, I am heavily influenced by my predispositions about conservatism, any perception of threat I believe Anne Coulter to pose, and personality characteristics like extraversion, openness to experience, and other factors. Because I am deciding if I will tolerate a speech from Ann Coulter, I am
relying upon my personality and predispositions in order to guide me to the most appropriate standing decision about my willingness to tolerate a speech on campus.

However, unlike predispositions, standing decisions have the potential to be manipulated and changed, depending on the other information provided to the respondent (Marcus et al., 1995; Cowan and Mettrick, 2002; Cowan et al., 2002; Haas and Cunningham, 2014; Halperin et al., 2014; Marcus et al., 2005; Kimble and Wiener, 2016; Peffley et al., 2001). While predispositions and personality are rigid, inflexible, and difficult to change, it is possible to change an individual’s standing decisions by manipulating the frame, prime, or information provided (Marcus et al., 1995; Cowan and Mettrick, 2002; Cowan et al., 2002; Haas and Cunningham, 2014; Halperin et al., 2014; Marcus et al., 2005; Kimble and Wiener, 2016; Peffley et al., 2001). Because previous research has demonstrated the ability of framing to alter standing decisions regarding political tolerance, one must also consider the role of contemporary information within political tolerance decision-making.

**Contemporary Information**

In the context of political tolerance decision-making, contemporary information can be defined as all of the stimuli respondents experience in their environment as they are making tolerance decisions (Marcus et al., 1995). For example, pretend you are asked to make a decision regarding your willingness to tolerate a group of anti-abortion protesters that would like to hold a public demonstration outside your local hospital. Whatever stimuli you are exposed to, whether sensory, symbolic, literal, or descriptive, is considered contemporary information as you are cognitively processing this information while making your decision. The presence of contemporary information is important to consider as it can affect the outcome of a political tolerance decision. For example, contemporary information can affect attitudes about the group or individual, perception of threat, level of anxiety, emotional state, credibility of information etc. (Marcus et al., 1995; Haas and Cunningham, 2014; Halperin et al., 2014; Marcus et al., 2005; Kimble and Wiener, 2016; Peffley et al., 2001).

In addition, depending on what combination predispositions and personality characteristics are present, contemporary information can be processed differently across different individuals (Marcus et
al., 1995). Instead of making completely new decisions every time they are asked to make a choice, individuals rely upon their predispositions, personality characteristics, and process contemporary information in order to make a judgment that either confirms or shifts their established position (Marcus et al., 1995). Yet, contemporary information does not have a generalized effect on every individual. Individuals who have relatively weak or moderate predispositions will be more influenced by contemporary information than individuals with stronger predispositions (Marcus et al., 1995). Because strong predispositions are deeply ingrained and inflexible to change, it is unlikely that contemporary information will succeed at changing such a firmly held position. However, individuals who have weak or moderate predispositions will be more affected by contemporary information, given the lack of conviction in their predisposition (Marcus et al., 1995). These findings are significant as they suggest that political tolerance decisions may be more malleable when individuals do not have strong predispositions.

Framing Political Tolerance Judgments

Acknowledging that respondents are highly affected by the contemporary information that frames political tolerance decisions (Marcus et al., 1995; Kimble and Weiner, 2016, Peffley et al., 2001; Cowan et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 1997), are certain frames more successful at eliciting tolerant responses than others? Previous research has produced varied results with regards to the effects of framing upon political tolerance judgments. In fact, prior research has revealed that frames providing information about different constitutional rights or democratic principles can significantly affect political tolerance judgements. Yet, it appears that framing using constitutional rights can motivate both intolerance or tolerance, depending on the constitutional right that was used in the frame.

Previous research has determined that using constitutional rights as a means to frame hate speech scenarios is successful at eliciting more tolerant or intolerant attitudes, depending on the constitutional right and type of frame used. In scenarios where individuals are asked about their willingness to tolerate hateful, offensive, or racist speech, framing the scenario by providing individuals with information about the right to the freedom of speech results in more tolerant attitudes towards the offensive or disliked group (Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al., 2001; Kimble and Weiner, 2016; Nelson et al., 1997). While
frames with information about the freedom of speech are highly effective at eliciting more tolerant judgements (Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al., 2001; Kimble and Weiner, 2016; Nelson et al., 1997; Gibson, 1987), frames that focus on the right to equal protection have much different effects.

Instead of encouraging tolerance, frames including information about the importance of equal protection may encourage significantly more intolerant responses (Cowan et al., 2002; Kimble and Weiner, 2016). When scenarios with offensive and hateful speech are framed with information about the right to equal protection, individuals are more likely to express more intolerant attitudes towards the offensive or disliked group (Cowan et al., 2002; Kimble and Weiner, 2016).

In addition, recent research has revealed that the use of positive or negative framing can significantly influence political tolerance decision-making. Specifically, the use of positive and negative frames with information about different constitutional rights can significantly affect individual’s toleration of hate speech. When using the constitutional rights of equal protection and the freedom of speech, positive framing may be more successful than negative framing at influencing the toleration of hate speech (Kimble and Weiner, 2016) However, further research is needed in order to determine how both positive and negative framing of hate speech scenarios affects tolerance judgments.

**Democratic Principles & Value Conflict**

Central to political tolerance decision-making is the role of democratic principles. Democratic principles can be conceptualized as the broad set of principles (freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of association etc.) that are required in order for democracy to function. While numerous studies have identified commitment to democratic principles to be associated with higher levels of political tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Marcus et al., 1995; Marcus et al, 2005; Peffley et al., 2001; Halperin et al., 2014; Kimble and Weiner, 2016), there is still uncertainty regarding the extent to which support for democratic principles can affect tolerance. While it has been widely demonstrated that a strong inherent commitment to democratic principles and constitutional rights, especially the freedom of speech, is associated with more politically tolerant attitudes and judgments (Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al., 2001; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003); Marcus et al, 2005; Halperin et al., 2014; Lee, 2014;
Petersen et al, 2011; Gibson, 1992; Gibson, 1987), ambiguity remains as to if framing tolerance judgments with information about specific constitutional rights can significantly affect the rate of tolerant or intolerant judgments.

Moreover, when discussing individual-level commitment to democratic norms it is important to consider that commitment to these norms can change throughout an individual’s life. Depending on the level of education, political knowledge, life circumstances, age, personality, and other characteristics, individuals may possess differing levels of commitment and awareness of democratic norms throughout their lifetime (Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al., 2001). However, one must note that the level of commitment to democratic norms is significant, as survey experiments have determined that those with high levels of commitment to democratic norms display higher levels of political tolerance (Marcus et al., 1995, Peffley et al., 2001; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Marcus et al., 2005; Halperin et al., 2014; Lee, 2014; Petersen et al., 2011).

Further, democratic principles may conflict with one another when individuals are considering scenarios where they are asked to make political tolerance judgments (Marcus et al., 1995, Peffley et al., 2001; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Halperin et al., 2014). When making political tolerance decisions, individuals must often weigh competing civil liberties and democratic values. For example, consider a proposal that allows an extremist religious group to hold a rally in your local community center. Suppose the group has been known to make hateful, false, sexist, and derogatory statements about women, racial minorities, and non-Christians. When making the decision to tolerate this group, some individuals may face a conflict between various democratic principles they support. While an individual may value the freedom of speech, the same individual may also value the right to equal protection under the law. In the circumstance an individual is asked to make a decision regarding their willingness to tolerate the group, it is likely the individual’s support for different democratic principles may conflict with one another if they feel tolerating the offensive speech would undermine their support for equality. Thus, in a scenario where the individual is asked to make a political tolerance judgment, they are forced to weigh competing democratic principles.
As a result of the competition between democratic values, citizens must sometimes determine which democratic values they find to be the more important (Peffley et al., 2001; Marcus et al., 1995). When individuals must make a choice between competing values in a political tolerance judgment they experience value conflict (Peffley et al., 2001). When an individual experiences conflict between democratic principles while making a political tolerance judgment, they are more likely to give a tolerant response (Peffley et al., 2001). Democratic value conflict results in increased political tolerance because it forces individuals to engage in more deliberative reasoning (Peffley et al., 2001; Marcus et al., 1995). When citizens are faced with a conflict of values, they must engage in more deliberative and lengthy consideration in order to make a decision (Peffley et al., 2001; Marcus et al., 1995).

