Institutional and Personal Homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Post-Materialist Explanation

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Institutional and Personal Homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Post-Materialist Explanation

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Abstract

Sub-Saharan Africa is currently the most homophobic place in the world in terms of both state institutions and public opinions. Many scholars have blamed this on the former colonial powers of Africa who imposed homophobic policies on their landholdings. In order to explain variations in African homophobia, this study conceptualizes homophobia in two forms: institutional, using a measure of the homophobic actions of African states, and personal, using a composite score of multiple opinion surveys regarding homosexuality. Using linear regression models, this paper contends that Inglehart’s post-materialist framework does a much better job of explaining variation in homophobia within Sub-Saharan Africa than could be explained by colonial influence alone. While colonial influence seems to have had a lasting impact on the homophobic culture of many Sub-Saharan states, the reinforcement of religious norms through economic underdevelopment also appears to be crucial in explaining contemporary African homophobia.

Introduction: Homophobia as a Contemporary Issue

Walking home from a soccer game on an empty street in Cape Town, Mvuleni Fana was ambushed by several men. They jumped her in the back of an alley, each man beating and raping her one at a time. The perpetrators knew about her sexual orientation, and before leaving her unconscious told her, “After everything we're going to do to you, you're going to be a real woman, and you're never going to act like this again” (Strudwick 2014). A similar story was told by Lungile Dladla who was walking home one evening with her fellow gay companion when, out of the dark, an armed man approached them. He tied their hands and feet, telling them “Ja, today I want to show you that you’re girls,” and proceeded to rape them both. Dladla’s case was not taken seriously at the police station because of her “butch” appearance, and more tragically
she nearly died years later because she had contracted HIV from the encounter (Hunter-Galt 2012). In South Africa, “corrective rape” represents a daily threat for many lesbians. In fact, gay women are assaulted nearly twice as often as their heterosexual counterparts (Hunter-Galt 2012). Even more disheartening, South Africa is seen as one of the most gay-friendly countries in Africa. It is only one of two countries in the region to have legalized gay marriage, and is the only one to include protections for gay citizens in its constitution. In other countries in the region homosexual acts are penalized by life imprisonment or even the death penalty.

Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is the most homophobic region in the world in terms of public opinion (Horowitz et. al. 2013; McCarthy 2014). At the same time as gay marriage’s legalization in 35 of 50 U.S. states, and the adoption of LGBT rights by the international community as a human rights issue, many African countries continually embrace ever-harder penalties for homosexual acts. At this moment homosexuality is illegal in over 70% of African countries (“Making Love a Crime” 2013). This begs the question: “what explains homophobia within Sub-Saharan Africa today?” Current literature largely places the blame on colonial institutions, which originally installed most of the homophobic laws in the region (Asal 2013; Gupta 2008; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Ireland 2013; Itaborahy and Zhu 2013; “Making Love a Crime” 2013; Sanders 2009), but this explanation fails to illustrate the larger picture. The interpretation hinges on a Euro-centric view that the actions of underdeveloped countries revolve around Western powers, and completely disregards the fact that Third World countries control their own fate. In the contemporary era, a uniquely homophobic culture has developed within the region. African governments have largely decided to go the opposite direction of their former colonizers who have become much more liberal in terms of the rights granted to the LGBT community. Countries such as Burundi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and
Zimbabwe have all instituted either new or revised laws within the twenty-first century, which carry prison terms for homosexual behavior (Itaborahy and Zhu 2013).

Clearly, a broader framework needs to be presented to explain homophobia within Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper argues that Ronald Inglehart’s post-materialist theory, which postulates that economic development leads to greater social tolerance of issues such as homosexuality, can incorporate both colonial and contemporary factors to explain variations in African homophobia. To accomplish this analysis, I isolate factors previously identified as central to the development of global homophobia and use linear regression models to see if the factors’ relationships to variations in African homophobia agree with Inglehart’s predictions. Previous studies have addressed economic development (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Wike and Horowitz 2007), education (Bobo and Licari 1989; Herek 1991), religion (Asal 2013; Epprecht 2013; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Shoko 2010), and colonial rule (Asal 2013; Gupta 2008; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Ireland 2013; Itaborahy and Zhu 2013; “Making Love a Crime” 2013; Sanders 2009) as some of the most salient aspects of homophobia within countries worldwide. I employ two types of homophobia (institutional and personal) to investigate the relationship between the aforementioned variables and Sub-Saharan homophobia. Through the statistical analysis, I posit that Inglehart’s theory largely supports variations in institutional and personal homophobia within Sub-Saharan Africa. It appears that both types of homophobia are largely influenced through religious cultural norms, which are upheld in underdeveloped states, and secularized in economically more developed African nations. It is posited that African governments lose their incentive to act in discriminatory ways through this process of secularization, and populations become more tolerant of homosexuality when they are both economically secure and no longer derive their moral convictions from traditional cultural
norms. Colonial influence appears to have made an impact on the development of both types of homophobia, while the influence of education largely remains unclear.

In the following analysis, I will begin by first defining the two types of homophobia in order to set the boundaries of the study. Inglehart’s post-materialistic theory is then explained and postulated as an explanation for both types of homophobia within the Sub-Saharan region. Economic development, education, religion, and colonization are framed within the boundaries of Inglehart’s theory as a way to analyze the current homophobic climate of the region. Subsequently, several hypotheses are presented, which are tested by separate regression models for each type of homophobia. An individual-level analysis of the Sub-Saharan countries in the fifth and sixth World Values Surveys follows to corroborate the results taken from the analysis on personal homophobia. Finally, a discussion and conclusion highlight how this study’s findings can help understand institutional and personal homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Defining Homophobia and the Theoretical Scope**

As a term, homophobia has been utilized in a vast array of settings, which has contributed to a misleading meaning. While literally translating to an irrational fear of homosexuals, it has adopted a more encompassing framework that includes “anger, hatred, bias, ignorance, jealousy, or other sources of antipathy toward queer persons” (Thoreson 2014). Authors have previously broken homophobia down into several levels. These generally include institutional, interpersonal, personal, and societal (Blumenfeld 1992, Raja and Stokes 1998). In the following

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1 In this paper I use the words homosexual, gay, LGBT, queer, and sexual minority interchangeably to mean people who have sex with others of the same gender. Although there are slight differences between the terms, they are all used in the literature to describe men who have sex with men and women who have sex with women. LGBT includes bisexuals and transgender individuals, but the way the term is used in the course of this paper does not significantly distort or change its meaning.
analysis, I study two dimensions of homophobia, institutional and personal, in order to study related, but distinct, dimensions of the term simultaneously.

Institutional homophobia is the systemic exclusion and discrimination of homosexuals through the actions of governments or state organizations (Raja and Stokes 1998, 118). Institutional homophobia encompasses a broad perspective of society as it includes governmental actions and rhetoric, state-sponsored violence, and the behavior of organizations within a country, along with other structural aspects. On the other hand, personal homophobia is the intolerant beliefs held by individuals in society regarding homosexuals (Raja and Stokes 1998, 118). These beliefs include viewing homosexuality as immoral or having hateful feelings towards gay individuals. The two terms address both the system of discrimination as well as the intolerant views of communities within states that together lie beneath homophobic cultures. Viewed side by side, the terms more fully contribute to an understanding of homophobia as a whole. By separating homophobia into these two terms, this analysis mirrors other studies that have broken down other types of discrimination, such as sexism and racism, into both an individual-level and a broader society-wide level of analysis (Arreola et. al. 2014; Herek 1996; Fiske 2001; Raja and Stokes 1998).

Since the terms are fundamentally different, with diverging causal factors, they must be measured independently from one another. Having said this, institutional and personal homophobia are not completely independent of one another; laws can change public opinion, and public opinion has an effect on the language and severity of the laws. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that one type contributes more to the homophobic climate than the other; instead both must be looked at simultaneously in order to gain a holistic understanding of homophobia in the region.
The Colonial Legacy of Homophobia

Many scholars have argued that colonial rule has shaped the current landscape and polices of African countries especially in regards to issues concerning homosexuality (Asal 2013; Gupta 2008; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Ireland 2013; Itaborahy and Zhu 2013; “Making Love a Crime” 2013; Sanders 2009). Their case is bolstered by a British historical legacy of discriminatory policies and actions towards gays. This legacy started in the 19th century when Britain imported the first anti-sodomy laws into their African landholdings from section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which they had themselves written to bring ‘civilized’ behavior to the backwardness of their indigenous colonies (Gupta 2008). The laws made “carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal” illegal for any person within the British domain and henceforth made rigid heterosexuality the sexual norm. Most African countries formerly colonized by the British still utilize this language in anti-homosexual laws today.

In contrast anti-sodomy laws were largely absent in places colonized by the French because homosexuality had been de-criminalized in the 18th century with the Napoleonic Penal Codes, which legalized activities done in privacy (Sanders 2009). While the French enacted some types of anti-sodomy laws in a few colonies, such as in the modern areas of Benin, Cameroon, and Senegal, in order to assert social domination, most places remained free of the discriminatory measures taken by the British (Gupta 2008). Today, 38 out of 54 countries in Africa ban the practice of homosexuality, and the region has some of the harshest anti-gay laws in the world (“Making Love a Crime” 2013). The vast majority of the countries banning homosexuality were formerly British landholdings, while most of the areas colonized by the French have no anti-gay laws in place (“Making Love a Crime” 2013). Indeed, Patrick Ireland’s
work on sodomy laws in the region found that a significant portion of variation in homophobic legislation was explained by being a former British landholding.

