"Out of and out of, out of an, out of": Language Space and Stein's "Objects" and "Rooms."

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Recommended Citation
deBurlo, Winn, ""Out of and out of, out of an, out of": Language Space and Stein's "Objects" and "Rooms." (2013). Undergraduate Honors Theses. 531.
https://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses/531
“Out of and out of, out of an, out of:” Language Space and Stein’s “Objects” and “Rooms.”
An Honors Thesis by Winn deBurlo.
English Department of the University of Colorado, Boulder.
Defended November 7th, 2013.

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I am interested in language as an art form, as a material—and perhaps even sculptural—medium. Although this interest began with poetry and prose, I learned very quickly that the most interesting works were those that did not take literary practice as a given, but rather as an experimental means to question the possibilities and limits of language itself. This ultimately led to an obsession with the burgeoning field of conceptual poetics, which engages with questions of language as art and the limits of its mediums.

My thesis project grew out of my explorations into these questions of limits. I began with the question “how does one really say nothing?” It seems like a fairly simple question at first, but it is not one that is easy to answer. After all, in English, negation is accomplished by the addition of auxiliaries like “not” to modify positive statements into negative ones; this seems somewhat contradictory: how do we arrive at less by adding more? Is it possible to ever represent absence?

My research into this topic led me to realize that absence was simply a function of syntactic space. I realized that words that only have structural functions (e.g. deictics, prepositions, & common adverbs like “not”) functioned like a series of interposed spaces which either included each other or excluded each other. This is to say that I found that these words do not have stable referents like nouns, but rather change meaning based on their spatial relationships with other words. This means that their meaning is between words, in the spaces, or perhaps absences, of what they refer to. Perhaps this sounds somewhat vague at the moment, but I will gradually build a more detailed picture of it throughout the essay.

My project is about exploring this “betweenness” through both a theoretical approach and a more practical approach. The first half of the project is a formal essay discussing these issues...
of syntactical space of language as they pertain to the historical treatment of space in language and its treatment in Mallarmé’s *Un coup de dés* and Gertrude Stein’s *Tender Buttons*. The second half of the project seeks to demonstrate and elaborate on the theoretical models presented in the first part by putting them into practice. The “Objects” section of *Tender Buttons* will be subjected to a series of erasures, beginning with nouns and extending through verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, until we arrive at the bare structure of Stein’s sentences. The “Rooms” section of *Tender Buttons* will be parsed by Stanford’s Natural Language Parser, and the resulting parenthetical representations\(^1\) of the sentences will be erased leaving only the parentheses, showing, again, how the grammar of the work is an intricate space. These works will be presented as an artist’s book that seeks to justify my claim that language is a spatial medium.

1. Constructing the Space of Language.

Ancient Greek mathematicians are often reproached for their inability or unwillingness to conceive of zero as a number. For them, mathematics was a language of presence and, as David Foster Wallace suggests in his popular mathematical history, *Everything and More: A Compact History of Infinity*, pure abstractions like absence or infinity were incompatible with this vision. In this language of presence, every number had to refer to or be represented by some geometrical figure. We might liken this to the type of “primitive language” which Ludwig Wittgenstein introduces as an example in §2 of *Philosophical Investigations*:

That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours. ... The language is meant to serve for communication between

\(^1\) e.g. “This is not a sentence.” becomes: “(ROOT (S (NP (DT This)) (VP (VBZ is) (NP (DT a) (ADJP (RB not) (DT a)) (NN sentence))) (.)})”
a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words “block,” “pillar,” “slab,” “beam.” A calls them out;—B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.—Conceive this as a complete primitive language.

In this geometricentric worldview, “block” only has meaning due to its connection with the actual building block in the same way that “6” only has meaning due to its description of, say, a diameter (Wallace, 44). In these primitive languages, everything must operate according to substitutions: values substitute for figures; words substitute for objects. It is as though the impossibility of absence necessitates that some figure always rush in to fill the space.

However, in order to avoid equivocating, we have to take a brief detour to distinguish between two types of space. The first is the geometric conception of space which denies absence and time. Zeno’s infamous paradoxes arose as a function of this denial; if an object in motion must traverse an infinite number of points on a line then it cannot possibly reach its destination, and yet it does. This geometric paradox would not be resolved until continuity (i.e. time) could be represented mathematically by calculus (Wallace, 48–53). The second conception of space is the more modern-physical idea of time as being simply a dimension of space. For example: as long as you have two points you have a duration suspended between those points. If you see a video of a broken mirror magically knitting itself back together, you know that the film is being played in reverse; the space defined by the mirror’s parts is dependent on time. We are capable of hitting a target with an arrow because we do so in time as well as space. The bricks and blocks in Wittgenstein’s example are not only spatially displaced from the builders, but also temporally, and the construction that they are working on will require their placement as part of a temporal
series. Pythagoras’ famously wrong denial of the existence of irrational numbers is a denial of the space between numbers, a denial of the interdependence of space and time.

We can find a parallel between this space and the space of language in Roman Jakobson’s famous essay “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,” where he claims that a language requires both metaphor and metonymy (which, as we will see, are equivalent to space and time respectively). Jakobson introduces this with a distinction between combination and selection:

Any linguistic sign involves two modes of arrangement: (1) Combination. Any sign is made up of constituent signs and/or occurs only in combination with other signs. This means that any linguistic unit at one and the same time serves as a context for simpler units and/or finds its own context in a more complex linguistic unit. Hence any actual grouping of linguistic units binds them into a superior unit: combination and contexture are two faces of the same operation. (2) Selection. A selection between alternatives implies the possibility of substituting one for the other, equivalent in one respect and different in another. Actually, selection and substitution are two faces of the same operation. (119)

Here, combination is the temporal, metonymic, and contextual aspect of a language; it is analogous to the temporal sequence that Wittgenstein’s builders must follow. Selection is the spatial principle that builder A must use when he chooses between blocks, pillars, slabs and beams; that is, he chooses which fits into the appropriate space within the series of successive spaces. If selection and substitution are in fact the same operation it is because they are both operating in this spatial manner by filling in absences. A paragraph below this, we see the issue of presence and absence brought up with respect to these distinctions:

In order to delimit the two modes of arrangement we have described as combination and selection, de Saussure states that the former “is in presentia: it is based on two or several terms jointly present in an actual series,” whereas the latter “connects terms in absentia as members of a virtual mnemonic series” (p. 123). That is to say, selection (and, correspondingly, substitution) deals with entities conjoined in the code but not in the given message, whereas, in the case of
Here, we find presence aligned with time and absence aligned with space. This reiterates the idea that a word fills a gap created by the absence of that which it refers to. However, we must remember that time always still exists in the absence of an object, and this is why combination is said to be present. Jakobson continues to refine these distinctions into “similarity” and “contiguity,” which are also defined along the lines of space and time. Jakobson quotes Hughlings Jackson and describes how an incapacity for one or the other of these processes leads to aphasia:

> It is not enough to say that speech consists of words. It consists of words referring to one another in a particular manner; and, without a proper interrelation of its parts, a verbal utterance would be a mere succession of names embodying no proposition. (1868:66)

Impairment of the ability to propositionize or, generally speaking, to combine simpler linguistic entities into more complex units, is actually confined to one type of aphasia, the opposite of the [similarity disorder]. ... This contexture-deficient aphasia which could be termed the “contiguity disorder,” diminishes the extent and variety of sentences. The syntactic rules organizing words into higher units are lost; this loss, called “agrammatism,” causes the degeneration of the sentence into a mere “word heap,” to use Jackson's image (1866). ... As might be expected, words endowed with purely grammatical functions, like conjunctions, prepositions, pronouns, and articles, disappear first, giving rise to the so-called telegraphic style, whereas in the case of a similarity disorder they are the most resistant. (Jakobson, 126)

The “so-called telegraphic style” is precisely the type of primitive, nounal language which Wittgenstein’s builders use. These builders are not capable of using sentences because they lack the capacity for metonymy, or contiguity; they are like aphasics who can only use a substitutive similarity. Everything in the geometricentric worldview had to be reduced to a substitution for a concrete referent, and this meant it was effectively the victim of a contiguity disorder. The
inability to use the absence between figures was a form of agrammatism. One telling example is that of the “heptadecagon,” a 17-sided regular polygon:

A polygon is said to be regular if its sides all have the same length and its angles are all equal. Constructing a regular polygon with $n$ sides amounts to dividing an angle of $360^\circ$ into $n$ equal parts. The ancient Greeks were able to construct, with straightedge and compass, regular polygons with 3 sides and 5 sides, but were not able to construct one with 7 sides. ... No further progress was made on the problem of constructing regular polygons for over 2000 years until in 1796 the nineteen year old Carl Friederich Gauss amazed the mathematical world by constructing a regular polygon with 17 sides. He did this by showing that the equation $x^{17} - 1 = 0$ can be reduced to a finite set of quadratic equations. So the regular polygon with 17 sides can be constructed with straightedge and compass. Gauss showed, furthermore, that a regular polygon with $n$ sides can be constructed whenever $n$ is a prime number of the form: $n = 2^{2k} + 1$ for some integer $k \geq 0$. (Jones, Morris, & Pearson, 1–4)

Because the Greeks could only use straightedges and compasses, they were bound by the two-dimensional lines of their own figures and could not construct a regular polygon with an odd number of sides over 5. Gauss, on the other hand, didn’t even need to construct the figure to prove that it could be done; it was an abstract proof of a concrete figure. This programmatic abstraction allowed him to generalize that any odd-sided regular polygon could be constructed if it met certain requirements.

It was not as though the heptadecagon was a spatial unreality; it was simply that the geometers were thinking in terms of form, when they should have been thinking about space. The avoidance of time, zero, and irrationals, made it impossible for Greek mathematicians to invent an axiomatic system (a grammar) like algebra. Algebra, and later calculus, were successful languages because they used both similarity and contiguity and thus accounted both for figures and the space-time between them. Using an axiomatic system—a grammar—where the condition of truth was the result of the contiguity of rules (i.e. functions) and not the
substitution of symbol for object, Gauss succeeded in making the heptadecagon more real than a series of lines in the sand. This is to say that his series of quadratic equations (which cannot strictly be called objects) were, in a sense, the negative space around the lines. It is this reversal, this renunciation of form and object which allows us to reify the heptadecagon, and we will see that it is also what allows language to function. After all, Wittgenstein’s builders’ job is to assemble a structure, not simply move objects from one place to another.² As is such, in this study we will be paying more attention to the space between things.