Furthermore, when considering political tolerance decision-making it is important to consider that individuals who demonstrate strong support for the freedom of speech tend to elicit the most politically tolerant judgments (Peffley et al., 2001; Marcus et al., 1995). Prior research has demonstrated that not only are those who strongly value free speech more likely to be politically tolerant; they can also be more affected by contemporary information, arguments, frames, and stimuli that highlight the need for free speech within a democratic society (Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al., 2001; Kimble and Weiner, 2016; Nelson et al., 1997).

The Pliability of Tolerance Judgments

Furthermore, one must address the strength of individual-level political tolerance judgments. Unfortunately, research has determined that tolerance is much more malleable than intolerance (Gibson, 2006; Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al., 2001; Marcus et al., 2005). It is relatively easy to manipulate a tolerant attitude to an intolerant attitude. Yet, it is exceptionally difficult to change an intolerant attitude to a tolerant attitude. Given that political tolerance is essential in order for democratic survival, these findings provide reason for normative concern. Considering political tolerance is a weakly held attitude with relatively little clout (Gibson, 2006), it is crucial to explore any mechanisms that can affect both levels of tolerance or intolerance. As such, future research should explore framing mechanisms that attempt to affect both respondents’ level of tolerance and intolerance.
The Role of Emotions

Before discussing any aspects of political tolerance decision-making further, it is critical to consider the role of emotions. While emotions were previously regarded as topics of study for psychologists, political scientists have begun to realize how emotions significantly affect political decision-making and behavior. While emotion has vast effects upon human behavior, it is important to consider several mechanisms by which emotions affect political tolerance decision-making.

When examining the effects of emotions on political decision-making, it is useful to consult the theory of affective intelligence. The theory of affective intelligence posits that individuals use two separate systems for emotion in their brain: the disposition system and the surveillance system (Marcus et al., 2000). Individuals rely upon the disposition system to bring them to their best judgment for familiar, typical, expected, or recurring events (Marcus et al., 2000). However, when individuals experience unexpected, dangerous, anxious, or concerning situations, they will rely upon the surveillance system in their decision-making process (Marcus et al., 2000).

As theory of affective intelligence posits, individuals engage in two dramatically different affective processes (Marcus et al., 2000), and it is critical to recognize that anxiety is often the emotion controlling the shift between these two processes (Marcus et al. 2005; Wolak and Marcus, 2007). When individuals experience lower levels of anxiety, they are able to rely on their predispositions and prior attitudes more strongly than individuals who experience high anxiety (Marcus et al., 2000). However, in many instances, individuals encounter higher levels of anxiety which triggers the activation of their surveillance system prompts them to render significantly more attention to contemporary information in the environment around them (Marcus et al., 2000). Thus, within political tolerance decision-making, anxiety can be thought of as stimulus that results in greater attention to current information and triggers the shift between the activation of disposition or surveillance system (Wolak and Marcus, 2007; Marcus, 2005).

In addition, the presence of anxiety may help decrease the strength of predispositions that negatively influence political tolerance judgments (Marcus et al., 2005). However, for individuals who do
not have negative predispositions about the group they are being asked to tolerate, the presence of anxiety actually renders increased intolerance (Marcus et al., 2005). Emotional priming with anxiety has also been shown to have the capability to increase tolerance judgments in relation to free speech protections. Because anxiety renders increased attention to current information and stimuli, the condition of anxiety and pro-free speech information results in increased political tolerance (Marcus et al., 2005).

Although conditions of anxiety produce more attention to current information, conditions of low or non-existent anxiety do not produce increased attention (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus et al., 2005). The role of predispositions and the strength of an individual’s anxiety interact so that increased anxiety causes more attention to current information and potential counter-arguments, thereby motivating the abandonment of predispositions (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus et al., 2005). With all of these findings in mind, future research examining political tolerance should be mindful of the level of anxiety that individuals experience, as it is highly significant in determining the attention and patterns of cognition that respondents will use throughout their decision-making process.

**Individual Differences**

Finally, it is essential to consider the role of individual-level differences when analyzing political tolerance decisions. Every individual that makes a political tolerance judgment will vary in their personal, psychological, emotional, and demographic characteristics. Yet, some individual characteristics have been found to dramatically affect political tolerance decisions. Specifically, political ideology and partisanship affect political tolerance decision-making (Linder and Nozek, 2009; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). In addition, research has yet to explain why women tend to be more intolerant than men (Halperin et al., 2014; Marcus et al., 1995).

Among all individual differences, one must consider the role of partisanship and polarization. Partisanship and political ideology have been found to have varying effects upon political tolerance decisions. In Linder and Nozek’s controversial study, the authors find evidence that ideological affiliation influences the decision to protect free-speech (Linder and Nozek, 2009). Specifically, they find right-wing individuals are intolerant of left-wing speech, and left-wing individuals are intolerant of right-wing
speech (Linder and Nozek, 2009). However, the authors find evidence that conservatism was more strongly associated with intolerance than liberalism (Linder and Nozek, 2009).

Yet, other tolerance studies have demonstrated that political intolerance is widespread on both the right and left wing of the political spectrum (Crawford and Pilanski, 2014). Crawford and Pilanski’s study reveals that that both liberalism and conservatism are equally strong predictors of intolerance towards those on the opposite side of the political spectrum (Crawford and Pilanski, 2014). These findings are significant as they contradict previous research claiming conservatism is a stronger predictor of intolerance than liberalism (Linder and Nozek, 2009). Thus, it is clear that partisanship and political ideology are strong predictors of intolerance towards those who are on the opposite side of the political spectrum (Iyengar and Westwood, 2014; Crawford and Pilanski, 2014). It is important for future research to measure partisanship and political ideology, given the inconsistency of previous findings.

Perplexingly, while education and political knowledge have consistently been regarded as factors that increase political tolerance (Marcus et al., 1995; Peffley et al., 2001; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003), new research challenges the premise that education fosters political tolerance. Although many scholars have claimed there is a causal relationship between education and political tolerance, new research offers strong evidence that education and political tolerance are not causally related. In the most robust study of education and tolerance to exist, the results demonstrated that enhanced civics education was not associated with any measure of increased support for civil liberties (Green et al., 2011). In fact, the authors found no significant relationship between increased knowledge about the democratic principles, the constitution and support for civil liberties (Green et al., 2011).

Thus, it seems that individuals may learn about constitutional principles without actually developing actual support for them. While the authors found correlation between support for civil liberties and political knowledge (Green et al., 2011), they assert extreme doubt that the two variables are causally related. Given these findings, it is important for further research to determine the mechanisms that affect support for political tolerance. If enhanced civics education does not result in political tolerance, are there certain ways to frame political tolerance judgments that will?
Theory

Despite all of the previous research, uncertainty with regards to the precise role of framing within political tolerance decision-making still remains. Although the literature has established that predispositions, emotions, democratic principles and values, and individual differences in characteristics affect political tolerance decision-making, there is still ambiguity as to how framing can be used to affect an individual’s decision to tolerate hate speech. While the literature suggests the use of framing can significantly affect political tolerance judgments, there is still uncertainty as to the precise role of framing within decision-making regarding hateful and offensive speech.

