A National Security Threat: Washington's Conflicting Response to Climate Change in Northern Pakistan

Katherine Henjum
Katherine.Henjum@Colorado.EDU

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses

Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, Environmental Indicators and Impact Assessment Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
https://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses/1364

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
A National Security Threat: Washington’s Conflicting Response to Climate Change in Northern Pakistan

Katherine H. Henjum

Undergraduate Honors Thesis
Submitted to the Department of International Affairs
University of Colorado at Boulder

Defended March 22, 2017

Advisor:
Dr. Douglas J. Snyder, Dept. of History and Program in International Affairs

Defense Committee:
Dr. Douglas J. Snyder, Dept. of History and Program in International Affairs
Dr. David Zierler, Historian, United States Department of State
Dr. Lucy Chester, Dept. of International Affairs
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my parents, my greatest sources of support and encouragement.

To Dr. Douglas Snyder, the primary advisor for this thesis, who enthusiastically and willingly dedicated many hours to reviewing countless drafts and engaging in conversation and idea development. Thank you.

Deserving special mention is Dr. David Zierler who introduced me to the significance of the connection between climate change and national security during my studies in Washington, D.C. Thank you for planting the seed that grew into the idea for this thesis and aiding me in its development over these many months.

And to my many secondary readers, who generously donated their time over the past year.

*Disclaimer: the views expressed by Dr. David Zierler in connection with my thesis are his alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government.*
ABSTRACT

“Pakistan is among the most vulnerable countries facing climate risks. Mechanisms need to be devised for greener, more resilient options for growth and sustainable development... the climate change clock is ticking too fast and the time to act is here and now.” – Marc-Andre Franche, Director of the United Nations Development Program in Pakistan

Developing countries such as Pakistan are particularly susceptible to the negative implications of changing climates as they face regional and in-country terrorism and violence, as well as infrastructure and government institutions that are still evolving. This thesis examines the intersection of climate change and national security through an analysis of shifting monsoon patterns and the subsequent impacts on vulnerable and displaced populations in northern Pakistan.

Over the past decade, the United States has chosen to act through two primary foreign policy methods: a military oriented approach focused on drone strikes and a humanitarian approach focused on foreign aid and development. While both serve specific purposes, this thesis argues that in the case of Pakistan, a multilateral humanitarian approach concentrated on the sustainable development and growth of Pakistan’s institutions, infrastructure, and communities will best serve U.S. interests and security in the long-term.

It is crucial for global stability to understand the ways in which changing climates impact the security interests of the United States and the international community as a whole when developing policy aimed at protecting and advancing those interests. This thesis identifies the ways in which changing climates serve as threat multipliers, exacerbating already existing fragilities and conflicts that put the security and interests of the United States at risk. By doing so, this thesis demonstrates the critical importance of examining foreign policy and national security through a climate lens.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. **INTRODUCTION** ........................................................................................................................................... 1  
   Methodology.................................................................................................................................................. 4  
   Literature Review........................................................................................................................................... 7

II. **CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS** ......................................................... 16  
   Climate Change........................................................................................................................................... 16  
   Shifting Monsoon Patterns.............................................................................................................................. 16  
   Causation v. Correlation................................................................................................................................ 17  
   Impact on Policy........................................................................................................................................... 19  
   Internally Displaced Persons......................................................................................................................... 21  
   Demographics................................................................................................................................................ 21  
   Vulnerabilities............................................................................................................................................... 22  
   Impact........................................................................................................................................................... 24

III. **SECURITY THREAT: ASSESSING U.S. INTERESTS** .................................................................................... 27  
   Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan............................................................................................................................... 27  
   History.......................................................................................................................................................... 27  
   Recruitment.................................................................................................................................................. 30  
   Impact of Monsoon Flooding......................................................................................................................... 32  
   U.S. Interests................................................................................................................................................ 34  
   Regional and Global Security....................................................................................................................... 32

IV. **FOREIGN POLICY: U.S. RESPONSE** ........................................................................................................ 39  
   Drones.......................................................................................................................................................... 39  
   Effectiveness............................................................................................................................................... 39  
   Public Perception......................................................................................................................................... 42  
   Flawed Policy............................................................................................................................................. 44  
   Humanitarian Assistance............................................................................................................................... 48  
   History of U.S. Aid to Pakistan....................................................................................................................... 48  
   Multilateral v. Bilateral Approach to Foreign Aid......................................................................................... 52  
   Climate Lens............................................................................................................................................... 54  
   Short and Long Term Goals......................................................................................................................... 57

V. **CONCLUSION**.............................................................................................................................................. 61  
   Summary of Findings.................................................................................................................................... 61  
   Looking Forward........................................................................................................................................... 66

VI. **BIBLIOGRAPHY** .......................................................................................................................................... 70
I. INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, there has been significant expansion in the discussion of climate change as a national security threat by key politicians and world leaders, including former President Barack Obama. As the New York Times reported in the last months of Mr. Obama’s presidency, “Climate change, Mr. Obama often says, is the greatest long-term threat facing the world, as well as a danger already manifesting itself as droughts, storms, heat waves and flooding.” In fact, Mr. Obama “believes that his efforts to slow the warming of the planet will be the most consequential legacy of his presidency.”

As a result of the unfolding effects of climate change, governments face security risks that can extend beyond local jurisdictions and national borders. Environmental scientists predict that global warming will increase the incidence of severe weather, including flooding from monsoon rains in especially vulnerable areas. In northwestern Pakistan, the growing problem of internally displaced people (IDPs) due to the intensification of such flooding amplifies political volatility in a region where the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has taken hold. The Taliban’s expansion into nearby countries, paired with Washington’s challenging relationship with the Pakistani government, makes this Islamic Republic the epicenter of geopolitical research on the impact of climate change as a national security threat.

A number of entities (including both the US and Pakistani governments) have diverging interests in Pakistan and the region as a whole, resulting in a disjointed and often counterproductive set of responses, the collective result of which is the alienation of an already vulnerable population of IDPs. The two most prominent policies currently used by the United States in this region are drone strikes and humanitarian assistance. This thesis addresses the

following questions: Why should climate change be considered a top national security threat? How can policy makers in Washington best address the rising threats as a result of changing climates? To what extent should the United States rely upon military and counterterrorism tactics such as drone strikes? Are their interests better protected and advanced through a humanitarian approach?

While neither drone strikes nor humanitarian assistance provide perfect solutions, this thesis will demonstrate that a larger focus on humanitarian orientated policy will better allow the United States to actively work to combat the effects of climate change in Pakistan. This thesis will present evidence that supports the argument that drone strikes further alienate vulnerable populations, creating additional hostility toward the United States and greater favorability of terrorist organizations like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan who capitalize on those vulnerabilities. In addition to creating opportunity to foster positive relationships between Pakistan and the United States, humanitarian assistance also allows the United States to focus on adjusting its foreign policy to maximize sustainable development for the Pakistani people, thereby minimizing potential security threats to the homeland and its partners in the region.

This thesis outlines select general policy recommendations for the United States moving forward, however, the primary purpose of this thesis is to bring attention to the importance of the interplay between two disciplines: climate science and national security, that have traditionally existed separately from one another. Varying arguments continue to be made about what is causing the climate to change and Earth’s temperature to rise. However, the reality of those events cannot be argued against. Now, more than ever, communities and governments must examine policy in every arena – but especially foreign policy and national security – through a climate lens, recognizing the role that changing climate plays in creating and exacerbating threats
and instability in various regions of the world. In the introduction to the book, *Climate Change and American Foreign Policy*, editor Paul G. Harris states, “understanding the complexities of American foreign policy is one of the prerequisites for understanding the larger international debate and the intricacies of global collective action on climate change.”\(^2\) The United States, being the world hegemon, has a great deal of responsibility and influence and should therefore represent and exemplify best practices for the interplay between climate change and foreign policy.

Methodology

International Affairs is a richly diverse and interdisciplinary field of study, incorporating a range of research methods used within the humanities and social sciences. To conduct research and create a framework of analysis, this thesis draws from various methodologies from a number of fields such as political science, history, and environmental science.

Outside the field of International Affairs, empirical and theoretical evidence frequently exist separately from one another. Because of this separation, the argument is often made that scientific conclusions or evidence should not be applied to study or explain the social or political world. In this thesis, I draw upon multiple methodologies to legitimize the basis of my argument in order to demonstrate that there is a clear and indispensable intersection between the empirical: climate science, and the theoretical: national security. Keeping empirical and theoretical evidence separate from one another when asking questions about how and why the world works and operates the way it does is an obstacle to the natural and necessary progression of policy and ignores the interconnected nature of the world and its many moving parts. While empirical evidence such as the collection of scientific data can be used to generate hypotheses to explain the physical world, the conclusions drawn should also be used to describe and understand social and political events happening in the modern world. Therefore, in this thesis I draw upon and join together a range of methods that traditionally exist apart from one another in order to develop a truly interdisciplinary approach to foreign policy.

The science behind shifting monsoon patterns in Pakistan is fundamentally important in explaining the impacts that those patterns have had on Pakistan and its population, and the subsequent security implications that have been enhanced as a result. While I did not personally

---

conduct any of the scientific experiments mentioned within this thesis, the scientific method—founded in the collection and observation of data and the formation of a hypothesis to explain patterns found in the data—was used by the scientists mentioned to come to the conclusions about the relationship between changing monsoon patterns and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.⁴

In tandem with the conclusions drawn from scientific methodology, I was able to use evidence collected through political science and historical methodologies such as the examination of cases studies and independent reports on topics ranging from national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism. Insight from elected officials, experts in the fields mentioned such as Michele Flournoy, Patrick Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi and witness testimony from congressional hearings were used to examine U.S. foreign policy—specifically national security—through a climate lens. Historian Melvyn Leffler defines national security policy as encompassing “the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats.”⁵ Leffler emphasizes the importance of looking at “the structure of the international system as well as the domestic ideas and interests shaping policy” in order to “overcome some of the great divides in the study of American diplomatic history.”⁶ I have used this definition of national security provided by Leffler to guide the structure, theories, and analyses developed in this thesis.

Throughout my research, it was challenging to find sources that made the same connections I make in my thesis that clearly establish a relationship between climate change and

---

⁴ For an overview of the science behind climate discussion see Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Age of Sustainable Development.
⁶ Ibid.
national security. This was not just unique to sources relating to Pakistan. It was equally challenging to find literature focused on other countries and regions of the world that demonstrate a clear connection between rapidly changing climates and subsequent security risks. I used a range of methods to conduct research and gather sources, including but not limited to, the use of ProQuest Congressional to access government documents and the University of Colorado Boulder library system to access relevant books and academic journals. While some supplementary information was gathered from newspapers and other news outlets such as The New York Times, the foundation of my research comes from academic journals and primary sources such as congressional testimony from experts to ensure validity and authority on the topics at hand.

The lack of literature and research that examines foreign policy and national security specifically through a climate lens reveals just how neglected – and new – the field of study is and emphasizes the importance of its expansion. Through the use of methodologies from various disciplines and the crossing of empirical and theoretical evidence, this thesis aims not only to establish the importance of examining national security through a climate lens, but also to be a source itself that exemplifies this intersection in a real world context.
Literature Review

Climate Change: Shifting Monsoon Patterns

Climate science is becoming an increasingly significant and necessary field of study, and the relevant literature is vast. In addition to literature about the physical science and factors behind the shifts in weather patterns, climate science literature in relation to national security is a quickly evolving field of study.

