

Spring 2013

The Decline of Violence and the Rise of Silent Warfare

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THE DECLINE OF VIOLENCE AND THE RISE OF SILENT WARFARE

By
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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with

GENERAL HONORS

from the Department of PSYCHOLOGY and the College of MUSIC

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SPRING 2013

ABSTRACT

Over the past several centuries there has been a global decline in violence which has been attributed to the Civilizing Process, in which a centralized government authority and mutually beneficial trade have a pacifying effect on humans within states. This decline in violence has also translated into a decrease in traditional international warfare; however, the relative peace created by the Civilizing Process can still be threatened or reversed by states using violence to achieve individual ends.

In order to protect the global decline in violence, states must have an alternative when peaceful methods of conflict resolution do not work. This thesis argues that the time has come for states and the international community to recognize the effectiveness of silent warfare in countering violent threats to the decline in violence and the Civilizing Process. Present applications of silent warfare, like targeted killing, are analyzed for their relative effectiveness compared to other types of warfare and their potential legitimacy issues in respect to current and future methods of use.

Silent warfare has already been used by states in the past several decades to varying degrees of success and sophistication to further individual state interests. The current moral climate will allow the use of silent warfare provided the tactics are used in regulated and legitimate ways and do not violate globalized humanitarian ideals. Given the potential for illegitimate applications, however, it is very important for the international community to systematically regulate the use of silent warfare tactics and technology before extra-judicial use becomes the norm for states as well as nonstate entities, and ultimately undermines the global decline in violence that silent warfare was originally intended to preserve.

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INTRODUCTION

By September 28th, 1938, also known as Black Wednesday, the plan had finally been in position for several days. Colonel Hans Oster, the chief assistant to Admiral Canaris in the *Abwehr*, the Intelligence Service of the High Command of Armed Forces (the OKW) in Nazi Germany, had crafted this particular plan as a member of the German Resistance against Adolf Hitler. The plan was to arrest Hitler after he issued the final order to invade Czechoslovakia, then try him in front of one of his own People's Courts on the charge "that he had tried recklessly to hurl Germany into a European war and was therefore no longer competent to govern."¹ At this time, the military members of the resistance were motivated to work against Hitler for the sole reason that they did not want to be drawn into a European war that they were sure Germany would lose. Great Britain and France covertly supported the plan.

Since the plan called for Hitler's trial by his own people, the Resistance needed their coup to be both morally legitimate and legally airtight; General Halder, Chief of the General Staff, was particularly insistent that they have irrefutable evidence of the impending invasion. The plot was therefore undone when British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain arranged the Big-Power Conference of September 27th to settle the Czechoslovakia question short of war by offering Hitler the Sudetenland on the condition that he would advance no further into Czechoslovakia.² With that agreement, the legitimacy of the Resistance's plan disappeared and the plan to arrest Hitler collapsed. The chance "to dispose of Hitler, bring a swift end to the Third Reich, and save Germany and the world from war" vanished.³

¹William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1988), 375.

² *Ibid.*, 407, 410.

³ *Ibid.*, 413.

As the world was thrown into World War II and the genocide of European Jews began, there would be a multitude of failed attempts on Hitler's life as it became increasingly important to stop him by any means necessary, not just remove him from power. Ultimately, as we all know, the war itself was the means of removing Hitler and the Nazis from power, and its human toll was immense: military deaths alone numbered as many as 25,000,000, while the total death toll may have reached 80,000,000. Leaving aside the unanswerable question of whether or not the greatest and most deadly war in history could have been prevented had Hitler been removed from power in 1938, it seems nonetheless clear that the war would not have begun as it did, and would not have proceeded to the extreme ends that it did, without Hitler's actions and agency. It is at the very least an arguable point that his early removal from power by any means would have been preferable to the war, and that the conspirators' insistence on clothing their coup in legitimacy ultimately imposed far too high a cost on humanity.

It would also seem to be clear that there is no reason to assume that a figure like Hitler can never arise again. Thus the question of how to deal with the threats Hitler posed remains an enormously important one. Are the only options to counter such threats either legal and peaceful (and thus likely to be of little avail in stopping such a figure as Hitler and such a party as the Nazis) or large-scale warfare? Is large-scale warfare really the only option left when peaceful methods fail?

Some recent scholarship suggests that such concerns may be overstated—that despite the massive death toll and violence of World War II, there has been a gradual, overall decline in violence in the world, and that the trend is likely to continue. The work of the evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker, in particular, suggests that human nature might be going through a microevolution to ultimately suppress the external, physical, violent expressions of human

aggression, creating an overall more peaceful human existence. Pinker attributes this process of declining violence to Norbert Elias's theory of the Civilizing Process, which describes the civilizing of man due to the rise of state governments and mutually beneficial trade. However true this may be in the long run, violent expressions of aggression such as warfare and interpersonal violence cannot be assumed to disappear in the next few generations or simply of its own accord. The mechanisms of the Civilizing Process are still vulnerable to the violent actions of individual state actors that threaten to derail or reverse this trend.

In order to prevent this reversal and protect the decline in violence that the Civilizing Process may be bringing about, there must be a way to counter the violent threats of international conflict. A solution may exist in the globalization of the Civilizing Process, which has thus far acted within individual states to decrease levels of violence. With the globalization of trade and culture, group circles of empathy have also expanded to include the people of other nations, allowing the globalization of morals and the laws based on those morals. This expansion of the Civilizing Process to global dimensions, as well as the actions of international governing bodies like the United Nations, may well offer hope for an ultimate end of war.

Unfortunately, however, the effects of the Civilizing Process on a global scale are still developing, as are the powers of international governing bodies. This leaves room for individual, sovereign states to continue to pursue their own self-interest through violent means, thus stymieing the effects of a global Civilizing Process—and returns us to the question of how to deal with individual states that insist on using violent conflict resolution methods against other states to the detriment of the global Civilizing Process and decline in violence. Since states use their monopoly on violence to decrease the violence of individuals within the state under the

Civilizing Process, then perhaps another regulated method of violence utilized by a supra-national authority can stop the violent actions of these states when peaceful methods fail.

Such a method of warfare exists that can be used without detriment to the global Civilizing Process and dates from ancient times, but is usually dismissed on moral grounds. Nearly twenty-five centuries ago the Indian political and military writer Kautilīya proposed three different types of warfare of varying utility based on the conditions present: open warfare, concealed warfare, and silent warfare. In modern terms, open warfare can be described as large-scale, traditional war; concealed warfare is similar to guerrilla warfare; and silent warfare includes assassination, subversion, and many tactics used by modern intelligence agencies. This thesis offers the conjecture that silent warfare can be repurposed and used to counter violent threats to the global Civilizing Process, while furthering the pacifying effects inherent to this process. This warfare type can be used in ways that are more precise, effective, and less costly in resources and human lives than the other two types of warfare. It can be argued, indeed, that notwithstanding its apparently repugnant nature, silent warfare under certain circumstance may be employed effectively for countering violent threats, preserving the fragile global Civilizing Process, and all without compromising the ideals of the process.

Traditionally, silent warfare has been viewed as amoral and dishonorable in political thought, while being a generally acceptable method of war in the military sphere. However, the modern moral climate has shifted due to the Civilizing Process in that greater importance has been placed on preserving human life as opposed to the heavy losses incurred in open warfare. Silent warfare aligns with this moral restriction in that it generally incurs significantly fewer human casualties compared to either open or concealed warfare. If silent warfare can be effectively regulated and legitimately used within the constraints of the moral requirements of

the Civilizing Process, it can be used to counter violent threats to that same process without violating the modern moral climate.

The difficulty lies in properly regulating silent warfare, since it can be used injudiciously for the individual ends of states, which would be fatally counterproductive to the global Civilizing Process which it is intended to preserve. The example of the United States is instructive in this connection, for it has used assassination in various forms to achieve political goals in the Vietnam War and currently in the use of drones for the targeted killing of suspected terrorists in the Middle East. The Targeted Killing program, its advocates might argue, protects the population of the United States from harm far more effectively than large-scale interventions like the invasion of Iraq, and arguably advances the Civilizing Process by reducing the overall levels of destruction and numbers of lives lost in the legitimate defense of American national security. Its opponents, with equal plausibility, might maintain that Targeted Killing is merely assassination in a form veiled in only the flimsiest of legal justifications and procedures, and that it is in no recognizable sense morally or ethically superior to the CIA's Phoenix program in Vietnam. To use such methods, they would argue, may achieve temporary pacifying effects, but ultimately self-interested violent methods will produce ends that undermine the Civilizing Process.

Silent warfare can in fact be used either to the benefit or the detriment of the global Civilizing Process. This thesis argues that the time has come to recognize both the effectiveness of silent warfare in countering violent threats to the global Civilizing Process and the reality of the challenges that Targeted Killing poses to that same process if it continues to be employed without serious reflection on its long-term effects. If Steven Pinker's hypothesis linking the global Civilizing Process to the achievement of international peace and the suppression of

violent aggression is to be more than an optimistic conjecture, the practical challenge of controlling the new technologies of silent warfare must be confronted as a matter of urgent concern by both national and supra-national political organizations.

The argument that follows has four parts. Chapter 1 describes the findings of Pinker and others who discuss the decline in violence due to the Civilizing Process, and considers as well future implications of this trend. It discusses how the Civilizing Process has thus far acted on the level of a state system, but remains vulnerable on the level of international violence. Chapter 2 describes the growth of a global Civilizing Process and the globalization of morals, laws, and trade, which can mitigate the violence of the state system and potentially create a type of global state, but recognizes that international governing bodies are still in fragile, preliminary stages of development. It suggests that these forms themselves urgently require protection from violent external threats, the most immediate of which proceed from the sovereign state system itself.

Chapters 3 and 4 address the question of how silent warfare can be used as a method of countering violent threats to the global Civilizing Process. This section of the thesis argues that the benefits and potential hazards of utilizing silent warfare in the current moral climate are equally real, and cannot be discussed without recognizing both the practical and ethical dimensions of current practices. Chapter 3 describes silent warfare in relation to other types of warfare and its traditional moral reception; chapter 4 examines the degree to which silent warfare can be considered morally legitimate in the modern moral climate in light of its potential effects on the global Civilizing Process. The United States' use of Targeted Killing as a silent warfare tactic is offered as a case in point, analyzed both with respect to its current use and to the potential benefits and detriments it poses for the global Civilizing Process.

CHAPTER ONE

THE DECLINE IN VIOLENCE

As the evolutionary psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson self-evidently suggest, “Killing one’s adversary is the ultimate conflict resolution technique.”⁴ While violence is usually the easiest method, however, the unintended consequences that flow from it can be so wide-ranging and drastic that it is seldom the best method. Violence as a means of conflict resolution always evolves for a strategic purpose, in that such a method will only be used when circumstances allow the expected benefits to outweigh the expected costs of the method.⁵ In this way, violent physical expressions of aggression have proven useful to the survival of humans in ancestral environments when pursuing objectives of self-interest. Daly and Wilson’s suggestion that “the arousal of violent inclinations is systematically and functionally related to self-interest and interpersonal conflict”⁶ implies that a human’s own self-interested desire to survive creates a certain evolutionary preference for violence as a mechanism for dealing with conflicts. Just because a trait was evolutionarily desirable in the past, however, does not mean that it will continue to be so in the present or future environment.⁷

Unfortunately, it is easy to deny the logic of violence and its place as an inherent part of human nature. However, we must be warned that, “denying the logic of violence makes it easy to forget how readily violence can flare up, and ignoring the parts of the mind that ignite violence

⁴ Margo Daly and Mark Wilson, *Homicide* (Hawthorne: Aldine de Gruyter, 1988), ix.

⁵ Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined* (New York: Viking, 2011), 33.