But while the colonial explanation for contemporary homophobia is compelling, it ignores the fact that modern discrimination is a complex phenomenon, which cannot be explained simply by a colonial past. Colonialism certainly appears to have set the stage for African homophobia, but fails to fully explain modern enactment of homophobic laws as well as modern forms of homophobia outside the scope of criminalization. For instance, several Sub-Saharan countries, including Burundi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, have all adopted either new or revised legislation with prison sentences for homosexual behavior within the last 15 years (Itaborahy and Zhu 2013). It is important to remember that African countries declared their independence from Europe decades ago, so there must be uniquely African and strictly contemporary reasons for homophobia to have become so entrenched in the region in the 21st century. Therefore, it is paramount to investigate other causes of African homophobia in order to look beyond colonialism as the only explanation.

*The Influence of Colonialism on Materialist Attitudes in Africa*

This paper contends that the colonial legacy can be incorporated into the broader framework of Inglehart’s post-materialist theory in order to explain African homophobia. Instead of viewing colonialism as the cause of African homophobia, post-materialism sees it as setting the stage for the future homophobic culture of the region. Post-materialism suggests countries follow path-dependent avenues of development according to their cultural heritage (Inglehart 1999). They develop in this way because the cost of changing cultural norms is expensive, especially for underdeveloped countries, and so they remain relatively unchanged over time (Asal 2013). Through the developmental process, states’ interests shift in a predictable way from
economic to social as they shift from materialist to post-materialist, but specific policies and cultural norms within societies reflect a common history.

Colonialism might also reflect on social attitudes in states in a path-dependent manner. Homophobic laws dating back to the 19th century could help form both norms about the morality of homosexuality, and set the stage for later discriminatory institutions. African countries under the same European authority would therefore be expected to develop political institutions and social values that reflect similar feelings about homosexuality. Under this framework, areas with harsher anti-gay legal systems under colonial rule would be expected to retain that legal code in the future, and store the principles of those laws in their cultural beliefs. However, even with a shared culture, countries should be able to shift their social outlooks as they develop economically (Inglehart 1999). Previous research supports this notion, finding that countries formerly colonized by the British do in fact have more homophobic laws than countries not colonized by the British, but the research also suggests that they do not take any longer to de-criminalize homosexuality than other states (Han and O’Mahoney 2014). This indicates that heritage may influence the political and social landscape of a country down the road, but does not determine it. Instead common heritage simply gives countries a similar developmental starting place and trajectory over time, which is influenced by modern conditions.

The Post-Materialist Explanation for African Homophobia

Ronald Inglehart’s post-materialist theory predicts countries will develop similarly over time according a country’s economic conditions (1987, 1990, 1997, 1999). Accordingly, populations within pre-industrialized countries exhibit materialist behavior, which reflects the needs of the emerging working class (Inglehart 1987). At an early stage in economic development, average citizens are more concerned about their own economic well-being than
society-wide social injustices because of a day-to-day struggle to survive. As a result, newly
industrializing societies tend to focus their resources on policies that will attain economic growth
in order to improve society’s overall quality of life. Traditional values and norms characterize
societies with dominantly materialist attitudes because they do not yet have the time or
political/physical resources to revise their norms in socially salient ways.

Important to this theory is that populations will adopt traditional values and norms, which
in many instances are religiously based, in order to provide a shared sense of purpose among
their fledgling populations (Inglehart 1987). These norms then continue in a path-dependent
manner, as they are fairly resistant to change, and continue to shape future cultural norms and
behavior over time. As a result, materialist oriented populations almost uniformly conform to
specific cultural norms and religious practices at the expense of individualism. This societal
structure continues until development eventually yields widespread economic security, and new
generations increasingly want to address neglected social inequity over economic growth
(Inglehart 1999). Through this cycle, societal attitudes slowly transitions from collectively
oriented, with mainly material interests, to individually minded, with primarily post-materialist
and social interests. Unfortunately, minority and marginalized groups within materialist-oriented
societies bear a significant burden in this stage of development. As a result of the entrenchment
of traditional norms, citizens within areas of predominately materialist attitudes “feel threatened
by foreigners, by ethnic diversity and by cultural change. This leads to an intolerance of gays and
other outgroups, an insistence on traditional gender roles, and an authoritarian political outlook”
(Inglehart 1999, 26).

While past studies have shown that post-materialism can explain variation in global
homophobia (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Anderson and Fetner 2008; Henshaw 2014; Stulhofer
and Rimac 2009), can it explain why some African countries are more homophobic than others?
As one of the most undeveloped areas in the world, the countries of Africa almost uniformly fit Inglehart’s description of states where societal attitudes are predominantly materialist. Accordingly, the region clings to traditional values, and has extreme, even violent, reactions to anything it sees as culturally foreign, including homosexuality. Further, the most economically developed country in the region, South Africa, has the most progressive gay-rights policies in all of Africa. There is, therefore, reasonable justification to analyze homophobia within Sub-Saharan Africa through Inglehart’s theory. To perform this analysis, several concepts previously put forth as impactful to either African homophobia or homophobia in general (including economic development, education, religiosity, and colonialism) are explored further in the context of Inglehart’s theory.

*Economic Development and Societal Interests*

At the core of the post-materialistic theory is economics: as countries economically develop, their population’s interests should shift from material to social (Inglehart 1987, 1990, 1997, 1999). Interestingly, economic underdevelopment is widely thought to be a driving cause of global homophobia (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Wike and Horowitz 2007). This belief comes from the observation that worldwide feelings towards homosexuals are generally more negative the poorer a country, suggesting that a country’s overall economic performance may be tied to a population’s opinion of the LGBT community. Previous research has found this to be true within European countries where the prosperous region of Western Europe has far greater tolerance towards homosexuals than less developed European countries, even when controlling for former Communist rule (Anderson and Fetner 2008).

But while economic development has been used to explain more tolerant views of homosexuality in the West, thus far, the same explanation has not been applied to clarify
variations of homophobia within Sub-Saharan Africa. There is good reason to believe that both homophobic attitudes and state actions in the region can be explained through an economic lens. Since the region ranks within the world’s most underdeveloped, ubiquitous materialist attitudes would be expected within African states through Inglehart’s theory (1987). As predicted by post-materialism, African countries are both some of the poorest in the world in terms of GDP per capita (“GDP per capita” 2014), and the most homophobic overall in term of opinion surveys (Horowitz et. al. 2013; McCarthy 2014). If economic circumstances have not allowed the interests of most people to shift from material to social, individuals could be perpetuating existing homophobic cultural norms as a result of widespread materialist attitudes in the region. Underdevelopment and poverty may, therefore, be responsible for homophobic attitudes in Africa by allowing the continuation and formation of conservative cultures, which form the basis for individual’s views.

Sub-Saharan countries, as previously noted, also have some of the harshest anti-gay policies in the world (Itaborahy and Zhu 2013). African governments may be implementing more homophobic policies in underdeveloped conditions to align with both the homophobic interests of their populations and the cultural norms of the country. Several scholars have noted how the impoverished conditions of Africa have encouraged the enactment of discriminatory policies towards gays within thriving homophobic cultures (Biruk 2014; Shoko 2010; Thoreson 2014; Van Klinken 2013). In fact it could be that underdevelopment has created a vicious cycle of discrimination in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereby widespread materialist attitudes have spurred the establishment of homophobic state structures, which have then further reinforced homophobic societal views. Overall, if underdevelopment can explain the predominance of both homophobic views and state structures in the Sub-Saharan region, materialist attitudes could reasonably be placed at the heart of African homophobia.
Education as an Avenue for Tolerance

Inglehart suggests that a formal education can give people the ability to break down dominant cultural norms because it allows for “autonomous decision-making” (1999, 22). Education may be a way for individuals to break from homophobic cultural norms and standards, to which the rest of society adheres, especially in underdeveloped countries. In addition, as states develop, they may be able to encourage rising educational levels as more money is allowed to finance schools. Therefore, education may act in a way to reform both homophobic cultures and state institutions. There is support for this framework in other places in the world such as Ireland where greater spending on educational programs seems to have led to more tolerant attitudes towards homosexuals across the entire population (Denny, 2011).

In Western countries, education is viewed as an essential avenue to increase societal tolerance. In fact, previous studies of developed countries have found education to be one of the strongest predictors of social tolerance towards homosexuality (Anderson and Fetner 2008). Previous research has demonstrated that individuals with a higher level of education tend to be more tolerant toward other groups, even ones that they do not like (Bobo and Licari 1989; Whitehead 2010). It seems that individuals with a greater amount of “cognitive sophistication” tend to see the worth in granting rights of expression to people different from themselves even when they do not necessarily see eye to eye (Bobo and Licari 1989). If education could be an avenue to counter discriminatory cultural norms, it could potentially be an important factor to explain homophobia in less developed places.

Importantly for Africa, more educated Sub-Saharan countries could have greater overall tolerance for marginalized groups, including gays. Even if educational programs are not directly teaching about LGBT issues, possibly a greater “cognitive sophistication” would allow individuals to tolerate the views and lifestyles different than their own. With the extremely
homophobic climate of Sub-Saharan Africa, education could possibly help to explain why some
countries are less homophobic than others. While many scholars have suggested that African
school systems actually worsen homophobic attitudes by labeling homosexuality as a sin
(Johnson 2007; “Making Love a Crime” 2013), it is difficult to tell if views are perpetuated by
the schools or by the broader culture. Potentially, a person in a homophobic culture may be able
to form individual beliefs only after a certain number of years in school. If education has the
same effect in underdeveloped countries as it does in developed ones, it would be expected to
oppose the homophobic culture of African states. When a large enough segment of the
population breaks from their country’s homophobic cultural ideals, governments should reform
homophobic state structures to reflect more tolerant interests. Education could therefore be a
force to challenge the homophobic culture of African states.