2. From Line to Field.

Such axiomatic systems are what Wittgenstein ends up calling “language-games”:

But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols,” “words,” “sentences.” And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.) Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (Wittgenstein, §23)

Wittgenstein’s insistence on use, with his emphasis on the gerund “speaking” and the phrase “an activity, or a of form of life” is, essentially, an appeal to the type of contiguity demonstrated by the heptadecagon example: in order to be an accurate representation of the world, a grammar must include both time and space; it must be a motion, an act, a verb, a continuity. Later in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein will explicitly state this:

Perhaps you say: two can only be ostensively defined in this way: “This number is called ‘two.’” For the word “number” here shows what place in language, in

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² Perhaps not coincidentally, this is what metaphor literally means in Greek: μεταφορά < μετα- meta- prefix (denoting change, transformation, permutation, or substitution) + φορά carrying. (OED)
grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word “number” must be explained before the ostensive definition can be understood.—The word “number” in the definition does indeed show this place; does show the post at which we station the word. ... So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use—the meaning—of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear. (Wittgenstein, §29–30)

In this passage we see Wittgenstein presenting the tension between space and time (metaphor and metonymy, respectively). He begins with the nounal “place in language,” the space into which things can be substituted, and then proceeds into the prepositional time in which meaning happens: “before the ostensive definition.” The “post at which we station the word” combines these into a complete verb phrase in which the space (the post) is connected to the time (we station) via a preposition (at which).

A game always includes time as well as space; in chess, one proceeds across a grid, a space. Figure is inadequate on its own, without this procession. This is analogous to Chomsky’s innovative realization that “a simple model of language as a finite state Markov process that produces sentences from left to right is not acceptable, and that such fairly abstract linguistic levels as phrase structure and transformational structure are required for the description of natural languages” (Chomsky, 106). We can see how the semantic inclination of Chomsky’s terms resonates with Wittgenstein’s statements as we move from the static “phrase” structure to the fluid “transformational” and from the machinic and prescriptive “finite state Markov process” to the “abstract” strata of “natural languages.”

This realization of the implicitness of time and metonymy leads to a very different syntactical understanding of meaning, which we might call interstitial, or between. That is—to take one of Sol Lewitt’s “Sentences” out of

3 “The machines that produce languages in this manner are known mathematically as ‘finite state Markov processes’” (20). In the same way Wittgenstein begins his text by showing the inadequacy of “primitive” descriptions of language, Chomsky too begins by refuting these Markov machines, which he calls an “elementary” linguistic theory.
context—we must not confuse numbers with mathematics.\textsuperscript{4} Mathematics is not made of numbers, it is made of relationships between numbers. A sentence is not made of words, it is made of the relationship between words. This is what Chomsky’s famous “colorless green ideas sleep furiously” example demonstrates;\textsuperscript{5} the sentence may be meaningless insofar as it does not refer to any possible referent, but it is nonetheless a functioning sentence because the words are in their proper spaces. A sentence is not a simple loop like those found in the “elementary” Markovian diagrams,

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{image.png}
\end{center}

but rather a complex field of stratified and interposed spaces:

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{image2.png}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{4} “16. If words are used, and they proceed from ideas about art, then they are art and not literature, numbers are not mathematics.” (Sentences on Conceptual Art” (1968))

\textsuperscript{5} Literally speaking, he only uses it to show that “grammar is autonomous and independent of meaning, and that probabilistic models give no particular insight into some of the basic problems of syntactic structure” (17). However, he does so to indicate the inability of the overly figurative and two-dimensional (qv. his diagrams on pg. 19) Markov machines to describe the “deeper” structures of syntax.
This is, of course, a rather dramatic reduction of “Synthetic Grammar,” but for our purposes it is sufficient to say that a sentence is not a line, it is a space.

The “words endowed with purely grammatical functions” from Jakobson’s above quote are the obvious example of this betweenness of meaning. A preposition, for instance, refers merely to a relationship between things; it itself does not exist as an actual object. In “The Reality Effect,” Roland Barthes makes much ado about the noun “barometer” in the following sentence from Flaubert’s “Un Cœur Simple”: “an old piano supported, under a barometer, a pyramidal heap of boxes and cartons.” For Barthes, the sheer arbitrariness and narrative pointlessness of the barometer points to the emptiness of the sign:

The disintegration of the sign—which seems indeed to be modernity’s grand affair—is of course present in the realistic enterprise, but in a somewhat regressive manner, since it occurs in the name of a referential plenitude, whereas the goal today is to empty the sign and infinitely to postpone its object so as to challenge, in a radical fashion, the age-old aesthetic of “representation.” (Barthes, 148).

I would like, however, to point to the preposition in the sentence: “under.” Where the barometer may point to the absence of any concrete object in the novel, “under” does so in any context; it always refers to a space between things, a space that never exists. The higher valence of abstraction, the pure emptiness of “under” allows it to be placed between any two objects and totally alter their relationship without ever changing itself. Like time, the preposition may appear between two points, but it also remains outside of—well, just that: outside of. This is to say that the meaning happens outside of a sentence and is still dependent on the form of that sentence in the same way that time could be theoretically outside of space, but is not experimentally isolable.

This brings up G.E. Lessing’s famously bad but incredibly popular distinction between art and poetry: “The rule is this, that succession in time is the province of the poet, co-existence
in space that of the artist” (Lessing, 109). We can’t blame Lessing, who was confined to a Newtonian world-view, but we also cannot entertain his conclusions in the context of the post-einsteinian 21st century. We can see how this formula partakes of the historical dissolution of time and space. Here, painting is conceived of as agrammatical and poetry as being chained by its linearity. We should notice here how this conception of the aspatiality of language arts and the atemporality of painting conforms to Jakobson’s two forms of aphasia, where painting is conceived of as lacking the temporality of metonymy and language as lacking the spatiality of metaphor. Obviously, this is a flawed view because a functioning language is a result of both similarity and contiguity, of metonymy and metaphor. Sentences are not chains, they are fields. Anybody who has constructed a parse tree is aware of this. As we noted before, if you have two points you have time in the form of an inferred line between the points. This is not a line in a purely figurative, geometrical sense like the metaphorical line or chain in Steiner’s discussion of narrative (which we can associate with Chomsky’s Markovian chains), but simply a conceptual space. A traditional painting has, if nothing else, at least four points. A canvas is a duration; this prescription of space as a medium for an art event is as temporal as spatial. Lessing’s conception of an atemporal art is simply physically impossible.

Even this description, however, ignores the intractability of the second dimension itself. It seems totally unreasonable to expect an animal that has spent its entire cognitive life immersed in three-dimensionality to suspend this reality entirely. The second dimension is only a token of the type of “dimension”; it is merely a part that is metonymically linked to the whole that is our three (or four dimensional, if you accept time as a dimension) experience. Are we supposed to pretend we are not standing in a room when we view paintings—much less a room in a museum
created expressly for the commodification of viewing such paintings? In the case of oil paintings especially, the image we see is the result of a complex refraction and reflection happening within the crystalline layers of paint. The refractive web cast through the image adds depth and duration. Its stillness is not a fact, but rather an mere effect of the speed of light. If we looked at the same thing happening in a glass of water, we would know it was three-dimensional, so why is it not so with painting? Even the act of seeing is inevitably three-dimensional. Light is refracted by the cornea, depth of field is adjusted by the pupil, and information is transduced in a complex chemical cascade (Neuroscience, “The Formation of Images on the Retina: Phototransduction”).

Whether with respect to the word or to the image, the effect this obviously arbitrary distinction has is a fixation on form; in each case, the denials of time or space, respectively, serve as a figure/ground distinction; we are asked to consider the subject of the image as apart from the background it is “placed” upon, and this equivalent to conceiving of nouns as being separate from the grammatical system to which they belong. Space as we have defined it is not the differentiation of space from time or the figure from the ground, but rather the realization of their unity. In creating this dissolution, figure/ground fixation fails to acknowledge the role of metonymic relationships; tokens are part of a type only with respect to the distance between them. This is again and again to confuse numbers with mathematics.

3. Language Space and Pictorial Space.

The fixation on form and its concurrent aphasic denial of betweenness and conceptual space is as much a hobble on painting and language arts as geometricentrism was on mathematics. It was precisely the arbitrariness of this hard figure/ground distinction which
experimental artists of the turn of the century were reacting to. From the early days of cubism to the “antiretinal” works of Duchamp, plastic arts became more and more concerned with including time, and language arts more concerned with space. This literary shift is best demonstrated by Mallarmé’s *Un coup de dés*. In the same way that Duchamp fragments the human body in *Nude Descending a Staircase* to reveal the metonymic temporality of painting, Mallarmé fragments text to emphasize the spatiality of language. Johanna Drucker contextualizes *Un coup de dés* as a move towards a visual “presentational” work, rather than a literary “representational” work:

One of the effects of this is to provide a spatial illusion, as if the elements of language achieved their relative size on the page by a contrast of real, physical weight and the optical effect of distance. As in the case of a stellar constellation, the appearance of the words as figures on a flat plane seems to be the result of their having been schematicized on a single picture plane, rather than of their actually existing in the same spatial plane. Thus the changes in size create an illusionistic space as well as a graphic and abstract *espace* within the white blankness of the page. (Drucker, 53–55)

In Mallarmé’s typographical innovations, the blankness of the page is, perhaps for the first time in literary history, made explicitly constitutive of the work. Mallarmé’s graphicalization is a radical refusal of G.E. Lessing’s prescription. Informed by his work as a magazine editor and designer at a time when popular media first began to threaten the cultural authority of Art, Mallarmé reacts with a stunning synthesis of the two.

The constellation metaphor is especially apt; although language appears to be flat, still and silent on the page, it inhabits a conceptual space deeper than we can imagine. All we have to do to realize this is watch how the space between these objects changes over time, perspective, and situation; Mallarmé’s text is one such study in parallax, especially considering the number of revisions and recontextualizations it has undergone in the last 99 years since it was first
published in 1914. It is interesting that Mallarmé died before he ever saw *Un coup de dés* published according to his elaborate prescriptions because this caused it to be published in the same year as *Tender Buttons*. Even more interesting is that he also died “imagining a work that exists in multiple media simultaneously, though his poetics and essays argue incessantly for the specific materiality of the linguistic signifier and the importance of the book edition for that materiality. In his preparatory notes for *Le Livre*, his unfinished last work and great fantasy of the multimedia synesthetic work, he computes prices for both performances and editions” (Haidu, 65). Here, Haidu is pointing towards a fundamental ambiguity in Mallarmé’s scheme which we see in Drucker’s discussion as well:

> The spatial and visual manipulation of the poetic text desired by Mallarmé in *A Throw of the Dice* embodies a curious paradox. On the one hand this poem, the most hermetic of Mallarmé’s works, was the expression of his desire to “… break away completely from the phenomenal world and toward a poetry of absolute purity.” But on the other hand, in the process of bringing forth an idea in form in order to render it perceptible, Mallarmé invested in a highly material practice. He manipulated the typographic form, paying close attention to its visual features, spatial distribution, and capacity to organize the text into a hierarchized figural order.

