Scale, Funding and the Law in Ukraine: Delocalizing Organizations and Impoverishing Movements

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SCALE, FUNDING AND THE LAW IN UKRAINE: DELOCALIZING ORGANIZATIONS
AND IMPOVERISHING MOVEMENTS

by

COLE VICTOR AKESON

B.A., Macalester College, 2005

A thesis submitted to the
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Scale, Funding and the Law in Ukraine: Delocalizing Organizations and Impoverishing Movements
written by Cole Victor Akeson
has been approved for the Department of Geography

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Date ____________________

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.

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Abstract

Akeson, Cole Victor (M.A., Geography)

Title: Scale, Funding and the Law in Ukraine: Delocalizing Organizations and Impoverishing Movements

Thesis directed by Associate Professor Elizabeth C. Dunn

This work seeks to answer three questions: 1) Why are measured levels of voluntarism in Ukraine significantly below those of relevant comparative settings? 2) What factors guide Ukrainians on whether or not to volunteer? 3) How are internationally framed expectations of voluntarism and civil society fulfilled or transformed on the regional and local scales in Ukraine? Contrary to previous related work, an open-ended ethnographic methodology opens new avenues of inquiry and reduces selective bias. The work reveals that voluntarism is hampered by a legal structure that dissuades nongovernmental organizations from pursuing volunteer-attractive projects. Furthermore, voluntary actions instead appear focused in practices that are poorly tracked in relevant metrics, such as participation in unregistered social movements. Conclusions include a need for a broader, more flexible definition of voluntarism than used in previous work, and the importance of the production and presentation of scale in influencing voluntarism and nongovernmental funding in Ukraine.
Dedication

To my parents, Craig and Deanna Akeson, for all the things you have done over the past 30 years to make this all possible. I never could have done it without you, in so many ways.

And to my grandparents, Carl and Merna Akeson, for instilling an interest in voluntarism from an early age.
Acknowledgements

Oftentimes we criticize academic work for lacking brevity. While I have attempted to take these criticisms to heart in this thesis, I would like to make an exception for this section. Many individuals helped me to gather information, plan logistics, compile data, conceptualize, write, edit and otherwise put this thesis together. All deserve my deepest gratitude; none of them are responsible for any errors I have made. Thank you all.

My profound gratitude goes to all the people in Ukraine who agreed to participate in my research. While their names are not mentioned here to protect their anonymity, their generosity with their time, connections, introductions, observations, and even homemade dolma not only made this research possible, but also helped me to fall in love with Ukraine.

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Notes on transliteration, toponomy and pseudonyms

Interviews and secondary research for this thesis were conducted in Ukrainian, Russian and English. Significant tensions persist in Ukraine regarding language choice and associated political debates. I have attempted to respect the preferred language and self-identification of my research participants, transliterating as necessary from their preferred language using the Library of Congress standard systems for Ukrainian and Russian.

Except where noted, I have used pseudonyms for participants and any organizations they represent to protect their anonymity in accordance with disciplinary ethical standards. As has become preferred in research on Ukraine, said pseudonyms were chosen to match the expressed linguistic and ethnic identities of the participants.

Certain exceptions to the mentioned transliteration rules have been made when another spelling has become more commonly recognized in English (i.e. “Chernobyl”) or clearer with modifications for phonetics or simplicity (e.g. “Yulia” rather than “Iulija”). However, a preference for “Kyiv” over the longer accepted “Kiev” has been maintained.
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I: Research Questions and Theoretical Context

As we roll through light traffic on Glybochyttska Street, Anton and Viktorya tell me their hopes to open Kyiv’s first homeless shelter and hopefully trade useful information. All patrons of a particular library for some weeks now, we discovered on a coffee break this particular day that we all were using the quiet space and free Internet for purposes related to voluntarism.

I had come to Kyiv to research why measured voluntarism lags in Ukraine compared to postsocialist European peers, and in postsocialist European states compared to many other areas of the world. For example, for the period 1999-2004, only 10.6% of Ukrainians reported that they had volunteered with at least one organization, versus 18.6% for post-2003 EU entry countries (i.e. Eastern European peers) and 28% for pre-2003 EU members1 (United Nations Volunteers 2010; World Values Survey 2009). To pursue this research, I was conducting interviews and occasional participant observation with NGOs and unregistered social movements (USMs) to learn what gaps the largely top-down, statistically focused previous research had missed.

Anton and Viktorya’s interests in voluntarism were more applied than mine. Normally focused on the expansion of their business, a weekly entertainment magazine, the couple had recently chosen to spend a portion of each workday committing their marketing skills and social networking to drumming up interest in a “home for adults without a home.” They had done well for themselves in recent years with the magazine and other ventures – a statement demonstrated by their well-running Japanese car, a distinct mark of the small Ukrainian middle class – but the especially hard economic period Ukraine entered in 2008 inspired them to do something for their compatriots as well. After consideration of what groups already exist – anti-AIDS organizations,

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1 See Table 1 on page 19 for further details, including additional comparison data and discussion of data reliability as relevant.
advocacy groups for economic and political transparency, orphanages, etc. – they concluded that the adult homeless had fallen through the cracks in both the “broad social problems” considered by other organizations, and the withdrawal from social welfare, especially in housing, by the state (cf. Phillips 2008, 18).

The couple readily admitted that they were naïve in designing their nascent project. They told anyone else who would listen that they wanted to start with a home at the edge of the Kyiv suburbs where they could provide not only basic shelter, but also rehabilitation for alcoholics and drug addicts; training in gardening, nutrition and cooking; domestic skills like ironing, washing up, and personal hygiene; and eventually administrative skills, including gradually handing over management of assignments to longer-term residents in preparation for reentering the workforce. The couple acknowledged that they would not be able to run the shelter themselves and would have to hire experienced NGO managers; they saw themselves as initial, and hopefully sustained, fundraisers. However, in regard to their application of their knowledge of marketing and business, they appeared not necessarily naïve as much as part of the trend toward discourses of self-reliance and free-market neoliberal ideals in international NGO development (Phillips 2008).

Unfortunately, Anton and Viktoriya’s plan hit an immediate snag with funding, the interests of potential domestic and international funders, and legal restrictions. Thus far, the pair had tried to coax commitments of donations or sponsorships from wealthy individuals and local businesses, but they were met with outright rejection, suspicion, questions of why companies would have any interest in the project, or commitments for nearly meaningless sums. Unable to attain commitments for seed funding from these local actors, their next step was to seek funding or other support from grant-giving organizations, which are typically international or domestic
agencies with predominantly international support (Palyvoda and Golota 2010). However, here Anton and Viktoria were in a catch-22: this funding would legally require registration of a civic association, which incurs significant payments for the paperwork and processing, as well as continual accounting and legal costs to document their finances to the state (Pro ob'ednannya hromadyan [On Civic Associations] 1992). Even without these costs, Anton and Viktoria would be caught by the fact that the opportunities for internationally derived funding are generally dictated through specific budgetary or grant directives from their multinational parent organizations, not open applications for local projects.

The pair expressed strong interest in voluntarism based in their personal desires to improve society and others’ lives despite the social mistrust and economic instability often prevalent in Ukraine. However, they have been thwarted in their particular efforts by limitations at every perceived scale, each under particular but interacting cultural and regulatory contexts: lack of local opportunities for funding, state restrictions that hamper further development, and international organizations with narrowly defined directives that exclude many nascent projects. These obstacles, both in connection to one another and separately, form part of an answer to the key question herein: why voluntarism in Ukraine significantly lags most European or Western states as well as the theoretical expectations in the research literature.

**Introduction and research questions**

More specifically, in this thesis I investigate why measured levels of voluntarism in Ukraine are significantly below those of most Western, postsocialist European or other post-authoritarian settings (CIVICUS 2009; Howard 2003; United Nations Volunteers 2010; World Values Survey 2009). Approaching the broad question from an alternative, bottom-up perspective, I ask why and how people choose whether to volunteer with civil society groups
(including by forming their own groups), thus hoping to illuminate trends in Ukrainian voluntarism that have been missed in the prevalent survey data. In more theoretical terms, I ask how internationally framed expectations of voluntarism and civil society are fulfilled or transformed on the regional and local scales in Ukraine.

Due to the reliance of previous work on these questions on large-scale, rote-response survey methodologies, I instead employed open-ended, semi-structured ethnographic interviews and participant observation of organizational events to encourage natural, non-rote responses from participants on the state of voluntarism in Ukraine. Participants were chosen via cold-calling and writing NGOs and USMs to ask if relevant people would be willing to discuss the research and a simple snowball method of following leads recommended by earlier participants. In total, 23 persons participated in in-depth interviews for the research.

The research questions raise theoretical issues about scale, politics and cross-cultural miscommunication in Ukraine that are currently topics of significant interest across the social science spectrum when considering the post-Soviet space. Since the end of the USSR, scholars, bureaucrats and NGOs originating in Western Europe and North America have attempted to foster the creation of a “civil society” in postsocialist Europe, including Ukraine, within the context of larger economic and political development initiatives. However, the success of these efforts has been seen as mixed at best. While the number of NGOs has indeed rapidly increased, including in Ukraine (Palyvoda and Golota 2010; Phillips 2008), the effect of these NGOs, both in terms of engaging the public through active voluntarism and more indirect polled support for NGO work, has generally not fulfilled expectations. Regarding voluntarism specifically, Ukraine has a number of voluntary memberships per person near the bottom of postsocialist

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2 More thorough details of the methodology and logistical preparations employed in this research can be found in Appendix 1 on page 133.
Europe. Moreover, the postsocialist European countries as a group lag both Western countries and other post-authoritarian states, contrary to expectations that organized voluntarism would blossom in the region following the Soviet collapse (Howard 2003).

In this thesis, I thus also seek to address one aspect of a key debate concerning postsocialist transformations in Europe – to what degree is the development of voluntarism vital to the development of civil society. In turn, I address the degree to which civil society groups, in particular NGOs and USMs by Ukrainian legal definitions, successfully engage local needs and/or fulfill international and national directives. To outline the theoretical rationale for my study in this chapter, I focus first on debate about the nature and importance of civil society, then on explanations for the dearth of voluntarism measured in comparison to Western scholarly and policy expectations. Finally, I explore reasons why Ukraine is a promising case study for exploring these issues, as well as highlighting other geopolitical and geocultural features of Ukraine that influence this thesis.

**Definitions of civil society in the West and the postsocialist space**

First and foremost, the term “civil society” is problematic in itself. This term is fraught with historical ambiguity as different scholarly schools have chosen to reinterpret its meaning. Most broadly, it can refer to all social organizations between the scales of the family and the state that is voluntary in nature (unlike those resultant from coercive state mandates). Marx treated civil society – in this full range of possible meaning – as an illusion, the counterpart of the state that masks class exploitation through patriotic appeal and a cloak of individual choice to participate (Hann 1996). Alternatively, Tocqueville narrowly defines civil society as politically motivated organizations and actions only, seeing a human tendency toward open association as a positive that eases and improved the relationship between the state and citizens (De Tocqueville
that is currently popular in political science and sociology, especially in analyses of the postsocialist transition in Eastern Europe (Hann 1996).

Moreover, civil society in the liberal-individualist tradition has been seen as one of the critical components of a successful democracy, a means of conveying shared values and commitments between citizens and the state, with civic engagement the conglomeration of actions that drive civil society (cf. Howard 2003; Putnam 1995; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Coupled with the common belief that a transition from socialism to capitalist democracy could be a steady, linear path (Badescu and Uslaner 2003), the creation of a strong civil society has been presumed to be both a goal and a byproduct of the postsocialist transition. In turn, democracy (supported by civil society) has been a key priority for Western policy circles in influencing postsocialist transformations in Eastern Europe. See, for example, the fears of former US Secretary of State James Baker regarding the future of the post-Soviet space should democracy fail:

The simple fact is we have a tremendous stake in the success of the democrats here. Their success will change the world in a way that reflects both our values and our hopes. What may be at stake is the equivalent of the postwar recovery of Germany and Japan as democratic allies, only this time after a long Cold War rather than a short, hot one. The democrats’ failure would produce a world that is far more threatening and dangerous, and I have little doubt that if they are unable to begin to deliver the goods, they will be supplanted by an authoritarian leader of the xenophobic right wing. (1995, 535-536)

This linear march toward an imagined Western model has stretched across different categorized spheres of society: a political system based in representative democracy; an economic system based in regulated capitalism (though the guides often suggested a more neoliberal, unregulated model than the Western countries themselves offered); and a social life offering strong civil society, a plethora of robust nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations, and
broadly defined freedom of expression. Often, this is expressed in terms of shared history between Western and postsocialist states, especially compared to “success story” countries with fewer commonalities. For example, Schifter states:

> Before 1945, Russia certainly had been exposed to democratic thought and the spirit of the Enlightenment far more than had Japan. Experience has shown that that thought and that spirit can surmount geographic and cultural barriers (2009, 256).

However, as in modernization theories more broadly (cf. Featherstone 1993), metaphors of time, a one-way path and bullet points of shared historical development have been privileged over appreciation for unique spatial or cultural contexts. Dunn’s comment on the Polish transformation could be applied across the topical literature:

> “Overwhelmingly, the idea that change for the good equals more like Western Europe or the United States has become the backbone of the ‘transition’ in Poland. The idea of convergence, or getting back on the ‘road to Europe,’ has been the driving metaphor of the postsocialist transformation” (2004, 162 emphasis in original)

This simplistic modeling of postsocialist development, including civil society, has been deemed “transitology,” an analytical and policy-oriented paradigm that has tended to conceive postsocialist transformations as a progression toward a natural, known, and specific end (i.e., from centralized socialist economies toward market-based, Western-style democracies)” (Verdery 1996, 228).

Alternatively, in 1980s Eastern Europe civil society came to be a symbol for all the Western trappings that the socialist states were perceived to lack, in particular the benefits of a system that incorporates views coming directly from the masses (Hann 1996). The communist parties worked to prevent the development of civil society in terms of politically unallied social groups, the freewheeling nature of which would be a direct threat to the monopoly on public discourse held by the parties. Civil society came to represent a reformist rise from the bottom of
society, as opposed to the attempts to reform from the top that had been prevalent throughout the socialist period (Tismaneanu 2001). Adamishin, then a Soviet government official, treats the relaxation of restrictions on such groups as a key moment for the Soviet Union:

Gorbachev’s relaxation of government control precipitated the appearance of thousands of civic associations, clubs, and movements. *For the first time in their lives, people could join together to form informal voluntary organizations.* Conservative circles in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) demanded compulsory registration of public organizations as well as legal norms regulating foreign aid to voluntary societies. The issue was brought to a divided Politburo. Gorbachev was on top of the situation and he instructed the Ministry of Justice to elaborate a basic law. Voluntary organizations must not be closed down, he said, and they could work without bylaws. In his mind, the public associations would become the foundation of the new social-political system. (2009, 120)

While developing forms of civil society has been propped up as an answer to the flaws of the socialist regimes both in the then socialist sphere and by the transitologists afterward, some scholars suggested that forms of civil society were in fact already operating in Eastern Europe, “not just as a conventional clandestine adversary but as a visible cultural and existential counterimage of communism’s unique hegemonic project” (Di Palma 1991, 49). On the one hand, this could be viewed as a sign that democracy could quickly flower in the soil of already emergent groups – first hidden, and then sanctioned – when the socialist regimes fell. It was exactly this interpretation of civil society as the answer to the socialist system, founded in Tocquevillian thought and composed by thinkers in both the capitalist and socialist regions, that caused a rekindling of interest in civil society in the West, regardless of the somewhat problematic and ideologically influenced definitions (Di Palma 1991; Tismaneanu 2001). However, in practice, the revolutions did not have the intended results. Rather, “unleashed in the name of a ‘return to Europe’ and the ‘rebirth of civil society,’ the revolutions of 1989 [not only] liberated democratic passions and commitments, [but also liberated] isolationist, xenophobic,
illiberal, anti-Western energies and resentments” (Tismaneanu 2001, 989). Furthermore, the practice of civil society emerged as significantly less strong than expected. Alexeyeva speaks of the Russian experience:

> An active civil society, which seemed to appear out of nowhere in Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union of 1989-90 after the long Soviet hibernation, receded far too quickly. The astounding difficulty of daily survival following the Soviet collapse trapped most Russians into focusing on their families’ most urgent needs. Civic apathy set in. (2010)

Hann has offered the clearest summary of how civil societies are significantly more complicated in practice and should not be ideologically assumed to support the democratic project (1996). He suggests that civil society should be deconstructed, as “the term is riddled with contradictions and the current vogue predicated on a fundamental ethnocentricity,” with the reality of civil society’s conceptual inadequacy hidden by the lack of observation of or even interest in “informal interpersonal practices” by less ethnographically focused disciplines (Hann 1996, 1). Furthermore, this indicates that a focus on civil society through institutions thus misses a significant array of practices, especially outside the expected venues of registered government and commerce, that show a form of civil society already existing in the socialist era. As Phillips states:

> Assuming that civil society as such was absent in the Soviet Union disregards the importance of Soviet-era networks that enabled citizens to come by scarce goods, obtain documents, enjoy special privileges, and generally sidestep or undermine state restrictions. (Phillips 2008, 68)

Leading from this train of thought, I highlight assumptions regarding the ideal function of civil society in light of the rather different real outcomes, specifically focusing on recurring themes of voluntarism and civic engagement, trust, and the influence of funders on civil society organizations. One key facet of these assumptions, and the resultant gaps in previous literature, is the presumption that voluntarism will manifest solely or predominantly in officially registered
and defined voluntary organizations, either due to the previous preconceptions of the nature of voluntarism or due to the ease in measuring voluntarism through registered groups. However, as the fieldwork will show, this presumption recurringly fails to adequately represent voluntarism in Ukraine either generally or even in a narrower Tocquevillian definition, the archetypal gold standard of civic engagement and association often used in the literature.

**Voluntarism, civic engagement, trust and foreign support**

Civic engagement is usually vaguely defined as an individual’s actions to address public issues. Voluntarism is a subset of civic engagement: labor performed of one’s own free will, free of coercion. Generally (and for the purposes of this thesis), voluntary labor is also defined as not being linked to direct remuneration, though the edges of this definition fray when one speaks of supply costs or per diems, as discussed by research participants later in this work. Voluntarism to support civil society groups is, along with philanthropy, the most obvious form of civic engagement and often one of the forms of civic engagement considered easiest to measure in a meaningful way.

Furthermore, voluntarism is considered a key indicator of the success of civil society in the general population and particularly relevant in postsocialist Europe. However, as with the importance of civil society to building a successful democracy (and economy), the vital role of voluntarism in breathing life into civil society is often poorly established – oftentimes, especially outside academic work on the subject, the value of voluntarism is simply accepted. Most often, the opportunity cost to the individual in providing free labor to society and/or the state is most

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3 Also note the purposeful use in this work of the term “voluntarism” as opposed to “volunteerism,” a more recently coined term. While the former traditionally refers to all voluntary labor, the latter, at least in earlier usage, referred more to the act and culture of being a volunteer, particularly in institutional settings. In this thesis, I have tried to use more precise and explicit terms when referring to this concept. The separation of these two words, however, has rather degraded in contemporary writing, and, while I use “voluntarism” as defined, the willy-nilly creep of “volunteerism” into texts both appropriately used and inappropriately used does lead to some use of the latter term in quoted sources.
often ignored; rather, the importance to societal development and state stability or efficacy is emphasized, especially in cases of financially weaker states. As stated by United Nations Volunteers, arguably the world’s most prominent voluntary organization:

Service to others is most important when the State is not strong enough to provide essential services, such as in the health and education sectors. Although these services were quite strong throughout the Region under socialism, they have greatly weakened in many areas since 1990. (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 38).

The causes of the significantly lower voluntarism figures both in postsocialist Europe and Ukraine specifically are disputed. For the Ukrainian case, Kuzio suggests that “the economic infrastructure to support development of a middle class – the foundation of modern civil society – does not yet exist in post-Soviet countries” (1999, 5), though in another piece he and colleagues suggest that the Ukrainian state may have been actively opposing development of a civil society that could raise questions about the state’s conduct (D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio 1999). Howard has offered the most complex answer to the question on a regional basis with a multivariate statistical analysis of Russian, East German and West German responses, determining that:

Three main causal factors are responsible, and all three involve people’s ongoing reinterpretations of prior and present experiences. These factors consist of (1) people’s prior experiences with organizations, and particularly the legacy of mistrust of formal organizations that result from the forced participation in communist organizations (2) the persistence of informal private networks, which function as a substitute or alternative for formal and public organizations, and (3) disappointment with the new democratic and capitalist systems today, which has led many people to avoid the public sphere. (2003, 180)

These results go against the prevailing wisdom of the early postsocialist period, stating that “those people who avoided or opposed communist organizations should be eager to participate now that the communist system no longer exists, and that people who were active in the communist system should be more resigned and passive today” (Howard 2003, 174).
However, it also makes sense if viewed from a perspective that considers social values separately from political/ideological allegiances – those who were interested and engaged in the Soviet era may remain interested and engaged in their communities in the postsocialist era, while those who were disinterested (or even disillusioned) before have not yet been given any impetus to change by the mixed results of the recent governments.

Several other studies all relate the low rates of voluntarism or civic engagement more broadly to a lack of generalized trust in institutions and/or strangers (Bartkowski 2003; Gibson 2003; Hayoz and Sergeyev 2003; Uslaner 2003; Uslaner and Badescu 2003; Sapsford and Abbott 2006). Hayoz and Sergeyev point out that many postsocialist citizens have little reason to trust institutions as their fairly limited exposure to institutions outside the state is likely limited to more nefarious forms of organization, such as the mafia (2003). Along the same lines, Uslaner and Badescu note that the socialist system taught citizens to be distrustful of their neighbors (2003), while Uslaner notes that the development of trust often requires first establishing a sense of optimism harbored through increased economic equality (2003). Sapsford goes further, stating that trust in society has broken down to a point of completely lacking confidence in interacting with institutions:

“What is being described here is an atomised society, one in which trust is confined to small local pockets of interaction. Culturally shared templates are no longer appropriate for guiding behaviour in the changed socioeconomic and cultural contexts, and there is no confidence in the social or economic future or in the institutions which are being created or developed” (2006, 61)

In all cases, the authors conclude that the postsocialist states currently lack the requisite traits that allow civic engagement to flourish in the West, traits which are neither easy nor inexpensive to develop.
Only more recently have studies started to appreciate the unique historical/geographic contexts around voluntarism across the region, as under socialism, “volunteer traditions that existed throughout the Region were varyingly embraced, transformed or suppressed” (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 11). Documented reactions to the usual state monopolies on philanthropy and voluntarism varied, with some reflecting positively on the state-controlled nature of such activity and/or its results for the community and participants, while others suggest that “the centrally controlled nature of much of this activity and the frequently weak state accountability of charitable funds” has left negative impressions and even suspicion “about current state involvement in volunteer programmes” (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 11). Moreover, a certain cynicism toward the act of voluntarism can be derived from the unpaid labor for the state apparatus and state-owned corporations in the early transition years, seen as a form of “volunteer” labor for which people deserve provision, at the very least a pension, but often received little or no remuneration (Phillips 2008).

Furthermore, the lack of voluntarism has not prevented NGOs from appearing throughout the postsocialist space, as previously mentioned. Since the end of socialism, postsocialist organizations have received significant funding from foreign donors resulting in mixed results. Sundstrom notes that NGOs catering to universally or locally relevant cultural values – as opposed to organizations promoting Western values not shared by host cultures – succeed best at fulfilling their mandates, whether locally or internationally managed (Sundstrom 2006). However, she also notes that “most authors in this growing field concur on several points… that democracy assistance tends to be structured as a universal template that donors assume to be equally applicable in any democratizing environment; that it is implemented in a manner that is too directive and closed to influence from actors in local contexts; and that it often supports very
narrow constituencies of Westernized intellectuals, to the neglect of the vast majority of the public in countries that receive assistance” (Sundstrom 2006, 13). Thus, it seems that part of the disappointing return on civic engagement is not necessarily caused by the local culture – rather, there is also an element of Western money being mismatched to causes that are of little or no interest.

**Voluntarism and institutions: Both limited definitions**

Under socialism, the various regimes created programs to utilize – and often mandate – “voluntary” behavior, ranging from short-term assignments in manual labor to longer-term service as part of educational requirements (United Nations Volunteers 2010). The consequences of these practices for voluntarism today have only recently been considered in the literature, including large-scale surveys to investigate the lagging voluntarism indicators. While this unpaid labor may appear in postsocialist hindsight to have been a cynical or totalitarian method of conscripting labor inherently disconnected from liberal voluntarism, it should be remembered that the relationships between labor, wages and services should be analyzed in the context of the command economy system. For instance, the inclusion of service requirements in educational courses could be viewed in light of the “free” provision of education – effectually, students’ labor was one form of compensation for state education. I do not argue that this is the case; however, it is important to know that this general idea remains in the minds of some research participants, either as a supportive factor or a cautionary tale toward “voluntarism” given the region’s recent history. For instance, recent ethnographic work has provided both positive and negative reactions to this system (Petryna 2002; Phillips 2008). Additionally, the inculcated values can promote voluntarism as well as cause hesitation:
All countries in the Region experienced various forms of unpaid work programmes during the socialist era. Though some of these models cannot precisely be called ‘volunteerism’ due to a certain level of state imposition, these activities did encourage the development of pro-social mindsets, on which the development of a volunteer culture depends, and which serve, or could serve, to encourage volunteerism today. Indeed, often people viewed their involvement as the realization of their inner convictions and personal motivations to help others and to support the development of their society. A collectivist ethic was fostered that remains, albeit in a weakened form, among the older generations” (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 13).

The classic example of fully or partially forced unpaid labor has been the subbotnik, which has continued as a voluntary activity (though perhaps strongly encouraged by one’s neighbors, skirting the edges of coercion) in many post-Soviet spaces today. “Throughout many parts of the Region, a subbotnik was (and still is in some of the successor States) a day of unpaid work, usually carried out on a Saturday in order to support some sort of public works project or cause” (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 11). The word itself comes from a diminutive form of the Russian word for Saturday, subbota.

“Communist subbotniks became obligatory political events in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, and an annual ‘Lenin’s Subbotnik’ was regularly held around Lenin’s birthday on 22 April. Subbotniks, through the mass participation that they garnered, were an effective way of mobilizing people to support localized development needs. They also served to encourage collectivism and identification with socialist ideals. This mass participation was shaped by a multitude of organizations, mainly focused at youth, whose purpose it was to support Communist Party initiatives in building the State, the economy and its culture” (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 11, italics in original).

Subbotnik participants do not uniformly view their experiences with bitterness about their stolen time and labor. Petryna tells of one participant’s fond memories:

Halia spoke proudly of herself as a subbotnyk (Saturday volunteer). With a red ribbon tied around her arm, she joined other subbotnyky raking leaves around apartment blocks, picking up garbage on the main streets of the city, painting walls, and planning flowers in public gardens. Being a subbotnyk made Halia feel socially well regarded. The voluntary activity also provided vital time away from the domestic pressures of the kvartyra [apartment]. ‘No one has time to work in a public garden anymore,’ she said” (2002, 198, italics in original)
Thus, as with the definitions of civil society earlier discussed, we see that definitions of voluntarism may be more muddled and varied than expected from the perspective of the civil society literature – and this may have consequences for how people view voluntarism today.

