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What Makes Counterinsurgency Strategy Successful? An Examination of Civil Conflicts in Peru, Nepal, and Cambodia

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Abstract: To this day, insurgency is a problem that confounds states all over the world. It presents a myriad of problems for the governments responsible for fighting them and there are no easy answers. Each insurgency is different, but there are general steps that counterinsurgents can take to successfully put these rebellions down without resorting to indiscriminate violence. This is where the literature has fallen short. It does a great job of explaining how and why counterinsurgents have failed, but does not take the next step and prescribe what can be done and how. This study seeks to understand that. In order to do so, the examples of civil conflicts in Peru, Nepal, and Cambodia will be analyzed. Peru emerged from its conflict with the Shining Path victorious. Nepal was forced into a stalemate with the Maoists and the Cambodian government was overthrown by the Khmer Rouge. By comparing these three cases, this study will pull out what made Peru successful in contrast to Nepal and Cambodia. The analysis will find that Peru used selective violence by engaging its civilian populace in its own defense as well as adaptations in its intelligence strategy that emphasized tracking and surveillance rather than interrogation and torture to great success.

Introduction

The problems associated with communism did not disappear with the Cold War's end in the early 1990s and Maoism did not die with Mao in 1976. People continue to be willing to ignite war under the banner of these ideas and governments continue to be unable to stop the insurgent rebellions they create. Nepal is proof of that. It was only in 2006 that Nepal's ten year conflict, responsible for the deaths of 13000 Nepalis and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more, staggered to a close (Marsh, 2007). The Maoists adopted a classical strategy of operating in the rural areas through guerrilla warfare in the hopes of eventually taking the cities and overthrowing the state. It nearly worked in Nepal despite the lessons of Cambodia's civil war going unlearned. Hundreds of thousands died during the Cambodian Civil War and the victory of the Khmer Rouge in 1975 initiated a genocide that would consume the country for the rest of the 1970s. In Peru, close to 70,000 people died during the twelve year battle against the Shining Path (Fielding & Shortland, 2010).

There is no shortage of literature exploring the nature of leftist insurgency and civil conflicts: how and why they start, the factors that allow insurgents to be successful, and even their tactics. Yet, there is little literature that explores insurgencies from the perspective of the governments responsible for fighting them. In essence, the question this paper seeks to answer is what exactly constitutes an effective counterinsurgency strategy? What are the specific tactics that inhibit rebel capacity? What impact do they have and why did they work or not work?

This paper will examine these questions by utilizing a qualitative and comparative case study approach, using the conflicts in the countries of Peru, Nepal, and Cambodia. These states were chosen for a multitude of reasons. First and foremost, they each had to cope with a Communist rebel group with charismatic leadership that posed a direct challenge to the authority

of the state by utilizing similar tactics such as bombings and assassinations (McClintock, 1998).

For instance, these Communist groups were often based in the rural areas of the countries they were fighting in and effectively used guerilla tactics combined with conventional military strength. Second, each of these states had experienced terrible poverty and had geographical features that made it increasingly prohibitive for the government to project its power out into the poorer, rural areas, providing an almost unreachable base of operations for the rebels (Bohara, Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006). Third, each country had, to a degree, authoritarian governments. Though Peru and Nepal were technically democratic, this label would be lost for both of them. Peru had a polity score of +8 (which signifies a democratic regime with 10 being the most democratic and -10 being the most repressive) and with President Alberto Fujimori's in 1990, this score plummeted to -4 (Marshall et al., 2011). Up until 2002 when King Gyanendra dissolved parliament, Nepal had a polity score of +6 (Marshall et al., 2011) After that point, it fell to -6. Through its five year conflict in the early 1970s under the military government of Lon Nol, Cambodia averaged a score of -6 (Marshall et al., 2011).

However, there is a significant difference across these cases that forms the basis of this study: the outcomes of war. Peru was victorious in its struggle against the Shining Path, effectively ending its challenge to the state in 1992. Nepal, after ten years of vicious fighting, battled to a stalemate in 2006 with its Maoist rebels with both sides signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending the war. Cambodia was defeated outright in its struggle against the Khmer Rouge. In April 1975, after five years of fighting, the Khmer Rouge swept into Phnom Penh, the government fell, and the regime of Pol Pot was born. This study seeks to understand why Peru was successful. What did the Peruvian government do that crippled the Shining Path and how did its strategy impact the course of the insurgency? Why was Nepal unable to

vanquish the Maoists yet able to prevent the Maoists from expanding their power and toppling the state? What did Cambodia do wrong to make the government fall so completely to the Khmer Rouge? Could what Peru did have saved Cambodia from defeat and provided victory to Nepal? This study will ultimately answer those questions by demonstrating that Peru's strategy revolved around certain tactics such as civilian self-defense and discriminate government violence as well as increased intelligence capability.

