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Sixty Years Later: The Special Relationship Between Germany and Israel

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Sixty Years Later: The Special Relationship Between Germany and Israel

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This thesis examines the continuation of the special relationship between Germany and Israel in the 21st century. The relationship has existed for nearly 60 years yet current politicians played no role in the crimes of Nazi Germany and it seems logical that they would not share the same motivating factors as earlier generations. In order to determine the future of the relationship, the paper begins by defining a special relationship within the field of international affairs. This focuses on motivations including shared interests, common values and ideals, historical intimacy or intensity as well as the influence of "soft" and "hard" factors on a relationship. Qualitative historical accounts are first used to provide background on the creation and growth of the Israeli-German special relationship. Having established that the relationship does in fact exist, comparative case studies are examined to highlight factors that could potentially change or end the special relationship. This includes data on rising levels of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism across Germany and Europe, increasing differences between Germany and Israel on the appropriate use of force, and German politicians' understanding of the special relationship within German identity and foreign policy. Having examined these influential factors, the power of "soft" factors in the continuation of the relationship is clear. German officials in the past have sacrificed strategic interests in favor of the alliance and have maintained the relationship with Israel as a vital piece of Germany's identity and policy with no signs of alterations in the near future. The German public however, demonstrates increasing displeasure with continued associations to the nation's Nazi past. More importantly, public opinion shows that Israel is increasingly viewed as committing crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in the Occupied Territories, which has led to a decrease in support from the German people. Even with increasing German displeasure over Israeli use of force, the strength of the "soft" power of the Holocaust will allow the special relationship to continue into the 21st century.

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Introduction

The history of relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany has been analyzed ever since the two states came into existence in the aftermath of the Second World War. The attraction to the material is due to the intertwined history of both nations that is often still defined by the events that took place over 60 years ago. German attempts to eliminate the Jewish people, the subsequent fall of Nazi Germany and the establishment of the Jewish state in Israel are inescapable in defining the two nations' relations. In the years following the end of the war and Israel's establishment, relations between the states were defined by silence, with Germany paralyzed by guilt and "psychological denial."¹ Mutual acknowledgement came only with the 1952 Luxembourg Reparations Agreement that signaled the beginning of an Israeli-German relationship and a mutual understanding that has lasted into the 21st century.

This thesis will examine the uniqueness of relations between Germany and Israel while attempting to assess whether the relationship will continue through the 21st century. This will begin with the cautious approaches made by both sides in the aftermath of WWII to establish ties and move beyond the horrors of the Holocaust. The two nations have collaborated extensively on subjects ranging from science and technology to youth exchanges, which have contributed to the uniqueness and strength of the relationship. Having established that a special relationship does exist between the two, the paper will proceed to examine whether or not this special relationship will continue to shape relations between the two states in the future. The relationship deserves re-examination as

¹ Lily Gardner Feldman, *Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 1984), 34.

Germany attempts to move beyond its moral obligation from the legacy of the Nazi era in order to embrace its 21st century identity. German unification since the collapse of the Soviet Union has created new circumstances within which Germany has begun to cautiously embrace its long dormant nationalism while reexamining the nation's postwar policy of "never again war." In addition, public opinion regarding Jews and Israel has also begun to be dramatically altered. Israel is increasingly maligned throughout Europe. While Germany has not yet experienced incidents of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism as dramatic as those of its neighboring European states, the growing trend appears to signal an end to the German public's traditional support of Israel.

The first step in determining whether Israel and Germany will continue to have a unique relationship within the field of international affairs will be to establish a functional definition of a "special relationship." In order to fully understand what features are required, the literature review will begin with an examination of other examples of "special relationships" throughout international affairs. Such relations will include those between Germany and the United States as well as the United States' relationship with the United Kingdom.

Once a clear definition of a "special relationship" has been established, chapter two will proceed to examine the beginnings of the Israeli-German relationship. Originally defined by mutual silence, it took nearly a decade for the two states to begin acknowledgement. Examined will be the Reparations Agreement that finally brought the two states together for the first time, coupled with the opinions of the governments and peoples of both nations at this development.

The third chapter will examine moments that have tested the strength of the relationship. The majority of these derive from Germany's attempts to balance relations with both Israel and the Arab world under the pressures of the Cold War. The painful legacy of the Holocaust came to the forefront with the discovery of German scientists working to develop Egyptian weapons, causing disbelief and anger in Israel. The capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel caused Germany to fear increased attention to the Nazi records of leading politicians, but in Israel the trial's testimonies taught a new generation of Israelis the specific crimes of the Holocaust. These events pressured the relationship by emphasizing the negative history between both peoples; despite these challenges, the special relationship persisted.

After examining the relationship's ability to withstand diplomatic challenges, chapter four will focus on the different interactions and cooperation between Israel and Germany that have bolstered the relationship's classification as "special." This will include an examination of scientific cooperation harkening back to the era before the Nazi regime in which Jews and Germans were leaders together in the scientific field. Along with this analysis will be an examination of youth exchanges that exist between the two nations. Originally sponsored by the German government, the exchanges allow German and Israeli students to directly address the Holocaust and its effects on national identity in both cultures.

With the background of German-Israeli interactions and policy thoroughly established, the paper will proceed to examine factors that could potentially bring about an end to the special relationship in assessing whether or not it will continue in the 21st century. Over 60 years have passed since the end of the Second World War, and today's

future leaders are now three generations removed from the grief, shame, and loss that haunted both nations after the war. It would seem logical that modern leaders would not share the same priorities as their predecessors, having been raised in completely different societies and circumstances.

The fifth chapter of this work will examine the consequences of the Second World War on the national identities of both Germany and Israel. For Germany, the violence and devastation of the war brought about an era of civilian power with military violence and strength becoming taboo subjects. Following unification however, German nationalism has begun to re-emerge. In addition, the nation has begun to re-assess its pledge of ‘never again’ war when faced with the continuation of ethnic cleansing and genocide worldwide. For Israelis, the lessons of the Second World War and the Holocaust had nearly the opposite effect. In their determination to never suffer the prejudice and violence faced by their elders, Israeli culture became centered around the military and the use of preemptive force to protect its citizens.

Another important factor in determining the future of the relationship is the two nations’ growing acceptance of one another especially in Jewish and Israeli opinions’ of Germany and more specifically, Berlin. Israelis are unwilling to forget the crimes of Germany but seem increasingly willing to accept Germany as they would any other nation. This acceptance includes Berlin as a top Israeli tourist destination along with an increasingly large permanent Israeli population within the city. Germany as a whole has experienced a revival of Jewish culture with the immigration of thousands of Soviet Jews after the fall of the Soviet Union. For these immigrant groups, the Holocaust does not serve as the community’s main association with Nazi Germany.

While the situation between Germans, Jews and Israelis has certainly changed in 60 years, the German government's policy toward Israel remains nearly unchanged from chancellor to chancellor. Chapter six will highlight the rhetoric and policy of the German government toward Israel and the Holocaust's role within German national identity. Looking specifically at the Schröder and Merkel governments, there have been some differences in the presentation of German suffering during the war, but despite this small discrepancy, support of Israel has remained widespread in Germany's ruling parties.

The final factors to be examined in assessing the future of the relationship are the rising levels of anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiments in Germany and across Europe in general. Israel is increasingly associated with the Nazi regime itself and faces growing criticism in Germany and greater Europe. In addition to rising anti-Zionist sentiments, anti-Semitism continues to influence European opinion of both Jews and Israel. Often times, anti-Semitic attacks and incidents have been directly related to displeasure of Israeli policy and the ongoing Middle East conflict. Increased displeasure of Israel and Jews as well as fatigue with the idea of German indebtedness for Holocaust crimes by the German public could dramatically shape and alter the motivations of German politicians.

Having examined these factors, the thesis should reach a conclusion as to whether or not the special relationship between Israel and Germany will continue through the 21st century. In order to evaluate this question, research was conducted to create a comparative study across various fields all relating to the future of the special relationship. The examination of scientific cooperation as well as youth exchanges are highlighted to meet the requirements of a special relationship as defined in the literature review. Existing research has analyzed anti-Semitism, the European policies toward the

Middle East conflict and Germany's re-emerging nationalism, but little in the past decade has been dedicated to examining these trends as they relate to the relationship between Israel and Germany. Much maligned in the European media, Israel today faces unprecedented criticism across the continent. With Germany as Israel's strongest ally in Europe, it must be questioned if a new generation of German voters will end the policies of their grandfathers moving instead to condemn Israel as their grandparents' heir. If German public opinion of Israel is found to be moving in such a negative direction, one cannot help but wonder if the German government would defy the mandate of their people and continue the special relationship even as it directly counters the people's desires.

Methodology

The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether or not the special relationship between Israel and Germany will continue through the 21st century. For sixty years, the relationship between the two has been defined by the events of WWII and its legacy. Yet, in sixty years, two generations have come of age having not lived during the war but experienced its ramifications decades on. This raises the question of how long foreign policy and national identity can be built on the experiences and actions of a generation that will soon no longer live to bear it. It would seem logical that modern leaders do not share the same priorities as their predecessors, having been raised in completely different societies. This leads one to expect that the third generation would no longer share the same political alliances and priorities that shaped the majority of past policies. However, in the case of Germany and Israel, even as those who participated in and lived through the war are decreasing in number day after day, foreign policy still appears to be

determined by the events of the past. This thesis will attempt to uncover both political and public factors that could potentially change the nature of the relationship. As Germany has experienced more change that could alter the alliance, the majority of the factors examined are from Germany.

In order to thoroughly examine the history and future of the relationship, comparative case studies have been used spanning various fields. These studies include both “hard” and “soft” factors that are influential in defining the relationship. The historical review of the relationship in Chapter Two utilizes “hard” and “soft” factors that led to the establishment of the relationship. In Chapter Three, “hard” factors are responsible for Germany’s struggles to balance international diplomacy with the “soft” factors tying the nation to Israel. Chapters Two and Three both utilize qualitative, historical accounts to illustrate the early struggles in the creation of the relationship that helped to define it as special. The case studies used in Chapter Four focus for the most part on “soft” factors based on the shared values, memories and ideals between the Israeli and German people. While the Israeli-German relationship has a long history of “hard” factors, including military cooperation and economic support, the use of “soft” factors allows for more insight into the interactions and opinions of the public rather than solely relying on the rhetoric and policy of governments. The later chapters of the thesis examine the continuing influence of “soft” factors on evolving “hard” factors that have the potential to influence the nature of the relationship. Analyzing the relationship using a wide spectrum of qualitative sources allows for the work to not cover only one specific area within the relationship but instead draw from fields including history, diplomacy, military policy, and sociology. This allows the research to view and analyze the

relationship from a variety of perspectives, all which have the potential to alter the status quo.

Sources covering both the Israeli and German perspectives have been used in an attempt to eliminate bias in favor of one country over the other. A large body of work already exists detailing the origins and beginning of the relationship. These secondary sources provide the basis of the paper. In examining factors that could alter the relationship, recent surveys and polls were examined in order to gain a better understanding of general opinion from both populations. Despite best efforts to examine the relationship and these factors from a wide perspective, there are expected limitations. Of these, the most influential is of course the language barrier. Official, primary documents from both Israel and Germany were therefore unobtainable. This also proved to be a challenge however, in examining secondary sources as much of the research done on the relationship has been conducted by German and Israeli scholars writing in their native tongues and therefore unusable when researching English-only documents. The University of Colorado also has limited or non-existent access to a variety of Israeli journals and books. With these limitations, it was not possible to acquire texts by scholars including Moshe Zimmermann that would have proved beneficial for the assessment.

Literature Review

Chapter One: Defining “Special”

Relations between states are never completely equal; some alliances are stronger than typically expected and some rivalries are fiercer than others. Favors shift from one nation to another as political atmospheres change. Yet special relationships seem to represent a more solid and reliable alliance between states lasting even as political tides shift. The special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States has been defined by one weakening state’s attempts to influence the policy of a growing power. Britain, with its own post-WWII global influence waning, realized that remaining close to, yet independent of, the United States would be the most effective way to serve British global interests. By using experience and knowledge, Britain was able, through its close relations with the United States, to guide American policymakers in favor of British interests.² This relationship was further cultivated through the “enduring power and use of the symbols, memories and experiences associated with World War II [which were] initially direct and often personal.”³ Many similarities in the German-Israeli case may be observed, especially in the use of symbols and memory in a personal context.

