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Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Developed Nations: A Comparative Study

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Abstract

This paper is a comparative study that aims to explore why anti-Muslims sentiment varies among 32 developed, democratic nations. I delve into the theory that the presence of more Muslims in developed nations leads to a higher anti-Muslim Sentiment. I also delve into the theory that a country with a poor state of economic well-being leads to a higher presence of anti-Muslim sentiment. Anti-Muslim sentiment can be measured numerous ways. A lot of previous research examines anti-Muslim sentiment in developed nations solely on the basis of public opinion polling. This paper will look at three different indicators of anti-Muslim sentiment. These indicators include public opinion polling data, institutional religious freedoms extended to Muslims, and behaviors that embody anti-Muslim sentiment. I find that a greater presence of Muslims in a nation is viewed by native born citizens as a nation over-run. Therefore, government institutions are pressured to place restrictions on the Muslim population. This paper will also look at historical implications of anti-Muslim sentiment in Bulgaria, Cyprus, and The United Kingdom.

Introduction

There is no doubt that there has been a recent rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes, institutional religious restrictions, and rise of the radical right’s tone against Muslims throughout the developed world. Hate crimes in the United States have reached an all-time high as of November of 2016 since September 11.¹ In February of 2015, a case of three Muslims shot execution style in Chapel Hill, North Carolina was ruled a hate crime.² That same year, police records showed that in 20 states across America, there were 260 hate crimes carried out against

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Muslims. Increasing violence towards Muslims is not defined as a sole American phenomenon, but applicable to other developed nations. For example, in November of 2015, a Muslim woman on a London bus was verbally attacked by a white male, as onlookers said nothing in her defense.

Many countries in the modern world have also restricted religious freedoms to Muslims through institutions. France has a record of restrictive policies on religious freedoms. Evidence of this is the banning of any display of religiosity in the public sector such as, courtrooms, public schools, and more. In the summer of 2016, more than 30 French cities made wearing the “burkini,” a covered-up version of swimwear that Muslim women would wear to the beach, illegal. In September of 2016, France’s highest administrative court ruled that mayors of these cities do not have the right to ban the burqini. The burqa, a cultural take on the hijab, is a veil used to not only cover a woman’s hair but also her face. In France, the burqa was banned across the country, and not just in the public sector. The burqa is mainly worn by women in Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, where women’s religious freedom is comparative to that of France. However, rather than forcing them to remove the burqa, they are forced to wear it. Following France’s lead, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has called for a ban of the burqa as well, stating, “the full veil is not appropriate [in Germany], it should be forbidden wherever that

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6 Ibid.
is legally possible. It does not belong to us.”

In the Netherlands, the burqa is banned on public transport, government buildings, schools and hospitals. The ban of the burqa is also present in Belgium, where the burqa and niqab are both banned in all public places. Bulgaria also has banned the burqa in all public sectors. In some cases, only cities have banned the burqa, in Ticino, Switzerland the burqa has been banned in all public places. Lombardy, Italy has also placed a ban on the burqa in hospitals and local government buildings.

Growing xenophobic attitudes in the United Kingdom were heightened during the push for Brexit of 2016, where many sighted their need to leave the European Union based on anti-immigrant attitudes in response to the influx of migrants in the country due to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Most recently, alt-right, neo-nazi, or radical right parties have been on the rise in Europe and America. These groups are largely known for their anti-Muslim rhetoric. For example, the leader of France’s alt-right National Front Party, Marine Le Pen believes she can come to dominate the French political sector because of the recent success of other alt-right actors such as Donald Trump in the United States. The rise of the radical right can also be seen in other Western European countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark. The radical right has also made an appearance in Eastern European nations such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. All these European countries are viewed as aligning themselves with the fear-mongering rhetoric that Donald Trump used to claim that “migrants are taking your jobs,

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8 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
Muslims threatening your culture and security, political correctness is threatening your ability to speak your mind and, above all, entrenched elites are selling you out in the service of the wealthy and well-connected.”

In Austria, the far-right party is known as the “Freedom Party” and is led by a man named Heinz-Christian Strache. In 2005, when he first led the party, his platform was centered around anti-Semitism and his approval ratings were low. Today, Strache has changed the party’s rhetoric as one that is supportive of Israel and back-tracked on their past anti-Jewish rhetoric. Instead of targeting Jews, the group began targeting Muslims. Strache states that “political Islam is the fascism of today, and that we have to fight it.”

Anti-Muslim sentiment is no doubt present throughout the developed world. This paper will attempt to explain is why some countries host a higher anti-Muslim sentiment than others. The two hypotheses that will be tested in this paper are: countries with a higher Muslim population will host a greater anti-Muslim sentiment. Countries struggling economically will host a greater anti-Muslim sentiment. When testing for anti-Muslim sentiment I looked at three different indicators: governmental institutions, social actions, and public opinion polling data.

**Literature Review**

Bigotry and prejudice have been issues prominent throughout world history. Perhaps one of the most notable and well-documented forms of religious prejudice is anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism to some degree may be comparable to anti-Muslim sentiment as they’re both religions

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16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
whose followers are targeted. It is questionable whether Islamophobia and anti-Semitism can be compared because the two have many distinct differences. These differences include the fact that Jews have faced religious persecution in the modern era, while Muslims have not. Notable is the Holocaust which is remembered in modern day history as time where anti-Semitism was rampant in Europe and in some ways still is. Nasar Meer takes a different point of view by comparing and contrasting these two sentiments in Britain using historical and recent perspectives in his article. Meer comes to find that there are stark similarities and differences and he argues that Britain has always possessed xenophobia to an extent. Klaus Hodi takes the comparison of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia a step further in her case study of Austria. This case study looks at the same question that this paper’s research will seek to answer: what is at the root of the recent rise in anti-Muslim sentiment? Hodi finds that the rising anti-Muslim sentiment is linked heavily to anti-Jewish sentiment. Research in this case study showed that anti-Muslim sentiment is used as a way to disguise the anti-Jewish sentiment that is frowned down upon in a post-World War II era. The research in this study has an interesting take on anti-Semitism, as it closely mirrors anti-Muslim sentiment due to the fact that they are both anti-religion and anti-culture to an extent.