⁶ Margo Daly and Mark Wilson, “An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on Homicide,” in *Homicide: a Sourcebook of Social Research*, ed. M.D. Smith and M.A. Zahn, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., 1999.), 58-71.

⁷ Ibid.

makes it easy to overlook the parts that can extinguish it.”⁸ Failure to understand violence as a part of human nature may thus diminish the possibility of decreasing violence on the interpersonal level or the international level, since nations as human constructions reflect self-interested strategies similar to those individuals pursue. Fortunately, however, much evidence suggests that violence is already decreasing globally; understanding the mechanism behind this trend may enable us to ensure its continuation, and indeed perhaps to accelerate it. .

The renowned evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker made a startling discovery that lead to a whole book describing the global decrease in violence. In this monumental book, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined*, Pinker explains that societies existing under centralized authority, such as a state, are significantly less violent than societies without governance, as shown by a decline in rates of homicide and warfare deaths, among other evidence. A series of graphic representations reproduced from Pinker’s book in the Appendix to this thesis, illustrate comparative rates of violence in various contexts. As Appendix Figure A⁹ shows, the homicide rates of the most peaceful, existing nonstate societies are significantly higher on average compared to state-organized societies, such as those of Western Europe. To put the scale of homicides per 100,000 people per year into perspective, “notoriously violent cities, like Detroit, had a rate of around 45 per 100,000” in the most violent years of the 1970’s and 1980’s.¹⁰ Even in the most violent years of recent U.S. history, the so called “peaceful” nonstate societies easily out rate the U.S. in homicides. Indeed, the combination of the ten largest cities in America is still hovering around the lowest nonstate society at about 30 homicides per 100,000 people. Western Europe in the 20th century is extremely low at a rate

⁸ Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 336.

⁹ Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 55.

Pinker’s Fig. 2-4, reproduced in Appendix as Figure A.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 52.

around one or two homicides per 100,000 people. In fact, Western Europe was especially active in this decline in violence, as it seemed to be at the epicenter of this global decline. The world map, Appendix Figure B,¹¹ shows that Western and Central Europe are, in terms of the risk of homicide, among the safest places human beings have ever lived. In 2004 annual homicide rates of between 0 and 3 per 100,000 people made Western European nations, along with states of the former British Empire such as Canada, the least violent societies in the world. Interestingly, the United States of America, a former British colony, hasn't followed as closely having an annual homicide rate between 5 and 10 per 100,000 in the company of countries like India and Algeria. In fact, the District of Columbia on its own keeps company with the most dangerous countries in Latin America with a rate of 30.8.¹² Even so, if rates around 30 annual homicides per 100,000 are on the high end of the spectrum in the world of 2004, this still remains on the low end of current nonstate homicide rates. It seems that having a centralized government helps decrease internal and external violence within a state, compared to a nonstate society.

The decrease in violence may be due to many factors; the theory to which Pinker subscribes, the "Civilizing Process," was developed by the German sociologist Norbert Elias. This Civilizing Process involves the concerted inhibition of impulses, consideration of long-term consequences of actions, and the practice of empathy and mutual accommodation.¹³ In this way, those living in societies began to refrain from excessive, violent activities once they came to live under a centralized authority. Elias observed that "In the modern age, cruelty and joy in the destruction and torment in others, like the proof of physical superiority, have been placed under

¹¹ Ibid., 88.

Pinker's Fig. 3-9 reproduced in Appendix as Figure B.

¹² Ibid., 94.

¹³ Ibid., 72.

an increasingly strong social control anchored in the state organisation.”¹⁴ His Civilizing Process is the mechanism through which such societal attitudes were cultivated and enforced over time. There are two interdependent mechanisms by which Elias’s Civilizing Process functioned: a centralized government monopoly on violence, and “Gentle Commerce.”

The centralized government monopoly on violence, or force, can be equated to Thomas Hobbes’s idea of a Leviathan state, and is not to be confused with the capitalist definition of a commodity monopoly. Hobbes theorized that, “during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.”¹⁵ To Hobbes, man’s basic state was that of “warre,” and in such a state there was no security, industry, trade, culture or society. Man lived in continual fear and the threat of a violent death was ever present in this “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” life.¹⁶ However, the means of lifting man out of this state was a “common Power to keep them all in awe;” and people will seek out this Power.

The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by

¹⁴ Norbert Elias, *On the Process of Civilisation: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Ed. Stephen Mennell et al. (Dublin: University College of Dublin Press, 2012), 187.

¹⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill* (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2004), 77.

¹⁶ Ibid.

feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of those Lawes of Nature set down....¹⁷

In order to escape the life of fear inherent in war, man will voluntarily consent to a covenant wherein he will give up his right to govern himself and entrust that right to a man, or assembly of men, thereby legitimizing the authority of this Power over his life. With a multitude of people agreeing to this covenant, they become united under the legitimate power of that man or assembly of men, which comes to be known as the Common-wealth or the Leviathan.¹⁸ This Leviathan then has the legitimate power to coerce the multitude into doing whatever is deemed correct, with the support of the newly attributed monopoly on violence within the Common-wealth. Once the central government has established this monopoly on violence and only a few are legitimately allowed to use force, then physical attacks are “limited to certain temporal and spatial enclaves,” such as in revolution or war.¹⁹ In this capacity, internal violence in a society can be decreased, since the central authority is expected to punish citizens for breaking laws. The government dispenses justice so individuals do not have to use violence to protect themselves and their families, creating an overall safer environment. Criminologists have suggested that the state lowers violence rates due to trust in the state to enforce order fairly.²⁰ Such enforcement of rules requires citizens to exercise self-control and empathy if they are to fit into state society. An effective government is able to make the promise of justice certain enough that most people do not see the percentage in risking violent behavior.

When it comes to the discrepancy between the levels of violence of nonstate societies compared to state societies, Elias would reason that “In this society there was no central power

¹⁷ Ibid., 105.

¹⁸ Ibid., 108.

¹⁹ Elias, *On the Process of Civilisation*, 196.

²⁰ Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 79.

strong enough to compel people to exercise restraint. But if in this or that region the power of a central authority grows, if...the people are forced to live in peace with each other, the molding of affects and the standards of the drive-economy are very gradually changed as well.”²¹ It is in this way that a state monopoly on violence has a pacifying and civilizing effect upon the people within it, thus reflecting the difference in violence levels between nonstate and state societies. But how is it that nonstate societies become state societies?

At the point when local community leaders reach a certain size and level of authority, they take advantage of that and establish their autonomy above the other in the community;²² and, it is at this point that Elias’s monopoly begins to form. Elias describes in detail how nonstate societies generally proceed to transform into state societies. Accordingly, within a major social unit, smaller social units of relatively equal social power engage in free competition with one another over a diminishing number of opportunities that are taken by force. Some units will succeed while other fail, eliminating the less successful units from competition, while social power becomes ever more concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of more powerful entities. At this point, a “private” monopoly is created wherein the concentration of power is in the hands of individual rulers, similar to a monarchical state.

When the monopoly is attacked for the purposes of redistributing social power, instead of destroying the monopoly, unfree competition ensues where the control of the monopoly passes from the individual or a few into the hands of more and more people according to the size of the monopoly. The weight of the monopoly tends to outgrow the strength of the few that uphold it, and then spreads through the “interdependent human web,” causing the “private” monopoly to

²¹ Elias, *On the Process of Civilisation*, 195.

²² C. R. Hallpike, *The Principles of Social Evolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 252.

become a “public” one, similar to a monarchy becoming a democratic regime.²³ This shift from a private monopoly to a public monopoly happens naturally as a function of social interdependence, and a “human web” with an increasingly high division of functions.²⁴ “It is only with the emergence of such a stable monopoly of central authority and its specialized apparatus for ruling that dominions take on the character of “states.”²⁵ This is the general process, with a thousand variations, that nonstate societies went through to become state societies, similar to the process of powerful families in Western Europe carving out their own land as noblemen, which was gradually absorbed into the present nation.

The process of state formation is promoted and reinforced by the second requirement of the Civilizing Process, “Gentle Commerce.” Commercial life flourishes under the protection of the state Leviathan²⁶, and in return helps preserve the power balance in favor of the state’s rulers.²⁷ This Gentle Commerce, or *doux commerce*, is defined as mutually beneficial trade. When humans started trading goods with others in ways that benefited the self-interests of both parties, they realized that those trade partners were more useful alive than dead.²⁸ Other people were no longer just obstacles, they were useful tools of mutual survival. Dealing with people in trade situations meant that people had to understand where the other person was coming from in order to execute a mutually beneficial trade, giving increasing importance to the use of empathy. It no longer made sense to risk violence where oneself could get hurt, or caught and punished by

²³ Elias, *On the Process of Civilisation*, 303, 309, 310.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 307.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 302.

²⁶ It is important to note that in this thesis the use of the term “Leviathan” is not used explicitly in the context of Hobbes’s definition, implying a tyrannical regime or monarchy, it is used to describe the “centralized government monopoly” as defined by Elias. In the context of current states, the term “state Leviathan” will refer to both *private* and *public* state monopolies as necessitated by the range of existing governments from monarchies to democracies. In the context of a future “global Leviathan,” this is used to imply a *public*, democratic international governing body.

²⁷ Hallpike, *The Principles of Social Evolution*, 256.

²⁸ Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 76.

the central authority, when a mutually beneficial trade could be worked out almost as easily. Therefore, Gentle Commerce forced people to cultivate their sense of empathy and self-control in order to be successful within society. As Pinker observes, “they did so not as an exercise in moral improvement but to hone their ability to get inside the heads of bureaucrats and merchants and prosper in a society that increasingly depended on networks of exchange rather than farming and plunder.”²⁹ It may not be morally inspiring, but self-interest is the most effective motivation to be found in nature, especially when it aligns with Hobbes’s “fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth *to seek Peace*. The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE....”³⁰ Hobbes was also of the opinion that peace could be found with the successful integration of human beings into society.

Not only was mutually beneficial trade in the best interests of the people in society, it is also in the best interests of the central authority to protect it as well. Within a state, merchants are protected and are allowed to make a private profit at the discretion of the government and ultimately in the best interests of the state.³¹ In this way, Gentle Commerce benefits the people and the government in exactly the same way, since both are protected from superfluous violence and turn a profit to support their livelihood. Merchants benefit in a comfortable lifestyle without fear of a violent death, and the state is able to continue funding its monopoly on violence and thereby its internal and external security. Elias points out that the modern age is characterized by this process of monopolization of violence and control over trade in that nations have a monopoly on violence and taxation is concentrated in the hands of the central government, whereby the accumulation of financial resources by this government reinforces both the monopoly on force and taxation. “Neither has in any sense precedence over the other; they are

²⁹ Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 169.

³⁰ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 94.

³¹ Hallpike, *The Principles of Social Evolution*, 258.

two sides of the same monopoly,” Elias confirms.³² This speaks to the interdependence of the two mechanisms of the Civilizing Process, and that both the state Leviathan and Gentle Commerce at once create the opportunity for the other and reinforce one another. However, the decrease in violence within states is not exclusively the only change in violence affected by the Civilizing Process.

The Civilizing Process has also helped decrease deaths due to warfare. Appendix Figure C³³ contains the annual rate of deaths in *warfare* (as opposed to the homicide rates discussed earlier) per 100,000 people for state and nonstate societies. Twenty-seven nonstate societies, comprised of hunter-gatherer and hunter-horticulturalist groups, and state societies of different time periods are shown.³⁴ Notice that the highest death rate due to warfare is a nonstate society with a rate almost at 1,500 deaths per 100,000 people, while the highest rate for state societies is only about half the average warfare death rate for all 27 nonstate societies. If you add up all the wars, genocides, purges, and man-made famines in the world in the 20th century, you end up with an annual death rate of around 60, which would be on the lowest end of the range for nonstate societies.³⁵ Not only have deaths due to warfare decreased, but the frequency of warfare has decreased over time as well. Appendix Figure D³⁶ shows the frequency of wars occurring between world powers from 1500 to 2000, as counted by the number of wars per quarter century. Despite a rough sawtooth pattern, the graph shows that over 500 years major world powers have become less and less likely to fight one another. Pinker also found that when great powers did

³² Elias, *On the Process of Civilisation*, 301.