Although he conceived of his work as breaking free from convention and prescription into an abstract poetical space, he did so using the material and ultimately pictorial technology of print. In the same way that the ancient science of astrology sought to describe the forms of the stars only to eventually prompt the discovery that they are actually as far away and unconnected as they could possibly be, Mallarmé’s investigation does not arrive at a more pure or essential word, but some ambiguous place between the ordinary world of the newspaper and the abstract space he was reaching out for. This is because the overtly pictorial figuration of the constellation never breaks out of the second dimension as long as it continues to deny the space of grammar:
Antimaterial though he may have been in his intentions, his means, in this work, suggest the possibilities for a materially investigative practice. ... This figuration is a kind of bringing forth, an appearance, that is radically antigrammatical. It does not derive from syntax or the tropes of speech which normally form a figure or image within language, but rather from the effect of language arranged to make a form independent of the grammatical order of the words. This arrangement is reinforced in the spatial distribution of the words on the page, but also, against the expectations of normative linguistic order. This concept of figuration belongs properly to the presentational rather than to the representational—to that order of visual and verbal manifestation which claims to bring something into being in its making, rather than to serve to represent an already extant idea, form, thought, or thing. (Drucker, 51–52, 55, 59)

With such an agrammatical approach Mallarmé can not meet the expectations which we have drawn thus far. This project may be a significant challenge to G.E. Lessing’s formula as an attempt to spatialize language, but it does so at the expense of temporizing space. By resorting to the conventions of the pictorial and the graphic though his obsessive formatting and typographical experimentation, Mallarmé did not consider whether space could be found within language itself. I would like to contend that this creates a sense of incompleteness in *Un coup*, which has prompted so many artists to do revisions, extensions, erasures, and extrusions of Mallarmé’s text.

In 1969, Marcel Broodthaers picked up this work, in the absence of its author, and took its material paradox to its next level by systematically erasing the words and replacing them with black bars, thereby filling Mallarmé’s incomplete space with even more incompleteness:

Broodthaers’ exhibit, translating *Un coup de dés* into various two- and three-dimensional media, asks what it means to claim a single icon for both contemporary art and poetics, and does so by examining a work that ambiguously straddles questions of medium, technology, and authorship. ... Broodthaers does not reproduce a single poem of Mallarmé’s in its entirety. Indeed, language barely appears in the exhibit, surviving only in the form of a few partially erased chalk-written lines of *Un coup de dés* on three shirts. Instead, the exhibit allows a range of supports and conventions to relay the absence of Mallarmé’s poem, and sets up tensions through the qualities of each medium used. ... Across the opposing
qualities of these media—across surface and groove, silence and sound, opacity and transparency—the words of the poem are repeatedly lost. The nonequivalence between registers of text, image, and spoken language addresses the specificity of each support and the historical conditions for reading, viewing, and listening. In this way the materiality of language is made dialectical across the space of the exhibit. (Haidu, 65, 70–71)

Here we see Mallarmé’s attempt at reaching a post-phenomenal world achieved by the total erasure and dematerialization of his work. However, this radical reversal was apparently not enough, as Michelet Pichler found it necessary to turn these black bands into actual cut-outs capable of being “read” by a player piano. The fact that Broodthaers and Pichler found it necessary to include the depth of the book itself by using transparency (Broodthaers in the form of the transparent paper and Pichler in the form of the cuts) points to a feeling of inadequacy in the two-dimensionality of Mallarmé’s text. The author of the most recent revision of Un Coup, Eric Zboya, has also picked up on this illusionistic constellational metaphor and its detriments and tried, through “extrusion” rather than erasure, to expose the higher dimensionality of Mallarmé’s text. Note Zboya’s simultaneous emphasis on “the annihilation of syntax” and “higher-dimensionality” in his summary of Un Coup and his revision of it:

Within this continuum, these textual structures form constellations of signification, all of which possess the ability to transcend margins, change shape, and exist in an almost infinite realm of possibility (14). In essence, Un Coup de dés exemplifies a kind of dimensional transcendence. ... The poem describes the aftermath of a shipwreck—a shipwreck that signifies, on a textual level, the annihilation of syntax in which the vessel’s semantic debris drifts aimlessly, chaotically, within the space of the page. According to Robert Greer Cohn, Un Coup de dés represents “one of the most indecipherable pieces of writing in any literature” (3) in the history of poetry due to the abstract, higher-dimensional conceptions and semantic fragmentations that permeate the text—conceptions and fragmentations that syntactically shatter the rules associated with the art of reading. ... I illustrate these ideas through a trio of my own three-dimensional translations. The first of these translations employ computer-generated, multidirectional typography to help accentuate the three-dimensionality of the text. The second translation showcases the text as a set of computer generated, stereoscopic
projections—three dimensional images that elevate the text off the flat, two-dimensional page. The third translation consists of computer-generated, algorithmic extrusions—mathematical translations that render each page as a dimensional entity within its own spatial environment. Together, these translations explore other untapped veins of spatial signification in *Un Coup de dés*, while remaining faithful to the higher dimensionality suggested by the themes of the text. (Zboya, 2–3)

The “untapped veins of spatial signification” are the result of a spatial incompleteness caused by the incompatibility of higher-dimensionality and a-syntacticality. Since this agrammatism is a denial of contiguity and thus the interdependence of time and space, Zboya seeks to reconcile this disparity with his graphic “extrusions.” In each case of these revisions we see increasingly involute attempts at reaching a non-Euclidian hyperspace by extenuating the medium a little further. From Broodthaers’s redaction of the text and etherealization of the page, to Pichler’s utter erasure of the text and re-materialization of the page, to Zboya’s total dematerialization through translation into digital information, we have a perplex series of reversals and inversions that threaten never to end. Despite the elegance of these artists’ responses to Mallarmé’s project, they are all essentially based on the assumption that to reveal the dimensionality of language, they must rely, as Mallarmé himself did, on a graphical translation. This is simply to say that they persist in fixating on form through the same figure/ground distinctions that have hobbled us all along.

This is evident in the very title of Mallarmé’s poem. “A throw of the dice will never abolish chance” may be a nonsensical statement, however, like “colorless green ideas sleep furiously,” it is nonetheless a perfectly grammatical statement. The reversal in this sentence is merely a semantic one since it still rotates around the presence/absence and figure/ground axis. It is not the symbolic relationship between dice and chance that operates this sentence, but rather
placement of a negative adverb. As we have seen, language always rushes, like an Archimedean flow, into the absence of objects. Barthes’ “barometer” is ultimately the absence of the actual object to which it refers and it is this issue which Maurice Blanchot describes so well in his discussion of Mallarmé’s equivocation between the “crude” ordinary and the “essential” poetic word:

This distinction itself is crude, yet difficult to grasp, for Mallarmé attributes the same substance to the two aspects of language which he distinguishes so absolutely. In order to characterize each, he lights on the same term, which is “silence.” The crude word is pure silence: “It would, perhaps, be enough for anyone who wants to exchange human speech, silently to take or put in someone else's hand a coin.” Silent, therefore, because meaningless, crude language is an absence of words, a pure exchange where nothing is exchanged, where there is nothing real except the movement of exchange, which is nothing. But it turns out the same for the word confided to the questing poet—that language whose whole force lies in its not being, whose very glory is to evoke, in its own absence, the absence of everything. ... However, the crude word is by no means crude. What it represents is not present. Mallarmé does not want “to include, upon the subtle paper ... the intrinsic and dense wood of trees.” But nothing is more foreign to the tree than the word tree, as it is used nonetheless by everyday language. A word which does not name anything, which does not represent anything, which does not outlast itself in any way, a word which is not even a word and which disappears marvelously altogether and at once in its usage: what could be more worthy of the essential and closer to silence? (Blanchot, 37–39)

What feels at first like a radical reversal may simply be how words functioned all along. Thus, the interstices of the text (graphic spaces between lines, syntactic spaces between fragments, etc.) are no more absent space than the words themselves since they persist in relying on the dichotomies of absence/presence and figure/ground to produce an illusory space. This is perhaps why, despite the radical format of Un coup, critics seem to be able to universally agree on the fact that, as Zboya puts it, “the poem describes the aftermath of a shipwreck—a shipwreck that signifies, on a textual level, the annihilation of syntax in which the vessel’s semantic debris drifts aimlessly, chaotically, within the space of the page” (Zboya, 2–3). This statement is a near echo
of Drucker’s interpretation: “Insofar as figures are created in Mallarmé’s poem, they are abstract and dynamic, registering the movement of the listing ship and the scintillating vibration of stars, rather than charting any literal course through seas or heavens or providing any iconic point of reference for the text” (Drucker, 55). The last clause is especially striking since it seems that both the constellation and the flotsam of the ship are explicitly iconic points of reference. It is somewhat easy for us to imagine the lines of text floating in some kind of fluid substrate, but, conversely, it is hard for us to forget that they are actually stuck where they are on the page. This makes the navigation of the verbal debris an ultimately prescriptive affair. Mallarmé took a risk when using this overly pictorial language of composition. Perhaps his approach was too overt. By graphicalizing his words in order to dimensionalize them, he effectively silenced the temporal aspect of reading. Even though we are conscious of our passage across the page, we are never truly allowed to experience the space of language in and of itself, but rather an imagistic and intractably nounal representation of space.

If we return to the title for a moment, we will notice that the semantic reversal discussed above is a function of the adverb “never” (jamais). In his nounal fixation, Mallarmé neglects to see that the abstract space of language which he was seeking was in the very structure of sentences, in the places between the nouns. Like any other deictic, an adverb does not mean anything in particular; it is not a substitute for any actual object. Rather, it is a spatio-temporal shift within the structure of a sentence. In this particular instance, although the nouns “chance” and “dice” are semantic correlates, they refract through “never” and come out inverted. It is not a semantic or pictorial space which this happens in, but the space of language. Caught up in his dramatic image of wreckage and constellation, we might forget how perfectly ordinary the space
of language is. The space of language will turn out not to be about its external relationship to figuration, but rather through its internal relationships, the space between.

4. The Placement of Objects.

*Tender Buttons*, Gertrude Stein’s investigation into the space of language was also published in 1914, but she would take a very different approach. Like Wittgenstein and Chomsky, she begins by acknowledging the elementary, primitive, and nounal quality of her medium:

Poetry is I say essentially a vocabulary just as prose is essentially not. And what is the vocabulary of which poetry absolutely is. It is a vocabulary entirely based on the noun as prose is essentially and determinately and vigorously not based on the noun. Poetry is concerned with using with abusing, with losing with wanting, with denying with avoiding with adoring with replacing the noun. ... Poetry is doing nothing but using losing refusing and pleasing and betraying and caressing nouns. (P&G, 138)

However, she will quickly move on to acknowledge the limitations imposed by the substitutive categories of replacing, losing, denying, and avoiding that we also saw as inadequate in Mallarmé’s experiment:

Now that was a thing that I too felt in me the need of making it be a thing that could be named without using its name. After all one had known its name any thing’s name for so long, and so the name was not new but the thing being alive was always new. What was there to do. I commenced trying to do something in *Tender Buttons* about this thing. I went on and on trying to do this thing. I remember in writing An Acquaintance With Description looking at anything until something that was not the name of that thing but was in a way that actual thing would come to be written. ... I decided and Lucy Church Amiably had been an attempt to do it, I decided that if one definitely completely replaced the noun by the thing in itself, it was eventually to be poetry and not prose which would have to deal with everything that was not movement in space. There could no longer be form to decide anything, narrative that is not newspaper narrative but real narrative must of necessity be told by any one having come to the realization that
the noun must be replaced not by inner balance but by the thing in itself and that will eventually lead to everything. (P&G, 141–2, 147)

