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The Complexity of Peace: A Case Study of the Peaceful Islamic-Christian Coexistence in Senegal

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The Complexity of Peace:

A Case Study of the Peaceful Islamic-Christian Coexistence in Senegal

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INTRODUCTION

We are flawed creatures with violent hearts that long for peace.

--Karen Armstrong (2014:76)

The media often fuels public preoccupation and interest with war, crises, violence, and religious extremism, demoting stories of peace to "non-news". The relatively new field of Peace and Conflict studies generally operates the same way, focusing heavily on the conflict side, finding conflicts to "fix" and learn what to avoid while devoting little energy to observing and studying situations of peace. As a result, countries like Senegal rarely come on the radar of such studies.

This small country on the west coast of Africa hosts a population of over thirteen million people, around 89 percent of which identify as Muslim and ten percent as Christian. The Senegalese have prided themselves on the peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians in their country, for not only do members of the two religions merely tolerate each other, but also appear to consciously cooperate together to actively promote amity and an environment of peace. Senegal does indeed seem to merit such praise and pride. They boast a low score of 0.2 on the Social Hostilities Index, which measures hostilities within and between religious groups and another low score of 1.6 on the Government Restrictions Index measuring government restrictions on religion (Sedghi 2012; Pew Research Center 2014). Scholars have praised Senegal for its peacefulness, and the United States Annual Report on International Religious Freedom commended Senegal as a country in which "religion plays an important role in the lives of most citizens, and society is generally very open and tolerant of different religious faiths" (US Department of State 2004).

Robert Ricigliano, author of *Making Peace Last: A Toolbox for Sustainable Peacebuilding* (2012), proposes a theory of peacebuilding that he calls the SAT model. This holistic approach to peacebuilding emphasizes the importance of including efforts to promote factors at the *Structural*, *Attitudinal*, and *Transactional* levels in order to resolve conflict and develop a sustainable, lasting peace. This thesis aims to evaluate Ricigliano's SAT model through an examination of the peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians in Senegal. By researching the various factors that significantly promote this Islamic-Christian coexistence I hope to determine the extent to which the SAT model adequately describes the peace in Senegal. In other words, I take a retrospective approach by examining an already established peace to see which components of the theory apply and which do not, as well as determine whether or not any gaps exist. This retrospective approach could help the peacebuilding field by giving insight into how to prioritize future efforts at conflict resolution and developing stable peace.

I have structured this thesis into four parts. In the first part I will elaborate on why I have chosen to study Senegal and address my first research question: Do Senegalese Muslims and Christians coexist in a genuine peace? In this section I will first draw upon my personal observations as a study abroad student. I will then move on to observations made by others, drawing upon statistics from various surveys and indices.

The second section will lay out the history and background information of Senegal that pertains to this study. I briefly describe the introduction of the Islamic and Christian faiths to the African continent and to Senegal and then move on to explain Senegal's pre-colonial and colonial history. This section concludes with a brief description of the practice of Islam and of Christianity in Senegal.

Section three will address my second research question: If a genuine Islamic-Christian peace exists in Senegal, what factors have significantly fostered this actuality? Here I will further describe the components of Ricigliano's SAT model. Following a definition of structural factors I will describe a number of aspects of Senegalese society that fit into this category and analyze their effect on peaceful Islamic-Christian relations. I will repeat this process for attitudinal and transactional factors.

In the final section of this thesis I will conclude with a summary of my findings in which I briefly recount the state of relations between Muslims and Christians, the various factors that significantly shape these relationships, and how these findings support or challenge Ricigliano's SAT model of peacebuilding.

Methods

I have drawn upon various sources to investigate my topic. I drew historical data from various scholarly sources recounting the histories of Islam, Christianity, and colonialism to ensure multiple perspectives and gain a more holistic, and hopefully more accurate understanding. I have also looked at a variety of secondary sources such as newspapers, journals, and books. I have statistically analyzed data collected from the Pew Research Center and Afrobarometer. The Pew Research Center conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, and other empirical social science research as a nonpartisan fact tank (Pew Research Center 2015). Afrobarometer, an independent, non-partisan research project, measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere by conducting surveys repeated on a regular cycle in more than 30 African countries (Afrobarometer 2015). Analysis of data from these surveys has allowed me to find possible patterns and factors that correlate with religious intolerance and to better understand contemporary attitudes and perspectives of Senegalese. In addition to these

secondary sources I have used my personal experience in Senegal to compliment and guide my research. This experience in Senegal lasted four months in the form of a study abroad in which I lived with a host family, allowing me to observe day-to-day interactions between Senegalese Muslims and Christians. Finally, I also emailed the Daniel Brottier Cultural Center, a civil society organization in Dakar, in order to gain a clearer understanding of their goals and work.

PART 1: Why Study Senegal?

RQ1: Do Senegalese Muslims and Christians Coexist in a Genuine Peace?

My Observations

My interest in this topic kindled while I studied abroad in Dakar, Senegal during the spring semester of 2014. During my four months in the country I had the privilege of living with a Senegalese host family, receive instruction from Senegalese professors, and experience a two-week long rural stay in two different villages: the village of Diolly in the Kaffrine region and the village of Keur Sadaro in the region of Thiès. In my daily conversations as well as in my observation of the actions and behaviors of others I began to notice a recurring theme of peaceful Muslim-Christian relationships.

Figure 1. Map of Senegal's Regions



Source: Cooperative D'Habitat Providence 2013 "Senegal Regions Carte"

Almost immediately during my first day in Senegal I became conscious of a rhetoric of peace as the Wolof word *jàmm* (peace) saturates daily conversations. In my various classes the program staff and professors also used this rhetoric, highlighting Senegal's peacefulness and often referencing the coexistence of Muslims and Christians as an example. To back up their claims they mentioned the frequency of intermarriage between the two religions and described how Muslims and Christians commonly cohabitate in a single family. In fact, almost one in five (18%) of Senegalese Muslims say they have other immediate family members, such as children, siblings, or parents, who are Christian (Pew Research Center 2010). The staff told us a number of incredible stories recounting the cooperation between members of the two faiths. They also described the relationship as brotherly, explaining how Senegalese Muslims partake with Christians in the celebration of Christmas and Easter while Christians join their Muslim neighbors in celebrating Tabaski. At first I doubted the veracity of these claims, viewing them as an idealistic exaggeration of reality. However, throughout my stay I personally witnessed these demonstrations of interreligious love and amnesty on a daily basis.

Living with a host family allowed me to closely observe Muslim-Christian relations as well as gain a sense of the overall attitude between the two groups toward each other. I lived with a Muslim host family, whom I will call the Secks, in a neighborhood called Sacré Coeur III, which hosted families from various ethnic groups and members from both Muslim and Christian faiths, though the majority were Wolof Muslims. I have given all of my Senegalese family members and friends different names in order to respect their privacy. My host mom, Binta, practiced the *salat* (Islamic prayer) every day. Though my whole family identified as Muslim Binta struck me as the most religious in the family as I rarely saw my host siblings pray.

Two doors down lived a Catholic family. Almost every day around seven o'clock in the evening Marie, the mother in the Catholic family, would knock on our door, come in, sit down, and converse with Binta. These lively conversations spoken rapidly in Wolof brimmed over with laughter. I asked my host sister, Awa, about Marie's relation to the family. She informed me that Marie was my host mom's best friend (though she also described many other people also as Binta's "best friend"). I later realized that Muslims and Christians in Senegal often have best friends from the other faith. When Easter came around Marie made her typical round to our house. This time, instead of staying to chat she simply dropped off a bucket of *ngalakh* (a delicious peanut butter and millet soup with Baobab juice) for the Secks and I to eat for dinner. Awa explained that Marie had to leave to deliver *ngalakh* to the other Muslim families in the neighborhood. She informed me that in Senegal Catholic families traditionally make meals for their Muslim friends during holidays like Easter and Christmas. "We will make some *yassa poulet* or something yummy for her family when Tabaski comes," she assured me to show the mutual attitude of giving and sharing. This demonstrates a profound coexistence that extends beyond mere toleration of each other, but rather close relationships based on consistent interaction, cooperation, and brotherhood.

I witnessed this coexistence on the professional level as well. During my four months in Senegal I had an internship through a Lutheran church centered in Maristes, a neighborhood in Dakar. This church had a variety of outreach programs, but I mainly participated in their Centre Communautaire Gallé Nanondrial, a community development center in Yeumbeul (a suburb of Dakar). This development center had primary and secondary school classes, a library, after school sports programs, microfinance classes, a lab to teach computer classes, and a group that went around to families and taught about women's health. Though Christians had established

these programs a majority of the staff was Muslim, as were the people whom they served. It struck me how both Christians and Muslims treated each other no differently than members of their own faith. At lunchtime everyone ate around the bowl together (a custom I will discuss in further detail in Part III), conversing in Wolof about their families, about the weather, and other friendly small talk. Everyone shared the same goal and passion to help the marginalized community in Yeumbeul. Though faith served as one of the main motivators behind the work they did not allow religious differences to hinder them from accomplishing these goals.

These explicit demonstrations of interfaith love and brotherhood sparked my interest into researching these Islamic-Christian relationships further and examine the possible factors that significantly influence this peaceful coexistence. I will expand upon my observations of interfaith coexistence later on in the section on attitudinal factors of peace. For now I will move on to explain how others describe this relationship in Senegal.

Scholarly Observations of Social Relations in Senegal

Shortly after beginning my research I realized that I do not stand alone in my observations of a peaceful Islamic-Christian coexistence. Many others, from citizens to tourists, scholars to politicians, have made similar remarks. A travel article from the New York Times calls Senegal "a beacon in West Africa -- a model of peace and prosperity since its independence" (Marche 2015). The United States Annual Report on International Religious Freedom describes Senegal as having "a long tradition of amicable and tolerant coexistence between the Muslim majority and Christian, traditional indigenous, and other religious minorities" (US Department of State 2004). Sakah Saidu Mahmud, a scholar of African politics and history, states that "Senegal demonstrates how a peaceful approach over time tends to cultivate a culture of tolerance" (Mahmud 2013:137).

Various international surveys reaffirm such statements. In particular I have looked at the Pew Research Center's survey, *Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, as well as information from the Afrobarometer Survey. The survey from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life collected information in nineteen countries, including Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, South Africa, and Senegal in April of 2010. The sample of the Senegalese population consisted of 103 Christians and 891 Muslims from all 11 regions proportional to population size and the urban-rural distribution and therefore a nationally representative sample. The respondents answered questions on various topics, such as their perceptions of politics, life, and social relations. The attitudes of the Senegalese as reflected in the survey tend support the notion of peaceful coexistence. For example, out of all of the Sub-Saharan countries surveyed Senegal ranked the lowest in the percentage of the population who viewed Christians as violent at only two percent. In fact, 92 percent of the Muslim population expressed overall positive views of Christians, the highest of all of the other countries. The majority of the population expresses a general attitude of trust toward those with religious values differing from their own. This extends even to the political level, where, even though almost everyone (90%) believes it is important for political leaders to have strong religious beliefs, two out of three (66%) also claim that they would not have a problem if the faith of a political leader differed from their own. Three principal factors seem to promote this general attitude of trust: a low fear of extremist groups, a high feeling of religious freedom, and perceived commonality between the two religions.

Out of all surveyed Sub-Saharan countries Senegal claimed the lowest percentage of its population concerned with religious extremist groups (20%) (Pew Research Center 2010). Both

the Pew Forum survey of 2010 and the Afrobarometer survey of 2013 find that conflicts between religious groups ranks among the lowest issues of concern among citizens, who instead view issues such as poverty, unemployment, good governance, drought, and health as the primary problems of the nation (Afrobarometer 2013).

Senegal also boasts an extremely high percentage (97%) of the population who say they feel very free to practice their religion (Pew Research Center 2010). This perception of freedom and a lack of threat to their religion signifies a lack of anxiety regarding discrimination or violence based on religious identity. Indeed, 96 percent say they view Muslims as tolerant and 93 percent say they view Christians as tolerant (Pew Research Center 2010). In general tolerance becomes easier the fewer differences people perceive. In the case of Muslims and Christians in Senegal only 28 percent of the population says that Christianity and Islam are "Very different," ranking the lowest out of all the surveyed Sub-Saharan countries (Pew Research Center 2010).

Senegal has also received favorable scores on various indices that measure various forms of peace. On the Social Hostilities Index, which measures hostilities within and between religious groups on a scale from 0 to 8, with 0 being the least hostile, Senegal boasts a low score of 0.2 (Pew Research Center 2014). Senegal has a similarly low score of 1.6 on the Government Restrictions Index, measuring government restrictions on religion (Pew Research Center 2014)¹. On the Global Peace Index Senegal ranks the 72nd most peaceful country out of 162, with a low score of 1.974, based on factors such as militarization, social indicators and level of security, and the amount of domestic and international conflict (Global Peace Index 2014e).

Between my personal observations, the observations of scholars, various indices measuring peace and conflict, and the low levels of interreligious conflict, I conclude that the

¹ For more information on how these indices are determined see the methodology section of the report on Religious Hostilities (<http://www.pewforum.org/2014/01/14/appendix-1-methodology/>)

simple answer to my first research question is "yes". The apparent cooperative and beneficial relationship between Muslims and Christians in Senegal does represent what goes on in actuality, and the two groups have successfully maintained a genuine peaceful coexistence. However, I do not intend to make any utopian claims about the peace in Senegal and as my research will reveal, there is no simple answer to this question. Senegal does not have a blemish-free record of peace. Instances of violence and conflict have occurred, some of which, namely the Casamance conflict (described on page 24), have lasted to modern times. However, political rather than religious motivations spur on a vast majority of these conflicts and in spite of these sporadic occurrences of violence I maintain that the peaceful Islamic-Christian relationship in Senegal merits recognition. In fact, this imperfect history and environment makes the peace between Muslims and Christians all the more remarkable and noteworthy. I will elaborate in later sections on how various structural, attitudinal, and transactional factors work together and play off of each other to create and maintain this peace, hopefully demonstrating the complexity of this relationship.