³³ Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 53.

Pinker’s Fig. 2-3, reproduced in Appendix as Figure C.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 225.

Pinker’s Fig. 5-13, reproduced in Appendix as Figure D.

fight, the duration of the wars decreased over this same 500 year span.³⁷ However, such wars also became more deadly as the years passed.

This may seem counter to the decrease in warfare deaths mentioned above, but what has happened is an increase in the effectiveness and destruction of warfare despite an overall decrease in warfare deaths. Appendix Figure E³⁸ shows the concentration of warfare deaths in wars between major states over the same 500-year period. This graph reveals the increasing destructive power of warfare over 450 years, potentially due to the advances in military technology and organization.³⁹ What is very important to notice is the steep decrease after 1950. Perhaps at this time, due to technological advances like the creation of nuclear weapons, warfare had reached a point of becoming prohibitively destructive to the point that it could not continue on in the pattern of the past 450 years. One must take into account that,

If one were to calculate the amount of destruction that nations have actually perpetrated as a proportion of how much they *could* perpetrate, given the destructive capacity available to them, the postwar decades would be many orders of magnitudes more peaceable than any time in history.⁴⁰

Pinker then goes on to point out all the destruction that *could* have happened after 1945, but *did not* happen even once: the use of a nuclear weapon in any conflict; great powers fighting directly with one another since 1953; interstate war in Europe after 1956; interstate wars between major developed countries, or internationally recognized states disappearing from existence through

³⁷ Ibid., 226.

³⁸ Ibid., 227.

Pinker's Fig. 5-16, reproduced in Appendix as Figure E.

³⁹ Ibid., 226.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 249.

conquest.⁴¹ With these major catastrophes thus far avoided, and the general decline of violence and warfare, some have taken this evidence to confirm the impending death of war itself.

In the article “The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?,” Bruno Tertrais proposes the extinction of warfare in coming years based on Pinker’s findings. He states that, “massive, organized conflict is now an exceptional feature of human society, and is on the verge of becoming a historical relic. It may very well have disappeared by the end of the century.”⁴² He supports his optimistic analysis with a projection of future conflicts and their intensity. Appendix Figure F⁴³ shows conflict intensity and number decreasing sharply after 1990. The line corresponding to intensity drops off much more sharply than that for the number of conflicts. However, one must be careful when referring to conflict intensity, as the scale can reflect differently depending on how “intensity” is measured. The “intensity” of a conflict can mean many different things including the level of effort or the level of violence. Even so, “intensity” tends to be a misnomer, since irregular operations like counterterrorism or stability operations can require more effort than traditional force-on-force operations like open warfare. In the same way, these irregular operations can also be extremely violent, even though their rated “intensity” does not reflect this.⁴⁴ Traditionally, anything that is not open warfare is spoken of as being of lower intensity, but this is not always the case. In this way, it is hard to take Tertrais’s projections involving conflict intensity at face value.

⁴¹ Ibid., 249-251.

⁴² Bruno Tertrais, “The Demise of Ares: the End of War as We Know It?” *The Washington Quarterly* vol. 35, issue 3 (Summer 2012): 18.

⁴³ Ibid., 14.

Tertrais’s graph “Conflict Data and Projections, 1950-2050,” reproduced in Appendix as Figure F.

⁴⁴ Paul Scharre, “Spectrum of What?” *Military Review* vol. XCII, issue 6 (November-December 2012): 75.

Tertrais states that, “the total number of [twenty-first century] wars is less than half what it was in 1990.”⁴⁵ Pinker has traced a decline in violence over centuries, but Tertrais is also depending on a trend over a decade long period, which may be too small a sample size to prove significant in the long run, at least in the context of warfare ending in the next century. He also specifically discusses “massive, organized conflict,” which can be defined as *open* warfare in particular. Indeed, open warfare is becoming less practiced; however, smaller scale warfare, such as concealed and silent warfare have been used instead. Tertrais, however, does point out societal changes that would reflect the movement away from the use of open warfare. In the past, open warfare was largely considered as the most “honorable” type of warfare. Conversely, Tertrais points out that, “For most of the world’s population, war is no longer associated with personal achievement or heroism.”⁴⁶ This follows Pinker’s observations that components of a warmongering society such as nationalism, a culture of honor, territorial ambition, and a low valuation of human life have mostly disappeared from civilized societies due to the Civilizing Process.⁴⁷ In this sense, Tertrais is correct in that warfare has shifted from predominantly open warfare to other forms like concealed and silent warfare as well as having such conflicts decrease in number overall.

On the other hand, the *complete* disappearance of warfare in all its types is likely to be farther off than Tertrais postulates. Indeed, state Leviathans have used their monopoly of force to subdue the violence of their internal populations, and there has been a decline in international warfare, especially in the past 50 years. Yet the Civilizing Process has mostly effected changes on the state, not the global, level. States commit acts of violence against one another at much

⁴⁵ Tertrais, “The Demise of Ares,” 8.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁷ Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 257.

higher levels than the people within these states commit violent acts as a means of conflict resolution. Thus, a system comprised of state Leviathans is not an end to global violence in itself, since these states will still fight each other. Also, this global decline in warfare is still susceptible to the violent threats of individual states, as evidenced in both world wars with the determination of a few to use violence as a means to an end. Even with the massive death tolls of both world wars the overall trend across centuries is a decrease in violence and warfare, but there are definitely periods of retreat or regression in the Civilizing Process, suggesting that there is still much work to be done to decrease international violence levels. The problem is decreasing violence on the state level as effectively as the Civilizing Process did within those states. If states were treated the same way as the individual people within, then an overarching Leviathan, or global Leviathan, could have the same civilizing effect over states when combined with the globalization of mutually beneficial commerce. Hence, a global Civilizing Process with the two mechanisms of a global Leviathan and global Gentle Commerce may help decrease violence on the international level to the same extent that they have decreased within individual states.

CHAPTER TWO

THE GLOBAL CIVILIZING PROCESS

The pacifying effects of the Civilizing Process can already be seen at some level on a global scale, since violence and warfare have decreased worldwide. In fact, the spread of humanistic morals, laws, and mutually beneficial trade across the world are also evidence of the global Civilizing Process. Over the past century, nations and governments have placed increasing importance on human rights, the humane treatment of enemies in warfare, and the rights and welfare of noncombatants. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Geneva Protocols of 1925, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, among others, offer evidence of the increasing importance placed on human life, especially during conflicts. With standards of state behavior becoming globalized, the global Civilizing Process may in effect normalize the moral conduct of individual states into a global humanistic trend, leading to higher respect for human life and a decrease in violence.

This international system and an ever-shrinking world have placed new pressures upon national governments, including the pressure to encircle states with unified sets of rules, institutions, and common values. In this way, nations are becoming increasingly interdependent and must work together to carve out “ethical standards and codes of conduct which span more than one cultural frame.”⁴⁸ These global values and norms arise from an integration of the norms from within states due to the Civilizing Process. This can be seen as a global rise in empathy, similar to the cultivation of empathy within states as a result of the Civilizing Process, an expansion of national moral circles to include the citizens of other nations outside one’s own.

⁴⁸ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1992), 299, 308.

Originally, the philosopher Peter Singer proposed the expansion of moral circles as a byproduct of increasing reason and intelligence that manifested in the creation of ethics. Singer's concept of expanding moral circles can be described as the process by which one reaches the level of reason where it is understood "that one's own interests are one among many sets of interest, no more important than the similar interests of others, is a conclusion that, in principle, any rational being can come to see."⁴⁹ Steven Pinker has adopted this metaphor to describe the decline in violence in the context of expanding circles of *empathy*, compared to Singer's metaphor of *ethics* expanding purely as a function of advanced reason.

Pinker employs the expanding moral circle concept "as a name for the historical process in which increased opportunities for perspective-taking [has] led to sympathy for more diverse groups of people."⁵⁰ People outside the circle of a tribal or national community, historically, have tended to be dehumanized and treated without sympathy, especially in times of violent conflict. With global trade bringing new cultures in contact with one another, Pinker maintains, moral circles may have begun to expand to include these different cultures, just as it was beneficial within state societies to practice empathy to effectively execute mutually beneficial trade. With more people and cultures entering the average moral circle, it may have become harder to act violently towards such included people, thus helping decrease violence as well as warfare internationally. As a result of globalization, moral circles may be becoming international in size allowing the further expansion of Gentle Commerce, a sense of empathy, and self-restraint affected within states by the Civilizing Process. Therefore, the decline in violence in the world may signal the globalization of the Civilizing Process.

⁴⁹ Peter Singer, *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1981), 106.

⁵⁰ Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 648.

In addition to the decline in violence and the increase in empathy as evidence of the slow global Civilizing Process, the mechanism of Gentle Commerce has spread across the world, reinforcing the process. As the expansion of moral circles makes the world more interdependent, “the pressures of world economics – the global market – and the ease and speed of communication seem to be constraining us into a tighter, more integrated system;”⁵¹ the global market thus increases the costs of conflict and increases the benefits of peaceful mutual relations through Gentle Commerce. This replicates on a larger scale the effects produced by Gentle Commerce within states, where individuals come to be seen to be more useful alive and in alliance than dead. The benefits of Gentle Commerce have significantly outweighed the advantages of simply taking goods by force due to the high cost in economic resources, materials, human lives, and now international opinion. Therefore, higher levels of trade between nations decrease their chances of resolving their conflicts through violent means.⁵²

In the case of international conflicts between groups with seemingly irreconcilable differences, as seen with many ethnic group conflicts, the prospect of mutual gain through economic compromise potentially offers a means of surmounting those differences that is more beneficial than violence to both parties. This was seen in Western Europe after the 1950s at the point when “the benefits of trade and open economies . . . [first] swamped the benefits of nationalist separatism.”⁵³ In the last half-century increasing numbers of states have combined into economic consortia, such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and other regional free market associations,⁵⁴ while the creation of the World Trade Organization represents a global economic union of nations, if a comparatively weaker one than

⁵¹ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 306.

⁵² Tertrais, “The Demise of Ares,” 11.

⁵³ Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 152.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 153.

those represented in the large regional trade associations. Thus, the expansion of state free markets into a combined global free market allows the benefits of Gentle Commerce to spread throughout the world, instead of focusing those benefits solely within each state.

Because the free market is based solely on self-interest, it does not in itself prevent people or states from utilizing negative methods of gain, like the military seizure of resources, in all cases. However, the self-correcting nature of the free market to solve economic problems encourages the protection of the market by political bodies,⁵⁵ as within the state system, imposing a prohibitively high cost of using those negative methods when mutually beneficial gain can be achieved at much lower cost. The free market has also proven to be more cost-effective when developing countries are peacefully brought into the global free market, as opposed to the colonial method of using violence to forcibly open an insular state economy to the global free market.⁵⁶ The developing countries as well as their global trade partners gain access to an expanded global market and avoid the exhaustive, long-term costs of violent colonialism. However, because Gentle Commerce works best within a framework of law enforced by a centralized authority, a global Leviathan would be needed to properly ensure the safety and continued mutual benefit of a free global market in addition to supporting the currently weak global Civilizing Process. The World Trade Organization would seem to be a step in the right direction, since it actively supervises the global economy; however, the success of Gentle Commerce under a Leviathan is largely due to the monopoly of violence that can be used to enforce its protection of Gentle Commerce, which the WTO does not possess.