After examining the relationship between Germany and the United States, Hanz W. Gatzke noted three conditions required in order to create a special relationship between nations. The first seems the most apparent; the nations must share common interests, both political and economic. Secondly, nations must share a similar identity

² John Baylis and Steve Marsh, "The Anglo-American "Special Relationship": The Lazarus of International Relations," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 17 (2006): 174.

³ *Ibid.*, 185.

regarding “basic aims, ideals, and values.”⁴ Lastly, between the two people, there must be “personal acquaintance and empathy” that is “firmly rooted in the past.”⁵ Like German-Israeli relations, the relationship between the United States and Germany reached an absolute low by 1945 at the end of the war. Yet, despite the crimes of Germany and America’s role in bringing down the Third Reich, common interests due to the rise of the Cold War brought the two former adversaries into alliance once again. Common interests and mutual needs were also fundamental in the establishing the original relationship between Israel and Germany as will be further examined in Chapter Two.

In looking specifically at the relationship between Israel and Germany, Lily Gardner Feldman presents her own view on the requirements for the establishment of a “special relationship” between nations. Feldman argues that special relationships are defined by both nations practicing “preferential treatment towards each other in more than one substantive policy area.”⁶ Nations cannot claim to have a special relationship that covers only one field; the relationship must span numerous fields. Feldman believes that “economic and defence seem to be essential” but at least one other policy area is required to support the case for special relations.⁷ These other policy issues can range from science and technology to cultural exchanges.⁸ In order to form a special relationship, Feldman’s definition requires historical relations spanning a long period or “an exceptionally intense history of mutual preoccupation.”⁹ These historical ties must

⁴ Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A "Special Relationship?"* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), 276.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 276.

⁶ Feldman, 266.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 266.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 267-268.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 262.

then be shared by the peoples and governments of both nations. Both nations and peoples must have perceived needs that only the other nation can fulfill with no alternative partner.¹⁰ Overall, Feldman argues that special relationships in international relations can be classified through comparisons of “policy toward other individual countries” to the norm of policy in a specific area.¹¹ Israel and Germany have without a doubt collaborated not only on economic and defense issues but also in optional fields that prove to strengthen relations between two states. The details of Germany and Israel’s special relationship will be further established in later chapters illustrating the different arenas in which the two nations share interests stemming from the historical intensity of the Holocaust.

One of the most commonly cited examples of a special relationship is Israel’s with the United States. In analyzing the relationship between Israel and the United States, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov argues that special relationships are defined by a combination of “soft” factors, common values and ideals, as well as “hard” factors, strategic interests.¹² While today the Israeli-U.S. alliance is cited as a primary example of a special relationship, it was originally much weaker as the United States was unwilling to compromise its strategic interests in the Middle East for the sake of Israel. It was the “soft” influences between the two states that often kept relations from reaching an irreparable rift.¹³ From Israel’s independence in 1948 to the Kennedy administration in 1960, shared “soft” factors were still not enough to establish a special relationship

¹⁰ Ibid., 262.

¹¹ Ibid., 266.

¹² Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948: A “Special Relationship”?” *Diplomatic History* 22, No. 2 (1998): 232.

¹³ Ibid., 233.

between the United States and Israel. Instead, for decades the United States viewed Israel as a political and strategic hindrance threatening ties between the United States and the Arab world. Eager to maintain relations with the Arab states and in doing so, prevent the further spread of Soviet influence, the United States often minimized the threats faced by Israel and refused to sell arms to the state.¹⁴

With the Kennedy administration, the United States, recognizing Israel's legitimate need for weapons when faced with Soviet-armed Arab states, and Israel developed a patron-client relationship. In return for U.S. weaponry, Israel practiced greater self-restraint against its Arab neighbors and halted nuclear developments. These policy changes did not occur because of increased understanding of the Israeli situation or the influence of American Jews but instead were initiated due to the decline of U.S.-Arab relations and the United States' attempts to balance Soviet power in the region.¹⁵ It was not until the 1967 war that American and Israeli interests met and signaled the beginning of the special relationship cited today. Even so, this relationship was fostered by "hard" factors, not "soft," as the United States hoped a stronger relationship would allow it to persuade Israel to make greater concessions in order to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. During his presidency, Nixon stressed that increased American support was due to Israel's role in balancing Soviet power and was not a result of the influence of American-Jewish support, a "soft" factor.¹⁶

It was only under the Reagan administration that today's special relationship fully came into being with Israel receiving unparalleled strategic cooperation as well as

¹⁴ Ibid., 234-235.

¹⁵ Ibid. 238.

¹⁶ Ibid., 241-244.

dramatic increases in military and economic aid. Even with the establishment of a special relationship, the United States and Israel often disagreed on strategic decisions from the U.S. sale of radar systems and F-15s to Saudi Arabia, Israel's 1982 war in Lebanon and the First Gulf War.¹⁷ Although the relationship strengthened greatly under the Clinton and later Bush administrations, it has experienced much more turbulence than its Israeli-German counterpart. Like the United States, Germany and Israel were forced to account for and balance the interests of "soft" and "hard" factors, but came to a much different conclusion.

¹⁷ Ibid., 252-257.

Chapter Two: Moving Beyond the War

Persecution of Jews is not a trait unique to a single European state, but for Germany above all others, the past continues to serve as a living piece of foreign policy. In the case of relations between Germany and Israel, it is impossible not to acknowledge the past and German attempts, from 1939 to 1945, to eliminate the Jewish people. Israel's establishment in 1948, with the pain and memories of the Holocaust not even four years in the past, was far too soon to create any formal relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, created one year later. In these years silence was the only policy shared between the two nations as neither could find an acceptable starting point to address all that had come to pass. The German public remained paralyzed by guilt, and Jews and Israel refused to be the first to acknowledge a nation that had attempted to destroy them. In 1951, 47 nations ended their state of war with Germany and with this act, Israel began to break the silence. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion argued that Germany had yet to renounce its activities throughout the war and had exhibited no public "change in heart" since the end of the war.¹⁸ By 1951 small German movements, including Erich Lüth's "Peace with Israel," began to call for an end to the silence on Germany's part. Due to the influence of these smaller movements, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer finally spoke on behalf of Germany, acknowledging the nation's need to "bring about a solution of the material indemnity problem" and attempt to heal a small piece of the suffering caused by the German state.¹⁹ With this single declaration, Germany and Israel finally began the process of healing wounds and creating a formal relationship.

¹⁸ Feldman, 37.

¹⁹ Ibid., 40.

It was through restitution and reparations that Germany and Israel first interacted with one another. While the states may have been speaking, there was no hiding the past in Israel's approach to West Germany. By March 1951, the Israeli government appealed to the four great powers to seek restitution from Germany not only for property and wealth lost by those who endured and died in the Holocaust but also those who survived to immigrate to the newly established Jewish state as refugees. Israel's letter to the Western powers spared no words or emotions in stating that although

no indemnity can make good the destroyed human lives [...] or pay for the tortures and suffering of the men women and children" and the crimes of Nazi Germany "cannot be atoned for by material reparation," Germany could attempt to begin its relationship with the Jewish state through "payment of damages to the heirs of the victims and the reintegration of the survivors under the conditions of normal existence."²⁰

Jewish refugees in Israel from Europe numbered approximately 500,000, and the total cost of absorbing the new immigrants was expected to be at least "\$1.5 thousand million."²¹ Israel's economy was under severe stress from inflation and the entire country was strained enough to implement food rationing for its citizens. Israel alone could not incur the costs of maintaining its economy and refugee population and thus looked to Germany as a source of capital to fight overwhelming inflation²². Israel argued that Germans, "responsible for this predicament" while still using and profiting from the property "taken from the Jews dead or alive," should "be called up to help integrate the survivors."²³

²⁰ Ibid., 42.

²¹ Rolf Vogel, *German Path to Israel*, (Chester Springs: Dufour Editions, 1970), 31.

²² Nicholas Balabkins, *West German Reparations To Israel*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 97.

²³ Vogel, 31.

The Israeli demand for reparations and subsequent agreement in no way reflected a common consensus among its Jewish citizens. Both the far left and far right of the Israeli political spectrum opposed the negotiations and agreements, believing that any money from the German state would be blood money. Israel believed “Germany was an international pariah” and feared that direct talks would “erase the stigma of its moral untouchability.”²⁴ Menachem Begin, the Polish-born leader of the Herut party and future prime minister, led the opposition arguing that direct talks with Germany were indeed worse than death and asked Israelis to consider what price they were willing to receive for “grandpa and grandma.”²⁵ As Prime Minister Ben-Gurion appealed to the Knesset for approval of the negotiations, 1,000 demonstrators armed with stones attacked the Knesset building and battled police for over two hours.²⁶ While the Israeli parliament did eventually accept the negotiations with Germany, the feelings of the Israeli public and political discord over the matter nearly drove the new state to civil war.

In Germany the public welcomed the opportunity for negotiations with the Jewish state. Germany had no obligation under international law to compensate Israel and the Jewish people for the crimes committed under the Third Reich, but did so as a means to not only begin to move beyond its past, but also as a means to gain further international support and legitimacy.²⁷ Speaking at Bergen-Belsen, West German President Heinrich Lübke noted that although “the burden of reparations is not in itself sufficient to relieve

²⁴ Balabkins, 120.

²⁵ Ibid., 122.

²⁶ Ibid., 120-123.

²⁷ Nana Sagi, *German Reparations: A History of the Negotiations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986).

[the] nation from its obligations,”²⁸ the opinion of West Germany throughout the world would be raised greatly with voluntary German restitution.²⁹ Press across the globe declared that German reparations would be the best action from the country “since before 1933.”³⁰ Many credit the United States as a force in pressuring Germany to make payments to Israel but in fact the United States was more concerned about Germany’s economic growth and ability to stand with the Western world in the Cold War. The United States feared that it would be forced to substitute the difference if Germany was unable to meet all of the reparation payments.³¹ For Germany, the reparations deliberations finally brought an end to the silence following the war and granted Germany its first step in moving beyond moral obligations from its National Socialist legacy.

Ratified by Germany on March 20, 1953 and Israel on March 22, the Luxemburg Agreement stipulated the terms of reparations between the two states. The treaty consisted of four separate agreements each detailing Germany’s financial obligations to Israel. The first agreement, the Shilumim, committed Germany to pay three million Deutsche Marks to Israel. Protocol No. 1, the second agreement, was a pledge by the Adenauer government to initiate additional legislation allowing for the individual compensation of victims of the Nazi Regime. Protocol No. 2, the third agreement, stipulated that Germany would pay DM 450 million to the Claims Conference. This money was to be used for worldwide rehabilitation of Jews and other victims recovering

²⁸ Vogel, 113-114.

²⁹ Michael Wolffsohn, *Eternal Guilt?: Forty Years of German-Jewish Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 13.

³⁰ Balabkins, 91.

³¹ Wolffsohn, 14.

from damages done by Nazi Germany. The fourth agreement in the treaty called for Israel to refund Germany for secular property located in Israel, which most notably included possessions of the Knights Templar. In total, the treaty granted DM 3.45 billion to Israel from Germany. Of that sum, DM 450 million was to be transferred to the Claims Conference located in New York.³² Of the total amount, Germany was to pay one-third in foreign exchange while the other two-thirds were to be made up of goods.³³ Germany's first payment of DM 60 million was due to Israel the day the treaty came into force. From that point, an additional DM 140 million was due by March 31, 1953. Payment periods began on April 1st of every year and were estimated to last for twelve to fourteen years until the full sum had been paid.³⁴ Yearly payments varied between DM 250 and 310 million with Israel paying no interest on the sum. Realizing the original method of placing yearly orders with Germany was inefficient, additional protocols were implemented throughout the years.

With this treaty, Germany and Israel took the first step in moving beyond the Holocaust's legacy. The first years of the relationship were not necessarily easy as Germany attempted to navigate the Cold War world and Israel worked to create a new image of Germans away from those of the Third Reich. In examining situations that placed the most pressure on the relationship, Germany often wavered but always supported Israel in the end.

³² Balabkins, 143.

³³ Ibid., 155.

³⁴ Ibid., 143.