PART II: History and Background

In my daily conversations with people many Senegalese boasted of their country's peaceful history and culture. This pride in a peaceful identity may underplay and minimize the history of conflict in Senegal. Though I do not claim a complete lack of violence or conflict, I do want to assert that the instances of strife that occurred did not bring about intractable conflicts or wars of unmanageable scale or violence. The very fact that the Senegalese emphasize the peaceful aspects of their history shows the value they place on peace in their culture and their desire to maintain a stable society of coexistence.

The first Christian-Muslim encounter in Africa occurred in Ethiopia. Muhammad sent some of his vulnerable and persecuted followers to find refuge with the Christian king of

Ethiopia. After questioning the Muslims the king declared that the Muslim faith was virtually the same as his own (Voll 2003). John Voll asserts that this "Christian-Muslim encounter provides one of the important affirmations in Muslim tradition that Islam and Christianity share a basic repertoire of religious concepts and symbols, in the tradition of Middle Eastern monotheism" (Voll 2003:23). Though Muslim-Christian encounters on the African continent may have started out peacefully the introduction of new outside forces made these relations less stable and more prone to conflict. Voll describes the Muslim-Christian encounters in Africa during the age of imperial expansion as having a tone of conflict relationships. However, he also asserts that religious identity rarely defined the conflicts, but rather an asymmetry of power, and came about because of Islamic resistance to European conquests (Voll 2003). The issue of conversion did not incite much competition as very few Muslims converted to Christianity and missionaries instead focused their attentions on people from indigenous religious traditions.

The slave trade significantly disrupted coastal African societies, including Senegal, where the Island of Gorée exported the largest number of slaves to Europe. Until the end of the eighteenth century Senegal exported around two thousand to three thousand five hundred slaves a year (Gellar 1982). The slave trade incited violence between states and this militarization of power promoted the advance of militant Islam (Voll 2003). The movement led by *marabouts* (Islamic holy men and leaders of the Islamic community) spread in Senegal and developed as a means to unify the states and fight the slave trade. During this time near the end of the 17th century Voll asserts that encounters between Muslims and Christians in Africa were "shaped more by the 'insider-outsider' identities of Europeans and Africans than by an awareness of religious issues" (Voll 2003:27). In other words, even though clashes did indeed occur between Muslims and Christians, concerns of political economy served as the source of conflict rather

than religious identity. A further look into the history of Islam and Christianity in Senegal reveals few major religious conflicts, neither between the faiths nor within them among the various brotherhoods or congregations.

Pre-colonial History

Much of Senegal's early history remains unclear until around the 13th century when the Mali Empire, led by the Mandinka ethnic group, ruled over much of modern day Senegal. The empire organized the land into chiefdoms in which a dominant ruling lineage controlled other peoples through conquest, although they allowed local villages and towns to maintain quite a bit of autonomy. Three main social groups categorized the population: the freemen, the servile artisan castes, and the slaves. Among the slaves, who constituted as much as a half to two thirds of the population, existed a subdivision called the *ceddo* (warrior crown slaves). The nobility absorbed and accepted many of the *ceddo* as a part of their social class because of their military successes. Around the end of the thirteenth century a leader named Ndiadiane N'Diaye formed the Jolof Empire, which peaked during the 15th century but disintegrated into smaller states and kingdoms in the 16th century.

Islam first reached the Wolof during the first half of the 11th century through the migration of Muslim merchants, teachers, and settlers. Due to the efforts of Waar Jaabi, the first ruler to convert to Islam, by 1040 CE Islam spread from Tekrur in the north to the Senegal River valley. The Tukulor, part of the Fulani and Pulaar, became the first major Senegalese ethnic group to embrace Islam (Gellar 1982) and the Wolof kings adopted practices from the Moorish clerics of Mauritania and Morocco shortly after. At the inception of Islam into Wolof society only a minority of the population converted and Islam remained confined to the nobility and ruling class. The Portuguese arrived in 1444, marking Senegal's first contact with Roman

Catholicism. They described Wolof society as "mostly characterized by religious mixing, whereby Islamic rituals were observed alongside elements of traditional religions" (Babou 2007:21). Today similar practices still occur among both Muslims and Christians.

Islam especially started to expand during the 16th century. Out of the collapse of the Jolof Empire rose several smaller states more receptive to the influence of Muslim traders and clerics. They gladly welcomed both material goods and ideas about structures of state and society. Islam spread mostly peacefully to the masses of the people rather than staying confined to the ruling classes. However, a jihad movement began in Mauritania during the second half of the 17th century in response to the slave trade. The Wolof states of Senegal joined in the jihad for a short period of time and imposed cultural and political dominance over much of the other populations living near the Senegal River. However, Moorish dissenters, French traders, and local aristocracies quelled the jihad, restoring the status quo and an institutional form of an Islamic state never precipitated in Senegal.

In spite of short periods of jihad, Cheikh Anta Babou describes the Islamization of Senegal overall as a "quiet revolution" led by advisers, scribes, and judges called the *serigne fakk taal*, who "were peace-loving farmers" (Babou 2007:25). In an attempt to remain politically neutral they kept their distance from rulers and focused instead on teaching and education. Though they did not directly involve themselves in political issues they managed to gain the respect of the political rulers. A group called the *Jakhanke* (anti-Jihadist Muslim scholars) also refused to engage in politics and war and instead committed themselves to maintaining a peaceful coexistence. "The group left a tradition that survived in which the Muslim leaders view their role in society as 'people of God committed to peace and development'" (Mahmud 2013:23). All of these factors prevented radical Islamic reform movements to take root in the

region. The attempts to establish theocratic states never succeeded in spreading and so they eventually always fell apart. Instead, the French succeeded in imposing western-type nation-states on traditional societies all across Senegal, creating a wider and more unified space within which the Muslims had to interact (Mahmud 2013).

During the second half of the 18th century the power dynamic shifted as some clerical rulers from a group called the Fuuta Tooro, led by Tukolor marabouts, started to proselytize aggressively in neighboring states and push for autonomy of Muslims in the kingdom. During this time the various kings and rulers could not agree about the role of Islam in the state, leading to division. Unlike other areas of Africa, such as in modern-day Nigeria, the process of establishing Islamic states failed (Mahmud 2013). This time also marked the beginning of French colonization, a new interference in local politics that caused leadership in the Muslim community to change. While some Muslim clerics pushed for jihad, most committed themselves to the peaceful expansion of Islam (Babou 2007). The Wolof king, Lat Joor, joined with Governor François X Valière in 1875 to fight against the jihad. The abysmal treatment of the prisoners during this time incited Amadou Bamba, founder of the Muridyia brotherhood, to take interest in becoming a Muslim leader and focus on teaching peace. Though there did exist divisions such as these among Muslims during early Islamization, from a long-term perspective "the actions of Muslim jihadists and teachers were neither contradictory nor disjointed; they were, rather, complementary and parts of the same continuum that James Searing termed the quiet (Islamic) revolution in West Africa" (Babou 2007:31). In any case, the efforts of the jihadists did cause a rapid expansion of Islam across Senegal, laying a foundation for teachers to create schools among communities and paving the way for a lasting Islamic influence.

Colonial Period

The French colonists arrived in Saint Louis, northern Senegal, in 1659 and in the Isle of Gorée, the main port for slave exportation, in 1677. Like many other colonizing countries, "France defended its acquisition of colonies on the grounds of a 'civilizing mission' that would bring peace, prosperity, and the benefits of French civilization to the 'backward and primitive' peoples fortunate enough to come under French rule" (Gellar 1982:9). They gained direct control over most of Senegal by the late 1880s when they extended into the interior of Senegal upon the death of Lat Dior, a Wolof king. Between 1886 and 1890 they had conquered the kingdoms of Kajoor, Bawol, and Jolof (Foster 2013). The French did not gain the Casamance region of southern Senegal, however, until after World War II due to great resistance from the Jola. A number of factors, which I will address and discuss later, have made the Casamance region more prone to conflict than the rest of the country.

By the 1880s when the French controlled most of Senegal a number of Christian congregations had also firmly established themselves in the colony. From the first introduction of Christianity into Senegal by Portuguese traders during the 15th century, a long period of time passed before Christianity began to gain momentum because the Portuguese did not prioritize proselytization or conversion, and the earliest French priests, originally sent to serve the French community, had little impact since they largely ignored the local populations. However, by the 1630s, before the colonists had arrived, French Capuchins started to send missionaries to evangelize south of modern-day Dakar. In 1779 the missionary Congregation of the Holy Spirit also sent priests from France to work in Saint-Louis. Catholicism gained more significant momentum in 1819 upon the arrival of the Sisters of Saint-Joseph de Cluny. These sisters ran public schools for girls in Gorée and Saint-Louis, managed an orphanage workshop, and served

as nurses in hospitals. Shortly after, in 1845 missionaries from the Congregation of the Holy Heart of Mary established operations to evangelize in Dakar, still an African village at the time. By this time the clergy had expanded their role to include active efforts to convert Africans in addition to their original purpose of serving the European and métis populations. In 1848 the Sisters of Our Lady of the Immaculate Conception of Castres, or *les Soeurs bleues*, came to run schools, workshops, and dispensaries in Dakar and Rufisque. The Vicariate of Senegambia was created in Dakar in 1863, running until 1962. Protestant missions also arrived in Senegal starting in 1863.

Unlike many other colonizing nations the French attempted to secularize the governance of their colonies, including Senegal. Secularization, or *laïcité*, did not altogether succeed and French power in Senegal divided between the secular rulers and the clergy, who desired to convert the Senegalese. This division in French power gave the Senegalese population an opportunity to exploit weaknesses in the rulers and gain more autonomy.

The coastal communes hosted a religiously and racially diverse population, though most Senegalese identified as ethnically Wolof or Lebu Muslims. The métis families, on the other hand, devoutly practiced Catholicism. Though families had the choice of sending their children to either Catholic schools or Muslim *daaras* (Qur'anic schools), many Muslim families decided to send their kids to Catholic schools since they had a reputation of providing better education. As a result of this integration of Muslims and Christians the French ruled their territory as a single unit rather than dividing rule and separating the populations. This manner of ruling a single, unified population laid the foundations of nation building amongst the different ethnic and religious groups, and by the time of independence in 1960 "Senegal emerged with a solid foundation for nation-building" (Mahmud 2013:30). To this day Senegalese citizens have a

strong national identity that unifies them across religious and ethnic lines. Even though the French unified the colony across religious lines they created division based on region, with some areas enjoying more privileges and freedoms than others, as explained in further detail shortly.

The French attempted to simultaneously subjugate the Senegalese while keeping them appeased and peaceful, which they had failed to do in other territories such as Algeria. This balancing act resulted in rights for the African population unparalleled in other populations elsewhere in the French empire. In fact, out of all of their colonies the French applied assimilationist ideals only in Senegal (Gellar 1982). For example, along with the French and métis population, the French granted full citizenship to African male inhabitants in the communes of Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque and Saint Louis, all located along the coast. As a result they had the right to vote for a deputy to represent them in the French legislature. The four communes of Senegal "was one of the rare areas in colonial Africa where Europeans and Western-educated Afro-Europeans and Africans could engage in politics on an equal basis" (Gellar 1982:10). Though assimilated as French citizens the French bureaucracy also allowed for a level of autonomy by guaranteeing Muslim French citizens to be judged by Muslim courts in accordance with Muslim law. Clearly these "Muslim African voters enjoyed a particularly advantageous and unique position that allowed them to vote as French citizens yet retain their personal status as Muslims" (Foster 2013:25). Citizenship did not extend to the interior, however, and the French governed rural Senegal more autocratically and denied most of their colonial subjects political and civil rights. To this day a great disparity exists between the coastal regions and regions in the interior, though not between the governance of ethnic or religious groups.

Sheldon Gellar notes how the "great disparity in colonial status between citizens and subjects gave rise to two markedly different styles of political leadership. In the communes, the prototype of the political leader was the urbane, Western-educated Senegalese intellectual; in the countryside, it was the marabout" (Gellar 1982:11). Since the main authority of the colony resided in the coastal communes the French needed to develop a new system to regulate the interior communes. Bureaucrats in Paris divided the colony into fifteen *cercles* (administrative districts) managed by civilians who reported to an authoritarian French commandant. In theory, a French administrator had absolute rule over a hierarchy of African chiefs, or cantons appointed by the colonial administration. They had the right to arrest and jail without trial, a system called *indigénat* (native justice). In reality the administrator, isolated and unable to speak the local language, heavily depended on the African chiefs whose responsibilities included collecting taxes and recruiting men for labor. The French showed a clear distaste for *Sharia* (or law based on Islam and the Qur'an) and granted very little administrative power to the Muslim leaders and marabouts. However, this only increased the respect of the masses for the marabouts because "they did not exercise temporal power at the time. They, therefore, assumed positions of respect from the traditional elites and became the mediators of conflict in the society" (Mahmud 2013:25). The Senegalese marabouts play a significant role in encouraging peace, which I will further examine in the section on *The Practice of Islam in Senegal*.

A power struggle between several parties in Senegal existed during colonial rule, including the French secular government administration, the French Catholics, the Devès family, and the African population. This power struggle led to interesting developments in Muslim-Christian relationships early on. The Devèses, a métis family largely supported by the public, built a vast commercial network into the interior of the colony. In order to protect their

commercial interests the Devèses openly attempted to pit Muslims and Christians against each other. Using the *Réveil du Sénégal* (a newspaper circulated among the four communes) they published stories and articles mocking nuns, clergymen, and the Catholic system of education. These publications discredited the church's civilizing mission as actually causing the converted Africans to regress into egotistical liars and hypocrites who drank too much (Foster 2013:32). In order to combat the attempts of undermining the church French missionaries began to use rhetoric of religious tolerance, claiming to identify with Muslims "because of their shared religiosity" (Foster 2013:33). This rhetoric espoused by the Church has lasted through the centuries and still exists today. The Catholic Church in Senegal, motivated perhaps in part by a fear of losing support and relevance in a predominantly Islamic country, still promotes stances of religious tolerance.