A supra-national authority with a monopoly on violence, has yet to be created, although certain elements would seem to be present in International Government Organizations (IGO's)

⁵⁵ Allen W. Johnson and Timothy Earle, *The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 381.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 382.

like the United Nations. One of the longest-running trends in human history is the decreasing number of independent polities in the world; whereas there were an estimated 100,000 or more independent political units in the Neolithic era,⁵⁷ the present United Nations is comprised of fewer than 200 member nations. This trend is likely to continue with the increased formation of regional blocs and organizations. IGO's have also been increasing in number, especially after the world wars.⁵⁸ With the increasing creation of IGO's and the collection of nations into regional blocs, power is becoming more and more centralized in the hands of a few, just as Norbert Elias described in the formation of state monopolies. If the same monopolization process that states went through in past centuries is indeed playing out on the international level, the result may be the formation of a global monopoly in which states are under the directions of regional blocs and ultimately a global authority, perhaps operating on a federal principle, if not as a unitary state. Yet, in order to be effective, this supra-national centralized authority would need the power to enforce and promote the changes of the global Civilizing Process, such as Gentle Commerce and humanistic moral norms.

The League of Nations was the first attempt at a unified global body intended to protect peace throughout the world; however, its fate was sealed with the failure of its weak economic sanctions to stop Mussolini from invading Ethiopia (Diehl, 174).⁵⁹ The next step in forming a global collective security authority was the United Nations, which was intent on learning from the failures of the League. "From covenant to charter, the focus clearly shifted from an emphasis on less to more coercive sanctions as instruments of enforcement" (Diehl, 182).⁶⁰ There was now a list of sanctions of increasing coercive power at the disposal of the United Nations, in addition

⁵⁷ Ibid., 245.

⁵⁸ Paul F. Diehl, ed. *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 44.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 174.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 182.

to detailed provisions of Articles 43-47 of Chapter VII in the UN charter for a standing military force. Political scientist Lynn H. Miller declares, “The lesson seemed clear: to stop the Mussolinis (and Hitlers) of the post-World War II period would require much more emphasis on a UN military threat than the League had ever been able to muster.”⁶¹ In the process of attempting to strengthen the UN as a state-like global authority, some have argued for building a monopoly on force on the basis of Articles 43-47; yet the overwhelming power of the constituent nation-states of the UN has yet to permit anything more than a minimal military power to emerge under the organization’s authority.

The United Nations has been active in a multitude of situations where violent threats were possible, but has responded with methods of varying levels of coerciveness (including economic sanctions, peacekeeping, and coalition military forces) that have not yet significantly challenged state sovereignty. Nonetheless, since 1990 the number of peacekeepers has increased by about 400 percent, while the number of peacekeeping missions has also increased by about 100 percent. Steven Pinker emphasizes the positive in arguing that “Peacekeeping is one of the things that the United Nations, for all its foibles, does well,”⁶² but this has not yet translated to the effective use of coercive methods to actively *prevent* warfare among states.

Thus far, the military force used by the UN has been comprised of military units under the direct control of their member states and indirectly controlled by the UN. In fact, these military coalitions tend to have heavy percentages of a particular major power member within the forces, with this member effectively ending up leading the coalition force. Two examples of such incidences are the Korean War of 1950 and the Gulf War of 1990. In both conflicts, the United States managed to hijack the collective security machinery of the UN and muster invasion

⁶¹ Ibid., 182.

⁶² Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 314.

level forces operating under American control in pursuit of the national foreign policy goals of the United States. Specifically with the Korean War, the UN forces were used in alignment with U.S. interests to prevent the spread of Communism and push the North Koreans out of South Korea.⁶³ In the Gulf War, after trade embargoes, economic sanctions, and a direct order to leave Kuwait failed to change the course of Iraq's government, Resolution 678 authorized member states cooperating with Kuwait's government to use force. Out of the twenty-seven member states that sent military units, 80 percent of them were U.S. troops, effectively forming a *U.S.-led* coalition, not a *UN-led* coalition.⁶⁴ With these examples in mind, global authority over the use of force is rendered ineffective; sovereign states that do retain adequate force clearly will continue to use it to enforce their individual interests.

The current ineffectiveness of the United Nations can be traced to its lack of a true monopoly on force over the state Leviathan system. The UN's hands are tied in instances where the permanent members of the Security Council cannot agree on a course of action, largely due to ideological differences. Yet, when the UN does become involved, it is usually after one or more actors have threatened or already used violence, which makes it significantly harder to resolve the conflict without further escalated use of violence by the UN. However, perhaps the most crippling issue is that the members of the UN generally lack the political will to support strong action on the part of the UN, even when there is consensus. The financial and human costs are borne by the individual members and are generally seen as too high in comparison to any gains related to their individual interests in the conflict (Diehl, 167).⁶⁵ In this current system, the UN's use of force is at the complete mercy of the states which functionally undermines the whole system of force monopoly described by Elias as the basis to date of the Civilizing Process.

⁶³ Diehl, *The Politics of Global Governance*, 180.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 167.

“With no international police force on the immediate horizon,” Paul Diehl maintains, “there is little prospect for global governance mechanisms that can prevent large-scale violence.”⁶⁶ Until the UN is able to muster the standing military force allowed in Articles 43-47 of the charter, the global Leviathan will remain a fantasy.

In 1992, there was a request to outline more aggressive and effective measures to be used by the UN to help prevent violent international warfare. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali returned a few months later with his *Agenda for Peace*,⁶⁷ which, among other recommendations, argued for a permanent, standing UN security force (organized under the authority of Articles 43-47) that could be immediately called upon in response to violent aggression. The response to this recommendation was negative: small member states were worried about being coerced, while the larger member states were unwilling to allow that level of military power in a supra-national governmental body.⁶⁸

Despite the ever increasing interdependence of the global community, states are not yet ready to agree to a social contract where a global authority wields the monopoly of force over them. States remain locked into calculations of immediate individual self-interest, while blithely ignoring the very same beneficial mechanisms on a global scale that allowed their congregation of power within the state, such as Gentle Commerce. The mechanisms of the Civilizing Process on a global scale allow the long-term mutually beneficial incentives of expanding moral circles, empathy, and mutually beneficial trade to outweigh the immediate benefits of self-interest, yet sovereigns are not ready to break out of the state Leviathan system to further the collective security of the world. Until such a time as states are willing to agree to a global Leviathan’s monopoly on force, the mechanisms of the global Civilizing Process will remain slow and

⁶⁶ Ibid., 167.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 183.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

fragile; without a global authority to promote and protect those mechanisms, warfare between states can and will continue.

Despite this impediment in progress, Lynn H. Miller observes that “we have been groping for a more fully blown social contract, where *human* security needs are primary,”⁶⁹ and are likely to continue to do so notwithstanding the reluctance of states to concede power to a global authority. Collectively, aggression has been made illegal on the global scale; as a result, the universal norm that every state has the obligation to oppose the use of international violence has taken hold as well. In this way, states are working, however slowly, towards consensus on what responses are required in the face of violent action, to varying levels of effect. Miller proposes that the UN seriously take into consideration the use of regional institutions to act out military responses, thus avoiding the group conflict inherent with outsider members coming into a region and performing violent actions.⁷⁰ This idea is very helpful currently in solving group conflict problems, while still allowing states under regional control to maintain their monopolies instead of giving that directly to an even higher supra-national body. On the other hand, as the world becomes ever more interconnected and states become more globalized and interdependent, the proxy of regional institutions can give way to a true global Leviathan at some future time.

In addition to the absence of a monopoly of force, the UN is also using coercive methods that are ineffective and largely imprecise. The economic sanctions used by the UN, while more coercive than those used by the League of Nations, still lack the force to accomplish ultimately coercive objectives. In fact, it could be argued that they do not even affect the intended target of the government, but instead the civilians end up bearing the brunt of these sanctions. As Miller notes of the Gulf War and its aftermath, “economic sanctions [were] widely viewed as heaping

⁶⁹ Ibid., 194.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

misery on much of the civilian population while their ostensible target – the government of Saddam Hussein [retained] its power.”⁷¹ Since states have control over commerce insofar as they can constrain it up to the limits imposed by the danger of inhibiting their own economic welfare, adjustments can be made so that the effect of an economic sanction is redistributed in a way that allows the government to continue on its present course. In this way, sanctions do not necessarily target the government, but instead greatly harm the civilians, the very same people growing humanistic norms say should be protected from harm and misery. These sanctions may temporarily slow down the government, but at a terrible cost to people not directly involved in the conflict.

Just as economic sanctions can largely end up being ineffective, imprecise, and devastating to the wrong people, the other end of the spectrum available to the UN can be even more so. The military methods of the UN have been largely coalition forces that engage in open warfare with the actors threatening or committing actions of violence. “In starkest terms,” Miller maintains,

when the effort to enforce the will of the global community against an aggressor produces massive death, destruction, and deprivations for civilians while leaving those responsible for the aggression in place, then one may be justified in viewing it as a war, with all the horror that term conveys, rather than as the exercise of a police power in which only proportionate force is justified to achieve the original, lawful goal.⁷²

The Gulf War was immensely destructive for the civilians of Iraq, but the suffering did not end with the conclusion of the conflict. Saddam Hussein remained in power to inflict further

⁷¹ Ibid., 187.

⁷² Ibid., 196.

deprivations within the country and compound the devastation immediately following open warfare.

Plainly stated, the methods of force available to the UN are largely ineffective, and can run counter to the global Civilizing Process when the massive destruction wrought upon civilians is taken into account. The UN is trying to make do with imprecise methods in the absence of the true monopoly on force that has empowered sovereign states and heretofore promoted the Civilizing Process. Sanctions are not strong enough to achieve the objectives and can be more devastating to the civilians than to the intended targets, while open warfare is becoming prohibitively destructive to all involved as evidenced by the humanistic moral climate due to the global Civilizing Process. This is in addition to the fact that members of the UN are unwilling to act strongly for the very reason that military intervention requires open warfare and the resulting extensive economic, resource, and human costs that must be paid by the individual members. Open warfare is no longer cost-effective on the state level, and it is even more so on the international level. Therefore, as the global Civilizing Process slowly continues, and the state system eventually gives way to a global Leviathan with a monopoly on force, it may behoove advocates of the global Civilizing Process to consider methods of force that are precise and strong enough to accomplish the same objectives of open warfare, and still protect the emerging global moral order from violent threats. Tactics fitting this description have in fact existed since the beginning of warfare itself; they just need to be repurposed for the current global moral climate.

CHAPTER THREE

KAUTILĪYA'S ARTHAŚĀSTRA

The year is approximately 326 B.C.E. The location is Pātaliputra, the capital of the Magadhan Empire in the Indian subcontinent, a polity ruled as a monarchy by the Nanda dynasty. The Nanda king who resided in Pātaliputra at this time was said to be of low caste, heretical in his hostility towards the upper castes of Brahmins and Kshatriyas, but he had been able to maintain a standing army of such formidable size as to halt Alexander the Great.⁷³ On the banks of the river Hyphasis, Alexander was faced with the decision of continuing his push eastward with exhausted and unwilling soldiers, or to return home. The land past the river was reputed to be rich and fertile. But according to Herodotus the Nanda monarchy, with an army of unquestionable strength,

possessed a much greater number of elephants than the other Indians, and that they were men of very great stature, and excelled in valour. These reports excited in Alexander an ardent desire to advance farther; but the spirit of the Macedonians now began to flag, when they saw the king raising one labour after another, and incurring one danger after another.⁷⁴

Despite an inspiring, impassioned speech made by Alexander to his men, the wish to return home did not leave the hearts and minds of his soldiers. Alexander returned to the west, dying in Babylon in 326 B.C.E. Instability and infighting followed within his immense empire. This instability was felt in the Macedonian controlled regions near Magadha, and contributed to

⁷³ R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta, *An Advanced History of India* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 91.