It is not only anti-Semitism that has been compared to anti-Muslim rhetoric. Scholars have compared other religious-out-groups to modern views on Islam in the past, such as Jews, Roman Catholics, Atheists, Freethinkers, and Protestants who did not conform to societal

23 Ibid.
norms. Scholars have found that this recent and lasting rise in Islamophobia is a result of globalism as it has led to easy immigration and a more interconnected world. This thus prompted the answer to the question: immigration creates anti-Muslim sentiment. But why is that? This paper will attempt to test the number of Muslims in a region to the presences or absence of anti-Muslim sentiment in developed nations.

What is anti-Muslim sentiment exactly? Racism? Bigotry? Xenophobia? Or something entirely of its own? Scholars have looked to identify whether Islamophobia can be considered a form of racism, as it is a religion, and not a race. Scholars have concluded that identifying Islamophobia as racism is “bad politics.” This finding is arbitrary, as the idea of racism isn’t based solely on race or ethnicity. For some – religion encompasses a more cultural way of life rather than being purely spiritual. Islam has been grouped with the idea of being “Arab,” despite the fact that the majority of Muslims are of Indonesian, Malaysian, and of other Asian nationalities. Islamophobia therefore can be compared racism as it is viewed as an ethnicity to an extent.

When scholars look at xenophobia as a whole, the data does not match that of anti-Muslim sentiment; it is as if it’s something of its own. Marc Helbing conducted a case study on xenophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment in Switzerland and found that Swiss people were less xenophobic but more Islamophobic between 1996 and 2007. Those polled were three times

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25 Ibid.
more Islamophobic than xenophobic. So what is at the rise of the Islam specific prejudice?

The recent rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in Western Nations has been studied by countless academics that all seek to find what is at the root of this recent surge. Among scholars, research shows little consensus as to what is the main cause for this surge in Islamophobia is throughout developed nations.

Scholars such as Sabri Cifti have found that one of the roots of anti-Muslim sentiment is the link between a Western populations association of Islam with violence and terrorism. The idea that Islam is synonymous with terrorism is also linked to education levels; the more education a person possesses, the less anti-Muslim sentiment they carry.

While there is no doubt that there is a rise of terror groups claiming to represent Islam, Cifiti fails to clarify if these groups do represent Islam but rather a specific political worldview. Robert Pape conducted the largest study on terror attacks citing over 150 cases from 1980-2005. Pape found that there was no connection between terrorism and Islam or any religion, “rather what all terrorist attacks had in common is the is the definitive and secular and strategic objective to compel Western countries to eliminate their militaries from the territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”

Others, such as Amir Saeed, have claimed that reason for the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment stems from media representation of Islam as a terrorist, war-like religion. Saeed conducts a case study of British media portrayal of Islam and Muslims. The article uses

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28 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
examples to display British media’s portrayal of Muslims as an out-group who are “un-British.” Saeed looks as this as a “new racism” that is not based a biological hierarchy but rather a notion of nationalism. Saeed notes that the media has created an in-and-out group logic that is in turn perpetuated by the population. Saeed concludes that the media is to blame for anti-Muslim sentiments as they portray Muslims and Islam as something to fear.

Ogan et al. also regard the rise and presence of anti-Muslim sentiment as a product of the media. Ogan et al. go a step further by conducting a comparison between the United States and Western Europe, rather than focusing on the sentiment itself. Their findings conclude that the two regions are relatively similar in their anti-Muslim attitudes and both of the countries anti-Muslim sentiment is created by the media.

Leora Moreno compared Central and Western Europe to see if the number of Muslims present influences anti-Muslim sentiments. The hypotheses I explore in this paper are that the more Muslims in a nation, the higher the anti-Muslim sentiment. Moreno uses Central Europe, given that it has a relatively smaller Muslim population compared to that of Western Europe. Moreno finds that anti-Muslim sentiment has become more widespread and thus normalized in Western Europe because of the large population of migrant Muslims.

At a macro level of comparison, Zan Strabac provides an understanding to the anti-

34 Ibid., p. 3.
35 Ibid., p. 4.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p 18.
39 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
Muslim sentiment in Eastern and Western Europe by conducting a 30-country study. This study is most similar to the one conducted in this paper, as Strabac looks Western and Eastern Europe, a region where most developed nations are. Strabac states that out of 30 countries, those with the highest anti-Muslim sentiment were in Eastern Europe. Lithuania was the country possessing the highest percentage of people not willing to have Muslim neighbors at 33.32%. The research conducted in the article finds that anti-Muslim immigrant sentiment is the highest out of all other minority immigrant groups in Europe. Strabac’s research also finds that anti-Muslim sentiment has existed prior to 9/11 and is not just a recent phenomenon, as the data used is from 1999-2000. Finally, Strabac states that there is no evidence to support that the number of Muslim populations in a region effects prejudice levels regarding Muslims. This project will further test this idea as there are other indicators to prove that the Muslim population reflects anti-Muslim sentiment whether it is social, institutional, or something else.

Kaya Serdar also conducted a study on the macro level, comparing anti-Muslim sentiment throughout 16 Western European nations. Serdar looks at anti-Muslim sentiment through an institutional lens. Serdar finds that there is less anti-Muslim sentiment if nations have a national specific religion or have a progressive citizenship process. The article makes the conclusion that an overall secular society will have more anti-Muslim sentiment compared to a

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44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
nation with a national religion. Also, nations that are more open or willing to granting immigrants citizenship also possess less anti-Muslim sentiments.