Another interesting dimension of the power struggle existed between the French themselves: the secular administration versus the Catholic missionaries, who seemed constantly at odds with each other. Missionaries in the colony strongly pushed for Catholicism to serve as the principal guiding force of colonization. Father Picarda, the vicar and chief administrator in Senegal, made the case "that the church was an indispensable partner in French colonization: colonizers could not hope to civilize 'naïve' Africans without using the power of Catholicism" (Foster 2013:35). The administrators, on the other hand, did not see the Catholic "civilizing" mission as a priority and instead focused on establishing themselves as the highest authority in the colony. Although the church managed to gain an abundance of social, cultural, and political capital, a number of factors eroded the status of the church in Senegal, including opposition from the Devès family and French government.

This rivalry between the French administration officials and the French Spiritan missionaries manifested itself in the Wolof-Serer rivalry. The Serer fiercely opposed Wolofization, or assimilating into Wolof culture, which included conversion to Islam from their indigenous animist religion. The French Spiritans sided with the Serer, viewing them as the "ideal tabula rasa for the implantation of Catholicism and civilization" (Foster 2013:49). The French government officials, therefore, favored the Wolof. Though the French administrators worried that Islam would undermine their power in Senegal as it had in Algeria and other places in West Africa, they trusted the Muslim Wolof more than the Serer, whom they considered "'anarchic' and 'savage' and prone to drunkenness" (Foster 2013:49). Even Governor General William Ponty, who argued that Muslims should have to renounce their faith to qualify for naturalization, declared, "I have always thought that our policy toward our Muslim subjects should be more clever and tactful than severe" (Foster 2013:153). The Serer successfully exploited the support of the Spiritans to lobby against the Wolof chiefs. "Indeed, the older Wolof/Serer antagonism simply flowed into the conduit of administrative and missionary rivalry as both Africans and Frenchmen translated and repackaged African conflict into French categories and forums during the transition to French rule" (Foster 2013:46). French intervention in the Wolof-Serer conflict blurred the original tensions that had religious undertones and that had the potential for creating attitudes of religious intolerance. Instead the conflict transformed into a political one, taking pressure off of religious divides. Later on, though many Serer remained Christian many others converted to Islam on their own accord, showing how religious conflict had diffused.

The Dreyfus affair, a political scandal lasting from 1894 to 1906 in which an Alsatian Jew was wrongly accused of espionage, caused the French to solidify their secularized politics. A

movement toward *laïcité* (secularization) began in 1903. The Chamber of Deputies invited the minister of colonies to "laicize all of his departments and remove all religious emblems from establishments dependent upon his ministry" (Foster 2013:69). By 1905 the administration secularized all of the public schools of Senegal and nuns could no longer work in hospitals. However, much of the local population, especially métis families, complained against closure of Catholic schools, and many stayed open illegally. Also, a lack of human resources forced the administrators to allow some nuns to continue their hospital work. In addition, the colonial administrators could not come to a consensus on how to apply *laïcité* to Islam. *Laïcité*, therefore, did not reach its full potential in Senegal and eventually the Ministry of Colonies chose not to extend this secularization movement to the federation for Senegal (Foster 2013).

Though French colonization may not have entirely succeeded in the secularization of public affairs, this attempt at *laïcité* may still have greatly shaped modern-day government attitudes of the separation of religion and state. In Nigeria, by contrast, the British entrusted Muslim leaders with some measure of secular political power that transformed into Sharia law (Mahmud 2013), leading to the more entangled relationships of politics and religion in the nation, and likely contributing to much of the violence between Muslims and Christians in the north.

After this crack down on religion came a time of *rapprochement* (the French word for "merging" or "coming together"). Ernest Roume, the governor-general of the Federation of French West Africa between 1902 and 1908, desired to reform the administration and economy, focusing on gaining a better understanding of the cultures in the colonies as well as their values, tradition, and leadership. Cheikh Anta Mbacké Babou describes *rapprochement* as "the creation of a climate of mutual acceptance and tolerance," allowing the French and Muslims "to coexist

and pursue their political, economic, and social interests, sometimes in cooperation and at other times separately" (Babou 2007:160). Essentially rapprochement created an environment where people could acknowledge differing goals without feeling threatened. This established a lasting precedent that extends into today's Muslim and Catholic communities. Christians and Muslims successfully find common goals that they share and cooperate with each other to achieve those goals; each group also allows the other to pursue unshared goals separately, though without resistance or opposition.

Though the French alleviated laïcization during World War I the church weakened as the missionaries had to focus on other war efforts rather than evangelism and Islam grew more during this time. The Catholic mission finally acknowledged that "Senegal was never going to be a Catholic colony" (Foster 2013:158), and therefore focused its energies into strengthening their existing converts and expanding in the Casamance, the last place where a large animist population remained: the Jola. Islam, on the other hand, made some new advancements. New political developments ensued in 1914 with the appointment of Blaise Diagne, the first Black African deputy in the French parliament. As a direct result of Diagne's appointment Muslim religious authorities gained increasing influence and involvement in electoral politics. By offering African troops to fight for the French in World War I Diagne gained more permanent rights for African constituents in the four communes. This helped to close the inequality gap between African Muslims and French Christians. Muslims could now share in secular rule and occupy the upper social classes.

Many scholars emphasize the role of French colonization in spreading both Christianity and Islam in Senegal. Ironically, though the French discouraged Islam, the most rapid Islamization occurred during the period of colonization (Searing 2006). Most scholars attribute

this growth as a manifestation of social discontent and as a means for Senegalese to unify and strengthen themselves under French colonial rule, or as a force of nationalization after independence (Leary 1970; Voll 2003; Gellar 1982). John Voll describes Islam as providing the "conceptual and symbolic tools for organizing resistance to European imperial expansion" (Voll 2003:28). Islam served as a new institution that replaced traditional structures and political systems (Leary 1970) that no longer satisfied the Senegalese. However, as James Searing reminds, one must not underplay the role of human agency in these conversions and must take into account other factors. He cites as an example the Serer-Safèn, a matrilineal ethnic group that found Islam more appealing than Christianity for redefining their ethnic identity and in coming to terms with their history. They admired the beauty of Muslim clothes and hairstyles, the lower cost of traditional funerals, appreciated flexibility in the ability to marry outside their ethnic group, and valued the public nature of Muslim spiritual knowledge (Searing 2006). We must not trivialize Islam as a mere coping strategy for the Senegalese during colonization because "those who responded to their calling were not merely seeking psychological adjustment, yanked as they were from 'peaceful village life' and thrust onto the bewildering world stage by colonizers. They were prompted by deeper spiritual needs and existential anxieties beyond matters of personal survival" (Babou 2007:183).

At the same time, the period of French colonization did lead to a number of developments that have influenced Senegal's cultivation of an attitude of coexistence between Muslims and Christians. First, the policy of *laïcité* created a lasting value in the Senegalese of separation of politics from faith, which reduces the stakes of adhering to a certain religion and decreases tensions. Second, they created a unified political climate that included both Muslims and Christians governed as a single unit due to the integrated societies in the communes. Third,

French colonization created disparities across regional divisions that mask or diminish the importance of religious divisions. Fourth, the French missionaries adopted rhetoric of religious tolerance to increase their support, which has carried on to modern times. Finally, the French unified the Senegalese by giving them a common oppressor and by transforming conflicts that could have had religious implications into political issues. Whether intentional or not, the French system of ruling helped to bridge religious divides and put Christians and Muslims on equal, level ground at the time of independence.

The Casamance Conflict

As stated earlier, the Casamance region deserves special attention. A region whose colonial history, ethnic and religious makeup, and natural resources distinguish it from the rest of the country, the Casamance hosts the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC), a secessionist group that began to push for autonomy in 1947. Historically the French administered the Casamance region separately from the rest of Senegal until 1939. Ethnically, the Casamance differs in its high concentration of Jola, who make up around 60 percent in the Casamance though only five percent of the Senegalese population as a whole (Fall 2010). Religiously, the Casamance region "is the least Islamized" (Fall 2010) with a high proportion of the population practicing forms of traditional animistic religions and a higher concentration of Christians than in the rest of the country. Geographically, the Gambia separates the Casamance from the rest of Senegal (see Figure 2 on the next page), rendering it isolated and marginalized. The Casamance also has higher levels of rainfall, making it richer in natural resources than the rest of the country, which suffers chronic drought.

Figure 2. Map of Senegal Highlighting the Casamance Region.



Source: History Guy 2014: "The Casamance War in Senegal (1982-2014)"

These distinguishing aspects have led to political, social, and economic grievances of many people in the Casamance who feel marginalized and exploited by the government. The MFDC broke out into fighting in 1982 and continued as a low-level civil war until the MFDC declared a cease-fire in May of 2014. "The Casamance war has been one of the less bloodiest [sic] among the multitude of African conflicts for the number and the nature/type of victims" (Fall 2010), and between 1982 and 2011 the death toll hovers under 5,000 people (Mané 2011).

Though the Casamance conflict does present an important exception to the general peaceful state of Senegal, I will not discuss it in further detail for a number of reasons. First of all, this conflict does not particularly pertain to my topic. It does not involve Christians and Muslims fighting each other, nor does it concern religious matters, but rather an independence movement against the government. Second, this conflict has remained confined to the Casamance region and has not permeated into the rest of Senegal. Finally, the main fighting of this conflict occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s and though higher rates of banditry still

exist in the Casamance, the cease-fire of 2014 ended most of the conflict. I do not wish to completely disregard the case of the Casamance; however, it does not hold much relevance to my focus on the nature of Islamic-Christian relationships.

The Practice of Islam in Senegal

Like most of West Africa, Senegal practices Sufism, a mystical form of Sunni Islam. Karen Armstrong describes many of the Sufi mystics as historically having "an outstanding appreciation of other faith traditions" (2014:217). This may have encouraged the peaceful rise of Islam in Senegal. Organized into various *tariqas* (brotherhoods), Sufism has provided a system of political leadership, especially for the rural masses as traditional chiefly authority declined during the colonial period (Gellar 1982). These brotherhoods, organized into hierarchies based on lineages, "are the principal social institutions responsible for the peaceful inter-religious relationships and between them and the state" (Mahmud 2013:71). At the top of the hierarchy stand the marabouts, very important religious and social leaders among Senegalese Muslims. Their followers often perceive them as a "miracle worker, intercessor, and teacher, often engaged in heterodox magical practices to satisfy the superstitions and spiritual needs" (Babou 2007:8), meaning that they do not conform to the orthodox form of Islam. For example, a woman might go to a marabout if she has not succeeded in finding a husband by a certain age. Parents may take their children to a marabout for blessings, or to purchase *gri-gri* (talisman) to protect them from evil *raabs* (spirits).

One anecdote during my stay in Senegal demonstrates the mystical role of the marabout and their influence in the lives of their followers. One day Mamadou, my host brother, woke up to find that someone had stolen his cell phone. Mamadou and my host mom visited a marabout to find out the culprit. The marabout asked them to randomly tell him all the names of people who


lived in or visited the house without telling him who they were or their relation to the family. They told him the names of my other host siblings, my name, the names of the maid and laundry lady, and a few neighbors and friends. Out of all of the names he selected Amina, the maid. Many Senegalese are slightly skeptical of this mysticism, however, especially among younger generations. Binta confronted Amina about the phone, and when she denied stealing it allowed her to continue working for the family. When I asked Awa, my host sister, if Binta believed the marabout, she explained that they believed Amina was the culprit, but since they could not know for certain and Amina denied it they wanted to give her the benefit of the doubt. About a week later, however, the Secks did fire Amina because she started spreading rumors in the neighborhood about how Binta accused her of stealing. In any case, the marabouts do have a large influence in Senegalese society.

The Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, and Muridiyya constitute the three main brotherhoods in Senegal. Sakah Saidu Mahmud claims that "The peaceful relations between Muslims and Christians goes back to the founding of the Muslim brotherhoods and what their leaders preached and practiced" (Mahmud 2013:67), since they have "preached tolerance not only of other Muslim sects, but also of other religious groups" (Mahmud 2013:68). Sheldon Gellar predicts that "it is highly unlikely that Senegal will be transformed into a radical Islamic republic led by a Khomeini-like religious leader or a Kaddafi. The leaders of Senegal's Muslim brotherhoods are likely to work out a modus vivendi among themselves and between themselves and the government rather than agitate for radical religious reforms" (Gellar 1982:123). So far his prediction has remained true.

The oldest brotherhood among the three, the Qadiriyya, most likely originated in Morocco during the 12th century and has a long history of activity in Senegal. Missionaries from

the Niger Bend and Mauritania first introduced this brotherhood to Senegal during the 18th and 19th centuries. Today most Senegalese Muslims identify as members of the Tijaniyya, founded by Ahmad al-Tijani in Fez around 1781 or 1782. Many often associate the Tijans with more wahhabite (fundamentalist branch of Sunni Islam) tendencies, such as ritual purification and doctrinal rigidity, and they have also had a more militant history, especially during the 19th century when the main warriors for the faith (*mujihaddin*) were almost unanimously Tijans (Leary 1970). Though the Tijans currently claim the highest number of followers (see Figure 3 below), the Mourides are rapidly growing in number and influence. As the most tightly organized and influential brotherhood in Senegal I will devote more time explaining the history of the Mourides and their influence on peace in the country.

Figure 3.



Source: Information from Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 2013. Put into graph by author.

Muridiyya

The youngest brotherhood, having its origins in Senegal, has grown rapidly both in Senegal as well as in other cities around the world (Voll 2003). Today more and more

Senegalese claim an identity as a Mouride, reaching 4 million followers in 2007 (Babou 2007), with most members belonging either to the Wolof and Serer ethnic groups.