⁷⁴ Herodotus, et al, *The Classical Accounts of India*, Comp. R. C. Majumdar (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay Publishers, 1960), 51.

the growing crisis facing the current Nanda king.⁷⁵ According to tradition, this king was despised by his people, as well as the upper castes to which he was so hostile.⁷⁶ However, these were not the only people the Nanda king had offended. A Brahmin from Taxila named Kautilīya, also known as Chānakya or Visnugupta, was insulted by the Nanda king while in Pātaliputra;⁷⁷ consequently, he resolved to bring about the downfall of the Nanda dynasty.

Kautilīya left Pātaliputra, and upon arriving at the Vindhya forest, met the young man that would assist him in overthrowing the Nanda king. The young man was currently fleeing an order of execution after supposedly offending Alexander the Great when he was a youth.⁷⁸ His name was Chandragupta Maurya: the man that would become the “first strictly historical person who can be properly described as emperor of India.”⁷⁹ Chandragupta’s origins are not precisely known, but his life before meeting Kautilīya is related through different traditions. The Brahmanical tradition holds Chandragupta as born of a shudra woman, named Mura, who was in the court of the Nandas.⁸⁰ As such, this tradition has Chandragupta born of an ordinary family. On the contrary, Buddhist tradition states that the Maurya family was the ruling clan of a small republic of the Pipphalivanain region of Gorakhpur.⁸¹ This tradition of being from a ruling clan is generally accepted as the more likely origin of Chandragupta. As for his life after his flight from Alexander’s order of execution, the Greek historian Justin relates the tradition of Chandragupta meeting a lion and an elephant, which are taken as good omens of Chandragupta’s bright future as a ruler. After meeting the lion in the forest, Chandragupta met Kautilīya and the

⁷⁵ R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta, *An Advanced History of India*, 91.

⁷⁶ Vincent A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, Ed. Percival Spear et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 83.

⁷⁷ R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta, *An Advanced History of India*, 92.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, 97.

⁸⁰ R. S. Sharma, *India's Ancient Past* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 170.

⁸¹ Ibid.

two raise a mercenary army to overthrow the Nanda dynasty.⁸² The details of the sequence of events relating to the governmental overthrow are unknown. However, what is known is that with Kautilīya's guidance, Chandragupta ended up forging an empire covering virtually the entire Indian subcontinent.

Under Kautilīya's direction, Chandragupta sought popular support for his sovereignty. Kautilīya assisted in this endeavor by instigating rebellion among the disaffected upper castes in Pātaliputra, like his fellow Brahmins. With the combination of a mercenary army and popular revolution, Chandragupta executed the Nanda family and seized control of the former Magadha Empire.⁸³ By 322 B.C.E., the Maurya Empire had solidified its control, with Chandragupta Maurya as the first ruler. He then turned his expansionist sights on the unstable remnants of the Macedonian empire. Chandragupta, with the help of northern nations, attacked and conquered Macedonian garrisons in the Indus basin adding substantial lands to the new Empire.⁸⁴ Chandragupta's expansion into regions of Macedonian control culminated near the end of his rule around 300 B.C.E. with a peace treaty between him and the Macedonian general Seleukos after the latter tried and failed to reconquer lands in the Indus. Chandragupta married Seleukos's daughter, receiving a substantial amount of territory west of the Indus, including modern day Afghanistan, the Hindu Kush range, and the Baluchistan area of Pakistan, as a dowry. In return for all this, Seleukos received 500 war elephants.⁸⁵ The active expansion of this empire continued with every Maurya successor including Chandragupta's son, Bindusāra, and his grandson, Aśoka. At its largest size, the Maurya Empire covered the Indian subcontinent except

⁸² Herodotus, et al, *The Classical Accounts of India*, 193.

⁸³ Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, 97.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Sharma, *India's Ancient Past*, 170.

for Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and some parts of northeast India, and stretched westward into Afghanistan and parts of Persia.

The Maurya Empire was not only impressive in size, but in military strength, administrative efficiency, and cultural accomplishment. According to Vincent Smith in *The Oxford History of India* (1958),

The advent of the Maurya dynasty marks the passage from darkness to light for the historian. Chronology suddenly becomes definite, almost precise; a huge empire springs into existence, unifying the innumerable fragments of distracted India...gigantic world-wide religious movements are initiated, of which the effects are still felt; and the affairs of secluded India are brought into close touch with those of the outer world.⁸⁶

This empire was unprecedented culturally, religiously, administratively, and militarily. Due to the size of the empire, the Maurya had a standing army about three times larger than their Nanda predecessors.⁸⁷ This allowed their rapid expansion over the subcontinent as well as the ability to defend their territory. In terms of administrative organization of the empire, R.S. Sharma aptly states, “The Maurya control over the settled parts of the country may have matched that of the Mughals and perhaps of the East India Company.”⁸⁸ All aspects of this empire were directly under the influence of a close advisor of Chandragupta. This man was the same Brahmin who guided Chandragupta in the forging of the Maurya Empire: Kautilīya.

Upon the successful overthrow of the Nanda dynasty, Kautilīya became Chandragupta’s chief minister and advisor, a position some refer to as a Chancellor of the Maurya Empire,⁸⁹ in

⁸⁶ Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, 94.

⁸⁷ Sharma, *India's Ancient Past*, 172.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁸⁹ Roger Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra* (Lanham:Lexington Books, 2002), 8.

which he actively shaped the empire's administration and its control over its subjects in all respects. Kautilīya's ideas on how a state should operate were collected in exhaustive detail in his work, the Arthaśāstra. As one of the few texts that survive from this period, it is assumed that the methods of statecraft described in the Arthaśāstra are closest to how the Maurya Empire was actually run under Chandragupta. The title, Arthaśāstra, loosely translates to the "science of politics." In his translation and analysis of the Arthaśāstra, R.P. Kangle describes the work with the distinction that, "The Arthaśāstra is not a theoretical treatise on political science. Its primary concern is with matters of practical administration."⁹⁰ However, the work is not only Kautilīya's thoughts on practical administration, but a collection of thoughts and solutions of kingdom administrators dating back to the beginning of this science, around 600 B.C.E.,⁹¹ and thus an epitome of the sources Kautilīya drew upon, as well as a summary of his own opinions on statecraft.⁹² Kautilīya's Arthaśāstra is therefore a collection of ancient Indian realist political thought up to the point in which it was written, and is arguably the oldest systematic expression of realist political thought, including abundant material on military tactics and foreign policy: it is in equal parts a political and a military work.

As a military treatise, Kautilīya's Arthaśāstra is compared with other great "art of war" military treatises such as those by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. As a work of political realism, the Arthaśāstra is typically compared to works similar to that of Weber and Hobbes. However, since Kautilīya's Arthaśāstra is not solely on one topic to the exclusion of all others, it is hard to compare the best works dedicated to a single topic to the all-encompassing Arthaśāstra. There is indeed only one other author in history whose work compares analytically with the whole of Kautilīya's treatise: Niccolò Machiavelli. *The Prince* and *The Art of War* serve as relevant

⁹⁰ R.P. Kangle, *Part III: A Study* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, 2010), 3:116.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 40.

comparisons to the exhaustive treatise of Kautilīya in its analysis of human behavior as related to foreign policy and war, in addition to the supposedly amoral military and political tactics they recommend.

In broad terms, the Arthaśāstra was written to instruct a ruler on all the proper details of ruling an empire, down to where to house the elephants. More specifically, topics addressed include how to be a wise and virtuous king, what types of countries and kings to conquer, how to test the loyalty of advisors, foreign policy, strategies of warfare, and the use of spies. For example, a virtuous ruler should behave in a way that he is an example for the people and should rule them in the most effective manner possible. Kautilīya recognized that popular support as well as the army comes from the countryside and the people. An unjust king runs the risk of losing all popular support, and becomes unsafe inside the state and outside. Therefore, the best domestic policy is that of social justice, and is the best defense against outside enemies.⁹³ Unhappy people will commit treasonous acts and are likely to be infiltrated by enemy spies; people who are happy, by contrast, have no reason to revolt and cause trouble for the king. Indeed, this knowledge can secure a king within his own state, and provide a significant opportunity when discontent is observed in an enemy state. This is quite a modern idea for an ancient political thinker derided for his realism. Acting in the best interest of the people is in the best interest of the king, in order to maintain his power. Machiavelli expressed similar sentiment in regards to the people, “For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavor of them may last

⁹³ Kautiliya. *Part II: Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes*, Trans. K. P. Kangle (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, 2010), 3:335.

longer.”⁹⁴ Any violence that must be done should be done quickly, so the king can set about bringing the people to his side with the regular benefits he provides. In this way, the people will be happy with the king and will be bound to him.

Similarly, performing actions in the interest of protecting the state which are considered morally unjustifiable are also performed in the interest of the people. After all, according to both Machiavelli and Kautilīya, acting in the best interests of the nation means acting in the best interest of the people. Conquering enemies by whatever means necessary results in removing one’s enemies and gaining wealth and resources from the conquered nation. Such actions benefit the ruler because they are in the best interest of the nation and the people. Kautilīya states that every nation will act in its own self-interest to maximize its power.⁹⁵ Machiavelli also reflects this same belief in the self-interest of man and inherently the nations of men.⁹⁶ As such, this idea forms the basis of Kautilīya’s foreign policy.

Foreign policy was in itself an extension of military strategy according to Kautilīya, and thus ultimately indiscernible from it. If every nation acts in its own self-interest, alliances between nations will last only as long as the alliance remains in the self-interest of both nations. Kautilīya also argued that promises and agreements are strategies, not moral obligations.⁹⁷ Therefore, alliances and agreements between nations are strategies that will be followed until they are no longer in the nation’s self-interest. This concept is echoed by Machiavelli in the event that agreements place a ruler in a dangerous position.⁹⁸ Kautilīya believed that the king would be betraying his own people if he did not assume a worst case scenario at all times. As

⁹⁴ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Ed. Dominic Baker-Smith. Trans. W. K. Marriott (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 41.

⁹⁵ Kautiliya. *Part II: Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes*, 389.

⁹⁶ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 80.

⁹⁷ Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist*, 87.

⁹⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 80.

Roger Boesche points out, Kautilīya “...did not say to himself, ‘Prepare for war, but hope for peace,’ but instead, ‘Prepare for war, and plan to conquer.’”⁹⁹ As mentioned before, conquering one’s enemies was seen as beneficial to the nation, because security was increased as well as economically enriching the nation. Even ambassadors were potential spies for Kautilīya. So, diplomacy and foreign policy were also weapons of military strategy.¹⁰⁰ By his definition of types of warfare, he was basically at war in some fashion with any nation with which he had foreign relations.

Kautilīya states in the *foreign policy* section, “Of war, there is open war, concealed war and silent war,” defining the three types of warfare as follows:

Open war is fighting at the place and time indicated; creating fright, sudden assault, striking when there is error or a calamity, giving way and striking in one place, are types of concealed warfare; that which concerns secret practices and instigations through secret agents is the mark of silent war.¹⁰¹

Open warfare describes most historical battles ranging from ancient Greece to medieval times and more. The American Civil War, World War I, and World War II for the most part can be seen as examples of open warfare. Soldiers wore identifying uniforms, the battle was at a decided location, and started at a particular time. Simply stated, people marched in lines and agreed to stand there and get shot or stabbed. Open warfare requires massive resources and money to sustain the battle effort. Most importantly, it requires large numbers of a valuable resource: soldiers. By the nature of open warfare and its tactics, large numbers of people are needed due to the comparatively high rate of casualties. When one has the advantage, superior strength and favorable environmental conditions, Kautilīya recommended this type of warfare

⁹⁹ Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist*, 78.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁰¹ Kautilīya. *Part II: Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes*, 339, 342.

since “open warfare . . . is most righteous;”¹⁰² insofar as honor and a straightforward manner are crucial to a particular military culture, open warfare has preferential standing as an instrument of the power of the king.