Whereas, as Blanchot noted, Mallarmé “does not want ‘to include, upon the subtle paper ... the intrinsic and dense wood of trees’” (39), Stein is, in fact, explicitly concerned with doing just that by presenting not an illusion of the thing but “the thing in itself.” As she says in “Rooms”: “The name is changed because in the little space there is a tree, in some space there are no trees, in every space there is a hint of more, all this causes the decision” (48). The “hint of more” in every space is the possibility for infinite combination, for building a three dimensional space into which we can enter. This potential is a function of the combinatory potential of grammar which Stein celebrates:

Beside being able to be mistaken and to make mistakes verbs can change to look like themselves or to look like something else, they are, so to speak on the move and adverbs move with them and each of them find themselves not at all annoying but very often very much mistaken. That is the reason any one can like what verbs can do. Then comes the thing that can of all things be most mistaken and they are prepositions. Prepositions can live one long life being really being nothing but absolutely nothing but mistaken and that makes them irritating if you feel that way about mistakes but certainly something that you can be continuously using and everlastingly enjoying. (P&G, 127)

Aware as she is of the treachery of naming, she chooses a very different route toward presenting the thing in itself. Rather than describe it, she makes a space for it and places it inside that space. Rather than create an illusory relationship between figure and ground, she creates a space “in which the figure–ground contrast is dissolved and one thing is indeed as important as another thing” (Perloff, 54). For Stein, things and people exist with respect to relative motion within a space:

But the strange thing about the realization of existence is that like a train moving there is no real realization of it moving if it does not move against something and so that is what a generation does it shows that moving is existing. ... I said in the
beginning of saying this thing that if it were possible that a movement were lively enough it would exist so completely that it would not be necessary to see it moving against anything to know that it is moving. This is what we mean by life and in my way I have tried to make portraits of this thing always have tried always may try to make portraits of this thing. ... I wanted however to do portraits where there was more movement inside in the portrait and yet it was to be the whole portrait completely held within that inside. I began to feel movement to be a different thing than I had felt it to be. It was to me beginning to be a less detailed thing and at the same time a thing that existed so completely inside in it and it was it was so completely inside that really looking and listening and talking were not a way any longer needed for me to know about this thing about movement being existing. (P&R, 99, 102, 121)

Through this progression of ideas in “Portraits and Repetition,” we see Stein reiterating herself within ever smaller limits: from things within a train, and a train within the something it moves against, to things within the portraits, to the portrait within itself. This creates a diagrammatic interposition not unlike a parse tree. Indeed, Stein has avowed her interest in diagramming: “I really do not know that anything has ever been more exciting than diagraming sentences” (P&G, 126). We might speculate that her early engagement with the structure of language afforded her an acute spatial awareness of how words have meaning, not with respect to their referents, but rather with respect to their placement among other words, that is: their “arrangement in a system to pointing” (Tender Buttons, 3).

In this compulsion towards the situated existence of objects, we see a parallel with Wittgenstein’s concept of meaning as use. As Marjorie Perloff says: “using the distinction drawn at the opening of Philosophical Investigations, we might say that Eliot is an Augustinian, Stein a Wittgensteinian. Eliot—and this would also be true of Pound or Stevens—believes that words have a naming function, that they mean individually, whereas Stein believes that meaning is only conveyed by use, and hence by the larger context of the sentence” (56). This emphasis on all the words in the sentence being equally as important, aside from reaffirming the claim that Stein has
forgone figure/ground relationships, demonstrates a commitment to the fact that we experience things while situated and interposed in any number of contexts. For instance, our understanding of a carafe is not simply a Saussurian equation of a word with an image, but rather the summation of our experience using it, of being *around* it.\(^6\) This connection between inhabited space and use is emphasized by the following passage from “Rooms”:

> If comparing a piece that is a size that is recognised as not a size but a piece, comparing a piece with what is not recognised but what is used as it is held by holding, comparing these two comes to be repeated. Suppose they are put together, suppose that there is an interruption, supposing that beginning again they are not changed as to position, suppose all this and suppose that any five two of whom are not separating suppose that the five are not consumed. Is there an exchange, is there a resemblance to the sky which is admitted to be there and the stars which can be seen. (45–6)

In the symmetrical tautology “a piece that is a size that is recognised as not a size but a piece” points to the relativity and meaninglessness of the two nouns “piece” and “size,” and therefore posits that the object is not created by pictorial recognition, but constructed by “what is used as it is held by holding.” The noun has effectively been effaced and replaced by the gerund “holding,” indicating a shift from meaning as pre-existent to meaning contingent on use. We are then asked to compare this his tactile object to that which can only be grasped by seeing: “is there a resemblance to the sky which is admitted to be there and the stars which can be seen.” Since we cannot hold this sky or stars, we are answered with the surprisingly terse “Is there. That was a question. There was no certainty.” Thus, the syntactic overdetermination of the work is accompanied by a semantically probabilistic space. As Markus Poetzsch notes:

> Her focus, significantly, includes not only objects but also the specific spaces they inhabit. In “A Mounted Umbrella,” for instance, the reader is presented not with

\(^6\) The ordinariness of the object is important; how can we know how to experience Mallarmé’s shipwreck if the majority of us have never been in one?
the titular object but with the context in which it is ideally to be found. ... The fact that the umbrella has not been left in its right place suggests that the place itself has attracted the author's (and consequently the reader's) attention and triggered this reflection on an absent object. The repetition of the place deictic 'there' implies a movement from the written to the spatial text; one must in fact make two imaginative leaps, first to the place to which Stein is pointing, the bare mounting, and then to the absent object, the umbrella, that typically hangs there. (Poetzsch, 948–9)

This absence is quite different from the blank interstices of *Un coup*. Here, “the bare mounting” is not a ground from which the figure has been visually subtracted because the absence of the umbrella is the absence which is already inherent to all nouns. A noun is merely “the name of anything,” which is to say a bracket around the absence of the object. However, in this case it is again a gerund, “mounting,” which replaces it; it is the act of mounting the umbrella which takes the place of the object’s image. This “putting” of the umbrella is, in a way, equivalent to Stein’s putting of any particular word into the syntactic place in which it belongs (or does not belong). These are not “imaginative leaps” as Poetzsch calls them, but rather simple steps into the embedded levels of the sentence.

This contextual and physical situation is also how the text itself works, with the shapes of the objects gradually emerging from the repetitious, stratified language. Like a room being constructed around a space, “a sentence is placed before us and then repeated with slight variation, each instance making us revise our sense of the one preceding it so that gradually meaning accrues” (Perloff, 57). We find this gradual sedimentation in the successive appearances of the word “paper”:

A courteous occasion makes a paper show no such occasion and this makes readiness and eyesight and likeness and a stool. ... A can containing a curtain is a solid sentimental usage. The trouble in both eyes does not come from the same symmetrical carpet, it comes from there being no more disturbance than in little paper. ... All the time that resenting was removal all that time there was breadth.
No breath is shadowed, no breath is painstaking and yet certainly what could be the use of paper, paper shows no disorder, it shows no desertion. A tribune, a tribune does not mean paper, it means nothing more than cake, it means more sugar, it shows the state of lengthening any nose. (TB, 12, 46–8)

We begin with what may as well be an empty page which seems to show nothing, and proceed through the abstractions readiness, eyesight, and likeness only to come to a stop at a stool. The fact that a blank paper can make a stool, though perhaps initially arresting, should come as no surprise since this is how we are accustomed to reading. In fact, this is how critics like Drucker and Zboya arrive at their metaphor of constellation through a figurative abstraction. However, in the second instance of paper we pass from eyesight into the “trouble in both eyes.” This trouble does not come from a lack of discrepancy in the symmetrical dyad of figure and ground (i.e. the curtain and the carpet), but from the fact that there is no “disturbance” in the paper. This lack of movement is a result of the paper’s flatness, its two-dimensionality. Despite its “breadth,” it still cannot show “disorder” or “desertion” without a spatial disturbance. It is only when this paper becomes stacked into a tribune, that is, a newspaper, that it attains this dimensionality. By the time it has ballooned into an object as substantial as a cake it is granted the ability to “show.” As we will read later in “Rooms”: “This which is mastered has so thin a space to build it all that there is plenty of room and yet is it quarreling, it is not and the insistence is marked” (49). The paper may be a thin space with which to build objects and entire rooms, yet, once “mastered” there is somehow plenty of room. This mastery is a realization of the space that is already built into language.

Where Mallarmé’s work was largely based on un- or anti-grammatical subtractive methods like fragmentation and elision, Stein’s is characterized by an excess of grammar, an
insistence on the structure of language. Appropriately, this constructional method is reliant primarily on Jakobson’s “words endowed with purely grammatical functions:”

I was as I say at that time reducing as far as it was possible for me to reduce them, talking and listening. I became more and more excited about how words which were the words that made whatever I looked at look like itself were not the words that had in them any quality of description. (P&R 115)

These words do not have any “quality of description” because they are not substitutive words like our much belabored blocks, pillars, slabs and beams, but rather like the mortar which holds these objects together. Stein actively scorned these substitutive nouns, instead upholding “verbs and adverbs aided by prepositions and conjunctions with pronouns as possessing the whole of the active life of writing” (P&G, 132). In “Rooms,” Stein questions the possibilities and limitations of substitution:

A fact is that when the place was replaced all was left that was stored and all was retained that would not satisfy more than another. The question is this, is it possible to suggest more to replace that thing. This question and this perfect denial does make the time change all the time (Tender Buttons, 44).

When the “place [is] replaced” with a stable noun, we find that this noun will not satisfy our desired to place the object any more than any other noun and this is reiterated by stein in her insistence that “a noun is the name of anything” (P&G, 125). The real question then becomes whether it is possible to replace (and we take this in literal sense of placement) the thing with something more than its name. We need more than the primitive language, more than blocks, to construct the space of these objects.