Literature Review

Definitions

Counterinsurgency strategy has perplexed countries large and small. For decades, states have struggled to defeat the insurgencies that challenge them, coping with various strategies to try to guarantee success. Peru, Nepal, and Cambodia each struggled mightily with their Communist rebellions. Each suffered immense casualties fighting and each struggle lasted for years. However, only one state was victorious: Peru. This study seeks to answer why. Why did Peru's tactics create success and does the literature support what Peru did? Why did both Cambodia's and Nepal's strategies fail? Though counterinsurgency theorists have seemed to coalesce around various elements of counterinsurgency strategy, the literature addressing the specific concerns of governments facing homegrown insurgencies is sparse on the whole. This study will fill an important gap. It will provide a comparative framework for directly analyzing the strategies discussed in the literature in a contemporary context and will pull out the specific tactics that make counterinsurgency effective. The literature does not make the direct comparative analysis between specific cases, as this study will, which will help break through the theory and into the practical implications of strategy.

Before delving into the literature, it is important to first establish a few definitions that are critical for understanding the context of this study. A government victory is defined as the "destruction of an insurgent organization or its capacity to challenge the state or the end of conflict without incumbent concessions to the insurgent group" (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). This occurred in the Peruvian case in 1992. Though the Shining Path still exists as a criminal organization today, after 1992, it was completely removed as a threat to the monopoly on power of the regime (McClintock, 1998). A "tie" is defined as a conflict-ending settlement where the government is forced to make concessions to the insurgent group; however, neither group attains it ideal aims (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). This definition fits the Nepalese case. In 2006, the Maoists and the government signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending the war. Though the Maoists got to join the government, many of their demands were unmet and their pursuit of a communist state went unaccomplished. A defeat is defined as the complete capitulation of the government to insurgent forces (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). This applies to the Khmer Rouge victory in the Cambodian Civil War and subsequent overthrow of the royal government in the early 1970s (Wilson & Lyall, 2009).

Competing Scholarly Perspectives – Population Control

Before launching into a thorough analysis of the literature, it is important to note that most of the literature focuses on counterinsurgency strategy for third parties intervening in civil conflicts. This means that the literature is mostly examining strategy for Great Powers like the United States and France when they encounter insurgencies after invasion rather than from the perspective of domestic governments tasked with defeating homegrown rebellions such as Peru,

Nepal, and Cambodia. That being said, the prescriptions of the literature are still useful in examining counterinsurgency strategy.

There seems to be a general consensus on a couple of elements of insurgency and counterinsurgent strategy. First and foremost, classical, communist insurgent strategy generally revolves around the fact that the government possesses greater conventional strength; that is, insurgents avoid meeting government forces on the open battlefield and thus will tend to operate in the rural areas where they can remain hidden and away from the government's power centers (Wilson & Lyall, 2009; Buhaug, Gates, & Lujula, 2009). This type of warfare is considered to be *guerrilla warfare* which is defined as a strategy of armed resistance that "1) uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct battle when possible and 2) seeks to win the allegiance of at least some portion of the noncombatant population" (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). The government seeks to engage the opponent in "peripheral and rugged terrain" while insurgents "hover just below the military horizon, hiding and relying on harassment and surprise" to impose unbearable costs on the state (Kalyvas, 2005). The insurgencies of the three cases utilized these tactics and thus fall under this definition. The Maoist rebellion in Nepal literally got its start from clandestine attacks on government supply depots in the mountainous west which provided the must-needed armament to ignite the insurgency (Marsh, 2007). The Khmer Rouge eliminated the Cambodian air force in one swift sneak attack, blowing it up in January of 1971 (Sat, 1979). Cambodia never recovered. In Peru, the Shining Path utilized political assassinations and bombings to instill terror and strike government forces without actually engaging them (McClintock, 1998).

The literature seems to have a positive consensus around the idea of "population control", that is, counterinsurgency strategy revolves more around engaging and controlling the population

than physically destroying the insurgency. However, it is around this issue that there is a bit of divergence in what exactly this means and why it has failed again and again. The literature tends to speak generally about this issue, saying that the population must be won or that intelligence is crucial to the effort without specifically prescribing how, which is what the study seeks to answer (Galula, 1964).

One theory that explains why governments have been unable to do this is that the mechanization of the modern day armed forces has caused government forces to be unable to control the population the way that 19th century "foraging" militaries could. This approach says that 19th century militaries were more focused on infantry that were better able to collect local information and keep insurgents out of civilian areas. By mechanizing and utilizing tanks, trucks, and planes however, counterinsurgent forces have lost that capability since World War I, which has negated their conventional advantages over weaker insurgents (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). The reliance on mechanized forces has created a tendency for government forces to stay away from the local areas where insurgents generally operate and use their forces from afar to attack. This explains then why insurgents refuse to engage the government on the open battlefield and why governments experience "information starvation" (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). Governments have no idea what is going on in rebel controlled territory since they are leaving their power centers. As a result, the success rate of counterinsurgent campaigns has fallen since World War I.

Since civilian identification and control become impossible, governments rely on a much more dangerous tactic called "draining the sea." Draining the sea is the idea that as a response to guerrilla warfare, governments will engage in mass killing, regardless of regime type, as a means of annihilating the insurgent movement (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Since the

population is the base of support and its allegiances are almost impossible to discern, governments often decide to wipe out large swaths of civilians to both send a message to people who back the insurgents and to cut off rebel support bases. This approach allows the government to bring its full forces to bear and intimidate the civilian populace while physically incapacitating the insurgents, a response made easier by the mechanization phenomenon discussed earlier (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Though this may alienate civilians, governments generally believe that the rewards of violence are higher than the costs. The importance of examining this approach is that 1) this is a particularly brutal approach that has immense consequences and 2) it is an unfortunately prevalent strategy among governments. It wreaks havoc on the civilian populace, destroys basic infrastructure, and perpetuates further conflict by causing mass civilian defection to rebel groups. It is not surprising then that the cases will demonstrate the ineffectiveness of this tactic.