Religion in Africa

Religiosity has regularly been cited as a reason for the homophobic nature of countries
(Asal 2013; Epprecht 2013; Shoko 2010). For instance, in a broad study of various international
actors, Alexis Henshaw found that “even controlling for a country’s level of modernization and
an individual respondent’s self-expression values, a respondent’s religious belief has a
significant and negative relationship to their tolerance toward homosexuality.” Inglehart’s theory
would suggest that religiously based conservative norms provide the moral backbone for the
majority of people in societies where materialist attitudes are standard, which tends to create
stigmatization of certain types of self-expression including homosexuality. In addition, religious
cultural norms can be impressed on governments who create policies to reflect those ideals,
thereby codifying homophobia into law (Asal 2013). However, as states develop economically,
their populations rely less heavily on the conservative cultural framework for support, which
allows cultural norms to secularize. Without homophobic cultural norms, governments’ incentive
for discriminatory policies disappears, and state institutions correspondingly reform over time. Unfortunately, in underdeveloped regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where conservative cultural norms have not been reformed, religion may continue to perpetuate discriminatory state structures and individual views.

Religion may make a considerable impact on the level of homophobia within African states because of its importance in African culture. It has been noted that religion ties together communities and families, and plays a large role in children’s’ upbringing and education in African cultures (Johnson 2007). Importantly, African populations are often taught that homosexuality is foreign, un-African, and sinful through a religious framework (“Making Love a Crime” 2013). This is significant in a region where religion is a part of almost everyone’s lives. Accordingly, a recent survey found that African countries have some of the most religious populations in the world (Crabtree 2010). When asked if “religion [was] an important part of [their] daily [lives],” 85% or more of every Sub-Saharan country surveyed responded “yes” (Crabtree 2010). Religion’s ubiquity in Sub-Saharan Africa may therefore influence the development of homophobic cultural norms that are then impressed on countries’ populations and state intuitions.

Importantly to this conversation, Christianity and Islam, whose most accepted doctrines around the world espouse anti-homosexual rhetoric, are the two major religions in most African states and serve as the dominant moral codes. Many African states have created systems with integral ties to either Christianity or Islam, which both have generally accepted scriptural interpretations that have made gays highly stigmatized and even hated by many Africans (Shoko 2010). For example, several African countries directly use the teachings of the Qur’an, in the form of sharia law, to punish convicted homosexual activity with death by stoning. A broad survey of Sub-Saharan Africa by the Pew Research Center found that 60% of African Christians
“favor making [the] Bible the official law of the land” and 63% of African Muslims “favor making sharia the official law of the land,” demonstrating the widespread influence of the region’s religious culture (Cooperman et. al. 2010). Interestingly, previous research has found Protestants, especially Evangelical Protestants, and Muslims both espouse the most negative views of homosexuals in comparison to Catholics, Jews, other religious groups and non-affiliated individuals (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Ogland and Verona 2014; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Whitehead 2010). With these two groups making up the majority of religious followers in the region (Cooperman et. al. 2010; Hackett et. al. 2012, 2011), the effects of the existing homophobic culture could be compounded in many African states.

Africa’s religious culture has also created a lack of separation between church and state in various countries, which has only exacerbated homophobia in those places. For example, in Uganda the integral relationship between religion, government, and general homophobia was painfully felt with the introduction of the Anti-Homosexuality Act to the country’s legislature in 2009 (Epprecht 2013, 144-145). The country’s government was convinced to introduce the law, known as the ‘Kill the Gays Bill’ because its maximum penalty for homosexuality was death, by missionaries Scott Lively and Don Schmierer who both toured across Uganda preaching about the gays’ “dark agenda” (Epprecht 2013, 144-145). The instant and overwhelming enthusiasm for the bill by the general population not only illustrated how deeply rooted religion was in the cultural fabric of the country, but also demonstrated how those norms have shaped people’s views of homosexuality. If a connection exists between Africa’s religious cultures and regional homophobia it is easy to see how both laws and attitudes could take on a discriminatory tone.
Hypotheses

With the above discussion in mind, I formulate several hypotheses about the role of economics, education, religion, and colonial rule on institutional and personal homophobia. My predictions follow the principles set out by Inglehart’s post-materialist theory; namely homophobia should proliferate in economically underdeveloped African states, which abide by religiously rooted traditional values. The homophobic systems of Africa should have been built upon the colonial past, which started many homophobic norms. In addition, education should be a way for African states to increase individual thought and decrease cultural homophobia. Through this framework institutional and personal homophobia should have the same underlying causes, as both came out of the same African historical legacy, and should be driven by the framework outlined by post-materialism.

The Sub-Saharan region is concurrently the poorest in the world (“GDP per capita” 2014), and also the harshest in terms of homophobic laws (Itaborahy and Zhu 2013). This is partly explained by the fact that structural changes are costly for societies as path-dependence would suggest (Asal 2013), and therefore changing old homophobic legal frameworks taken from previous decades may be difficult for poor countries. But economic underdevelopment also plays a critical role by both bolstering conservative cultural norms, which reinforce negative social attitudes and discriminatory institutions. Opinion surveys have consistently shown Sub-Saharan countries as the most disapproving of homosexuality of any area surveyed in the world (Horowitz et. al. 2013; McCarthy 2014). However it remains to be seen if there is a relationship between homophobic attitudes and economic development specifically within Sub-Saharan countries.

- Hypothesis 1: Economic development is negatively correlated with institutional homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.
• Hypothesis 2: Economic development is negatively correlated with the personal homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Inglehart suggests that education can help individuals distance their thinking from traditional cultural norms (1999), and therefore change dominant cultural values over time. This is supported by other studies, which have found that education increases individual’s tolerance towards homosexuals (Bobo and Licari 1989). Possibly an ability to view the world from different perspectives allows people with more education to see the value in giving freedoms, such as expression, to others even when they do not like them. Likely, greater levels of education allow citizens to learn about other groups in society through a more objective lens. In Sub-Saharan Africa, countries with the economic stability to finance educational institutions may have more tolerant attitudes and institutions within their states as a result of more educated populations.

• Hypothesis 3: The overall educational level of a country is negatively correlated with institutional homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.

• Hypothesis 4: The overall educational level of a country is negatively correlated with personal homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Most African countries have norms and legal institutions based on religious teachings. This would be expected of states where materialist attitudes dominate because they tend to have populations who follow conservative overarching cultural norms (Inglehart 1999). Islam and Christianity, the two major religions in Africa, both largely view homosexuality as a moral sin. If the cultural frameworks of states rely heavily on these teachings, populations should be more radicalized in their dislike of homosexuality, and African government institutions should concurrently take harder stances against homosexuality (Epprecht, 2013).
• Hypothesis 5: The religiosity of a country is positively correlated with institutional homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.

• Hypothesis 6: The religiosity of a country is positively correlated with personal homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The British have been accused of initiating the homophobic nature of their former landholdings with the discriminatory laws they instituted into those places (Asal 2013; Gupta 2008; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Ireland 2013; Itaborahy and Zhu 2013; “Making Love a Crime” 2013; Sanders 2009). Accordingly, as a result of path-dependence, the effects of colonialism should reflect on the current norms of former British colonies by having more discriminatory attitudes and institutions within those states.

• Hypothesis 7: Being a former British colony is positively correlated to institutional homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.

• Hypothesis 8: Being a former British colony is positively correlated to personal homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Measurements and Methods

The Need for a Better Indicator

To date, a considerable portion of the research that has been done on homophobia in Africa has focused on the criminalization of homosexuality (Asal 2013; Itaborahy and Zhu 2013; “Making Love a Crime” 2013). Unfortunately, this fails to show the true variation in the degree of homophobia felt in Sub-Saharan African countries. Recently, Gallup compiled a worldwide survey, which asked: “Is the city or area where you live in a good place or not a good place to live for gay or lesbian people?” (McCarthy 2013). Places such as Benin, Chad, and Gabon overwhelmingly said their country was a bad place, 91%, 94%, 95% respectively, for gay people to
live (McCarthy 2013) even though those countries have no laws banning homosexuality. Angola and Botswana, which have up to three and seven year prison terms respectively, for homosexual acts, had two of the highest percentages of people agreeing that their countries were a good place for gays to live (McCarthy 2013).

Many of the discriminatory legal systems were instituted over a century ago and therefore may not accurately represent the true nature of homophobia in their countries. Some African laws were likely too expensive for the underdeveloped states to change and therefore remained through the years even if they did not reflect broad societal interests (Asal 2013). This is apparent in many Sub-Saharan countries, such as Sierra Leone and Angola, where harsh sentences for homosexual acts exist, but the states have never actually prosecuted individuals under the laws. Both Angola’s and Sierra Leone’s anti-gay laws have not been updated since the 1800s suggesting that they are less homophobic than they appear when only measuring homophobia by the severity of the existing legal system. Unfortunately, the narrow view of homophobia looked at through the lens of criminalization fails to account for the multifaceted nature of homophobia.

Operationalizing Homophobia

As a result of the inadequacies of using criminalization as an indicator of homophobia, this study divides homophobia into the categories of institutional and personal in order to more accurately operationalize the term. As stated previously, institutional homophobia is the discrimination or exclusion of homosexuals in society through structurally-sanctioned means. In this context, institutional homophobia is anti-gay discrimination perpetuated by African state institutions and organizations. Personal homophobia, on the other hand, is the social stigma of homosexuality held by the population of a state. In this case, intolerance emanates from socially held biases and views of collective groups of African individuals. By utilizing these two terms
this analysis attempts to take a holistic view of homosexuality that was not previously attainable when defining homophobia by the severity of anti-gay laws. The two terms are investigated side by side in order to illustrate both of their individual and underlying causes. Both are utilized in this study because the causes of an institutionalized system and the social stigmas held by the general public are likely quite divergent. Conceptualizing homophobia at the micro and macro-level helps to conceptualize the term by giving two sides of homophobia simultaneously.