Chapter Three: Testing the Relationship

The special nature of foreign relations between Germany and Israel can most clearly be found in Germany's strained relations with the Arab states. More often than not, Germany has maintained strong relations with Israel at the cost of steady relations with Arab nations hostile to Israel. Germany's balancing act is clear in the examination of two political issues that arose between Germany, Israel and various Arab nations: the question of diplomatic recognition and the case of German scientists working with the Egyptian government to create weapons.

The issue of formal diplomatic relations was complicated by German attempts to maintain friendly relations with the Arab states and Israel simultaneously. Compared to other European powers, the Arab states had historically viewed Germany on much friendlier terms. Positive German-Arab relations began with the alliance between Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Ottoman Empire in 1898. Part of this alliance included the building of a railroad line by German companies connecting Bosphorus to Baghdad creating the "only traffic connection in the Middle East."³⁵ Even after Germany's defeat in WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, positive associations between the two regions remained. With the outbreak of WWII, Arab states under the rule of European powers fought against Germany yet made it clear that their sympathies lay with the Nazi regime. The fact that Hitler fought against France and Britain greatly allied the Arab people to the Nazi cause. Furthermore, with increasing hostilities toward Zionism and Jews in general, Arab leaders greatly favored Germany's anti-Semitic policies. Even after the fall of the

³⁵ Inge Deutschkron, *Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition* (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Company, 1970), 76.

Nazi regime, Germany continued to be associated with the Third Reich throughout the Middle East.³⁶

As Germany established relations with Israel and began negotiations on the Luxemburg Agreement, Arab criticism became increasingly prevalent. The Jordanian Prime Minister warned Adenauer that German ties with Israel would greatly threaten relations with the Arab states. The Syrian government echoed this warning that German restitution payments to Israel would have dire consequences to the state of German-Arab relations and threatened a blockade of all German imports.³⁷ Despite the threats issued, the German government felt it had little reason to fear any severe repercussions in response to the Luxemburg Agreement. In order to prove Arab resolve, Saudi Arabia cancelled a \$2 million order with the German company Siemens but reversed this decision only a short while later.³⁸ Other Arab states voiced disapproval by cancelling meetings with German officials, but these decisions were often revoked in a short matter of time. These choices illustrated to the Germans that despite the threats, the Arab states were not as willing to allow the dissolution of relations, as they would have liked the Germans to believe. Even after the ratification of the Luxemburg Agreement, the Arab states could not come to agreement on the implementation of an economic blockade and no action was taken against Germany.³⁹

While Arab protest was not enough to halt the Luxemburg Agreement, the Arab states were much more successful in halting the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany. When negotiations of the

³⁶ Ibid., 76-77.

³⁷ Ibid., 79-80.

³⁸ Ibid., 82.

³⁹ Ibid., 88.

Reparations Agreement first began, Germany highly favored the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Yet, the Israeli government, judging from the public protests that erupted in reaction to reparations, decided that full diplomatic relations would be too much for the Israeli public to accept.⁴⁰ In 1955, Germany's adoption of the Hallstein Doctrine dramatically complicated the issue of diplomatic relations with Israel. Developed in the context of the Cold War divide between East and West, the Hallstein Doctrine stated that the West German state would sever all ties with nations that granted full diplomatic recognition to East Germany.⁴¹

With the Hallstein Doctrine, Arab leaders were able to exploit the division between the two Germanys as an opportunity to hinder German-Israeli relations. Egypt's President Nasser was the first to announce that Germany's establishment of relations with Israel would be viewed as a hostile act and Egypt would establish ties with East Germany in retaliation. These sentiments were soon echoed throughout the Arab world and if followed through, West Germany would have no choice but to end formal diplomatic ties with the majority of the Arab states. This time Arab threats were taken seriously by the West German government, which was not willing to risk Germany's increasingly large trade with the region nor have the prospects of German unification weakened further with Arab recognition of East Germany.⁴² Despite multiple Israeli requests to begin talks to establish formal ties, West Germany continued to object in fear of Arab recognition of East Germany.

⁴⁰ George Lavy, *Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 31.

⁴¹ Deutschkron, 90.

⁴² Lavy, 34.

With the issue of formal diplomatic relations still unresolved, the relationship between Germany and Israel was further strained with the discovery of German scientists working for the Egyptian government to develop arms. Following the Suez conflict, Nasser committed to better developing the nation's arms in order to match Israeli weaponry.⁴³ With goals of both domination of the Arab world and the destruction of Israel, the Egyptian government in 1958 began recruiting foreign scientists to improve Egypt's weaponry. Israeli intelligence soon discovered that among these scientists were a group of Germans from a government-funded institute in Stuttgart. Without attracting public attention, the Israeli government protested to the German government, which responded by dismissing the scientists from the institute. Despite efforts to mollify the situation, many of the dismissed German scientists returned to Egypt on their own accord to continue their work.

When Egypt launched two missiles against Israel on July 21, 1962, public attention was brought to the issue of German scientists working to further develop Egypt's arms stockpile. Israelis were distressed at Egypt's acquirement of missiles capable of reaching their nation but throughout Israel, public outrage was directed most at the involvement of German scientists in creating weapons that could possibly destroy the Jewish state and from the Israeli perspective, finish the work of the Third Reich.⁴⁴ From a purely political vantage point, the missiles were not a serious threat to Israel's overall security with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban assuring that Egypt's German scientists were only "second-rate [and] Israel's progress [was], so far, greater than

⁴³ Hannfried von Hindenburg, *Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy toward Israel, 1952-1965* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 69.

⁴⁴ Lavy, 61.

theirs.”⁴⁵ As Israeli anger grew over the issue, the German government maintained that it had no legal ground to prevent its citizens from traveling and working abroad.⁴⁶

Unsatisfied with the German government’s response and facing growing public displeasure at home, the Israeli government created its own policy to resolve the issue. Beginning in 1963, German scientists working in Egypt began to be attacked while in Europe. One escaped a shooting uninjured, while another disappeared; his body was never found. Another barely escaped an unexplained plane crash that killed his wife. Finally, in March 1963, when two men were arrested for threatening the daughter of another scientist, it became clear that the men were members of the Israeli secret service and the agency had been responsible for the attempted assassinations and disappearances. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion ordered an end to the secret service missions when they were made public. The violence caused anger amongst many members of Germany’s government and Ben-Gurion had invested too many years personally working to foster positive relations with Germany to allow the situation to cause permanent damage.⁴⁷

The Israeli government instead returned to diplomatic means in order to bring about an end to the work of the German scientists in Egypt. In May 1964, the Knesset passed a resolution stating that West Germany had a moral obligation to prevent German citizens from creating weapons whose goal was to kill Jews.⁴⁸ West Germany once again cited its Basic Law guaranteeing German citizens the freedom of movement, which only allowed the government to take action against its citizens if a West German law was violated; as the scientists committed no crimes working for the Egyptians, the Germans

⁴⁵ von Hindenburg, 70.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 71.

⁴⁷ Lavy, 62-63.

⁴⁸ von Hindenburg, 71.

maintained that there was nothing they could legally do to stop their involvement.⁴⁹ Once again, Cold War dynamics came into play, as Germany feared legal action against the German-Egyptian collaboration would allow Soviet scientists to fill the void and further encourage Egyptian diplomatic recognition of East Germany. While Parliament members attempted and failed to introduce multiple amendments to the German constitution in order to deem the scientists' work illegal,⁵⁰ the German public echoed the disbelief of the Israeli press and public that fellow Germans might once again create weapons to murder Jews.⁵¹ In order to resolve the issue while maintaining relations with both Israel and Egypt and pacifying domestic and international criticism, the West German government quietly began recruiting the scientists with large monetary compensation to return to work in West Germany.⁵²

After resolving the issue of German scientists, attention turned once again to the issue of diplomatic recognition and the Hallstein Doctrine. When news leaked in October 1964 of German arms shipments to Israel, the Arab states once again threatened to recognize East Germany in retaliation. Nasser demanded that German shipments to Israel be halted immediately while Syria demanded that Germany commit DM 350 million for the construction of a dam. With Germany's refusal of both demands, Nasser moved to recognize East Germany by inviting the Premier to Cairo. With this, Germany did in fact halt arms shipments to Israel, but still waited to invoke the Hallstein Doctrine warning Egypt instead that Germany would revoke all economic aid if the Premier's visit was not cancelled. Despite the warnings, the visit took place and was swiftly followed with an

⁴⁹ Lavy, 67.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 68.

⁵¹ von Hindenburg, 73.

⁵² Lavy, 70.

announcement that Egypt would establish a consulate-general in East Germany. After a brief statement, the German government offered Israel full diplomatic recognition. With this act, ten of the thirteen members of the Arab League broke diplomatic relations with West Germany.⁵³ After over a decade of attempting to balance relations between Israel and the Arab states, Germany was forced to finally commit to Israel from both moral obligation and Cold War realities. In the establishment of relations, German officials seemed to believe that their nation had done all that was required of it in moving beyond the legacy of the Holocaust, but for Israel, the establishment of official ties was seen only as a necessary step in the continuing special relationship.

In the midst of the crises of diplomatic recognition and the German scientists, the Holocaust was once again brought to the forefront of discussion with the 1960 capture of Adolf Eichmann. Joining the Nazi Party in 1932, Eichmann would become a member of the S.S., the S.D. and the Gestapo. With the outbreak of the war, Eichmann headed the transfer of Jewish and Polish inhabitants from western Poland. In March 1941 Eichmann was nominated to head Office IV B4. Within the Gestapo, this office was responsible for “Jewish Affairs and Evacuation.”⁵⁴ While attending the Wannsee conference, Eichmann served as the officer dealing with the question of the final solution of the Jewish problem. Those who directly carried out the mass murder of European Jewry did so under the regional and police departments of Eichmann’s office.⁵⁵

Having escaped an American internment camp in 1946, Eichmann eventually made his way to Argentina where he adopted the name Ricardo Klement working in a

⁵³ Feldman, 161-162.

⁵⁴ Peter Papadatos, *The Eichmann Trial* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 24, 26.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 26-27.

Mercedes-Benz plant.⁵⁶ It was in Buenos Aires, 15 years after the end of the war, that Mossad agents captured Eichmann on May 11, 1960 and smuggled him back to Israel. After confirming without a doubt that Ricardo Klement was in fact Adolf Eichmann, Ben-Gurion announced on May 23 the capture to a stunned Knesset. The announcement was made up of only two sentences stating that Eichmann was detained in Israel and would stand trial for the implementation of the 'Final Solution' that resulted in the deaths of six million Jews.⁵⁷ The news shocked the entire nation serving as a source of pride but also forcing Israel to face the memories and painful experiences of Holocaust survivors who made up almost a quarter of the country's population.⁵⁸

Surrounding the trial were questions of legality and jurisdiction, yet German concerns did not focus on Israel's right to try Eichmann. As Eichmann had been kidnapped from Argentina, questions arose over the breach of Argentina's sovereignty and Israel's violation of international law. This argument was weakened by the fact that no extradition treaty existed between Argentina and Israel at the time, nor had Argentina granted Eichmann asylum.⁵⁹ Despite the fact that this breach of sovereignty did not affect Jerusalem's jurisdiction to try Eichmann, Argentina did submit a complaint to the U.N. Security Council. The issue was resolved with a Security Council resolution in which Argentina excused Israel's violation and refrained from insisting on any type of

⁵⁶ Harry Mulisch, *Criminal Case 40/61, the Trial of Adolf Eichmann: An Eyewitness Account*, trans. Robert Naborn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 24-25.

⁵⁷ Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust*, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 326-327.

⁵⁸ Hanna Yablonka, "The Development of Holocaust Consciousness in Israel: The Nuremberg, Kapos, Kastner, and Eichmann Trials," *Israel Studies* 8 (2003): 9.

⁵⁹ Papadatos, 57.

restitution.⁶⁰ Issues also arose regarding Israel's right under international law to try Nazi criminals. The crimes Eichmann stood accused of occurred before Israel was established as a state, took place outside Israel's borders, and when the crimes were committed, the victims were not citizens of Israel.⁶¹ While the international community did find the legal precedents to support Israel's trial of Eichmann, Germany made no official statements or disagreements on the trial.