Aristotle Kallis compares the rising anti-Muslim sentiment to the rise of radical right parties in Europe. The radical right is known to vocalize anti-Muslim rhetoric in their campaigns across Europe, some more so than the latter. However, Kallis argues that the radical right is responding to anti-Muslim sentiments that are already present throughout bigger European culture and are not actually creating it. Kallis notes that the mainstream is silent on the radical right comments showcasing that Europeans are growing less accepting of immigration, Islam, multiculturalism and human rights as a whole. Kallis claims that for Islamophobia to end, it must be taken as a serious mainstream issue, not a fringe one. Ultimately, the radical right is playing into what most of the population already thinks about Islam and Muslims.

In America, there is also no doubt of a rising anti-Muslim sentiment. In 2015, when the question on whether Syrian refugees should be allowed to enter the United States, Jeb Bush, a presidential candidate at the time stated only if “you’re a Christian,” of if “you can prove you’re a Christian,” you should only then be allowed to seek refuge in the United States.

Caroline Nagel brings in the current refugee crisis to a micro level in a case study on South Carolina during this past election season of 2016. South Carolina was a region without

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
many refugees or Muslims until President Obama brought in 10,000 Syrian refugees.\textsuperscript{58} The article discusses the partisan problems that the resettlement of these refugees created.\textsuperscript{59} Nagel’s study displays the anti-Muslim sentiment found in the United States and the anti-Muslim rhetoric that is spoken predominantly by conservatives and the alt-right.\textsuperscript{60}

Mayida Zaal shows case study evidence of civil rights violations against Muslims in the workplace, school, and more.\textsuperscript{61} The article describes that 1.6 billion Muslims can be painted with a single brush stroke. The article displays the repercussions of anti-Muslims sentiments in societies and the impacts they have on many lives.\textsuperscript{62} Zaal concludes that the number of hate-crimes and civil rights violations have gone up do to these existing sentiments. \textsuperscript{63}

Nationalism is linked highly to growing populist and anti-Muslim sentiments. Eric Hobsbawm argues that in today’s societies, nations like to believe that their nationalism is natural and deeply rooted in their histories. \textsuperscript{64} Hobsbawm goes on to detail the processes he believes is not natural but rather a social engineering of nationalism. Hobsbawn conducts case studies of France and Germany through their use of institutions such as education, military, public ceremonies, and public monuments. Hobsbawn finds that in France, leaders are typically carefully selected by unifying moments in history. In France there is an emphasis placed on civic ideals such as liberty, equality, and fraternity. \textsuperscript{65} In Germany national leaders combine Prussian


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
and Germanic histories in which they would define themselves against the French. Hobsbawm claims that there are two kinds of nationalism: instrumentalist accounts and primordial accounts. Instrumentalist accounts are a crafty type of social engineering that have created nations out of leaders or other elites that shaped what it means to be a “French,” “German,” or “Italian.” While primordialist accounts are natural, organic, or have biological ties that bind group members together.

Not all agree with Hobsbawm on the various types of this so-called nationalism. “Imagined communities” is an idea created by Benedict Anderson. Imagined communities claims that nationalism arises from social constructed communities, unlike Hobsawm’s claims there are no natural communities, rather only socially constructed ones. Anderson explains that media plays a larger role in creating these communities as they depict images and address the nations as a people. This relates back to other scholars stating that the media perpetuates out-groups that cause anti-Muslim sentiment.

According to Anderson, these communities are relatively new and have spread due to print capitalism. Because of print capitalism leaders could publish their media and other forms of text in their native languages rather than a standard Latin. Anderson also disagrees with Hobsawm, as nationalism is not something to fear but rather something to embrace.

Anthony Smith defines nations, nationalism, and ethnies all differently. Nations, according to Smith are defined as group of people sharing historic boundaries and thoughts as well as shared pasts. Nation populations are also defined by sharing the same culture, a single economic

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
system, and a set of common legal rights. Ethnies on the other hand are almost identical to this although they regard the presence of elites. Smith defines them as "named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites." Finally, nationalism is defined by Smith as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'." Ethnies can change overtime through state building and can ultimately create a nation. Ethnies typically change with immigrant influence, which become integrated into the mainstream ethnies culture. Smith argues that this helps the survival of the ethnie.

This paper will depart from previous research, as it will provide a new explanation for anti-Muslim sentiment. While there is obviously different reasons person to person on why they possess anti-Muslim sentiment, this paper hypothesizes that it is dictated by the number of immigrants as well as the economic state of the country. Research conducted in this paper expects to obtain similar but also different conclusions, as the economic atmosphere of these developed nations in relation to anti-Muslim sentiment has never been studied before. This paper will also build on previous research by giving specific case studies on Cyprus and Bulgaria; two nations whose data differs vastly from other developed nations regarding Muslim attitudes. No case studies have been conducted on the anti-Muslim sentiment found in both these countries in relation to their Muslim population. I will also be comparing these nations to the United Kingdom.

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71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.
In Figure 1, the data tested anti-Muslim sentiment in regard to the economic wellbeing of a nation. As for the hypothesis that economic troubles cause a higher anti-Muslim sentiment, there is no correlation, but, there were interesting outliers as well. Both Greece and Spain had unemployment in the 20-percentile range, but not a high anti-Muslim sentiment to the extent that nations such as Latvia, Estonia, and Austria did. I therefore conclude that there is no correlation between the economic welfare of a nation and anti-Muslim sentiment.

When testing anti-Muslim sentiment with other indicators such as institutional freedoms and actions of citizens, I found no correlation with economic well-being. Therefore, I can conclude, despite the rhetoric of the far-right, anti-Muslim sentiment has nothing to do with a country’s economic well-being.

Social Hostilities and the Percentage of Muslims
For actions of citizens as indicators of anti-Muslim sentiment, one can look to social hostilities towards Muslims. The Social Hostilities Index “measures - on a 10-point scale - acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups. This includes mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse”\(^{75}\) When looking at social hostilities towards Muslims based on the percentage of Muslims, the regression is at a 0.375, which indicates correlation.\(^{76}\) The hostility indicators vary but include “vandalism of religious property and desecration of sacred texts to violent assaults resulting in deaths and injuries.”\(^{77}\) A complete list of questions can be found in the appendix. Figure 2 looks specifically at the social hostilities towards Muslims in relation to the percentage of Muslims. The data indicates that more Muslims in a country, the higher the hostilities towards Muslims. This prompts me to wonder if only xenophobia is on the rise, or if it is just Islamophobia.