Homophobia was operationalized using two composite scores. The institutional homophobia score was created using several questions that conferred the amount of structural discrimination towards homosexuals in a specific country. The composite score includes, on the one hand, the current status of laws regarding homosexuality, and, on the other, the amount of homophobic persecution allowed by the state. Personal homophobia was quantified using a composite score of various surveys from the last 10 years asking respondents how they felt about homosexuality. This allows for a variety of countries within the Sub-Saharan region to be analyzed, which gives a clearer picture of population’s feeling regarding homosexuality. Table A1 gives a description and statistics about the various variables utilized within the study (see appendix A). Table A2 shows the state-level data collected for the 49 Sub-Saharan countries (see appendix A).

**Institutional Homophobia Dependent Variable**

The institutional homophobia dependent variable attempts to capture the degree to which societal institutions persecuted homosexuals. To quantify this measure several yes or no questions were asked to gauge the level of a country’s institutional homophobia. The questions were set up so that one point was awarded if the answer to the question was “yes” and zero if the answer was “no.” After points had been designated, they were added to give a final score. A greater score indicates a greater degree of structural discrimination towards gays, and questions
were set up so that answering “yes” to any question conferred a higher homophobia score. One component of the score included the severity of laws regarding homosexuality (ranging from the death penalty to legalized gay marriage), \(^2\) and the other sought to capture a greater breadth of institutional homophobia’s meaning through questions directed at structural discrimination or inequality within societies.

The questions making up the portion of the Institutional homophobia score demonstrating the severity of homophobic laws include: Does the country have the death penalty for homosexual behavior? Is there life imprisonment for homosexual behavior? Does the penalty for homosexual activity range from 10 to 100 years? Does the penalty for homosexual activity range from 1 month to 9 years? Is homosexuality illegal within the country in some form? Is gay marriage illegal within the country? Have anti-homosexuality laws been updated since 1950?\(^3\) Is the government or other organizations legally allowed to discriminate against gays? Has anyone ever been arrested for homosexual activity? Has anyone been prosecuted for homosexual activity?\(^4\)

The questions making up the second part of the Institutional Homophobia score include: Is the state involved in violence against LGBT individuals? Is there a lack of LGBT organizations within the country? Has the state discriminated against or interfered with LGBT organizations? Has the state prevented open demonstrations of support for LGBT issues within

\(^2\) In terms of scoring for laws regarding homosexuality, one point was awarded for the given level of severity of the law and one point was also given for each level of severity beneath it. For example, countries with the death penalty for homosexual acts got six points, one for every “homosexual legality” section, and countries with life imprisonment got five points.

\(^3\) 1950 was chosen because it represents at least a generation away from modern policy-making in the region. Homophobic laws passed within the more modern era should reflect a more discriminatory cultural mentality.

\(^4\) These questions, regarding homophobic laws, were answered using Itaborahy and Zhu’s report on the criminalization of homosexuality.
The institutional homophobia variable ranges from 1 at the low end of the homophobic spectrum to 14 at the high end (Table 1). The data’s mean of just over around 8.6 shows that the countries are skewed towards being more institutionally homophobic.

Table 1: Institutional Homophobia Variable Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Min</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Homophobia</td>
<td>Composite score demonstrating the level of institutional discrimination</td>
<td>8.571</td>
<td>3.048</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score</td>
<td>towards homosexuals within a country.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potential drawbacks of the variable include the limited availability of information for African countries and inaccuracies of the weight given to particular components of the score. In terms of Sub-Saharan Africa, there is always a question as to the reliability of information. Many instances of violence and persecution go unreported in countries with weak policing infrastructures and few credible news agencies. Especially in terms of the LGBT community, the degree of repression can be difficult to determine. This was the reasoning behind making the measure from multiple questions in order to possibly eliminate inaccuracies of the score given to any one question. Taking the vast majority of the data from either Itaborahy and Zhu’s report on

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5 To answer these questions the U.S. State Department’s *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013* were consulted for each individual country.

6 To answer this questions the academic database Lexis Nexis (say who this is) was consulted. For each country the commands “the name of the country OR the name of the country’s leader AND homosexuality OR gay” was entered into the search engine. This produced all newspaper, magazine, and journal articles from the period of 2000-2014 that mentioned both homosexuality and the African country or the state’s leader in the same article. Public statements by elites or country leaders were then used to gauge opinions of homosexuality.
worldwide anti-homosexuality laws or the U.S. State Department’s *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* also makes the scoring information more credible and consistent. But even so, invariably some countries will have somewhat skewed scores based on missing or inaccurate information, but unfortunately this problem is difficult to avoid. The other difficulty to consider is that every question is given the same weight in the score. It is possible that some aspects should contribute more when quantifying institutionalized discrimination, but doing this only adds more subjectivity to the score. For this reason each question was weighted equally.

**Personal Homophobia Dependent Variable**

Personal homophobia sought to capture the level of socially held anti-homosexual stigma held by the populations of various African nations. It was quantified using eight opinion surveys that all asked respondents about their feelings regarding homosexuality. The surveys were taken from Gallup, the Pew Research Center, and the World Values Survey. Each survey was given an individual score according to country by dividing the percent of total respondents showing dislike for homosexuality by the same number added to the total percent of respondents showing

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7 The two Gallup surveys asked, “Is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place to live for gay or lesbian people?” (McCarthy 2013; Naurath 2007). The Pew Research Global Attitudes Project survey asked, “Should society accept homosexuality?” (Horowitz 2013). In another survey, the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes and Trends project asked, “Do you personally believe that homosexuality is morally acceptable, morally unacceptable, or is it not a moral issue?” (“Morality Interactive” 2013). A Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life survey told respondents, “Next, I’m going to read some behaviors. For each, please tell me whether you personally believe that it is morally acceptable, morally wrong, or is it not a moral issue?—Homosexual behavior” (Cooperman et. al. 2013). This survey was not included because the answers were broken up into four categories, which did not match the scoring framework used for the rest of the reports. The Pew Global Project Attitudes Survey asked respondents to complete the statement, “Homosexuality should be…accepted—rejected” (Wike and Horowitz 2007). An earlier Pew Research Global Attitudes Project stated, “Homosexuality should be accepted by society” to respondents who were asked to answer, “Yes or no” (Albright et. al. 2003). The fifth and sixth World Values Surveys asked, “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?—Homosexuals” (“Wave 6” 2014; “Wave 5” 2009).
positive views of homosexuality. In order to get easier numbers to utilize the results were multiplied by 100.

\[
\text{Personal Homophobia Score} = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} \times 100 \quad 8
\]

This effectively eliminated the percent of respondents who gave an answer along the lines of “don’t know” for which it is impossible to infer the true meaning. Each county’s score was averaged across the surveys, in order to get a single score for each country. The surveys ranged from the years 2003 to 2013 in order to include as many countries in the analysis as possible. It is both assumed that attitudes remained fairly constant during this time frame and that the questions asked were measuring the same thing, which is reasonable because a comparison of scores for identical countries showed a high degree of agreement across all surveys included. A high personal homophobia scores indicates a greater social rejection of homosexuality across a given population. The personal homophobia score ranges from around 59 to 96 (Table 2). The scores mean is around 90, which is considerably skewed towards the upper bound of the data. This reflects the overall negative attitude felt about homosexuality by the majority of Sub-Saharan populations.

The principle disadvantage of the personal homophobia variable comes from inaccuracies after averaging multiple surveys into one score. These surveys come from different years and ask varying questions. It is possible that while the questions asked were similar across surveys, they were not all investigating the same issue. In addition, the percentage of people having either a favorable or unfavorable view of homosexuality fluctuates from year to year, which could result in an unrealistic averaged score. Having said this, a high correlation between related country scores across surveys makes it far less likely that questions demonstrate vastly different issues or

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8 $\alpha$ is the percent of total respondents showing dislike for homosexuality, and $\beta$ is the total percent of respondents showing positive views of homosexuality.
that there has been a dramatic change is opinions regarding homosexuality in the last several years. Therefore, these potential hurdles do not appear to be major problems when drawing meaningful conclusions from the variable.

Table 2: Personal Homophobia Statistics Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Min</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Homophobia Score</td>
<td>Composite survey score reflecting the percent of a country’s population who disproves of homosexuality.</td>
<td>88.82</td>
<td>7.857</td>
<td>95.592</td>
<td>58.971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth mentioning that the two variables for homophobia are related by a Pearson correlation coefficient (r) of 0.625. This suggests that they may influence one another, although the relationship between the two is difficult to define. It is important to recognize that African societies with high levels of homophobic views tend to also have state structures that are strongly discriminatory towards gays. However, the analyses in this paper will not focus on the relationship between the two dependent variables, although one may exist.

**Independent Variables**

GDP per capita, PPP was used as proxy for economic development (see Table A1 for details). The measure was used instead of GDP per capita to account for variations in cost within different domestic markets. The gross domestic product effectively demonstrates the size of a country’s economy by measuring the total value of goods produced in the country within the year. By using GDP per capita, a fair approximation of a country’s relative economic performance can be demonstrated, which can be compared to other countries regardless of population size. One downside is that countries with a single lucrative industry, but with few tangible jobs, can give an inflated GDP per capita, which does not represent the country’s
overreaching economic development. GDP per capita, PPP was taken from the World Bank from 2014.