Hence, this kind of ‘volunteerism’ played a very significant part in the life of the Region’s people, and a signification proportion of the infrastructure was built in this way. But was it volunteerism? What motivated people to participate, to the extent that they had any choice at all? Certainly, some forms of state-instigated ‘voluntary’ action amounted to human rights abuses. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Ukraine, during which people were recruited or volunteered to participate in the rescue operation without being informed about the risks of exposure, is one of the starkest examples. (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 12)

UNV defines voluntarism as “a form of social behaviour that is undertaken freely, without financial motivation, and in order to primarily benefit others” (2010, 8). If we consider a definition of voluntarism that is not limited to structural, institutional action but rather also considers voluntarism among personal networks, voluntarism suddenly seems much more widespread in formerly socialist Europe (United Nations Volunteers 2010). However, most of the preceding literature on these topics has largely focused on the NGO as the basic unit of civil society throughout the postsocialist region. The realization of their establishment, support, and eventual self-sufficiency have been the material and monetary processes through which Western states have pushed their ideology of the role of civil society in postsocialist transformation. By the same token, measurement of NGOs – sometimes by metrics as simple as a count of NGOs registered – have become the measure of “strength” of a civil society, even to the exclusion of other factors (Phillips 2008).

As such, a study that includes voluntarism slightly more broadly – beyond institutional voluntarism with NGOs, the kind most often measured – has potential to provide a more robust understanding of voluntarism in postsocialist states. Furthermore, as discussed in the following chapters, the legal regimes of postsocialist states often make NGOs a fairly limited venue in
which to measure forms of voluntarism as myriad forms occur outside such organizations. It is thus a bit ironic that NGOs are so often the primitive unit through which we measure civil society, as the registered NGOs may not be the best form of organization in which to look for the Tocquevillian, liberal-individualist goals “to decentralize political power and increase civic participation in formerly socialist countries from the ‘bottom up’” (Phillips 2008, 68). Furthermore, such definitions and resultant metrics are often not ideal in varied international contexts. UNV considers that forms of voluntarism may be lost or incomparable under disparate conditions:

In Western countries, for example, unpaid work done within the family or for private gain is not considered volunteering; rather, there must be a public service dimension to the activity. In many countries, however, ‘the family’ does not have clear boundaries; ‘private’ is not so easy to distinguish from ‘public’; and ‘work’ is not so clearly separated from ‘private life.’ As a result, survey attempts to measure absolute levels of volunteering for a given country – much less an entire region – may vary widely. (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 18)

Finally, we must consider that voluntarism is always evolving in new forms. For instance, in Western states there are now also volunteers who perform all of their action online (Dawson 2010), as well as voluntary groups that have emerged from the financial crisis to combine voluntarism with keeping participants’ job skills sharp and visible (Huffington 2009). Online-related voluntarism and broader civic engagement in particular has been drawing attention in the postsocialist space. Alexeyeva, for example, speaks of the online sphere in organizing voluntary resistance to the state in Russia:

There are also other signs of awakening civic engagement, which are particularly evident in Internet discussions, which the Kremlin cannot control in the same way that it does other Russian media. Citizens have started to use the Internet for self-organization, for example, to generate simultaneous “flash mobs,” as well as protests by automobile owners, in different cities…. The federal government and regional authorities are clearly alarmed by this rapidly growing civic activism. But despite changed conditions, they respond with the same old methods — suppression, intimidation and misinformation. With elections to the State Duma in
December 2011, followed by the presidential election in March 2012, officials are particularly concerned by an upsurge of civic activism. (2010)

As predicted, online organizational tools – including Twitter, LiveJournal, Facebook, Odnoklassniki and VKontakte – have become critical tools for the Russian opposition and facilitate, if not define, forms of voluntarism beyond any particular NGO. Last but not least, we must remember that voluntarism varies in the degree to which it is political or politicized, and that politically charged voluntarism has occasionally drawn the ire of governments across countries and scales.

Overall, the transitology literature has failed to produce testable hypotheses or policies for the development specifically of voluntarism across the postsocialist space, despite the cornucopia of theory and empirical studies on democratization, civil society, civic engagement and the development thereof. Rather, as stated by United Nations Volunteers:

“‘Hidden volunteering’ probably dwarfs the kinds of ‘visible’ volunteering that is typically recorded by cross-national studies such as the WVS [World Values Survey]. Certainly, most volunteering in the East takes place outside the familiar context of service-providing VIOs (volunteer involving organizations)” (2010, 25)

Why Ukraine?

Ukraine was chosen as the fieldwork focus of this research because of the country’s particularly low voluntarism indicators and because the country’s history from the late socialist period onward presents several unique narratives that make the investigation of postsocialist European voluntarism particularly relevant. Ukraine – along with the Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus – reports the lowest overall levels of voluntarism across indicators in postsocialist Europe (United Nations Volunteers 2010).
Additionally, Ukraine has been overshadowed in the literature on the intersection of postsocialist studies and civil society, particularly by Poland and Russia, despite its large population and geopolitical role between Russia and Europe. Kubicek elaborates:

Ukraine has largely been overlooked in the burgeoning literature on postcommunist societies, as scholars prefer to study the ‘success’ stories of Eastern Europe or the presumably more important case of Russia. This is unfortunate, because Ukraine is a country of immense importance. It is the second largest of the Soviet successor states and occupies an important geo-strategic position between the states of Central Europe clamoring to join NATO and Russia. While the issue of its nuclear status has finally been resolved, it still has great importance as a buffer between Russia and the rest of Europe. A stable, peaceful, democratic Ukraine is commonly asserted to be a guarantor of stability in the region, a bulwark against any would-be Russian expansionism. A weak, unstable, divided Ukraine, however, could invite regional stability and conflict.

To the extent that Ukraine’s troubled economy and the inability of the political authorities to respond to the needs and interests of its citizens constitute a prime danger to Ukraine’s very future as a sovereign state, the study of civil society and political and economic reform in Ukraine is timely and important (Kubicek 2000, 3)

While understudied relative to its neighbors, Ukraine also presents a striking variant of the postsocialist dearth of civic engagement. That Ukraine would be the site of declining civic engagement is ironic considering that the republic was the base of the most prolonged act of civil disobedience of the Soviet era, the Donbas miners’ strikes against mistreatment of miners’ families’ benefits by Ukrainian Soviet officials (Mykhnenko 2003). Nonetheless, measured voluntarism had actually dropped since the Soviet era to 2000 in terms of voluntary associations per individual (Kubicek 2000). In 2010, the World Giving Index survey reported that only 14% of Ukrainians reported engaging in voluntary charitable work, while 19% stated that they helped their neighbors and only 5% engaged in philanthropy (World Giving Index 2010). World Values Survey (WSV) and Civicus Civil Society Index (CSI) data are more positive, but it should be noted in particular that the CSI data are drawn from a combination of civil society organizations on the number of volunteers they engaged in combination with somewhat opaquely
defined “representative surveys” of the general population on voluntary involvement. As such, the data may be skewed more positively due to the greater reliance on interested civil society actors. Also note that the WVS data shows a distinct preference for voluntarism outside of the context of formal organizations.
Table 1: Voluntarism statistics reported by World Values Survey, Civicus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>CIVICUS Civil Society Index 2009 Percentage of population:</th>
<th>World Values Survey 1999-2004 Percentage of population:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of civil society organization (CSO)</td>
<td>Taken part in collective community action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia i Herzegovina</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>35% in one CSO</td>
<td>20% participated in community activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>13.71% in more than once CSO</td>
<td>28.5% participated in community meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>45% more than one CSO</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia (without Kosovo)</td>
<td>56% one CSO</td>
<td>17% participated in community meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>21% one CSO</td>
<td>13% participated in community meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>48.4% participated in community meetings or activities</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU: 2003-entry countries</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU: Pre-2003-entry countries</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With formatting changes, this table replicates Table 1 from *Understanding Volunteerism for Development in South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Lessons for Expansion*. Additionally, note that data among countries are not always directly comparable due to different survey compositions – in particular, the Ukrainian CSI figure is affected by a very broad definition of voluntarism through participation in a “community action” that may be misleading.

Sources: (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 20; CIVICUS 2009; World Values Survey 2009)
Palyvoda’s survey data indicate that organizations are working with volunteers at a relatively stable level based on a broad, simple participation metric (i.e. have they used volunteers in the past year):

For the last eight years [from 2009 numbers], the level of volunteer involvement in CSO activities has been static. This year, the number came in at 76% while previous years recorded 77% in 2005, 73% in 2004, and 78% in 2002…. In 74% of organizations surveyed, volunteers are usually students.” (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 10)

On average, 27 volunteers work in a single CSO over the course of a year. Such a high average index is due to the fact that several larger organizations have significantly larger numbers of volunteers. This in turn affects the average indicator for the sector. If we remove data for one organization that reported 6,000 volunteers, the average indicator per CSO is 13 people…. The result of the research during 2009 shows us that in most CSOs volunteers are students (74%). Only in some organizations, volunteers are clients (40%), unemployed people (13%), housewives (7%), and others (17%)” (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 38)

Situation, site and Ukraine as social ecotone

In broader terms, Ukraine also offers a particular platform for studying voluntarism, civil society, etc., in a geographic situation at the center of a range of geopolitical rivalries and consequentially competing discourses. The state is culturally, politically and geographically situated between a constellation of post-Soviet peers influenced by a reinvigorated Russia and an expanding European Union (O'Loughlin 2000). This situation is hardly new: underlying currents of history and historiography continue to churn regarding relationships with Russia, Poland, Germany, fellow successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and competing factions of Orthodox (Kyiv Patriarchate, Moscow Patriarchate and Ukrainian Autocephalous) and Catholic (primarily Ukrainian Greek Catholic) churches. The situation is further complicated by the

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The Palyvoda survey was given to “civil society organizations” as defined by two Ukrainian laws. For our purposes here, the definition falls in line with NGOs, though this does not match the Ukrainian legal definition, which excludes so-called “charitable organizations” from the terms Palyvoda defines as NGOs.
cultural and economic influence of the Ukrainian diaspora, which often carries crystallized ideals from a mix of history and idealization-in-exile and has been noted, like many immigrant communities, for particularly close social ties and voluntarism within the community (see, for example, the stories of communal activities in Smith, Perks, and Smith 2001).

A study on voluntarism, especially when not focused on democratization or other political reforms, hardly seems a topic subject to politicization or historiography. In practice, however, conducting qualitative research on nearly any topic seems unable to escape consideration of the crisis (or crises) of post-Soviet identity and geopolitical alignment that have become a dominant theme in the present Ukrainian zeitgeist, especially when choosing where and in which language to conduct research.

Internally, Ukraine, perhaps more than anywhere else in postsocialist Europe, represents a region of combination and competition between the paths of development followed by Western Europe and its new East-Central European partners, and the development of Russia and other formerly Soviet republics (the Baltic states being the key exceptions). In this regard, a parallel may be drawn to what the biological sciences call an “ecotone,” a zone of transition between two different plant communities (Graves, Wang, and Hogan 2010). In an ecotone, plant communities may gradually or sharply transition, while in Ukraine divisions between political, religious, national and even linguistic factions are often more nuanced than the simple two- and three-way splits first observed. Ukraine also bears similarity to the “edge effect” of increased biodiversity seen in ecotones (Graves, Wang, and Hogan 2010), as research can and does occur in a diverse milieu of languages – languages linked to titular groups, and others representing hybrids between – and in settings where a topic as seemingly benign as voluntarism can be pulled into constructs of national and political debate.
In particular, this research was unquestionably influenced by the timing of the bulk of the interviews in July-August 2009, after the 2004 Orange Revolution and in the late period of the Yushchenko presidency and the relevant dominance of the so-called Orange factions that rallied around him in 2004. The revolution resulted in a still ongoing, dramatic battle between an oligarchy of politicians and businessmen traditionally allied with Russia and newer (or, by the reckoning of some, turncoat) factions seeking to move toward NATO and the EU. The role of the revolution in influencing opinions of civic engagement broadly comes up time and time again in the interviews, as well as in the academic and popular literature (Kaskiv, Chupryna, and Zolotariov 2007; Kulick 2006; Kuzio 2006; Krushelnycky 2006). For example:

“During the days of the protests a friend from Kyiv wrote to me that, in contrast to the usual cynical mood regarding politics, for the first time she saw faces beaming with hope and optimism, and she felt herself swept up in the atmosphere of generosity and good-will among the people in the streets of the city” (Bilaniuk 2005, 196)

However, the influence of the revolution was by no means all positive (or negative) on desires to volunteer; rather, its legacy on the ground is much more mixed than commonly summarized, especially in English media accounts. By mid-late 2009, a broad perception of failure around Yushchenko and the broad Orange alliance had emerged, stemming from the failure to prosecute various oligarchs or the inner circle of former President Leonid Kuchma (especially the inability to find the murderer of journalist Georgiy Gongadze), the pyrrhic sacrifices of progress made in spats between Yushchenko and Orange partner Yulia Tymoshenko, and other factors. In this regard, the course of Orange rule had set an often expressed, occasionally implied mix of former hope and present disappointment over discussions of voluntarism and its meanings that was far less pervasive in earlier studies and media accounts nearer to the events of late 2004 (Phillips 2008). Continued monitoring and updating through
both secondary sources and discussions with research participants via Internet voice applications, e-mail and social networking services continued into mid-2012, well past the election of Orange foe Viktor Yanukovych as president and the defeat of the Orange splinter factions in parliamentary elections.

Additionally, the Ukrainian public is exposed to the trials and tribulations of the state and NGOs through the environmental discourses surrounding the highly publicized Chernobyl disaster and aftermath (see Wanner 1998; Petryna 2002), offering avenues of inquiry beyond the usual choice of democratization. As a consequence of the Chernobyl disaster, Ukraine has a community of environmental NGOs and a broader public awareness of environmental issues that is more advanced than that of most countries within the post-Soviet space. The particular emphasis upon environmental NGOs examines a key question concerning both post-Soviet and other developing regions, how to encourage political and economic development while also repairing previous environmental degradation and preventing further degradation from processes of industrialization that disregard the environmental concerns increasingly pushed by the international community.

Situating geographically in Kyiv and Lviv

I further specified the research predominantly to Kyiv specifically because the city is the focal point of both the state and NGOs in Ukraine, and thus the most opportunistic place to begin research. However, the primary focus on Kyiv also means that similar research in other Ukrainian spaces could produce different results, which should be acknowledged. As can be seen in Table 2: Populations of leading Ukrainian cities, 2001, Kyiv is by far the largest city in Ukraine, and is of course the capital city of Ukraine. Furthermore, the city is by far the most
actively integrated into world economic networks in Ukraine (The World According to GaWC 2008 2008), which is a key consideration when most Ukrainian NGOs are still largely dependent on foreign funding (Palyvoda and Golota 2010). As a partial result of these factors, the Kyiv region simply has more active, registered NGOs than other administrative regions of Ukraine (Palyvoda and Golota 2010). While reliable data are not available, it is likely that Kyiv also has the greatest number of social movements and volunteers as a corollary of these listed factors. Similarly, participants in civil society groups in Kyiv may come from all across the country due to the city’s primate status, offering the best opportunity for learning about views elsewhere within the logistical limits of one city. Lastly, Kyiv is generally considered less partisan in the regional political debates than provincial capitals significantly to the east or west, although the region did strongly support Yushchenko (82.7%) in 2004 (Results of voting by regions of Ukraine 2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Populations of leading Ukrainian cities, 2001</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lviv*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001 2001)

* Included for comparison

Lviv

Due to strong feedback from Kyivan participants, I also spent brief time in Lviv for comparative purposes. Lviv is often presented in the popular imagination as the cultural nexus of Western Ukraine. Participants from across the regional and linguistic spectra, both utterly
non-volunteering and passionate daily participants, suggested that Lviv was the crux of voluntarism, civic engagement in any terms, banal environmental stewardship, and the push for democracy in Ukraine. In Lviv, I observed public spaces and conducted a number of brief interviews with residents.

**Introductory summary of results**

The following chapters present in detail the results of this research. In each chapter, a set of relationships are drawn between the micropractices promoting, counteracting or simply commenting on voluntarism and macrolevel processes of postsocialist transformation that enlighten how voluntarism and related social phenomena are in the process of being conceptualized in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Chapter II discusses the cycle that emerges from the prevailing Ukrainian legal code on nongovernmental organizations and social movements. Specifically, I examine how access to money, in particular external funding, requires a process of registration and maintenance that itself generates costs, thus forcing registered NGOs to seek continual income for operational purposes. Under the same legislation, USMs are denied formal access to capital, forcing them to operate with no funding or seek alternative means of financing.

In chapter III, I discuss how NGOs lose focus on local issues in favor of the global/national work preferred by grant provides from the international civil society community. Particular attention is paid to a hybrid NGO/for-profit model called the hrantoyidy, or grant-gobblers. I also discuss how the state, while playing a regulatory role, plays little to no role as a provider of funding in this context, unlike in the Western settings that, as discussed above, supposedly play the model for the ideal civil society model.
Chapter IV covers the other side of the scale and funding issue, the development of USMs that focus on local or “glocal” issues. These social movements are more able and, in some cases, more interested in voluntarism than NGOs but lag in what they can directly achieve due to their barrier from capital.

The stories of NGOs and USMs reunite in chapter V, which details ways that participants in NGOs and USMs find to subvert their scalar, legal and funding limitations, often through cooperation between the two categories of groups and clever interpretations of their group associations and practices. In this way, the practices of voluntarism portrayed challenge some of the conceptions of “what is voluntarism” in the literature, and I argue that the Ukrainian case studies suggest a need for a more holistic definition and appreciation of unexpected forms of voluntarism.

Finally, chapter VI explores means of inculcating voluntarism in Ukraine for present and future under the current social and legal environment, with particular focus on forms of institutional voluntarism, through means of outreach, marketing and civic education. As general voluntarism is accepted as a given positive by most participants, the discussion both illuminates how international civil society knowledge has circulated in Ukraine and reveals further details of how research participants innovate solutions to their limitations under present conditions.
II: The scalar circus of organizational registration, funding, and legislation

Why does Ukraine see such low rates of measured voluntarism? First and foremost, organizations that are most likely to encourage and incorporate volunteers that will be picked up in the statistics, i.e. NGOs, are restrained or distracted from doing so by a legal structure that instead leads them to focus by and large on issues that are less attractive to potential volunteers. To elaborate, the Ukrainian legal code concerning NGOs, voluntarism and philanthropy forces NGOs to pay recurring costs (both direct fees and costs to hire adequate accounting and legal staff to provide required reports) to maintain their legally registered status, based in the law “Pro ob'ednannya hromadyan” (“On Civic Associations”, 1992) and extensions. This, in turn, leads NGOs to focus their efforts toward constant fundraising. For reasons discussed in depth later in this chapter, the easiest and most consistent sources of funding for NGOs are international grant providers (Palyvoda and Golota 2010). This confluence of factors leads Ukrainian NGOs to focus on issues and projects that will appeal to the often narrow directives of international funders (generally through the requests for proposals process) and not toward issues situated in local concerns or that would foster local voluntary initiatives. As such, the laws of the Ukrainian state hinder organizations from accessing funding except through international organizations, whose mission directives lead local organizations (or branches) to cast their gaze not toward the social problems surrounding them in daily life, but rather toward satisfying the missions of international funders and the regulations of the state bureaucracy.

Sofia, an American heritage speaker of Ukrainian and longtime director of a nationally active NGO, describes this cycle of funding through organizations and scales as more, in fact, a “circus.”
Origin of civic association restrictions

Sofia: There was this mushrooming of charitable organizations, NGOs, everything else [following independence]. They weren’t taxed, they weren’t anything, so there was all this money being funneled through these ‘pseudo-NGOs’ so to speak. So the reaction was to simply clamp down on them completely, and for a good, I would say six years, there was only one form of organization that you could create basically, and it was extremely limited in what you could do. As I remember, they had to pay tax for a time on any money that was coming into their accounts. Anything was considered income, they had to pay a tax, that was it. Some of that has changed slowly now, but it’s still difficult to move.

The origin of the legal code surrounding NGOs lies in attempts to combat organized crime, false charity, labor exploitation (such as prolonged, unpaid internships) and other forms of exploitation of individuals or the state in the 1990’s by organizations claiming charitable cause. Definitions of such organizations were not absolute: While they could be complete shells, they could also be skirting the law or simply benefiting from gaps in legislation, like Petryna’s fondy that engaged in “a large informal economy based on imports of a variety of goods, including pharmaceuticals, cars, foodstuffs, and so on” (2002, 18). Regardless of the material reality of how many organizations were falsely representing their actions, or perhaps engaged in processes of legal or ethical opaqueness, the popular and state attention incurred by these pseudo-NGOs leaves a bitter undertone to impressions of NGOs still today. As Phillips states, “NGOs are often perceived as fictitious fronts for money laundering, and I heard of numerous reports of bogus organizations that were supposedly registered with the exclusive purpose of procuring funds rather than advancing a social cause” (2008, 70). In turn, the structural aspect of the rise of (both criminal and legitimate) pseudo-NGOs – that such organizations were allowed to exist less because of any implicit quality of supposedly charitable organizations than because of an environment where bureaucracies and corruption remain unyoked to adequate legal enforcement
or prosecution (Kornai 1992; Petryna 2002, 143) – is rarely, if ever, mentioned by those I interviewed or by participant comments in other academic work.

By the same token, the very concept of voluntarism has repeatedly drawn concern from the Ukrainian Rada (Parliament). While past proposed legislation is not publicly accessible, two participants had both been involved with lobbying and educational efforts surrounding proposed Ukrainian legislation toward voluntarism. John had then worked for 2-3 years in Ukraine in an international development office with a mandate specifically to encourage voluntarism among Ukrainian citizens, while Claire has worked on projects that engaged volunteers and encouraged voluntarism for over five years in Ukraine, having previously worked in similar fields in other post-Soviet and Western countries. Both recalled at least three instances when the Rada had considered legislation that would restrict voluntarism. The most recent case of this was in 2007 (existence of draft formally noted, but text not supplied in Kurennoy and Nadosha 2007), a law that Claire cited as claiming to protect against labor exploitation, but also suspiciously appearing to work against political organizing. In this regard, Ukraine is similar to a minority of its postsocialist European peers as a state that had considered restricting, rather than encouraging or protecting, voluntarism in legislation (United Nations Volunteers 2010).

**Registration and reporting requirements drive continual costs**

Ukrainian law defines the operations and regulations of communal organizations that are not seeking profits, are not organized under a government entity, and are not wholly staffed by volunteers (Pro ob'ednannya hromadyan [On Civic Associations] 1992), hence equating to a general international definition of nongovernmental organization. The only specific subtype under unique (in this case, tighter) regulations within the law is political parties, while trade unions - acknowledged nonprofit, voluntary-membership organizations - are specifically
exempted and placed under a different legal regime. All other organizations meeting the described absences fall under the general classification of “civic associations”\(^5\).

The definition of seeking profits broadly refers to the sale of items or attempts to use an association to promote a commercial fund; however, the law explicitly allows for the creation of commercial entities in partnership with civic associations that may produce profit for the purpose of funding a civic association. These are then under the relevant commercial codes. Civic associations are also defined through establishment as an economic entity – such as through the establishment of bank accounts for the entity, receipt or delivery of payments or salaries, etc. – as opposed to “volunteer formations,” which are wholly dependent on voluntary labor and have no formalized, communal financial reserves, income or expenses.

Outside of this legal section, I typically refer to registered civic associations as NGOs, consistent with participants’ comments and the international civil society literature. Similarly, the so-called volunteer formations are referred to as (unregistered) social movements, or USMs. When referring more broadly to both types of group, I typically use the term “civil society groups,” or just “groups,” modifying the more common term “civil society organization” to respect the insistence of many movement participants that their groups should never be deemed “organizations,” for purposes of legal presentations as well as, in some cases, a distaste for the NGO community.

While the right of citizens to create civic associations is guaranteed in “On Civic Associations” with additional references to the Ukrainian Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the law also establishes legal requirements placed on civic associations (Pro ob’ednannya hromadyan [On Civic Associations] 1992). However, the law

\(^5\) Additional legal sub-classifications of civic associations have existed in the Ukrainian legal code; however, these terms are largely irrelevant to this thesis.
also mandates that all civic associations legally register, which includes official fees and the filing of paperwork documenting their structure, membership, sources of income, and expenses. As noted by several participants, the government has justified these practices as means to prevent abuse of NGO status for purposes of criminal activity and dishonest means of personal enrichment. Some participants also suggested that the legal requirements provide a mechanism for the state to slow the activities of opposition groups.

This registration process itself is often remarked by research participants as being further complicated by the slowness of the bureaucracy and requests for unofficial payments in the interim to hasten or complete the project, and are, in fact, more burdensome than the official tasks on paper. One research participant, Olena, tells of how she balances her time between working for a large, internationally funded environmental NGO and volunteering with a student environmental group through her university. A group of alumni from Olena’s university club are trying to register as a civic association so that they might extend their club’s work – the club cannot legally seek funds except via the university, hence their projects are quite limited – and as a way to create jobs for themselves. Ideally, Olena would like to work for this new NGO, once registered and funded, because her current employer is more interested in international initiatives and national policy reform, while her interests lie more in local environmental issues and education. However, the first hurdle of registration has remained insurmountable through open, legal means:

It’s been in formal registration for a year or two, going through the bureaucratic procedures. They submitted papers many times, the bureaucrats rejected them because they weren’t bribed, they wanted something. They wanted all the mistakes corrected formally, then we have had to submit the document again and again to be registered. I think it will be finally registered in the spring [in ~9 months time].
Furthermore, once organizations become legally registered civic associations, they must adopt national accounting and bookkeeping standards, maintain statistical records, register with tax agencies and pay taxes if necessary, and present income and expense declarations to government financial organs under unspecified regular intervals and by request. Additionally, the regulations allow state officials to be present at any meetings of NGOs to determine that they are filing proper documents and obeying the law more generally. While these regulations are not unusual, they produce constant costs to registered organizations.

These regulations also expose organizations to legally nebulous and costly scrutiny from officials who privilege their own political and economic welfare higher than any deep ideological desire for liberal civil society. The abuse of such regulations remains rampant, as noted by journalist Peter Byrne in summarizing the statements of law enforcement leader and current Rada Deputy Hennadiy Moskal:

‘Political allegiance is a prerequisite for being appointed’ to any top position in Ukraine’s feudal power structure, Moskal said. Be it a job in government, the courts or law enforcement, the country is run by rival business and political groups... If your side is in power, you get the job and cash by collecting bribes for favors, grabbing lucrative assets, charging for get-out-of-jail-free-cards, or putting opponents behind bars temporarily to smooth your activities. Caught up in the middle and totally defenseless are average and cash-strapped citizens.” (2010)

In fact, the use of legal measures to restrain NGOs perceived to be unfriendly to the contemporary administration appear to be increasing, with rising reports of detainments of foreign NGO workers and nebulous tax inquiries of organizations critical to the administration (Buckley and Olearchyk 2010).

**Questionable legality and culture of philanthropy impede domestic funding**

It would be unfair and overly simplistic to state that the only reasons for the dependence on international grants for funding is the molasses-like legal structure around NGOs and the
constant costs of registration and reporting. Intertwined with and functionally inseparable from the problems of law, Ukraine also demonstrates a low appreciation or devotion to philanthropy among the public, hence reducing available funding sources. For example, UK-based Charities Aid Foundation found that only 5% of the Ukrainian population donate money to charity (World Giving Index 2010). Admittedly, this figure is likely affected by linguistic and cultural difficulties in translating a broad, holistic form of philanthropy or responsibility for public welfare at levels more atomized than the state; however, they are in line with the other figures discussed in the first chapter and with the ethnographic data. This number contributes to ultimately placing Ukraine 150th out of 153 in the organization’s World Giving Index, significantly lower than even Ukraine’s low-ranking Central and Eastern European peers.

