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The Effect of United Nations Peacekeeping Interventions on Civil War Duration: A Case Study Approach

Kristina Ryan
University of Colorado Boulder

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The Effect of United Nations Peacekeeping Interventions on Civil War Duration: A Case Study
Approach

Kristina Ryan

Submitted to the Department of International Affairs

Sarah Sokhey, Honors Project Advisor, Political Science Department

Jaroslav Tir, Political Science Department

Jessica Martin, International Affairs Department

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The Effect of United Nations Peacekeeping Interventions on Civil War Duration

A Case Study Approach

Abstract

Factors of civil war duration, such as contraband, natural resources, ethnic fractionalization, and geography have been immensely studied. While there is a general consensus that the mentioned factors effect duration, there is less consensus on the role other factors, namely external intervention, play in civil war duration. Some scholars claim external intervention, specifically United Nations intervention, to be directly correlated with increasing a conflict's duration, while others find the contrary. There is a remaining question, however, that is not addressed within the literature: the effect of United Nations intervention on civil war length. I argue that the UN's intervention should have little effect. In order to analyze the effect of UN intervention, it is necessary to examine: the role of UN intervention in conflicts that are expected to be different in duration, the different types of UN peacekeeping operations, and the effect of the interests of the Permanent Five on peacekeeping operations and civil war duration. Through examining the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Colombia, the analysis proved that the relationship between UN intervention and duration is most direct in longer lasting conflicts, that UN Observer and Verification Missions are actually most effective in altering a conflict's duration, and that the Permanent Five's interests largely determine a mission's success.

Introduction

What is the effect, if any, of United Nations interventions on civil war duration? Does United Nations peacekeeping intervention into a civil war while fighting is occurring prolong the period of war, usher in peace, or have no independent effect? Essentially, is the direct correlation between external intervention and longer civil war duration, which many scholars propose, true?

The end of the Cold War sparked renewed scholarly interest in all aspects of civil war study. It has been found that while the number of new civil wars starting each year is rather low, at a rate of 2.3 per year, the number of civil wars ending each year is only at a rate of 1.85 per year; more civil wars are breaking out than those that are ending, thus leading to more civil wars

in any given year (Fearon 2004, 275). It is important to study civil war duration because as with each additional year of war the costs to the domestic population and to the country as a whole increase dramatically. For instance, the war in Angola had a significant effect on the civilian population, as each additional year of fighting saw increased causality rates. The best estimates indicate that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the number of civilian casualties resulting from one-sided violence with the main rebel groups was less than one hundred. However, as the conflict progressed, this number steadily increased with hundreds and even thousands killed in any given year up until 2002 when a peace agreement was signed (“Angola: General One-sided violence Information”). Additionally, each continued year of fighting in Angola had detrimental impacts on the economy. Apart for a few years in the middle of the war, the GDP per capita steadily decreased and remained well under the per capita income in the years after the conflict ended (“GDP per Capita”). This trend is seen among many civil war cases, thus highlighting the importance of studying civil war duration and the factors effecting duration.

Interestingly, since the end of the Cold War, the average duration of civil wars has increased dramatically; as in 1999 the average length of a civil war was approximately sixteen years, while in the early 1990s the average duration of wars in progress was roughly twelve years (Fearon 2004, 275). With empirical evidence finding that the overall duration of civil wars are now increasing due to internal characteristics of the conflicts themselves, scholarly work has now shifted to include those associated with civil war duration. Scholars have hypothesized many factors to have a correlation, either positive or negative, with civil war duration. These factors include, but are not limited to: ethnic fractionalization, per capita income, indigenous land claims, geography, economic growth, external intervention and lootable resources.

The effect of external intervention is unique because the success of intervention, which is most simply defined as ending violent conflict, can be argued to be largely dependent on many other factors associated with duration. Many times external intervention is deemed a failure because it fails to end fighting, and perhaps wrongly assumed to increase the duration of a conflict. Some prominent scholars have called into question the direct relationship of factors, such as ethnic fractionalization and per capita income, on civil war duration. These scholars argue the effect of these factors is actually rather small; that the effects of these factors of duration are rather ‘picked up’ by other factors’ direct relationship on civil war duration. Interestingly few, if any, scholars have hypothesized whether the relationship between external intervention and duration is as robust and as many have speculated. The data which the academic community has used to determine the effect of external intervention fails to take into account that external intervention may not independently affect the duration of civil wars; rather those countries that the United Nations intervenes in are already those cases that are expected to have a long duration. It is academically, as well as practically important to determine whether the relationship between civil war duration and external intervention is a direct bivariate relationship as most scholars have proposed, or whether it is actually a multivariate relationship, in which external intervention is not the most determinant variable in the relationship.

It is particularly important to focus on the effect of external intervention because of the policy implications, such as when should international organizations like the UN intervene and should they intervene at all. For the purposes of this paper external intervention refers specifically to United Nations multilateral peacekeeping missions and Security Council Resolutions. Multilateral, or multi dimensional peacekeeping missions, are the most often used mechanism used by the United Nations to “rebuild the basic institutions of the post-civil war

state” (Howard 2008,1). While the term peacekeeping is defined by the United Nations as a mechanism designed to preserve the peace in a post-conflict state (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 18), these missions are also involved in active civil conflicts, as in the civil war in Angola where the United Nations launched three missions all during active civil war years. In the post-Cold War era, civil war interventions and peacekeeping operations have increased dramatically; out of a total of sixty civil wars from the year 1988 to 2003, the United Nations launched nineteen missions (Gilligan and Stedman 2003, 42). This is in stark contrast to during the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War era there were sixty-three civil wars recorded, with the UN only launching four missions: “two in Cyprus, one in Korea, and one in the Congo” (Gilligan and Stedman 2003, 42).

UN engagement and intervention in civil wars, however, goes beyond peacekeeping missions. The Security Council is also instrumental as they often adopt resolutions aimed at ending active civil conflicts. It is noted that between “1989 and 2006, the Security Council moved from a stance of disengagement from civil wars to one of engagement,” dramatically increasing its involvement in the resolution of civil wars and the peace process after the war has ended (Cockayne et al. 2010, 1). The Security Council has steadily increased its involvement in civil wars. In 1993, the Security Council “adopted resolutions on peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace building in more than one-third of all active civil wars in the world” and recently, as of 2008 the Security Council had “formally engaged in more than 40 percent of all active internal wars in the world –a higher share than ever before” (Cockayne et al. 2010, 1). The Cold War period saw relatively few United Nations peacekeeping operations, as well as Security Council resolutions because of the fundamental differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Security Council was essentially an ineffective institution during the Cold War

because of the veto power, which led the Soviet Union and the United States to veto numerous resolutions and operations that would benefit the other.

The end of the Cold War not only brought about more UN interventions, but also signaled a change of criteria for UN intervention. While the concept of peacekeeping is not directly addressed within the UN Charter, many scholars associate UN peacekeeping with Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter, which specifically address pacific settlement of disputes and action with respect to threats to peace breaches and acts of aggression (Gilligan and Stedman and the UN Charter). As a result of the UN Charter not directly addressing peacekeeping operations, the Security Council, through resolutions, decides which civil wars the UN should influence. In theory, the “prerequisite for [the Security Council’s] enactment is a threat to or an endangerment of the maintenance of international peace and security” (Gilligan and Stedman 2003, 37).

As seen below, there have been a total of 166 civil wars that have either ended post-Cold War or began in the post-Cold War period. Some have lasted much longer than others and some have been the recipients of United Nations intervention. The fact that some civil wars have lasted very long and others only a few months, establishes an important question as it addresses the ability of the international community to mitigate the effects of civil war.

Table 1: Civil War Duration in the Post-Cold War Era

Country	Years of Conflict (Duration in Parentheses)	UN Intervention?
Afghanistan	1978-2001 (23); 2003-2009 (6)	Yes (1 st conflict)
Algeria	1991-2009*	No
<i>Angola*</i>	1975-2002 (27); 1991-1998 (7); 2002-2004; (2) 2007-2009 (2)*	Yes (1 st and 2 nd conflicts)
Azerbaijan	1991-1994 (3); 1993 (1); 1995 (1); 2005 (1)	No
Bangladesh	1975-1992 (17)	No

Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-1995 (3); 1993-1995 (2); 1993-1994 (1)	No
Burundi	1991-2006 (15); 2008 (1)	Yes (1 st conflict); No in 2008
Cambodia	1978-1998 (20)	Yes
Central African Republic	2001-2002 (2); 2009* (1)	No
Chad	1989-1994 (5); 1997-2002 (5); 2005-2009*	Yes (3 rd conflict)
<i>Colombia*</i>	1964-2009* (45)	No
Comoros	1997 (1)	No
Congo	1993-1994 (1); 1997-2002 (5)	No
Cote d'Ivoire	2002-2004 (2)	Yes
Croatia	1992-1995 (3)	Yes
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	1996-2001 (5); 2006-2008 (2); 2007-2008	Yes (1 st and 3 rd conflicts)
Djibouti	1991-1994 (3); 1999 (1)	No
Egypt	1993-1998 (5)	No
El Salvador	1979-1991 (12)	Yes
Eritrea	1997-1999 (2); 2003 (1)	Yes (2 nd conflict)
Ethiopia	1964-1991 (27); 1976-1991 (15); 1977-2009* (32); 1994-2009* (15); 1995-1996 (2); 1996 (1); 1999 (1)	Yes (4 th conflict)
Georgia	1991-1993 (2); 1992-1993 (1); 1992 (1); 2004 (1); 2008 (1)	Yes (all conflicts)
Guatemala	1965-1995 (30)	No
Guinea	2000-2001 (1)	No
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999 (1)	No
Haiti	2004 (1)	No
India	1983-1993 (10); 1989-2009* (10); 1989-1990 (1); 1990-2009* (19); 1992-1997 (5); 1992-2006 (14); 1992-2009* (17); 1993-2004 (11); 1997 (1); 2000 (1); 2005-2007 (2); 2009* (1); 2008 (1); 2008 (1)	Yes (2 nd conflict)
Indonesia	1975-1992 (17); 1990-1991 (1); 1997-1998 (2); 1999-2005 (6)	
Iran	1979-1990 (11); 1991-1993; 1993 (1); 1996 (1); 1997-2001 (4); 2005-2009* (4)	Yes (2 nd conflict)
Iraq	1973-1992 (19); 1991-1996 (5); 1995-1996 (2); 2004-2009* (6)	Yes (2 nd conflict)
Israel	1949-1996 (47); 1990-1999 (9); 2000-2009* (9); 2006 (1)	No

Laos	1989-1990 (1)	No
Lebanon	1989-1990 (2)	Yes
Lesotho	1998 (1)	No
Liberia	1989-1990 (1); 2000-2003 (3)	No
Macedonia	2001 (1)	No
Mali	1990 (1); 1994 (1); 2007-2009* (2)	No
Mexico	1996 (1)	No
Moldova	1992 (1)	No
Morocco	1975-1989 (14)	No
Mozambique	1977-1992 (15)	Yes
Myanmar	1949-1998 (49); 1990-1994 (4); 1990 (1); 1991-1994 (3); 1992 (1); 1993-2002 (9); 1996 (1); 1997 (1); 2000-2009* (9); 2005 (1); 2005-2009* (4); 2009* (1)	No
Nepal	1996-2006 (10)	No
Nicaragua	1982-1990 (8)	No
Niger	1991-1992 (2); 1994 (1); 1995 (1); 1997 (1); 1997 (1); 2007-2008 (2)	No
Nigeria	2004 (1); 2004 (1); 2009* (1)	No
Pakistan	1990 (1); 1995-1996 (1); 2004-2009* (5); 2007-2009* (2)	No
Papua New Guinea	1989-1996 (7)	No
Peru	1982-1999 (17); 2007-2009* (2)	No
Philippines	1969-2009* (40); 1970-1990 (20); 1993-2009* (16)	No
Russia (Soviet Union)	1990-1991 (1); 1994-1996 (2); 1999(1); 1999-2007 (8); 2007-2009* (2)	No
Rwanda	1990-1994 (3); 1997-2002 (5); 2009* (1)	Yes (1 st conflict)
Senegal	1990-2003 (13)	No
Serbia (Yugoslavia)	1991 (1); 1991 (1); 1998-1999 (1)	No
<i>Sierra Leone*</i>	1991-2000 (9)	Yes
Somalia	1982-1996 (14); 2001-2002 (2); 2006-2009* (3)	Yes (1 st conflict)
Spain	1991-1992 (1)	No
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	1984-2009* (25); 1989-1990 (1)	No
Sudan	1983-2009* (26)	Yes
Tajikistan	1992-1998 (6)	No
Thailand	2003-2009* (6)	No

Turkey	19984-2009* (25); 1991-1992 (2); 2005 (1)	No
Uganda	1979-1992 (13); 1994-2009* (15)	Yes (2 nd conflict)
United Kingdom	1971-1991 (20)	No
United States of America	2001-2009* (8)	No
Uzbekistan	2004 (1)	No
Venezuela	1992 (1)	No
Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen)	1994 (1)	No

*Italicized countries constitute the case studies of civil war in this research.

