Identity, Civic Duty and Electoral Participation: Causes of Variation in Electoral Participation

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Identity, Civic Duty and Electoral Participation: Causes of variation in electoral participation

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science

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This dissertation thesis entitled:
Identity, Civic Duty and Electoral Participation: Causes of variation in electoral participation

written by Matthew F. Foster
has been approved for the Department of Political Science

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Date

The final copy of this dissertation has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.
Abstract:

Foster, Matthew F. (Ph.D., Political Science Department)
Identity, Civic Duty and Electoral Participation: Causes of variation in electoral participation
Dissertation directed by Associate Professor Jennifer Fitzgerald

What causes variation in the turnout of an individual from election to election? Most individual level predictors of turnout can account for the propensity of an individual to vote but fail to account for changes in turnout behavior. Broad aggregate factors can account for variation in turnout trends from election to election but fail to account for changes in turnout at the individual level. In this dissertation I argue that civic duty can capture the variation that typical predictors of voter turnout cannot. Civic duty can account for variation in the turnout of high and low propensity voters, as well as distinguish why some groups turnout in one election and other groups turnout in another. The capacity of civic duty to capture such variation comes from the sensitivity of civic duty to the saliency of identities and the competing group concerns they generate. Civic duty motivates an individual to vote due to a sense of obligation that is generated by multiple group identities, with these identities either complementing each other and enhancing a sense of civic duty or conflicting with each other and diminishing such a sense. I apply and test such theory using the case of the 2017 British general election. With this case I find that civic duty can uniquely capture a sense of European identity, as well as the variation in salience of such identity that can account for the highly unexpected turnout of Millennials in 2017.
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Chapter 1: Civic Duty and Turnout

What can account for variation in the turnout of an individual from election to election? Typically variation in turnout is attributed to broad aggregate predictors such as election type, campaign spending, timing of the election, and competitiveness of the election (Franklin 2005, Geys 2006). While these aggregate predictors can account for variation in turnout, such predictors affect all voters within a given election and fail to account for varied individual changes in turnout behavior. If we want to better understand individual turnout we must examine individual level factors. At the individual level the act of voting tends to be habitual, and certain characteristics like age, education, income, and partisanship are known to have a substantial impact on the propensity of an individual to go out and vote (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995; Green and Shachar 2000; Fowler 2006). While these characteristics drive a likelihood to vote, we still see variation in turnout behavior even amongst the most likely voter. Yes, the current literature on voter turnout has identified a number of key predictors for individual turnout, but most individual level predictors tend to be static rather than dynamic, therefore failing to account for variation over time.

In this dissertation I address the question of what motivates an individual voter to go out and vote. I argue that civic duty can capture the variation that typical predictors of voter turnout cannot. Civic duty can account for variation in the turnout of high and low propensity voters, as well as distinguish why some groups turnout in one election and other groups turnout in another. The capacity of civic duty to capture such variation comes from the sensitivity of civic duty to the saliency of identities and the competing group concerns they generate. Civic duty motivates an individual to vote due to a sense of obligation that is generated by multiple group identities,
with these identities either complementing each other and enhancing a sense of civic duty or conflicting with each other and diminishing such a sense.

Identity, Civic Duty, and Turnout

Blais (2000) defines a civic duty to vote as a belief that a citizen has a moral obligation to vote. Such a belief generates a fear of feeling guilt from not fulfilling this obligation, thereby driving an individual to turnout. But what generates this obligation? I argue that this obligation comes from the influence of group identities, and the social pressure such identities generate.

Knack (1992) identifies how social pressure can manifest itself as a sense of duty that is generated through group loyalty. Green and Gerber (2015) utilize civic duty as the treatment effect that captures social pressure and find that such appeals to civic duty directly influence the likelihood of voting. In this social behavior literature civic duty has often been alluded to and characterized as an internal manifestation of social pressure. But where does this social pressure come from? The effect of sanctioning on turnout is fundamentally tied to a sense of belonging to a group. The predictive power of variables that capture group identity such as ethnicity, religiousness, and partisanship can be attributed to the social pressure such identification generates. Because such social pressure is a consequence of group and social interactions that are often derived from identity, I argue that if civic duty is an internal manifestation of social pressure it can also serve as an internal manifestation of the pressure felt from group identity. Therefore, group identity generates a sense of civic duty to vote that in turn motivates an individual to turnout:
The diagram above visualizes my main causal argument. Group identity influences individual voter turnout by enhancing a sense of civic duty to vote. The more strongly an individual identifies with a group, the more strongly they will feel a sense of civic duty to advance the interests of their group through political participation. This conception views civic duty not as some ingrained static characteristic of civicness that is inculcated through education and society, but rather a concept that is directly influenced by group identity and mediates the effects of identity on turnout. With group identity comes concern for the interests of the group; this concern for group interests generates a sense of obligation that manifests itself as civic duty. Such duty motivates an individual to go out and vote on behalf of others or suffer a sense of guilt. A more complete form of the diagram is below:
The key difference between these two diagrams is the inclusion of group concerns and guilt. These are critical mechanisms that act as the glue between group identity, civic duty, and turnout. The concerns generated from group identity are what connect identity with civic duty, while it is the guilt generated from a sense of duty that drives an individual to vote. These mechanisms may appear to complicate the mediating relationship of civic duty, but they are also necessary to flesh out, as civic duty has not always been viewed as a social mechanism and a sense of obligation (Knack 1992; Blais 2000; Green and Gerber 2015). Traditionally civic duty has been viewed as a taste for voting, and when placed in a rational model acts as a concept that counteracts the costs of voting with psychological benefits (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). I test this debate in chapter 3 and find evidence that the conception of civic duty as a sense of obligation is more accurate, reinforcing the importance of viewing civic duty as a mechanism influenced by group concerns that generates guilt as visualized in the second diagram.

So far I have described how the concept of civic duty can theoretically connect group identity with individual turnout. But the central question of this dissertation does not simply ask about causes of individual turnout, the central question also asks about variation. The concept of civic duty not only serves as a mediator between group identity and turnout, it can also offer a theoretical concept that can account for the interaction of multiple identities and the shifting salience of these identities, thereby accounting for variation of individual turnout behavior over time. Civic duty is not merely a culmination of group concerns from multiple identities. Yes, some identities may influence economic interests such as class, others moral interests like religion; but often these multiple identities may generate competing interests. How might a working-class identity that generates an interest to protect jobs through trade protection, be reconciled with the identity of a consumer that wants cheaper products? Or how can identifying
as a Christian and the socially conservative interests such identity instills, be reconciled with being a young Millennial with more liberal interests? These identities generate opposing interests that appear hard to reconcile, and if both identities generate equal concern for such opposing interests, how would an individual with such competing group concerns act politically? This competition of opposing concerns and interests is reflected in civic duty. If strongly identifying with a group generates concerns that manifest as a civic duty to vote, then when such concerns are for conflicting interests we should see a diminishing effect on a sense of obligation and duty. Conversely, if such concerns are for complementary interests we should see an enhancement of the effect such identities have on a sense of obligation. I argue that it is not enough to just understand that group identity matters by influencing civic duty, but to also understand how such identities interact, as no one identity defines a person’s behavior. It is through the moderating relationship of competing group concerns and whether they represent conflicting or complementary interests that we see variation in the turnout of an individual from election to election, and it is this moderating relationship that makes civic duty such a useful concept for understanding turnout.

If civic duty represents a sense of obligation, then identities that generate concerns for complementary group interests can be expected to enhance this sense of obligation; but identities that conflict and generate concerns for opposing group interests should diminish this sense of obligation. Therefore the group concerns generated from group identity would not mediate the influence of identity on civic duty but rather moderate the influence:
Figure 1.3: Conditional Effect of Group Concerns for Group Identity and Civic Duty

The diagram above visualizes a moderating relationship in which group concerns can either conflict or complement with each other and moderate the influence group identity has on civic duty. For example, a union member can identify with a conservative party or a liberal party. Either partisan identity is expected to generate a sense of civic duty. This is also true for a union identity. All of these identities can generate concerns for the interests of the group the stronger an individual identifies with these groups. But while the interests of a union member and a member of a liberal party can align through common economic interests, this is not necessarily the case for the interests of a union member and a member of a conservative party. An individual that identifies with a union identity and liberal party identity will experience complementing concerns due to the common economic interests these identities share, thereby enhancing the effect of these identities on civic duty. An individual that identifies with a union identity and conservative party identity will likely experience conflicting concerns due to the conflicting interests for these two identities, thereby diminishing the influence of these identities on civic duty. In the case of complementing identities this would mean a stronger sense of civic duty to vote, while for conflicting identities this entails a weaker sense of civic duty to vote. I will test my theory of the relationship between identity and civic duty by using the case of the
2017 British general election. This election illustrates the critical role identity and group concerns play in motivating a voter to turnout.

**Civic Duty in the 2017 British General Election**

The case of the 2017 British general election serves as an excellent example of the role civic duty plays in the turnout of an individual. The unanticipated outcome of a hung parliament surprised many as Prime Minister May called this early election expecting to grow the Conservative majority. But the unexpected level of youth turnout took away this opportunity and led to a strong showing for Corbyn and the Labour party. My theoretical conception of civic duty and the role of this concept as a mediator of identity and turnout can account for these unexpected outcomes and the variation in turnout of Millennials. The shifting salience of a European identity post-Brexit and the strong pro-Brexit positioning of the Conservative party generated complementary identities for typical Millennials, thereby enhancing a sense of civic duty and the obligation to go out and vote.

The Brexit referendum in 2016 was a national vote to decide the future of Britain’s membership in the European Union. With increasing nationalist pressure, concerns of immigration, and the economic volatility of the EU members of the south, many Britons were becoming dissatisfied with European integration. Signs of such nationalist and anti-EU sentiment were prominent in the 2015 general election and led to a Conservative majority. This nationalist fervor continued, and these concerns over European integration culminated in an eventual vote to exit the European Union, the Brexit Referendum. Brexit was not only seen as a referendum on EU membership, but also on Prime Minister David Cameron's leadership. Prime Minister Cameron was for remaining in the EU, and even campaigned on a platform of remain
but reform. Upon the success of the Brexit referendum in June of 2016 David Cameron stepped down and Theresa May took over as Prime Minister in July. Anticipating a strengthening of support for her leadership and the Conservative Party she called for snap elections the following April to be held on June 8th of 2017. This election was meant to strengthen a Conservative majority and generate a mandate going into Brexit negotiations with the EU. But Prime Minister May did not anticipate the surge in turnout amongst voters under the age of 35, and the anger, anxiety, and fear these Millennials harbored. This group of voters that typically turnout at a far lower rate than other age groups, changed the course of politics in the 2017 general election by turning out at a higher rate than ever before, and in the end would destroy any hope for a Conservative mandate let alone a majority.

The feeling of being drowned out by a surge of nationalist sentiment that sought to destroy the future economic success of Britain concerned Millennials. These concerns grew to the point that a European identity became so salient as to generate a sense of obligation to vote on behalf of other youths. This sense of obligation manifested as an increased sense of civic duty amongst Millennials and the anticipation of an increased sense of guilt from not voting. The effect of this European identity was further enhanced by the complementary partisan identity of Labour, so that Millennials that felt very European and belonged to the Labour Party saw an especially high boost in civic duty. This sense of civic duty and the anticipated guilt that comes from it generated a boost in turnout amongst a normally less participatory group of voters, which led to the highly unexpected outcome of a hung parliament. Such a case offers direct evidence of how civic duty mediates the relationship between identity and turnout, while also accounting for the moderating nature of multiple identities.
Plan of Dissertation

The next chapter focuses on how civic duty can uniquely account for the unusual increase in turnout of Millennials. More specifically, I examine how Millennials saw a strong increase in civic duty between the 2015 general election and the 2017 general election. This increase in civic duty can account for the higher turnout rate that led to the hung parliament that took place in 2017. I test this argument using panel data from the British Election Study that allows me to compare how individual behavior and civic duty changed amongst Millennials in the 2015 as well as the 2017 elections, and how it is civic duty that can uniquely account for their variation in turnout. Later in the chapter I argue that this increase in civic duty amongst Millennials can largely be attributed to an increased sense of Europeanness amongst such youths, as it is civic duty that captured the growing group concerns and interests from the visible post-Brexit anxiety these young people exhibited. Theoretically this chapter offers evidence that civic duty is more directly related to group identity rather than a predictor of turnout like campaign interest, which very powerful in its own right, more effectively captures rational concerns like ideology and policy rather than social pressure from identity.

Chapter 3 builds off these findings by testing why civic duty is such an excellent concept to capture such group dynamics. My dissertation builds off the more recent conception of civic duty as a social mechanism that functions as a sense of obligation that generates guilt, rather than an older conception that portrays civic duty as a taste for voting that generates satisfaction. Civic duty effectively captures and mediates the group concerns generated from group identity due to the relationship between duty and guilt. Group concerns generate a sense of obligation that increases a sense of civic duty, which in turn generates a sense of guilt from this increased sense of duty. Using unique questions that capture group considerations, personal considerations, guilt,
and satisfaction from the British Election Survey for the 2001, 2005, and 2010 general elections, I test the degree civic duty is associated with group concerns and guilt rather than being an internal manifestation of civicness that generates satisfaction from voting. In this chapter I find that group concerns drive a belief in the civic duty to vote and through this duty these concerns drive a sense of guilt. It is this conception of civic duty as a mechanism of obligation and guilt that is most accurate, more so than an earlier conception that views civic duty as a taste for voting that generates a sense of satisfaction as stipulated in a traditional rational model.

Chapter 4 is the final empirical chapter and seeks to test the relationship between competing group identities and civic duty. Up until this point I have simply argued that civic duty captures and mediates group interests generated by group identity. But what identities matter to turnout and how do they interact? In chapter 4 I identify the interplay of multiple identities and show that identities not only need to be strong but also salient. When two politically salient identities exist they can either complement or conflict with each other in a moderating relationship. Each identity conditions the other and this directly influences civic duty. I test this interplay with a partisan identity and European identity and show that while conflicting identities can generate a cognitive dissonance that diminishes the effect of a strong political identity like partisanship, complementary identities can enhance the effect of such identities on civic duty. I end the chapter by testing these effects for both the 2015 and 2017 general elections. While the 2015 general election saw a surge of nationalist sentiment that benefitted the Conservative Party, the increased saliency of a European identity that came after the anxiety and uncertainty generated from the Brexit vote benefitted a more EU centric Labour Party in 2017. Millennials, who identify as both European and Labour at higher rates than any other age group, benefitted the most from these complementary identities. Being European and
Labour generated complementary group interests in the 2017 general election, which enhanced the effect these identities had on civic duty, and in the end turnout for Millennials. Chapter 4 highlights the dynamic relationship multiple identities have on civic duty and reinforces how civic duty can uniquely capture the interplay of salient identities, and how the shifting salience of one identity can account for both the strengthening and weakening of the relationship between partisanship and civic duty.

This dissertation focuses on the relationship between identity and civic duty. With identity comes pressure. Pressure to conform to group behavior and promote the interests of the group. Such pressure manifests as a sense of civic duty, and it is this sense of duty and obligation that can motivate an individual to go out and vote beyond seemingly rational calculations. Where policy and ideology can be abstract for a voter and require significant information and time to rationalize, identity is tangible and can convey a host of policy concerns and interests in a simple idea. Identity can be a powerful motivator to turn out and vote, and it is through civic duty that we see the true independent impact of identity on voter turnout.
Chapter 2

Civic Duty and Identity: The Effect of a European Identity on the Civic Duty of British Millennials in the UK 2017 General Election

My central argument focuses on the role of civic duty in the relationship between identity and turnout. I argue that civic duty is a reflection of the social pressure generated from identifying with a group, and that this pressure manifests as an obligation to vote. Civic duty essentially serves as a mediator between identity and turnout. It is through civic duty that identity exerts independent social effects on individual turnout behavior. In this chapter I analyze and test the relationship civic duty has with both turnout and identity, and I find that civic duty can uniquely account for the varying turnout of Millennials in the 2017 British general election as well as capture the influence of an increasingly salient European identity.

***

The 2017 British general election did not go as planned for many. Expecting a mandate for the Conservative Party, the snap election called in April by Prime Minister Theresa May was viewed as a sign of confidence and momentum for the Tories. The media, pundits, pollsters, and politicians all saw this call for a snap election as a move taken from a strong position. The success of the referendum on whether Britain will exit the European Union was taken as a sign that the Conservative Party should become the party of Brexit. David Cameron even stepped down from his position as Prime Minister, allowing for Theresa May to take the role of the head of the party and of Parliament. With the surprise success of Brexit and her successful campaign framed around pro-Brexit policy, Prime Minister May felt the tailwinds favored her and the
Conservative Party and expected to gain a stronger majority from this unexpected snap election. This greater majority was expected to be viewed as a mandate and help strengthen the negotiating position of Prime Minister May during the upcoming Brexit negotiations with the EU. This was the motivation for calling an early election in April of 2017, a motivation that would prove fundamentally flawed by June.

It is this case of the 2017 British general election that serves as an excellent study for the effects identity has on turnout, and the vital role of civic duty regarding this relationship. Many thought that the strong nationalistic sentiments seen in the 2015 general election, as well as the Brexit vote, would continue into 2017, but this was wrong. The reality of the threat of a British exit from the EU satisfied these nationalist sentiments but activated a latent feeling of Europeanness amongst many others. It was this increased saliency of a European identity that led to a hung parliament by driving a sense of civic duty amongst typically less participatory voters such as Millennials. In this chapter I will test this argument and show that civic duty uniquely accounts for the surge in youth turnout in 2017 and that such a concept is directly related to a European identity.

European Identity and Millennial Turnout in the 2017 General Election

Theresa May sought to increase the Conservative majority by calling an early election after April polls indicated the Conservatives held a 20-point lead over Labour. Expecting to increase the majority, Theresa May was blindsided when support for Labour went from 30.4% in the 2015 general election to 40% in 2017 general election. Media outlets like The Guardian, The Independent, The Daily Telegraph, and Financial Times all attributed this shocking outcome to a surge in youth turnout. The 2017 British Parliamentary election saw unprecedented turnout
amongst 18 to 24-year-olds. Amongst this age group turnout surged by 16 points between the 2015 and 2017 election, going from 38% to 54%\(^1\). An unusually large increase was also exhibited by 25 to 34-year-olds, with an increase of 8% between these elections. All other age groups declined at this time.

So, what was the cause of this turnout? A common explanation for such an increase amongst pollsters and the media has been the anger and fear generated by the Brexit vote. Millennials were reeling from the Brexit vote, with 71% of youths between age 18-24 voting to remain part of the EU\(^2\). Weeks leading up to the election and immediately after the outcome, British pollsters like YouGov and IPSOS Mori saw a surge of anger, anxiety, and fear amongst young voters and growing support for Labour’s anti-Brexit positioning. The early election called by Theresa May allowed for such youth discontent to be voiced at the ballot box.

But why was such fear and anxiety so much stronger in 2017 than 2015? A rational account could argue that the central issues were the same between the 2015 and 2017 general elections, and therefore turnout trends should have been quite similar for these two elections. In 2015 like 2017, the role of Britain in the European Union was already being questioned and Euroscepticism was on the rise (Forster 2002, Gifford 2014, Spiering 2004). In fact, the question of Britain’s future in the EU was a critical one for many and led to the surprise outcome of the success of the Scottish National Party as well as the United Kingdom Independence Party in 2015. The SNP saw unprecedented gains in 2015 winning 56 seats, and this success was viewed as an indication of the growing frustration with the deteriorating relationship between Britain and the EU (Bogdanor 2016). This was matched by the UKIP which received 12.5% of the national

\(^1\) IPSOS MORI: 2017 How Britain Voted
\(^2\) YouGov: How Britain Voted at the 2017 general election
vote share with its anti-EU and anti-immigrant message (Ford and Goodwin 2017). The success of these small parties ensured that EU policy was at the forefront of the 2015 campaigns, therefore a shift in policy focus cannot account for such variation in turnout. Even more relevant was the expectation of a hung parliament. Media and pundits predicted a hung parliament for the 2015 general election. This was so anticipated that the topic of a hung parliament not only consumed regular media but also social media such as Twitter and Facebook (Burnap et al 2015, Fisher and Lewis-Beck 2015). Such talk of a competitive election signaled to voters that Labour had a strong opportunity to recover seats in parliament in 2015. This in addition to the salience of the policy of Britain’s relationship with the EU, should have entailed an equally rational motivation for Millennials to vote in 2015 as they did in 2017. In fact, the anticipated success of Labour in 2015 as opposed to 2017 should have given young people even more rationale to go out and vote, but this was not the case. So, what was different?