Anti-Muslim Sentiment on the Rise?

**Figure 3: Anti-Muslim Sentiment 1999 v 2008**

**Figure 4: Percentage of people that would not like to have Muslims as neighbors, 1999**
Figure 5: Percentage of people who would not like to have Muslims as neighbors, 2008

When looking at whether anti-Muslim Sentiment has been declining or on the rise, it differs from nation to nation. Some have suggested that anti-Muslim sentiment has been on the rise but overall xenophobia has been on the decline. This differs from country to country, as can be seen with Figures 3, 4 and 5. The level of xenophobia and Islamophobia differs vastly from nation to nation when compared at a macro-level. Some nations anti-Muslim sentiment has gone up, and in some nations anti-Muslim sentiment has gone down.
Institutions and Anti-Muslim Sentiment:

Institutional Religious Freedom and Percentage of Muslims in a Nation

Figure 6: Institutional Freedoms and the Percentage of Muslims in a Nation (without Bulgaria and Cyprus)
Figure 7: Institutional Freedoms and the Percentage of Muslims in a Nation

Figure 8: Institutional Freedoms and the Percentage of Immigrants in a Nation
Pew Research Center conducted a survey regarding attitudes surrounding religion. One variable of The Government Restrictions Index (GRI), looks at institutional freedoms on a 10-point scale, such government laws, policies and actions that restrain religious freedoms.\textsuperscript{78}

The data displays that the higher the population of Muslims in a country, the stricter the government restrictions are on religion, as seen in Figure 6. The regression on this data is 0.37, meaning that there is a correlation between the two variables.

When first running the data regarding political freedoms, Cyprus and Bulgaria differed greatly from all other developed nations, as seen in Figure 7. They’re both relatively new European Union countries, but so are Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, and other Eastern European nations that fit the general trend. In regard to religious restrictions, Cyprus and Belgium were both outliers who messed up the regression values. As seen in Figure 7, with Cyprus and Belgium added to the data, the regression was 0.178.

However, in Figure 8, Bulgaria and Cyprus fell into line with other developed nations in regards to religious freedoms given when compared to the number of immigrants in a given nation. The data found that the more migrants in a nation, the less restrictions. The data showed a correlation with a regression of .09. This data set differs vastly from the Muslim population in relation with The Government Religious Restrictions Score as the slope is downward rather than upward.

Anti-Immigrant sentiment when compared with anti-Muslim sentiment when tested with institutional freedoms displays that Muslims are given less religious freedoms while immigrants as a whole are given more religious freedoms. In my case studies, I will seek to explain why Bulgaria and Cyprus differ from the other nations.

\textsuperscript{78} “Global Religious Futures,” \textit{Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project}, accessed December 1, 2016, \url{http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org}. 
I wanted to know why the institutional data differed between Muslims and Immigrants. As many European migrants are Muslims. Figure 9 is the percentage of immigrants in a nation that identify as Muslim. While France nearly meets the 50% mark, other countries are low. This shows that there is difference to an extent between Muslims and the immigrant population.

Analysis of Data:

Economic well-being of a nation has no correlation with anti-Muslim sentiment. There is no correlation with any of the indicators such as the Governmental Restrictions Index, Social Hostilities Index, and public opinion. Therefore, the economic state of a nation plays no role in whether a country possesses more or less anti-Muslim sentiment.

Regarding economic well-being, when looking at 1999 vs 2008, there seems to be no consistent change between anti-Muslim sentiment. In some nations, it is increasing while in others it is decreasing. This is further proof that economic well-being is not a reflection on anti-Muslim sentiment. In 1999, the economy was flourishing with little economic trouble in the developed world. By 2008, there was a recession throughout most of the developed world. If
economic well-being effected anti-Muslim sentiment, it would be seen in this data. This however was not the case, as the data differed from country to country.

While there is no correlation between anti-Muslim sentiment and the unemployment rate, there is correlation between anti-Muslim sentiment and the number of Muslims in a nation. For example, the Social Hostilities Index indicates that there are more acts of anti-Muslim sentiment in countries with a larger Muslim population.

Cyprus and Bulgaria represent exceptions to the otherwise clear correlation between the number of Muslims and anti-Muslim sentiment in developed nations. The more Muslims in a nation, the greater the restrictions placed on religious freedoms. On the other hand, among all developed nations, including Cyprus and Bulgaria, in nations where there are more immigrants, there are fewer restrictions placed on religious freedoms.

This is an indicator that, since these countries are democratic nations, the anti-Muslim sentiment present is a product of the nation’s voters. Therefore, xenophobia is not as high as indicated by the greater religious freedoms extended to immigrant populations.

The restriction of religious freedoms towards Muslims can be further understood within the concept of the hijab or headscarf. Muslim women, as a mark of faith are expected to wear the hijab, and cannot take it off once it is worn. When compared with other religious symbols, such as wearing a cross or Yakama, which can be removed without compromising the person’s faith. The hijab represents a unique symbol that subjects the religious belief of its wearers to be easily identified.

The hijab inherently allows people of Muslim faith to be easily identified and feared as the “other.” My case-study on the United Kingdom will explore the idea that as the number of Muslims increase, fewer religious freedoms are extended to Muslim populations.
**Case Studies**

Bulgaria and Cyprus are both nations that do not fit the mold of the other developed nations in the case of institutional freedoms extended to Muslims. As can be seen in Figure 10, Cyprus has the highest number of Muslims in the data set, with a staggering 25.3% and Bulgaria has the second highest population with 13.7%. Bulgaria and Cyprus do however extend the same religious institutional freedoms as other developed nations in the data set in regards to immigrants.