Instead, the German government's main concerns focused on the fear that the trial would revive anti-German sentiments or bring the Nazi-tainted backgrounds of some officials to the public. Continuing the personal relationship that had formed between the two leaders, Adenauer personally contacted Ben-Gurion following Eichmann's arrest to ask that the Prime Minister act to prevent the trial from inflaming anti-German sentiments. In addition, Adenauer feared that the trial might bring further attention to the Nazi associations of Hans Globke. While Globke was a close advisor of Adenauer, his record was far from clear as he had worked for the interior ministry under the Third Reich and had "written one of the authoritative interpretations of the Nuremberg statutes."⁶² Documents incriminating Globke were necessary for the case against Eichmann, but Ben-Gurion assured Adenauer that Chief Prosecutor Gideon Hausner would avoid drawing attention to Globke's role in the documents.⁶³ Throughout the trial, Ben-Gurion stressed the need to focus on the guilt of Hitler instead of the German people as a collective whole. Even with Eichmann as the defendant, Ben-Gurion instructed

⁶⁰ Ibid., 60.

⁶¹ Ibid., 43.

⁶² Segev, 340.

⁶³ Ibid., 341.

Hausner to focus on Hitler as the “main and central factor [...] and only then Eichmann.”⁶⁴

Both the German and Israeli public followed the trial closely bringing the issue of the Holocaust into discussions in both nations. In Germany, the trial was followed by up to 85% of the population through television and radio reports from Jerusalem. By the end of the trial, 85% of Germans polled agreed with the use of the death penalty on Eichmann. While they understood and supported Israel’s right to try Nazi criminals, the majority of Germans still felt personally detached from the Holocaust and its guilt. 53% of Germans polled wished to forget the crimes of the Third Reich and of those polled, only 8% felt “somehow implicated” in the crimes Eichmann was executed for.⁶⁵

The trial granted Israel an opportunity to re-examine its own understanding of the Holocaust. For Ben-Gurion, punishing Eichmann was not the trial’s most important role. The trial allowed the opportunity to remind the entire world that the “Holocaust obligated them to support the only Jewish state on earth.”⁶⁶ In reiterating the crimes of the Holocaust, Ben-Gurion wished to also shame the Western powers for not doing more to save Europe’s Jews. More importantly, according to Ben-Gurion, the trial offered the chance to impart a more important lesson on the Israeli people. Ben-Gurion hoped the trial would teach the lessons of the Holocaust to younger generations of Israelis for whom the era had become much further removed.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Ibid., 347.

⁶⁵ Marc von Miquel, “Explanation, Dissociation, Apologia: The Debate over the Criminal Prosecution of Nazi Crimes in the 1960s,” in *Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975*, ed. Philipp Gassert et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 54.

⁶⁶ Segev, 327.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 327.

There is no doubt that prior to the Eichmann trial the memories and lessons of the Holocaust had been deeply internalized by the Israeli public. However, Israelis struggled, like most, to understand how six million Jews could have simply been murdered with what was perceived in Israel as no resistance. While Israelis saw themselves as the opposite of passive Diaspora Jews, the victims of the Holocaust came to represent the worst traits of exiled Jews in simply allowing themselves to be led “like sheep to the slaughter” by the Nazis.⁶⁸ Unable to sympathize and comprehend the effect of the Holocaust on survivors, the Israeli public preferred that survivors silence their memories and instead focus on the future rather than dwell in the past. Survivors in Israel came to be represented by the image of a “tongue-tied [...] eccentric, dumbstruck figure, living on the margins of society and often on the verge of insanity.”⁶⁹ According to former Israeli minister Yossi Beilin, native-born Israelis of the 1950s associated Holocaust survivors as “sad people with numbers on their arms [or] insane people who wandered around with staring eyes.”⁷⁰

This classification of survivors at the margins of Israeli society was broken with Chief Prosecutor Hauser’s “parade of Holocaust witnesses.”⁷¹ The trial featured the testimonies of more than 100 survivors. The testimonies were broadcast across Israeli radio. For most, this was not only their first experience with the detailed crimes of the Nazi era but also the use of the radio brought survivors’ testimonies and pain into nearly every Israeli home. For the first time, survivors were invited to share their experiences

⁶⁸ Tamar Liebes and Amit Pinchevski, “Severed Voices: Radio and the Mediation of Trauma in the Eichmann Trial,” *Public Culture* 22:2 (2010): 275.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 276.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 277.

⁷¹ Segev, 350.

with the Israeli public.⁷² In hearing survivors' accounts for the first time, the Israeli public was forced to change its opinions on the passiveness of the victims. Writing on the trial, Israeli poet and novelist Haim Gouri, speaking for the generation of Israelis who discounted the experiences of survivors, wrote, "We must ask forgiveness from [those] we so harshly judged [...] without asking ourselves what right we had to do so."⁷³ With the trial, a new respect for the "heroism of the weak" emerged in Israeli society bringing the crimes to the entire nation and further building Israel's collective identification with the Holocaust.⁷⁴

⁷² Liebes and Pinchevski, 267.

⁷³ Anita Shapira, "The Eichmann Trial: Changing Perspectives," in *After Eichmann: Collective Memory and the Holocaust since 1961*, ed. David Cesarani. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 27.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

Chapter Four: “Special” Dealings

As established in the literature, the formation of a “special relationship” in the field of international relations goes far deeper than simply foreign policy. The relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States demonstrates the need for shared memories and symbols; German-American relations stress not only political and economic interests, but also shared identity and empathy between the people of both nations, and according to Feldman, it must extend beyond one policy field. As with British-American and American-German special relations, the core of the German-Israeli relationship is rooted in the historical legacy of the Second World War. The special relationship between the two nations is perhaps illustrated most in the prominence of scientific cooperation and youth exchanges that involve interactions between citizens, not politicians of each nation. These exchanges reach far beyond the official rhetoric of support from both nations. With them, Germans and Israelis are able to work and interact personally with one another providing the opportunity for each nationality to witness and experience the legacies of the Holocaust and Second World War in the other culture.

Shared identity and empathy between Germans and Israelis has been fostered through both state-sponsored and independent scientific and youth exchanges. In promoting cooperation between scientists of each nation, Germans and Israelis not only contribute to the development of each nation but also pay tribute to the legacy of German and Jewish-German science that existed prior the rise of the Nazi Party. Until 1933, there existed a strong tradition between German and German-Jewish scientists with German-Israeli scientific cooperation being seen as a return to a natural partnership.⁷⁵ This

⁷⁵ Feldman, 146.

tradition is in fact partially responsible for the strength of Israeli scientific institutions and scientists. The first waves of scientists to arrive in Israel were Zionists educated in German universities and institutes. These scientists were instrumental in the growth and development of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Increasingly after 1933, Israel became a refuge for German-Jewish scientists fleeing Nazi persecution.⁷⁶

With the strong historical basis of German-Jewish scientific cooperation, exchanges between the two nations began in the 1960s. Israel's Weizmann Institute and Germany's Minerva Foundation were instrumental in creating bonds between the two nations. Beginning in 1960, the German government granted DM 3 million to the Weizmann Institute, which was followed with a formal contract between the institutes in 1964. Between 1963 and 1972, the Minerva Foundation contributed over DM 37 million to fund basic research at the Weizmann Institute and sponsored a DM 70 million partnership between both institutions' scientists. The Minerva Foundation distributes funds to projects chosen by a group of 30 Germans and Israelis. Originally, the Volkswagen Foundation sponsored Minerva's student exchanges in Israel until 1973 when the Ministry of Research and Technology took responsibility. With this, the German government increased its annual contribution to DM 1 million per year while Volkswagen continued to sponsor its own research programs in Israel.⁷⁷

In both Israel and Germany, scientific cooperation between the two nations has been noted for its uniqueness. The German chairman of the Minerva Committee commented that cooperation between Germany and Israel is of "higher learning than

⁷⁶ Ute Deichmann and Anthony S. Travis, "A German Influence on Science in Mandate Palestine and Israel: Chemistry and Biochemistry," *Israel Studies* 9, 2004.

⁷⁷ Feldman, 142-146.

Germany enjoys with most [of its] Western European neighbors.”⁷⁸ Germany has contributed DM 13-14 million annually to scientific programs with Israel, an amount far greater than any of its contributions to other nations’ programs. For Israel as well, cooperation with Germany is much stronger than with other states. Some have estimated that without German cooperation, the Weizmann Institute’s budget would have collapsed. Comparatively, the United States in the 1970s only contributed \$2 million per year to Israel, almost two-thirds less than Germany’s contributions in the same period.⁷⁹ In restoring a tradition destroyed by the Nazis, both Germany and Israel have been leaders in the scientific and technological fields.

Along with scientific cooperation, the uniqueness of the German-Israeli relationship in terms of public interaction is perhaps best displayed in the long-established youth exchanges. While similar to scientific cooperation, youth exchanges explicitly work to overcome the misconceptions present in both nationalities fostering understanding between Israeli and German youths. Occurring when most participants are teenagers, these programs offer the opportunity to positively shape perceptions at a time when most are creating and solidifying their opinions of politics and world order. Originally sponsored through government funds, these programs have become formative experiences for thousands of Israeli and German youths.

That Germany has an exchange program with Israel is not unique; the nation has programs throughout Europe and the globe. What is unique is the prominence of the Israeli exchange programs above all other programs. From the earliest years of youth exchanges, German interest was far greater than Israeli. In 1961, the Knesset approved

⁷⁸ Ibid., 144.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 144.

visits by German students to Israel in order to broadcast the great strides and achievements the state had made in little over a decade since its establishment. While German students visited Israel, the Israeli government initially had no interest in sending Israeli youths to Germany in return. While bilateral cooperation on youth exchanges began in 1969, it was not until 1971 that the Israeli government took an active role and responsibility in sponsoring youth exchanges.⁸⁰ In 1974, the German-Israeli Mixed Commission met to create regulations for the program determining aims, desired participants, and financial and administrative responsibility.⁸¹

When compared to other German exchange programs, the foundations of the program with Israel appear rather different. In establishing exchanges with other nations, a formal cultural agreement is implemented between both nations, but in the case of Israel, this agreement was never put into place. As opposed to being headed by a senior civil servant as usual, the head of the German Department of Youth personally directed the program until 1979. The program with Israel receives the same amount of funding from the German government as other programs but in addition, the Israeli program is granted an additional DM 500,000 annually. From 1970-78, the Israeli program received 15.3% of total German funding for all youth exchanges greatly exceeding the percentage of German students participating in the program.⁸² The German government has borne the majority of costs associated with the Israeli exchange program, going so far as to pay for participants' travel costs, a burden not handled for exchanges with any other nation. By

⁸⁰ Ibid., 147-148.

⁸¹ Ibid. 148.

⁸² Ibid. 149.

1975, 70% of all Israeli exchanges with non-Jewish groups were with Germany.⁸³ For Germany, the exchange program with Israel is considered the most important receiving the government's full support.

As a definitive piece in German-Israeli special relations, youth programs are considered one of the best means to heal and overcome the legacies of the Holocaust in both nations' youths. Through these exchanges, it is clear how each culture has adapted the legacy within national identity. One dimension that arises within exchanges dealing explicitly with the Holocaust is the reversal of historic roles between Jews and Germans. Martin Schellenberg, an educational director and researcher at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, noted that in youth exchanges, Israelis tend to hold the majority of power in the relationship between the two groups. German students are most concerned with Israeli opinions of Germans and whether or not the Israeli students have family members who died or survived the Holocaust. When visiting locations of Nazi atrocities, many German students feel the need to express feelings of guilt to their Israeli counterparts. Seeing guilt still harbored by Germans born decades after the Nazi era, Israeli students often move to comfort their visibly upset counterparts. In doing so, Schellenberg argues that the Israeli students hold the power of forgiveness for Germans and with this, control overall the levels of acceptance between the two groups.⁸⁴

Despite German feelings of guilt that often emerge in addressing the Holocaust, Germans for the most part disagree with the concept of collective identity while Israeli

⁸³ Ibid. 151.