Concealed warfare, which includes tactics of guerrilla warfare, is appropriate when the enemy possesses superior troops or more advantageous environmental conditions. Kautilīya lists various tactics of concealed warfare, such as attacking the enemy during an environmental calamity or on unfavorable terrain; feigning retreat and attacking the pursuing enemy on unfavorable ground; combined frontal attack with assault from another direction, as in hammer and anvil, pincer, and flanking attacks; attacking the enemy on the opposite side of unfavorable ground; using an initial force to tire the enemy, then sending in a second force; feigning a rout, then ambushing the unsuspecting enemy troops; ambushing the enemy when preoccupied with plundering; infiltrating the ranks of the enemy with strong troops concealed within weak troops; keeping enemy troops awake all night by hit-and-run assaults, then attacking during the day when enemy is still tired or asleep; among several others.¹⁰³ Some of the tactics detailed are common tactics in open warfare as well; therefore, they are of no surprise compared to tactics in other military treatises. Since concealed warfare or guerrilla warfare is typically utilized by groups of smaller numbers and resources compared to their enemies, concealed warfare can be less costly in resources, money and people compared to open warfare.

Concealed warfare may seem similar to what is currently referred to as “irregular warfare,” and indeed, some tactics can be defined as both. However, the difference between concealed and irregular warfare arises in how they are defined; thus, preventing the tactics in either respective type from automatically being categorized as belonging to both concealed and

¹⁰² Ibid., 438, 440.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 438-439.

irregular warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense characterizes the difference between “traditional warfare” and “irregular warfare” as based on the use of populations. “Traditional warfare” is opposition of an enemy by “force-on-force conflict,” while “irregular warfare” depends on influencing populations for political ends, like promoting insurgency or using terrorism.¹⁰⁴ Such tactics have been used with certain levels of success by Mao, Che Guevara, and the Taliban.

It is important to note that Kautilīya’s definitions of concealed and silent warfare include tactics that could be defined as both traditional warfare and irregular warfare as defined by the DOD, and not all tactics defined as irregular warfare are recommended or even mentioned by Kautilīya. The DOD’s irregular warfare does not exactly equate to Kautilīya’s concealed warfare. A tactic defined as irregular warfare does not mean it can also be categorized as concealed warfare, and vice versa. For example, sowing discontent in a population is recommended when advantageous, but acts of terrorism are not mentioned or condoned in the Arthaśāstra, as such acts are counterproductive in many ways in a conflict between two states, as indicated by Kautilīya’s ideas on foreign policy. Also, the DOD places special emphasis on the stipulation that traditional warfare is performed by regulated state actors, while irregular warfare is performed by a non-state actor against a regulated state actor. Although smaller groups like non-state actors are very likely to use concealed warfare against a larger state actor as indicated by the DOD definition, such special delineations are not made in Kautilīya’s definitions of types of war, since an enemy is simply an enemy, state or non-state.

Silent warfare encompasses certain tactics used by intelligence agencies such as psychological warfare, deception and disinformation. However, Kautilīya also delineates more active uses for spies, such as assassination. In fact, silent warfare for Kautilīya includes much

¹⁰⁴ Scharre, "Spectrum of What?" 76.

more direct action than what modern intelligence agencies typically allow themselves to be known to practice. Spies can be used to harass neutral nations into war with their neighbor so one can form an alliance with them; to sow discontent in alliances within a state that oppose the ruler to destroy the group; to assess the loyalty of soldiers and politicians; to sow discontent in the enemy army; or to destroy the enemy by use of weapons, poison, or fire.¹⁰⁵ Kautilīya lists various types of people to employ as secret agents, including prostitutes, artisans, actors, and the elders of the army: anyone, indeed, who can gain information on any of the classes of subjects within a state. Kautilīya describes in explicit detail each of these points on the use of espionage against enemies. In no other work has espionage been so important or explicitly described as a foreign policy.

Kautilīya “recognizes that on the battlefield tactics are essential, particularly when one is at a disadvantage.”¹⁰⁶ Kautilīya would similarly recommend the use of the type of warfare that would provide the best advantage. If circumstances dictate the use of silent warfare to gain advantage, then that is what should be employed; if open warfare is advantageous, he would advise that more “honorable” path instead. In Neal Wood’s introduction to Machiavelli’s *The Art of War* he describes Machiavelli’s outlook on warfare which can similarly be applied to Kautilīya. “War for him is war, a no-holds-barred contest. Victory is the aim to which all other considerations on the battlefield must be subordinated. Behavior toward the enemy is not subject to common moral considerations. Every type of trickery and violence is legitimate when used against the enemy.”¹⁰⁷ The object of warfare is to defeat the enemy, as it is in one’s best interests to do so for the ruler, the nation, and its subjects. Silent warfare has the possibility of requiring

¹⁰⁵ Kautilīya. *Part II: Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes*, 462-464.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 260.

¹⁰⁷ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, Ed. Neal Wood. Trans. Ellis Farnsworth (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1965), xxv.

even less resources, money and loss of life than either open or concealed warfare. Additionally, the reduction in loss of life is more likely for both sides in the conflict.

Despite such advantages, tactics classified as silent warfare are generally condemned as amoral by the political community. Machiavelli was condemned in his time for condoning the use of conspiratorial tactics in the political sphere. However, the use of deception, assassination and spies is more thoroughly discussed by Kautilīya than even by Machiavelli. Kautilīya explicitly describes the use of assassination as well as the use of spies for external enemies across a range of situations. Hence, silent warfare has been around from ancient times, and has been used whether overtly known or not. Espionage in warfare has been mentioned in other books on warfare, including Sun Tzu, who exhorted ancient Chinese rulers to “Be subtle! Be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business.”¹⁰⁸ Sun Tzu even goes on to describe 5 types of spies and their uses in warfare.¹⁰⁹ Similar, basic treatment of spies and their uses can be found in many other specifically *military* treatises throughout history. Neal Wood states, “Conspiracy falls quite naturally within the classical military perspective, since it is a friend-foe relationship attaining a characteristic military form in civil war.”¹¹⁰ In a military context, nothing that Kautilīya suggests would be seen as particularly radical or unethical; the difference is that he explicitly elaborates on the use of spies in warfare more thoroughly than other military thinkers. In the military sphere, these crafty techniques would simply be seen as valuable tactics that have been used time and again in actual warfare against an external enemy.

On the other hand, the use of spies and conspiratorial techniques is generally considered amoral and dishonorable in *political* thought, even in the context of use against an external enemy. Machiavelli is known for these ruthless ideas and was burnt in effigy in his time for

¹⁰⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Ed. Dallas Galvin. Trans. Lionel Giles (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2003), 207.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 200-211.

¹¹⁰ Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, lxv.

proposing the use of such tactics in the political realm of foreign affairs, just as Kautilīya suggested before him. Machiavelli and Kautilīya share a realistic perspective about the disconnection between ethics and the political sphere, as well as the existence of pervasive political dishonesty.¹¹¹ Kangle elaborates: “The fault of the Arthaśāstra, as that of Machiavelli, lies in openly saying something that has always been actually practiced by states everywhere.”¹¹² The idea that politics should be bound by ethics in all instances is the wish of the political idealist. However, such ethical considerations are cast aside in practical application of politics.

When enemies threaten the security and independence of the state, a nation may perform actions that are considered unethical and morally unjustifiable under normal circumstances. Therefore, the idea that using espionage to destabilize an enemy instead of face him honorably on the battlefield may be dishonorable to the political idealist, but is simply practical in realistic politics. Each state views its own interests as supreme; and, in the defense of such interests, a state will do what is necessary in actuality to protect those interests.¹¹³ In fact, Wood states, “Political power is acquired by conspiracy and is preserved by counter-conspiracy,”¹¹⁴ as was evidenced in the creation of the Maurya Empire, and innumerable other historical examples. If political power is attained through conspiratorial and secret means, it does not make much sense to immediately reject the use of spies and conspiracy in politics based on ethical considerations.

Conditions in the world have not changed to the point that silent warfare has become entirely unnecessary or disadvantageous compared to other types of warfare. Kangle points out that

¹¹¹ Kangle, *Part III: A Study*, 271.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 282.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 264, 274.

¹¹⁴ Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, lxvi.

We still have the same distrust of one nation by another, the same pursuit of its own interest by every nation tempered only by considerations of expediency, the same efforts to secure alliances with the same cynical disregard of them in self-interest, the same kind of intelligence service maintained by one nation in the territory of another which we find referred to in the Arthaśāstra.¹¹⁵

Not only was silent warfare advantageous under certain conditions in the 4th century B.C.E., but it can be just as advantageous today. In fact, many countries utilize intelligence agencies that specialize in silent warfare tactics. Governments, such as Israel and the United States, are even authorizing the use of drones for targeted killing. It seems that silent warfare is becoming more advantageous than open warfare and even concealed warfare in modern times.

The rise in the advantage of silent warfare may be due to a new factor currently regulating the use of all types of warfare. World opinion and a growing global morality serve as a check on blatantly self-interested warfare actions. With the creation of the United Nations and other international bodies, it has become harder for nations to commit acts of war that provide only individual benefits at the cost of another nation; and, until such a time as there is a “one world government or an effective supra-national authority,” nations will continue to practice the teachings in the Arthaśāstra openly or covertly.¹¹⁶ However, the increased prevalence of silent warfare in current times may seem antithetical of what should happen with international bodies like the United Nations growing in power. Neal Wood skillfully describes a relevant underlying idea in Machiavelli’s *The Art of War*: “A military establishment tends to reflect the qualities of the civil society of which it is a part.”¹¹⁷ If the military tactics used in this time are a reflection of current societies, what does that say about current nations or the current moral climate? The

¹¹⁵ Kangle, *Part III: A Study*, 283.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, lxvii.

increased prevalence of silent warfare may be seen to point to a regression of society to underhanded and amoral violence in warfare. However, an alternate trend could be occurring: the comparatively lower costs associated with silent warfare, especially in human casualties, may reflect a positive shift in morality that allows the prospect of the legitimate use of silent warfare, particularly in the case of use by a global authority. Perhaps minimizing the loss of life for all sides of a conflict is becoming more morally important than using traditionally “honorable” tactics, especially since nations use silent warfare anyway, the United States being publically known to do so in several different conflicts. Warfare is not about to disappear from human existence any time soon; but, perhaps the use of silent warfare instead of open warfare is a step on the road towards a less violent global existence if such tactics can be acknowledged and systematically regulated by a global Leviathan to ensure proper use in relation to the global Civilizing Process.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEGITIMIZING SILENT WARFARE

If we are to take Machiavelli at his word that the military sphere reflects society and its values, the increasing use of silent warfare preferentially over open and concealed warfare reflects a shift in moral attitudes allowing such tactics to be used over the traditionally “honorable” tactics of open warfare. The modern moral climate is not drastically different from that of the past; with a shift in the relative importance of morals, the possibility of using silent warfare in the proper way is allowed. The increasing importance of humanitarian morals, such as prevention of loss of human life or human suffering, are beginning to outweigh older considerations of honor and forthrightness, typically associated with military cultures of the past. In addition, as the global Civilizing Process continues, the spread and unification of morals globalizes this shift in moral climate. The degree to which the tactics of silent warfare align with this moral shift, and can be made consistent with both effective methods and humanitarian restraints on violence, are the subjects of the present chapter.

“Political assassination – the murder of a public figure for political purposes – has been known since ancient times and is much commoner than is usually supposed.”¹¹⁸ As discussed earlier, the specific silent warfare tactic of assassination has long been dismissed out of hand as morally reprehensible. Poison, treachery, and assassination were among the earliest techniques to be denounced as “despicable form[s] of warfare,”¹¹⁹ even in Kautiliya’s day. However, realists like Kautiliya and Machiavelli have recommended such tactics be used in the military sphere due

¹¹⁸ J. E. Hare and Carey B. Joynt, *Ethics and International Affairs* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 154.