Amadou Bamba, the founder of the Mourides, came from the Mbacké family, modest teachers who especially valued the pursuit of Muslim scholarship and moral virtue. The Mbacké family focused on higher learning as a means to accumulate social and cultural capital rather than associating with kings, instead choosing to maintain a position of political neutrality. The jihad in the 1860s deeply impacted the Mbacké family whose village transformed into a battlefield. Cheikh Babou notes the importance of the jihad in shaping Amadou Bamba's teachings. He witnessed the killing and abduction of children, the pillaging of their harvests, and other forms of violence, all of which "helped fashion his philosophy of nonviolence and his suspicious attitude toward temporal rulers, whether secular or religiously inspired" (Babou 2007:42). Bamba's frustrations with the sociopolitical situation and the inadequacy of the classical educational system to respond to these challenges led him to develop new teachings.

Amadou Bamba especially began to emerge as a prominent leader after his father died in the early 1880s. Like other Sufi orders his first works focused on the themes of theology, mysticism, and Islamic rituals. Babou describes how Bamba's attitudes especially focused on "a rejection of deliberate involvement with rulers, an aspiration to separate the politics of Islam from the politics of kings, and an attraction to mysticism" (Babou 2007:55). Bamba's later teachings also introduced some educational reforms focusing on *tarbiyya*, or education of the soul, that started to separate and distinguish him from other Sufi orders.

Tarbiyya is a holistic approach to education invented by the Sufis that goes beyond the mere transmission of knowledge and seeks to transform the whole being by touching the body, the mind, and the soul. It establishes a special

relationship between the sheikh and his disciple, who is no longer a taaleb (student) but a murid (aspirant) on the path to God who surrenders his will to his master and gives him command of every aspect of his life. Tarbiyya requires from the aspirant a clear commitment to follow the sheikh's recommendations on all matters, temporal and spiritual. (Babou 2007:63).

Bamba's pedagogy reform included three steps. He valued exoteric education, or *taalim*, aiming at transmitting knowledge through the study of the Qur'an and Islamic sciences, as most other Sufi orders. However, he went farther and also valued esoteric education, or *tarbiyya*, aiming at educating the soul. He also described a third step of ascension, or *tarqiyya*, which only a small number of gifted disciples attain. Amadou Bamba's emphasis on educating the body, mind, and soul rather than merely transmitting knowledge in a top-down styled hierarchy rapidly attracted new disciples, including many atypical educators who did not possess the traditional credentials and beliefs attached to their profession.

Bamba established two new villages for his followers: Daaru Salaam in 1885, and Touba in 1888. Bamba moved to Jolof in 1895 due to overpopulation, but his popularity had already attracted the attention of the colonial administration that feared his power and accused him of wanting to start a jihad. African chiefs, who viewed the Muridiyya as a threat to their own power and influence of the population, fueled these suspicions of jihad. This false accusation led to Bamba's exile to Gabon between 1895 and 1902. Although his seven-year exile led to a lull in Muridiyya activities, Amadou Bamba's return brought even more support among his disciples who now considered him a *wali Allah* (friend of God) and a miracle worker (Babou 2007). Ultimately Bamba's exile did not weaken the

Muridiyya. During the time of rapprochement the French began to realize the Mourides did not actually pose much of a threat to their rule, but the African chiefs continued to stir up tension between Amadou Bamba and the French, who exiled him again from 1903 to 1907, this time to Mauritania.

As the French began to recognize the futility of trying to up-root the deeply ingrained Islamic religion, they also started to notice the beneficial role Mouride peanut harvesters played in the economy. Starting in 1912 and lasting through independence in 1960 the French and Muslims had a more pragmatic and accommodating relationship in which Muslims held sacred authority and the French had secular power, "contributing to the institutionalization of civil Islam" (Mahmud 2013:26).

The Mouride doctrine also focuses on *hubb*, (a pure love untainted by selfish motivations, but done merely for the sake of the other person), *khidma* (service and hard work, expressing loyalty to their cheikh), and *hadiyya* (pious gifts or voluntary donations to the cheikhs). The Mourides especially differ from other brotherhoods in their devotion to their spiritual leaders and complete submission to the cheikhs. The Mourides also lay claim to the *daara tarbiyya* (Qur'anic school for male disciples) taught by a marabout.

The violence and tensions during the colonial period shaped Amadou Bamba's religious philosophy to focus on developing peace through deep inner transformation and education, through valorizing hard work, and through keeping faith separate from politics. Marabouts, who gained prestige as religious leaders, demonstrated and modeled these teachings, which in turn their disciples closely followed. As Sakah Saidu Mahmud points out, "Bamba's activism represented an element of human agency in the public expression of Islam in Senegal. He did not change Islam as a religion, but he gave it a distinct social

and political expression that remains with the Mouride brotherhood till today. This attitude has also been adopted and imitated by the other brotherhoods" (Mahmud 2013: 26).

Through their religious doctrine and political separation the Mourides have significantly contributed to the establishment of a peaceful social and political climate in Senegal.

The Practice of Christianity in Senegal

Depending on who you ask, Christians make up somewhere between four to ten percent of the population in Senegal. The vast majority of this group practices Roman Catholicism, which has around four hundred thirty thousand followers (Pew Research 2011). During the time of colonization the Serer and Jola people still practiced traditional African religions, unlike other groups such as the Wolof who practiced Islam. French missionaries targeted these non-Muslim groups. As a result, Senegalese Christians are most prominent among the Serer and Jola ethnic groups concentrated in the southwest of Senegal, as well as dispersed around Dakar. Though most Catholics live in the coastal regions, Catholicism does extend to the interior of Senegal as well and the regions of Saint-Louis, Thiès, Ziguinchor, Kolda, and Tambacounda all have their own Diocese (refer back to Figure 1 on page 4 for a map of Senegal's regions). Benjamin Ndiaye recently replaced Théodore-Adrien Sarr in December 2014 as Archdiocese of Senegal, stationed in Dakar.

Catholic schools during the colonial era played a leading role in establishing Catholicism in Senegal (Foster 2013). Though most students of these schools came from French or métis families, many prominent Muslim families also sent their children here in order to help them get ahead in the colony. To this day many Muslim families prefer to send their children to Catholic schools while still maintaining their Muslim identity. This

early immersion of young Muslims and Christians together may have served as one of the foundations of peaceful coexistence. Integration may help to render perceptions of believers from opposite faiths as less "other-like" and therefore less threatening, diffusing tension and creating fewer opportunities for conflict. Indeed, only two percent of Senegalese Muslims view Christians as violent, the lowest out of all Muslim populations surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa (Pew Research Center 2010). Ironically, Senegal also has the highest percentage (76%) out of all countries surveyed that also says they know either not very much, or nothing, about Christianity (Pew Research Center 2010).

The Catholic Church in Senegal has also promoted peaceful Islamic-Christian relations through espousing an attitude of religious tolerance. The archbishop of Dakar, Théodore-Adrien Sarr, has said that "L'entente entre chrétiens et musulmans est la seule base d'une paix durable dans ce pays" [The harmony between Christians and Muslims is the single cornerstone of a sustainable peace in this country] (Kouakou 2011:93; translated by author). In addition the Church has also supported Islamic endeavors in Senegal. For example, during the summit of the organization of the Islamic conference, held in Dakar from the seventh to fourteenth of March in 2008, the archbishop said that "nous, chrétiens du Sénégal, sommes en communion avec nos frères musulmans pour la bonne réussite de ce sommet. Et nous souhaitons également que ceux qui seront présents s'inspirent des bonnes relations qui existent entre chrétiens et musulmans au Sénégal et puissent le démultiplier ailleurs" [We, Christians of Senegal, are in communion with our Muslim brothers for the success of this summit. We also hope that those who will be present will be inspired by the good relationships that exist between Christians and Muslims in Senegal, so that they can multiply elsewhere] (Kouakou 2011:94; translated by author).

A small number of Protestant congregations exist as well, including Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and Evangelicals, and a few others, totaling around 20 thousand people. However, these congregations reside almost exclusively in Dakar and most of the congregants have European descent. Dakar also has a small population of Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventists, totaling around one thousand five hundred.

The practice of Catholicism and of Christianity in general varies from family to family. While some families hold strictly to the doctrine of the church, others hold on to traditional beliefs, such as in the powers of *gri-gri* and other rituals and practices. Some Catholic families in less urban areas even practice polygamy alongside their Muslim counterparts. From my personal observations, Catholics in Dakar seemed to adopt many Occidental cultural practices. For example, I noticed that the students who stayed with Catholic families generally ate at a table with their own plates rather than together around the bowl. Christian Senegalese also seemed to wear traditional Senegalese garb less frequently.

PART III

RQ2: If a genuine Islamic-Christian peace exists in Senegal, what factors have significantly fostered this actuality?

Introduction to the SAT Model of Peacebuilding

In the relatively new field of peace and conflict studies people have realized the necessity of recognizing the complexity of conflicts. Rather than treating conflicts as deterministic systems one must realize that the conglomeration of unpredictable human behaviors and agency creates a very complex and dynamic situation. Specific “inputs” or solutions applied to a conflict will not bring about a determined, predictable output. Effective theories of peacebuilding must operate

from this perspective. "The first, and humbling, observation is that our present and future study of conflict can only provide us possibilities that might lead to resolution. Our work will never produce a deterministic formulae to create resolution," and "we can not ever manage a system in conflict as if it were a Boeing 747" (Jones 2003).

For this exploration I have decided to operate under Robert Ricigliano's SAT model for peacebuilding that he discusses in his book *Making Peace Last: A Toolbox for Sustainable Peacebuilding* (2012). This systemic and holistic model of peacebuilding discusses the importance of structural, attitudinal, and transactional factors operating simultaneously in order to develop a lasting peace. Later on I will describe each of these factors in further detail as well as discuss how they pertain to Islamic-Christian relations in Senegal.

In this investigation I approach this model for peacebuilding through an atypical angle. Thus far most peacebuilders and theorists of peace and conflict have operated from the conflict side: they observe the dynamics of a conflict and contrive a potential solution, evaluating models of peacebuilding in light of the success or failure of the implemented solution. I take the opposite approach and examine a situation of already established peace—the sincere coexistence between Muslims and Christians in Senegal—in order to evaluate Ricigliano's model of peacebuilding. I lay out the various structural, attitudinal, and transactional characteristics of Senegal and then evaluate their role in either fostering or potentially threatening peace. This examination and evaluation of the SAT model applies specifically to the context of Senegal. However, the findings could also help determine the rigidity or flexibility of Ricigliano's model when applying it to other contexts. This retrospective angle of analysis and examination should help deepen the understanding of complexity in the peace and conflict field.

I will start out by defining and explaining structural factors and then describe a variety of Senegal's structural factors, concluding with an evaluation of how these could impact peaceful relationships in Senegal, particularly between Muslims and Christians. I will then move on to do the same thing for attitudinal and transactional factors.

Structural Factors


The "S" in the SAT model for peacebuilding stands for structural factors, which "refers to systems and institutions designed to meet people's basic human needs" (Ricigliano 2012:34). Examples of these needs include the more tangible needs of security (in sustenance, shelter, and protection from violence) as well as the less tangible needs such as cultural security and identity, freedom, participation, and justice (Marker 2003). Most theorists of peacebuilding conclude that conflict comes about when a party or multiple parties perceive an unmet need. As a result the systems and institutions that attend to human needs play a crucial role in conflict prevention. These structures can include governmental policies, the state of the economy, and the security sector among others. In this section I will examine these structures in Senegal and evaluate how they meet the needs of the population.

Due to the small size of the Christian population it was difficult to find statistics that differentiated between the Islamic and Christian populations, making it almost impossible for me to draw conclusions comparing how the needs of the two communities are met. As a result I will concentrate my analysis on the structural factors meeting the needs of the population as a whole and describe how they influence the general social atmosphere, fostering either relationships of peace or of conflict. Within this broader context I will comment on the possible implications for Islamic-Christian relations.

State Fragility


Senegal faces several trends that undermine the stability of the state as a whole. In 2014 the Fragile States Index ranked Senegal as the 62nd most unstable country out of 178 countries, classifying it under "Very High Warning" (Fragile States Index 2014b). The FSI has 12 indicators including demographic pressures, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven economic development, economy, state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention, each ranked on a scale from zero to ten. The higher the number means more instability; a ranking of 0-1 means excellent, 2-3 means good, 4-5 means moderate, 6-7 means weak, and 8-10 means poor. The FSI rates Senegal as having "moderate" State Legitimacy, but it rates all other indicators as "weak", except for demographic pressures, rated "poor". In addition, Senegal has steadily worsened since 2006 in almost all of the indicators (See Figures 4 and 5). The x-axis indicates the year and the y-axis measures the ranking on the FSI. Since higher numbers signify worse conditions, upward movements represent worsening trends, while downward movements represent improving trends.

Figure 4.
Senegal: Social and Economic Indicator Trends 2006-2014



Source: *Fragile States Index 2014b*.

Figure 5.
Senegal: Political and Military Indicator Trends 2006-2014




Source: *Fragile States Index 2014b*.

In comparison to other countries the Fragile States index ranks Senegal as more stable in most indicators than the regional average of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet less stable than the global average (see Figure 6). One exception is the indicator of State Legitimacy, for which Senegal ranks similarly to the global average and better than the regional average. This means that Senegal's government does a relatively good job in representing its citizens, has a low level of corruption and few power struggles, while having a high level of government effectiveness, political participation, level of democracy, and fair electoral processes (Fragile States Index 2014a). I will elaborate on the governance of Senegal in the section on transactional factors.

In Figure 6 the image on the left shows the ranking of each of Senegal's indicators on the FSI in 2014, including demographic pressures (DP), refugees/IDPs (REF), group grievance (GG), human flight (HF), uneven economic development (UED), economy (ECO), state legitimacy (SL), public services (PS), human rights and rule of law (HR), security apparatus (SEC), factionalized elites (FE), and external intervention (EXT). The image on the right compares Senegal's rankings in each indicator to the regional and global averages for each indicator.

Figure 6.
Senegal: Indicator Comparisons 2014




Source: *Fragile States Index 2014b*.