These indicators are due at least in part to the country’s present economic situation. Like other post-Soviet peers, Ukraine experienced tremendous economic turmoil in the 1990’s due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent socioeconomic restructuring. Furthermore, Ukraine’s golden growth period in the 2000’s was matched by a much less lauded increase in inflation and consumer prices, followed by a biting recession worse than regional or world peers in the ongoing financial crisis (Ukraine at a Glance 2009). There is little doubt that “common sense” arguments against personal philanthropy can be made from perceptions of personal and national economic insecurity. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter I, Ukrainians place little trust in NGOs, a significant impediment to local philanthropy.

However, the bureaucracy involved in Ukrainian philanthropy from minor donations to large grants remains overwhelming, while the ambiguities behind charitable giving provide an element of wariness for locals. Previously I have quoted Sofia, who has worked in NGOs in Ukraine since shortly after independence. With her long-term experience in Ukraine and a
Ukrainian-American heritage, she has a talent for comparing the civil society sectors in both countries, a skill set that has been essential for her in managing several large development programs for Western donors. Regarding personal philanthropy, she states:

The question... becomes, ‘How do you contribute? Where do you contribute? What are the legal ramifications for that NGO? Can that NGO have a legal way to accept such contributions?’ Here, unfortunately there’s nothing so simple as writing a check. You have to find time to either get on the Internet so you can put in your card information – if that’s even possible, and usually it’s not – because the NGO can’t afford to have that system created in the first place. Or you have to go to the bank, complete forms explaining how much money you are sending, and where, and why, and stand in line to be able to submit that money to the bank or post office because I think – I’m not even sure you can still do that in the post office – so you give up an awful, big piece of your time because it’s not simple, it’s complicated, so I think for most people it’s just too frustrating. They don’t want to have to deal with that. But if you tried to get people on the street, yeah, they’ll be willing to give you a few grivs [hryvny, Ukrainian currency] here and there, but is it legal? Because it’s not, so not only does this NGO have X amount of money, but ultimately they have a way to make it legal, but officially it’s illegal... A lot of them just don’t want to put themselves in a situation where they may be questioned about why all of a sudden they have 20,000 hryvny [US ~$2,600] on their accounts in one fell swoop. Is this some made-up person or someone who actually put the money into that account? Where did that person get the money? Because that’s the way things work here sometimes. I’d like to be able to say that in most cases the government doesn’t pay such attention to small amounts of money, and I think that to some degree that’s becoming true, but try and do something like that in a small community and then the tax inspector has a reason to come to you and bother you. Not that he’s – he’s doing his job because it’s not legal to do that – and then it becomes lots of graft, corruption, so do you really want to deal with it? No. So part of it is also that there needs to be systematic change in the ways that NGOs are viewed by the government, accounting systems need to be changed, tax laws need to be changed.

These legal-structural impediments also exist for philanthropy through corporations or other organizations, compounded by additional factors: a perceived lack of interest in philanthropy on the part of Ukrainian businesses as a whole; the lack of funding opportunities from the government in addition to the legal issues; and domestic foundations that choose to do all their work in-house, with little opportunity for seeding outside organizations (or taking
advantage of their expertise). Claire, having worked and volunteered with various NGOs in Ukraine and the CIS for over a decade, summarized the problems of philanthropy as:

There’s no culture of philanthropy here, zero. The couple foundations that have been established are doing their own projects, they are not giving grants. The Pinchuk Foundation? He’s not giving out funds to other people, he’s got his pet projects and he’s pretty much funding them himself and hiring people to do his things…. foreign companies give some money. Intel does stuff. Coca-Cola sometimes gives money to things. Some of the foreign companies give money to things – not, well, I can’t say that I’ve seen huge projects, but they’ll give money to some. Why don’t Ukrainian companies give money? Because I think they don’t understand that, don’t feel a sense of social responsibility very much yet, and probably don’t trust each other. The government? I don’t understand how this government functions!

For Claire, the key problem is that domestic businesses are not interested in philanthropy and do not trust each other or, presumably, organizations that might seek grant funds. Of course, as an American working long-term in non-profit organizations and fundraising in several states, her view may be more influenced by the literature and discourses of this sector than others. Regardless, as with most participants interviewed, the government remains a source of regulation but not of guidance or opportunity, essentially a passive thorn of inactivity.

By contrast, Sofia – who knows Claire professionally but does not work directly with her – sees the lack of inter-entity philanthropy problematic, but also finds unique strengths in the highly internalized focus of the few moneyed Ukrainian foundations:

One of the reasons that the NGOs have to look more to the international communities is because there’s little philanthropy in terms of actual philanthropy. You’ll hear a lot about how Oligarch X is doing this or that, or gave this or that, but what a lot of them do is they have their own foundations or their own organizations, which, the foundation really makes sense to me, but from that foundation it’s not necessarily so that a local NGO can apply to that foundation for a grant, not always so. Sometimes they’ve got small pieces of money that they want to give out, but most of the time the foundation itself creates programs, so rather than outsourcing the issue, they try to do it in house. There’s actually some great work being done – for example, the Pinchuk Foundation is doing education, I forget his wife’s foundation, she’s got her own, but they do a lot of HIV/AIDS work, etc. Again, they’ve created their own little thing, their own
people running it, and that’s the way they work rather than having this foundation of theirs be an entity for ‘grant giving’ so to speak.

Certainly, the problems seen in Ukrainian philanthropy – and hence domestic funding for NGOs – are not unique. All of these problems also occur in other states, including states with longer or more active histories of philanthropy. However, in this regard Ukraine has a confluence of simultaneous factors – economic instability (both statistical and perceived), a lack of interest or pressure for businesses to become involved with nonprofit causes (particularly in light of the socialist-era ideal of the state as sole provider of care), the vertically integrative approach taken by the few moneyed domestic foundations, and a legal morass impeding or preventing donations for individuals and organizations alike.

**International grants required**

Ukrainian NGOs are thus caught in a circus of regulatory costs and searches for funding that forces many organizations to become dependent on international grants for their continued legal existence. As previously discussed, they seek to evade the limitations placed on them by the Ukrainian state by producing a link to opportunities and leverage seen beyond, the grants available from international civil society organizations. The formal and informal costs of reaching and maintaining mandated registration status generate constant expenses for NGOs coming from the state apparatus, at times increased by the activities of specific regulatory officials within that apparatus. This is compounded by the declining funding available from the government through direct grants or indirectly through social services support complementary to NGO activities, as the government undergoes budget deficits and continual waves of neoliberal restructuring (Petryna 2002; Phillips 2008; Palyvoda and Golota 2010). At the same time, local and national private funding often fails to meet the gaps, as:
1. **individuals** decline to donate due to material and perceived economic underperformance and instability, as well as a lacking cultural precedent for philanthropy and its benefits tied to recent history and a lack of trust in institutions;  

2. **moneyed, nonprofit foundations** decline to donate due to a highly insular, vertically integrated structure that limits funding to internal projects; and  

3. **for-profit firms** decline to donate due to the same reasons as above, and perhaps also due to the lack of a perceived indirect benefit to companies’ revenues through positive public relations feedback.  

   In such a funding environment, the acquisition of international grant funding becomes paramount for the continued functioning of NGOs, regardless of whether an organization’s managers are working to fulfill their mission or merely pay themselves and their employees. In the three figures below, it becomes apparent not only that international grants are essential, but also that international grants provide more than twice the amount of funding to recipient NGOs on average than any other funding type and are the overwhelmingly most important form of new funding sought.
Figure 1: Percentage of surveyed organizations reporting use of different source types, 2008

Percentages represent the proportion of surveyed organizations using each source. “Specific business activity” refers to regulated commercial activity or partnerships established by surveyed organizations. Five hundred seventy-nine organizations were surveyed, approximately 16% of the total number believed to be active under the survey designers’ metrics.

Source: Data and original chart representation from Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 41.

Figure 2: Percentage of organizational funding from different source types, 2008

Percentages represent the proportion of funding coming from each source type only for surveyed organizations reporting funding from the selected type. “Specific business activity” refers to regulated commercial activity through partnerships established with commercial entities.

Source: Data and original chart representation from Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 42.
Figure 3: New funding sources for surveyed organizations, 2008

- **Grants**: 46%
- **Business donations**: 22%
- **Individual donations**: 12%
- **Government**: 8%
- **Own economic activity**: 7%
- **Membership fees**: 5%

Source: Data and original chart representation from Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 47.
III: NGOs as service providers to international funders

In this chapter, I elaborate on how the funding and regulatory “circus” leads NGOs away from focuses on or potential projects that might engage volunteers, thus contributing to the dearth of measured voluntarism in Ukraine. Intimately tied in with this, potential volunteers – both those already engaging in other forms of voluntarism (be it courteously helping neighbors for mere moments or participating multiple times per week in the planning and execution of actions by USMs), and those who merely state an interest in an issue – fail to engage with NGOs and, in extreme cases discussed below, even view NGOs as hostile to their goals.

The reliance upon international grants, and the semi-competitive market of the international grant cycle through which they are selected and disbursed, fosters a relationship in which NGOs effectively become subcontractors to their financial benefactors, closely related to and influenced by the desires and discourses of the international funding communities. As international grant funding has become prominent in NGOs’ continued existences, the portion of time committed to fulfilling providers’ directives in exchange for funding has risen – as frequently lamented by research participants – especially with the relative dearth of other funding opportunities. This process leads NGOs to focus their attentions on the international communities from which they draw funding: other state governments through their development initiatives (i.e. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, United States Agency for International Development, British Council), multinational entities constitutive of and extended from individual state governments (UN agencies, for instance), and large international foundations that may have a mix of private and government funding (Open Society Foundations, World Wildlife Fund).
In this regard, NGOs both local and transnational participate in one of Peet’s strategies for resolving nation-states’ drive for accumulation under the modern neoliberal framework with the counter-pressures (or distractions) of pressing social issues, “a displacement of regulatory power ‘upwards’ to unelected and only partially responsible global governance institutions” (2004, xv). By participating in the “second strategy,” NGOs work toward the resolution of the “big” international issues important to their funders, and ultimately their funders’ own minders, whether they are pushing for additional privatization, monitoring election transparency, or organizing public expositions to educate the public about climate change. While the scope and effect of this trend is open to debate, at the very least it echoes for the Ukrainian context the questions asked by Watts regarding the donor activities of transnational NGOs in the global South:

Large TNGOs as major donors (i) changing the domestic politics and structure of the local NGOs communities in the South, (ii) how foreign and local NGOs actually build political strategy and alliances; and (iii) how social capital is constructed in North-South inter-NGOs collaborations” (2004, 27)

For example, Yulia tells of how her employer, one of Ukraine’s largest environmental NGOs, evolved from a focus on pressing local environmental issues around Kyiv to focusing almost exclusively on internationally funded educational projects and national policy initiatives: “In the economic crisis [in the 1990’s], the money wasn’t enough anymore, the government stopped supporting this organization, and so they began to seek out money from some international funds.” In the intervening years, her organization has developed an internal modular structure with one team devoted to each of the organization’s large grants (or group of grants), such as climate change education and representing the interests of the environmental movement (international and national) in forming state energy policy. While Yulia and her colleague Olga could both speak of how they were inspired to become ecologists in their
childhood by experiences in nature, neither could relate their work planning climate-education expositions directly to the daily, lived experience of natural ecology represented in their own inspirations and the organization’s foundational history. When asked about whether they receive inquiries from the public on their globally and nationally focused work, the two both laughed.

Yulia further responded:

No. Sometimes journalists call. Sometimes people call who… well, people never call in about climate. They might read about it, hear about it. But they don’t call. Sometimes people call about their city or their neighbor, that there are plans to build something and they don’t know what to do about it, and then they begin to call. Because of our name people think we’re some kind of state structure, so sometimes people call to ask what to do, how. We also have a youth division that works with youth who… well, they’re not exactly volunteers because they aren’t usually coming in and out, maybe they work actively with five organizations and they’re working on questions about the protection of nature, say in Kyiv. This has already come to be around the country. They want to talk about what construction is happening, what parks are being destroyed, new apartment buildings that are taking away public space. They have questions about how to make requests and inquiries. They ask about the rules, how they may work against all this.

Ironically, despite the local, lived experiences mentioned by three employees in this organization – the third being Olena, who splits her time between this organization and her student club – and their organizational narrative of a foundation in local environmental issues arising as the Soviet Union collapsed, their public presentations through pamphlets and websites failed to mention any local issues at the time of these interviews.

**NGOs jump scale to secure funding**

In the story above, as well as the other stories in chapters II and III, I discuss how NGOs develop a focus on projects that will draw funds from donor organizations outside Ukraine. In essence, NGOs reform their practices and rhetoric to produce themselves as players in the international civil society community; they “jump scale” to evade the material limitations of the
actors engaging with the national scale and instead work with more receptive international partners. This presentation of an NGO on a new scale (as intended to be perceived by the creator of this projection as well as the given audience) dovetails with the developments in the literature in the past two decades, which has seen conceptions of scale increasingly move from accepted or even natural standard divisions with defined boundaries to created, malleable constructions and the processes of creating these constructions (cf. Taylor 1982; Smith 1993; Agnew 1994; Wimmer and Schiller 2002). In particular, Smith (1993) presents scales as layered, intertwined and overlapping conceptualizations – and thus created, as facilitating “jumps” between scales “to organize the production and reproduction of daily life and to resist oppression and exploitation at a higher scale – over a wider geographical field” (1993, 90). Through jumping scales, Smith’s research participants were able “to dissolve spatial boundaries that are largely imposed from above and that contain rather than facilitate” (Smith 1993, 90). NGOs herein do something similar with their formation around international grant opportunities and their self-presentation as engaging, internationally apt partners to receive and fulfill grants.

Furthermore, Smith shows how scale is “a social process, i.e., scale is produced in and through societal activity which, in turn, produces and is produced by geographical structures of social interaction” (1993, 97). Elsewhere, scale is presented to inform or convince a particular audience, such as a “global” company or a state government emphasizing their actions on the “human scale” (Jonas 1994), hence jumping scales in narratives. In the stories of Ukrainian NGOs here, we see two forms of jumping scales: 1) a flow of capital from the international civil society community to organizations legally resident in Ukraine, and 2) a presentation of scale to those funders that identifies Ukrainian organizations as potential executors of the plans of the moneyped organizations, agents of the international donor community. In this regard, scale-
making is shown to be both rhetorical and material, a result of and an effect on both everyday life and macro-level social structures, again echoing the literature (Marston 2000, 221, closely paraphrased). Through these practices of jumping scale, Ukrainian NGOs assure the reproduction of their daily work by reorienting their work in both practice and presentation to appeal to the desires of this international community.

**Loss of the local, vaporizing voluntarism**

However, the gaze toward the international funding communities creates a disconnection between internationally funded organizations and the local communities in which they are physically situated, and hence from potential volunteers. For instance, another metric for the connections between NGOs and various communities is the distribution of annual reports – albeit one that is frequently and rightfully criticized as having little practical result on the ground. Palyvoda found that 38% of organizations distributed their annual reports to government agencies, 32% to their donors, 30% to participating members, and only 8% to the communities they claimed to serve (2010, 13). Admittedly, the metric is imperfect as Ukrainian NGOs are not always legally required to produce annual reports, leading to only 58% of surveyed organizations claiming to have done so despite rising encouragement from international advisers and funders (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 13). Additionally, the government figure cited above may be largely driven by satisfying the financial reporting requirements (Pro ob'ednannya hromadyan [On Civic Associations] 1992). In either case, the figures suggest a rather clear hierarchy of whom organizations choose to engage assertively: the government as part of satisfying legal requirements, followed by their donors, then members who have committed time or money, and finally the communities that the NGOs claim to serve. In other words, contrary to surface rhetorical expectations, the organizations do not treat their in situ communities as their clients –
rather, the beneficiaries become the means to production (of grant fulfillment, and thus evidence to contend for further revenues), while the donors are in fact the clients to persuade and satisfy.

To clarify, no direct intent to ignore local issues either on the part of international funders or locally situated NGOs branches is meant to be implied or assumed. Rather, this process of rescaling is gradual and structural, predicated on the relationship between grant market and grant fulfillment that draws NGOs closer to the communities of international civil society than to their own physical environs as they seek to sustain their organizations. As NGO director Sofia states:

No international organization – and it doesn’t matter who the major funder is, what government, what country – they send in teams to do needs-assessment research…. What happens between, however, assessing the needs, creating a pool of money, and then distributing that to the people, the NGO, that ultimately gets that funding, and what the NGO does with that, that’s where I think there’s sometimes a disconnect….

Part of the big problem, I think, is their sustainability. It’s difficult for them to think about their sustainability because they’re never really sure where their funding is going to come from, there’s no constant source of funding, and again, because other things haven’t changed here in Ukraine, it’s a little difficult for them to think about the really long term. So what they’re still doing is looking for grantees that want specific projects done, and they will then see, ‘Does that project fit my mission or not?’ If it does, even if this NGO, [has a] main mission to deliver food to the elderly, that organization, just to be able to get some funding, etc., may turn around and do a training project for something that has completely nothing to do with food help. It’s not a bad thing either though because sometimes it gives them some experience in sectors that are related to what they want to do, but I think the big problem for them is it’s really hard to talk about missions, etc., when they really don’t know where their next meal is going to come from, so to speak.

While Sofia can see a silver lining of training and experience in the dependency on constant grant-writing (a topic touched upon in chapter VI), she and others recognize how grant dependency yokes NGOs to funders’ directives. Phillips recounts:

My informants who were tapping into foreign grant sources for their NGO work found themselves scrambling to keep up with donors’ changing priorities, and to reconcile the ‘hot topics’ with their own mission statements… sources of funding
were often fleeting and donor exit frequently resulted in the abandonment of projects (2008, 69).

However, discord exists among participants as to the level of conscientious decision-making in the process of disconnection that plays a key role in the relationship between the emphasis on the acquisition of international grants and Ukraine’s low levels of institutional voluntarism.

**Grant-gobbling: Hrantovidy and hrantozheri**

Survey data from 2009 suggests that most NGOs, or at least their representatives, are driven by desires to influence society positively (73%) and help others (67%). A smaller number aspire to representing members’ direct interests (36%) or realization of founders’ visions (34%). A minority directly reports a desire to receive funding (15%) (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 9). Admittedly, the data is likely influenced to some degree by the desire of NGO directors and communications personnel to present their organization and sector in a positive light. However, despite the intentions displayed in the survey, a perception is held even among those closely associated with NGOs that such organizations exist for salaries and grants, not for society’s benefit, and therefore should be viewed with caution if not outright suspicion.

Olena, discussed earlier for her commitments to both a large environmental NGO and her environmental student group, defines her student group as, “an organization in which we don’t work for money. In an NGO, we work for money. We do funded projects in these organizations.” While she appreciates that her work allows her to participate for pay in her general field of interest, ecology and environmental policy, her work bears little relation to the passions that brought her to environmental studies and activism in the first place. However, she does not see any simple answer to escape the funding circus, as increased funding is coupled with needing the expertise to deal with the bureaucracies of reportage and payment involved:
I think for voluntary youth organizations it’s very difficult to deal with these financial, bureaucratic rules. Even if we are given this money it is very difficult to report how we use it, all these different things. It really requires one person working part-time throughout the time of the project to prepare all the financial documents and reports that are required by the state and the funding organizations. The university is much simpler, they just give us money and we just report to them that we spent this on that, that on this, etc. It’s much simpler than the reports for other organizations, but they don’t give us much [laughter].

By contrast, Ivan refuses to work with NGOs at all because of previous experiences that suggested “they” cared more about sustaining grants and government permissions than about the social causes they claimed to represent. For over a decade, he has worked as an activist errant to support transparency and oppose corruption. In particular, he participated in the unregistered Ukraina bez Kuchmy (Ukraine Without Kuchma)\(^6\) social movement that opposed President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005), who has been accused of literally dozens of crimes including widespread graft and the murder of oppositional journalists during his reign. Today, Ivan is involved as both a participant and researcher with a variety of social movements ranging from the more abstractly theoretical (leftist groups, for instance) to groups embedded in reform of the legal and material in Ukraine, such as historic preservation advocacy groups. He summarizes his position on NGOs as, “Our relations with NGOs are very complicated because many people are suspicious about them, they don’t see them as sincere. They work on grants, perhaps they work mainly for finances, not for a cause.” When I told him that I was interviewing employees and volunteers from locally nascent groups, he responded, “But even those groups you call grassroots, do they work with an international agenda, or their agenda? Do they work with people, or only with some government?” For Ivan, any organization receiving grants from the state or foreign organizations is inherently complicit in the plans of the governments, domestic or foreign, from which they ultimately draw funding, and hence not genuinely representing their

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\(^6\) Owing to the large scale and informal organization of this movement – as well as Ivan’s expressed pride – a pseudonym was not used for this group.
conceptual causes in Ukraine. If not, then at the least they may simply looking to siphon money for their network, continuing the Soviet tradition of providing access to services and resources among personal contacts (cf. Ledeneva 1998; Petryna 2002).

It is difficult to discern to what extent this suspicion toward NGOs comes from the precedent set during the early post-Soviet experience versus the present structures between NGOs and international funders, as the narratives are typically intertwined. Regarding the sector’s development, survey data suggests that the number of NGOs admitting to the acquisition of grants as a primary purpose has fallen as the number of NGOs with a publicly available, defined mission has increased (Palyvoda and Golota 2010). Sofia states,

There was a time that people were just creating NGOs because of grants. And really, those NGOs didn’t have a mission, they didn’t have a focus, there wasn’t something specific that this NGO wanted to do. I think they’ve grown out of that, or at least for the most part. Most NGOs now at least exist for a reason, they have missions.

However, this seems not to match the perceptions of NGOs even among NGO participants. It is more likely that any attempt at a division would be contrived, in that these discourses are in fact part of a wider, mutually constitutive narrative of the reasons individuals in Ukraine distrust NGOs and do not find institutional voluntarism a worthwhile venture.

This narrative has been codified into a dystopian archetype of NGO: the hrantoyidy (grant-eaters) or hrantozheri (grant-gobblers), organizations that exist only to consume grants for the material gain of their organizations, founders and employees. Such organizations are effectively the photo negative from which other NGOs hope to distinguish themselves. Maksym, who works on regional and national projects for a rapidly expanding transparency/anti-corruption NGO based in Kyiv, describes the grant-gobblers:

You see, NGOs in Ukraine get money mostly from international foundations, but we are people who still remember their mission, what we are trying to do and
were trying to do. A lot of NGOs in Ukraine have forgotten their mission, they’re just business projects. People have to earn money, they know how to form an NGO and raise funds. But in Ukraine, this is quite normal. It is not so bad as in Belarus, for example. A lot of hrantoyidy, ‘grant-eaters.’ In Ukraine there are a lot of cool organizations with cool missions, but they do these business projects to rise to a higher level, to form missions, to try not to move just from project to project but to do broader research. There was a project for example, Rise Ukraine, that had problems with this because NGOs had their own missions, while they wanted them to do other things, and it looked like the NGOs just took money and did what was wanted. It looked like that because, while they weren’t all hrantozheri, there were hrantozheri among them.

The managers of Maksym’s organization transitioned from volunteers in an USM to organizers of an official NGO after a sudden burst of offers for funding and volunteers during their participation in the Orange Revolution. Specifically, the group received robust press coverage of its protest organization and orchestrated exposures of corruption. While they do not directly target the transparency of the civil society sector in their mission, their general emphasis on transparency has led to a logical internal attempt to avoid becoming consumed by grant directives alone. Although they compete for and fulfill international grants, they also actively reach out to local social movements – as well as less obvious contacts, such as student groups or neighborhood associations – to seek out locally derived or desired projects on which they might assist with labor, experienced consulting, or public relations. Furthermore, they release annual reports on their website (typically in Ukrainian, English and Russian) that include their funders, as well as associated directives and countries of origin, in order to reveal the purposes and results of their external associations to interested members of the public.

Nataliya, on the other hand, chose a more individual path to avoid grant-gobbling. She is the most widely experienced research participant encountered in terms of experience with different organizations, having volunteered or worked in more than half a dozen movements and organizations. She has become disillusioned with the relationship between funding and focus
among NGOs, and is now pursuing her social causes through the novel approach of opening a business that offers free information and publicity on environmental causes and groups, on top of the goods for sale. The following table summarizes her breadth of nonprofit experience, both work and voluntarism:
Table 3: Nataliya’s civil society career summarized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational pseudonym</th>
<th>General sphere of work</th>
<th>Role(s) played by Nataliya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote Ukraine</td>
<td>Election awareness, participation</td>
<td>Volunteer, trainee/intern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>Transparency (broadly speaking)</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldly Wisdom</td>
<td>Cultural awareness</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Election transparency, pre-Orange Revolution political change</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the Trees</td>
<td>Ecological issues, forest and tree protection and expansion</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against AIDS</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS education, prevention, care</td>
<td>Employee, additional volunteer in off hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Orders</td>
<td>Company selling natural goods and offering free information on environmentalism, environmental movements or NGOs</td>
<td>Founder and co-owner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nataliya provided this list of groups in which she had either been a volunteer, employee, or both since she finished her secondary education, spanning at least three Ukrainian cities. All were nonprofits except the last, a business she founded with a purpose of servicing both consumers and NGOs, with intentions of providing some of the profits back into environmental causes. Nataliya does not mention whether these groups were registered, excluding the business, which was not registered at the time of the interviews but has since become official. She further stated that this was not comprehensive, merely representative of those with which she had spent the most time and gained the most experience. This was in addition to other paid work, including freelance journalism at the time of our interviews, and smaller concurrent voluntary commitments.

Source: Interviews with Nataliya

Elucidating her view on the funding and focus relationship for Ukrainian NGOs, Nataliya says:

The vast majority receive international funds, and it is not always good because international funds specify limits along their particular themes, and organizations must endeavor to be along these limitations. Interested or not, for that organization to be financed it has to try. In this plan, many organizations begin to degrade because they are not independent. Hence they work nowadays to concoct what is required by the head of a fund, in order to receive financing from that fund. These requirements may not be important now for Ukraine, but they always must satisfy the requirements. For example, one fund working on the development of democracy and civil society is in actuality working on statistical lines that they don’t understand, and is going toward a project on other lines that are also not understood. It’s very bad.
Her own career in voluntarism and NGO work were inspired by an older student who
convinced her to join election transparency group Vote Ukraine when she was in university. She
has seen at length how the disconnections between NGOs and local communities inspire more
cynicism than interest in voluntarism:

They don’t become volunteers because they know little about nongovernmental
organizations. They haven’t seen that there are many of them in Ukraine, or they
know little about them. This is related to the problems of which I already spoke:
organization of projects that Ukraine actually needs. Things a person in Ukraine
worries about. If it’s not important, volunteers will not appear. They don’t
become volunteers because the person thinks, ‘Whatever.’ He doesn’t see how
it’s about his problems, and that’s it. They become volunteers if there’s a big
percentage of people who realize it’s a problem, they see the purpose of the
activity, in my opinion. Or because an organization is sufficiently interesting,
shows people how their activity is interesting…. I think that organizations need to
show that they can work on problems that are sufficiently interesting to the
people, and not just international funds. When people will want to participate in
these actions, then people will also possibly come to finance them, when
problems are more important than money.