⁸⁴ Martin Schellenberg. "On "Mourning" and "Friendship" in German-Israeli Youth Encounter: The Need to Address the Sensitive Issues," in *Dissonant Memories Fragmented Present: Exchanging Young Discourses between Israel and Germany*, ed. Charlotte Misselwitz et al. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 47.

students often group themselves as one entity no matter their own family connections to the Holocaust. Researchers Nirit Bialer and Tanja Kersting found that among German students there are decisive attempts to avoid identifying as a collective group. Since the end of the Second World War, there have been few, if any, attempts by the German people or government to create a German identity as nationalism and extreme collective identity are taught as definitive traits of the Third Reich. Instead, Germans tend to categorize themselves generationally. This allows German students to differentiate themselves and clearly oppose the ideology of their grandparents' generation. Taking the opposite approach, Israeli students discuss the Holocaust and identification as citizens of Israel and a collective group. While Israelis told their own personal experiences with the legacies of the Holocaust, they more importantly together represented the "victim side" of German history. In Israel, the Holocaust is far more present in the creation of national identity with the entire nation commemorating the victims of Nazi violence on Yom HaShoah whether or not their own relatives suffered during WWII. The Israeli educational system and military service also greatly encourage a collective identity to which nearly all Israelis identify themselves as a part of.⁸⁵

German and Israeli students learn and identify with the Nazi era and Holocaust from opposite perspectives and as expected, differences arise between the two when addressing the legacy in each culture. These educational exchanges allow Israeli and German students to face the past and understand the complexities of one another's

⁸⁵ Nirit Bialer and Tanja Kersting, "Different Approaches to Collective Identity and Mourning: Experiences from the Exchange Project "Beyond Memory,"" in *Dissonant Memories Fragmented Present: Exchanging Young Discourses between Israel and Germany*, ed. Charlotte Misselwitz et al. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 58-59.

cultures together, helping to ease some of these differences. In creating bonds that extend from personal interactions, both groups are able to create perceptions based on reality rather than history.

Chapter Five: Changes to National Identity

It is arguable that of all the nations whose people fought and died in WWII, it was the societies of Germany and Israel which were most influenced by the war's events. Both people embraced the concept of 'never again' but have taken opposite lessons from its meaning. By the end of the war, German attitudes on military violence had been completely altered from where they stood during the rise of the Nazi party. Unique among Western powers, Germany's great trauma caused the nation to completely abandon warfare as a means of political influence. The "horrors of the Nazi Era" created a "stable anti-militarist political culture" in which Germany completely abandoned the nation's previous military ambitions.⁸⁶ Instead of relying on the influence of the military, Germany instead became a complete civilian power. With this new ideology, the German government's civilian policy included:

1. Constraining the use of force in settling political conflicts [...]
2. Strengthening the rule of law through the development of international regimes and international organizations [...]
3. Promoting participatory forms of decision-making both within and between states
4. Promoting non-violent forms of conflict management and conflict resolution
5. Promoting social equity and sustainable development to enhance the legitimacy of international order and
6. Promoting interdependence and division of labour.⁸⁷

This new political outlook meant that the state worked closely with its Western allies in "multilateral institutions and the UN."⁸⁸ Germany's political mantra became "never

⁸⁶ Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality," in *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?* ed. by Douglas Webber (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 62.

⁸⁷ Sebastian Harnisch, "Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy," in *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?* ed. by Douglas Webber (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 37.

⁸⁸ Dieter Dettke, *Germany says "No": The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 5.

again, never alone, and politics before force.”⁸⁹ Germany’s deviations from the traditional use of force allowed Germans to view themselves once again as exceptional and “distinctly different” from their Western neighbors, creating a new model of political development committed to German multilateralism and the restriction of violence to self-defense.⁹⁰

As well as losing military ambitions, Germany’s defeat also brought about an apparent end to visible German nationalism. After 1945, any efforts to bind Germans around a common identity were abandoned as all images led back to the National Socialist era and the shame of the nation’s past. The rise of European integration in the aftermath of the war allowed Germany to adopt a new overarching identity. By identifying with Europe instead, Germans were able to escape the burden of the Nazi crimes on their national character.⁹¹

Following unification, Germany’s foreign policy made dramatic strides in moving past the nation’s WWII legacy. Most importantly, Germany has begun a process of remilitarization. While Germany participated only financially in the first Gulf War, the conflict in Kosovo created a situation in which Germany could no longer simply observe.⁹² In the years following the Gulf War, the Kohl government cautiously engaged in operations to slowly gain the support of the German public in favor of out-of-area missions. The most significant of these operations was the participation in strikes over

⁸⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 6.

⁹¹ Yehuda Cohen, *The Germans: Absent Nationality and the Holocaust* (Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 2010).

⁹² Adrian Hyde-Price, “Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?” in *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*, ed. by Douglas Webber (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 19-20.

Bosnia. Previously German troops had only served as peacekeepers abroad, but as knowledge of ethnic cleansing and Serbian crimes came to light, Germany was forced to debate once again the meaning of ‘never again.’ In the past, the phrase had signaled that German troops would only fight in self-defense, never to engage in foreign conflict. Yet, as Serbian violence against civilians became more pronounced, Germans came to the conclusion that ‘never again war’ must also include a clause for ‘never again Auschwitz.’ Germans felt they had a moral responsibility to prevent another people from suffering a fate similar to the victims of German WWII violence. When confronted with the possibility of genocide and crimes against humanity, Germany was prepared to use force in combat in order to be on the “right side of history” in this case.⁹³ The German left, which had been the strongest opponent against the use of force, was forced to reexamine its position and eventually came to the conclusion that Germany was morally obligated and justified to participate in a humanitarian intervention.⁹⁴

Many German policy makers saw this return to the use of force as the beginning of ‘normalization’ for the nation. The success of post-Soviet unification brought about for the first time in 50 years a positive image of Germany. Germans felt that they had finally achieved their long time goal; “never before in history had Germany been at peace with its neighbours, united, democratic and free [... After decades] Germany had found its place in Europe.”⁹⁵ Germans felt they were finally moving beyond their WWII legacy and “coming of age, becoming more self-confident and assertive.”⁹⁶

⁹³ Ibid., 22.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 21.

⁹⁵ Harnisch, 49.

⁹⁶ Baumann, 66.

Israelis Jews experienced the same war as the Germans but on the opposite side of history as the victims. Once again, the mantra of ‘never again’ was adopted but with a completely different meaning. Israelis were determined to ‘never again’ suffer the horrors their parents and grandparents faced, a lesson that was engrained in the Israeli psyche even before independence. From the beginnings of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Haganah and Palmach, WWII brought a sense of fatality to military strategy that has yet to be abandoned. Although allied and fighting along side the British, Jews feared “being abandoned by the Allies “to be surrounded by Germany and the Arab world facing almost certain death.⁹⁷ If the war had progressed to that point, the Jews of pre-state Palestine were determined to fight until the end rather than be led to the gas chambers. As the ideology of the IDF developed further, soldiers became “Giborei Israel – the heroes of Israel” looking for inspiration in the legendary fighters of Masada and the Warsaw Ghetto willing to defend the Jewish people till death.⁹⁸ This principle only grew stronger as Israelis assessed their own precarious situation in the years after independence. The Holocaust was paramount in shaping the warrior spirit, as the young nation struggled to understand the systematic murder of six million Jews and the continuation of widespread anti-Semitism. Especially in Israel, there was a sense that no matter how far Jews fled or assimilated, it would never be enough to appease hatred against Jews. Military might therefore came to be seen as the only means of protection against global anti-Semitism.⁹⁹ In addition to internalizing the Holocaust, Israel after independence was a state surrounded by hostile nations. Israelis perceived themselves to be “a small island in an

⁹⁷ Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 7.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 145.

⁹⁹ Howard Singer, *Bring Forth the Mighty Men: On Violence and the Jewish Character* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 71.

Arab sea” and despite advantages in technology and weaponry, felt completely outnumbered against an enemy intent on their destruction.¹⁰⁰ Together the threat of Arab violence and consequences of the Holocaust created a mentality of “Ein Breira,” translated as “no choice or alternative,” reflecting the overwhelming belief that the only obstacle between Israel and destruction was the IDF.¹⁰¹

The idea of no other option has taken a leading role in shaping the IDF’s strategy. Most importantly, the IDF is characterized by “an extremely effective and overtly aggressive military” serving as a deterrent against the nation’s hostile neighbors.¹⁰² Due to Israel’s reality as a small, narrow nation, “it became imperative that Israel always attack first.”¹⁰³ With military violence deemed an unavoidable necessity for continued survival, the idea of no other alternative grants the IDF a type of moral justification for violence. This can be seen even in the name of the army - defense forces – as opposed to offense.¹⁰⁴ The IDF views itself as only resorting to self-defense when forced to by an enemy; hatred for an enemy does not serve as the impetus for war.¹⁰⁵ In addition, the original ideology of the IDF prided itself on a “purity of arms.” This doctrine called for the “restricted and cautious use of arms [while] preserving humanistic norms in combat, refraining from unnecessary bloodshed, and avoiding, at all cost, harming civilians in general.”¹⁰⁶ These morals were meant to not only preserve Western ethics but to also

¹⁰⁰ Martin Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 125.

¹⁰¹ Gal, 146.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁰⁴ Israel Tal, *National Security: The Israeli Experience*, trans. Martin Kett (Wesport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 43.

¹⁰⁵ Gal, 147.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 239.

prevent bitterness and personal hatred toward Israelis from their Arab neighbors allowing for the possibility of peaceful relations in the future.¹⁰⁷ In actual warfare, however, these idealistic morals have proven continually challenging to uphold and many would argue they have been violated in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon War, intifadas, and military operations in Gaza and Lebanon.

With military force aimed at preventing the destruction of Israel, times of war have often brought forward feelings of unavoidable danger and fear. These feelings only increased in the Israeli psyche after the June 1967 Six Day War. Once again, Israel felt it was at the brink of extinction. In Tel Aviv, parks were prepared to create mass graves for the tens of thousands expected to die with one official expecting “to dig graves for forty thousand.”¹⁰⁸ For many Israelis, it brought back the feeling of being unable to escape death that had been felt under the Third Reich.¹⁰⁹ War after war with Arab neighbors has left Israelis believing that genuine peace will never follow.¹¹⁰ Israel has been left to face terrorist violence with military power and today is repeatedly condemned by world opinion for excessive violence. Despite international criticism, the lessons of history have taught Israelis that military self-defense is the only means with which they can fulfill the pledge of ‘never again.’

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 239.

¹⁰⁸ Singer, 89.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 91.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 219.

Chapter Six: Acceptance of One Another

There is no question that the Holocaust will never be forgotten; it is a simple fact that history will always remember the actions of Nazi Germany. Even today, 51% of Israeli Jews disagree with the question, “Is it time to forgive the German people and Germany for crimes committed in the Holocaust,” another 19% disagree somewhat and only 23% are willing to forgive the Holocaust.¹¹¹ Yet, Israelis and Jews in general are beginning to look beyond Germany’s Nazi past and in fact seem to favor the nation in various cases. Since the 1970s, Israeli opinion of Germany has steadily become more positive and in general, the Israeli public tends to hold more supportive views of Germany than Israeli politicians or media.¹¹² Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, while Israeli politicians and media spoke of the dangers and possible return of Nazism to a united Germany, the Israeli public was increasingly in favor of reunification. In a March 1990 poll, over “two-thirds of the Jewish Israelis interviewed [...] raised no objections to the unification of Germany” with the younger generation of Israelis expressing even fewer doubts.¹¹³ Even when asked to respond as a diplomatic representative of Israel to the question, “Must Israel be for or against German unification?” polls showed that only 21% of respondents were opposed to unification.¹¹⁴ When specifically asked about the ramifications of German unification to Jews, 34% responded that unification possessed a threat to Jews while 49% disagreed and 17%

¹¹¹ "Poll: Israeli Jews Still Don't Forgive Germany for the Holocaust," *Haaretz*, November 22, 2010, accessed November 22, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/poll-israeli-jews-still-don-t-forgive-germany-for-the-holocaust-1.326030>.

¹¹² Wolffsohn, 60.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 90.

“didn’t know” if united Germany would be a danger to the Jewish people.¹¹⁵ At the time of unification, 40 years after the Holocaust, Israeli public opinion reflected the acceptance of a new Germany beyond associations with the Nazi past.