In order to place her objects in space, Stein has to use words that have as their sole function the organization of syntactical space. If we strip away all of the unnecessary words in “A Box” (nouns, non-copulative verbs, adjectives, and adverbs that do not refer to place) we are
left with: “Out of and out of, out of an, out of. So then the is that a of being is something a and is it, it is not, it is so to be and see a it is so a not to but again.” In this way, the volume of the box is defined not by it’s visual description, but by the prepositional “out of.” We could draw a comparison here between Stein’s formalism and that of minimalist sculptors like Carl Andre. In a famous piece like “Lever” (Andre, 70), for instance, Andre takes the repetition of a brick and uses it to invert and redefine the formerly neutral and taken for granted space of a gallery. The static line of bricks becomes a lever insofar as the viewer becomes the point on which it pivots. The viewers become conscious of the space between themselves and the work, and between the work and the walls. This is reiterated by Andre’s claim that his works are not positive but rather the negative space which turns the space around it into the positive space of the work: “Up to a certain point I was cutting into things. Then I realized that the thing I was cutting into was the cut. Rather than cut into the material, I now use the material as the cut in space” (Andre, 142). The same could be said of his column works like “Shiloh” (Andre, 293); with the imposition of a grid into a space which viewers must pass through, the viewer becomes conscious of the very act of passage. This passage is analogous to our passage through Stein’s passages, carving out a new plane of the object with every deictic shift. Poetzsche also notes this self-conscious passage:

Deixis, as Ann Banfield notes, works against “pure narration” (153) by shifting both tense and perspective, by disrupting the very illusion that the text is self-contained and cohesive. Because Stein does not distinguish particular objects and their movements except through deixis, she invariably draws the reader beyond the text to the circumstances and moments of perception itself. (Poetzsche 949)

However, for our purposes this idea of being drawn “beyond the text” is a step too far. Rather, we are drawn into it; we become surrounded by it. The involutions of her grammar do not tend outward, but rather inward:
All the looking was there the talking and listening was there but instead of giving what I was realizing at any and every moment of them and of me until I was empty of them I made them contained within the thing I wrote that was them. The thing in itself folded itself up inside itself like you might fold a thing up to be another thing which is that thing inside in that thing. (P&R, 120)

Since Stein often places words in juxtaposition so as to make them polysemous, the reader must make decisions about how to proceed through her grammar in the same way Andre’s audience must decide how to place themselves in relation to his sculptures. For instance, the title “A LEAVE” puts a verb next to an indefinite article, which causes us to read it not as a verb but as a noun. This prompts the question “what exactly is ‘a leave?’” Perhaps, as the verb would suggest, a leave is an object which always recedes away from us, an object which folds itself up inside itself. This folding sensation is an awareness of our passing from one language space into another. Indeed, the poem continues to recede with the verb “leading”: “In the middle of a tiny spot and nearly bare there is a nice thing to say that wrist is leading. Wrist is leading” (16).

It is this compulsion towards the folds and recesses of grammar that allows Stein to create a three-dimensional space through language. The following experiments with “Objects” and “Rooms” are an attempt at baring these interpositions. Not unlike the revisions of Mallarmé, I have chosen to do so through erasure. However, I have done so not in order to translate space into time or vice versa, but rather to try and strip away the surface and reveal the grammatical structure behind the works. The first of these erasures is a series of gradually reductions until all that is left are the pronouns, prepositions, articles and adverbs that refer to space of time relationships. For instance, by the fourth and final revision of this series “IN BETWEEN” becomes: “In between a and a that than anything, so that a a a with that. A a and so between and and and out and a between and there.” By drawing attention to the structural words of Stein’s
sentences, the places “in between a and a that,” these revisions point not towards the points at which lines intersect but rather the space of possibility between these points. In this way, the objects are defined by the space around them. The second experiment consists of first feeding every sentence of “Rooms” into Stanford’s Natural Language Parser’ and then removing the text from in between the parentheses in the resulting parse tree. Thus, “Act so that there is no use in a center” becomes:

(Root
   (S
      (NP (NNP Act))
      (RB so)
      (NP (DT that))
      (ADVP (RB there))
      (VP (VBZ is)
         (NP
            (NP (DT no) (NN use))
            (PP (IN in)
               (NP (DT a) (NN center))))))

After the erasure it becomes:

( ( ( ) )
  ( )
  ( ( ) )
  ( ( ) )
  ( ( )
   ( ( ) ( ))
   (( )
    (( )) ( )))

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In this language field, there is no center; there is no central figure against a ground but rather a series of interposed and interdependent spaces in suspension. This shows how the sentences are really a series of rooms within each other, how each unit is placed within a complex spatial relationship with all of the other units. Like Andre’s “cuts” these parentheses mark the space between the figure and its ground; they mark the space across which meaning is transferred.

Bibliography.

Works Cited:


Additional Resources:


Textual Experiments.

Removing the objects from “Objects.”

1. Stein wished to replace nouns, but this only deferred reference since a noun is already a replacement of an object. I am not interested in replacing one object with another, but rather in defining the space in which that object is present, so I will begin by deleting all nouns. Pronouns are deictics and so they are still useful at this level. Present participles functioning as gerunds will be considered nouns and ones functioning as adjectives will be considered adjectives. In some cases words which are usually considered verbs or adverbs are used as nouns in Tender Buttons, e.g. the title “A Leave.” In such cases I have deleted the word since it is still functioning as a noun. In instances where a title has been deleted because it consists only of nouns, I will use an ellipsis to indicate it’s omission.

A, THAT IS A BLIND.
A in and a, a and nothing strange a single hurt and an in a to. All this and not ordinary, not unordered in not resembling. The is spreading.

GLAZED.
what is, it is originally rid of a.
The in that is that red weakens an. The has come. There is no. But there is, there is that and that and sometime, surely any is unwelcome, sometime there is and there will be a and charming very charming is that and. is handsome and convincing.
There is no in and in. There can be in. That is no. That is no chosen. It was chosen, that showed and perhaps and. It certainly showed no and perhaps if is not natural there is some in.

A IN A.
The of is likely and a a very little is prepared. is not a.
Callous is something that hardening leaves behind what will be soft if there is a genuine in there being present as many as. Does this change. It shows that is clean when there is a.
A has that. Supposing you do not like to change, supposing it is very clean that there is no change in, supposing that there is and a is that any the worse than an and an. Come to that is there any extreme use in and. Is there not much more in a and more and very likely and a to put them.
A of fine and a to see a.
What is the of a violent of if there is no in not getting tired of it. The does not come before there is a. In any of there is a to and it is a at any rate there is some in refusing to believe. It shows what use there is in a whole if one uses it and it is extreme and very likely the little could be dearer but in any case there is a and if there is the best thing to do is to take it away and wear it and then be reckless be reckless and resolved on returning.
Light and the same with makes a. It shows that there is no. Any shows that and very likely it is reasonable. Very likely there should not be a finer. Some means a and this is the best for three and more being together. A little is so ordinary and in any there is and some of that.
A and and a and and a.
A, a does not connect under the. The if it is white and black, the has a green. A a whole and a little grinding makes a such a sweet singing and a red not a round but a white, a red and a white.
The is not in nor even in it comes out out of the.
What is the like. The is not like anything mustard it is not like a same that has stripes, it is not even more hurt than that, it has a little.

A.
Out of comes and out of comes same, out of an comes, out of comes painful. So then the is that a white of being round is something suggesting a and is it disappointing, it is not, it is so rudimentary to be analysed and see a fine strangely, it is so earnest to have a green not to red but to point again.

A OF.
More of.
A in no new.
A single is not. Dirty is yellow. A of more in not mentioned. A of is not a. The to yellow is dirtier and distincer. The clean is whiter and not coal color, never more coal color than altogether.
The of a, the same slighter, the of a simplier negative, the same sore, the to, the same, the same. The to show a is when too late and later there is no in a.
A not torn rose-wood color. If it is not dangerous then a and more than any other if it is cheap is not cheaper. The amusing is that the sooner there are no fewer the more certain is the dwindled. Supposing that the contained and a. Supposing that there was no for a and more likely for a, supposing that there was no, is it not necessary to mingle.
The settling of stationing is one not to shatter scatter and scattering. The one to use is to use and for. The one to see is to have a concentrating the and the. The perfect is to accustom the to have a and the of a and to be solid, quite solid in standing and to use in. It is light enough in that. It has that nicely. Very nicely may not be exaggerating. Very strongly may be sincerely fainting. May be strangely flattering. May not be strange in everything. May not be strange to.

AND NOT.
and not makes a darker. It makes the so heavy and makes no harder.
It makes and and even a to spread a fuller. There are more not empty. They see.

NOTHING ELEGANT.
A a single is doubtful. If the is and there is a surrounding it, if inside is let in and there change then certainly something is upright. It is earnest.

MILDRED'S.
A and no, a and loud enough, a cause and a loud and an extra, a of extra, a a small and an established and cunning, a slender and no, this means a a great a.

A OF A.
A single to a, a straight to a, a desperate and and a, all this which is a, which has, which has and, all makes an attractive.

A RED.
If are lily white if they exhaust and and even, if they dusty will dirt a that has no extreme, if they do this and it is not necessary it is not at all necessary if they do this they need a.
A.

A large is handily made of what is necessary to replace any. Suppose an is necessary, the plainer it is made the more there is for some outward that there is a. A is made sometimes and them to see to see to it neatly and to have the stopped up makes it necessary to use.

A which is necessary when a is used and taken is that a large of the there are three which have different. The one is on the. The two are on the. The three are on the. The one, one is the same as is shown by the being longer. The other is different there is more that shows it. The other is different and that makes the have the same the eight are in singular to make four necessary.

Lax, to have, to be lighter than some, to indicate a, to last brown and not curious, to be wealthy, are established by and by.

Left open, to be left pounded, to be left closed, to be circulating in and, and sick that is grey that is not dusty and shows, to be sure do measure an empty sooner than a choice in.

Winged, to be winged means that is yellow and that are brown are if is washed off, then it is that is to say it is fitting sooner than.

An why is an idle, why is silver, why is the brighter, if it is brighter is there any, hardly more than ever.

A.

An for a, an occasional is in buying and how soon does enable a of the same neater. If the is small a clever is in order.

and a of colored. Pack together a and enough with it to protect the, cause a considerable and gather more as it is cooling, collect more and not any even trembling, cause a whole to be a.

A sad a that is not sad is blue as every of blue is precocious. A of green a in green and nothing flat nothing quite flat and more round, nothing a particular strangely, nothing breaking the losing of no little.

A splendid a really splendid is not shown by giving a freely, it is not shown by a or by. Cut cut in, cut in so lately. Cut more than any other and show it. Show it in the and in starting and in coming.

A is not the only of. The and the are not the only of. The and the and the are not the only altogether.

A a hearty, a compressed and no, not even a or a to incline each, a that has that and that is the one that shows.

A.

Any of many to a, any of this makes around it what is in and certainly discolor in. The of this is manifold. Supposing a certain selected is assured, suppose it is even necessary, suppose no other is permitted and no more is needed, suppose the of the is mixed with a very long slender and even if it could be any black, supposing all this altogether made a and suppose it was actual, suppose the mean to state it was occasional, if you suppose this in and even more melodiously, if you suppose this even in the necessary of there certainly being no in and, suppose this and an elegant a very elegant is more than of consequence, it is not final and sufficient and substituted. This which was so kindly a was constant.
A LONG.
What is the that makes, that makes it crackle, what is the that presents a long and a necessary.
What is this.
What is the, what is it.
Where is the serene, it is there and a dark is not a dark, only a and are black, only a and are blue,
a is scarlet, a is every. A distinguishes it. A just distinguishes it.

A RED.
A dark, a very dark, a quite dark is monstrous ordinarily, it is so monstrous because there is no in it. If is in everything it is not necessary. Is that not an for any of it and even so is there any that is better, is there any that has so much stretched out.

A BLUE.
A blue is guided guided away, guided and guided away, that is the particular that is used for that and not any not even more than a.

A.
If the is open, if the is careless, if the of a strong is not awkward, if the is held by all the waving and there is no, not any. If there is no in a and there can be none scarcely, if there is not then the is the same as up standing.
This is no dark and it even is not acted in any such a that a is not spread. That is spread, it shuts and it lifts and awkwardly not awkwardly the is in standing.