Table 1 shows the variety among civil war cases in terms of length of conflict and UN intervention. In the post-Cold War era there were a total of 166 civil wars, with 35 of them ongoing as of the end of 2009. In order to calculate the average duration of these wars, the ongoing civil wars were calculated with their duration up to 2009. This is because the most recent research on civil wars from the database used for this project was compiled at the end of 2009. The average duration of the 166 civil wars was approximately 6.9 years, with the standard deviation being approximately 9.5 years. As according to Table 1, the longest civil wars include: the conflict in Myanmar with a length of 49 years, the war in Israel which lasted 47 years, and the Colombian civil war with a duration of 45 years (as of 2009). As seen from the table there are many civil wars that lasted for a very short amount of time, one or two years. These conflicts are most often coups or popular revolutions and include the war in Comoros, Guinea, and Venezuela, among others. As of 2009, the United Nations intervened in 33 of the total 166 civil conflicts, which means the UN intervened in approximately one-fifth of all the civil wars. The average duration of these conflicts is approximately 7.5 years, with about half of these interventions in conflicts whose duration greatly exceeded the total average of 6.9 years.

Literature Review

Factors of Duration

Literature regarding civil war duration can be divided into general groups, in which there is relative consensus on how duration of conflict is affected by the factors that comprise each group. These groups can be divided into: economic, social, geographic, and political factors of duration. While there are other variables that effect the duration of a conflict, the variables addressed in the following passages are largely thought to be the main determinants of civil war duration.

Civil wars, and wars in general, are not only costly in terms of risk taking but are also costly in terms of economics. Therefore, it is understandable that much research has been done regarding the economic factors that influence the duration of a conflict. There is relative consensus within the academic community that conflicts in which rebels use contraband (gemstones, narcotics, and timber) as a major source of funding will on average be longer than other wars. The casual mechanism as to why, however, is debatable. Contraband generally refers to goods that are relatively easy to produce, obtain and transport, however the key is that they are illegally exported or imported. Contraband commonly utilized in civil wars include opium, precious gems, timber, and coca (Fearon 2004, 284). It is often thought that smuggling of these goods provides rebel groups with a dependable means of finance capable of supporting long lasting civil wars; it increases the funds available for arms purchase, and increases ease of rebel recruitment. Some scholars, including Buhaug et al., however have speculated that this casual mechanism would actually make wars shorter as it alters the balance of power among the fighting actors. Thus, these scholars have proposed that contraband increases the duration of a conflict because the steady monetary gains actually reduces the incentives for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and/or because the rebel groups may instead concentrate more on

extracting profits and less on fighting the state (Buhaug et al. 2009, 555). A select few, namely Ross, even though they acknowledge that civil wars in which contraband is present last longer than average, speculate the causal direction is not entirely clear, that it may be the case that “longer-lasting insurgencies...[are] more likely to sell contraband because they have more time to establish the production and trading networks they need to profit” (Ross 2006, 292).

Despite these speculations, it is apparent that contraband funded civil wars are typically longer than the average civil war. During the years 1945 to 1999 there were seventeen instances of contraband funding long-running civil wars (Fearon 2004, 284). These cases include, but are not limited to: the war in Colombia funded by cocaine, and the wars in Angola and Sierra Leone fueled by diamonds. According to the data used by Fearon, the average duration of contraband funded wars is 48.2 years, which is approximately 40 years longer than other civil wars (Fearon 2004, 284). It is important to note that studies have found countries that produce goods such as opium and precious gems are also more prone to civil war onset. Strictly in terms of civil war duration, however, studies have found that once a country is engaged in civil conflict, lootable goods are more likely to prolong war due to of the economic influence of these goods on the balance of capabilities between forces.

Increases in the world price of primary commodity exports are also found to prolong civil wars. Therefore, decreases in the price of primary commodities will shorten a conflict. Since rebellions “will only occur where and only where they are profitable...where revenues during conflict are atypically high and costs atypically low,” it is reasonable to see that the hypothesis of the effect of primary commodity on the duration of conflict holds (Collier et al. 2004, 256). If the price of a commodity, in which the rebels control, decreases then rebel groups will be underfinanced. If the world prices continue to drop opportunity costs for fighting will be high;

fighting will now be harder and more costly than peace, therefore prospects of peace will improve and a conflict is more likely to end (Collier et al. 2004, 256).

Duration of civil war is also negatively related to the initial per capita income (Collier et al. 2004, 255). Reasoning behind this finding is that if the initial per capita income in a country is relatively high, then the cost of conflict to society will also be high. Particular groups within society will therefore have more to lose by engaging and continuing to fight in civil conflict. This high opportunity cost will lead groups to either not engage in conflict or to not engage in a long-lasting conflict. When the cost of conflict to a society is high there should be a mutually beneficial settlement to be found in order to avoid war (Collier et al. 2004, 255). It is expected then that if the initial per capita income of a country is low, society has less to lose by continuing to engage in conflict, and therefore will choose to fight until the fighting is too costly, which may be many years (Collier et al. 2004, 255). Through examining large-scale violent civil conflict covering the 1960-2000 period, Collier et al. empirically found that “higher income increases the hazard of peace and thus reduces the expected duration of conflict” (Collier et al. 2004, 262). Numerically, they found that a “10% increase in per capita income is associate with a 5% reduction in the duration of conflict” (Collier et al. 2004, 262).

Other scholars, most notably Fearon, have found a strong bivariate relationship between per capita income and duration, however they note that this relationship is not always a guarantee. The main outlier in this case is the 31-year civil conflict occurring in Northern Britain; in many datasets this is the richest country, thus providing a counter argument to the strong relationship between income and duration (Fearon 2004, 287). This however is a single outlier and does not provide a convincing argument against the case that a lower per capita income is strongly correlated with long-lasting civil wars. While Fearon’s studies have found

that there is a pattern of longer civil wars occurring in countries with initial low per capita income, he hypothesizes that the “bivariate impact of income has been ‘picked up’ in part by contraband and sons-of-the-soil dynamics,” which not only lead to significantly longer civil wars but also are found in poor countries (Fearon 2004, 287). While this observation is valid, it is difficult to determine how much effect each variable has on duration. Given Fearon’s lack of empirical support for this theory, it can be reasonably asserted for now that per capita income does have an effect on civil war duration.

Social factors, namely the composition of society, have also been found to directly affect the duration of conflict. The measure of ethnic diversity within a country has been immensely studied, and is strongly correlated with conflict duration. Ethnic fractionalization is most commonly measured on a scale of 0 to 100 in which 0 marks complete homogeneity and in which 100 marks complete heterogeneity. The ethnic diversity within a country is determined by the “probability that two randomly drawn individuals do not belong to the same group” (Collier et al. 2004, 262-263). Studies have found that duration is at its maximum when a country has two or three large ethnic groups, and an ethnic fractionalization of 50 (Collier et al. 2004, 263). Two or three large ethnic groups increase the level of social cohesion on the side of the rebels, essentially creating two sides; all those against the government will side with the rebels thus creating larger capacity on the side of the rebels. More than three large ethnic groups reduces social cohesion on the side of the rebels effectively lessening the ability of the rebels to launch a successful campaign against the government. An ethnic fractionalization of 50, perfect heterogeneity, is often associated with long civil wars. These conflicts last on average 84 months. This is in comparison to “59 months if the fractionalization score is 25, and to 70 months if the fractionalization score is 75” (Collier et al. 2004, 263).

Fearon has also examined ethnic fractionalization and found that it is correlated with longer civil wars. He, however, hypothesized a different reason as to why. Fearon found that ethnic fractionalization alone might not have as significant an effect as previous authors have thought. While he does acknowledge ethnic diversity is seen to be associated with longer civil wars, he also states that countries that are ethnically diverse, having a fractionalization number of 50, are also highly correlated with long-lasting peripheral insurgencies. Thus, he hypothesizes the second variable of peripheral insurgencies might be more significantly associated with long-lasting wars (Fearon 2004, 287). Similarly, he found that more “homogeneous countries...have been more likely to have the brief civil wars that emerge from coups or revolutions,” so the brevity of the conflict may be more because of the type of war – coup or revolution – and less because of the ethnic homogeneity (Fearon 2004, 287).

In addition to the composition of society, population size is said to also have an effect on civil war duration, however the magnitude of the effect is questionable. Studies have found that on average more populous countries have longer civil wars; that “doubling the population increase the duration of conflict by 18%” (Collier et al. 2004, 263). This assertion however is misleading, and needs to be examined with caution. The fact that more populous countries tend to have longer civil wars is not the same as saying one particular rebellion lasts for longer in more populous countries. More populous countries, given the larger number of citizens, tend to have more rebellions, and thus since “a conflict is coded as continuing if any rebellion is continuing,” multiple separate rebellions may be coded as one rebellion and one civil war (Collier et al. 2004, 263). Whereas in a smaller country, where there are less people, there will be fewer rebellions and thus less of a chance that multiple separate rebellions will be coded as a

long-lasting civil war. Another possible problem with this finding is that Collier et al. never define how many people are needed to constitute a populous country.

Geographic influences of civil war duration have also been abundantly studied and it has been found that 'sons of the soil' wars greatly affect the duration of a conflict. A 'sons of the soil' war is a type of intrastate war described as involving a land conflict between a peripheral ethnic minority and the state supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group (Fearon 2004, 275). The ethnic minority, as a result of losing land and being oppressed, support insurgencies against the state and the state-supported migrants. Of the 128 civil wars coded by Fearon, 21 are described as sons of the soil wars, and 12 were fought in Asia (Fearon 2004, 283). These wars are estimated to be relatively longer than other wars. The average duration for these sons of soil cases is 33.7 years compared to 8.5 years for the rest of the civil wars between 1945 and 1999 (Fearon 2004, 283). It has also been found that rough terrain increases the duration of conflicts, as if a rebel or guerrilla group is located in the more difficult to access areas, government forces will have a more difficult time projecting power, as mountainous terrains can offer good defensive and strategic positions (Buhaug et al. 2009, 547).

Similarly, it has been found that conflicts that occur far away from the state center last twice as long as those conflicts in which fighting occurs close to the state center (Buhaug et al. 2009, 546). Logic behind this is that government forces have a disadvantage if they have to operate over long distances, and are more difficult for the government to project their power (Buhaug et al. 2009, 550). Other disadvantages include: "physical barriers for transportation of troops and equipment...higher costs associated with longer distance, limited knowledge of the local environment, and...lack of support from the local population" (Buhaug et al. 2009, 550). Operating over long distances effectively lessen the advantage the government in terms of

military power, giving the rebels, who are most often the militarily weaker side, a clear advantage, which thus increase the conflict period.

In terms of political factors that affect the duration of a civil war coups and popular revolutions are correlated with short civil wars. Short is a relative term, however, but in this case short refers to duration below the average for civil wars, which is around 8.8 years (Fearon 2004, 280). A coup-related war is defined as “a civil war between groups that aim to take control of a state, and that are led by individuals who were recently members of a state’s central government” (Fearon 2004, 280). A popular revolution is often defined as a civil war that it sparked by mass demonstrations in favor of ousting a regime currently in power (Fearon 2004, 280). Average durations for these types of civil wars are well below the average. The mean war duration for coups and revolutions is only at 3 years. From comparison it can be seen that there is a strong correlation between coups and popular revolutions and a shorter duration of conflict.

Table 2: Summary of Existing Explanations of Civil War Duration

Causal Variable	Expected Effect
Contraband	Trade in contraband increases the duration of civil wars (for various reasons)
Price of commodities	Decreases in the price of primary commodity exports will shorten the length of civil wars
Wealth (income per capita)	Higher initial per capita incomes will shorten the length of civil wars, and lower per capita incomes will lengthen the conflict. *The direct relationship is debated.
Ethnic Fractionalization	More diverse societies will have longer civil war duration
Population Size	The larger the population size the longer the conflict is expected to last
Land conflict: “Sons of the Soil”	Will lengthen the civil war
Rough Terrain	The greater the degree of rough terrain the longer the civil war will last
Location of conflict	An increase in distance from the state center will increase the duration

Coups/ Popular Revolutions	Correlated with shorter than average civil wars
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External Intervention and Civil War Duration

Policymakers have little influence on these domestic factors of duration, but we should consider whether and what the UN can do to alter the initial predisposition of states to engage in shorter or longer conflicts. With the increase in the number of United Nations intervention and peacekeeping operations, there has been a renewed interest in examining the effects of these operations on civil war duration, and civil war in general. Within civil war literature there are two sides in the debate on the effect of UN intervention in civil war; those that agree UN intervention does affect the duration of a conflict, and those that argue it has no causal effect on conflict duration. Those that argue UN intervention is a major determinant of civil war duration, however, tend to be divided on whether this effect is beneficial for peace or leads to a longer duration of conflict. Central to studies on external intervention is the assumption that “outside interventions into internal conflicts are a form of conflict management and therefore attempt to control the hostilities rather than exacerbate them;” that the main goal of outside intervention is to reduce the duration of a conflict (Regan 2002, 59). Most authors analyze duration as depending “critically on the balance of military capability between the government and the rebels” (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 1). There are many hypotheses on the relationship between intervention by international organizations and the duration of a conflict. Patrick Regan, a preeminent scholar on the topic, has found that interventions “carried out under the auspices of international organizations have no independent effect on the expected time until a conflict ends” (Regan 2002, 72). No independent effect, however, in this case is not synonymous with decreased or increased duration; it simply means there is a lack of empirical support. This lack of support, as Regan hypothesizes, may stem from the fact that 45% of interventions by

international organizations are not impartial. Thus, it is more accurate to analyze these interventions by international organizations as analogous to unilateral interventions (Regan 2002, 72). Therefore, Regan's results on unilateral interventions in favor of one side in a conflict are also relevant to the question at hand.

In regards to unilateral external intervention and civil wars it is generally argued that overall most interventions increase the duration of a conflict. Elbadawi and Sambanis, who define external intervention as: "a unilateral intervention by one (or more) third party government(s) in a civil war in the form of military, economic or mixed assistance in favor of either the government or the rebel movement involved in a civil war," find that external interventions are positively and highly associated with war duration (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 8). Even though they found that external interventions lead to longer conflicts, they explicitly stated that this "evidence does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. It may be the case that causality runs in the opposite direction and interventions may occur only in wars that are already long lasting" (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 12).