This increasingly positive association with Germany can clearly be found in tourism trends for both nations. Beginning in the late 1960s, Germans and Israelis increasingly visited one another’s nations. From 1965 to 1966, German tourism to Israel increased by 15% with 13,500 Germans visiting Israel in 1966. In 1965 alone, German youths spent 9,635 nights in Israeli hostels, and the next year the list of Israeli hostels was published in German.¹¹⁶ From 1975 to 1977, German tourism to Israel more than doubled with 110,000 Germans visiting in 1977. Tourism trends to Israel appear to correspond with the political environment. Tourists numbers in general dropped dramatically with outbreaks of violence such as the 1982 Lebanon War and the First Intifada but in the specific case of German tourism, numbers also depend on the strength of the special relationship at the time. As Germans have become more confident in their position as a leading European nation moving beyond the legacy of the Holocaust, German tourism to Israel increased. Yet with Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s 1981 tirade against German Chancellor Schmidt and the German people for their indifference and compliance with the Nazi regime, German tourism to Israel fell dramatically the following years. Even when coupled with the influence of the 1982 Lebanon War, the decrease in German tourism is still far greater than those of other Western European nations. Germans were

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 90.

¹¹⁶ Vogel, 104.

unwilling to travel to Israel due specifically to the decline in bilateral relations. It took until 1987 for the number of German tourists visiting Israel to return to the 1981 level.¹¹⁷

While German tourism to Israel is illustrative of the strength or weakness of the relationship, Israeli tourism is a clear indicator of the public's willingness to treat Germany as any other nation. Beginning in the 1960s, Israeli tourism to Germany began to dramatically increase. Traveling throughout Germany in 1965, Israeli youths spent 26,666 nights in German hostels.¹¹⁸ Germany has continued through the decades to be a leading destination for Israeli tourists. Even in 1983 with the Begin government clearly vilifying Germany as a whole, 131,000 Israelis traveled to the nation. These numbers are remarkable as Israel at the time was financially strained and any travel abroad was a huge financial commitment.¹¹⁹ Today Israelis represent the second largest number of non-Europeans to visit Berlin behind Americans. The director of public relations for Berlin Tourism Marketing reported that in the first half of 2010, Israeli vacations to Berlin increased by almost 25% with 22,531 Israelis visiting.¹²⁰

Along with a thriving supply of Israeli tourists, Berlin has also welcomed large numbers of Israeli immigrants. While exact numbers are uncertain, estimates place 9,000 to 15,000 Israelis in Berlin. For many older Israelis, immigration to Germany was seen as a betrayal and even today the location remains taboo. Growing numbers of young Israelis are attracted to Berlin as a modern, fast-paced cultural capital in the heart of Europe. Many come for work, education and artistic opportunities that are unavailable in Israel.

¹¹⁷ Wolffsohn, 116.

¹¹⁸ Vogel, 104.

¹¹⁹ Wolffsohn, 117-118.

¹²⁰ Findlay, Stephanie, "Why Israelis Love Berlin," *Maclean's*, September 27, 2010, accessed December 2, 2010, <http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/09/22/why-israelis-love-berlin/>.

Berlin is attractive due to the “freedom and space” as well as a more “tranquil [...] relaxed spirit” that many feel Israel lacks.¹²¹ While the past may not define Germany for young Israeli émigrés, many are also drawn to the city in part by family ties. German immigration policy grants citizenship to Jews who fled under the Nazi Regime and extends this to their descendants as well.¹²² Many Israelis of German-Jewish descent claim that while growing up in Israel, they still feel somewhat German and identify with German culture. Often, Israelis living in Berlin speak of their families’ connections to the city citing grandparents’ accounts of happy childhood memories before the Nazis came to power and “abducted” the nation.¹²³ Living in Berlin allows these Israelis the opportunity to visit their family’s past while also enhancing one’s sense of Jewish identity.

Along with a growing Israeli presence in Berlin, Jewish communities across the nation are experiencing a population boom and cultural resurgence. At the end of the Second World War, approximately 6,500 Berlin Jews had survived and were joined by an additional 2,000 concentration camp survivors. Despite calls by international Jewish organizations to leave Germany, the Jewish community remained with many survivors viewing themselves as witnesses whose presence forced Germans to confront the nation’s past. As the bearers of this legacy, many German Jews did view themselves as simply biding their time in Germany, sending their children abroad through Jewish organizations

¹²¹ “Young Israelis are Moving to Berlin in Droves,” *Jerusalem Post*, September 13, 2010, accessed February 12, 2011, <http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=187909>.

¹²² Jane Paulick and Sonia Phainikar, “Young Israelis Flock to Berlin, the City Their Grandparents Fled,” *Deutsche Well*, December 2, 2010, accessed February 12, 2011, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5232943,00.html>.

¹²³ “Young Israelis are Moving.”

to prepare for their eventual departure from Germany. Yet even as later generations did move abroad, many returned to Germany as their home.¹²⁴

By 1989, Germany's Jewish community still survived, but was facing huge demographic concerns. Although the total West German Jewish population numbered 20,000 to 30,000, the majority were elderly citizens and the birthrate continually decreased. The situation was dramatically altered with the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent mass migration of Russian Jews to united Germany.¹²⁵ Under the 1991 'Contingency Refugee Act,'¹²⁶ Germany "grants all Jews from the former Soviet Union citizenship and automatic government benefits."¹²⁷ It is worth noting that originally, Israel opposed Germany's immigration policy toward Soviet Jews. Israelis argued that Soviet Jewry would be granted automatic citizenship in Israel and pressed Germany to make it more difficult for Soviet Jews to immigrate. For Germany, this demand was unreasonable, as it would allow immigration of Soviet refugees yet exclude Jews making it clearly discriminatory with allusions to Germany's Nazi era.¹²⁸ With this policy's implementation, Soviet Jews flocked to Germany and in doing so saved German Jewry from population collapse. Over 190,000 Soviet Jews have immigrated to Germany since 1989 and today make up 85% of Germany's Jewish population. The official Jewish

¹²⁴ Jeffrey M. Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 11.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹²⁶ Olaf Glöckner and Julius H. Schoeps, "Fifteen Years of Russian-Jewish Immigration to Germany: Success and Setbacks," in *The New German Jewry and the European Context: The Return of the European Jewish Diaspora*, ed. Y. Michal Bodemann (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 144.

¹²⁷ Stefan Theil, "The Sweetest Revenge," *Newsweek*, July 14, 2003, accessed December 2, 2010, <http://www.newsweek.com/2003/07/13/the-sweetest-revenge.html>.

¹²⁸ Pól Ó Dochartaigh, "Philo-Zionism as a German Political Code: Germany and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Since 1987," *Debatte* 15 (August 2007): 238.

Community in Germany has 108,000 members with 12,000 of those living in Berlin. Currently, Germany has become an even more popular destination for Soviet Jews than Israel and in 2002, received 19,262 admissions for citizenship while Israel received only 18,878.¹²⁹

For these Soviet Jewish immigrants, the Holocaust does not serve as their primary point of reference toward Germany. Instead of the painful legacy of the Holocaust, Soviet Jewish identity was shaped by discrimination and prejudice at the hands of Stalin with memories of murder and exile to Siberia. From the Soviet perspective, German violence was directed not just at Jews but also against the entire Soviet nation. There have been many instances of Jewish Soviet émigrés in Germany proudly displaying badges earned while serving in the Red Army during WWII. By immigrating to Germany instead of Israel, Soviet Jews enter a financially strong nation whose culture and heritage are much more similar than Israel. Germany's violent history against Jews is today a memory of the past and when faced with the images of suicide bombs and war in Israel, many Soviet Jews consider Germany to be a much safer destination.¹³⁰

From this data, it would seem that when prompted, Jews and Israelis will categorize Germans by their Nazi crimes, but overall, there has been a normalization of relations between the Jewish and German people based on historical ties going beyond the Holocaust. For both nations, tourism allows the other an inside look at a nation that has been continually classified by the legacy of the Holocaust. As Germany's Jewish population strengthens, its growth presents the opportunity for the Jewish present to perhaps eclipse the past violence against German Jews.

¹²⁹ Theil, "The Sweetest Revenge."

¹³⁰ Peck, 42.

Chapter Seven: German and European Foreign Policy Toward Israel

Although Germany has begun to re-embrace nationalism and its role as Europe's leading nation, as of now there have been no serious attempts to alter policy toward Israel. The 1998-2005 Red-Green coalition led by Gerhard Schröder focused heavily on maintaining a "Holocaust-centered memory" in German policies, believing that the Nazi past and its crimes to be an undeniable piece of Germany's national psyche. In the years following the Second World War, Germans publically ceased to celebrate their own national identity, and Schröder worked to promote a German identity once again while at the same time "acknowledging German historical responsibility."¹³¹ The Schröder government was responsible for the completion of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe just a few blocks from the iconic symbols of Germany, the Reichstag and the Brandenburg Gate. Along with the controversial memorial, the Schröder government was also responsible for compensation to forced laborers under the Third Reich. In fully acknowledging Germany's historic legacy, Schröder encouraged nationalism stating that in accepting the past Germans would be "less inhibited" and feel "even more German."¹³² The Red-Green coalition worked against the rising trend to focus on the German victims of the Third Reich that occurred in the early 2000s.¹³³

Under the Schröder government, Israel's needs and German responsibility to the nation remained paramount in German foreign policy. Schröder's ambassador to Israel

¹³¹ Ruth Wittlinger, "The Merkel Government's Politics of the Past," *German Politics & Society* 26, no. 4 (2008): 9-27, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=36638535&site=ehost-live>, 9-10.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 11.

stated that ensuring Israel's survival is a vital piece of Germany's "raison d'état."¹³⁴ Chancellor Schröder echoed these sentiments stating that "Israel gets what it needs" from Germany in order to maintain its security.¹³⁵ All five main German political parties "maintain a political foundation in Israel."¹³⁶ According to Green party member Joschka Fischer, Schröder's Foreign Minister, the continuation of the special commitment to Israel is rooted in Germany's "historical responsibility for the Holocaust [and is] non-negotiable and cannot be qualified."¹³⁷

Current Chancellor Angela Merkel has retained some of her predecessor's policies on integrating Germany's legacy into modern politics but differs significantly in stressing German suffering during the war. Immediately after coming to power, Merkel's coalition worked to institutionalize memorialization of the Third Reich's German victims along with the more traditional victims of Nazi violence. With this, the German government proposed dedicating a site in Berlin to the victims of forced migration and expulsion. Merkel's approach to dealing with Germany's historical legacy is to accept Germany's responsibility:

without attempting to normalize the past, clear appreciation of German suffering [...] as a consequence of Nazi Germany [and] a link between the past, present and future in Germany's historical responsibility on discourse and policy.¹³⁸

Despite the growing trend to recognize the German victims of the Third Reich, Merkel has successfully balanced the remembrance of Germans with Germany's historical legacy

¹³⁴ Dochartaigh, 240.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 240.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 240.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 241.

¹³⁸ Wittlinger, 14.

toward Jews and Israel. Like Schröder, the Merkel government maintains acceptance of the German past as a means to empower Germany in its modern political role.

Merkel has kept the Nazi past as a key element in Germany's policy toward Israel, stating that the relationship is "special and unique" with no plans to normalize relations in the near future. Foreign Secretary Frank Walter Steinmeier reiterated "with no other country [is Germany] linked so inseparably through our history."¹³⁹ Israel remains the only non-European state with which Germany holds joint cabinet meetings. For the 60th anniversary of Israel's independence, Chancellor Merkel brought over half of the German cabinet to Israel for the ceremonies. This trip in March 2008 was Merkel's third visit to Israel in two and a half years. During the trip, Merkel visited Yad Vashem Museum with Israeli President Shimon Peres and members of both governments representing the first time the nations had jointly commemorated the victims of the Holocaust. As the first German head of government to address the Knesset, Merkel stressed the uniqueness of the Holocaust and maintained that German-Israeli relations would continue to be special.¹⁴⁰ Merkel also addressed the growing trend by the European public to view Israel as the largest world threat stressing that European governments must not "fearfully bow to public opinion" against Israel.¹⁴¹ Merkel has continually stressed the severity of Iran's threats against Israel and denial of the Holocaust. She has reiterated on numerous occasions that supporting Israel in speeches is not enough and speeches must be reflected by actual deeds in support of Israel.¹⁴² Economically, Germany is Israel's second largest trading partner with 4.3 billion Euros

¹³⁹ Ibid., 15.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 15.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴² Ibid., 20-21.

of bilateral trade in 2007.¹⁴³ Support of Israel has become an inescapable piece of German foreign policy in the nation's mainstream political parties. The rhetoric of the German leaders would suggest that Germany will not normalize the relationship in the near future, nor does it have the ability to as the relationship forms a vital piece of Germany's reason of state.