Specifically, there is uncertainty as to how positive and negative framing of constitutional rights affects an individual’s willingness to tolerate hate speech. As such, the role of positive and negative framing of constitutional rights upon hate speech toleration judgments has yet to be clarified and refined. My study seeks to clarify this ambiguity by attempting to determine the precise effects of framing upon individual’s decisions to tolerate hateful, offensive, and racist speech on a college campus. By measuring the effects of various positive and negative frames concerning the freedom of speech or the right to equal protection, my study will determine if the framing of constitutional rights affects individual’s toleration of hate speech.

Because of the need for further research into political tolerance decision-making (Gibson, 2006), specifically further examination of the effects of framing of constitutional rights within political tolerance decision-making (Kimble and Weiner, 2016), my study will make two valuable contributions to political tolerance research. First, by examining the role of positive and negative framing, I will determine if positive and negative framing can be successful at encouraging individuals to give more tolerant or intolerant reactions to hate speech. Second, I will determine whether appeals to the the First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment are more successful at eliciting politically tolerant responses towards hate speech. By determining if positive or negative framing of the First and Fourteenth Amendment can be successful at eliciting more tolerant or intolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech, my study
will contribute to research concerning political tolerance decision-making and the toleration of hateful speech.

Recent research has suggested that positive framing of constitutional rights can be more successful at affecting the toleration of hate speech than negative framing (Kimble and Weiner, 2016). This paper seeks to build upon recent findings by examining whether the use of positive and negative framing of the freedom of speech and equal protection can significantly affect individual’s toleration of hate speech on a college campus. As my research will examine the effects of positive and negative framing of constitutional rights within individual’s decision to tolerate hate speech, the study yields valuable insight into the effects of framing upon willingness to tolerate hateful, offensive, and racist speech.

**Hate Speech Decision-Making**

Arguably, our current political environment fosters a disturbing amount of political polarization. Much of the intense discriminations and partisan animus can be attributed to the lack of social and democratic norms surrounding the expression of partisan bias (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). Thus, many political elites and partisan leaders are incentivized to engage in conflict and hostility instead of cooperation and toleration. Partisans, on both sides, have powerful and implicit negative reactions towards individuals of opposing political parties (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). Researchers have largely attributed this bias and discrimination to the fact that the United States lacks the proper constraints, behavior and social norms that surround appropriate responses to opposing partisans, and partisan disagreement (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). Yet, this level of polarization may have dangerous implications for our democratic processes, as it encourages ‘taunting,’ ‘bashing,’ animus, and other behavior that encourages intolerance (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). Clearly, Americans hold highly hostile, biased, aggressive, and discriminatory attitudes towards one another that may often create individual predispositions that encourage intolerance.

Moreover, despite constitutional protections regarding hate speech, 40% of Americans express support for government efforts to prevent hate speech in public locations (Elkins, 2017). According to
recent polling, nearly half of college students do not believe the First Amendment protects hate speech, and 19% supported the use of violence in efforts to prevent hate speech on campus (Villasenor, 2017). The finding that so many Americans are hesitant to embrace the right to unrestricted freedom of speech is noteworthy, and it suggests many individuals are willing to sacrifice freedom of speech in favor of environments void of hateful and offensive speech.

Given the widespread polarization, disagreement, and resistance towards unrestricted freedom of speech, it is likely that many individuals will have predispositions that encourage intolerance of hate speech. Yet, I argue that framing manipulations surrounding hate speech can affect individuals’ response to the hate speech. More precisely, I argue that the positive and negative framing of the First and Fourteenth Amendment can affect an individual’s response to and toleration of hate speech.

According to the theory of affective intelligence, any information or stimuli that individuals are exposed to during their decision-making process can affect the final outcome of the decision [the standing decision] (Marcus and MacKuen, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000). Because any contemporary information or stimuli the individual is exposed to during the decision-making process is more readily available in the individual’s mind throughout their decision-making process, the information the individual is exposed to while making their decision may affect the ultimate decision [standing decision] the individual makes (Marcus and MacKuen, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000). Therefore, the use of framing manipulations within the decision-making process regarding the toleration of hate speech is likely to affect the final decision the individual makes. Because the framing manipulations serve as contemporary information designed to encourage a specific response, the framing manipulations may affect the ultimate standing decision the individual makes regarding whether or not to tolerate the hate speech.

As individuals decide whether or not to tolerate hateful or offensive speech, they will weigh their attitudes towards various constitutional principles and values. When making the decision to tolerate hate speech, individuals will consider attitudes about specific constitutional principles related to the toleration of hate speech. In the context of hate speech, individuals may often consider attitudes about the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment (Cowan et al., 2002; Kimble and Weiner, 2016; Nelson et al.,
1997). When information about these constitutional principles are used to frame hate speech scenarios, respondents are more likely to give a response suggested by the specific constitutional principle they read about.

When information about the freedom of speech is used to frame hate speech scenarios, the freedom of speech frame will serve as contemporary information in the individual’s decision-making process. Therefore, the individual will be giving increased attention to the information regarding the freedom of speech that was provided in the frame. When information about the right to equal protection is used to frame hate speech scenarios, the equal protection frame will also serve as contemporary information in the individual’s decision-making process. Because the frame will hold more weight in the decision-making process, exposure to the frames is likely to significantly affect responses to the hate speech.

Furthermore, I contend that the content and tone of the frame used to surround hate speech scenarios is important in determining the response to it. When examining decision-making individuals regard potential positive and negative outcomes very differently (Kahneman and Traversky, 1979; Mittal and Ross, 1998). In general, individuals are not perfect or rational maximizers of utility (Kahneman and Traversky, 1979). Because potential positive and negative outcomes imposed by decisions are influential in determining individual behavior and within the decision-making process (Kahneman and Traversky, 1979), it is important to examine how the use of positive and negative framing can be used to influence the outcome of individual decisions.

Previous studies have determined that the use of positive framing and negative framing associated with decision-making can cause significant differences in the outcome of individual attitudes, judgments, and opinions. For example, researchers have compared positive and negative framing of messages promoting physical activity (Latimer et al., 2008), and found that the use of positive framing, was more successful at promoting physical activity than negative framing (Latimer et al., 2008). Similar results demonstrating the significant effects of positive and negative framing can be found across social science, public health, economics, psychology, and other disciplines (Haley et al., 2006; Shamaskin et al.,
As such, I argue that the use of positive and negative framing manipulations will produce significant differences in responses to scenarios of hate speech.

Because the frames are each designed to have a specific tone, positive or negative, and a constitutional right, either the freedom of speech or the right to equal protection, frames are expected to have different effects upon individuals based upon the tone and content. First, I argue that the use of positively framed free speech messaging is likely to result in individuals having significantly more tolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech. Because the positive frame will highlight the value of the freedom of speech provided by the First Amendment, individuals exposed to the positive freedom of speech frame will be more likely to consider the positive value and importance of unrestricted speech protections. Because the positively framed freedom of speech frame reminds individuals of the value of unrestricted speech protections, individuals will consider this information in their decision-making process for the toleration of hate speech. As individuals consider whether or not to tolerate the speech, the positive information regarding the freedom of speech will be fresh in their mind. This positive free speech information will serve as a reminder of the positive benefits of unrestricted speech protection. Therefore, individuals exposed to a positive freedom of speech frame are more likely to respond to the proposed hate speech scenario with tolerance.