While Nataliya was still volunteering with one organization regularly and consulting a
number of others at the time of our interviews, she had also decided to open her own business
with four other frequent volunteers. In opening her own business, Nataliya hopes to alter her
career track to find funding self-sufficiency, continue her commitments to social causes and
potentially allow her and her cofounders to become official donors themselves. She sees this
venture as a way to provide an example of social change that she values in Ukraine:

I decided to form my own business because people can’t see that they can form
their own business that can do what’s important for Ukraine and for the world,
like with ecology [issues]. People can be shown that an activity can actually
bring change through a good example; positive actions and attitudes; and interest.
That what’s good for them can also be good for others.

The business in question is an Internet store for ecologically friendly products, based around the
environmental issues that the five activist founders share most dearly. Nataliya describes the
business as a means to buy from, sell to and eventually donate to environmental NGOs.
Furthermore, the store website prominently incorporates a blog that promotes world and Ukrainian environmental news, events related to environmental activism in Ukraine, and companies and NGOs that have formed partnerships with the store. An ongoing theme of the news stories and product descriptions is the connection between environmental consciousness and modernity or sexuality, encouraging young Ukrainian adults to become active on environmental causes both through store purchases and participating in public environmental actions. In founding a business with a direct connection to social causes thematically and financially, Nataliya and her cofounders not only seek to transverse the scalar circus of funding represented by the hrantozheri, but also expand on the business partnerships noted in the civic associations legislation and the push for funding self-sufficiency that recurs in contemporary civil society guidance (Pro ob'ednannya hromadyan [On Civic Associations] 1992; Phillips 2008).

In these accounts, focuses on sources of funding, and the produced scales at which funding sources appear, recur as the driving factor that transforms NGOs. For the formally registered, internationally funded NGOs, international or multilateral organizations supply the necessary capital for them to exist while locally emergent discourses often bear little direct effect on internal objectives. In turn, participants also note how they have sought to avoid jumping scale to the international community by pursuing their own projects within their NGO work or avoiding NGOs entirely. However, thus far participants have generally paid little heed to the state actors that have traditionally been treated as critical, if not paramount, in the literature (Taylor 1982; Staeheli 1994; Steinberg 1994).
Where is the state?

Under normal circumstances, especially in a state that had long seen varying levels of autocratic tendencies since its independence, one would expect frequent interaction with the organs of the state, from municipal to national government (see discussion of such processes in Miller 1994). Thus far, however, the only substantial nod to a role for the state has been the legal registration regime and restrictions on unregistered groups, nothing acknowledging a more active role in the state evolving with (or against) the NGO community. One would especially expect some narrative as a number of participants had been independently serving as consultants to the state on related issues. However, when asked about how their movements or organizations worked with the government, most participants only responded with wry smiles or outright laughter. While legal/structural interactions were paramount – the decision to register and maintain that registration, visas for work abroad, etc. – most participants had completely written off working with governments across the urban, regional and state scales.

When discussing working with the government with the three NGO workers from Ecoclearinghouse (one of the largest Ukrainian environmental NGOs), the employees said they had not spoken to anyone in the government in months – contrary to what one might expect from the flurry of environmental legislation passed in the shadow of Chernobyl during the early independence period (Petryna 2002). At the time of the interviews, the Ministry of the Environment was being traded back and forth between Yushchenko’s, Tymoshenko’s and Yanukovych’s factions, so even more than usual, the civil servants were refusing participation or acknowledgement of the environmental groups. Instead, the three participants and their organization were ignoring the ministry, and focusing only on their local actions and communications with other organizations and grant sponsors at home and abroad. Thus,
organizations at perceived scales above and below the states – particularly international grant providers – had superseded the government in most matters of importance.

Furthermore, the lack of state engagement with NGOs, contrasted by strong willingness for international organizations to engage, both slowed groups’ actions but also made them increasingly less dependent on the state and its satisfaction, hence lessening the soft power of the state in civil society and its social consequences. Rather, organizations typically focus on evading the molasses morass of government (in)action, or combating selective abuses of power that, at the least, tend to reflect not on the state or local state itself, but rather on individuals or small groups abusing the leverage of their positions. Consequentially, while the state has faded as a perceived partner for funding or other organizational support, it has emerged under three more negative qualities: the state as stasis, the state as incapable, and the state as a source of danger.

The state as stasis

Volodymyr, the founder of an active environmental movement called Green Action, never once brought up the state in our interviews. When I finally asked why, he replied, “About our government, I think it is enough to say that there is an election every fourteen months.” For Volodymyr and his fellow volunteers, the constant infighting that had caused the government to grind to a halt had led to a detachment from daily popular life that made the state simply irrelevant, existing in an unchanging state of disorder that removed it from the equation of evolving environmental considerations. By the same token, this stasis has been further reinforced, or at least validated, by the increasing detachment of NGOs. NGO representatives themselves cite their own passivity in ensuring legal and regulatory enforcement as one of the
The foremost factors impeding development in the civil society sector (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 14).

The detachment between the state and civil society is further reinforced by the atomized interactions of its individual constituents. When Nataliya – the owner of a socially responsible business – was asked about why she largely ignores the state, she emphasized not the systematic trend but rather interactions with individual, irresponsible bureaucrats:

Actually this depends on the concrete personality of a person because we have a lot of bureaucrats that don’t do things very respectably / in an orderly fashion [poryadochno]. In such a country it depends on the person…. The organs of power are often very difficult to reach, very rarely listen to what is said in society. The bureaucratic system is very difficult to go through. If one works on a project, say, with some international funds or organizations, it is simpler than working with local or state powers. The state authority is very difficult because there is a lot of unevenness [nechënost’] and very little support.

Nataliya thus has preferred cooperation with international organizations for the simple fact that they are active, consistent, and less beholden to bottlenecks by individual participants.

Olivia has identified similar trends of the state. An international development worker and volunteer, she is coordinating a large-scale project involving multiple ministries, local groups (registered and unregistered), and her employer, the Ukrainian office of an international NGO. A large component of the project requires education and solicitation of opinions from local schools, in which she had generally found enthusiastic participants. However, their work was delayed for months due to simple certifications from one of the ministries that were not processed. “Nothing happens unless it’s approved. It’s a top-down structure.” Rather than providing relatively simple paperwork to receive benefits from international funding and engage both international and local expertise, the state agents responsible had to seek approval and re-approval constantly from superiors: “The idea is not to work alone because they come from a past when all the leaders, all the agencies, were at war with each other and they still are.”
However, Olivia differentiates the national figures from regional and metropolitan authorities. She states:

On the regional level – an interesting contrast – we get a lot of support from authorities. On the national level, we get a lot of obstruction…. Because the gain on the national level is about power and bribery, and at the regional level people are more accountable to the people that they live with. That would be my guess. Our national project manager has said that in the ministries right now, at the top levels, people are just hiding…. The commitment is to maintaining positions, positions in power and money.

The regional authorities mentioned, especially in smaller cities, have been more engaged overall with Olivia’s projects and the consequences for local communities, schools, etc. However, they too must push through or evade the inertia of inactivity throughout the system. As Sofia states:

Once you start trying to talk seriously about how to break, how to change policy to bring about something better, that’s when you start hitting the walls basically because that is so much more difficult be it on the local level or be it on the national level, and people don’t necessarily want to deal with it.

The state as incapable

These narratives not only show perceptions of the state in an unchanging stasis of disorder and inactivity, but also portray the state as more broadly incapable. The reasons for this incapability include not only insular infighting and corrupt or inept individuals, but also more structural and less ethicized origins, such as a lack of state funding or inefficient bureaucracies. For example, Goldman has discussed so-called “shadow organizations” that conduct “the work of an existing state agency, but without the obvious representational or bureaucratic constraints” in Southeast Asia, as the shadow organization with foreign ties is often better equipped and connected than its state counterpart (2004, 179).

However, in the Ukrainian context the particular nexus of financial or bureaucratic inability, the passage of laws unmatched by financial support, and the general distrust between the organs of the state and the public can exacerbate the perception of incapability. Maksym, the
transparency and democracy worker, discusses how he realized that inaction on the part of various regional and metropolitan officials could, in fact, extend from a lack of understanding between the public and government agents about the balance between finances and legal requirements, not only ineptitude on the part of civil servants:

Half a year ago I had a situation where I had to talk to representatives on the City Council. I came there and said, ‘I have a problem. We will be protesting near the City Council, but if you will explain the measure to us, why you passed it, and how it is a logical decision, we won’t protest.’ These representatives said, ‘We didn’t do it, we don’t know who did it. Maybe it was someone over there.’ [Gestures outward] The problem is that all of society thinks that people who work in the state structure are stealing our money. They think the government is stealing. That means that the people they are talking with – workers in the government – think that the people they meet with assume they are thieves. ‘Okay, you still think I’m a thief.’ That’s why they close the door, close themselves. That’s why I made rounds all around the City Council from one room to another until I convinced them to believe that I’m really… the whole of society wouldn’t go to this protest if they would discuss it. There was a person trying to talk to them to better understand why something’s not okay. On one side of the problem, people don’t try to understand why decisions are made. Even if they are not interested in a decision, they don’t care how the decision was made. Maybe it was a compromise. On the other side of the problem, local governors, workers, don’t try to explain to people why they did what they did because people won’t believe them. Maybe that’s the problem with all the reforms…. There was such a situation in Cherkassy region. There is a law [with certain requirements]. The local governors tell them, ‘You see, we don’t have money. If we have to do this, we would need 50 years to form all these [requisite] organizations. Do you understand that if we repair your building, we can’t do anything in your neighbors’ building? So we propose that you take a long-term loan from our city budget that you pay for twenty years, for example, and we’ll take a loan from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. We’ll also take a loan, to give a loan to you. We can’t do it just because it’s written in the law, even such a simplistic thing, so we propose another option.’ That was the first time I saw city council representatives try to show why they made a decision, and people did not believe them. They said, ‘You have to do this! It’s the law, that’s it!’ That’s why governing officials at every level start thinking, ‘We don’t have to inform people because they don’t try to understand us.’ For example, if they are raising prices on hot water or gas or city public transportation, people think, ‘Oh, these are such high prices!’ They think that they’re trying to make a lot of money, they’re trying to turn government into a business.
The formal state apparatus is thus perceived as inaccessible, incapable and unchanging. As such, it is often considered not worth the time to engage the state, especially when international organizations offer faster and more efficient support. However, the reasons for these traits assigned to the state are varied, in fact more varied than might seem obvious, and combine material realities of funding for agencies of assorted operations and scales; sociocultural relationships between the public, stage agencies and organizations; and the legal, regulatory structures through which these relationships and fund flows are defined and restricted.

The state as danger to independence

Finally, participants view the state as a danger to organizations’ independence. The general (in)dependence of organizations is, of course, a constant theme in this chapter. However, the specific relationship of the state to organizations through regulation, funding, and at times forms of surveillance and repression, remains a reason to be wary of, or outright avoid, the state for participants in both registered organizations and unregistered movements.

The potential attraction, and hence dangerous “slippery slope,” of increasing government affiliation for NGOs naturally extends from the dearth of funding and the regulatory morass NGOs must battle. If an NGO becomes increasingly friendly with the state and its officials, funding may appear and bureaucratic snafus may ease, especially in a sociocultural context where interpersonal relationships are privileged in engagement with the state. Additionally, in Ukraine functional government entities themselves may be legally formed as NGOs, despite their state affiliation, for regulatory purposes or to gain access to funding independent of the state to fulfill state objectives. Sofia explains these dissonant creations and the resulting confusion and mistrust:
Part of the problem of NGOs in general here in Ukraine is that there’s a limited amount of funding to apply for, and so we get these weird things going on, like in Eastern Ukraine there are these NGOs that are actually directly related to the government. They call themselves NGOs, but they’re not really NGOs. They’re actually, like, an arm of a local government entity, be it at the regional/provincial (oblast’) level or city level, but they call themselves an NGO because that’s the way they’re registered.

Of course, this quasi-NGO or “quango” concept is by no means unique to Ukraine or Eastern Europe; however, the specific emphasis on creation of quangos as means to access external funding is less familiar. Additionally, the relationship between many NGOs – especially international NGOs – as complimentary organizations rather than checks on state power raises concerns and, often, disapproval. Sofia continues:

A lot of Ukrainians still have a problem with the fact that part of the rule of NGOs is to help the government, not necessarily to create, but to execute the reforms that it’s putting in place. I remember having a conference about battling corruption in higher education, and the journalist that was interviewing me asked, ‘Why does it matter to you? Why are you doing this? Shouldn’t the Ministry be doing this?’ And I said, ‘Well, the Ministry has already said that you can’t take bribes for grades, and the Legal Code says that too, but as long as you’re getting a bribe and the professor’s accepting it, he’s asking for one and you’re giving one, it’s not going to stop, regardless of what the law says and the Ministry says.’ And so you know, I think we’ve gotten over that hurdle too, it’s great to have laws, but if nobody’s listening to them you’re not going to get too far.

In this case, Sofia’s organization was engaged by the state – and possibly the organization’s international funders – to assist the state in moving reforms from paper to enforcement, particularly on problems that continue to plague Ukrainian higher education. However, the cozy relationship between a state agency of questionable efficacy and activity and a foreign organization that many would assume to be more oppositional again raised concerns. Why was the government not fulfilling its duties? Why is this organization participating in this manner, and who is sponsoring their participation?
Furthermore, Ukrainian participants can look elsewhere in the former Soviet space to see examples of NGOs losing independence. This is particularly relevant as the influence of the Russian state, as a foreign power and as a model for governance, on now President Yanukovych is constantly debated in the Ukrainian press. GONGOs – government-organized NGOs, an obvious oxymoron contrasted with “real” NGOs – are growing in the comparatively less fluid civil society environment of Russia. These organizations directly depend on the financial support of the state (though perhaps through local or regional entities rather than the federal government) or the support of donors who are closely linked to state officials or agencies. Regarding activists’ attraction to GONGOs for their comparatively firmer and stronger funding position, “it has turned out that the movement between NGOs and GONGOs is a one-way street” as traditional NGOs “drift toward the government ones, and never the other way around” (Podrabinek 2010). While life in GONGOs is “juicy, but not durable” due to the inevitable exposure of state ties, the “GONGOists” inevitably end up transitioning to direct forms of the civil service (Podrabinek 2010). Podrabinek cites this trend as a key reason that activists and “NGOists,” to borrow his term, are perceived as having questionable ethical integrity in Russia.

Reactions to the danger of losing independence to the state vary, but one is to engage all funders – the state, other states, international organizations – with a certain functional distance and transparency in reporting financial and joint-project associations, and thus demonstrating independence from donors and other allies. Maksym addresses this issue for the organization in which he works:

We have our own policy on our financing. We try to show that we have varied financing from varied countries because it shows that we are not, for example, Russian NGOs in Ukraine. They are like lobbyists for the Russian influence in Kyiv. We try to show that we work with varied foundations and we are not someone’s interest in Ukraine.
For Maksym’s organization, the best way to maintain independence has been to seek funding from a variety of sources in terms of function and origin, and to ensure that all those sources are openly reported. However, as previously discussed, this is by no means the norm at this time among NGOs in Ukraine, which has partially caused the proliferation of USMs as concerned individuals judge their issues inadequately engaged by moneyed NGOs.

Of course, the perceived threat to independence of government affiliation – foreign and domestic, through direct oversight of NGO functions or indirect influence through funding – raises a broader question of whether the “non-” in nongovernmental organization is in fact representative of a false dichotomy, suggestive that any NGO with a connection, however tenuous, to governmental funding should be identified as such, in Ukraine or elsewhere. While ultimately this question of semantics and representation extends beyond the scope of this locally situated thesis, the question remains poignantly in the background of funding influences, trust and interest in voluntarism as most funding providers ultimately receive support from one or more specifically government institutions.

**Stepping beyond the state to “government”**

In an environment where the state is perceived by participants to be inactive, at best, while other entities – in particular in this chapter, international donors – are significantly more dominant, perhaps not only the conception of scale need go beyond the state, but also the conception of government.

Foucault interpreted a definition of government broader and older than the managing bodies of the state, rather referring to the practices of conduct and relationships among individuals and groups in society (Foucault 2003[1978]). Foucault’s government, defined by practices rather than institutions, thus transcended any conceptions of scale from the individual
to the state and beyond, across family life, economy and politics. Government as practices then includes: “How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, [and] how to become the best possible governor” (Foucault 2003[1978], 230). In broader terms, government is not the relationship between the institution of the state and the public, but rather the interrelated discourses throughout society without the leadership of some sole institution.

Foucault also states, “Government is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good… but to an end that is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed” (Foucault 2003[1978], 237). Note the difference between this perspective and the moralist presumption of value of institutions and civic engagement practices that recurs in the civil society literature – a focus on government as practices to seek the convenient management of society avoids the usual assumptions of the proper roles of the state, the public, civil society organizations, etc.

Thus, let us proceed from Foucault’s broadened definition to ignore institutional biases, moralization and ethnocentrism, and the presumed preeminence of the state as the actor of government. Instead, at least momentarily, let us look to the conglomeration of practices of government first – and see how international funding organizations and Ukrainian NGOs practice an exchange of directed activities and funding through the grant process that traverses the paths and obstacles set by the state. In so doing, this exchange of funds, ideas, activities and focus forms one branch of an evolving configuration of governmental practices in which supranational entities take on forms of independent “social welfare” and public education that were largely presumed to be in the sphere of the state by both the academic and
“nongovernmental” communities of civil society and by purveyors of the-state-is-all Soviet socialism.

Ecoclearinghouse jumping scales for funding then becomes more clearly a result of the search for the most effective and convenient end to satisfy staffers’ goals, such as publicizing environmental issues in Ukraine, paying costs to maintain legal status and earning wages for their own livelihoods through the available models of receiving grants. In turn, the organization’s funders work to reduce the Ukrainian contribution of global warming chemicals through legislative lobbying, instill the promoted values of the international environmental community through public education, etc. The staffers’ goals themselves are partially derived from their exposure to practices of government from a multitude of sources, which have inculcated the existence of as well as urgency and value in resolving environmental problems based in science and the social welfare, both present and future. In this regard, it becomes apparent how the practices of government, and the actors among the strands, become irrevocably intertwined – they can be tweaked, manipulated, rhetorically identified, but never functionally unwound.

Furthermore, practices of government employed by individuals in international funding organizations may attempt to persuade populations that their security/welfare depend on following project advice, such as by making lifestyle choices to combat global warming. As international funding organizations pay local partner organizations to execute specific projects, the reorientation to these projects can reform organizations’ activities and structures around these ends, driving a synthesis of knowledge by the governed (Dean 1999; Lemke 2002) that feeds into the discourses between local actors and the international NGO community, as well as pushing organizations to display structures in line with the expected norms of funders. As a corollary of
these practices, we begin to see how the conception and reconception of NGOs’ scalar relationships can be yet another discursive means by which NGO staff seek the most effective and convenient means to their goals, as achieving an “international” design can be a potent argument for future grant applications.

In turn, however, it appears that the gaze toward international funders’ objectives does not, for the most part, appeal to potential volunteers. While the lack of appeal is unimportant to many NGOs – grant-gobblers in particular – this is not always the case, and a dearth of voluntarism certainly does not suit the broader conceptual goals for civil society set out in the liberal-individualist literature. Alternative approaches to the international gaze also exist, as do resistances to the power of either the state or the alluring funding of international donors. In the next chapter, I discuss an alternative approach to organization: the USMs.
IV: Unregistered movements offer alternative to the international focus

In the previous chapters, I discussed the various expectations and metrics for voluntarism in Ukraine, including difficulty in measuring voluntarism outside the most institutionalized form, voluntary labor with registered NGOs. Additionally, I noted that voluntarism in the former Soviet space is increasingly believed to occur not in the easily measured, registered institutional settings but rather in forms of “hidden volunteering” that are poorly tracked (United Nations Volunteers 2010). I have also discussed disconnections of scalar focus between NGOs and potential volunteers, as recounted by participants ranging from fully unsalaried volunteers to the paid directors of large NGOs. In this chapter, I tie together these threads with participants’ observations to consider another aspect of an answer to why measured voluntarism is so low in Ukraine: the voluntary practices that are occurring do not fit those traditionally tracked by civil society scholars, as they exist on the outskirts or simply outside of the expected institutional frameworks. Specifically, herein I discuss an alternative outlet for volunteers’ enthusiasm, “social movements” (as referenced by participants) that meet the legal definition of the “volunteer formation” (see page 32), i.e. a voluntary-labor group of citizens devoted to particular social causes with no legal sources of organized funding. Due to the fact that the legally unregistered status of most movements is critical to understanding their practices, features and limitations, I typically further abbreviate to “USM” to be succinct and explicit.

Unregistered social movements: Hidden voluntarism? The true “secondary associations”? To recap, USMs observably demonstrate greater progress in gaining and sustaining relationships with volunteers for their needs than NGOs, but by their legal definition have no formal access to capital for their projects. However, owing to the untracked nature of this sector, broad quantitative metrics for participation among the population are cursory or outright
nonexistent, as discussed in Chapter I. Furthermore, unlike registered NGOs, USMs in Ukraine are far less beholden to state and multilateral funders, and therefore better able to fulfill some of the conditions for Tocqueville’s secondary associations: forming a bulwark in contention with the state, and an impetus for organization coming at least partially from a popular, bottom-up establishment (Baccaro 2001). Additionally, the formation and projects of the USMs, which are often marginalized by politicians and excluded from access to capital by the legal code, represent practices of resistance to state power seen as limiting and/or oppressive (Hunt and Wickham 1994), in contrast to the NGOs that at least superficially work with the state and are fully accounted. Thus, the incompletely accounted status of USMs, their activities and their “memberships” raise the question that perhaps part of the answer to the lack of measured voluntarism in Ukraine is, in fact, that the measurement tools in the literature have been inadequately devised to account for the myriad “voluntarisms” occurring. In this section, I consider the development of several USMs and related groups, linked through the ways they subvert or innovate beyond the ensemble of paradigms and practices set by Ukrainian law and the international development community. More specifically, I discuss USMs’ focus on local issues; volunteer recruitment through appeals to visceral, impassioning causes; and their balance between freedom from fixed legal costs and limited access to capital.

Focus on the local

On page 51, I introduced Nataliya as a broadly based volunteer and the cofounder of a business promoting ecologically friendly goods – and through the business, environmental idealism with legal commercial funding. She cites the lack of awareness and interest among NGOs in local issues as a key reason she chose to shift spheres, both due to her own interests and
a belief that local emphasis is key to engaging the public. Below, she discusses her frustrations with Ukraine’s globally driven environmental NGOs:

Ultimately, very few Ukrainians think about global warming, global problems. They’re more interested in their local, on-site problems because in Ukraine there are very many! With water, with destruction of forests or parks, and of course we have Chernobyl. People are more interested in what can happen in the city or their village, especially in the eastern regions. There are mines, there’s a lot of factories and plants. People are more worried about what is next to them than what will happen broadly in the future…. We are interested in very important mechanisms of what people know, what they know about what’s happening in nature. We are not thinking about the authorities, rather about what’s happening to our neighbors and ourselves. Pollution of the water, the need to turn off one’s lamps to preserve energy, people buying plastic goods that may easily be from other alternatives. It’s a concrete part of the world. It’s more about what exists…. People are also talking about social problems: communal apartments in Kyiv, utilities charges, factories closing, not earning enough money, honest elections. About ecology, people [are talking] about local things.

While Nataliya’s present association is primarily with a business, she and her cofounders are using this business as a means to promote their united interests in local and global environmentalism while also making a profit; furthermore, they hope to expand their activities later to finance projects directly. Additionally, Nataliya continues to volunteer with environment and health-focused social movements in her free time, albeit irregularly. Having given up on NGOs as too detached from Ukrainian realities, Nataliya continues her work through a mixture of entrepreneurism and voluntarism outside the expectations of the literature and between (but still within) the constraints of the state legal code. Working in a business with short and long-term goals to support environmental protection allows her to provide for herself and better see an effect on the issues she cares about from her labor, whereas her work in NGOs, particularly her paid work, had been less explicitly effective.

Similarly, Svitlana found that the local issues about which she is most passionate are best served by social movements. Svitlana, like Nataliya, is already a battle-hardened veteran of
Ukrainian social activism in varied forms despite not yet being 30: she has already worked for pay in both NGOs and offices within the Ukrainian government, studied civil society at a graduate level in university to look for insights for her work, and dedicates time to social movements, in particular a movement in which she was an early member and now key organizer that works to preserve historic architecture and landscapes in Kyiv from illegal redevelopment. This movement, Past Preservation, began when a group of activists and previously disinterested neighborhood citizens began discussing an illegal, but unofficially government-sanctioned and sponsored, building project in a historic, protected green space in central Kyiv. Svitlana recounts:

So Past Preservation started in August or September 2007…. When it started, we didn’t think it was going to last more than a few months. It was, you know, [because] we have this problem with building in the city center. The worst was this one site on the top of Andriivs'kyi Uzviz. There’s the church, and then on the other side of the street behind the houses there’s a small hill, some park, and there are some houses over there. When [the illegal building] was being built, people from the neighboring [residential] buildings were very much against that construction because they were afraid their buildings would come down. It was against the law as well because you can’t build there in the city center, in this protected area. It’s illegal under international and Ukrainian law. So we started talking about doing something on a blog, on LiveJournal. We decided to do something, that the trend [of illegal construction] cannot last forever, we’re tired of new buildings everywhere. Illegal buildings that they’re trying to build. [The initial activists] started talking about it on the Internet, then they met for the first action against it. It attracted some journalist attention, and [this] attracted some interest. It was funny because it was discovered that it was a project for the people in the building next to it, which were people working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The funny thing is that the UNESCO office here is within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. This site was in a UNESCO protected area, and UNESCO in Ukraine is in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was in this building! They were the ones that were supposed to protect the area.

Despite the prominence of collapsing historic structures, illegal redevelopment and destruction of communal spaces in Kyiv (Stack 2010), inhabitants were met with little interest and empty words when the approached government officials and NGOs for help resolving or at
least publicizing these issues. Instead, a nascent USM became the most effective and efficient means to work toward their local goals. From this initial and eventually successful project, Past Preservation has expanded to a variety of local projects along with similar groups. Overall, the movement’s key activities have required very little funding, relying on a backbone of mostly free Internet presence to organize demonstrations of local inhabitants (relative to each project) and volunteers from throughout the city, as well as a number of volunteers with media experience and their friendly journalist contacts.

Officially, Past Preservation eschews formal leadership structures in favor of providing organizational expertise and technologies on individual case bases, but in practice a number of most active or most popular organizers within the movement have appeared. Their key strategy has been to cause enough noise through varied protest techniques to call significant media or political attention to individual projects – a technique that has worked in other post-Soviet metropolises, most notably Moscow (see Nikishenkov 2009; Kagarlitsky 2010; Krainova 2010). Svitlana and other involved participants with whom I spoke mention that this supports the movement’s ideological goals (or rather, lack of goals, beyond historic preservation and enabling local resistance) but also noted that this has led to the rise of occasional factionalism within the movement. In particular, Ivan – previously mentioned for his association with Ukraina bez Kuchmy (see page 49), but who also has occasionally worked on projects with Past Preservation – notes how a shift from local issues to a more globally focused ideology sputtered:

They were trying to get out of this very marginal, ideological ghetto and work with the masses. The [functional, not official] chairman of this movement reoriented to a leftist framework, for example. Not talking about illegal buildings, but how these buildings are unjust. They’re not for poor people, these buildings are for corporations or powerful people because poor people, middle-class people are not able to buy flats in these new apartments. They’re more expensive than many years’ wages. So they started to work with trade unions, organize protests, some other local campaigns…. But this is a problem for the Past Preservation
movement. They’ve worked mainly for actions but they haven’t worked enough with local inhabitants, they didn’t put much into making them understand the more global level of their problems. They target just one corrupt official, or talk about a greedy corporate builder. This is a systemic problem – huge corruption in the seat of the laws of the capital. But they didn’t do much about this systemic side. This is why this movement is still very local and a very simple issue.