Beginning with Israel's occupation of the Palestinian Territories following the 1967 Six Days War and continuing with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, European views of Israel changed dramatically. Israelis became seen as colonizers, with the Palestinians inheriting the previous Jewish role as the victims of racism and oppression.¹⁴⁴ Israel and Europe have maintained differing views on the most important factors in establishing peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Throughout the 1970s, Israel took continued offense to Europe's argument that Palestinian rights were at the center of the conflict, the idea of a Palestinian homeland, and Europe's insistence that a comprehensive agreement would solve the conflict better than Israel's preferred bilateral negotiations.¹⁴⁵ On June 13, 1980, the European Council released its most comprehensive resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Venice Declaration. Israel was highly critical of the Declaration including Europe's insistence at the participation of the PLO in negotiations. Israel once again argued that Europe had no understanding of Israeli security concerns.¹⁴⁶ France has

¹⁴³ "Friends in High Places," *Economist*, March 22, 2008, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/10881121>.

¹⁴⁴ Gershowitz, Suzanne, and Emanuele Ottolenghi. "Europe's Problem with Ariel Sharon." *Middle East Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (2005): 13-23. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=18764051&site=ehost-live> (accessed October 12, 2010), p. 15.

¹⁴⁵ Costanza Musu, *European Union Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Quicksands of Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 38.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

played a leading role in determining the direction of European opinion toward Israel and has, in general, led European diplomatic and economic support of the Palestinian Authority.¹⁴⁷ French disapproval of Israel continued with the 2008 Operation Cast Lead by Israel against Gaza with the French government heavily criticizing Israel's actions. These sentiments were not, however, echoed by all of Europe with the Czech president and Italy classifying the operation as a defensive action provoked by Hamas while the U.K. attempted to establish a ceasefire through diplomatic means.¹⁴⁸

Within the European sphere, Germany's support for Israel has been demonstrated in its neutrality during European criticism of Israel. As early as 1971 with the Schuman Paper, Germany has worked to prevent the publication of EU documents favoring the Arab cause.¹⁴⁹ Although the published Venice Declaration was unfavorable toward Israel, there are claims that Germany prevented an earlier draft from being endorsed, as it was even more critical of the Israelis.¹⁵⁰ Germany has often used its own strong relations with Israel to bridge the distrust and distance between Europe and Israel. With this, Germany has been able to lead peace initiatives on behalf of the EU that otherwise would have been more difficult to implement.¹⁵¹ Although Germany has on a small number of occasions used the European Union as a means to criticize Israel, more often than not, Germany has been Israel's most ardent supporter on the continent. The power of Europe

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 90.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 79.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 31.

¹⁵⁰ Lavy, 197.

¹⁵¹ Musu, 91.

in influencing the Middle East conflict has been inconsequential and a uniform policy has yet to be agreed upon by the European powers.¹⁵²

¹⁵² Lavy, 196.

Chapter Eight: Rising anti-Semitism across Germany and the European Continent

Acutely aware of the consequences of historical anti-Semitism, Germany and Europe as a whole have struggled to differentiate between criticism of Israel and traditional anti-Semitism. The European continent has been much more critical of Israeli policy but these sentiments have also become attached to European Jewish communities as well. For the majority of Europe, Israel has become an international pariah often compared to some of history's worst regimes. Negative European perceptions of Israel began in the aftermath of the 1982 Lebanon invasion coupled with the Sabra and Shatila massacres carried out by Christian Lebanese fighters. From that point, the European left began to view Palestinians as the victims of racism and oppression by Israel.¹⁵³ The majority of Europeans possess an "abiding suspicion of the Jewish state [with] very little empathy for the Israeli situation."¹⁵⁴ Disregarding Israeli security concerns, European diplomats often argue privately that "Israel should make more concessions"¹⁵⁵ with members of the Nobel Prize committee expressing the desire to recall Shimon Peres' prize but not that of his Palestinian counterpart, Yassar Arafat.¹⁵⁶ Of 7,515 EU citizens polled in October 2003, 59% said that yes, Israel was a threat to world peace, ranking the nation first ahead of others such as Iran, China and Russia.¹⁵⁷ 35% of Europeans believe

¹⁵³ Suzanne Gershowitz and Emanuele Ottolenghi, "Europe's Problem with Ariel Sharon," *Middle East Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (2005): 15, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=18764051&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁵⁴ Steven Grlanger, "The World: The Jewish Question; Europe Knows Who's to Blame in the Middle East," *New York Times*, April 7, 2002.

¹⁵⁵ Gershowitz and Ottolenghi, "Europe's Problem," 14.

¹⁵⁶ Grlanger, "The World: The Jewish Question."

¹⁵⁷ Klug, 54.

that the IDF intentionally targets Palestinian civilians with Israeli responses to terrorism being considered “excessive.”¹⁵⁸

Becoming increasingly prevalent throughout Europe is the association of the current Israeli state with Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa. When asked, 35% of European respondents answered that modern Israel is similar to apartheid South Africa. In 2005, the Executive Council of Britain’s Association of University Teachers voted in favor of boycotting two Israeli universities, Bar Ilan and Haifa, with the objective to “end Israel’s occupation, colonization and system of apartheid” in the occupied West Bank.¹⁵⁹ Leading European authors have been especially taken with this comparison. Louis de Bernières wrote, “Israel has adopted tactics which are reminiscent of the Nazis” while Irvine Welsh stated that “Israelis were educated by the Nazis and the Palestinians suffer.”¹⁶⁰ Continuing these sentiments, Benjamin Zaphaniah claimed that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands was “genocide” and Portuguese Nobel laureate José Saramago “compared Ramallah to Auschwitz.”¹⁶¹ Agreeing with these authors, many European media outlets have promoted the association between Israel and the Third Reich. British MP Oona King compared the Gaza Strip to the Warsaw Ghetto in an article published in the United Kingdom’s *The Guardian*. In 2002, the Greek newspaper *Ethnos* featured a caricature depicting two Israeli soldiers looking for Palestinians to torment with one telling the other that Jews went to Auschwitz “to learn,

¹⁵⁸ Gershowitz and Ottolenghi, "Europe's Problem," 13.

¹⁵⁹ Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small, “Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (2006): 548.

¹⁶⁰ Emanuele Ottolenghi, “Making Sense of European Anti-Semitism,” *Human Rights Review* (2007): 117.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* 117.

not to suffer.”¹⁶² The Austrian newspaper *Kleine Zeitung* in 2004 showcased a caricature of two pictures side by side. The first showed an SS soldier and a Jewish child with a burning background. This was a clear illusion to an iconic photo of a Jewish child and SS officer in the Warsaw Ghetto. The other half of the caricature featured the same setting but in this case, the soldier was now Israeli and the child was clearly Palestinian.¹⁶³

Between the European literary world and mass media, comparisons of Israel to the Nazi and apartheid regimes are becoming prevalent in influencing public opinion.

Along with rising levels of anti-Israel sentiments, Europe has also experienced rising levels of anti-Semitism. The Anti-Defamation League’s annual report on European attitudes toward Jews illustrates how rampant anti-Semitic attitudes are across the continent. The 2009 report covered seven European states from Spain to Poland consisting of 35,000 telephone interviews. Across the continent it is widely believed that Jews are more loyal to Israel than their nation of residence with 64% of Spanish and 63% of Polish respondents agreeing this was “probably true.”¹⁶⁴ Following the traditional anti-Semitic stereotype connecting Jews and money, 67% of Hungarian, 56% of Spanish, and 55% of Polish participants agreed it was “probably true Jews have too much power in the business world.”¹⁶⁵ Out of all seven nations surveyed, over 40% of respondents believed this statement to be true. Correspondingly, 74% of Spanish, 59% of Hungarian, and 54% of Polish respondents believed that it was “probably true Jews have too much power in

¹⁶² Ibid. 118.

¹⁶³ Ibid. 118.

¹⁶⁴ “Attitudes Toward Jews in Seven European Countries,” Anti-Defamation League, (February 2009) http://www.adl.org/Public%20ADL%20Anti-Semitism%20Presentation%20February%202009%20_3_.pdf.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

international financial markets.”¹⁶⁶ 44% of all surveyed believed that “Jews still talk too much about [...] the Holocaust” with the largest percentages occurring in Hungary (56%), Poland (55%) and Austria (55%).¹⁶⁷

A European nation’s history with anti-Semitism and the Holocaust directly affects current levels of modern anti-Semitism. Countries that lacked significant anti-Semitism prior to 1945, such as Scandinavia and the U.K., today have much higher levels of anti-Semitism than nations with a historical tradition of anti-Semitism and experienced the Holocaust, including Germany, Poland and Ukraine.¹⁶⁸ The former director of the European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia stated “anti-Semitism is permanently present in Europe in a more or less hidden way.”¹⁶⁹ Jewish communities throughout eight different European Union states have reported fearing for their safety with the chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth, Jonathan Sacks, proclaiming that anti-Semitism today is “directed against Jews as a sovereign people.”¹⁷⁰

Across Europe, increasing levels of anti-Semitism have corresponded with rising levels of violence against Jews. In Belgium, with a Jewish population of 40,000, children attending Jewish schools are frequently harassed and receive police protection. Within one week in 2004, Antwerp reported six anti-Semitic attacks that included the stabbing of

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Werner Bergmann, "Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Europe: A Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Social Issues* 64, no. 2 (2008): 348, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=32073024&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁶⁹ Brian Klug, "Is Europe a Lost Cause? The European Debate on anti-Semitism and the Middle East Conflict," *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, no. 1 (2005): 49, accessed October 12, 2010, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=16336378&site=ehost-live>.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. 51.

a 16-year old Jew, the attempted shooting of three Jewish youths, and a beating that left another youth unconscious.¹⁷¹ At a 2004 conference, with these rising levels of anti-Semitism and violence, a Jewish friend asked Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel when the Jews should leave Europe.¹⁷²

Along with violence stemming from traditional anti-Semitic prejudices, European violence against Jews has become increasingly associated with anti-Israel sentiments. Studies by the Community Security Trust in Great Britain have shown that attacks against Jews directly correspond with coverage of violence in Israel and the Middle East. With the beginning of the Second Intifada, attacks against Jews in the U.K. increased five-fold with 20 reported in September versus the 50 reported in October 2000. Attacks increased in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks and remained above average through October and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. September 2002 saw European governments engaged in heated debates regarding the proposed invasion of Iraq. With this, anti-Semitic attacks rose from 15 in August to 47 and 45 reports in September and October of that year. With the actual invasion of Iraq the following March, anti-Semitic incidents doubled within the next month. Israel's assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed in March 2004 corresponded to 100 anti-Semitic reports as opposed to 28 the month prior. The ICJ's ruling on the Israeli 'security barrier' in June and July 2004 corresponded with 64 and 48 anti-Semitic reports for each month.¹⁷³

As opposed to other European nations, German criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism have not occurred at such high levels, yet still reflect the changing opinion of

¹⁷¹ Raphael Israeli, *Muslim Anti-Semitism in Christian Europe* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 124-125.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁷³ Ottolenghi, 116-117.

the public. By 1990, Israel was ranked lower than China by the German public and its popularity dropped even further with the outbreak of the First Intifada.¹⁷⁴ Traditional anti-Semitic motifs are still present with 50% of Germans polled believing that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the German state. In the same study, 30% answered that Jews do not care about what happens to anyone but their own kind. Even in Germany, a country whose politicians have recognized the Holocaust and Nazi history as a piece of national identity, 58% of respondents in 2002 thought that Jews still talk about the Holocaust too much.¹⁷⁵ Following this trend, a 2009 study by the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence reported that 16.5% of Germans polled fully or partially agreed “Jews have too much influence in Germany” with another 10.9% fully or partially agreeing “Jews are also responsible for their own persecution.”¹⁷⁶

A 2009 annual report by the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of anti-Semitism and Racism illustrated the nature of anti-Semitism and with it anti-Israel sentiments throughout Germany. The institute found that in 2009, 1,520 anti-Semitic incidents were reported. While this data shows a slight increase in the total numbers of incidents reported compared to the previous year, the report found that there was a significant decrease in violent acts against Jews in Germany that year. There are gaps in this data however, as desecrations of Jewish cemeteries and Holocaust memorials, which occur on a near weekly basis throughout Germany, are not included in the data and are instead recorded as vandalism, not anti-Semitic acts.