A.
A in a wise and more shows that are even. It addresses no more, it shadows the and. A regular, the severest and the most preserved is that which has the not more than always authorised.
A suitable, well housed, practical, and, a suitable, very suitable and not more particularly than complaining, anything suitable is so necessary.
A is that when the is just like that, no more, longer, sudden and at the same not any, the main is that without a there is no.
Practice, practice the that means that really means a necessary, in showing that there is.
what is a, a is the between the circular and nothing else, nothing else.
To choose it is ended, it is actual and more than that it has it certainly has the same, and a all that is practiced and more easily much more easily ordinarily.
Pick a, a whole, and bend more slender than have ever been necessary, shine in the necessarily.
Actually not aching, actually not aching, a stubborn is so artificial and even more than that, it is a, it is a binding, it is and.
If the to dirty diminishing is necessary, if it is why is there no, why is there, why is there no special.

A FRIGHTFUL.
A which was left and not only taken but turned away was not found. The was shown to be very like the last. A was not exchanged, not a of it, a was left over. The was mismanaged.

A.
A was not green, it was not straw, it was hardly seen and it had a use a long and the, the was never missing, it was not misplaced, it showed that it was open, that is all that it showed.

A MOUNTED.
What was the of not leaving it there where it would hang what was the if there was no of ever seeing it come there and show that it was handsome and right in the way it showed it. The lesson is to learn that it does show it, that it shows it and that nothing, that there is nothing, that there is no more to do about it and just so much more is there plenty of for making an.

A.
Enough is plenty and more, more is almost enough for that and besides if there is no more is there plenty of for it. Any shows the best.

MORE.
An elegant use of and and a little of white and.
Wondering so winningly in several of is the that makes so regular and enthusiastic. The that there is more are the same very colored rid of no round.

A NEW AND.
Enthusiastically hurting a clouded yellow and, enthusiastically so is the bite in the.

...
Within, within the and slender alone, with sudden and no more than three, two in the make two one.
If the is long and it is filled so then the best is all together.
The of is made by.

...
A in, a is well placed in the of an.

A.
A blind is manly and uttermost.

CARELESS.
No is broken in more and mended, that is to say a is broken and mending does do that it shows that is Japanese. It shows the whole of and. It does more to choosing and it does more to that ministering. It does, it does change in more.
Supposing a single is a supposing more of them are orderly, does that show that, does that show that famously. Does it.

A.
A courteous makes a show no such and this makes and and and a.

A.
The of this is entirely and best to say the, best to say it best to show sudden, best to make bitter, best to make the tall and nothing broader, anything between the.
RAINING.
astonishing and difficult altogether makes a and a.

COLD.
A in yellow sold extra makes lying.

...
The sudden is the same in no. The sudden is the in the.

AN.
Coloring high means that the strange is in front not more in front behind. Not more in front in of the.

A.
A light, a, an, a rosy.

A.
A star, a single frantic, a single financial grass.
that is in. Hold the, hold the, hold in the, make the .
A of. A change, in a change that is remarkable there is no reason to say that there was a.
A woolen gilded. A country is the best, a couple of any of them in order is so left.

A TO EAT.
A pleasant simple habitual and tyrannical and authorised and educated and resumed and articulate. This is not tardy.

A LITTLE OF A.
A shining of consists in there having been more of the same than could have been expected when all were bought. This was the hope which made the and have no use for any more and this necessarily spread into nothing. Spread into nothing.

A.
What was the of a whole to send and not send if there was to be the of that made that come in. A was nicely sent.

A.
A of all the, a not a because there is no.

RED.
A cool red and a pink cut, a and a sold, a little less hot.

IN BETWEEN.
In between a and is a narrow that shows more than anything, so much really that a a measured a whole with that. A a whole is judged made and so between and and real and more out and a perfectly unprecedented between old and mild there is no satin shining.
COLORED.
Colored are necessary to show that are worn by an of blank, this makes the difference between single and broad, the least thing is lightening, the least thing means a little and a big a big that makes more than little really little. So clean is a that nearly all of it shows and little. A large is tall and me and all whole.

A.
A is trimmed, it is trimmed by the and the and the, it is trimmed by little leaning and by all of mounted and loud. It is surely cohesive.

A.
A which is not not more so is relaxed and yet there is a, a is pressing.

A LITTLE CALLED PAULINE.
A little called anything shows.
Come and say what prints all. A whole few. There is no.
No in and little and choose wide and little really little.
A little makes. This is not true.
Gracious of gracious and a a blue green white a blue green lean, lean on the top.
If it is absurd then it is leadish and nearly set in where there is a tight.
A peaceful to arise her, and and. A a cold a a shaving and nearly the best and regular.
Nearer in fairy, nearer and farther, show white has in sight, show a of ten. Count, count more so that thicker and thicker is leaning.
I hope she has her. Bidding a, widening received treading, little leading mention nothing.
Cough out cough out in the and really it is not for.
Please could, please could, jam it not plus more sit in when.

A.
beaten with and little and all and reckless reckless, this is this.

A.
A means does it not my it means a whole. Is it likely that a.
A means more than a even a looking is tall. A means necessary and a a of a little it means it does mean that there has been a, a where it did shake.

... 
To be a with a a of pounding and nearly enough makes a steady. It is.
A shallow rose on red, a shallow in and in this makes less. It shows.

A.
A little goes like a that means to say that means to say that more sighs last goes. Leave with it. A little goes like a.

A WHITE.
A white is nearly crazy.
A.
In the of a tiny and nearly bare there is a nice thing to say that is leading. is leading.

SUPPOSE AN.
Suppose it is within a which open is open at the of that is to say it is so.
All the are needing blackening. A white is in. A a real has a worn a worn of different that is to say
if he can read, if he can read he is a to show shutting up twenty-four.
Go red go red, laugh white.
Suppose a in rubbed, in rubbed get.
Little little little of.
Little of and such beautiful beautiful, beautiful beautiful.

A.
A is a and hurt and a red and an under and a a of.
A is a, a of a little. A.
Pick a, pick it in strange and with. There is hollow hollow, a is a.
A that has a little, all of them, any so.
Please a round it is.
It was a to state that a and a and a laid and a and a and a little is a it.

... was there, it was there. Stop it, stop it, it was a, a wet and it was not where it was wet, it was not high, it was directly placed back, not back again, back it was returned, it was needless, it put a, a when, a.
Suppose a a realistic of resolute suggests pleasing itself white all white and no does that mean. It does not so. It means wavers and little to beside beside. A.
Suppose, that is one to breed, breed that. Oh to say, oh nice old. Next best and nearest a. not valuable, be papered.
Cover up cover up the two with a little of and hope and green, green.
Please a, put a to the and really then really then, really then it is a that joins many many lead. It is a and a and a and a and a colored a colored grey and nearly that nearly that let.

PEELED, CHOKE.
Rub her.

IT WAS BLACK, BLACK TOOK.
Black best brown.

Excellent not a, not a, no no, no no.

THIS IS THIS, AIDER.
Aider, why aider why whow, whow stop touch, aider whow, aider stop the.

A in kill her, a in, makes a meadowed, makes a.
2. Although the separation of adjectives from the nouns they modified creates an interesting ambiguity, the problem of replacing nouns persists since these adjectives now seem to fall into the vacancies left by the nouns. For instance, in the first sentence of “A, That is a Blind” we can’t really help but read “hurt” as a noun: “A in and a, a and nothing strange a single hurt and an in a to pointing.” For this reason, it will become necessary to strip away the adjectives as well.

A, THAT IS A.
A in and a, a and nothing a and an in a to. All this and not, not in not. The is spreading.

...
what is, it is originally rid of a.
The in that is that weakens an. The has come. There is no. But there is, there is that and that and sometime, surely any is, sometime there is and there will be a and very is that and. is and.
There is no in and in. There can be in. That is no. That is no. It was, that showed and perhaps and. It certainly showed no and perhaps if is not there is some in.

A IN A.
The of is likely and a a very little is. is not a.
is something that leaves behind what will be if there is a in there being as many as. Does this change. It shows that is when there is a.
A has that. Supposing you do not like to change, supposing it is very that there is no change in, supposing that there is and a is that any the than an and an. Come to that is there any in and. Is there not much more in a and more and very likely and a to put them.
A of and a to see a.
What is the of a of if there is no in not getting tired of it. The does not come before there is a. In any of there is a to and it is a at any rate there is some in refusing to believe. It shows what use there is in a if one uses it and it is and very likely the could be but in any there is a and if there is the to do is to take it away and wear it and then be be and on returning, and the same with makes a. It shows that there is no. Any shows that and very likely it is. Very likely there should not be a.
Some means a and this is the best for three and more being together. A is so and in any there is and some of that.
A and a and and a.
A, a does not connect under the. The if it is and, the has a. A a and a grinding makes a such a singing and a not a but a, a and a.
The is not in nor even in it comes out out of the.
What is the like. The is not like anything it is not like a that has, it is not even than that, it has a.

A.
Out of comes and out of comes, out of an comes, out of comes. So then the is that a of being is something suggesting a and is it, it is not, it is so to be analysed and see a strangely, it is so to have a not to but to point again.

A OF.
More of.
A in no.
A is not. A of in not. A of is not a. The to is and. The is and not, never more than altogether. The of, the, the of a s, the, the intention to wishing, the, the. The to show a is when too and there is no in a. A not. If it is not then a and more than any other if it is is not. The is that the sooner there are no fewer the is the. Supposing that the contained and a. Supposing that there was no for a and likely for a, supposing that there was no, is it not to mingle. The settling of is one way not to shatter scatter and scattering. The one to use is to use and for. The to see is to have a concentrating the and the. The is to accustom the to have a and the of a and to be, quite in and to use in. It is enough in that. It has that nicely. Very nicely may not be exaggerating. Very strongly may be sincerely fainting. May be strangely. May not be in everything. May not be to.

AND NOT. and not makes a. It makes the so and makes no. It makes and and even a to spread a. There are not. They see.

NOTHING. A a is. If the is and there is a surrounding it, if inside is let in and there change then certainly something is. It is.

MILDRED'S. A and no, a and enough, a and a and an, a of, a a and an and, a and no, this means a a a.

A OF A. A to a, a to a, a and and a, this which is a, which has, which has and, all makes an.

A. If are if they exhaust and and, if they will dirt a that has no, if they do this and it is not it is not at all if they do this they need a.

A. A is handily made of what is to replace any. Suppose an is, the it is made the there is for some that there is a. A is made sometimes and them to see to see to it neatly and to have the up makes it to use. A which is when a is and is that a of the there are three which have. The one is on the. The two are on the. The three are on the. The one, one is the as is shown by the being. The other is there is that shows it. The other is and that makes the have the the eight are in to make four. to have, to be than some, to indicate a, to last and not, to be, are by and by. Left, to be left, to be left, to be circulating in and, and that is that is not and shows, to be sure do measure an sooner than a in. to be means that is and that are are if is washed off, then it is that is to say it is than. An why is an, why is, why is the, if it is is there any, hardly than ever.

A. An for a, an is in buying and how does enable a of the. If the is a is in.
and a of. Pack together a and with it to protect the, cause a and gather as it is cooling, collect and not any trembling, cause a to be a.
A a that is not is as of is. A of a in and nothing nothing quite and, nothing a strangely, nothing breaking the losing of no.
A a really is not shown by giving a freely, it is not shown by a or by.
Cut cut in, cut in so lately. Cut than any other and show it. Show it in the and in starting and in coming.
A is not the only of. The and the are not the only of. The and the and the are not the only altogether.
A a, a and no, not even a or a to incline each, a that has that and that is the one that shows.