While Senegal's State Legitimacy may rank favorably compared to the regional average, Senegal ranks among the most unstable in the world in the indicator of Demographic Pressures (Figure 6 above). The high population growth, youth bulge, and food and water scarcity constitute the main demographic pressures. The Afrobarometer survey recorded high percentages of the population that lacked food, water, medical help, cooking fuel, and money in the past twelve months (See figure 7). This reflects a situation of relatively prevalent poverty in which a significant percent of the population struggles to meet basic physical needs of sustenance. Such a condition should theoretically cause more tensions and create more potential for conflict. The disparity between urban and rural populations also deserves attention. A significantly higher percent of the rural population said they lacked food, water, medical help, and cooking fuel "several times" or "constantly" in the past twelve months compared to the urban population. More of the urban population reported not having enough money than the rural population, though this probably has to do with the fact that the city has a much higher cost of living. In fact,

Dakar ranks among the top 50 most expensive cities in the world. Nevertheless, a clear disparity exists between urban and rural populations in their fulfillment of needs. This could heighten regional hostilities and frustrations.

Figure 7.




Source: Information from Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 2013. Put into graph by author.

Economy

Two vastly different regions characterize the country: Maritime Senegal and Sahelian Senegal. Maritime Senegal has many economic advantages and contains most of the country's modern industries. Almost all of the banking and financial institutions and luxury hotels are located in the Dakar region, which also has a major international trade center, plentiful fishing resources, one of West Africa's best natural deepwater ports, a favorable climate, and phosphates. On the other hand Sahelian Senegal does not fare nearly as well. The more interior the hotter the climate and the poorer the resources. As a resource-poor, low-income country

Senegal largely depends upon external economic forces. The most significant sources of revenue come from trading fish, phosphates, and groundnuts (particularly peanuts), as well as from tourism. The chronic drought in this predominantly desert ecosystem has caused stagnation of the agricultural sector, making it the "Achilles' heel of the Senegalese economy" (Gellar 1982:50). Peanuts, millet, and sorghum make up most of the agricultural output, though in the Casamance region of the south, which receives more rain, farmers can grow rice. The agricultural sector has significantly weakened the economy, leading to high rates of unemployment and widespread poverty as well as a difficulty to meet some of the basic needs of the Senegalese population. Figure 8 reflects the weakness of the economy by showing the top ten problems the public thinks the Senegalese government must address based on responses from the Afrobarometer survey. Unemployment and poverty/social exclusion make up the two main concerns. In fact, according to the World Factbook 2007 estimate Senegal has an unemployment rate of 48 percent (Index Mundi 2014).

Figure 8.



Source: Information from Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 2013. Put into graph by author.

Senegal's weak economy has clearly impacted the living conditions of the population, having a particularly negative toll over rural communities. However, the fact that Senegal's economy relies on relatively low-demand resources may actually help to maintain stable peace. Countries rich in resources also often suffer exploitation, conflict, and violence. For example in countries rich in oil such as Sudan and South Sudan, Nigeria, and many countries in the Middle East, or countries with blood diamonds such as Angola or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the competition over these resources, both international and internal, as caused violent, intractable conflicts. Senegal, on the other hand, has been spared this "resource curse" and

remains off of the radar of such violent international drama and competition. Senegal is not a high-priority country for trade and so there is little to no competition over trade relations, which minimizes international conflict and potential for war.

Security

Compared to other Sub-Saharan countries Senegal has relatively low rates of serious crimes such as physical aggression or murder, yet higher rates for petty crimes such as theft. For example, 40 percent of the population says they had been a victim of theft in the past 12 months, compared to 27 percent in Nigeria, percent in Mali, 33 percent in Kenya, and 32 percent in Botswana (Afrobarometer 2013; 2012c; 2012b; 2011; 2012a). These high rates of petty crimes cause people to have a healthy suspicion and only lukewarm trust in their friends and neighbors. Only 30 percent of the surveyed population believes they can trust most people while the other 70 percent say one must be very suspicious (Afrobarometer 2013).

I consciously observed this suspicion on a daily basis as my host mom would constantly remind me to lock the door to my room before I left for school or even if I went out for a quick run. However, from what I could tell this suspicion generally impacted personal actions and behaviors rather than interactions with others. People cautiously guarded their belongings, yet did not let this caution extend to making interactions with others more hostile. They did not let their common sense interfere with how they normally treated others. In addition people generally feel safe and have confidence in security forces such as the police. Only eight percent say they do not trust the police at all, compared to 58 percent who report having a lot of trust in the police. In addition 85 percent say that those who commit a crime are "never" or "rarely" left unpunished (Afrobarometer 2013). Though high rates of petty crime in Senegal have given people a healthy

suspicion and lack of trust in others this sentiment of insecurity does not reach the severity that it creates tense, hostile relations with others that spill over into rampant conflict or violence.


Education

Senegal's education system has various types of schools, including Catholic schools, daaras (Qur'anic schools) and state schools. The government devotes 5.6 percent of the GDP to education spending, a rate comparable to that of the US (Global Peace Index 2014e; 2014f). The largest share of this government funding goes to established Christian schools because they generally have the highest performance rates and the strongest academic reputations. Due to the rigor of the private Catholic schools many Muslim families prefer to send their children there, and the majority of students attending Catholic schools are actually Muslim. The schools tend to accommodate students from other religious backgrounds, offering religious education to Christian students and moral education to non-Christians, and not requiring non-Christians to take the Christian religious courses. These practices of integration and tolerance provide opportunities for people of different religious backgrounds to learn about each other and build relationships and friendships. The government has also funded a growing number of Islamic schools as well, in which approximately 60 thousand students are enrolled (US Department of State 2012).

Though the constitution requires all children to attend school through age sixteen a lack of resources makes enforcement of this policy nearly impossible. While 75.5 percent of official school-age children are enrolled in primary school, this number drops to 21.6 percent for secondary school, and only 7.9 percent of the population is enrolled in higher education. The average person receives 8.2 years of schooling, and the adult literacy rate is 49.7 percent (Global Peace Index 2014e). These results are comparable to Nigeria's, which has 62.1 percent primary

school enrolment, 25.8 percent secondary school enrolment, 10.3 percent higher education enrolment, nine years average of education, and an adult literacy rate of 60.8 percent (Global Peace Index 2014d). However, Senegal has higher rates than the DRC, which has only 32.4 percent primary school enrolment, ten percent secondary school, and 6.2 percent higher education, though with an adult literacy rate of 66.8 percent (Global Peace Index 2014b). Figure 9 below shows the level of education of the Senegalese population in the Afrobarometer Survey.

Figure 9.



Source: Information from Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 2013. Put into graph by author.

The Afrobarometer survey reflects a general sentiment of discontent toward the government because of the quality of education in the state-run schools. Out of the population that had family members enrolled in public schools 56 percent say the government does not adequately satisfy the needs in education. Most of these discontents stem from a lack of resources with 73 percent saying they have lacked manuals or other supplies and 75 percent saying that classes are too full (Afrobarometer 2013).

Many people cite the critical role of education in preventing extremism and promoting more peaceful, stable relationships. Though a large percent of Senegal's population receives little to no education a number of smaller organizations actively work to ensure that lack of education does not result in extremism by creating educational tools to disperse to various communities. I will examine some of these specific organizations later on in the section on transactional factors. In addition schools can provide a sphere in which Muslims and Christians can interact at a young age, creating closer ties and reducing the likelihood for polarization and violence.

Conclusion for Structural Factors

Upon examination it appears that Senegal's various structures do not adequately meet many of the needs of the citizens. The weakness of the economy results in high rates of unemployment and widespread poverty, often rendering much of the population unable to obtain basic physical needs such as food, water, and fuel for cooking. Unmet needs such as these result in high rates of petty crimes and theft. In addition a large disparity exists in which the population living in rural areas tends to have a much more difficult time accessing medical facilities, physical resources for sustenance, quality education, and acquiring a job compared to their urban counterparts. The education sector also has a number of weaknesses with a lack of resources, high dropout rates, and high levels of illiteracy.

Unmet needs create strains and frustrations that can undermine the social contract and lead to instability, conflict, and violence. At the structural level Senegal does not necessarily appear to be "ripe" for fostering peaceful relationships among its citizens because of these unmet needs. However, though the statistical evidence may suggest that Senegal has many structural weaknesses that could threaten peace, some positive, less tangible factors exist in each of these ostensibly weak structures. For example, a lack of resources may weaken the economy yet allows Senegal to avoid international political pressures associated with trade. High rates of petty crime may exist, but the population feels relatively confident in the security apparatus. Education may not reach optimal rates of enrollment or quality, but the educational system does allow for the integration of children from different religious backgrounds. This leads me to two conclusions. First of all, one cannot measure the effectiveness of structural factors solely based on statistics of how they provide for the needs of citizens. Second, structural factors, while undeniably important in fostering peace, may not always play as crucial a role as other factors. Though unmet needs may increase the likelihood of conflict they do not guarantee it.

In Senegal a high percentage of the population (43%) say they think their current living conditions are either "bad" or "very bad" while only one percent says they are "very good" (Afrobarometer 2013). However, in general most Senegalese have optimistic views rather than feeling hopeless. Around 77 percent say they think their conditions will improve in 12 months while only eight percent say they think they will get worse. In addition 64 percent say that in general they think the country is moving in a good direction and improving. Regarding the top ten problems (Figure 8), 57 percent say that it is very likely the government will solve these problems in the next five years, compared to only six percent that say it is not at all likely. This

leads me to my next point of examining the importance of attitudinal factors and their significance in fostering peace in light of structural weaknesses.

Attitudinal factors

The "A" in the SAT model of peacebuilding stands for attitudinal factors, which "refers to shared norms, beliefs, social capital, and intergroup relationships that affect the level of cooperation between groups or people" (Ricigliano 2012:34). Attitudinal aspects reflect how groups perceive each other and their relationships, which in turn affects the way they treat each other. In this section I will expand upon the attitudes that I briefly mentioned in Part I between Muslims and Christians. I will also describe a number of factors that I believe help to shape these attitudes and create a unified identity of fraternity among Senegalese. Though the list of factors that shape Senegalese attitudes could probably go on forever, I will highlight four main aspects that I believe play the most significant roles: (1) The strong cultural value of peace (2) demographic factors including ethnic identity, (3) traditional religions, and (4) national pride.

Cultural Values and Practices

As I mentioned earlier, even by a superficial observation of daily conversations one can easily see how *jàmm* (peace), permeates Senegalese culture. Typical greetings, for example, revolve around this theme. Senegalese Muslims and Christians alike greet each other with the typical Islamic greeting, "Asalaamalekum" (peace be with you) and the response, "Malekum salaam" (and peace with you also). This greeting, shared by Muslims across the globe, does not necessarily reflect a value of peace by itself, however, as even extremists greet each other this way. In the case of Senegal, however, I believe that this greeting usually does extend beyond mere words into a true sentiment of wishing peace, health, and well-being for the other. After starting with this Arabic greeting they move into the Wolof greetings, which last a very long

time and continue along the theme of peace. "Nanga def?" (How are you?), which one may answer with either "Maangi fii rekk" (I'm here only), or "Jàmm rekk" (peace only). People can use the phrase *jàmm rekk* in response to almost anything. "How's business?" *Jàmm rekk*. "How is your health?" *Jàmm rekk*. "How did you sleep?" *Jàmm rekk*. "How has your day been?" *Jàmm rekk, alxamdoulaay*. (Peace only, thanks be to God!). After finishing a meal people will tell each other, *Narass ak jàmm* (digest in peace). Before going to bed you tell others *Fanaan ak jàmm* (sleep in peace). The list goes on. The rhetoric of peace extends beyond the language and manifests itself in actions and other cultural values as well.

One such value, *teranga* (hospitality) especially reflects an attitude of coexistence. The program staff for my study abroad program explained to us that people refer to Senegal as "The land of Teranga," and that in Senegal people believe every citizen has the duty to welcome others and show hospitality toward guests. I often heard people say that the peninsula of Dakar is the westernmost point of the African continent, showing how Senegal stretches out to eagerly welcome visitors. From my experience I did indeed feel welcomed and "at home". Sheldon Gellar also notes Senegal's welcoming attitude toward foreigners, citing examples of how it has especially welcomed the large Lebanese community, as well as non-Senegalese Africans, who especially come from Guinea, Mauritania, and Mali (1982). This general attitude and atmosphere of hospitality manifests itself in a number of different ways and extends not just to foreigners, but to fellow citizens as well.

Mealtimes and food especially represent hospitality and togetherness. In Senegal almost everyone eats around the bowl. This means people sit on the floor around a big, communal bowl or platter of food covered with rice or millet with all of the meat and vegetables located in the center. First you generally start by grabbing a handful (or spoonful) of rice from your "personal"

zone right in front of you. To get the "goodies" you must reach into the center, the communal free-for-all section. Often times people use their hands rather than silverware and since Muslims consider the left hand unclean people may only use the right hand to eat. This can make it hard to break meat or other food into small enough pieces to eat. Instead, one may grab a large piece of chicken, for example, and ask the person sitting next to him or her to grab onto it as well so that together they can break it apart. Even when using silverware people tend to omit forks or knives, employing only the spoon and therefore still requiring help from others to break apart large pieces of food. This extremely personal and intimate method of eating reflects an attitude of mutual dependence, cooperation, and tolerance.

Rather than limiting themselves only to family, mealtimes almost always include extra friends or neighbors. My host mom, a Muslim, as well as one of my female Senegalese professors, a Catholic, explained how for every meal they cook they always make enough to serve an extra two or three people more than for whom they originally expect to eat. Friends and neighbors constantly stop by, often times without notice, and if in the process of eating you must invite them in to join. *Kai, lekkal!* (Come, eat!) I estimate that our house averaged five or six visitors a night, sometimes reaching as high as nine (although I think my host mom may have been especially popular in the neighborhood). Even neighbors that my family did not seem to know very well would drop by for a quick chat. My professor explained that people expect an invitation, so if you do not have enough food to feed guests they view you as a "bad Senegalese woman" who does not fulfill the duty of *teranga* because of a lack of anticipation.