However, when free speech rights are framed negatively, freedom of speech frames may be used to suggest an intolerant response. When free speech information is framed negatively, suggesting free speech undermines other constitutional rights, individuals may actually provide more intolerant responses by declining to protect hateful or offensive speech. When an individual values free speech, the desire to protect other values may still override their support for the freedom of speech (Gibson 2006; Peffley et al. 2001). As such, it is likely the use of negatively framed free speech messaging will achieve success at eliciting more intolerant attitudes.

Because the negative frame regarding the freedom of speech will be considered contemporary information, the negative information regarding the freedom of speech will be more heavily weighted in the decision-making process. As individuals consider tolerating the hateful and offensive speech, they
will also consider the negative aspects of unrestricted freedom of speech. As a result of the negative framing of the freedom of speech, individuals will be encouraged to give a response that includes the consideration of this information about the negative consequences of free speech. By considering the negative aspects of unrestricted freedom of speech, respondents will be more likely to give intolerant reactions to the speech, as intolerant reactions are consistent with the negative free speech frame. Thus, the negative frames surrounding freedom of speech will be more successful at eliciting intolerant responses.

Moreover, because equal protection is often regarded as the guiding consideration when explaining willingness to tolerate hate speech (Kimble and Weiner 2016; Cowan et al., 2002), framing hate speech scenarios in terms of equal protection is likely to produce significant effects. First, positively framed equal protection messages should be more successful at eliciting intolerant responses than a negative equal protection frame. Given positively framed equal protection messaging will emphasize the importance of equal treatment under the law, it will render increased attention to the importance and value of equal protection. As respondents will give more weight to concerns over equal protection, respondents are more likely to give an intolerant response to the presence of hate speech. Arguably, the toleration of hate speech can be perceived to undermine equal protection by allowing racist, sexist, and other offensive groups to advocate for the advancement of bigotry, hate, racism, etc. Therefore, when individuals are exposed to positive framing regarding the right to equal protection, they will be more likely to give an intolerant response to the hate speech.

On the other hand, negatively framed equal protection messages are likely to result in greater tolerance of hate speech. Because negatively framed equal protection messages will describe the right to equal protection as frivolous and unnecessary, the frame will produce in increased attention to this information in the decision-making process. Considering respondents will give more attention to the negative aspects of the right to equal protection, the use of negatively framed equal protection messages in will result in increased tolerance of hate speech. As respondents are considering their willingness to tolerate hateful and offensive speech, they will consider the information about the negative, frivolous, and
unnecessary aspect of the right to equal protection. As a result of this negative framing of equal protection, respondents exposed to the negative equal protection frame will consider equal protection to be less important. Thus, they will be more likely to tolerate the presence of hate speech.

Ultimately, through the use of positive and negative framing of the rights provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendment, respondents are likely to give more attention to the information about the freedom of speech or the right to equal protection they were exposed to in the framed message. As a result, the framed message will serve as part of the contemporary information that the individual will be exposed to throughout their decision-making process. Because the frames have been designed to encourage either a more tolerant or intolerant response, depending on the frame, it is likely that the frames, acting as contemporary information in the decision-making process, will override potential predispositions and other characteristics that can affect attitudes regarding the toleration of hate speech.

**Hypotheses**

**Hypothesis 1:** individuals exposed to positively framed messaging concerning constitutional rights will demonstrate increased measures of tolerance or intolerance, as suggested by the message, compared to those exposed to negatively framed or neutral messaging concerning constitutional rights

**Hypothesis 1a:** individuals exposed to positively framed freedom of speech messages will demonstrate increased measures of tolerance, as compared to those exposed to negatively framed or control messaging concerning freedom of speech

**Hypothesis 1b:** individuals exposed to positively framed equal protection messages will demonstrate increased measures of intolerance, as compared to those exposed to negatively framed or control messaging concerning equal protection

**Hypothesis 2:** individuals exposed to negatively framed messaging concerning constitutional rights will demonstrate increased measures of tolerance or intolerance, compared to those exposed to positively framed or neutral messaging concerning constitutional rights

**Hypothesis 2b:** individuals exposed to negatively framed freedom of speech messages will demonstrate increased measures of intolerance, compared to those exposed to positively framed or neutral messaging concerning freedom of speech

**Hypothesis 2c:** individuals exposed to negatively framed equal protection messages will demonstrate increased measures of tolerance, compared to those exposed to positively framed or neutral messaging concerning the freedom of speech

**Hypothesis 3:** individuals exposed to neutral messaging will demonstrate increased measures of tolerance or intolerance, as suggested by the message, compared to individuals exposed to neutral messaging
Hypothesis 3a: individuals exposed to a neutral freedom of speech message will demonstrate increased measures of tolerance, compared to individuals exposed to a neutral equal protection message

Hypothesis 3b: individuals exposed to a neutral equal protection message will demonstrate increased measures of intolerance, compared to individuals exposed to a neutral free speech message

Hypothesis 4: individuals exposed to a control frame will demonstrate either increased or decreased measures of tolerance, compared to individuals exposed to a positive, neutral, or negative equal protection or free speech frame

Methods and Procedure

Survey Experiment

To determine the effects of positive and negative framing of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, I conducted an original survey experiment via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Because Amazon’s Mechanical Turk provides greater diversity than that of college students or typical methods of respondent recruitment (Buhrmester et al., 2011), Mechanical Turk is an acceptable platform for survey experiments to be conducted.

In terms of the demographics of the respondents in this study, white or caucasian individuals are overrepresented and make up the majority of the respondents at 76%. Of the total respondents, 6% identified as Hispanic or Latino, while 7% identified as black or African American. The remaining 11% of respondents identified as Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, or preferred not to say. In terms of income, approximately 16% of respondents have an annual income of <$25,000, 29% between $25,000-$50,000, 27% between $50,000-$75,000, and the remaining 28% >$75,000. Further, approximately 10% of respondents had completed high school as the highest level of education. 29% have completed some college, 43% have obtained a college degree, and 18% have obtained a graduate degree. In terms of gender, approximately 49% identify as male, 48% identify as female, and 1% identify as transgender. With regards to partisan and ideological diversity, the respondents in the study are diverse in regard to partisanship and political ideology. Approximately 46% of respondents identify as Democrats, 23% as independents, 29% as Republicans, and 2% as another partisan affiliation. In terms of political ideology, approximately 13% of respondents identify as very liberal, 21% as liberal, 16% as somewhat liberal, 19% as neither liberal nor conservative, 14% as somewhat conservative, 13% as somewhat conservative, and 4% as very conservative.
Although Mechanical Turk is an acceptable platform to use in order to conduct survey experiments, there are a few potential biases that are important to address within this sample. First, it is important to recognize that Mechanical Turk workers are generally more educated, interested, and politically knowledgeable than the average citizen. The respondents in my study also likely have more free time than the average citizen. Also, it is important to note that Democrats are highly overrepresented in this study. While these are factors important to consider when assessing the results of the survey experiment, the sample is still considered to be a quality sample capable of producing reliable and valid results.

**Experimental Design, Procedure and Measures**

This study was survey experiment that contains a 2 x 3 factorial design. The first factor is the presence of either an equal protection frame or a freedom of speech frame. The second factor is the presence of either a positive, negative, or neutral tone. Respondents were randomly placed into one of seven experimental conditions: positively framed freedom of speech message, negatively framed freedom of speech message, neutral freedom of speech message, positively framed equal protection message, negatively framed equal protection message, neutral equal protection message, or control message. The survey experiment was completed electronically by respondents on the Mechanical Turk site in February of 2018. On the platform, 600 respondents were compensated $.35 for their participation. Approval from the University of Colorado Boulder’s Institutional Review Board was obtained prior to experimentation. All measures were developed under the supervision of Dr. Jennifer Wolak, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado Boulder.