These explanations seem to tie with a useful framework that describes the "trilemma" government forces face. The "trilemma" theory says that government forces face three choices: force protection, distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, and the physical destruction of the insurgents (Zambernardi, 2010). Unfortunately, governments can only choose two of these options while sacrificing the third. For instance, a government can decide to protect its force while physically eliminating the insurgents, but this comes at the risk of killing large numbers of civilians (Zambernardi, 2010). A government can protect its force and population but it then loses the ability to actually eliminate the insurgents. Alternatively, it can decide to protect the civilian population while eliminating the insurgents which puts the state's military forces at risk for higher casualties which hurts domestic support (Zambernardi, 2010). This is the fundamental problem in counterinsurgency: some sacrifice has to be made. Proponents of this

theory go further however and argue that force protection must be sacrificed with the emphasis being placed on the destruction of military capabilities of the insurgents and control of the populace. Sacrificing the lives of the armed forces is necessary and "it is…the political capacity of accepting and tolerating human costs which is key to winning these wars" (Zambernardi, 2010).

The final school of thought that this study will look at and utilize heavily, in part because it seems to address the arguments of the other theories, examines the rational basis behind both insurgent and government violence and follows logically from the "identification" element of strategy described in the trilemma. According to this theory, violence serves two purposes: "the demonstration or signaling function, whereby violence is used to signal capability, induce mobilization and attract international attention, and the terrorist function, whereby violence is used to deter civilians from collaborating with the enemy" (Kalyvas, 2005). Rather than simply a facet of war, violence is a strategic resource used to shape the motivations of the population. This serves as a contrast to the "draining the sea" concept of violence previously mentioned where government brutality is used to simply blast out insurgents hiding amongst the civilian populace. In guerrilla warfare, one side will be discriminate in its use of violence in order to identify friend and foe and mold public opinion.

In Peru, the Shining Path used violence to strike overwhelming fear into both the populace and its opposition and terror was a hallmark of the Maoist strategy in Nepal. So regarding the violence then becomes this: who can control it? Who can wield violence to identify the foe without alienating the populace? The answers to these questions often signal who has the upper hand in the conflict. There is a direct, correlative relationship between violence against civilians and military success. Rebel groups that are losing the military struggle are more likely

to attack the civilian population as a means of raising the cost of conflict on the government (Fielding & Shortland, 2010). As rebel military defeats go up, indiscriminate killing of civilians rises with it making the government more likely to respond with greater force. Thus, a greater cycle of violence is perpetuated and the conflict is escalated ultimately straining the government's war effort further suggesting that the government that is forced into excessive civilian violence is going to lose.

Weaknesses of the Literature and Theory

While the consensus around population control is solid, the literature, for the most part, seems to be missing some of the nuance in its analysis of strategy. The literature seems to generally lack specifics regarding how governments can most effectively prevent insurgent penetration of civilian areas. Instead of explaining how governments can succeed against guerillas, the literature seems most focused on analyzing how they have failed (Galula, 1964). That being said, this study will go beyond looking at just the problem and instead look into how governments can most effectively use their strength.

To start, the idea that it is the shift toward mechanized forces that has caused counterinsurgent strategies to fail is not entirely convincing. While it is absolutely an associated factor, there are a number of confounding factors that make it hard to believe that there is a directly causal relationship. Guerrilla warfare is not a uniform phenomenon because insurgencies can differ on a whole host of issues such as ideology, religion, and ethnicity which can present very different strategic problems. Insurgencies have changed in character since World War II and especially since the 19th century, becoming both longer and deadlier (Lyall & Wilson, 2009). As mentioned before, what seems to matter is why and the extent to which indiscriminate

violence is being used against the insurgents, not how. The mechanization argument might answer the how and it may enable governments to be indiscriminate with force, but it does not address the underlying issues creating that circumstance in the first place. As a result, this study does not find this explanation sufficient for answering why governments are failing to put down insurgencies.

The trilemma theory does present another framework for understanding counterinsurgent strategy and the forces that dictate it. It does a good job of generally describing the conditions government faces; however, it seems to present a false trichotomy. The theory treats the three elements (force protection, physical destruction of the insurgents, and making the distinction between combatants and non-combatants) as equal options where the loss of one element hurts the counterinsurgency strategy as a whole. This does not need to be the case though—that is, a well run strategy that utilizes two of the elements does not necessarily need a third. To treat them as mutually exclusive goals is not necessary and the Peruvian case will ultimately demonstrate that. Once again though, this explanation does not really go past the dilemma description other than saying that destroying insurgents and ensuring local population support are important enough goals that sacrifices the soldiers in the armed forces are necessary. Furthermore, these options are not equal and should not be treated as such. The distinction between combatant and non-combatant is critical but it provides a foundation for preserving the other two factors. A government that knows who is friend and who is enemy can protect its force by selectively engaging it in rebel strongholds and preventing it from being drawn into unnecessarily bloody civilian conflicts. The case studies will demonstrate this idea. Consequently, this makes the acquisition and utilization of reliable intelligence critical to the war effort.