In general many Senegalese have a very broad and loose definition of family. *Bokk* (sharing) serves as the root of *mbokk* (family), which in a general way reflects the notion that family can include those with whom you share something, whether heritage, food and resources,

or common interests. Bokk also makes up part of the Wolof word for "you're welcome", or *ñokk a bokk*, which literally translates to "we share it." In contrast to the English expression, which may reflect an attitude of entitlement ("you are welcome to *my* resources"), the Wolof expression demonstrates an attitude of community and shared resources. This cultural understanding and norm of sharing and community may help to strengthen relationships. Strong relationships make a strong foundation for peace.

With this broad conception of family comes a rather fluid family framework. Before moving in with the Secks I met with the housing coordinator of the program. He gave me a list of the names of the people in my family and their ages but warned me that people come and go all the time, likely making the list inaccurate. More people may live in the house than written on the list, or some included on the list may no longer reside there. During my stay the constant people who lived in our house the entire time included my host mom Binta, my two sisters Kiné and Awa, my older brother Babacar, and my cousin Cherif. My other older host brother, Mamadou, came home from living in Italy and stayed with us for one month. At the end of my stay my younger brother, Papis, came home from Qur'anic school and stayed for a week.

Other visitors came sporadically and spent the night. I had a hard time discerning all of the relations between these people and my host family. Awa would tell me they were uncles, aunts, cousins, or grandparents. Only upon more vigorous questioning ("surely the family can't be *this big*," I thought) did I find out they had no blood relation to the family, but were rather just close friends whom they regarded as family. For example, a woman whom Awa referred to as "grandma" came on three separate occasions, staying a few days each time. I later learned that the real grandma, Binta's birth mom, had passed away several years ago. This woman was the best friend of the deceased grandmother and the Secks took her into the family. The notion of

family can even extend past blood relatives and friends to the professional level as well. Halfway through my stay my family hired Fatou, a young girl around Awa's age, to work as a live-in maid. The Secks accepted her almost like another daughter (except one who had to do all the chores.) She slept in the same room as Awa and Kiné and ate all her meals around the bowl with us. This fluid notion of family extends the typical family boundaries to include a wide variety of people, deepening relationships and creating a sense of closeness. This could very well play a major role in developing a sense of brotherhood between people and diminishing violent tendencies.

The practices of *attaya* and *waxtaan* also demonstrate the appreciation of relationship-building. *Attaya* is the Wolof word for tea, but the connotation refers to a much more complicated process. In the afternoon many families make *attaya*, typically around the time people stop by to visit. As the host brews the tea people *waxtaan*, a verb without a good English equivalent, referring to sitting around and discussing, or chatting, usually over a long, relaxed period of time. After the brewing someone (generally a younger member of the family or a maid), skillfully pours the tea back and forth between two small glasses. After creating a layer of foam he or she disperses the tea glasses to everyone. This whole process usually occurs two to three times, lasting anywhere from one to three hours, with the first round being the most bitter and the last being the most sweet. People *waxtaan* throughout the whole time of *attaya*, building closer relationships through time spent together.

Senegalese cultural values such as *jàmm* and *teranga* and practices such as *attaya* and *waxtaan* generally emphasize themes of hospitality, sharing, high level of sociality, an inclusive, broad view of family, and relationship-building. These cultural norms play a significant role in developing attitudes of tolerance of others and diminishing a sense of "otherness." Such positive

attitudes significantly decrease the amount of destructive, violent conflicts and foster an environment in which various groups of people, including Muslims and Christians, can have respectful, brotherly perceptions of one another. Indeed, almost the entire population views both Muslims and Christians as tolerant (96% for Muslims and 93% for Christians) (Pew Research Center 2010).

Traditional Religions

When discussing the religious demographics in the country many Senegalese will describe Senegal as "90 percent Muslim, ten percent Christian, and 100 percent animist." In other words, while only a very small percent of the population (around one percent) explicitly identifies as animist, hints of traditional African religions still remain and have shaped the modern form and practice of both Christianity and Islam. The Pew Research Center survey finds that 58 percent of the population believe sacrifices to spirits or ancestors can protect them from bad things happening and more generally 55 percent exhibit high levels of belief and practice in traditional African religious beliefs and practices (Pew Research Center 2010). In this sense the practices of traditional African religions may unify many Senegalese. Traditional beliefs may help to minimize perceived differences in the Muslim and Christian faiths and create a perception of similarity. Indeed, out of all surveyed Sub-Saharan countries Senegal ranks the lowest in percent of its population that views Islam and Christianity as "very different" (Pew Research Center 2010).


However, the influence of traditional African religions on the Christian and Islamic faiths exists in most, if not all sub Saharan African countries, including those with high levels of religious violence. In addition one must note the plurality of "traditional African *religions*", as ethnic groups and peoples did not share a universal belief, but rather many different beliefs and

practices varying from group to group. Generalizing "traditional African religions" into an all-inclusive practice of animism is problematic because it conceals the variety of beliefs and practices that have actually divided groups historically rather than united them. For example, the Peuls (Pulaar) practiced "fetish worship, respect for sacred cows, fear of a mystical snake hidden in the forests, and belief in a supreme being in the after-life" (Leary 1970:51), whereas the beliefs of the Jola focused on invisible spirits that came to live in certain people who then ruled over their community; they believed the hereditary political kings were "the embodiment of many evil spirits" (Leary 1970:29). Even among the Peuls no unified religious structure existed among all of the villages. In describing the Pulaar and Mandinka faiths Leary remarks how "identification with one of the two competing religious factions implied identification with one political system, language, culture and faith" (Leary 1970:51).

These factors complicate the process of discerning the influence traditional beliefs have on current Islamic-Christian relations. Obviously animism and traditional beliefs by themselves do not sufficiently explain peaceful coexistence. However, I believe that overall the remnant of traditional African religions, perhaps diluted in their differences, merged with the passing of time and have an overall positive and unifying impact in the larger context of Islamic-Christian relations. Figure 10 examines the relationship between the practice of traditional African religious beliefs and the perception of Islam and Christianity as "very different" in 19 different Sub-Saharan countries. In general most countries have a high percentage of the population that views Islam and Christianity as "very different"; however, a slight negative correlation (with a correlation coefficient of -0.64) does exist between the two factors. The higher the percentage of people practicing traditional religions can loosely predict a lower percentage of the population that views Islam and Christianity as "very different". This might indicate that traditional African

religious beliefs do play a small role in bridging the differences between the Islamic and Christian faiths.

Figure 10.



Source: Information from the Pew Research Center 2010. Organized into graph by author.


Demographics and Ethnicity

As mentioned earlier, peace exists not only on the religious level but also between ethnic groups. Sheldon Gellar remarks that "Senegal has been remarkably free of the racial and ethnic strife that has plagued many other African nations... Senegal has also been tolerant of non-Senegalese Africans coming to live and work in the country" (Gellar 1982:98). This does not mean that the country completely lacks ethnic tension; the Tukolor, for example, have had grievances against the Wolof for asserting their culture and language, and the Jola and Mandinka living in the Casamance region have developed a strong Casamançais identity separate from the rest of the country. However, the conflict of the Casamance has more regional and political implications than roots in ethnic conflict. Where ethnic tensions do exist they have rarely erupted in violence and have never turned into desires of ethnic cleansing, as in the Rwandan genocide between the Hutus and Tutsis. Overall, members from various ethnic groups get along extraordinarily well.

While studying abroad I conducted an informal survey with other classmates for my Development Practicum in which we interviewed twenty families in Pikine, a suburb of Dakar. Out of the twenty families we interviewed, a mixture of Wolof, Tukulor, Pulaar, and Serer, every single family responded that they had no problems with members of other ethnic groups, but that they got along very well. Several went so far as to describe their neighbors from other ethnic groups as "friends" and "brothers". In fact, members from various ethnic groups will often playfully tease or mock each other. The Jola and Serer, for example, consider each other "Joking cousins." The Jola often comment on how the Serer are their slaves, and the Serer mock the Jola for eating too much rice. People make comments such as these in a light-hearted manner, often times even following them up with an invitation to eat together.


The population demographics, relatively homogenous, may play a significant role in developing this actuality. Senegal has only three main ethnic groups: Wolof, Pulaar, and Serer, which together make up roughly 83 percent of the population (see Figure 11). The Wolof by themselves make up close to half of the population, and the Wolof culture and language has permeated the minority ethnic groups. This "Wolofization" process occurred simultaneously with Islamization since Senegal's independence and has unified the country. Almost everyone speaks Wolof, the primary language of communication, and in urban areas members of minority ethnic groups sometimes even speak it better than their own ethnic language (Gellar 1982:97, Mahmud 2013:12). Kenya, on the other hand, has a long history of ethnic violence that continues today, and by comparison to Senegal has a much more heterogeneous population with no unifying group that greatly outnumbers the others, but rather a handful of ethnic groups that compete for dominance (see Figure 12).

Figure 11.



Source: Information from Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 2013. Put into graph by author.


Figure 12.



Source: Information from Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 2011. Put into graph by author.

Upon examination of perceptions of conflict in Sub Saharan African Countries a high correlation exists between religious and ethnic conflict. Countries in which a high percentage of the population views conflict between ethnic groups as a very big problem also tend to have a high percentage of the population that views conflict between religious groups as a very big problem. Likewise, when less of the population worries about ethnic conflict, less of the population worries about religious conflict as well (see Figure 13 below).

Figure 13.



Source: Information from the Pew Research Center 2010. Organized into graph by author.

Even with a correlation as strong as this (with a correlation coefficient of 0.82) one must take care not to assume causation. One could easily jump to the conclusion that this finding suggests religions tend to divide along ethnic lines. In other words, people of one religious background may exclusively belong to a certain ethnic group and people from another religion belong to a different ethnic group. This would explain why religious and ethnic violence have such a high correlation since ethnic and religious groups would divide along the same lines. Although similar ethnic and religious divisions may cause conflict between groups in certain situations, further examination reveals the complexity of the reality and that such an explanation does not always apply. For example, in Kenya a high amount of both religious (predominantly

between Muslims and Christians) and ethnic (predominantly between the Kikuyu and Luo) conflict occurs. In this case the explanation of similar ethnic and religious divisions does not apply since the Kikuyu and Luo almost exclusively practice Christianity.

In the case of Senegal the extent to which the Muslim and Christian faiths divide along ethnic lines remains unclear. Christianity concentrates primarily among the Serer and Jola, however many in these groups also practice Islam. The fact that Senegal has such a small Christian population to begin with makes it hard for any ethnic group to hold Christianity as a strong defining marker of their ethnic group. Membership in the Islamic brotherhoods, however, does seem to more clearly cross over lines of ethnic group membership (Mahmud 2013:12). The religious spread in Senegal, though perhaps minimal, may play a small role in creating more opportunities for people to find similarities with others, as people from certain ethnic groups do not automatically assume someone from a different ethnic group also practices a different religion. This may help to mitigate tensions by lessening polarization. However, the safest explanation for the correlation between religion and ethnic violence is the social environment itself. Ethnic peace does not inherently cause religious peace, nor does religious peace necessarily cause ethnic peace, but rather the broader scope of factors in dialogue with each other, such as widespread attitudes, cultural values, behavioral tendencies and structural factors, creates an environment that either fosters peaceful relationships (whether religious, ethnic, class-based, etc.) or threatens them.

National Pride and Identity

Senegal's governmental stability and relatively peaceful history has brought about a strong sense of national pride among citizens. In addition the shared practices of traditional religions and the lack of explicitly clear religious divides helps to unite people under this

common national identity. The Afrobarometer survey finds that 84 percent of the population is proud to be called Senegalese (2013), and this percent may reach even higher among the younger generations. Much of this pride roots itself in the Senegalese identity of peace. In a short book of detailing former President Wade's efforts at hosting an Islamic-Christian dialogue Kouakou writes a chapter entitled "The Senegalese Model of Religious Freedom and Tolerance" in which he quotes Abdoulaye Wade saying, "Le Sénégal n'a pas d'or ni de pétrole. Mais il a une richesse que beaucoup de pays, pour ne pas dire tous les pays lui envient, à savoir la paix. Et c'est cela notre richesse. C'est de pouvoir assumer le pluralisme dans le domaine religieux et dans bien d'autres domaines tels que celui politique, ethnique, etc." [Senegal has neither gold nor petroleum. But it has a wealth that many, if not all countries envy: a realization of peace. That is our wealth, to be able to achieve pluralism in the religious domain and even other domains such as politics, ethnic groups, etc.] (Kouakou 2011:89; translated by author). This statement demonstrates how Senegal's peace, between religious faiths, ethnic groups, and in politics, serves as a source of pride for the citizens amongst other hardships.

This well-merited pride in an identity of peace may normalize, perpetuate, and even actively encourage peaceful attitudes and behaviors like a positive self-fulfilling prophecy. It even draws near to the line of arrogance in which many citizens view Senegal as a light and model for other nations. Kouakou says:

Nous demandons au Dieu Tout-Puissant, que le modèle sénégalais de liberté et de tolérance religieuse ainsi posé s'éternise et contribue à promouvoir partout, des rapports de plus grande compréhension et de coopération entre les croyants de toute religion en général et en particulier entre Chrétiens et Musulmans et que le modèle sénégalais participe grandement au

rétablissement et à l'affermissement de la paix au sein des nations et entre les peuples. [We ask the all powerful God that the Senegalese model of religious freedom and tolerance would last forever, and that it would promote greater understanding and cooperation between religious believers of all faiths, and in particular between Muslims and Christians. We pray that the Senegalese model would greatly contribute to the reestablishment and strengthening of peace within the nations and between the people] (Kouakou 2011:110; translated by author).

It appears that people may view religious peace in a similar way to how they view teranga, as a national duty and identity for the Senegalese people. Senegal may view it as its personal responsibility to maintain coexistence between Muslims and Christians so as to serve as a good role model for the rest of the world. This idea of responsibility, shared by Muslims and Christians alike, may unite various groups under a common goal and help foster a positive attitude and strong motivation for consciously working toward the development and maintenance of this peace. Senegal's national motto: "Un peuple, un but, une foi" [One people, one goal, one faith] sums it all up. The citizens have cultivated a widespread attitude in which they unite under one nation. This motto does not clarify a specific goal, but rather expresses a more general sentiment of unity in which people work together, perhaps to serve as the model for the rest of the world for interreligious peace. In the same way the motto does not clarify to which "one faith" it refers, but implies that Muslims and Christians share a belief in and love of God.