In this study, I used a combination of pre-existing batteries and the development of original frames and other measures. Prior to the experiment, respondents filled out a pretest survey questionnaire with a variety of measures. First, on a seven-point scale, respondents were asked to rate a variety of statements that relate to their personality\(^7\). These measures were used in order to assess how inherent

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\(^7\) Respondents were asked to consider the following: “Think about your personality. Consider the following traits and consider how much you agree or disagree with the statement. Please rate the extent to which the traits apply to you, even if one trait
personality characteristics like neuroticism, agreeableness, and emotional stability may be related to the willingness to tolerate hate speech and the reaction to the behavior of protesters attempting to prevent the hate speech. By capturing some of respondents’ underlying personality characteristics, I am able to determine how these traits may predict or interact with willingness to tolerate hate speech.

In addition, I developed an original anxiety battery in order to measure respondents reported level of anxiety. The four-question battery captures both general anxiety and political anxiety. By capturing both general anxiety and political anxiety, I am able to determine whether self-reported anxiety has any effect on the toleration of or response to hate speech. Further, I also include a pretest battery measuring support for free speech. In this study, I employed a reliable and valid battery originally developed by Gibson et al., 1992 to measure support for the freedom of speech. To measure support for equal protection, I used a common battery of questions to measure support for equality and equal treatment under the law. By including pretest measures of support for the freedom of speech and support for equal protection and equal rights, I am able to examine how support may affect toleration of hate speech.

Before respondents were exposed to framing manipulations, they were instructed to read a standard definition of hate speech. After all respondents read the definition of hate speech, they were randomly divided into seven different experimental conditions: positively framed free speech message, negatively framed free speech message, neutral free speech message, positively framed equal protection

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8 Respondents are asked to consider the following statements and consider how much the statement describes them: “I am easily able to relax...I am often fearful about the future... When I encounter a problem, I find it difficult to think about anything else.”

9 Respondents are asked to think about themselves and consider how much the following statement describes them: “The current political environment in the United States causes me to worry.”

10 For example, respondents were asked to share their agreement or disagreement with statements like “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country,” and “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.”

11 Respondents were asked to read the following definition of hate speech: “Hate speech is a term used to define speech that targets people on the basis of a particular aspect of their identity such as race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or ethnicity.” The definition was built from the standard definition of hate speech used in prior survey experimentation regarding hate speech toleration (Cowan et al., 2002).
message, negatively framed equal protection message, neutral equal protection message, and a control category. The text of each frame for each experimental condition is listed below:

**Positive Freedom of Speech:**

The purpose of the First Amendment in the United States Constitution is to guarantee the right to freedom of speech for all Americans. Freedom of speech allows all Americans to speak their mind, no matter how hateful, disagreeable, or offensive some may consider the speech to be. Because the First Amendment protects all speech, no matter how controversial or offensive, it ensures that citizens have the right to communicate freely and express themselves openly. Because the freedom of speech allows everyone to speak their mind, all Americans enjoy the right to free expression and open communication, and they have the opportunity to share their beliefs with others.

**Negative Freedom of Speech:**

The purpose of the First Amendment in the United States Constitution is to guarantee the right to freedom of speech for all Americans. Freedom of speech allows all Americans to speak their mind, no matter how hateful, disagreeable, or offensive some may consider the speech to be. Because people can say anything they want to, people can make sexist, racist, discriminatory, or offensive statements. Because the First Amendment lets people say whatever they feel like, people can abuse speech protections by encouraging and inspiring further hate and discrimination.

**Neutral Freedom of Speech:**

The purpose of the First Amendment in the United States Constitution is to guarantee the right to freedom of speech for all Americans. Freedom of speech allows all Americans to speak their mind, no matter how hateful, disagreeable, or offensive some may consider the speech to be.

**Positive Equal Protection:**

The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution is to guarantee the right for all citizens to be treated equally under the law. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that all citizens must be treated equally regardless of race, sexual orientation, gender identity, class, religion, ethnicity, age, or any other factor. In instances of racism and discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that it is the government’s responsibility to protect targeted groups from harm, discrimination, and violence. Therefore, by protecting all citizens from discrimination and harm, the government ensures that all citizens are protected equally under the law.

**Negative Equal Protection:**

The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution is to guarantee the right for all citizens to be treated equally under the law. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that all citizens must be treated equally regardless of race, sexual orientation, gender identity, class, religion, ethnicity, age, or any other factor. Because the Equal Protection Clause requires equal treatment under the law, people can make frivolous and absurd requests for accommodations or special treatment. Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause allows people to make special demands that are unwarranted and inappropriate.

**Neutral Equal Protection:**

The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution is to guarantee the right for all citizens to be treated equally under the law. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that all citizens must be treated equally regardless of race, sexual orientation, gender identity, class, religion, ethnicity, age, or any other factor.

**Control Frame:**

Citizens of the United States enjoy rights and liberties and provided by the Constitution.

To ensure respondents were paying attention and read the framing manipulation fully, they were
subject to a manipulation check\textsuperscript{12}. Respondents who failed the manipulation check were removed from the data set. In order to test the effectiveness of the framing manipulations upon respondent’s willingness to tolerate hate speech, respondents were asked to read the following scenario:

Suppose a group, Citizens for a New America, are coming to a college campus in the city nearest you. Citizens for a New America is an alternative right, or alt-right, group advocating for the advancement of white nationalism within the United States. The group has been known to make offensive and controversial statements in the past regarding African-Americans, Hispanics, and other ethnic and racial minorities. Next month, the group is planning on holding a speaking event on campus at the university nearest you. While some students and community members support Citizens for a New America and are excited for their speech on campus, other students and community members do not want the group to speak. While supporters of Citizens for a New America argue the group is legally entitled to organize and speak, others argue that the group should not be allowed to speak given their history of hateful, offensive, and derogatory comments.

After reading the scenario containing an instance of hate speech on a college campus, respondents are asked a variety of questions that serve as dependent measures of political tolerance. Multiple dependent measures were designed in order to get an accurate measure of an individual’s willingness to tolerate the speech. After reading about the scenario involving hate speech, respondents are asked questions measuring their willingness to allow the group to hold an event on the college campus\textsuperscript{13}, whether or not universities should ban hate speech on campus\textsuperscript{14}, and their willingness to protect or suppress the speech\textsuperscript{15}. Respondents were also asked about their opinion on the group’s right to speak on campus,\textsuperscript{16} if they believe the First Amendment should protect hate speech\textsuperscript{17}, and whether they supported efforts to prevent the group from speaking on the university’s campus\textsuperscript{18}. Taken together, such a wide

\textsuperscript{12} After reading their assigned frame, respondents were asked “What constitutional principle did you just read about?”
\textsuperscript{13} The survey question reads, “How much do you support or oppose allowing Citizens for a New America to hold an event on the university’s campus?”
\textsuperscript{14} The question reads, “how much do you agree or disagree that universities and colleges should ban hate speech on their campus?”
\textsuperscript{15} The question reads, “To what extent should the message of Citizens for a New America be protected or suppressed?”
\textsuperscript{16} Respondents were asked how much they agree or disagree with the following statement: “To what extent should the message of Citizens for a New America be protected or suppressed?”
\textsuperscript{17} Respondents were asked how much they agree or disagree with the following statement: “The First Amendment should protect hate speech.”
\textsuperscript{18} Respondents were asked how much they or disagree with the following statement: “It is wrong for students to prevent groups like Citizens for a New America from speaking on campus.”
range of dependent measures of tolerance allows the study to capture the potential effects of framing manipulations across multiple measures of tolerance.