¹⁷⁴ Wolfssohn, 59.

¹⁷⁵ Bergmann, 348.

¹⁷⁶ “Germany 2009,” The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Anti-Semitism and Race, accessed February 12, 2011, <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2009/germany.html>.

A survey of 45,000 German 9th graders showed that 6.4% hold anti-Semitic views with 14% believing that Jews deserved the Holocaust. Along with these viewpoints, 1 out of 20 teenage boys belong to far-right groups. An October 2009 poll by the German magazine *Der Spiegel* reported that 13% of students attending German army academies in Hamburg and Munich, two leading centers of Jewish life in Germany, agree politically with new rightists. These new rightists believe that the elite should lead Germany and have serious doubts in the parliamentary system. Following these trends, “criminal anti-Semitic acts motivated by ultra-right” political ideology increased from 1,496 to 1,520 throughout Germany in 2009; of these, 242 occurred in Berlin, an increase from the 197 that took place in 2008. This trend is also clear among Muslim youth who possess above average tendencies toward anti-Semitic prejudices. A 2007 survey by the German Ministry of the Interior found that 15.78% of youths with a Muslim background agreed, “Jews are greedy and arrogant.”¹⁷⁷

Following the overall European trend connecting anti-Semitism against European Jews with anti-Israel sentiments, Germany has reported decreases in traditional anti-Semitism while experiencing increases in anti-Zionism. German Jews have increasingly reported feelings of insecurity in general, but these feelings increase during particularly anti-Israel moments by the German public. Scholar Yves Pallade reported that throughout Germany anti-Zionist ideology has become tainted with traditional anti-Semitic thinking. With this new perspective, anti-Zionism and the anti-Semitism found within it has become socially acceptable, especially in German and more broadly, European academia. German anti-Zionist rhetoric, similar to its European counterparts, has come to focus on

¹⁷⁷ “Germany 2009”

the nazification of Israel. These sentiments are found not only in the extreme right and left wing political parties but have also become common in centralist ideologies. In 2004, 51% of Germans felt that Israel's treatment of Palestinians was "not so different from the Nazi treatment of Jews during the Holocaust," and 68% agreed, "Israel is waging a war of extermination against the Palestinians."¹⁷⁸ With the 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, anti-Zionist protests erupted across Germany. In Mainz, a 5,000 strong anti-Israel protest took place with protestors carrying signs asking "Should Gaza become Auschwitz" and invoking the traditional anti-Semitic blood libel in stating "Israel drinks the blood of our children." Counter-protesters carrying an Israeli flag were called "Jewish pigs" by the marchers. Police determined that the Israeli flag was provocation and counter-protesters were forced to remove the flag. Another anti-Israel march occurring only a few days earlier in Berlin featured the same sentiments with protestors chanting "Death to Israel" and "Kick out the Jews." Signs at both protests featured the Star of David, a symbol of both Judaism and Israel, intertwined with the Nazi swastika. At a 2009 showing of Claude Lanzmann's film *Pourquoi Israël*, left-wing protestors set up imitation Israeli checkpoints and chanted on the injustice of the "Jewish pigs."¹⁷⁹ Even in a nation such as Germany, which typically observes extreme sensitivity in associations with the Nazis, public opinion linking Israel and the Third Reich has become all too common.

The increase in anti-Semitism within Germany itself shows a definite change, and the rise in anti-Semitism is a factor that has the possibility to influence German-Israeli politics. Germany has sworn to "never again" allow Auschwitz to be repeated. Yet with

¹⁷⁸ Gershowitz, p. 17.

¹⁷⁹ "Germany 2009"

Israel and Jews now being singled out as an inheritor to Nazi violence by Europe as a whole, one must question how Germany will respond.

Conclusion

The question is not whether a special relationship exists between Germany and Israel; the existing literature has firmly established that relations between the two states are unique. The real matter arises in questioning if the relationship will continue to be defined by the legacy of the Holocaust, Feldman's "exceptionally intense history."¹⁸⁰ Throughout its existence, the relationship has been singular for its basis in both "hard" and "soft" factors with "soft" factors often holding more influence than those based on strategic interests. Israel's other special relationship with the United States formed only after Israel finally became a strategic asset for the United States, not an inconvenience in the Cold War, and has experienced severe challenges over the decades. While the relationship with the United States may be addressed more frequently, the special relationship with Germany is not only decades older, but has proven to be much less volatile in wavering support.

On the Israeli side, the relationship was based more often on both "hard" and "soft" factors. Knowing his nation's financial stress and limitations, Ben-Gurion welcomed the Reparations Agreement from a strategic viewpoint. Israel's power from the "soft" influence of the Holocaust has proven instrumental in the survival of the relationship for what has now been nearly six decades. For Germany, the foundation of the relationship came from "soft" interests. With the advent of the Cold War, Germany had nearly regained its former strategic standing in the Western world, yet Israel was the only country that could begin to grant moral redemption. Thus, aside from a slight boost to its already recovering legitimacy, it had little to gain in "hard" factors from a

¹⁸⁰ Feldman, 262.

relationship with Israel. The memory, symbolism and psychological effect of the Holocaust were so great that Germany was, and has continued to be, willing to sacrifice its own strategic interests for the continuation of the Israeli relationship and with it, gain some small recovery from its crimes.

The “soft” power of the Holocaust has continued to be the most influential aspect of the relationship. While Germany has occasionally wavered in its support for Israel, the two nations have never experienced a disagreement large enough to end the alliance. Germany’s relations with the Arab world collapsed in response to its weapon deal with Israel, yet the relationship remained. Although German scientists violated no laws by working for Egypt, the German government still acted to end the scientific arrangement. Israeli horror from the project did not come from the fact that foreign scientists were working for Egypt, but from the idea of German scientists working on weapons that could once again be used to kill Jews too soon after the Holocaust to be permissible. Even after Israeli agents harmed and murdered some of the scientists, the “soft” power of the Holocaust prevented Germany from loudly protesting Israel’s actions and instead quickly brought the scientists home. The influence of “soft” factors further continued in the established ties between the two nations. Along with traditional “hard” areas of cooperation that include military and economic aid, the strength of the relationship can be seen in the “soft” areas of collaboration between the two. This includes the youth and scientific exchanges that feature greatly in defining the relationship as unique. It is these programs that allow Israelis and Germans to understand their intense historical bond that surpasses strategic importance and instead places the most value on repairing relations between the two people.

From the data and studies collected examining the perceptions of each people on one another, it would appear that these “soft” programs have been successful in rationalizing and humanizing both Israelis and Germans beyond historical prejudices. Yet even as both people have accepted one another in a modern context, disparities remain. Germans, both the people and government, accept their nation’s role as the perpetrators of the Holocaust and with it the death and suffering of millions. Yet, the German people as a whole have shunned the idea of bearing personal responsibility for the Third Reich’s crimes. For Israelis, attempts to move beyond the Holocaust and interaction with Germany have been a much more difficult process. Therein lies the main difference in the memory and legacy of the Holocaust in both cultures. Germans have accepted their nation’s responsibility for the Nazi regime and its crimes, but have maintained a personal distance from individual responsibility of the violence. Both the German people and the government have spurned the idea of collective identity and with it collective guilt. For Israel, the nation has taken an entirely different approach to integrating the Holocaust within national identity. In this case, collective identity is the basis of Israeli culture. Even if one’s family did not suffer directly under the German Third Reich, the Holocaust has become an integral part of the Israeli psyche. While Germans would prefer to leave their guilt in the past, both the Israeli public and government, although willing to appreciate Germany beyond its Nazi past, at no time in the near future will be able to view Germany as simply another European nation.

With Israel holding firm to its expectations of a special relationship, it is Germany that has experienced the most change in the last two decades and is the most likely to alter the relationship’s nature. The rising levels of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism across

Germany and Europe illustrate increasing displeasure with Israel that is associated with European Jews as well. Europe takes pride in no longer being a continent marred by near constant war and killings, yet mentions of the Holocaust exemplify Europe's pained past that most would prefer to not mention. Also influential is the rising trend to classify Israel as the heir of Nazi Germany itself. Weakening support of Israel by the German public appears to be directly related to the image of Israel as a genocidal occupier. This trend should be considered in relation to Germany's growing use of military force. The most common motivation for German use of force on foreign soil is the occurrence of crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide. Germany, as the nation responsible for the Holocaust, feels that it has a moral obligation to intervene to protect human life and in doing so, right a small part of its troubled past. This policy is in direct conflict with the general opinion that Israel is in fact the nation most like the Nazi regime in crimes committed against the occupied Palestinian people. If one believes that Israel's policies are equal to those of Nazi Germany, then according to German policy, the nation would have no choice but to withdraw its support of Israel and fulfill its moral obligation to people suffering under occupation and ethnic cleansing, in this case, the Palestinians.

Despite growing public displeasure, the German government has made no attempts to weaken the special relationship. In fact, German politicians are currently even more explicit in classifying the relationship as a vital piece of Germany's foreign policy. For decades, German politicians argued that the establishment of formal diplomatic relations signaled a normalization of the relationship. Today there appears to be no hesitation by the German government in stating that Germany's actions will first and foremost always support Israel's sovereignty and right to exist. Even beyond foreign

policy, the German government is far more pronounced than the people in placing the Holocaust within the nation's collective identity. Recent governments have stressed the necessity of accepting the Nazi era, thus allowing Germany to continue forward and once again embrace nationalism. While the relationship has existed between two nations, much more has been required of Germany and the government seems to have no interest in altering this.

Currently, Israel has no motivations for bringing about an end to the special relationship. Israel is able to rely on Germany to have its best interests in mind while facing an increasingly hostile Europe. Therefore, if the relationship were to come to an end, it would be most logically at Germany's will. In establishing ties and reparations with Israel, Germany attempted to repay its moral obligation to the Jewish people and regain standing in the Western world while gaining little in return strategically. For nearly sixty years, Germany has supported Israel's strategic interests politically, economically and militarily working to right the past as much as possible. While arguments may be made for or against a nation's ability to ever fully atone for genocide, Germany has retaken its role as a leading nation both politically and economically; its policies regarding military force and acceptance of the Nazi era demonstrate a clear attempt to accept responsibility and change ideologies. Even so, the German government has displayed no suggestions that it might attempt to bring about an end to the special relationship. With this lack of interest by the German government, it must be concluded that any change in policy toward Israel will be the result of public pressure on the ruling party. As the German public becomes more and more critical of Israel's policies and increasingly unwilling to live with the guilt of their grandparents' generation, it will be

the German people who demand an end to the special relationship. It should be noted however, that when directly confronted with the horrors of the Nazi era, German youths experience feelings of guilt that they must express to their Israeli counterparts. On a deeply internalized level, even two generations after the war, when pressed, Germans do feel responsibility and remorse for their forefathers' actions.

In determining whether or not the relationship will continue through the 21st century, there is not a concise answer agreed upon by both the German public and government. The enormity of the Holocaust has created a relationship much stronger than almost all would have expected. The "soft" power resulting from this shared history shows no signs of weakening with both governments pledging a continuation of the relationship. The German government has taken the lessons of WWII and used them to foster and support ties to Israel as a fellow victim of the Third Reich. Because of this, if continued under solely governmental control, the special relationship will continue into the 21st century. Yet the war's same lessons have been embraced by the German people as well, and with this new viewpoint, Israel has come to be viewed as an international pariah undeserving of the "new" Germany's support. If public opinion continues to rise against Israel, the German government may have no choice but to implement substantial changes in the special relationship, perhaps going as far as to end the alliance with the backing of the German people. The strength of the relationship has always been rooted in the historical intensity of the Holocaust; it is only with a decrease in this intensity that the relationship will be changed. Even with decreased public support and increased vilifying of Israel, the legacy of the Holocaust could very well prove to still be strong enough to maintain the relationship in the eyes of the German public.

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