This study is important because it will provide the most direct analysis of successful counterinsurgent strategies. The literature has great analysis of the adverse conditions counterinsurgent forces face in taking on rebellions and consensus on general platitudes on what creates success. While these platitudes provide the "what" of certain tactics, it is crucially missing the "how" and "why." This type of detail is incredibly important and it is the aim of this study to begin to tease this out using similar cases. None of the theories provided by the literature provide the basis for understanding what makes counterinsurgency successful and the tactics they discuss do not lead to victorious outcomes.

To reiterate the main point, the government that fights the best is the one that fights with the most intelligence and deliberation. It does not drain the sea and wipe out whole villages for the sake of eliminating insurgents. Rather, it responsibly engages and cooperates with those villages to provide their own defense.

H1: The use of discriminate violence through the promotion of civilian self-defense is critical to enemy identification and ultimately, military success.

This entails a genuine effort on the government's part to empower civilians to defend themselves as a means of government strategy and the ability to successfully do so to bring conflict to a favorable conclusion. Civilian defense prevents the populace from defecting to the insurgents, protects the armed forces, and allows the government to selectively employ those forces. By arming these groups, keeping them under military oversight, and ensuring strong

communication between the government and the people, the armed forces can prevent arms and civilians from falling into insurgent hands.

Governments must be more responsible and more discerning when it engages its forces and in order to do so successfully, the importance of intelligence comes to the forefront. Without intelligence gathering and analysis, "governments would be unable to implement any measures against terrorists" (Guiora & Page, 2005-2006). Governments traditionally rely on what is called "human intelligence" to acquire information. This generally entails capturing a person believed to be involved with the rebel organization and questioning them to get the prisoner "to provide additional information concerning the involvement and location of others involved in terrorist operation" (Guiora & Page, 2005-2006). Unfortunately, most of these interrogations are driven by torture which is defined as "any act which by severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession" (Guiora & Page, 2005-2006). Though governments may often feel the need to torture because it is easy and instills fear into the population, it is notoriously unreliable. Prisoners will often make false confessions in order to get the torture to stop, rendering most of the information the government obtains useless (Stevenson, 2001). What this seems to indicate is that the successful government will not indiscriminately torture civilians to acquire any information it can without regard to reliability.

H2: A counterinsurgency strategy that does not rely on extrajudicial killing, torture, and forced disappearances is more successful in resolving conflict than one that does.

This means utilizing different tactics such as tracking insurgent operatives to get to rebel leadership as well as constant surveillance in order to anticipate their attacks and understand their overall structure. Coordination between the different parties responsible for both intelligence gathering and the armed forces is critical for the intelligence to be useful in the field. By acquiring information through more reliable and less violent means, the government can not only differentiate friend from foe, but also win populace allegiance and prevent defection to the rebellion. Analyzing the three very similar cases separated by only outcome will make it clear how this idea of discriminate force and innovation in intelligence plays out in actual conflict.

Research Design

Data on the three cases was collected in different ways. I researched the Cambodian Civil War by referencing General Sak Sutsakhan's (Lieutenant General of the Cambodian military, Chief of the General Staff of the Khmer Armed Forces, and the last Chief of the State of the Khmer Republic) report on the war which covers the conflict from before it actually broke (discussing Cambodia's general preparedness) to both government and Communist tactics up through the end of the conflict. His account was buffeted by secondary sources. Similarly, research on Nepal and Peru came from secondary sources. However, original analysis on the three cases will be done through a directly comparative approach that revolves around the adoption of certain tactics. This research will be useful in understanding the general trends that characterized each conflict and it will make clear who was successful at what and how that translated into their respective conflict outcomes.

Data Analysis

Peru

As stated previously, Peru is a prime example of a country that managed to end the insurgent challenge to the authority of the state. The Shining Path emerged as response to terrible economic conditions in the country, especially for the rural peasants. Thus it formed its base of operations in the rural areas of the country and secured the support of the peasantry as well as disaffected teachers and youth (Kent, 1993). It then planned to eventually move in on the cities, cut off their food lines, and ultimately topple the government, establishing a communist state (Kent, 1993). For a long time, they were successful. They were extremely effective in using intimidation to create discord in the areas they were attacking and in control of. The government did not know how to respond. President Belaunde initially marginalized the Sendero threat. As the threat grew in late 1981, the government introduced emergency laws in affected areas and it was not until 1982 that Belanunde started using antiterrorist police to combat the insurgency, refusing to utilize the military (McClintock, 1998) (Fielding & Shortland, 2010). In fact, it was only at that point that Belaunde declared a state of emergency in the provinces of Ayacucho, allowing the armed forces to occupy these provinces, suspend civil rights, and create "civil defense patrols" that gave peasants the capability to attack the insurgents. (McClintock, 1998) (Fumerton, 2002). The police were given wide latitude to torture, arbitrarily arrest people, and murder citizens who were hard to distinguish from rebels. The newly established civil defense patrols, while important later, did not have a large impact initially (Fumerton, 2002). It would not be until they expanded that their effectiveness increased.