While there is evidence that suggests a relationship between shifts in monsoon patterns leading to increased monsoon rains and subsequent flooding, there is also an growing body of literature that addresses the difficulty of attributing direct causality between the two factors at this point in time. Scientists at the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology and the National Centre for Atmospheric Science-Climate are among those who have observed and believe there to be a relationship between monsoon rains and increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. However, according to experts at the Congressional Research Service, “although monsoon’s floodwaters appear broadly consistent with predicted climate change impacts for the region, it is currently not possible to attribute direct causality.”7 Additionally, while many of the scientists who convened at the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) project “more frequent and more intense weather events due to global warming,” they also report that more time will be needed to connect specific weather events to changes in climate.8 That being said, although patterns in monsoon flooding have shifted recently and while it might not be sufficient enough time to make a direct connection, because these monsoons are displacing millions of people and it seems to be a new pattern that has emerged from recent changes in

8 Ibid., 27.
climate, this thesis will rely more heavily on literature and evidence that suggests there is direct causation.

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), starting in 2010, northwestern Pakistan began to experience extreme monsoon rains that resulted in devastating flooding displacing upwards of 11 million people. In 2011, another 4 million were displaced, of whom 35% had also fled during the 2010 monsoon season.\(^9\) IDMC reported that in 2011, 57% of all IDPs living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) a northwestern province on Pakistan, are under the age of 18; 60% are children; and 8% are under the age of 5.\(^10\)

Studies suggest that young populations, especially those who have lost their homes and families, are especially vulnerable and susceptible to being recruited by terrorist organizations such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A case study by Patrick Johnson and Anoop Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Pakistan,” published by the *International Studies Quarterly*, stated that one of the four reasons terrorist organizations are believed to target civilians is because “civilians are often ‘softer’ targets and are more plentiful in these groups’ areas of operation due to relative lack of government and military presence in the region”.\(^11\)

When the government structure is weak and unable to provide for its citizens - as is the case in northwestern Pakistan - terrorist organizations have the opportunity to take advantage of the vulnerable populations, specifically the young IDPs who have lost their homes and their families.

IDP populations in Pakistan have faced years of chaos and displacement that continue to contribute to their vulnerabilities. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service  

---

\(^9\) Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Pakistan: Displacement caused by conflict and natural disasters, achievements and challenges.”

\(^10\) Ibid.

that provides an overview of the flooding in Pakistan, “Several regional populations of Pakistanis have undergone cycles of displacement from militancy and military operations. Before the flooding, for example, the Pakistani military initiated the return of approximately 2.9 million displaced people in the Malakand region of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). With the flooding, many of the returning displaced populations have been displaced yet again with additional damage to infrastructure and households.”

Literature that covers topics such as IDPs, more specifically the vulnerabilities that they face, often appears to be based on assumptions generated from observations. When researching terrorist organizations and how they interact with these populations, the validity of the claims that are made must be carefully assessed. Sources that come from the terrorist organizations directly and that are used to brief government organizations and officials or generate additional reports are not always completely reliable: therefore, it is necessary to view such sources through a skeptical lens. However, a review of the literature on the topic of IDPs and their vulnerabilities to the TTP, does indicate that most experts in the field assert a connection between IDP vulnerability and the TTP. This connection, validated by much of the literature outlined above, will serve as the key foundation for many of the arguments made in this thesis: IDPs are vulnerable and susceptible to Taliban recruitment, and because of this, the United States must continue to closely monitor the situation and remain alert to the various risks posed to regional security and national interests.

**The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)**

Over the past several decades – and especially since the events that occurred on 9/11 – there has been a rise in government organizations and experts dedicated to studying and

---

12 Kronstadt et al., 11.
combating terrorism. There is significant literature that addresses terrorist organizations, their leadership, goals, and motives. The primary focus for the purpose of this literature review and thesis is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, specifically the way they interact with IDP populations in Pakistan and the threat they pose to regional security and U.S. interests.

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formally established in 2007 as an umbrella organization bringing together some 40 Islamic militant leaders and their groups from across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Their primary objective is to overthrow the Pakistani government and replace it with an Islamic emirate similar to the one created by the Afghan Taliban in the late 1990s.  

The expansion of the Taliban from Afghanistan into Pakistan has created regional security implications that have subsequently threatened the United States and the international community. The surge in IDPs is a contributing factor to the rapidly expanding TTP Pakistan presence in the region.

Recruitment

Recruitment strategies used by terrorist organizations is one of the most difficult areas in which to find research. Going beyond just obtaining the literature, making sure that it is accurate and reliable presents additional challenges. As is the same with literature on IDPs and their vulnerabilities, conclusions made about Taliban recruitment are likely to come from observations.

The Congressional Research Service report on the overview of flooding in Pakistan addresses how factors such as poor government infrastructure, slow response time to natural disasters, and military operations contribute to Taliban recruitment efforts. The report states:

---

13 Abbas. “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” 2.
“While ongoing U.S. and NATO military operations in neighboring Afghanistan are relatively unaffected, the circumstances inside Pakistan appear to be providing time and space for both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban militants, as well as numerous other assorted indigenous Islamist extremist groups, to regroup.”

The report goes on to address that, “by undertaking disaster relief efforts in areas poorly served by the government, Islamist charities linked to such groups could boost recruitment and improve their standing with affected residents.”

Several sources including the U.S. News and World Report and the International Studies Quarterly have published works addressing the impact that U.S. drone strikes have on displaced populations in Pakistan and how they ultimately aid the TTP in recruiting members. Currently, drone strikes targeting TPP and FATA militants represent a primary action used to combat the security issue resulting from increased populations of IDPs susceptible to Taliban recruitment in northwestern Pakistan.

An article by Aamir Latif in U.S. News and World Report provides evidence that drone strikes have pushed young IDPs, specifically young men, into the arms of the TTP. “A recent report by Pakistan's intelligence agencies suggests that hundreds of angry young men, who earlier along with their families had taken shelter in different refugee camps set up by the government with the help of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, have joined the Taliban ranks during the past few months.”

14 Kronstadt et al., 21.
15 Ibid.
16 See Aamir Latif, “Taliban Finds Fertile Recruiting Ground in Pakistan’s Refugee Camps” and Johnston and Sarbahi, ”The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan.”
17 Aamir Latif, “Taliban Finds Fertile Recruiting Ground in Pakistan’s Refugee Camps.”
While these sources are important accounts and examples of some of the strategies and opportunities that the TTP have capitalized on to recruit members, literature on more concrete methods is still lacking.

**Washington’s Response: Drones**

There is a vast amount of literature both from proponents and adversaries of drone policy that examine the various impacts. There is an especially substantive volume of literature addressing drone policy in Pakistan directly, as Washington’s primary use of drones covers Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.\(^\text{18}\) A study conducted by Patrick Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi about the impact of U.S. drone strikes suggests: “Given the relative sparseness of Pakistani government presence with a heavy reliance on local, usually civilian, actors and the absence of US boots on the ground, the civilian population is by far the largest and most important “target set” for FATA militants seeking to establish, maintain, and consolidate a territorial sanctuary in Pakistan.”\(^\text{19}\) In addition to the findings of Johnston and Sarbahi, there were two articles written in *Foreign Affairs*, one in favor of drone policy, another against. Audrey Cronin, author to the *Foreign Affairs* article, “Why Drones Fail”, argues along lines similar to that of Johnston and Sarbahi. Cronin states: “Like any other weapon, armed drones can be tactically useful. But are they helping advance the strategic goals of U.S. counterterrorism? … The main goals of U.S. counterterrorism are threefold: the strategic defeat of al Qaeda and groups affiliated with is, the containment of local conflicts so that they do no breed new enemies, and the preservation of the security of the American people.”\(^\text{20}\) Cronin goes on to make that assertion that, “drones do not serve all these goals. Although they can protect the American people from attacks in the short

\(^{18}\) Byman. “Why Drones Work”, 32.

\(^{19}\) Johnston and Sarbahi. ”The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” 208.

\(^{20}\) Cronin. “Why Drones Fail”, 44.
term, they are not helping to defeat al Qaeda, and they may be creating sworn enemies out of a sea of local insurgents.”

According to the other article in Foreign Affairs written by Daniel Byman titled “Why Drones Work”, he even concedes that polls have found that the “Pakistani public is vehemently opposed to U.S. drone strikes.” Byman states that “A 2012 poll found that 74 percent of Pakistanis viewed the United States as their enemy, likely in part because of the ongoing drone campaign...This has led critics to argue that the drone program is shortsighted: that it kills today’s enemies but creates tomorrow’s in the process.”

**Washington’s Response: Humanitarian Assistance**

Governments around the world deliver humanitarian aid and assistance to countries and regions that experience disaster and conflict. There are a variety of scholars in the field of humanitarianism including The International Committee of the Red Cross who have developed a “gold standard” of what humanitarianism should look like and encompass. “The standard entails: the independent, neutral, and impartial provision of relief to victims of armed conflict and natural disasters – in short, to save those at immediate risk of death.” Michael Barnett, author of “Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism” echoes the importance of independence, neutrality, and impartiality in humanitarianism: “impartiality, for they must give aid based on need, not on who is being helped or where they live; neutrality, for they must avoid

21 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
appearing to act in ways that favor one side or another; and independence, for they must be unconnected to any party with a stake in the conflict.”

This thesis will examine the various humanitarian practices used by the United States Government and government-related aid organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). When controlled by government, or directly related to government, research suggests that humanitarian action doesn’t always align with the above definitions.

**Threat to Regional Security and U.S. Interests**

A Congressional Research Report on “Security and the Environment in Pakistan” states that, “Pakistan is of great interest to the national security of the United States. U.S. Interests are primarily focused on Pakistan’s ability to control its territory to prevent it from being used as a haven for anti-American terrorists and prevent inter-state conflict with India that would be regionally destabilizing or worse, given their nuclear weapons…To this end, U.S. assistance may increasingly take into consideration the potential negative impact that environmental stress, particularly water shortages and its impact on food security, may have as a threat multiplier.”

In addition to water shortages and food security, for the purpose of this research, monsoon floods that displace millions of Pakistanis may also be considered one of the negative impacts that environmental stress may have as a threat multiplier.

During a hearing on Climate Change and Global Security before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sharon Burke, vice president of the Center for a New American Security, submitted comments for the record addressing the risk Pakistan poses to U.S. security. “While there are many cases in which climate change will combine with economic, political, and social

---

27 Vaughn et al., 18.
factors in ways that pose national security challenges to the United States, Pakistan is an especially stark example. Today, Pakistan is the only state with nuclear weapons ranked at highest risk for state failure in the Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy Failed States Index. By this ranking, even North Korea is more stable. Pakistan’s instability, internal governance, economic fragility, and social divisions are of constant concern to the United States and our allies.”

Research on the threat to regional security and U.S. interests due to climate change and increased IDPs and their susceptibility to Taliban recruitment is one of the areas of research that is not lacking in substantive literature. The United States Government and various additional actors and experts in the national security field have conducted extensive research and collected vast amounts of intelligence on terrorist organizations and the threats that they may pose to the United States. This thesis will add to related content on U.S. national security threats, with a particular emphasis on the role that climate change plays in contributing to those security threats.