Conclusion for Attitudinal Factors

Attitudinal Factors clearly play a large role in encouraging peaceful relationships between Muslims and Christians, as well as among the broader Senegalese population as a whole. Many Senegalese place a high cultural value on peace, hospitality, and sharing with others, which generally produces behaviors and interactions, based on respect and brotherhood rather than competition or conflict. Some possible factors that create these sentiments of unity and brotherhood could be demographic factors, a vague dispersion of religions among ethnic groups, and the common practice of traditional religions that create a stronger sense of unity expressed in the national pride, "One nation, one people, one faith."

Transactional Factors

The final part of Ricigliano's model stands for transactional factors, which "refers to processes and skills used by key people to peacefully manage conflict, build interpersonal relationships, solve problems collaboratively, and turn ideas into action" (Ricigliano 2012:34). Some examples of these "key people" include leaders on the international, national, and community levels and in both political and non-political spheres. Ricigliano lists tools to help build positive transactional factors, such as formal mediation initiatives, confidence-building measures, negotiation training, and back channel dialogues (Ricigliano 2012). One might think of transactional factors as the behaviors and actions that foster peace. I will examine the transactional factors that exist in Senegal on the international, national, religious, and community levels.

International Relationships

Overall Senegal has had peaceful international relationships. Since independence Senegal's foreign policy strives to maintain peaceful coexistence with countries of various

political and economic systems. During the cold war era, for example, Senegal took an officially nonaligned, neutral position, wanting "both the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from meddling in the internal affairs of African states or taking sides in inter-African disputes" (Gellar 1982: 82). In Asia they have also refrained from taking sides in disputes, and as a result have maintained positive diplomatic ties with "both North and South Korea, China and Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Its ties with Asian communist nations give credibility to Senegal's claim to nonaligned status despite its clear preference for the West" (Gellar 1982: 81). North Korea, in fact, donated money for la Statue de la Renaissance in Dakar during Abdoulaye Wade's presidency.

In the past Senegal had rocky relationships with its neighbors, Mauritania, Mali, the Gambia, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, but these have never broken out into war or severe violence and these relationships have significantly stabilized over time. Due to Senegal's opposition of interventionist politics they have had tense relationships with Libya, Algeria, and Cuba, though this opposition hardly extends past verbal disapproval. Today, Senegal has especially close ties with France and Egypt, receiving quite a substantial amount of financial aid from France and also relying on them as one of their main trade partners. Senegal also has a friendly relationship with the United States and was one of the first countries to accept U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers. Senegalese diplomats also play an active role in the United Nations, and have even played a peacekeeping role in the former Zaire. Sheldon Gellar describes Senegal as a country that bridges relations between the West and Islamic world:

Despite its special relationship with France and its advocacy of a French-speaking commonwealth of nations, Senegal has still managed to establish its credentials as a prominent member of the Islamic world. Senegal's close

ties with both the West and Islam continue patterns found in Senegal's colonial and pre-colonial past. They are also a product of a policy initiated by Senghor to make independent Senegal a bridge joining African, European, and Islamic civilizations (Gellar 1982: 79).

Senegal's generally peaceful international relations serve as a transactional factor that helps to stabilize the internal state of the country and minimize threats to civilian security. As a result Senegal has effectively established a role for itself as a kind of international collaborator, a sentiment that extends into the internal politics.

Political Background

Many scholars have commended Senegal's government, praising it as "One of the most stable and least repressive political regimes on the African continent" (Gellar 1982:23) and "among the great postcolonial success stories with respect to its record of civilian rule" (Harrison 2012). Current stability in Senegalese politics owes much credit to the colonial history, the Sufi brotherhoods, as well as to the first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor.

Today Senegal has a strong, centralized state, much of which remains from French colonization. "The French administered Senegal as a single unit in which Christians, Muslims, and the traditional elites from different geographical regions were ruled as a single nation" (Mahmud 2013:110). The British colonization in Nigeria, by contrast, left a very decentralized, weak, and unstable state. The political framework left behind by the French set up a stable environment for Léopold Senghor to govern the nation upon independence in 1960.

Senegalese politics started off as highly competitive electoral politics with a National Assembly and a Prime Minister, Majhemout Diop, to ensure balance of power. However, things quickly moved toward a one-party state, that of Senghor, the Parti Socialiste (PS). The PS held

all seats in the National Assembly with no formal political opposition in national or local elections. Senghor also eliminated the office of prime minister due to the fierce opposition he faced from Majhemout Diop. However, toward the end of Senghor's time in office politics moved back toward a multiparty system with more competition. He reinstated the position of Prime Minister and allowed for three official parties. Senghor's party held a social democratic ideology. The Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) led by Abdoulaye Wade held a liberal democratic ideology. Majhemout Diop led the Parti Africain de l'Indépendance (PAI), which held a Marxist-Leninist/Communist ideology. Senghor allowed fourth party in 1979, called Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais (MRS) which promoted private property, free enterprise, and traditional Islamic and African family values, led by Boubacar Guèye. (Gellar 1982).

Though starting out as a potentially autocratic ruler, Senghor miraculously turned toward a more democratic system of ruling and set many positive precedents during his term in office for his successors to follow. For one thing, he voluntarily handed over power to Abdou Diouf in 1981, the first time such a peaceful transfer of power had occurred in Africa. Since then Senegal has successfully democratically elected three presidents: Abdou Diouf, Abdoulaye Wade, and Macky Sall, rendering Senegal one of the few African nations that has never had a coup d'état. The Afrobarometer survey in Senegal shows that a vast majority (91%) of the population views these elections as free and democratic while only 1% say the elections were not at all free or fair (2013). Aside from elections the Afrobarometer survey finds that a majority of the population (68%) are extremely or mostly satisfied with the way democracy functions in their country, compared to only 26 percent in Nigeria and 43 percent in Kenya (2013; 2012c; 2011). In fact, almost everyone (98%) say they feel free to vote for whomever they want without pressure.

Politics and Religious Freedom

Senghor also set a precedent of interreligious cooperation. Though a Catholic, he managed to effectively lead Senegal's predominantly Muslim population and gain their respect. "What was important to the Muslim leaders was not the faith of government officials but the approach of officials toward them" (Mahmud 2013:114), and Senghor actively worked toward collaborating with the marabouts. This left a lasting positive impression and normalized a level of religious diversity in politics. For example, though the three presidents following Senghor have all been Muslim, Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade each had a Catholic wife. Furthermore, though 90 percent of the population agrees that it is important for political leaders to have strong religious beliefs, two out of three Senegalese say they would be ok if their political leader had a different faith than their own (Pew Research Center 2010). Though Christians make up a small minority of the population the government does make sure to respect them and represent them fairly. In fact, in addition to recognizing Islamic religious holidays (such as Tabaski, Tamkharit, the Birth of the prophet Muhammad, and Korite), the government also observes Easter Monday, Ascension, Pentecost, Feast of the Assumption, All Saints' Day, and Christmas as national holidays (US Department of State 2012).

This does not mean, however, that politics do not have an Islamic overtone. Though Senegal's government has restrained from imposing Qur'anic law one cannot deny the strong Islamic identity of the country. Abdou Diouf, for example, openly attempted to give Senegal an Islamic image during his term, thereby securing Arab financial support and a lasting connection to the Arab world. Senegal's strong Islamic identity seeps into the political sphere despite the constitution's explicit defining of Senegal as a secular state. Indeed, a very interesting relationship between politics and religion exists in Senegal. One might even describe it as

paradoxical at times because "the separation of religious from political affairs, which the religious leaders preached, has made them more influential, politically" (Mahmud 2013:73). The Muridiyya, for example, have advocated against direct involvement in politics since the founding of the brotherhood by Amadou Bamba. However, the "heads of Senegal's major Islamic brotherhoods constitute the most influential interest group in the country, largely because of their hold over their mass following" (Gellar 1982:34). The marabouts hold a great deal of respect and influence over their followers and therefore may promote certain politicians in exchange for various concessions from the government. Such concessions include subsidies for mosque and daara construction, higher prices for their peanut crops, easy access to government loans, etc. (Gellar 1982).

Each of Senegal's presidents has recognized the need for a symbiotic relationship with the Muslim brotherhoods due to their great influence and respect among the population. However, they have also recognized the dangers aligning themselves too closely with a specific religion or brotherhood. For example, when Abdoulaye Wade bowed to a Mouride marabout the public chided him for bringing religion into the political sphere. In fact, 54 percent of the population believes that bringing religious leaders, such as Imams, into the political space is dangerous, giving reasons such as that politics and religion must be separate, and that it is dangerous for democracy (Afrobarometer 2013). Political leaders recognize the wariness of the public regarding the mixing of religion and state and as a result manifestations such as these do not occur often.

Though the government does place a great deal of stress on Islamic values in order to gain support of the masses, Senegal has never had a widespread Islamic state or Sharia law. Mahmud argues that religious groups use history to maintain their identity and search for proper

courses of action in their current situation. In the case of Senegal, "the only significant practice of Sharia among the Muslims in Senegal was personal and not derived from state-imposed policy. There has therefore not been a strong and popular demand for a return to the past to reestablish Sharia as has been the case in Nigeria" (Mahmud 2013:27). Part of this has to deal with the success of the strong centralized state in preventing the flow of fundamentalism into Senegalese society early on. Some measures the government has taken to prevent this have been to close down the Iranian embassy in 1984 and to break of diplomatic ties with Libya for meddling in Senegal's internal affairs (Mahmud 2013). The Islamic overtone, though undeniably present and active, does not go to the extreme of excluding or discriminating against the Christian minority.

The 2012 International Religious Freedom Report gave a very favorable evaluation of Senegal. It notes how the "constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom. The constitution specifically defines the country as a secular state and provides for the free practice of religious beliefs, provided that public order is maintained" (US Department of State 2012) and reports no abuses of religious freedom. The government has been careful to support Muslims and Christians equally. For example, the government provides financial assistance both to Muslims participating in the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith) as well as to Roman Catholics making a pilgrimage to the Vatican and Israel (US Department of State 2012). Religious freedom also manifests itself in public debates over many topics such as Sharia law, the role of women in society, and other subjects that concern Muslims and Christians.

In Senegal such peaceful approaches to issues with religious sensitivities have resulted in four decades of religious peacebuilding... The Senegalese

approach offers an alternative way at looking at Islam and conflict or peacebuilding. This has been made possible through the intervention of Muslim leaders and the institutions (tariquas) working harmoniously with the state and other religious groups in the country (Mahmud 2013:129).

Contrary to claims of a secular state, religion creeps into Senegal's political sphere with stronger influence generally coming from the Islamic faith. However, despite the tendency for a linkage of politics and religion to lead to discrimination and violence Senegal has managed to maintain religious freedom and equality. Muslims and Christians alike receive the support, protection, and representation of the government. This equality and freedom helps to perpetuate an environment in which Muslims and Christians may view each other as equals and as brothers rather than as competitors or enemies.

Despite international praises and recognition of Senegal's democracy, various political leaders have acted questionably. Aside from Senghor's dispensing of Diop as Prime Minister, civilian frustrations surfaced during the second term of Abdoulaye Wade, the third president. Wade spent \$27 million on the controversial "Monument de la Renaissance Africaine," a North-Korean-made statue, for which he claims 35 percent of the revenue from tourist visits because of his "intellectual rights" to the project. This has stirred up complaints among the citizens regarding wasteful spending that has done little to boost the economy. In addition, during his terms the government amended the constitution more than a dozen times. Many of these amendments related to his efforts to gain a third term, and then to ensure the succession of his son, Karim, to the presidency. However, these efforts ultimately failed; Wade did not secure a third term, nor did Karim succeed his father as president. Instead the people elected Macky Sall as the fourth president, marking a success for the democratic institutions in Senegalese politics.

Although Wade made his fair share of questionable decisions in regards to constitutional amendments and economic investments, he also made several democratic advances for the country. For example, the new constitution he helped to construct in 2001 guaranteed the equality of men and women in the workplace, as well as other advances for women, allowing them to own land and property. This new constitution won international attention, and Wade received the annual human rights award in 2004 from the International League of Human Rights.

In addition to his interest in human rights Wade demonstrated a clear interest in peaceful inter-faith relations, and in 2006 he hosted the World Summit on Islamic/Christian Dialogue in Dakar to bring together leaders from around the world to "créer un mouvement mondial pour combattre les divisions, les préjugés, les incompréhensions entre les cultures, notamment islamique et occidentale" [To create a global movement in order to combat the divisions, prejudices, and lack of understanding between cultures, particularly between Islamic and Occidental] (Kouakou 2011:31; translated by author). His efforts, which began in 2004 to plan and organize the summit, earned him the 2005 Houphouet Boigny Peace Prize, an award intended to honor those who have made "a significant contribution to promoting, seeking, safeguarding or maintaining peace, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of UNESCO" (UNESCO 2009).

Mohamed Kouakou NDA wrote a short book entitled *Abdoulaye Wade: L'apôtre du dialogue islamo-chretien*, or *Abdoulaye Wade: The Apostle of the Islamic-Christian Dialogue*, in which he outlines the goals of the president through this dialogue. A book with strong political undertones and hints of propaganda, Kouakou Nda describes Wade as a "guide sûr pour l'humanité actuelle" [a sure guide for modern humanity] (Kouakou 2011:6; translated by author) because of his efforts to ameliorate relations between Muslims and Christians. This piece of

political propaganda can give us a deeper insight into Senegalese values and perceptions by analyzing the appeals of the President to his citizens. It also reflects the Senegalese rhetoric of peace and the pride that surrounds it, demonstrating how Senegal views itself as a light to the rest of the world of how to develop stable Islamic-Christian peace.