Note that for Ivan, Past Preservation members’ inability to shift the overall conversation to a local/global focus is a failure. Yet, his own focus as an activist has ranged back and forth between the local and global, concrete and ideological, with a strong focus on leftist politics. While he makes the point above to critique Past Preservation, his observation again speaks to the difficulty in shifting focus and interest to more global, impersonal projects.

**Recruitment through local and “glocal” interests**

Rather, Ivan’s complaint reinforces the strong pull of local, lived issues in driving Ukrainian voluntarism among research participants. In cases where potential volunteers were coaxed with techniques not based in local issues, a consistent trait among the different approaches was to base the rhetoric in intertwined local and global/national issues, supporting the contemporary literature’s rejection of power and scale relationships only moving from the broad to the narrow (see Howitt 1991, 1993, 2003; Jhappan 1992; Smith 1993; Swyngedouw 1997; Marston 2000 for broad examples). As Marston states:

Scale is not necessarily a preordained hierarchical framework for ordering the world – local, regional, national and global. It is instead a contingent outcome of the tensions that exist between structural forces and the practices of human agents (2000, 220)

Instead, conceptions of scale, from the most rigid (legal, for instance) to most fluid (public perceptions, polling data, zeitgeist) may be manipulated through interscalar claims or alliances both up and down the hierarchy. Swyngedouw, in particular, has focused on the bidirectional interactions he coined “glocal” to represent how they are intensely and inseparably
representative of both global and local processes, with neither conceived scale discretely bearing greater power or sway (1997). I use the term here as it suits the fluid shifts between local and global in participants’ work.

Recruiting volunteers to USMs relies on appeals to participants touting movements’ work on moving, personally felt issues. This was not the exclusive method used of course – appeals to friends, family and colleagues through personal networks; arguments of personal value, entertainment or popularity through the experience; and suggestions of applicability to one’s future career; etc. are also employed. However, issues that were experienced directly and materially by participants, locally or glocally framed, were the key element. For example, when asked how she and others become volunteers, Nataliya specifically refers to personal importance, particularly local relevance:

Well actually, one becomes a volunteer on issues that are important to the person. For example, it’s in the neighborhood the person lives in. Local inhabitants may work on issues from which they see value. Things that are more abstract or removed are harder to explain in speech. People become volunteers when they sufficiently feel that something needs to change, that there will be value. To plant trees, for instance, it’s a concrete result. To pick up trash. People are very open to hearing about this. It’s close to them.

In turn, Green Action teaches students about general water quality, but through a prism of Kyiv regional and Ukrainian water quality problems. Admittedly, that volunteer groups would use appeals to direct experience is hardly surprising – this technique is a basic primitive of any form of persuasion or marketing. However, the key to note here is that these movements consistently apply this technique when registered organizations by and large lack interest in volunteer recruitment or are too detached from local causes to make plausible arguments. As Nataliya noted:

[People] don’t become volunteers because they know little about nongovernmental organizations. They haven’t seen that there are many of them in Ukraine, or they know little about them. This is related to the problems of which I already spoke: organization of projects that Ukraine actually needs.
Things a person in Ukraine worries about. If it’s not important, volunteers will not appear… The person thinks, ‘Whatever’…. They become volunteers if there’s a big percent of people who realize it’s a problem, they see the purpose of the activity, in my opinion. Or because an organization is sufficiently interesting, shows people how their activity is interesting.

Movements typically emphasize direct effect, while research participants often spoke to the lack of connection between work activities and some impression of a tangible result in NGOs. Furthermore, many of these types of local issues are often difficult to frame for NGOs even if they are interested, as they tend to cut across the sectors defined for global and Ukrainian civil society organizations. The Past Preservation movement, for example, investigates illegal development that could fall under NGO grant mandates related to anti-corruption, rule of law, environmental protection, and historic preservation and cultural heritage. However, they eschew any attempt to subcategorize or alter their work for the desires of external agencies. As such, it would largely be difficult to support under one of these spheres alone owing to the movement’s disparate focus on a project-by-project basis.

I earlier mentioned Olena’s experiences balancing NGO work and student voluntarism (see page 33). Her NGO is structured into sub-units around key grants, while the university group educates students about environmental issues across scales and conducts projects to improve the local environment. On how voluntarism differs between Ecoclearinghouse and Environmental Action Center, she stated:

Well, I think I would describe [Environmental Action Center] as very informal, active, creative. In our organization\(^7\), the people are not working for money, they’re working for experience, for having fun, for other things. We have an internal force that’s driving the organization, it’s absolutely different from other formal organizations, environmental NGOs that are paid…. A formal organization [like Ecoclearinghouse] is organized differently, they’re more bureaucratic and they have more restrictions, etc. We don’t have that much of that in Ecological Action. We still produce annual reports and other things, trying to keep track of

\(^7\) NB: She uses the term “organization” generally, not in reference to the legal or civil society discourse. She is speaking of the university group.
our finances. We do basic things like that, but we’re not overloaded with all the bureaucracy [that] I think kills the enthusiasm. We do the minimum to keep our organization running. [The university] require[s] annual reports from us, but they’re not very complicated, just basic things like number of members, what projects we’ve done.

As a university group, Environmental Action Center can receive a stipend from the university and charge group members a small membership fee (unlike “pure” USMs) with narrow restrictions on how the money may be used. Additionally, the university can facilitate receipt of external grants, as long as the grants do not contradict Ukrainian law or other state and university regulations. Olena and other university group participants consistently emphasized how their bureaucratic reporting requirements are minor compared to a legally registered NGO – and as such, they focus the majority of their volunteering time on planning and execution of projects. As a result, Olena cites the lack of continual costs as the key structural difference between her university group and NGO, and thus the ultimate driver behind the difference in enthusiasm:

This is the difference between the volunteer organizations and formally registered organizations. In our case, we don’t work for money, we don’t need to pay salaries. We just have an idea, we want to implement it, and we look for sources to do it. In the case of environmental NGOs, they have their employees and they have to pay salaries, so they look for, in some cases, sponsorship possibilities. They develop projects that would be acceptable to the funding sources. In an NGO, we work for money. We do funded projects in these organizations. As I already said, in Ecological Action we work based on our personal enthusiasm, for ourselves, on our interests and what we want to do. I went [to Ecoclearinghouse] because I wanted to work on something important to me but for money at a fixed level.

I also mentioned in the earlier section that Olena and peers are working to register an NGO that would extend beyond their university group. However, there is an inherent contradiction here: if Olena and her partners register an NGO “sister” to their university group, will this new NGO not also face the same financial hurdles leading to a loss of local, personal
focus? For the moment – with no funding and only entering registration – one volunteer has covered the base requirements:

Now, since we’re [registering], we still have to submit reports to the state authorities even though we don’t have any financial projects. We still have to submit. It consumes time. Luckily we have one girl who is responsible for this as a volunteer, she’s not paid.

However, Olena cannot answer this question for the longer term, and acknowledges that the requirements would go beyond what one volunteer can do longer-term. Olena notes that the group is already suffering difficulties as “they don’t yet have enough money to create positions and it’s difficult to get projects,” and she harbors doubts that the group can fulfill members’ hopes to provide funded jobs working on their specific interests. Ultimately, sacrifices will likely have to be made to transition to an NGO, either giving up funding opportunities or reorienting toward more lucrative causes.

**Free to focus on chosen issues, but activities and funding restricted under the law**

This emphasis on local and glocal issues fuels an engine that provides movements with voluntary labor while also pushing movements to incorporate volunteers’ interests and evolve their missions. These are in essence the Tocquevillian secondary associations the literature is looking for – groups of citizens banding together for causes they care about, pushing against levers of power (even if the scope of those levers may have expanded beyond Tocqueville’s conception of state-as-government to corporations and other entities, and the technologies of power have become more diverse as well). As long as participants behave in ways that will not provoke authorities to restrict their actions\(^8\) by law or physical force, they face few functional restrictions in what causes they may choose or how they may pursue their interests in terms of

\(^8\) To say “behave legally” would be rather inaccurate, though perhaps more inaccurate in Ukraine than in most European states.
activities. This of course differs from NGOs, which face continual costs to maintain registration and thus typically become restricted by the search for and conditions of their income – desires to focus on local causes thus become filtered and typically lost through the funding cycle, as previously discussed. However, social movements’ activities are in turn complicated as well by the legal prohibition against receiving funding, forcing activists who lack vast cash reserves (i.e. nearly all activists) to innovate balances between effective efforts, low costs and alternative means of securing capital that stay within the letter of the law.

At the most basic level, the social movements whose volunteers were interviewed tend to limit their expected activities specifically to those that require little or no cash to proceed, focusing rather on whatever level of direct voluntary labor the movement can provide. For example, Past Preservation typically only takes on projects when the community surrounding the project demonstrates that they will provide the bulk of the labor, especially as flash mobs and protests are key to the movement’s activities. Longer-term volunteers in Past Preservation will guide toward government and media resources, provide introductions, and consult on organization, but cannot provide the sheer labor power or cash to drive effective projects without community support. Svitlana recounts:

That is the sad part because people will call us and say, ‘Hey, I heard you could help me with this,’ and we cannot really help them. We can give them assistance, but the main ideology of Past Preservation is that the people in buildings nearby should do most of the work and we will help them. That is the main idea because you need to do a lot of work with the judiciary to stop construction, go to different administrations, and things like that.

Consistently, activists noted that free Internet resources are key to their activities. Ukrainian Internet penetration is low though quickly rising – 18% of Ukrainians used the Internet regularly in 2009 (when the bulk of fieldwork was conducted), 31% in 2011 according
to Euromonitor International (*Passport* 2012). However, users skew heavily young and urban, generally a key audience for social movement voluntarism. Key approaches include:

- E-mail for organizational and individual communication, as well as, when necessary, anonymous communication to avoid interest from undesired elements.
- Blogging services (i.e. LiveJournal) and social networking sites (i.e. Facebook, VKontakte) for activity organization; open dialogue on movement plans and interests; and publicizing causes, forthcoming events, and results.
- Proprietary, relatively static websites to present unified, agreed upon views and commentaries on the above topics. Admittedly, such websites may not be “free” per se but may be informally funded by a supporter of the movement.

To be fair, most of the Kyiv-based NGOs surveyed also had notable presence on the Internet, in particular proprietary websites. However, most of these were less prominent in the organizations’ activities, less frequently updated, and more likely to focus on results of past events than driving interest in new activities or crowdsourcing ideas from visitors. Indeed, while NGO sites typically were designed more professionally in terms of layout and branding (suggesting a greater investment of labor and/or cash), many of these also seemed more oriented toward attracting funders or fulfilling requirements for “public outreach” than toward a continual dialogue or appeals for voluntary labor. Furthermore, NGO sites were somewhat more likely to have been designed by external professionals, while social movements’ sites were often designed by hand by amateur volunteers, although in some cases a professional web designer with the movement volunteered services. However, this comparison should not be viewed in a vacuum – as many NGOs’ theoretical service communities have very low Internet penetration, a focus on the much more heavily wired funding entities is not surprising.
In addition to Internet media, social movement volunteers tend also to cultivate contacts that may be interested in aiding the movement or be willing to trade favors to achieve their goals with little cash investment. The obvious question would be whether this is merely a result of shared interests, a continuation of classic Soviet/post-Soviet favor trading (see Wanner 1998), or the banality of “networking” that is all the rage in the Western press – frankly, it is all of the above. For example, Svitlana cultivated contacts among journalists and international organizations to connect interested parties and publicize Past Preservation’s efforts. She went in to specifics on one event early in her time with the organization, when UNESCO representatives were coming to Ukraine to monitor the World Heritage sites that Past Preservation had been working to publicize and protect:

There were some people from the UNESCO commission, from the office in Paris, that came to Ukraine from the World Heritage Committee. They came to Ukraine to inspect how the World Heritage sites had been protected in Ukraine. So, we found out about this, and I sent ten press releases about that so the journalists would find out about that. I called the UNESCO commission and said, ‘Hey, would you want to talk about this? Perhaps present some results of the visit?’ They said, ‘Oh, it’s good that you called me because we wanted to get in touch with some journalists. It is crazy what is happening with heritage UNESCO sites here in Ukraine.’ I said, ‘Well, if you want to talk to the journalists, we could arrange a press conference.’ You know, because that is normally what you do when you talk to journalists! [Laughing] They replied, ‘Oh! A press conference! That sounds like a good plan.’ So I arranged the whole press conference for the UNESCO Commission here in Ukraine. They were so happy about it, and we became famous. Everybody started talking about it, and now everyone in Kyiv at least knows that there is this problem with the buffer zone around the UNESCO sites.

While this was only one facet of a long battle (2008-present), Svitlana bringing these two communities together became a beachhead moment for the movement and was credited by several volunteers as key to the eventual success of their first project, protecting the green space in the historic Andriivs’kyi Uzviz district.
Finally, volunteers also find alternative means to fund projects while staying within the letter of the law. Typically, this involves movement volunteers approaching potential sponsors, most often registered NGOs or international companies with interests in voluntary projects, to find common ground. Sponsors and movements then develop means to provide necessary funding and resources to the volunteers within the letter of the law, such as by purchasing resources up front and providing them to volunteers by hand, or by drafting consultant contracts with the individual volunteers that bypass the legally strapped movements. I return to this topic soon below, in the section on exchanges of NGO funds and movement labor on page 88.

However, first we must discuss more broadly the missing piece of the puzzle here – how NGOs and unregistered movements interact to better achieve their respective goals and harness their different resources.

The differences between registered NGOs and USMs regarding voluntarism and related factors may thus be categorized as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of entity</th>
<th>Registered NGO</th>
<th>Unregistered social movement (USM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scalar focus</td>
<td>• International or extremely broad issues of concern, likely not related to directly local interests.</td>
<td>• Local or glocal issues/concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding source</td>
<td>• International or national grants with specific directives, legal processing.</td>
<td>• Unofficially and/or indirectly funded by individual participants, external sponsor entities (NGO or corporate) and/or wealthy sponsors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How people volunteer/participate/engage</td>
<td>• May officially volunteer or work for pay. Volunteers can be legally noted, including on curriculum vitae.</td>
<td>• Volunteering for non-economic reasons (either genuine care about issues of concern or connections through personal networks).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Volunteers may seek internship experience or future potential for employment.</td>
<td>• No direct opportunities for remuneration and no direct status from which to draw claims of training/experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives to encourage voluntarism</td>
<td>• Typically few or no initiatives.</td>
<td>• Word-of-mouth, social media and/or favors from personal networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Possibly calls for short-term volunteers for specific events.</td>
<td>• Key recruiting technologies rely on spurring interest in issues, typically through localized appeals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• May have passive recruiting (i.e. website form, etc.).</td>
<td>• Completely reliant upon voluntarism for labor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives to encourage philanthropy</td>
<td>• Directly seek funds from international (sometimes national) funding organizations.</td>
<td>• No legal means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Occasional appeals directly to concerned, wealthy individuals or foundations.</td>
<td>• Movement cannot receive funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising and public relations approaches</td>
<td>• May have official campaigns for specific events or broader initiatives.</td>
<td>• Word-of-mouth and social media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Often have personnel for outreach.</td>
<td>• No official outlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can advertise through various paid/maintained mass media (print, radio, television, Internet).</td>
<td>• Lack funding to advertise in press, but may use personal connections and “interesting” issues to gain press attention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Movements particularly successful with the press often build on previous events and relationships.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews

In summary, USMs achieve many of the goals sought in the civil society literature regarding voluntarism and even civic engagement more broadly, but they do so through practices that appear to have largely evaded the expectations of the literature on postsocialist civil societies. They serve as organizers of activity to press the desires of members of the public.
against the state (looking toward the strictest DeTocquevillian definition) and other sources of practices of government (if we accept the broader definition previously discussed). They are predominantly driven from the bottom up by nascent activists who may or may not be working with and influenced by the global institutions and discourses of civil society. Lastly, they are more, if not fully (arguably an impossible box to check), organized around principles that do not include direct remuneration for participants. In the activities and formation of USMs, we perhaps see not only the “hidden volunteering” of the post-Soviet space (United Nations Volunteers 2010), but also how the expected practices of the civil society literature may be transformed and reinterpreted in different ways than in the often revered case studies of North America and Western Europe.
V: Innovations to subvert limitations for NGOs and movements alike

Reviewing the previous chapter, the most elemental difference between NGOs and USMs in Ukraine that emerges is the multifaceted relationship between voluntarism and funding. This relationship is driven by legal restrictions and scalar focus, as well as the resultant effects on choices of activities and issues on which groups focus. In this section, I discuss how NGOs and social movements find means to exchange their relative resources of funding and labor to better meet their group goals and the goals of their individual participants. In particular, I highlight the hybrid roles individuals often play as both NGO employees and social movement volunteers, exchanges of funding and labor, trading expertise for numbers, and gaining necessary resources through unorthodox means. Through these roles and practices, participants further demonstrate the lack of both push and pull factors in favor of voluntarism with registered NGOs, the myriad forms of voluntarism occurring outside the usual metrics, and the ways participants and groups subvert and innovate beyond legal regimes and material limitations to achieve their goals. In this chapter, I discuss these practices further and argue that the Ukrainian case study calls for a revised conception of the practices of voluntarism, acknowledging how voluntarism (even in forms that work toward the desired ends of the liberal-individualist civil society literature) may occur outside expected venues and institutions. However, to pursue these ends, we must first address one theoretical model drawn from the post-Soviet space that helps to illuminate how these practices manifest.

Entrepreneurial governmentality and scale as resistance

By subverting the relationships of law, funding and scale between NGOs and USMs, individuals and groups practice a variation of what Yurchak has called “entrepreneurial governmentality”: 
In Foucauldian terms, then, to be an entrepreneur is to have *entrepreneurial governmentality* that makes it thinkable and practicable to relate to different aspects of the world – people, relations, institutions, the state, laws, etc. – in terms of symbolic commodities, risks, capital, profits, costs, needs, demands, etc. It is a way of knowing what an entrepreneurial act is, who can act entrepreneurially, and what or who can be acted upon in an entrepreneurial way (Yurchak 2002, 2, emphasis in original)

To clarify, Yurchak has argued that the late Soviet Union did not lack traits and activities deemed “entrepreneurial,” as was classically argued in top-down Sovietological literature, but in fact exemplified them as the demands of the state were no longer achievable, and thus had to be mediated and transformed to achieve goals. For example, he describes the role of the Komsomol Secretary:

To be a Komsomol Secretary, especially during the late Soviet period, was to apply very particular technologies of entrepreneurial governmentality that allowed one to fulfill projects, achieve goals and earn symbolic profits by conducting procedures, organizing people, relating to institutions, etc. (Yurchak 2002, 2)

Thus Yurchak finds that the incongruities and molasses-like bureaucracies of the Soviet period – a shortage economy versus quota demands, the official discourses of ideological success and the reality of a growing crisis – were traversed with entrepreneurial technologies that were then adapted for use in the grand economic reset to capitalism as well, performing a crucial role in synthesizing the new era of private business. I argue that similar technologies of subversion and compromise are key to effectively and conveniently achieving goals for NGOs and USMs as well, beginning with individuals who act in both spheres, to mediate the limitations imposed by government bureaucracy and the culture and economy of international grants.

**Hybrid roles of NGO employees and USM volunteers**

More often than not, research participants engaged with NGOs or USMs were in fact participating in both types of groups. Of the 13 interview participants A) who are Ukrainian nationals and had not spent periods of more than one year abroad, B) with whom I conducted one
hour or more of interviews, and C) were regular participants in either NGOs or social movements (i.e. directly participating at least weekly):

- Seven were engaged in the preceding six months volunteering for social movements more than twice per month and also working as full-time NGO employees. This count includes one who had recently left her NGO for a full-time job in a related for-profit field and one who had worked on an NGO contract for an unspecified period in that time and has since joined an NGO full-time.
- Three were NGO employees but not volunteering regularly with any USMs.
- Three were volunteering regularly with USMs but not employees of an NGO.

This is not a statistically significant sample, and is not meant to be represented as such. However, it does indicate a relationship and raises questions. Why would people working full-time in an NGO commit additional time to different social movements? Why would social movement volunteers work in NGOs when the common discourse is that the NGOs do not value the local issues on which these individuals volunteer?

Olena already provided practical answers to these questions earlier: in an NGO she can earn money working on issues that are connected to her more personal, driving interests (even if she wishes they were closer together), while her movement voluntarism allows her to work directly on those interests but with no material compensation (see page 48). Others offered similar compromises – for example, both Ivan and Nataliya are working in for-profit ventures that have social interests related to their movement participation. In Ivan’s case, he makes a significantly smaller salary than in his previous career because of his move in position and sector, and he puts his spare time into his social movement. While balancing basic material needs and social causes is the most basic explanation here, I contend that this is also an
expression of Yurchak’s balancing of officialized-public and personalized-public spheres in entrepreneurial governmentality:

These complex hybrid practices – distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless types of work, organizing people to perform these types work [sic], juggling different meanings, producing different reports, and ultimately relating to the state’s laws, institutions and ideologies in these different ways – became thinkable and practicable precisely because of the particular form of late-socialist entrepreneurial governmentality (Yurchak 2002, 13).

More specifically, Yurchak discusses how “types of action” signified the “routine personalization or officialization of the individual’s relations with the state” (2002, 10). Yurchak recounts how the Soviet state’s official demands became untenable (or at least, highly impractical) in the broader material reality of what individuals could achieve with their given resources. Thus, individuals’ public lives became separated between what was reported and documented to the state (the officialized-public) and what individuals actually did, with particular emphasis on attempts to fulfill the spirit of the state’s demands while adjusting particular details. As such, while objectives were achieved in the officialized-public, they could be subverted in the personalized-public. For example, the Komsomol Secretary may report to the Party that they had aired 15 promotional videos as required, but in reality be proud to have successfully aired a mere few after trading for replacement parts.

While the situation has changed – the state’s influence is now met by both encouraged and discouraged influences from multinational and foreign entities, corporations, nonprofits, the political opposition, etc. – individuals still find themselves needing to innovate unique solutions to fulfill their real objectives amid the legal and economic reality of postsocialist Ukraine, regardless of whether those goals are to benefit society or oneself. Furthermore, Yurchak draws

9 While Yurchak offered a particular interpretation of officialized-public and personalized-public spheres within his broader argument of entrepreneurial governmentality, as I use it here, the original conceptualization and terms come from Voronkov and Chikadze (1997), as Yurchak also cites.
on Hann and Dunn (1996) to point out that the broader milieu of a civil society needs to be understood less through its “formal structures and organizations” and more through “beliefs, values and everyday practices,” including the acknowledgement that the societal products of postsocialist transformation emerge from and repackage socialist-era practices (Yurchak 2002, 32). Thus, hybrid employees/volunteers are one example of this balance in beliefs and practices – these individuals commit their labor to work in NGOs that supports their more specific social interests in a roundabout way (or to no perceived social end, in some cases), for experience and connections, and for wages; on the other hand, they devote additional labor to less remunerative voluntarism with social movements that represent their more direct social issues, to extend Yurchak’s terms.

Furthermore, these entrepreneurial activists muddy any philosophical attempt to separate the altruistic volunteer and the selfish worker. In NGO Ecoclearinghouse, most employees with whom I spoke were spending a portion of their free time (and often using their Ecoclearinghouse contacts) to work on the local issues that first brought them to voluntarism. In NGO Reform, the two employees interviewed both joined the organization after being recruited from collaborations with USMs, and both were using the relative freedom their wages provided to put more time in to their other voluntary interests. In USM Green Action, volunteers could benefit from trips abroad and opportunities to be recruited for consultancies – while Volodymyr denied that this was ever a motivating factor, the fact that some material benefit was possible remains.

**Exchanging resources between movements and NGOs**

Moving one step further out from the discussion of entrepreneurial activists, everyone involved – employees, volunteers and those who do both – uses their contacts to cross-pollinate between the needs of NGOs and social movements. At the most banal, this might be just an
exchange of experienced contacts or alerting an acquaintance to an upcoming opportunity, little different in barest practice than would be seen in other geographic settings. Most notably, however, among the interactions between NGOs and social movements are the ways that participants find to exchange NGOs’ funding and movements’ volunteer rolls through trusted contacts and colleagues, in the process subverting, but not breaking, the law and covering the two group types’ resource deficits.

Such events of using interpersonal connections to evade institutional deficits and restrictions are hardly unique in the post-Soviet space, with Yurchak’s examples of Russian lateral trading to compensate hierarchical failures just one of many examples (2002). Specifically in Ukraine, Wanner discusses how networks of trading goods and favors were “vitally important” for Ukrainian daily life and breaking “through the dense morass of bureaucratic regulations that often seem to have been designed to prevent anyone from getting anything accomplished” (1998, 51). In turn, Petryna records how state hospitals had to use network appeals to supply their basic needs. Admittedly, subversion of laws due to perceived inadequacies for the individual, for society and even for the state itself is well-trod ground in post-Soviet studies. Furthermore, the theoretically deregionalized study of social capital as panacea, ambrosia, and all-around salvation for civil society seems to have been resurrected every few years since 1995 in the broader civil society literature, particularly following Putnam’s seminal works (Putnam 1995; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Putnam 2000). However, the key for this study is that this particular type of interpersonal exchange has facilitated NGOs becoming involved in local issues (with a corollary that individual employees who wish to work on local issues receive some satisfaction), while social movements gain some form of funding to pursue and publicize projects.
On many occasions, these exchanges were recounted as one-offs without a pattern. Olena, for instance, notes how her student group receives support:

If we work together to organize, for example, Earth Day or Climate Action Day and we are working together with other organizations that have received other funding, then we just tell them that we need a bit for this, I don’t know, t-shirts or something like that, then they will give us funding from their sources. It’s a simpler way to operate for us. In this way we’re already incorporated with Ecoclearinghouse, where I work now, and several other environmental NGOs. It’s a way out for us.

To a degree, these one-offs are due to how much voluntarism in postsocialist Europe is typified by short-term events, typically involving a mix of organizations, the formality of logistical organization and even marketing with the informality of “loose, limited and short-term commitment” to the campaign by many of the volunteers (United Nations Volunteers 2010, 15). Success of these so-called “actions” (aktsii in both Ukrainian and Russian) to promote a particular issue or initiative is often measured by locals and by grant funders by some metric of the number of people at the event and possibly by submissions of interest from participants/spectators. As such, the combination of NGOs’ funding and social movements’ appeals to volunteer networks (and subsequently, those volunteers’ personal networks) can boost events for NGOs and social movements alike.

However, these exchanges should not be so crudely represented as being merely about bills and bodies. NGOs and social movements also exchange less tangible resources. NGOs can often provide tested “best practices” from abroad, long-term expertise in general fields of interest (i.e. environmentalism, anti-corruption, etc.), and contacts with people of influence. Social movements can often provide deep local awareness and a pedigree that avoids concerns over outside or even foreign influence, or the concern that an NGO will disappear overnight never to finish projects. As a result of all of these factors, while many exchanges appear to be one-offs at
first, longer-term collaborations often develop when viewed more broadly than stories of particular events.