Further, the study included questions designed to measure respondents support for various reactions to the hate speech. Designed in order to resemble similar incidents where student protesters and campus visitors clashed, respondents were asked to consider a range of actions that student protesters took in order to prevent the speech from occurring on campus. Respondents were asked to share their approval or disapproval of actions students took to prevent the speech from occurring. These actions include, glitter throwing\textsuperscript{19}, yelling\textsuperscript{20}, a physical blockade\textsuperscript{21}, and even violence\textsuperscript{22}. By measuring the respondents’ approval of efforts to prevent the speech from occurring, I am able to capture the willingness of some respondents’ willingness to prevent the occurrence of hate speech. Finally, a standard battery of demographic questions including age, income, gender, ethnicity, was included in the study. Questions measuring both partisanship and political ideology were also included to determine if partisanship or political ideology predicts or affects willingness to tolerate hate speech.

**Results and Analysis**

In order to determine if the framing manipulations had any effect upon respondents’ toleration of hate speech, a combination of one-way and two-way ANOVA tests was utilized. First, one-way ANOVA models were created for each dependent measure of tolerance to determine if the presence of framing manipulations created significant variance among respondents’ reaction to the hate speech. In the six different one-way ANOVA models I created, each model contained a measure of political tolerance as the dependent variable and the framing manipulations as the independent variable. Within the independent variable in the one-way ANOVA models, participants were categorized into seven different groups: free

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\textsuperscript{19} Respondents were asked how much they approve or disapprove of the following: “Students throw flower and glitter in the face of Citizens for New America group members in an effort to prevent group members from speaking on campus.”

\textsuperscript{20} Respondents were asked how much they approve or disapprove of the following: “Students are yelling, screaming, clapping, and whistling in an effort to prevent the audience from hearing the speech.”

\textsuperscript{21} Respondents were asked how much they approve or disapprove of the following: “Students form a physical blockade around the building on campus where Citizens for a New America is scheduled to speak.”

\textsuperscript{22} Respondents were asked how much they approve or disapprove of the following: “A student punches the leader of the Citizens for a New America group in the face as they are entering the building to speak on campus.”
speech positive frame (n=84), free speech negative frame (n=86), free speech neutral frame (n=82), equal protection positive frame (n=88), equal protection negative frame (n=87), equal protection neutral frame (n=81), and the control frame (n=86). For each one-way ANOVA model created, none of the models revealed any significant variance among the mean level of tolerance expressed by respondents in different experimental conditions (p-values all >.05). Additionally, pairwise comparisons conducted for each dependent measure of political tolerance revealed virtually no significant variance in mean levels of tolerance when compared across all possible pairs of experimental conditions.23

For example, for the first dependent measure of tolerance, I created a one-way ANOVA model in order to determine if the presence of framing manipulations produced any variance among respondents’ willingness to tolerate Citizens for a New America’s visit to the university’s campus. In this model, participants were classified into seven different groups: free speech positive frame (n=84), free speech negative frame (n=86), free speech neutral frame (n=82), equal protection positive frame (n=88), equal protection negative frame (n=87), equal protection neutral frame (n=81), and the control frame (n=86). In this one-way ANOVA model, I examined whether the presence of framing manipulations revealed variance in respondents’ willingness to tolerate the group’s visit to the university’s campus. Consistent with all other one-way ANOVA models, the model failed to demonstrate any significant variance in levels of tolerance between experimental conditions (F=.62, p=.72). I also conducted pairwise comparisons to determine if certain pairs of frames revealed variance in mean levels of tolerance. When compared across all possible combinations of experimental conditions, the pairwise comparison revealed no variance in respondents’ willingness to tolerate the group’s visit to campus (p-values all >.05).

In addition, one-way ANOVA modeling did not reveal any variance in respondents’ support for banning hate speech. In this one-way ANOVA model, participants were classified into seven different conditions:

23 Pairwise comparisons for most dependent measures of tolerance failed to produce variance in respondents’ mean level of tolerance. However, when compared to one another, one pair of experimental conditions did reveal slight variance among mean levels of support for the right of Citizens for a New America to speak on the university’s campus. As higher scores indicate more tolerant attitudes towards the group, respondents in the positive free speech condition were slightly more tolerant of the group (m=4.87) than respondents in the negative free speech condition (m=4.35, p-value=.02).
groups: free speech positive frame (n=84), free speech negative frame (n=86), free speech neutral frame (n=82), equal protection positive frame (n=88), equal protection negative frame (n=87), equal protection neutral frame (n=81), and the control frame (n=86). I sought to determine whether the presence of framing manipulations had any effect upon willingness to support a hate speech ban on college campuses. Consistent with other findings in this study, the model showed no significant variance among experimental conditions with regards to willingness to support a hate speech ban on college campuses (F=.29, p=.93). I also conducted a pairwise test to determine if certain frames motivated differences in support for a ban on hate speech. Yet, pairwise comparison did not show any variance in mean levels of support for a ban on hate speech when compared across all possible combinations of experimental conditions (p-values >.05).

When I examined the mean level of political tolerance expressed across the experimental conditions, I continued to find a complete lack of effects with regards to the presence of framing manipulations. See the results of figure one below. Figure one illustrates respondents’ mean level of tolerance of across all seven experimental conditions. For the first dependent measure of political tolerance, willingness to tolerate hate speech is captured. Specifically, the first dependent measure of tolerance measures support for allowing Citizens for a New America to speak on the university’s campus. A comparison of means across the seven experimental conditions reveals no significant variance in willingness to allow the hate speech on campus (free speech positive frame, m=3.72, free speech negative frame, m=3.45, free speech neutral frame, m=3.85, equal protection positive frame, m=3.58, equal protection negative frame, m=3.93, equal protection neutral, m=3.57, and the control frame, m=3.79).
Second, examine figure two below. Within figure two, you can view the mean scores regarding the second dependent measure of tolerance across all seven experimental conditions. For the second dependent measure of political tolerance, the willingness to prevent hate speech due to its danger to society is measured. After examining figure two, I can determine there is no significant variation in the mean level of tolerance across experimental conditions (free speech positive frame, m=3.60, free speech negative frame, m=4.05, free speech neutral frame, m=3.86, equal protection positive frame, m=4.02,
equal protection negative frame, \( m=3.60 \), equal protection neutral, \( m=3.92 \), and the control frame, \( m=3.95 \).

**Figure 2**

Respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statement on a seven-point Likert Scale: “Citizens for a New America should not be allowed to visit campus because the group is a danger to society.” Within the response scale, respondents were asked to rank their agreement or disagreement with banning the group from speaking on campus. In the figure below, higher scores reveal more intolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech.

Further, the results of figure three below reveal that there are no significant differences across experimental conditions with regards to the mean levels of the third dependent measure of tolerance. For the third dependent measure of tolerance, I measured support for students protesting the occurrence of hate speech. More precisely, the third dependent measure of tolerance captures support for students
protesting the group’s visit to the university’s campus. Figure three suggests there are no significant differences across all seven experimental conditions in terms of respondents’ willingness to tolerate student protestors (free speech positive frame, m=4.33, free speech negative frame, m=3.99, free speech neutral frame, m=4.23, equal protection positive frame, m=4.20, equal protection negative frame, m=4.24, equal protection neutral, m=3.70, and the control frame, m=4.10).

Figure 3

Respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statement on a seven-point Likert Scale: “It is wrong for students to prevent groups like Citizens for a New America from speaking on campus.” Within the response scale, respondents were asked to rank their agreement or disagreement with the statement. In the figure below, higher scores reveal more tolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech.
In addition, see figure four below. Figure four illustrates the mean level of tolerance across all seven experimental conditions for the fourth dependent measure of political tolerance. The fourth dependent measure of tolerance captures respondents’ support for the right to elicit hate speech. Specifically, the fourth dependent measure of tolerance captures support for the right of Citizens for a New America to speak on the college campus. Figure four demonstrates that there are no clear and visible differences across all seven experimental conditions in terms of respondents’ endorsement of the group’s right to speak on campus (free speech positive frame, m=4.87, free speech negative frame, m=4.35, free speech neutral frame, m=4.66, equal protection positive frame, m=4.58, equal protection negative frame, m=4.64, equal protection neutral, m=4.12, and the control frame, m=4.53).