The next president, Alan Garcia, adopted a different approach, trying to preserve basic human rights while fighting in and simultaneously investing in the troubled regions. However,

this had the adverse effect of alienating the military and was ultimately ineffectual because Sendero was already firmly entrenched in that area (McClintock, 1998). In essence, it was too little, too late (McClintock, 1998).

Garcia did make a couple of changes however that laid the foundation for the ultimate defeat of the Shining Path and provided concrete turning points in the war. First, he expanded the capacity of the government's intelligence which would lead to Leader Abimael Guzman's capture in September 1992. Second, he promoted the *rondas*, which were the civil defense patrols formed under Belaunde. President Alberto Fujimori then came into power in 1990 with a much heavier hand toward fighting the insurgents, repairing relations with the military, stabilizing the economy by introducing market reforms that brought down hyperinflation and created growth, and then reaping the benefits of Garcia's shift in strategy (McClintock, 1998). Though this had the effect of creating more poverty, it set Peru on the course of economic stabilization. Examining Peru provides a great case to examine the evolution of tactics across a conflict and how the changes in tactics affect rebel capacity.

Nepal

The civil war in Nepal, like its counterpart in Peru, ignited as a response to the failure of economic development. The Maoists were able to mobilize "disadvantaged youth from the remote and rural areas in their fight against the political system" (Do & Iyer, 2007). On February 13, 1996, the Maoists initiated the war in Western Nepal, attacking Nepali police and army barracks (for the purpose of getting weapons) and spreading from there with the ultimate objective of establishing a communist state (Marsh, 2007). As the war proceeded, the Maoists stepped up their clandestine attacks and were able to supply themselves through these raids on

government depots. In November 2001, the Maoists initiated a much larger assault, raiding the headquarters of the Royal Nepal Army and in the city of Ghorahi, they killed 14 soldiers and stole "hundreds of modern weapons, including SLRs (self-loading rifles), SMGs (Sten-machine guns/carbines), LMGs (light machine guns), light pistols, mortar grenades, and several rounds of ammunition" (Marsh, 2007). The government in Kathmandu responded with extremely brutal tactics, arresting and torturing over 1000 people in 1999 alone and in fact, more people were killed by the state between 1998 and 1999 than were killed by the Maoists (Do & Iyer, 2007) (Stevenson, 2001). In 2001, the royal family was assassinated by the Crown Prince Diprendra and a truce was called. It was short lived however. The Maoists broke off the truce in November of that year, a state of emergency was declared, and the army was mobilized. Parliament was dissolved in 2002, another ceasefire was declared and then broken by the Maoists, who cited the government's refusal to "consider their demand for a Constituent Assembly" as the reason for their return to violence (Bohara, Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006) (Do & Iyer, 2007). The Maoists continued to progress toward the urban areas until 2005 when King Gyanendra effectively declared martial law. The other political parties, as well as the Maoists, banded together to protest the king's action and as a result: Gyanendra abdicated in 2006. Consequently, Parliament was reinstated and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, ending the conflict.

Cambodia

Cambodia was, in a sense, doomed from the start. First, Cambodia received disparate types of aid from the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. This created huge logistical problems as the "divergence of materiel affected the training

of combat and technical personnel, maintenance, and especially the supply of spare parts and ammunition" (Sutsakhan, 1980). This training was further hampered when Prince Sihanouk, who led until Lon Nol's military coup in 1970, decided to engage the military in the economic development of the country, having them build roads, schools, hospitals, et cetera. This had the consequence of neglecting the armed forces' general level of preparedness and military training, as well as making the military burn through the aid that it received from the United States and France (Sutsakhan, 1980). In contrast, the Khmer Rouge were very well organized and prepared. They set themselves up in a three-tiered structure creating "popular forces and auto-defense groups at the city and village levels" meant to capture territory, and then a general force that directly reported to military command (Sutsakhan, 1980). The Communists had forces at every level. By setting themselves up at the village level even before the conflict's start in 1970, they were already prepared to prevent government co-optation of the civilian populace. Further, the Khmer Rouge spread anti-government propaganda, cut economic supply lines, and did everything it could to create chaos in the villages so as to completely undermine government support. Thus, when the conflict broke out, the Communists were easily able to take the frontier provinces along the border with Vietnam and Laos and hold on to them as the conflict progressed (Sutsakhan, 1980).

As a response, Cambodian leader Lon Nol called for the expansion of the FANK (Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres) throughout the entire nation, setting up recruiting and training centers in the provinces to accelerate the rate of new recruitment and to hone combat skills. This proved initially successful in increasing FANK's preparedness, but the Communists still routinely the new units because they had vastly superior weaponry. In essence, Lon Nol tried to

turn the FANK into some grand institution like the US army in a rapid period of time without the prerequisite development that such institutions have to undergo (Sutsakhan, 1980).

Cambodia's model of counterinsurgency was a top-down method that failed to properly incorporate the civilian population into the overall strategy. The fighting force was ill-equipped, ill-trained, and had fleeting allegiance to the government, especially as the communists gained ground. As the war progressed, the FANK continued to be wracked by corruption (military officials claiming phantom personnel in their units to make them seem bigger than they were) and ineffectual tactics. By late 1972, FANK was basically trying to defend Phnom Penh and the area around it. People were fleeing the rural areas making the humanitarian situation in Phnom Penh progressively worse. The armed forces, beset by the myriad problems discussed before, disintegrated in the face of the ruthlessly efficient Khmer Rouge. The city was ultimately overrun in April 1975 and the Khmer Republic fell.