---

II. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Climate Change

As Earth’s climate continues to change, incidents of severe weather increase with it. Massive floods and devastating droughts alter lands and displace populations. Recent events of extreme environmental distress have often led to civil unrest and increasing conflict in vulnerable areas. Changes in climate have caused alarm not only among populations directly affected, but also among governments who must respond to these disasters. Due to an increasingly globalized world, reactionary discourse no longer starts and stops with the countries directly affected. It involves discussion and action from regional partners and global hegemonies that have interests in the countries affected. In the case of Pakistan, monsoon flooding has destroyed lands and displaced millions of people. In 2010, the flooding of the Indus River as a result of intense rains initially displaced upwards of 11 million people; in 2011, another four million were displaced during the monsoon season, of which 35% had fled during the 2010 monsoon season.29

Shifting Monsoon Patterns

Traditionally, strong monsoon conditions appear where the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean converge. Regionally, this includes India and Southeast Asia on the northern side of the equator.30 A common geographic marker used in observing and indicating monsoon weather patterns is the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) that fluctuates over the equator. The ITCZ passes through southern Pakistan and northern India, but in recent years monsoon rains

---

29 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Pakistan: Displacement caused by conflict and natural disasters, achievements and challenges.”
and flooding have been observed at elevated and abnormal levels in northern Pakistan. The monsoon flooding that displaced so many people in 2010 and 2011 was centered north, over one of Pakistan’s driest regions. Abdul Qadir from the United Nations Development Program when commenting on the monsoon flooding that occurred in 2010 and 2011 stated: “Never before have the monsoons gone that far north. I think this was the first time in recorded history that there was so much rain in the high alpine areas, and that really basically created these flash floods.”

Findings from research and observations conducted by climate and atmospheric scientists have shown that there may be a correlation between changing monsoon patterns and climate change, specifically the rise of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Scientists at the National Centre for Atmospheric Science-Climate have found that the intensity of monsoon rains and resulting floods have shifted as carbon dioxide levels have increased in the atmosphere. They state that, “Over the next 50-100 years, there will be an increase in rainfall in most monsoon regions as climate warms due to the rising levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.”

Causation v. Correlation

Climate scientists focused on studying the effects of increased CO2 levels on monsoons have conducted various experiments. Scientists at the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology “used a set of experiments with CO2 multiplied by a factor or two, four and sixteen with respect to present-day mean value…The non-linearity in terms of the mean global climate response to atmospheric forcing found in the most extreme experiment may give hints in the

---

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
understanding of the changes in the monsoon thermodynamics.”\textsuperscript{34} Essentially, their experiments found a relationship between warmer atmospheric temperature and increased atmospheric water holding capacity. A variety of scientists collaborated on a study examining Asian monsoon patterns that collected data that suggests the monsoon system is much older than originally anticipated. “The monsoon system emerged at a time when levels of carbon dioxide were three or four times what they are today…It then weakened as carbon dioxide levels gradually reduced and the Earth entered an ice age 34 million years ago. The study reinforces what scientists already know – that there is a connection between the strength of the greenhouse effect and the Asian monsoon system.”\textsuperscript{35} Dr. Alexis Licht, one of the lead authors of the study believes that “this suggests that the monsoons may be more sensitive to global climate change than we thought.”\textsuperscript{36}

There is evidence and general consensus among climate scientists that there is a strong correlation between monsoon rain intensity and increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.\textsuperscript{37} However, while correlation is widely recognized, there is some dispute among climate scientists about causality. Some scientists speak to the difficulty of attributing direct causality between the two factors at this point in time. According to experts at the Congressional Research Service, “although monsoon’s floodwaters appear broadly consistent with predicted climate change impacts for the region, it is currently not possible to attribute direct causality.”\textsuperscript{38} Additionally, while many of the scientists who convened at the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on

\textsuperscript{34} Cherchi et al. “Effects of increased CO2 levels on monsoons,” 3.
\textsuperscript{35} Licht, “Asian monsoons in a late Eocene greenhouse world,” 4.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{37} National Center for Scientific Research.
Climate Change (IPCC) project “more frequent and more intense weather events due to global warming” they also report that more time will be needed to connect specific weather events to changes in climate.\(^{39}\) While acknowledging that more time may be needed to assert concrete causation, examining recent trends and patterns between rising carbon dioxide levels and increasing monsoon rains leads to an understanding that in all likelihood, climate change is amplifying the monsoon phenomenon.

**Impact on Policy**

Climate policy that specifically addresses rising carbon emissions and temperatures should be a priority of all governments globally, especially as more and more countries begin to experience first hand the consequences of a volatile changing climate. In the last decade, there has been significant expansion in the discussion of climate change as a national security threat by key politicians and world leaders, including former president Barack Obama. As the New York Times reported, “Climate change, Mr. Obama often says, is the greatest long-term threat facing the world, as well as a danger already manifesting itself as droughts, storms, heat waves and flooding. More than health care, more than righting a sinking economic ship, more than the historic first of an African-American president.”\(^{40}\) However, actual changes in foreign policy relating to national security or counterterrorism measures as a response to changing climates have yet to manifest.

There is considerable research that has generated proposals and protocols to address carbon emission standards, clean energy investments, energy security and the like. Environmental scientists, policy makers, and academics have produced reports and entire books,

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 27.
many with titles and content conveying a new strategy for foreign policy relating to climate change. Upon examining those reports however, there is rarely – if ever – a mention of how foreign policy must be altered as a result of climate change to address new security threats. Instead the reports touch on the various ways in which governments around the world must alter climate policy specifically. It is becoming increasingly evident that many security risks are being created or further exacerbated by changing climates and therefore traditional foreign policy approaches must be altered to reflect those changes.

While climate policy should be a top priority of governments, policy to address the direct effects of the changing climate must be discussed, shaped, and implemented productively and sustainably. In September of 2016, Earth surpassed the threshold of 400-ppm carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This came as a harsh reality for many. Ralph Keeling, the scientist who runs the program for carbon dioxide monitoring at the Scripps Institute for Oceanography stated that it would be almost impossible for the carbon dioxide level to dip back below 400 ppm even if October yielded a lower monthly value than September. Given this sobering event, there is no climate policy that could reverse these results overnight. Governments must act through policy that directly targets the effects of severe weather events to prevent further distress and, in the case of Pakistan, the displacement of vulnerable Pakistanis that further intensifies regional and global security issues.

Kahn. “Earth’s CO2 Passes the 400 PPM Threshold – Maybe Permanently.”
Internally Displaced Persons

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is one of the leading organizations focused on studying, tracking, and assisting the displacement of people globally. Recognized and endorsed since 1998 by the United Nations General Assembly, the IDMC not only monitors and tracks global displacement but continues to be the leading analyst, informer, and influencer of policy and subsequent action for governments faced with internal displacement. By working with a range of partners from governments to the United Nations to civil society organizations and academic institutions, the IDMC is uniquely positioned to provide thorough and critical information about displacement globally.

The IDMC defines displacement as “the forced or obliged movement, evacuation or relocation of individuals or groups of people from their homes or places of habitual residence in order to avoid the threat or impact of a disaster.” In recent decades, the number of people displaced because of natural disasters has increased substantially. It is estimated that as of 2015, there are 38 million IDPs worldwide. Half of those IDPs have been displaced as a result of natural disasters. Changing climates can destroy or significantly alter the lands on which people live, forcing them to relocate.

Demographics

The IDMC has closely monitored the disaster displacement of people, noting that the 2010 monsoon season in Pakistan resulted in the short-term displacement of nearly 11 million

42 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “About IDMC” found online at http://www.internal-displacement.org/about-us/
44 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Global Figures” found online at http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/
45 Ibid.
people. In 2011, another 4 million were displaced, of whom 35% had also fled during the 2010 monsoon season.\textsuperscript{46} After the immediate chaos of the flooding, many IDPs were able to resettle; however, according to the FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), an official count (though recognized as a possible underestimation) of roughly 850,000 people were still considered displaced. Using an average family size of 5.2, it was also estimated that 129,000 of the 850,000 still displaced, were families.\textsuperscript{47} FDMA also reported that in 2011, 57% of all IDPs living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) a northwestern province on Pakistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), are under the age of 18; 60% are children; and 8% are under the age of 5.\textsuperscript{48} Through monitoring and data collection, the IDMC is able to cautiously conclude that in the KP and FATA regions, 31 percent of IDPs are boys and 23 percent are girls (under the age of 18), with 21 and 22 percent of the IDPs being adult men and women under the age of 60, respectively.\textsuperscript{49} This means that the majority of the IDP population in the FATA and KP region are young boys which is the exact demographic that the TTP search for when recruiting.

**Vulnerabilities**

Various studies suggest that young populations, especially those who have lost their homes and families, experience elevated vulnerability and weakness.\textsuperscript{50} In order to most effectively address the issue of internal displacement, studying various risk factors are another facet of research conducted by the IDMC. They outline various hazards and vulnerabilities that increase the likelihood of displacement, such as the severity of the disaster, confirming “climate change is expected to alter normal variability in the weather and make some hazards more severe

\textsuperscript{46} Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Pakistan: Displacement caused by conflict and natural disasters, achievements and challenges.” 1.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{49} Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Global Figures.”
and frequent.” What is most notable about their analysis of risk factors, however, is not what causes the displacement, but rather what occurs in the space and time of displacement. These factors “also affect evolving threats to security and human rights while displaced, the duration of their displacement and the obstacles displaced people face in their effort to achieve durable solutions.”

In the case of Pakistan, young populations can be the target of recruitment from militants and terrorist organizations such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has compiled numerous reports looking specifically at security and the environment. In their report titled, “Security and The Environment in Pakistan,” researchers address how natural disasters that displace large populations of people can have severe internal consequences: “The response to these events can stress governments and lead to or exacerbate internal conflicts. These events can provide radical groups an opportunity to help displaced people and recruit new members, when government responses are weak.” One of the examples the report points to is the 2005 earthquake in Azad Kashmir and the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan that “earned [militants] a degree of legitimacy within communities affected by the quake” because of their quick response and assistance to the displaced populations.

Political scientists Patrick Johnson and Anoop Sarbahi have published a case study analyzing the impacts of U.S. drone strikes on Pakistan. The majority of their findings will be used to conduct further, in-depth analysis in one of the following chapters on U.S. drone policy; it is important to note here in this chapter, however, their findings regarding the targeting of

---

52 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 12.
civilians by terrorist organizations. Johnson and Sarbahi write that “civilians are often ‘softer’ targets and are more plentiful in these groups’ areas of operation due to relative lack of government and military presence in the region”.\textsuperscript{55} When the government structure is weak and unable to provide for its citizens - as is the case the FATA and northwestern regions of Pakistan - terrorist organizations have the opportunity to take advantage of the vulnerable populations, in this case, young IDPs, many of whom have lost their homes and their families.