In "Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts" Regan largely agreed with previous studies, in that he hypothesized interventions specifically in support of the government early in a conflict will shorten the expected duration of a conflict (Regan 2002, 62). Being that a civil war is most simply described as a conflict between a government and a rebel group with relatively less military power, it would logically follow that if a third-party intervenes on the side of the government that has more military might, then the duration of a civil conflict would shorten. Thus, also it would be assumed that if a third-party intervened on the side of the opposition early in a conflict then the expected duration of a conflict would be longer, because

the third-party is altering the balance of capabilities by making both sides more equal in terms military power.

Interestingly, Regan also hypothesizes that neutral intervention will lead to shorter expected duration than interventions that support one side over the other. He argues this to be the case because in theory these interventions are more likely to “distribute resources in a manner that increases equality” (Regan 2002, 64). While Regan found that intervention in support of the government does not lead to a shorter duration, he found overwhelming support that intervention on average tends to increase the expected duration of a civil war (Regan 2002,71).

Recent research into the relationship between expected duration of a conflict and external intervention has broken down external intervention into varying components. Instead of broadly asserting that external intervention leads to increased duration of conflict, this new research states that only certain kinds of interventions increase the duration of a conflict, while some types actually decrease the expected duration. Intervention largely comprises two types: those that attempt to change the relationship between governments and rebel movements, and those that attempt to “manipulate the information that these actors hold” (Regan and Aydin 2006, 738). Diplomatic interventions are found to dramatically reduce the expected duration of a conflict by reducing the “asymmetry of information about capabilities and incentives” (Regan and Aydin 2006, 741). In these interventions third-parties act as intermediaries between warring parties to reveal information in a credible way. Diplomatic interventions are largely successful in reducing the expected length of a conflict because it helps “warring factions overcome commitment problems” (Gilligan and Sergenti 2007, 6). The criticism in regards to this finding is that diplomatic intervention requires voluntary agreement by all parties, thus all parties may

potentially already be open to negotiation, and therefore the civil war would already be coming to an end not because of the intervention. Interestingly, while accounting for the lingering effects of interventions over time, Regan and Aydin find that neither “economic nor military forms of intervention have any statistically significant impact on expected duration” (Regan and Aydin 2006, 748).

Most previous work on the effect of UN intervention on the duration of civil war gives a general answer that supposedly applies to all civil war cases. It is important, however, to determine the effect of UN intervention by examining it in light of the expected duration of a conflict. The argument for this project adds to previous civil war literature by focusing on the effect of UN intervention specifically in regards to the anticipated duration of a conflict. Additionally, rather than assuming all UN peacekeeping interventions to be the same, as previous research has done, this project aims to break the variable of UN intervention into various subcategories and determine their distinct effect on the duration of a civil conflict.

Theory

Does United Nations intervention, in the form of peacekeeping operations and Security Council Resolutions, increase the duration of an active civil conflict, help bring peace, or have no independent effect? Much civil war literature on the effect of UN intervention on the duration of civil war states that intervention does have an effect on duration, either positive or negative. As a result of the UN claiming peacekeeping to be a solution to the commitment and informational problems associated with civil war, one would expect to see UN intervention decrease the duration of civil wars. At first glance one may associate those peacekeeping missions that were deemed successes to decrease the duration of conflict and those that were

deemed failures to increase the duration of conflict. These assumptions, however, are not entirely founded as those successful missions may have been in wars that were expected to be shorter anyways. Thus, in order to determine if the mission was truly a success one would have to determine the expected duration of the conflict and see if or how the UN intervention decreased the expected duration. Similarly, those mission failures may not have fully ended the conflict, but in order to determine if a mission was indeed a failure, in that they did not have any effect on the conflict's duration, one would have to first identify the factors robustly associated with the conflict's duration and determine if the UN altered the relationship between the factors and the conflict.

Utilizing this logic one can deduce that the UN may not have a significant effect in altering the anticipated duration as other factors may make the UN's effect on duration obsolete. Previous studies on the subject on UN intervention and civil war length leave opportunities for more research, as most do not question the direct correlation between external intervention and conflict duration. In contrast to previous works (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002; Regan and Aydin 2006; Gilligan and Sergenti 2007), I argue that the effectiveness of UN intervention decreases with a greater expected duration. Thus, in those civil wars that are expected to last much longer than the average, UN intervention would have a minimal effect on ending the conflict. This is because when a conflict is expected to last relatively long, the relationships between domestic factors of duration and the conflict are robust; the relationships are stronger than the effect of UN intervention.

As seen from Table 1, the data shows that the UN intervenes in those civil wars that typically last longer than the average civil war. One can thus make the assertion that the UN intervenes in the more difficult to resolve cases, those that are expected to last longer. This

assertion therefore leads to the main question of this paper: does UN intervention have a significant impact on an intrastate war's duration or do other factors that determine a war's expected duration have a more direct significance and correlation with conflict duration? Based on existing research, I argue that we should expect the following: 1) UN intervention is more effective in less severe conflicts, 2) UN Observer Missions are much less effective than UN Missions and Operations, and 3) UN intervention is more effective when the Permanent Five members of the Security Council have greater interests with the country at war. I address each of these hypotheses in turn.

Hypothesis 1: The effectiveness of UN intervention into active civil conflicts decreases with the greater the expected duration of the conflict.

The logic behind this hypothesis is that those civil wars characterized by longer expected durations of conflict will be less affected by UN interventions regardless of intervention timing because the interplay of factors associated with duration renders UN intervention less effective. Essentially, the direct relationship between UN intervention and conflict duration decreases with the greater the expected duration of a conflict based on domestic factors. Thus, civil wars that last much longer than the average civil war have more factors that are strongly associated with a conflict's duration, and as a result of this, the UN's effectiveness and influence on a conflict's duration decreases. Essentially, an increase in the expected length of a conflict based on domestic factors decreases the effectiveness of the UN; the relationship between UN intervention and civil war duration becomes less direct with the longer an expected duration.

Simply examining numerical data however is not sufficient enough to explain the basis for this hypothesis. Previous scholars have proposed the aforementioned situation, in which a variable's supposed effect on an outcome is actually the by-product of other, more robust

variables, for factors such as initial per capita income and ethnic fractionalization. This theory, however, has not been examined in regards to external intervention. The fact that scholars have left opportunities to examine this relationship is interesting not only because the situation has been examined with other variables, but also because it has been studied and found in other datasets that UN peacekeepers are more likely to intervene in conflicts that are believed to be more difficult to end (Gilligan and Stedman 2003).

A main focus of this study is the fact that when domestic factors make civil war likely to be much longer than average, there is not much the UN can do to mitigate conflict and bring about peace. UN intervention is not robustly correlated with civil war duration when a conflict is expected to last much longer than average. However, a main point of this hypothesis is that UN intervention can be directly correlated with decreasing the duration of a civil war if the conflict is expected to be short. I will determine the expected durations of each conflict used for this study relative to one another. As this study will not be undergoing large statistical analysis, the question of how to determine which variables are most important in a conflict is crucial. A factor is important to the duration if it plays a large role in fueling the continued fighting. Only those factors that are strongly correlated with altering a conflict's duration will be considered. For instance, a country may have rough terrain in one region of the country, but if fighting was not concentrated in this area, then this factor will not be important in determining the conflict's expected duration. Therefore this study will not attribute variables such as these to altering a conflict's expected duration.

While the basis for this hypothesis comes from trends observed among the UCDP dataset, the expected durations attributed to the specific cases used to analyze this hypothesis will be original to this project. The relative anticipated durations of the three conflicts will be based on

which factors within the respective countries most contributed to conflict duration (i.e. most robust). For example, in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Colombia, lootable resources (diamonds and drugs) played major roles in funding the continuation of fighting. However, the extent to which they effected continuation varies from case to case, as it is difficult not to measure the variable on a continuum. The anticipated duration will take into account all the variables within a country that are shown to effect the duration and the interplays between the variables.

Hypothesis 2: UN Observer/Verification Missions, when deployed into active civil conflicts, are less effective than UN Missions/Operations in ending a conflict.

In light of this hypothesis, it is important to distinguish between the two general categories of UN peacekeeping previously mentioned. United Nations Observer/ Verification Missions and UN Missions/Operations fall into the general category of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which are called upon “not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law” (What Is Peacekeeping?). Upon examining the past and current UN peacekeeping operations, it is apparent that all UN missions do not all attempt to address each of the previously mentioned points; some operations are more actively involved in the conflict while other operations simply look on as observers. The terminology used in Observer/Verification Missions’ mandates is drastically different than other peacekeeping operations. Observer Missions tend to be composed of less than 1,000 personnel, some less than even 100 personnel, with few to any casualties. These missions tend to verify peace arrangements agreed upon by all parties, monitor and implement ceasefires, observe and

verify elections, and monitor the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. As their title suggests, they essentially observe the state of affairs within a country.

In contrast, UN Missions/Operations tend to be relatively more actively involved in assisting the ending of a civil war; they are a more serious commitment to being involved. These peacekeeping operations on average have more than 1,000 troops, with many missions having upwards of 10,000 personnel (Howard 2008). As a result of these missions being more actively involved in the civil wars they intervene in, casualties are higher. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone had a maximum strength of approximately 18,000 personnel and 192 casualties, both numbers much higher than observer or verification missions. Whereas observer and verification missions are mainly involved in overlooking and monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements, UN missions and operations actively assist in the disarmament and the demobilization of troops, and are often told to establish a presence at key locations throughout the country in which they are deployed. While these missions also, for example, provide support to elections, it is apparent through looking at their mandates that their main goal is to help end fighting and bring about peace.

The basis for this hypothesis comes from examining the multitude of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping cases. The majority of the cases fall into two general subcategories: UN Observer/Verification Missions and UN Missions/Operations. Upon first glance, one may assume all UN interventions are equally effective, as many civil wars end shortly after UN intervention. To assume this, however, is wrong as many of these conflicts are already coming to an end, with ceasefire or peace agreements being signed once the UN intervenes. Therefore, in order to analyze this hypothesis this project will examine how each of these two categories of UN

peacekeeping dealt with the factors that were most determinant in prolonging the conflict, and how long fighting lasted once the UN intervened.

Simply through a brief analysis of the cases used for this study (Angola, Colombia, and Sierra Leone), one can see that all the UN peacekeeping operations deployed to Angola during the two decade long civil war were UN Verification and Observer Missions. At first glance it seems as though the missions in Angola were not effective in decreasing the duration of the conflict or in ending the conflict, as the civil war did not end during any of the missions but rather years after the UN had withdrawn from the country. In order to fully analyze this hypothesis in regard to Angola, it will be important to examine the degree of severity during the years in which the UN was present in the country; did the missions lead to a decreased severity or did actions not associated with the UN missions help bring about peace? One can also analyze this hypothesis by looking at how the UN mission dealt with the variables of the conflict that were most robust in effecting the conflict's duration.

The UN peacekeeping operations deployed to Sierra Leone in the midst of the conflict also shows that UN Observer Missions may not be very determinant in altering a conflict's duration. The UN Observer Mission deployed to Sierra Leone in July of 1998, which monitored the military and security situation in Sierra Leone was ended in October of 1999 and quickly replaced with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone. In order to determine the effect of Observer Missions and UN Missions/ Operations on the duration of a conflict, a similar approach as that of Angola will be used.

Hypothesis 3: UN peacekeeping interventions will be most effective in ending those civil conflicts in which the interest of the war to the Permanent Five in the Security Council is highest.

The Security Council consists of fifteen total countries; it includes five permanent members (The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China), while the ten remaining seats in the Security Council are rotating positions, which always include members from Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 9). An intervention's approval requires "the affirmative vote of nine states, including no negative votes from the five permanent members (the P5) and four positive votes from the ten elected members" (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 9). This hypothesis assumes the Permanent 5 would most often vote negative on those interventions in which the wars do not or will not have a significant effect on their country, and thus the Permanent 5 would vote approvingly or be indifferent to those interventions in countries that they are heavily invested in or those that could indirectly effect the state of affairs in their own country.

While other studies have examined the question of whether UN involvement in civil wars is strategic, meaning the UN intervenes in those conflicts that are expected to be more manageable, or benevolent in nature, my hypothesis is based on the found trend previously established that the UN intervenes in those conflicts that last longer than the average civil war, and thus are typically less manageable. Seeing as such the UN does not intervene most often in the wars that last the shortest, one can conclude the UN may not be basing their decision on which conflicts are less or more manageable. If the UN were basing their decision to intervene on this, one would expect the UN to intervene in the conflicts that are anticipated to be brief,

however the average duration of conflicts that the UN has intervened in is greater than the total average.

As funding is a major part of any UN mission, as it is required in order to be successful, one can assume that the UN would not want to spend a considerable amount of money on a conflict that is expected, based on domestic factors, to last much longer than average. Utilizing this reasoning, it would follow that the UN may intervene in civil wars that are anticipated to last longer because of the invested interest of the Permanent 5. Thus, as previously stated, this project hypothesizes that in those conflicts that are expected to last longer than average, the decision to intervene is based on the interest of the conflict in the eyes of the Permanent 5. These interventions would also be more effective at ending conflict as more funding, troops, and attention would be given to that mission as a result of the higher interests of the conflicts to the main actors in the Security Council.

My theory differs from existing explanations in that it argues the relationship between UN intervention and civil war duration is not strictly a direct relationship; the direct correlation between UN intervention and civil war duration changes with the anticipated duration of a conflict. Existing explanations assert that either intervention has a positive or negative effect; they do not consider that the effect might be on a continuum in which the effectiveness of UN intervention decreases with the longer expected duration of a conflict. Additionally, my theory adds to existing research on the effect of UN intervention of civil war duration as it differentiates between types of intervention. Most previous work does not differentiate between types, however it is important to do so as the each type of UN interventions plays a distinct role in conflict duration.

Methodology

In light of the proposed theory, it is necessary to define what this study deems a civil war. Academically, civil war often is defined differently than the United Nations, or other international organizations, would define a civil war. Some UN interventions may have gone into a country they viewed as a civil war, but one that does not meet the academic requirements. Much disagreement exists within the academic community in regards to a proper definition of an intrastate war. Civil war lists in the past relied heavily on the Correlates of War database to code civil conflicts, however, in recent years with advancements in civil war studies, scholars have increasingly created their own lists due to questionable coding rules for the Correlates of War project and other similar projects. While it has been mentioned that differing definitions of civil war may cause skewed results, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the academic community to agree on a single definition of civil war. Therefore, this project will rely on UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset 2010, as its civil war definition and lists are similar to many other definitions (Singer & Small, 1994; IISS, 2000; Licklider, 1995; Sivard, 1996; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Etsy el al., 1998; Gleditsch el al., 2002; Valentino, 2002), and have strict coding rules. The Uppsala program defines an intrastate-armed conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Department of Peace and Conflict Research: Definitions). Even though the threshold number of battle deaths for this definition is rather low, at only 25 as opposed to other definitions, which use 100 or 1,000, this data set is still appropriate as it is commonly used within the academic community. This dataset, produced by Uppsala Conflict Data Program, is

ideal as it is very well documented and accurate as many conflict are coded to the specific date in which fighting began and ended.

A problem, however, with this dataset is that it assumes the civil war ends when the killing ends. The Uppsala Conflict Termination Dataset, while reliable and accurate, seems to divide many conflicts into multiple separate conflicts even though the same actors are fighting and the same intent behind the fighting is present. As Fearon and other scholars have stated, it is misleading to code a civil war as ending simply when the killing ends as there simply may be a lull in fighting due to factions re-grouping in order to launch another campaign. Consequently, this project will draw on Fearon's criteria on how to code the end dates, as it does not assume that a war ends when the killing ends. The civil war list used specifically for this project will code a civil war as continuous if a victory, peace agreement, ceasefire, or low activity is not followed by at least three years of peace. Requiring three years of peace is sufficient as it allows time for a lull in fighting if rebel groups or the government are simply attempting to re-group in order to launch another attack. Additionally, this project's dataset will end in 2009 and thus those wars that in 2009 were still ongoing will be given 2009 as a tentative end date. Ending the dataset in this year is appropriate as any later date would not be sufficient under the definition for what determines an end date, as at least three years of peace must be observed.

The Uppsala data set and original coding serve as the basis for this project, however Fearon's data set version 2004 will also be utilized, as it is a comprehensive civil war data set that includes all civil wars from 1945 to 1999. This data set is not solely used for the purposes of this project because it only codes those civil conflicts up until 1999. This project will not use Fearon's years of duration for each conflict, however this data set is useful as it codes the expected duration of a conflict and also because it includes variables on contraband financing,

ethnicity, and geography, which will be important for the theory and analysis portions of this project.

In order to analyze this proposed hypothesis, a most similar comparative case study is employed. Two of the three cases (Angola and Colombia) are similar in terms of aspects that are largely accepted within the academic community to affect the duration of a civil conflict. The cases differ, however, on the variable of external intervention. Both countries chosen are similar in terms of the amount of factors of duration present and the composition of those factors, thus each country will have a similar expected duration of conflict. Given the diversity among civil war cases, it is impractical to expect to match these two cases on every factor of duration and characteristic of the conflict. As no two cases of civil war are exactly alike and since the factors in which the countries differ may have an unprecedented effect on civil war duration, this project will have limitations but will nonetheless offer an important contribution to our understanding of civil war duration. The third case study (Sierra Leone) used in this study will have been the recipient of UN intervention and will have some similar aspects to the previous two civil wars, however the expected duration of this war will be shorter than the other two. Thus, this will help determine if the effectiveness of the UN in civil wars with varying degrees of expected durations. Comparing countries that have experienced UN intervention, and one that has not been the target of intervention effectively isolates the effect of external intervention, making the effect on the length of the conflict apparent.

As previously discussed, this research project will employ a case study approach to examining the effect of United Nations intervention on the duration of civil war. An inherent problem however with utilizing a case study approach to answer the proposed question is that this method makes it harder to come to a generalizable conclusion. Utilizing case study

approaches are sufficient as they can provide the basis for future research and maximize what can be learned in a short amount of time. Although this research does employ a case study approach, the specific cases used span regions, reasons and origins of war, and follow very different courses throughout the war, thus this conclusion can apply to many different cases of civil conflict. Additionally, as this project aims to analyze how UN peacekeeping interventions affect the duration of a conflict, a case study approach is ideal because analyzing wars quantitatively cannot take into account an underlying and not readily apparent effect of an internal variable on a conflict's duration. For example, many quantitative studies have found initial per capita income to be minimally correlated with conflict duration. For many conflicts, however, a low per capita income at the start of fighting may be highly correlated with continued fighting, as one reason for the civil war starting was economic decline or stagnation. Qualitatively analyzing case studies in this regard is ideal because it takes into account complex relationships between the factors of the conflict and the duration.

Angola, Sierra Leone, and Colombia are appropriate and useful cases for answering the proposed hypotheses because, firstly, Angola has been the recipient of much UN intervention during the almost three-decade long civil war. The UN launched four missions in Angola in order to attempt to establish peace in the country. The first mission, which began in early 1989 and lasted until mid-1991, entitled United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, was established to verify the phased and total withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops in Angola (Howard 2008). Upon successful completion of the mandate, the Security Council issued the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II in order to verify the arrangements agreed on by the government of Angola and UNITA during the 1991 Angolan Peace Accords. This mission also monitored the ceasefire and the Angolan police during the ceasefire and was also called

upon to observe and verify elections (Howard 2008). The mission which was established in mid 1991 and lasted until early 1995 was also in charge of overseeing the initial stages of the Lusaka Protocol signed by the government of Angola and UNITA on November 20, 1994. The third mission to Angola, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, was established in February of 1995 to help the government of Angola and UNITA restore peace, however the mission failed and the United Nations withdrew in June of 1997 (Howard 2008). The fourth and final mission was that of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, which was established in 1997 and lasted until 1999. Its main goal was to assist Angola in consolidating peace and to create an environment conducive to long-term peace and stability. This mission was terminated in 1999 when fighting between UNITA and the government became more intense (Howard 2008).

Sierra Leone is also an appropriate case for this study as it too has been the recipient of a large amount of UN peacekeeping. UN intervention in Sierra Leone is similar to that of Angola in which there was an Observer Mission, however it differs in that there was also a United Nations Mission. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) began in July 1998 towards the end of the conflict and continued until October 1999. This peacekeeping force was delegated to monitor the military and security situation in the country while also monitoring the disarmament of former combatants. The civilian element of UNOMSIL was expected to advise the Government of Sierra Leone on matters such as police training and the “need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies” (“UNOMSIL”). Upon reigniting of the conflict UNOMSIL was replaced with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) which began in October 1999 and continued until December 2005. This mission, as stated by its mandate, was actively involved in the civil war as they were expected to

assist the government in the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, and, among other, to provide security at important locations throughout the capital of Freetown and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programme (“UNAMSIL: The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone-Mandate”).

Colombia, in contrast, has not been the recipient of any UN peacekeeping intervention. The civil war in Colombia is an appropriate case study for this project because comparing cases which had different forms of UN intervention with a case that saw no UN intervention effectively isolates that variable, allowing one to determine the effect of that intervention on similar civil conflicts. Even though these cases will help to answer the proposed question, criticism in regards to the choice of the specific cases is expected for three reasons: all cases are not of the same region, one case is still ongoing, and two of the cases started in the Cold War period while the other did not. These concerns, while valid, will not affect the legitimacy of the study. Firstly, examining countries that are not all located in the same region is beneficial for this study. An inherent problem with case study approaches is that a generalizable conclusion is difficult to make. The challenge of a generalizable conclusion is less of a concern here because of the breadth of cases.

Analysis

Cases

With the increase of UN peacekeeping operations and Security Council Resolutions concerning civil wars in the post-Cold War era, there are many potential case studies. As of 2008 there had been thirty-five post-Cold War operations, including but not limited to: Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia (Howard 2008, 4). Since the

end of the Cold War in 1989 the Security Council has also steadily increased their influence in civil wars. Throughout the 1980s the average number of resolutions passed by the Security Council were around 20 per year. In 1990, only one year after the end of the Cold War, this number increased to 37, and since then has steadily increased with upwards of 60 resolutions passed in 2011. (“Security Council: Resolutions”).

Sierra Leone

Background Information

The civil war in Sierra Leone, which lasted from 1991 until 2000, was one of the most well-known civil wars of recent years as it was infamous for conflict diamonds, child soldiers, and wide spread mutilations and amputations imposed upon the public by the main rebel group the Revolutionary United Front. The end date of the civil war in Sierra Leone is debated, with some databases claiming the war lasted until 2002. In late 2000 after the Peace Accord, however, fatalities decreased to the point where, according to the definition used for this study, the conflict could no longer be coded as an intrastate conflict. The civil war claimed approximately 20,000 to 75,000 lives and displaced 2.1 million, which at the time was almost half the country’s population (Davies 2000, 350).

In 1961 Sierra Leone gained independence from Great Britain and appeared to be on a prosperous path as it had one of the most highly developed educational systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. The economy was growing at an annual rate of 4 percent between 1965 and 1973, and, among others, primary school attendance had doubled between 1961 and 1973. State failure, however, soon resulted (Chege 2002, 151; Davies 2000, 349). The first to lead Sierra Leone on a path of self-destruction was that of President Siaka Stevens who ruled the country from 1968 to 1985. He pursued “slow-motion, self-destructive policies,” such as render the once productive

parliament powerless, and ban all opposition parties. The gross economic mismanagement, which resulted in economic decline, high unemployment rates, and high levels of poverty, led to grievances most notably among the youth and therefore is largely regarded to be a major cause of the civil war (Davies 2000, 351).

In 1985 Stevens handed leadership of Sierra Leone over to Momoh, a former military general who was even more inept at governing state affairs. As the government continued to ignore the needs of its people, the public began to view the government as illegitimate (Chege 2002, 153). While the government's mismanagement of the entire state system established grievances among the general population, these grievances alone were not enough to launch the country into civil war; there was no opportunity or means to fund a civil war. This opportunity however came in 1991. With support from Liberian and Burkinabe fighters from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia and financial support from Libya, the rebel group The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was able to launch a full-scale rebellion. The RUF first attacked those rural towns located near the Liberian border, and as a result of the inept handling of the government and the lack of legitimacy the government had throughout the country, the RUF found many willing recruits (Davies 2000, 358). However, as the civil war ensued the RUF was no longer perceived as a favorable force to overthrow the government, but rather as a malicious rebel group. Widespread atrocities, such as conscripting children to fight, and using women and children as human shields were reported throughout the course of the civil war.

The civil conflict was largely funded and fueled by 'conflict' diamonds. Diamond mining in Sierra Leone was a major factor in prolonging fighting, as it "requires no heavy machinery or technology, since these alluvial stones sit close to the surface in dried riverbeds," and thus is relatively easy for any armed group to use as a source of financial support (Bellows and Miguel

2008, 5). Diamonds produced a “war-prolonging congruence of interest among the war protagonists – the rebels and allied neighbouring countries, the army and other pro-government forces, and sometimes the government itself” (Davies 2000, 359). Even though all parties involved in the war utilized contraband as a source of funding at some point, the RUF were the most devoted and dependent on this source of funding. For instance, in 2000 the RUF controlled approximately 90% of Sierra Leone’s diamond mining regions (Davies 2000, 359). Often, the RUF would exchange diamonds with President Taylor of Liberia for weapons, cross border sanctuary and mercenaries, which greatly prolonged the civil conflict (Davies 2000, 359).

Additionally, the Sierra Leone conflict was heavily internationalized, with interventions from not only the United Nations but also from ECOMOG, and the mercenary group Executive Outcomes. The search for peace was also instigated by the international community with ECOWAS, the UN, Commonwealth, OAU, the UK, and the USA playing large roles on the establishment of various peace accords, such as the Abidjan Peace Accord of 1996, the Conakry Peace Plan of 1997 and the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999. While the first two accords were largely unsuccessful, the Lomé Peace Accord as a power sharing agreement had more promise. The accord’s intended goal was peace, it called for amnesty of all rebels, “power sharing between the government and the rebels, transformation of the RUF into a political party and for its leader, Foday Sankoh, to enjoy the status of vice president and chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development” (Davies 2000, 364).

Even though all parties signed the peace agreement, fighting continued. The Peace Accord completely fell apart in May 2000 when the RUF kidnapped 500 UN peacekeepers and killed protestors in the capital of Freetown. The final ceasefire came on 10 November 2000 with

the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone agreeing to observe a ceasefire and halt all hostilities. It also called for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to actively assist in implementing the ceasefire and the demobilization of the fighters (Binningsbo and Dupuy 2009, 4). This ceasefire was successful in restoring peace to the country, effectively ending the civil war in Sierra Leone.

Expected Duration (Sierra Leone)

In terms of effecting the expected duration of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the following factors had the greatest effect: valuable contraband funding, geography, initial per capita income, and non-UN external intervention. It is important to note that these factors are simply those that are most heavily correlated with influencing the duration of the Sierra Leonean civil war. Those factors that had a minimal effect on the conflict's duration will not be analyzed, as identifying this small effect is beyond the scope necessary for this project. When determining the effect contraband has in the duration of a civil war, there is not a strict degree in which to determine the effect, rather one should think of the effect of contraband as a continuum, where these lootable resources more heavily affect some wars. The case of Sierra Leone is one in which diamonds played the largest role in increasing the duration as the war was always closely connected to the competition for resources.

The diamonds in Sierra Leone are mainly secondary or alluvial, meaning they are easily extracted from riverbeds, with most diamond mines being located close to the border with Liberia. It is important to determine how these diamonds were used to affect the civil war, as different usages can effect duration differently. As previously stated, illegal diamond trading can alter the duration of a civil war in various ways: increasing the funds available to purchase weapons, reduce incentives for a peaceful settlement as aim is profit oriented, and increase the

ease of rebel recruitment. Through examining the war in Sierra Leone, it is apparent that the main actor in the conflict, the RUF, traded diamonds with neighboring Liberia in exchange for weapons in order to promote instability and recruit rebels. A few years after the war began, in 1992, the RUF infiltrated the Kono district of Sierra Leone, and soon they were controlling 90% of the country's diamond producing regions rich in alluvial diamonds, and thus easily lootable (Davies 2000, 366). Soon after the procurement of the Kono district, the RUF fueled their conflict by trading diamonds for weapons with Liberia, and to a lesser extent, Cote d'Ivoire (Silberfein 2004, 223). Both Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire have few if any natural diamond endowments, however in 1997 Liberia "exported 5,803,000 carats of diamonds to Belgium while Cote d'Ivoire exported 885,000 carats" (Davies 2000, 359). It is apparent that the increase in diamond exports in these countries was not due to an increase in the number of primary or secondary diamonds sites but rather due to illegal smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone. There could be no other logical manner in which Liberia could go from, in 1988, exporting US \$8.4 million worth of diamonds to in 1995 exporting US \$500 million worth of diamonds when the Liberian economy was virtually non-existent in the aftermath of a brutal civil war (Davies 2000, 359). Further evidence of diamonds militarily funding the RUF came from personal documents of the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, which displayed much evidence the RUF engaged in illegal diamond trading with Charles Taylor of Liberia. These documents testify to the large role Liberia, specifically Taylor, had in Sierra Leone's destructive civil war.

As previously stated the relationship between diamonds funding arms purchase and rebel recruitment is debatable as some speculate it will increase the duration of civil war, while others speculate it will decrease the length. In regards to Sierra Leone, it strongly appears as though the diamonds mined to support the RUF were used mainly as a dependable means of finance to

secure weapons, and to increase the rebel recruitment rates. Even though the relationship between these variables is uncertain, this study asserts that the use of diamonds in the Sierra Leonean civil war actually made the war shorter than what is typically seen with contraband funded civil wars. Fearon (2004) coded the mean civil war duration for conflicts in which valuable contraband played a major role to be approximately forty-six years, which is much longer than the average civil war length, which he found to be approximately nine years. It is important to note that Fearon used a different definition to code for civil war, and thus his average durations differ from the dataset used for this study, however, the pattern that contraband funded civil wars last longer than other civil wars is a trend seen within most data sets including the one used for this study.

At first glance, one may assume that diamonds lengthened the civil war in Sierra Leone; this may have been the case if the RUF did not actively seek out government forces and engage in fighting. The fact that the RUF had a dependable means of finance capable of supporting a long-lasting insurgency could have meant the civil war in Sierra Leone could have played out similar to other cases in which contraband played a major role. However, this relationship actually altered the balance of power between the RUF and the government, leading the RUF to actively infiltrate regions close to the capital and to pursue the capital of Freetown. On many occasions, including the following, the RUF came close to taking Freetown: in 1998 the Kabbah government was almost successfully overthrown by the military in an alliance with the RUF, in early 1999 the Kabbah government almost lost control once again when the RUF invaded Freetown, and in May of 2000 the rebels came close, once again, to taking Freetown. It is apparent that much fighting between the RUF and the government occurred close to the capital. This study therefore finds that the illegally traded diamonds used by the RUF actually led to the

civil conflict in Sierra Leone to be shorter than many other contraband funded civil wars because the weapons gains by this trading were actually used by the RUF to fight with the government and to push closer to the capital of Sierra Leone and the government stronghold. The prolongation of the civil war may have been due to the fact that many times the RUF withdrew to the rural regions close to the border of Liberia in order to rearm and regroup. This logic brings the effect of geography on civil war duration into consideration.

As previously stated, a civil war in which fighting occurs close to the state center will typically be twice as short as wars in which fighting is concentrated in rural areas and the periphery. The weapons the RUF obtained from diamond trading allowed the RUF to push close to the state center, which may have off set the extreme prolonging effect of contraband financing on civil war duration. Apart from the location of the fighting in respect to the government stronghold, it does not seem as though any additional geographical factors had a major role in prolonging the conflict, as the absolute size of Sierra Leone is relatively small at 71,740 square kilometers, and while there are mountainous, and rough terrain, the fighting was not concentrated in these locations and thus could not have had a large effect on conflict duration.

While there is speculation from quantitative data results regarding initial per capita income and its influence on conflict duration, it is apparent that the economic instability and stagnation prior to and during the civil war in Sierra Leone had a great effect on the conflict's duration. Data sets (Fearon 2004) have speculated that the lower the per capita income in the year prior to the war start date the longer a civil conflict will last as opportunity costs for going to war are rather low and conflict can be sustained for longer periods of time as losses are also low. In 1990, the year prior to the start date of the war, the GDP per capita (in current \$US) was 163. This is drastically lower than neighboring countries in the West African region, such as

Cote d'Ivoire, which in 1990 had a GDP per capita of 862, Guinea with a score of 463, and Guinea-Bissau with a score of 240 in 1990 ("GDP per capita"). Liberia, with a score of 181, had a similar GDP per capita as Sierra Leone, however this is most likely attributed to their own civil war that began in 1989, which negatively affected Liberia's economy ("GDP per capita"). It is apparent that the relatively low per capita income in Sierra Leone in the year prior to the civil war start date led to a prolongation of the civil war as the opportunity costs for the people of Sierra Leone was very minimal. Thus, the initial per capita income in Sierra Leone had a prolonging, but minimal, effect of the civil conflict.

An additional factor that played a large role in altering the duration of the civil conflict was that of the pro-government interventions of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and Executive Outcomes. ECOMOG is the military force of the organization ECOWAS which generally promotes cooperation among West African states. ECOMOG entered the Sierra Leonean civil war in 1997 when the then president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, was overthrown. In late 1997 when a peace treaty failed to reinstate Kabbah as president, ECOMOG launched a military campaign with the goal to return the elected government to power. With help from the Civil Defense Forces, ECOMOG was successful in pushing the rebels from Freetown and out of many key areas surrounding the capital. Even though ECOMOG was successful in restoring the Kabbah government, they did not have the military might or capacity to fully defeat the RUF.

In addition to ECOMOG, in mid-1995 the government of Sierra Leone contracted the private security firm, Executive Outcomes, to aid in fighting the RUF. Executive Outcomes, as a result of having much experience and being more technologically advanced, they were much more effective than the government in fighting the RUF. Executive Outcomes was critical in the

government's effort to win the war as they were effective in "obliterat[ing] the RUF camps, [and] were very loyal as long as they were paid, and...they allowed the government to retake the diamond areas and obtain a reliable source of income" (Silberfein 2004, 224). In 1996 Executive Outcomes left the country when the government of Sierra Leone signed a treaty with the RUF.

The effect of the pro-government interventions of ECOMOG and Executive Outcomes, as they took place mid to end war, should be analyzed based on work that differentiates between types of interventions. As both ECOMOG and Executive Outcomes fought in support of the government, much literature (Regan 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000) finds unilateral intervention in the form of military assistance will increase the duration of a conflict. As neither ECOMOG nor Executive Outcomes were capable of fully eradicating the RUF and thereby ending the civil war in Sierra Leone, this case study provides evidence that unilateral military intervention in favor of the government will prolong a conflict.

From analyzing the previously described factors, it seems as though the war in Sierra Leone should have lasted longer than the average civil war as lootable resources, location of fighting, initial per capita income, and external interventions all played major roles in the prolonging the conflict, with only geography shortening the expected duration. These findings agree with the actual duration of the Sierra Leonean civil war as it lasted approximately nine years, which is longer than the average civil war in this project's database, about 6.9 years, however a duration of nine years is still far below what would have been expected. Even though there are factors this study does not take into account that could have had a shortening effect on the duration of Sierra Leone's civil war, they would not effect the expected duration that much that it would decrease to an anticipated duration close to the observed duration. A possible

explanation for why the war lasted shorter than would be expected is that UN intervention played a significant role in altering the course of the conflict.

Hypotheses 1 and 2: Effect of Domestic Conditions and Type of Intervention (in Sierra Leone)

As previously stated, Sierra Leone saw two UN intervention missions. The first, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), was established with the Security Council Resolution 1181 on 13 July 1998. The mission's main objectives were to monitor the military and security situation in the country, and to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. As the mandate stated, the mission was established to observe the situation and report its findings back to the Security Council. The mission was not actively involved in ending the conflict. This is seen when the RUF in late 1998 and early 1999 reinitiated fighting and overran the majority of Freetown. The UN mission did relatively little to prevent the return of fighting, and instead relocated to Conakry, Guinea which was when the Security Council then decided to downsize the mission. If simply analyzing the proposed hypothesis based on this mission, it would be apparent that in those civil wars that are expected to last shorter UN missions do not have a direct correlation with altering a war's duration. However, upon UNOMSIL's departure the Security Council established a second mission: the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

UNAMSIL was established in October 1999 and its main objectives were to assist in the implementation of the disarmament and demobilization plan established under the Lomé Peace Agreement, to provide security at important locations in Freetown and surrounding areas, and to assist the government in extending its authority throughout the country (Malan 2003, 57). Initially, it seemed as though UNAMSIL would be no more effective in curbing violence than

was UNOMSIL, as the available troop strength was too low to allow a widespread deployment (Malan et al. 2002). UNAMSIL was deployed hastily without sufficient troops largely because the lack of commitment by the RUF to stop fighting and the withdrawal of ECOMOG required the UN to make an attempt, even if rushed, at keeping the peace and resolving the conflict.

In April 2000, in order to facilitate the demobilization and disarmament process, a subgroup of UNAMSIL opened new demobilization camps in RUF controlled locations. Instead of this quickening the process of disarmament, in actuality, it delayed the peace process in that RUF reneged on the peace agreement and attacked the UN camps in Makeni and Magburaka, taking over 500 UN hostages. It is thought that the original state of dysfunction of UNAMSIL “inspired both sides to renege on commitments made in the peace accords” (Howard 2008, 304). The RUF as a result of the attack on UN troops captured the armored personnel carriers used by the UN in order to launch an attack on Freetown. Inadvertently, the UN gave the RUF capacity and opportunity to resume fighting. Upon this apparent failure of the UN mission, the UK sent in paratroopers and warships in order to protect British nationals, these troops however ended up assuming the role of the UN in defending parts of Freetown and the Lungi international airport (Malan et al. 2002, 11). A top UK official even stated that Britain was essentially running the day-to-day operations of UN forces. The above-mentioned situation shows that UNAMSIL increased the duration of the conflict, however this increase was mainly due to structural and organizational problems within the mission itself. In order to analyze the proposed hypothesis one also needs to determine if UNAMSIL engaged with or dealt with the factors that were expected to increase the war’s duration.

In terms of contraband, UNAMSIL did little to stem the production, which would have, in turn, lessened the profit to the RUF and presumably shortened the conflict. The mission could

have accomplished this, while still following the mandate and the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping, impartiality, consent of all parties, and non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate. A key objective of UNAMSIL was to actively assist in the demobilization of RUF combatants; however towards the end of the civil war only two towns within RUF controlled areas had UN deployments, and no towns within diamond producing areas had a UN presence (Hirsch 2001, 148-149). While there is no denying that the UN did have some success at camps throughout the country, it is apparent that the disarmament process could not have had a substantial effect in creating peace as the central combatants were not demobilized.

As the other factors that most affected Sierra Leone's civil war (geography, initial per capita income, external intervention) the UN could not have changed, it is apparent that the UN Mission in Sierra Leone did not decrease the war's duration. While the UN mission did have a role in bringing all parties to the negotiating table, the evidence suggests that UNAMSIL had a small negative effect on the war's duration, meaning the UN missions in Sierra Leone slightly increased the duration of the civil war.

Hypothesis 3: Interests of the 5 Permanent Security Council Members (in Sierra Leone)

The civil war in Sierra Leone saw moderate interest by the Permanent Five (P5) as a whole, however it saw great interest by Great Britain, a member of the P5. The relationship between Britain and Sierra Leone is one that was present years before the civil war began in 1991. In 1781 Britain established a colony in Freetown as a refuge for freed slaves, and it quickly became the base of Britain's West African empire. British companies also have had an invested interest in the state of affairs within Sierra Leone, as the major diamond producing companies in Sierra Leone (The Consolidated African Selection Trust and the Subsidiary Sierra

Leone Selection Trust) are British owned. As a result of the long-standing ties between the two countries, Britain felt a sense of responsibility to intervene in the war-torn country when it was apparent the UN mission was struggling. British military intervention was instrumental in the civil war and the disarmament process. Great Britain, throughout the civil war also maintained non-military links with Sierra Leone. For instance, from March 1998 until late 2000, the UK had given over sixty-five million pounds to the government of Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program ("Britain's Role in Sierra Leone").

In regards to the other members of the P5, interest was not as high. The United States played a moderate role in the civil war, as they helped establish the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999. This however was the extent of U.S. direct involvement in the civil war, as they did not send troops when UNAMSIL requested help. In terms of Security Council Resolutions there were only seventeen over the course of the entire conflict, with all of these resolutions coming post-1998. There were more resolutions regarding the state of affairs in Sierra Leone after the end date in 2000, however as the third proposed hypothesis is only concerned with the P5 interest during the civil conflict, these resolutions are not relevant.

The next case study analyzed (Angola) is similar to that of Sierra Leone in terms of UN intervention. The cases differ, however, on their expected duration. Even though they share many factors of duration, such as contraband, it is important to examine how these variables interact with the conflict as a whole. This interaction is what sets Angola apart from Sierra Leone, and grants it a longer anticipated duration.

Angola

Background Information

The Angolan civil war was one of the longest and most destructive civil wars lasting over three decades and resulting in hundreds of thousand deaths and even more internally displaced peoples. The Angolan civil war was also one of the most heavily invested in by the United Nations with four separate missions and numerous Security Council Resolutions. The length of the civil war varies, as some databases and lists code the start and end dates differently depending on the definition of civil war used. The Correlates of War database codes the war as beginning in 1976 and lasted until 2002, while the civil war list used for this study classifies the war as a twenty-seven year conflict, starting in 1975 and ending in 2002. The civil war in Angola is occasionally sub-divided into two or three separate wars, however many civil war lists, including the one used for this study, classify the conflict as one continuous civil war as there was not a wholesale demobilization, a military victory or a peace agreement that was followed by at least three years of peace. This discrepancy is mainly due to problems associated with determining the end date of a war. For this project the end date of the Angolan civil war is 2002 as this year marked the demobilization of the main rebel group and peace has since ensued.

Upon independence from Portugal in 1974, three main political parties within Angola, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), agreed under the Alvor Accords to form a coalition government to rule the newly independent state. Personality, ethnic and ideological issues, however, soon led to conflict and disagreement among the parties. The MPLA was a socialist movement headed by Eduardo dos Santos and gained much of its support from the general populations in the Luanda region, while the remaining

nationalist movements were divided initially along ethnic lines. The UNITA movement, headed by Jonas Savimbi, drew much of its leadership from the Ovimbundu ethnic group, which was and continues to be the largest group in Angola with upwards of thirty percent of the population identifying as Ovimbundu (Bell 2010). The final movement, the FNLA, headed by Roberto Holden, was largely associated ethnic base of Bakongo (Bell 2010), the third largest ethnic group. Even though initially the main ethnic groups were associated with different rebel movements, ethnicity did not seem to have a significant impact on the duration of the civil war, because as the war continued the main rebel group did not claim to represent or fight for one ethnic group. In fact, UNITA is often mistaken for a tribal movement, as the Ovimbundu ethnic group comprises the core, however as the war progressed UNITA membership could not longer be described as falling along ethnic lines (Bect 2009, 348).

Soon after independence, each nationalist movement quickly pursued their own agenda. In 1975, with support from Soviet weapons and Cuban troops, the MPLA drove the FNLA and UNITA from the capital of Luanda and on November 11, 1975 declared the People's Republic of Angola, effectively launching the Angolan Civil War. The FNLA was never able to regain their strength and thus withdrew from the conflict. The MPLA, even though they were now in control of the government, were unable to assert their legitimacy throughout the country, leading to the continuation of the conflict (James 1992, 7).

While animosity and diverging ideologies fueled the MPLA and UNITA to continue fighting, the scale at which the violence persisted was largely due to external support for each side. During the 1970s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the MPLA "de facto government [was] supported by the Soviet bloc," and Cuba. Throughout the war, South Africa and the West were the main supporters of UNITA. From the years 1976 to 1985 the United

States indirectly supported UNITA through South Africa, however in 1986 the United States “began to make sizable military contribution to UNITA” (Lodico 1996, 107). Thus, the civil war in Angola, from 1975 until the end of the Cold War, was essentially a proxy war, which pitted the United States and the USSR indirectly against one another. The international support for each group, however, did not solely fuel the conflict during the 1970s and 1980s, in fact “beyond their international backing, the MPLA elite in Luanda or abroad prospered from the growing oil revenues, while UNITA sustained its bid for power from diamond revenue and control of populations in the hinterland” (Le Billon 2001, 58).

The early 1990s saw two peace accords created, the Bicesse Peace Accords and *Acordos de Paz para Angola*, which resulted in a brief hiatus from fighting. In September of 1992 elections called for by the Bicesse Accords were held, and results declared Dos Santos, leader of the MPLA, the victor. While the elections seemed to be the first step in ending the Angolan civil war, Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, soon declared fraud and fighting quickly ensued. The following two years resulted in more devastation and killing than the previous decades combined, with “indiscriminate killing of UNITA supporters and Ovimbundus in Luanda” and throughout the country (Le Billon 2001, 58-59). Another peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol initiated in 1994, sought to establish peace and a ceasefire in Angola, however UNITA was reluctant to abide by the measures and continued fighting. As the war continued for the next decade, the ideological reasons for fighting diminished and the war was now a pure resource conflict in which fighting continued because of the revenue gained from oil and diamond production (Almeida 2010, 4). The Angolan civil war came to an end in 2002 following the death of UNITA’s charismatic leader, Jonas Savimbi. After the death of Savimbi, the government was able to seize more power and legitimacy, and just six weeks after the death of

Savimbi, the government and UNITA signed a peace agreement that ended the Angolan civil war (Almeida 2010, 9).

Expected Duration (Angola)

The factors that influenced the duration of the civil war in Angola are very similar to those that affected the civil war in Sierra Leone, however differences are apparent. The main factors that contributed to the expected duration of the Angolan civil war are: contraband, oil, geography, and lack of UN intervention.

As with the civil war in Sierra Leone, diamonds played a crucial role in prolonging the Angolan civil war. Diamonds in Angola are found over a wide range with the highest concentration in the northeast. Alluvial diamonds and diamonds mined from kimberlite deposits contributed to Angola, in the early 2000s, being the fourth largest producer of diamonds (Le Billon 2001, 67). In terms of fueling the civil conflict, diamonds were a major source of finance for UNITA since the late 1970s, and increased in the early 1990s when the US and South Africa withdrew their support. Realizing the importance of diamonds as a major source of financing, UNITA “professionalized its diamond operations, training its staff in diamond sorting and investing in mining equipment,” thus showing that, rather than use the diamonds solely to obtain weapons and arms, as the RUF did in Sierra Leone, UNITA aimed for diamonds to fund a long lasting civil war, one in which they would profit from (Le Billon 2001, 67). While it is unknown the level of profits UNITA received from its diamond production, for the period of 1992 to 2000 the value of diamonds produced is estimated at around US \$3-4 billion (Le Billon 2001, 69).

The manner in which the diamonds are used largely determines the role they play in a conflict’s duration. Some authors speculate that diamonds increase a war’s duration because as a dependable source of weapons and finance is provided, while others hypothesize that contraband

increases a war's duration because it reduces incentives for a peaceful settlement as the parties are more focused on monetary gain. The effect of diamonds on the Angolan civil war was particularly strong as diamonds were not only used as a means of finance but also provided incentives to continue fighting and not find a peaceful settlement. The illegal exchange of diamonds was used by UNITA to "to purchase, deploy, and resupply expensive weapon systems through an extensive network of private corporations and foreign state authorities" (Le Billon 2001, 67). Despite the abundance of technologically advanced weapons, it is interesting that UNITA never launched a full-scale attack on the state center. This thus suggests the notion that the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, and other top ranking officials, prolonged the war in order to gain monetarily; peace would have meant development of the diamond industry with the government and international firms profiting from the mining. In order for UNITA to continue profiting from diamonds, illegal activities were necessary.

The majority of the peace agreements signed over the course of the war did not take this into account and as a result fighting continued. For instance, the Lusaka agreement granted "a limited number of government posts to UNITA, in return for the rebels returning the territory under their control to state administration" (Pearce 2004, 54). However the majority of the land held by UNITA was diamond-producing land and therefore, the agreement most likely failed as a result of the accord failing to realize the war was essentially a war over resources; UNITA was reluctant to give over their land because influential leaders of UNITA desired to "secure a stake for themselves in the mining industry" (Pearce 2004, 54). In 1997 only under military pressure did UNITA return the main diamond-producing area of Lunda to the government.

Even though it is unclear as to which causal mechanism is responsible for the greatest effect on a war's duration, both could be the underlying cause of why contraband has such a

great impact on a war's duration. Therefore, as diamonds in the Angolan civil war not only helped militarily finance the main rebel group, they also created incentives for UNITA leadership to forego a peaceful settlement, it is apparent that diamonds had the most impact on the conflict's duration. The effect of diamonds on the Angolan civil war was much greater than in Sierra Leone's civil war, however in order to determine whether the Angolan civil war was expected to last longer than the Sierra Leonean civil war, more research into the important variables of the Angolan civil war is needed.

In addition to Angola's natural endowment of diamonds, the country also has an abundant supply of oil. In 2001 Angola produced 780,000 barrels of oil per day, which was then only second to Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is estimated that this production should quadruple by 2015 (Le Billon 2001, 61). In the 1990s it was estimated that oil was responsible for over 90% of Angola's official exports and 80% of the government's total revenue. The MPLA led government, however, did not use this money to better the Angolan people but rather to resist attacks from UNITA (Le Billon 2001, 61). The off shore oil production gave the government an advantage as the off shore location provided no way for the rebels to infiltrate. While quantitative studies have found oil to affect the onset of a civil, the effect of oil on the duration of a civil war is ambiguous and debated. As previously stated, an advantage with a case study approach is one can determine whether a variable has an effect on a conflict's duration that quantitative studies may not necessarily deem important. Such as, quantitative studies have found that overall oil is not robustly correlated with conflict duration, however this does not mean that oil is not robustly correlated with duration for every conflict, there may be some conflicts in which oil has a great effect on prolonging or shortening the conflict. Angola is a prime example of this. Upon independence, UNITA and the MPLA both had considerable

external funding and aid in which both groups relied on to fuel the conflict. UNITA, since the late 1970s, was focused on capturing the diamond-producing areas of Angola and as a result had a considerable amount of profit in order to sustain fighting and re-supply their heavy artillery (Le Billon 2001, 71). At one point during the war, UNITA controlled a majority of the country, and would have likely defeated the MPLA led government if oil revenue had not helped the government sustain political order through coercion and clientelism. The revenue the government obtained from its oil reserves thus prolonged the Angolan civil war as it equalized the balance of power between the main actors, thus preventing an early victory for either side.

Geography also had a large influence on the duration of the civil conflict in Angola. As previously stated the larger the scope of a conflict the longer the conflict will last; the further away from the state center fighting occurs, the longer is the expected duration of the conflict. In contrast to the size of Sierra Leone (71,740 square kilometers), the size of Angola is approximately 1,246,700 square kilometers. While the majority of Angola does not fall under the category of rough terrain, there are plateaus and mountains in the central interior that could possibly affect the government's ability to successfully fight UNITA. In fact, for a majority of the war, UNITA's headquarters was in Huambo, which is over 200 miles from the state center and located in the central plateau region of the country. Thus, as the terrain in Angola is more variable than that in Sierra Leone, and since the absolute size is greater, meaning government forces would have further to travel than in Sierra Leone, it follows that this would have an increasing effect on the conflict's duration.

Additionally, as fighting was not centralized close to the state center, it therefore follows that because of this, the war would last relatively longer than the war in Sierra Leone. From analyzing the Angolan civil war, it seems as though UNITA when re-entering the country in the

1980s purposefully took control of the diamond mining regions, and purposefully engaged in fighting mainly in the interior, rural areas far from the state center of Luanda. Thus, unlike in Sierra Leone, the main rebel group in Angola did not actively seek out fighting the government in the state center, but rather the government came to them.

Non-UN external intervention also played a crucial role in increasing the duration of the conflict. As previously stated, the civil war in Angola was a Cold War proxy site, which pitted the U.S. indirectly against the Soviet Union. The MPLA in the initial stages of the war was supported by mainly the Soviet Union and Cuba, while UNITA was supported by the United States and apartheid South Africa (Beck 2009, 345-346). This external intervention gave both sides substantial financial and weapons support, thus equalizing the balance of power between the parties. The war may have been shorter if foreign forces had not intervened, as it seemed the MPLA was militarily stronger than UNITA (Beck 2009, 346).

Hypotheses 1 and 2: Effect of Domestic Conditions and Type of Intervention (in Angola)

Between the years 1988 and 1999, the UN deployed four separate missions to Angola (Howard 2008, 35). Upon first glance one could assume these missions did not effect the duration of the conflict as the war ended in 2002, years after the withdrawal of the last mission. However, as with Sierra Leone, simply examining the hypothesis in regards to whether the mission failed or not, is not entirely correct. In order to determine the effectiveness of the missions on the war's duration, we need to examine how the missions dealt with the factors that were instrumental in the conflict's duration.

The first UN mission in Angola, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was established to verify the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops. As seen, the external intervention in the beginning stages of the civil war most likely increased the

expected duration of the conflict because both the MPLA and UNITA received aid, thus equalizing the balance of power. UNAVEM I, as it negotiated the withdrawal and actually participated in overseeing the withdrawal of the foreign troops, was an important “adjunct to the peace process in southern Africa” (Fortna 1993, 385). Even though fighting resumed between the MPLA and UNITA after the foreign withdrawal of troops, the first UN mission in Angola did decrease the duration of the conflict as it rid the country of external influences that have been found to negatively effect duration and as it set the foundation for future internal peace processes, such as the Bicesse Accords.

The second mission, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II was established in 1991 with the Security Council resolution 696. The role of the mission was: to monitor the ceasefire established by the Bicesse Peace Accords, and to observe and verify the democratic elections. Even though this mission was present in a majority of the country, in regions controlled by both the government and UNITA, as a result of their limited mandate, they did not have a positive or negative effect on the war’s duration. The mission did not attempt to curb UNITA’s diamond funding, their mission as stated by the mandate was essentially created to “watch the watchers” (Fortna 1993, 393).

As UN missions are created to keep the peace, one would assume that these missions would actively attempt to deal with the main factors that are expected to make the fighting continue. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III was established in 1995 after the Lusaka Peace Accord was signed, and was mandated to: monitor the ceasefire, verify the demobilization and disarmament of troops, verify the extension of the state administration to UNITA controlled areas, and collect and supervise UNITA arms, and monitor and verify the presidential elections (Howard 2008, 39). Given the mission’s mandate and main objectives, it

would appear that this mission would be more effective in altering the duration of the conflict than previous missions. This mission did have a slightly positive effect on the duration, as the mission was present in a majority of Angola, in both the MPLA and UNITA controlled areas. As the absolute size of Angola played a major role in increasing the expected duration of the conflict, increasing the areas to which peacekeepers and the government have access to should shorten the conflict. UNAVEM III was not more effective because, in UNITA's view, it lacked legitimacy. The final mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), fared no better than the previous missions. The UN terminated MONUA in February of 1999 after the mission was unable to keep the peace and a full-scale war ensued. From analyzing the four UN missions in Angola, it appears that the first and third missions were the only missions that dealt with factors impeding peace.

Hypothesis 3: Interests of the 5 Permanent Members of the Security Council (in Angola)

The level of interest of the Permanent Five (P5) in the Security Council varied over the course of the three decade long civil war in Angola, however throughout the majority of the war, the level of interest was moderately higher than in Sierra Leone. As the beginning of the Angolan civil war was essentially a Cold War proxy site, it would follow that the majority of the P5 (United States, Russia, and China) would have an invested interest in the outcome of the conflict.

Interest in the war eventually decreased with the end of the Cold War. Even though the U.S. and the Soviet Union helped negotiate a peace accord between UNITA and the MPLA led government, the subsequent mission (UNAVEM II) showed this lack of interest, as it was a small mission; the Security Council did not want to create another massive and costly

peacekeeping operation. It is often noted that this mission, as a result of being too small and disorganized, actually made the situation in Angola worse than ever before.

From 1993 onwards, the evidence suggests that the P5 were much more interested in the conflict than before as approximately half of the seventy-one Security Council resolutions regarding Angola were drafted post-1993 and, Russia and the U.S. were once again involved in the peace process, as they helped draft the Lusaka Peace Accords. While the UN Missions were required to remain impartial to either side, it is clear that members of the P5 are not obligated to do so, as in the years 1993, 1997, and 1998, the Security Council placed sanctions on UNITA. This is important because never before had the UN placed sanctions on a non-governmental entity (Howard 2008, 38). The Permanent Five showed their interest in Angola not only by voting in favor of sanctions on UNITA but also by: supplying the MPLA led government with weapons (done by Russia and China), selling military aircrafts to the government (U.S.). The United States in particular has had a high level of interest in solving the Angolan civil war, as Angola has consistently been a large exporter of oil to the United States (Howard 2008). The end of the war continued to see continuing interest from the Security Council as approximately ten resolutions were created from 2000 to 2002.

The final case study this project examines is that of Colombia. The civil war in Colombia and the conflict in Angola are given similar expected durations, as the interplay between many factors of duration and the conflict itself are similar. The case studies differ greatly, however, on the variable of UN intervention, as the Colombian civil war has never been the recipient of UN peacekeeping and it is likely it never will be.

Colombia

Background Information

The third case study this project will examine is that of the low intensity but long-lasting civil war in Colombia. The Colombian conflict began in 1963 and is currently ongoing. In contrast to the civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone, the war in Colombia has claimed much fewer lives, approximately 44,000 people and is mainly a war between two guerrilla groups – the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) – and the people supported government known as the National Front. The FARC, currently still active in Colombia, was founded in 1964 and as of 2004 had approximately 16,000 to 20,000 fighters (Restrepo et al., 2004, 400). The other guerrilla group, ELN, was founded in 1965 and of 2004 was estimated to have between 4,000 and 6,000 fighters. It is important to note that these guerrilla groups are separate entities and do not fight solely against the government, they also fight each other.

The origins of the Colombian Civil War lie in the country's political past. Even though the end of the period known as *La Violencia* established a coalition government of the two main political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, the underlying factors that caused *La Violencia* decades ago were still present throughout society years after it ended. The continued economic instability led to growing discontent with the repressive government and soon led to guerrilla group formation. The civil war in Colombia differs greatly from many other civil wars as it was not caused by “polarization along religious, regional or ethnic divisions,” but rather, the guerrilla groups fought the government on the basis of ideological differences. Both the major guerrilla groups claimed to fight and represent “the rural poor by supporting aims such as land redistribution” (Dube and Vargas 2007, 9). It is unclear whether the main objective of the

guerrilla groups was to overthrow the government or to gain profits from fighting a long lasting, low intensity civil war. While the major guerrilla groups both supposedly had the same initial idea of overthrowing the government, the groups were fundamentally different. The ELN, which was a direct product of the Cuban revolution, was driven by Cold War ideologies and practices, while the FARC was a Colombian born resistance movement and “the heir of a long and endogenous process of accumulation of peasant armed resistance” (Sanín 2004, 263).

The beginning years of the Colombian civil conflict were marked by low intensity violence favoring the government that barely met the criteria for a civil war (Restrepo et al. 2004, 401). However, as the war continued, the intensity of violence steadily increased in the 1970s as an alleged fraudulent election increased support for the guerrilla groups. This increase in intensity has also been attributed to the rise of another guerrilla group, known as M-19. Rather than promoting Cold War ideologies, M-19 promoted national imagery, which resulted in bringing the urban middle class into the war. Even though M-19 failed militarily and withdrew from the conflict in the form of a peace process, it succeeded in bringing the war to the forefront of Colombian politics, which ultimately helped the FARC and the ELN to increase their intensity (Sanín 2004, 265). The war continued, and as with Angola, the Cold War period resulted in steady fighting, as both the FARC and the ELN were recipients of mainly economic support from the Soviet bloc, thus the Colombian civil war was also a Cold War proxy site (Dube and Vargas 2007, 9). The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the subsequent break up of the drug cartels in the mid-1990s resulted in both the FARC and ELN becoming involved in the drug trade and using this trade as their main source of finance (Iannone 2003, 4).

Not only did the 1990s alter how the guerrilla groups financed the war, it also saw an increased intensity in fighting. Both guerrilla groups expanded their location of fighting. During

the years 1987 to 2000, FARC “expanded operations from 26 to 48 fronts, while ELN expanded from 4 fronts to 41 fronts” (Sanchez and Palau, 2006). The 1990s also saw the creation of another other major actor in Colombia’s civil war, the paramilitary groups of the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), which was formally created in 1997 and was estimated in 2004 to have approximately 13,000 fighters (Restrepo et al. 2004, 400). As each guerrilla group throughout the course of the war brought their separate subsections of the population to the forefront of the war, the AUC was and continues to be “financed by large landowners and therefore seen to be affiliated with the political and economic elite” (Dube and Vargas 2007, 9).

The late 1990s and the 2000s saw numerous peace agreements between the government, the FARC and ELN, most notably a period of peace of approximately three years was established in a demilitarized area known as *Despeje* in the country’s south (Restrepo et al. 2004, 400). Also, the year 2003 saw peace and demobilization talks among the Colombian government and the paramilitary group, AUC. Despite the peace talks, armed actions peaked for all three groups in 2000 and have continued to increase throughout the decade. The FARC are by far the most actively involved in prolonging the civil conflict, however both the FARC and ELN are frequently involved in massacres, kidnapping, killing, and the use of antipersonnel landmines (Human Rights Watch Country Summary: Colombia 2011). The demobilization talks between the government and the paramilitary were claimed by the Uribe administration to have been successful, and thus the government stated the paramilitary were completely demobilized, however many claim this not to be the case. The Colombian National Police as of 2009 claim the large paramilitary groups to have upwards of 4,000 fighters and continue to engage in the drug trade, massacres, killings and rape Human Rights Watch Country Summary: Colombia 2011).

The civil war in Colombia is currently ongoing and it has continued to result in relatively high levels of armed conflict.

Expected Duration (Colombia)

The factors that play major roles in the continuation of the Colombian conflict are similar to those of Angola and include: contraband in the form of narcotics, oil, geography, and non-UN intervention. The role of contraband in the Colombian civil war is the most robust of the three case studies used, as the majority of the main actors rely on narcotics trafficking and as intensity of fighting is closely linked to narcotics. The Colombian civil war is often referred to as a 'greedy war' in which the main actors continued to engage in conflict as they profited monetarily from war. In the beginning years of the war the main guerrilla groups, the FARC and the ELN did not rely on contraband as a means of funding; the war during this time was of rather low-intensity, some even describing the main actors as "guerrillas without war" (Sanín 2004, 265). As the war progressed the guerrilla groups began establishing themselves within the narcotic production, which helped them expand not only their numbers, but also their influence. The opportunity for this largely came as a result of the demise of the original drug cartels. The FARC gains from controlling the coca producing territories in various ways: it acts as "an interface between the peasants and the intermediaries, regulating commerce...and setting prices," it collects a tax on the production and trade of the narcotics, additionally it may also "participate directly in the commercialization and exportation of coca" (Sanín 2004, 266). FARC's ability to capitalize on coca production allowed it, in the mid-1990s, to amass more than \$600 million a year, making it one of the richest insurgent groups in history (Parado 2000, 70). While FARC was originally a guerrilla group seeking political power, it seems as though that as the war progressed this want for political power diminished. While it is apparent that coca sustains

FARC's war efforts it is unclear whether FARC uses the profit to fight the government in order to gain political power or rather simply to maintain the instability, which is needed to extract profits from illicit crops.

Non-UN intervention, mainly in the form of policy pressure and economic intervention, has also played a crucial role in the continuation of the Colombian civil conflict. The main goal the U.S. has in indirectly intervening in the Colombian civil conflict is to curb the amount of drugs from Colombia and neighboring countries entering the United States. As the Colombian civil war is one fueled largely by narcotics, it is important to note that any U.S. intervention aimed at drugs should have a large effect on the civil war as a whole. United States policy intervention aided in increasing the duration of the conflict as it altered the balance of power between the main combatants. The United States' pressure on Colombia to destroy the Medellín cartel and the Cali cartel in the late 1980s and early 1990s greatly increased the power of the FARC as they no longer were challenged by paramilitary groups who were weakened by the destruction of the drug cartels. As a result, by the end of the 1990s FARC "had built eight fronts in the Middle Magdalena Valley and had strengthened its presence throughout the areas that had been dominated by paramilitary groups during the late 1980s (Peceny and Durnan 2006, 104). The destruction of the Medellín cartels removed one of FARC's main political and military competitors, therefore increasing the power of the FARC. A similar outcome was produced with the destruction of the Cali drug cartel. The U.S. did not only engage in pressuring the Colombia government to destroy the cartels, they also gave \$100 million annually to Colombia in the early 1990s (Peceny and Durnan 2006, 105). The demise of the two major drug cartels left an industry for the FARC to exploit. The fall of the cartels also led to a longer civil war in Colombia because as a result of the cartels being replaced by smaller-scale operations, transnational transportation

networks were no longer feasible, this thus increased the Colombian cultivation of coca. For instance, in 1993 Colombia was only producing 20 percent of the region's coca, while by the end of the 1990s Colombia was producing approximately 75 percent of the region's coca. With the majority of the coca cultivation located in FARC strongholds, it is apparent that the demise of the drug cartels led the FARC to take over the coca industry and increase its strength, which in turn made it a more difficult opponent for the Colombian government. Additionally, U.S. pressure also increased public support for the FARC. For instance, the U.S. pressure on Colombian government to eradicate the coca fields increased FARC support among the locals, leading them to turn to the FARC for protection against the government (Peceny and Durnan 2006, 101).

The geography of Colombia also has played a vital role in the continuation of the conflict, as the guerrilla groups and paramilitary have largely been located in difficult to access rural hinterlands characterized by rough terrain. The absolute size of Colombia, 1,138,910 square kilometers is similar to that of Angola but the composition of that size is very different. In comparison to Sierra Leone the absolute size of Colombia, which is quite larger than that of Sierra Leone, plays a more vital role in the conflict's duration as the government has a disadvantage in operating over long distances comprised largely of rough terrain. Not only does the absolute distance give the government a distinct disadvantage, the terrain in which the government has to travel makes them less effective at fighting the insurgents. The FARC is located primarily in the coca producing regions of the south and east, namely the provinces of Caqueta, Guaviare, and Putumayo, characterized by tropical rainforests (Peceny and Durnan 2006, 107). Dense forest favors insurgent groups as it makes them harder to detect and it essentially protects them from the enemy, thus they are able to continue fighting for longer

periods of time (Buhaug et al. 2009, 551). Additionally, the ELN throughout the war has been mainly located in the west, which is characterized by the Andes mountain range. Even though the ELN is noticeably smaller than the FARC they have been difficult for the government to fully defeat, as the rugged terrain proves difficult.

Hypotheses 1 and 2: Effect of Domestic Conditions and Type of Intervention (in Colombia)

In terms of the first proposed hypothesis, the data suggests that the war in Colombia would be approximately equal to, or greater than the war in Angola as the main factors affecting duration are quite similar, the interplay between these variables are also similar, and because general characteristics, such as timing, are also comparable. Thus, if the first hypothesis were correct then UN intervention would be minimally effective in the Colombian civil war. However, as it was seen, the UN was fairly successful in altering the duration of the Angolan civil war, thus if similar approaches are taken in Colombia, UN intervention could also shorten the conflict. The use of the Colombian civil war as a case study is useful in terms of determining whether the relationship between UN intervention and civil war duration is a multivariable relationship in wars that last much longer than average. As the expected durations of the Angolan and Colombian wars are similar, if the relationship between UN intervention and duration is a multivariate relationship in which intervention has a minimal effect, then we should see the wars lasting around the same number of years. Also, as both wars were most heavily influenced by contraband, both should last around the average for these wars, which is approximately forty-eight years. The war in Colombia was a forty-five year conflict in 2009, and thus is in line with the prediction, however the Angolan civil war was a twenty-seven year conflict, which is shorter than expected, but not dramatically so. It seems as though there was not a direct bivariate

relationship between UN intervention and the conflict's duration as the UN did not dramatically decrease the duration, but that there was not an extreme multivariate relationship either as the UN did play a role in shortening the conflict's duration. This, therefore, does not support the idea that the relationship between UN intervention and the duration of a conflict is a strict multivariate relationship in which intervention has a minimal effect.

In terms of the second proposed hypothesis, Colombia would most likely benefit from UN interventions similar to that of Angola as they are closely related in terms of expected duration. In order for UN intervention to have a decreasing effect on the civil war in Colombia, the missions would have to take a similar approach as done in Angola. The missions would need to have mandates that focus on the factors that are shown to prolong the conflict. As the relationship between the factors of duration and the conflict are very strong, a UN intervention would have to actively engage with these variables.

Hypothesis 3: Interests of the 5 Permanent Security Council Members (in Colombia)

As seen, the civil war in Colombia is heavily invested in by the United States. While the U.S. has not and does not plan on direct military intervention in Colombia, the U.S. has directly influenced the progress of the civil war through pressuring the Colombian government into policy favoring the U.S and through economic means. It is apparent that the U.S. has great interest in Colombia; however, the remainder of the Permanent Five in the Security Council do not seem to have great interest in the outcome of the civil war or the country of Colombia. Throughout the course of the civil war, the Security Council has issued one resolution on the state of affairs within Colombia, Resolution 1465, which condemned a bombing in the capital city of Bogotá. The situation regarding Colombia and the interests of the Permanent Five seems

to be similar to that of Sierra Leone, in that one member has much interest in the country, while the remaining members are rather ambivalent. Strictly evaluating potential UN effectiveness in terms of hypothesis three, it seems as though UN peacekeeping operations would not help decrease the duration of the conflict.

Summary of Findings

Hypothesis 1

From examining the variables that had the most effect on each conflict's expected duration, it appears Sierra Leone should have had the shortest duration of conflict. Even though all three cases were greatly affected by lootable resources, the diamonds in Sierra Leone led to a more severe and quick conflict than in Angola or Colombia, as the rebel group benefiting from the resources used the profit to actively seek political power by launching attacks on the state center. In Angola and Colombia the groups benefiting from contraband profit did not actively seek out government forces to as great a degree as the RUF in Sierra Leone, and this most likely resulted in the differences in the effect of the contraband among the three cases.

Additionally, Sierra Leone was expected to have the shortest duration, as geography did not play as large of a role as it did in Angola or Colombia. Even though all three conflicts did have non-UN intervention to an extent, the external intervention in Sierra Leone seemed to be the only intervention that alternated the balance of power in favor of one side. The non-UN interventions in Angola and Colombia seemed rather to make the balance of power more equal, thus making these conflicts last longer. Additionally, the initial per capita income was much lower in Sierra Leone than in the other two countries, however as scholars have found this variable to have a rather minimal effect on duration, this variable alone cannot increase the

expected duration to a point where one could reasonably find the conflict in Sierra Leone to last longer than the conflicts in Angola or Colombia. Also based on the examined variables, this study finds that the civil wars in Angola and Colombia are expected to have similar durations as the characteristics and interplay between the variables is very similar. These expected durations are consistent with the actual durations of the conflicts, as the conflict in Sierra Leone lasted nine years, while the Angolan and Colombian conflicts lasted considerably greater, at twenty-seven years and forty-five years.

If the first proposed hypothesis, which states UN effectiveness in ending a conflict decreases with the longer the expected duration, eventually becoming an unimportant factor in a multivariate relationship, is correct then we would expect to see the UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone to have been more effective in shortening the conflict than the interventions in Angola. After comparing the successfulness of the UN missions in Angola and Sierra Leone, it appears Angola saw more success in terms of decreasing the expected war duration. While this success was slight, as fighting intensified in the years after foreign troop withdrawal and after UNAVEM III. Even though the war did not end for years after the withdrawal of foreign troops and of UNAVEM III, the evidence still shows that the missions in Angola were relatively more effective than those in Sierra Leone. However, to say that the relationship between the UN interventions in Angola and the conflict duration was strictly a direct bivariate relationship is currently unfounded. It seems as though the relationship between UN intervention and civil war duration is more complex, depending on pre-existing domestic factors.

Hypothesis 2

As seen in the above sections, it is apparent that there is a major difference between UN Observer/Verification Missions and UN Missions/Operations in terms of their mandates. The UN

Observer Mission in Sierra Leone did not have an effect, either positive or negative, on the duration of the conflict. The UN Mission that was deployed to Sierra Leone arguably increased the duration of the conflict through its lack of legitimacy and organization. As previously stated, the first verification missions in Angola had a slight positive effect on the duration as its actions helped rid the country of foreign influences. Also, the third verification mission in Angola helped decrease the duration of the conflict as it lessened the problem of geography. If all the Observer or Verification Missions in the two countries had a positive effect on the respective durations, then one could reasonably assert that these interventions are more effective than UN Missions or Operations, however they did not. It is difficult to make a claim such as this when the majority of the Observer/Verification Missions had no effect in changing the durations. Strictly from examining Sierra Leone and Angola, the evidence found does not support my second hypothesis, as the Observer/Verification Missions were relatively more successful than the UN Mission/Operation.

Hypothesis 3

As according to the third hypothesis, it would be expected that the UN interventions in Angola would be most effective as the Permanent Five had the most interest in the conflict and the country itself. From comparing the UN Missions in Angola and Sierra Leone, it was found that the UN interventions in Angola were most effective. Thus, the evidence found supports the third hypothesis, which states that UN interventions will be most effective in those conflicts that are of greater interest to the Security Council, most specifically the Permanent Five. It is interesting that all the missions deployed to Angola were either Verification or Observer missions. This may indicate that the Permanent 5 deploys Observer/Verification missions to

countries that they have a greater interest in because these missions are relatively more successful in ending fighting. This statement is in opposition to what one would expect given that UN Missions/Operations seem to be a more serious commitment by the UN to end civil war. Additional research, however, would have to be conducted in order to determine whether this assertion that the UN deploys Verification/ Observer Missions to those conflicts that the Permanent 5 are most invested in is correct.

Hypothetically, if Colombia were to become the recipient of UN intervention, based strictly on the findings in regards to hypothesis three, we would expect UN intervention in Colombia to be less successful than that of Angola. This is because the Permanent 5 had a great deal of interest in seeing the conflict in Angola end peacefully. In Colombia, however, the United States is currently the only member of the Permanent 5 to display a heavy interest in the outcome of the Colombian civil war. Since over the course of the four decade civil war the UN has never intervened, it is unlikely they ever will; that the interests of solely the United States is not enough for the Security Council to issue a peacekeeping mission to Colombia.

Implications

While my project initially argued UN intervention to be less effective in those conflicts expecting to last longer than average, the evidence finds the contrary, that UN intervention is relatively more effective in those civil wars that are expected to last longer. This, however, is a statement based on three cases studies and is likely not the case for all long lasting conflicts that have or have had UN intervention. This also does not mean that the UN should only intervene in these conflicts. The UN, as a global peacekeeping force, should not limit its scope to that of longer lasting conflicts, but rather decide which conflicts to influence by the conflict's effect or

possible effect on the international community. As expected, I found those missions that engaged with the factors of duration specific to the country were relatively more effective than missions with generic mandates. While each mission mandate is slightly different, most tend to have underlying themes such as monitoring the ceasefire or verifying elections. The mandate for each new mission should include these themes, but should also focus on changing the dynamics of factors within the country, as this should be most effective in shortening a conflict. Creating mandates that focus on these factors does not mean altering the three basic principles of peacekeeping. As seen from Angola, a mission can focus on changing a factor of duration, and thus shortening a conflict while remaining impartial, acquiring the consent of all main parties, and not using force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate.

While not necessarily shown in the case studies chosen for project, the UN has had a positive impact on many civil wars. The UN has helped to curb fighting and bring all warring parties to the bargaining table in many cases of civil conflict. The UN, however, is still plagued by their intervention failures. While this project found the UN to be relatively more effective in ending long lasting conflicts, this may not apply to large sample of civil wars. Based on this, further research into whether this statement applies to a general sample of cases would be an important addition to civil war studies. This completed project adds to civil war literature, as it does not assume there is only one effect of external intervention on civil war duration. A conflict's duration is largely dependent upon how the UN peacekeeping force interacts with the internal factors that are likely to increase duration. While not necessarily the primary predictor of duration, the UN can have a positive influence on civil war length if the missions understand the country and the situation they are coming into. In order to increase the rates of success, UN peacekeeping missions need to understand that a conflict's duration is largely dependent upon

domestic factors. They should attempt to directly alter how these factors interact with the warring parties and the war itself. The findings from this research project are significant as they may aid the UN in increasing their peacekeeping success rate, thus helping to stem the violence from civil wars that in past years has been increasing at an alarming rate.

Appendix

Table 3: Summary of Case Studies

Country Case	Expected Duration Based on Domestic Factors	Role of UN Intervention
Sierra Leone	Relatively shorter than Angola and Colombia	Overall a negative effect; may have elongated the conflict.
Angola	Longer than average and longer than Sierra Leone. Duration should be comparable to Colombia	Relatively positive effect; may have helped to shorten the duration.
Colombia	Longer than average and longer than Sierra Leone. Duration should be similar to Angola	N/A

Table 4: UN Missions

Country	UN Mission (Duration in Parentheses)
Afghanistan	UNAMA (2002-Present); UNGOMAP (May 88-Mar 90)
<i>Angola*</i>	UNAVEM I (Dec 88-Jun 91); UNAVEM II (Jun 91-Feb 95); UNAVEM III (Feb 95-Feb 97); MONUA (Jun 97-Feb 99)
Bosnia	UNPROFOR (Jun 92-Mar 95); UNMIBH (Dec 95-Dec 02)
Burundi	ONUB (Jun 04-Dec 06)
Cambodia	UNAMIC (Oct 91-Mar 92); UNTAC (Feb 92-Sep 93)
Central African Republic	MINURCAT (Sep 07-Dec 10)
Chad	MINURCAT (Sep 07-Dec 10)
Cote d'Ivoire	MINUCI (May 03-Apr 04); UNOCI (Apr 04-Present)
Croatia	UNPROFOR (Feb 92-Mar 95); UNCRO (Mar 95-Jan 96); UNTAES (Jan 96-Dec 97); UNPSG (Jan 98-Oct 98); UNMOP (Feb 96-Dec 02)
Cyprus	UNFICYP (Mar 94-Present)
Democratic Republic of Congo	MONUC (Dec 99-Jun 10)
East Timor	UNMISET (May 02-May 05)
El Salvador	ONUSAL (Jul 91-Apr 95)
Ethiopia, Eritrea	UNMEE (Jul 00-Jul 08)
Georgia	UNOMIG (Aug 93-Jun 09)
Guatemala	MINUGUA (Jan 97-May 97)

Haiti	UNMIH (Sep 93-Jun96); UNSMIH (Jun 96-Jul 97); UNTMIH (Aug 97-Nov 97); MIPONUH (Dec 97-Mar 00); MINUSTAH (Jun 04-Present)
India	UNMOGIP (Jan 49-Present)
Indonesia	UNTAET (Oct 99-May 02)
Kosovo	UNMIK (Jun 99-Present)
Lebanon	UNIFIL (Mar 78-Present)
Liberia	UNOMIL (Sep 93-Sep 97); UNMIL (2003-Present)
Mozambique	ONUMOZ (Jun 97-Feb 99)
Pakistan	UNGOMAP (May 88-Mar 90); UNMOGIP (Jan 49-Present)
Rwanda	UNOMUR (Jun 93-Sep 94); UNAMIR (Oct 93-Mar 96)
<i>Sierra Leone*</i>	UNOMSIL (Jul 98-Oct 99); UNAMSIL (Oct 99-Dec 05)
Somalia	UNOSOM I (Apr 92-Mar 93); UNOSOM II (Mar 93-Mar 95)
Sudan	UNMIS (Mar 05-Present); UNMISS (Jul 11-Present); UNISFA (Jun 11-Present); UNAMID (Jul 07-Present)
Syria	UNDOF (May 74-Present)
Tajikistan	UNMOT (Dec 94-May 00)
Timor-Leste	UNMIT (Aug 06-Present)
Uganda	UNOMUR (Jun 93-Sep 94)
Western Sahara	MINURSO (Apr 91-Present)

*Italicized countries constitute countries used in this research

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