To measure the overall level of education within a country, the mean years of schooling from the HDI score was utilized. This indicator was used because more years of school across a population on average would be expected to demonstrate a more educated population overall. A drawback of the variable is that it does not show the quality of the populace’s education. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that populations with more years of schooling also have received a better education overall than other populations with less average years of education.

A measure of religiosity was difficult to determine by country. Not enough information was available to find the degree of religious adherence for most populations of Sub-Saharan countries. Studies normally rely on measures of individuals rate of church attendance or personal belief in God, but unfortunately this type of data is lacking for Africa. For this reason another measure of religiosity was used. Instead of religious commitment, the percent of a population who placed themselves in the “unaffiliated” category in religious identification surveys was used as a proxy for the degree of secularity within a country. In the surveys, respondents were given the choice to identify with one of the major world religions, a folk religion, the “unaffiliated” category, or an unlisted religion. For the purposes of this study, I am defining religiously unaffiliated respondents as non-religious. Therefore I am characterizing countries with more non-religious or unaffiliated individuals as more secular and less religious overall. By doing this, I am assuming that the percent of the population identifying as unaffiliated is inversely related to the relative religiosity of a country. Admittedly, this is not a perfect indicator, but on the whole it appears to be a sensible measure of a state’s secular nature. In the following analysis the religiosity of a country will be approximated using the inverse value of the religiously
unaffiliated percentage of a population. The percentage of unaffiliated was taken from Hackett, Grim, and Cooperman’s report on the global religious landscape.

To measure the effect of colonial influence I use nominal dummy variables to account for the identity of colonizing countries. Since Britain and France were the two main colonizers, and had very different approaches in terms of the treatment of homosexuals in their landholdings, I compare them to all other former African colonizers as a baseline. Other colonizers include Portugal, Spain, Germany, Belgium, and Italy. The former colonizers of modern day Sub-Saharan countries were identified based on the European country controlling the majority of the territory directly before the country gained independence. I decided to assign colonizers in this fashion because the country last in control most likely set the anti-gay policies in the territory before independence. The identity of the former colonizers was taken form the U.N.’s report on colonial landholdings (“Trust and Non-Self-Governing” 1999).

Other controls were also utilized for the state-level of analysis, which have been included in similar analyses (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Henshaw 2014; Stulhofer and Rimac 2009). One is regime type; it has been suggested that countries with democratic governments may have less repressive state structures towards homosexuals because of the voice given to minorities in democratic systems (Han and O’Mahoney 2014). Polity scores were used to approximate regime type (Marshall 2014). The polity score ranges from 10 to -10, where a score of 6 to 10 is defined as a democracy, 5 to -5 as an anocracy, and -6 to -10 as an autocracy. Another necessary control in any study of Africa is ethnic fractionalization because of the large number of ethnic groups present in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to show that the phenomenon being investigated is not explained by the region’s ethnic landscape. Alberto

9 In the analysis 2013 polity scores were used. Where data was not available for 2013, scores from 2012 were employed.
Alesina’s measure of ethnic fractionalization was used as a control because it encompassed the greatest number of African countries (Han and O’Mahoney 2014). In addition, studies have found varying ages within populations to be an important predictor of homophobic attitudes (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Stulhofer and Rimac 2009). In developed countries, it has been observed that younger people tend to be more tolerant of homosexuality than older individuals, which is generally attributed to changes in social norms regarding homosexuality over different generations (Inglehart 1990). This may not be true of the younger generation in Africa since social norms have been extremely anti-gay (Albright 2003; McCarthy, 2014). It is also conceivable that younger populations, which are generally more politically active, may be seeking homophobic governmental policies and actions. This analysis employs the median age of a country’s population from the CIA’s World Factbook to control for the possibility that the age distribution within a country affects opinions about gays and the level of discriminatory actions by state institutions.

**Country-Level Results**

Several regression models are employed in order to predict variations in institutional and personal homophobia scores. Incremental building of the models is used to individually examine independent variables. Institutional and personal homophobia are both analyzed in almost identical respects, and the framework of incrementally building models is the same for both dependent variables. Models 1, 2, and 3 all isolate singular independent variables and employ bivariate regression models. Models 4, 5, and 6 gradually add more variables and controls in order to see if relationships between variables hold across different models.

Model 1 (addressing hypothesis 1 and 2) examines the effect of GDP per capita, PPP, model 2 looks at education (addressing hypothesis 3 and 4), model 3 (addressing hypothesis 5 and 6) illustrates the effect of religiosity, and model 6 (addressing hypothesis 7 and 8)
investigates the influence of colonial rule. Model 6 uses the identity of the former colonizing
countries before independence as dummy variables. This allows the nominal criteria of either
being a British or French former colony to be used as an independent variable in the analysis.
The baseline is countries formerly controlled by countries other than the French or British.
Model 4 utilizes the first multivariate regression to compare all of the continuous independent
variables. Model 5 adds controls to the models including the median age of the population,
ethnic fractionalization, and country polity scores.

The Causes of Institutional Homophobia

Table 3, which illustrates the regression models created for institutionalized homophobia,
shows tentative support for Inglehart’s theory (1999). The driving force of post-materialism,
economic development (modeled using GDP per capita, PPP), illustrates a significant negative
correlation through almost every model. The negative relationship supports hypothesis 1 and
suggests, as expected, that wealthier Sub-Saharan countries tend to have less discriminatory state
institutions. The relationship seems to support Inglehart’s prediction that economic development
allows states to adopt more socially progressive institutions even within the generally
homophobic states of Africa. The relationship holds through almost every model, demonstrating
the importance of the variable. Only in Model 6 does GDP per capita, PPP fail to produce
significant results, which could be a result of the number of controls used for the relatively small
sample size. The number of Sub-Saharan countries with similarly small GDP values also seems
to have potentially inhibited a more robust relationship with the institutional homophobia score.

One of the most striking results of the analysis is religiosity’s strong and positive
correlation through every model. The relationship suggests that more religious African societies
will have correspondingly more discriminatory state institutions, which lends credence to
hypothesis 5. In states where materialist attitudes are common, societal institutions should reflect
the interests of dominant religious norms (Inglehart 1999), and this should be reflected in African societies where religious doctrine generally encourage anti-gay ideologies. By itself, religiosity predicts around a quarter of the variance (its beta coefficient is 0.440 compared to all other variables in the sixth model), which implies that African countries have developed discriminatory institutions partially as a result of religious influences. However, the predictive ability of the variable also indicates that religion does not tell the whole story. It is difficult to tell if there are any outliers in the analysis (Figure 1) because many of the countries have very high religiosity scores, which makes it difficult to determine if groups of countries are deviating from their predicted values.

Table 3: Regression Models for Institutional Homophobia (Standard Error in Parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita, PPP (000’s of US$)</td>
<td>-0.149* (0.061)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-0.185** (0.067)</td>
<td>-0.162* (0.063)</td>
<td>-0.112 (0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in Years)</td>
<td>0.324*** (0.081)</td>
<td>0.323*** (0.085)</td>
<td>0.333*** (0.078)</td>
<td>0.280** (0.079)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-0.109 (0.068)</td>
<td>-0.109 (0.065)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Index</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-0.503** (0.134)</td>
<td>-0.501*** (0.129)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age (in Years)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-0.699 (1.501)</td>
<td>-0.831 (1.456)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>2.092* (1.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.645 (0.861)</td>
<td>0.645 (0.861)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.645 (0.861)</td>
<td>0.645 (0.861)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Colonizers</td>
<td>9.177*** (0.504)</td>
<td>9.130*** (1.064)</td>
<td>-20.803* (7.838)</td>
<td>-24.062** (8.610)</td>
<td>-16.432* (7.957)</td>
<td>-11.086 (8.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P-Value < 0.05, **P-Value < 0.01, ***P-Value < 0.001
Throughout most of the models, education appears to be a significant predictor of institutional homophobia. Only in model 2 does the variable not show a significant relationship. In the rest of the models, education has a fairly large (with a beta coefficient of 0.414 in the sixth model) and positive relationship, suggesting that African populations with more years of schooling, on average, live in places with more homophobic state structures (contradicting hypothesis 3). It is therefore possible that African school systems are actually reinforcing discriminatory cultures within the region. It seems strange that education’s significance varies so much throughout the models, which leads one to believe that the variable’s significance may be masked by other factors. In a separate analysis (not published), I find that the variable becomes especially significant with the addition of the median age variable. Possibly the relationship between institutional homophobia and a country’s average educational level differs depending on the country’s age distribution. It could be that in places with a younger population, the educational system can actually reinforce the country’s homophobic culture to a greater degree.
because of the greater number of people likely enrolled in school. Interestingly, the education variable only becomes significant with the addition of the GDP per capita and religiosity variables. It seems conceivable that education could reinforce homophobia in both more religious settings and economically less developed countries.

As described by previous studies (Asal 2013; Han and O’Mahoney 2014; Ireland 2013; Sanders 2009), the type of former colonizer has a significant impact on contemporary homophobia. Countries formally ruled by the UK show a positive relationship compared to Portuguese, Spanish, German, Belgian, and Italian colonized countries, which supports hypothesis 7. The variable’s beta coefficient is fairly large at 0.343 (in the sixth model), showing that type of colonial influence makes quite a difference in the structure of African states. This falls in line with the model of path-dependence, posed by Inglehart, where culturally historic practices are reflected in states’ unique paths of development (1999). This suggests that, overall, former colonies of the UK have developed more homophobic institutions, compared to countries with other colonial influences, because the British introduced homophobic colonial laws. An interesting conclusion is that British colonies have actually continued more discriminatory systems partially because their former colonizer originally planted the homophobic seed. In contrast, former colonies of the French show no meaningful difference in the level of institutional homophobia compared to countries colonized by other European powers.