Figure 4

Respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statement on a seven-point Likert Scale: “Citizens for a New America have a right to speak on campus.” Within the response scale, respondents were asked to rank their agreement or disagreement with the statement. In the figure below, higher scores reveal more tolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech.
It is also useful to examine figure five below. Figure five illustrates the mean levels of tolerance across all seven experimental conditions for the fifth dependent measure of tolerance. The fifth dependent measure of tolerance captures the willingness to tolerate racist hate speech. More specifically, this measure of tolerance captures respondents’ willingness to ban the group’s visit to campus because the group elicits racist remarks. Figure five shows that there is no clear variance between the mean level of tolerance across all seven experimental conditions (free speech positive frame, m=3.65, free speech negative frame, m=4.01, free speech neutral frame, m=3.78, equal protection positive frame, m=3.85, equal protection negative frame, m=3.61, equal protection neutral frame, m=4.06, and the control frame, m=3.74).

**Figure Five**

Respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statement on a seven-point Likert Scale: “Citizens for a New America should not be allowed to visit the campus because the group is racist.” Within the response scale, respondents were asked to rank their agreement or disagreement with the statement. In the figure below, higher scores reveal more intolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech.
Finally, see figure six below. Figure six illustrates the mean level of support for a ban on hate speech across experimental conditions. In order to capture willingness to ban hate speech, respondents were asked about their agreement or disagreement with the decision to ban hate speech on college campuses. Figure six demonstrates that there is no significant differences in respondents’ willingness to ban hate speech on college campuses across experimental conditions (free speech positive frame, $m=4.30$, free speech negative frame, $m=4.54$, free speech neutral frame, $m=4.26$, equal protection positive frame, $m=4.51$, equal protection negative frame, $m=4.44$, equal protection neutral frame, $m=4.60$, and the control frame, $m=4.33$).

**Figure Six**

Respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the following question on a seven-point “How much do you agree or disagree that universities and colleges should ban hate speech on their campus?” Within the response scale, respondents were asked to rank their agreement or disagreement towards banning hate speech on college campuses. In the figure below, higher scores reveal more intolerant attitudes towards the presence of hate speech.
Through examination of figures one through six, it is clear that the effects of the framing manipulations did not produce any significant variance between experimental conditions. Further, not only did one-way ANOVA models for each dependent measure of tolerance fail to reveal significant variance in mean levels of tolerance among experimental conditions (p-values all >.05), but two-way ANOVA models also failed to reveal significant effects of framing manipulations. In the two-way ANOVA models, both the tone of the frame (positive, negative, or neutral) and the content (either the freedom of speech or equal protection) failed to produce significant effects.

While one-way ANOVA models revealed that the presence of framing manipulations was not successful at affecting respondents’ mean level tolerance towards hate speech, I created a two-way ANOVA model to determine if the tone of the frame (positive, negative, or neutral/control) and the content of the frame (equal protection, freedom of speech, or control) affected the mean level of tolerance respondents expressed. First, a two-way ANOVA was run to examine if the effects of tone or frame content had any influence upon toleration of Citizen for a New America’s visit to the university’s campus. In this two-way ANOVA model, variables were created for the tone and content of the frame. The tone variable I constructed had three categories: positive tone, negative tone, and neutral/control tone. The content variable I created also had three categories: freedom of speech content, equal protection content, and neutral/control content. The main effects of the analysis did not show any significant effect with regards to the tone of the frame ($F=0.67, p=0.65$) or the content of the frame ($F=0.29, p=0.83$). Additionally, I included an interaction between the tone of the frame (positive, negative, or neutral/control) and the content of the frame (equal protection, freedom of speech, or control) in this two-way ANOVA model, and interaction between tone and content did not reach significance ($F=0.73, p=0.68$).

Further, I created another two-way ANOVA model to determine if the tone or content of the framing manipulations had any effect upon respondents’ mean level of support for a ban on hate speech. The main effects of the analysis did not show any significant effect with regards to the tone of the frame ($F=0.24, p=0.96$) or the content of the frame ($F=0.86, p=0.46$). Additionally, I included an interaction between the tone of the frame (positive, negative, or neutral/control) and the content of the frame (equal
protection, freedom of speech, or control) in this two-way ANOVA model. The interaction between tone and content of the frames did not reach significance (F=.31, p=.93).

In addition, I conducted multiple regressions for each dependent measure of tolerance using dummy variables created for the tone (positive, negative, or neutral/control) and the content of the frame (equal protection, freedom of speech, or control). I also included an interaction between the tone and content of the frame in the models. After examining the multiple regression model testing the effects of tone and content of the frames, I can determine that the framing manipulations do not predict toleration of the hate speech (p-values all above >.05). For example, the multiple regression model created to analyze the effects of tone (b=.14, t=.73, p=.46), frame content (b=.13, t=.17, p=.78), and the interaction of tone and content (b=.05, t=.86, p=.39) failed to produce any significant results. In each multiple regression model created for each dependent measure of political tolerance, no model revealed that content, tone, or the interaction between tone and content had significant effects upon toleration of hate speech.

Finally, it is useful to consider the results of two multiple regression models. Although my survey experiment failed to demonstrate significant effects of framing manipulations, it did capture variables that predict willingness to tolerate hate speech. Table one displays the results of a multiple regression model predicting support for a ban on hate speech. Looking at the results of the regression model, I can determine that gender, political anxiety, support for free speech, support for equal protection, and partisanship can predict support for a hate speech ban. Among these predictors, I must note that support the freedom of speech and political anxiety most strongly predict willingness to support a ban on hate speech. As individuals become more politically anxious, they are more likely to support a ban on hate speech (b=.22, p=.004). But, as individuals report stronger support for the freedom of speech, they are more likely to oppose a ban on hate speech (b=−.39, p<.001). Given the large beta weight and extremely small p-value, freedom of speech strongly affects willingness to support a ban on hate speech.
Table 1: Predicting Support for Hate Speech Ban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for Hate Speech Ban</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political anxiety</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General anxiety</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-1.38</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for equal protection</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for free speech</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-3.92</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lastly, refer to table two for the results of a multiple regression model predicting willingness to tolerate hate speech. Based upon the results of this regression model, only partisanship, support for free speech, and support for equal protection significantly predict willingness to tolerate hate speech. This model reveals that as individuals become stronger Republicans, they are more willing to tolerate the presence of hate speech \((b=0.11, \ p=.02)\). Consistent with other findings within the experiment\(^{24}\), stronger support for the freedom of speech, predicts more willingness tolerate hate speech \((b=.36, \ p<.001)\), and stronger support for the right to equal protection, predicts more intolerance towards the presence of hate speech \((b=-.31, \ p<.001)\).