A.
Any of to a, any of this makes around it what is in and certainly discolor in. The of this is.
Supposing a is assured, suppose it is even, suppose no other is and no is, suppose the of the is with a very and even if it could be any, supposing all this altogether made a and suppose it was, suppose the mean to state it was, if you suppose this in and melodiously, if you suppose this even in the of there certainly being no in and, suppose this and an a very is than of, it is not and and.
This which was so kindly a was.

A.
What is the that makes, that makes it crackle, what is the that presents a and a. What is this.
What is the, what is it.
Where is the, it is there and a is not a, only a and are, only a and are, a is, a is. A distinguishes it.
A just distinguishes it.

A.
A, a very, a quite is ordinarily, it is so because there is no in it. If is in everything it is not. Is that not an for any of it and even so is there any that is, is there any that has so much out.

A.
A is guided guided away, guided and guided away, that is the that is for that and not any not even than a.

A.
If the is, if the is, if the of a is not, if the is by all the and there is no, not any. If there is no in a and there can be none scarcely, if there is not then the is the as up standing.
This is no and it even is not in any a that a is not. That is. it shuts and it lifts and awkwardly not awkwardly the is in standing.

A.
A in a and shows that are. It addresses no, it shadows the and. A, the and the is that which has the not than always.
A, and, a, very and not than complaining, anything is so.
A is that when the is just like that, no, and at the not any, the is that without a there is no.
Practice, practice the that means that really means a, in showing that there is.
what is a, a is the between the and nothing else, nothing else.
To choose it is, it is and than that it has it certainly has the, and a all that is and easily easily ordinarily.
Pick a, a, and bend than have ever been, shine in the necessarily.
Actually not aching, actually not aching, a is so and even than that, it is a, it is a binding, it is and.
If the to diminishing is, if it is why is there no, why is there, why is there no.

A.
A which was and not only but turned away was not. The was shown to be very like the last. A was not exchanged, not a of it, a was over. The was.

A.
A was not, it was not straw, it was hardly and it had a use a and the, the was never, it was not, it showed that it was, that is all that it showed.

A.
What was the of not leaving it there where it would hang what was the if there was no of ever seeing it come there and show that it was and in the it showed it. The is to learn that it does show it, that it shows it and that nothing, that there is nothing, that there is no to do about it and just so is there of for making an.

A.
is and, is for that and besides if there is no is there of for it. Any shows the.

...
An of and a of and.
Wondering so winningly in of is the that makes so and. The that there is more are the very rid of no.

A AND.
Enthusiastically hurting a and, enthusiastically so is the in the.

...
Within, within the and, with and no more than three, two in the make two one.
If the is and it is so then the is all together.
The of is made by.

...
A in, a is in the of an.

A.
A is and.

...
No is in and, that is to say a is and mending does do that it shows that is. It shows the of and. It does to choosing and it does to that ministering. It does, it does change in.
Supposing a is a supposing of them are, does that show that, does that show that, does that show that famously. Does it.

A.
A makes a show no such and this makes and and and a.

A.
The of this is entirely and best to say the, best to say it best to show, best to make, best to make the and nothing, anything between the.

RAINING.
and altogether makes a and a.

...
A in sold makes lying.

...
The is the same in no. The sudden is the in the.

AN.
Coloring means that the is in front not more in front behind. Not more in front in of the.

A.
A, a, an, a.

A.
A, a, a.
that is in. Hold the, hold the, hold in the, make the .
A of. A change, in a change that is there is no to say that there was a. A. A is the, a of any of them in is so.

A TO EAT.
A and and and and. This is not.

A OF A.
A of consists in there having been more of the than could have been when all were bought. This was the which made the and have no use for any and this spread into nothing. Spread into nothing.

A.
What was the of a to send and not send if there was to be the of that made that come in. A was nicely sent.

A.
A of all the, a not a because there is no.
A and a, a and a, a.

IN BETWEEN.
In between a and is a that shows mounting than anything, so really that a calling a a with that. A a is judged made and so between and and and out and a perfectly between and there is no shining.

...
are to show that are by an of, this makes the between and, the is lightening, the means a little and a a that makes than really. So is a that nearly all of it shows and. A is and me and all.

A.
A is, it is by the and the and the, it is by leaning and by all of and. It is surely.

A.
A which is not not so is and yet there is a, a is pressing.

A CALLED PAULINE.
A called anything shows.
Come and say what prints all. A few. There is no.
No in and and choose and really.
A makes. This is not.
of and a a a, on the top.
If it is then it is and nearly in where there is a.
A to arise her, and and. A a a a shaving and nearly the and.
Nearer in, nearer and farther, show has in sight, show a of ten. Count, count so that and is leaning.
I hope she has her. Bidding a, leading mention nothing.
Cough out cough out in the and really it is not for.
Please could, please could, jam it not plus sit in when.

A.
with and and all and, this is this.

A.
A means does it not my it means a. Is it likely that a.
A means than a even a looking is. A means and a a of a it means it does mean that there has been a, a where it did shake.

...
To be a with a a of pounding and nearly makes a. It is.
A on, a in and in this makes. It shows.

A.
A goes like a that means to say that means to say that sighs last goes. Leave with it. A goes like a.
A.
A is nearly.

A.
In the of a and nearly there is a to say that is leading.

SUPPOSE AN.
Suppose it is within a which is at the of that is to say it is so.
All the are. A is in. A a has a a of that is to say if he can read, if he can read he is a to show shutting up twenty-four.
Go go, laugh.
Suppose a in, in get.
of.
of and such.

A.
A is a and a and an under and a a of.
A is a, a of a. A.
Pick a, pick it in and with. There is, a is a.
A that has a, all of them, any so.
Please a it is.
It was a to state that a and a and a and a and a and is a it.

... was there, it was there. was there. Stop it, stop it, it was a, a and it was not where it was, it was not, it was directly back, not back again, back it was, it was, it put a, a when, a.
Suppose a a of suggests itself all and no does that mean. It does not so. It means wavers and to beside beside. A.
Suppose, that is one to breed, breed that. Oh to say, oh. Next and nearest a. not, be.
Cover up cover up the two with a of and and.
Please a, put a to the and really then really then, really then it is a that joins many many. It is a and and a and a and a and a a and nearly that nearly that let.

CHOKE.
Rub her.

IT WAS, TOOK.
not a, not a, no no, no no.

THIS IS THIS, AIDER.
Aider, why aider why whow, whow stop touch, aider whow, aider stop the.

A in kill her, a in, makes a, makes a.
3. This is a more interesting revision, where the grammatical structure starts to become more bare. Words that once had a referential valence are gradually being replaced with a more “purely grammatical function.” However, we are still faced with the problem of words wanting to act nouns or adjectives. The past and present participle are particularly slippery in this regard, so on this round we will be deleting all non-copulative verbs and all adverbs that do not refer to place or time.

A. THAT IS A.
A in and a, a and nothing a and an in a to. All this and not, not in not. The is.

... what is, it is of a.
The in that is that an. The. There is no. But there is, there is that and that and sometime, any is, sometime there is and there will be a and is that and. is and.
There is no in and in. There can be in. That is no. That is no. It was, that and and. It no and if is not there is some in.

A IN A.
The of is and a a is. is not a.
is something that behind what will be if there is a in there being as many as. this. It that is when there is a.
A that. you do not, it is that there is no in, that there is and a is that any the than an and an. to that is there any in and. Is there not in a and and a them.
A of and a a.
What is the of a of if there is no in not of it. The before there is a. In any of there is a to and it is a at any there is in. It what there is in a if one it and it is and the could be but in any there is a and if there is the is it away and it and then be and on. and the with. It that there is no. Any that and it is. there should not be a. a and this is the for three and being together. A is so and in any there is and of that.
A and a a and a.
A, a does not under the. The if it is and, the has a. A a and a a a and a not a but a, a and a.
The is not in nor even in it out out of the.
What is the like. The is not like anything it is not like a that, it is not than that, it has a.

A.
Out of and out of, out of an, out of. So then the is that a of being is something a and is it, it is not, it is so to be and see a it is so a not to but again.

A OF.
of.
A in no.
A is not. is. A of in not. A of is not a. The to is and. The is and not, never than altogether.
The of, the, the of a s, the, the, the, the.
The a is when too and there is no in a.
A not. If it is not then a and more than any other if it is not. The is that the sooner there are no fewer the is the. that the and a. that there was no for a and for a, that there was no, is it not.
The of is one not to and. The one is and for. The is a the and the. The is the a and the of a and to be, in and in. It is in that. It has that. may not be. may be. May be. May not be in everything. May not be to.

AND NOT.
and not a. It the so and no.
It and and even a a. There are not. They.

NOTHING.
A a is. If the is and there is a it, if inside is in and there then something is. It is.

MILDRED'S.
A and no, a and, a and a and an, a of, a a and an and, a and no, this a a a.

A OF A.
A to a, a to a, a and a and a, this which is a, which, which and, all an.

A.
If are if they and and, if they will a that has no, if they this and it is not it is not at all if they this they need a.

A.
A is of what is any. an is, the it is the there is for that there is a.
A is sometimes and them to it and the up it.
A which is when a is and is that a of the there are three which. The one is on the. The two are on the. The three are on the. The one, one is the as is by the being. The other is there is that it. The other is and that the the eight are in four.
to have, to be than some, a, and not, to be, are by and by.
to be to be, to be in and, and that is that is not and, to be an sooner than a in.
to be that is and that are are if is off, then it is that is to say it is than.
An why is an, why is, why is the, if it is is there any, than ever.

A.
An for a, an is in and how a of the. If the is a is in.
and a of. together a and with it the, a and as it is, and not any, a to be a.
A a that is not is as of is. A of a in and nothing nothing and, nothing a, nothing the of no.
A a is not by a, it is by a or by.
in, in so. than any other and it. it in the and in and in.
A is not the only of. The and the are not the only of. The and the and the are not the only altogether.
A a, a and no, not even a or a each, a that that and that is the one that.

A.
Any of to a, any of this around it what is in and in. The of this is. a is, it is, no other is and no is, the of the is with a and if it could be any, all this altogether a and it was, the it was. if you this in
and even, if you this even in the of there being no in and, this and an a is than of, it is not and
and. This which was so a was.

A.
What is the that, that it, what is the that a and a. What is this.
What is the, what is it.
Where is the, it is there and a is not a, only a and are, only a and are, a is, a is. A it. A just it.

A.
A, a, a is, it is so because there is no in it. If is in everything it is not. Is that not an for any of it
and even so is there any that is, is there any that has so out.

A.
A is away, and away, that is the that is for that and not any not even than a.

A.
If the is, if the is, if the of a is not, if the is by all the and there is no, not any. If there is no in a
and there can be none, if there is not then the is the as up.
This is no and it even is not in any a that a is not. That is. it and it and awkwardly not the is in.