**Impact**

In addition to outlining the various risk factors and challenges of displacement, the IDMC offers solutions and ways to respond to and reduce displacement risks, emphasizing the importance “of building standards to make homes and infrastructure disaster resistant, and strengthening the resilience of communities and livelihoods so that they are better able to withstand or adapt to the hazards they face.”\textsuperscript{56} Yet, due to the level of development of Pakistan, the instability of Pakistan’s economy, and the inconsistency and corruption within it, along with the overwhelming number of IDPs needing assistance, Pakistan’s government often lacks the ability to appropriately respond to and eliminate these risk factors. In addition to costing the economy over 4\% of the GDP, law enforcement agencies, audit and local government procedures have all been deemed responsible for some of the corruption within infrastructure that accounts for 10-15\% of the project value, with average projects running three times longer and two times more expensive than planned for.\textsuperscript{57} Additionally, it has become difficult for Pakistan’s economy to make up for the loss in GDP because terrorism and insurgency have

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{57} Ahmed et al., “Public Infrastructure,” 4.
turned off both foreign and domestic investors and successive governments in Pakistan continue to avoid taxing the wealthy, with only 0.6% of the population paying income tax.\textsuperscript{58}

Pakistan’s development challenges stem from a long history of struggling to define a national identity while creating a political system to represent the diversity of the country. Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world with 182 million people speaking over 20 languages with nearly 300 different dialects.\textsuperscript{59} Various wars with India, regional conflicts, and economic crises have made it immensely difficult for various leaders to form a constitution and create a functioning and self-sustaining political system that can transition with relative ease from leader to leader. While the majority of the country, nearly 98%, identify as Muslim, there has been ideological debate about what form of government should be adopted in Pakistan: Islamic or secular.\textsuperscript{60} The presence of the Taliban whose goal is to overthrow the existing political system and implement an Islamic regime based on a specific Pashtun-influenced interpretation of Shar’ia law has placed additional stress on Pakistan’s government in achieving strong economic and social structures, and above all, protecting their people.

Between 2008 and 2014, Pakistan ranked fourth highest in the world for internal displacement in terms of the absolute number of people displaced.\textsuperscript{61} While Pakistan experienced some of its most severe displacement after the monsoon seasons in 2010 and 2011, it continues to experience natural disaster related displacement. In September of 2014, riverine flooding in seven provinces of Pakistan was responsible for the displacement of 740,150 people, ranked as

\textsuperscript{58} The Economist. “Pakistan’s Misguided Obsession with Infrastructure.”
\textsuperscript{59} Jalal. “Pakistan: A Political History.”
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Global Estimates 2015: People displaced by disasters.” 32.
the sixth largest displacement event of 2014 globally.\textsuperscript{62} Pakistan is one of many nations that experiences annual events resulting in mass displacement, making quick and effective response and infrastructural development difficult for affected communities and governments. Aside from the difficulties displacement presents for the general development and growth of a nation, in countries like Pakistan where terrorism and internal military conflict persist, managing vulnerable populations and avoiding dangerous influence from terrorist organizations like the Tehrik-i-Taliban offers an entirely new set of challenges, not only for Pakistan, but for the United States as well.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, 88.
III. SECURITY THREAT: ASSESSING U.S. INTERESTS

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

History

On December 14, 2007, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formally established by Pashtun commander, Baitullah Meshud as an umbrella organization of the Taliban bringing together some 40 Islamic militant leaders and their groups from across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other parts of the northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Upon their establishment in 2007, the TTP announced several objectives and principles: “1. Enforce Shar’ia law, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform defensive jihad against the Pakistan army. 2. React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat District and North Waziristan Agency. 3. Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area. 4. Refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan.”

The overarching objective of the TTP is to overthrow the Pakistani government and replace it with an Islamic emirate similar to the one created by the Afghan Taliban in the late 1990s.

Madrassas, which are Islamic religious schools where most members of the Taliban receive their education, are the primary source of funding for the TTP. Madrassas collect money predominately from wealthy Saudi benefactors who share the common ideology of Shar’ia law. The money received by the madrassas is then funneled into the hands of the TTP. Shar’ia law, a radical view of Islam that is indoctrinated into students in madrassas, originated in Saudi

---

63 Gall et al., “How the Pakistani Taliban Became a Deadly Force.”  
64 Abbas. “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” 2.  
65 Ibid.  
67 Ibid.
Arabia and has spread throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan in direct response to the presence of U.S. forces.\(^{68}\)

Through the formation of madrassas, agreements with an ineffective Pakistani government, and the use of force, the Pakistani Taliban insurgency has taken steady control of northwest Pakistan. Since its establishment, the Pakistani Taliban has worked strategically to influence and even control political and social structures of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.\(^{69}\) After several takeovers had been initiated by the TTP, agreements between the TTP and the Pakistani Government emerged in an effort to maintain some semblance of peace and reduce attacks on Pakistani soil. The Waziristan Accord was brokered between the Pakistani Government and tribal elders in Waziristan – region in northwest Pakistan sharing a border with eastern Afghanistan – which has allowed the Taliban-associated Haqqani Network (HQN) to continue to gain strength and power in the region.\(^{70}\) U.S. Air Force Senior Master Sergeant Greg Smith writes in the *Journal of Strategic Security* that, “following the peace deal in Waziristan, Pakistan itself became an unwilling state sponsor of terror by allowing the group to operate unrestricted in exchange for no attacks in Pakistan.”\(^{71}\) The TTP’s influence in the FATA continues to be a complicated obstacle for Pakistan, as the government lacks the adequate resources to mitigate conflicts.

Not surprisingly, in the quest for additional territory and power, the TTP have continued to break peace agreements in Pakistan. In December of 2008, the TTP insurgency took over the

---

\(^{68}\) Smith, 32.  
\(^{70}\) Smith, 33.  
\(^{71}\) Ibid.
Swat Valley located in the Swat District of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). As a result of this takeover, the District is subject to shar’ia law and the construction of madrassas have grown, with admission only granted to boys since girls are no longer allowed to attend school. Various other occupations over the last decade have resulted in Taliban influence and control extending throughout the Tribal Areas in northern Pakistan.

Image 1: Map of Tehrik-i-Taliban influence in Pakistan

---

72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Office of the Director of National Intelligence: National Counterterrorism Center, “Counterterrorism Guide: Terrorist Groups” found online at https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/afghan_taliban.html
Recruitment

In order to maintain control of the FATA, the TTP must continue to grow not only in strength but also in numbers. Due to the recent and previously absent flooding in northwestern Pakistan by cause of shifting monsoon and climate patterns that has displaced hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis – the majority of whom are under the age of 18 – the TTP has capitalized on the vulnerabilities of the displaced that have not been effectively addressed by the Pakistani Government.

Many of the displacement camps set up by the Pakistani government lack the basic necessities such as health, food, and water facilities. The Congressional Research Service has uncovered evidence that some “extremist-run charities have undertaken relief efforts in areas where government aid has been lacking. By providing food, shelter, and other benefits to desperate victims, such organizations may win sympathy and even (additional) future support from affected residents.”76 Those residing in the camps were forced to relocate there because of disaster and conflict, some having lost their family along the way. Because of this, there is much anger and anguish among the displaced, resulting in numerous examples of young men joining the Pakistani Taliban insurgency to avenge the deaths of their family members – even if they don’t necessarily agree with their philosophy.77 Not only do the Taliban exploit the angry young men that have lost family during the flooding and displacement, but they also exploit the deaths of women and children from U.S. drone attacks and bombings by Pakistani forces to coax their recruits.78

---

76 Kronstadt et al., 22.
77 Ibid.
Patrick Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi, both political scientists specializing in terrorism and counterinsurgency, conducted a study about the impact of US drone strikes on terrorism, specifically looking at Pakistan and the TTP and Haqqani networks. In their study they outline various incentives for terrorist violence, examining and analyzing their movements and strategies. They concluded the following:

Given the relative sparseness of Pakistani government presence with a heavy reliance on local, usually civilian, actors and the absence of US boots on the ground, the civilian population is by far the largest and most important ‘target set’ for FATA militants seeking to establish, maintain, and consolidate a territorial sanctuary in Pakistan…Many claim that drone strikes radicalize alienated civilians and therefore increase overall terrorist violence. The logic of this argument holds that the radicalization of segments of the civilian population renders it ripe for recruitment by fellow Muslims with whom they share common enemies—the US or Pakistani government. Militants could thus recruit more manpower and mobilize more resources.79

Johnston and Sarbahi’s findings provide important evidence that the Pakistani Taliban and other militants in the FATA are strategic in their recruitment efforts, capitalizing on vulnerabilities and using conflict – much of which they have played a role in creating – to their advantage.

Unfortunately, due to Pakistan’s long history of inefficient government, a struggling economy, and poor infrastructure (conditions which existed even before the establishment of the TTP), the nation has been left “ripe for potential major upheaval” as a result of the flooding.80 Researchers from the CRS have concluded that “Pakistanis appear to feel significant anger toward politicians at all levels of government and this sense of abandonment in time of need could significantly weaken the standing of democratic forces in the country.”81 One of the senior Pakistani analysts at the CRS commented on “both the federal and provincial government

79 Johnston and Sarbahi, 205.
80 Kronstadt et al., 22.
81 Ibid., 23.
responses as representative of the broader “abysmal failure” of the country’s political class.”

Evidence of this weakening and failure has already been shown through the TTP’s efforts to exploit IDPs and utilize displacement camps as recruitment grounds.

**Impact of Monsoon Flooding**

Monsoon flooding as well as Pakistani military operations and U.S. drone strikes have not only left the FATA and other northern provinces of Pakistan heavily populated with defenseless IDPs, but they have also forced IDPs and the TTP itself to move south and relocate to Karachi, the capital of the southern Sindh province and the largest and most populated city in Pakistan.\(^83\) The migration of the TTP to a densely populated city makes it that much more challenging for the United States to collect intelligence on the TTP and formulate strategy to dismantle them. It also positions the TTP to contact and potentially recruit more members. Evidence gathered and submitted to Pakistan’s Supreme Court reveals that as of 2012, entire Pashtun neighborhood were believed to be under Taliban influence, with nearly 7,000 TTP militants having infiltrated Karachi.\(^84\) This movement has increased concern among the Pakistani and United States governments, as Karachi is home to the country’s central bank and stock exchange.\(^85\) The stability of Karachi is, consequently, essential to the stability of the country as a whole.

It is important to note that climate change has far-reaching implications for affected areas. Even if the shifting monsoon patterns in Pakistan that have resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people have not necessarily changed the recruitment strategies of the TTP – although there is substantial evidence to show that it has – the flooding has forced the

\(^{82}\) Ibid.
\(^{84}\) Ibid.
\(^{85}\) Ibid.
TTP to relocate, pushing them into a more populated, and arguably safer space where they can continue to conduct their business and spread their influence. The enhanced and strengthened presence of terrorist organizations with access to more resources and people further threatens the stability and security of Pakistan, and as the next chapter will show, the security of the United States and the region.
U.S. Interests

Pakistan and the United States have been partners since the 1950s, shortly after Pakistan’s founding in 1947.\textsuperscript{86} Pakistan was an ally of the United States during the Cold War, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and to this day continues to be a partner in the War on Terror.\textsuperscript{87} The two countries have continued to develop a relationship, one that while volatile and unsteady, is arguably in the interest of both nations as they work to navigate a changing global climate.