![Percentage of Muslims in Nation](image)

**Figure 10: Percentage of Muslims in a Nation**

Despite a relatively high Muslim population in both nations, the data for these two nations deviates from other nations in the study. Cyprus has less institutional restrictions placed upon their Muslim populations according Pew’s Governmental Restrictions Index, scoring a 2.5. In comparison, Bulgaria’s score doubles that of Cyprus, at 5.4.

In this portion of my paper I will seek to answer why Bulgaria and Cyprus are both deviating from the norm of the other developed nations in the study. I will also be comparing Bulgaria and Cyprus to The United Kingdom, a country that follows the pattern.

**The Case of Bulgaria:**
Bulgarian History

Historically, parts of Bulgaria have been a part of the Ottoman Empire. The presence of the Ottomans created a relatively small sized Muslim population when compared to the likes of Bosnia or Albania.\textsuperscript{79} The number of Muslims in Bulgaria was relatively low to begin with and has also been dwindling ever since the end of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{80} In 1887, there was a recorded population of 21% Muslims.\textsuperscript{81} As of 2011, the population is now at 10.1%. In 2014, 25.1% of immigrants in Bulgaria identified as Muslim.\textsuperscript{82}

To understand Bulgaria’s anti-Muslim sentiment today, one must look to the historical treatment of Muslim populations and the idea of what it means to be a Bulgarian. In Bulgaria, there have been 3 identifiable Muslim groups: Turks, the Roma, and the Pomaks.\textsuperscript{83} Pomaks are depicted as converted Bulgarians. However, it is widely understood by Bulgarians that Pomaks are inherently Turkish and not Bulgarian nationals.

Once the Ottoman Empire fell, a series of political institutions arose in Bulgaria. These political institutions enforced the protection of foreign populations and minorities in the nation. The first was the 1878 Treaty of Berlin that protected the rights of foreign populations within the newly created Bulgarian boundaries.\textsuperscript{84} By the 20\textsuperscript{th} century international law furthered the rights of all populations. Examples of this include the Treaty of Constantinople of 1913 and the Neuilly

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Ivanova, "Islam, State and Society in Bulgaria: New Freedoms, Old Attitudes?." p. 38.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
Treaty of 1919 which furthered religious freedoms, such as allowing religious minorities to utilize self-governance.\textsuperscript{85}

Inspired by these treaties, the Bulgarian state extended freedoms to their Muslim minorities. Bulgaria’s constitution embodied this as it promised the freedom of religion.\textsuperscript{86} In 1895, the Prince of Bulgaria put in place a Mufti (an Islamic leader) for the Muslim population in Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{87} By 1908, Bulgaria gained independence and the position of Mufti changed into an elective one.\textsuperscript{88} In 1919, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bulgaria was given the right to fire the Mufti and any of the Mufti’s employees.\textsuperscript{89} This essentially turned the Mufti and his employees into employees of the state. After the First World War, even more protective rights were given to Muslim communities in Bulgaria through international treaties.\textsuperscript{90} Turks in Bulgaria were extended minority rights but other Muslim populations such as the the Pomaks were not regarded as an “other” ethnically. Therefore, the Pomaks were not given any religious or cultural rights.\textsuperscript{91}

In 1934, the Bulgarian tolerance towards Muslim populations began to change as right-wing governments rose to power.\textsuperscript{92} The 30s-40s were marked as a time of “revival.”\textsuperscript{93} Cities and areas were re-named from their past Ottoman names to Bulgarian names and mosques were chosen randomly chosen, shut down, and converted into Churches.\textsuperscript{94} Roughly 200,000 Muslim Pomaks changed their faith to Christianity, as well as their names to Bulgarian ones.\textsuperscript{95} Many sources suggest that most of these conversions and name changes were forced by the Bulgarian

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p. 38-39.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Ivanova, "Islam, State and Society in Bulgaria: New Freedoms, Old Attitudes?." p. 39.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p. 40-41.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Popov, Radko. "Islam In Modern Bulgaria: 1878 To Present Days." p. 3.
Orthodox Church. The police and army were aids of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Prime Minister at the time had stated that he was in favor of “the fight of the cross against the crescent.”

In 1937, another revival began under the organization known as the Rodina Association. The Rodina Association claimed they wished to modernize the Bulgarian Race. The General Secretary of the organization was also an employee of the Bulgarian government. The group sought to convert Muslim Pomaks and change their names as the original revival movements had done. The Rodina Association would instill fear in Muslim populations by threatening serious punishments to those who did not agree to convert.

By the time the Communist regime took power in Bulgaria in 1946, an all-inclusive policy was issued and these “revival” movements were reversed. The Rodina Association and its members were punished. A new constitution was issued that extended more freedoms to minorities, such as, allowing them to “develop their own national culture” and learn their original language. This however did not happen in the case of Muslims, as Islam is not a race but a religion and being a Communist nation at the time, Bulgaria took an atheist policy. This anti-religious framework was also applied to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church whose power and association with the government was cut.

In 1950, roughly 155,000 Turkish Bulgarians were deported to Turkey and the few remaining Turks were forcibly assimilated. The Posmaks assimilation process was much

96 Ibid.
98 Ibid., p 40-42.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
stricter as they were seen as traitors who were under “Turkization.” In 1962, the government decided to promote the reversal of “the Turkization of gypsies, Tatars and Bulgarians.” This was the first-time Bulgarian Communists attempted their own “revival” to change the names and religions of Muslims in the nation.

From 1969-1978, another 130,000 Bulgarian Turks were sent back to Turkey. In 1970, Pomaks were again targeted with re-naming policies. The government also began removing Muslim tombstone names, altering hospital records, and so on. Furthermore, during this period in 1971, the constitution was revised and removed the word minority and all freedoms extended to minorities. Throughout the rest of the 70s and 80s the Muslim populations were renamed, including the Gypsy’s and Turks. The government had believed Pomaks were Turks disguised as Bulgarian nationals.

In 1989, the communist government fell and thus prompted a regime change. The Muslim Turks were considered to have played a large role in the removal of the Communist regime through a group known as The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF).

The new post-Communist constitution of 1991 extended religious freedoms that had not been around since the early 20th century. The constitution also called for the separation of religion and the State. However, the separation of the State and religion was not consistent

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105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
with other parts of the constitution, which called for the official and cultural religion of Bulgaria to be Eastern Orthodox Christianity.\footnote{Ibid.}

With the new constitution, Muslims were permitted to regain their old Muslim names. This was met with backlash as nationalist, right wing Bulgarians protested.\footnote{Vassilev, Rossen. 2002. "Bulgaria's ethnic problems." \textit{East European Quarterly} 36, no. 1: 103-125. \textit{Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)}, EBSCOhost (accessed March 1, 2017). p. 104.} The new government was prevented from allowing Muslims to exercise their religion publically.\footnote{Ibid.}

By September 11, 2001 views on Muslims worldwide began to change, and Bulgaria was not an exception.\footnote{Broun, Janice. "Muslims in post-Communist Bulgaria." p. 52.} Tensions once again began to escalate within the country between Muslims and Christians leading to a growing anti-Muslim sentiment. Surprisingly, anti-Muslim sentiment has gone down between 1999 to 2008 (as seen in Figure 3 on page 17) in Bulgaria. In 1991, 21\% of Bulgarians that were surveyed stated that they would not want Muslims as neighbors, while in 2008 it was 18\%.\footnote{"European Values." \url{http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/}.} Though this percentage drop isn’t much, it indicated a lowering of anti-Muslim sentiment overall.

\textit{Bulgaria Today}

Today, roughly 13.7\% of Bulgaria’s population is Muslim, it is estimated that 75\% of the Muslims are Turks, while the rest are Pomaks and Roma.\footnote{Vassilev, Rossen. "The Roma of Bulgaria: A Pariah Minority." \textit{The Global Review of Ethnopolitics} 3, no. 2 (2004). p. 40-51.} Bulgaria is considered by many a success as they did not fall into a genocidal war framework such as Yugoslavia post-Communism.\footnote{Ragaru, Nadege. 2001. "Islam in Post-Communist Bulgaria: An Aborted "Clash of Civilizations"?." \textit{Nationalities Papers} 29, no. 2: 293-324. \textit{Academic Search Premier}, EBSCOhost (accessed February 22, 2017). p. 293.} However, there is a clear indicator of institutional anti-Muslim sentiment present, one that does not fit the mold of the rest of Europe and other developed countries in this study.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{114} Ibid.
\bibitem{116} Ibid.
\bibitem{117} Broun, Janice. "Muslims in post-Communist Bulgaria." p. 52.
\bibitem{118} "European Values." \url{http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/}.
\end{thebibliography}
Like many other European nations, such as France, Bulgaria passed a bill that banned the niqab, or face cover, in most public places as of September 2016. The ban on the niqab was pushed for by a radical right party known as the Patriotic Front Party. The reasons cited for this by a representative from the party, named Krasimir Karakachanov stated that “the burqa is more a uniform than a religious symbol.”

Bulgaria also scores the lowest out of the 32 nations on the Pew Research’s Index of Access to National Identity, which doesn’t pertain entirely to the Muslim population as historically, they have always lived there.

*Bulgaria Analysis*

The anti-Muslim sentiment in Bulgaria is interesting given the historical background with Muslims. The nation has a relatively small population of Muslims and relatively high institutional restrictions placed upon religion.

It appears that the anti-Muslim sentiment is a learned act that has been passed down. Anti-Muslim sentiment may have been more blatant in the respects of revival but now take form in institutions that ban them from embracing their religion. This in turn is more secretive racism then blatant, which would be frowned upon in the globalized world of today.

It is also evident that Bulgarians have never regarded the Pomaks as true Bulgarians. Pomaks have been regarded as Turks who have lived in the nation since the Ottoman Empire, claiming to be Bulgarian. This allows the Bulgarians to mark their Muslim population as a complete “other” who threaten their society.

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122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
Roma in Bulgaria

The Roma are the second largest minority in Bulgaria, after the Turks. As of 2011, there are a reported 4.1% of people whom identify as Roma living in Bulgaria.124 I wanted to see if Bulgarians are mainly anti-Muslim, or anti-other in general.

The percentage of Roma in Bulgaria is not reliable, as in Bulgaria there is a stigma against identifying as Roma.125 The word *tsigani* is the Bulgarian word for Roma and is also seen as a derogatory word.126 Over half of the Roma population are assumed to be Muslim while the other half are assumed to be Orthodox Christian.127 The Orthodox Christian typically claim they’re ethnically Bulgarian and dismiss the idea that they are Roma altogether.128

Under the Communist regime, the Roma were also forced to assimilate into Bulgarian nationalism.129 This is proof that the Bulgarian assimilation was not only targeted at Muslims but also any group that was easily identified as an “other.” Bulgarian scholar Rossen Vasilev of Ohio State University states that:

“The Roma have been historically Bulgaria’s most disadvantaged and maligned ethnic minority. Not only have the Bulgarian Roma been the target of periodic official name-changing drives, but the majority of them have been forced to live in extremely poor, unhygienic, and substandard conditions, isolated from the mainstream of Bulgarian society by discriminatory government policies and by the long-standing Roma tradition of preserving ethnic customs and mores at all costs.”

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125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
Institutional freedoms extended to the Roma are very limited. This is because in 1991 when the new post-Communist constitution was created, a law was created that prohibits the Roma from actively participating in national elections through their own parties.\footnote{Ibid.} Bulgaria is the only nation in Eastern Europe which prohibits the Roma from participating in national elections through their own parties.\footnote{Ibid.}

The Turkish Muslims and their political party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), have been permitted to engage in national elections in the post-Communist government.\footnote{Ibid.} It therefore appears that Bulgarians appear to have a complete hatred of the “other” rather than just targeting Muslim populations institutionally, as half of the Roma are Orthodox Christian. The Bulgarians have spent most of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century forcing out-groups so assimilate into Bulgarian identities. This may be due to the fact that their national identity was suppressed throughout the time of the Ottoman Empire.

\textit{The Case of Cyprus:}

Cyprus possesses the opposite traits of Bulgaria in regards to this study. Cyprus has a relatively high Muslim population and a relatively low Governmental Restrictions Index score. Like Bulgaria, the history of Cyprus and the nationality of their Muslim population may be able to explain this inconsistency.

\textit{Cyprus Historically}

Cyprus possess two different kinds of Cypriots: Greek and Turkish. Cyprus, much like Bulgaria, was a territory of the Ottoman Empire since 1571.\footnote{Moudouros, Nikos. 2016. "Between anti-Westernization and Islamism: Turkey’s ‘Islamic’ vision in Cyprus?.” \textit{Journal Of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies} 16, no. 2: 317-333. \textit{Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost} (accessed February 22, 2017). p. 318.} In 1871 the Ottoman Empire lost
the island of Cyprus to the British Empire along with their global hegemony.\textsuperscript{134} Cyprus was an important island for both empires as it held the key to invading Egypt, Syria, and more. The British saw it as a strategic island that would help them gain control of the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{135} Post-Cold War Cyprus was still seen by Brittan and many other nations as an important island as it played a role in the trade of oil.\textsuperscript{136} As of 2014, 25.3\% of Cyprus’ immigrants identified as Muslim.\textsuperscript{137}

\textit{Cyprus Independence}

In 1959 once Cyprus gained independence from Great Brittan, the island was divided, much like Berlin post WWII. Cyprus was divided between Great Brittan, Turkey, and Greece.\textsuperscript{138} To Great Brittan, this was the best solution at the time as they feared that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots would lash out against one another.\textsuperscript{139} Also, as Cyprus gained this new sort of independence, it became a crucial island for the United States during the Cold War. Cyprus was a crucial island because it was a potential way for the USA to attack the Soviets.\textsuperscript{140}

\textbf{Turkish and Greek Cypriot Tensions}

Soon after gaining independence, ethnic clashes between Turkish Cypriots and Greece Cypriots began. In the early 1960s Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the state partnership of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{141} A coup was then lead by the military colonel’s regime in 1974 against the Greek Makaroius regime.\textsuperscript{142} This coup promoted an invasion from Turkey who claimed they wished to protect Turkish Cypriots. The coup ignited a civil war which lead to the coup being a failure.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} “Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.” \textit{OECD}.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Papadakis, Yiannis, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz, eds. \textit{Divided Cyprus: Modernity, history, and an island in conflict}. Indiana University Press, 2006.
Eventually, Makarios regained power and in 1975, Turkey took the Northern part of Cyprus and declared it the Turkish Federated States of Cyprus. This new state was not recognized by the Republic or Cyprus and the United Nations. In 1983, after nearly a decade of failed negotiations between the Cypriot community and Turkey, the North was declared by the Turkish government as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This was also not recognized by the United Nations of the Republic of Cyprus.

There was not much of a reaction of Great Brittan or America when Turkey did this as they were a key ally that was needed during the Cold War against the Soviets. By the time the Soviet Union fell, Turkey’s importance decreased in the Western world. Today Turkey is more scrutinized by the West for its participation in Cyprus.

Cyprus Today

In 2000, despite being a divided nation, Cyprus has joined the European Union. Turkey has not been allowed in as a member of the European Union and one of the reasons cited is the tension between Turkey and Cyprus. Turkey is a Muslim majority nation and as are the Turks in Cyprus, with 99% being Sunni Muslim. Northern Cyprus is a secular state, like the rest of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots are Eastern Orthodox and make up about 78% of the population of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus Analysis

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144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 “Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.” OECD.
152 Ibid.
Cyprus has a large Muslim population but extends relatively high religious freedoms compared to other developed nations. This may be because most voters who are Muslim are not immigrants. Cyprus has a large Muslim population, but the population itself is not foreign born. They are originally Turkish, but also considered national Cypriots. Muslims have always essentially been nationally Cypriot with ancestral Turkish background. The Muslim population there are not an out-group, but rather a part of Cyprus’ national identity. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in general wish to be one nation, rather than a nation divided in two or controlled by Turkey. Historically there were no tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots until the division of the country by Great Brittan.

*The Case of the United Kingdom*

The United Kingdom has a relatively average Muslim population of 4.8%. The nation scores a 3 on Pew’s Governmental Restrictions Index. The United Kingdom, unlike Cyprus and Bulgaria, has never been a part of the Ottoman Empire because it was an empire of its own.

The United Kingdom has a relatively low Muslim population of 4.8%. Only 22% of immigrants in the United Kingdom identify as Muslim. This explains why the United Kingdom is where it is on Figure 6 on the graph, in regards to the other developed nations.

*History of Muslims in the United Kingdom*

Historically speaking, the United Kingdom has always had one main religion and ethnic population. The majority of British nationals throughout history have typically been white Christians. The first Muslims came to the United Kingdom in 17th and 18th centuries and were

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153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
Muslim-Indian sailors brought by the East Indian Company.¹⁵⁵ Many of these ended up staying in the United Kingdom, but they were still a minority. The first Mosque in Great Brittan was opened in 1960 in Cardiff.¹⁵⁶ This is very different from the Ottoman’s who opened mosques throughout their empire since the 15th century. In 1869, once the Suez Canal opened there was another influx of Muslims in the United Kingdom.¹⁵⁷

The United Kingdom Today

As of 2011, 42% of United Kingdom citizens identify as Christian, while 49% identify as non-affiliated.¹⁵⁸ Also as of 2011, 87.17% of the population is white or Caucasian.¹⁵⁹ The United Kingdom, unlike Cyprus and Bulgaria never dealt with a large population of another ethnicity or religious background prior to globalization. The nation is homogenous in terms of race and religion.

United Kingdom Analysis

As the presence of Muslims became present in the nation, it prompted an ideological threat from the voters of the United Kingdom. Since the United Kingdom is a democratic nation, the institutions that withhold freedoms to Muslim should be a direct result of voters. Since Muslims are a small population in the United Kingdom, constituents are not calling for an absolute restriction as they are in places with greater populations, such as France. The more the out-group, in this case Muslims, can be identified, the more the people in a democratic society will call for restrictions against them. These restrictions may even lessen the presence of the out-

¹⁵⁸ “Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.” OECD.
¹⁵⁹ Ibid.
group by making the nation look less appealing to the Muslims. Finally, unlike Cyprus or Bulgaria, the United Kingdom never had such a large amount of Muslims, nor were they under any Muslim rule.

**Conclusion and Future Research**

My original hypotheses were that as the number of Muslims increase, as does the anti-Muslim sentiment. My second hypotheses stated: that the worse a nation is doing economically, the anti-Muslim sentiment will be higher. While there is no evidence to back up the claim that a country's economic well-being effects anti-Muslim sentiment, there are multiple implications that suggest anti-Muslim sentiment is caused by the number of Muslims in a nation. Anti-Muslim sentiment, when tested with public opinion polling, institutional freedoms, and social hostilities, all point to a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment where there is a greater Muslim population. The data is also interesting as it implies that as immigrant populations rise, there are less governmental religious restrictions. This could imply multiple things such as the possibility that Muslims are not assimilating into the nation's country, or that Muslims are more easily identified as an out-group. Since only France’s immigrants make up 45% of their population, this may imply that other immigrants coming into these developed countries follow the same religion as the countries they are migrating to. This would be something I would like to explore in future research.

Bulgaria and Cyprus are interesting outliers whose place in the data can be easily explained through historical context. Bulgaria’s story also may relate to the fact that they wish for a larger Bulgarian identity. This explains Bulgaria’s historical treatment of Muslim and Roma populations, who were forced to change their names and convert. The Roma, despite having a large Orthodox Christian background, were also forced to change their names and erase any
indications that they were Roma. This also explains Bulgaria’s claims that Pomaks are not actually Bulgarian Muslims, but rather national Turks claiming Bulgarian ancestry. Cyprus on the other hand, does not have one collective race but rather two races who are both essentially Cypriots but of a different heritage.

Anti-Muslim sentiment in developed countries may appear to be a relatively new phenomenon, however xenophobia and fear of the other has always been around in developed nations, and in Europe in particular. Muslims have been growing in the nation due to globalization, past colonization, and most recently the Arab-Spring. The Muslims are an out-group with a growing population in a globalizes world, thus prompting a rise in the anti-Muslim sentiment. Jews have been an out-group and have been targeted for years in Europe and other parts of the developed world. In Europe, this can be seen through the Holocaust and even centuries prior. Anti-Muslim sentiment in developed world is heightened with the rhetoric of right-wing populations that claim the Muslims are dangers to society, whether they be a threat to security, culture, or economics. While anti-Muslim rhetoric has been seen in politics in Europe and America, America’s rhetoric has also seen anti-Mexican rhetoric. In future research, I would like to test how the population of Mexican immigrants relates to anti-Mexican sentiment in the United States of America in comparison to the anti-Muslim sentiment there and in Europe.

Case studies on all the nations in this study may also answer why more Muslims in the countries prompt a rising anti-Muslim sentiment. Some explanations may be related to the fact that Muslims are out-groups and seen as a threat to nationalism, or that the media can target Muslims more easily because of their growing population. Overall, there are many avenues one can explore regarding anti-Muslim sentiment.
Appendix:

Questions asked to determine the Governmental Religious Freedom Index by Pew Research:

- Does the government limit religious literature or broadcasting?
- Does the constitution protect freedom of religion?
- Are there limits to the constitution's protection of freedom of religion?
- How do the country's constitution, laws and policies affect religious freedom?
- Does the government interfere with religious worship?
- Does the government limit public preaching?
- Does the government limit proselytizing?
- Does the government limit conversion from one religion to another?
- Are foreign missionaries allowed to operate?
- Does the government regulate wearing religious clothing or symbols?
- Did the government harass or intimidate religious groups?
- Did the government use physical violence against minority religious groups?
- Did the government fail to protect religious groups from discrimination or abuse?
- Does the national government have an organization to manage religious affairs?
- Did the government denounce any religious groups as "cults" or "sects"?
- Does the government formally ban any religious group?
- Did the government attempt to remove a religious group from the country?
- Are religious groups asked to register with the government?
- Did government action or policy result in deaths, physical abuse, detention, displacement or property damage due to religion?
- Does the government recognize a favored religion or religions?
• Do all religious groups receive the same level of government access and privileges?
• Does the government provide funds or resources for religious education or religious schools?
• Does the government provide funds or resources for religious property?
• Does the government provide funds or resources for religious activities other than education or property?
• Does the government provide funds or resources to religious groups?

Questions asked to determine the Social Hostilities Index by Pew Research:

• How many different types of crimes, malicious acts or violence motivated by religious hatred or bias occurred?
• Was there mob violence related to religion?
• Was there sectarian violence between religious groups?
• Were religion-related terrorist groups active in the country?
• Was there a religion-related war or armed conflict in the country?
• Did violence result from tensions between religious groups?
• Did groups attempt to dominate public life with their perspective on religion?
• Did religious groups try to prevent other religious groups from operating?
• Was violence or the threat of violence, including "honor killings," used to enforce religious norms?
• Were individuals assaulted or displaced in retaliation for religious activities considered offensive or threatening to the majority faith?
• Were women harassed for violating religious dress codes?
• Were there incidents of hostility over proselytizing?
• Were there incidents of hostility over conversions from one religion to another?
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