Results

Hypothesis 1: Indiscriminate Violence and Citizen Patrols

As previously discussed, Hypothesis 1 outlined two critical elements of counterinsurgency strategy: discriminate use of government violence and empowerment of the civilian population to defend itself. These two strategies indicate that the government is not only in control of the military situation (a reversion to indiscriminate violence against civilians generally means that the government is beginning to get desperate), but that it also has a strong relationship with the people that encourages their participation in defense and prevents their defection to the insurgents. On both of these measures, Peru scores better than both Nepal and Cambodia.

Peru

Peru's engagement of its peasant population in its own defense was crucial to the country's winning strategy. The Peruvian case is demonstrative of the idea that a government does not necessarily need to face the "trilemma" nor does it need to resort to indiscriminate violence to achieve strategic objectives. Peru was eventually able to facilitate the self-defense of the population against the Shining Path through the formation of the rondas. Rondas were peasant defense patrols that were armed by the military but were tasked with defending themselves against the incursions of the Shining Path (McClintock, 1998). This tactic served all three elements prescribed by the trilemma: it ensured civilian support by allowing the peasants to defend themselves, protected the government's forces from the actual fighting, and physically eliminated insurgents. The rondas came into existence in southern Peru in the province of Huaychao on January 21, 1983 when seven Senderistas were killed by villagers as a response to Sendero abuses in the area (Mitchell & Hancock, 2007). This response was met with national praise by the country and the government began integrating what came to be called "rondas campesinas" into the overall counterinsurgency strategy. This approach was officially formalized in late 1983 as these rondas were incorporated into the first "civilian defense committees" and the Peruvian military began to give them arms and provide oversight to ensure that the arms did not fall into the wrong hands McClintock, 1998). These committees were formed by the Marine infantry and through government support, their numbers swelled to 700 rondas in 1989 to more than 2,500 just eight years later (Mitchell & Hancock, 2007). This drastic increase in the number of rondas had a twofold effect: it reduced the burden on the military to defend these areas and the peasants were extremely vociferous defenders of their homes. The government was successfully

able to turn peasant anger against Sendero into a productive way of fighting the rebels while still reducing the terrible burden on the armed forces.

Nepal

In contrast, Nepal's use of violence was indiscriminate and was responsible for more casualties in the war than the Maoists were. Throughout the course of the conflict, there was a general level of high hostility between the government and the civilian population. The government's treatment of the civilians was generally abhorrent and for many, there was very little incentive for people to lay down their lives, especially in Maoist controlled areas, to fight for the government. This was especially true after 2001. In that year, there were only 643 civilian casualties (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006). However, in December of that year, the royal family was abruptly killed Crown Prince Diprenda and King Gyanendra took the throne. He took a much harder stance against the Maoists as well as the civilian population, dissolving Parliament and declaring a state of emergency. Basic constitutional rights were suspended and martial law was enacted. In 2002, 4,647 people were killed in fighting, a total that represents 1/3 of the war's total casualties (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006). Thus, when Nepal tried to emulate Peruvian strategy by creating "civil defense" units by distributing arms to the civilian population, it is unsurprising then that the strategy failed (Marsh, 2007). Further, there was no coordination between government forces and the civil defense patrols in was trying to facilitate throughout the country in part because the government could not access much of the areas outside of Kathmandu and the other cities. As a result, the government could not ensure that the weapons it was distributing would not fall into the wrong hands and that the civilian defense units would stay loyal to the government, an issue that became very potent over the course of the war.

In short, the government's strategy was flawed from the start from the time that the Maoists first struck in 1996. When the war started, the police were the only line of defense and the military was only really mobilized when King Gyanendra took control in late 2001. The military's strategy though was not focused on controlling the civilian population. It was almost solely focused on eliminating Maoist insurgents, no matter the cost. It is unsurprising then that casualties were so high in 2002 after Gyanendra moved to a much more brutal strategy. The Maoists were allowed to operate without much resistance from the civilian populace because the military did not support them in the way that Peru did.

Cambodia

As previously mentioned, Cambodia sent out a call to the rest of the country to get volunteers for the military. While the ranks of the military did swell, the army simply did not have the ability to absorb all of these new recruits. They were given outdated American, British, and French weapons from the 1950s and the training period for new recruits was cut by 50% to "accelerate the creation of new units" (Sutsakhan, 1980). Even though the enthusiasm for joining the army was there, by late 1970, the Khmer Rouge had already taken northeast Cambodia, which effectively cut those newly created units off from the rest of the country. The FANK then tried to empower the villagers to defend themselves in much the same way as Peru and Nepal. However, the government again gave them extremely outdated arms that no longer had ammunition in production. It is no surprise then that the combination of little training time and extremely obsolete weaponry led the village defense forces and the FANK to absolute defeat (Sutsakhan, 1980). However, as the war progressed, civilian enthusiasm for the government war effort dissipated. In connection with the Vietnam War, Lon Nol had supported American efforts

to bomb Communist forces and bases in Cambodia (Kiernan, 1996). The bombs were responsible for the deaths of thousands of Cambodians in part because Lon Nol was not completely honest with the Americans. What the Americans were told were "training camps" were "in fact merely political indoctrination sessions held in village halls and pagodas" (Kiernan, 1996). As a result, civilians flocked to the Communists to flee the bombings. The Khmer Rouge were very effectively able to channel civilian fear of American bombings and turn them against the government. As the communists gained ground, civilians fled for Phnom Penh, the final refuge for the government for much of the last half of the conflict. By April 1975, approximately six million Cambodians out of a total population of seven million (including almost three million in Phnom Penh) lived under government control even though the Khmer Rouge had conquered most of the country (Sat, 1980).