¹¹⁹ Michael L. Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.

to their effectiveness, despite the largely *political* moral objections over time to such suggestions. For Kautilīya, choosing warfare tactics was all about utility and the expected cost compared to expected benefit. Obviously, peace was the best method of all, maximizing the gains of all involved. The use of other tactics short of force were also deemed preferable: “Financial support by the conqueror for his friends, [and] bribery and subversion of his enemy’s population might...reduce [war’s potential] scope or even make it unnecessary.”¹²⁰ If peace could not be attained, resolution of the conflict in the quickest, cleanest way possible was the best; in this connection silent warfare practices carried the possibility of rendering further warfare and conflict unnecessary. The use of silent warfare tactics avoided the larger resource requirements of open and concealed warfare, while reaching the same ends while preserving life.¹²¹ Simply stated, silent warfare is cheaper in all resources compared to open and concealed warfare, and thus more cost effective overall.

The tactics of silent warfare tend to place less emphasis on “overwhelming destructive power and lethal force” than conventional warfare.¹²² Sowing internal discontent and seizing the opportunity to encourage dissent within a state does not require destructive power and need not encourage lethal force. “Assassination, on the other hand, is a lethal tactic but one that is often accurate and avoids excessive civilian casualties. This too, limits combatant and noncombatant casualties significantly.”¹²³ Again, the use of a silent warfare tactic such as assassination aligns with the modern moral climate insofar as it may minimize losses of life for both combatants and noncombatants on both sides of the conflict; in this sense assassination can be argued to possess the “singular virtue of substantially reducing collateral damage and harm to noncombatants while

¹²⁰ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 82.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War*, 9.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 10.

eliminating grave military threats.”¹²⁴ In this manner, the tactics of silent warfare (if they could be used properly) might follow and even promote the morals and mechanisms of the global Civilizing Process and contribute to the overall decline in violence in the world through an effective and limited use of force. These benefits might arguably prove invaluable within the asymmetric conflicts of today, allowing at once effectiveness and precision in the use of violence and the observation of humanitarian morals.

Not only is the moral climate shifting, but the needs of the military sphere are changing as well with the increasing occurrence of asymmetric wars, such as the one currently underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Faced with conflicts against smaller groups of nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, states “are now ready to reconsider deeply held ideas about combatant rights, unnecessary suffering, and noncombatant immunity to lay a foundation for practices that are both militarily necessary and, they hope, humane.”¹²⁵ Military organizations have indeed adapted their tactics to the environment of asymmetric warfare, albeit with varying degrees of reluctance. Concealed warfare has increasingly been used in asymmetric conflict by both nations and the nonstate groups; nations have merely tested the waters when it comes to silent warfare, however, due to centuries-old moral indignation against practices that seem to many not only unconventional but repugnant. “First,” the Israeli political and military ethicist Michael L. Gross observes,

the practice of war is changing. Fueled by military necessity, such practices as targeted killing, aggressive interrogation, nonlethal warfare, and attacks on civilians are slowly emerging as new norms of war making. Second, moral thinking about war is changing.

Fighting at close quarters, lack of uniforms, and the growing role for nonlethal weapons

¹²⁴ Ibid., 101.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 4.

compel such fundamental wartime principles as noncombatant immunity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality to accommodate the exigencies of asymmetric war. Nations are not simply adopting new practices but also confronting international proscriptions [against them].¹²⁶

With the decline in use of open warfare, a vacuum has opened up within the categorization of acceptable military tactics according to the global moral climate due to the global Civilizing Process. It may be the case that silent warfare practices can fill this void.

Despite moral rejections, silent warfare has been used by many nations before this current shift in the moral climate. The General Intelligence Presidency of Saudi Arabia (Al Mukhabarat al-A‘amah) is known to have utilized silent warfare tactics for the promotion of what the kingdom regards as Muslim interests; the KGB of the Soviet Union utilized the tactics of silent warfare extensively during the Cold War; during that same period the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States used silent warfare techniques ranging from bribery to involvement in assassination and coup attempts directed at the removal of foreign leaders, including Patrice Lumumba, Fidel Castro, Rafael Trujillo, and Ngo Dinh Diem.¹²⁷ In the Vietnam War and the war on terror alike the U.S. has employed silent warfare approaches that stimulated moral outrage, in response to which it has by turns sought to cover up and justify its practices. It has persisted in using these approaches notwithstanding the opprobrium they have aroused, Gross maintains, because they “meet the demands of military necessity and humanitarianism.”¹²⁸

The U.S. has not been deterred by the fact that, historically speaking, the balance between military exigency and humane values has been difficult to maintain. The Vietnam War offers a

¹²⁶ Ibid., 24.

¹²⁷ Hare and Joynt, *Ethics and International Affairs*, 155, 156, 158.

¹²⁸ Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War*, 24.

notable case in point. In late 1963, the CIA was alarmed by the organizational power of the Viet Cong after the demise of Diem, and the serious lack of related intelligence on this development. Together with Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the CIA pushed for a general restructuring of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) in order to enhance intelligence gathering on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). These were the roots that eventually lead to the birth of the Phung Hoang Program in 1965, also known as Operation Phoenix.¹²⁹ The Phoenix program was supported by the US, but operated by the GVN. Various supervisory and advisory roles were filled by the CIA, MACV, U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), GVN, and the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN), while the active roles involved such groups as Census-Grievance (C-G), Revolutionary Development (RD), Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), uniformed police, Police Special Branch (PSB), Popular Forces (PF), and elements of the U.S. armed forces. Phoenix was designed to suppress the Communist political and administrative structure through the collection of local-level intelligence on the VCI that it distributed to American and South Vietnamese military units and pacification elements.¹³⁰ However, the most well known of the several programs involved with Phoenix were the ones involved in the use of interrogation centers and targeted killing. The PRU and PF were usually used in such instances as well as for small-scale operations into contested and enemy territory.

The most common PRU objective was “neutralization” of Viet Cong partisans. Killing and capture were not the only “neutralization” methods intended or practiced by Phoenix operatives, who frequently sought to discredit Viet Cong sympathizers in villages and to frame Viet Cong cadre members as embezzlers. From the beginning, however, lethal force was authorized if the targeted individual resisted or if armed Viet Cong were encountered. This

¹²⁹ Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., *Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 255.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 254.

authorization effectively licensed an assassination program that led to the deaths of large numbers of more innocent civilians as PRU operatives acted on locally-reported intelligence to generate “black lists” of people to hunt down. This notoriously faulty intelligence was infected with false accusations of Viet Cong activity by which informants used Phoenix agents to exact revenge and settle scores with personal enemies: estimates of the number of civilians killed with no Viet Cong affiliations range as high as 90 percent.¹³¹

Despite the overwhelming negative image of the Phoenix program, it did achieve significant levels of success in some provinces to the point that it was ordered to double in size. The record of PRU results from May through September 1967 indicated 1,500 Viet Cong killed and 960 captured;¹³² in some cases where relations with the locals were positive these results had a crippling effect on the Viet Cong infrastructure. In provinces like Long An where local populations were on the fence or sympathetic to the Viet Cong, however, the PRU and Viet Cong engaged in what more closely resembled a blood feud, trading assassinations and other attacks in lock step.¹³³ On the other hand, “The Communists credited Phoenix activity with making serious inroads on their rural organization....”¹³⁴ Despite instances of effectiveness, the Phoenix program was at best a crude effort at implementing silent warfare tactics in a conflict that it was not necessarily conducive to use; its principal lessons for the present are cautionary ones.

Similar issues can be seen in the use and implementation of targeted killing of Palestinian guerrillas by Israel in what analysts have identified as a “colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes” (CARS) conflict. In some contexts, the Vietnam War can also be considered

¹³¹ Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War*, 119.

¹³² Ahern, *Vietnam Declassified*, 276.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 274.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 304.

a CARS conflict, which can help explain the circumstances that render targeted killing and other tactics of silent warfare less effective. However, in the situation of Israel and Palestine, the Palestinians are being targeted and are not in a position to have their communities “won over” by the Israelis, and vice versa. The element of securing the good will of the community by protecting them from the guerrillas does not exist in this conflict as it did in certain provinces of Vietnam, or as may currently be the case in some localities in Afghanistan. In the absence of the potential to win the hearts and minds of a population by eliminating threats to their survival and well-being, experience has shown that targeted killings can be dangerously destabilizing. Insofar as they cause highly emotional reactions of moral outrage and a thirst for revenge, they can trigger a vicious cycle of revenge killing and terrorism.¹³⁵ As Gross argues, specifically of the Israeli-Palestinian case, “Targeted killings reduce enemy capabilities but easily instill a stronger will to fight.”¹³⁶ In this way, targeted killing acts to strengthen the guerillas within the community, just as acts of terrorism can be counterproductive in drawing together enemy forces with mutual, strong feelings of moral outrage. This also has future implications, in that such strong feelings of moral outrage and revenge are very likely to hamper any future efforts at peace or reconstruction.

One must consider what benefits and costs are traded when utilizing certain tactics in warfare and how that changes the effectiveness of the tactic employed. In the case of Israel, they may benefit from focusing targeted killing only on dangerous, key members of the guerrillas, instead of going simply for large numbers of guerrillas.¹³⁷ This may have an effect in augmenting the shift in costs and benefits due to the cycle of revenge, potentially increasing the overall effectiveness of the targeted killing tactic.

¹³⁵ Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War*, 116.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 114.

On the other hand, the use of targeted killing by Israel in this conflict undermines the overall effectiveness of this tactic of silent warfare and in the long term may run counter to the moral climate instilled by the global Civilizing Process. Silent warfare *must* be used in the correct circumstances to maximize its effectiveness in a conflict, as well as be able to follow the moral stipulations of the global Civilizing Process. Kautilīya stressed the necessity of examining the relative costs and benefits of each of the three types of warfare, and demarcated the requirement of using the method most appropriate to the circumstances presented by the conflict in order to maximize effectiveness and ensure success. The use of targeted killing in the Israel-Palestine conflict, like the frequently counterproductive effects of assassination in the Phoenix program, suggests how grave the cost of ignoring these guidelines can be.

The fact remains that the use of targeted killing, effective or not, is typically regarded as murder clothed in a thin legal veil. In modern times, “Assassination...has emerged as the targeted killing or extrajudicial execution of suspected terrorists” – a particular problem because “the status of targets is ambiguous.”¹³⁸ Traditionally, soldiers, or uniformed combatants, can kill or be killed at will until they surrender; at the moment they cease to be combatants they receive immunity as prisoners of war (POWs) and cannot be held personally responsible for the actions of the government they had served. On the other hand, civilians have noncombatant immunity that protects them from suffering due to conflict or being killed on the spot by combatants for being an enemy civilian. However, this line is intentionally blurred in asymmetric conflict, in which combatants are not uniformed military personnel, and indeed derive their deadliness from the fact that they are indistinguishable from ordinary civilians. Distinguishing between civilians and non-uniformed combatants, and minimizing the likelihood that civilians will suffer or be killed, are among the greatest challenges of fighting modern asymmetric wars in accordance with

¹³⁸ Ibid., 1, 118.

“the laws of war.” These problems are exacerbated by the fact that terrorists and guerrillas exploit this ambiguity by maintaining two statuses: one of similar status to a combatant when on the battlefield, and when not on the battlefield that of something similar to a noncombatant.¹³⁹ Especially with the tendency of guerrillas to use civilians as cover, and are deeply intertwined with regular civilians who support the guerillas to varying degrees, the fate of civilians in this environment can be questionable. However, once a soldier removes his uniform, he is still a soldier and can be killed as a combatant; this same rule applies to guerrillas since they do not stop being guerrillas once they blend back into the civilian population. So, the question remains how can extrajudicial targeted killing be legitimate when the status of those targeted is ambiguous? The answer depends on finding a means of identifying the affiliation of the target. This means, in effect, determining *who* is eligible to be killed; that in turn requires those who make the determination to determine *how* to classify the enemy.

In the absence of uniforms or insignia that clearly identify the affiliation of the person in question, the current solution for the U.S. Targeted Killing Program is to identify enemies individually, creating a list of names, much as was the intention of the creators of the Phoenix program in Vietnam. The deadly problem of inaccuracy that was so evident there arose from the lax regulation of operatives and the absence of due diligence analysis of the intelligence they generated. This, of course, is a potential problem in any program of targeted killing that functions on the identification of targets by list, and as such systematic regulations should be put in place to establish the point at which action can be taken once affiliation is established for what is defined as “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Thus *how* targets are classified in terms of status becomes the critical issue.

Conventional, uniformed combatants are expected to respect certain codes of behavior, such as

¹³⁹ Ibid., 105.

conduct during the surrender of an enemy combatant or POW regulations that can be turned against soldiers by guerrillas who are not bound by such codes of conduct. It is not useful to classify guerrillas as noncombatants, because then they are immune to any kind of violent threat from a combatant, which can again be used against a combatant. There exist two circumstances that justify lethal force universally: war or law enforcement. Enemy soldiers can kill each other with very few restrictions, while law enforcement allows the use of lethal force only in regards to the threat of imminent danger from a suspected criminal. A war criminal, on the other hand requires that he be captured and tried, but if he is on the battlefield or assessed as a dangerous threat he can be killed like a regular combatant. In this case, he is not necessarily protected like a combatant upon capture, since he will be tried and not get to automatically go home without being held personally responsible.

Currently, the United States' approach to using armed drone aircraft to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban enemies depends on its intelligence agencies' ability to classify targets as combatants and create a list containing the names of those who can be killed. This seems to be an effective policy for now. However, intelligence gathering is always important in warfare, especially in the special confounding circumstances of modern asymmetric warfare, so capturing a target when possible is always more useful than lethal force. The problem is that if a target classified as a regular combatant is actually captured, he is protected as a POW and cannot lawfully be pressed for information or held responsible for his actions. Just as silent warfare tactics like targeted killing need to be assessed for their potential effectiveness and benefits when used under certain circumstances in a given conflict, the method of classifying ambiguous entities like guerrillas or terrorists needs to be examined and imposed with a system of regulations. In that way, classifications cannot be abused for self-interested purposes leading to the illegitimate use of

targeted killing. Guerrillas should be classified as exactly what they are: something between a soldier who is simply obeying the orders of his government, and a civilian.

It may prove helpful to view the classification of status as a spectrum ranging from noncombatants to combatants. In such a spectrum, the half-way point would delineate the point at which lethal action may be taken under certain circumstances (the combatant half) and the area in which any action, if taken, will be *nonlethal* (the noncombatant half). Right above this line in the lethal action half would be those people deemed threatening enough for a “signature” strike. Between “signature” strikes and combatant at the far end of the spectrum could be a classification unique to guerrillas or terrorists who are “unconventional combatants,” but depending on the circumstances can be equated to combatants (when on the battlefield) or something just below them (when blending into civilian cover) which alters the immediate threat level controlling the legitimacy of lethal action under specific circumstances. This classification is similar to that of a war criminal, in that capture is preferable, but lethal force can be used as circumstances dictate, and they do not have immunity like a POW. On the nonlethal end of the spectrum between the half-way point and strictly noncombatant civilians are various levels of noncombatants classified by their level of involvement related to the support roles they perform.

In order for this spectrum of classification to work, several key questions and concerns must be addressed. The half-way point of the spectrum, at which lethal action can even be considered, needs to be clearly defined as it separates the levels of categorization of combatants compared to noncombatants. Due to the blend of war and law enforcement justification methods found in the lethal action half of the spectrum, exactly what circumstances constitute a person as an “immediate threat” need to be delineated in order to decide borderline cases like “signature” strikes as well as cases of changing circumstances found in the “unconventional combatants”

categorization. Since international standards regarding the law enforcement justification are utilized, for classifications involving law enforcement reasoning where the targets are in foreign states, consent of the foreign government must be obtained. With targeted killing mostly being performed in foreign nations, it would be best if an international authority could monitor and approve the classifications of suspected targets in order to systematically regulate how targeted killing is used by states and prevent the extra-judicial use of targeted killing for the ends of individual nations.

Overall, it is up to the international community to create an appropriate classification for guerrillas that is both decisive in its definition while allowing flexibility for the unusual circumstances inherent to the asymmetric conflicts on modern times, while taking into account the political implications of that definition. If such systematic regulation of methods of silent warfare were to occur, as with the classification of guerrillas and the application of targeted killing given circumstances, the international community could effectively legitimize and regulate the use of silent warfare that would be in keeping with, and reinforcing of, the humanitarian morals of the global Civilizing Process. As general guidance for these international policies the possible justifications of coercive action delineated by J.E. Hare and Carey B. Joynt should be kept in mind:

- (1) a response to intervention by one's opponents;
- (2) a defense of the integrity of the internal political process;
- (3) a means to re-establish the balance, not to destabilize it;
- (4) a venture with a reasonable chance of success;
- (5) a last resort, following human and constructive efforts to deal with the fundamental problems;
- (6) an undertaking

proportional in its means to the value of its end; (7) not a violation of basic moral principles....¹⁴⁰

In considering this list of legitimate circumstances for coercive action, the UN and the international community would be able to better determine what kinds of restrictions should be placed on the use of international force, especially silent warfare, in order to maintain legitimacy with respect to humanitarian morals.

Ultimately, the best option would be the systematic regulation of silent warfare by a global Leviathan, just as the UN is attempting to regulate the open warfare of the state system. Currently, the UN uses military force primarily in wars of intervention to counter violent threats of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. However, the use of targeted killing or other silent warfare tactics may hold more inherent legitimacy when used as a method of UN intervention. In fact, the use of assassination could conceivably allow a global authority to topple a rogue or genocidal regime without the massive costs of open warfare, and fewer of war's unpredictable effects.¹⁴¹ In the case of a relatively weak global authority like the UN, such low cost tactics may be exactly what is needed to help accumulate by degrees a monopoly on force, without having to wait for the distant day when states will either voluntarily cede their sovereignty to a superintending organization or field a large standing army under international control to enforce the monopoly against disruption by rogue regimes.

By the very nature of a global Leviathan's monopoly on force coming from the agreement of the state system, the use of force and intervention is made even more legitimate. Therefore, the systematic regulation of silent warfare in addition to all other types of warfare by a supra-national authority should ensure the best interests of all states by its collective nature. In

¹⁴⁰ Hare and Joynt, *Ethics and International Affairs*, 160.

¹⁴¹ Gross, *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War*, 101, 119.

this way, the abuse of silent warfare by the violent threats and individual self-interests of states is avoided, and the regulation over open warfare by a global Leviathan (like the UN) can continue to increase, adding to the supra-national monopoly on force. In addition, the intervention of a global authority into a state avoids the complications of in-group vs. out-group conflicts, and since the global authority is free from individual self-interest, except that of international peace, the above ethical guidelines of coercive force can always be observed, as they serve the best interests of all the states involved. In this way, a global Leviathan can use the force needed to prevent international warfare within the state Leviathan system in a way that is consistently legitimate, in the best interests of all states, and in support and protection of the global Civilizing Process.

CONCLUSION

Above all, legal and peaceful methods must remain the primary methods of conflict resolution on the individual, state and international levels, and we must focus our efforts on increasing the effectiveness of such methods over time. However, states must also have at their disposal effective methods of force that can be deployed in ways consistent with the global Civilizing Process but which nonetheless will have the strength to counter violent threats when peaceful methods have failed. Tactics of silent warfare can be used to fulfill this necessity as long as these tactics are systematically regulated to prevent the misuse of these violent methods for the self-interest of individuals and states, and furthermore to the detriment of the global Civilizing Process and the decline in violence.

Sovereign states are most likely to take advantage of military tactics of silent warfare as the price of the international community. The reinforcement of a global governing authority like the United Nations, however, could potentially prevent the extra-judicial use of silent warfare tactics like targeted killing by sovereign states. Currently, the UN does not possess a global monopoly on force with which to enforce the legitimate use of silent warfare or to adequately prevent international warfare from occurring, and until such a time as the member states are willing to allow the UN a supra-national supervisory authority over international violence, states will continue to use silent warfare without consideration of the future global implications.

To prevent the unintentional international precedent of illegitimate use of silent warfare, international public policies should be systematically developed to curb the current potentially destructive technological advances that are rapidly emerging in silent war techniques (armed drone usage in particular) before the extra-judicial use of these techniques advances beyond the possibility to regain control of their legitimate use. In this matter the UN could prove to be invaluable as an international governmental organization, in that the UN could provide states

with the opportunity to work together to create these international public policies regulating the use of silent warfare before illegitimate use becomes too prevalent to control, while acting as a supra-national authority free of individual national interests enforcing these policies to the mutual benefit of the all.

In order for the UN to act as an effective international governing body, states must first realize the long term mutual benefits of international cooperation and agree to support the UN in its authority to enforce international law and humanitarian morals. Indeed “progress will only come as the powers perceive this to be in their national interest, weighing costs and benefits in terms of their own frameworks of value. World society, the *civitas maxima*, is not likely to overtake them unawares,”¹⁴² and the realization of such a future will take much time and effort. With a global governing authority like the UN presiding over the creation and enforcement of the international regulation of silent warfare, this could secure the legal and humanitarian use of silent warfare internationally now and in the future, thereby ensuring the protection and enhancement of the global Civilizing Process and the continued decline in violence for a more peaceful future human existence.

¹⁴² Hare and Joynt, *Ethics and International Affairs*, 185.

APPENDIX

Figure A




FIGURE 2-4. Homicide rates in the least violent nonstate societies compared to state societies

Sources: !Kung and Central Arctic Inuit: Gat, 2006; Lee, 1982. Semai: Knauft, 1987. Ten largest U.S. cities: Zimring, 2007, p. 140. United States: FBI Uniform Crime Reports; see note 73. Western Europe (approximation): World Health Organization; see note 66 to chap. 3, p. 701.

Figure B




FIGURE 3-9. Geography of homicide in the world, 2004

Sources: Data from UN Office on Drugs and Crime, International homicide statistics 2004; see note 66. Estimate for Taiwan from China (Taiwan), Republic of, Department of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior, 2000.

Figure C




FIGURE 2-3. Rate of death in warfare in nonstate and state societies

Sources: Nonstate: Hewa and Goilala from Gat, 2006; others from Keeley, 1996. Central Mexico, Germany, Russia, France, Japan: Keeley, 1996; see notes 62 and 63. United States in the 20th century: Leland & O'Rourke, 2010; see note 64. World in 20th century: White, 2011; see note 65. World in 2005: Human Security Report Project, 2008; see notes 57 and 58.

Figure D



FIGURE 5-13. Frequency of wars involving the great powers, 1500–2000

Sources: Graph from Levy, 1983, except the last point, which is based on the Correlates of War Inter-State War Dataset, 1816–1997; Sarkees, 2000, and, for 1997–99, the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008, Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005. Data are aggregated over 25-year periods.

Figure E





FIGURE 5-16. Concentration of deaths in wars involving the great powers, 1500–2000

Sources: Graph from Levy, 1983, except the last point, which is based on the Correlates of War Inter-State War Dataset, 1816–1997; Sarkees, 2000, and, for 1997–99, the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008, Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005. Data are aggregated over 25-year periods.

Figure F



(1) intensity: summed war magnitudes scores; data up to 2010 from Center for Systemic Peace (left-hand scale). (2) number: total number of conflicts; data up to 2010 from UDCP Armed Conflict Data Set (right-hand scale). Five-year interval.

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