In the end it was not the policy and ideological concerns of Millennials that can account for such a change in turnout between 2015 and 2017, nor was it the expectation of winning. These rational arguments would account for high turnout amongst Millennials in both 2015 and 2017, and especially during the Brexit vote. What changed was a sense of European identity amongst Millennials and the anger and anxiety that instilled such an identity post Brexit; the fear that the Conservative Party had become the party of Brexit; the fear that Britain’s exit from the EU would be a sure thing now with this snap election; the fear that leaving the EU would undermine Britain’s future with Europe and the EU. Millennials support the European Union at a higher rate than any other generation (Down and Wilson 2013). Growing up under strengthening European integration has generated a greater sense of European identity and instilled a fear of the consequences of leaving the EU (Fox and Pearce 2018). This sense of
European identity amongst Millennials has been further supported by recent focus groups conducted by the London School of Economics, where 40 youth focus groups emphasized bemusement, anger, and resentment at the choice to leave the EU (Mejias and Banaji 2017). The fear and anxiety described by pundits and the media reflected the increased importance of this European identity to such Millennials politically. These shared intergroup emotions of anxiety and fear indicated a perception of threat from an unavoidable Brexit, and this perception of threat is what drove up the salience of a European identity. The feeling that bigger and stronger forces were dictating Britain’s political direction outside of their control drove a feeling of vulnerability amongst these Millennials and generated a more distinct and clear sense of Europeanness. This newly salient and strengthened European identity then generated an obligation to go out and vote amongst Millennials. So even though the policy choices and concerns were the same between 2015 and 2017, and such policy offered motivation for Millennials to turnout in both, it was the increased sense of Europeanness that gave such youths extra motivation and a sense of obligation to vote. In this chapter I argue that this obligation is a belief that it is their civic duty to vote. I test the power of civic duty using panel data that can identify the changes in this mechanism and individual voter turnout behavior within the same Millennials in the 2015 general election as well as the 2017 general election.

What is Civic Duty?

So why civic duty? Why is civic duty the mechanism that can account for the unexpected turnout of Millennial voters in the 2017 general election? I argue identity affects voter turnout

---

3 In chapter 4 I discuss the causes for the shift in salience in more detail. The outcome of the Brexit referendum, in addition to Theresa May’s actions regarding framing the Conservative Party as the party of Brexit, generated a perceived threat and sense of anxiety amongst Millennials that increased the saliency of a European identity.
beyond a rational model. And that civic duty uniquely captures the independent effects of identity. Identity can inform rational considerations of policy and ideology, but there is also a critical social aspect that goes un-captured in a rational model. Civic duty uniquely captures this social aspect of identity as well as providing a mechanism to motivate turnout. Civic duty is fundamentally shaped by the group concerns generated by identity and these concerns create a sense of obligation that in turn motivates an individual to go out and vote to avoid a sense of guilt. This combination of group orientation as well as the emotional generation of guilt is what link Millennials to higher turnout in 2017. And the concept of civic duty has been associated with both group concerns and intrinsic emotions for centuries.

The concept of civic duty has been one of the oldest political concepts conceived of. It was argued in Plato’s *Republic* and *Laws* as well as Aristotle’s *Politics* that good governance can only come when individuals are instilled with a civic virtue that reinforces love of state and constitution. For both Plato and Aristotle, a concern for the state and the citizens of the state must trump personal self-interest for an individual to effectively govern. In Rousseau’s *The Social Contract*, he argues that this virtue is essential for participatory governments; Rousseau reflects in the text that these values should generate a sense of duty that motivates the people of the state to reinforce and protect the government’s institutions. Rousseau saw such civic virtue as so essential to a state that he believed there must be mass education to instill such values. The development of the concept of civic duty in the past has emphasized the group-oriented thinking required to cultivate it, as well as the emotional nature of civic virtue that generates a sense of duty and love of country which motivates selfless action on behalf of the state and its citizens.

But although we can gain better understanding of the roots of civic duty from these early thinkers, and can confirm that common attributes of civic duty are the same today as in the past,
is civic duty the same in today’s democracy where millions are enfranchised to vote, and the
burden of participation is considerably less? While past political thinkers idealized participation
in democratic institutions, today we commonly describe participation as the act of voting.
Should we assume that the same virtues of these past philosophical thinkers are necessary for the
mere act of voting? And does love of state matter as much with the introduction of party systems
and partisanship?

What we see in more modern conceptions is a similar emphasis on group concerns and
emotion. Although it is apparent that the concept of civic duty has centuries old origins, the
more modern conception of civic duty and how it applies to voting was re-examined during the
Behaviorist movement with works from Berelson et al (1954), Campbell et al (1960) and Riker
and Ordeshook (1968). The first American National Electoral Study (ANES) in 1952 includes
civic duty as one of six major psychological variables relevant to voters. Although such a
variable was utilized by such works as Berelson et al (1954), Campbell et al (1954), and
Campbell et al (1960), the findings and effects of civic duty were relegated to either a footnote or
the appendix. One of the most robust early modern conceptions of civic duty, and early
arguments for the role duty plays in turnout, comes from Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and their
inclusion of a D term in the calculus of voting. Unless costs are infinitesimally small, the
Downsian model would suggest that voting is an irrational act because an individual vote (in
most cases) will not influence the outcome of an election one way or another. Downs (1957) did
discuss the potential influence of voting to support a democratic system, but this was not
contextually defined to influence this calculus. Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) addition of the D
term fixed this issue, but in a very broad way. This term is seen as a taste for voting that
includes five components:
1. “The satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting, which if the citizen is at all socialized into the democratic tradition is positive when he votes and negative (from guilt) when he does not.”

2. “The satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system: For many people, this is probably the main rationale for voting. It is also a highly political motive and to leave it out of the calculus would be absurd.”

3. “The satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference: Voting gives the citizen the chance to stand up and be counted for the candidate he supports. For many voters this must be the most important and politically significant feature of voting. Why else vote so determinedly for a candidate whom the voter knows is almost certainly going to lose or, for that matter, going to win?”

4. “The satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls, etc.: These items are usually regarded as costs, but for those who enjoy the act of informing themselves for the decision, who get social satisfactions out of going to the polling booth, etc., these supposed costs are actually benefits.

5. “The satisfaction of affirming one’s efficacy in the political system: The theory of democracy asserts that individuals and voting are meaningful and for most people the only chance to fulfill this role is in the voting booth.”

Components 1 and 4 appear to be especially pertinent to my theory. Component 1 argues that the D term can be viewed as an “ethic of voting” and explicitly states the emotion of guilt this ethic generates by an individual not voting. Component 4 discusses the role of social satisfactions, adding a social dynamic to the D term. But as can be seen with such broad catch-all components, the concept of the D term has often been butchered and treated as a blunt way of capturing civic duty. Stubbings and Carmines (1991) consider the D term an embarrassment to social science due to the vagueness of the term. Grofman (1993) sees the D term as some magical element that acts like a deus ex machina when arguing the rational model of voting creates a “paradox that ate rational choice theory”. Bendor et al (2003) argue that the D term is theoretically shallow, while Goldfarb and Sigelman (2010) view this “theoretically shallow term” as acting more like an error term to capture all the unexplained variance from the original Downsian model.

These critiques are justified if we are to believe that Riker and Ordeshook (1968) are the paramount authorities on the concept of civic duty, and that every component from partisanship to efficacy is truly a part of civic duty. Blais (2000) pushes back on the past conception of civic duty as “a taste for voting” that derives satisfaction from the laundry list of components, by
building upon the one component Riker and Ordeshook (1968) described as an ethic of voting. Blais (2000) identifies that the main mechanism that drives the influence of civic duty on turnout may not be satisfaction, but rather a sense of guilt due to a feeling of obligation to vote. Blais and Galais (2016) even find that a sense of guilt is a critical component of duty through a factor analysis of responses to questions regarding whether voting is a duty and whether an individual feels guilt when not voting. This association of civic duty with guilt is further supported if we examine the concept of civic duty within a social framework. Knack (1992) sees voting as a collective action problem, arguing that norms and social sanctions generate a sense of duty in the individual that causes them to go out and vote for fear of social reprisal. Gerber et al (2008) find support for such a social reprisal argument by conducting an experiment in which political mailers were sent out to invoke a sense of civic duty and indicate the individual’s voting record will be made public; the results from this experiment support the claim that compliance with social norms is more likely when behavior is expected to be public, and more importantly to this chapter, these results highlight that such internal fears of reprisal in the form of civic duty can generate negative sentiments such as guilt and shame.

Scholars such as Blais, Knack, Green, and Gerber all conceptualized civic duty as a social mechanism that generates expectations of guilt, as opposed to a more traditional conception of civic duty as a taste for voting that generates satisfaction. Under this conception civic duty serves as an internalization of social pressure by generating a sense of obligation that motivates an individual to vote to avoid any sense of guilt. Civic duty is not merely seen as an

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4 In appendix D I include an extensive analysis of civic duty, in which I construct the “components” of civic duty and test the strength of these factors in predicting levels of civic duty within an individual. Such analysis identifies partisanship, feelings about democracy, patriotism, and perceived understanding as the most robust predictors of civic duty. All these factors can be theoretically connected to identity as well as the perceived ability to help such groups through the act of voting.
attribute that generates greater feelings of satisfaction from voting, but rather a belief that alters expected feelings of guilt from future actions or inactions out of a sense of obligation.

Two of the most consistent characterizations of civic duty are the guilt that is associated with it as well as the social nature of civic duty. From the classical conception of deferring to the concerns of the state above self, to the internalization of social sanctioning in Knack (1992), civic duty is a social variable that relies on group concerns to establish a sense of obligation. In turn, it is this sense of obligation that generates an expectation of guilt when an individual does not fulfill their civic duty to vote. It is this dual nature of civic duty that makes it essential in explaining turnout, and it is this dual nature that makes it a key mechanism for accounting for the rise of Millennial turnout in the 2017 general election. In later chapters I will directly test this connection of civic duty with group concerns and guilt, but in the following sections I will first test the power of civic duty to uniquely capture the turnout of Millennials in 2017 and the European identity that is common amongst this group. It is this election that offers a perfect case to test such arguments, as turnout trends dramatically shifted between the 2015 and 2017 general elections, as well as the saliency of a European identity.

**The Mechanism of Civic Duty and Millennial Turnout in 2017**

The goal of this chapter is to establish the role civic duty played in the turnout of young voters in the 2017 British general election, and in doing so highlight the unique connection civic duty has with identity and group concerns. I argued that a critical reason for the hung parliament was the unprecedented turnout of young voters. Young voters typically turn out at a far lower rate than their older counterparts, and so it is essential to test if there was a difference in the
influence of being a Millennial on turnout in the 2017 election as opposed to past elections.

From this I can generate my first hypothesis:

**H1**: Being a Millennial has a significant and positive effect on individual turnout in 2017 but not in 2015.

This hypothesis is a critical first check for my theory as well a test of whether the media and pundits were correct in attributing so much influence to the turnout of Millennials. While a cross-sectional survey with many missing responses may not be representative of the actual electorate and voting population, the unique nature of panel data allows me to see the change in turnout within the same set of Millennials for these two elections. A key aspect to understand with hypothesis 1 is that I am not expecting Millennials to exhibit a greater propensity to turnout in 2017 than all age groups, because this is highly unlikely as it is established older people have higher turnout rates and a sense of civic duty (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), but that by controlling for age, Millennials would be a significant predictor of turnout in 2017 and not 2015. This would indicate that 2017 saw a unique trend in Millennial turnout, a trend that is unusual for such young people.

Next it is necessary to confirm the predictive power of civic duty on turnout. My entire theory is predicated on the fact that civic duty is an extremely powerful predictor of turnout and that it exhibits effects beyond rational self-interest, uniquely capturing social pressure. To test this, I will include other very powerful predictors of turnout to see if civic duty maintains its independent effect or whether this effect is washed out by higher priority predictors. One of the

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5 As part of appendix B I include lowess curves for turnout and age for the 2015 and 2017 elections. These curves visualize a higher turnout rate for older individuals, but also visualize how Millennials have decreased the discrepancy in turnout with the older Generation X. In addition, this curve shows that the difference between turnout rates of older and younger Millennials vanished in 2017.
most commonly accepted predictors of turnout that can serve as such a baseline is the interest an individual has in the current campaign. Campaign interest has been used as a proxy for campaign exposure as well as being verified as one of the most robust predictors of turnout. In addition, interest in a campaign and election should reflect the degree of the perceived importance and stakes of the election. It is campaign interest that can most effectively capture rational self-interest, and so I use this variable to capture the effects of a more traditional rational model. If civic duty is as powerful a predictor of turnout as I argue, and it has effects beyond a traditional rational self-interest, then civic duty should still maintain independent effects with the inclusion of a powerful and deterministic predictor like campaign interest. From this I can generate a second hypothesis:

**H2:** Civic duty has a significant and positive effect on turnout that is equal to or greater than campaign interest.

Hypothesis 2 merely serves as another hoop test for my theory. If civic duty is not the powerful predictor I argue it to be, then my theory is a moot point. But if it is still a powerful predictor of turnout with the inclusion of such a broad and deterministic variable such as campaign interest, then we can be confident that it is a robust predictor of turnout as well.

But while I expect civic duty to maintain a significant relationship in a full model, I do not expect this to be the case for being a Millennial. In many ways what I am suggesting is a mediating relationship. Mediation suggests that the influence an independent variable has on an outcome, fully or partially occurs through a third variable. This is not a moderating relationship,

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6 In appendix B I include an interaction model for campaign interest and civic duty. Such a model shows that the effects of these two variables and their interaction nearly account for all variation in turnout. Highlighting the powerful effect of these two predictors.
but rather a relationship that suggests the influence of a given variable on the outcome somehow occurs through that variables influence on a mediating factor. Baron and Kenny (1986) identify a technique to isolate such relationships by comparing three models:

Mediator  = α₁ + β₁X + ε₁  
Outcome  = α₂ + β₂X + ε₂  
Outcome  = α₃ + β₃X + β₄M + ε₃

For mediation to exist regarding Baron and Kenny (1986), β₁ would have to be significant, and indicates that the independent variable of interest has a significant relationship with the mediator. β₂ must also be significant and identifies that the independent variable also has a significant relationship with the outcome of interest. Finally, β₄ must be significant while β₃ either shows no significance or becomes significantly smaller in size relative to β₂. If my theory is correct we should expect to see that the Millennial variable is not significant in a full model with civic duty included in it, therefore leading to a third hypothesis⁷:

H3: The inclusion of civic duty, campaign interest, and partisanship will negate the significant effect of being a Millennial in 2017.

But as stated above, to find evidence of mediation it is not enough to show a change in significance or substantive effect with the inclusion of civic duty, I must also show that Millennial is a predictor of civic duty. If I am correct to argue that civic duty can uniquely

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⁷ This basic mediation analysis does not serve as a test to identify the degree of mediation. Due to the data being non-experimental and the inability to claim sequential ignorantly, I cannot make claims of significant mediation. But this does serve as a test, in that if we do not see mediating type changes within these basic tests and results, we could rule any mediating relationship out.
capture social influences beyond self-interest, and that these social forces positively influenced Millennial turnout beyond policy and ideological concerns, then I expect civic duty to exhibit a varying relationship that can also account for the variation of the turnout of Millennials between 2015 and 2017. This relationship is where the nuance of civic duty as the mechanism for turnout of Millennials in 2017 really comes into play. This relationship should only exist in 2017, and not in 2015. If being a Millennial in 2017 meant a higher propensity to turnout due to civic duty, then this relationship should be weaker in previous elections when youth turnout was much lower. Hypothesis 4 focuses on this relationship between civic duty and Millennials:

**H4:** Being a Millennial has a significant and positive effect on civic duty in 2017 but not in 2015.

The central argument I make is that something was different about Millennials in 2017, that normally such group identity does not matter, that the salience of this identity normally does not shape political behavior. And so, I expect civic duty to have little or no relationship with being a Millennial in 2015, even as a mediator. But this should not be the case for 2017, where this identity becomes politically salient and should have a strong effect on civic duty. As with the earlier hypotheses I use campaign interest as a baseline to make comparisons. As before, this campaign interest variable serves to highlight the unique role of civic duty beyond rational self-interest and is expected to not vary in a way as to account for Millennial turnout in 2017.

Fortunately, the unique panel nature of the data allows me to take these tests further and test the change within individuals between the 2015 and 2017 elections. If the increased turnout of Millennials in 2017 was due to an increased sense of civic duty, then we should see an increase in civic duty within individuals between elections. The final hypothesis tests this relationship:
H5: Being a Millennial has a significant and positive effect on individual change in civic duty between 2015 and 2017.

Hypothesis 5 serves as a final confirmation of the growth of civic duty amongst Millennials and makes use of the unique panel structure of the data. The next section tests these five hypotheses using logit and ordered logit models for data taken from the 2014-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel. Through these models the substantive effects of civic duty can be compared with campaign interest, with the expectation that civic duty can uniquely capture the varying turnout trends of Millennials.

Data

To test my hypotheses, I utilize the British Election Study Panel Survey 2014-2018. This survey is an internet panel that consists of 13 waves starting from February 20th, 2014, with the most current wave conducted after the 2017 general election between June 9th to the 23rd. Each wave ranges from 30,000 to 35,000 respondents, with retention rates between waves ranging from 65% to 83%. Those that took all waves account for 17% of respondents, while 43.1% of all first wave respondents have also take wave 13. While not perfect, the sheer size of the sample, with thousands taking this survey, and the high retention rate makes this an effective data source to test within person change and temporal electoral dynamics. For this dissertation, and the examination of change between the 2015 and 2017 general elections, I primarily utilize wave 6, wave 12, and wave 13 of the study. Wave 6 had 30,725 respondents take the survey just after the 2015 general election between May 8th to May 26th. Wave 12 had 34,464 respondents take the survey just before the 2017 general election between May 5th and June 7th; 25,395 of these also
took wave 11, for a wave retention rate of 81.9%; 5,832 respondents took the first 12 waves of the survey, while 19.3% of respondents who originally took wave 1 also took wave 12; wave 12 is the primary wave for the construction of the variables for most of my models in this chapter. The final wave I utilize is wave 13, which had 31,196 respondents take the survey just after the 2017 general election between June 9th and June 23rd; this wave is included primarily to identify the individual turnout in 2017. Even with an imperfect retention rate and missing data, these surveys still accommodate a minimum N of 9,000 in most models.

*Key Variables: Turnout, Civic Duty, Campaign Interest, Millennial*

The most critical variables in my models include turnout, civic duty, and campaign interest. My first four models in the results section of this chapter use turnout as the dependent variable. Two of the models capture turnout in the 2017 general election, while the other two capture turnout in 2015. The responses to turnout were taken from wave 6 and 13 respectively. These were the waves conducted directly after the 2015 and 2017 general elections. This *Turnout* variable is dichotomous with 0 representing not voting and 1 representing voting.

The critical concept of civic duty that is a key explanatory variable in the turnout models, and a dependent variable in the later models, is constructed from a question that asks the respondent the degree they agree with the statement, “It is every citizen’s duty to vote in an election”. This question was asked in wave 6 and 12, with the constructed *Civic Duty* variable ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

The next critical concept that also serves as a dependent and explanatory variable is campaign interest. This concept is operationalized from a survey question that asks the degree

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8 A list of the key variables with the mean, min, max, and n are included in appendix A.
the respondent is interested from the statement, “How interested are you in the General Election”. Interest is constructed from questions in waves 6 and 12 and ranges from 0 (not at all interested) to 3 (very interested).

My final critical explanatory variable, and the one central to the unexpected result of a hung election, is being a Millennial. This variable is dichotomous and 1 if the respondent is under 35 in the 2017 general election and 0 if they are 35 or older.

Controls

Partisanship is consistently evoked as a key determinant of turnout (Campbell et al 1960, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Verba et al 1995). The inclusion of partisanship in any model of turnout is often seen as essential. The inclusion of partisanship in the models below serves as a control that should put the power of civic duty to the test, like that of Interest. Partisanship is constructed from two questions asked in waves 6 and 12; “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?” and “Would you call yourself very strong, fairly strong, or not very strong”.

Partisanship ranges from 0 (no party attachment) to 3 (strong party attachment). In addition, I include the standard demographic controls of Income, Age, Education, and Female that are found in most models for turnout.

Results

The central focus of this chapter is the impact Millennials had on the 2017 general election due to an increased sense of civic duty. More specifically, I argue that the higher than expected turnout of Millennials that kept the Conservative Party from establishing a majority in
Parliament was due to a unique increase in civic duty amongst Millennials. If this is the case, then being a Millennial should have a stronger influence on turnout in 2015 than in 2017. Table 1 includes logit models for turnout in the 2015 and 2017 general elections to test this argument.