Figure 1: Summary of Hypothesis 1

	IV: Military oversight of arms distribution to civilian groups	IV: Up-to-date arms technology	IV: Military oversight of civilian defense activities	IV: Discriminate use of government violence	DV: Success?
Peru	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Victory
Nepal	No	Yes	No	No	Stalemate
Cambodia	No	No	No	No	Defeat

Alternate Hypotheses

The alternate hypothesis for Hypothesis 1 would predict that by engaging in indiscriminate violence without regards to the civilian population, governments can force

insurgents out into the open where their conventional military strength would provide victory. The findings for Nepal and Cambodia seem to utterly refute that conclusion. They engaged in that type of violence and not only did it fail to smoke out insurgents, it also caused mass civilian defection. This underscores the importance of executing this strategy carefully. Peru engaged their population by not only providing them with modern arms, but also with guidance and oversight. At all times there was both communication and coordination between the military and the rondas which allowed them to jointly execute strategy. In contrast, Nepal tried to just distribute arms and hope for the best. Unfortunately for them, most of these arms ended up in Maoist control. They only had success in areas where the Maoists were civilians grew weary of Maoist abuse. The government was never truly able to capitalize on this resentment however, in part, because the anger it inspired was just as strong. This was the case as well in Cambodia. Both resorted to indiscriminate violence with the Cambodians going so far as to lie to the Americans in order for them to bomb a wider area (Kiernan, 1996). Rather than cower in fear of the government, they ran into the arms of the communists, bolstering their ranks and depressing government morale. These cases clearly demonstrate that indiscriminate violence is not a viable strategy for military success against an insurgent, guerilla group.

Hypothesis 2: Intelligence Strategy

Combined with their adjusted intelligence tactics, Peru did not necessarily have to concern itself with sacrificing one of the elements of the trilemma to carry out the other two. It also did not have to engage in the type of violence characterized by the Nepalese and Cambodian cases. To be sure, Peru engaged in torture and forced disappearances through the course of the war. Even today, President Alberto Fujimori sits in prison for his crimes against humanity.

However, the argument here is that Peru's intelligence strategy was not only different from both Nepal and Cambodia's, but it also proved to be a critical factor in bringing down the Shining Path.

Peru

The Peruvian government moved from traditional torture-based interrogation to unconventional tracking of Shining Path leadership, which proved to be a critical change in tactics. Peruvian intelligence traditionally captured Senderistas and interrogated them to get the whereabouts of the leadership, but this ultimately led nowhere as confessions provided under torture are notoriously unreliable (Stevenson, 2001). The turning came when the Special Intelligence Group (GEIN) was created in March 1990. They chose to work with a variety of methods and the main point to be made here is that GEIN was adaptable and repeatedly experimented with varying tactics to great success. For example, rather than trying to glean information through interrogation, GEIN would track members of Sendero both by analyzing evidence left at the scene of attacks and through relatives (McClintock, 1998). Once the SIG identified a Sendero operative, he would be placed under constant surveillance. By observing the operative at all times and especially during Sendero activities, the SIG was able to discern the organization's structure as well as anticipate further attacks. The SIG would then evaluate the mission, making "constructive criticism" that would lead to improvements, thus Peru's intelligence capabilities were constantly getting better over the course of the conflict. (Oliva, 2005).

All of these steps were taken to acheive the eventual goal of taking down the Shining Path leadership and their results almost immediately began to look promising (McClintock,

1998). In September, GEIN disrupted Sendero's "propaganda apparatus and the next year, in January 1991, they declared the capture of electronic files and videos showing Guzman dancing with his deputies. The police could prove that Guzman was alive" (Oliva, 2005). At the same time, the intelligence bureaucracy was decentralized, allowing for better communication between officials at the regional level and headquarters in Lima (Oliva, 2005). As a result of its adjustment, the government was able to capture Guzman in September 1992. After this point, the Shining Path's threat to the authority of the state disintegrated (McClintock, 1998).

Nepal

Nepal's intelligence capabilities were nowhere near that of Peru's and their strategy suffered greatly as a result. The agencies responsible for intelligence gathering (the police, the National Investigation Department, the Royal Nepal Army) "were quite unprepared for the demands of the internal war and generally deficient in both information gathering and intelligence production/dissemination" (Marks, 2003). As a result, the government mostly turned to traditional interrogation using torture. The government arrested and tortured over 1000 people in 1999 alone and in fact, more people were killed by the state between 1998 and 1999 than were killed by the Maoists (Do & Iyer, 2007) (Stevenson, 2001). In fact, it is estimated that over the course of the conflict, more than 70% of Nepal's prisoners reported being tortured for information and half reported giving out false confessions as a result of that torture (Stevenson, 2001). Thus, the information the government was receiving was not reliable and agencies did not coordinate with each other which made the limited intelligence they were acquiring useless. This ultimately hampered the government's ability to coordinate the armed forces in the field. There was no cohesion in the government's strategy at any point in the war.