It is in the best interest of the United States and its objective of security and stability in the region for Pakistan to be a strong democratic presence in a region otherwise entrenched in conflict. According to Congressman Duncan Hunter, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, in 2007, shortly after the establishment of the TTP, U.S. interests in Pakistan were centered around several elements: al Qaeda’s continued exploitation and violation of various tribal peace agreements made between them and the Pakistani government; the state of the Taliban along the Afghan-Pakistani border that have an impact on military operations in Afghanistan; the status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs; and the evolving political environment and what that means for the United States.\textsuperscript{88} Throughout the Obama administration, many of those same issues continued to be of great interest to the United States. Michele Flournoy, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Department of Defense, when speaking in front of the House Committee on Armed Services asserted that “President Obama has charged us with building an effective partnership, one that advances U.S. interests while demonstrating to Pakistan that we will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and

\textsuperscript{86} House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, \textit{Security Challenges Involving Pakistan and Policy Implications for The Department of Defense}, 110\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 2007, 73.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{88} House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, \textit{Security Challenges Involving Pakistan and Policy Implications for The Department of Defense}, 110\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 2007, 51.
prosperity over the long term… On the security side, our programs are designed to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target violent extremist groups that threaten both of our countries, the region, and the world.”

With the recent election of Donald Trump as US president, specific and detailed future policy plans regarding U.S.-Pakistani relations have yet to be released by the new administration. However, in December, as reported by The Atlantic, then president-elect Trump made a phone call to Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, reportedly stating during that call that Pakistan is “a “fantastic” country full of “fantastic people” that he “would love to visit.” The Atlantic reported that Trump allegedly added, “I am ready and willing to play any role that you want me to play to address and find solutions to the outstanding problems.” While there is for now little clarity or specificity regarding future policy and evolving U.S. interests in Pakistan, events in Pakistan that threaten U.S. security endure and must be addressed.

Regional and Global Security

National security experts are nearly unanimous that it is unlikely that the Pakistani Taliban would attack the United States on its own soil. In 2015, Former FBI Director James Comey asserted before the House Committee on Homeland Security that the threats that remain among the highest priorities for the FBI and the Intelligence Community as a whole are “individuals who seek to join the ranks for foreign fighters traveling in support of ISIL, and also

---

89 House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Security and Stability in Pakistan: Developments in U.S. Policy and Funding, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, 4.
90 Friedman. “Lessons From Trump’s “Fantastic” Phone Call to Pakistan”
91 Ibid.
homegrown violent extremists who may aspire to attack the United States from within.”

That being said, while the TTP may not register high on a list of direct threats to homeland security, regional and global security is dependent on the stability of Pakistan and the future decisions made surrounding their nuclear weapons program. Additionally, the TTP vehemently opposes any attempts by the Pakistani government at democratic reform as well as any imposition of government rule in the NWFP, FATA and KP regions. Such opposition directly conflicts with U.S. interests.

When addressing the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at a hearing about U.S. interests in Pakistan, Toby Dalton, the Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, asserted: “The first priority is the prevention of intentional or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, which is most likely to occur during a military confrontation.”

Dalton pointed out that although it may seem obvious, “it is worth underscoring the point that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program does not exist in a vacuum. Nuclear weapons are central to Pakistan’s security-seeking behavior in a region it considers to be enduringly hostile.”

While Dalton acknowledges that the probability of a nuclear terrorist incident is low, since the attacks on September 11th, prioritizing the security of nuclear weapons has increased twofold in U.S. global counter-proliferation policy.

---

94 Smith, 35.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
Pakistan remains one of the only states with nuclear weapons ranked at the highest risk for state failure in the Fund for Peace Failed States Index. Researchers at CRS assessing the environment and security risks in Pakistan claim that “if these conditions worsen, they could act as a threat multiplier in combination with other threats to the state such as expanding population and food insecurity, strife among political-military elites, poor economic resources, Islamist extremism, secessionism, inter-provincial competition for resources, and/or cross border conflict with Afghanistan or India.” With cyclical natural disasters resulting in a growing IDP population and decreasing domestic and political strength that the TTP continue to capitalize on, the United States should remain highly alert to nuclear and terrorist activity in Pakistan, working diligently to develop and adopt policy to address precarious instability in the region.

Continued dishonesty and deceit on the part of the Pakistani government contributes to volatility between United States and Pakistani governments. In 2011, a senior official from Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s military spy agency, told The Atlantic that Pakistan’s nuclear program “is completely secure” and that “no one with ill intent can get near our strategic assets.” However, there are six nuclear facilities in Pakistan that have already been targeted by jihadist militants. Not only does the United States have to remain vigilant and alert around the movements and activities of the Taliban and its militants, it also has to do the same with Pakistan’s government who remains reliably insincere. While Pakistan may see it in their best interest to offer misleading information to the United States in order to preserve their relationship and the benefits that come with it, fooling U.S. intelligence can be a challenging feat.

98 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Climate Change and Global Security: Challenges, Threats and Diplomatic Opportunities, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 1.
99 Vaughn et al., 13.
101 Ibid.
Though not due to any fault of their own, IDPs place significant strain on Pakistan and its ability to establish a functioning democratic state. Without sufficient infrastructure to appropriately assess and address the growing IDP population in Pakistan, the Pakistani government remains overwhelmed by their presence, unable to respond as quickly as the TTP. Obstacles such as IDPs that divert Pakistan’s attention away from becoming a strong democratic state are a threat to U.S. interests and goals in the region and therefore must be addressed.

Incidents of severe weather will only continue to increase, many of them with the potential to exacerbate already existing internal, regional, and global conflicts. No longer can foreign policy and climate policy exist separately from one another. In order to sufficiently address security issues, changing climates and their influences must be considered when formulating effective and sustainable policy, as it is a proven threat multiplier. Drone strikes and humanitarian assistance, which are currently the two largest policy approaches taken by the United States in Pakistan, cannot fight climate change or alter weather patterns. If used effectively, however, U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan can be a catalyst for change, altering the current reality of monsoon flooding that displaces vulnerable populations for years on end. Policy founded in humanitarian principles should direct action aimed at tackling economic and infrastructural instability so that when monsoon season hits, the Pakistani government is equipped to respond independently and efficaciously.
IV. FOREIGN POLICY: U.S. RESPONSE

Drones

Effectiveness

The main goals of U.S. counterterrorism are as follows: strategic defeat of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and groups affiliated with it, containment of local conflicts to eliminate the potential growth of new enemies, and the preservation of U.S. security abroad and at home. Policy makers, elected officials, and counterterrorism scholars and experts alike generally agree upon these goals. While there is significant debate about their effectiveness, one of the primary methods employed to achieve these goals is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also referred to as drones.

Since 2004, there have been roughly 400 drone strikes conducted in Pakistan’s tribal areas. According to data collected by the New America Foundation’s drone database, the Obama administration presided over the longest duration of drone strikes in Pakistan. Mr. Obama oversaw a total of 355 strikes in Pakistan compared to the 48 strikes under the Bush administration. As is true for a wide range of covert military operations conducted by the United States government, there is a lack of transparency surrounding drone missions, making it challenging to collect concrete data about the number of civilians and militants killed as a result of strikes. That being said, through a variety of credible sources and news reports compiled by New America, they have estimated that drones have killed somewhere between 255 and 315

103 The Economist. “Drone Strikes: cause or effect.”
civilians and 1,850 and 3,079 militants in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{105} It is important to note that when a drone hits a target in a compound, there is significant risk that any intelligence or information that may have be in the same location also gets destroyed. This possibility helps explain why there is a relatively wide range in the calculation of the number of people killed by drones. Additionally, it constitutes an argument against the use of drones as it makes gathering intelligence all the more challenging.

Arguments in favor of the use of drones emphasize their precision and ability to take out high profile targets while keeping the American servicemen and women who operate them out of harm’s way.\textsuperscript{107} While drones certainly can serve that purpose and may well protect people from threats in the short-term, it seems much less likely that they are positively aiding in the ultimate long-term destruction of terrorist organizations such as the Pakistani Taliban. Instead, drone

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Number of strikes} & \textbf{Minimum total casualties*} & \textbf{Minimum civilian casualties} \\
\hline
2004 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
2006 & 20 & 80 & 10 \\
2008 & 40 & 140 & 20 \\
2010 & 60 & 200 & 30 \\
2012 & 80 & 400 & 40 \\
2014 & 100 & 600 & 50 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Drone strikes in Pakistan}
\end{table}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{drone-strikes.png}
\caption{Graph of drone strikes in Pakistan\textsuperscript{106}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} The Economist, “Drone Strikes: cause or effect” found online at http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/daily-chart-drone-attacks-and-terrorism-pakistan
\textsuperscript{107} Byman, 35.
missions create more enemies, alienating vulnerable populations, and assisting in the propaganda and recruitment efforts of the TTP.\textsuperscript{108} Targeted killings of TTP leaders do not prevent them from finding new leaders. Rather, they provide additional sources of anger and resentment against the United States within the organization.\textsuperscript{109} In an article written for \textit{Foreign Affairs} that assesses why drones are not an effective method in combating terrorism, Audrey Cronin, a professor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, D.C., argues that “the picture is mixed: drones are killing operatives who aspire to attack the United States today or tomorrow. But they are also increasing the likelihood of attacks over the long term, by embittering locals and cultivating a desire for vengeance.”\textsuperscript{110} Clearly, drones are playing a tactical role, but that role may at best yield short-term gains in a long-term battle.

Johnston and Sarbahi offer further commentary on short-term versus long-term benefits and advances achieved by drones in the fight against terrorism. While they acknowledge in their study that drone strikes are “generally associated with a reduction in the rate of terrorist attacks” and “in the number of people killed as a result of terrorist attacks,” they are careful to point out that their study only monitors short term changes in terrorist violence.\textsuperscript{111} They further note: “Our findings do not provide a basis to conclude that the effects of drone strikes on these measures of terrorist violence extend beyond the week during which they take place.”\textsuperscript{112} For years, the short-term advantages of drones have overshadowed the long-term risks. If the United States is to be successful in strengthening Pakistan’s government and securing its vulnerable citizens in the fight against terrorism, the focus must shift to the long-term.

\textsuperscript{108} Cronin, “Why Drones Fail.”
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Johnston and Sarbahi, 204.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
Public Perception

Two forces generally guide elected officials in charge of creating and implementing policy: their own expertise and ideologies and the opinions of the electorate who give them the job. In order for elected officials to gain high approval ratings, work as effectively as possible, and retain their positions, positive public perception and approval of policy is critical. Drone policy is no exception and continues to be closely monitored not only by U.S. citizens but the world at large. U.S. drone policy has yielded unfavorable views of the United States not just within Pakistan and among the TTP, but also among international actors – including, notably, some allies of the United States. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project referenced by Audrey Cronin, “only 17 percent of Pakistani respondents to a 2012 poll approved of American drone strikes against the leaders of extremist groups, even if they were jointly conducted with the government of Pakistan.” Cronin refers to international opposition as well: “the vast majority of people polled internationally in 2012 indicated strong opposition to the U.S. drone campaign. The opposition was strongest in Muslim-majority countries, including traditional U.S. allies, such as Turkey (81 percent against), Jordan (85 percent against), and Egypt (89 percent against).” Cronin also notes polls conducted in Europe with strong opposition to U.S. drone policy in Poland, Germany, France, Spain, and Greece. While these statistics were received with relatively little alarm from government officials in Washington, policy tends to have a short lifespan without substantial public support.

Not only has outrage surrounding drone policy erupted within Pakistan and abroad, it has also threatened U.S. homeland security. Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen originally

---

113 Cronin, “Why Drones Fail.”
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
from Pakistan, cited U.S. policies in Muslim countries and the use of drone strikes in Pakistan as motivation when he pleaded guilty for an attempted car bombing in Times Square in 2010. During his sentencing hearing, Shahzad made clear that he was “only a first droplet of the flood that will follow me” going on to say, “if you call us terrorists, then we are proud terrorist and we will keep on terrorizing until you leave our land and people at peace.” Success in counterterrorism efforts is often measured in the number of Taliban targets taken out, yet their conviction and strong anti-American sentiment does not die with them and the use of drones continues to fuel that fight.