Table 2.1: Determinants of Voting in 2015 & 2017 British General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.90 (0.04)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.64 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.79 (0.05)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.67 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.42 (0.05)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.35 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millennial</td>
<td>0.17 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.09)**</td>
<td>0.03 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.04 (0.00)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.00)**</td>
<td>0.04 (0.00)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.04 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.20 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.08 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.19 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.15 (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>-0.28 (0.24)</td>
<td>-3.53 (0.32)**</td>
<td>-0.54 (0.17)**</td>
<td>-2.50 (0.21)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>11868</td>
<td>11481</td>
<td>19504</td>
<td>18491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Models 1 and 3 are trimmed models with just the key demographic controls and the Millennial variable. What stands out right away is the significance of Millennial in model 3 but not in model 1. This supports my first hypothesis that predicts Millennial would be a significant predictor of turnout in 2017 but not 2015. What is key to understand here, is that the significance of Millennial requires controlling for age. Young voters are prone to abstention, and traditionally youth turnout is substantially low, but by controlling for age this group is a significant predictor of turnout in 2017, highlighting the importance of this group in 2017. This
is an important hoop to jump through, because it does show that Millennials behaved differently in 2017.

My second hypothesis argues that civic duty is a powerful predictor of turnout. To test this, I include campaign interest and partisanship to serve as controls, with the expectation that they are strong enough predictors of turnout to potentially render civic duty insignificant. But looking at the full models this is not the case. Even with the inclusion of Interest, Civic Duty is a powerful predictor of turnout. In fact, it has the strongest effect of any variable in both models 2 and 4. In model 2 for the 2015 general election, going from strong disagreement to strong agreement that voting is a duty increases the predicted probability of voting by 0.31, going from a probability of 0.68 to 0.99. This strong relationship is also seen in model 4 for the 2017 general election, with an increase of 0.23 in the predicted probability of voting, going from a probability of 0.75 to 0.98.

Both models indicate a very strong relationship between Civic Duty and Turnout, confirming my second hypothesis. But I included Interest not to just render Civic Duty insignificant, but to also compare the substantive effects of civic duty with another powerful predictor of turnout. While also a very strong predictor in both models, Interest does not have as quite as strong of a marginal effect. Going from having no interest at all to very interested increases the likelihood of voting by 0.14, going from a probability of 0.84 to a predicted probability of 0.98 in model 2 for the 2015 election. In model 4 this increase is 0.13, with the change in predicted probability of voting going from 0.84 to 0.97. In both cases the marginal
effect of *Interest* is around half of that of *Civic Duty*, indicating that *Civic Duty* is a very powerful predictor of turnout even when compared to other powerful predictors.\(^9\)

| Table 2.2: Determinants of Civic Duty and Interest for the 2015 & 2017 British General Elections |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Millennial                     | -0.04 (0.08)                   | 0.21 (0.05)**                  | 0.57 (0.09)**                  | 0.57 (0.05)**                  |
| Age                            | 0.01 (0.00)**                  | 0.03 (0.00)**                  | 0.02 (0.00)**                  | 0.03 (0.00)**                  |
| Income                         | 0.01 (0.01)**                  | 0.03 (0.00)**                  | 0.05 (0.01)**                  | 0.06 (0.00)**                  |
| Education                      | 0.03 (0.01)**                  | 0.10 (0.01)**                  | 0.23 (0.01)**                  | 0.22 (0.01)**                  |
| Female                         | 0.20 (0.04)**                  | 0.24 (0.03)**                  | -0.34 (0.04)**                 | -0.30 (0.03)**                 |
| N                              | 11772                          | 19272                          | 11799                          | 19391                          |
| Adj. R^2                       | 0.01                           | 0.02                           | 0.04                           | 0.04                           |

Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)

But the critical aspect of my theory has yet to be tested. I make the argument that changes of civic duty were a direct mechanism for the shift in Millennial turnout between 2015 and 2017, and so in a full model with *Civic Duty, Interest, and Partisanship*, we should see the influence of *Millennial* on *Turnout* diminish with the inclusion of such variables. As predicted by hypothesis 3, this is the case and is seen in model 4, with *Millennial* no longer being significant. But this does not confirm any true mediating relationship. To better understand if the inclusion of these variables truly influences the effect of *Millennial* on *Turnout* it is necessary to see the degree *Millennial* affects *Civic Duty*. If *Civic Duty* does serve as a mechanism that has caused greater turnout amongst Millennials in 2017, then the *Millennial* variable should be a

\(^9\) I also test *Civic Duty* and *Interest* as an interaction. Finding the conditional relationship to be significant. And only when both are at their highest levels do we see a predicted probability of 0.99.
significant predictor of *Civic Duty* in 2017 but not 2015 as stated in hypothesis 4. Table 2 tests this relationship and compares it to the relationship between *Millennial* and *Interest* for both the 2015 and 2017 general elections.

The models in table 2 use ordered logit because the dependent variables of *Civic Duty* and *Interest* are ordinal. While models 3 and 4 indicate that *Interest* is significantly influenced by *Millennial* in both elections, this is not the case for *Civic Duty*. In model 1 for 2015 *Millennial* is not a significant predictor of *Civic Duty*, but in model 2 for 2017 *Millennial* is a significant predictor. From this it can be inferred that being a Millennial did not have an effect on *Civic Duty* in 2015 but did in 2017. This confirms hypothesis 4 as the variation of significance of *Civic Duty* also reflects the variation in the turnout trends of Millennials between 2015 and 2017, unlike *Interest*, which is significant for both years.

To further reinforce the differing effect of *Civic Duty* in the 2017 general election it can be helpful to understand how a sense of civic duty changed within individual Millennials between 2015 and 2017. If being a Millennial had become a significant factor in generating a greater sense of duty to vote, then we should see an increase of *Civic Duty* within these individual Millennials. Because of the unique panel structure of the data I can examine such temporal trends. Table 3 shows the change in *Civic Duty* for both Millennials and non-Millennials between 2015 and 2017.

| Table 2.3: Average Civic Duty Amongst Millennials |
|-----------------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
|                 | 2015 | 2017 | Change | N     |
| Millennial      | 3.04 | 3.13 | 0.09   | 1189  |
| Not Millennial  | 3.27 | 3.36 | 0.09   | 15570 |
As expected *Civic Duty* is always less for Millennials, but what is interesting is that the change between these elections is the same for both older and younger voters at 0.09. This suggests that the discrepancy between these two groups narrowed between these two elections, an uncommon event, and one that if it were to continue would lead to less disparity between younger and older voters in terms of civic duty in the future.

To further examine changes in civic duty, table 4 directly tests the influence *Millennial* had on a change in *Civic Duty* between 2015 and 2017 and compares it with the change between 2014 and 2015\(^{10}\). The results from table 4 confirm my final hypothesis, as *Millennial* is a significant predictor of change in *Civic Duty* between 2015 and 2017 but not between 2014 and 2015. These results indicate that while being a Millennial in 2017 meant an increase in a sense

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\(^{10}\) This is only a one-year gap due to data limitations.
of duty to vote, this is not the case in the past. The unique change in the influence of being a Millennial in 2017 on Civic Duty coincides with the unique change in the influence of being a Millennial in 2017 on Turnout.

Discussion

The goal of this analysis has been to identify the important role civic duty played in the surprisingly high turnout of young voters. Being a Millennial is a significant predictor of turnout in the 2017 general election but not the 2015 general election. This result supports my first hypothesis, and the claims of the media and pundits. This significant effect vanishes in the full models with the inclusion of civic duty and campaign interest. In these full models, civic duty has the strongest substantive effect, even stronger than a very deterministic predictor like campaign interest. These results support my second and third hypotheses. And while civic duty has the strongest marginal effect on turnout in both the 2017 and 2015 general elections, it was only in the 2017 general election that being a Millennial is a predictor of civic duty; supporting my fourth hypothesis. The strong and unique influence of being a Millennial on civic duty in 2017 is further supported by the significance of the Millennial variable on a change of civic duty between the 2015 and 2017 general election but not between 2014 and 2015; confirming my final hypothesis and the fact that Millennials saw an unusually high increase in civic duty between 2015 and 2017.

But what is it about being a Millennial that had such a strong impact on civic duty? And what makes it more uniquely capable of picking up such changing dynamics as opposed to another strong predictor like campaign interest? In the next section I argue that it is a sense of
European identity that is at the heart of these turnout trends. And that such identity and the group concern it generates are uniquely captured by civic duty.

**Identity and Civic Duty**

Earlier in the chapter I stated that typical rational considerations have a difficult time accounting for the turnout of Millennials in 2017. I stated that policy, ideology, and personal concerns cannot explain the variation in the turnout of Millennials, especially as the thought of a competitive election seemed far-fetched in 2017 and the policy positioning of Millennials was just as pro-EU as in the past. It was not a change in rational self-interest that motivated these typically less participatory youths in 2017 to vote due to a heightened sense of civic duty, but rather an increased sense of identity. The shared sense of Europeanness that many Millennials felt became an increasingly salient identity due to the threat of Brexit. The anxiety from the Brexit vote did not reflect a change in the policy position of Millennials, as most were very much against Brexit before as well as after. What such anxiety and fear reflected was an increased sense of European identity. It was not changes in policy orientation or ideology that motivated Millennials to turn out and vote in 2017, but rather an increased sense of European identity and the importance of this identity politically that motivated Millennials to vote with a heightened sense of civic duty. This identity and the group concerns it generated drove an increase in civic duty amongst Millennials that resulted in the unusually high turnout of this group in 2017. In the following section I test the degree identity increases a sense of civic duty during the 2017 election, and how civic duty better captures the strength of identity as opposed to the strength of policy positioning and ideology for an individual.
Identity vs Policy: Causes of Civic Duty

Why such identity matters over policy is due to the power and influence of identity. Yes, through rationalization literature that ideology and identity are closely intertwined (Bartels 2002; Carsey and Layman 2006; Gaines et al 2007; Davies, Steele, & Markus 2008; Malka and Lelkes 2010; Huddy 2013), but we also see a growing literature that highlights the primacy of identity in terms of a stronger effect on behavior, polarization, partisanship, and emotion (Sears and Funk 1991; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Malka and Lelkes 2010; Iyengar, Sood, Lelkes 2012; Huddy 2013; Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe 2015). Identity and policy tend to rationalize each other, but when this is not the case, it is identity that has been shown to be the stronger predictor of behavior. And therefore, it is essential to better understand civic duty, as it is civic duty that uniquely captures the independent effects of identity beyond its relationship with policy and ideology. While identity often shares predictive power with considerations of policy and ideology due to rationalization, identity also has effects independent of such considerations through group dynamics that internalize social pressure as civic duty. Identity not only serves as a mechanism to rationalize policy positioning, it also generates group concerns and social pressure that I argue manifest as a sense of duty to vote.

In this section I test this argument and examine the relationship between civic duty and identity as well as the relationship between civic duty and policy. I compare these relationships with the relationships between campaign interest and identity as well as campaign interest and policy. I expect that while civic duty is strongly related to identity, the strength of the relationship between civic duty and policy should be substantially less than that of campaign interest and policy. Earlier in this chapter I provided evidence that civic duty exhibited the varying relationship with being a Millennial that could account for their increased turnout in the
2017 general election, and I associated such motivation with a growing sense of Europeanness. Although Millennials held policy concerns over Brexit, such concerns were not enough to drive them to the polls. It was the activation of a European identity caused by the anxiety of Brexit and Theresa May’s new direction for the Conservative Party that drove Millennials to the polls through a sense of civic duty. And it is this effect that identity has on civic duty that makes it such a strong predictor of behavior over policy and ideological concerns. To test this argument, I develop a few hypotheses that can help identify the degree civic duty is related to identity and group concerns as opposed to policy and self-interest concerns:

**H6**: An increase of European/Not European identity will increase civic duty but not campaign interest.

This hypothesis seeks to test the unique relationships between civic duty and group identity. I expect both European and Non-European identity to increase civic duty, as it should be the strength of identity, and not any individual identity that relates to civic duty. To test this hypothesis, I utilize a question that asks the degree the individual feels European. This ranges from 0 (Non-European) to 10 (Very European). To get at identity strength I take the distance from the neutral response of 5 (Neither), so that a neutral response is 0 while both Very European and Very Non-European are 5. I use *Identity Strength* in both a model for *Civic Duty* and of *Interest*. The comparison of these two dependent variables will offer support for my argument that civic duty is uniquely related to identity. In addition, I include a variable that captures EU policy as opposed to identity, with a question that ranges from 0 (Protect our independence) to 10 (Unite Fully), and similarly takes the distance from 5 (neither). This EU policy variable will serve as a control, and a comparative indicator, with the expectation that this
policy-oriented variable will be more related to the *Interest* variable as opposed to the *Civic Duty* variable.

**H7a:** An increase in the belief EU integration will help/hurt the economy will increase civic duty.

**H7b:** An increase in the belief that EU integration will help/hurt personal finances will not be a significant predictor of civic duty.

Hypothesis 6 taps into the relationship between identity and civic duty, while hypotheses 7a and 7b tap into the broader group-oriented nature of civic duty. It is not the identity itself that drives civic duty, but rather the group concerns that are generated from identity that drive a sense of duty to vote. These hypotheses test the degree civic duty is related to such group-oriented thinking. Although more recent arguments have identified cultural and identity-based causes of Euroscepticism (McLaren 2002, Lubbers and Sheepers 2005, Ford and Goodwin 2014, Scherer 2015), early analysis has found economic concerns as drivers of this phenomenon (Anderson and Reichart 1995, Gabel 1998). While such economic considerations are not always associated with identity, sociotropic concerns about the broader economy, as opposed to more personal pocketbook concerns, indicate group considerations (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981; Kramer 1983; Sears and Funk 1990; Lewin 1991; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001, Mansfield and Mutz 2009, Hainemuller and Hiscox 2010). That is why I expect both broad economic and personal variables to have a significant relationship with *Interest*, but only broad economic considerations to have a significant relationship with *Civic Duty*. Such results would offer evidence of the group-oriented nature of civic duty. I construct both variables using a question that asks the perceived consequences of leaving the EU on the economy at large and on personal finances. The responses to these questions range from 0 (Much worse) to 4 (Much better). I construct each
variable to capture the strength of the response (similar to the previous variables) ranging from 0 to 2.

**H8:** The more one individual places the ideology of their party farther from their own, the less interest they will have in the campaign. This will not affect civic duty.

This final hypothesis uses the ideology vs identity debate of partisanship to test the degree *Interest* is influenced by ideology and the degree *Civic Duty* is not. There has been extensive evidence that partisanship can be characterized as an identity (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Malka and Lelkes 2010; Iyengar, Sood, Lelkes 2012; Huddy 2013; Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe 2015), this has largely been in response to the argument that partisanship is a running tally that is perpetually updated (Fiorina’s 1981, Achen 1992), and more recently supported by the Abramowitz and Saunders’ (2006) argument that partisanship is best captured by ideology. While both conceptions are not mutually exclusive, I expect to see an ideological conception more associated with *Interest* than *Civic Duty*. If this is accurate then a person who believes their party is more ideologically like them should feel more interest as the perceived stakes of that party winning should be increased. Such ideological congruency should matter less if partisanship is acting more like an identity, and therefore *Civic Duty* should have less of a response to such ideological congruency with partisanship. This variable is constructed from the respondent’s placement of self and party on an ideological spectrum that ranges from 0 (Far Left) to 10 (Far Right) and is calculated using the distance between the placement of these ideological positions.
Results

One of my critical assumptions relies on the increased strength of a European identity for Millennials during the 2017 general election. Table 5 shows the change in a sense of Europeanness between the 2015 and 2017 surveys. I break these statistics down by age group, and the 2015 and 2017 columns represent the entire sample for each election year. European identity increased for all groups confirming the increased salience of such an identity, but the increases appear to be most pronounced amongst Millennials. Because of the panel data, we can see how such feelings changed within individuals, and we can see that there was nearly twice as large a shift in feeling European amongst this group compared to older voters. This stronger increase of European identity within Millennials between 2015 and 2017 supports my claim that it was a change in European identity that was so critical to a change in Millennial turnout.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.5: Level of European Identity and Support for EU Integration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Older</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it is critical to find evidence of an increase in the strength of a European identity in 2017, the purpose of this section is to also tie civic duty to such identity. The models in table 6 begin to directly test this argument. Models 1 and 2 compare the relationship between identity and policy with civic duty and campaign interest. As expected by hypothesis 6, the variable European Strength is significant in the model for Civic Duty but not for Interest. European Strength captures the strength of both European and non-European identity, where 0 is neither
and 3 represents a very strong identity. Going from the minimum to maximum values of 
*European Strength* changes the predicted probability of strongly believing voting is a duty by 
0.07, going from a probability of 0.51 to 0.58. It is important to note that *EU Policy* is also 
significant for *Civic Duty*, with a larger marginal effect of 0.13, but that this effect is smaller for 
*Civic Duty* than *Interest*, which has an increased predicted probability of 0.20 when *EU Policy* 
goes from the minimum to maximum value. These results reinforce the fact that *Civic Duty* is 
more strongly related to identity while *Interest* is more strongly related to policy, even though we 
still see *EU Policy* as a significant predictor of *Civic Duty*. If anything, this can be a 
consequence of the high correlation of identity and policy.

Table 2.6: Determinants of Civic Duty and Interest for the 2017 British General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 (Duty)</th>
<th>Model 2 (Interest)</th>
<th>Model 3 (Duty)</th>
<th>Model 4 (Interest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Policy</td>
<td>0.11 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.16 (0.02)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Str.</td>
<td>0.09 (0.04)**</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Personal</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.00 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Economy</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.27 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.48 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Workers</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.22 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.12 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.02 (0.00)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.00)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.00)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.05 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.04 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.07 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.29 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.11 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.23 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.21 (0.08)**</td>
<td>-0.21 (0.08)**</td>
<td>0.31 (0.04)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2774</td>
<td>2781</td>
<td>12295</td>
<td>12332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)
The next two models in table 6 test hypotheses 7a and 7b. As expected from these hypotheses, personal economic considerations are only significant for *Interest*. *EU Personal* captures the strength of the belief that EU integration will have a personal effect on one’s finances, negative or positive, and going from the minimum to maximum values changes the predicted probability of being very interested by 0.05, going from a probability of 0.52 to 0.57. This is not the case for *Civic Duty* which does not exhibit a significant relationship with personal economic considerations. On the other-hand broad economic considerations are significant for both *Civic Duty* and *Interest*, with a marginal effect of 0.13 for *Civic Duty* and 0.23 for *Interest*. It is interesting that *EU Economy* is stronger for *Interest* than *EU Personal* and highlights the power of sociotropic concerns, which appear to always have a higher substantive effect than personal pocketbook concerns. I included a third variable, *EU Workers*, to better get at group economic considerations beyond just sociotropic considerations. Constructing a similar variable on EU integration but asking the respondent’s view on the impact such integration has on specifically workers, gets significant results for both models. But in this case, there is a much stronger marginal effect for *Civic Duty*, with a 0.11 change in predicted probability, as opposed to a 0.05 increase for *Interest*. From these two models it is evident that *Civic Duty* is only related to sociotropic and group economic considerations, and that the more these considerations are oriented around clearly defined groups, such as workers, the stronger the effect; as opposed to *Interest*, which is sensitive to all economic considerations whether personal or sociotropic.

My final table for this chapter includes models that test my last hypothesis. These models try to test the significance of a perceived distance between an individual's personal ideology and their party’s ideology. To capture this, I stratified each sample based off party affiliation. Models 1 and 2 test the significance of the degree the personal ideology of a
Conservative differs from their perceived ideology of the Conservative Party, with the assumption that the greater the distance the less perceived congruency of ideology. As expected, this relationship is only significant for Interest, and these results are replicated in models 3 and 4 but for individuals that identify as Labour. These results confirm my argument that Civic Duty is not influenced by policy or ideological concerns, but rather group concerns. Even when ideology between individual and party is not congruent, such non-identity considerations have minimal effect. On the other-hand a sense of campaign interest is diminished when an individual sees their party ideologically distant from themselves. Similar to the EU Worker variable, I include another variable that can further test my last hypothesis. This one takes the form of perceived policy distance between the Conservative and Labour parties, with the assumption that a greater perceived distance should increase the stakes of the election like ideological...
congruency of individual and party. This variable is significant in all models but has a stronger effect on Interest in all cases. For Conservatives the marginal effect of going from perceiving no ideological difference between oneself and the party to perceiving a large difference increases the predicted probably of feeling very interested by 0.36, and this is even greater for an individual that is Labour at 0.42. These marginal effects are much smaller for Civic Duty, with a 0.17 increase in likelihood for individuals identifying as Conservative and a 0.21 increase in likelihood for individuals that identify as Labour.