\(^{24}\) I also created a one-way ANOVA model to determine if mean support for a hate speech ban among different levels of support for the freedom of speech. In this model, respondents were sorted into seven different categories based upon their support for the freedom of speech (very weak support \(n=123\), weak support \(n=127\), somewhat weak support \(n=85\), neither weak nor strong support \(n=75\), somewhat strong support \(n=89\), strong support \(n=58\), and strong support \(n=37\)). The analysis of the model revealed that the mean level of support for hate speech significantly varied by the strength of respondents’ support for the freedom of speech \((F=8.27, \ p<.01)\). Specifically, as respondents reported stronger support for the freedom of speech, they reported less support for a potential hate speech ban (Very weak support \(m=5.08\), weak support \(m=5.02\), somewhat weak support \(m=5.03\), neither weak nor strong support \(m=4.88\), somewhat strong support \(m=4.59\), strong support \(m=3.93\) and strong support \(m=3.59\)).
After examining mean levels of tolerance across experimental conditions, the results of multiple regression models, and the results of both one-way and two-way ANOVA models, I am unable to accept any of my hypotheses. I am also unable to reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the experimental categories is zero. While some may be surprised at the complete lack of effects that framing manipulations had upon toleration of hate speech, my results suggest that the lack of effects are not due to error or fault in experimental design. Because my study successfully identified variables that can predict toleration of hate speech [see table one and table two], the lack of effects with regards to framing suggests that a flawed experimental design cannot explain the failure of the framing manipulations. Instead, respondents genuinely did not react to the framing manipulations designed to affect their reaction to the hate speech scenario.

Further, because my framing manipulations were nearly the same length, it is unlikely that the failure in the frames’ design was responsible for the lack of effects. Respondents in the study were also highly engaged and reacted well to stimuli throughout the survey. In fact, approximately 77% respondents gave optional text responses at the end of the survey when asked to share their opinions about hate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Predicting Toleration of Hate Speech</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toleration of Hate Speech on Campus</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>.13</td>
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<td>.07</td>
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<td>-1.74.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>.329</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for equal protection</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for free speech</td>
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<tr>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.53</td>
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<td>.026</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frame</td>
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<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.03.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.09.</td>
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<tr>
<td>.925</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
speech. Finally, respondents were subject to a manipulation check after reading their assigned frame. The manipulation check ensured that respondents read and processed the frame they were assigned to read. Any respondents who failed the manipulation check (n=5) were removed from the data set. Respondents were also subject to an additional attention check in the survey to ensure they were giving full attention. Respondents who failed the attention check (n=1) were also removed from the data set.

Therefore, the failure of framing manipulations is not reflective of a flawed experimental design or poor-quality responses from respondents. Rather, the complete lack of effects with regards to framing manipulations may be explained by the fact that other considerations, such as partisanship, ideology, gender, and anxiety, influenced and affected the decision-making process regarding hate speech toleration. When respondents were deciding whether or not to tolerate the proposed scenario of hateful and offensive speech, the framing manipulations served as contemporary information in their decision-making process. However, it appears that the use framing manipulations as contemporary information in the decision-making process was not persuasive enough to produce any effects upon respondents’ decision to tolerate the hateful and offensive speech. Instead, other variables [see table one and two] including anxiety, partisanship, support for equal protection, and support for free speech, affected the decision to tolerate hateful and offensive speech. Given these results, I can conclude that either the frames had absolutely no persuasive effect when serving as contemporary information in the respondents’ decision-making process, or that any marginal effect of the framing manipulations were outweighed by the effects of other variables within the decision-making process. As a result, I can determine this study demonstrated the presence of framing manipulations had no effect upon individuals’ toleration of hate speech.

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25 After reading their assigned frame, respondents were asked “What constitutional principle did you just read about?”

26 After answering questions about their reaction to hate speech, respondents were asked to select the number eight from a list of numbers to report they were paying attention.
Discussion and Implications

My analysis of the results from my survey experiment are extremely interesting. Not only do my results suggest framing may have no effect upon willingness to tolerate hate speech, but the findings revealed other underlying factors that predict the willingness to tolerate hate speech. As such, my findings can be considered relatively surprising and highly intriguing. Several implications can be derived from the results of my analysis.

First, my findings reveal that the use of framing manipulations designed to affect willingness to tolerate hate speech are not effective. Despite the use of positive and negative framing of persuasive messages regarding the freedom of speech and equal protection, the use of framing failed to affect willingness to tolerate hateful and offensive speech. Across five dependent measures of tolerance, the framing manipulations did not produce any significance variance in mean levels of tolerance when compared across framing categories. Further, the analysis revealed the use of equal protection and freedom of speech framing failed to produce effects. The finding that the use of equal protection and freedom of speech frames produced no significant effects upon willingness to tolerate hate speech is noteworthy because it implies attempts to influence decisions to tolerate hate speech through framing of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights is not effective.

Because my study suggests that framing manipulations are not effective at influencing toleration of hate speech, the potential implications of this finding are profound. Given politicians, media, advertising, and other industries employ framing in order to influence public opinion, the finding that framing is ineffective at influencing toleration of hate speech suggests individuals are not easily susceptible to overt attempts to influence their decision-making. Because the use of framing was highly ineffective at influencing willingness to tolerate hate speech, it is wise for future research to continue to explore if framing manipulations can affect willingness to tolerate hate speech. Future studies should determine if different framing manipulations can be effective at producing changes in willingness to
tolerate hate speech, or if framing manipulations are no longer effective at influencing the outcome of decisions regarding the toleration of hate speech.

Considering framing manipulations were ineffective, while other factors such as partisanship, ideology, and support for the freedom of speech and equal protection predict willingness to support hate speech, the results of this study suggest that the influence of other preexisting factors overrides potential effects of framing manipulations. Specifically, my findings indicate partisanship, gender, political ideology, and support for First and Fourteenth Amendment rights may explain and predict willingness to tolerate hate speech.

It is particularly interesting to note the effects of partisanship and partisan ideology. While previous research has found that conservatives can be much more intolerant, my findings reveal that Democrats and those who have liberal political ideologies are more intolerant. Although my findings show Democrats and liberals to be much more intolerant of hate speech, I cannot conclude that Democrats or liberals are more politically intolerant overall. Because the willingness to protect hate speech is only one way to measure political tolerance, I cannot conclude Democrats are more politically intolerant in general. In addition, it is noteworthy that my results demonstrate no effect of partisanship upon willingness to support punching, physical blockades, or violence in reaction to hate speech. Because some pundits may attempt to claim association between partisanship and support for violent confrontations, the finding partisanship cannot explain willingness to support violent reactions to hate speech is important.

Finally, my results suggest support for the freedom of speech and the right to equal protection have a much more significant role than previously considered. Out of all variables, the freedom of speech can best predict willingness to tolerate hate speech. This implies that support for the freedom of speech produces the strongest influence upon willingness to tolerate hateful, offensive, and racist speech. Yet, my findings imply that support for equal protection predicts more intolerance of hate speech. Because my study demonstrates equal protection motivates intolerance of hateful, offensive, and racist, speech, it
implies that individuals who value and support the right to equal protection are willing to act in intolerant manner in an effort to protect equality, equal protection, or the right to equal treatment.

Ultimately, my findings challenge the perception that individual decision-making can be easily influenced through persuasive framing manipulations. In the context of tolerating hate speech on a college campus, the failure of framing manipulations to produce any changes in toleration of hate speech implies that use of persuasive frames as contemporary information is not effective at changing the ultimate outcome of an individual decision. As instances of hateful, offensive, and racist speech are on the rise, it is important for future research to determine if different framing manipulations can be used to motivate peaceful and tolerant reactions to hate speech.

**Conclusion**

This study demonstrated that framing of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights does not affect toleration of hate speech on a college campus. As previous research has not found so little effects with regards to framing manipulations, my findings should motivate further inquiry into the role of framing within individual decision-making. Although my study does not prove framing can no longer be effective, my findings challenge the perception that the outcome of individual decisions can be easily manipulated or influenced through framing. Given the ubiquity of framing within media, politics, journalism, and advertising, my findings potentially open the door for reexamination into the ability of framing manipulations to influence individual decisions regarding political tolerance.
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