Image 3: Graph depicting the number of drone strikes and terrorist attacks in Pakistan

---

117 Wilson, “Shahzad Gets Life Term for Times Square Bombing Attempt.”
With the use of nuclear weapons most likely to occur during or shortly after a military confrontation, it is possible that drone use could place increased pressure on already incensed Pakistanis to turn to nuclear weapons as a form of retaliation.\textsuperscript{119} If the use of drones continues to instill anger in Pakistanis and amplify their desires to avenge the deaths of their loved ones, developing a more favorable view of the Unites States that could stop them from acting irrationally and with nuclear weapons, becomes less likely.

**Flawed Policy**

As mentioned in Chapter III, in addition to monsoon flooding, U.S. drone strikes have caused the TTP to relocate to Karachi, the capital of the Sindh province. There is a direct correlation between the TTP’s movement to Karachi and the surge of violence in Karachi. In a report published by The Remote Control project, Dr. Wali Aslam, a lecturer specializing in precision strike warfare and international intervention at the University of Bath in the United Kingdom, provides statistical evidence supporting the correlation between the TTPs movements and U.S. drone strikes. Aslam writes, “Where there were 36 and 54 drone strikes in 2008 and 2009 respectively, their number shot up to 122 in 2010. It has been noted by, among other sources, the Associated Press that a number of militants fled the tribal area of Pakistan to take refuge in Karachi precisely because drones cannot and will not target the city.”\textsuperscript{120} This shift is a dangerous one as Karachi is responsible for 70 percent of Pakistan’s GDP and overall economic stability. The partial relocation of the TTP to Karachi places even more obstacles in the way of U.S. efforts to achieve counterinsurgency goals.

\textsuperscript{119} Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Interests in Pakistan*, 114\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 2\textsuperscript{nd} sess., 2016.

\textsuperscript{120} Aslam, “Terrorist Relocation and the Societal Consequences of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” 5.
While the frequency of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan has steadily decreased over the last three or four years with less than one hundred combined attacks in both 2012 and 2013, the explanation for the reduction given by the United States is that most threats have been eliminated – i.e., TTP leaders and high profile targets.\textsuperscript{121} This explanation is overly simplistic and short-sighted, providing further indication that the United States continues to view foreign policy and national security through a singular lens without consideration for factors such as climate change and the subsequent instability and vulnerability it creates in Pakistan. Johnston and Sarbahi offer an important assertion about drone effectiveness:

\begin{quote}
The effectiveness of drone strikes at countering terrorism lies at the core of US policymakers’ arguments for their continued use in these environments. Yet because, in no small part, neither US officials nor human rights advocates present compelling, systematic evidence in support of their claims, debate about the effectiveness of drone strikes continues unabated.\textsuperscript{122}
\end{quote}

For IDPs already negatively impacted and disadvantaged by a changing climate that destroys their homes and livelihoods, the use of drones not only creates additional trauma and destruction but also contributes to existing ones. By using drones, the United States is amplifying hostility in Pakistan, making the protection of its interests and the achievement of its goals exceedingly – and unnecessarily – difficult.

While theories about how newly elected President Donald Trump will alter policy on drone strikes is largely speculative at this point (the new administration has yet to release a detailed plan), general inferences may be drawn based on statements from President Trump and various members of his cabinet over the course of the presidential campaign. Although President Trump has never mentioned drone use specifically in Pakistan, on the campaign trail during a

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, 11. \\
\textsuperscript{122} Johnston and Sarbahi, 204.
\end{flushright}
speech in Fort Dodge, Iowa, President Trump said that we would “bomb the s--- out of ‘em”, referring to ISIS.\textsuperscript{123} On another campaign stop, President Trump stated, “The other thing with the terrorists is you have to take out their families, when you get these terrorists, you have to take out their families.”\textsuperscript{124} Members of President Trump’s cabinet who are responsible for intelligence, defense and security matters, including the Director of the CIA, Mike Pompeo, and the Secretary of Defense, General James Mattis, have both alluded to their support for drone warfare in the past.\textsuperscript{125} In 2011, General Mattis was one of the biggest proponents for an escalation of air strikes in Yemen.\textsuperscript{126} Regardless of the future shape of drone policy under a Trump administration, the policy observations and recommendations outlined in this thesis still apply; indeed, if it turns out that President Trump attempts to make good on some of his more belligerent messaging, the urgency to keep in mind that short-term tactics may interfere with long-terms interests will be even more relevant.

The United States government has failed to recognize the role that its own actions have played in creating a volatile, terrorism prone climate in Pakistan. The need to adopt policies aimed at sustainable growth and stability that will chip away at the legitimacy of terrorist organizations like the TTP is exceedingly important. The short-term benefits of taking out high value targets with drones do not outweigh the costs of the effects that drone strikes have on local communities. While the long game does not always achieve the immediate results desired by politicians seeking reelection or policy makers hoping for validation from colleagues, embracing a utilitarian and humanitarian approach focused on achieving a strong and secure democracy in

\textsuperscript{123} Engel, Pamela. “Donald Trump: ‘I would bomb the s--- out of’ ISIS.” Business Insider.
\textsuperscript{124} Peter Bergen and David Sterman, “Will President Trump restart the drone war in Pakistan?” CNN, January 21, 2017.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
Pakistan that benefits the greatest number of people – specifically vulnerable populations such as IDPs that desperately need assistance and protection – will yield results that are more clearly in the best interests of both the United States and Pakistan.
Humanitarian Assistance

The primary objective of this thesis is to prove that there is a clear and indisputable intersection between climate change and national security. Because of this, the ever-changing dynamics and impacts of this intersection must be addressed appropriately. There are many policy approaches that can and should be taken in response and while this chapter will outline humanitarian assistance as one of those potential responses, it is neither absolute nor defined in its entirety.

History of U.S. Aid to Pakistan

In 2016, Congress approved President Obama’s $4 trillion budget, with less than one percent of the entire budget spent on foreign aid.127 Within that one percent, one third – or about $5.3 billion – was allocated to health; one sixth – or about $2.7 billion – to economic development; and another sixth to humanitarian assistance.128 A total of $34 billion is planned for foreign aid in fiscal year 2017.129 While the United States is one of the most generous donators to foreign aid, it also has one of the lowest percentages of gross national income donated to foreign aid.130 Given that the United States has a budget of $4 trillion and one of the largest GDPs in the world, $34 billion – roughly the size of Mozambique’s GDP – committed to foreign aid is relatively little.131

Similar to other facets of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, the giving of foreign aid to Pakistan by the United States has been inconsistent. While the United States has recently

---

128 Ibid.
130 Rutsch, “Guess How Much of Uncle Sam’s Money Goes to Foreign Aid. Guess Again.”
131 CIA World Factbook: Mozambique.
restarted a relatively steady pattern of bilateral giving. U.S. aid to Pakistan has traditionally been intermittent and dependent on Pakistan’s behavior.\textsuperscript{132} Various events, including the Indo-Pakistan wars and the construction of a uranium enrichment facility in 1979 in Pakistan, have triggered the halt of foreign assistance from the United States.\textsuperscript{133} During the 1980s and the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, the U.S. began funneling aid back into Pakistan as they presented themselves as useful allies.\textsuperscript{134} However, in the early 1990s, the Pressler Amendment was passed which prohibited the United States from providing assistance of any kind to Pakistan without annual presidential certification that Pakistan did not have any nuclear arms or devices within their borders.\textsuperscript{135} Unable to meet such conditions, Pakistan was without the sizable U.S. assistance it had been relying upon for nearly a decade.

Following a substantial break in the allocation of funds to Pakistan, the United States renewed aid following the September 11 attacks.\textsuperscript{136} Between 2002 and 2009 the United States allocated approximately $12 billion to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{137} Ten percent of that was allocated explicitly for development, while nearly 75 percent was allocated to military and counterinsurgency operations.\textsuperscript{138} The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (S. 962) is a bipartisan bill that was passed into law on October 15, 2010. Sponsored by Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Dick Lugar (R-IN) the focus of the act is centered on providing effective and sustainable aid to

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibrahim, 8.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
Pakistan. Upon passage of the act, then Senator John Kerry emphasized the importance of a stable Pakistan stating: “Pakistan is facing a critical moment, and today the Senate has made a clear bipartisan commitment to replace an atmosphere of mutual distrust and lack of accountability with a broad-based, durable commitment to Pakistan and its people…A secure, prosperous Pakistan is vital for the 175 million citizens of Pakistan and is critical to America's national security.” In the fall of 2016, the act was renewed again – and has been every year since its original passing in 2010 – and the United States, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has committed to dedicating an additional $407 million towards development and economic prosperity in Pakistan.

Since the passing of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, the United States has intended to give Pakistan between $700 and $900 million annually, with a primary focus on economic development and health. The amount actually spent consistently falls short of what was planned. In 2016, for example, there was $803 million planned in the budget to be given to Pakistan; $383 million was actually spent with $101 million spent on economic development specifically targeting infrastructure improvements. Another $35 million was spent on humanitarian assistance. Broken down, $33 million was spent on protection and assistance, $1.5 million went to migration management, and only $28,000 was allocated for disaster readiness.

---

140 Ibid.
142 Ibrahim, 8.
143 Foreign Assistance, “Map of Foreign Assistance: Pakistan.”
144 Ibid.
The anticipated amount for fiscal year 2017 is $742 million, the lowest annual amount planned since 2008.\textsuperscript{145}

![Image 4: Visual graphic of 2017 Planned Foreign Aid by Category | Pakistan\textsuperscript{146}]

While the United States should be mindful and conscientious when considering the implications of what is spent on foreign aid and why, consistency in such expenditures is imperative. The United States should adopt a holistic and interdisciplinary approach to foreign aid and humanitarian assistance that considers all of the factors contributing to the ineffective use or potential waste of aid and works to eliminate them. In countries where risks to security and stability are elevated, as is the case with Pakistan, effective and sustainable financial assistance is especially important in order to advance and secure U.S. interests in a timely manner.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146} Foreign Assistance, “Map of Foreign Assistance: Pakistan” last modified 2017, found online at http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore.
Multilateral vs. Bilateral Approach to Aid

Many governments in the developed world choose to spend a portion of their wealth on humanitarian assistance, often in the form of foreign aid. The ways in which to distribute foreign aid are as plentiful as the countries that need the assistance. However, most governments tend to adopt a combination of two primary approaches: bilateral and multilateral. Bilateral foreign aid is the distribution of funds from one country directly to the recipient country. Multilateral foreign aid is the distribution of funds from a donor country to multilateral institutions (such as the United Nations) that collect funds from multiple countries and then allocate those pooled funds to recipient countries.147

Since the United States assumed a prominent global leadership position following WWII, it has given aid through both bilateral and multilateral channels, though the primary approach has been bilateral aid with only a range of 10 to 30 percent of its total distributed through multilateral channels.148 There are incentives and benefits for nations choosing to give aid bilaterally, such as the ability to control aid policy and maintain influence over recipient countries. While it remains important for the United States government and its taxpayers to know specifically where its money is going and why so as to ensure the advancement of American interests, an increasing body of evidence indicates suggests that multilateral aid is “often more efficient than bilateral aid” and is “more likely to follow rules for best practices in aid and thus is less likely to serve donor’s priorities than recipient needs.”149