**Discussion**

The results in this section confirmed my assumption that an increased sense of European identity took hold within Millennials and the voting population at large. The media and pundits were right to identify the anxiety and fear amongst these young people, and such anxiety was accompanied by an increased sense of being European. But more importantly to my theory, civic duty was far more strongly associated with identity rather than policy and ideology.

While both European identity and EU policy were significant for civic duty, campaign interest was more strongly related to EU policy while not having any relationship with identity. These relationships highlight that civic duty will almost always be related to policy due to the high correlations of all these factors, but that it is identity that civic duty is most strongly related to, confirming my first hypothesis. In addition, this relationship with identity may exist with civic duty, but does not exist with other highly deterministic predictors of turnout such as campaign interest. We see further evidence of this group-oriented nature of civic duty with the economic predictors.
While economic predictors can often drive self-interest, we know that there is a distinction in the power of sociotropic versus pocketbook considerations. Sociotropic considerations have far more power, and we see this in the stronger relationship of such sociotropic economic concerns with campaign interest. While the broader economic considerations were stronger for campaign interest, personal considerations were still significant. This was not the case for civic duty, which was only related to the broader economic considerations, reinforcing the group orientation of civic duty, and confirming hypotheses 2a and 2b. This group-oriented nature of civic duty was further reinforced by the stronger relationship civic duty had with a more identity driven consideration of worker welfare.

The final models in the results section offered further evidence of the stronger relationship civic duty has with identity as opposed to policy, by confirming that ideological considerations do not drive civic duty. In the models we see ideological distance between individual and party diminishing the level of interest of an individual, but such ideological distance between individual and party had no effect on civic duty.

These results highlight the stronger relationship civic duty has with identity and group-oriented thinking more broadly, as opposed to campaign interest which exhibited a stronger relationship with policy and ideology. This distinction is important and makes sense when we see these two highly deterministic predictors of turnout maintaining independent effects even when placed in a turnout model together. While these two predictors tend to wash out the effects of most other predictors of turnout, the maintained significance of each indicates they must influence turnout independently. And this section has identified that these independent effects exist due to civic duty better capturing identity and campaign interest better capturing policy.
Conclusion

The results from this chapter support my theoretical claim that civic duty was a critical factor in the turnout of Millennials, and that such civic duty is strongly related to identity and group concerns. Millennials experienced an increase in civic duty between 2015 and 2017, atypical for such a young demographic group. This increase in civic duty was accompanied by a substantial increase in a sense of European identity compared to other age groups. These trends and the strength of the relationship between civic duty and identity, in addition to the results that support the unique ability of civic duty to capture the variation of Millennial turnout between 2015 and 2017, together offer strong support for my argument and explanation that the increased saliency of a European identity drove Millennials to the polls through a sense of civic duty in the 2017 general election.

The effect of Brexit increased the saliency of a European identity, with many voters feeling more European due to these events, especially young Millennials. Because civic duty is strongly related to such identity, the effect of such increasing Europeanness increased a sense of civic duty amongst Millennials. It is this unique capacity of civic duty to capture the effects of identity beyond policy concerns that makes the concept such a powerful predictor of turnout.

But so far, I have just tested the relationship between civic duty and European identity, and not the causal process of how such factors can account for increased turnout. My theory makes some critical assumptions that go untested in this chapter. I theoretically connect being a Millennial with higher turnout in 2017 by arguing that it was the growing concerns generated from an increasingly salient European identity that increased civic duty amongst Millennials. More specifically, such group concerns generate a sense of obligation in the form of civic duty that in turn generates expectations of guilt if one were to not vote. But although I make this
argument and show how these pieces are related to each other statistically, I do not confirm the
degree such group concerns and guilt channel through civic duty. In the next chapter I test this
complex relationship and show how civic duty is a critical mechanism for turnout due to its
ability to capture group concerns and channel them into a sense of guilt that motivates a person
to go out and vote.
Chapter 3

Obligation and Guilt: How Group Concerns Mobilize Voters by Generating Guilt

One of the most consistent characterizations of civic duty emphasizes the emotional nature of this concept. It is argued that civic duty can motivate an individual to turn out and vote through intrinsic emotional motivations such as a taste for voting that generates satisfaction (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), a sense of obligation that generates guilt (Blais 2000, Blais and Achen 2010, Goldfarb and Sigelman 2010, Bowler and Donovan 2012, Blais and Galais 2016), or a fear of social reprisal and shame (Knack 1992, Gerber et al 2008). All these conceptions of civic duty make an argument that the mechanism that drives the relationship between civic duty and turnout is emotional in nature. For Riker and Ordeshook (1968) the act of voting generates a sense of satisfaction captured by a sense of civic duty; for Blais (2000) it is the act of abstaining from voting that generates feelings of guilt and shame the more an individual believes it is their duty to vote. This emotional conception of civic duty focuses on affective attitudes such as guilt and satisfaction, and I argue this is what makes civic duty such a powerful predictor of turnout. But what is it satisfaction or guilt? Traditionally a rational model has viewed civic duty as a mechanism that generates intrinsic utility from voting. The satisfaction from expressing one’s political opinion, showing allegiance to the system, supporting one’s party all generate internal benefits that overcome the cost of voting. But more recent conceptions view civic duty, as I do, as a mechanism of obligation that generates guilt. In this chapter I test these arguments and find that the latter is more accurate.

But it is also essential to understand that this guilt is fundamentally shaped by the obligation that an individual internalizes as a sense of duty. Without a sense of obligation there
would be no expectation of guilt. That is why the group dynamics involved with civic duty are so essential to understand as well. Classic political theory has emphasized the need for the individual to put country and government above self, such civic virtue required a sensitivity to group concerns. More recent conceptions associate civic duty with social pressure and emphasize that civic duty is an internal manifestation of pressure from group considerations (Knack 1992, Green and Gerber 2015, Panagopoulos 2010). And so, when a given identity is politically salient to the point where the act of voting can be seen to offer benefits to the group, then civic duty will manifest these group concerns as a sense of duty and obligation.

To understand the role civic duty plays in motivating an individual to turnout requires an understanding of both the emotional and group dynamics that are associated with it. If civic duty captures group concerns that generate guilt when an individual does not fulfill their duty, then we should see civic duty be strongly associated with a feeling of guilt as well as variables that can capture group-oriented concerns. The previous chapter tested the three key components of my theory: group identity, civic duty, and turnout. But I only made assumptions about what connects these components of my model. More specifically, I only made assumptions based off the literature on civic duty that identifies group concerns and interests as well as guilt as the mechanisms that bridge these components.

In this chapter I test these assumptions. The first half of this chapter tests the relationship between civic duty and guilt. This is done by comparing unique questions that tap into feelings of guilt and satisfaction from the act of voting. These unique questions are taken from the British Election Study Surveys for the 2001, 2005, and 2010 general election. With these unique questions I test the relationship civic duty has with both guilt and satisfaction, finding that civic duty is more strongly associated with guilt, while other predictors of turnout like campaign
interest and partisanship are more evenly related to both emotions. These results in addition to the previous chapter further provide evidence that the inclusion of civic duty in the traditional rational model as a taste for voting does not capture all the effects of civic duty, and more specifically the stronger effect of guilt. Civic duty does not just generate a warm feeling of satisfaction from fulfilling civic obligations, but also generates feelings of guilt from failure of such obligations. What drives the degree of such guilt are the group concerns and interests generated by salient identities. The second half of this chapter tests the relationship between civic duty and group concerns. I compare the difference in the relationship between civic duty and group benefits with the relationship between civic duty and personal benefits. Using two other unique questions that tap into expected group vs personal benefits from the act of voting in the British Election Study Surveys for the 2001, 2005, and 2010 general elections, I find that civic duty is substantially more related to group rather than personal concerns. I also find that this relationship between civic duty and group concerns is more strongly associated with generating a sense of guilt, while this is not the case with personal concerns which are more associated with satisfaction.

**Duty, Satisfaction, and Guilt**

The relationship between civic duty and turnout is fundamentally associated with psychological mechanisms. The earliest conceptions of civic duty, from Aristotle to Rousseau tie it with a strong love of country and constitution. Such love manifests itself in a sense of civic virtue that drives a citizen to put the good of the country above their own needs. The introduction of civic duty into the rational model was motivated by the need to capture the psychological benefits of voting. The act of voting is expected to generate a sense of satisfaction that must be
accounted for in the calculus of voting beyond the perceived benefits of one candidate or party winning over another (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). More recent analysis of civic duty ties negative feelings of guilt and obligation to the relationship (Blais 2000, Blais and Achen 2010, Goldfarb and Sigelman 2010, Bowler and Donovan 2012, Blais and Galais 2016), and the experimental studies examining social pressure and turnout identify that appealing to a sense of duty can shame individuals into voting (Knack 1992, Gerber et al 2008, Panagopoulos 2010). Emotional mechanisms are consistently evoked when describing the relationship between civic duty and turnout, yet most arguments simply make the theoretical assumption rather than empirically test this connection between civic duty and affective attitudes like satisfaction and guilt.

*Satisfaction*

The initial conception of civic duty heavily relied on the satisfaction an individual citizen feels when taking action. In Plato’s *Republic* the ideal citizen is filled with such a love for their country and fellow citizens that their ultimate purpose and fulfillment from life is the betterment of the country and its people. In Aristotle’s *Politics* society and education mold the citizen to value the fundamental philosophy and goals of the State’s constitution, so much so that one’s civic actions are reflective of one’s own interests and goals. In *the Social Contract* Rousseau adds to this by arguing that civic actions further increase this love and appreciation of the constitution. What all these classic pieces have in common is that a sense of duty is created and reinforced by a love of country and constitution and that acting as a “proper” citizen would be an expression of that love. Civic engagement that can increase the stature and ideals of one’s country should be expected to generate a sense of satisfaction, because that is what an individual
with a high sense of civic virtue cares most about. This conception of civic virtue runs throughout more recent works like Almond and Verba’s (1963) *The Civic Culture* and Putnam’s (1994) *Making Democracy Work*, which tie civic virtue to a sense of civicness that makes an individual yearn to fulfill their civic duty. But a direct emotional connection of civic duty to a sense of satisfaction was only first explicitly discussed and tied to turnout by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). Riker and Ordeshook (1968) continue this conceptualization of civic duty as generating a sense of satisfaction with the initial inclusion of the D term in Down’s (1957) classic rational model.

Riker and Ordeshook (1968) contend that the negative effects on turnout from the cost of voting can be counteracted by positive feelings generated from the act of voting. For Riker and Ordeshook (1968) voting does not just incur costs but also provides psychic benefits that take the form of feelings of satisfaction. These feelings of satisfaction from voting are generated from many sources that include compliance with democratic traditions, affirming allegiance to the political system, affirming partisan preference, going to the polls, and affirming efficacy. These sources of satisfaction for Riker and Ordeshook (1968) should be expected to generate a sense of satisfaction that can generate benefits beyond what is expected from policy outcomes. These benefits exist regardless of whether the candidate or party the individual supports wins; thereby counteracting the negative impact of the cost of voting and making the act of voting rational even when the likelihood of being a decisive vote is infinitesimal. But such conceptions of civic duty conceive of it as an innate attribute, with more civic duty generating more satisfaction. As discussed in previous chapters, such ways of thinking of civic duty create a conceptually stretched variable that accounts for a lot but explains little. The more modern conception of obligation and guilt can help rectify this.
Guilt

Although the addition of the D term by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) is commonly accepted, it is not without critique. A term that includes sentiments about democracy, partisanship, and efficacy seems to take a kitchen sink approach that offers little theoretical leverage outside of trying to resolve the paradox of voting. Grofman (1993) identifies this D term as some magical element that acts like a deus ex machina so safe the rational model. Bendor et al (2003) argue that the D term is theoretically shallow, while Goldfarb and Sigelman (2010) view this “theoretically shallow term” as acting more like an error term to capture all the unexplained variance from a rational model.

Blais (2000) acknowledged these problems and sought to reconceive civic duty. Blais (200) argues that civic duty is not “a taste for voting” that generates a sense satisfaction, but rather a feeling of obligation that generates a sense of guilt. Blais and Galais (2016) even find that a sense of guilt is a critical component of duty through a factor analysis of responses to questions regarding whether voting is a duty and whether an individual feels guilt when not voting. This sense of guilt is essential to account for the power of civic duty as a predictor of turnout. As it is this emotion that motivates actions and does so in a stronger way than a more positive emotion like satisfaction; this is similar to the degree the literature has found how negative emotions such as anxiety, anger, and fear drive behavior more so than positive emotions like enthusiasm, hope, and pride (Marcus and MacKuen 1993, Miller 2011).

Civic Duty and Guilt

If Blais’s (2000) conception is more accurate, and my theory is right to rest on the assumption that civic duty generates a sense of guilt, then it is necessary to test the strength of
this relationship. Like in the previous chapter, just identifying a significant relationship may not be enough. Civic duty can be associated with several emotions, but I argue that it is guilt to which it is most strongly related. Therefore, comparing the relationship between civic duty and guilt with civic duty and satisfaction can be helpful. Satisfaction comes as a counter hypothesis taken from the older Riker and Ordeshook (1968) conception of civic duty. The Riker and Ordeshook (1968) conception applies to a rational model of voting in which civic duty offers psychic benefits that increase the utility of voting. If satisfaction were to be more strongly associated with civic duty, then a rational model would be more appropriate; but if it is guilt that has the stronger relationship with civic duty, then the past traditional placement of civic duty in a rational model should be reconceived. Therefore, my assumptions lead to one critical hypothesis:

**H1**: The substantive effect of civic duty on guilt is greater than the substantive effect of civic duty on satisfaction.

My theory anticipates that civic duty has a stronger relationship with guilt over satisfaction. But my theory does not preclude a relationship between civic duty and satisfaction. To evaluate the strength of civic duty’s effect on guilt and satisfaction, it can be helpful to include a variable to compare with civic duty. In addition to civic duty I include another predictor from the previous chapter, campaign interest. Theoretically I expect a feeling of interest to be more loaded with personal concerns and be more associated with a traditional rational model. Therefore, I expect campaign interest to generate far stronger emotions of satisfaction than civic duty, generating a second hypothesis:
**H2**: The substantive effect of campaign interest on guilt is equal to or less than the substantive effect of campaign interest on satisfaction.

Finding evidence that supports these two hypotheses would be a critical test for my theory and the strong assumptions I make. To test these hypotheses, I utilize different survey data from the previous chapter. The surveys I use are also from the British Election Study, but rather than panel data, these are cross-sectional surveys for the 2001, 2005, and 2010 general elections. While I do not have the advantage of comparing change within individuals, they do offer three separate cases and elections to better confirm the robustness and consistency of the results. These three surveys are exceptionally useful for this analysis due to several unique questions that accommodate the construction of variables that capture a sense of guilt, satisfaction, and group concerns. All three surveys ask individuals to respond to the statements:

- I would feel very guilty if I didn't vote in a general election.
- I feel a sense of satisfaction when I vote.

These two statements directly relate to guilt and satisfaction and can help inform the degree civic duty is related to a sense of guilt from not voting rather than a sense of satisfaction from voting. Identifying the emotional mechanism that drives civic duty can help verify the key assumptions of my theory. If civic duty does act as a form of obligation from group concerns, then guilt must be a consequence of such a relationship. By verifying that such an assumption is correct, I offer further support for my theoretical argument.

**Results**

The purpose of this chapter’s first empirical section is to identify the degree *Civic Duty* is related to *Guilt* as opposed to *Satisfaction* as stated in the first hypothesis. Table 1 includes six
models, two for each survey year. Models 1, 3, and 4 are ordered logit models for *Guilt*; Models 2, 4, and 6 are ordered logit models for *Satisfaction*. In each of these models *Interest* is also included to test my second hypothesis and serves as a comparison to the influence of *Civic Duty*.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>0.84 (0.05)**</td>
<td>0.36 (0.05)**</td>
<td>1.00 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.53 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.89 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.37 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.26 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.33 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.31 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.46 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.44 (0.05)**</td>
<td>0.26 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
<td>0.29 (0.05)**</td>
<td>0.49 (0.05)**</td>
<td>0.30 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.36 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.17 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.40 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.92 (0.05)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>1.03 (0.06)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>1.08 (0.05)**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.78 (0.04)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.87 (0.06)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.93 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>2917</td>
<td>2045</td>
<td>2045</td>
<td>2951</td>
<td>2951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Both *Civic Duty* and *Interest* are significant in all models regardless of whether the dependent variable is *Guilt* or *Satisfaction*. And these results are replicated for each election year. Although both are always significant, *Civic Duty* has a higher coefficient for all models. This indicates that *Civic Duty* has a stronger relationship with both emotions, as *Civic Duty* is ranged 0 to 4 as opposed to *Interest* with a range of 0 to 3. But although *Civic Duty* has a more substantial effect in all models, what is also interesting is that this effect is much larger regarding *Guilt*. The coefficient for *Civic Duty* appears to decrease by half in the *Satisfaction* models as opposed to the *Guilt* models, offering support for my first hypothesis. This is not the case for *Interest*, where in 2001 and 2005 the coefficient for *Interest* is higher in the *Satisfaction* models, offering support for my second hypothesis. These results indicate that Civic Duty may have a
stronger connection to the emotions of Guilt and Satisfaction, but that Civic Duty is more related to Guilt while Interest is more related to Satisfaction respectively.

Figure 1 digs deeper into these substantive effects, by displaying the predicted probability of strongly agreeing that not voting would generate feelings of guilt when Civic Duty and Interest are at their minimum and at their maximum values. As was inferred from Table 1, Civic Duty has substantially higher marginal effects on Guilt than Interest. Going from the minimum value of Civic Duty to the maximum value increases the predicted probability of strongly agreeing by a minimum of 0.26, as seen in 2001 and 2005, to a maximum of 0.29, as seen in 2010. Regarding Interest these effects are much more modest, ranging from 0.08 to 0.14.

Figure 2 below is a similar figure but for Satisfaction rather than Guilt. In figure 2 it is evident that the disparity between marginal effects is minimized. Unlike with Guilt, the range of the marginal effect of Civic Duty on Satisfaction is wider and the effects substantially smaller, with a
range of 0.01 to 0.11. This higher variation between election years and lower effect size for *Satisfaction* indicates that *Civic Duty* is far more associated with *Guilt* than *Satisfaction*. For

**Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of Satisfaction = Strongly Agree**

![Bar chart showing predicted probabilities for Civic Duty and Interest across 2001, 2005, and 2010 general elections.](image)

*Interest*, the variation of the marginal effects is quite lower regarding *Satisfaction*, with a range of 0.07 to 0.08. These figures establish that *Civic Duty* has a much stronger effect on *Guilt* than *Satisfaction*, and these effects exhibit less variation across surveys. This is not the case for *Interest*, with the marginal effects of *Satisfaction* exhibiting substantially less variation than with *Guilt*.

**Discussion**

The results above support both hypotheses. Civic duty has a substantially stronger and less varied impact on guilt as opposed to satisfaction. In fact, the effect is at minimum twice as strong and three times less varied across these three surveys for the 2001, 2005, and 2010 general elections. These results confirm my first hypothesis. My second hypothesis uses campaign
interest as a comparison. The choice of campaign interest was due to the highly deterministic relationship it has with turnout, but as seen with the results in the previous chapter civic duty captures a significant portion of interest’s unexplained variance. The significance of civic duty even when campaign interest is included in a model for turnout would suggest that while both civic duty and campaign interest may share mechanisms that influence turnout they also have mechanisms that do not overlap. And while both are strong predictors of turnout, they exhibited differing relationships with guilt and satisfaction. As expected by my second hypothesis, civic duty had a much stronger relationship with guilt, while campaign interest could be viewed as more strongly associated with satisfaction, as the effects of campaign interest were less varied between surveys for satisfaction.

More broadly, the results of this section provide support for the conception of civic duty as a sense of obligation that generates guilt. But what generates this sense of obligation? In the next section I test my theoretical argument further, by tying the relationship civic duty has with guilt to group concerns. It is this guilt-oriented nature of civic duty that makes it such an effective mechanism to capture group concerns, and it is the strength of these group concerns that influences these feelings of guilt.