Cambodia

It is no exaggeration to say that the Khmer Rouge had a distinct intelligence advantage at almost every single stage of the conflict, in part, because of their own cohesion and the complete breakdown of communication within the Cambodian government. From the start, the Khmer Rouge was better organized and was able to translate its gains from intelligence into strategic victories against the forces of the Khmer Republic. On the night of January 21, 1971, 100 Communist commandos infiltrated and attacked the air force base at the Pochentong airfield, west of the capital Phnom Penh (Sutsakhan, 1980). Nearly every single aircraft at the base was destroyed and the Khmer Rouge used the chaos to attack several other villages around Pochentong, which forced the government to withdraw from its main offensive, Operation CHENLA. It was a brilliant tactical maneuver that caught the government completely off-guard, distracted it from its main strategic objectives, and inflicted an enormous cost on the government's capability by eliminating its air advantage. Had the government a better intelligence capacity, it likely would have anticipated that an attack of that magnitude would take place and it could have prepared. This is an unfortunate theme that would be repeated throughout the course of the war. The government could not get its act together to coordinate strategy and because it did not, time and time again it would be caught off-guard by Communist counter-attacks.

Figure 2: Summary of Hypothesis 2

	IV: Coordination of intelligence sharing and analysis among intelligence agencies	IV: Reliance on torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings to acquire information	IV: Use of advanced techniques such as tracking and constant surveillance	IV: Use of intelligence to disrupt rebel leadership	DV: Success
Peru	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Victory
Nepal	No	Yes	No	No	Failure*
Cambodia	No	Yes	No	No	Defeat

In the case of Cambodia, defeat is meant to connote that their intelligence failures lead to the circumstance that the created the government's overthrow. For Nepal, failure connotes the inability to successfully use intelligence to create favorable strategic outcomes leading to stalemate. These failures did not lead to their defeat as they did in the Cambodian case.

Alternate Hypotheses

The alternate hypothesis for Hypotheses 2 would predict that traditional torture and interrogation will extract from prisoners the crucial information needed to anticipate rebel activities as well as take down the insurgent leadership. In the case of Hypothesis 2, the results here seem unequivocal rejecting that alternate hypothesis. Intelligence is critical to a successful war effort, but traditional torture and interrogation are not effective means of acquiring the information necessary to take down rebel organizations. For ten years, Peru found that to be the case and it was only when they changed their tactics to tracking and surveillance that they finally found success. As a result of their efforts, they were able to take out Guzman and decimate the capability of the Shining Path. In contrast, Cambodia had almost no intelligence capability and this simply decimated them throughout the war. They were constantly outwitted by the Khmer Rouge and as a result, they were completely outgunned. Nepal's effort was similarly ineffective as torture released very little helpful information and the information they did get was made

useless by breakdowns in communication and coordination. As a result, the government was never close to taking out the Maoists' charismatic leader Prachanda, a failure that may have cost them victory. It seems clear then that under close analysis of the three cases, the alternate hypotheses do not hold up.

Conclusions

On almost every measure of the two hypotheses, Peru came out better than both Nepal and Cambodia, seemingly reinforcing their conclusions. Though Peru's strategy was certainly not flawless, they fulfilled all of the critical success factors necessary to pull out a victory. They successfully supported the creation of civilian defense patrols by arming them and providing them with crucial guidance and oversight. Government arms that were provided to the civilian populace generally did not find themselves in the hands of the Shining Path. Communication between both the rondas and the military and the government and the military was strong. They each knew what the other was doing which helped make Peruvian strategy more coherent and effective. This was reinforced by their potent intelligence capabilities discussed in Hypothesis 2. Peru's intelligence capabilities reached a turning point in 1990 with the formation of the Special Intelligence Group. By adapting their intelligence strategy and transitioning it to one based on careful tracking and surveillance, Peru was successfully able to track Shining Path leader Guzman on September 12, 1992 in an apartment in Lima. After this point, the Shining Path was never the same and the war effectively reached its close. Peru conclusively supports the strategies laid out by Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Nepal and Cambodia failed on nearly every front. The only substantive way they differed was on the arms distribution measure. In attempting to facilitate the civilian defense patrols,

Nepal distributed arms without much oversight which provided the Maoists with easy firepower, though it did help support civilian defense to a small degree. Cambodia's strategy on the other hand, was completely flawed. It tried to incorporate the civilian population into the army, but only gave them extremely outdated weapons with very little training, making the whole program essentially useless as they were easily routed by the communists. Both cases were characterized by a complete breakdown of coordination between those responsible for creating strategy and those responsible for implementing it.

Counterinsurgency is incredibly complex. Each civil conflict is unique as are the immense challenges they present. While there are no easy solutions, there are general indicators that mark a successful strategy for the governments tasked with implementing them. It is a strategy that relies on the smart prosecution of a war effort that wisely engages the entire population to rise in defense of the country and uses intelligence to support military capability.

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