One of the greatest – and perhaps most overlooked – advantages for a country like the United States in adopting a predominantly multilateral approach to aid is that many multilateral

148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
institutions have already put in substantial work and conducted extensive research to develop programs and strategies to determine the best and most effective ways to implement pooled funds. They have refined these strategies and guidelines to be country – and demographic – specific. Even from the perhaps overly simplistic perspective of what approach saves the donor nation time and resources, going multilateral is highly cost-effective. In his book Humanitarian Business, Thomas Weiss cautions, “the geopolitical calculations of donors often trump basic humanitarian values.”\(^{150}\) While there has been a development in evidence that highlights increased “bilateralization” of multilateral aid, taking a multilateral approach to aid can save the United States from potential scrutiny for selfish and donor-oriented practices and prioritization of aid giving.\(^{151}\)

Should the United States choose to deliver most of its aid through a bilateral channel, they should consider adopting aspects and characteristics of other frameworks such as the Pakistan Humanitarian Pool Fund (PHPF) within the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) that have been successful in establishing flexible in-country funds to be used at the onset of an emergency.\(^{152}\) While the PHPF is a multilateral pooled-fund mechanism with contributions primarily from European countries, as of January 15, 2016 it has funded 286 completed projects and 36 ongoing projects with 58% of the funds directly allocated to Pakistani NGOs.\(^{153}\) One of the benefits of giving directly to national NGOs within Pakistan is that they know best the needs of the people within the communities in which they operate. Additionally, it keeps the money out of the hands of government and military officials who may

\(^{150}\) Weiss, 126.

\(^{151}\) Ibid, 123-6.


\(^{153}\) Ibid.
have a history of corruption and misallocation of foreign funds.\textsuperscript{154} Further, by relying primarily on private and nongovernmental organizations within Pakistan, consistency of foreign aid can be maintained.

One of the greatest detriments to development in a country like Pakistan is the sporadic stopping and starting of aid. For example, projects centered on infrastructural and economic development require consistent funding in order to be properly completed. When such projects begin with a reliance on foreign funding that then abruptly stops, not only is the specific project in jeopardy, but development of communities and the country overall are compromised. To avoid this and other such disadvantages, the United States should develop a framework that adopts some of the principles of the PHPF – and other frameworks like it – working directly with Pakistani NGOs to address various needs and reduce threats that impact the United States and its interests.

\textbf{Climate Lens}

Many of the standards and rules that comprise best practices in aid have been developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The mission of the OECD is to “promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world” and to provide “a forum in which governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems.”\textsuperscript{155} Within the OECD, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is comprised of 30 member countries, including the United States, who pledge to implement the various recommendations proposed by the OECD and adopted by

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{154} Ibrahim, 8.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{155} Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “About the OECD” found online at http://www.oecd.org/about/
\end{flushleft}
In addition to individual governments adopting these best practices into their own bilateral giving, various multilateral institutions and frameworks have also adopted best practices aimed at preventing manipulation and corruption in social and economic global development projects. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) cultivated by the United Nations is an excellent example.

In September of 2015, Heads of State and government representatives met at the United Nations headquarters in New York to develop a new set of global Sustainable Development Goals. There are seventeen SDGs, each outlining specific goals and targets for action over the next fifteen years. As politicians and leaders shape future U.S. foreign policy for development and security in Pakistan, special consideration should be placed on three of the seventeen SDGs: SDG 9 which focuses on building resilient infrastructure; SDG 13 which focuses on climate change action; and SDG 16 which focuses on promoting peaceful, inclusive, and accountable institutions. Target 2 of SDG 13 recommends integrating “climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning,” further providing support for the necessity of examining policy through a climate lens. While the focus of SDG 13 is directly related to climate change action, SDG 9 focuses on developing sustainable infrastructure that is better prepared for the impacts of various factors such as climate change. SDG 9 aims not only to

---

156 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “DAC members” found online at http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm
159 United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change” found online at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg13
160 United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation” found online at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg9
develop sustainable and reliable infrastructure, but places a focus on “affordable and equitable access” for infrastructure that supports “economic development and human well-being.”\textsuperscript{161}

Finally, and perhaps most relevant to U.S. policy toward Pakistan specifically, is SDG 16, which has set targets aimed at reducing violence, death, exploitation, and corruption at all levels of government and society.\textsuperscript{162}

While the United States and the world as a whole would benefit greatly from heightened focus and dedication to achieving all of the SDGs, for the protection, security, and advancement of U.S. interests in Pakistan, the United States should incorporate the targets outlined in SDGs 9, 13, and 16 in their own policy development in Pakistan. Investing in the development of sustainable infrastructure and strengthening “relevant national institutions to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime” – all through an interconnected policy frame and climate lens – are critical in combating the many negative effects of monsoon flooding and the ultimate dismantling of the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{163} In his book \textit{Humanitarian Business}, Weiss also addresses the relationship between counterterrorism and humanitarianism efforts: “Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many countries, especially the United States, have viewed counterterrorism and humanitarianism as crime-fighting partners – with failed states as sanctuaries and staging platforms for terrorists. Humanitarian organizations, in this view, can become part of a wider ‘hearts and minds’ campaign.”\textsuperscript{164} By choosing to examine counterterrorism policy through an interdisciplinary lens, emphasizing the role of climate change and humanitarianism, the United States can reduce military intervention and tactics such as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{162} United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goal 16: Promote peaceful land inclusive societies for sustainable development” found online at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Weiss, 28.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
drones and implement a heavier focus on humanitarian practices and invest in the repair and development on the front end, saving innocent lives, time, and resources – all while protecting its own interests and security.

**Short and Long Term Goals**

In order for any policy that may be formulated to be successful and sustainable, public support is essential, not only among U.S. citizens, but also among the people of Pakistan. Historically, less than a fifth of Pakistanis have held favorable views of the United States.\(^{165}\) Drone strikes have fueled further anger and animosity among Pakistanis, but having to rely on humanitarian assistance and charity from the United States has also bruised their pride.\(^{166}\) The success of projects funded by the United States to enhance infrastructure, the economy, and democratic institutions within Pakistan depends on a positive reception by the Pakistani people to make sure these various projects are as successful as they can be.

Ultimately, Pakistani perception of the United States is a factor that is out of the direct control of the United States. Despite that, efforts to work closely with NGOs, local governments, and communities to problem-solve effectively and sensitively should be made on all fronts. During a congressional hearing before the House Committee on Armed Services, Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute, testified about U.S. policy in Pakistan, emphasizing the power of “[a] robust U.S. policy of engagement with Pakistan that helps in building civilian institutions, including law enforcement capability, and eventually results in reverting Pakistan’s military to its security functions.”\(^{167}\) Dr. Weinbaum argues that

\(^{165}\) Vaughn et al., 12.
\(^{166}\) Kronstadt et al., 23.
this approach “would be a more effective way of strengthening Pakistan and protecting United States policy interests there.”\textsuperscript{168} As noted by experts like Audrey Cronin, Patrick B Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi, drones are not a functional tactic to gain support and a positive, working relationship between Pakistan and the United States.\textsuperscript{169} A humanitarian and utilitarian approach rooted in objectives to assist in the growth and development of Pakistan and its people is more likely to yield peaceful results.

The United States government and its citizens can contribute to these efforts by fostering further U.S. domestic support for the advancement of Pakistan and its development, emphasizing the benefits of a more unified approach to combating terrorism and security issues exacerbated by the changing climate. In his book \textit{Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference}, author William MacAskill addresses the importance of thinking beyond the short-term, gut reaction to problems in the world: “Our response to natural disasters is one of the clearest cases of how, when it comes to charity, most people follow their gut and respond to new events rather than ongoing problems.”\textsuperscript{170} MacAskill explains: “When a disaster strikes, the emotional centers of our brain flare up: we think – emergency! We forget there is an emergency happening all the time, because we’ve grown accustomed to everyday emergencies like disease and poverty and depression.”\textsuperscript{171} While the intentions behind quick responses and gut reactions usually come from a genuine desire to help, long-term damage can occur without taking a step back to assess the specific details unique to the communities faced with disaster or the lasting implications of certain actions.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} See Cronin, Johnston and Sarbahi.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
In reality, what works to combat terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan, or Iraq, or Syria may not work in Pakistan. Given that there are different risk factors and variables at play, foreign policy has to be shaped to address those specific variables, especially as climate change continues to worsen. That being said, structures and larger concepts that have worked in other countries can be used as a foundational basis for the revision and creation of Pakistan-specific policy. In fact, in an article about revising U.S. relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan written for the *Journal for Strategic Security*, authors Steve A. Young and Imdad Hussain Sahito argue that “the U.S. effort must be coordinated between and within each country, because neither country’s insurgency or terrorist problem can be solved independently of the other.” They further assert: “However, if any of these problems are to be solved, or at least contained, one must attack the source of the problem: radicalization and instability in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”

There are many recommendations already in play that could serve long-term policy goals in Pakistan. While the majority of recommendations certainly do touch on the necessity of sustainable and lasting economic and infrastructural development, what is largely lacking is a conversation about how to incorporate and address shifting monsoon patterns and the general changing global climate. For example, Young and Sahito suggest that “the long-term goal should be to establish the Tribal Areas as a free trade zone, drawing foreign direct investment from Arab, Western, and Asian sources…a more sufficient transportation system can only help farmers and tradesman get goods and services to market in a timelier manner that reduces loss of fresh produce and increases quantity of scale for other goods.” While Young and Sahito propose a free trade zone in the FATA that could increase economic growth in the region, they

---

172 Young et al., 26.
173 Ibid, 27.
fail to acknowledge how monsoon flooding may impact and potentially inhibit trade and transportation in the region. The development of policy must be considered through a climate lens that recognizes that extreme weather events like monsoon flooding will inevitably affect communities and plans for development in Pakistan.

Whichever approach the United States ultimately chooses as its primary mechanism for foreign aid, the ultimate, long-term goal for the United States in Pakistan must be to build stronger communities with stable infrastructure, which reduces the reliance on terrorist organizations like the TTP to provide basic needs. Should the United States choose not to increase financial contributions to various multilateral frameworks and institutions, at the very least the United States should consider incorporating some if not all of the aforementioned targets and aims into their own foreign aid agendas, aligning them to the various interests and values unique to the United States and its objectives in Pakistan.
V. CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

Understanding the ways in which climate change impacts the security interests of the United States is critical to developing effective foreign policy and national security strategies. This thesis has demonstrated a clear connection between climate change and national security through the analysis of shifting monsoon patterns in Pakistan and the effects that the flooding has had on populations in northern Pakistan who have been displaced.