Civic Duty, Guilt, and Group Identity

In the previous section of this chapter I test the degree civic duty is related to guilt, finding that civic duty is a far better predictor of guilt than satisfaction. Guilt is an attitude strongly associated with group concerns. Tagney et al (2007) identify that when individuals describe guilt experiences they are often evoking a concern for others. It is this group centric nature of guilt that makes it so related to civic duty. Feelings of guilt are generated from a sense
of obligation that manifests from group concerns. I argue that such feelings of obligation are an internalization of powerful group pressures such as public shaming (Knack 1992, Gerber et al 2008) and pressure from group networks (Zuckerman 2005; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Nickerson 2008; Abrams et al 2010). This pressure motivates individuals to vote not from expected gains and a sense of satisfaction, but to avoid social stigmatism and a feeling of guilt. This manifestation of obligation in essence is civic duty, and if I am correct then civic duty must be strongly associated with group concerns.

Group concerns have extensively been examined in voting behavior. This is most evident in the literature that distinguishes between sociotropic and pocketbook thinking. Sociotropic concerns have been shown to be more directly associated with political perceptions and political motivations than self-interested pocketbook concerns (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981; Kramer 1983; Sears and Funk 1990; Lewin 1991; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001, Mansfield and Mutz 2009, Hainemuller and Hiscox 2010). This literature traditionally has argued that the reason for such sociotropic concerns mattering more than pocketbook concerns is due to the broad factors that influence individual well-being beyond politics (Kramer 1983, Kiewiet and Lewis–Beck 2011). Individuals may attribute several factors toward their individual well-being, well beyond the capacity of government and politics, while the well-being of society can be more attributable to government and political outcomes. But such results from my analysis can offer an additional mechanism for the stronger influence of sociotropic concerns beyond a statistical anomaly.

Similar to the altruistic approach by Lewin (1991), and later experimentally tested by Fowler and Kam (2007); I argue sociotropic concerns are group concerns, but rather than attributing the strong influence of sociotropic concerns to an individual characteristic similar to altruism, I attach it to group pressure. This is not a new argument. Uhlaner (1989) argues that
group loyalty can generate a perception of group benefits, thereby overcoming the paradox of voting. Uhlaner even states that civic duty is evoked to mobilize in this context:

“For example, leaders can use the group's communications resources to mobilize members to vote by enhancing their sense of citizen duty by an appeal to group loyalty. Loyalty within a group translates into power outside it.”

Alone an individual’s vote does not matter, but group loyalty and the potential for group benefits, can overcome this free-rider problem through collective action. For Uhlaner (1989), viewing electoral benefits regarding the group rather than individual makes the act more rational. This dynamic was later tested experimentally in Schram and Sonnemans (1996), where group identity increases participation, and later by Fowler and Kam (2007) who test group concerns as well as identity, finding support for both.

While it is evident that there is a robust literature on the power that group concerns have on voting behavior; there is less that also adds emotion into the mix. The work by Huddy offers some of the only literature to also attach emotions to the relationship between group concerns and voting behavior. Feldman, Huddy, and Cassese (2012) and Huddy (2013) make a similar emotion-based argument for the relationship of group identity and participation as I do, but rather than a sense of guilt from an obligation to the group they identify the role of anger and enthusiasm as a motivator to volunteer, protest, and donate. Huddy et al (2013) identify how anger and enthusiasm motivate political participation such as protests and campaign volunteering. But even with this extensive work, none have proposed a theoretical model that can integrate group concerns, emotions, and turnout as I do. In addition, integrating group concerns into such a broader model suggests that such group concerns do not simply motivate due to an overcoming of collective action and free rider problems, as described by Uhlaner (1989), but also due to the unique ability of group concerns to generate emotions of guilt through a sense of duty.
In the next section I utilize the 2001, 2005, and 2010 British Parliamentary Election surveys to test the degree civic duty is related to group concerns, and how these group dynamics relate to a sense of guilt. This is possible due to two unique questions:

- Being active in politics is a good way to get benefits for groups that people care about like pensioners or the disabled.
- Being active in politics is a good way to get benefits for me and my family

These two questions allow me to test the influence of groups concerns on civic duty and guilt and compare it with personal concerns. These broad questions offer an advantage over more specific questions that focus on specific policy. As these are catch-all questions for group and personal concerns, they are less sensitive to the saliency of a specific issue or identity. Where it might be necessary to generate a battery of concerns, as economic concerns may be more salient to one respondent and social concerns to another; these questions are broad enough as to capture all concerns but are specific enough to distinguish between group and personal concerns. From the responses to these questions I can generate a few hypotheses:

H3: The substantive effect of group concerns on guilt decreases when civic duty is introduced into the model.

This hypothesis seeks to identify the sensitivity of group concerns to the inclusion of civic duty. If civic duty truly captures group concerns, then the inclusion of civic duty in a model for guilt should decrease the influence of the group variable in the model.

H4: The substantive effect of group concerns on satisfaction will exhibit no change when civic duty is introduced into the model.
Hypothesis 4 seeks to compare the sensitivity of group concerns regarding guilt, with the sensitivity of group concerns regarding satisfaction. I argue that civic duty uniquely captures group concerns due to the guilt civic duty generates. Therefore, the inclusion of civic duty in a model for satisfaction should have little to no effect on the influence of group concerns in the model. If this is true, then it becomes more evident that the relationship between group concerns and civic duty is driven by guilt.

H5: The substantive effect of personal concerns on guilt and satisfaction will exhibit no change when civic duty is introduced into the model.

This final hypothesis seeks to test the influence of civic duty on personal concerns and compare it with group concerns. My theory fundamentally relies on the argument that civic duty captures group concerns as opposed to personal concerns. Therefore, it is necessary to see how civic duty would affect the relationship between personal concerns and the emotions of guilt and satisfaction. If the inclusion of civic duty has similar effects on the relationship between personal concerns and guilt (satisfaction) as it does for group concerns and guilt (satisfaction) then my assumption and my theoretical argument would be incorrect.

Results

My theory relies on civic duty generating a sense of guilt through group concerns. Table 2 below shows the correlations of the variable Civic Duty with both the Group variable and Personal variable, as well as the correlations of Guilt with both the Group variable and Personal variable. The correlation for both Civic Duty and Guilt is higher with Group than with Personal, as expected. But there is more nuance to my argument than just correlation. Yes, Civic Duty
and Guilt are more related to group concerns than personal concerns, but how do all these factors interact? Table 3 shows the effect Civic Duty has on the relationship between Group and Guilt.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
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</table>

The purpose of table 3 below is to compare the change in the influence of Group and Personal on Guilt when Civic Duty is included and excluded in the model. While changes in the coefficients may suggest a mediating relationship, my goal with this table is not as ambitious. I merely am comparing how Group and Personal respond to the inclusion of Civic Duty, with the expectation that there are changes in the Group variable and not the Personal variable. As predicted, the Group variable shows much more variation in the coefficient as Civic Duty is included and excluded in the models for all the survey years. While the coefficient for Group nearly doubles in all models when Civic Duty is excluded, only in model 2 does the Personal variable increase. This would suggest that Civic Duty can account for a significant portion of the Group variable’s influence on emotion, while Civic Duty cannot account for such influence regarding the Personal variable.
Figure 3 shows the substantive effects of the *Group* variable on strongly agreeing with the statement that an individual will feel guilt from not voting. The figure is broken down by survey year as well as whether *Civic Duty* is included in the model. The marginal effect of going from the minimum to the maximum value of *Group* ranges from a 0.03 increase in the predicted probability to a 0.7 increase in the predicted probability amongst these three survey years when *Civic Duty* is included in the model. The effect of *Group* on *Guilt* nearly doubles, and in some cases triples, when *Civic Duty* is excluded from the models; with the marginal effects ranging from 0.09 to 0.11. From these results it is evident that the presence of *Civic Duty* in the model does diminish the influence of *Group* on *Guilt*, as predicted by hypothesis 3. So far, my analysis has confirmed hypothesis 3, but I still need to compare these effects with the models for *Satisfaction*. While the inclusion of *Civic Duty* in the *Guilt* models substantially reduces the effect of *Group*, I expect this change in influence to not be as pronounced in the *Satisfaction* models.

### Table 3.3: Determinants of Guilt for British General Elections

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>1.04 (0.04)**</td>
<td>1.30 (0.04)**</td>
<td>1.22 (0.04)**</td>
<td>1.61 (0.04)**</td>
<td>1.22 (0.05)**</td>
<td>1.51 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>0.90 (0.05)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>1.07 (0.04)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.95 (0.05)**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.12 (0.07)*</td>
<td>0.18 (0.07)**</td>
<td>0.17 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.31 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.19 (0.07)**</td>
<td>0.32 (0.07)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
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<td>0.21 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.07 (0.04)*</td>
<td>0.20 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.13 (0.05)**</td>
<td>0.22 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>0.02 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>2787</td>
<td>4032</td>
<td>4033</td>
<td>2854</td>
<td>2856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)
Table 4 includes the ordered logit models for Satisfaction. Interestingly Group has a stronger influence on Satisfaction than on Guilt in all models with Civic Duty included. Even though Group is more correlated with Guilt it is evident that group concerns can also instill a sense of satisfaction. But more pertinent to my theory is that when Civic Duty is excluded the influence only modestly increases; nowhere near the doubling or tripling of the coefficients as seen with the Guilt models. This confirms hypothesis 4. What is also interesting from this table is the fact that there is absolutely no change in the coefficients for Personal when Civic Duty is included. This outcome in addition to minimal changes for Personal in the Guilt models provides evidence to support hypothesis 5 and indicates that Civic Duty has little impact on the emotional effects of personal concerns.
The substantive effects shown in figure 4 further reinforce the diminishing influence of Civic Duty has in Satisfaction models as opposed to models of Guilt. With Civic Duty in the models for Satisfaction the marginal effect of the Group variable on Satisfaction ranges from a 0.06 increase in predicted probability to a 0.08 increase in predicted probability. When Civic Duty is excluded in a model for Satisfaction the marginal effect of the Group variable only

### Table 3.4: Determinants of Satisfaction for British General Elections

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>0.91 (0.04)**</td>
<td>1.07 (0.04)**</td>
<td>1.03 (0.04)**</td>
<td>1.29 (0.03)**</td>
<td>1.05 (0.04)**</td>
<td>1.21 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>0.44 (0.05)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.59 (0.04)**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.40 (0.05)**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
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<td>0.02 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.07)*</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Group</td>
<td>0.16 (0.05)**</td>
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<td>0.36 (0.04)**</td>
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<td>0.26 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
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<td>0.21 (0.04)**</td>
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<td>0.16 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.18 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.18 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2786</td>
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<td>4032</td>
<td>4033</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Figure 3.4: Min/Max Marginal Effect of Group on Satisfaction
slightly increases for all survey years, with a range of 0.08 to 0.09. The changes in the marginal effects when *Civic Duty* is excluded in the models for *Satisfaction* is substantially more modest than the changes in the marginal effects for the *Guilt* models. This helps to confirm hypothesis 4, but it is important to note there are modest changes indicating that there is some role, although modest, for satisfaction in the relationship between civic duty and group concerns.

Discussion

A sense of duty must come from a sense of obligation to others, and guilt is a social construct. Thus, it comes as no surprise that both are more highly correlated with group concerns than personal concerns. But these results add more to this, and find that the introduction of civic duty into a model of guilt diminishes the effect of group concerns on guilt by over half in all models while also decreasing variation between models by half, supporting hypothesis 3 and 4. This was not the case for personal concerns, which exhibited minimal changes in effect on guilt when civic duty is introduced (even increasing in one model), and almost no changes in a model for satisfaction. From these results it is evident that civic duty has an influence on the relationship between group concerns and guilt, while having almost no effect on the relationship between personal concerns and guilt, as expected by my final hypothesis.

Conclusion

The role of these past two chapters was to test my theoretical model and offer evidence that civic duty is best utilized in a model of identity. The second chapter tested the relationship between group identity, civic duty, and turnout. It did so in the context of the 2017 general election and used my theoretical model to address a very unprecedented outcome, high youth
turnout. High turnout of young people is rare and civic duty uniquely captured this variation of Millennial turnout between the 2015 and 2017 general elections, as well as also capturing a broader sense of Europeanness. This chapter tested the mechanisms of group concerns and guilt that connect these broader factors, acting somewhat as the glue between group identity, civic duty, and turnout. Group concerns and guilt are intrinsically associated with civic duty, and they are what make civic duty such a powerful predictor of turnout. It is this relationship with group concerns and guilt that make civic duty more appropriate in a model of identity as opposed to a rational model. The connection between civic duty and voting is not merely a sense of satisfaction from fulfilling a sense of civicness, nor is it simply an action to gain satisfaction from expression. Civic duty is connected to turnout primarily due to a sense of guilt and fear of not fulfilling one’s obligation. Salient identities generate group concerns that create the sense of obligation that is civic duty. But in many ways, it can be argued that civic duty is superfluous in this model. Why not just connect group identity and guilt together, or group concerns and guilt? Or even just identity and turnout? Yes, these would make the model more parsimonious, but it also fails to address the insights that can be gained through the concept of civic duty.

The advantage of civic duty is that it offers a conceptual mechanism for turnout. If we try to connect identity with guilt or turnout, we would have to make the theoretical argument that a sense of duty exists in order to offer a mechanism for the generation of such feelings and behavior. And with such a conceptual mechanism other expectations can be generated. If civic duty serves as a mechanism of obligation due to salient group identity, then such obligation must be a consequence of multiple identities. In the next chapter I show how civic duty is a consequence of group concerns from multiple identities, not just one. But that it is not merely an aggregation of these identities. Civic duty being a feeling of obligation entails that the action of
the individual is expected to benefit the group that individual identifies with. If the action is expected to hurt the group, then such action would not impose such a sense of obligation. And being a consequence of multiple identities, civic duty can offer up a few theoretical expectations, such as conflicting identities can diminish a sense of obligation while complementary identities can be expected to enhance this obligation. Understanding these dynamics are essential to understanding turnout, as these complementing and conflicting identities can account for consistently salient identities like partisanship to have varying effects from election to election. This is most evident in the case of the 2017 general election; where the increased salience of a European identity complemented the typical Labour partisan identity of Millennials but alienated European feeling Tories after Theresa May decided to make the Conservative Party the party of Brexit. Understanding the role of civic duty offers unique theoretical leverage to tease out the effect of these complementary and conflicting identities on turnout.
Chapter 4

Salient and Competing Identities:
How Complementing Identities Drove Nationalistic Voters to the Polls in 2015 and Millennials in 2017

The previous two chapters have shown how civic duty uniquely captures group concerns that are generated from identity and manifests them as a sense of obligation to vote. Through several models, I have tested the degree group concerns generate civic duty and in turn how such duty generates guilt, but why is civic duty necessary in the model? What does including civic duty into a model for turnout add that would not be captured by a more direct model of group identity and turnout? I argue that civic duty is essential because it gives us a theoretical mechanism to account for the politically salient identities of individuals for any given election. Everyone has multiple identities, and at times some are more politically salient than others. Civic duty can offer theoretical leverage to account for these dynamics and how they can account for unusual variation in turnout.

As we saw in the 2017 British general election, turnout and electoral outcomes can be a result of unexpected identities being politically activated, and it was civic duty that uniquely captured this variation in a salient European identity among young people. Traditionally youths do not vote. The turnout of young people is typically far less than older voters. In addition, the turnout of older nationalistic voters had been a substantial reason for the success of the Conservative Party in the 2015 general election. Such expectations were a key reason for Prime Minister May’s early confidence, as older voters who have disproportionately higher turnout, were also disproportionately in favor of Brexit. But unexpectedly youth turnout surged in 2017. Nationalistic sentiment and identity dominated the 2015 general election and the Brexit vote, but this did not continue in the 2017 general election. Rather than a fervor of nationalism driving
older working-class voters to the polls, an increased sense of Europeanness instilled a feeling of obligation to vote within Millennials.

In this chapter I argue that civic duty can capture these dynamics of multiple identities and the changing saliency of such identities from election to election. The power of civic duty comes from the fact that it does not merely capture an additive process. Civic duty does not increase with the more identities an individual has. Some identities may generate certain group concerns that conflict with others. This tension is reflected in civic duty as such conflict diminishes a sense of obligation. On the other-hand other identities my complement each other, and in turn generate a stronger sense of obligation. These dynamics are what make civic duty so powerful, and capable of capturing shifting salient identities. Because civic duty is sensitive to the interaction of multiple identities we can identify the saliency of these identities by their effects on civic duty. In the case of the 2017 general election, the growing sense of Europeanness that came from the anxiety generated from the Brexit vote, as well as the Labour Party serving as the counterbalance to May’s pro-Brexit Conservatives, generated strong and salient complementary identities that boosted Millennials’ sense of civic duty; a dramatic shift from the strong sense of nationalism and British identity that drove older voters to the polls in 2015 and during the Brexit vote.

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So far, I have only examined the effect of one identity at a time as well as group concerns more broadly. But reality is a lot messier, and several other politically salient identities for these young people could be at work beyond a sense of European identity. Some are blue collar while
others are white collar; some see themselves as Scottish while others English; some are Labour while others are Tories. Clearly amongst young people a European identity was heightened and became more salient as many saw their future challenged by the Brexit vote, but did the increased salience of this European identity impact the effect of other identities? I argue yes, and in fact we can see this regarding the most politically salient identity, partisanship.

If civic duty is expected to capture a sense of obligation and motivate a person to vote through generating an expectation of guilt, then the individual must believe their action would benefit the group or groups they are loyal too. But if such action may help one group and hurt another, then this sense of obligation should be reduced. A working-class individual may feel European, and these two identities can generate completely conflicting concerns on free trade. These conflicting group concerns can then influence civic duty by diminishing a sense of obligation to vote. Conversely, the more the group concerns from multiple identities complement each other, the stronger a sense of civic duty will be, as the act of voting can offer benefits to multiple groups. This could be the case for technologically savvy youths and consumers who may see an advantage with free trade, thereby generating concerns that complement a European identity, and in turn generate a stronger sense of obligation. In this chapter I argue that fluctuations in the predictive effect of partisanship on civic duty can be accounted for by the degree of such internal contradictions or agreement of concerns generated by competing identities.

I analyze this theory of complementing and conflicting identities on civic duty by testing the conditional effect of a European identity on partisanship in the 2015 and 2017 general elections. Why did 2015 see higher turnout amongst older nationalists while 2017 saw a jump in European feeling youths? The changing saliency of identity brought on by a perceived threat can
account for this variation. Where in 2015 the threat of a globalized world reinforced a salient nationalist identity that complemented a Conservative identity and in 2017 the threat of Brexit reinforced a salient European identity that complemented a Labour identity. The anxiety and uncertainty of the future from the Brexit referendum and the strategic choice of making the Conservative Party the party of Brexit politicized a European identity as well as made Labour appear as a more firmly pro-EU party. The increased saliency of a European identity after the Brexit vote in addition to Labour taking a stronger pro-EU stance helped motivate Millennials to the polls through an enhanced sense of civic duty in 2017; this is similar to a wave of Euroscepticism that drove older nationalistic minded voters to the polls in 2015 out of fear of an ever growing globalized and integrated world, especially Conservative voters who saw a boost in civic duty the more non-European they felt. It is this unique aspect of shifting saliency of identity as well as stronger positioning of the two major parties that sets up a proper test of competing identities, as rarely can we see such identities be so politicized and change so drastically in saliency between elections, in addition to the two main parties taking such clear and polarized stances on the concerns and issues such identity generates. This sets up a perfect test case for these complementary and conflicting identities, and a perfect case to highlight the power of civic duty.

**May’s Eurosceptic Rhetoric and the Conservative Party**

One of the most consequential decisions made before the 2017 general election was framing the Conservative Party as the party of Brexit. The Conservative Party had traditionally embraced a soft-Euroscepticism. This stance typically takes the form of policy concerns and a belief that national interest is at odds with the current direction of the EU (Taggart and
Szczerbiak 2000, Kopecky and Mudde 2002). But with Brexit and the election of Theresa May, the party had rhetorically taken a more hard-Eurosceptic stance in which exit from the EU is a given. Prior to 2017 the Conservative Party was a party on the upswing, expecting considerable growth after the embarrassment Labour suffered in the 2015 general election. This loss was greatly attributed to a rise in nationalistic sentiment amongst older voters. Many of these older voters switched support from the Labour Party to the EU Skeptic Conservative Party, as well as the nationalist UKIP and SNP. To build upon this groundswell of nationalism and recapture the voting base lost to the UKIP, Theresa May sought to frame the Conservative Party the unequivocal party of Brexit and Euroscepticism.

During her candidacy for leadership of the Conservative Party Theresa May found success with a pro-Brexit message:

“Because Brexit means Brexit, and we're going to make a success of it…Second, we need to unite our party and our country… And third, we need a bold new positive vision for the future of our country - a vision of a country that works not for the privileged few, but for every one of us.”

Her success at claiming leadership with this Brexit position meant that the Conservative Party would represent a pro-Brexit position during her tenure. And by April of 2017 Prime Minister May sought to strengthen her hand at the bargaining table for Brexit negotiations by calling a snap election. But this positioning of the Conservative Party as the party of Brexit and hard-Euroscepticism is only a recent phenomenon, as the party has consistently struggled with balancing between the more nationalistic working-class supporters and the globalist financial supporters.

11 Theresa May launched her national campaign to become Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on July 11, 2017 with this speech and slogan.
Euroscepticism initially took hold within the Conservative Party after Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was deposed. Europe’s role in this leadership change put the new Prime Minister, John Major, in a difficult position. But during the John Major government a pragmatic level of soft-Euroscepticism was maintained to appeal to both Europhiles and Eurosceptics. This position was tenable throughout the 90’s and when the Conservatives returned to opposition (Lynch and Whitaker 2013, Fox and Pearce 2016). Since then this Eurosceptic divide has been a source of party disunity (Lynch and Whitaker 2013). When Prime Minister May made the party the party of Brexit rhetorically, she ended this debate and balancing act. The decision put to rest any question of where the parties stood in terms of Britain and the EU; unlike the party positions during the Brexit vote, where Cameron’s pro-EU stance, Corbyn’s Eurosceptic past, and the lackluster campaign of Labour made it unclear where Labour stood (Hobolt 2016; Vasilopoulou 2016; Heath and Goodwin 2017). With May’s rhetoric and positioning on policy as well as Corbyn’s anti-austerity platform, it became evident and clear that Labour would be the party of integration and the Conservative party the party of Brexit for the 2017 election (Heath and Goodwin 2017). This strengthening of party positioning meant greater complementing effects for those that identify as Labour and European, as well greater complementing effects for a Conservative with nationalistic sentiments. But such strengthening of party positioning can also alienate. A nationalist Labour member or European Conservative may feel opposing concerns generated from these identities, and such opposing effects can diminish a sense of obligation and duty to vote.

Later in this chapter I argue that Brexit satiated nationalistic voters and reduced the saliency of a non-European identity in 2017, while generating a fear and anxiety that activated a sense of Europeanness in Millennials out of a perceived threat that their future is being taken
away. This event serves as a critical juncture, where I can theoretically divide elections by the saliency of identity as well as identify the effect of such changing saliency. The increased saliency of a European identity activated an identity that complemented the typical partisan identity of Millennials, the Labour Party; and these complementary identities boosted the civic duty of Millennials due to a greater sense of obligation, much like a nationalistic identity boosted such civic duty in older Conservatives in 2015. My argument relies on the assumption that the saliency of a European identity increased after Brexit, while the saliency of a nationalistic identity decreased after Brexit as the referendum was seen as an answer to the concerns generated by such an identity. In the next section I provide an account of the rise and fall of the United Kingdom Independence Party as an example of such shifting salience.

**Salient Identities and the 2015 and 2017 General Elections**

This chapter seeks to account for variation in turnout through shifting identities that either complement or conflict with a partisan identity. For my theory to explain Millennial turnout I must show that a European identity became more salient in the 2017 general election. And while I have shown that a sense of Europeanness had grown amongst Millennials and the voting population at large, how can we account for such increases in a sense of Europeanness? And is this increase in Europeanness due to an increased saliency? While an individual may feel European, the importance of this identity may not be reflected in political action. Yes, a strong European identity can influence civic duty, but only if it is politically salient. Everyone has multiple identities, and many of these can be a strongly felt by an individual. But even strongly held identities may not be politically salient enough to influence a sense of civic duty to vote.
Oakes (1986) argues that salient identities emerge when there exists “separation” and “clarity” between identity categories. When an identity is clearly defined and seen as distinct from other categories it can be salient and motivate behavior. But when can we expect to see such separation and clarity? Brewer and Brown (1998) identify that such separation and clarity tend to be strongest when there is a perceived minority status. I argue that such separation and clarity occurred for many European feeling Millennials after the Brexit vote made exit from the EU a reality. A sense of disbelief took hold of many Millennials as the unthinkable happened, and their perceived prospects for the future looked bleak. This new reality in addition to the strong Eurosceptic position the Conservative Party took under Theresa May made the cleavage between those that feel European and those that do not feel European evident and tangible for voters. A unifying anxiety and fear took hold of those that felt European, and the belief that most of Britain felt like them was shattered. These commonly shared emotions from threat and the sense of losing majority status generated the separation and clarity necessary to drive the saliency of a European identity in 2017, but this increased salience only occurred due to the culmination of the slowly increasing saliency of a nationalistic identity. This nationalistic identity grew as the success of the UKIP increased, culminating in the 2015 electoral gains for the party and the eventual success of the Brexit referendum.

The 2017 general election can be viewed as a backlash to the growing nationalistic sentiment that had been building up for over a decade in Britain. This growing nationalism was most evident with the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party. The UKIP formed in 1993 out of the Anti-Federalist League, a minor cross-party organization that sought to campaign against the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. Originally being a hard-Eurosceptic party, the UKIP was seen not as a nationalist party, but rather an anti-EU party. It was not until the late 90’s that the
UKIP was infused with nationalism, when many coming from the far-right Referendum Party joined the UKIP (Goodwin and Dennison 2017). Throughout the next decade leaders such as Nigel Farage fused the Eurosceptic stance of the party with anti-immigrant sentiments. After the 2010 general election the UKIP saw a steady rise in electoral success and the national profile of the party. The fusion of Euroscepticism with anti-immigration sentiment struck a chord amongst older white working-class voters. These voters felt left behind by the two major parties, perceiving each as becoming increasingly cozy with the EU as well as becoming increasingly lax on immigration. This perceived multi-cultural and socially liberal consensus by the two parties drove many to support the growing nationalist UKIP (Ford and Goodwin 2017). By the 2015 general election the UKIP grew enough to claim 12.6% of the national vote, even though Farage failed to convert this electoral success into more than one seat in Parliament. But even with the lack of tangible seats, the UKIP became a firebrand that injected nationalist rhetoric into the general elections and a sense of feeling left behind for millions of older white working-class Britons. This nationalist sentiment and moment for Britain culminated in the Brexit referendum vote in 2016, where the UKIP and its members finally realized its main objective of an exit from the EU. The success of Brexit and the UKIP relied not on simple Euroscepticism, but rather a growing sense of nationalism of those who felt left behind by a globalized world that seemed to threaten and marginalize them. These feelings of threat and marginalization are what drove the salience of a nationalist identity during the 2015 general election and are what drove the success of the Brexit referendum, but are ultimately what doomed the movement.

Ironically, achieving the ultimate-goal of exit from the EU was also the downfall of the UKIP. A party initially created around such a single issue, meant that upon achieving such policy objectives the party appeared less relevant and unnecessary. The 2017 general election
made this quite apparent with the UKIP receiving a tenth of the vote share they did in 2015. Recent analysis by Heath and Goodwin (2017) finds that many of these lost UKIP votes went back the now more hard-Eurosceptic Conservative Party. But while we saw a sort of coming home to the Conservative Party for many older white working-class voters, Heath and Goodwin (2017) note that these gains in 2017 were offset by the high turnout in pro-remain areas, and places with high concentrations of minorities, youth, and college graduates. So, while Brexit satiated the concerns generated from a nationalist identity, it generated concerns for those who feel European. Brexit turned the tables, shifting a sense of helplessness and anxiety from older nationalistic Britons to young European feeling Britons. Older voters saw the globalized world as threatening British identity and economic security in 2015, younger voters saw the impending reality of Brexit as the beginning of a bleak future of economic loss for Britain in 2017.

Such shifts in the saliency of a nationalistic vs European identity reflect traditional theory on salient identities. In both cases there was a growing us vs them aspect to these identities, but what defined the saliency of each in their respective elections was the fact that such increased saliency was also accompanied by an increasing anxiety and feeling of being outnumbered. A critical mechanism that drives clarity of an identity and thereby saliency is a feeling of minority status (Brewer and Brown 1998). In 2015 it was older nationalistic feeling voters that felt outnumbered by a perceived socially liberal and multicultural European elite that was growing larger by the day, while in 2017 it was younger European feeling voters that felt outnumbered and voiceless compared to an older out of touch voting block that passed Brexit. This shift in perception can account for a shift in saliency between a nationalist and European identity. Brexit serves as a perfect critical juncture to test such shifts in saliency. But as discussed earlier such increases in saliency do not simply add to a sense of civic duty to go out and vote, but rather
interact with other salient identities, one critical identity being partisanship. Partisanship can be considered one of the most politically salient identities, and the interplay between a partisan identity with a newly salient European identity in 2017 can account for the surprising turnout trends of Millennials in 2017 due to how such competing identities influence a feeling of obligation to vote.

**Group Identity, Partisanship, and Europeanness**

There is a long tradition of viewing partisanship as an identity. Campbell et al (1960) originally saw partisanship as the unmoved mover, suggesting partisanship is a static identity that shifts very little over time. The revisionist school of thought first developed by Fiorina’s (1981) concept of a running tally and Achen’s (1992) conceptualization of Bayesian updating, suggests that partisanship can change over time due to independent evaluations. The basis for this revisionist challenge of the classic “Michigan School” argument was the abundance of empirical findings that partisan attachments vary temporally both individually and in the aggregate (Fiorina 1981, Jennings and Markus 1984, Brody and Rothenberg 1988). Green and Palmquist (1990, 1994, 2002) challenge this revisionist development by arguing that these findings fail to account for measurement error in how they operationalize partisanship; and by making this claim they seek to reestablish the importance of viewing partisanship as an identity, like religious identification. Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) push back against this identity argument when they find that predictors of identity perform worse than predictors of ideology. But this challenge is a bit unfair as Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) argue that partisanship acts as an identity like religion, not that religion or other identities will influence partisanship. This conceptualization of partisanship as an identity all its own has been supported in later literature.
Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe (2015) find that partisanship based on a multi-item identity scale accounts for campaign activity more so than a policy-based scale. While Clifford (2017) finds that a stronger sense of group loyalty is associated with stronger partisanship.

As the literature on partisanship continues to develop, it is evident that partisanship is being examined increasingly as an identity. And while partisanship can be considered the most politically salient identity, other identities may also matter. The anxiety and fear generated by integration and globalization made a nationalistic identity salient in 2015, while the anxiety and fear generated by Brexit made a European identity salient in 2017. Both cases are defined by groups that perceive a growing threat from outside forces gaining strength. This perceived threat has generated anxiety amongst these groups, and MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, and Marcus (2010) identify how such anxiety makes partisanship more pliable. They argue that unfamiliar circumstances generate an anxiety that leads to more deliberative behavior, and less reliance on partisan identity. The mitigation of partisan identity is also examined in Keele and Wolak (2006), who find that when a conflict of values exists within an individual, such conflict generates greater partisan volatility. Both studies emphasize that a strong politically salient identity like partisanship can fluctuate over time, both due to a growing anxiety and a conflict with existing values. And this is the case for both the 2015 and 2017 general elections. A growing nationalistic identity that came from the anxiety of globalization in 2015 and a growing European identity that came from the anxiety of Brexit in 2017 were forced to interact with existing partisan identities, leading to election outcomes that reflect these trends. Extending the impact of competing values to identity, I argue that as one identity increases in salience and conflicts with existing salient identities, this interaction of competing identities can depress the effect of both, thereby reducing a sense of civic duty. I also add that complementary identities
can enhance the effect of each. This is what occurred in 2017, with a growing sense of European identity complementing the traditional Labour Party identity of Millennials and conflicting with a growingly Eurosceptic Conservative party.

*Europeanness, Partisanship, and Civic Duty*

In this chapter I want to highlight how civic duty can capture the dynamics of identity. If the saliency of identities can shift, and such changes can influence the effects of other identities on turnout, then civic duty needs to be able to capture these dynamics if it is truly a mechanism that drives turnout by capturing identity. While a nationalist identity was salient in 2015, a European identity became more salient in 2017. Add to this the strong rhetoric of Theresa May which framed the Conservative Party the party of Brexit and the increased effort to frame the Labour Party the party of Brexit opposition, and you create strong complementary identities between a European identity and Labour Party identity; two identities that are disproportionately Millennial.

<table>
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<th>Table 4.1: Level of European Identity and British Identity</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>European</strong></td>
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<td><strong>British</strong></td>
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This increase in Europeanness is reflected both in terms of European identity and EU integration policy. But as seen in table 1 it was an increase in European identity that characterized Millennials; where Millennials saw a greater increase in European identity between 2015 and 2017 than older voters. This precedence of European identity is further supported when examining a sense of British identity12. What makes civic duty such a powerful concept is the ability to capture these complex dynamics. While it would be safe to say partisanship is always a politically salient identity, other identities may not be so consistently salient. In some elections class matters, in others ethnicity. While one identity may be salient enough to complement or diminish partisanship one election, it may not be salient enough in the next. Therefore, I expect a European identity to be salient in 2017; and that such saliency, which was activated through the post-Brexit fear and anxiety that characterized Millennials, generated a greater sense of civic duty for European identifying Labour supporters. These identities are most clearly exemplified by Millennials who feel European and identify as Labour at a higher rate than older voters, and so Millennials should be the group that sees the positive effects of these complementary identities the most.

H1: The more European an individual who identifies as Labour feels, the stronger the effect such party attachment has on a sense of civic duty.

Hypothesis 1 tests the complementary effect of Europeanness on a Labour supporter. My main argument for the rise in turnout of Millennials in 2017 rests on the effect an increased sense of European identity had on a belief that it is a duty to vote. I argue that the strong Eurosceptic

12 Included in the appendix is a table that tests the influence European and British identity had on turnout in the 2015 and 2017 general elections. With the results indicating that a British identity is a significant predictor of turnout in 2015 but not in 2017, and European identity is a significant predictor of turnout in 2017 but not 2015.
positioning of the Conservative Party clarified the position of the Labour Party as the party to remain, and that the increased salience of a European identity interacted with the clarified Labour Party position in a way that complemented each other. These complementing identities enhanced the effect of both identities, generating a stronger sense of obligation. This should not be the case for a Conservative supporter. In the case of a Conservative this sense of European identity should diminish a sense of obligation to vote on behalf of the Conservative Party. Identifying with the party of Brexit would conflict with a European identity and generate the hypothesis:

**H2:** The more European an individual who identifies as Conservative feels, the weaker the effect such party attachment has on a sense of civic duty.

Hypothesis 2 tests my argument of conflicting identity. Theresa May’s victory indicated that the Conservative Party will be one that ensures a clean break from the EU. This can conflict with Conservatives who feel European and have benefited from an integrated European system. But a variable like European can entail two different identities, due to the valence nature of the variable. The more European a person feels would indicate less nationalistic sentiments, while the less European a person feels would indicate more nationalistic sentiments. If a nationalist identity was less salient in 2017 due to the passing of Brexit, then we may not see strong negative effects of a European identity for Conservatives in 2017 because feeling nationalist had weak complementary effects. But this is not the case for 2015.

In 2015 nationalism was on the rise with little expectation of a vote like Brexit. Therefore, at this time a non-European identity should have had a strong complementary effect on being Conservative. Once Brexit occurred, and the nationalist interests answered, this
perceived threat from globalists diminished and so did the distinction between a nationalistic Conservative and a European Conservative. This change in saliency would make the distinction between a nationalistic and European Conservative important in 2015 but not 2017. But as Brexit satisfied nationalists it threatened those that identify as European. Therefore in 2017 a European identity should strongly and significantly complement a Labour Party identity. While a non-European identity should strongly and significantly complement a Conservative Party identity in 2015. From this I can make a final hypothesis:

H3: The conditional effect of European will be significant for a Labour identity in 2017 only, and for a Conservative identity in 2015 only.

This hypothesis seeks to test the capacity of civic duty to reflect the nuance of salient identities. In 2015 a sense of nationalism would make a non-European identity more salient and complement the Eurosceptic interests of the Conservative Party. This increased saliency would make the distinction between a non-European feeling Conservative and a European feeling Conservative significant. Once Brexit occurred a nationalist identity became less salient, thereby diminishing the conditional effect a nationalist identity would have on a partisan identity. On the other-hand, a European identity became salient because of the perceived threat of Brexit, thereby generating strong complementary concerns between a European identity and Labour identity. These strong complementary identities and concerns in 2017 make the distinction between feeling non-European and European critical for someone identifying as Labour in 2017 unlike in 2015 when such European identity was less salient. Because of the valence nature of European, I expect a positive conditional relationship for European and Labour and a negative conditional
relationship for European and Conservative (with feeling non-European capturing a nationalistic identity). \(^\text{13}\)

**Results**

This final results section gets directly at the heart of my argument for civic duty and the outcome of high Millennial turnout in the 2017 general election. A sense of Europeanness is what helped the Labour Party achieve more success in 2017 than expected. And my hypotheses predict that a European identity will enhance civic duty amongst Labour supporters and diminish civic duty amongst Conservative supporters.

Table 2 includes four ordered logit models for *Civic Duty*, two representing 2015 and two representing 2017. Each of these models is specific to one party, with a 2015 and a 2017 model for the interaction of *European* and *Labour* as well a 2015 and a 2017 model for the interaction of *European* and *Conservative*. The first model in table 2 includes the interaction between *European* and *Labour*. As expected this interaction is significant and positive. This significant relationship would indicate that the more European an individual who identifies as Labour feels, the stronger the effect these identities have on strongly agreeing that voting is a duty. But examining the significance of such an interaction does not tell us much. Often such significance can be spurious and reflect merely intercept shifts due to the additive nature of the two variables.

\(^{13}\) In 2015 the Conservative Party was not the most Eurosceptic. As I detailed earlier, the UKIP took the strongest anti-EU stance and melded it with anti-immigrant sentiment that had shaped the discourse of the 2015 general election and injected nationalist fervor into the campaigns. Therefore, we should see the strongest complementary effects of a non-European identity with party affiliation regarding the UKIP (or negative effect of a European identity with UKIP). Generating an alternate hypothesis:

\(H3a: \) The strength of the conditional relationship between European and UKIP will be greater than the conditional relationship between European and Conservative in 2015.

Appendix C includes the ordered logit model with substantive effects.
To truly understand the nuance of an interaction we must see how one variable conditions the marginal effects of the other. Figure 1 displays the predicted probability of strongly agreeing that voting is a duty as *European* goes from its minimum to maximum value.

| Table 4.2: Determinants of Civic Duty for the 2017 & 2015 British General Elections |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Conservative                       | **              | 0.47 (0.13)**   | 0.13 (0.07)*    | **              |
| Labour                             | -0.32 (0.15)**  | **              | **              | 0.26 (0.08)**   |
| European                           | 0.01 (0.02)     | 0.11 (0.02)**   | 0.02 (0.01)     | -0.03 (0.01)**  |
| Con*Euro                           | **              | -0.15 (0.04)**  | -0.09 (0.03)**  | **              |
| Lab*Euro                           | 0.17 (0.04)**   | **              | **              | 0.04 (0.02)*    |
| Age                                | 0.02 (0.00)**   | 0.02 (0.00)**   | 0.01 (0.00)**   | 0.01 (0.00)**   |
| Income                             | 0.05 (0.01)**   | 0.05 (0.01)**   | 0.02 (0.01)**   | 0.02 (0.01)**   |
| Education                          | 0.04 (0.03)     | 0.02 (0.03)     | 0.04 (0.02)     | 0.05 (0.02)**   |
| Female                             | 0.20 (0.08)**   | 0.20 (0.08)**   | 0.21 (0.04)**   | 0.20 (0.04)**   |
| N                                  | 2761            | 2761            | 8703            | 8703            |
| Adj. R²                            | 0.02            | 0.02            | 0.01            | 0.01            |

Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)

As expected, as a sense of *European* identity increases so does the effect that *Labour* has on strongly agreeing that voting is a duty, confirming hypothesis 1. Going from feeling not European at all to very European is expected to increase the predicted probability of strongly believing that voting is a duty by 0.26, going from a likelihood of 0.44 to 0.70. This is both a substantial increase as well as a significant increase as the confidence intervals do not overlap when *European* is 0 and when *European* is 6. This conditional relationship appears to not exist for other parties as we see a relatively flat line when *Labour* is 0. But this 0 can be a bit
misleading as rather than representing Conservative, it represents all other parties or no party affiliation at all. To identify the conditional effect of European on Conservative I generate a second model. Model 2 captures the interaction between Conservative and European.

Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability of Civic Duty for a Labour Partisan (2017)

![Graph showing predicted probability of civic duty for Labour partisans with and without European affiliation.]

Although the interaction between European and Conservative is significant and negative, figure 2 would indicate that the difference between a European feeling Conservative and a non-European feeling Conservative is not significant. Yes, the relationship is negative, suggesting that European diminishes a sense of Civic Duty for a Conservative – as expected by hypothesis 2. But the confidence intervals overlap, suggesting that the difference is not statistically significant. One final point that can be taken from this model is that when an individual does not identify as
*Conservative* the variable *European* has a significant and positive effect on *Civic Duty*, reinforcing the saliency of a *European* identity in 2017.

But if the complementary effects of a European identity and a Labour identity are so strong, why didn't we see such high turnout amongst Millennials in 2015? I argue that such a European identity was not as salient. And that while the conflicting effect of *European* on *Conservative* was not significant in 2017, it was in 2015. Model 3 captures this as I test this relationship for the 2015 election. Figure 3 visualizes this effect, and unlike in the 2017 model, we see a significant difference in a *Conservative* who feels *European* and one who does not.
Figure 3 visualizes a conditional effect that indicates that as a *Conservative* goes from not identifying as European to feeling very European, the predicted probability of strongly believing that it is a duty to vote declines by 0.11. While this may be viewed as a negative effect, we can also view it as the more non-European (nationalistic) a *Conservative* feels the more civic duty they will feel. The fact that this is a significant conditional relationship in 2015, but not 2017, indicates that such *European* identity was more salient in conditioning a *Conservative* identity in 2015. This is not the case for *Labour*, where we see the significant interaction in the 2017 model become insignificant in model 4 for the 2015 election and is visualized in figure 4. Therefore, the interaction between *European* and *Conservative* is significant in 2015 but not 2017, and the interaction between *European* and *Labour* is significant in 2017 but not 2015, confirming my
final hypothesis. In addition, model 4 also indicates that someone who does not identify as Labour will receive a boost in Civic Duty the less European they feel, as indicated by the significant and negative result of European.

**Discussion**

The results in the previous section confirm my three hypotheses. While the positive effect of feeling European helped enhance the effect a Labour identity has on civic duty in 2017, this was not the case in 2015. For a Conservative, the expected negative relationship is only significant in 2015. While this may indicate that my hypotheses are only correct given certain election conditions, these results actually reflect the power of civic duty. Civic duty is not affected by all identities at all times, rather it is affected by salient identities. And while a
nationalist identity was salient in 2015, it appears a European identity was salient in 2017. You add to this the fact that Labour strongly became the party in opposition to the pro Brexit stance of Theresa May’s Conservative Party, and you get a highly complementary effect of a strong European identity with a strong pro EU Labour Party identity that generates high civic duty in Millennials. Civic duty effectively captured these dynamics theoretically and statistically, and this is reflected in the changing of significance of these interactions between the 2015 and 2017 models.

**Conclusion**

The goal of this chapter was to highlight the role competing identities have on civic duty and turnout. Many identities can shift in salience from election to election, and this variation in salience can be a fundamental factor in accounting for the fluctuation of turnout trends even amongst strong partisans who are expected to have the highest propensity to turnout. As the salience of a European identity grew out of the Brexit referendum, this increased feeling of Europeanness complemented the typical Labour identity of young people. Such interaction of identities generated a strong sense of obligation to vote that manifested as increased civic duty. This sense of civic duty in turn motivated a typically less participatory group of young voters to go to the polls out of a sense of obligation. And while less European feeling members of the Labour Party may have felt more inhibited to go out and vote, the boost in Millennial turnout existed due to the high propensity of this group to both identify as Labour and as European. This trend is very similar to the role nationalism played in 2015, where we saw a boost of nationalistic Conservatives going to the polls and giving the Conservative party an unexpected victory.
By understanding the interplay of identities and how they can either work together to generate a greater sense of civic duty or conflict with each other and diminish a sense of civic duty, we can better understand the variation in turnout amongst even high and low propensity voters. While the existing literature on turnout has done an incredible job of finding factors that influence an individual’s propensity to vote, accounting for variation amongst high propensity and low propensity voters has been hard to accomplish at the individual level. Examining identity and civic duty together, offers a theoretical framework that can account for such variation, and can account for unexpected outcomes like the 2017 British general election.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

At the heart of this dissertation is the question: What influences turnout? This is a question that has been asked for decades and has been addressed theoretically in many ways. The purpose of these chapters is not to disconfirm these past answers, but rather offer a novel way of examining the relationship of already existing mechanisms that can account for variation in turnout beyond traditional models. I have accomplished this by building upon the existing literature on identity, civic duty, and social pressure. All three of these broad concepts have been attached to turnout in the past, but none have been placed in a cohesive framework and tested. The theory I offer views these three concepts as essential mechanisms that can account for turnout beyond typical rational considerations based on policy and ideology, framing the relationship between identity and civic duty in a social pressure context.

Identity is not merely another factor to consider when calculating the utility of voting. It does not just add more interests to the calculus of voting, it also generates group concerns that manifest as a sense of civic duty. These group concerns can vary but ultimately motivate a person to turnout beyond perceived individual utility. When these group concerns manifest as a sense of civic duty, it is not utility that then drives a person to go out and vote, but rather a sense of social pressure to vote on behalf of the group. Civic duty is just that, a duty. It is the internalization of social pressure through the feeling of obligation to groups one identifies with.

I began this dissertation with the goal of explaining what typically goes unexplained by traditional turnout models. I was interested in answering why we see variation in turnout from election to election by individuals who would be predicted to always vote and by individuals who would be predicted to rarely vote. Strong partisans, older voters, more educated voters, wealthier voters should all consistently turnout. We even know that past turnout behavior is a
very strong predictor of future turnout behavior, with the expectation that if you voted in the past you will vote in the future. But while the literature has effectively identified high propensity voters, these voters still vary in behavior. Such variance in behavior can also occur amongst voters that would be deemed to have little propensity to vote. Young, uneducated, poor voters may not always turnout, but many still do. Whether it is a high propensity voter sitting it out, or a low propensity voter driven to the polls, at the individual level we can see variation that flies in the face of existing theory. Such variation can have a significant impact on an election and so it is necessary to understand the dynamics of such variation and not just treat it as a nuisance. My theoretical argument addresses this variation and can account for these unexpected outcomes. Civic duty is not an aggregation of identity, but rather a reflection of competing identities that vary in salience from election to election. It is this shifting of the strength of identity that can account for a strong partisan not to turnout and a young person to turnout. As an identity grows in salience it can either generate concerns that complement or conflict with existing identities. If such group concerns complement they strengthen the effect of these salient identities on civic duty, if they conflict they diminish this effect. Such interplay can account for variation in a strong partisan, as it is competing identities that can diminish the effect of partisanship on civic duty, and in the end turnout. It is this interplay that can also account for traditionally non-participatory young voters to go out and vote. By better understanding the relationship between identity and civic duty, and how it applies to social pressure, a better understanding of variation in turnout is obtained.

***
I have applied and tested my theory using the case of the 2017 British general election. This election is the perfect case for such analysis as we saw dramatically differing turnout trends in this election as opposed to the 2015 general election. Young people turned out at an unprecedented rate, and the outcome of the election blindsided many. If my theory can account for such variation when others cannot, then it offers unique insight that adds to the robust literature that already exists on turnout. And as I have shown through these chapters it does.

Civic duty effectively captured the growing salience of a European identity in the 2017 general election and the unique outcome of high youth turnout. As a European identity became more salient it complemented the traditional Labour Party identity of young voters, amplifying a sense of civic duty amongst Millennials and increasing their propensity to vote. This was not the case for older voters who more typically harbor nationalistic sentiments and are Conservative. Such a sense of nationalism was not as salient in 2017 as it was in 2015, where in 2015 the fear of globalism drove a nationalistic identity that complemented a Conservative Party identity, thereby accounting for the high turnout of older working-class voters in 2015. It is civic duty that can capture both the variation of turnout of these groups and the shifting in salience of the identities that drove them.

**Implications**

The main contribution of this dissertation is to better understand variation in individual turnout behavior. I argue that variation of both high and low propensity voters can be accounted for with a better understanding of the relationship between identity and civic duty. Identity is an exceptionally strong predictor of turnout. Whether it is a partisan identity, working-class identity, European identity, British identity, how we identify not only informs our ideology and policy
concerns, but also generates social pressure. This pressure manifests as a sense of civic duty that has effects independent of typical rational concerns. This allows identity to be a powerful motivator beyond rational utility, as policies and ideology do not have to be rationalized to drive groups of people to vote, they just need a strong sense of group identity. In addition to highlighting the power of identity, my theory and results offer a more structured model of how identity influences turnout through social pressure. The mechanism of civic duty offers theoretical leverage to account for the social effects of identity. And such a mechanism can not only identify the independent effects of identity, but also how multiple identities interact. Understanding these interactions offers further insight into the variation in the turnout of high and low propensity voters.

All these findings reinforce the need to still measure civic duty. Whether it is through experiments or surveys, civic duty is still a fruitful concept to explore. Yes, it is a highly deterministic concept, but it is also an important theoretical mechanism to deal with identity. The correlation of civic duty may be very high with other predictors such as campaign interest, but civic duty still maintains significant independent effects. And it is with identity that we see the strongest effects.

Going forward it can be fruitful to extend my analysis to other countries. If I can replicate such results this can further validate my findings. The German Longitudinal Study as well as the American National Election Study offer further panel survey data to conduct further analysis. In addition, testing such theory in less developed countries can offer interesting insight. My current paper with Dr. James Scarritt examines the role ethno-linguistic cleavages played in the rise of the Patriot Front and United Party for National Development in the Zambian political system. Such theory can help explain the power of politicizing ethnic difference, and account for
the success of these two parties. Finally, I consistently reference emotion in my analysis and theory. But due to the lack of experimental data I am limited in my causal claims of emotion. Applying experimental techniques to connect identity, civic duty, and turnout can help to test the true causal process as well as be able to integrate emotion more prominently. Overall, there is still plenty of fertile ground to explore with the relationship between identity and civic duty, as well as identity and turnout more broadly.
References


• Szczerbiak, A., & Taggart, P. (2000). Opposing Europe: Party systems and opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation.

**Data**

• Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Steinbrecher, Markus (2015): Short-term Campaign Panel (GLES 2009). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5305 Data file Version 5.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12198
• Rattinger, Hans; Roßteutscher, Sigrid; Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger; Weßels, Bernhard; Wolf, Christof; Plischke, Thomas; Wiegand, Elena (2016): Short-term Campaign Panel 2013
( GLES). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5704 Data file Version 3.2.0, doi:10.4232/1.12561

Appendix A:
Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Figure A.1: Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics 2017

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Figure A.2: Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics 2015

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Figure A.3: Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics 2010

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Figure A.5: Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics 2001

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Appendix B:

Figure B.1: Lowess Curve for Turnout and Age (2015)

Figure B.2: Lowess Curve for Turnout and Age (2017)
Table B.1: Determinants of Voting for the 2015 & 2017 British General Elections

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<td>1.02 (0.06)**</td>
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<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
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<td>1.24 (0.08)**</td>
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<td>Duty*Interest</td>
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<td>-0.18 (0.03)**</td>
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<td>**</td>
<td>0.04 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.06)**</td>
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Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)
Appendix C:

H3a: The strength of the conditional relationship between European and UKIP will be greater than the conditional relationship between European and Conservative in 2015.

- The marginal effect of going from non-European to European reduces the effect of being Conservative by 0.11 while reducing the effect of being UKIP by 0.26. This supports hypothesis 3a.

### Table C.1: Determinants of Civic Duty for the 2015 British General Election

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<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
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<td>0.35 (0.11)**</td>
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<td>European</td>
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<td>UKIP*Euro</td>
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<td>Income</td>
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Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)
Appendix D: Components of Civic Duty

Civic duty is one of the oldest concepts we have in the field of political science. Being first evoked by Classical Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, civic duty is portrayed as the virtue of a citizen that ensures engagement and respect for the institutions of the state. In democratic institutions of today, civic duty has been argued to drive participation in a system where one person may seem to not matter. Civic duty has evolved from an ingrained virtue that is reinforced by a lifetime of education, to a sense of patriotism, gratification, or shame. The complexity of civic duty is evident in the variation of answers one would receive when asking of what civic duty is. Almost all understand civic duty and know it when they see it; but asking what civic duty is invokes varying responses. Is it belief in democratic institutions? Love for one’s country? Obligation to one’s party? Or a sense of gratification or shame. In many ways these are all civic duty, yet this concept is often simplified and left little definition when used. The goal of this chapter is to better define this ancient concept and understand how it influences participation in modern democracies.

Civic duty has its origins in the concept of civic virtue discussed by Classical Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. This concept was further refined to be applied to democratic practices by Revolutionary era political thinkers such as Rousseau and Jefferson. And with this concept of civic virtue, it becomes evident that the D term introduced by Riker and Ordeshook (1959) was not a revolutionary idea, but rather evolutionary in that it adapts the concept of civic virtue to modern day partisan politics. This modern conception of civic duty has consistently been identified as a robust predictor for whether an individual decides to vote (Berelson et al 1954, Campbell et al 1960, Knack 1992, Knack 1994, Verba et al 1995, Campbell 2006, Blais and Achen 2010), but it is often overlooked and seen more as a nuisance than a
casual factor of turnout (Grofman 1993). But more recent work (Knack 1992, Knack 1994, Blais 2000, Blais and Achen 2010, Blais and Galais 2016) has sought to reevaluate civic duty as a primary causal factor of individual turnout. Such analysis has sought to better identify how to measure and conceive of this complex and powerful concept. This chapter will examine these developments of the concept of civic duty. I will test these developments with an analysis using panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study to better identify the components of civic duty.

**Civic Virtue**

It is quite amazing a commonly known political concept such as civic duty has its origins over two thousand years ago. But is this ancient concept the same one we understand today? Examining the writing and discourse of early classical thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, and later revolutionary era thinkers such as Rousseau and Jefferson, we see a common reference to a civic virtue that includes sentiments of patriotism, appreciation of constitutional law, duty to other citizens, and a need for education to instill such values.

*Civic Duty and Classical Greece*

The concept of civic duty can be traced back to the thinkers of Classical Greece. Plato and Aristotle consistently refer to a concept of civic virtue that must be instilled in every citizen through education. This virtue consists of a love for country and its people, love for law and the constitution, and a sense of responsibility for the welfare of all that are a part of the state. We see references to all these aspects in Plato’s Republic and Laws, along with Aristotle’s Politics.
Plato’s Republic seeks to identify an ideal form of the state. One critical point of focus is on the type of individual that should be left to rule. Plato identifies these individuals as the guardians of the state. Such guardians should have a superior virtue born into them, one of which is a love for country which Plato goes as far as to identify as patriotism:

“We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner’s fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death.”

Plato’s Laws looks beyond the ideal type state and discusses the role citizens play in strengthening states that vary from democracy to oligarchy. For Plato it is not enough to just love the state and its people, but also the laws and constitution:

“And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow citizens, he is by far the best, who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country, and who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best through life.”

It is important to note that this love of country and laws, and deference to public over private interests is not just an innate ability in some unique few. The deference to the good of the state and the constitution is one of many virtues that must be instilled through rigorous education:

“For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all.”
For Plato, education can instill a sense of virtue that embraces a love of country and constitution. This suggests that patriotism, love of country and constitution, is a key component for every citizen, and that such a sentiment is a part of a greater virtue that all civic participants must embrace. Aristotle reinforces Plato by arguing that all should be educated for the good of the state:

“And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that it should be public, and not private — not as at present, when everyone looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole.”

Education in Aristotle’s eyes is a public good that generates virtue in the people that best suits both society’s and the state’s needs:

“No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution the citizen should be molded to suit the form of government under which he lives. For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to preserve it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy; and always the better the character, the better the government.”

To so strongly argue that the care of the state is equal if not greater to oneself, and that it is for the good of society that all must be educated to instill such deference, suggests that education is expected to instill a civic virtue that generates a strong sense of duty, both to the state and the constitution. This civic virtue that generates a duty to the state, can be viewed as the seeds of the concept of civic duty.

Both Plato and Aristotle reinforced the belief that a virtue must be instilled in individuals. This virtue ensures individuals think first of state and society. While the degree this meant a chosen few or the general public varies greatly within these pieces, they do agree that such virtue
must instill a sense of love for country and constitution. These common themes run throughout the writings of Plato and Aristotle and reinforce the importance of deferring individual interest for state interest. But this is not due to any coercive means, but rather the cultivation of veneration for the state and its laws within the individual; often being accomplished through education.

*Rousseau and Jefferson*

The works of Plato and Aristotle suggest that the foundation of the concept of civic duty can be found in their emphasis on virtue, that includes a deference to the common good through both love of state and constitution. While several thinkers have further discussed the concept, it wasn't until Rousseau that we understand how civic duty applies to democratic forms of government.

In the initial paragraphs of *The Social Contract*, Rousseau discusses his motivations for writing the treatise. One key reason is that the ability to vote makes it his duty to study public affairs:

“As I was born a citizen of a free state and am a member of its sovereign [see Glossary], my right to vote makes it my duty to study public affairs, however little influence my voice can have on them. Happily, when I think about governments I always find that my inquiries give me new reasons for loving the government of my own country!”

Although thousands of years apart from the Greek thinkers, Rousseau conveys similar requirements for a participating citizen. If one is to be an active participant one must study the laws and grow to appreciate the constitution and state. Rousseau takes this one step further by emphasizing such knowledge as an essential duty. Rousseau believes that such knowledge and
appreciation is so critical for a state which gives citizens the right to vote that there must exist a sense of civic mindedness that can rival the values espoused by religion:

“So there’s a purely civil profession of faith, the content of which should be fixed by the sovereign—not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social sentiments that are needed for to be a good citizen and a faithful subject. While it can’t compel anyone to believe them, it can banish from the state anyone who doesn’t believe them—banishing him not for impiety but for being anti-social, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice, and if necessary sacrificing his life to his duty. If anyone publicly recognises these dogmas and then behaves as if he doesn’t believe them, let him be punished by death: he has committed the worst of all crimes—lying before the law.”

In *the Social Contract* Rousseau seeks to identify key attributes of state and society that would accommodate a truly legitimate political authority. Like the Greek philosophers of the past, those that participate must truly absorb and appreciate the laws that make up the state. Such values are not innately born into individuals, but rather gained through study and socialization. We further see these beliefs and arguments in the thoughts of Thomas Jefferson, who as a founding father understood that participatory government can only function as well as the capacity of its citizens can accommodate:

“No government can be maintained without the principle of fear as well as duty. Good men will obey the last, but bad ones the former only. If our government ever fails, it will be from this weakness.”

Thomas Jefferson fundamentally believed that the American experiment with democracy relied on the capabilities of the citizens. For Jefferson the maintenance of these democratic institutions falls on the average citizen, and that such maintenance is best achieved through a sense of civic duty. In a letter to John Adams on the topic of a public education bill Jefferson remarks:

“This bill on education would [raise] the mass of the people to the high ground of moral respectability necessary to their own safety and to orderly government, and would [complete] the great object of qualifying them to secure the
veritable aristoi for the trusts of government to the exclusion of the pseudalists ... I have great hope that some patriotic spirit will ... call it up and make it the key stone of the arch of our government."

Jefferson fundamentally believed that the strength of the democratic government relied on an education of the masses to understand and respect such democratic institutions. Without a people educated in civic virtue, the susceptibility of the failure of such institutions increases. Similar to Rousseau, Plato, and Aristotle, Jefferson argues that a sense of civic virtue is necessary for effective government and the reinforcement of a state laws. And that such virtue is instilled through education and the inculcation of a sense of duty.

The concept of civic duty has been one of the oldest political attributes conceived of. Plato and Aristotle understood that good governance can only come when individuals are instilled with a virtue that reinforces love of state and constitution. Rousseau and Jefferson understood that this virtue is essential for participatory governments and emphasize mass education to instill such values. And both Rousseau and Jefferson reflected that these values should generate a sense of duty, that motivates the people of the state to reinforce and protect the government institutions.

All universally believed such virtue includes a sense of patriotism and respect of the constitution. And to this day we still attribute patriotism and knowledge of the constitutional law as requisites of civic duty. But although we can gain better understanding of the roots of civic duty from these early thinkers, and can confirm that common attributes of civic duty are the same today as in the past, is civic duty the same in today’s democracy where millions are enfranchised to vote, and the burden of participation is considerably less? While past political thinkers idealized participation in democratic institutions, today we commonly attribute participation as the act of voting. Should we assume that the same virtues of these past
philosophical thinkers are necessary for the mere act of voting? And does love of state matter as much with the introduction of party systems and partisanship?

**Civic Duty and Voting**

Although it is clear that the concept of civic duty has centuries old origins, the more modern conception of civic duty and how it applies to voting was re-examined during the behaviorist movement with works from Berelson et al (1954), Campbell et al (1960) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). The first American National Electoral Study (ANES) in 1952 includes civic duty as one of six major psychological variables relevant to voters. Although utilized by such works as Berelson et al (1954), Campbell et al (1954), and Campbell et al (1960); civic duty was relegated to a footnote and appendix, like efficacy. It wasn’t until Riker and Ordeshook (1968) that the concept of civic duty was applied theoretically to voting.

Downs (1957) established one of the earliest theoretical models to account for the act of voting. The initial calculus suggested that an individual will vote when the multiplied effect of the utility of voting and the probability of the vote mattering is greater than the cost. Invariably the probability of a vote mattering is so small that with such a model voting becomes an irrational act. Downs (1957) suggested that factors such as supporting democracy can help account for the paradox of voting, yet this was never fully fleshed out into a civic duty term. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) seek to address this shortcoming by including a D term that has commonly been associated with civic duty. In this piece they argue that Downs’ (1959) calculus of voting can never match reality as it left out the psychic benefits one gets from performing one’s civic duty. They articulated five components to this term:
Ethic: “The satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting, which if the citizen is at all socialized into the democratic tradition is positive when he votes and negative (from guilt) when he does not.”

Allegiance: “The satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system: For many people, this is probably the main rationale for voting. It is also a highly political motive and to leave it out of the calculus would be absurd.”

Expression: “The satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference: Voting gives the citizen the chance to stand up and be counted for the candidate he supports. For many voters this must be the most important and politically significant feature of voting. Why else vote so determinedly for a candidate whom the voter knows is almost certainly going to lose or, for that matter, going to win?”

Social: “The satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls, etc.: These items are usually regarded as costs, but for those who enjoy the act of informing themselves for the decision, who get social satisfactions out of going to the polling booth, etc., these supposed costs are actually benefits.”

Efficacy: “The satisfaction of affirming one’s efficacy in the political system: The theory of democracy asserts that individuals and voting are meaningful and for most people the only chance to fulfill this role is in the voting booth.”
This list includes five categories that I chose to name for ease of reference as they are just numbered elements in the text of Riker and Ordeshook (1968). It seems appropriate to name each as they all focus on different aspects of “satisfaction” that can be attributed to the concept of civic duty. Recognizing that Riker and Ordeshook (1968) did not see the D term as one broad concept, but rather a term that encompasses multiple elements can either mean we are dumbing down the term by considering it civic duty, or that our concept of civic duty is complex and multifaceted. Below I will examine each of these components and seek to identify how each component can be tied to mechanisms that have been associated with civic duty both in past and present literature.

**Ethic**

The ethic of voting according to Riker and Ordeshook (1968) claims that once socialized into democratic norms an individual will feel a duty to participate by voting. Not voting should generate an internal guilt, regardless of external pressure, once an individual is socialized into the democratic tradition. One way to operationalize this component would be to examine an individual’s support for the concept of democracy. Including such a factor in a model for civic duty would make sense, as we have seen how important appreciation for the constitution and form of government is in the classic works of Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau. These thinkers argue that a love of constitution is a critical component to the development of civic virtue, and that such virtue should take the form that best supports the current system of government. Voting in elections is the one universally accepted essential task of democracy, even in a minimal definition such as Schumpeter’s (1942). Whether sentiments about democracy fully capture this component, or merely predict it, including individual beliefs about democracy are
essential in a model for civic duty. And including variables derived from questions that ask one’s support for democracy and belief that the current government is a democracy would appear to be essential for any model of civic duty.

Allegiance

The second component for Riker and Ordershook (1968) is a sense of affirming allegiance to the political system. This component most closely resembles the love of country discussed by past thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle. To find satisfaction in affirming allegiance, an individual must first feel attached to their country. Questions such a degree of attachment to one’s country and the degree one loves their country can get at this requirement. Recent work by Galais and Blais (2015) identify the importance of this factor in influencing the relationship between civic duty and turnout. They find that a sense of civic duty to vote is moderated by the type of election an individual is voting in. In national and regional elections individuals have a stronger sense of duty to vote than supranational European elections. They further find that typical arguments of the perceived stakes of the elections do have an impact on these sentiments, but the stronger effect comes from a perceived sense of attachment.

The past classic works of Plato and Aristotle in addition to the recent finding of Galais and Blais (2015) indicate that Riker and Ordershook (1968) are correct when including allegiance as a critical component. And questions of attachment and love of country can capture this aspect. It is important to include both of these forms for preliminary analysis because, although similar, they may capture different sentiments. Love of country may differ from attachment in places like Germany due to the reluctance to exhibit high levels of patriotism
because of the legacy of nationalism within Germany. I will include both to account for this potential discrepancy.

Expression

The third component focuses on the satisfaction an individual gets by expressing their partisan preference through voting. Such partisan expression can require attachment to a given party or candidate. Although Blais and Achen (2010) argue that this component is one aspect that makes Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) concept of civic duty “too imprecise to be fruitful” they identify how an interaction of candidate preference and duty significantly effects turnout. Suggesting that candidate preference has a moderating effect. It is true that partisanship and preference are obvious factors when influencing turnout, but it can also be true that we are attributing to much effect to an independent relationship between partisanship and turnout. The relationship between partisanship and turnout may in fact be heavily determined by civic duty. Factors such as partisanship and preference may not affect turnout independently, but rather through mediated effects that go through civic duty. By identifying how these robust predictors effect turnout through civic duty may help us generate more accurate models.

Efficacy

A fourth component according to Riker and Ordeshook (1968) is affirming individual efficacy. This component could often seem overlooked, but including it makes sense as how can an individual feel the need to fulfill their duty if they believe such duty has no effect? The original Downsian calculus would identify that an individual vote does not matter. But could a broader belief in the efficacy of the voting populous and responsiveness of government still be
critical? Efficacy is more than believing your individual vote matters in determining an election. Although most likely never decisive, an individual vote matters in the aggregate, and so if an individual feels government is responsive to the people and they are capable of understanding the complexity of the political process, they can affirm their efficacy even without being a deciding vote. Efficacy is a broad concept that itself has many components. Neimi et al (1991) offer an extensive breakdown of the components of efficacy. There are broad categories that include internal efficacy, external efficacy, and trust. Internal efficacy tends to be measured using internal feelings about politics that include an individual’s degree of understanding and qualifications, along with how complex they feel the system is and how well informed they are. External efficacy tends to be captured in questions about the degree they believe politicians care about voters, the degree voters have a say, and whether government respects the voter. A final category that may also be included as external efficacy, are measures of trust in government. Efficacy is a broad concept, and as seen in Neimi et al (1991), this concept can require several variables to effectively capture it. But including it in a model for civic duty appears essential, because even though an individual may acknowledge that their vote alone may not matter, they may feel that government is responsive to the voters in the aggregate and that their vote can be one of many that shapes the direction of government.

**Social**

The final component may be the hardest to pin down and operationalize. Social satisfaction is a very ambiguous concept but would require social interaction to gain such gratification. If social interaction can be viewed as a requisite for social satisfaction than discussion of politics and contact with a campaign could be relevant to this component.
The influence of social pressure through group networks on turnout and participation has been thoroughly examined in the edited volume of Zuckerman (2005), where we see arguments that social interactions and interdependence can influence individuals to turnout. Nickerson (2008) finds a contagion effect within households, where if one member receives outside pressure to perform their civic duty and vote through a GOTV effort, the effect spills over to members of the household. Abrams, Iversen and Soskice (2010) find that voting does not have to be from an altruistic sense of civic duty but rather to seek social approval from a group network. These studies highlight the continued examination of the intermingling of social networks, civic duty, and turnout; and reinforce the need to include these interactions in a model for civic duty. The simplest way to model such interactions would be through a measure that captures the amount one discusses politics with friends, family, and colleagues.

Much of the social pressure literature focuses on the influence of individuals that have daily interaction with friends, family, or coworkers. But it is not just acquaintances that can apply social pressure, during elections campaigns can be an important social force. Campaigns are often argued to subsidize information for individuals by defining clear choices and offering information shortcuts. But a growing piece of the literature on campaigns finds that campaigns can also apply pressure socially. Like friends or family, campaigns can instill shame, pride, and offer social gratification for an individual. And the current experimental literature on campaigns has found significant support for such claims. In fact, the literature has done the most to connect civic duty and social pressure through the experiments that randomize who receives campaign mailers and the degree they reveal voting behavior. Recent developments in this experimental school for turnout have investigated the role of social pressure. Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) return to the role of mailers regarding increasing turnout. Although their past studies find
very little impact compared to face-to-face contact, when the mailers exert some degree of social pressure the effectiveness of mailers at increasing turnout becomes apparent. Mailers that convey a message of civic duty have positive effects compared to no form of pressure. This effect is increased as the pressure becomes more targeted towards the individual, and when there exists a perceived potential for others to find out. Mailers that state the individual is being monitored, the records are public, and the records of those in the household are printed on the mailer see an increase in likelihood of voting comparable to face-to-face contact. These results have been supported by an experiment conducted by Panagopoulos, Larimer, and Condon (2013) and a temporal analysis that combined the studies of a majority of the experiments conducted over the past two decades (Davenport et al. 2010). This recent literature on the social pressure campaigns can exert entails that campaign contact should also be examined as a factor involved in the social component described by Riker and Ordeshook (1968).

**Data and Analysis**

Rather than measuring civic duty through a battery of questions to ask, the approach in this section will utilize several responses to survey questions to generate a battery of indicators that best correlate and potentially influence civic duty. This is accomplished utilizing responses from the German Longitudinal Electoral Survey for 2013. There are many advantages to utilizing this survey. First this has been a study that has conducted panel surveys since 2002 and has refined their questions and offered more consistent carryover of questions from one panel to the next. This survey is conducted in a developed democracy and offers a most likely case for these components to have an impact, which can help identify spurious components and mechanisms to weed out. The structure of a longitudinal survey within a given election can help
to account for temporal dynamics, and greater opportunities to ask a number of ranging questions multiple ways. Finally, this survey is one of few longitudinal surveys that focus on elections, offering a better range of questions that are relevant to the study of civic duty.

Civic Duty

Civic duty is captured by using one of the most commonly asked questions for civic duty: “In a democracy it is the duty of all citizens to vote regularly in elections”. As discussed in Blais and Galais (2015), such a question has a host of problems. One of the most significant is that this may not actually capture the level of civic duty an individual has, but rather their opinion on voting and civic duty. While this may provide an issue of validity, much of this chapter seeks to embrace this complex issue and analyze whether responses to such a question can be supported by expected relationships with components of civic duty. And although this question specifically focuses on voting, the broader objective of this dissertation is to identify the effects civic duty has on turnout. Ultimately generating an index that can best capture civic duty is the goal, but by first utilizing this imperfect question, such an index can be established. The way civic duty is operationalized is through a question that asks the degree to which they believe it the duty of all citizens to vote regularly. This variable ranges from 0-4 and is used as a DV in the civic duty models later in this section.

Ethic

Democracy – A belief and love of constitution has been argued to be a fundamental component of civic duty. The German constitution is founded on democratic principles, and if an individual is supportive of the constitution and system of government we should see such support through
the belief in democratic forms of government. This support of democracy is captured by asking a respondent to “rate democracy compared to other state ideas”. The response ranges from 0 to 6 with 0 being worst conceivable and 6 being best conceivable.

Democracy Germany – Similar to the democracy variable, this variable seeks to capture an individual’s sentiments of the current system of government; but this variable differs in that it seeks to capture the belief their country is implementing such a system effectively, asking the question, “All in all, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with democracy in Germany?” The variable ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 being very dissatisfied and 4 being very satisfied.

Dictatorship – Does the ethic of voting entail a rejection of other systems as much as it entails an embracing of their own? The dictatorship variable seeks to address this, and is operationalized using the statement, “Under certain circumstances a dictatorship is the better form of government”. This variable ranges from 0 to 4 with 0 being strongly disagree and 4 being strongly agree.

Allegiance

Patriotism - The variable patriotism seeks to capture the love for country discussed in past philosophical works and the benefits from affirming allegiance to the system. This variable is operationalized using a question that asks the respondent the degree they are a proud German, with 0 being strongly disagree and 4 being strongly agree.
German Attachment – This is the second variable that seeks to capture allegiance and the love of country that is often attached to civic duty. But unlike partisanship, this variable seeks to disassociate a sense of pride from the response. This can be critical in the German case as nationalism and patriotism may be less easily expressed by Germans due to their historical experience of nationalism in WWI and WWII. This variable is constructed using the question: “People feel attached to Germany, Europe, their state and their community to a different degree. How about you? How strongly do you feel attached to…?” This variable ranges from 0 to 4 with 0 being not attached at all and 4 being strongly attached.

Expression
Partisanship - This variable seeks to capture part of the expression component, which articulates that there exist benefits from expressing a partisan preference. This variable is constructed from a question that asks if an individual feels close to a particular party and the degree they are attached to the party. The variable goes from 0 to 5. If an individual answered no they received a 0, 1 represents very weakly attached and 5 represents very strongly attached.

Merkel – Germany having a mixed electoral system, allows voters to vote both for party and individual candidate. Such a system allows voters to express partisan preferences both at the party and candidate level, and so constructing a variable that captures attachment to a candidate may have independent explanatory power beyond just party attachment. This variable is constructed from a feeling thermometer of current Prime Minister Angela Merkel and ranges from -5 to 5. The variable takes the absolute value of the response to capture degree of attachment both positive and negative.
**Efficacy**

Understanding - This variable seeks to capture internal efficacy and is constructed using a question that asks for a response that ranges from strongly disagree to strongly agree to the statement: “I am perfectly able to understand and assess important political questions”. This variable ranges from 0 to 4. 0 strongly disagree and 4 being strongly agree.

Confidence Discuss – This variable offers another way of capturing internal efficacy from the statement, “I am confident that I could actively participate in a conversation dealing with political issues”. This variable ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 being strongly disagree and 4 being strongly agree.

Politicians Care – Politicians care seeks to capture external efficacy and is constructed from the statement, “Politicians care about what ordinary people think”. This variable ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 being strongly disagree and 4 being strongly agree.

Federal Trust – Trust in government is often considered a component of external efficacy, and this federal trust variable seeks to capture this aspect of efficacy. This variable is constructed from a question that asks the degree the respondent trusts the federal government and ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 being no trust at all and 4 being fully trust.

Bundestag Trust – Trust in the federal government may be tied to the party in power, therefore it is important to include trust in the legislative branch of government. The expectation is that
partisans that do not support Merkel or the CDU may not trust federal government but do trust
the legislative branch where they have representation. This variable is constructed from a
question that asks the degree the respondent trusts the Bundestag. This variable ranges from 0 to
4, with 0 being no trust at all and 4 being fully trust.

Social
Discussion - Discussion of politics is a fundamental component to civic duty as it can create the
opportunity for increased social pressure, attachment, and efficacy. Theoretically discussion can
have several mechanisms that can include duration, number of discussions, and diversity of
discussants. To operationalize this variable, I utilize a question that asks how many days in the
past week an individual discusses politics with a friend, spouse, family, neighbor, coworker
respectively, ranging from 0 to 7. I total each response constructing a measure that ranges from
0 to 35. To gain more variation and capture duration dynamics I utilize the advantage of the
panel structure by including all 6 waves (6 weeks) of this question. By constructing it this way I
seek to capture dynamics that include frequency, number of discussion partners, and duration.

Campaign Info - Like the discussion variable, campaign info is constructed from a question that
asks the past weeks behavior. More specifically it is a dichotomous variable with 1 having
received some campaign information such a campaign pamphlet, email, or text; and 0 having not
received any information in the past week. To gain more variation I again utilize the advantage
of the panel structure by including all 6 waves (6 weeks) of this question.
Correlations and Test

Table 1 below is a correlation table that includes all variables. The variables are organized by the component they belong to. One advantage of using panel data is the ability to compare one variable at multiple time points, and this can accommodate a baseline of what high correlation would be by comparing civic duty at wave 7 with civic duty at wave 1. Interestingly, these are statistically different suggesting that civic duty is not some static ingrained concept, but rather a dynamic concept that can change within weeks. The correlation between civic duty at the first and last timepoint is 0.6. This can serve as a solid baseline to compare other correlations. Looking at the table it becomes evident no variable comes close to this level of correlation. It appears that the more highly correlated variables have a correlation between 0.2 and 0.3. What is also notable is that there is greater variation of correlation within components rather than between components. This may suggest that each component has relevance, but that some variables better capture the component than others. The only component that does not have a variable reach a correlation of 0.2 is the social component.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table D.1: Correlation with Civic Duty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethic</strong></td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>German Dem</td>
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<td>Dictator</td>
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Democracy, German Attachment, Partisanship, Understand, and Trust have the highest correlation with civic duty, and German Democracy and Patriotism have similar, but slightly smaller, correlation coefficients. From Table 1 it becomes evident that each component does appear to have a relationship with civic duty, with the social component having the smallest effect. It is also clear that some variables capture these relationships better than others. Table 2 takes the highest correlated variables and includes them in ordered logit models for civic duty.

Table 2 confirms the strength of these selected variables. The variables that capture the ethic, allegiance, partisan, and efficacy components are all significant, and remain significant when individual attributes like age, education, and income are introduced into the model, as seen in model 2. The social variables do not remain significant when such attributes are included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table D.2: Determinants of Civic Duty for the 2013 German Federal Election</th>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attachment</td>
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<td>Partisanship</td>
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<td>Understand</td>
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<td>Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>Campaign Info</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
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Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)
suggesting less of a substantial effect on civic duty. Figure 1 below shows the marginal effects from model 2 when civic duty is at the maximum value. Democracy has the largest substantive effect, going from a belief that democracy is the worst conceivable form (0) to a belief it is the best conceivable (6), increases the likelihood that an individual strongly agrees that voting is a duty (4) by 0.36, from 0.22 to 0.58. Understand exhibits the second strongest effect, going from strongly disagreeing (0) that they understand politics to strongly agreeing (4) increases the likelihood of strongly agreeing that voting is a duty by 0.27. This is followed by Attachment at 0.24, Partisanship at 0.21, and Trust at 0.17. As is expected Discussion and Campaign have the smallest effects.

Figure D.1: Marginal Effects for Duty at Max

These results support my claims that civic duty is complex and influenced by multiple components. But should we expect these components to remain equally important across elections and country? Table 3 compares the results from the 2013 German Federal Election,
with results from the 2009 German Federal Election and 2015 UK Parliamentary Election. These two elections were chosen to offer variation both temporally and by country\textsuperscript{14}. Testing these components in multiple elections shows the variation that can exist in the relationship between these components and civic duty. The coefficient for Democracy nearly doubles in the 2009 Germany model, but is nearly 0 for the 2015 UK model\textsuperscript{15}. While the impact of Democracy

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.33 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.61 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.03 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment</td>
<td>0.25 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.15 (0.08)**</td>
<td>0.18 (0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>0.17 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.10 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.26 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand</td>
<td>0.27 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.14 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.25 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.17 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.19 (0.07)*</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.09 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.12 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Info</td>
<td>0.12 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.12)**</td>
<td>0.18 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.10 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.06 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01 (0.00)**</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.03 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.07 (0.03)**</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3788</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>9739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R\textsuperscript{2}</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Std. Errors in Parentheses; * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests)

\textsuperscript{14} The Democracy and Attachment variables for the 2015 UK Parliamentary Election are different from the German models due to differences between surveys. Democracy for the 2015 UK model is constructed using a question asking the degree an individual is satisfied with democracy in Britain. Attachment is constructed using a question that asks the degree an individual feels proud to be a British citizen, a more traditional patriotism measure.

\textsuperscript{15} This is partially attributable to the different operationalization. But even when a similar form of the variable that asks the degree of satisfaction in Germany is included in the 2013 German model, this variable has a coefficient of 0.19. Indicating the Democracy has minimal impact in the 2015 UK model.
increased in model 2, *Attachment, Partisanship*, and *Understand* decreased. This indicates that the influence of such variables and components can vary greatly. With *Democracy* having a strong effect on duty in one election and country and a minimal effect in another; or partisanship going from a predictor outperformed by other variables, to one that has the strongest relationship.

**Discussion**

The results from this analysis indicate that sentiments about democracy, attachment to country, patriotism, partisanship, and perceived understanding are some of the strongest predictors of civic duty. These results conform to my theory as these can all be viewed as variables that either capture identity or capture the capacity to fulfill an obligation. Patriotism and partisanship reflect an attachment to country and party. This attachment can act very similar to an identity. Sentiments of democracy and perceived understanding can affect the degree an individual would believe that the act of voting can matter. If the individual does not believe in democracy or does not feel confident they understand politics, then a feeling of obligation to go out and vote should be expected to be diminished, as they may not feel capable of being effective with such an act.