It is interesting to notice that median age of a country was also an important negative predictor in the analysis. The relationship suggests that countries with younger populations on average have more homophobic systems. This could imply that younger populations within Africa are pushing for discriminatory institutions. Importantly, Inglehart’s theory depends on younger generations to drive changing societal interests during the course of population turnover (1987). With economic development, generational changes in Western societies have made
social issues increasingly important. However, in countries where the culture indoctrinates homophobic ideals, population turnover may actually reinforce those ideals, and this seems to be reflected in African states’ institutions.

*The Cause of Personal Homophobia*

Table 4 illustrates the regression models developed for the analysis of personal homophobia. Interestingly, the initial results show a marked difference from the analysis of institutional homophobia. With the addition of controls, only the type of colonial rule and the average age of the country show significance. In model 5, religiosity approaches the level significant with a $P > |t|$ score of 0.053, but this relationship doesn’t hold up in the subsequent models. Importantly for this analysis, Inglehart’s theory does not seem to hold weight since GDP and economic development do not have a relationship with personal homophobia. However, upon closer inspection of model 1, there appears to be an outlier country, which has a significant effect on the results (Figure 2). The models seem to be skewed by Gabon whose GDP per capita is one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country has a small population of slightly over 1.5 million (“Population, total” 2014), and derives its wealth primarily from oil exports. As with most oil exporters, Gabon’s substantial petroleum revenue appears to be concentrated in the hands of a select few, which makes its GDP per capita artificially high, especially for the underdeveloped region (see Table A2 for information on the regions GDPs per capita). Overall, the country’s population remains extremely poor and lives in economically difficult conditions. Consistent with Inglehart’s theory the majority of the population seems to have very negative views of homosexuals, but the inflated GDP per capita impedes an investigation into a possible relationship. The country was therefore omitted and the models were reanalyzed (Figure 3).
Table 4: Regression Models for Personal Homophobia (Standard Error in Parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita, PPP (in 000’s of US$)</td>
<td>-0.876** (0.285)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-0.518 (0.377)</td>
<td>-0.456, (0.367)</td>
<td>-0.553 (0.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in Years)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-1.452* (0.606)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.775)</td>
<td>0.750 (0.849)</td>
<td>0.872 (1.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>0.808** (0.234)</td>
<td>0.577 (0.286)</td>
<td>0.321 (0.302)</td>
<td>0.236 (0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Index</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-0.081 (0.290)</td>
<td>-0.051 (0.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age (in Years)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-1.649 (0.842)</td>
<td>-1.919* (0.788)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>4.560 (6.752)</td>
<td>1.467 (6.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>4.579 (4.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>7.572* (3.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Colonizers</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>91.911*** (1.589)</td>
<td>95.407*** (3.039)</td>
<td>11.502 (22.458)</td>
<td>35.551 (28.901)</td>
<td>83.856* (36.511)</td>
<td>93.804* (34.923)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P-Value < 0.05, **P-Value < 0.01, ***P-Value < 0.001

Table 5 depicts this revised analysis with the dropped variable, and the results are surprising. With one less country in the analysis, GDP per capita becomes highly significant in every model (with a large beta coefficient of -0.771 compared to all other variables in the sixth model). The variable shows a negative correlation with personal homophobia, in support of hypothesis 2 (Figure 3), which means that higher GDP per capita African countries tend to have lower levels of discriminatory views within their populations. This falls squarely in line with the post-materialist explanation by supporting the notion that economic development is at the backbone of homophobic views. Dropping Gabon allows GDP per capita to explain far more in the model than it had before. In the previous analysis, GDP per capita explained about a quarter
of the variance in personal homophobia. With the dropped variable, GDP per capita can explain almost two-thirds of the variance. The vast difference in the two analyses is due to the small number of countries included. With an N of only 32 to begin with, the model can be radically changed with the omission of one country. For this reason, an individual-level of analysis of the fifth and sixth wave of the World Values Survey was performed later in this study, to corroborate the results of state-level analysis.

Table 5: Regression Models for Personal Homophobia with the Dropped Variable (Standard Error in Parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita, PPP (in 000’s of US$)</td>
<td>-1.823*** (0.272)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-1.948*** (0.323)</td>
<td>-1.792** (0.471)</td>
<td>-1.803*** (0.415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in years)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-1.674* (0.612)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>0.626 (0.608)</td>
<td>0.843 (0.693)</td>
<td>0.184 (0.807)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>0.820** (0.234)</td>
<td>0.145 (0.238)</td>
<td>0.074 (0.255)</td>
<td>-0.098 (0.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Index</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-0.046 (0.237)</td>
<td>-0.182 (0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age (in Years)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-0.601 (0.744)</td>
<td>-0.699 (0.681)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>3.269 (5.523)</td>
<td>-0.178 (4.977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>8.155* (3.363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>6.952** (2.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Colonizers</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>94.125*** (1.222)</td>
<td>96.062*** (3.008)</td>
<td>10.209 (22.424)</td>
<td>77.870** (23.912)</td>
<td>92.123** (29.123)</td>
<td>117.128** (27.370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P-Value < 0.05, **P-Value < 0.01, ***P-Value < 0.001
Figure 2: Regression of Personal Homophobia vs. GDP Per Capita, PPP

Figure 3: Regression of Personal Homophobia vs. GDP Per Capita, PPP with Dropped Variable
It is interesting that neither education nor religiosity shows a robust relationship in this analysis. In the bivariate regression models, both education and religiosity have a significant relationship to personal homophobia, but these correlations fades in subsequent models. It is interesting to notice the near significance of religiosity in the first analysis of personal homophobia, and its complete absence in the revised one. Moreover, Inglehart’s theory would lead one to believe that religiosity should play a major role in the development of materialist beliefs in underdeveloped societies (1999). Economic development’s overwhelmingly strong relationship raises the possibility that smaller relationships are hiding in the analysis. With the information given thus far, neither hypothesis 4 or 6 can be accepted or denied, but an individual-level investigation of the World Values Survey is provided to corroborate these results.

The difference between the original and subsequent analyses is also intriguing. Originally, median age showed an important negative relationship, which would suggest that countries with younger populations tend to have populations with more negative views of gays. This would seem to reflect the logic put forth by Inglehart whereby the younger generation is driving societal interests in Africa in a more conservative direction and would also support the results found in the analysis of institutional homophobia. In African societies, where homophobic views are the norm, it would be expected that populations composed mainly of a young, impressionable generation would reflect the homophobic norms that they grew up with. The first analysis on personal homophobia seems to support this notion with a significant negative relationship. However, the relationship disappears in the second analysis, which makes the true relationship less clear.

The first analysis also shows a positive relationship between colonies of the French and personal homophobia compared to other colonizers, which would suggest that African countries
with French colonial influence actually have more homophobic views overall. This appears to contradict hypothesis 8, as well as discredit the notion that homophobic views in Africa originated from colonial laws introduced by the British. However, in the updated analysis, former colonies of the British and French have positive correlations with personal homophobia. The coefficients of both variables are surprisingly large with a beta coefficient of 0.511 for the British variable and 0.441 for the French variable coefficient (in the sixth model). In view of this, influence from both colonizers may have had a lasting impact on the development of homophobic views to the present day.

**Individual-Level Results**

*Individual-Level Methods*

To corroborate the results of the state-level analysis, and to shed light on the true causal relationship of various factors on personal homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa, an individual-level investigation was done using the fifth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey. The fifth wave of the survey was done during the period of 2005 to 2009 and the sixth wave was conducted from 2010 to 2014. This report used only countries in the two waves of the World Values Surveys from the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The summary statistics for these seven countries and the variables used are available in tables B1 and B2 (see appendix B). The purpose of this additional analysis was to see if relationships posed at the state-level hold up at the individual-level. This aims to avoid the individualistic fallacy, whereby state-level phenomenon are inferred to be the result of aggregated individual actions or interests even when a causal link is not made at the micro-level (Seligson 2002). This is especially important when using Inglehart’s theory, which justifies changes in populations’ interests from material to social on changing lifestyles of individuals. It was recognized in this study that a spurious relationship was
possible when casual relationships between state-level variables and individual homophobic views are assumed to be true without individual-level data. Therefore the World Values Survey data was used to back up the claims made at the state-level.

Personal homophobia was measured using questions from the surveys that ranked the respondent’s view of homosexuality on a 1-10 scale, with 10 denoting homosexuality as always justifiable and 1 as never justifiable. This scale gave a measure of tolerance, which is the inverse of the dependent variables used thus far. To fit the format of the rest of this study, all answers were multiplied by -1 in order to give a measure of homophobia, which serves as the dependent variable.

Several individual-level variables are incorporated from questions in the World Value Survey, which reflect independent variables used in the previous analysis. Income was measured using questions that asked respondents to place their household revenue on a scale from 1-10, with 10 being the highest in society and 1 the lowest. The educational level was quantified using a survey scale from 1-9, with each subsequent point representing a higher educational level attained by the respondent. Religiosity was approximated using questions that asked

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10 Question V253, from the fifth wave, and V239, from the sixth wave, stated, “On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.”