Kouakou Nda lays out a number of reasons expressed by Wade for why Christians and Muslims can and should coexist. To start out he lists similarities between the Islamic and Christian faiths: (1) both religions believe in and pray to the God of Abraham. (2) Both religions value prayer, and pray to God for forgiveness and intercession, to express their adoration and dependence on him, and to pray for others. (3) Both religions have a paternal perception of God, which includes the common themes of praise, thanksgiving, intercession, and the quest for salvation. (4) Both religions acknowledge that God is mysterious and that we do not have an exhaustive knowledge of Him. (5) Both religions ascribe similar characteristics to God, such as merciful, King, Holy, and Prince of Peace. (6) The two religions have many of the same practices to honor God, such as charity, supporting justice, intercession and prayer, and study of their faith and theology. (7) Though the two religions have different conceptions about the personage of Jesus, they both recognize the miraculous pregnancy of Mary and birth of Jesus, and believe that Jesus will return to earth to govern the world in godliness and holiness (Kouakou 2011).

Though Wade desires to focus on the similarities between the two faiths, he does not wish to hide the differences, creating false perceptions that could create more tension in the long-run. Instead he wants the dialogue to help each religion gain a true idea of the other and "découvrir le meilleur de l'autre" [to discover the best in each other] which "est là, mais pas toujours facile à discerner!" [is there, but not always easy to see!] so that "comme des frères,

nous pouvons vivre et grandir ensemble et assumer nos différences" [as brothers, we can live and grow together and live with each other's differences] (Kouakou 2011:23; translated by author). Although Wade acknowledged the risks a dialogue could bring, he insisted that no issue be avoided in the discussion so that the dialogue would be authentic. Wade's leadership reflects a behavioral tendency in Senegal in which people do not try to bypass difficult conversations altogether, but rather address them and talk through them. This helps to create a more stable relationship based on truth, which develops an atmosphere of trust rather than on tenuous relationships.

Wade's effort at hosting an international dialogue between Christians and Muslims serves as a great example of a transactional factor in which a key figure in Senegal works to build interpersonal relationships and solve problems collaboratively. This dialogue, intended to demonstrate the Senegalese model of Islamic-Christian collaboration to the rest of the world, shows strong transactional influence toward peace at the political level.

Religious Leaders

In the sections describing the modern practices of Islam and Christianity I described how religious leaders from both faiths have played a significant role in developing peaceful tendencies and behaviors among their followers, including peaceful inter-faith relationships. I will briefly restate and summarize my points here.

Among Senegalese Muslims the marabouts have a very strong influence over their followers. The marabouts of the Mouride brotherhood have historically maintained practices and teachings of political separation as well as peace toward members of other Islamic brotherhoods and other faiths. Other brotherhoods in Senegal have also adopted these tendencies and as a

result the general Muslim population has demonstrated a great tolerance and willingness to cooperate with Christians, the religious minorities in the country.

Since colonial times the Catholic Church in Senegal has also held attitudes of tolerance. Perhaps due to its status as a religious minority, the Church has openly supported endeavors of their Muslim brothers and actively cooperated with them. The archbishop of Dakar, for example, has emphasized the importance of the relationship between Muslims and Christians as the base of a sustainable peace in Senegal (Kouakou 2011). Even during the Islamic conference held in Dakar in 2008 the archbishop expressed his hope for the success of the summit and that it would inspire peaceful Islamic-Christian relations elsewhere in the world as they had been experienced in Senegal (Kouakou 2011). Catholic schools and organizations welcome Muslim students and members and members from the two faiths work peacefully alongside each other.

Both Islamic and Christian leaders in Senegal have espoused teachings that emphasize tolerance of others and the value of inter-faith peace and have “worked together to help diffuse social crises and promote dialogue to resolve political tensions between the government and the opposition” (US Department of State 2010). This mutual sentiment of respect and love has allowed leaders from both groups to encourage followers to cooperate with their brothers of other faiths. The general public has largely accepted and follows these teachings, resulting in a peaceful atmosphere between the two faiths in Senegal.

Community Organizations

As described earlier in the section on Senegalese culture, many of Senegalese cultural values and social practices help to develop a sense of community. This, in turn, spurs on high rates of participation in community groups, and "Like the Americans, the Senegalese are a nation of joiners, especially in the urban areas, where even the humblest Senegalese are a member of

some organization" (Gellar 1982:95). The Afrobarometer survey finds that 57 percent of respondents participate in a religious group (member, active member, or leader), 49 percent participate in a community association or group, and 57 percent have participated in community gatherings (Afrobarometer 2013). This active participation represents a strong civil society, which can defuse latent tensions by increasing interactions.

Senegal hosts a number of private organizations that actively work to develop the civil society, including promoting peace between Muslims and Christians. The Catholic sponsored Brottier Center, for example, has hosted interfaith dialogues in which "leaders of the larger religious groups, both Islamic and Christian, have maintained a public dialog with one another... promoted debate between Muslims and Christians on political and social issues that confront the country" (Mahmud 2013:80).

In order to gain more insight into the purpose of this organization I contacted Alexandre Vigué, the Webmaster and creator of the Daniel Brottier website. Mr. Vigué, a Frenchman who has lived in Senegal since 2008, describes how he is "a witness everyday of the peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians. The Senegalese people have a strong culture of PEACE!" (Email to author November 30, 2014; translated by author). He gave me a brief history of the organization, describing how the first building was constructed in 1945 in honor of Father Brottier, a Catholic who did many good works in Senegal, who died in 1936. Today it belongs to the Catholic Christian community, although it remains open to everyone to use for gatherings, trainings, and meetings. In 1949 the Catholic Studies group organized the first conferences and meetings to speak about all subjects pertaining to society, with a particular focus on helping people improve their lives. In 1958 the center expanded and began to welcome more groups. Essentially the Daniel Brottier Cultural Center is "a platform to express oneself" (Alexandre

Vigué in an email to author December 3, 2014; translated by author). A handful of well-known people have also used the center to discuss Senegalese society, including former presidents Léopold Senghor and Abdoulaye Wade, and Marc Sankalé, a famous professor of medicine in Dakar.

Today the center hosts conferences pertaining to a wide variety of topics, including religious conferences with Christians and Muslims. Politicians and various businesses also come here to have meetings. Youth groups have plays here, and the school of Saint Michel occasionally uses the space to hold classes. Mr. Vigué emphasized how "the center is open to all subjects, and allows everyone to express themselves... At the center we try to allow everyone a chance to be able to express themselves on all subjects, to help society" (email to author December 3, 2014; translated by author). He said they particularly try to keep things calm during political movements, although he emphasized that apart from elections the country stays rather peaceful. "The Senegalese don't have a custom of war or of violence, it's not in their culture. Very rarely do they argue, and they aren't aggressive... They also peacefully tease each other about their history, saying that one ethnicity is the slave of another, while laughing" (email to author December 21, 2014; translated by author).

Organizations such as these help create an open environment where people feel they can express concerns or discuss topics with others in an organized, peaceful way. This helps to defuse latent tensions by bringing them to the forefront so that the citizens can address them together. In this way frustrations do not go ignored or escalate into greater problems that erupt into violence. Though many other states attempt such dialogues, such as Nigeria (Mahmud 2013), Senegal differs in that religious groups and individuals have taken initiative rather than relying solely on the government. "By independently promoting dialogue outside the confines of

the state, the groups can do so without the state using such dialogue for political gains" (Mahmud 2013:80). This encourages an enduring dialogue that continuously builds up tolerance. Support and interest at the grassroots level makes these efforts of dialogue more effective and sustainable.

The Fondation Konrad Adenauer et l'Asecod also makes efforts at the community level to foster peace and guard against potential threats. In Senegal's national newspaper, *Le Soleil*, international news often consists of news of religious violence, especially in Nigeria, Somalia, and Mali. The Senegalese recognize the vulnerability of youths to manipulation toward extremism, so the Fondation Konrad Adenauer et l'Asecod has come up with educational programs and dialogues to conduct in middle and high schools to promote tolerance. In his article describing the organization, Coly quotes one teacher remarking that in light of all of the religious extremist events of late they "must have the courage to install bridges of dialogue" (Coly 2015; translated by author).

Efforts on the local level to promote peace can make a crucial difference in strengthening relationships and constructively handling potential conflicts and tensions. Senegal certainly does not lack in leaders among the general population who have turned ideas of peacebuilding and collaboration into action. Giving people an outlet for positive conflict resolution processes helps to build strong interpersonal relationships, the cornerstone of peace.

Conclusion for Transactional Factors

Overall Senegal has a positive conglomeration of transactional factors that help to perpetuate a peaceful Islamic-Christian coexistence. Many of the attitudinal and cultural factors create a society in which leaders have a strong influence over the population, who usually looks

to their leaders as an example for how to behave, and in general these leaders have used this influence for good.

At the international level Senegal has had very little conflict. Aside from financial aid it has a low level of international intervention, minimizing the potential for conflict with other nations. Instead, it has often served as a mediator for conflict in other countries. At the national level political leaders have set good precedents that have encouraged an effective government with minimal corruption and peaceful inter-group relationships. Abdoulaye Wade's World Summit on Islamic-Christian dialogue demonstrates this particularly well, showing the Senegalese model of collaboration. The religious leaders, who have a particularly strong influence over the public, have also contributed to the push toward peaceful, collaborative behaviors by encouraging tolerance and support of each other and demonstrating inter-religious cooperation and maintaining a public dialogue. Other community groups and organizations at the local level also help to create an environment in which people can constructively address conflict, developing a positive civil society. These behaviors and actions on the various levels of Senegalese society help to create an environment that promotes active efforts of collaboration and peaceful Islamic-Christian relationships.

PART IV:

CONCLUSION

I hope my readers will walk away with two main takeaways after reading this paper: (1) By and large Muslims and Christians in Senegal coexist in a genuine peace. This relationship deserves recognition and gives insight to the field of peacebuilding. (2) This peaceful coexistence has innumerable factors interacting with each other, revealing the complexity of

peace and the difficulty of using peacebuilding theories, such as Robert Ricigliano's structural, attitudinal, and transactional (SAT) model.

Scholars, tourists, citizens, politicians, and social scientists alike have commented on the peaceful coexistence that exists between Muslims and Christians in Senegal. Examination of various sources, such as surveys on public opinion, statistics measuring religious violence, and personal observations of daily interactions between the groups reaffirm that this relationship merits the rhetoric and praise of maintaining a veritable peaceful coexistence. Members of the two faiths do not merely tolerate each other, but rather actively integrate and cooperate within families, schools, professions, and the community as a whole. I do not advocate for a disillusioned, utopian image of Senegal as occasional instances of conflict and violence do arise; however, these isolated and sporadic cases do not disrupt the more long-term brotherly love and cooperative relationships. This reflects the profound stability of peace between the two groups. Further research and examination of this relationship could give new perspectives to the field of peace and conflict studies by determining which factors seem most essential in fostering peace, allowing peacebuilders to prioritize their efforts more effectively.

Upon further examination of Senegalese society I have presented a number of factors that I believe significantly encourage harmony between Muslims and Christians. I have also pointed out some aspects of Senegalese society that seem as though they could threaten the peace. For example, several factors, especially demographic pressures and a weak economy, cause the Fragile States Index to rate Senegal as having a "very high warning" for state fragility. A high percentage of the population, especially in rural areas, often have difficulties obtaining basic needs; high rates of unemployment exist; many people do not have access to education, and an even more drop out before high school. However, security forces seem to do a reasonable job at

making people feel secure and controlling crime. Overall it seems that Senegal lacks strong structural factors, the systems that provide for people's basic needs. Theoretically this lack of structural factors should cause more conflict, as people must resort to competition and potentially violence to obtain these needs, yet Senegal maintains low levels of conflict. This potentially presents a challenge to Ricigliano's SAT model which emphasizes the crucial need to develop structural, attitudinal, and transactional factors simultaneously in order to develop a sustainable peace. Though not completely devoid of structural factors to foster peace, Senegal does seem to suffer a shortage in this area.

Fortunately the strengths of the attitudinal and transactional factors seem to sufficiently counteract the potential threat to peace from structural weaknesses. For example, Muslims and Christians generally have very positive views and attitudes toward one another. Cultural values and practices, demographic factors, low levels of ethnic conflict, and practices of traditional African religions may help to foster these attitudes. In addition, key figures on the international, national, religious, and local levels have actively worked to establish strong interpersonal relationships and provide opportunities to handle conflicts in constructive, healthy ways. This seems to support Ricigliano's theory by highlighting the importance of attitudinal and transactional factors in sustaining peace.

Overall I believe the peaceful Islamic-Christian relations in Senegal partially support Ricigliano's SAT model. Efforts at peacebuilding must operate holistically, working simultaneously to address needs at the structural, attitudinal, and transactional levels and not failing to neglect one of the categories, keeping in mind that they interact closely with each other and change in area could spur on change in another. However, I also believe that the case study of Senegal testifies to the complexity of peace and reveals that even a holistic, systemic approach

such as Ricigliano's may lead to a reductive perception of peace and conflict. Without explicitly stating it, Ricigliano seems to imply that each category of factors equals the other and prioritization of one over the other will not lead to a sustainable peace. I argue, however, that situations vary, and sometimes strengths in one area may outweigh weaknesses in another. Though perhaps not ideal, one must take this into consideration when prioritizing which factors to focus on developing in peacebuilding strategies. In the case of Senegal, positive attitudinal and transactional factors seem to counteract weak structural factors and allow for a stable peace. In other cases strong structural factors might make more of a difference. One must carefully "read" each situation in order to understand the historical, cultural, and environmental context and determine which factors might play the biggest role.

These findings should not lead to an abandoning of holistic peacebuilding; indeed, people must continue to promote and develop healthy factors at all levels, including structural, attitudinal, and transactional. This examination of religion in Senegalese society should instead reinforce the notion of the complexity of conflict and peace. Even theories that operate through the lens of complexity, such as the SAT model, may still lead to reductive perspectives and disillusioned understandings and expectations. One must consciously fight against this tendency and continue to actively recognize the complexity. Truly, no formula exists to build stable peace, no matter how complex, holistic, and well thought out. This should not cause discouragement. On the contrary, the case of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians in Senegal should give hope that peace and harmony can exist even under imperfect circumstances.

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