The challenge of asserting “direct causation” is not unique to this topic but in fact pervades all scientific inquiry. Various fundamental principles guide this type of inquiry such as: developing an empirically testable hypothesis, collecting data, and designing studies that can be replicated to test the hypothesis. Lisa Towne and Richard Shavelson, editors of the book *Scientific Research in Education* state that “[w]hat unites scientific inquiry is the primacy of empirical tests of conjectures and formal hypotheses using well-codified observation methods and rigorous designs, and subjecting findings to peer review.”174 The findings generated from various scientists that were used in this thesis to establish the existence of a relationship between monsoon patterns and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere do just that. Towne and Shavelson go on to declare: “The long-term goal of much of science is to produce theory that can offer a stable encapsulation of facts that generalizes beyond the particular.”175 This thesis relies upon extensive research conducted by many climate and atmospheric scientists at the National Center for

---

175 Ibid.
Atmospheric Science that concludes there is a correlation between the intensification of monsoon rains and increasing levels of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere.\textsuperscript{176}

This thesis has described monsoon flooding in the tribal areas of Pakistan that has resulted in the displacement of millions of Pakistanis, many of whom have lost their homes and families and require significant assistance and aid to reorganize and recover from the flooding. With virtually nonexistent government presence and control in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are highly vulnerable and susceptible to recruitment by the Tehrik-i-Taliban, which capitalizes on the anger and fragility of the IDP populations to grow their insurgency.

Further, this thesis argues that although a growing TTP presence in Pakistan does not necessarily increase the likelihood of an attack on U.S. soil, an amplified and growing presence of the TTP in Pakistan contributes to the instability of the country as a whole and hinders the creation of strong democratic institutions in Pakistan, creating additional obstacles to the preservation and advancement of U.S. interests. This dynamic is especially problematic because Pakistan remains one of the only states with nuclear weapons ranked at the highest risk for state failure in the Fund for Peace Failed States Index.\textsuperscript{177} Researchers at the Congressional Research Service responsible for assessing the environment and security risks in Pakistan claim that “if these conditions worsen, they could act as a threat multiplier in combination with other threats to the state.”\textsuperscript{178} Decreasing the relevancy of the TTP in Pakistan is critical to achieving U.S. security objectives.

\textsuperscript{176} Gronewold, “What Caused the Massive Flooding in Pakistan?”
\textsuperscript{177} Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, \textit{Climate Change and Global Security: Challenges, Threats and Diplomatic Opportunities}, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 1.
\textsuperscript{178} Vaughn et al., 13.
Drone strikes, one of the primary mechanisms used by the United States to combat terrorism and violent extremism in Pakistan, further alienate IDP populations, pushing them closer to the TTP as they search for ways to avenge the deaths of their loved ones. The short-term benefits of eliminating high value targets with drones do not outweigh the costs of the effects that drone strikes have on local communities. While the long game does not always achieve the immediate results desired by U.S. policy makers, embracing a multilateral humanitarian approach focused on building a strong and stable democracy in Pakistan that will better enhance U.S. security in the long-term is in the best interest of the United States. By doing so, the relevance of the TTP in various communities across Pakistan, specifically in the northwest where the majority of disaster displacement occurs, will diminish. If vulnerable IDP populations can rebuild, develop, and meet their basic needs without relying on the help and assistance of the TTP – in tandem with decreased animosity and desire to exact revenge toward the United States because of a decrease in drone strikes – an almost certain result will be a decrease in the population of weak and easily recruited IDPs. When developing security policy moving forward, the United States would be wise to emphasize policies that strengthen and protect U.S. security and interests in the long-run over those that simply provide short-term gains.

The patterns and trends outlined in this thesis surrounding climate change and national security in Pakistan are not unique to Pakistan. In fact, these same patterns can be found across the globe. One pertinent example is that of Syria. Starting in 2006, Syria suffered its worst drought in over 900 years.\textsuperscript{179} As reported by Vikram Mansharamani for PBS, the drought “ruined farms, forced as many as 1.5 million rural denizens to crowd into cities alongside Iraqi refugees

and decimated the country’s livestock… The suffering and social chaos caused by the drought were important drivers of the initial unrest.”\textsuperscript{180} Much like the security threats that have escalated in Pakistan as a result of rising CO2 in the atmosphere that has shifted monsoon patterns in the region, climate change is also recognized as a threat multiplier that led to civil unrest in Syria and ultimately the war. In a speech given in October 2015 just a month before the Paris Climate Change Conference, Secretary of State John Kerry noted, “I’m not telling you that the crisis in Syria was caused by climate change, but the devastating drought clearly made a bad situation a lot worse.”\textsuperscript{181} While climate change cannot be independently blamed for any one of these events, it has and is playing a role that cannot be ignored or brushed off as insignificant.

Ten years later, with many additional and complicated factors at play, the Syrian Civil War has contributed to the rise of ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a jihadist terrorist organization), which has resulted in one of the largest refugee crises in modern history and fostered political disorder across Europe, the Middle East, and even within the United States.\textsuperscript{182} Responses to the refugee crisis have varied as countries such as the United States have become increasingly worried that members of terrorist organizations like ISIL will infiltrate communities, pose as refugees, and use that as a method to execute their attacks. For example, on January 27, one week after his Inauguration, President Trump released an Executive Order titled, “Protecting The Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into The United States,” that places a 150-day ban on refugees from a handful of Muslim majority countries, including Syria, until a more

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
effective and secure vetting process can be devised.\textsuperscript{183} The legal standing of this order continues to be questioned as revisions to the order are made. This order has received vast criticism, as it is a radical departure from both U.S. policies in recent history as well as from the responses of nearly every other country that has needed to address the refugee crisis.

Syria is not the sole place experiencing negative and far reaching effects of climate change. Mexico City – a land locked city in North America – may seem like an unlikely victim of impending disaster intensified by climate change, but it is yet another example of the how far and wide the arms of climate change can reach. Ranked as the fourth largest city in the world, with a population of roughly 21 million people, Mexico City is located on top of clay lakebeds that continue to weaken as the city drills for water beneath Earth’s surface in response to perpetual water shortages.\textsuperscript{184} Climate change in the form of rising temperatures that lead to quicker evaporation and drought exacerbates water shortages that then require even more drilling.\textsuperscript{185} It is a vicious cycle that has the potential to create a surge in climate refugees seeking new land and water. Furthermore, as reported by Michael Kimmelman for \textit{The New York Times}, “the world has a lot invested in crowded capitals like this one, with vast numbers of people, huge economies and the stability of a hemisphere at risk.”\textsuperscript{186} Mass migration and the collapse of an economically important city in a country that shares a border with the United States not only puts the security and stability of the United States at risk, but also the global community as a whole.

The reality is that there are many examples of how climate change on its own and in combination with various other factors has the potential to create new security issues, complicate

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
already existing ones, or completely envelop entire communities and nations.\footnote{See \textit{The United Nations Chronicle}, “Small Islands, Rising Seas” found online at https://unchronicle.un.org/article/small-islands-rising-seas} The American Security Project, a nonpartisan organization with the goal of forging bipartisan consensus on a new national security strategy, asserts: “Climate change alone will not cause war, but it serves as an ‘accelerant of instability’ or a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes already existing threats worse.”\footnote{American Security Project, “About” found online at http://www.americansecurityproject.org/about/} Shattered economies, mass migration, civil unrest, resource scarcity, heightened violence, and death are just some of the effects that may well intensify – and have already manifested in cases like Pakistan – as a result of climate change.

**Looking Forward**

This thesis has attempted to answer the following questions: Why should climate change be considered a top national security threat? How can policy makers in Washington best address the rising threats as a result of changing climates? To what extent should the United States rely upon military and counterterrorism tactics such as drone strikes? Are their interests better protected and advanced through a humanitarian approach? While these questions were examined in the context of a specific case study analyzing the effects of monsoon flooding in Pakistan, they can and should be used and to explore the implications of climate change for other geographic locations. In the future, when the United States is establishing policy to address specific events in other parts of the world, there should be a set of questions to guide the policymaking process. For example: Is climate change a possible threat multiplier in this instance? What are the potential impacts that climate change will have on this region, and how will that threaten U.S. security interests? What kind of action should be taken to reduce those impacts? What resources and methods are best equipped to address the issues at hand? Should
the United States choose not to incorporate these questions – or some version of them – in the policymaking process, the advancement and protection of its security and interests are further jeopardized in the long run. It seems likely that had the United States examined policy through a climate lens over the past decade in Pakistan, money and other resources could have been saved.

Even within the examination of Pakistan, further research could address U.S. intervention with regard to military aid and the presence of U.S. and military personnel on the ground and the impact that has on local populations. Additionally, further research that focuses more in depth on the relationship between U.S. and Pakistani governments could allow for a better understanding of potential obstacles to the advancement of U.S. interests and long-term development in Pakistan and how to overcome them. Finally, in order to create and implement effective policy examined through a climate lens, research on the interdepartmental expansion of said policy is critical. A unification of policy across various executive branch departments such as the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State allows for a more streamline and effective approach to policy regarding U.S.-Pakistani relations. In order for that to happen, additional research on the dynamics and functions of each department and their roles must be conducted. As policy evolves into more concrete and succinct forms, the more likely Congress, the “holder of the purse,” is to approve funding for its implementation. The expansion of this thesis through these various avenues of research will allow for an even more comprehensive understanding of the issue at hand and how to achieve solutions moving forward.

As this thesis has established, there is an indisputable connection between climate change and national security. Climate change may not always be the sole cause of long-term cataclysmic events, but it is a proven threat multiplier. In the case of Pakistan, the threat reaches beyond the
borders in which monsoon flooding takes place, creating and augmenting already existing
security risks for the United States. The future of U.S. foreign policy must embrace a unified
approach when examining security risks in order to best address future impacts. Such an
approach includes support and agreement across departments of the United States government.
In October of 2014, former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel unveiled a plan developed by the
Department of Defense to address climate change as a threat multiplier.\(^{189}\) In his address at the
Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in Peru, Secretary Hagel argued: “Politics or
ideology must not get in the way of sound planning. Our armed forces must prepare for a future
with a wide spectrum of possible threats, weighing risks and probabilities to ensure that we will
continue to keep our country secure.” He further asserted that “[b]y taking a proactive, flexible
approach to assessment, analysis and adaptation, the Defense Department will keep pace with a
changing climate, minimize its impacts on our missions, and continue to protect our national
security.”\(^{190}\) Secretary Hagel no longer oversees the Department of Defense, but the current
administration and its various departments should take note of Secretary Hagel’s words and the
plans incorporating climate change as a threat multiplier that were developed at the Pentagon
during his tenure.

Whether it is water scarcity in Mexico City or sea level rise in U.S. coastal cities, security
policy must be examined through a climate lens in order to anticipate and address potential
future impacts.\(^{191}\) There may still be disagreement among U.S. politicians and the American
public as a whole about the cause of climate change, but this lack of consensus should not dictate

\(^{189}\) John D Banusiewicz, “Hagel to Address ‘Threat Multiplier’ of Climate Change,” *United
\(^{190}\) Ibid.
\(^{191}\) Nick Stockton, “Map shows where sea level rise will drown American cities.” *WIRED*,
October 12, 2015.
future action nor drive strategic policymaking. As Secretary Hagel stated at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in 2014, “this [disagreement] cannot be an excuse for delaying action.” The effects of climate change are indisputable and can no longer go unaddressed in the sphere of foreign policy and national security. As this thesis has shown, climate change is contributing to both short and long-term consequences that directly impact U.S. and global security. The longer it takes to develop sustainable and effective risk mitigation methods to address the clear trends of climate change, the harder it will be not only to assist impacted populations around the world, but also to insure the legitimate security interests of the United States.

---

192 Banusiewicz, “Hagel to Address ‘Threat Multiplier’ of Climate Change.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY


