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Unifying the Conscious Self Through Internalist Reflection on First-Person Memories

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Introduction

I look around and notice external-world phenomena that seemingly exists independent of my mind. I close my eyes and attempt to bring to mind my recent experiences, which seem to be memories. What is this experience I seem to be having at any given moment I am conscious in the present? If I can recall memories from the distant past to the most recent past, is it the case that my memories are all unified and bound to the same consciousness over time?

These are the kinds of questions that my thesis addresses. I am interested in describing what I take to be my consciousness as I experience it in the present moment in time wherever I may be, even when I am not attempting to describe it. This includes if I am in front of my laptop computer, reading an article on the philosophy of mind at Norlin Library, walking through the UMC, looking at a photograph from three years ago, listening to music, or doing anything whatsoever. My consciousness persists in these moments when I do not have my attention singly directed at describing it; I'm still experiencing my consciousness when I am engaged in these activities that are not attempting to describe it since I still experience it in the same way. What may be implicit in what I'm trying to communicate in the preceding sentences may be more bluntly put into the following question: am I the private audience member that is constantly seated in a theatre watching a sort of performance or play in front of me at any given moment I am conscious?¹

This question is closely related to other questions, such as questions about personal identity, the self, the structure of consciousness, and memory. I organize my thesis as follows. First, I give some historical background in the philosophy of mind. More specifically, I lay out John Locke and David Hume's empiricism about the mind, then provide Hume's critique of the

¹ This question touches upon Dan Dennett's "Cartesian Theatre" claim about consciousness, which he then critiques. Susan Blackmore briefly mentions Dennett's view in her article, "There Is No Stream of Consciousness." *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 9, no. 5-6. (2002): 17-28.

self. As one potential response to Hume's critique, I focus on a paper, "The Structure of Self-Consciousness" by David Woodruff-Smith and provide his argument that the self is found in the modality of self-consciousness. Next, I draw a parallel of Woodruff-Smith's account to Joseph Levine's work on characterizing a first-person experience within the theoretical framework set by contemporary theories of consciousness. Since I want to focus on experiences from the first-person perspective, I switch to Sven Bernecker's discussion of these memories. Here, I defend John Locke's theory of the unified self across time and make the main claim of my thesis: First-person memories squarely fit into this Lockean view of the unified consciousness that constitutes a single self across time. I claim that I can assess my own memories from a methodological internalist position, give an example of a memory $EV\chi$, and subject it to Bernecker's five conditions for first-person memories in order to designate the memory as a genuine or true one. I argue that if my attempts succeed, then I have defended Locke's claim that one consciousness underlies the self over time. Finally, I give a summary of my argument and make a brief statement about the problem of other minds.

Philosophical Background to the Mind

I take my own consciousness to be at the very root of everything I've ever experienced since I started existing. The contents of my mind must have come from somewhere. Philosophers have attempted to give answers to the question, "Where does the mind obtain its content?" Here I cite two main philosophers, John Locke and David Hume. John Locke famously held the position that the mind is a *tabula rasa*, or blank slate. His claim is that the mind is unfurnished with any ideas until the precise moment it can receive any information coming externally from

the senses.² These sensible bodies are then apprehended by the mind, constituting simple ideas that then furnish the mind with information that came only through the senses. David Hume followed Locke's empiricism but expanded on it. I will focus on Hume's expansion only in two ways: his account of how ideas come to be in the mind and his critique of the self's existence.

In Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, he gives a theory of ideas and where they originate. Since he is an empiricist, he holds along with Locke that all ideas come originally through sense perception, meaning that mind is originally a blank tablet until it can start receiving information external to the mind through the senses.³ However, Hume divides the information conveyed through sense perception to the mind into two classes: thoughts/ideas and impressions. Thoughts and ideas are "less forcible and lively"⁴ meaning that they are fainter in their strength as the mind directs its attention or inner gaze towards them. Impressions are "all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will."⁵ Impressions then are the vivid perceptions the mind apprehends in the current moment.

In his *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume critiques the existence of a self through a few different arguments. One argument involves connecting continuous impressions to this supposed self. Hume thinks that the idea of a self that continuously exists must only come from a unity of perceptions in the mind. He says that the human mind, "...is not able to run the several different perceptions into one, and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which are

² Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Edited by Roger Woolhouse. London: Penguin, 2004. 109-11.

³ I should not fail to mention that rationalist philosophers such as Plato would disagree with Locke and Hume's empiricist view of the mind.

⁴ Hume, David. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Edited by Eric Steinberg. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2012. 10.

⁵ Ibid.

essential to them.”⁶ This means that a continuously existing personal identity or self over time cannot be unified by its perceptions. In applying his four part theory of causation of spatial continuity, temporal contiguity, resemblance, and conjunction to this argument, he states that a self still cannot unify these perceptions because they are merely reduced to an association of ideas.⁷ He thinks humans cannot help but make these associations, but if we subject the supposed unity of our perceptions to his four conditions of causation, there is nothing that makes these perceptions into one coherent idea of a self. Thus, if the idea of the self comes from an association of ideas and these ideas cannot be put into a coherent whole, then it is not the case that the idea of a single continuing self exists. The idea of the self is what gives rise to the role of the self, which constitutes personal identity. Thus, if Hume's argument against the existence of the idea of a self is successful, this means that the role of the self cannot be established. If the role of the self is what constitutes personal identity and it cannot be established, then personal identity cannot be established either. Here Hume's empiricism entails that the existence of the idea of a single continuous self cannot be coherent because his four causal principles merely reduce any perception, where the idea of a continuous self would come from, to an association of ideas.

A related argument Hume puts forth against the self comes out of Hume's attempt to look for his own. When looking for a self or identity that might act as a backbone for his experience, Hume finds none. Instead, he finds some sort of perception, no matter what his attention is directed to. He cannot think of his self as anything but a series of perceptions and he cannot find any foundation for these series of perceptions. He asserts that if his perceptions were to cease, he would also cease. What he means is, for example, if he is asleep and is not perceiving any

⁶ Hume, David. *Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. 259

⁷ *Ibid.*, 260

perceptions, he can be said not to exist. Hume goes on to state, "the mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations."⁸ Hume thinks the mind is situated in a sort of theatre that receives impressions, but he does not assert the existence of underlying self or continuous identity. At any given moment that he attempts to look for his continuously existing self, he finds only some sort of impression that makes its appearance in the theatre of the mind. For Hume, there is no audience member, or self, watching the play in the theatre; there is only the performance on the stage at any given moment.

Adding to Hume's critique of the self we now turn to his views on the resemblance of perceptions and memory. When our attention is drawn to our succession of perceptions, he holds that the mind looks for resemblance of these perceptions to one another. This is what helps humans attribute a single identity to a single object. The succession of perceptions may appear to closely resemble one another and one may infer from this sameness or resemblance that the objects of perception are the same throughout. Hume finds this phenomenon extremely misleading, since the object of perception may appear to be unchanged, but this does not mean that the object did not change.⁹ Hume is troubled by this observation about the smooth continuity of perceptions that will not allow the perceiver to notice changes in the object of their perception should a significant change happen quickly. The object of perception may not appear to be changed, but the object can nevertheless change without the person noticing. This causes trouble for the self, as Hume thinks that any idea of self would be a perception. Recall Hume's empiricism and his position that any and all ideas come from sense perception. So nothing else

⁸ Ibid., 253

⁹ Ibid., 254. I note here that Susan Blackmore gives a similar argument in her paper against the "stream of consciousness" view posited by William James. She does so by citing empirical literature on a cognitive phenomenon called "change blindness." Hume appears to be preemptively providing the philosophical explanation of "change blindness" here.

but perception can ground the existence of the very idea of a self. He says whenever he looks for a self, he finds a perception. If the self can only be found in perceptions and those perceptions mislead us into thinking that the objects that we perceive are continuous when they might not be, then this means that inferring the existing of a single persisting self is misleading. Thus, Hume concludes that these perceptions that inform the concept of a self are not in fact continuous and should not give rise to the idea of a continuous self.

Included in Hume's attack of the self is his critique of memory and its role in personal identity. He asks, "For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? Who can tell me, for instance what were his thoughts and actions on the first of *January* 1715, the 11th of *March* 1719, and the 3d of *August* 1733?"¹⁰ If his readers have forgotten their thoughts and actions on these dates, then he suggests they should not assert that their current self is the same self as the self at these past times. Hume's aim here is to attack the philosophical position that memory produces the connection between the past self and present self. Since they cannot remember their actions or thoughts at these earlier times, memory cannot act as the means by which personal identity is produced. Philosophers advocating that memories produce personal identity must explain how identity persists despite a struggle to accurately recall previous memories of exact thoughts or actions at the times one thought they existed in the past. Implied in Hume's argument is the claim that if one should be able to establish the self, the attempt to recall past thoughts and actions should seamlessly reveal a continuity in one's identity. But his enquiry into these past impressions and a failure to recall means that the existence of a continuing self can be rejected.

Hume's theory of impressions and his critique of the self provides a suitable background to my thesis. His theory of impressions is relevant to my current conscious experience. As I look

¹⁰ Hume, *Treatise*. 262.

at my computer screen and type this sentence, there is an impression of words that appear to my consciousness during the construction of this sentence. My act of typing that sentence produced the impressions that would then appear to my mind whereas the original impression of the page was a blank white sheet before I started typing, to state one example. In terms of his critique of the self, I can reflect on my life and sympathize with him that my life has felt like a rich composition of perceptions and sensations conveyed to my mind in the past. The impressions generated through vision especially seem to make the richest and most readily accessible impressions. His worries about the idea of a single self over time lead his reader, like myself, to question its existence. Is it really the case that my idea of a continuing self is confused? Is my conscious experience just like Hume's: a perception at any given moment not bound by a continuous self?

One potential response to Hume's critique of self comes from David Woodruff-Smith in his paper, "The Structure of (Self) Consciousness."¹¹ I will lay out Woodruff-Smith's various arguments in the paper in detail. After a mention of Levine's work characterizing a first-person experience, I will build on Woodruff-Smith's theory with a discussion of first-person memory. More specifically, I examine memory's connection to the experience of a unified self through the process of internalist reflection. "What structures the experience of my consciousness?" is the question that motivates the next section of my thesis.

Woodruff-Smith's Account of Self-Consciousness

Woodruff-Smith starts his discussion about self-consciousness with a mention of the 19th century philosopher Franz Brentano's view on the self-presentation of an image in consciousness.

¹¹ Smith, David Woodruff. "The Structure of (Self-) Consciousness" *Topoi* 5, no.2, (1986): 149-156.

He held that any and all experiences in consciousness includes two key characteristics. First, there is a mental presentation of the main object in the experience given by the senses. Second, there is another, conscious mental presentation of the original presentation. Brentano argued that, if one takes this secondary self-presentation claim seriously, it leads one to an infinite regress of conscious presentations. However, Brentano himself found the consequence of this infinite regress of secondary conscious presentations to be unacceptable. He therefore concluded that this secondary awareness that accompanies the presentation of the image noticed is *internal to the experience*, not accompanied by an infinite series of correlative conscious presentations. That is, the mental state that makes the presentation conscious is intrinsic to that mental state and does not require any further conscious mental states.

I formulate Brentano's argument for an infinite regress of conscious presentations with premises and a conclusion, as follows:

1. Mental phenomena can be caused by sensory experiences such as sight or hearing.
2. The mental phenomenon of hearing are explained by two presentations: (a) the presentation of the sound, which we call "hearing". (b) a presentation of this hearing.
3. Presentation (b) is either conscious or unconscious.
4. Presentation (b) is not unconscious, for the subject is aware of (b).
5. So presentation (b) is conscious
6. If presentation (b) is conscious, then it must be accompanied by a conscious mental state.
7. It must be accompanied by a conscious mental state.

8. If presentation (b) must be accompanied by a conscious mental state, then there are now three presentations total: (a), (b), and now (c): a presentation of a presentation of this hearing.

9. Since presentation (b) is conscious, (c) is also accompanied by a conscious mental state.

10. Since both presentations are accompanied by a conscious mental state, then there are now four presentations: (a), (b), (c), and now (d): a presentation of a presentation of the presentation of the act of hearing.

11. Since all three presentations are conscious, (d) is also accompanied by a conscious mental state.

12. If there is always another presentation, that presentation is always conscious and subsequently accompanied by a conscious mental states, then the pattern seen in premises 6-8 results in an infinite regress.

13. There is always another presentation, that presentation is always conscious and subsequently accompanied by a conscious mental state.

Therefore: the pattern seen in premises 6-8 results in an infinite regress of conscious presentations.¹²

In order to see how Brentano's infinite regress of secondary presentations might be generated, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose you are in a funhouse with a group of friends. At some point in the house, you become separated from them and the path you take leads you to a dark room. Once you've entered the room, you turn back towards the way you came with the intention to leave. You notice a mischievous giggle coming from the someone

¹² Brentano, Franz. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Edited by Oskar Kraus. English edition edited by Linda L. McAlister. Translated by Antos. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 121-22.

who quickly closes off the entrance, leaving you in the dark room. After a few seconds in the pure darkness of questioning just how much fun you're having, a light above you turns on. You quickly gather that you are in a room that is entirely made of mirrors; each wall is a giant mirror, and the light bulb is hanging on a small chord coming from the ceiling mirror. Everywhere you look in the room, you see a reflection of yourself. Even if you are not directly looking at your own reflection in the mirror, you see an increasingly high number of reflections of yourself in the background images. No matter which mirror you look at or where you look in the mirror, you can still see the images of the reflections becoming fainter and fainter as you follow the bounds of your images in the mirror. This leads you to believe there are an infinite number of reflections as long as you are looking at a mirror. This infinite amount of reflections that you see no matter which mirror you look into is analogous to Brentano's infinite regress of secondary awareness of the self-presentations in consciousness of the original image that is presented. Just like the funhouse case, one cannot help but see an infinite regress of images wherever they look at primary object because there is always a secondary self-presentation of that object that comes along with the awareness of the object in the first place.

This discussion helps lay the foundations for Woodruff-Smith's argument about subject secondary awareness of self-consciousness. Like Brentano, Woodruff-Smith thinks that the infinite regress consequence is unacceptable and he accepts Brentano's proposed solution: that the secondary awareness of the presentation of the original image is internal to the experience in the observer. After his discussion of the infinite regress problem, Brentano concludes, "inner experience seems to prove undeniably that the presentation of the sound is connected with the presentation of the presentation of the sound in such a peculiarly intimate way that its very

existence constitutes an intrinsic prerequisite for the existence of this presentation."¹³ However, Woodruff-Smith's motivation is to further develop the *structure* of this secondary awareness that is internal to the experience that Brentano defends. He develops his argument by laying out key concepts such as conscious vs unconscious mental states, reflexivity, mode, modality, qualia, and ego-reflexivity. These concepts must all fit together on his account of this intrinsic awareness that comes along with self-consciousness. He starts with following claim: mental states are conscious if there is a certain awareness in the subject that they are indeed having the experience. He defines 'experience' as a conscious mental state or process.¹⁴

Presumably as Woodruff-Smith is writing his paper, he notices a frog. Woodruff-Smith thinks this inner awareness that allows him to see this frog must have resulted from either a conscious process or an unconscious process. If the process is unconscious, then he cannot see how this visual experience could be made to be within his awareness already. So it must be conscious. He gives a phenomenological description of the frog, "I see this frog." If you say, "I judge that I see this frog", and that judgment has a correlative consciousness, then this turns into "I judge that I judge that I see this frog", *ad infinitum*. This soon leads to a similar infinite regress by following Brentano's line of reasoning. Without conscious awareness of the frog, there would have been no infinite regress made in the first place, but nevertheless he is conscious of the frog and that seems to result in the infinite regress.

Here is my interpretation of Woodruff-Smith's argument that results in infinite judgments.¹⁵

1. I notice external world phenomena through the five senses.
2. I am either conscious or unconscious of this external world phenomena.

¹³ Ibid., 127.

¹⁴ Woodruff-Smith, 149-50

¹⁵ Notice the similarity between this argument and Brentano's infinite regress of presentations argument.

3. If I am conscious of this external world phenomena, then this entails a judgment in inner-awareness.

4. This judgment in inner-awareness itself is either conscious or unconscious.

5. If my judgment is unconscious, then it follows that I am unaware of it.

6. It is not the case that I am unaware of my judgment.

7. So the judgment in inner-awareness itself is conscious.

8. If this judgment is conscious, then it was caused by a further judgment in inner-awareness that is either conscious or unconscious.

9. If this further judgment is conscious, then it was caused by another judgment that is either conscious or unconscious.

10. If this pattern of further conscious judgments is repeated for every judgment in inner-awareness, then an infinite regress results.

11. This pattern of further conscious judgments is repeated for every judgment in inner-awareness.

Therefore, an infinite regress of conscious judgments results.

Now I apply this argument's form to Woodruff-Smith's example of the frog:

1. I notice a frog through sight.

2. I am either conscious or unconscious of this frog.

3. It is not the case that sight is an unconscious process.

4. So I am conscious of this frog.

5. If I am conscious of this frog, then this entails a concurrent judgment in inner-awareness that is either conscious or unconscious.

6. It is not the case that this judgment is unconscious.

7. So the judgment is conscious.

8. If this judgment is conscious, then it was caused by a further judgment that is either conscious or unconscious.

9. It is not the case that this further judgment is unconscious.

10. So this further judgment is conscious.

11. If this further judgment is conscious, then it was caused by another judgment that is either conscious or unconscious.

12. It is not the case that this other judgment is unconscious.

13. So this other judgment is conscious.

14. If this pattern of one conscious judgment causing another is repeated, then an infinite regress of conscious judgments of the frog results.

15. This pattern of one conscious judgment causing another is repeated.

Therefore, an infinite regress of conscious judgments of the frog results.

A principle claiming that that a conscious experience entails a concurrent judgment is important for generating the regress in these arguments. Woodruff-Smith attempts to address this regress trouble arising from this principle by incorporating an immediate recollection into his description of the experience. Now his example with the frog turns into, "I recall that I just saw a frog." This regress results from the same line of reasoning as the previous example; the frog is now in conscious awareness. But this becomes, "I recall that I just recalled that I had just seen that frog" in the similar infinite regress pattern earlier. So this does not appear to solve the infinite regress problem. Echoing Brentano's response to his infinite regress troubles, Woodruff-Smith states, "the inner awareness that makes an experience conscious must be somehow a

constituent and constitutive feature of the experience itself – not a second presentation of the primary presentation, but a feature of the original presentation itself.”¹⁶ His aim is to highlight the reflexive character of this inner awareness. He changes his phenomenological description to include the reflexive character of the experience by adding the words, “In this very experience...” The description now becomes, “In this very experience I see a frog”. By making explicit this notion of reflexivity, he is also subtly referring to his own consciousness in the moment.

Here Woodruff-Smith introduces a distinction between the mode and the modality of the presentation that is central to understanding his argument. The mode of the presentation is the object of the presentation. The modality of the presentation is *how* the mode is presented to consciousness. Now to illustrate these two concepts. The mode for Woodruff-Smith is the frog since this is the object that the phenomenological description points to. The modality of the frog is vision in this case because vision is the way he came to know of the frog. There are other kinds of modality, but vision is the example Woodruff-Smith uses here.

He goes onto say that the reflexivity of the presentation is part of the modality and not the mode of the presentation. The modality can be indicated by the words, “in this very experience I see”, in the phenomenological description. This means that the experience itself of seeing the frog is not presented. What is presented is the mode, in this case, the frog itself. Since the reflexive aspect of this presentation is part of the modality, and not the mode, this blocks the infinite regress from happening. There does not require a second conscious presentation of the frog, a third conscious presentation of that second conscious presentation of the frog, *ad infinitum*; it is just the mode (frog) presented once through the modality (sight) in conscious

¹⁶ Woodruff-Smith, 150

awareness. The modality is a feature of the secondary presentation in the awareness itself and hence does not generate the regress.

Also important to Woodruff-Smith's analysis is the indexical. As part of the phenomenological description, "In *this* very experience...", the indexical restricts his inner-awareness to the circumstance at hand. The frog is the mode. The modality is how the frog came to be in conscious awareness. The indexical then restricts the person's consciousness of the frog in the circumstance at hand, which implies that they are consciously aware of such a frog in their circumstance. There is not another conscious presentation of their conscious presentation that then leads us into an infinite regress, but there is the primary presentation of the frog that is included in their inner awareness of the circumstance. Now his phenomenological description becomes, "In this very experience, I see a frog."

But what is inner-awareness?¹⁷ Woodruff-Smith thinks it is *ipso facto* self-awareness. Awareness of anything in consciousness includes one's own awareness of their self, or "I", as the subject of that particular experience. It is this self or "I" that is aware of its own mental processes such as its thinking, desiring, seeing, etc. This is what he means by his claim that *ipso facto* self-awareness is inner awareness. An assertion that uses "I" in its linguistic structure means that this "I" is noticing something as part of its own awareness. He cites Kant, in calling this "apperception". He claims that he apperceives the mode of his awareness. Thus, in his example, he apperceives the frog.

He distinguishes between two kinds of intentional structures conveyed in the phenomenological description of his perception: the object-oriented structure and subject-oriented structure. The object-oriented structure is when the description is focused on the mode

¹⁷ Woodruff-Smith's paper was published before David Chalmers' paper, "Facing Up to The Problem of Consciousness" that distinguishes between awareness and consciousness. Here, Woodruff-Smith is using awareness, but I think he means consciousness in Chalmers' sense.

of presentation, which is the frog in his example. The egocentric structure is when the use of the word, "I" is also included as part of the phenomenological description. There is a reference to oneself when one uses this subject-oriented structure in their description. Conveyed in this structure is a self-reference to an "I" and that this "I" is experiencing some object. This does not mean that "I" am presented to "myself", necessarily. Woodruff-Smith constructs a case where this is the intent. For example, he says, "I judge that I am weary". This includes both the egocentric structure in "I judge" but also an assertion about oneself, who is the object of the observation in the "I am weary" part of the statement. This means that the subject, and object, of the description are the "I". So this example shows that both kinds of structures can be included in just one phenomenological description.

He continues his analysis of self-awareness with a discussion of a different kind of self-awareness, which is captured by the use of the subject-oriented structure. But as part of self-awareness, one is aware of the experience before them at the given moment. The reflexivity of the phenomenological description attempts to capture this in language, through the use of the words, "in this very experience". Combining the reflexivity and the subject-oriented structures, he calls this new structure the reflexive-egocentric structure. This structure allows for Woodruff-Smith to say he apperceives himself and can convey this through both the subject-oriented and reflexive-egocentric structures. His inner or self-awareness is indicated by these structures and they are in play when he gives his phenomenological description of himself noticing the frog. Importantly, he adds that both of these structures are included as part of the modality of presentation, and not the mode. Therefore, the use of these language structures and the modality of the presentation both capture the "I" that is used in the phenomenological description.

Next, Woodruff-Smith gives an account of why Hume and other philosophers who were attempting to find the self failed. They were looking for the self in examples where the self is in the mode of presentation such as the object of a visual perception. But the self, included in self-awareness, is part of the modality of a presentation. More specifically, the self is located in the modality of a presentation as indicated by the egocentric and reflexive-egocentric structures. He provides a metaphor inspired by 20th century existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, "I am aware of myself not when I look for myself, but when I look for anything at all; I am peripherally aware of myself at the source of my every experience, as I am aware of my own body (nose, eyebrows, hands, feet) even as I look upon the frog before me."¹⁸

No infinite regress is generated in this account of self-consciousness. Both the egocentric and reflexive-egocentric structures indicate that one grasps one's self as the subject, not the object, in the experience. Woodruff-Smith's claim is that both of these structures are included as modality of the presentation. His motivation behind the mode and modality distinction is to argue against philosophers like Hume. For Hume, one is only aware of the constant series of perceptions in their consciousness and there is no idea of self that binds all these perceptions. Woodruff-Smith might respond by saying that Hume is making a fundamental mistake. Hume is looking for the existence of the self or the "I" in the mode of the presentation and not the modality. Of course, if Hume thinks that the self is to be located in the mode, then he is not going to be able to find it when he looks for it. For Woodruff-Smith, the modality of self-consciousness is the part that allows for self-awareness because the modality is *how* the mode is presented in consciousness. Without the modality, the mode cannot be presented in consciousness.

¹⁸ Woodruff-Smith, 151-52.

The egocentric and reflexive-egocentric structure allows for Woodruff-Smith to say that the “I” is not the object of the perception, as Hume might have thought, but rather the subject of the perception. The mode is presented to the subject through the modality. The mode signifies the objects independent of the mind that seemingly exist in the external world and are presented to conscious awareness. An infinite regress results if the secondary presentation has a correlative conscious presentation, which will have a correlative conscious presentation, etc. Brentano found this consequence unacceptable. There are only two presentations; the first presentation is the perception itself of an object from the external world and the secondary presentation is the inner conscious awareness of this external world phenomena. He held that the consciousness of inner awareness, in which the secondary presentation lies, is intrinsic. This means that the consciousness of the secondary presentation in inner-awareness is a feature of the inner-awareness itself. So there is no need for an infinite regress of conscious presentations.

Woodruff-Smith adds to Brentano’s account of this intrinsic secondary awareness by attempting to give its structure. The modality is a necessary part of this the intrinsic secondary awareness’s structure and is included in self-consciousness. The modality is described using the egocentric and reflexive-egocentric intentional structures, which bring with them the distinction between subject-oriented and object-oriented intentional structures. Subject-oriented structures refer to the subject of the presentation, and both the egocentric and reflexive-egocentric intentional structures are examples of a subject-oriented structure. Woodruff-Smith’s key claim, then, is that these subject-oriented structures are parts of the *modality*. Object-oriented intentional structures are the kinds used by philosophers like Hume when they were looking for the self. These structures signify the *mode* of the presentation. But this is mistaken, since the self is included as part of the modality and not the mode. Since the modality is a necessary aspect of

the secondary awareness internal to the experience, and the modality is included in the intentional structures of subjected-oriented phenomenological descriptions, no infinite regress is established.

Woodruff-Smith next includes a discussion of qualia of consciousness.¹⁹ Qualia and phenomenal character are interchangeable terms that concern the question of "what-it-is-like" to have a certain experience. There are many different kinds of qualia, or many ways wherein there is something it is like to have that particular experience. Visual perceptions, emotions, and pure thoughts about something are a few examples. He adds the claim that if a mental state is conscious, then it has qualia. Qualia then are part of what makes the mental state conscious in the first place. If a mental state is not conscious, it does not have qualia since the subject of the unconscious mental state is unaware of its occurrence and thus those mental states will not convey "what it is like" to experience them in consciousness.²⁰

Now I can summarize Woodruff-Smith's account. Like Brentano, he feels threatened by the generation of an infinite regress of conscious presentations. He agrees with Brentano's solution to the problem: this secondary awareness is not an infinite series of correlative conscious states. Instead, he holds that the secondary awareness is *intrinsic* to the experience of an object. Woodruff-Smith then claims that the modality is part of the secondary intrinsic awareness, and not part of the mode. Since this secondary awareness of the experience is intrinsic or internal to the experience and since the modality is a necessary aspect that comprises the structure of this awareness, then the infinite regress of presentations cannot be established.

¹⁹ Ned Block details four different concepts of consciousness in his article, "Concepts of Consciousness" included in Chalmers' *Philosophy of Mind* anthology. The four concepts for Block are phenomenal, access, monitoring, and self-consciousness. I'm interested in the intersection between phenomenal and self-consciousness, in other words, the phenomenal character of self-consciousness. I'm assuming that phenomenal consciousness interacts with self-consciousness and that experiential memory plays a role in the unity of the self. I will discuss this later in the thesis.

²⁰ This discussion of qualia becomes more important in the next section and later on when I talk about experiential memory.

I now move from Woodruff-Smith's expansion of Brentano's account of the modality of self-consciousness to a brief discussion of Joseph Levine's experience "E" from a first-person perspective. The reason for this is because I think both of these authors are talking about a similar philosophical phenomenon.

Connecting Woodruff-Smith to Levine

I see a relevant and important similarity between Woodruff-Smith's discussion of the frog and Levine's discussion of what he calls experience "E".²¹ He describes experience "E" as follows, "I'm looking at the snowy woods behind my house through the window. I see the (still) white snow on the ground, the grayish/brownish trunks of the trees, and the dark green needles. The sky is bright and blue."²² Levine holds that "E" is an ongoing mental state with phenomenal character, as given by his description of "E". I think a comparison of the frog case and experience "E" reveals a significant overlap between Woodruff-Smith and Levine. Woodruff-Smith's homing in on the frog and Levine's homing in on experience "E" of the snowy woods are both attempts at drawing attention to the same philosophical phenomenon: the experience of consciousness in the present moment. But they go on to talk about their respective phenomena in significantly different ways.

Where they differ in their discussion is that Woodruff-Smith goes onto expand on Brentano's response to the infinite regress problem by talking about the philosophical features of the modality that stops an infinite regress and its different features from the mode. Woodruff-Smith also adopts a kind of Kantian theory of apperception in order to help inform his discussion of the "I", and a philosophy of language that encompasses the intentionality of the subject-

²¹ Levine, Joseph. "Phenomenal Experience: A Cartesian Theater Revival." *Philosophical Issues* 20, no. 1. (2010): 209-25.

²² *Ibid.*, 209.

oriented and object-oriented structures. Levine differs because he focuses on two main theories of consciousness where experience "E" instantiates phenomenal character. He discusses higher-order theory and representationalism, including the merits and troubles of accepting each view in addition to assessing his own view about "E".

Higher-Order Theory (HOT) claims that phenomenal character results from having certain higher-order representations that make up these states of phenomenal character. For HOT theorists, "...what is distinctive of experience is that it is a specific kind of relation, a cognitive relation between a subject (or one of her states) and what is being experienced."²³ There are multiple mental states to note. There are the mental states in which the phenomenal character is instantiated in, call these the "target states". Then there are the higher-order mental states that make these target states conscious experiences. On this view, the phenomenal character of experience "E" is instantiated into target states are then made conscious *by* a higher-order mental state. These states are called higher-order because of this very reason; they cause the target states with phenomenal character to become phenomenally conscious. Representationalism holds that the experience of phenomenal character is the representation given to the mind. For representationalists, the experience of phenomenal character is the external world's representation in the mind, whereas for HOT theorists, experience depends on the higher-order states to the target states. Levine goes on to critique both of these views, showing that their implications for his experience "E" are all unacceptable. Levine rejects both of these views and argues for what he calls "appearance theory", where phenomenal character depends on the threefold relation between subject, object, and conscious awareness.²⁴ So then phenomenal

²³ Ibid., 211.

²⁴ Ibid., 220.

character becomes a sort of appearance to the subject's mind rather than the result of a representation or a higher-order state with a target state.

Levine critiques his own view, saying it is also subject to one of the objections of representationalism: dealing with hallucinations.²⁵ He distinguishes between two key features of phenomenal character: what the phenomenal character is instantiated in and what it is to experience the phenomenal character itself. Applying experience E to this, he talks of the former as the property of whiteness being instantiated in the snow and the latter as the experience of the whiteness. He then argues that representationalism only accounts for the former and not the latter in the cases of hallucinations; it is a separate question to ask of the instantiation of the hallucination in a property and to ask of the experience of the hallucination itself. Hallucinations have phenomenal character, but the experience of the phenomenal character is not captured by pointing to a property from the external world because the phenomenal character of hallucinations are internal representations. This means the phenomenal character of these hallucinations does not come from the external world and that representationalism cannot capture the phenomenal character of the hallucination by means of representing an external-world experience. So representationalism fails to give an account of the experience of this phenomenal character of a hallucination.

Levine attempts to get around this problem by not appealing to sense data experience as a representationalist would, but by appeal to the Cartesian theatre model. He notes the weakness here is that this move may not be ontologically respectable, since it would imply that objects presented to the Cartesian theatre might be virtual and so the appearances would be virtual as well, like a movie. He holds that veridical reality is governed by the laws of physics, which would include the construction of the Cartesian theatre in the first place, so it can experience

²⁵ I note here that I am talking about Levine's "relational representationalism" or RR.

veridical as well as hallucinatory experiences given it is in a physical reality responsible for its existence. However, he's not sure if his brain is in a vat or is subject to other kinds of weird skeptical scenario which would prevent him from distinguishing between veridical experiences and hallucinations.²⁶ Nevertheless, he accepts the "appearance theory" over both representationalism and HOT theory for explaining his experience "E".

I see both Woodruff-Smith and Levine start from a very similar place before they go on to give and discuss their respective arguments. After introducing Brentano's view, Woodruff-Smith gives his phenomenological description, "I see this frog." Levine jumps right into his phenomenological description at the start of his paper, "I'm looking at the snowy woods behind my house..." I think they are both attempting to describe a fleeting moment wherein their consciousness was focused on one particular perception before it was lost among the series of other successive perceptions. Once they wrote down what this fleeting perception was, they then began to give an account of it by appealing to certain theories or using terms grounded in the philosophy of mind.

I am very interested in philosophically describing the phenomenal character of my ongoing conscious mental states in the same way that Woodruff-Smith and Levine are. Like these philosophers, I will draw attention to one aspect of my consciousness for later philosophical analysis that is of particular interest to me. This aspect I now draw attention to is the following phenomenological description: "I not only see the words on the page in front of me on my laptop as I type this sentence of my honors thesis at this very moment in time, but I simultaneously can see a plethora of peripheral visual phenomena such as my desk and my hands

²⁶ Ibid., 212.

in front of me."²⁷ Following Levine, I'll call a description of my ongoing conscious experience EV.²⁸

However, I must make a clearer distinction between EV and EV χ .²⁹ I call my memory report above EV χ , and it is captured by the particular phenomenological description above of, "I not only see the words on the page in front of me..." EV is my ongoing experience of my own consciousness, which includes its phenomenal character and self-consciousness. My memory report EV χ directly resulted from experience EV through a relevant connection between ongoing consciousness and memory formation. Memory report EV χ was, at one time, equivalent to my ongoing experience EV because its source is in the reception of impressions of external world phenomena. In other words, EV produced EV χ . At the time that I wrote down my experience EV, it then became a potential memory report which I call EV χ . Now, unlike Woodruff-Smith and Levine, I will focus most on memory's relation to conscious awareness and more specifically, in what way memory is connected to one's consciousness over time. What motivates the next section of my thesis is the following question: "How can I describe my memories?"

Bernecker's Account of Memory

In his book, *Memory: A Philosophical Study*, Sven Bernecker includes and discusses theories in the philosophy of memory at length. In order to do this, he first must provide suitable foundations on which to build his theory, which are given in his introductory and first chapters.

²⁷ Following Woodruff-Smith, the modality of my self-consciousness provided the original structure in the mind for the creation of this memory.

²⁸ For "Evan". I claim this is where phenomenal character intersects with self-consciousness; there is something it is like to be me attempting to characterize my consciousness.

²⁹ Here I note that χ is not a variable or a constant. It is a time designation wherein the content of the memory, in this case, is found in the external world phenomena impressing on the conscious mental state at that time. So EV χ refers to a specific time in the past in which EV was conscious of external world phenomena, which then comprises the memory's content.

In his second chapter, he lays out the different views concerning memory's potential connection to personal identity. I focus on the first few chapters, and not any of the remaining chapters. Similar to the section of Woodruff-Smith, a philosopher's taxonomy must be introduced and explained before it can be actively used in arguments that follow. Then I will apply this discussion to my memory report $EV\chi$.

Bernecker's introductory chapter covers the rudimentary distinctions between the different kinds of memory. Philosophers typically make a threefold distinction: practical, propositional, and experiential. Practical memory is memory how, such as remembering how to tie one's shoe. Propositional memory is memory that "p", where p stands for some true proposition. Experiential memory is memory of an event or experience one had through a first-person perspective.³⁰ An example would be of my recent memory walking upstairs in my apartment to load the washer in the laundry room.

In chapter one, Bernecker argues that this threefold characterization is mistaken and splits all memories into either propositional memories or non-propositional memories. Propositional memories under this new taxonomy also encompass experiential memory from the previously threefold memory distinction. Experiential memories, or memories of the first person including its qualia, now fall under Bernecker's characterization of propositional memory. Since I want to focus most on these first-person memories with qualia, Bernecker's characterization of propositional memories will be given the most attention.

He further distinguishes two kinds of propositional memories: introversive and extroversive. Introversive memories are memories of one's mental states. Extroversive are of, "things other than one's mental states."³¹ He focuses on both of these kinds of memories in the

³⁰ Bernecker, Sven. *Memory: A Philosophical Study*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

first and third person mode of presentation by giving individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. I will only provide one of these sets, which I will specify after the taxonomy is introduced.

Before I give his characterization to these propositional memories, I nevertheless must set the relevant context by introducing more terminology from Bernecker. I start with his classifications of memories, then move to the distinction between methodological externalism and methodological internalism. This helps set the foundation for the reidentification and characterization questions that are important to memory's connection to personal identity, which I will then focus on in terms of Bernecker's propositional memory. Once this groundwork is laid, my goal is to connect veridical memory reports of past events from the first-person perspective in propositional memory to the phenomenal character of my ever-present conscious mental state EV.

Bernecker states that to remember is , "...to retain some previously acquired representation..."³² He provides various classifications of memory because any one memory of a past representation can fit into these classifications and take on multiple features. He includes the following classifications: veridical and ostensible memory, first-person versus third-person memory, inferential and non-inferential memory, conceptual and non-conceptual memory, *de re* and *de dicto* memory, occurrent and dispositional memory, unconscious & subconscious & conscious memory, and explicit and implicit memory. I will only include a short description of the first two classifications in the list and therefore neglect to include descriptions of the remaining classifications. For the present focus, I only need to characterize the first two classifications.

³² Ibid., 5.

Veridical and ostensible memories are exactly what they sound like; they are true memories and ostensible memories are false memories. First-person and third-person memories are, again, exactly what they sound like. First-person memories include implicit indexical references to the rememberer and presuppose the diachronic identity of that rememberer.³³ Indexical references are words used to call attention to the relevant conditions in the environment. For indexical references in memories, the relevant condition in the environment is the person making the memory. Diachronic identity concerns the continuously existing self across time. Third-person memories do not presuppose the diachronic identity of the rememberer and are just memories of someone in the past. These kind of memories do not necessarily point to the sameness of identity in the rememberer and so they are memories of someone who might not necessarily be the same person who had the experience at the time of the original memory's formation.

With this classification briefly characterized, I now move on to a discussion of methodological externalism and methodological internalism. Externalism in epistemology holds that justifying factors for a belief can be external to the subject's mind. Internalism in epistemology holds that the justifying factors for a belief must be accessible to the subject's mind. Bernecker says, "when one examines what it takes for someone to remember something, one must do so from some point of view."³⁴ Drawing from the distinction between externalism and internalism, Bernecker cites two methods by which one can take a certain perspective. Methodological externalism is the view that one takes when they examine a memory report from a third-person perspective. Conversely, methodological internalism is the view that one takes when one examines a memory report from a first-person perspective. Bernecker's own view is of

³³ Ibid., 24-5

³⁴ Ibid., 32.

a methodological externalist. Differing from him, I claim to be a methodological internalist about my own memory reports. Thus, when giving my first-person memory reports, my descriptions of memory reports will be of a methodological internalist. However, I do not see what's stopping others from taking a methodological externalist view.

Next, I cover two important questions relating memory to the self. The reidentification question asks, "What makes someone the same person over time?"³⁵ John Locke, in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, answers this question by putting forth the view that it is the continuity of consciousness that makes someone the same person. It is their sameness of consciousness and the person's ability to access earlier memories of thoughts or actions that unifies the self. He says of the self, "...in this alone consists *personal identity*, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that *person*; it is the same *self* now it was then; and 'tis by the same *self* with this present one that now reflect on it, that that action was done."³⁶ When evaluating the existence of a continuous self, or personal identity, Locke is here claiming that this continuous self is grounded in continuity of consciousness. This continuity of consciousness can then be evaluated by reflecting on the past thoughts or actions of one's self. I claim that the activity of memory recall is a kind of reflection of the sort Locke is talking about here. Thus, I claim that Locke would have no problem in including the activity of memory recall as a kind of reflection that is done when considering one's past self.

I mentioned some of Hume's objections to a theory like Locke's theory of a continuing consciousness unifying the self earlier. Philosophers Derek Parfit and Sydney Shoemaker also take issue with Locke's theory. More specifically, they object to Locke's implicit endorsement of

³⁵ Ibid., 63.

³⁶ Locke, *Essay*. 302.

the memory-based psychological criterion of personal identity. This criterion holds, "A person X is identical to a person Y if and only if X remembers Y's experiences." Parfit and Shoemaker put forth the circularity objection against this criterion.³⁷ The objection may be put into the form of a question, "How can you know that the person who formed the memory in the past and the person recalling that memory now are of the same person?" The objection is directed at this principle because it rejects the view that a definition of personal identity should include experiential memory. If personal identity requires a person's access to genuine memories, but genuine memories of the past require the person's access to these memories be of the same personal identity, then these claims are circular. Bernecker says of the circularity objection, "While someone's remembering having experienced E is a sufficient condition of his having experienced E, we cannot use the former as a criterion for the latter, since in order to establish that a person really does remember having experienced E, we have to establish that he, that very person, has experienced E."³⁸

In order to answer the circularity objection question, the person must remember having the experience as described in their memory report and establish that they experienced E. If not, then the criterion should be abandoned. Parfit and Shoemaker hold that past experiential memories might be ostensible, so they might not be true. They could be true, but they can only be made true through establishing that that they are the same person who experienced E. But this presupposes that the experiencer and the rememberer are the same person. Since memory implies personal identity and personal identity implies memory on this account, it is circular.

³⁷ However, Bernecker credits Joseph Butler as the inventor of the circularity objection.

³⁸ Bernecker., 47. Bernecker is talking of using experiential memory in the conditions included in a definition for personal identity here.

Due to this circularity objection, they introduce the term, "quasi-memories". A quasi-memory, or q-memory, is a memory of an experience that *some* person had. Q-memories establish that a person can correctly recall their previous experiences, but that person cannot on this basis alone, say that they are the same person they were when they formed that memory. If they accept Parfit and Shoemaker's objection, they will be forced to say that a correctly recalled memory from the past is a q-memory of *some* person, but not the *same* person who is currently recalling the memory. Therefore, when recalling a true q-memory, they are not recalling from the first person but from the third person. These philosophers charge the memory-based psychological criterion for personal identity with the circularity objection and this objection provides the grounds for abandoning this criterion.

In contrast to the reidentification question, the characterization question asks, "What is it to be a particular person?" Restated, this question concerns the characteristics that define a person. Marya Schechtman offers her narrative theory as an answer to this question.³⁹ This theory claims that the grounds for being a particular person is their narrative or story about their life that they experience. This narrative provides the backgrounds to one's life and answers what it is to be that person. I hold that Schechtman's view is intuitive. If one person asked a stranger on the street, "Tell me about your life", after receiving a suspicious glance, they are probably going to give a Schechtman-like response to this question. The person is probably going to provide some background information about their life like where they're from and influential experiences on their identity.⁴⁰ These experiences all provide the foundations that are applicable

³⁹ Schechtman, Marya. "Stories, Lives, and Basic Survival: A Refinement and Defense of the Narrative View." *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 60 (2007): 155-178.

⁴⁰ I claim here that these narrative descriptions would all be memories of some sort.

in answering the characterization question. For her, the narratives and stories that one tells are the things that define a person. Bernecker, however, remains unconvinced.⁴¹

Returning to the aim of this section's starting paragraph, I can now establish the kinds of memories I would like to focus on: extroversive propositional memories in the first-person mode. Bernecker gives his necessary and sufficient conditions as follows: "S remembers at t2 that p, where p stands for an extroversive proposition in the first person mode only if:

1. S represents at t2 that p
2. S represented at t1 that p*
3. P is true at t2
4. P is identical with, or sufficiently similar to, p*
5. S's representation at t2 that p is suitably connected to S's representation at t2 that p*⁴²

Bernecker gives the specific name of each condition as follows. Condition one is the representation condition. Condition two is the past representation condition. Condition three is the truth condition. Condition four is the content condition. Condition five is the connection condition. He provides independent reasons for setting up these conditions, but I will not discuss those here. I should also note the lower the time number, the further in the past the memory occurred and the higher the number, the more recently the memory occurred. So "t1" means in the most distant past and "t2" means the most recent past. P* means that the representation that is similar, but not necessarily identical, to the original representation P.

Connecting Bernecker's Account of Memory to the present focus

⁴¹ Bernecker objects to Schechtman's narrative theory to the response of the characterization question because he thinks that Schechtman's theory presupposes the diachronic theory of identity. I claim that this implies Locke's theory of consciousness that Parfit and Shoemaker subject the circularity objection to. Thus, her theory is subject to the circularity objection.

⁴² Bernecker., 34-5.

Bernecker's taxonomy above helps provide a background to the question I'm interested in asking: "What is this experience EV that I seem to always be having at any given moment that I am conscious?" This is where Woodruff-Smith, Levine, and I are all alike in our purposes; we call attention to a fleeting aspect of our conscious experience. Woodruff-Smith calls attention to a particular aspect of his consciousness when he gives the phenomenological description, "I see this frog" and he goes on to give a detailed account of the structure of self-awareness. Levine calls attention to a particular aspect of his consciousness when he gives the phenomenological description, "I'm looking at the at the snowy woods behind my house..." and goes on to characterize different predominating theories of consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind literature in order to explain his experience E. Recall my memory report EV χ , "I not only see the words on the page in front of me on my laptop as I type this sentence of my honors thesis at this very moment in time, but I simultaneously can see a plethora of peripheral visual phenomena such as my desk and my hands in front of me."⁴³ I go in a different direction from Woodruff-Smith and Levine because I focus on my first-person extroversive propositional memories, to use Bernecker's term. Thus, I shift attention from the subsequent philosophical discussions of these two philosophers in order to focus on these first-person extroversive propositional memories.

Between introversive and extroversive memories, I focus on extroversive because they seem to comprise my own personal identity in the way that interests me more in the present study. As I stated in the introduction, my thesis is aimed at characterizing the relation between my consciousness and the world external to my mind. Following the empiricists on the start of the mind, I hold that there is at least some truth to the claim that the mind is initially a blank slate

⁴³ See footnote 27. Woodruff-Smith's modality provides the original structure for the memory.

until impressed upon.⁴⁴ One feature of the mind is its ability to reflect. Included in its ability to reflect is an ability to remember, with a scope covering both extroversive and introversive memories. I focus on the relation between self and memory through extroversive memories in the first-person mode. I do not discount memories of my own mental states or introversive memories as unimportant or irrelevant to personal identity, but they are not the present focus.

Returning to Bernecker's set of conditions that comprise first-person extroversive propositional memories, he claims that that conditions one and two, "presuppose a diachronic identity in the rememberer."⁴⁵ The reidentification and characterization questions both bear on diachronic identity and so they bear on conditions one and two. Hence, if I am to incorporate Bernecker's account of first-person extroversive propositional memories and two of the conditions of this account presuppose the diachronic identity of the rememberer, I will also need to include a discussion of the reidentification and characterization questions. I now turn to discuss experience EV as an extroversive propositional memory in the first-person mode and then give attention to a discussion of experience EV in terms of the reidentification and characterization questions important to memory and personal identity.

Applying Bernecker's Account to memory report EV χ

I will now discuss experience EV in Bernecker's terms, as an extroversive propositional memory in the first-person mode. Recall the phenomenological description of my memory EV χ : "I not only see the words on the page in front of me on my laptop as I type this sentence of my

⁴⁴ Empiricists hold that sensible, material bodies are conveyed through the senses and impresses upon the mind. Rationalists like Plato hold that the mind can also be impressed upon by the existence of immaterial forms. I wanted to, again, note that empiricism and rationalism disagree about the origins of the mind's contents and so this is a controversial subject in philosophy that has existed for thousands of years.

⁴⁵ Bernecker., 24-5.

honors thesis at this very moment in time, but I simultaneously can see a plethora of peripheral visual phenomena such as my desk and my hands in front of me.” Now I can examine my first-person extroversive memory of my memory $EV\chi$ by checking each of Bernecker’s conditions. For the present purposes, I will substitute each condition for checking experience $EV\chi$ instead of “p” as I originally wrote Bernecker’s condition:

I remember at t_2 that $EV\chi$, where $EV\chi$ stands for an extroversive proposition in the first-person mode only if:

1. I represent at t_2 that $EV\chi$ (representation condition)
2. I represent at t_1 that $EV\chi^*$ (past representation condition)
3. $EV\chi$ is true at t_2 (truth condition)
4. $EV\chi$ is identical with, or sufficiently similar to, $EV\chi^*$ (content condition)
5. My representation at t_2 that $EV\chi$ is suitably connected to my representation at t_2 that $EV\chi^*$ (connection condition)

The truth of these questions falls on the accuracy of my own mind’s ability to fulfill all the criteria set by these conditions and so necessarily depends on my own mind’s ability to reflect on representations in my memory. This is where I employ methodological internalism in order to assess a memory report. Upon assessment, memory reports can be either true or false on this account. If I correctly recall my memory $EV\chi$ given the conditions set forth, then I can say that I have a veridical first-person extroversive propositional memory. I claim that I can correctly recall my memory $EV\chi$ given the conditions set forth. So I have a veridical first-person extroversive propositional memory. I now have a certified true memory *report* for the extroversive memory described in the first-person mode at t_2 , wherein I recalled $EV\chi$.

But now we must turn to Bernecker's claim that conditions 1 and 2 presuppose a diachronic identity and so we must examine my memory report $EV\chi$ in terms of the diachronic identity. I disagree with Bernecker's methodological externalist position on personal memories, for it assumes the methodological internalist position fails and diachronic identity is indefensible. I take what Bernecker means by diachronic identity is the view posited by Locke; continuity of consciousness unifies the diachronic identity of a person. The sameness of consciousness across time, in the sense that it is the conscious mind is able to reflect on its past actions and thoughts, comprises the same self. Thus, I claim the mind's ability to *reflect* on past memories explains a singular self across time, which is done from an internalist perspective. One can take either the methodological externalism or internalism perspective on my memory report $EV\chi$. If one takes a methodological externalist perspective on my memory report $EV\chi$, then they will assess my report from a third-person perspective. This would mean that one would assert that the "I" given in the conditions is not *my* memory but *someone's* memory. The methodological externalist route makes my memory report to be immune to Parfit and Shoemaker's circularity objection.

If one takes the methodological internalist perspective on my memory report $EV\chi$, then they will have to assess my memory report from my perspective. Following Bernecker's suggestion that conditions 1 and 2 presuppose the diachronic or Lockean view on identity, this now become subject to the circularity objection. If I am to defend that this memory is *mine* and not *someone's*, then I'm going to need to defend this memory from this circularity objection or show that the circularity objection bears on my claim. Since the circularity objection bears on the reidentification question, then I will need to give an answer to the reidentification question first.

Recall what the reidentification question asks. "What makes someone the same person over time?" John Locke's answer to this question is a person's continuity of their consciousness is

what makes them the same person over time. Now recall what the circularity objection says. "If you are to distinguish between a veridical and an ostensible memory of a person in the past, then you must establish that you remember having the experience that you claim to remember." If one cannot genuinely remember, then that person is said to have q-memories, the alternative put forth by Parfit and Shoemaker. Although q-memories are the same as experiential memories and hence first-person extroversive propositional memories, they are not of the same person or self but of some possibly different one.

Following Locke, I claim that present reflection on past conscious experiences, such as memories, and the ability to truly recall those memories explains the unification of consciousness over time and thus I agree with Locke's answer to the reidentification question. When I think of my life, I think a rich succession of extroversive and introversive memories I had at one time or another. These memories are just the recollection of past experiences and the configuration of their objects. Bernecker claims that Locke's theory of consciousness continuity presupposes the diachronic identity of the self, meaning that the *same* self continues across time. I hold that this diachronic identity of the same self is not a problem and so I disagree with Bernecker. He defines psychological continuity as follows, "it is the relation between intentions, actions, persistence of beliefs, character traits, values, etc."⁴⁶ Consciousness continuity is exactly what it sounds like, when a human's consciousness continues over time. Barebones qualifications for the continuity of consciousness is the mind's ability to think and reflect.

I claim that Bernecker, Parfit, and Shoemaker's use of q-memories as an answer to the circularity objection implies the existence of multiple selves across time. But since I take a Lockean view that the continuity of consciousness and its ability to reflect on past memories unifies the self across time, I cannot agree with this claim about q-memories for all past

⁴⁶ Ibid., 47. Since I do not talk of psychological continuity in detail, this definition works for my purposes.

memories. If I were to accept their claim, I would also have to accept the existence of multiple selves across time for any correctly recalled memory in the past. But this is the claim I am not willing to accept.

To claim that q-memories could be memories from another person is to claim that these memories could be from different selves, not of a continuous self. I understand Bernecker's worry and that quasi-memories eliminate the need to claim that there is a unified conscious self. But I deny that correctly recalled memories mean that the self is a different *person at the most fundamental level*, since I agree with Locke's claim that a person is a continuously conscious being. Thus, in a sense, I am rejecting the memory-based psychological criterion for personal identity because I hold that *consciousness continuity* makes person X and person Y identical. But I agree with the criterion in the sense that consciousness continuity is indicated by correctly recalled memories.

Thus, I echo the Lockean claim that at the most fundamental level of a person is the existence of their consciousness and that it does continue, as indicated by its ability to reflect on its past actions, thoughts, or memories. I claim that reflection on past memories indicate past conscious states and explicitly refer to this same underlying consciousness. Although psychological features of that person can change, this does not bear on the sameness of their consciousness. So I claim that the continuity of consciousness outlasts all changes in psychological continuity. Even further, I claim that the underlying or fundamental feature of any veridical memory is a clear reference to this continuing consciousness. Thus, my neo-Lockean approach to the reidentification question is that consciousness continuity, indicated by reflection on earlier memories, is fundamental to human consciousness. Although changes to psychological features can and do happen, but this does not entail changes in the underlying consciousness and

hence the underlying self. I still allow for the possibility of q-memories, but only if I cannot *correctly* recall a memory from an internalist perspective.⁴⁷

Applying this reasoning to my memory report $EV\chi$ means that my genuinely recalled memory does not entail that merely *someone* recalls memory report $EV\chi$, but that *I* recall it. Otherwise, it might be a q-memory of a different self or different person. Although my psychological features may have changed between the time my memory $EV\chi$ was formed and my current conscious experience EV , the same consciousness underlies both $EV\chi$ and EV . I hold that it is understandable, but absurd to claim that memory report $EV\chi$ and my experience EV are references to two different people or selves; they are not because they are bound by the same consciousness as indicated by my correct *internalist* reflection on these memories.

Remember my methodological internalist position that I am defending. If I took the externalist route, then I would not need to worry about the circularity objection. My internalist position is pivotal and it allows me to defend Locke's account. My same self, bound by the same consciousness, is indicated by the mind's *internal* ability to reflect on previous thoughts, actions, and memories and correctly recall these thoughts, actions, and memories from the past. When memories are *correctly* recalled from this internalist position, I claim that they are indications or references to the same consciousness at the most fundamental level and hence are not q-memories. If Bernecker's five conditions are fulfilled, then I can say that I have a correctly recalled extroversive memory. Thus, I am arguing for a diachronic or continuous existence of a self that is bound by the same consciousness through internalist reflection on true memories from the past. This is my answer to the reidentification question.

⁴⁷ My analysis focuses on true recall, not on cases where recollection fails. In these failed cases, I agree with Parfit and Shoemaker's claim that these incorrectly recalled memories could be q-memories.

Now I must directly answer the circularity objection, which takes issue with the diachronic, continuous existence of the self. Parfit and Shoemaker hold that the only way around the circularity objection is to claim that experiential memories are not from this same diachronic self, but from someone. This is what leads them to be methodological externalists. If someone cannot genuinely and truly recall a past memory that was theirs, then they are said to be recalling q-memories. These q-memories are not necessarily of the person who is currently recalling them, but of someone in the past who formed that memory. Thus, when someone recalls a q-memory, they are not necessarily remembering from their same self but of some possibly different self. This claim about q-memories fits well into methodological externalist assessment of memories and avoids the circularity objection.

My answer to the circularity objection is that it holds *only if* the rememberer cannot genuinely recall a past first-person propositional memory from the internalist position. What if one can genuinely recall a memory by fulfilling Bernecker's five criteria for a first-person extroversive memory through an internalist assessment? If I can assess a memory as fulfilling all the criteria set forth from this position, then I can say that I recall a memory truly. One can assess memory reports in two ways: either through methodological externalism or methodological internalism. If one takes the methodological externalist route, then they already avoid the circularity objection by denying the existence of a diachronic self. An accessed memory for an externalist is just a q-memory from the past of *some* person. This is the route of Bernecker, Parfit, and Shoemaker. If one takes the methodological internalist route, then this presupposes the diachronic identity of the rememberer that is counted in conditions one and two of a first-person extroversive memory. This is the route I take, but I claim this presupposition is not a problem

only if I can truly recall a memory from the past by an internalist assessment of Bernecker's five conditions. Recall the conditions for my memory report $EV\chi$:

1. I represent at t_2 that $EV\chi$ (representation condition)
2. I represent at t_1 that $EV\chi^*$ (past representation condition)
3. $EV\chi$ is true at t_2 (truth condition)
4. $EV\chi$ is identical with, or sufficiently similar to, $EV\chi^*$ (content condition)
5. My representation at t_2 that $EV\chi$ is suitably connected to my representation at t_1 that $EV\chi^*$ (connection condition)

I argued above that the diachronic identity presupposed by conditions one and two is not an issue if *genuine* recall occurs through the internalist methodology. Genuine recall for a first-person extroversive memory is determined by fulfillment of Bernecker's five conditions above. Any memory or memory report can be evaluated from either a methodological externalist or methodological internalist position. I evaluated my memory from a methodological internalist position since a methodological externalist position leads one to avoid the circularity objection by claiming that my memory is of *some* self but not *mine*. Since I do not take the methodological externalist route, I'm open to the circularity objection in the sense that I rely on my memories to be past references to the same consciousness, and so I must still face it. My answer is that the circularity objection holds only if I fail to genuinely recall a first-person memory through the internalist position. In order to fully address the circularity objection, then, I must evaluate my own memory from a methodological internalist position to see if it is genuine or not.

The only person suited to evaluate a methodological internalist position is me. If my methodological internalist position is to be helpful in genuinely recalling a first-person

extroversive memory, then the truth of the conditions for a first-person extroversive memory relies on my mind's accurate assessment each of Bernecker's five conditions. So I must go through each condition and truthfully answer them. Now this is a matter of asking myself a question about each condition. Can I represent at t2 that $EV\chi$? Yes. Can I represent at t1 that $EV\chi^*$? Yes. Is $EV\chi$ true at t2? Yes. Is $EV\chi$ identical with, or sufficiently similar to, $EV\chi^*$? Yes. Is my representation at t2 that $EV\chi$ suitably connected to my representation at t2 that $EV\chi^*$? Yes. The answers to all of these questions came about through my own mind's ability to reflect and represent the memories internally.

Here I give my argument in defense of the Lockean answer to the reidentification question:

1. If the first-person extroversive memory conditions are all satisfied from a methodological internalist position, then I genuinely remember a first-person extroversive memory.
2. The first-person extroversive memory conditions are all satisfied from a methodological internalist position.
3. I genuinely remember a first-person extroversive memory.
4. If I genuinely remember a first-person extroversive memory, then I avoid the conditions that the circularity objection bears on.
5. I avoid the conditions that the circularity objection bears on.
6. If I avoid the conditions that the circularity objection bears on, then I claim that the diachronic identity exists.

Therefore, I claim the diachronic identity exists.

Since the circularity objection does not bear on *genuinely* recalled past extroversive memories assessed from the internalist position, and the continuity of consciousness is indicated by *genuine* recall of these past extroversive memories, then I have no problem claiming that a diachronic identity or existence of a continuous self exists.⁴⁸ I put forth this argument because philosophers like Bernecker, Parfit, and Shoemaker would not allow me to make the claim that my memory report EV χ was mine, but that it might be somebody else's. Since I am not willing to concede to the circularity objection, I claim that my memory EV χ is indeed mine and not merely somebody's. My argument shows that the circularity objection cannot apply, in cases of genuinely recalled first-person extroversive memories from an internalist position. Bernecker gives the five conditions for genuinely recalling a first-person extroversive memory. I evaluated each condition from a methodological internalist position, which relies heavily on my own mind's ability to correctly assess my own memories and fulfill all of Bernecker's conditions in order to claim that I have a genuine extroversive memory.

I could take my defense of Locke's answer to the reidentification question further. Since I am defending the existence of a continuous consciousness, then I can make another interesting claim about memory's connection to self-consciousness. That claim is as follows: as long as mental state EV is conscious with certain relevant connections, then it is constantly in reception of potential first-person extroversive and introversive memories.⁴⁹ What I mean by "certain relevant connections" is my mind's ability to receive impressions of external world phenomena

⁴⁸ Again, my thesis focuses on extroversive memories. An analysis of introversive memories could reveal a similar result for the existence of a continuous self.

⁴⁹ These memories all have phenomenal character. My focus is on the creation of extroversive memories in consciousness and not on other relevant activities of the mind such as deliberation and volition. My claim here is a tricky one. Volition, plausibly, may be responsible for the ultimate source of at least some extroversive and introversive memories. It is also employed in the assessment with Bernecker's five conditions that establish the truth of a memory. Here, I'll assume that volition is included in the "reflection" part that is needed to establish the truth of a memory report, but I will not talk about the role of volition in this philosophical account further.

(that constitute extroversive memories), impressions of its own activities (that constitute introversive memories), *and* my mind's internalist ability to reflect on these kinds of memories.

These memories can be reflected upon by subjecting them to Bernecker's five conditions. This internalist reflection then establishes whether the first person extroversive or introversive memories are true or not. Memory report $EV\chi$ is just one example of a former potential memory from my conscious mental state brought into actuality by satisfaction of Bernecker's five conditions. But there would be more potential memories waiting to be made actual through internalist reflection if I so chose to reflect on them and subject them to Bernecker's five conditions. Examples would be when I'm doing anything whatsoever, such as walking around my apartment, doing laundry, eating, taking pictures, reading a book, working on homework, riding my bike, talking to friends, and so on. These potential memories could all be given verbal descriptions, assigned a name like memory report $EV\delta$, $EV\epsilon$, $EV\pi$, and assessed via internalist reflection on Bernecker's five conditions for first-person extroversive memories.

The origins of these potential memories lies in the exact moment in which the extroversive or introversive impression, which comprises the extroversive or introversive memory, was unified to the ongoing conscious mental state. For my case, I claim that memory $EV\chi$ was, at one very specific time, identical to my ongoing conscious state EV at the time which it received the impression. The result of this theory of memory's connection to self-consciousness is that the number of potential extroversive and introversive memories are an exceedingly high number. Since there is a vast number of potential memories from the past, this means there is also a vast number of potential memory reports. This memory reports can be true or false, and are restricted by whatever the bounds of the memory are, including the description of its content, and the subject's ability to assess the memories using Bernecker's five conditions

from the internalist position. Additionally, these exceedingly high number of memories would all have phenomenal character and would be bound by the same conscious mental state EV.

Recall one of Hume's objections against the existence of a continuous self, which directly bears on this account of memory. "Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the first of *January* 1715, the 11th of *March* 1719, and the 3d of *August* 1733?"⁵⁰ My response to Hume would be that, even though I may not be able to recall some specific instances from the past, if I can recall other past memories that are nevertheless made true by an assessment of Bernecker's five conditions from a methodological internalist standpoint, then that shows that my consciousness persisted at those times in the past. I am not able to recall every single thought or action from my past as this would be to presuppose that all potential memories must be made actual to constitute a continuous identity, which I claim is probably very rare.⁵¹ But I still can recall *some* memories from the past truly. This still shows the unity of the diachronic identity at those times. In other words, when I can genuinely recall a memory from the past, this memory is a reference to my conscious state EV that I occupied at the time of memory formation in the past. So long as my mental state EV is conscious through time, it is in constant reception of potential memories that may be actualized through the process of genuine recall at a later time. When these potential memories of the past are actualized at the time of genuine recall, they are explicit references to the past ongoing conscious state EV that I occupied at the time of memory formation. The conscious state EV, that my genuine memory refers to, *is* my current conscious state EV that I am now experiencing, but in the past.

⁵⁰ Hume., *Treatise*. 262.

⁵¹ In Bernecker's "Introduction" chapter, he gives an example of a woman named Jill Price who can recall specific instances in her life from specific dates in the past. She is a rare case of extraordinary memory, where she can actualize nearly all potential memories from the past.

This might become clearer with an analogy. Say I am at my local water park and intend to spend a few hours there. At the park is an array of structures like a swimming pool, a wave pool, a lazy river, a hot tub, a flat water slide, a twisted water slide, and a whirlpool. First, I jump into the swimming pool and swim in the lukewarm water for about fifteen minutes. Then I leave the swimming pool and enter the hot tub to lounge for five minutes before entering the whirlpool nearby. Tired from the tossing and turning, I enter the lazy river and then go down the flat water slide, the twisted water slide, and make my way back to the swimming pool. Then I go around to different parts of the park, mixing and matching the rides for the next few hours before it closes. Hours later, as I leave the water park, I reflect. The sequence of each activity lies in potential memory that could be actualized. But I have trouble recalling the exact sequence of activities I engaged in while I was at the park. I subject these memory reports to Bernecker's five conditions and do so through an internalist perspective. I am able to recall the first few activities I did, such as swimming in the lukewarm pool, the hot tub, and the whirlpool. I also remember a few of the middle activities, and many of the last few activities of the day. But I have seemed to forgotten the exact sequence of all activities.

Since I cannot remember every single activity, does it follow that I did not exist at the park the whole time? I answer, "No." Although I cannot remember the exact sequence of the activities that I did, I can still remember at least some of the sequence. It is true that I cannot remember the exact sequence of all activities I engaged in while at the park and so I was only able to actualize a certain few memories while many of the others still lie in potentiality. These memories maybe be able to be brought into actuality, either through a cue or sustained reflection. But they might never be actualized and could forever lie in potential dormancy. My claim is that they nevertheless happened and they were bound by EV. Potential memories were constantly

created throughout the whole time I was at the park. To claim that I would need to remember every single potential memory of activities that I did at the water park throughout the day would be analogous to the claim that I need to remember every action I've ever done throughout my life in order to establish the existence of the diachronic identity. But I claim that, internalist reflection can reveal at least some, and maybe a substantial number, of activities or memories from the past that then act as the glue that binds the diachronic identity together.

Hume, a fellow water park enthusiast who is leaving the park, sees my face of strained reflection and questions me in the parking lot. He might claim that if I cannot remember the exact sequence of activities at the water park, then I cannot remember my day at the water park whatsoever. My response is that this is going too far and that I remember many parts of the day, just not all of it. The parts that I actively remember through my internalist perspective are references to my same consciousness that persisted in all of those activities. Other water park enthusiasts overhear my disagreement with Hume. Bernecker, Parfit, and Shoemaker, walk over and claim that my memories from the day's activities in the park are only of some water park enthusiast's memories, but they might not be mine. I argue that, through my internalist reflection on my own first-person memories, the memories I bring to mind are in fact mine and not some other water park enthusiast's. This is not falsifiable by anybody other than me. As long as I am truthful in my own assessment, I can at least assess my own memories from an internalist perspective using Bernecker's five criterion for having true extroversive memories.

My true first-person extroversive memories of the water park may be symbolized as $EV\alpha$, $EV\theta$, $EV\psi$, etc. $EV\alpha$ could be my first-person extroversive memory of entering the water park, swimming in the pool, entering the hot tub, then the whirlpool. $EV\theta$ could be the memories towards the middle of my time at the park, like lounging on an inner-tube on the lazy river. $EV\psi$

could be the memories right up until talking to Hume, like leaving the swimming pool, grabbing my towel, and walking towards the parking lot. The ongoing consciousness EV was in reception of external world impressions that comprise potential extroversive memories, which are actualized through genuine recall. There are memory gaps between $EV\alpha$, $EV\theta$, and $EV\psi$ that may forever lie in potentiality and hence never brought into actuality through genuine recall. Nevertheless, conscious state EV was ongoing during all of the gaps and in reception of potential memories with qualia the whole time.

Turning now to the characterization question, I note that my answer could squarely fall under Schechtman's "narrative" theory. Bernecker charges her theory with presupposing a diachronic identity or continuous consciousness. But if I have effectively defended Locke's answer to the reidentification question, then this presupposition is not a problem. If this is the case, Schechtman's theory could be applied here. One could think of their vast number of potential memory reports that serve as the foundations for stories or narratives. These memory reports then would be expanded upon in the story to further describe their qualia. The telling of these stories and narratives just is the telling of previous extroversive and or introversive memories in a more literary sense. I claim there may be a hierarchy of qualia that are especially conducive to the retaining of some memories, which then become stories. There could exist a hierarchy of qualia such that the qualia at the time of the memory's creation is of higher importance than at other times where the qualia of the memory's creation may be less interesting. Every-day, mundane qualia that factor into potential extroversive and introversive memories may not be especially conducive to creating memory reports interesting enough to include in a narrative. Conversely, when the qualia are especially fascinating and hence the creation of the extroversive and or introversive memories is more fascinating, then these memories may be more

conducive to later description in a narrative. Nevertheless, Schechtman's theory is not at tension with the neo-Lockean theory that I've defended.

Summary and tying it all together

Now that I've posited the kinds of memories included in conscious mental states and defended the existence of a diachronic continuity of consciousness, I can make the connection back to the beginnings, Woodruff-Smith, and Levine. I claimed at the beginning of my thesis that the mind's content must come from somewhere. I fall into the camp that the mind starts as a tabula rasa or blank tablet with the empiricists, at least in a sense. The start of the mind, then, is precisely when it can be first impressed upon by the external world through the senses. In the vein of Woodruff-Smith, one can notice these external world phenomena and claim their noticing of it. He accepts Brentano's answer that self-presentations do not result in an infinite regress but rather there is an intrinsic awareness of a conscious mental state and its object that prevents the regress. Woodruff-Smith then argues that the modality is where the conscious self is to be found in perceptions of the external world from a Kantian theory of apperception. The modality is the aspect of the mind that allows for one to notice external world phenomena, and the ego-reflexive structure sets the grounds for the indexical reference to the self, or "I" included in phenomenological descriptions of the external world. The Humean objection that the mode is the only possible source for the perceptions to conscious awareness cannot be established because the mode cannot be noticed without the modality; this is to say that the modality is necessary for the mode's perception in the first place. The modality then is where the self is located, and can be expressed through the ego-reflexive intentional structure Woodruff-Smith gives.

Levine is also interested in describing his consciousness of external world phenomena. He calls his ongoing conscious mental state experience E, and characterizes the qualia of experience E in terms of different contemporary theories of consciousness. He argues that the theories of representationalism and HOT both fail in adequately characterizing the instantiation of qualia in experience E. Instead, he appeals to a theory he calls “appearance theory” which focuses on the subject, object, and qualia in the perception. He critiques his own theory, but holds that it still withstands objections better than representationalism and higher-order theory.

Like Woodruff-Smith, and Levine, I’m interested in describing a feature of my ongoing conscious mental state, which I call EV. Unlike Woodruff-Smith and Levine, I put more of a focus on the continuity of consciousness as indicated by genuine recall of first-person memories. Following my characterization of EV, I define my memory $EV\chi$ and give its description. Citing Bernecker’s work on memory, I give his five conditions for the genuine remembrance of an extroversive first person propositional memory. Bernecker claims that two of the five conditions presuppose a diachronic identity in the rememberer. If the memory is not diachronic, then the memory is from a different self. However, the diachronic identity is the answer that Locke gives to the reidentification question, specifically through access to memories. If I am to defend that the memory is mine and not of someone else’s, I need to defend that presupposing the diachronic identity is not a problem and thus defend Locke’s answer to the reidentification question.

Bernecker, Parfit, and Shoemaker's notion of q-memories implies the existence of multiple selves, which I reject. I hold, following Locke, that consciousness continuity explains the sameness of person over time. In a sense, I reject the memory-based psychological criterion for personal identity, favoring Locke's continuity of consciousness answer to the reidentification question. But I also claim that these past conscious states can be accessed through reflecting on

past memories and this is the sense that I agree with that criterion. Reflection bridges the gap that separates one's conscious self in the past to one's conscious self in the present. I claim that if these memories can be genuinely recalled using Bernecker's five conditions for a first-person extroversive memory from an internalist reflection, then they are bound by the same diachronic identity. If these memories are genuine, then they are not q-memories of some different self. Instead, they are explicit references to the same consciousness and same fundamental self in the past

I gave the example of my memory $EV\chi$ and argue that I remember it from a methodological internalist position. I still need to address the circularity objection. I give my argument that the circularity objection to this claim about memories cannot be established if I can correctly recall my memory report $EV\chi$ from an internalist perspective. Even though I am in my current conscious experience EV , I can still recall my past memory report $EV\chi$. This does not mean that I am recalling a memory merely from someone. Rather, when I created the memory $EV\chi$, I was in the same ongoing conscious state EV as I type these words that signify the specific time window in which I can point to my present conscious state. *At the time of memory formation*, EV was in reception of external world impressions as well as impressions of the mind's own activities. The external world impressions at the time of memory formation comprised the content of my memory $EV\chi$. But EV right now is, strictly speaking, the experience of writing this very sentence at this moment in time and is not receiving the exact same impressions that formed $EV\chi$ in the past. I assigned the Greek letter chi " χ " to this specific memory in the past because it represents the impressions of the external world on EV that comprised the memory's content at the moment of memory formation *and* it also designates the time of memory formation in the past. The diachronic identity, or sameness of consciousness, underlies the creation of $EV\chi$

since EV just is this diachronic identity or sameness of consciousness persisting across time. So I call my memory “EV χ ”, since “ χ ” designates a specific time and specific memory which was formed when EV was conscious in the past.

Taking my account further, I can claim that at any given moment I am conscious and hence am in EV in the relevant way for extended periods of time, it receives the potentiality for creating an exceedingly substantial number of extroversive and introversive memories. This is not to say that I could recall every potential memory report, as a large multitude of these potential memories are forgotten and hence never made actual. The way to bring a potential memory into an actuality is to “ χ ” correctly recall it through fulfillment of Bernecker's five conditions. If these conditions are fulfilled, then one can say they have a genuine memory from the past.

What is the source of these memories? Impressions of both external world phenomena and internal mental activities, which are just extroversive and introversive memories, respectively. The mind notices these impressions through Woodruff-Smith's suggestion of the modality. It is through the modality that my conscious mental state EV first received impressions that would then comprise EV χ . Through the modality, my mind is able to notice or receive external world phenomena impressions. This, along with the task of typing, generates memory report EV χ : "I not only see the words on the page in front of me on my laptop as I type this sentence of my honors thesis at this very moment in time, but I simultaneously can see a plethora of peripheral visual phenomena such as my desk and my hands in front of me." The ego-reflexive intentional structure allows me to refer to myself or "I", and it also refers to the modality of my apperception of myself as well as the external world phenomena at the time memory EV χ was formed.

Next I claim this memory $EV\chi$ and my conscious experience EV are not bound by two or more different selves, but by the same diachronic identity. In order to claim this, I must defend Locke's account by arguing that the circularity objection does not apply to genuinely recalled first person extroversive propositional memories where Bernecker's five conditions are all satisfied from a methodological internalist position. Taking this account further, I claim that my consciousness EV is constantly in reception of potential extroversive and introversive memories that could result in an exceedingly high number of potential memory reports. I hold that the overwhelming majority of these memories are forgotten. Nevertheless, the genuine recall of extroversive or introversive memories ties past conscious mental state EV , that generated $EV\chi$ at the time, to present conscious mental state EV , which is constantly generating new potential memories. These features of memories and their connection to conscious awareness provide my grounds for rejecting Hume's critique of the self, rejecting Bernecker, Parfit, and Shoemaker's claim about q-memories from some other self, and accepting Locke's continuity of consciousness answer to the reidentification question. I illustrated this with the water park analogy.

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Still, someone might object. They might claim that the person that started writing this thesis in the past is not the same person who is currently writing this sentence. They might claim that the person that started writing this thesis is a different self than the person who is currently writing it. My reply to this objection would be to cite my memory report $EV\chi$. It refers to, not only myself writing a part of my thesis at a time in the past, but also my ongoing consciousness EV at the time $EV\chi$ was generated. My current conscious state EV is typing this sentence but it

was, at one time, receiving the impressions that generated $EV\chi$. At the times I'm not seated in front of my laptop writing my thesis and in conscious state EV , I'm generating potential extroversive and introversive memories which can be later brought into actuality by fulfilling Bernecker's five conditions through internalist reflection. Examples would be my activity of doing anything else whatsoever, such as walking around my apartment, doing laundry, eating, taking pictures, reading a book, working on homework, riding my bike, talking to friends, and so on. These are all potential memories, which could be labeled as $EV\delta$, $EV\epsilon$, $EV\pi$, and so on. My consciousness still persists during the creation of each and all of these memories and there is phenomenal character to all of them. These memories are not falsifiable by anyone other than myself, which an internalist reflection reveals. The "EV" aspect included in the name of the memory shows that my same consciousness underlies them, and the content of the memory report would be described by appealing to the philosophy of language encompassing the ego-reflexive intentional structure and modality included in Woodruff-Smith's account of self-consciousness.

There is one important implication for this view in terms of solipsism, which is the view that I am the only person with a mind who exists. I will assume this view is false and that other minds do exist. If other minds operate similar to mine and can reflect on memories as they are created in consciousness throughout their conscious lives, then maybe other minds could insofar as the creation of their memories in consciousness happens by a relevantly similar philosophical process. Or if it does not, then other minds could also attempt to communicate this. But if no mind ever tried to give a characterization under the assumption that solipsism is false, and if it really is, then there would have been no attempts to characterize memory's connection to the same consciousness over time and hence no account would have ever existed. So I'm assuming

that solipsism is false so that, in the case that it is, other minds might be able to relate or not. From this, other minds then could communicate how their experience of memories might be similar or different for their theory of the conscious self.⁵²

Master argument

1. At least some of the mind's contents originate in sense perception.
2. The idea of a self arises out of sense perceptions only if one takes the mode to be the means by which one come to know all perceptions (like Hume claimed).
3. Either the idea of the self comes from the mode or the modality.
4. If the self comes from the modality, then it is necessary for the reception of any external world impressions.
5. The mode necessarily relies on the modality.
6. So it is not the case that the idea of a self arises out of sense perceptions since the mode necessarily relies on the modality.
7. The mind's ability to know the source of external world impressions is through the modality, more specifically, the modality included in apperception according to Woodruff-Smith.
8. Both Woodruff-Smith, Levine, and I characterize this ongoing conscious mental state of the self signified by apperception in different ways but I focus on first-person memories.

⁵² I would like to extend my utter gratitude to Professor Rob Rupert for agreeing to advise my thesis, a process lasting multiple months, on extremely short notice *and* without having me as a student before. He frequently corresponded with me when he was abroad this summer and met with me nearly every week this semester. I very much appreciate his patience as I narrowed down my topic, a project in itself that lasted many months. Additionally, I am thankful for his many helpful suggestions on my sometimes last-minute drafts. Without Professor Rupert's initial agreement to advise me, I would never have had the privilege to explore my interests in philosophy at a deeper level. He's been an invaluable mentor from the start to the end. I wish to extend my gratitude to Professor Bailey for his guidance at the beginning of the thesis process and for his general helpfulness. I also want offer my sincerest thanks to Professor Munakata for attending my thesis defense via online video connection despite her recent hospitalization. Defending my thesis in front of this committee was an honor.

9. Potential first-person extroversive and introversive memories are created from the binding of external-world phenomena and internal, mental activities with an ongoing conscious mental state, respectively.

10. This ongoing conscious mental state is the self, what I call EV.

11. The mind's ability to describe its own memories, including their phenomenal character, is through indexical self-references (such as the ego-reflexive structure).

12. If potential extroversive and introversive memories are created from the binding of external world phenomena with an ongoing conscious mental state EV (known through the modality of apperception and communicated through indexical self-references), then that ongoing conscious mental state EV or self is at the root of these potential memories.

13. So the ongoing conscious mental state or self is at the root of these potential memories.

14. The mind's ability to reflect on these past potential memories produces potential memory reports.

15. These potential memory reports are made actual by fulfilling Bernecker's five conditions for a first-person extroversive memory through methodological internalist reflection.

16. If these potential memory reports are made actual by fulfilling Bernecker's five conditions for a first-person extroversive memory through methodological internalist reflection, then the circularity objection does not bear on these memory reports.

17. The circularity objection does not bear on these memory reports.

18. If the circularity objection does not bear on these memory reports, then these memory reports are clear references to the same underlying consciousness.

19. These memory reports are clear references to the same underlying consciousness.

20. If these memory reports are clear references to the same underlying consciousness, then these reports provide the grounds for accepting the existence of a diachronic identity.

21. These reports provide the grounds for accepting the existence of a diachronic identity.

22. The existence of a diachronic identity is another name for Locke's claim that the same consciousness comprises the same person over time.

Therefore: The genuine recall or actualization of potential memories, which are clear references to the same consciousness in the past, provide the grounds for accepting Locke's claim that the same consciousness comprises the same person over time.

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