These instances of trading not only show the balance between officialized-public and personalized-public amid participants’ efforts to achieve goals effectively and conveniently, they also showcase how scale can be used not only to classify and differentiate, but also to contest claims and restrictions (Smith 1993). The means through which scale is contested and is used to contest are varied. While capital in terms of internationally based grant funding is a prevailing topic throughout this thesis, the interactions of civil society actors construct and contest scale through additional, related means as well, including the flows of knowledge, training and information available from international civil society actors (see Smith 1996 for examples in other geographic contexts). At the same time, these forms of resistance, or of seeking an easier path, remind that scales, spaces and places are inextricably bound together and must be traversed to be contested (Massey 1994). Inherently, contestation across scales requires movement across scales, to shift to a scale with similar or greater strength – financial, rhetorical, electoral, etc. For example, movements working in opposition to power elites, in particular, may benefit from greater opportunities by jumping scales to flank their restrictions, whether that means calling on the knowledge gained from a training or calling a UNESCO press conference (Staeheli 1994). The use of scale to contest and evade restrictions is exactly what is happening in Ukraine, but not always in an open usage of public relations or legal battles. Rather, in Ukraine resistance through scale is also occurring through subversion of the state’s restrictions on both USMs and registered NGOs via exchanges of labor and capital.

In the following three case studies, I profile three groups’ means of resisting or evading their restrictions through varied approaches to exchanging funds, volunteers and specialized
expertise to innovate beyond their legal and material limitations. In the first case, I discuss how NGO Reform works with social movements while presenting a transparent, conservative interpretation of the relevant legal restrictions. In the second case, I examine how volunteers with USM Green Action have innovated ways to find financial support for projects while satisfying the letter of the law. Finally, in the third case I tell of Past Preservation’s less orthodox methods of supporting projects.

**Reform provides expertise to cultivate local causes, voluntarism**

Introduced earlier in this thesis (see page 50), Reform is a Ukrainian NGO that developed as a splinter from an USM that emerged during the Orange Revolution – a not uncommon pedigree – vowing to continue long-term, organized resistance to forms of corruption at municipal, regional and national levels in Ukraine. Despite having publicly supported then-President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in the Orange Revolution, Reform faced significant government scrutiny at the time of these interviews from the presidential and prime ministerial administrations as well as the then-political opposition, as well as accusations of Western training and financing. While acknowledging without reservation that the organization had received training from similar or sympathetic groups across Europe and North America, the group publishes externally audited accounting in local languages to dissuade and debunk detractors. While they do, without question, receive money from international and national funds, they work to disclose any grant requirements as well as show that their funders are not NGO operatives for foreign governments (the Russian Federation and the United States being the particular focus of concern), though this last point is hotly debated due to the subjective nature of defining such connections.
Under this notably intense scrutiny, Reform avoids providing any support that could be considered tangibly monetary by even the most remote definitions (i.e. office supplies, free phone calls, etc.) to unregistered movements. Rather, their support is purely in terms of providing consulting time from their paid staff – in fact, supporting USMs for local causes with consulting is considered a key part of their mandate, and most of the USMs whose members were interviewed were at least aware of Reform’s services. In this regard, Reform has served as a local example of the discourse among international NGOs to solicit local ideas and support umbrella organizations that support other groups with expertise.

For example, Reform employee Maksym offers several forms of expertise to social movements: arranging, advertising and executing protests and actions; formal and informal contact with government officials (including applying his relationships with government officials in more than three regions); and developing an effective internet presence. While he also plays a variety of organizational and administrative roles in Reform’s central office, his key work is this external consulting. Like many Reform employees, he was recruited to work in the organization after having played a prominent role in a social movement campaign on which Reform was consulting. Regarding his primary project, he says:

[Our team] has a network of people who are interested in organizing groups. I don’t know how many they have because we mostly have partners that are made up mostly of volunteers. Now we try to work with these people. Because of their interests, mostly people volunteer within their interests, and we try to suggest to them a project we are doing. If they phone us about housing reform, on that project we work with lawyers that can help them if they have judicial or lobbying problems.

Note the key points here: most of their contacts are themselves social movement volunteers, Reform tries to support their interests, and they try to recruit these social movements and their volunteers to participate in additional/successive projects with Reform support. Furthermore, he
puts volunteers in touch with specialized expertise, in this cause lawyers. Maksym then explains that Reform’s goals are to encourage voluntarism and to work with social movements because the group has found it effective to combine their organizational and advocacy expertise with locals’ interests, labor and specialized skills for the projects at hand:

We work with them, but we are not the organizers, we are consultants because it’s good when someone is interested to make more groups, maybe NGOs, formed on their own. We can’t do everything, and if we have experience it is easier to offer that experience to someone who will carry out plans themselves. In this campaign in Ivano-Frankivs’k region, we were working primarily with ecologists. They are scientists and don’t have the lobbying experience or advocacy experience, but they have experience working with our office in the Ivano-Frankivs’k region. They know that we do advocacy well, social lobbying well, so they requested that we help them with other work in Kherson region because they also have the experience to work in the ecological sphere.

Additionally, note here the continuity of the projects – in this case, a group of scientists asked for Reform’s support after using their support with a project in another region. While Reform internally is not focused on environmental initiatives, their experience with the levers of government and civil society organizations provided these scientists with support.

Unlike the other NGOs in which I conducted interviews, Reform structurally relies on volunteers and rhetorically presents recurring voluntarism as essential to the organization. However, Reform takes a unique approach here, as external voluntarism with social movements is featured, and internal voluntarism is predominantly promoted at universities and other settings in order to build connections and funnel more voluntary support to social movements’ projects via word of mouth. However, this is not entirely surprising as the organization represents itself as locally nascent but internationally inspired incubator for civic engagement. Additionally, as part of this effort they staunchly argue that they are different from other local peers that are not “true” NGOs, whether hrantozheri or the NGO arms of Ukrainian politicians.
Reform’s employees are intent on changing how NGOs are perceived in Ukraine, attempting to counter the stereotypes of political operations (Ukrainian and foreign) and grant-gobbling that persist in the public consciousness regarding NGOs. Without question, they do provide a resource that could have monetary value to the social movements – honed experts, training and contacts. However, according to their reporting and my experience with the organization (approximately half the social movements I encountered had worked with Reform on some initiative owing to their prominent status and nationwide reach), they offered no direct or monetary resources to the movements, in line with the strictest possible interpretation of the legal code.

**Green Action volunteers build individual relationships to fund projects**

In turn, Volodymyr’s USM, Green Action, often funds necessary or complementary resources for their activities by seeking partner companies or NGOs that will formally and legally sponsor their projects, while the activists provide the labor as volunteers to the sponsor or, more rarely, paid consultants. For example, after having previously volunteered to help with Kyiv’s Water Information Centre, some of the volunteers became paid consultants to design, draft and construct exhibits.
Kyiv’s Water Information Centre, housed in a historic pump station, serves to educate the community on local water issues as well as broader local and global environmental issues. The Centre is funded by a host of international NGOs, government-affiliated agencies and corporate sponsors, with this funding occasionally used to hire local environmental consultants to create new exhibits and external projects. Individual volunteers with Green Action were among the consultants hired to draft and construct exhibits.

Source: Author

Formally, Volodymyr and his co-volunteers encountered a rare opportunity to earn a small amount of cash – after expenses – working on an issue on which they usually volunteer, water health spanning from Kyiv region to the globe. Without question, they and the Centre followed the law exactly, as Green Action had nothing whatsoever to do with the consulting – in
fact, there is no legal record of Green Action, nor does there need to be. Furthermore, the fact
that these consultants already knew one another and had demonstrated experience working
together certainly proved an advantage to the center, as did the fact that these consultants could
bring in friends who would put in some hours as volunteers.

Note that this clearly again raises the question of where voluntarism ends and wage labor
begins, not to mention offers a further opportunity to look for experiential answers to the
question of the relationship between voluntarism and altruism. Volodymyr had several answers
for himself and the activists with whom he works in terms of why he views them as volunteers:

1. The forms of compensation received by Volodymyr and his co-activists are consistently far
less in terms of any accountable hourly rate compared to what their services would be in their
regular positions. Volodymyr notes that he left a lucrative position in banking to work in
corporate environmental consulting and volunteer with environmental movements, further
emphasizing that pay is not the key motivator.

2. Nearly all of Green Action’s projects started with the volunteers bringing an idea to potential
sponsors, unlike grant-driven NGOs. Some projects started with a sponsor approaching
Green Action for their expertise in environmental education or labor power, based on
previous experience or a word of mouth recommendation. As one of Green Action’s key
interests is offering free environmental education to students, particularly in their schools, the
group often takes on opportunities to expand what they can offer. Volodymyr explains:

We can propose our services, which we have. For instance, we have tried to work
with commercial companies because they are interested in corporate social
responsibility and environmental issues. We do educational projects for instance
and ask, ‘Can you support us? Can we use your resources?’ For instance, we
worked with [an international packaging company], we recycled paper [with
school students]. For the students, it was a very interesting educational
opportunity, for [the company] it was a CSR activity, corporate social
responsibility. They supported us, and [then] they gave us information about this
WWF project, and we participated and they helped us to join the team. It works in both ways. Sometimes companies find us and say, ‘We have this project and we need reliable participants who will really do something,’ or somebody recommended us to them. It happens sometimes in very interesting ways, we never know what will happen next because somebody will call and say, ‘Well, we have a project in which your students could participate.’

3. Most non-monetary benefits the volunteers may receive, e.g. conference or training opportunities, are only offered after a particular successful project. As Volodymyr states, “If we get [compensation], we usually get it as an award, a benefit. We may travel, and this will be for the whole group that is involved… [It] is an invitation.”

4. Any direct monetary compensation comes to an individual, not the movement, to return registered expenses, or comes as a paid consultant’s fee bilaterally between an individual and the sponsor. As suits the legal requirements, Volodymyr is exceptionally careful to differentiate between direct organizational funding, and these types of permitted payments:

Akeson: How specific are they usually? These organizations who provide funding from companies, international organizations, etc.

Volodymyr: We don’t receive funding! We don’t receive funding!

A: But you receive enough to set up the projects, right?

V: We don’t receive any at all [up front]. No money. We receive only at the end. We receive payment for the journey, training, equipment, for doing these trainings. But we never receive money, funding for the execution of projects. We may receive only a fee, for instance, for the day [as an individual per diem].

More prominently, Volodymyr and some of his co-volunteers have had recurring, bilateral agreements to consult with one large international organization with environmental interests. As Volodymyr notes, “For Development International, yes, we will receive funding for development of educational documents, for traveling, for visiting, [but] they are very specific [about the expenses].” At the time of the interview, the project in play was an effort to teach school students about local, national and global water pollution – a project with strong resonance
in Ukraine due to Soviet heavy industry and environmental standards, as well as post-Chernobyl fears. Volodymyr and his co-consultants had secured participation from 14 schools to use their facilities for short summer classes with students. While Green Action had taught similar classes before to students in various settings, in this case several paid consultants, all of whom just happen also to volunteer with Green Action, were teaching together on behalf of Development International.

Thus in the officialized-public sphere, Volodymyr and his partners have been contracted to perform intermittent services to this organization related to environmental education in Ukraine, each on a bilateral consulting agreement with the organization or working as volunteers. In practice, i.e. the public-personalized sphere, a legally nonexistent group of people calling themselves Green Action are exchanging ideas, local knowledge and expertise for an international organization’s resources. Some members are paid for these services by personal contracts, and no one need ever know if they use some of those funds to pay back a friend for some poster or construction materials that the friend randomly agreed to pick up. In turn, the local officers of the international organization are able to access expertise they otherwise would not have, fulfill the expectations of certain granted projects, and combine their globally oriented objectives with local issues through several individuals with particular interest, a mutually beneficial relationship that has reportedly improved the success of their projects in terms of public participation.

In all cases, the individuals and groups involved have found a way to achieve legally a goal that, on first blush, might seem nearly impossible at first glance – they have adapted and innovated around legal and bureaucratic impediments to achieve goals of improving and deepening education that are ironically in line with the broader goals of the state. Furthermore,
Green Action activities have allowed a group of volunteers to work on issues they value, including with a heavy local emphasis, with little administrative or bureaucratic baggage. On most of these projects, the volunteers also had an opportunity to encourage voluntarism and environmental stewardship among school students, a goal the activists all claim to value highly (as reported first- or secondhand by Volodymyr and one additional volunteer). Some have received additional, intangible benefits – good contacts, experience they can and have applied in their careers – and some have gained more tangible benefits, like trips abroad and opportunities for paid consultancies, though these are reported to be little more than honorariums after expenses. The “costs,” if they must be pseudo-monetized, have been that their voluntarism has required abundant amounts of free time with any form of compensation always unexpected.

**Past Preservation funds protest technologies through unorthodox means**

By contrast, volunteers with USM Past Preservation have taken significantly less orthodox approaches to supporting their initiatives, for both tangible and intangible resources. As earlier discussed (beginning page 70), Past Preservation has no centralized hierarchy for decision making, both as a philosophical decision to show the importance of the individual participants and perhaps also as a means to ensure no focus for unwanted attention. Rather, the group relies predominantly on a few of the more active volunteers to guide discussions and following through when a sort of critical mass expresses interest in a project– some participants joke that “movement” is almost too strong a word to describe the relatively loose setup. Part of this ethos of (dis)organization has been to avoid open forms of sponsorship or patronage – after all, with no formal leadership structure or voting mechanisms, no one can be said to represent the cohesive voice of the group of people involved and no inference of political or financial compromise can be made by politicians or the public.
While it is not unheard of, in fact not uncommon, for NGOs or USMs to accept partnerships with outside entities in exchange for some forms of support – especially in cases where there is no request for compromise or some form of compensation from the sponsors/patrons – Past Preservation volunteers have been particularly reticent to accept such. This hesitance has been strongest in cases where the outside factions are perceived to have become interested due to selfish or ulterior motives. For example, Ivan recounts the response when the Kyiv mayor’s office shifted their support in favor of a Past Preservation project that had received media attention and significant public support, reported by other participants to be for the continuing operation of a clinic located in a historic building:

**Ivan:** Relations are more complicated with some of the positions of the political forces because many of them are trying to make kind of a spearhead. They come to this focus to show they are interested in the programs of the electors and so on. Trying to make party symbols, do as many interviews with TV journalists as possible. Activists are quite angry toward them. One, for example, the political consultant of the current Kyiv mayor, [Leonid] Chernovetsky, came to one of [the] actions. The activists didn’t even acknowledge him. You know that Chernovetsky is called ‘Cosmos’?

**Akeson:** I didn’t, no.

**I:** Once he said that he saw some being from the cosmos, some extraterrestrial intelligence or something like that. From that time it’s become a joke that he’s Chernovetsky the Martian. He’s also called ‘Cosmos.’ So, the activists made a banner, ‘Kosmos tozhe fak’ ['Cosmos is also fucked’ or ‘Cosmos can also go fuck himself.’]. [They placed this banner] just in behind this political consultant of Chernovetsky’s. So, they tried to keep this banner up while he was talking there in the actions to show the TV journalists that he’s not with us, we don’t have anything to do with him. They didn’t want to show common action with political parties, and in their actions they won’t use any partisan symbols even of organizations that are in the campaign, like leftist organizations, Marxist symbols. So, it’s a purely grassroots civic action movement.

10 Chernovetsky resigned in June 2012. For additional context of Chernovetsky’s eccentricities, see the following: “Think New York City has had its share of outsize personalities as mayor? They have got nothing on Mr. Chernovetsky, who is also known as Lenny Cosmos because sometimes his head seems to be someplace far, far away. He makes eccentric suggestions (a statue of Ukraine’s most famous poet should be erected in Africa) and staffing decisions (firing a zoo director for not finding a mate for an elephant), and personal gestures (offering to sell his kisses in a lottery). He interrupts meetings by warbling melancholy Soviet ballads, and even issued a CD on which he covers his favorites. ‘Who sings better than me?’ he asked. ‘Nobody does, besides God!’” (Levy 2009).
However, Past Preservation’s techniques in fighting these purportedly illegal construction projects are increasingly countered by the participants’ opposition. Most notably, one of related volunteers’ central protest techniques – storming a site with a flash mob off work hours and destroying or significantly hampering construction progress – has been increasingly resisted by construction companies and their clients with concrete/steel fencing and on-site security. For example, activists’ attempts to halt the redevelopment of Lybids’ka Park into a church (Russian Orthodox under the Moscow Patriarchate) resulted in construction of a fence around the previously public green space:
Figure 6: Changing signage in the midst of protest in Lybids’ka Park

A new sign (as of the picture) announces the construction of the Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ that has caused dispute over the legal rights to the park, as well as ecological, social and religious discussion and protests. A sign for the park under its previous designation, by contrast, was heavily defaced, reportedly after the announcement of the park’s conversion but before the installation of the fences.

Sources: *Tut Buly Gory, Boeraky, Lesa y Zarazy; Lopata*

Figure 7: Poetic graffiti protest against cathedral construction in Lybids’ka Park

Translation (from Russian): “Crosses instead of trees, a church instead of a park, the brutes chop up the public squares.” The original has a cadence that is lost in translation. Following the construction of the fence, protests have largely been limited to defacing the fences as seen above.

Sources: *Tut Buly Gory, Boeraky, Lesa y Zarazy; Lopata*

Admittedly, it should be noted that the legality of these techniques is debatable – companies and clients contest that the protest actions are illegal, participants have contested that the illegal nature of the construction sites supersedes any legal review of their own actions, and
courts as of this writing had generally declined to address the issue more broadly than on a case-by-case basis. I make no legal value judgments here on whether the developers or the activists, including local inhabitants and those with Past Preservation, were correct. Media sources on the topic by and large vocally supported the side of the activists, but public opinion is neither infallible nor binding. Rather, the key to take here is how volunteers innovated approaches to reach goals that required monetary resources despite movements having no legal direct access to funding.

In any case, as a result of the increased resistance to their lower-cost approaches, Past Preservation volunteers have overcome the earlier mentioned hesitation when a project frankly required resources beyond their grasp or when patrons exhibited a level of commitment to movement ideals perceived to be adequate. For example, when a number of local residents began working with Past Preservation volunteers to protest the seizure and redevelopment of a dilapidated communal green space and garage yard near their homes on *Peyzazhna Aleya* (Landscape Alley), participants reported that the construction site was fenced to prevent access and continue construction, despite a court order.

**Figure 8: Images of Peyzazhna Aleya prior to redevelopment**

Source: Past Preservation participants
Svitlana recounts the early stages of the protest effort:

There was this spot where they had a lot of [prefabricated metal] garages and there was a garage cooperative there. The construction company bought most of the old garages, but there were seven people who didn’t want to sell their garages, so they were legally bound to reconstruct the garages [elsewhere nearby]. People [with] Past Preservation were very dissatisfied with that because we wanted there to be a park, not garages. We won a case in the Supreme Court, but people from the construction company still tried to build a fence over there even though it was already decided in the Supreme Court.

As is often the case for the movement, Past Preservation volunteers put local residents in touch with lawyers. While flouting a court order is certainly not unheard of, defying a Supreme Court order so openly, as reported, is rather more unusual. Furthermore, while exact specifics were not public, the legal services were not pro bono, at least not entirely, and had to be paid somehow.

Svitlana reported that the protestors grew tired and increasingly disillusioned:

It was mentioned a lot on TV, in all the newspapers, everything! The construction company would, for instance – well, the case was in court, and the court said that all the construction work should be suspended until the decision of the court. What is called the executive department of the court would come to the construction site and say, ‘Okay, we have this paper, you must suspend the construction.’ And they replied, ‘Oh, we don’t see it.’ This paper was issued in December 2008, and there was construction going on and on and on. They will not listen to the prosecutors or to the court decision. People were just desperate, they didn’t know what else to do. They got a court decision to suspend it, they got the prosecutors to act. They didn’t know what to do in the legal field, so they really wanted to stop it physically, but they couldn’t do it themselves, and we couldn’t help them because the fence was too big. We didn’t have the machines and so on. For some people it got really scary at some point because the walls of their buildings began to shake, and in some buildings people said they couldn’t close their doors anymore because the floor shifted a little bit. It’s dangerous to build there.

Under duress, the protestors chose to accept assistance from a prominent deputy of the Ukrainian Rada and former leading law enforcement official in Ukraine, who had learned of the situation from the increasing media attention.

So they accepted help from this Member of Parliament… He had people standing there in the tents – it’s a good political tradition in this country that when you
protest something, put up a tent – so they got the tents to sort of help people stand there. Then there were some negotiations with the construction company, ‘Hey, we need to make an agreement. We need to be friends.’ And so on and so on. But at the same time their security people – well, there were a few fights there in the last month, they physically beat the people that were protesting.

**Akeson:** Which deputy was this, by the way?

**Svitlana:** Kyryl[o] Kulykov

A number of politicians across Ukraine, most notably Kulykov and Kyiv City Councilmember Vitali Klitschko, have become allies of illegal construction and historic preservation activists, including the volunteers with Past Preservation. Svitlana summarized that the politicians have not become direct participants in the movement per se – this would be counter to the political party neutrality agreed by the movement broadly, and direct association or perceived sponsorship of an amorphous group accused of vandalism and illegal activity would not benefit the politicians – key outreach volunteers with the movement provide the politicians with event updates and occasionally beseech their intervention on specific projects.
However, in the case of Peyzazhna Aleya, Kulykov’s intervention alone was not enough to stop the construction despite the increased media attention and political scrutiny. At this point, a businessman who wished to remain anonymous – and whose broader associations with Past Preservation or similar groups was not given – offered to intervene with funding, machinery, and workers to effectively trash the construction site, creating a significant physical hindrance to the progress. It was also implied that this individual helped pay the legal fees incurred in the court proceedings. Svitlana and I agreed not to record our direct conversation of these events, but she has permitted me to present the following summary from my field notes:
I turn off the recorder, and Svitlana discusses a local businessman who is secretly funding their large-cost activities, such as the dump trucks and sand necessary to unexpectedly – and illegally – fill the Peyzazhna Aleya site to hinder the construction efforts. The businessman does this completely of his own accord, after discussions with Past Preservation. He had no vested interests in this or related construction sites (or their failure), does not live in the neighborhood, and most importantly, wants no credit or acknowledgement. In fact, as the particular construction in question was governmental[ly related], he wants and needs to remain anonymous for his own protection. Obviously the opponents within the [government] and hired construction firms know that someone, somewhere had to provide the funding and/or materials for this operation and that Past Preservation could not have done this alone.

Thus, in the process of one project, Past Preservation found alternative means through external contacts to provide legal services, generate mass media publicity and political attention, and physically delay construction efforts – all of which, were it monetized, would have incurred large costs that Past Preservation could never legally pay as an USM.

Figure 10: Summary of key external approaches and results in Peyzazhna Aleya project

Source: Author

Moreover, as an amorphous movement with no formal organization, exact details of the technologies employed and the logistical and financial planning required were known only to a few members and factions. Svitlana notes how a near mythology developed around the effort,
failing to incorporate rather obvious signs that substantial funding was necessary along with the physical presence of the protestors:

[The leftist activists] thought that we stopped the *Peyzazhna Aleya* construction, that it was just us, but they never thought about who was paying the lawyer, and who paid for the trucks to fill the site with sand. It was kind of cool – we did something with our own hands! It was a big thing. But then they never thought about who paid for the trucks with sand. It’s good that [the activists] did what they did. It was really good, and now there’s still a park over there rather than a building. They did a good job. But they never thought about it.

At the time of our interviews, the activists had won a decisive victory through the combination of vigorous public protest, court orders, media attention, political pressure and blatant physical impediments to the construction. As a result, the construction company, private developers, and unclearly defined government officials supposedly providing de facto sanction to the project backed down under the increasing costs and impending fallout. Under legal advice and with funding from anonymous sources (purportedly the mentioned businessman), local participants, relevant authorities and contractors began to redevelop the space as a mixed-use combination of restoration of the garages with a public park. As Svitlana recounts:

The lawyer said that they had to reconstruct the garages there because that is the protection from new attacks from the construction company… They built the garages, and they are now trying to make it into a park, and now are kind of trying to make the garages fit in there so it doesn’t look ugly. When I say ‘they,’ I mean someone is trying to put a park there, put in some benches, put in trees there. They’re trying to make it into a nice park. But nobody says exactly who is doing that because it’s actually this businessman who is paying for all of these things, all of the benches, decorating the garages with mosaics so they will look nice.
As can be seen in Figure 11, the redevelopment is now complete. However, threats to part or all of the space from illegal construction and commercialization continue, and sustaining this space remains on the agenda for Past Preservation and other volunteer activists (Kulykov 13 March 2012).

**Voluntarism may happen in unexpected ways**

The case studies discussed in this chapter lay out an ultimately simple argument: voluntarism exists in Ukraine in unexpected and generally unaccounted forms. These practices (including but not limited to entrepreneurial-governmentality tactics, the subversion of restrictive de jure legislation, and the exchange of restricted currency, goods and services) clearly describe, in both form and function, voluntarism as labor without expected remuneration for some form of
the social welfare. Moreover, these case studies reveal how the groups through which these practices are organized, existing off the bureaucratic ledger and in the legal shadows, serve many of the same functions expected of civil society groups, in some ways better than the NGOs observed by the government and the international civil society community. Thus more and more it appears not only that voluntarism metrics are low due to a disconnection between NGOs and potential volunteers in terms of objectives, issues of interest and scales, but also potential voluntarism is instead practiced outside the expected means anticipated by the literature.
VI: Opportunities for inculcating voluntarism?

Above, I have discussed how and why NGOs generally lack focus on the local issues that participants identify as driving voluntarism, the relative invisibility of USMs and their forms of voluntarism, and the innovations made by NGOs and social movements to connect funding and volunteers across scales of interest. However, thus far I have only indirectly approached the final component of this examination of Ukrainian voluntarism: how participants believe voluntarism is, can and should be cultivated among Ukrainians for the future; and how technologies of persuasion further interact with the focuses on the local, glocal and global. This line of inquiry illuminates another facet of why voluntarism rates are quite low in Ukraine – a discussion of how to solve a “problem” tends to inherently interrogate the causes of said problem. Indeed, all research participants, including those who did not identify as volunteers in any form, identified voluntarism as good for Ukraine, and the vast majority conceptually agreed with the predominant view in the literature that Ukrainian voluntarism is underdeveloped in both absolute terms and relative to other parts of the world. Perhaps more importantly, the theme of this chapter also presents a view on how civil society is perceived and interpreted in Ukraine, and how and why voluntarism is allotted presumed value for society at large.

More specifically, I examine participants’ views of future voluntarism development through predominantly imported technologies, including those of public outreach, marketing and civic education. I also explore local innovations on such technologies and the emphasis on local issues to draw volunteers, both of which emerge from participants’ comments on how to reach out to potential volunteers. Finally, throughout the section I consider the spectrum of views between the external institutional literature on Ukrainian voluntarism, international NGO
employees working in Ukraine, and local participants with less or little exposure to the international civil society discourses on voluntarism.

**Ukrainian NGO outreach and marketing seen as lagging, ineffective**

By and large, the use of media and outreach technologies, both traditional and “new” (i.e. online), to promote voluntarism and general awareness is seen as poorly developed across postsocialist Europe, including Ukraine (United Nations Volunteers 2010). By the numbers, however, it does appear that NGOs are at least employing some variety of outreach technologies:

47% of CSOs meet their constituents on a daily basis. The most popular way for disseminating information about CSO activities is through press releases and brochures/flyers (84% and 55% of CSOs respectively). CSOs continue to increase the number of presentations (46% in 2005, 51% in 2006, 49% in 2007, and 53% in 2009), use their own websites, annual reports, and the websites of other CSOs to disseminate information about the own activities. (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 12).

The most effective source of information dissemination about updates to existing laws and regulations are the internet ([according to] 81% of CSOs) and meetings and workshops (56% of respondents)” (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 14).

Nevertheless, interview participants consistently linked the lack of voluntarism to a lack of adequate and/or targeted information regarding issues and events. However, participants disagreed over *why* such information was unavailable or poorly designed, focusing on either a lack of specialized knowledge in how to approach distribution or a lack of interest on the part of groups to conduct outreach.

The first argument, that NGOs (and in some cases, social movements) lack adequate training and technologies to reach out to the public effectively, was most prominent among research participants with significant exposure to international civil society through daily interactions with this sphere or punctuated training opportunities. In particular, these participants often lamented the lack of sophisticated techniques adapted from the for-profit sector, seemingly
echoing the literature on the neoliberal incorporation of for-profit techniques in civil society globally and the efforts to cross-pollinate experience and techniques transnationally among civil society actors (Peet and Watts 2004; Goldman 2004). Internationally experienced organizer Volodymyr, for instance, views lack of effective outreach as the key deficit in Ukrainian voluntarism, along with a dearth of organizations offering opportunities:

**Akeson:** Are people becoming interested in voluntarism, things like this? In environmental organizations, and even in general if you wish?

**V:** People are ready to volunteer, they would like to, if somebody will organize them, give opportunities to them to volunteer. Of course not all of them, but some portion of them definitely will do something for fun, to volunteer. It depends of course on how difficult it will be to volunteer.

**A:** How so?

**V:** If you work with disabled people, I guess it is quite difficult. It is good to understand that… the feeling that you will get in the end is very very valuable, because you help someone that really needs your help. That is quite difficult as a first step, yeah? There is a barrier.

**A:** So it’s about difficulty partly, and someone to organize them. But there are so many organizations already in Ukraine that will take volunteers, that want volunteers…. Why aren’t more people volunteering?

**V:** Because there are not so many organizations.

**A:** You think so?

**V:** Absolutely. There is a deficit of these organizations, and they are not popular. This should be like the aroma of life. It shouldn’t be like, oh it’s somebody in your building, let’s plan an action the next day, and half of the people will come the next morning to help. At least they should ask, ‘Did you plan to clean the street yesterday?’ The behavior of the people… I guess it’s…

**A:** For example, on the television there is an advertisement for, I don’t know, Green Action, that says we need volunteers, call, 8 800 555 5555. Will people call the number?

**V:** They will. People want [to participate/volunteer] if you provide a good, interesting idea. For example, Green Action needs people for creative promotions, something like environmental educational problems, and if people will understand that it’s really cool, they will go.
A: But do they need a neighbor to tell them? Can you do kind of this mass media advertising on television, on radio? Or do they need to know someone?

V: They need a previous experience to see that it was cool. Or that it was rewarding or effective or interesting. They need... they need just this information. If someone will say, ‘Eh, it was very interesting last time,’ they will go and try it themselves.

A: So how do we convince them to go that first time?

V: Well, through PR technologies. Why can’t environmental and such NGOs use PR technologies? If you want to do something better, you should use effective marketing principles, PR technologies. ‘Are you not yet a member of Green Action? Shame on you!’ Something like that. Say, change the energy. And it can work, it happened last year when these big tote bags were introduced as green bags. It’s becoming more and more popular because I already have a collection of these bags. From every conference, it is a very highly efficient PR tool to present these bags to everyone. It works. It should be popular, so that everyone would like it, and if you don’t, if you are not involved, ‘shame on you, you are a loser.’ That is how you change the mentality!

Elsewhere, I have discussed that Volodymyr emphasizes local issues in his work both on principle and as a key aspect of recruitment to his projects and broader causes. This remains true. However, he also believes that the mentality toward voluntarism in Ukraine can be changed by thoughtful usage of “PR technologies,” among other factors. Notice also that he presumes that most people will have interest, if approached effectively. Volodymyr believes that these approaches can change how people view not only voluntarism, but also the relationship between voluntarism and what is right for them.

Yuri, a veteran of multiple social movements and NGOs primarily in the field of anti-corruption and electoral transparency, similarly identified a lack of effective outreach as the critical gap in encouraging voluntarism, along with poor organization for volunteers. By providing persuasive guidance and reframing the scale of the discussion to showcase successful examples, he believes rates of voluntarism would be improved. Yuri broke down his argument into four factors:
1. People do not know opportunities are available.

2. People need an organizer, someone to get them involved. This can be, but does not need to be, someone they already know.

3. People do not know what needs to be done, in the sense that pressing issues are poorly publicized.

4. People feel that “we can’t affect anything. We can’t effect change.” Yuri linked this factor in particular to the broad public disappointment in the infighting that emerged in the government after the Orange Revolution, and reported that he had seen interest in voluntarism in his fields decline since the Orange alliances split. Only positive counterexamples, local or international, can counter this trend amid the communal malaise toward the broad public sphere.

These views on a lack of effective outreach are supported by Palyvoda’s survey of Ukrainian NGOs, which indicated that only 22% of organizations attracted “new members” through “advertising or distributing information through mass media” (the most common forms of cold outreach), 39% through one-off “special events” and 66% through “personal contacts” (2010, 37). In essence, reaching beyond the immediate contacts of organization employees is rare at best, while going beyond a direct one-on-one conversation is even rarer. Furthermore, in a multi-organizational and multinational review of Ukrainian civil society organizations, the organizations were found to be generally “weak… at systematically attracting the CSO’s members and the public to review and renew their viewpoints according to changes in the environment,” scoring only a 3.26 of 6 on the index component for ability to seek “input and response from its members and the public” (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 80-81). Unlike, grant funders’ views, integration of the views of supposed beneficiaries lags.
From a more atomized viewpoint, the relative success stories in terms of volunteer recruitment among research participants relied heavily on forms of active and innovative outreach, often with some element of training or inspiration from examples in the international civil society community. Furthermore, all the given examples included direct appeals to local knowledge and relevance.

Among NGOs, Reform, as discussed in the sections starting page 92, presents a particular success story from their work cross-pollinating volunteers across different projects, conducting various campaigns to encourage student participation (i.e. recruiting events on campuses, encouraging word-of-mouth among student volunteers, offering students free Internet in their Kyiv office, etc.), and drawing on relevant experience and positive examples by hiring most of their staff from former volunteers on Reform-affiliated projects. Additionally, Reform seeks cooperation and compromise with social movements to pursue local issues, which has helped the NGO build broader, more ideological interests among volunteers beyond their local experiences.

Student groups Ecological Action Center and Zelena Grupa, almost completely reliant for voluntarism on their student peers, conduct assertive outreach within their campuses (and surrounding communities, to some degree) appealing to ethical/moral responsibility, combined global/local perspectives on issues, and the fun social opportunities to be had for students in their voluntary efforts. Social movement Past Preservation (page 100), of course, provides a textbook case for how groups can use online media, not to mention careful nurturing of relationships with “old media” journalists, to appeal to the public for both soft support and voluntarism.

Additionally, three other traits are shared by these cases – regardless of the outreach technologies employed, appeals included:

1. emphasis on local or glocal issues;
2. forms of active approaches, not only passive approaches that require initial interest on the side of potential participants (i.e. static websites, flyer/brochure stands, etc.); and
3. degrees of interactivity, with volunteers’ opinions apparently solicited and considered.

These three traits, while obviously useful for outreach, are rather closer to common sense than any particular internationally distributed innovation, though some of the specific techniques used, particularly Reform’s networking approaches and Past Preservation’s online work, owe significant debts to imported thinking adapted to the groups’ local needs. However, despite the common sense nature of these basic approaches and the ample availability of tested techniques from throughout the international civil society community, outreach to new volunteers still remains heavily based in personal networks rather than broader approaches. Even fewer NGOs take the obvious step of engaging the supposed beneficiaries of their services in decision making, a la Reform, with only 6% reporting that beneficiaries are directly involved in “planning programs and projects” (Palyvoda and Golota 2010, 82).

Frankly, despite the fact that encouraging and engaging volunteers has become a buzzword in grant competitions (Phillips 2008), voluntarism itself seems ignored, yet again, as many NGOs have not assertively pursued volunteer recruitment, or perhaps it has been outside of their experience to the degree that they have no conception of how to engage volunteers or generate interest through outreach. Nataliya recounts how students desiring volunteer experiences have been rebuffed by organizations with no ideas or interest in engagement:

**N:** Usually [people] hear of [volunteer opportunities] from informational sites, funds. Sometimes competitions. Sometimes partners of organizations. Mainly from the Internet and partners.

**Akeson:** And organizations here never search for volunteers? Advertise, etc.?

**N:** Very rarely, if they don’t work in universities, student organizations. Information, lessons, actions that give information, leaflets that tell how an
organization works. Sometimes students intern in organizations, are thrown at
different social workers with general organizations. What other ways do I know?

A: [Do they] also [search] in schools, or only in universities?

N: Just in universities.

A: I was never a student here in Ukraine. Is it common for students to lead these
public presentations?

N: Well, it’s not generally through the university. I studied in a provincial
university, and there were several organizations that organized these
presentations, some had very little student activity and some more. One
organization organized a students’ civics group. I’ve seen other organizations that
have students come [to them], and [the organizations] ask, ‘What are they? Who
are they? We don’t work in that sphere.’ Regarding students, they don’t need to
know more.

A similar trend can be seen in the following comments from Yulia and Olga from
Ecoclearinghouse. Note in particular how Yulia, the more experienced NGO employee of the
two, emphasizes presenting the “whole, concrete organization,” while Olga emphasizes
relatability and communicability, in particular through local relevance.

Akeson: Here at Ecoclearinghouse, do you work with volunteers?

Y: We try. We are always trying. We would really like to work with volunteers
because organizations can’t always exist on their own. It would be good. We
have followers (staroninki). The problem is that we used to have students, five,
that were doing voluntarism. They wanted to do a lot, they had a lot of time to
spend. Therefore we singlehandedly could make plans to work, write, prepare
letters, decisions. But there has simply not been enough time for volunteers….
Plus volunteers are such people that can do things of their own free will
(dobrovolno), at the beginning they want to do certain things and they may not
always realize the results they wanted…. In the last year we did some actions,
prepared forms, prepared an action with the Central Bank with volunteers.
Volunteers just need to know who to talk to, what problems there are, support to
call or speak or write. We unfortunately have little support for this connection
these days. We would like to. We want people to understand that they should
work on these problems further.

A: When you have worked with the public, how did you try to inform the public
about your issues?
Y: Well, we plan to present our whole, concrete organization because our interests, our work on solving ecological problems needs to be communicated. I can’t even say.

O: Maybe how we communicate on other levels, the local level, for example? Not all people have become acquainted, understand problems with the climate. We know what we study, but people want to know what is practical. People simply want a clear explanation about what’s happening, and why we should care, about what is happening with the environment. For example, I communicate with people who don’t know anything about climate problems, and it’s really simply to show the purpose of our work and what can be done. It takes minimal time to do this. It’s simply clear communication.

Yulia and Olga primarily work on a project funded by external grants to educate the Ukrainian public and lobby the government on climate issues, in particular global warming but also more localized aspects like urban smog. Despite being a relatively senior employee on planning outreach actions, Yulia is perplexed by the mismatch between the scales of focus in her project and public inquiries, as well as by adapting or innovating outreach activities. Following our discussion of how and why the public contacts Ecoclearinghouse (see her comments on page 44), we moved on to how she views the organization’s outreach and scale of issues:

Akeson: So, people more often call about local problems than global issues?

Y: Well, yes, they rarely call about the global things. People are very disinterested.

A: Yes, that’s unfortunate.

Y: Honestly speaking, I unfortunately don’t know what to do. We perhaps are too small of an organization, about 10 or 20 people, but we don’t work on a lot of these issues, for example on issues of garbage. For example, people will drop by to ask us what to do about a problem with trash in their building. But we don’t focus on how to organize or prepare answers to these types of psycho-ecological questions! We don’t work on this level. It’s a bit of a different focus, so we usually tell them to call journalists. In our sphere we have politics, Chernobyl, parliamentary deputies – these are the problems we bring to the table. It’s understood that people can bring up their own ideas, need to work with journalists, communicate with power more, [work] in that circle.
To be abundantly clear, Ecoclearinghouse’s work, and the grants that fund their work, mandate public outreach efforts. Olena, the Ecoclearinghouse employee also volunteering with an environmental student group, mentions two sub-projects she has worked on, with her enthusiasm clearly focused on the more interactive and locally relevant project:

In Kontraktova Square, we had a flash mob and some other things. It was hoped to attract the attention of the media and show the public that they can really make a difference on the climate change issue. We participate in these kinds of projects as well, demonstrations, etc. We also have a very interesting project now which is called… I don’t remember… it’s about making a photographic book of nature. Groups go to the natural preserves, they have trainers who are also students, and they teach the group how to do photography of insects, plants, and other things. It’s cool!

When led more directly on the global vs. local theme, Yulia also identifies a local component as a key factor in encouraging interest:

**Akesson:** What do you think, do people here think more of local problems in the natural sphere or of wider scale [problems], global warming, etc.? We had spoken of how people call more on…

**Y:** Well of course people will call based on their own psychology, a person is interested in his own local problems, his own problems, personal things, children. But there are also times that, when we speak of how climate is a big problem, it seems too that a person can feel that concretely. Also energy, which may be counted as a national problem, but people can talk of how they have to pay for it and pay taxes and they don’t know how to save their money and preserve this. They are paying taxes for this and are thinking about this direction. It’s very difficult to say because there are local ecological problems that we may speak of specifically, but we also try to show people how global problems are connected to their lives, their local problems. For example, we sponsor local projects connected to climate.

On the last point, Yulia shifted subjects and offered no further evidence. Ecoclearinghouse’s website, both as of the time of this interview and in mid-2012, offers evidence of three local projects connected to climate in 2007, while as of mid-2012 one additional event is noted from mid-2010. It thus should be noted that at the very least, these local projects were not of great enough interest to present on the organization’s website.
To summarize, the notion that sophisticated outreach, marketing and PR would advance voluntarism, particularly voluntarism with NGOs, in Ukraine seems at best only a partial approach to boost voluntarism. Indubitably, the evidence suggests that ample opportunities exist for groups to expand their outreach efforts, including by jumping scales to draw on international experience. In particular, making opportunities more interactive (both in terms of the activities themselves and in terms of decision making), actively recruiting beyond personal networks of employees, and, especially, emphasizing local relatability have been reported as successful by various groups. However, yet again it seems that the structure of NGO funding, project execution and scalar focus in Ukraine has made volunteer recruitment, and less intensive forms of engagement, a secondary objective at best for many organizations. Thus, in many cases volunteer recruitment and assertive outreach is something that is not pursued at all, or is pursued only halfheartedly even when participants are aware of the weaknesses in their outreach efforts and have some background in new techniques that might be adopted.

**Civic education to bridge the “enthusiasm gap”?**

In contrast to more general public outreach, projects with Ukrainian school and university students to educate on specific issues and/or encourage voluntarism are rhetorically and demonstrably important across groups. Of ten NGOs or social movements for which operations were discussed in detail in research interviews for this thesis, eight had one or more specific objectives related to working with students and could demonstrate work in this sphere. This interest cuts across every subcategorization – NGO vs. USM, international vs. local origin, grant recipient vs. self-/unfunded, and “sector” of interest (i.e. environmental, anti-corruption, health, etc.). Civic education in the form of independent training of adults with already demonstrated interest was similarly prominent. Furthermore, civic education, especially including service
activities and especially in the general educational system, has been shown to be vital in inculcating a culture of voluntarism in international studies (United Nations Volunteers 2010). More practical varieties in particular support the ethos of an independent civil society desired by many donors, as “trainings are supposed to enable participants to develop the qualities that donor organizations deem necessary for citizens’ empowerment: positive thinking, self-reliance, initiative, individuality, and a positive self-image” (Phillips 2008, 92). Finally, approaching the issue from the most basic behavioral considerations, nothing is more effective in inculcating particular practices than to teach them while young and/or impressionable.

Most participants noted some combination of two key traits that must be included in educational approaches to achieve perceived success: sustainability and local relatability. Claire, who has worked and volunteered in NGOs in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states for over a decade, emphasizes the importance of sustainability after seeing one-off projects that fizzled:

You’ve thrown people into the pool with a little life preserver, said, ‘Okay, we’re going to teach you how to swim.’ Then, after they paddle around in the pool for a while, you take the life preserver away and assume that somehow they’ve learned to swim.

Claire’s work is particularly close to this subject, as she manages projects that seek to provide students appropriate education and preparation for exchanges between postsocialist Europe and the US. Her programs offer regular, guided instruction as well as encouragement to use her organization’s ample variety of independent sources and study tools.

Similarly, Nataliya began her volunteer experience with a group that cultivated volunteers’ skills in their relevant field and civil society more broadly, which created a cyclical effect with sustaining that particular group’s volunteer efforts:

Well, organizations exist where volunteers are absolutely vital. I very much like the organization I started in, Vote Ukraine, where volunteers were constantly working. They were doing treyningy [more practical or skill-based training
programs], obucheniya [more theoretical, academic or methodological training programs]. It was a program where people would come, study practical matters, learn to organize effectively. They could learn how to send knowledge to different cities, how to convert their knowledge to other places. It was functionally a school to learn how to work with social organizations. For instance, ‘how do I work with different organizations, I don’t know.’ I know examples [of other groups] where people just sat around, didn’t learn to work, weren’t really doing anything. I luckily fell into this [more active organization].

Local relatability, both in demonstrating local relevance and in adapting approaches to Ukraine, comes up in the context of both failures and successes. Phillips, for example, discusses how weakly organizations concerned with gender have attempted to interact and incorporate their outreach within local conceptions of gender, often alienating or confusing participants (2008). Ukrainian-American NGO director Sofia, in turn, emphasizes that she tries to inculcate voluntarism through local pride, common values between the US and Ukraine and a plea to Ukrainian self-empowerment, stating:

You explain to them that this is your country, this is your city, or this is your school, whatever, and this is why it’s important to volunteer…. If you have to work hard in the United States to make yourself a good life, you have to work hard here to make a good life. If you have to stop at a red light there, you have to do the same thing here. So there are a lot of things that people, stereotypes believed in the past, they’re finally realizing that it really is up to them to build their own country, etc. I think that the rule of the NGOs is becoming more important in terms of changing the mindset.

As discussed in greater detail above (see page 95), movement Green Action’s activities are largely based around education, with particular emphasis on school students. Some of these works are one-offs, like their daylong programs teaching school students about water issues, but even here they have typically tried to maintain contact. Others, like their work with the Water Information Centre (see Figure 4, page 96), are largely a one-off for the group but are intended to be long-term and hopefully reach a large audience.
Reform, as may already be implicitly apparent, has made cultivation of local voluntarism and training part of its key mission, which employee Maksym and the NGO call “citizenship engineering.” The national structure of the NGO is based in a tandem between regional offices (and their local initiatives) and the Kyiv headquarters (compiling, coordinating and producing major strategic decisions). This allows the organization to provide training to and in turn benefit from the activities of new movements, some of which have since registered as NGOs. In this regard, active engagement is grown from the seeds of local interests that the educational efforts cultivated.

Maksym himself was originally a volunteer in a student group fighting corruption and bribery at his university that sought organizational knowledge and guidance on gaining media attention through Reform. From there, Maksym – a computer programming and information systems major – became a volunteer in Reform projects, then an employee in the regional office, and finally an employee in the capital hub. He applies his university education to assist Reform and other local groups with websites and IT issues while also teaching the skills he has across civil society and information technology to new volunteers.

In turn, Maksym recruits new volunteers from Reform’s training efforts and projects, including those bringing new skills to the table:

For example, I had a volunteer on [the project to save historic theatre] Zhovten’ of my age that works in an architectural bureau. If we have a new project on architecture in Kyiv, I’ll take her not even as a volunteer but as a volunteer manager because she knows me quite well and she is interested.

Reform also practices what they preach internally, seeking the advice of similar organizations from across Europe to cultivate their own skills. At the time of our interview, Reform employees and volunteers were training with experienced Polish activists in how to
approach projects to preserve and nurture threatened cultural infrastructure (both physical spaces and more abstract values).

**Voluntarism is assumed to be valuable, should be promoted, and is currently promoted poorly**

Three beliefs emerge across the case studies above. First, voluntarism is assumed to be valuable in some way (predominantly to the development of society). No participants, even those who express little personal experience or interest in volunteering, presented any doubt of this. Some had more concrete reasons, other less. While the origins of this assumption in themselves would be worth further study, the simplest explanation seems to be that some form of service to the community, a kernel or lead to voluntarism, has been promoted at least on a superficial level by the Soviet government, the post-independence Ukrainian administrations, a broad swatch of influential social groups (including secular and international civil society groups, religious organizations, the military, etc.), and the perceptions of North American and Western European societies that many Ukrainians believe should be emulated to one degree or another. A notion, often quite fuzzy, emerges that voluntarism benefits society (thereby making the individual a better citizen) and the self. Note that even when specific practices of or causes for voluntarism are discouraged – particularly by governments (local to national) against opposition-friendly elements – the general concept of voluntarism remains privileged.

Secondly, voluntarism should be promoted, for the same reasons – or lack of clear reasons – for which voluntarism is given value. Expanding on this, voluntarism should be promoted particularly among the young, who are more impressionable, may provide more of a boost to voluntarism through their longer lifespans ahead and may influence subsequent generations.
Lastly, contemporary promotion of voluntarism is perceived as weak, though the reasons for this and potential solutions are scattershot. Groups and individuals should hew more to Ukrainian issues and/or forms of voluntarism popular or traditional in Ukraine. On the other hand, they should import more expertise from models of voluntarism abroad, including those promoted by overarching civil society organizations. Perhaps, they should import these models but adapt them to the Ukrainian context. Alternatively, all of the above should be employed. While the exact approach is debated, the need to fill a deficit seems indubitable.
VII: Conclusions

Revision of research questions and summary

In this thesis, I have sought to provide answers to the following three primary questions:

1. Why are measured levels of voluntarism in Ukraine significantly below those of most North American and Western European, postsocialist European, and other post-authoritarian settings?

2. What factors guide individuals on whether or not to volunteer? As a corollary, how do these factors relate to the practices of civil society groups?

3. How are internationally framed expectations of voluntarism and civil society fulfilled or transformed on the regional and local scales in Ukraine?

In chapter II, “The scalar circus of organizational registration, funding, and legislation,” I set the stage to answer these questions by discussing how Ukrainian law mandates fixed, recurring bureaucratic procedures and costs for registered NGOs. These costs and procedures in turn lead to additional costs – some official, some de facto while being unofficial – thus forcing NGOs to pursue revenues to survive, let alone thrive. In a state where philanthropy is culturally unusual and legally difficult, this forces NGOs to look elsewhere for funding, away from topics that attract interest in voluntarism.

In chapter III, “NGOs as service providers to international funders,” I elaborated on how NGOs are formed or transformed to fulfill the needs of donor organizations, predominantly international, that set particular objectives. These objectives tend to be globally or nationally oriented, and thus NGOs often lose sight of local concerns, were they ever concerned with such in the first place. In the most extreme cases, NGOs derisively dubbed hrantozheri, or grant-gobblers, are seen to abandon the theoretical service aspect of civil society work in favor of a de...
facto for-profit model reliant on grant-offering clients. As research participants continually cited local concerns as the key attribute driving voluntarism, this disconnection between NGOs’ international and potential volunteers’ local focuses is the key factor found in the research on why Ukrainians have low rates of measured, i.e. institutional, voluntarism, a reason that neatly compliments the lack of generalized trust typically hypothesized in the literature as both reflect that potential volunteers do not see NGOs as representing their best interests. I also examined the somewhat silent or at times absent role of the state in the relationships between potential volunteers, NGOs and funders, framing the relationships within a broader sense of the practices of government that suggests the exchanges between potential volunteers and the international civil society community are ultimately as important or more important to understanding Ukrainian rates of institutional voluntarism as are relationships with the state.

In chapter IV, “Unregistered movements offer alternative to the international focus,” I explored the USMs that have emerged as an alternative to NGOs as spaces and actors for voluntarism. These groups fill the gap of work on local issues left by the state, local NGOs and international donor organizations. As they are unregistered and have not usually been the focus of research on their memberships and practices, their voluntarism is poorly and inconsistently accounted for, or even outright hidden, from usual metrics, suggesting that the statistics on Ukrainian voluntarism in fact miss voluntary practices that fail to fit the parameters of the previous research and/or available datasets. Furthermore, USMs’ focus on the local and their clear relationships drawn between global concerns and local effects provide a connection to local volunteers that the NGOs typically lack. However, USM activities are limited by their legally penniless status.
I followed up on these relative strengths and weaknesses of NGOs and USMs in chapter V, “Innovations to subvert limitations for NGOs and movements alike.” Herein, I discussed how groups innovate effective and convenient solutions around the restrictions placed on them by the state and their material deficits, with particular emphasis on how movements trade local labor and knowledge for funding and expertise from international civil society communities. I then provided three case studies of different approaches to innovations and jumping scales, including Reform’s careful cooperation with volunteers on local issues, the individual consultancies found by Green Action volunteers, and the particularly roundabout techniques used by Past Preservation participants to fund emergency needs.

Finally, in chapter VI I move slightly away from the theme of local importance to discuss which groups are or are not using outreach, public relations, marketing and civic education to encourage voluntarism. Most interestingly, voluntarism emerges more strongly here as an inherently privileged concept or even ideal, with many participants providing fuzzy explanations at best for why they ascribe such societal or personal value to voluntary practices. Herein, participants also most frequently but also inconsistently leap back and forth between privileging practices promoted by the international civil society versus the broad national or local context, relatability to national/local issues and nascent national/local practices.

**Broader implications**

Overall, the interview data suggest measured voluntarism lags in Ukraine compared to peers due to the poor relatability of NGOs’ global or overly abstract objectives to potential volunteers’ local, lived experiences. Though it cannot be proven definitively with the given data, it also appears that voluntarism measures for Ukraine would be markedly higher were unaccounted forms of voluntarism, particularly voluntarism with USMs, better incorporated in
the data collection. This may in part indicate why the CSI and WVS data on Ukrainian voluntarism is so vastly mismatched between general voluntarism (admittedly, an amorphous concept generally that translates poorly across different countries’ versions of surveys), on which Ukraine scores over a huge range from being a leader among postsocialist states to near the bottom, and voluntarism specifically within an organization (see Table 1 on page 21), wherein Ukraine consistently rests among the laggards. Additionally, participants agree that civil society groups, in particular NGOs, could improve their outreach methods to improve rates of voluntarism, especially in terms of connecting projects to relatable, local experience. Outreach approaches grounded in local cultural values and ordinary activities, and avoiding ethnocentric or neocolonial understanding of “teaching volunteerism” to local people, have been successful in other parts of the world and the former Soviet Union (United Nations Volunteers 2010). At the same time, incorporating and adapting outreach practices from the international civil society community is also encouraged. However, regardless of the outreach issue, NGOs are often not compelled to attract volunteers under present relationships between donor organizations and NGOs, so to some extent the point is moot.

Additionally, the Ukrainian legal regime covering NGOs and social movements has proven overly rigid and outdated, neither anticipating the full developments in the sector since passage nor providing anything near ideal legislation, i.e. a balance between adequate safety precautions on behalf of the state to protect the social welfare while providing leeway and rights for civil society groups to benefit society positively. While the gap between legal text and interpretation is always present, the sheer number of workarounds and subversions indicate that the personalized-public here has blossomed in to a full “shadow civil society,” leaving the state behind simply to complete basic projects. However, interviews indicate that the state may not be
ready or willing to pursue such reforms. Additionally, the interviews demonstrate that NGOs and USMs often have complementary strengths, and further collaborations, perhaps along the lines of the model set by Reform, could be beneficial to their causes, whether within or prior to a program of regulatory reform.

Theoretically, the key point to emerge from the research is that perceptions and constructions of scale inform and influence individuals’ decisions, in this case as expressed by participants’ attitudes toward the local versus global in decisions of how to expend their time. This feature runs contrary to the “anti-scale” movement in the literature. For instance, Marston, et. al. (2005) would have us reject scale wholeheartedly due to the many inadequacies the concept provides ontologically and epistemologically, amounting to the fact that the definition of either vertical or horizontal scales now fails to represent the complexities of our research. However, while defined scales may be increasingly harried in terms of their value as a frame for research, scale is still and will continue to be a vital attribute to the reporting and understanding of news and world affairs among the broad public and elites – scale matters for perception, and perceptions influence decisions.

Scale continues to matter because the production of and perceptions of scale have been used to produce the systems of regulatory practices that affect everyday life – for purposes of this thesis, the relationships between registered nongovernmental organizations, unregistered social movements and potential volunteers in Ukraine. Even if defined scales were to be judged ontologically vapid or unknowable in academic circles, the production and perception of scale – never separated processes – will continue to inform the construction and execution of practices in everyday society. Multilateral international agreements define foreign development aid and its subsequent requirements for distribution within states, Ukrainian state laws define when and how
organizations may receive funding from sources internal and external to the state’s grasp, individuals and agencies of regional governments choose whether to hasten or hinder organizations’ activities, and reactions by actors within NGOs and unregistered movements to these systems of regulation affect whether individuals will decide to volunteer with particular groups. For these very reasons, it would be a sign of tremendous shortsightedness to excise a concept that can be vital to representing participants’ views of the world.

Scale has also helped individuals to conceptualize, understand and manipulate networks (see Cox 1998; Howitt 2003). The processes of interaction and interpretation, and the regulatory regimes and perceived scales with which they engage, shape how potential volunteers choose to relate to other individuals and groups, with ripple effects down the line along each relationship. While “global” may be an attribute that bonds and implies similarities between USAID and WWF\textsuperscript{11}, as well as suggesting a relatively small distance of social involvement within a wider “international community” of development organizations, these organizations are still related – by communication, by funding flows (or the lack thereof), by personal relationships among volunteers and employees – to epistemologically more “distant,” local USM Green Action or local NGO New Dawn Fund.

Drawing these threads together, the literary focus on NGOs as the base unit of civil society coupled with the scalar focus of many registered NGOs in Ukraine away from their local surroundings also raises the question of a lack of awareness or even hypocrisy in the civil society literature. Tocqueville’s secondary associations traditionally are composed of concerned citizens and mediate between the citizens and the state (2000 [1840]). Even if we were to adapt “the state” in this usage to include the myriad agents of power suggested by a focus on the practices

\textsuperscript{11} Acronyms purposefully emphasized, comparison purely for illustrative purposes
of government and a world where traditional political sovereignty has been amended by globalization and international law, these organizations still fail the call as they are, regardless of any judgment of “doing good” or “building capacity” for “civil society,” beholden to the international grant market. Rather, USMs – emergent from a group of concerned citizens, mediating between individuals and the actors of government, generally guided by an at least non-economic or communally economic goal rather than individual profit – are closer by functional definition to the sought after secondary associations, and should they need to be more thoroughly acknowledged and accounted for in the literature, both in theory and statistical collection.

**Suggested avenues for further research**

First and foremost, this research could and should be expanded by a survey or surveys to properly account for the voluntarism that occurs in Ukrainian social movements. Though it is beyond the scope of this research, I suspect that the same could be said for the rest of postsocialist Europe as well. The simple catch-all questions in the WVS and CSI, while useful, are not adequate and should not be used to infer the relationship as other, unknown variables could also be at play. Ideally, such a survey would be prepared after preliminary qualitative discussions and testing to consider whether appropriate questions have been found. On a similar vein, long-term participant observation of two Ukrainian NGOs – one emphasizing voluntarism and possibly cooperation with social movements, one not – could vastly broaden and deepen our understanding of the processes of voluntarism beyond the law books and press releases that I have only briefly interrogated here, and also strengthen the type of surveys mentioned above.

Furthermore, two additional categories of response were given repeatedly by participants as to why they and other Ukrainians do or do not volunteer, and these perspectives should also be explored thoroughly. First, participants stated that they or their peers do not feel they can afford
the loss of time required to volunteer. This seems to be a corollary of the shift in focus to individual labor for one’s own wage in an economic environment that has frequently failed to provide ample opportunity for labor, and thus income, as participants or their peers reported that they needed to devote maximum labor time to earning wages. On the other hand, participants reported that they or their peers felt socially and culturally exempt from individual responsibility to strive for change due to the perceived ineffectiveness of all organizations in the country (including government and civil society organizations) and/or a narrative of Ukrainian, Russian, or Soviet “peoples” as preventing or having prevented any possibility of fruitful change, driving a fatalism that change cannot occur. Were this thesis a dissertation, for instance, I would expand on these themes, likely tied together by governmentality, narratives of postsocialist transition to neoliberal capitalism, nationalism, and possibly social psychology.
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Appendix 1: Methodological approach

Contrary to most prior studies on the subject of voluntarism or civic engagement in the literature on Ukraine, this research is based in qualitative fieldwork methods. Specifically, the research was conducted via open-ended and semi-structured ethnographic interviews, as well as participant observation of organizational events, to find explanations of the lagging state of voluntarism from those directly and personally involved daily with the processes and practices of voluntarism in local Ukrainian settings.

Selection of methodology

Qualitative fieldwork methods were chosen to bridge perceived gaps in the previous research, specifically an overreliance upon theoretical constructions of the societal role and practice of voluntarism based on Western, primarily American, case studies drawn from traditions of Tocquevillian thought. This research instead draws out practices, processes, discourses and values regarding voluntarism that privilege locally situated explanations of multiscalar phenomena rather than directing responses into predetermined categories based on case studies from other geographic contexts.

This qualitative fieldwork approach is not, however, intended to provide final answers to the research questions investigated, either for Ukraine or other postsocialist states. Rather, as previous studies have been unable to explain the perceived underdevelopment of voluntarism convincingly, this methodology is intended to open up the hidden everyday knowledge and practices of involved parties (Dunn 2004; Schoenberger 1991). As discussed further in the section on research implications on page 134, I hope that the outcomes of this methodological approach have provided starting points for longer-term qualitative work emphasizing lived experience and prolonged participant observation, approaches that have been said to have been
too little used in human geography, (cf. Crang 2002, 2005; Dunn 2007; Jackson 1993). Additionally, I have aspired to provide context-specific understanding that will improve the construction of survey questions and enrich quantitative analyses on the topic in later research.

**Modified Spradley-McCurdy interview method**

In the construction, execution and analysis of interviews and participation observation, I employed a modified form of the ethnographic methods employed by David McCurdy and James Spradley (McCurdy, Spradley, and Shandy 2005; Spradley 1979, 1980; Spradley and McCurdy 1972). While systematized interview methodology has become increasingly passé in ethnographic work, this method is useful for composing open-ended questions with a specific intent of eliciting natural responses, rather than responses based on the researcher’s preconceived expectations. Additionally, the method employs a framework based in ethnosemantic coding for key terms and relationships that can be applied to facilitate analysis of diverse sources, such as individual interviews, planned and unanticipated instances of participant observation, and print media.

**Ambiguity and structure**

The so-called Spradley-McCurdy method, especially in earlier renditions (Spradley 1979, 1980; Spradley and McCurdy 1972), has been and should be critiqued for employing an overly structuralist interpretation of how humanity thinks and organizes society. The latest edition has begun to account for this by discussing exactly these limitations of the method (McCurdy, Spradley, and Shandy 2005). In my research, I have used the prescribed ethnosemantic analytical technique as a beginning guide to interpretation of interviews and field observations, but have also tried to account for multiple and contrasting layers of connections, contradictions, ambiguities of meaning and unclear conceptual borders that often arise from ethnographic work.
(Wolford 2006). For those already familiar with the method, this will be apparent from the decreased emphasis on simpler presentations of relationships (“domain analysis” and “taxonomy”) and an increased emphasis on more complex, multi-layered analyses (“componential analysis” and “paradigms”) (McCurdy, Spradley, and Shandy 2005) as well as full-text descriptions of relationships. Furthermore, I have attempted to represent conflicting and ambiguous information from participants throughout the text with greater emphasis than has been traditionally the case under this technique, both to clarify points and because ambiguity itself can provide insight into unexpected nuances (Schoenberger 1991).

Additionally, while the Spradley-McCurdy method calls for an almost entirely open-ended approach to composing questions during interviews based on initial responses, I instead used a semi-structured interview template (see Appendices 2 and Appendix 3) that combined a set collection of questions with room for fluidly incorporating unplanned follow-up inquiries. First and foremost, this change is meant to elicit responses to common questions and themes from participants while still ensuring the adaptability necessary to follow unexpected paths of investigation. Additionally, the questionnaire approach allowed me to work with native Russian speakers to craft questions in near-native language, which I found to be critically valuable for employing the ethnosemantic approach in a foreign language. Providing an initial interview template also met the one of the ethical requirements of the University of Colorado’s Institutional Review Board. Despite the move away from a purely open-ended and adaptive approach, the interview template itself follows the general guidelines of the traditional Spradley-McCurdy technique, moving from open, descriptive questions to more refined, detailed questions for clarification and comparison.
Analytical process

Analysis of interviews and field notes followed a seven-step process modified from Creswell (2009) and Spradley (1979):

1. Organizing and preparing recordings and notes for analysis (transcribing, compiling and matching to field notes, etc.);
2. Reviewing all available data for initial broad themes, both while conducting full-time fieldwork and upon returning to the university;
3. Coding data to draw out more tacit details and themes;
4. Describing categories and themes in the data;
5. Detailing nuances and ambiguities pulled from the exposed themes;
6. Interpreting the data through participants’ expressed knowledge and previous academic literature; and
7. Finding new questions and avenues for further research.

Reliability and ethics in framing expectations of power, class, nationality and gender

While deconstructions of the researcher’s role in terms of power, class, nationality, gender roles and relations, etc., are not a prevailing theme of this thesis, it should be noted that these social constructions play latent and open, tacit and expressed roles in affecting fieldwork. As most NGOs in Ukraine are heavily dependent on funding from international organizations (Palyvoda and Golota 2010), exposure through Western research can greatly aid or hinder both their causes and grant revenues. Less legally formalized social movements can also benefit from or even be legitimated by research interest, both domestic and foreign. The power dynamics between an American, male researcher and Ukrainian participants, both women and men, may be loaded by a host of discourses and historiographies of the post-Soviet experience between the
two cultures – gender differences in income and educational attainment, perceptions of Americans based on previous individual experience or media exposure, etc. – that are vast and not always possible to anticipate prior to an interview (see Hrycak 2001, 2006, 2009; Phillips 2008; Wanner 1998 for a variety of viewpoints on these issues). In all cases, I have attempted to consider how these factors may have influenced my interactions with participants and their statements, approaching these factors with an open mind and critical analysis, aware that this situation is hardly unique or new to fieldwork (see McDowell 2001; Till 2001). As relevant, I have cross-checked information with multiple participants, secondary sources and/or other field researchers, including discussion thereof as appropriate.

In order to protect the privacy and well-being of my research participants, I have used pseudonyms for both them and their relevant organizations in accordance with disciplinary ethical standards for ethnographic research (Statement of professional ethics; Code of Ethics of the American Anthropological Association). The use of pseudonyms and nondisclosure of personally identifiable information should not be viewed as a mere formality, as the shifting and unclear status of civil rights in the post-Orange era in Ukraine suggests participant protections are more warranted now than ever before. Exceptions to the use of pseudonyms at the request of participants who are already known public figures have been noted in the text. The use of pseudonyms helps with reliability as well by reducing expectations of publicity resultant from the research. As previously mentioned, the ethical protocols have been approved by the University of Colorado Institutional Review Board (protocol #0609.30).

**Incorporating Ukrainian participants’ linguistic preferences into the methodology**

Matters of language carry heavy political, social and economic tension in post-Soviet Ukraine, especially between self-identified Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking
Ukrainians and ethnic Russians (Bilaniuk 2005; cf. Phillips 2008; Wanner 1998). As discussed in more historical and contemporary political terms in Chapter I, the choice of language (or, more often, languages) in a conversation takes on marked political and ethnic undertones. As such, the choice of language and the explanation thereof were often critical to establishing a baseline of rapport and trust in the research.

As detailed in Chapter I, nearly all interviews and observations for this research were conducted in Kyiv. As the primate city of a country with a conflicted, at times ambiguous and thoroughly politicized linguistic history, the choice of language in Kyiv often requires nuance and swift adjustability.

Officially, Kyiv is predominately Ukrainian-speaking, with 92.3% claiming Ukrainian as their mother tongue in the last census (All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001 2001). However, that figure is questionable in applied terms – the question asks about mother tongue, not language used in public, everyday settings – and possible political/national influence on responses. In practice, Kyiv retains a Soviet legacy of use of Russian in daily conversation to the extent that use of “clean Ukrainian” in vernacular settings often elicits surprise (or, with foreigners, bemusement). Furthermore, Kyiv, like other large Ukrainian cities, retains a long legacy of embraced multilingualism that has since been promoted by both dominant political factions as a boon for the country in the wider world economy (Bilaniuk 2005).

As such, most interviews were conducted in Russian, while blending into Ukrainian when speaking of official documents or government actions. Other interviews were conducted in English, either due to a participant’s personal preference or the use of English as the strongest shared language between the participant and me. Finally, a small minority of interviews were conducted in a combination of Ukrainian, Russian and English, often jokingly dubbed by
participants as *amerykanskyi surzhyk*, a dubious blend of the three languages (for a full explanation of the nuances of surzhyk, foreign-flavored and otherwise, see Bilaniuk 2005). In all cases, I attempted to respect the language preference of the participants to the greatest degree possible, appreciative of broader political-linguistic context and the impressions made by honoring local expectations for language (Gade 2001; Veeck 2001).

In turn, Lviv is often treated as the crèche of modern Ukrainian, a reputation enthusiastically embraced and encouraged in the city. Taking advice from a wide variety of Lvivans, Kyivans and foreigners with more experience in the city, I used primarily English and Ukrainian in research here.

**Summary of participants and sampling**

In-depth interviews were conducted with 23 persons, including organization directors, employees and volunteers; volunteers in unregistered groups; and individuals who expressed utterly no desire to participate in either NGOs or unregistered groups. While most participants were Ukrainian by citizenship and self-identification, four participants were Western Europeans or Americans with long-term involvement in the Ukrainian NGO or movement communities and have been identified as such in the text. Nearly all interviews were recorded.

Participants were chosen through a combination of cold-calling and a simple snowball method. Cold calls and e-mails were placed to specifically targeted individuals (directors and/or volunteer coordinators) found on organization/movement websites and in NGO directories. Additional participants were then found by soliciting recommendations and introductions from earlier participants’ social networks to find relevant potential interviewees whose names would have been unlikely to appear in public sources, such as volunteers, former volunteers, and part-time or freelance NGO employees. As volunteers – especially those involved with USMs – and
other NGO participants with less than full-time status are unlikely to be listed on open
documents, not to mention that they represent a relatively small minority of the population of
Ukraine, these methods were the most logical and practical in order to find relevant participants.
Additionally, finding participants through personal introductions along social networks is
typically far more effective in terms of eliciting responses than cold contacts in postsocialist
European, especially post-Soviet, settings. Other participants were found through unrelated
acquaintances in order to solicit participation from people completely unassociated with
voluntarism and diversify the participant pool away from a complete bias toward individuals
entrenched in voluntarism-related environments.

Reliance upon a narrow range of participants connected by social networks is commonly
considered by statisticians to introduce bias into research. However, as the focus of the research
remains on those with the most intimate knowledge of voluntarism in Ukraine – an often hidden
population of people involved in organizations/movements with volunteer involvement – rather
than the broad, general population sample studied in other work (for example, the World Values
Survey2009), random selection would be neither insightful nor appropriate. That said, the use of
cold-calling and conscious triangulation of response data along known social networks was
intended in part to orient the research toward the knowledge of general NGO and movement
communities rather than a narrower range defined by participants’ personal relationships, as
recommended in some mixed and qualitative methods literature (Creswell 2009).

**Initial focus on environmental organizations, broadened to other voluntary spheres**

When originally conceptualizing and planning the logistics of this research, I had
intended to focus only on environmental groups for two reasons. First, Ukraine has a
pronounced history of environmental activism catalyzed in the late socialist era around the
Chernobyl nuclear disaster and its aftermath. The disaster and its effects have been tied to
growth in Ukrainian resistance to the Soviet Union and skepticism of post-Soviet administrations
on environmental grounds, as well as less politicized forms of environmental awareness (Petryna
2002; Wanner 1998). While not unique among postsocialist states – Hungary in particular has
had a vibrant and influential environmental movement (see Harper 2006) – the environmentalist
sphere presented a fertile point of entry to investigate Ukrainian voluntarism. Secondly, I chose
to focus on environmental groups specifically in an attempt not to become exclusively mired in
the residual effects of the 2004 Orange Revolution. While the Orange Revolution is
unquestionably vital to this research and recurs throughout the text, the research questions
pertain to broader trends and values (or lack thereof) of voluntarism in which the activism
leading up to and resultant from the Revolution plays a part, but is by no means the entire story.
While voluntarism in Ukraine has generally been understudied, the study of Orange and related
activism has been exhaustive (see Kaskiv, Chupryna, and Zolotariov 2007; Kulick 2006; Kuzio
2006).

However, initial fieldwork quickly suggested that this approach was flawed. The bonds
between the environmentalist sphere and other sectors of civil society also led to rather few
environmental groups in fact being exclusively committed to environmental causes. Few
research participants were exclusively concerned or involved with environmentalist groups, as
most instead had been involved with a host of different causes with environmentalism as a
current subject of particular interest, or one of several spheres in which they were actively
engaged. Furthermore, a large number of encountered groups with little stated interest in
environmental causes were in fact engaging in work on a variety of environmental topics. For
example, the USM Save Old Kyiv (Zberezhny Staryi Kyiv) openly conducts protests against the
destruction of Kyiv’s nature parks, both independently and with varying levels of open cooperation with environmental groups, such as in ongoing protests against the replacement of Borschahivka Park with a new church for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (*Save Old Kyiv - Borschahivka* 2010). These connections between environmentalism and other idealist frameworks, such as democratization, historic preservation, etc., are by no means unique to Ukraine. However, in terms of this research and methodology, the social networks of the research participants and the broader structural ties within the civil society communities led to a natural broadening of focus, ultimately resulting in approximately one-third of participants self-identifying with environmental causes, movements and organizations, while the others are involved primarily in other spheres.
Appendix 2: Interview question bank – English

The following interview question bank, as approved under HRC protocol #0609.30, was used for English-language semi-structured interviews.

**NGO function/structure/management**

1. How would you describe your organization, generally speaking?
2. How do you describe the mission of your organization?
3. How do you view your role within the organization and your part in fulfilling your organization’s mission?
4. Why do you work in/with this organization?

5. How does your organization work with the public, if you do?
6. Do you try to educate the public regarding your organization’s goals?
   a. If so, how?
   b. Why is this (not) important?
7. Do members of the public volunteer with this organization? If so, how?
8. Is voluntarism important to your organization? How?
   a. Number/percentage of labor hours?
   b. Number of active volunteers?
   c. Percentage of active volunteers, infrequent volunteers, employees?
9. Do members of the public provide contributions to your organization?
   a. If so, what extent of your funding comes from small donations?
   b. What extent comes from large private donations?

10. Generally speaking, where does the funding for your organization come from?
    a. [leading] From the government, from international organizations, from private individuals, etc.?
    b. What do your funding organizations ask in return for funds?
    c. How do you fulfill these requests?
    d. When fulfilling donors’ requests, do they provide any guidance as to how they want you to proceed?
    e. Do you adapt your donors’ instructions to the particular environment of Kyiv (etc.) in any way?
    f. Do your donors ask you to incorporate the public in your work? If so, how?

11. What role does the government/state play in your work?
    a. Local government? Regional government? National government?
b. Regarding non-governmental funding organizations, do the government’s and the donors’ goals work together? Do you ever have to resolve differences between the two?
c. Does the government in any way encourage you to work with the public? If so, how?

Environment

12. In Ukraine, how do you rate environmental problems in comparison to other issues?
13. Does your opinion change looking specifically at Kyiv? Or Europe? Or the world?
14. What environmental problems do you see as the most critical? Are you aware of work being done to solve these problems?
15. How do you relate these issues to local social needs? To countrywide social needs in Ukraine?
16. Is the environment a daily concern for you, personally? How?
17. Do you think people in society more generally are concerned about environmental problems? How? Why or why not?
18. How does this organization relate to these problems? Are they working to fix these problems? If so, how?
19. Why do you (not) care about environmental problems?

Civic engagement

20. Why did you choose (not) to become involved in an environmental organization? Why do you care about these issues?
21. How are you involved in this organization?
22. How prevalent or visible are volunteers in this organization?
   a. How many hours of labor are performed by volunteers, in total and as a percentage of the organization’s labor?
23. In your opinion, are volunteers broadly involved in environmental organizations in Ukraine? How/why?
24. Should people become more involved, in your opinion?
25. Why are people (not) involved?
26. Is voluntarism important to you? Why or why not?
27. Is voluntarism valued in society here? How/why?
28. Should voluntarism be (more/less) valued? What role do you think it plays in society? How/why?

Scale

29. What are the most important local environmental problems, in your opinion? What are the most important broader environmental needs, in Ukraine, in Europe, in the world?
30. In your opinion, is the organization you work with involved in solving local problems and meeting local needs?
   a. Are other organizations doing so?
   b. Is this important for you?
31. Do you see any connections between these local and broader issues?
32. In your understanding, how do environmental organizations form here in Ukraine?
   a. How do they decide their projects? Who guides these decisions?
   b. In your understanding, how do these organizations receive funding to work?
   c. How do you describe the process between funding and choosing projects? Which step is first – finding funding, or choosing a project?
   d. How does the government fit in?
   e. What relationships do you see between environmental organizations, local communities, funding organizations and the state? [Use diagram? Card sort? Add a point for “the environment”?]

Additional questions for former volunteers

33. Why did you stop volunteering with this organization?
34. Do you currently volunteer at any other organizations? Have you done so in the past? Why?
Appendix 3: Interview question bank – Russian

The following interview question bank, as approved under IRB protocol #0609.30, was used for Russian-language semi-structured interviews.

**НПО функция / Структура / Управление**

1. Как бы Вы в общем описали свою организацию?
2. Как бы Вы описали миссию своей организации?
3. Как Вы понимаете свою роль в организации и в выполнении ее миссии?
4. Почему Вы работаете (в / с) этой организацией?

5. Ваша организация работает с общественностью? Как?
6. Вы стараетесь донести до населения цели вашей организации?
   a. Как?
   b. Почему это (не) важно?
7. Представители общественности стают волонтерами этой организации? Как?
8. Волонтерская деятельность важна для организации? Как?
   a. Сколько процентов труда в организации делается волонтерами?
   b. Сколько волонтеров в организации? Из них сколько активных?
   c. Сколько процентов делают 1) сотрудники, 2) активные или частые волонтеры, 3) неактивные или редкие волонтеры?
9. Представители общественности дают взносы на организацию?
   a. (ДА) Сколько процентов финансирования приходится на маленькие взносы?
   b. (ДА) Сколько процентов финансирования приходится на большие частные взносы?

10. Вкратце, каким образом финансируется организация?
   a. [leading question] Государством, международными организациями, частными людьми, и так далее?
   b. Что финансирующие вас организации просят в обмен на средства?
   c. Вы выполняете эти просьбы? Как?
   d. После выполнения просьб доноров, они предоставляют вам какие-либо указания относительно дальнейшей деятельности?
   e. Вы каким-то образом адаптируете инструкции ваших доноров к конкретной среде Киева (и т.д.)?
   f. Ваши доноры просят Вас включать общественность в вашу работу? Как?

11. Какую роль играет (правительство / государство) на вашей работе?
   a. Местное руководство? Региональное руководство? Государственное правительство?
b. Сходятся ли цели и желания руководства и доноров? Если нет, приходится ли Вам решать эту проблему?
c. Руководство просит Вас работать с населением? Как?

Окружающая среда
12. Как вы оцениваете экологические проблемы в сравнении с другими проблемами в Украине?
13. А в Киеве? В Европе? В мире?
14. По Вашему мнению, какие экологические проблемы самые серьезные?
   a. Что вы знаете о работе по решению этих проблем?
15. Как эти проблемы связаны с местными социальными потребностями? С общенародными социальными потребностями в Украине?
16. Вы думаете о экологических проблемах каждый день? Почему?
17. По вашему, люди в обществе переживают об экологических проблемах? Как?
   Почему?
18. Какой вклад вашей организации в решение экологических проблем?
19. Почему Вы (не) переживаете о экологических проблемах?

Деятельность волонтеров
20. Почему Вы стали сотрудничать с этой организацией?
21. Как Вы понимаете свою роль в организации?
22. Насколько распространенными в организации являются волонтеры?
23. По Вашему мнению, волонтеры часто задействованы в экологических организациях? Как?
24. Должны ли люди принимать более активное участие в организациях?
25. Почему люди (не) активны?
26. Важна ли для Вас волонтерская деятельность? Почему?
27. Волонтерская деятельность ценится в украинском обществе? Как ее оценивают, и почему так происходит?
28. На Ваш взгляд, волонтерская деятельность должна цениться больше или меньше? Как Вы считаете, какую роль она играет в обществе? По возможности, поясните свой ответ

Масштаб
29. Каковы наиболее важные местные экологические проблемы, на ваш взгляд? Каковы наиболее важные крупномасштабные экологические проблемы, в Украине, в Европе, в мире?
30. По Вашему помогает ли организация решать местные проблемы?
   a. Другие организации помогают?
   b. Важно ли для Вас решение местных проблем?
31. Видите ли Вы какие-либо связи между этими местными и более широкими вопросами?
32. Согласно Вашему пониманию, как экологические организации создавались тут в Украине?
a. Как они выбирают проекты? Кто рекомендует эти проекты?
b. Как, по-вашему, эти организации получают финансирование?
c. Как связаны выбор проектов и получения финансирования? Что происходит в первую очередь?
d. Какие отношения вы видите между природоохранными организациями, местными общинами, финансовыми организациями и государством? [Use diagram? Card sort? Add a point for “the environment”?]

Дополнительные вопросы для бывших волонтеров

33. Почему вы прекратили волонтерскую деятельность с вашей организацией?
34. Вы в настоящее время являетесь волонтером в любой другой организации? Почему вы раньше этим занимались?