11 Question V238, in the fifth wave, and V248, in the sixth wave, asked, “What is the highest educational level that you have attained?” The nine levels, from lowest to highest on the scale, were no formal education, incomplete primary school, complete primary school, incomplete technical/vocational training, complete technical/vocational training, incomplete secondary school (university preparatory), complete secondary school (university preparatory), some university level education (without degree), and finally university level education (with degree).
respondents how important God was in their lives on a scale from 1-10, with 10 being highest and 1 lowest.\textsuperscript{12}

To test Inglehart’s theory of state-level economic development GDP per capita, PPP was utilized. Each respondent was assigned a GDP per capita value corresponding to the year his or her country was surveyed. All GDP per capita values were taken from the World Bank. This study clustered the data around country type in order to standardize individual responses by the country that they originated from. Since only seven countries were represented in the surveys, not many state-level variables could be included. For this reason, neither polity score nor ethnic fractionalization were utilized in the study. In addition, all but two of the countries in the surveys were former British colonies, and none were French, so dummy variables for former colonizer were not included.

Age\textsuperscript{13} and gender\textsuperscript{14} of the respondent, along with religious denomination, were used as controls, which mirrors similar individual-level studies (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Henshaw 2014; Stulhofer and Rimac 2009). Dummy variables for religious denomination were created to see if one type of religious group mattered more than another.\textsuperscript{15} Separate dummy variables were created for Protestants, Roman Catholics, Orthodox, Muslims, and other religions (as a baseline). These denominations were selected because they represent the largest religious groups in the Sub-Saharan region (Cooperman et. al. 2010; Hackett et. al. 2012, 2011).

\textsuperscript{12} Questions V192, in the fifth wave, and V154, in the sixth wave, asked, “How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means “very important” and 1 means “not at all important.”

\textsuperscript{13} Age, in years, of the respondent was determined using questions V237 and V242, from the fifth and sixth waves respectively, which stated, “This means you are ____ years old.”

\textsuperscript{14} The respondent’s gender was determined using observation by the survey administrator in questions V235, in the fifth wave and 240, in the sixth wave.

\textsuperscript{15} Questions V185, in the fifth wave, and V144, in the sixth wave, asked, “Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one?”
Individual-Level Findings

Table 6 shows the results of the individual-level analysis of the Sub-Saharan countries within the fifth and sixth wave of the World Values survey. Interestingly, the results present nearly an identical picture to the state-level analysis done previously. Even while controlling for the socioeconomic status of individuals, the GDP per capita of the country in which the person resides, has the ability to predict homophobic views. The negative correlation gives evidence that individuals residing in more economically developed countries will have less homophobic views compared to others in similar socioeconomic conditions within less developed countries. In light of this, economic underdevelopment is likely an important driver of the larger homophobic cultural views within African states. This seems to fit into a post-materialistic framework where economic development influences cultural norms, which impinge negative views of homosexuality onto the population.

The analyses also show that income, religiosity, as well as religious denomination seem to have standalone effects on people’s views outside of the states economic development, although their r-squared values seems to imply that these effects are less significant. Income’s negative correlation illustrates that poorer people tend to hold more discriminatory attitudes towards homosexuals. It would appear that while statewide economic development can shift society’s view of homosexuality, socio-economic status can also change the views of individuals within Africa. This matches the results of other studies that have investigated the connection between income and homophobia (Anderson and Fetner 2008).
Table 6: World Value Survey Individual-Level Regressions for Personal Homophobia (Standard Error in Parenthesis)\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita, PPP</td>
<td>-0.213*** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.217*** (0.0125)</td>
<td>-0.209*** (0.015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(000's of US$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.11* (0.041)</td>
<td>-0.128* (0.048)</td>
<td>-0.128* (0.048)</td>
<td>-0.129* (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.244 (0.112)</td>
<td>0.153* (0.056)</td>
<td>0.152* (0.055)</td>
<td>0.142* (0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in Years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.085 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.091 (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.242* (0.073)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.027 (0.080)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.260 (0.127)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.426 (0.254)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.007 (0.003)</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17773</td>
<td>17773</td>
<td>17772</td>
<td>17735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.409* (1.110)</td>
<td>-2.034** (0.377)</td>
<td>-2.125** (0.379)</td>
<td>-2.232** (0.362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P-Value < 0.05, **P-Value < 0.01, ***P-Value < 0.001

An investigation of religiosity was also interesting because the results from the previous analysis of personal homophobia were inconclusive. While the term was on the level of significance in the original models of personal homophobia, the updated analysis no longer showed a role for religiosity. Religiosity’s significance was likely not apparent in the previous analysis because of the dominant role of the GDP per capita variable, or because of the small sample size. Additionally, the important role of religiosity in the institutional homophobia

\textsuperscript{16} A dummy variable controlling for the specific wave of the World Values Survey was included in a final model (not published) but was not significant. This was done to demonstrate that the results are not due to changes in attitudes in the surveys from the fifth to the sixth wave.
models would make it surprising that the variable plays no role in personal homophobia. The individual-level analysis is useful to look at relationships that were not apparent at the state-level. Intriguingly, religiosity shows significance in almost all models with a positive correlation, further demonstrating that there is a relationship between religiosity and homophobic views. It is also interesting that religiosity only becomes significant in the models after the addition of GDP per capita, which might suggest that the relationship between homophobic views and religiosity is different at various levels of economic development. This would make sense under Inglehart’s theory where religious cultural norms change as states go through stages of development (1999).

Another interesting result coming from table 6 is the significance of the Protestant dummy variable compared to the other religions. The relationship to homophobic views is positive, meaning that Protestants tend to be more homophobic compared to other denominations. Several studies have noted that Protestants tend to be more homophobic overall compared to other religious denominations (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Ogland and Verona 2014; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Whitehead 2010). The results from this study seem to support this notion in African states. In contrast, neither Catholic nor Muslim individuals showed any difference in homophobic views compared to other religious denominations.

Several of the variables, including educational level, age, and gender appear to play no significant role. The lack of robust correlation between education and homophobic views supports the state-level analysis of personal homophobia, which seems like sufficient evidence to reject hypothesis 4. The age and gender variables lack of influence in the models was somewhat surprising since previous studies have found them to be important factors to predict homophobic views (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Stulhofer and Rimac 2009). It seems that the previously established relationships with both age and gender in developed countries may not be true in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Discussion

This paper is noteworthy because, to my knowledge, it is the first time the post-materialist argument has specifically been used to explain variations in African homophobia. While past studies have certainly used similar variables to explain why Africa is so homophobic compared to the rest of the world, this study is unique in how it places the results within Inglehart’s framework. Viewing African homophobia in this way could have important implications for how future research both analyzes African homophobia, and how the West chooses to respond to the discrimination of sexual minorities in the region.

Primarily, this paper demonstrates the importance of economics in the development of homophobia in the region. This component may be particularly problematic because the region is so impoverished overall, and under conditions of severe poverty, homophobia may be self-reinforcing. As implied by other authors, it is conceivable that African governments use homophobic policies as a way to obtain political support from a homophobic electorate, which in turn may reaffirm the discriminatory views of the population (Awondo 2012; Biruk 2014; Epprecht 2013; Thoreson 2014). In line with this, previous research has postulated that many governments frame homosexuality as a threat and often set up institutions to reflect this mentality for political gain (Henshaw 2014). This is especially relevant in African countries where materialist attitudes predominate because governments can easily institute homophobic laws and issue state sponsored crackdowns on homosexuals. Both can be used to reassure the public of the government’s ability to effectively govern, and to distract from problems of chronic underdevelopment (Epprecht 2014). For instance in Malawi, when the country went through an economic downturn in 2011, the country’s president, Bingu wa Mutharika, rallied popular support for his own administration by condemning the country’s problems on gays, which stoked persecution of the LGBT community (Biruk 2014). In other instances, anti-gay movements and
legislation, like ones seen in both Uganda and Senegal, have appeared during times of growing dissatisfaction with their governments’ handling of country-wide economic stagnation (Awondo 2012; Thoreson 2014).

The perverse role of religion in this study also suggests large problems for underdeveloped African states because religion remains an integral part of those societies and permeates into the core beliefs of most Africans. Several scholars have addressed how religious cultural ideals, which teach heterosexuality as the only acceptable form of sexual orientation, are an integral part of most African’s upbringings (Johnson 2007; “Making Love a Crime” 2013). It is also of interest that African Protestants seem to show more homophobic views compared to other religious denominations. These results back up studies from other regions in the world (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; O gland and Verona 2014; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Whitehead 2010). This is particularly important for Sub-Saharan Africa were the largest religious group is Protestant (Cooperman et. al. 2010; Hackett et. al. 2012, 2011), and many missionary groups from the West are of a Protestant denomination. Many blame Western missionaries for Africa’s extreme homophobia (Epprecht 2013; Johnson 2007; “Making Love a Crime” 2014). This study provides tentative evidence that Protestant missionary groups within African states are worsening homophobic sentiments compared to other religious denominations.

The structure of homophobia found in the context of this paper raises further questions. For instance, if economic development underlies African homophobia, should the West increase African aid and development projects to curb discrimination against sexual minorities in the region? If religious ideology has been creating a hostile environment for gays, how should the United States view the actions of domestic religious organizations working in the Sub-Saharan region? In addition, what other factors have created widespread homophobia within Africa?
Future research should attempt to address these issues, in order to find the best ways to help the many persecuted individuals living within homophobic states.

Some limitations of this study should also be discussed. The biggest of which comes from doing a study at the state-level of analysis. The possibility of a spurious relationship is always a drawback of a state-level study because the research infers micro-level mechanisms from macro-level data. This could be especially problematic for institutional homophobia, as an individual-level analysis could not be done to back up the state-level data, which was the case for personal homophobia. Therefore, future research should verify the state-level results found in this study. Having said this, the fact that both the analysis of institutional and personal homophobia as well as the individual-level analysis had similar results, suggests that this study’s findings are valid.