A.
A in a and that are. It no, it the and. A, the and the is that which has the not than always.
A, and, a, and not than, anything is so.
A is that when the is just like that, no, and at the not any, the is that without a there is no.
the that that really a, in that there is.
what is a, a is the between the and nothing else, nothing else.
To it is, it is and than that it has it the, and a all that is and.
a, a, and than have ever been, in the.
not, not, a is so and even than that, it is a, it is a, it is and.
If the to is, if it is why is there no, why is there, why is there no.

A.
A which was and not only but away was not. The was to be like the. A was not, not a of it, a was
over. The was.

A.
A was not, it was not, it was and it had a a and the, the was never, it was not, it that it was, that is
all that it.

A.
What was the of not it there where it would what was the if there was no of ever it there and that
it was and in the it it. The is that it does it, that it it and that nothing, that there is nothing, that
there is no about it and just so is there of for an.

A.
is and, is for that and besides if there is no is there of for it. Any the.
An of and and a of and.
so in of is the that so and. The that there is are the of no.

A AND.
a and, so is the in the.

... Within, within the and, with and no than three, two in the two one.
If the is and it is so then the is all together.
The of is by.

... A in, a is in the of an.

A.
A is and.

... No is in and, that is a is and does do that it that is. It the of and. It does to and it does to that. It
does, it does in.
a is a of them are, does that that, does that that, does that that. Does it.

A.
A a no such and this and and and a.

A.
The of this is and to the, it to, to the and nothing, anything between the.

...
and altogether a and a.

...
A in.

...
The is the in no. The is the in the.

AN.
that the is in front not in front behind. Not more in front in of the.

A.
A, a, an, a.

A.
A, a, a.
that is in. the, the, in the, the.
A of. A, in a that is there is no that there was a.
A. A is the, a of any of them in is so.

A.
A and and and and and. This is not.

A OF A.
A of in there having been more of the than could have been when all were. This was the which
the and no for any and this into nothing. into nothing.

A.
What was the of a and not if there was to be the of that that in. A was.

A.
A of all the, a not a because there is no.

...
A and a, a and a, a.

IN BETWEEN.
In between a and is a that shows than anything, so that a a a with that. A a is and so between and
and out and a between and there is no.

...
are to that are by an of, this the between and, the is, the a and a a that than. So is a that nearly all
of it and. A is and me and all.

A.
A is, it is by the and the and the, it is by and by all of and. It is.

A.
A which is not not so is and yet there is a, a is.

A PAULINE.
A anything.
and what all. A few. There is no.
No in and and and.
A. This is not.
of and a a a, on the.
If it is then it is and in where there is a.
A her, and and. A a a a and nearly the and.
Nearer in, nearer and farther, in, a of ten. so that and is.
I she has her. a, nothing.
out out in the and it is not for.
it not in when.

A. with and and all and, this is this.

A. A does it not my it a. Is it that a. A than a even a is. A and a a of a it it does that there has been a, a where it did.

... To be a with a a of and nearly a. It is. A on, a in and in this. It.

A. A like a that that last. with it. A like a.

A. A is nearly.

A. In the of a and there is a to that is. is.

AN. it is within a which is at the of that is to say it is so. All the are. A is in. A a a a of that is if he, if he he is a up twenty-four. a in, in.
of.
of and such.

A. A is a and a and an under and a a of. A is a, a of a. A. a, in and with. There is, a is a. A that a, all of them, any so.
a it is.
It was a that a and a and a and a and a and a and is a it.

... was there, it was there. was there. it, it, it was a, a and it was not where it was, it was not, it was back, not back again, back it was, it was, it a, a when, a. a a of all and no that. It not so. It and to beside beside. A. that is one, that. Oh to, oh. Next and nearest a. not, be. up up the two with a of and and.
a, a to the and then then, then it is a that. It is a and a and a and a and a and a a and that that.

...
her.

IT WAS.
not a, not a, no no, no no.

THIS IS THIS, AIDER.
Aider, why aider why whow, whow, aider whow, aider the.

A in her, a in, a, a.
4. At this final erasure we are left with only pronouns, articles, prepositions, and adverbs referring to space, meaning we are able to concentrate on all of the interstitial space of the text. We are left with a text that constantly moves, that folds in on itself and multiplies itself as we pass through its successive spaces.

A, THAT A.
A in and a, a and nothing a and an in a to. All this and not, not in not. The.

...
what, it of a.
The in that that an. The. There no. But there, there that and that and sometime, any, sometime there and there a and that and. and.
There no in and in. There in. That no. That no. It, that and and. It no and if not there some in.

A IN A.
The of and a a. not a.
something that behind what if there a in there as many as. this. It that when there a.
A that. you not, it that there no in, that there and a that any the than an and an. to that there any in and. there not in a and and and a them.
A of and a a.
What the of a of if there no in not of it. The before there a. In any of there a to and it a at any there in. It what there in a if one it and it and the but in any there a and if there the it away and it and then and on. and the with. It that there no. Any that and it. there not a. a and this the for three and together. A so and in any there and of that.
A and a and a.
A, a not under the. The if it and, the a. A a and a a a and a not a but a, a and a.
The not in nor even in it out out of the.
What the like. The not like anything it not like a that, it not than that, it a.

A.
Out of and out of, out of an, out of. So then the that a of something a and it, it not, it so to and a it so a not to but again.

A OF.
of.
A in no.
A not. A of in not. A of not a. The to and. The and not, never than altogether.
The of, the, the of a, the, the, the, the.
The a when too and there no in a.
A not. If it not then a and more than any other if it not. The that the sooner there no fewer the the. that the and a. that there no for a and for a, that there no, it not.
The of one not to and. The one and for. The a the and the. The the a and the of a and to, in and in.
It in that. It that. may not. may. May. May not in everything. May not to.

AND NOT.
and not a. It the so and no.
It and and even a a. There not. They.

NOTHING.
A a. If the and there a it, if inside in and there then something. It.

MILDRED’S.
A and no, a and, a and a and an, a of, a a and an and, a and no, this a a a.

A OF A.
A to a, a to a, a and and a, this which a, which, which and, all an.

A.
If if they and and, if they a that no, if they this and it not it not at all if they this they a.

A.
A of what any. an, the it the there for that there a.
A sometimes and them to it and the up it.
A which when a and is that a of the there three which. The one on the. The two on the. The three on the. The one, one the as by the. The other there that it. The other and that the the the eight in four.
to, to than some, a, and not, to, by and by.
to to, to in and, and that that not and, to an sooner than a in.
to that and that if off, then it that to say it than.
An why an, why, why the, if it there any, than ever.

A.
An for a, an in and how a of the. If the a in.
and a of. together a and with it the, a and as it, and not any, a to a.
A a that not as of. A of a in and nothing nothing and, nothing a, nothing the of no.
A a not by a, it by a or by.
in, in so. than any other and it. it in the and in and in.
A not the only of. The and the not the only of. The and the not the only altogether.
A a, a and no, not even a or a each, a that that and that the one that.

A.
Any of to a, any of this around it what in and in. The of this. a , it, no other and no, the of the
with a and if it any, all this altogether a and it, the it. if you this in and even, if you this even in
the of there no in and, this and an a than of, it not and and. This which so a.

A.
What the that, that it, what the that a and a. What this.
What the, what it.
Where the, it there and a not a, only a and, only a and, a, a. A it. A just it.

A.
A, a, a, it so because there no in it. If in everything it not. that not an for any of it and even so there any that, there any that has so out.

A.
A away, and away, that the that for that and not any not even than a.

A.
If the, if the, if the of a not, if the by all the and there no, not any. If there no in a and there can be none, if there not then the the as up.
This no and it even not in any a that a not. That. it and it and not the in.

A.
A in a and that are. It no, it the and. A, the and the that which the not than always.
A, and, a, and not than, anything so.
A that when the just like that, no, and at the not any, the that without a there no.
the that that really a, in that there.
what a, a the between the and nothing else, nothing else.
To it, it and than that it it the, and a all that and.
a, a, and than ever, in the.
not, not, a so and even than that, it a, it a, it and.
If the to, if it why there no, why there, why there no.

A.
A which and not only but away not. The like the. A not, not a of it, a over. The.

A.
A not, it not, it and it a a and the, the never, it not, it that it, that all that it.

A.
What the of not it there where it what the if there no of ever it there and that it and in the it. The that it it, that it it and that nothing, that there nothing, that there no about it and just so there of for an.

A.
and, for that and besides if there no there of for it. Any the.

...
An of and and a of and.
so in of the that so and. The that there the of no.

A AND.
a and, so the in the.

...
Within, within the and, with and no than three, two in the two one.
If the and it so then the all together.
The of by.

... A in, a in the of an.

A. A and.

... No in and, that a and that it that. It the of and. It to and it to that. It, it in. a a of them, that that, that that, that. it.

A. A a no such and this and and a.

A. The of this and to the, it to, to, to the and nothing, anything between the.

... and altogether a and a.

... A in.

... The the in no. The the in the.

AN. that the in front not in front behind. Not in front in of the.

A. A, a, an, a.

A. A, a, a. that in. the, the, in the, the. A of. A, in a that there no to that there a. A a the, a of any of them in so.

A. A and and and and. This not.

A OF A. A of in there of the than when all. This the which the and no for any and this into nothing. into nothing.
A. What the of a and not if there the of that that in. A.

A. A of all the, a not a because there no.

... A and a, a and a, a.

IN BETWEEN. In between a and a that than anything, so that a a a with that. A a and so between and and out and a between and there no.

... to that by an of, this the between and, the, the a and a a that than. So a that nearly all of it and. A and me and all.

A. A, it by the and the and the, it by and by all of and. It.

A. A which not not so and yet there a, a.

A PAULINE. A anything. and what all. A few. There no. No in and and and.
A. This not. of and a a a, on the. If it then it and in where there a. A her, and and. A a a a and nearly the and. Nearer in, nearer and farther, in, a of ten. so that and. I she her. a, nothing. out out in the and it not for. it not in when.

A. with and and all and, this this.

A. A it not my it a. it that a. A than a even a. A and a a of a it it that there a, a where it did.

... To be a with a a of and nearly a. It. A on, a in and in this. It.
A.
A like a that to that to that last. with it. A like a.

A.
A nearly.

A.
In the of a and there a to that.

AN.
it within a which at the of that it so.
All the. A in. A a a of that if he, if he a up twenty-four.
a in, in.
of.
of and such.

A.
A a and and a and an under and a a of.
A a, a of a A.
a, in and with. There, a a.
A that a, all of them, any so.
a it.
It a that a and a and a and a and a and a it.

...
there, it there. there. it, it, it a, a and it not where it, it not, it back, not back again, back it, it, it a,
a a when, a.
a a of all and no that. It not so. It and to beside beside. A.
that one, that. Oh to, oh. Next and nearest a. not, be.
up up the two with a of and and.
a, a to the and then then, then it a that. It a and and a and a and a and a a and that that.

...
her.

IT.
not a, not a, no no, no no.

THIS THIS, AIDER.
Aider, why aider why whow, whow, aider whow, aider the.

A in her, a in, a, a.
Baring the space of “Rooms”

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