Conclusion

This study sought to explain variations in Sub-Saharan homophobia through the lens of Inglehart’s post-materialist theory, which suggests that societal interests change from material to social, and survivalist to individualist, as countries economically develop (1987, 1990, 1997, 1999). The results of this study strongly suggest that economic development, religiosity, and colonialism play important roles in the development of African homophobia. Further, the relationships follow the predictions made by Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism, which suggest that variations in both institutional and personal homophobia can be explained by post-materialism in remarkably similar ways.

This study found that both the economic developmental of a state and a greater individual income appear to counter the effects of homophobia within African nations. Just as increases in standard of living improve individual tolerance of homosexuality at the micro-level, economic
development at the macro-level increases whole population’s tolerance of gays. The religious culture in the region appears to work in conjunction with economic development, and negatively impacts homophobic state structures and views within African states. However, the two types of homophobia seem to diverge in how they were affected by colonial influence and the educational level of society. Institutional homophobia was found to have British influence, which would make sense since the British enacted homophobic laws into all of its colonial landholdings. Unexpectedly, personal homophobia seemed to be greater in both French and British former landholdings. This makes sense in former colonies of the British, where homophobic laws would naturally influence personal views over time, but the same does not hold for former colonies of the French, which largely avoided sodomy laws. It could be that while the French did not put homophobic laws on the books, they enforced discriminatory policies in reality.

Also surprisingly, while education seemed to have a strong positive relationship with institutional homophobia, the variable failed to produce a correlation with personal homophobia. Thus, it would seem that education is not significantly making African individuals more homophobic at the same time that it is bolstering homophobic state structures. This seems improbable since education would be expected to reinforce homophobic state structures through individuals. Possibly homophobia is being taught to individuals in African countries outside of the school systems, which could indicate that simply growing up in certain cultures is sufficient to instill widespread homophobic views in Sub-Saharan populations. Regardless, since the African educational system is either reinforcing the existing homophobic culture or playing no significant effect, it is certainly not acting as a counter-force to homophobia in the region.

With the information provided by this study, a post-materialist explanation for the development of homophobia within Sub-Saharan Africa can be conceived. The findings suggest
that some of the first homophobic practices came from the former colonizers of Africa and have influenced a homophobic culture to the present day in many states. At the same time, homophobia has been allowed to spread across the continent as a result of economic underdevelopment, which has provided an environment for a conservative religious culture to prosper. Therefore, economic development and religion seem to share an intimate relationship in the maturation of African homophobia. It appears that African populations stuck in a survivalist mentality tend to uniformly adopt religiously inspired homophobic norms. At the same time, African governments conform to both the interests of the population and to culture’s religious norms. Interestingly, this study found that even with the underdeveloped Sub-Saharan region, the wealthier a state, the less homophobic the country is overall. It seems that economic development has allowed cultural norms to be secularized in some Sub-Saharan sates, which has helped subdue the homophobic culture somewhat in those places.

If this explanation is correct, there could be important implications for how Western governments respond to African homophobia. Since the phenomenon seems to be driven by a post-materialist framework, one policy recommendation for the West would be to allow improving economic conditions counter homophobia in the region naturally. In the last several years, most African states have been experiencing steady growth, which would be expected to increase societal tolerance of homosexuals over time. As of now, the homophobic actions of African governments have been tied to foreign aid, which has actually increased both anti-Western and ant-homosexual sentiments in many places. In the current economic climate, where African countries continue to show improvements in terms of economic development, Western countries may want to take a step back and allow local gay rights organizations to promote tolerance on their own.
Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank my primary advisor, Dr. Andy Baker, for his continual patience and time. I would not have been able to complete this project without his advice and expertise. I am also very grateful to Dr. Scott Adler for encouraging a discussion about my topic among my peers, which helped mature this thesis. Furthermore, I am very appreciative of the Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program for providing the funding for this research. From the beginning, Dr. Rolf Norgaard helped me develop and bring this project into reality, for which I express the utmost gratitude. Additionally, I want to thank both Dr. Norgaard and Dr. Janet Donavan for participating on my honors committee. Finally, I would like to give my highest praises to Cali Greksa and Cameron Lees for the endless hours they spent proofreading my work.
References


## Appendix A: Summary Statistics

Table A1: Independent Variable Statistics Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Predicted Effect on Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Min</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita, PPP (in 000’s of US$)</td>
<td>GDP per capita divided by the number of people in the population and standardized for purchasing power parity, which is the standardized price within the domestic market. The measure was further divided by 1000 for ease of analysis. Source: The World Bank.</td>
<td>Negatively correlative with both dependent variables.</td>
<td>4.818</td>
<td>6.731</td>
<td>33.72</td>
<td>0.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in years)</td>
<td>The average number of years of schooling a person within the population of country receives. Source: a component of the Human Development Index.</td>
<td>Positively correlative with both dependent variables.</td>
<td>4.609</td>
<td>2.112</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>100 minus the percent of a country’s population who defines their religious following as unaffiliated. Source: the Pew Research Center.</td>
<td>Positively correlative with both dependent variables.</td>
<td>3.902</td>
<td>4.788</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>Quantifies a country’s regime type. A score of 6 to 10 is defined as a democracy, 5 to -5 as an anocracy, and -6 to -10 as an autocracy. Source: Polity IV Project.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2.596</td>
<td>4.972</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Years)</td>
<td>The median age of the entire population of a country. Source: the CIA’s World Factbook.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>19.63</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.704</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>Measures ethnic heterogeneity within a country’s population.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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Table A2: Summary of Dependent and Independent Variable Statistics Grouped by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institutional Homophobia Score</th>
<th>Personal Homophobia Score</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita, PPP (US$)</th>
<th>Education (in years)</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>74.098</td>
<td>7538</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
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<td>1791</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>72.727</td>
<td>15675</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>88.679</td>
<td>1634</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>82.716</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>91.806</td>
<td>2711</td>
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<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>6412</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>90.588</td>
<td>2081</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>97.5</td>
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<td>Comoros</td>
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<td>99.9</td>
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<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>3012</td>
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<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>87.356</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>2998</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>33720</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>99.9</td>
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<td>19260</td>
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</tr>
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<td>95.7</td>
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<td>94.562</td>
<td>2265</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>93.671</td>
<td>878</td>
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<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>91.930</td>
<td>1395</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>780</td>
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<td>97.5</td>
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<td>1641</td>
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<td>97.3</td>
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<td>95.355</td>
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<td>99.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>9685</td>
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<td>94.372</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>91.330</td>
<td>5601</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
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<td>82.941</td>
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<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
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<td>2970</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Seychelles</td>
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<td>24189</td>
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<td>97.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>87.802</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>1927</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>58.971</td>
<td>12504</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>2330</td>
<td>2330</td>
<td>99.5</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>3372</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
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<td>6683</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>93.354</td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>90.217</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>96.592</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>84.982</td>
<td>3181</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>93.765</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B: Individual-Level Data

Table B1: Individual-Level Statistics Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Homophobia</td>
<td>A score from 1-10 denoting how respondents felt about homosexuality. 1 denoted never justifiable and 10 denoted always justifiable. The scores were multiplied by -1 so that the highest scores would denote dislike of homosexuality.</td>
<td>-2.456</td>
<td>2.368</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>18583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita, PPP</td>
<td>GDP per capita divided by the number of people in the population and standardized for price within the domestic market, and further divided by 1000 for ease of analysis. Source: The World Bank.</td>
<td>5.525</td>
<td>4.487</td>
<td>12.507</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td>18898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>A scale of income from 1-10 denoting how a respondent’s household income compared to others in society. 10 denoted the highest income and 1 denoted the lowest.</td>
<td>4.920</td>
<td>2.218</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>The highest level of education attained by the respondent using nine possible groups. 1 point denoted the lowest level of education (no formal education) and 10 denoted the highest (full university education).</td>
<td>4.881</td>
<td>2.203</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>A score from 1-10 denoting how important God was in the respondent’s life. 10 denoted the highest importance and 1 the least.</td>
<td>8.988</td>
<td>1.758</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>The respondent’s age in years.</td>
<td>34.097</td>
<td>13.862</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>The respondent’s gender. (Male=1 and Female=2).</td>
<td>1.501</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>A dummy variable denoting a respondent’s religious denomination. A 1 was assigned to every respondent who said they belonged to a Protestant religious denomination. This included</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
people who identified as being a Protestant, Evangelical, South African Evangelical, and Pentecostal. All other respondent’s were given a 0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Average Personal Homophobia Score</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita, PPP in US$ (Year)</th>
<th>Average Income Score</th>
<th>Average Education Score</th>
<th>Average Religiosity Score</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>A dummy variable denoting a respondent’s religious denomination. A 1 was assigned to every respondent who said identified as a Roman Catholic. All other respondent’s were given a 0.</td>
<td>0.226 0.418 1 0 18844</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>A dummy variable denoting a respondent’s religious denomination. A 1 was assigned to every respondent who said they identified as Orthodox. All other respondent’s were given a 0.</td>
<td>0.068 0.252 1 0 18844</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>A dummy variable denoting a respondent’s religious denomination. A 1 was assigned to every respondent who said they identified as a Muslim. All other respondent’s were given a 0.</td>
<td>0.090 0.287 1 0 18844</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td>A dummy variable denoting a respondent’s religious denomination. A 1 was assigned to every respondent who said they identified anything other than a Protestant, Evangelical, South African Evangelical, Pentecostal, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim. All other respondent’s were given a 0.</td>
<td>0.223 0.416 1 0 18844</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>-1.813</td>
<td>1,626 (2011)</td>
<td>4.859</td>
<td>5.121</td>
<td>9.605</td>
<td>33.772</td>
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</tbody>
</table>